The Duality of Hezbollah

The crossroads of armed struggle and local community development

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Abstract

The Duality of Hezbollah: the crossroads of armed struggle and local community development

By Shaheen Sajan

Abstract: Contrasting Hezbollah’s local community development projects and campaign for political struggle, this study seeks to understand if supposed terrorist organizations can function as successful community development organizations in their home locales. Research for this topic involved over a dozen first-hand interviews with Hezbollah officials to understand how Hezbollah operates from a development standpoint. Our approach to local community development incorporates the provision of coping mechanisms with addressing the underlying structural causes of marginalization. We find high stocks of social capital account for the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of Hezbollah’s social service network, which combined with its political activities, increase space for popular participation on macro level issues. Standing at the crossroads of local community development and armed struggle, Hezbollah reveals the need to avoid separating organizations that engage in advocacy from those that engage in development work, recognizing in many contexts, dual role organizations are the only enduring way forward.

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Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION................................................................. 1
  1.1 General Introduction .......................................................... 1
  1.2 Study overview and problematic........................................... 2
  1.3 Study Rationale .................................................................... 2
    1.3.1 Gaps in existing literature .............................................. 2
    1.3.2 Importance of this study .................................................. 4
    1.3.3 Motivation for research .................................................... 4
  1.4 Questions this study seeks to answer ...................................... 5
  1.5 Methodology ........................................................................ 6
  1.6 Thesis Structure ................................................................... 8
  1.7 Summary of Findings ............................................................. 8

CHAPTER 2: LANDSCAPE OF THE DEBATE ......................................... 9
  2.1 What is 'Development'? .......................................................... 10
    2.1.1 Mainstream Development ................................................. 10
    2.1.2 Alternative Development ................................................ 12
  2.2 Perspectives on local community development ....................... 13
    2.2.1 What is a 'Community'? ..................................................... 13
    2.2.2 What is 'Local Community Development'? ....................... 16
  2.3 Operationalizing local community development ..................... 19
    2.3.1 Building Social Capital .................................................... 19
    2.3.2 Participatory Development ................................................. 24
    2.3.3 Decentralizing Power ......................................................... 27
    2.3.4 Empowerment .................................................................. 28
  2.4 Acting locally, thinking globally: local community development and
      the structural environment ..................................................... 29
    2.4.1 Exploring Structure and Agency ........................................ 30
  2.5 Aligning local struggles with social movements: the role of local
      culture and the socio-political context ................................... 39
  2.6 Landscape of the debate on the Middle East: issues and debate .... 47
    2.6.1 Political-community movements in conflict zones in the global south. 47
    2.6.2 Political-community movements in conflict zones in the Middle East . 48

CHAPTER 3 CASE STUDY DATA: NASRULLAH IS ONE OF US ............ 54
  3.1 Background on Lebanon ......................................................... 54
  3.2 Background on Hezbollah and the Local Community ................. 63
    3.2.1 What is Hezbollah? ......................................................... 63
    3.2.2 Terrorists, War Criminals or Resistance Fighters? .............. 64
    3.2.3 Does Hezbollah reflect local norms and values? ................. 68
    3.2.4 How does Hezbollah know if it is addressing community priorities?... 73
  3.3 Local Definitions of Community Development ......................... 77
    3.3.1 How is community defined in the local context? ................ 77
4.9 Local community development and the implications of external support

4.10 The existence of dual-role development organizations

4.11 Is it a contradiction to simultaneously engage in armed struggle and provide social services?

4.12 What do our findings mean for local community development?

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

APPENDIX A: FIELD RESEARCH QUESTIONS

APPENDIX B: TABLE OF SOCIAL SERVICES

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chapter 1 Introduction

"It is wrong to expect a reward for your struggles. The reward is the act of struggle itself, not what you win. Even though you can't expect to defeat the absurdity of the world, you must make that attempt. That's morality, that's art. That's life."

- Phil Ochs

1.1 General Introduction

In 1985, the Lebanese movement Hezbollah, emerged onto the world scene, transforming a historically neglected and marginalized community into a powerful political force. Like many movements born in the twentieth century such as the ANC, the Zapatista, the IRA, the Sandinistas, Hamas and the Ikhwanul Muslimeen, Hezbollah became known for its social service network, filling a gap in government services, while also engaging in armed struggle. The question arises; can supposed terrorist organizations in fact function as successful community development organizations in their home locales? Our research will focus on the social services provided by Hezbollah in those regions under its de facto control. This study explores the viability and popularity of current forms of Hezbollah’s community development initiatives and places this in relation to their political struggle in order to understand the complex relationship between Hezbollah’s political ambitions and its social capital formation and direct delivery of needed services at the local level. From this understanding we hope to derive a number of principles which may be applied to other parts of the developing world where armed political struggle and community development appear to go hand in hand, such as Tamil Nadu, Aceh Province, and similar regions. This study presents an initial exploration of a very complex topic and serves a first step to initiate discussion on the subject. Further research should be conducted involving the community who contribute to Hezbollah or are affected by its activities.
1.2 Study overview and problematic

This study explores the relationship between Hezbollah’s local community development projects and its campaign for political struggle, seeking to answer the following problematic, is Hezbollah a terrorist organization or is it a local community development organization? Our study draws on the theory of social capital formation to understand how a marginalized community can create its own social service network and whether a local community organization can alter the structures that lie at the root of their marginalization while simultaneously ensuring their community’s day-to-day needs are met.

As Hezbollah provides a wide range of social services, it would be difficult to sufficiently study the full breadth of their activities in a meaningful way. For the purpose of this study, only a snapshot of Hezbollah’s undertakings are researched, with a focus on Hezbollah’s agricultural, environmental, reconstruction, medical and physical rehabilitation projects, all of which are considered in relationship to Hezbollah’s broader political pursuits.

1.3 Study Rationale

1.3.1 Gaps in existing literature

Both, mainstream development and alternative development theorists have contributed substantially to the body of knowledge on local community development. The mainstream development paradigm fuses a comprehensive structural adjustment program with exogenously-conceived local community development projects. The alternative development perspective argues local community development should begin
with communities setting the development agenda, a vision largely criticized for failing to address macro-level, structural development issues. Some alternative development theorists urge local community development organizations to align themselves with broader social movements capable of addressing the structural and systemic causes of their marginalization. However, the literature remains very vague on what such a relationship would entail and how local organizations may ensure their issues transcend to the national level and ultimately, alter the structural environment.

Significant gaps also appear in the literature on Hezbollah, particularly in the English language, where works generally focus on Hezbollah’s political struggle. Discussions about Hezbollah’s social service network tend to only go as far as providing a summary of services provided by the organization. Some studies such as Na’im Qassem’s, *Hezbollah: Inside Politics*, provide further details such as which sectarian communities access Hezbollah’s social services and Judith Palmer Harik’s, *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism*, has also discussed the quality of services provided. Souhad Kahil’s, *Does God Have a Party? Rhetorical Examination of Hezbollah*, provides a unique perspective, studying Hezbollah as a cultural phenomenon rather than a political one (Kahil, 2007:9). In the wake of the July 2006 war, some articles in the mainstream media did explore the impact of these social services on the community’s broader goals and priorities. The more analytical works theorized the end goal of these services is to increase support for armed activities, however, the academic literature has not addressed this relationship in a systematic manner. The literature has also not explored how Hezbollah, which emerged from a historically neglected and marginalized community, acquired the capacity to provide a host of social programs including interest-free loans,
infrastructure development, consulting services, health awareness campaigns, a 24-hour news channel, a radio station, scouts leagues, schools, hospitals, recreational facilities, restaurants and construction companies among many other service areas.

1.3.2 Importance of this study

This study attempts to fill existing gaps in the literature by approaching local community development theory in a manner that incorporates the provision of coping mechanisms with addressing the underlying structural causes of marginalization. This is achieved by combining a comprehensive review of community development theory with literature on structure-agency and social movement theory in our analysis of Hezbollah’s activities.

While previous studies have been largely descriptive in their discussion of Hezbollah’s social service activities, this study digs deeper, exploring how Hezbollah logistically operationalizes its social service network and what role social capital plays in this regard. As well, when gathering data on Hezbollah, this study looks at the role of the movement’s three wings: the political; the military; and, the social service wing in a holistic fashion, applying a community development perspective that assesses the impact of the movement’s three arms on the community’s overall development.

1.3.3 Motivation for research

After the July 2006 war, Hezbollah rose to new heights in notoriety on the Arab street, in the western press and in Lebanon itself. In 2006, Hezbollah was one of the ten most commonly searched items on Google’s internet search engine (Oliveira 2006), indicating people the world over were curious to learn more about this movement that on
the one hand, bears arms including an arsenal of anti-tank munitions and long-range zilzal rockets and on the other hand, runs kindergartens, hospitals and farmers markets. As the current research typically approaches Hezbollah with a political frame, the motivation for this study was to learn more about how the organization operates from a development perspective.

Financial support for Hezbollah’s social service activities is banned in three countries: Canada, the US and Israel. Hezbollah is frequently described as either a movement of freedom fighters or a group of terrorists. In light of the fluidity with which such labels can be applied, this study challenges how far local community development advocates and practitioners are willing to support or condone local community development initiatives that may clash with their own values, views or policies. This study may also provide further clarity on whether the ban on the social service wing is warranted or whether it should be further adopted by the European Union and other bodies debating the matter. The findings may in turn influence how global citizens would lobby their governments on this issue, particularly if having an effective policy in the Middle East either entails dealing with influential, local organizations or the converse, refusing to sit at the same table as such groups.

1.4 Questions this study seeks to answer

This study seeks to understand how Hezbollah rose from a history of marginalization to establish such a comprehensive social service network. When armed movements are involved in social service delivery, a number of questions emerge: What motivates these movements to provide coping mechanism’s while engaging in political
struggle and how are they able to transcend the state’s role in this regard? Does this strategy present a way forward in international development studies or a way to prolong the status quo of a state of conflict? Does the provision of coping mechanisms reduce the impetus to alter structures, or can a local community development organization use its agency to impact the surrounding structural environment? Finally, are advocates of local community development willing to support local practices that may clash with their own norms, values or ideals?

1.5 Methodology

This study was conducted through first-hand interviews with Hezbollah’s operatives. All respondents were contacted using a snowball sample. This non-probability method was useful in extracting the very specific sample characteristic desired for the research project (Babbie 2007: 193). Desired respondents had to either have expertise on social services available in south Lebanon or on social services provided by Hezbollah. As such, qualified respondents included representatives of UN agencies providing services in Lebanon, think tanks or NGOs with regional specialization, the administrators of Hezbollah’s social services and the organization’s political leadership. This process of snowball sampling continued until cases no longer yielded new information and the sample had become saturated. A qualitative methodology was employed to increase the researchers understanding of the social and cultural contexts within which Hezbollah operates (Kaplan & Maxwell, 1994). The snowball methodology also helped take into account the social environment related to the subject of study (Coleman, 1970:118).
All interviews used open-ended questions, to ensure the questions were 
“...unobtrusive, accepting and non-judgemental...(Chaitin, pg. 1150).” Open-ended 
questions also ensured the respondents had greater control over the interview process to 
discuss aspects of the research that are important to them and on issues that the researcher 
may not have even been aware of. At the same time, all questions were standardized, 
facilitating the corroboration of evidence. Appendix A, contains a list of all interview 
questions asked.

The research was conducted in the Middle East and commenced in 2007 and was 
completed in 2 months. A total of 19 interviews were conducted. While some 
respondents spoke English or French as a second language, most interviews were 
conducted in Arabic, the mother tongue of the respondents and a translator was present at 
all interviews. All data was recorded into fieldbooks, which are organized 
chronologically by date. When two interviews were conducted in a single day, they are 
further classified by morning and afternoon.

No focus groups were held and the number of people present during each 
interview was kept to a minimum in order to minimize power relations that emerge in 
group discussions and to maximize the confidentiality of all respondents. In order to 
further protect the privacy of all respondents, the names and gender of respondents are 
kept confidential as well as the town or city in which the respondents work. One 
limitation in this methodology is that the respondents were in leadership positions and no 
recipients of Hezbollah’s social services were interviewed. Such interviews with service 
recipients would have proved useful in further corroborating the data, but will have to 
wait for subsequent research. This thesis is intended as an initiative pointing in the
direction of future, detailed research on Hezbollah.

1.6 Thesis Structure

Chapter 2 provides a landscape of the debate on local community development. This discussion begins by comparing the meaning of common yet elusive concepts in the local community development lexicon including ‘community’, ‘local community development’, ‘social capital’, ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’. A framework is then created that incorporates structural and local community development theories into a single approach. Chapter 3 presents the data obtained on Hezbollah and the results of the interviews. Chapter 4 analyzes the data in relation to the theories discussed in the landscape of the debate. Chapter 5 presents a summary of conclusions, recommendations, and the implications of the research for local community development.

1.7 Summary of Findings

This study finds high stocks of social capital account for the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of Hezbollah’s social service network. The findings suggest that Hezbollah has contributed significantly to transforming a depressed, deprived and neglected community into a people with great pride in their local identity, and that rather than taking away attention from structural issues, Hezbollah’s social services, combined with its political activities, increase space for popular participation on macro level issues and participatory development.
Chapter 2 Landscape of the Debate

"Then that suffering that united us made us speak, and we recognized that in our words, there was trust, we knew that not only pain and suffering lived in our tongue, we recognized that there is hope still in our hearts... [A]nd we were new again, and the dead, our dead, saw that we were new again and they called us again, to dignity, to struggle."

- Zapatista Army of National Liberation, communiqué

Chapter two presents a landscape of the debate on local community development. First, we review relevant development paradigms. Second, the discussion asks, what is a 'community' and what is 'local community development?' Third, we compare the relevance of social capital, participation, decentralization and empowerment in operationalizing local community development. Fourth, a summary of the structure-agency debate provides insight into the implications of local community development while a comparison of bridging social capital, political space and social movement theory asks if alternative development can address day-to-day local development issues while simultaneously altering the broader structural environment contributing to the community's marginalization. Fifth, we explore the tension between international opinion and locally appropriate initiatives that risk access to international development assistance. Finally, we consider the role of local community and political movements in social service delivery in conflict zones in the global south in general and in the Middle East in particular.

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2.1 What is ‘Development’?

This chapter begins by asking, what is development and how did it surface? The discussion then contrasts the emergence of two major tendencies in the discourse, mainstream development and alternative development, exploring their guiding principles and their impact or contributions on the lives of people in the global south.

In a bid to limit the spread of the socialist revolution that had been winning hearts and minds in many parts of the globe, US President Harry Truman pledged foreign aid to help ‘third world’ countries prosper. It was at that point the term ‘development’ was coined. International development studies has since been characterized by grand theories offering standardized planning from above, ignoring local priorities and imposing an exogenous vision on unique communities (Rahman, 1993:213; Won-Jeong, 1995:330; Brohman, 1996:325). These grand theories encompassed the laissez faire paradigms of modernization, liberalism and neoliberalism on the right side of the spectrum and structuralism, Marxism, neo-Marxism and, political economy perspectives on the left. The alternative development perspective distanced itself from such grand theories, arguing development should be endogenous and should be a reflection of local priorities (Won-Jeong, 1995:330).

2.1.1 Mainstream Development

During the Cold War, mainstream development was championed under the modernization paradigm and later replaced by the neoliberal paradigm, marking the era of the globalization of capitalism. The laissez faire paradigms tend to exhibit neo-colonial characteristics; ensuring development aid guarantees the donors with access to
raw materials, cheap labour and abundant markets throughout the Global South. For the purpose of this study, the modernization, liberal and neoliberal paradigms will be referred to as mainstream development.

Mainstream development subscribes to the positivist understanding that development is measurable through economic indicators. Escobar argues when the World Bank made per capita income an indicator of poverty and wealth in 1948, drawing the poverty line at a per capita income of $100, two thirds of the world's population were suddenly labelled 'poor' (as cited in Brock, Cornwall & Gaventa, 2001:9). Anisur Rahman (1993:136, 203) adds this in no way reflected how this two thirds of the world defined itself as only the 'rich' label others 'poor' based on their material standards, with no acknowledgement of the richness of their culture, values and collective endeavours to move forward.

Arundhati Roy, Henry Veltmeyer, James Petras, Della Porta and Diani argue mainstream development has achieved little in terms of development for the global south. According to the 1999 UN Human Development Report, per capita income in the global south had dropped lower than what it was in 1989 (Della Porta & Diani, 2006:39). Veltmeyer and Petras (2000:9) add inequality has increased starkly since that time. According to Forbes magazine, in 2004, the combined wealth of the world's 587 billionaires stood at 1.9 trillion dollars, exceeding the gross domestic product of the world's 135 poorest countries combined. At the same time, since 2003, the number of billionaires increased by 111 (Roy, 2004:23-24).
2.1.2 Alternative Development

Veltmeyer and Petras (2000:20, 209) describe alternative development as a third way forward that attempts to avoid the limitations of previous paradigms. While the narrow worldview of post modernization neglected the interconnectedness of the world, the grand theories did not reflect the diversity that exists across the globe, nor did they result in development reaching the masses. Meanwhile, the deterministic perspective of political economy disempowered communities through their ominous warnings that as globalization advances, communities are denied a voice in influencing socio-economic policies affecting their daily lives. It was in this context of disillusionment the alternative development paradigm emerged.

In 1974, a conference organized by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation publicly announced the idea of Another Development, or Alternative Development, which two decades later became a clearly articulated movement (Veltmeyer, 2001a:47). Ho Won-Jeong and John Brohman explain alternative development recognizes communities are diverse and complex meaning development cannot be universally pre-determined. In order for strategies to be relevant, a community’s historical context as well as its local values should inform its unique process of social change (Won-Jeong, 1995:330; Brohman, 1996:325, 327). Veltmeyer and Petras (2000:21-23) add, not only are communities conceived of as the beneficiaries of the development process but community-based organizations are the agents that make the development process happen. Veltmeyer (2001c:2-3) adds development should be a heterogeneous experience. Veltmeyer, Petras and Brohman caution alternative development is ultimately limited in its inability to bring about structural change and alter systems that lie at the
root cause of a community’s marginalization. Instead, its community-based projects tend to be restricted to the micro-level of development, focusing on survival and the implementation of coping mechanisms (Brohman, 1996: 347-348; Veltmeyer & Petras, 2000:23-24). They add, until such macro level change is attained, this paradigm is far from presenting an alternative development model (Veltmeyer & Petras, 2000:1, 35).

2.2 Perspectives on local community development

This section seeks to develop a common understanding of what constitutes a community and what qualities a community might bring to the development process. It also explores whether communities are geographically based or value-based, homogenous or diverse, conflict-ridden or driven by cooperation and static or constantly evolving.

2.2.1 What is a ‘Community’?

Veltmeyer categorized current understandings of community into two camps. The first camp portrays the community as a homogeneous arena that conceals class divisions and exploitation. It also conveys a notion of community as a paradise lost that was forever altered due to the effects of colonialism and modernization. The second camp sees community as a place of resistance to imperialism and capitalist exploitation and a path to alternative development (Veltmeyer, 2001c:27; O’Malley, 2001:206).

While Stanley Hyland suggests a community can be quite sizeable, describing it as larger than the family unit and smaller than the state (Hyland, 2005:4), Veltmeyer suggests communities are small in size, adding the community should not be defined too broadly to include any type of social organization (Veltmeyer, 2001b:35).
Theorists such as Gallaher, Padfield, Nigeria Iseyin, Bolanle Wahab, Michael Kaufman and Haroldo Dilla Alfonso suggest a community has a shared geographic locale and community members have a shared origin (Gallaher & Padfield 1980; Iseyin & Wahab, 1996:58; Kaufman & Alfonso, 1997:8). Carl Moore (as cited in Hyland et al., 2005:4-5) similarly describes a community as a place of shared language, values and identity with some form of permanent membership. Jim Ife (1997:168) also describes ones personal identity as closely connected to the communities they identify with.

Veltmeyer (2001b:35) raises the pertinent question, if identity and mutuality are the underpinning of community, then what distinguishes a community from any other type of social organization? Writing in German, Ferdinand Tönnies’ 1963 treatise (as cited in Veltmeyer, 2001c:27) distinguishes between community (Gemeinschaft) and society (Gesellschaft). The former refers to mutual obligation related to an organic sense of identity, while the latter refers to a rational, voluntary association based on common interest and a mutual understanding of convenience. Susanne Keller (2003:8) argues communities should not be analyzed in terms of what makes them exclusive but in terms of their dynamism and the way in which a community has evolved, making a community’s context key to any analysis. Veltmeyer (2001a:63; 2001b:27, 41) agrees communities are not homogenous, exotic locales nor are they stagnant or encapsulated in time.

Veltmeyer (2001a:63; 2001b:27, 41) adds even where there is a shared sense of origin, communities are intensely diverse and so consumed by class struggles, power and conflict they are barely communities in a real sense and by name only. He raises the question, if communities are so stratified along class lines, then how can a development
project represent the interests of all and if not, then how do we know which segment of a community is being represented? Writing from a mainstream development perspective, the UN body, the Economic and Social Council of West Asia (ESCWA) agree community development needs to be aware of power relations at the local level as communities are not homogenous entities (ECSWA 2004:4). In contrast, also writing from a mainstream development perspective, Iseyin and Wahab (1996:58) argue that as a community has a shared experience and roots and a shared sense of purpose, this creates a basis for cooperation and not conflict. Claire Dorsner (2004:368) balances the two perspectives, arguing communities are places of varying power relations and social structures, and are thus characterized by both cooperation and conflict.

Communities have layers, some of these layers are geographically confined whereby a town is a community, some are broader, whereby a town can have several communities. While the literature suggests a community cannot refer to a value system that has no geographic connection, it remains quite conceivable for individuals and communities to simultaneously have membership to various levels of identity, yet neither of these communities are homogeneous or conflict free. The question remains, do these diverse communities and layers of communities work in cooperation for the common interest or are they in constant conflict, and do they advance community development while resisting exploitation and domination or do they replicate the exploitation intrinsic in the capitalist system? This will be discussed further in the section on social capital.
2.2.2 What is 'Local Community Development'?

Mae Shaw aptly summarizes the elusive nature of local community development, a concept she says can readily reflect a neo-colonial approach or conversely, a grassroots ideology. Shaw (2006) adds the difference is entirely dependent on which paradigm is framing the discussion. This section first seeks to define local community development, second, it asks, what type of development is desirable from a local community development perspective and third, what role does priority identification play in the development process?

What is Local Community Development?

In alternative development, the terms 'local community development', 'community-based development' (Veltmeyer & O'Malley ed., 2001) and 'people-centred development' (Carner & Korten, 1984:201) have been used inter-changeably to advocate for local communities driving the development process. In contrast, in mainstream development, the terms 'community development', 'local community development' and 'community-driven development' are used inter-changeably to denote top-down development in which day-to-day administrative tasks are decentralized to the local community but major policy directives are centralized at the top. Anthropologists have also contributed to the understanding of local community development, reflecting a post-modernist perspective that the local community should develop without looking externally for ideas and in a manner that reflects local context and culture.

Local community development typically involves the provision of coping mechanisms, or the delivery of social services by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's), a welfare state or by local communities. The objective is to ensure day-to-day
survival needs are taken care of or to enable self-sufficiency rather than seeking to alter the underlying structural environment. Coping mechanisms can include a range of projects such as micro credit, school fee subsidies and vocational training.

**What kind of development is desirable?**

If community development is driven at the local level, then the first question to consider is who determines what kind of development is desirable? Is it something that can be universalized or does development mean different things in different contexts?

Wakefield (2005) describes three approaches to community development. The first involves a social planning approach in which external ‘experts’ drive the process. The second is a local community development approach in which community members participate in identifying their own development priorities in a romanticized notion of community as a homogenous group that moves forward collectively. The third is a social action approach in which communities seek to alter underlying power structures while also seeking to improve service delivery to their communities.

Iseyin and Wahab (1996:62) suggest community development involves social and economic development. According to writers from an alternative development perspective, local community development could include areas as broad as cultural, political and where relevant, spiritual development. George Carner and David Korten (1984:201), give economics little priority over other facets, arguing the creative capital of people, is the most significant development resource in the development process. In Michael Kaufman and Haroldo Dilla Alfonso’s (1997:10) study of housing communities in Latin America, they state development should be based on the local community’s expression of their holistic set of needs, which transcends economic and social factors to
include cultural and spiritual needs. Ife (1997:132, 133) concurs, adding environmental development and spiritual development should also be part of the framework as in many cultures, the latter is considered a prerequisite to all other types of development. Rahnema (1992:126) similarly describes the spiritual dimension as an astounding catalyst of astute and creative forms of collective mobilization.

**Identifying development priorities**

According to the alternative development perspective, the development process should begin with the identification of priorities by the local community. Given the intensely diverse nature of communities, the process by which community priorities are determined is widely debated in the literature. This is discussed in further detail under the section on participatory development.

In mainstream development, the process of priority identification is replaced by a needs-based approach. Eliud Ngunjiri (1998:466-467) describes this as an inherently disempowering starting position that not only obliges communities to self-identify as deprived, negatively impacting the community’s self-esteem, but it also leads the community to believe they do in fact need external aid and guidance. Ife (1997:66, 68) initially rejects the needs-based approach for taking away attention from the underlying political nature of an issue but later suggests empowerment requires people to be able to define their own needs with the assistance of external facilitators and experts such as researchers and planners.

According to the mainstream development paradigm, the primary goal is predetermined to be social and economic development and it is understood that priorities may be identified externally. According to the alternative development perspective,
development priorities are identified locally. The question remains, how is local community development operationalized?

2.3 Operationalizing local community development

This section explores perspectives in the literature on how community members are involved in the identification and implementation of community development programs. Social capital, participation and empowerment are common concepts arising in the literature on local community development; this section will explore how these concepts are defined.

2.3.1 Building Social Capital

Giles and Stokke (2000:258) describe social capital as an integral aspect of local community development. Wakefield (2005) adds, social capital’s ability to enable communities to work together to resolve collective problems, makes it both a means to community development as well as a product of it. Our discussion on social capital first contrasts individualist and collectivist definitions of social capital, exploring if social capital is a resource available to all, or if it is more accessible to the already privileged. Second, we consider the elusive nature of social capital, asking, can it serve as a facilitator of corruption, or is it exclusively a promoter of moral values? Third, we ask, does social capital promote cooperation and pursuit of the collective good and if so, at what cost?

Collectivist and individualist definitions of social capital

Alan Warde, Gindo Tampubolon and Mike Savage describe two significant schools of thought in the social capital camp. The first reflects a collectivist perspective,
advanced by theorists such as Robert Putnam, James Coleman and Francis Fukuyama
who argue social capital is a product of trust, cooperation and solidarity mobilized for the
collective good (as cited in Warde, Tampubolon and Savage, 2005:403). In contrast,
Meyerson (1994, 383-399), Frans Schuurman (2003, 994), Stanton-Salazar and
Dornbusch (2003, 116-135) and Bourdieu (1987), Burt (1992) and Lin (2001) (as cited in
Warde et al., 2005:403) argue the purpose of social capital is to use one’s social
connections for personal benefit. Whether it serves the individual or the collective
interest, the question remains, who benefits from social capital? Is it a resource available
to all, or is it more accessible to the already privileged?

Mainstream development theorists in both the collectivist and individualist social
capital camp, hail social capital as a means to drive development by lowering transaction
costs. This pro-market approach is shared by John Roskam (2003:30) who argues the
state system is ineffective and inefficient in service delivery and weakens social capital
and the volunteer sector by placing too many controls on the free market. The World
Bank describes social capital as the ‘missing link’ between markets and government
and the Economist (2003) have described social capital as a stock that increases trust in
communities, enabling people to work together more efficiently, saving money on
transaction costs, contracts and lawyer fees.

In contrast, Wakefield (2005) criticizes Putnam’s influential work for altering
social capital from a perspective that highlights uneven power relations into a theory that
ultimately justifies the retrenchment of the state. Bourdieu (1987), Stack (1974), Foley,
Edwards (1999) and Cleaver (2005) represent a critical perspective, arguing social capital
is an inaccessible resource for a community’s marginalized segments. While Putnam (2000) describes networking in formal organizations such as little league or at the gym as a means to build social capital, Foley and Edwards (1999: 141–173) argue such opportunities are generally restricted to those who have money. Stack says social capital puts undue strain on the already marginalized by pressuring them to share their extra resources with the community whenever required rather than putting them into savings. Cleaver (2005) found the potential for social capital was lowest for the chronically poor as they have less time to participate in community events and make bonds of social capital with community members. This was confirmed by Robert Wuthnow’s (2002:670) review of data from the 2000 Religion and Politics Survey in the US, which affirmed people of lower incomes were less likely to volunteer.

*A facilitator of corruption?*

If social capital facilitates free-market transactions, but is not accessible by all, the question arises, can social capital serve as a facilitator of corruption, or is it exclusively a promoter of moral values? Benjamin Fine (2002:796) charges social capital is used so elusively and broadly that it can mean anything from the social networks in the mafia or prisons to those in a church or a faith-based community. In Scott Morrison’s study of social capital in Sudan, he finds there are low levels of trust in the government but high levels of trust within small, exclusive groups. Scott Morrison (2001:125, 126) argues these groups form corruption rings, depleting the states legitimacy. Morrison concludes the state should play a greater role in providing social services to reduce corruption and maintain its sense of legitimacy.
In contrast, Fukuyama (2005) describes social capital as shared moral values that create the expectation of honest behaviour amongst community members. Coleman (as cited in Healy, 2004:12) adds that social capital helps reduce corruption as the resulting bonds of social ties ensure if anyone misuses resources, then everybody in the community would come to know. If social capital can facilitate corruption or shared moral values, the question arises, does it facilitate community cooperation or exacerbate intra-community conflict?

**Do communities work in cooperation or remain in conflict?**

As communities have been described in the literature by several theorists as intense places of conflict, this section explores whether social capital promotes cooperation and pursuit of the collective good. Tom Healy (2004:12, 13) explores why people work together when they may reap greater benefit by acting for themselves. Healy describes the notion of reciprocity as a central component of social capital that ensures community members do to others as they hope they would do for them. Based on the findings of a 1999 survey of rural communities in Iowa, Vernon Ryan, Kerry Agnitsch, Zhao Lijun and Rehan Mullick (2005:287, 310) find while formal volunteering has an expectation of reciprocity, informal volunteering such as helping a neighbour, is solely aimed towards increasing the collective good. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (as cited in The Economist, 2003) conclude the existence of social capital and the desire of an individual to assist others with no expectation of reciprocity means human nature is intrinsically good. This conclusion is supported by Ryan et al. (2005:288) who provides the example of a study conducted in Detroit where people volunteered because they felt no one else would do it. Rahman (1980:85, 86) suggests in collectivist societies,
individuals experience fulfillment through serving the collective interest, concluding it
would be inconceivable to serve ones individual interests at the expense of others.
Fukuyama (2000:98-111) cautions rather than bonds of trust emerging from this process
of reciprocity, community members participate in this collective show of good will to
guard their reputations. Habermas (as cited in Wakefield, 2005) also warns in its
emphasis on collective good will, social capital prevents alternative voices from
emerging.

Arthur Brooks (2003:41, 42) conducted a national survey in 2000 to measure the
link between volunteering, charitable donations and religiosity. In total, 30,000 surveys
were filled across 50 communities, finding that religious people were 25% more likely to
donate money than secularists (91% to 66%). The study also found religious people were
23% more likely to volunteer their time than secularists (67% to 44%). These findings
were consistent regardless of which religion it was, leading Brooks to conclude there are
greater levels of social capital in religious communities (Brooks, 2003:50). The study
also found ‘the poor’ are more likely than the middle class to give charitable donations
and to give more frequently as well as larger proportion of their income and that they
gave on par with the extreme wealthy. Similarly, Gerry Veenstra (2002:549, 556, 561-
562) conducted a study of volunteerism in the province of Saskatchewan, Canada, to
identify contributors to trust. Veenstra obtained 534 surveys from randomly selected
participants across eight districts, finding trust was highest amongst religious people,
older people and in rural communities.

Social capital has the potential to operationalize local community development,
yet it remains debatable whether it is a resource more accessible to the wealthy or if it
benefits the marginalized as well. It is also debatable whether it facilitates the collective
good or serves the individual interest. These issues will be explored further in the context
of Hezbollah and its ability to inspire the local community to operationalize the
development process.

2.3.2 Participatory Development

Participatory development has grown into a key catchphrase in the development
lexicon, originating in grassroots circles as an affront to exploitive powers and later being
co-opted by mainstream development. This section first contrasts alternative and
mainstream understandings of participation. Second, we ask, how is participation
achieved and third, we ask, who decides who participates?

Participation emerged as a key concept in development theory in the 1950s to
explain why the majority of development projects were failing (Rahnema, 1992:117). Veltmeyer
(2001c:13) views participation as a means to transform systems. Dorsner
(2004:360) explains the goal of participation is to shift power to the poor. Kaufman and
Alfonso (1997:7, 8) describe participation as both a process and an end goal. As a
process, it is a way for communities to strengthen their voice and to get organized while
the end goal is to achieve a society where there is no class-based exploitation. In either
case, social justice is a prerequisite. Caterina Ruggeri Laderchi adds participation was
initially a politically charged affront to the discourse of mainstream development
(Laderchi, p.3).

Nancy Cosway and Steve Anankum (1996:89) explain in the mainstream
development perspective, it was initially considered more efficient to plan outside the
community as the community was perceived to lack relevant knowledge or skills. Jean-Philippe Platteau and Anita Abraham (2002:104) suggest the local level is generally ineffective in furthering their community’s development. In the 1970s, participation began to gain prominence in mainstream development circles as it became equated with project efficiency and project success (Brock, et al., 2001:12; Veltmeyer, 2001c:13; Laderchi, p.3). Majid Rahnema argues as the term was co-opted by mainstream development, it ironically began to be used with directly contrasting aims. Rahnema (1992:120) explains, mainstream development uses it to keep the status quo intact, while from an alternative development perspective, participation is viewed as a means to challenge the status quo by transforming systems.

A wide range of perspectives exist on how participation should be achieved and how communities may be involved in planning the course of their development. According to Jason Ben-Meir (2004:5, 45), communities need external facilitators who can help to identify local priorities. In contrast, Rahnema (1990:203) explains the key is for the agenda to be identified by participants in an organic fashion. Rahnema (1992:123, 152) argues any type of external intervention causes power dynamics to tip in favour of the external party, which rarely seeks to learn from the local community and instead, de-values local traditions, while imposing their own values and perspectives of change, creating a feeling the local community cannot develop on its own accord. Rahnema (1992:127) endorses a French concept of animation-facilitation, providing several examples of animators from local communities that inspired grassroots action including the more well-known, Mahatma Gandhi.
Based on the perspective that communities are intensely diverse, Karen Brock, Andrea Cornwall and John Gaventa (2001:35) raise the question, how is it determined who may participate and who is excluded and how can it be known the most marginalized are being represented? Kapoor (as cited in Dorsner, 2004:368) echoes the concern that because participatory frameworks often assume communities are homogenous, they ignore internal power dynamics resulting in many groups being excluded. This concern is affirmed by Christopher Larrison and Eric Hadley-Ives (2004:55) who compared two university initiatives to send students to assist rural communities in Mexico identifying how their quality of life may be improved finding the most marginalized did not have time to participate in community projects. In contrast, Della Porta and Diani (2006:58) explain there is no direct correlation between the socioeconomic status of an individual and whether they will engage in collective action.

Participation is described as a means to operationalize development by most theorists as well as the end of goal of development by some. While mainstream and alternative perspectives debate whether participation means the agenda is identified endogenously or exogenously, one common challenge is ensuring the diverse and conflicting perspectives of community members are represented. The potential for a participatory framework to drive local community development will be further explored in the context of Hezbollah’s identification of development priorities.
2.3.3 Decentralizing Power

Decentralization is another common concept appearing in mainstream development, this section begins by exploring typologies of decentralization. We then contrast understandings of decentralization from mainstream and alternative perspectives.

John Martinussen (1997:210-212) identifies four types of decentralization, each with varying degrees of decision-making authority given by the central government to local government, public enterprises, the private sector or NGOs. Kaufman's (1997:171, 174, 179) conceptualization focuses on the type of power that is strengthened, describing three types of decentralization. The first is functional decentralization, which marks the transfer of political power, the second is municipal decentralization, which strengthens local powers increasing citizen participation and the third is neoliberal decentralization, which strengthens existing power structures.

According to Shaw (2006), decentralization is used in the mainstream, dominant discourse to mean moving responsibility to local levels while centralizing power and control. Writing from a mainstream development perspective, Mustafa Hussein (2003:277-278) argues shortcomings at the local level such as a lack of education, capacity, skills, power dynamics, weak institutions, corruption and low levels of democracy impede decentralization from increasing participation.

In contrast, Veltmeyer (2001a:58-59, 62-63) suggests decentralization has the potential to open up political space so that civil society may impact the state, thereby strengthening democracy. However, he finds decentralization is rarely practiced as such citing the example of Bolivia, where responsibility for providing social services was decentralized to the local level but effective control was still centralized at the top. While
decision-making took place at the municipal level, it was not led by traditional local organizations, limiting opportunities for social movements to challenge structures, as well as limiting the impact of participation to purely local issues. Ultimately, this negatively impacted the democratic responsiveness of the state to the concerns of local communities.

Decentralization has the potential to either distance citizens from the decision-making process or to create a space where they may affect structures more directly. In the following chapter, we will explore the impact of decentralization on local community development in the areas under Hezbollah’s de facto control.

2.3.4 Empowerment

Empowerment is used broadly in the literature and can involve communities attaining control of decision-making on local issues only when they are ‘allowed’ to do so by those with greater authority or it can mean communities must seize power in a bottom-up manner. This section first explores, what does empowerment mean from a mainstream perspective? Second, how is this position critiqued? Third, what are alternative development understandings of empowerment?

Writing from a mainstream development perspective, ESCWA (2004:2) defines community development as a process in which communities take control of their resources and decision-making affecting their local development by narrowing the information gap between community planners and development project recipients.

Kassey Garba (1999:169) critiques such mainstream approaches, describing them as exogenous strategies of empowerment that are imposed in a top-down manner. Representing an alternative development perspective, Shaw (2006) adds in such
approaches, power is given to local communities only if they make the ‘right decisions’, arguing empowerment is then used to privatize public issues and is applied as a precondition for aid rather than to increase democratic participation and social justice.

Ife (1997:56), Garba (1997:169) and Eric Shragge (1997:xiii) describe empowerment as an endogenous, bottom-up approach in which communities challenge the status quo, redistributing power from the privileged to the marginalized. Rahman (1993:219, 225) describes empowerment as an important element of the local community development process, enabling communities to devise locally conceived, creative solutions towards development. Rahnema describes endogenous development as integral to empowerment. Rahnema explains, “When A considers it essential for B to be empowered, A assumes not only that B has no power – or does not have the right kind of power – but also that A has the secret formula of a power to which B has to be initiated (Rahnema, 1992:123).” Ngunjiri (1998:466-467) suggests empowerment also means recognizing learning can happen both ways between the global north and south. Brock et al. (2001:28) caution in both bottom-up and top-down empowerment models it is likely that only local elites will be empowered rather than the ‘local poor’.

These issues will be further explored in chapter 4, through a consideration of how Hezbollah acquired power and whether it in turn retains that power or distributes it across the communities it operates in.

2.4 Acting locally, thinking globally: local community development and the structural environment

Our discussion on the impact of local community development on the structural environment is divided into two parts. The first part begins by contrasting implications
of structure and agency-based approaches. In the second part of the discussion, we explore the possibility of garnering the advantages of both an agency-based and a structural-based approach by bridging social capital, creating political space or aligning with social movements.

2.4.1 Exploring Structure and Agency

The agency-structure debate has consumed theorists in many disciplines, mirroring the free will versus pre-determination debate often waged in theocratic circles. First, we compare definitions of agency and chart its emergence. Second, we compare definitions of structures and opportunity structures, comparing perspectives on their malleability. Third, we ask, does an agency approach blame the victim for their plight and does a structuralist approach ignore the priority of communities to begin developing today?

Klaus Eder (1985:173) defines agency as the ability of a group to define or redefine norms, values, and interests. Ruth Alsop and Nina Heinsohn (2005:6-7) describe agency as the ability of people to make and implement choices while Jean Schensul (2005:220) adds these choices must be representative of the public’s will.

Roland Bleiker studied the historical emergence of agency in Europe, which he says was prominent in Ancient Greece but had fallen to obscurity in the middle Ages, an era where Bleiker says life and laws were perceived as pre-determined and God-ordained, with no space for human agency. During the same time period, the Islamic world was a centre of resistance where most scholars rejected fatalism arguing individuals are accountable for their actions and their in-actions. As early as the seventh century, the
Qur’an advised, “Allah does not change a people's lot unless they change what is in their hearts (Holy Qur’an, 13:11).” This is also emphasized by Prophet Muhammad who said, “The highest form of Jihad is to speak the truth in the face of an unjust ruler (as cited in Noorani, 2002:45).” In Europe, agency was only brought back to prominence by Étienne de la Boétie’s sixteenth-century landmark paper, Anti-One, which inspired dissent and resistance to authoritarian rule by spreading the idea that people had the ability to solve problems for themselves rather than passively living out their perceived destiny (Bleiker, 2000:26, 51, 54). La Boéte writes,

> The one who controls you so much has only two eyes, has only two hands, has only one body and has nothing more than what the large and infinite number of men in your villages have. All he has is the means that you give him to destroy you. From where does he get all these eyes to spy upon you, if you do not give them to him? How can he have so many hands to hit you with if he does not take them from you? The feet that trample down your cities, where does he get them if not from among you? How can he have any power over you except through you? (as cited in Bleiker, 2000:58)

In la Boéte’s emphasis of the agency possessed by the masses, he argues people may defeat the most unjust rulers through the mere act of refusing to consent (Bleiker, 2000:58, 60). In the lead up to the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, Dr. Ali Shariati similarly argued, individuals are not private beings as every action of every individual has the potential to create a ripple effect upon all of humanity and its intellectual maturity. Shariati rejected fatalism and determinism to the extent that he argued even the socio-political context that an individual finds themselves in is a result of their own actions or in-actions. Shariati adds the centuries of quietism and fatalism that had been consuming pockets of the Shia community was solely intended to keep the exploitive
status quo intact and had no religious merit. According to Shariati, religious merit lies in struggling against an unjust system (as cited in Rahnema & Nomani 1990:56).

Several theorists refute such an agency-laden approach. David Imbroscio (1999:46) argues structures are enduring and largely limit agency. According to Alsop and Heinsohn (2005:9), structures are influenced by social norms, values, regulations and legislation. Bob Clifford, Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald agree that structures often appear natural and unrecognizable because they are so long-lived and deeply rooted in historical circumstances but they differ on the potential to alter them.

Several theorists argue structures cannot be changed except during exceptional moments. Brand and Andrew Wyatt (Wyatt, 2004:1) describe opportunity structures as extraordinary moments of turmoil where structures become weak, the system becomes vulnerable to political challenge and agents are able to bring about change in the structural context. McAdam et al. (1996:189) describe such opportunities as beyond a movement’s control but pivotal in preventing or enabling a movement success. Piven and Cloward (as cited in Gamson & Meyer, 1996:279) argue a movement’s tactics and strategies are only secondary to the openness of a moment when determining a movement’s success, advising ‘the poor’ to wait until opportunities open.

In contrast, theorists such as William Gamson and David Meyer (1996:276) argue not only can opportunities shape or constrain a movement, but a movement can also create opportunities. Imbroscio (1999:46) similarly describes a balance, recognizing the role of structures in shaping actions that are a product of a particular context while also recognizing the ability of individual actions to shape structural contexts. Hank Johnston and John Noakes (2005:22) also find while social movements are impacted by the
political context they operate in, they describe a cyclical process in which a movements framing also impacts political opportunities.

Both neoliberal and alternative development frameworks are criticized for the limited or nonexistent role for people and communities to alter the structures that contribute to their marginalization. Local community development is often criticized for emphasizing agency to the extent that it blames the marginalized for their circumstances, shifting the onus for development onto the affected community while absolving all other parties of any responsibility (Veltmeyer & O’Malley ed., 2001). Ife (1997:170) criticizes mainstream development for implying individuals can achieve anything with enough determination and that failures to be successful are the fault of the individual for lack of trying. Anthony H. O’Malley (2001:211) argues such a perspective may be setting up communities for failure as in some cases a community can do everything in its means and use all available resources through skilled leadership and still not prosper.

Veltmeyer (2001c:6, 28) and O’Malley (2001:210) argue while development at the local level empowers people to collectively participate in bringing about change, communities are only involved in decision making for local issues rather than participating in changing global and nationwide structures. Lars Engberg-Pedersen (2002) suggests while local communities may play an active role in service delivery, the likelihood of their altering structures through political action with an impact on national, political decisions is highly restrained. Roy (2004:43) similarly critiques NGO’s for defusing political anger by taking away attention from power structures and further disconnecting communities from impacting structures. O’Malley concurs with Roy’s
contention that neither NGO’s nor grassroots organizations can impact structures, adding what is needed is a broad-based, anti-systemic social movement (O’Malley, 2001:218).

Members of the Concertación de Organismos de Desarrollo (CCOD), which consists of like-minded NGOs in Central America, signed a statement distinguishing between neoconservative NGO’s from NGO movements connected to popular groups with the former seeking to keep the structure of power intact and the latter seeking to transform the structure of power to deepen democratic representation (as cited in Macdonald, 2001:136) Laura Macdonald (2001:136) explains according to the CCOD, grassroots participation must be linked with participation in social movements to change power structures. Mae Shaw (2006) disagrees with O’Malley’s analysis, arguing endogenous community development is capable of politicizing a community’s experience. Kaufman and Alfonso (1997:11) similarly argue community organizations are very capable of empowering people to challenge power structures, providing the example of the Sandinista Defence Committees in Nicaragua, which overthrew the Somoza dictatorship, although it may be argued the Sandinistas can be considered akin with the type of social movements that Macdonald is alluding to (Macdonald, 2001:136).

While Veltmeyer and Petras (2000:24) critique the alternative development movement for over-emphasizing agency and failing to connect micro-level development to macro-level structures, Rahman (1993:194) describes structural change as a promise that ignores the priority of communities to begin developing today as individuals as well as in terms of social organization and values. Matthias Stiefel and Marshall Wolfe (1994:4) also critique such broad structural changes as being out of touch with the real struggles and aspirations of the disadvantaged in specific settings. However, Engberg-
Pedersen (2002:20) cautions against a localized perspective as not everything local is micro, various factors, such as historical circumstances cannot be controlled by locals, yet they must react to them. Merging these perspectives, Giles and Stokke suggest development happens by acting locally while thinking globally. Rather than only focusing on a populist approach to removing structural causes of marginalization, while allowing daily living standards to decline, there needs to be a more balanced approach to development. ...Resistance must be localised, regionalised and globalized at the same time (Giles & Stokke, 2000:262).

Several theorists describe social capital, political space or social movements as a connector of the micro to the macro or the local community to national and international structures. The following sections compare perspectives on the potential of each of these approaches to enable agents to influence structures.

**Bridging social capital**

This section explores a spectrum of perspectives on social capital and its ability to bridge the local to the global, with some theorists arguing social capital is the stuff that enables agents to change power structures while others argue it keeps those very structures intact. Several theorists describe social capital as a meso level theory that links several spheres and bodies of theory together adding, one of its major contributions is the connections it draws between human agency, social structure and political economy (Fox, 1996:1089-1103; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000:225-249; Bebbington, 2002:495-520; Bebbington, 2002:801; Bebbington, Guggenheim, Olson & Woolcock, 2004:39). Fine (2002:796, 798-799) critiques social capital for neutralizing dissent, but also agrees with Anthony Bebbington that social capital effectively links the micro to the meso. Presenting a cautiously optimistic perspective, Schuurman (2003:1000) describes the
potential of social capital to reconnect the social sphere with the political sphere as an ideal that is quite distant from the current reality. In this section, we ask, does social capital bring people of different backgrounds together, or does it keep privilege intact?

Putnam advances the term, bridging social capital, to describe people of different backgrounds coming together in a manner that will benefit the entire community. This notion is further explored in Robert Wuthnow’s study of the links between religiosity and the bridging of social capital in which he analyzed data from the 2000 Religion and Politics Survey in the US. Wuthnow (2002:669, 677) found social capital to be higher in religious congregations theorizing they provide a bridge between people of a lower and higher socio-economic status. Wuthnow also found people of lower incomes were less likely to volunteer but found a positive correlation between attending a religious congregation and having a friend who is a political representative.

Faranak Miraftab (2004), Schuurman (2003), Wakefield (2005) and Bebbington (2004) critique the very premise of bridging social capital suggesting it keeps privilege and uneven power structures intact. Miraftab argues it was Putnam’s contribution to social capital theory that effectively removed any discussion of class conflict from mainstream understandings of social capital, depoliticizing what was once a very charged concept (Miraftab, 2004:241). Both Tarrow (as cited in Harriss & De Renzio, 1997:928 and Bebbington et al. (2004:36-38) add rather than addressing the root cause of marginalization or factoring in the context in which a community is operating in, social capital is merely used to justify the retrenchment of the state, shifting the onus for development onto marginalized communities. Fine (2002:796, 799), an advocate of social capital also acknowledges it ignores a community’s context and socio-historical
circumstances. Schuurman (2003:998) explains, the type of social capital found in the global north is more congenial to develop capitalist economies and democratic institutions opposed to the types of social capital found in the global south. Miraftab (2004:239, 241) and Schuurman (2003:1000) argue as a result, social capital blames the poor for their poverty.

The potential for social capital to bridge local community development to national structures will be further explored in the context of Hezbollah's parliamentary participation and other areas of national involvement. Political space has also been described as an alternative way to make that link from the micro to the macro, this potential will be explored in the following section.

*Creating political space*

Engberg-Pedersen, Sam Hickey, Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke and Shragge suggest political space presents the potential for communities to develop locally while challenging deeply entrenched structures responsible for their marginalization. This section will explore these perspectives further by first, defining political space and second, by contrasting it with social capital and the activities of NGOs, where a political frame is absent.

Engberg-Pedersen describes political space as the exploration of how poverty reduction can take place by the poor or by local organizations on behalf of the poor, while ensuring power dynamics favour the marginalized. Engberg-Pedersen (2002:12) says political space involves communities using their own assets to deliver coping mechanisms while at the same time, enhancing their mobilization, organization and representation to affect policy decisions, redistribute resources and bring about
institutional change. Magdalena Villareal (2002:80) defines political space as the place where the state and society interact with each other and fulfill their rights and obligations to each other.

Contrasting political space with social capital, Hickey (2003:10-11) argues while political space adequately balances providing day-to-day coping mechanisms with altering underlying structures, social capital fails to add a political frame to community development or to address underlying power relations responsible for marginalization. Engberg-Pedersen (2002:5, 16) adds unlike political space, which explores development in its context and enables local actors to use their agency to shape that context, social capital ignores the historical context it is operating in as well as an understanding of the causes of marginalization of a specific group..

Shragge (1997:ix), Mohan, Stokke (2000:258, 262) and Engberg-Pedersen argue development cannot be attained when it is separated from the political dimensions of an issue. They say development should include both, a political strategy and practical poverty alleviation program to impact the national government. One example would be micro credit initiatives, which focus on small business development without addressing the underlying causes of marginalization such as unemployment. Engberg-Pedersen (2002:168) criticize NGOs for maintaining a distinction between development and politics, advising NGOs to shift the focus beyond solving problems to preventing them from occurring in the first place by acting as a pressure group on behalf of the marginalized. Maria Lange and Mick Quinn lament that NGOs tend to provide aid now and conduct analysis later or simply lack the capacity for such research on the need for
structural change. They advise NGOs to shift their corporate culture and partner with organizations involved in analyzing the political context of aid (Lange et al., 2003:22).

Gamson and Meyer (1996:277-278), who have written extensively on social movements and their impact on structures, suggest social movements have a unique role in shaping political space. The following section explores what role social movements play in local community development.

2.5 Aligning local struggles with social movements: the role of local culture and the socio-political context

Veltmeyer and Petras (2000:23-24) argue the grassroots projects of local community development organizations should be combined with the struggles of social movements that can effect change at national levels. Although O’Malley (2001:218) and the CCOD (as cited in Macdonald, 2001: 136) describe social movements as effective partners for local communities to alter structures and address the underlying causes of their marginalization, little appears in the body of literature on development on what this relationship should entail. For this reason, this chapter now turns to an examination of social movements, by first comparing how social movements are defined and what distinguishes them from local community development organizations. Second, we explore the implications of aligning a local struggle with a social movement, asking are social movement tactics a reflection of the local culture or of the local context? Third, we consider the impact of these tactics on how local struggles are perceived internationally.
How are social movements defined and what distinguishes them from local community development organizations?

Working towards a definition of social movements, the literature distinguishes between traditional social movements, which were typically class-based and new social movements which several theorists including Della Porta and Diani (2006:6) describe as an amalgamation of nearly all social justice issues under one banner. Peyman Vahabzadeh (2003:7-8, 29) argues this distinction is arbitrary and simplistic, similarly critiquing Eder for suggesting social movements share key common characteristics. Vahabzadeh (2003:22) finds both Tourane and Melucci focus exclusively on social movements in Europe and America, only privileging them as social movements, disregarding Latin American social movements and other third world societies. Vahabzadeh’s critique of the Eurocentric privileging of certain organizations as social movements raises the question; can a local community organization be a social movement in certain contexts? The literature defining what a ‘community’ is suggests the opposite, that social movements are distinct from communities. This will be further explored in the context of our case study.

McAdam et al. (1996) define a social movement as a formalized, structured organization with specific goals. In contrast, both Vahabzadeh (2003:30) and Della Porta and Diani, describe social movements as decentralized, non hierarchical organizations. According to Della Porta and Diani (2006:233, 243), they have no formal membership and aim to influence the entire political system rather than individual policies, making them distinct from religious sects, political parties and interest groups. However, just as the literature on local community development has little written on what connecting with
social movements would entail, the literature on social movements has little written on how they would impact or partner with the local level.

**Are social movement tactics a reflection of the local culture or of the local context?**

This section now turns to exploring how social movements frame their struggles, asking, are their tactics a reflection of their local values, their local context, or of the stage of growth they are? While the debate that follows focuses on social movements, these perspectives can be applied broadly to any local community development initiative that evokes external support or criticism.

Rahman argues development should be endogenous and that the path to development is a heterogeneous experience (Rahman, 1993:217). Theorists debate whether this means reflecting an organic cultural system or the socio-political context.

French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, suggests it is cultural values and norms that lead individuals to activism. According to Hank Johnston and John Noakes (2005:9-11), social movements draw on existing cultural symbols, values and norms to frame their message to ensure what they are presenting resonates with the target audience. Ife (1997:105, 157-158) similarly suggests development should reflect local traditions.

In contrast, Rahman (1993:217) argues development should reflect a community's historical conditions through the application of organic, creative solutions, cautioning while any achievements made could serve as an inspiration to others, they could not be reproduced in other contexts. Piven and Cloward (1992) also suggest actors are affected by the political context they are operating in.

These perspectives are mediated by scholars like Melucci, who argue actors are inspired by a combination of their political context and culture (Melucci 1996; Rupp &
Taylor 1987, 2003; Rochon 1998). According to Eder (as cited in Vahabzadeh, 2003:27-28), social movement tactics are typically an outcome of the cultural space in which the action occurs and the context in which the agency is located, suggesting these tactics are intended to resonate locally. Eder adds social movements also seek to alter those dominant moral values and norms that the cultural space is composed of while seeking to alter dominant practices that make them seem illegitimate. Similarly, Delia Porta and Diani (2006:152) explain, agents may influence cultural structures while at the same time being influenced by existing structures.

Gamson and Meyer suggest tactics are an outcome of a social movement’s growth cycle. In order for social movements to gain external support, they must gain access to the media. Gamson and Meyer explain (1996:288) the media seeks stories that are sensationalistic and has a tendency to give snapshots of a story, rather providing any of the structural or historical background that would place the news story in context. Gamson and Meyer and Delia Porta and Diani (2006:226-227) suggest as social movements become more formalized and gain access to resources, they shift away from sensationalistic tactics to more mainstream modes of action.

According to Vahabzadeh, the tactics of new social movements typically involve passive resistance and civil disobedience. Della Porta and Diani (2006:149, 161, 244) agree with Gamson and Meyer that tactics vary based on the stage of growth a social movement finds itself in. They describe four stages, beginning with unorganized, unfocused agitation, followed by articulation and clarification of the movement’s objectives and action plans. The movement eventually undergoes a process of formalization in which participants become disciplined and implement movement
strategies in a coordinated matter. In the final stage, movements become institutionalized and bureaucratic with a focus on efficiency that ultimately discourages participation from below. In this stage, some morph into political parties or interest groups, some turn commercial, some experience increased radicalism, embracing violent tactics, while others become more isolated and exclusive much like religious sects. These issues will be further discussed in the context of Hezbollah, exploring whether their approach to development is an outcome of their context, traditions, growth cycle or externally imposed values.

What is the impact of these tactics on how local struggles are perceived internationally?

One of the challenges facing social movements is the struggle to find legitimacy for their cause. Social movements use framing strategies to influence dominant values, norms and culture to lend their cause greater legitimacy. We now turn to a discussion on how external perspectives impact local activities. First we ask, what happens if local community development efforts are contextually appropriate or effective as Della Porta and Diani advise they should be but are perceived to be illegitimate from an external standpoint? Second, we compare perspectives on whether all local traditions are worth preserving and finally, we look at the argument from the inverse, asking if it is appropriate to violate laws or contravene dominant norms perceived to be unfair from a local perspective. This discussion is helpful in considering the implications of partnering with a social movement and how local community organizations are perceived externally.

Clifford (2005:33-34) cautions, while movements tend to frame their struggles in ways that resonate locally, it is unfortunate these frames may be viewed as inappropriate
in the global north, which would limit access to funding sources. Those who represent their local values ultimately suffer but those who appear politically correct to the outside world, prosper. Clifford suggests NGO’s and advocacy groups tend to support movements that use tactics that are acceptable to themselves. The irony Clifford explains is that NGO’s live in a very different context and yet they expect movements to use tactics that are acceptable in the NGO’s context. “most insurgent groups live in far rougher neighbourhoods and their methods must be correspondingly tough (Clifford, 2005:33, 35-36).” Arundhati Roy (2004:42-43) concurs that in mainstream development, aid is typically given to local agencies that are structured similarly to western NGO’s and reflect western priorities and values. For this reason, Della Porta and Diani (2006:146) are weary of external support, cautioning it means a local organization’s agenda can easily become controlled by external interests if they continue to generate funding from the outside.

According to Rahman (1980:83) striving for development requires resistance to exploitive power structures. However, Della Porta and Diani lament that dissent, protest and other confrontational actions linked to social movements are losing their effectiveness as they become normalized into the mainstream. They argue social movements must invent new forms of mass defiance that constantly “challenge the state on issues of law and order.” (Della Porta & Diani, 2006:28-29, 146), a process that suggests tactics may at times cross legal limits when defying laws perceived as unfair, raising questions about the perceived legitimacy of social movement tactics.

Rahnema argues resistance against power structures and unjust laws occurs passively on a daily basis through a true show of people power.
it manifests itself in the reality of ‘tax payers cheating the state, young people evading conscription, farmers accepting subsidies or equipment from development projects and diverting them to their own ends, technicians or repairmen working without permits or licences, government paid teachers using the classroom to denounce government abuses of power (Rahnema, 1998 cited in Rahnema, 1992:123).

While Ife (1997:105, 157-158) describes the cultural traditions of indigenous communities as paramount in driving the development process, Ife argues not all local traditions are worth preserving, particularly when they conflict with the universality of human rights and social justice principles, which he suggests would be limited to passive means of engagement. In contrast, Veltmeyer and Petras (2000:41, 42) provide the example of the Zapatista as a successful endogenous movement that resorted to armed struggle. They argue the cause of the Zapatista’s success is their ability to reflect elements of Marxism intertwined with an ideology of Zapatismo that championed armed struggle and a sense of indigenismo, which emphasized direct democracy. As a result, they were organically connected with the indigenous peoples, achieving their full confidence in the struggle.

Exploring the legitimacy of tactics to resist dominant power structures from a theoretical standpoint, Ernest van den Haag (1972:11) contrasts writers who stress the duty to resist unjust laws with those who stress the duty to obey. While St. Augustine argues “an unjust law is not a law” (as cited in van den Haag, 1972:8), ven den Haag (1972:12-14) reflects a Hobbesian perspective, arguing there is no justification to disobey laws as obeying the law would become optional and society would then be without social order.
Vigilantly guarding the right of the individual, Henry David Thoreau argues “the only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right,” (as cited in van den Haag, 1972:9). In contrast, emphasizing the responsibilities of the individual to the collective, Van deen Haag writes when Socrates was charged with civil disobedience and found guilty by the court of ‘corrupting the youth with aesthetic ideas’, he argued he never disobeyed the law and vowed given the chance, he would continue to teach in the way he did. At the same time, when he was sentenced to death, Crito urged him to escape but Socrates refused, explaining while he did not reject the general laws that bound him as a citizen, he still reserved the right to disobey them when necessary. Essentially, Socrates regarded the system as legitimate and thereby the death sentence as legitimate. As a result, he submitted to the sentence as it was his moral duty to do so just as it was his moral duty to engage in civil disobedience (as cited in van den Haag, 1972:6-7).

It remains subject to debate whether the type of development that is pursued should be appropriate to the local context or congruent with local traditions. It is also debatable whether there is a limit to how far the international community should go in supporting locally appropriate actions that may clash with exogenous understandings. These questions of whether tactics reflect context, traditions or a movements growth stage will be explored further in the context of Hezbollah’s armed and passive resistance activities. The following section explores how armed movements in conflict zones in the global south in general and in the Middle East in particular negotiate these issues.
2.6 Landscape of the debate on the Middle East: issues and debate

2.6.1 Political-community movements in conflict zones in the global south

In our discussion of the role of political and community movements in conflict zones in the global south, first, we consider the appropriateness of local community organizations participating in social service delivery. Second, we consider the appropriateness of local community organizations engaging in armed struggle in an effort to alter their structural environment.

This section contrasts perspectives on whether the local community is the ideal party to deliver social services in conflict zones or whether their participation prolongs conflict. In various World Bank studies on post-conflict reconstruction, Cliffe et al. (2003:2), Jane Nelson (2007:144) and Goovaerts et al. (2005:10) find communities are better at identifying and prioritizing reconstruction needs than external organizations. However, Lange and Quinn (2003:10) and Goovaerts et al. (2005:14) caution against establishing non-governmental organizations to provide aid in conflict zones as they will further weaken and undermine a collapsing state. Lange and Quinn (2003:10) similarly caution non-governmental aid delivery will conceal the true cost of war, enabling armed movements to garner support for their activities while masking the consequences of their actions. Goovaerts et al. argue while it is often characteristic for local organizations in conflict zones to develop an acute capacity to articulate demands, they are not necessarily representative of the community’s interests. Goovaerts et al. (2005:6, 14) add, these armed actors make aid delivery very challenging by usurping donor and government funds in a bid to increase their own economic and political strength.
This section contrasts perspectives on whether it is appropriate for the local community organizations in conflict zones to engage in armed struggle to alter their structural environment, or whether their participation prolongs conflict. The Chiapas became known the world over and put themselves on the government's agenda as a result of their use of armed force. Veltmeyer and Petras (2000:40, 43) discuss the irony with which the Zapatista succeeded through a form of politics abandoned by the left, while at the same time, cautioning the time for armed struggle is over in the region as its continued use would be met with great state repression. In contrast, Roy (2004:9-10) suggests the limitations on armed resistance and the idea that its time has passed is only a view led by a minority of dominant states, engaging in occupation, while the majority of the world are in favour of it. Veltmeyer and Petras (2000:40, 43) advise the only available way forward for the Zapatista, is to move beyond armed struggle and emerge as a national political force that can open up political space in which social organizations may freely and effectively further the rights of marginalized, oppressed indigenous peoples at the national level. Writing from a mainstream development perspective that typically advocates for a roll-back of the state and a greater role for civil society, Nelson (2007:132) argues the state needs to strengthen its institutions in order to provide security adding that civil society cannot substitute the states role in this regard.

2.6.2 Political-community movements in conflict zones in the Middle East

In our discussion of the role of political and community movements in conflict zones in the Middle East, first, we consider whether the welfare networks of local community organizations are inclusive or exclusive in their social service delivery and whether their objective is to assist the marginalized or gain support for their political
ambitions. Second, we consider perspectives on the appropriateness of local community organizations engaging in armed struggle when seeking to alter their structural environment of the Middle East.

Jihad Makhoul and Lindsey Harrison (2002:621) lament that NGO networks in the Middle East tend to be accessible only through personal connections, or wasata. Asef Bayat (2000:iv, 5) agrees, arguing Islamic movements provide a host of social services to an exclusive group of people. According to Clifford (2005:33), NGOs from the global north tend to work in a similar manner by only funding local NGOs that happen to resemble NGOs of the global north, while avoiding Islamist organizations, despite the latter’s importance in indigenous democratization movements.

Bayat (2000:5, 17) argues groups such as Hezbollah have a top-down approach that does not involve citizen participation and has a very limited participation of women in developing their communities. According to Bayat,

The moral vision of Islamists means repressing women, being intolerant to other religions, and intolerant of those who want a democratic process that is secular. This impedes any true participatory culture or process. Without a true participatory process, there cannot be true social development (Bayat, 2000, p.19).

According to Bayat (2000:iv, 5, 17, 19), the social services provided by Islamists ultimately provide a social safety net that reinforces the existing system rather than aspiring for broader socio-economic rights. Bayat argues the aim of movements such as Hezbollah is not to help the disenfranchised, instead they work through the poor to achieve their own objectives of attaining an Islamic state. Bayat contrasts the aim of Islamic movements with Latin American liberation theology where the primary objective
is to liberate the poor while he argues according to the Islamic movement ideology, social justice can only be attained under an Islamic state, making that the primary aim. Ben-Meir (2006:5) agrees with Bayat arguing Islamic governance is imposed on communities by a small minority concluding the US should bolster socio-economic aid to such regions to promote values of freedom and democracy in the Middle East. Alf Morten Jerve (2001:317, 320) similarly argues local community organizations and political movements in Lebanon bring sectarian interests to the forefront, making the socio-political situation too delicate to accommodate strong local governance and to advance the development agenda.

We will now consider the appropriateness of local community organizations engaging in armed struggle in an effort to alter aspects of the structural environment in the Middle East. We first ask how common passive resistance is in the Middle East and if armed resistance is more attractive to individuals of a lower socio-economic status. Second, we contrast perspectives on the role of armed and passive struggle while exploring the culture of Ashura, organic to both the Shia community in Lebanon and Iran.

Hamit Bozarslan (2004:8, 102, 137) is concerned with the use of sacrificial violence in the Middle East to alter power structures, concluding there is a need to invent non-violent forms of action in the region. In contrast, Bayat (2000:10) describes everyday acts of passive resistance and non-violent dissent taking place in the Middle East in resistance of unfair power structures.

Bozarslan finds previous explanations that explore the rationale for such actions to be insufficient. For example, while Ted Gurr (as cited in Bozarslan, 2004:5) concludes violence is a result of class-based deprivation, Bozarslan argues in the Middle East,
armed movements attract members of various social classes (Bozarslan, 2004:15). This will be further explored through an analysis of the socio-economic background of Hezbollah’s cadres.

Given Hezbollah’s close affinity to Iran, the Islamic revolution in Iran provides a useful example of a community and political movement in the Middle East. The prominent ideologues of the revolution included Khomeini, Ayatollah Motaharri and Dr. Ali Shariati, their perspectives on engaging in armed or passive struggle are discussed below.

Shariati (as cited in Rahnema & Nomani, 1990:57, 70-71) identified two modes of struggle against oppression: engaging in armed struggle to attain liberation; or, speaking against injustice by raising the consciousness of the masses and spreading the revolution. Failure to engage in either path would render the individual complicit with the oppressors. Unearthing the heroes that had always existed and whose memory is ingrained in the psyche of not only each Iranian, but in the psyche of virtually each Shia in every part of the world, Shariati identified Hussein (A.S.) and his sister Zainab as the ideal models in this two-pronged revolutionary struggle. In addition to being notable for their piety, Shariati (Abedi, Shariati, Mutahhari & Taleqani, 1986) explained Hussein (A.S.) was the one who engaged in armed struggle to attain social justice, while Zainab was the one who raised the consciousness of humankind, spreading news of Hussein’s revolution and inspiring society towards action and social justice. The annual remembrance of these iconic figures is usually met with the display of large black banners, with slogans such as “Everyday is Ashura and every land is Karbala” meaning that each individual has the opportunity to join Hussein and Zainab in their struggle by
standing against social injustice anywhere in the world that it occurs today (Abedi et al., 1986; Rahnema & Nomani; 1990:70-71; Kahil:2007:122).

Rahnema & Nomani (1990:54-55) argue, by framing the story of Ashura as a struggle against injustice, Shariati successfully drew upon locally appropriate cultural symbols to make Marxist-Lenninist ideas relevant in Iran. The result was an endogenous version of Marxism, which was simpler to comprehend and internalize, since its history was a part of the people’s everyday life and its heroes. This is supported by Della Porta and Diani (2006:81) who explain religion plays an important part in social movement framing.

Representing an alternative vision, Motahhari (as cited in Rahnema & Nomani, 1990:57, 70), who originally worked collaboratively with Shariati in founding the Hosseinieh-e Irshad, the highly politicized Islamic centre popular among Iranian the youth in the 1970s, parted ways finding Shariati too radical for his own liking. Motahhari argued that in the Islamic context, a religious being was one who submitted themselves to God’s will and adhered to the tenants of their faith. Struggling against injustice was not indicative of faith as being politically passive was not frowned upon. Motahhari, who respected the market system and private property, disassociates Islam from Shariati’s infusion of Marxism, arguing there is no polarization between the exploiters and the exploited as pious believers may be found among all classes.

Ultimately, the leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Khomeini invoked aspects of both Shariati and Motahhari’s positions. Drawing on Shariati’s class-based ideology and language, Khomeini rationalized the true believer is a pious person, adhering to the tenants of the faith, but such an act becomes impossible in an unjust, corrupt
environment. Khomeini (as cited in Rahnema & Nomani, 1990:71) said a believer would overthrow the corrupt environment, including corrupt systems of government and oppressive, criminal and treacherous regimes.

Much of the literature argues Lebanon is closely influenced by Iranian politics, describing Hezbollah as Iran’s proxy army in the area (Jorisch 2004; Shay, 2005; Oded 2006). Other ideologues such as Amal Saad-Ghorayeb (2002:112-117) draw a parallel between the Iranian’s and the South Lebanese, arguing they are organically connected through a shared faith and shared space on a frontier of resistance. Lara Deeb (2006) argues while Hezbollah-Iranian relations are very close, Iranian efforts to dominate the Lebanese scene would be opposed by Hezbollah itself. These perspectives will be elaborated on in the following chapter where we consider whether Hezbollah is reflecting local interests and endogenous development, or a foreign agenda.

As mainstream and alternative perspectives vary greatly on what local community development should entail, we will assess these competing approaches in relationship to our case study on Hezbollah and its dual role as a social service provider and an armed movement. Chapter 3 will detail Hezbollah’s pursuits in both of these areas, including its role in social capital formation and its activities that seek to expand agency and alter structures.
Chapter 3 Case Study Data: Nasrullah is one of us

"Your friend can be only Allah, and His messenger and those who believe, who establish worship and pay the poor due, and bow down [in prayer]. And whosoever taketh Allah and His messenger and those who believe for friends [will know that], Lo! The Party of Allah (Hezbollah), they are the victorious."

- Holy Qur’an (5:56)

The Shia of Lebanon were once a neglected minority that has since grown organizationally, in a bid to expand their sense of agency and advance their own community’s development. This chapter begins by charting the history of Lebanon’s Shia community and the advent of Hezbollah onto the Lebanese scene. We then explore the relationship between Hezbollah’s social services and its armed and passive resistance activities by researching the following questions: Are Hezbollah’s activities a reflection of the local community’s priorities or are they an imposition of exogenous interests upon the local community? How does Hezbollah implement its social service network and to what extent do they build social capital? How does Hezbollah bridge social capital and alter their structural environment? Will Hezbollah go out of business if a state of conflict ceases to exist? Finally, how do international attitudes impact Hezbollah’s ability to operate?

3.1 Background on Lebanon

This section explores the history of the Shia of Lebanon by first reviewing external factors that affected the community’s growth, including the impact of foreign conquerors, the confessional system, government neglect, the influx of Palestinian refugees, the Lebanese civil war and the Israeli occupation. We then turn to internal factors affecting the community’s development including the eventual birth of activism.
and the community’s realization of their sense of agency. This discussion is then continued in the following section that charts Hezbollah’s emergence onto the Lebanese scene.

Housing eighteen religious groups, sectarian tension has consumed the tiny coastal strip known as Lebanon for centuries. The countries three major sects include the Christian Maronite, the Sunni Muslims and the Shia Muslims. The Maronites have sizeable communities in the south, the north and Beirut; the Sunni’s are largely urban and the Shia are concentrated in the south, the Bekaa valley and the Beirut suburbs.

*The Impact of Foreign Conquerors*

The Maronites have long been Lebanon’s most socio-economically advanced group. With longstanding access to Lebanon’s most powerful political offices and strategic alliances first with Rome and then with France, social service delivery has largely focused on Beirut and Maronite areas (Ramal, 2008:97, 135-136). The Sunni community received much financial support during the Ottoman Empire, which continued from predominantly Sunni Arab states after the Empire’s collapse. The Sunni also had access to political clout and benefited from existing infrastructure in their urban locales, but still suffered from widespread government neglect (Ramal, 2008:139-140).

Historically, the Shia community faced discrimination from a series of foreign conquerors, starting with the Mamluks, the Ottoman Empire and continuing on into the French Mandate. Historians suggest the Shia in Lebanon may have originated from the Arabic ġĀmelah tribe in Yemen (Ramal, 2008:68). Some settled the Kesrwan Mountains north of Beirut but were forced to relocate by the Mamluk conquerors into the Bekaa Valley and South Lebanon, a mountainous terrain known as Jabal ‘Amil (Hamzeh,
2004:9; Ramal, 2008:68) which at the time, was a sub district of Safad in Palestine (Hamzeh, 2004:9-10; Harik, 1972:126). The majority of Shia Muslim’s in Lebanon belong to the *ithna-asheri* (twelver) branch of Shi’ism (Ramal, 2008:68). Although the twelver Shia community in Lebanon predates the sixteenth century introduction of Shi’ism to Iran (Norton, 2007:52), the Ottoman Empire long suspected its Shia subjects including those of Jabal ‘Amil, of having loyalty to the Safavid Empire that had been ruling Persia (Hamzeh, 2004:9-10; Norton, 2007:12-13). As a result, the Shia lost nearly all their land and authority in Lebanon as part of an entrenched policy of discrimination (Hamzeh, 2004:9-10).

*The Confessional System*

In 1942, Lebanon’s confessional system was born, according to which political and military posts were to be allotted to Lebanon’s eighteen sectarian groups in proportion to their population size at the time of the 1932 census. The Maronite’s were deemed to be the largest group at that time and were accorded Presidency, followed by the Sunni Muslim’s who were accorded Premiership (Hamzeh, 2004:12) and the office of Chamber of Deputies was reserved for Lebanon’s Shia Muslim’s (Ramal, 2008:94-95). The confessional system succeeded in providing a semblance of national unity and on December 31, 1946, all foreign troops were evacuated and Lebanon succeeded to attain independence (Ramal, 2008).

*Neglect and Deprivation*

At the inception of confessionalism, the Shia accounted for 19 per cent of the population, but only held 3.2 per cent of the highest posts in the bureaucracy (Hamzeh,
Government spending on public institutions such as schools and hospitals was allocated on a sectarian basis, meaning those with the least government representation were the least likely to see money being invested in their communities. Deprivation in the Shia community was compounded by the fact that the few Shia parliamentarians that held office at that time all came from the elite and feudal landowners and rather than pursuing their communities' interests in parliament (Deeb, 2006; Jaber, 1997:10-11, 147), they distributed power and resources to family and other connections (Harik, 2004:18). Lebanon's demographics changed dramatically since independence and by the 1980s, the Shia became Lebanon's largest sect, numbering 1,400,000 people, while the Maronite and Sunni communities were estimated at approximately 800,000 people (Hamzeh, 2004:13). The confessional system continues to bar the Shia from attaining any post higher than that of the Parliamentary Speaker.

By the 1960s, while Lebanon entered a period of economic growth and Beirut was popularly referred to as the Paris of the Middle East, the Shia communities were without basic services such as hospitals, schools, roads, clean water (Jaber, 1997:10-11; Fieldbook-24/01/08) and sewage networks (Harik, 2004:18, 83). In contrast to the Sunni and Christian communities that were over-represented among the urban elite, 85 per cent of the Shia community were rural based and were disproportionately impacted by the modernization program and government failure to invest in rural development. The cash crops that proliferated in the south and the Bekaa Valley, forced hundreds of thousands of destitute Shia to move to the Southern Suburbs of Beirut in pursuit of work as wage labourers. The Beirut suburbs could not cope and the streets were festerred with garbage

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2 All data was recorded into fieldbooks, which are organized chronologically by date.
and sewage, while only 10 per cent of the population had access to running water and electricity was inexisten (Jaber, 1997:145-146).

Lebanon's increasing integration into the world capitalist economy further widened income disparities in Lebanon (Picard, 1996; Jaber, 1997:8; Ghorayeb, 2002:7; Hamzeh, 2004:13-14; Deeb 2006; Norton, 2007:13;) According to a 1999 survey by ESCWA, 34 percent of households in Ba'albaak and 49 per cent in Hermel were without access to clean water, in comparison to 5.6 per cent of the national average (Harik, 2004:87). At present, the power grid in South Lebanon provides a sporadic twelve to eighteen hours of electricity a day and clean running water is also on short supply, with most people having to buy drinking water or fill containers from a common source (“Lebanon: Destruction of Civilian Infrastructure,” 2006). Lebanon is also plagued by one of the highest national debts in the world due to high corruption levels, further compounding the effect of government neglect (Daily Star, January 20, 2001; Harik, 2004:93; Norton, 2007:122; Noe, 2007:264; Fieldbook-30/12/07;).

The Proliferation of Weapons

In 1948, the Palestinian (Nakba) 'catastrophe' occurred as a result of the creation of the State of Israel. Palestinian refugees streamed into all neighbouring states, including Lebanon (Ramal, 2008:177). By the 1960s, the armed Palestinian resistance began using Lebanon as a launch pad for attacks against the State of Israel and in 1970, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) officially set up shop in Lebanon (Hamzeh, 2004:15). Each Palestinian attack brought with it massive Israeli strikes, seeking to make Palestinian resistance unattractive to the Lebanese government and the general population (Ramal, 2008:119-120). In 1973, the poorly trained Lebanese army
rolled into action, aiming to root out the PLO from Lebanon but failed in this mission, in part because half the army had sympathies to the PLO (Ramal, 2008:122). The army came out appearing weak and many Lebanese began arming themselves, losing faith in the government’s ability to provide them with security (Ramal, 2008:122). The centuries of sectarian tension, crystallized in the confessional system, coupled with the proliferation of weapons on the streets, put all the wheels in motion for the civil war, which erupted in 1975 and lasted a gruelling 15 years. Social service delivery further deteriorated during the civil war as the state ceased to function effectively and sectarian leaders used their ministerial and monetary powers to improve services in their own communities (Jaber, 1997:146). The Taif Agreement brought the civil war to an end in 1989 and identified Syria as ‘the supreme authority over Lebanese affairs’ (Ghorayeb, 2002:52-53). The Taif Accord also resulted in a resumption of parliamentary elections in 1992, the first since the start of the civil war (Qassem, 2005:187).

Foreign Occupation

While the civil war was still raging, in 1978, half of Lebanon’s territory was invaded by Israel in an effort to root out the PLO (Hamzeh, 2004:16). The UN responded by issuing Resolution 425, demanding Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon (Hamzeh, 2004:16). Israel withdrew partially and handed over the area to their proxy, the South Lebanese Army (SLA). Israel re-invaded Lebanon in 1982.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak explained, “When we entered Lebanon there was no Hezbollah. We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the south. It was our presence there that created Hezbollah” (Newsweek, July 18, 2006 cited in Norton, 2007:33). In September 1983, the SLA perpetuated the Sabra and
Chatila massacre, surrounding the densely populated Palestinian refugee camps and killing over 1000 civilians. Internally displaced Shia being hosted by the Palestinian refugees (Jaber, 1997:77; Hamzeh, 2004:16-17), constituted nearly one quarter of those killed in the massacre (Ghorayeb, 2002, p.11). In the same year, the PLO were forced to evacuate but at the same time, Shia resistance against the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) increased (Jaber, 1997, p.25). The October 16, 1983 desecration of the Shia festival of mourning known as Ashura, is described as a major catalyst that drove the Shia towards resistance of the Israeli occupation. As thousands gathered in Nabatiyeh for the annual Ashura day procession, an Israeli convoy drove through the emotionally charged crowd of mourners, who reacted angrily and as a result, two mourners were killed and fifteen were injured by the IDF. The event became a milestone, largely unifying the Shia in their contempt of the Israeli invaders (Jaber, 1997:17-18; Ghorayeb, 2002:11-12; Koya, 2007:30).

Life under Israeli occupation quickly became intolerable for the already marginalized Shia community. By 1984, the IDF succeeded in isolating South Lebanon from Beirut, limiting entry to a single roadblock (Jaber, 1997:19). Whole villages were sealed off from each other, effectively creating an economic blockade and entire villages were cut off from water and electricity supplies (Ghorayeb, 2002:11, 13). The impact on the Southern economy was detrimental as the population’s livelihood had largely been based on selling produce in Beirut and North Lebanon (Jaber, 1997:19). In 1985, the IDF implemented the ‘Iron Fist’ policy. Parked cars were routinely blown up and a carte blanche policy was put in place to shoot at anyone in designated ‘free fire zones.’ Southern produce was destroyed (Ghorayeb, 2002:11), forests and orchards were
routinely burned and houses were demolished when families refused to cooperate (Jaber, 1997:25-27). An indefinite curfew from sunset to sunrise was in effect (Jaber, 1997, p.23; Ghorayeb, 2002, p.13) and scores of villagers were regularly rounded up and imprisoned (Jaber, 1997, p.26).

**Early activism**

Having reviewed the series of external factors that affected the community’s growth, we now begin our investigation of internal factors. We will first review the development of activism and the community’s sense of agency beginning in the 1960s when Imam Musa al Sadr mobilized the community to simultaneously engage power structures while providing social services. We also explore the undertakings of Al-Sayyid Fadlallah, another prominent Shia leader in Lebanon providing a host of welfare services.

Sadr was born in Qom, Iran to a family of prominent Lebanese theologians and returned to Lebanon in 1958 (Shay, 2005:60). Sadr argued the Shia tradition of quietism and passivism was misplaced and that the community should play an active role in bringing an end to their deprivation and marginalization, adding that activism was an integral part of the Shia identity (Hamzeh, 2004:21; Norton, 2007:18). In 1969, Sadr was elected inaugural president of the Supreme Islamic Shi’ite Council, which aimed to empower the growing Shia middle class with a voice (Hamzeh, 2004:20) and to give the Shia community political representation while pushing an agenda of social justice (Harik, 2004:22; Shay, 2005:60). In 1974, he established the Movement of the Deprived (Harakat al-Mahroumeen) to mobilize the Shia in pushing for governmental reform (Jaber, 1997:14; Harik, 2004:22), which in 1975 evolved into the Amal movement. In
addition to reducing the power of traditional elites (Norton, 2007:18), he also established several charitable organizations (Harik, 2004:22; Kahil, 2007:30-31) to meet the communities day-to-day needs. Popularly referred to as the vanished Imam, Sadr disappeared on a visit to Libya, foul play was suspected. There has been no information about him since that time (Jaber, 1997:14; Kahil, 2007:30-31). The Amal movement continues to fill the socio-economic gaps faced by many (Ramal, 2008:138).

Al-Sayyid Fadlallah was born in Najaf to a Lebanese father where he was also influenced by an activist interpretation of Islam. This led him to mobilize the Shia community into social service delivery when he permanently moved to Lebanon in 1965 (Hamzeh, 2004:21-23). He founded several charitable institutions starting in 1978, providing healthcare, education and welfare services to Shia communities (Hamzeh, 2004:21-23; Norton, 2007:ch.5). This massive social service network is funded through a combination of foreign remittances and *khums* donations but for the most part relies on local fund-raising, local donations and a series of businesses including gas stations, a publishing house, computer store and restaurants (Norton, 2007:108-109). The evidence suggests Fadlallah is not affiliated with Hezbollah (Ghorayeb, 2002:7), although his home was bombed by the IDF in 1985 and again in the July 2006 war (Norton, 2007:138).

The longstanding neglect and discrimination levelled against Lebanon’s Shia, first by a series of foreign conquerors and then by Lebanon’s independent government was exacerbated by decades of war, occupation and the short-sited confessional system. Although Lebanon’s political and religious landscape is undeniably diverse, we now turn
to a discussion on one direction in the microcosm, charting the emergence of Hezbollah and their effect on the Shia community’s sense of agency.

3.2 Background on Hezbollah and the Local Community

3.2.1 What is Hezbollah?

Hezbollah means the ‘Party of God’ and was derived from a passage of the Holy Qur’an that advises those who join the Party of God shall be victorious (5:56). Hezbollah declared its formal existence in 1985 through the publication of an Open Letter addressed to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World (Deeb, 2006). In this letter, Hezbollah positioned itself as an Islamic Resistance movement. Hezbollah is thought to have been in existence since 1982 as a loose umbrella organization before it morphed into a disciplined entity with a detailed command structure. Hezbollah has three wings, the political, military and social service arms. According to the party’s Deputy General, Na’im Qassem, membership in Hezbollah requires cultural and military training and recruitment is based on geographic and demographic proportionality. Membership is only extended to those who agree with Hezbollah’s goals, possess religious belief and manifest behavioural and *jihad* credentials (Qassem, 2005:60). According to Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh (2004:74, 76), membership exceeds 200,000, making Hezbollah Lebanon’s largest party. Hamzeh adds, Hezbollah’s membership comes from two categories, the first is the ‘oppressed’ (mustad’afin), of a low socioeconomic position and second, the petty bourgeoisie including shopkeepers, small and medium sized business persons, small landowners, professionals, teachers and clerks.
3.2.2 Terrorists, War Criminals or Resistance Fighters?

Hezbollah’s armed wing is frequently labelled as a terrorist organization although locally, it is widely perceived as a resistance movement. While it is beyond the scope of this book to explore such categorizations in-depth, this section explores alleged and confirmed activities of the armed wing as discussed in the literature with the aim to understand the Party’s international standing. While in many cases the evidence remains inconclusive, we shall proceed by listing all allegations and noting where conclusive evidence was found or admissions of responsibility were made.

Two definitions of terrorism are used by authors who have studied the organization in great detail. Augustus Richard Norton defined terrorism as “…as the intentional use of political violence against civilians and civilian sites such as schools, hospitals, restaurants, buses, trains, or planes (Norton, 2007:76).” Ghorayeb writes, “…for simplicity’s sake, terrorist violence will be treated as one strategy of insurgency which is distinguished from other strategies by its deliberated attempt to terrorise a civilian population for political ends (Ghorayeb, 2002:16).”

In 1983, the US Embassy and the US and French Marine Barracks were destroyed and hundreds of soldiers were killed by a human bomber. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility but several writers allege this is a cover name for Hezbollah (Jorisch, 2004:5; Hamzeh, 2004:83; Shay, 2005:93). Hezbollah denied any responsibility for either attack (Ghorayeb, 2002:100; Noe, 2007:257). Norton writes, “A blue-ribbon investigating commission established by the American government....found Iran largely responsible,” concluding Hezbollah was not involved (Norton, 2007:71).
Through the 1980s, scores of westerners were taken hostage in Lebanon, an act largely attributed to Hezbollah or groups linked to Hezbollah (Jaber, 1997:31-35; Jorisch, 2004:8; Hamzeh, 2004:85; Shay, 2005:71, 118; Norton, 2007:41, 73). Hezbollah denies any responsibility for the kidnapping of foreigners (Ghorayeb, 2002:96).

Norton (2007:42, 76) says Hezbollah was responsible for a 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 and that one of the hijackers was Imad Mughniyah. According to Harik, Hezbollah denies any relationship with Mughniyah (Harik, 2004:173) but the party later claimed him as one of their own when he was assassinated in 2008 in Damascus. Hamzeh adds Hezbollah was also implicated in the hijacking of Kuwaiti planes in 1984 and 1988. No denial of these events by Hezbollah is found in the literature.

In 1992, the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and in 1994, a Jewish cultural centre in Argentina were bombed. Responsibility was claimed by Islamic Jihad, which according to Shaul Shay (2005:95) is a front for Hezbollah. Hezbollah denies any responsibility (Nasru’llah, 1996).

Although in many cases, evidence remains inconclusive, some writers suggest Hezbollah may have had a hand in terror-related activities but has grown more pragmatic since the time of these events. Others suggest Hezbollah has always carefully avoided any terrorist activities in a bid to safeguard their international standing. We shall now turn to international law in relationship to Hezbollah’s activities following the Israeli withdrawal of May 2000.

Syed Hassan Nasrullah argues, “Even at the level of international law and internationally recognized norms, a people whose land is occupied has the right to resist occupation (as cited in Noe, 2007:92).” According to UN Resolution 3103 issued
December 12, 1973, it is permissible to use arms to achieve self-determination when striving for decolonization. Resolution 37/43 issued December 3, 1982, “Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle.” This right is also covered by the Fourth Geneva Convention, which affirms civilians may use military force to protect themselves (Harik, 2004, p.165). Norton agrees as long as Lebanon’s territory is under occupation, Hezbollah and other groups have the right to resist foreign occupation through violent tactics. Analysts suggest Israel shared a similar understanding. In a 1996 ceasefire agreement signed by Israel, France, the US, Syria and Lebanon formalizing the rules of combat, Israel did not challenge Hezbollah’s ‘right’ to attack Israeli soldiers on Lebanese territory, which Harik (2004:181-182) and Norton (2007:85) describe as a de facto recognition of Hezbollah’s resistance status.

According to Norton (2007:76), Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from Lebanese territory diluted Hezbollah’s justification for armed resistance. This point is underscored by Oded Haklai (2006) who says, Hezbollah is no longer fighting foreign occupation. In contrast, Hezbollah claims the withdrawal is incomplete; arguing the disputed stretch of territory known as Shebba Farms belongs to Lebanon but remains under Israeli occupation.

According to Norton (2007:76, 86), Hezbollah has limited its attacks to armed soldiers of the IDF and its proxies. Harik explains Hezbollah used this strategy so they could not be labelled as a terrorist organization. However, all of this comes under question in the July 2006 war where Hezbollah and Israel exchanged rocket fire and 43 Israeli and 1,109 Lebanese civilians killed (Noe, 2007:378). Human Rights Watch
(HRW) says according to the International Committee of the Red Cross’s *Customary International Humanitarian Law*, it is not permitted in international law to target civilian populations in response to attacks on one’s own civilian population. Upon reviewing the Red Cross document referred to by HRW, Norman Finkelstein writes,

Turning to the cited pages, however, the manual reads: ‘it is difficult to conclude that there has yet crystallized a customary rule specifically prohibiting reprisals against civilians during the conduct of hostilities.’ This is the consensus position among experts in the field...HRW has apparently misrepresented international law in its eagerness to discredit Hezbollah (Finkelstein, 2007).

In addition to questions around the applicability of the terrorist label, questions were also raised after the July 2006 war on whether either party had engaged in war crimes. Finkelstein writes,

Hezbollah used, according to HRW, low-tech weapons that could not discriminate between civilian and military targets, and therefore were incapable of deliberately targeting civilians, whereas Israel used high-tech weapons that could discriminate between civilian and military targets yet repeatedly hit civilian targets even when no military targets were in the vicinity. Nonetheless HRW concludes that “strong evidence” exists that Hezbollah committed war crimes whereas it finds no evidence that Israel deliberately targeted civilians and reserves judgment on whether Israel committed war crimes (Finkelstein, 2007).

While charges of terrorism and war crimes remain the subject of intense debate, the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s guerrilla activities remains contentious and contingent upon whether the disputed strip of territory, Shebba Farms, does in fact belong to Lebanon, or whether it is a pretext to continue the armed struggle against Hezbollah’s sworn enemy. The question arises, at the level of ideology, has Hezbollah imposed itself and its approach upon the local community, or are they part of an endogenous bid at local community development?
3.2.3 Does Hezbollah reflect local norms and values?

Two perspectives appear in the literature debating whether the movement reflects local norms or values. The first perspective suggests Hezbollah is more than a party or a movement and is a deeply ingrained part of the community. The second perspective suggests Hezbollah’s agenda is controlled externally in Tehran and lacks an organic connection to the community. This section explores the nature of this relationship and whether Hezbollah reflects endogenous values or whether it marches to an Iranian agenda. We also consider whether they seek to impose their vision of an Iranian-inspired Islamic government on the Lebanese state or their Islamic code of conduct on the local community.

Suggesting Hezbollah is organically connected to the local community, Brian Humphreys writes,

Hezbollah has engrafted itself to the aims and aspirations of the Lebanese Shiite community so completely that Israel can not destroy it without also destroying the community, with all the attendant political and moral costs. It is the willingness of women, children and old men to support Hezbollah and its political program at the risk of their lives that gives the organization power far beyond its military means (Humphreys, 2008:A21).

Kahil (2007:48) describes Hezbollah as a reflection of the local political, religious, economic and social context. At the same time, Hezbollah develops rhetoric that draws upon local traditions, narratives and symbols to develop the community’s ability and readiness to engage in social change. Several examples of this emerge in the literature including Hezbollah’s ability to attract new adherents through mourning rituals that cultivate a willingness to embrace sacrifice and death. Kahil (2007:44-46, 111,116) adds Qur’anic symbolism is also closely intertwined with the local culture through the coding
of language, which Hezbollah has drawn upon to reassure the community that victory is imminent.

In contrast, Hala Jaber (1997:19) argues, Hezbollah’s influence comes from Iran. Ghorayeb (2002:71-72) acknowledges many Iranian symbols are visible in Lebanon, with posters of Iranian leaders Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei plastered across the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, Ba’albaak and south Lebanon while pockets of women clad in an Iranian style chador are visible in many communities. Jaber suggests this is evidence of the imposition of foreign cultural symbols on the local community. Nasrullah argues they are pictures of maraji (religious scholars), a reflection of the concept of Wilayat e Faqih (as cited in Ghorayeb, 2002:71-72). Nicholas Noe (2007:26) and Ghorayeb (2002:71-72) explain all Shia are to refer to a religious scholar of the highest authority for religious guidance. Hezbollah’s scholar of choice is the Iranian, Khamenei.

Hamze (2004:17-18) argues the revolution in Iran had a strong impact on the Shia in Lebanon. Ghorayeb (2002:14) contends much of Hezbollah’s eventual leadership was involved in the Committee Supportive of the Islamic Revolution, prior to the actual revolution. They also participated in demonstrations in favour of the 1979 revolution prior to the fall of the Shah, suggesting they were very much part of the same revolutionary paradigm but were at the same time inspired by its success in Iran and thus began mobilizing in Lebanon thereafter. Further cementing this relationship, when Israel launched its 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Iran reacted by immediately dispatching 1500 of its elite revolutionary guards to the Bekaa Valley to train the Lebanese in guerrilla warfare tactics (Jaber, 1997:20, 47; Hamze, 2004:24; Jorisch, 2004:8; Qassem, 2005:67;
Kahil, 2007:51). This played a significant role in the formation of Hezbollah (Ghorayeb, 2002:14; Deeb, 2006). The question arises, is Hezbollah seeking to impose an Iranian style, Islamic government on the people of Lebanon?

**The Goal of an Islamic State**

In their 1985 Open Letter, Hezbollah declared its desire to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon with the caveat, “We do not seek to impose Islam on anyone as we hate those who impose their beliefs and regimes on us and we do not want Islam to reign Lebanon by force... (Jaber, 1997:61)” a sentiment also echoed by Nasrullah (as cited in Noe, 2007:90; Nasru’llah, 1997). One year after the publication of the Open Letter, Jaber (1997:29) writes that Hezbollah imposed their religious zeal on the local community, alienating many by prohibiting alcohol, loud music, parties, dancing, mixed beaches and closing coffee shops while popular beach resorts became ‘ghost towns’. More recently, Hezbollah MP, Fneish, insisted despite having a well formulated view on personal conduct, “We try to convince others of our views, but we don't impose them on anybody... You find women with hijabs and others without, and we have no problem with that (as cited in Cavanaugh 2007).” Nasrullah claims an Islamic state would not be imposed unless it was voted on by the overwhelming majority of Lebanon’s population (as cited in Noe, 2007:90; Nasru’llah, 1997).

**The Najaf Connection**

We now turn to the question, does Hezbollah reflect Iranian interests or do they reflect norms and values that are more organically connected to the community? Hezbollah emerged as an outcome of a series of events including the earlier mobilization of the Shia community, the vacuum created with the disappearance of Sadr in 1978 and
the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. But the data suggests development of Hezbollah’s ideological framework largely began outside of Lebanon, in Najaf, Iraq.

According to some accounts, much of the Shia community had become enthralled in centuries of passivism and quietism (Shay, 2005:19). They accepted their marginalization as an injustice that would not be lifted until al Mehdi (the messiah) returns to spread social justice. According to Ghorayeb and Hamzeh, this perspective began to change as a new spirit of activism emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, infusing Shiism with a model of empowerment. They explain a movement arose in Najaf’s theological schools under the leadership of Ayatollah Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr and Khomeini that rejected fatalism and encouraged the Shia to create the change they want to see (Mallat, 1988:6-7; Ghorayeb, 2002:13; Hamzeh, 2004:18-19). Attracting students from Lebanon, Iraq and Iran, the list of alumni from the Najaf theological school reads like a role call of Lebanon’s prominent Shia activist leaders and Hezbollah’s eventual founding members (Agha & Khalidi, 1995:7; Hamzeh, 2004:19; Harik, 2004:16, 53; Shay, 2005:63). Najaf alumni included Imam Musa al Sadr and Al-Sayyid Fadlallah, who became prominent figures in Lebanon. It included Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei who went on to become leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It also included Sayyed Abbas al Musawi, Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, Sheikh Ragheb Harb and Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah who went on to form Hezbollah’s leadership. As these paths crossed in Najaf, cross-cultural connections were brought to the surface between Shia’s in Lebanon, Iraq and Iran (Hamzeh, 2004:18-19; Nasru’llah, 1997). It was only in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in Iran that Iraq became unsafe for the advancement of this dynamic line of thinking and the Shia centre of theological studies moved from
Najaf, Iraq to Qom, Iran (Hamzeh, 2004:19; Norton, 2007:4-5). At the same time, a similar line of thinking was emerging within Iran itself at the Hosseinieh-e Irshad, founded in the 1960s, by Motaharri, a student of Khomeini, and Shariati.

**The Husseini Model**

The data suggests the basis of this new spirit of activism and empowerment revolves around the Shia tradition of commemorating the seventh century battle of Karbala. In this battle, the grandson of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), Imam Hussein (A.S.) was mercilessly slaughtered, along with his faithful companions for refusing to submit to a corrupt and unjust adversary. Known as the day of Ashura, the Shia annually remember this event in an elaborate festival of mourning. The activist ideas that emerged in Najaf in the 1960s and 1970s largely transformed the commemoration of Ashura from a tool that maintains the status quo into one that challenges it, encourages politicization (Norton, 2007:66-67) and re-frames Hussein’s sacrifice as a stand against injustice (Shay, 2005:23). Shariati argues this stand against injustice should be emulated today by those who mourn his death (Abedi, et al., 1986). Norton adds,

> Hussein’s martyrdom is presented as a model of courage, assertiveness, and self-help, and the modern interpretation of that event led to conclusions very similar to those arrived at by Catholic liberation theology: that people must not wallow in fatalism but must act to help themselves (Norton, 2007:50-51).

Deeb and Ghorayeb add this re-interpretation became the personification of a model of activism and resistance (Deeb, 2006; Ghorayeb, 2002:125). “Hizb’ullah affirms the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon would have never come to be without the Husseini model as their inspiration (Nasru’ullah, 1997b).” The first cleric (Fieldbook-26/12/07) explains,
just as *Ashura* is a central element of the local culture, Hezbollah is an organic product of the revolutionary example of Imam Hussein A.S.

The data suggests Hezbollah has drawn on this activist model that encourages a sense of agency and shifts how local traditions and culture are interpreted, ultimately inventing new values and norms. Similar adaptations occurred in Shia communities outside of Lebanon around the same time period, which appear to largely be an outcome of the centralization of thought emerging from Shia theological schools. This suggests Hezbollah reflects a combination of endogenous and pan-Shia values and norms. The next section explores whether Hezbollah has any mechanisms in place to ensure they are in fact reflecting the local community’s priorities, particularly in terms of their daily operations.

3.2.4 How does Hezbollah know if it is addressing community priorities?

In this section we ask, does Hezbollah reflect the community’s priorities in a bottom-up manner, or do they impose their vision of development on the rest of the local community with no meaningful input from those affected by their activities? Ten respondents addressed this question; many argued their organic connection to the community enables an acute awareness of the community’s priorities. Respondents debated whether Hezbollah’s field visits, consultations and in-depth studies are in fact participatory methods of identifying community priorities. Some respondents also argued Hezbollah’s election standings serve as evidence that that community’s priorities are in fact being addressed.

Discussing Hezbollah’s connection to the community, the first respondent from the Islamic Health Society stated, “We are able to reflect priorities that are important to
the community because we are from the people (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am).3” The second respondent from the Hezbollah-affiliated consulting agency, the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation, (Fieldbook-24/01/08) also claims Hezbollah derives its development goals from society, rather than imposing them on the people. The Mayor explained, “I live with them and I know their priorities. Therefore I know how they think and what they need.” Acknowledging the municipality is very diverse, the Mayor adds, “I know the poor people and the rich people in this community and we work as a team (Fieldbook-23/01/08).” This Mayor has been described by other respondents as very accessible, with his door open to community members at all times.

The respondent from Mu’assat al-Jarha claims Hezbollah is a bottom up organization and that community priorities are at the forefront. This respondent relayed an encounter with a foreign journalist who asked, “So, you are Nasrullah’s guys?” The respondent answered, “No, we are not. He is one of us.” The respondent added, “Hezbollah isn’t a group, it is the community (Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08).”

Some respondents explained Hezbollah has a heightened awareness of local priorities because they conduct their own surveys, studies and needs assessments in the areas served by their social services. The Qard al Hassan loan program identifies community priorities through loan applications and regular meetings with regional representatives (Fieldbook-19/12/07). According to Muhammad Khansa, a director of one of Jihad al Binaa’s agricultural centers, while the government does not collect statistics in assessing needs in rural development, Jihad al Binaa conducts its own

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3 All data was recorded into fieldbooks, which are organized chronologically by date. When two interviews were conducted in a single day, they are further classified by morning and afternoon.
surveys to determine community priorities (Fecci, 2007:26-27). According to Lamia al Moubayed’s 1999 ESCWA study, *Jihad al Binaa* does not use a participatory process to determine community needs and instead identifies priorities based on the observations of field visits by the organization's engineers (as cited in Harik, 2004:90). The respondent from *Jihad al Binaa*’s agricultural unit (Fieldbook-17/01/08) acknowledged Hezbollah initially operated in a top-down manner, rationalizing need was so high at that time that anything they did was helpful. The respondent maintains they now involve the beneficiaries in the planning and execution of development projects through monthly field visits, informal gatherings, radio call-in shows and weekly and monthly workshops and seminars where farmers identify problems and needs and *Jihad al Binaa*’s engineers provide advice and problem solve alongside the farmers.

In the immediate aftermath of the July 2006 war, additional examples were provided of community needs assessment and consultations. According to John Kifner (2007), large numbers of community members volunteered with *Jihad al Binaa*, brandishing clipboards and walkie-talkies while surveying the extent of damage and going door-to-door, asking residents what help they need. The second respondent from the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation (Fieldbook-24/01/08) relayed the example of *Jihad al Binaa* involving 5000 affected community members from the Beirut suburbs in the deciding how to go about the reconstruction of their apartment blocks and neighbourhoods that had been devastated in the July 2006 war. Hezbollah outlined three options on how to rebuild. The first option was to build everything exactly as it was. The second option was to engage in a process of urban planning and rebuild the suburbs better than they were. The third option was for each individual family to find their own
shelter through the government compensation being offered. The residents filled out surveys, electing the first option. The choice revealed people's priorities were to get home as soon as possible rather than participate in a lengthy planning process. The respondent contrasts this with the post-civil war reconstruction of Solidaire, a neighbourhood in downtown Beirut, which was rebuilt into a restaurant and shopping complex by the government without consulting with the property owners.

Recognizing different geographic areas have distinct priorities; the second respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-27/12/07, pm) explained their technical department coordinates research on issues unique to each of the following regions: the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, the Bekaa Valley and South Lebanon. Monthly meetings are then conducted with representatives from each region to discuss their priorities. The third respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-28/12/07) added they conduct surveys to identify local priorities. For example, after the war, they administered a large survey that identified water sanitation as a major issue. They also carry out needs assessments to determine what to focus their awareness campaigns on, which cover issues such as cancer, smoking and dental hygiene. The first respondent from the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation (Fieldbook-22/12/07) explained they seek collective solutions through consensus decision-making and advise municipalities on development strategies that consider impacts on surrounding communities as well as the community in question.

The data suggests voting was described as one avenue for the community to voice their priorities. The Hezbollah parliamentarian (Fieldbook-30/12/07) suggests Hezbollah's parliamentary victory is proof of the party's popularity and that Hezbollah's
social service and military activities are addressing the community’s priorities. Ghorayeb (2002:46) says their popularity is further corroborated by Hezbollah’s strong standing in the municipal elections. In one of his speeches, Nasrullah encouraged community members to vote in the municipal elections so they may “…participate in their own development and the treatment of their economic ailments (as cited in Noe, 2007:12).”

Hezbollah ran on a platform that aimed to: decentralize authority to the municipal level in the provision of education and health care and the management of socioeconomic affairs; finance development projects; involve the most qualified persons in development projects; and, involve citizens more actively in the identification of development projects (Hamzeh, 2000:744 and 2004:123-124;).

Hezbollah has several methods of connecting with the community, the majority of which seem to involve marginalized segments of community, a reflection of the socio-economic position of Hezbollah’s own cadre. The following section explores local understandings of community and development, drawing out issues of diversity at the local level that impact the effectiveness of such participatory processes’.

3.3 Local Definitions of Community Development

3.3.1 How is community defined in the local context?

Respondents were asked to define what community means in the local context. Five respondents addressed this question, some defining it geographically and some according to shared values.

The respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s reconstruction unit (Fieldbook-25/12/07) defined community geographically by the areas in which Hezbollah operates, namely, the
Bekaa Valley, South Lebanon and the Southern Suburbs of Beirut. This perspective was shared by the respondent from Mu’assat al-Jarha (Association of the Injured) (Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08).

The respondent from Mu’assat al-Jarha (Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08) also defined community along sectarian lines to mean all Shia in Lebanon. The respondent adds a community can also be comprised of people sharing a common goal such as fighting Zionism despite them being of different religious sects and ethnicities. This view was shared by the respondent from Qard al Hassan (The Good Loan) (Fieldbook-19/12/07). The first cleric (Fieldbook-26/12/07) also suggests a community has no geographic limits and cited the locally revered Islamic figure from the 7th century, Imam Ali (A.S.) who said we have two families, the first is the worldwide Islamic community (Ummah) and the second is all mankind and there is a duty to help all.

Suggesting an alternative understanding of what constitutes a community, Hezbollah divides the world in two categories, individuals are either members of the oppressed (mustad’afin) or the oppressors (mustakbirin) (Norton, 1987:167-187; Ghorayeb, 2002:16; Hamzeh, 2004:42), with the idea the oppressed must rise up against the oppressors (Shay, 2005:20). Ghorayeb and Avi Jorisch both explain this idea of the oppressed and the oppressors does not pit Muslim’s against non-Muslim’s (Jorisch, 2004:15). It is a worldview that unifies all oppressed, regardless of faith and refers to all who are either culturally, politically or socio-economically oppressed and can thus include people of all social classes and religions (Ghorayeb, 2002:17, 19). Ghorayeb describes this worldview as a reflection of both the Qur’anic verse that refers to all ‘those who were being oppressed on earth’ (28:5) and Frantz Fanon’s work, ‘The Wretched of
the Earth,' thereby conjoining secular and religious ideologies (Ghorayeb, 2002:17). In contrast, Motahhari argues the Qur’an does not present society as polarized between those who exploit and those who are exploited as the pious can be found among all classes (as cited in Rahnema & Nomani, 1990:42).

The respondent from Qard al Hassan (Fieldbook-19/12/07) explained there are layers of community and that each city, each region and the nation are all communities, adding there can be great diversity within each community, just as each homogeneous sect can have an intense diversity of views. This perspective was corroborated by the respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s reconstruction unit (Fieldbook-25/12/07).

3.3.2 How is development defined in the local context?

While the second respondent from the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation (Fieldbook-24/01/08) explained Hezbollah does not have a single definition of development, the data suggests Hezbollah’s worldview encompasses several layers of development, beginning with continuous improvement of the individual; followed by development of the collective and development of the afterlife. An endogenous development strategy also emerges in the data that suggests development should reflect Islamic teachings and the local context.

Development of the Individual

The first cleric (Fieldbook-26/12/07) and the respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s reconstruction unit (The Reconstruction Campaign) (Fieldbook-25/12/07) describe development as continuous improvement, citing Imam Ali (A.S.) who said, 'everyday should be better than the day before it'. This perspective is corroborated by the respondent from Qard al Hassan (Fieldbook-19/12/07) who explains, “Islam is a religion
that motivates the person to what is better, not to freeze their energies.” Hezbollah’s carefully constructed cultural codes also play an important role in individual development. For example, the elaborate mourning rituals surrounding the battle of Karbala feature nightly lectures and poetry on the lessons that can be drawn from the battle while local towns and villages are decorated with black banners featuring revolutionary slogans encouraging individuals to draw lessons from the battle or act against injustice today. Together, these cultural activities have served to develop individuals and attract them towards a spiritual path that embraces struggle against the odds and sacrifice of material gain. These messages are reinforced throughout the year at annual ceremonies commemorating Hezbollah’s fallen leaders, through Hezbollah’s production of videoclips that glorify sacrifice and bravery and at the annual Jerusalem Day parade. The parade also bridges individual development with the idea of working as part of a collective level, presenting both, a collective show of strength and a consortium of individuals united towards a single goal (Kahil, 2007:74-75,103-105,121-125).

Development of the Collective

The first cleric (Fieldbook-26/12/07) argues once development occurs on an individual level, it can then occur on a societal level. In contrast to capitalism’s individualist worldview, Hezbollah holds the community’s welfare above that of the individual (Qassem as cited in Jaber 1997:56; Hamzeh, 2004:42). The first respondent from the Islamic Health Society explains,

A person is both an individual and is part of the collective community. Therefore we all have individual rights and collective responsibilities. In Islam, you can buy anything you want as long as it doesn’t harm the community. So you can manufacture as long as it doesn’t hurt the human experience. Social ethics are very important in Islam, you have a right to
live but you are one of the group. For example, in a boat, there is no right for anyone to break the boat just because they may will to do so, as they will all sink (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am).

Kahil explains Hezbollah’s ability to draw upon cultural practices and to use rhetoric proved effective in bringing community members together to engage in collective endeavours. For example, when Hezbollah was still being established, its founders used community events such as Friday prayer gatherings at local Mosques and commemorative events to encourage the spiritual, social and political development of the collective. Eventually, they also started developing their own cultural activities to further cultivate their notion of development of the collective (Kahil, 2007:29, 30).

*Development of the Afterlife*

The notion of striving for development in both the current life and the afterlife further distinguishes Hezbollah’s development model from that of mainstream development. Qassem, Hamzeh and Fouad Noureldine of *Jihad al Binaa* describe Hezbollah’s provision of social services as a fundamental tenet of faith and as basic a religious requirement as prayer and fasting (Hamzeh, 2004:42; Qassem, 2005:25; Worth & Fattah, 2006:2), all of which are intended to secure a positive afterlife. The respondent from *Jihad al Binaa*’s reconstruction unit (Fieldbook-25/12/07) explains according to the Qur'an, development means first, working for justice in this world and second, working to secure a good place in the hereafter. This view was corroborated by the first respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am) the first cleric (Fieldbook-26/12/07) and Nasrullah (Nasrallah, 2000a).
Exploring whether development is an endogenous or exogenous experience, Qassem (2005:224-225) writes there was an internal debate about the value of spreading the Hezbollah experience to other countries. Hezbollah’s Council decided to refrain from exporting their model rationalizing Hezbollah’s strategies reflect the particular context found in Lebanon and while examples could be drawn by others, the experience could not be replicated as a model. The respondent from *Qard al Hassan* explained having their own social service network enables them to circumvent an external worldview being imposed upon them and to do what is appropriate locally.

The west wants to come, civilize us as if we are savages. They tell us they are advanced because they have technology and now it’s the Lebanese person’s responsibility to catch up to this technology. But we found it’s not just about the west trying to bring us into modern technology, but it’s a case of hegemony and the west trying to dominate us…. (Fieldbook-19/12/07)

The first respondent from the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation similarly explained

the local community knows how to live life and have their own objectives and priorities and want a solution tailored to the local community. They do not want western values imposed upon them. If they want to change their own values, they will do so only after they themselves have found them to be false, not by someone from outside dictating to them (Fieldbook-22/12/07).

The first respondent from the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation adds,

many NGOs want to benefit from foreign funding and in order to have this funding, they need to work toward a western agenda. We however are not on that track, we work towards our own agenda based on our culture and Islam and this is our strength here. That does not mean we do not use western tools, for example, our centres have western standards and measures, we do not have a problem with their tools or processes, but with the foundation of their rules.
Describing Hezbollah’s unique approach to development, the second respondent from the Islamic Health Society provides the example of Hezbollah’s hiring practices.

Employees are selected based on their *deen* (level of faith) and reputation as a good person. *Deen* is important because that way we’re not duplicating services, we’re reflecting our local cultures values. In our culture, experience and *deen* go together. In this spirit, before hiring someone, we ask for recommendation letters for hiring, including references from spiritual persons or someone pious (Fieldbook-27/12/07, pm).

Hezbollah’s notion of development of the afterlife results in a very unique approach to local community development. Given the level of diversity that exists within a community, the question arises, are Hezbollah’s social services only available to adherents of a similar worldview?

### 3.4 Accessibility and the Social Service Network

Appendix A provides a comprehensive list of social services and specific projects provided by Hezbollah that were reviewed for the purpose of this study. Hezbollah’s social service network emerged in the early 1980s and grew to encompass a broad range of areas including investment in agriculture, community development consulting services, vocational training, scholarships, interest-free loans, healthcare, anti-smoking and other health related awareness campaigns, physical rehabilitation, welfare services, support for the elderly, education, reconstruction, road networks, the provision of shelter, the delivery of drinking water, environmental protection, local markets for farmers, art workshops and galleries for the injured, women’s programs and youth programs such as scouts. We now turn to a consideration of the accessibility of these services.
3.4.1 Who may access Hezbollah’s Social Services?

Five respondents discussed who may access Hezbollah’s social services. The responses answers varied from the broad society to an exclusive community depending on the nature of the social service provided.

According to a 1999 survey by ESCWA, ‘Poverty and Gender Profile in the Ba’albaak-Hermel Region’, Hezbollah’s social services cut across class lines (Harik, 2004:87). The respondent from Mu’assat al-Jarha (Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08) explained the organizations services are available to all those injured in the war regardless of sectarian or political affiliation. The respondent from Qard al Hasan (Fieldbook-19/12/07) explained interest free loans are geared towards helping the lower and middle class with the merit of loan applications being based solely on need. Religious, political or sectarian affiliations are not relevant. At the same time, the respondent added they also do not support any business proposals pertaining to the vices such as opening a bar or restaurant that serves alcohol.

According to the literature, Hezbollah’s health services are accessed by both Muslim’s and Christians (Jorisch, 2004:11; Koya, 2007:35) irregardless of their political views (Norton, 2007:110). The first respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am) explained they operate one centre in the Palestinian refugee camp Ain el Hilwe as well as two hospitals in Sunni areas and one in a mixed community. This is corroborated by Hamzeh (2004:88-89) who adds, the staff includes a mix of Sunni and Christians but the majority are Shia.

We address all humans needs, not just Shia’s needs. This is mainly because as Imam Ali A.S. said, all people are either brothers in religion or in humanity….Our centres are open for all people, but the population
often prefers to go to their own centres, but also choose to come to our centres as they know the quality is good and because we are all religious, so they trust us (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am).

The third respondent from the Islamic Health Society added health services are also made accessible to people regardless of socio-economic status.

We provide services for poor people and it becomes free if they are really needy. This can be arranged by them getting a reference from a Hezbollah member, as each village, city or town has a reference person who can verify if they really are needy (Fieldbook-28/12/07).

Several of Hezbollah’s social services appear to be accessible to the broader community regardless of political or religious affiliation with measures in place to increase accessibility for the more marginalized segments of society. The next section explores whether Hezbollah is creating a monopoly on social service delivery or seeking to undermine or duplicate current efforts by the government or the NGO community.

3.4.2 Do alternatives exist?

Respondents were asked to discuss whether there are other alternatives available or if Hezbollah is the only entity providing such services in the community. Twelve respondents addressed this issue, including service providers from the UNDP and UNICEF. Responses explored the activities of other multilateral organizations, faith-based organizations, government services and exogenous community development initiatives.

The respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s reconstruction unit (Fieldbook-25/12/07) explained that Hezbollah is not the only organization providing social services on the ground and the community’s development is largely furthered by foreign remittances and
by UNIFIL’s presence of 10,000 peacekeepers, which helps support the local economy in the South. In informal conversations, one respondent explained there are many parties involved in post-war reconstruction with countries such as Qatar and Iran having sponsored the reconstruction of entire villages, road networks or other infrastructure projects. To avoid any duplication of efforts and to ensure priority areas are addressed, all of these undertakings are coordinated by Hezbollah.

Both respondents from the UN discussed measures in place to ensure no duplication between the UN and the activities of other NGOs or Hezbollah. The first respondent from the UNDP (Fieldbook-15/01/08, pm) explained the UN opened four new sub-regional offices in Lebanon after the July 2006 war, focusing on quick implementation projects with long-term benefits. The respondent argues due to the immense lack of services, duplication is unlikely between any parties operating in Lebanon. At the same time, the UN organizes field visits and sector working groups that bring together all NGO’s and municipal representatives to coordinate activities to ensure no overlap. The respondent adds duplication with Hezbollah is minimized by the fact that all UNDP projects are coordinated through the municipality, which in turn is aware of all local Hezbollah projects in the area (Fieldbook-15/01/08, am).

The first respondent from the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation (Fieldbook-22/12/07) contrasted Hezbollah’s social services with those provided by Fadlallah’s faith-based charitable organization. The respondent stated Fadlallah’s social service programs focus on poverty alleviation and welfare services but do not deliver sustainable solutions while Hezbollah encourages self-sufficiency in addition to providing welfare services. Contrasting Hezbollah’s social services with those provided
by other non-profit or private sector organizations, the respondent from *Qard al Hassan* (Fieldbook-19/12/07) stated no one provides loans at the scale of *Qard al Hassan*.

Similarly, the respondent from *Jihad al Binaa*’s agricultural unit (Fieldbook-17/01/08) stated Hezbollah is the only one who is concentrating on long-term extension work while other NGO’s tend to focus on short-term projects.

The health sector provided an interesting case study as in some cases, there were alternative hospitals available and in other cases the Hezbollah health centre or hospital was the only one servicing several towns or villages at a time. The third respondent from the Islamic Health Society discussed cases where both government and Hezbollah medical centres are available in close geographic proximity to each other, arguing the Hezbollah clinic or hospital would be more affordable and reputed to have high quality service. Through informal conversations, one individual gave the example of Sheikh Ragheb Harb hospital, an Iranian hospital in the town of Duwair and the government hospital, which is in the nearby city of Nabatiyeh. This respondent suggested contrasting the quality of health care may be entirely subjective, relating a story of a child being injured and the relatives arguing over which hospital to go to. One relative was a Hezbollah supporter and insisted the best service would be provided at Sheikh Ragheb Harb while the secular relative felt the best service would be at the government hospital.

The first respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am) argues Hezbollah’s hospitals are more accessible. While medical care is subsidized by the government, there is a high volume of outstanding hospital bills that patients owe to government offices, resulting in government hospitals often refusing treatment except in very critical cases (*Lebanon: Destruction of Civilian Infrastructure, 2006*).
Two respondents discussed exogenous community development initiatives that targeted communities in Lebanon, arguing these initiatives did not benefit local communities and were designed to create a sense of external dependency. The first respondent from the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation provided the example of a community development project led by France.

Lots of money came from outside and from France after the war, and they impose exogenous values and priorities on the community. For example, France funded one community in the south with money to build a recycling plant. This money was donated to the locality with the condition that the plant is built by France with French machinery and parts. France did not train the local community with how to repair or maintain the plant as the community must bring experts from France for all maintenance. This means even more money goes to the donor. The question arises, where will money come to sustain the plant and what comes next? There's no plan to educate the community on recycling and sorting garbage at a household level and the existence of the plant does not reflect community priorities after the war. France also did not provide a management plan (Fieldbook-22/12/07).

This respondent further argued the World Bank and ESCWA do not bring real alternatives and only what they as outsiders think would be good. The first respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am) shared the example of the EU, which in 1996 gave $10 billion to Mediterranean region with $350,000 to Lebanon. The stated objectives were to raise the level of culture and technology, but the respondent argues, “...really the agenda was for us to become markets for their goods.” The respondent added, ESCWA’s only current project in South Lebanon is to build smart communities and increase broadband Internet access, which the respondent argues is similarly intended to build markets for technical goods, e.g., hardware, software, digital cameras and products, MP3 players, etc.,
The majority of responses indicate the level of need is so great in Lebanon that any duplication of services is unlikely. At the same time, the goals of the service providers ranging from Fadlallah to Hezbollah to the government and ESCWA appear significantly different from one another, suggesting the possibility of very different outcomes for similar services.

3.4.3 What role do women play in Hezbollah?

While exploring the accessibility and availability of services, the question arises, what impact does Hezbollah’s presence have on women’s access to the public sphere? Six respondents discussed the role of women in Hezbollah.

According to the respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s reconstruction unit (Fieldbook-25/12/07), half of all registered scouts are girls. In Hezbollah schools, the majority of teachers are women and in radio and TV, 40 per cent of employees are women. Women constitute the entire organizational body of Hayat-I-Nisae, a foundation created in Hezbollah for women. The third respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-28/12/07) states the majority of staff in the polyclinics are also women. The first respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am) explains women have the same job levels as men in Hezbollah’s hospitals and are paid the same, although sometimes men might be paid more if they are responsible for the family while if a woman is the main bread winner, she is paid more. The respondent adds the position of coordinator with the regional hospitals is reserved for a man as there is extensive travelling involved and all the people they will meet will also be men. The respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s agricultural unit stated,
We always try to empower and involve women. In the rural areas, they do most of the jobs, take care of the family house, farming, etc., so we believe they are more serious and their role is increasing in managing their society. Much of our awareness campaigns target women. We have farming co-ops for women to train them on how to conserve and sell food. We are training hundreds of women yearly in Lebanon. We train on healthy habits on food and preservation. We train on how to make a profit if there’s a surplus. Every family here grows food in the summer to conserve in the winter and we help them on how to conserve better. We organize local markets to sell their food in autumn (Fieldbook-17/01/08).

According to Kahil (2007:58, 64), women in Hezbollah are present in all areas of work in Hezbollah’s social service network and other activities including on the frontlines and as educated writers. Kahil describes their role as "crucial and vital" although they have yet to attain a high rank in the organization. According to Qassem, women are not present on the frontlines of fighting but play an integral role behind the scenes through supporting their husbands on the frontlines (as cited in Jaber, 1997:90) and through recruitment by moulding the next generation to understand and adopt the ethos of struggling for social justice (Qassem, 2005:46, 60). According to Jabir (1997:90), a member of Hezbollah’s women’s association tabled a proposal to allow women to become human bombs.

After discussing the accessibility of social services, the question arises, how does Hezbollah logistically operationalize such a diverse range of services? Particularly, given the community’s history of neglect and marginalization, where does the knowledge and capacity arise from that would be required to implement such massive undertakings?
3.5 How does Hezbollah develop & implement its social service network?

3.5.1 What role does social capital play in the development, implementation and delivery of community development programs?

Eight respondents discussed the level of involvement of community members in the development, implementation and delivery of community development programs. Several respondents touched upon social capital in their responses, some mentioning it specifically and others discussed aspects of it such as the role of reciprocity, volunteerism, trust, solidarity and cooperation in facilitating local community development.

The second respondent from the consulting agency claims social capital enables Hezbollah to “attain big results with little resources”; citing the example of the studies they conduct with very few financial resources. The respondent explains Hezbollah uses the social capital of its people and high levels of volunteerism to make such activities possible.

Reciprocity

While the notion of reciprocity is prominent in social capital, many respondents shared examples of individuals giving to the community with no expectations of getting anything in return. The first respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am) provided the example of six of their paramedics who were killed in the July 2006 war, which the respondent explains, exemplifies individuals wanting to serve the community interest with no expectation of gaining anything in return. The first cleric (Fieldbook-26/12/07) provides the additional example of a community member who experienced $1 million in losses as a result of the war but reasoned this loss is not worth
one drop of the blood of Hezbollah’s fighters, denoting a rather unique understanding of reciprocity

**Volunteerism**

The first respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am) claims the health organization has more than 1500 volunteers, attributing this high level of volunteerism to a close-knit local culture that suggests community members have a duty to help those in need of assistance. This is corroborated by the third respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-28/12/07) who says their polyclinic has 50 to 200 volunteers at any given time.

The second respondent from the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation (Fieldbook-24/01/08) claimed Hezbollah has over ten thousand professionals volunteering with them. This is corroborated by Robert Worth and Hassan Fattah (2006) who describe the high levels of volunteerism in Bint Jbeil, one of the hardest hit communities in the July 2006 war, where *Jihad al Binaa* enlisted 1700 volunteers including engineers, geologists, plumbers, and architects to removed rubble, dig ditches and built temporary bridges. Kifner describes a similar swift post-war clean-up led by volunteers,

hundreds of Hezbollah members spread over dozens of villages across southern Lebanon [and] began cleaning, organizing and surveying damage. Men on bulldozers were busy cutting lanes through giant piles of rubble. Roads blocked with the remnants of buildings are now, just a day after a cease-fire began, fully passable (Kifner, 2007).

**Trust**

Several respondents described trust as a key enabler of Hezbollah’s social service programs. The first respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am)
argues the community has a high level of trust in Hezbollah. The respondent provides the parallel of trusting ones family doctor because they are trustworthy professionals and would not perform unnecessary procedures on their patients and Hezbollah similarly gaining the peoples trust and confidence because, “We will do what we say. And we don’t have a hidden agenda.” The mayor explained, “now development is moving fast and the dreams we had before are now being realized very quickly because there is a high level of trust (Fieldbook-23/01/08).” A similar sentiment was shared by the respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s agricultural sector who stated, “We have gained the trust of the local community, which enables us to experience positive results with minimal resources. In contrast, some programs spend lots of money just to gain peoples trust and have them adopt new ideas (Fieldbook-17/01/08).”

According to the second respondent from Hezbollah’s consulting agency, “the reason Hezbollah is so effective and efficient is due to the trust that exists between the people.” The respondent was asked, is this trust genuine, or is it coerced under the presence of the barrel of Hezbollah’s guns. The respondent argued Hezbollah’s high electoral standings in the south suggests the support is genuine and not coerced adding, the “...people trust them [Hezbollah] and don’t fear them.” And, “Hezbollah never used its arms against its own [the Lebanese] people and wasn’t involved in the civil war.”

This question is further addressed by Sayyed Nasrullah who argues,

The people used to go and tour the entire south even before 12 July [2006]. Did anyone see a person wearing a military uniform or carrying a Kalashnikov or wireless radio?...One of the reasons for the success of our resistance, its popularity, and its acceptance by the people, is that it avoids armed manifestations, and does not show off in mobilization, fighting, preparedness, presence, or even the burial of martyrs. Have you seen a
gun or a rifle at the funeral of any martyr? There has been nothing of the sort. This is our policy (Noe, 2007:384-386).

**Solidarity**

The mayor suggests there is a high degree of solidarity in the community, which inspires the involvement of a cross-section of people in the implementation of social service programs.

During the war, we coordinated between everyone to bring people food, water and electricity. During the war, we stayed with the people, talked to them, protected their stores, coordinated with the hospitals and the volunteers. My house was destroyed in the war and my four children were injured and trapped in the rubble... six rockets were fired into my home... At this point, I lost all my belongings. But this is okay as I am working for humanity. We work for a better future, our lives and people and country are not cheap. We fight for positive change. The first three months after the war, our office was full with people asking for help and coming to help. The second floor was full of baby food and donated goods. We would keep referring donors to different municipalities because people have confidence in me, that’s why we were getting most of the donations, and I wanted to ensure the other municipalities also have their needs met. We get help and tell them which municipality and people need help and only to help at that end, and when all others are helped, then we would take their donations for our municipality (Fieldbook-23/01/08).

**Cooperation**

The second respondent from the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation (Fieldbook-24/01/08) provides the example of Wa’ad, a subsidiary of **Jihad al Binaa**, which led the reconstruction of the Beirut suburbs where 250 buildings including 7000 apartments were destroyed. During a post-war community meeting, 80 per cent of people voted that Wa’ad should take their government compensation money to rebuild their apartment blocs, which the consultant says demonstrated the community’s high level of trust in Hezbollah as well as community cooperation and social capital. The respondent explains,
...if a building is destroyed, it would be impossible to rebuild if everyone worked individually, so Hezbollah took everyone’s ideas to rebuild based on this, which increased community cooperation and also ensured the communities priorities are met (Fieldbook-24/01/08).

The respondent from Mu’assat al-Jarha relayed the amount of goodwill and cooperation that occurred when Hezbollah undertook a capital project to develop a rehabilitation and recreation facility for fighters injured during the war.

We built this centre not with an expensive contractor, that would have been faster, but instead, hundreds of community members came from the community and were hired and worked slowly and materials were donated, including sand and rocks...people would give so much...and all these contributions had a huge impact on our budget...and the community felt a sense of ownership and we created jobs for them. That way, we avoided using a big construction company and saved 20% of the cost (Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08).

Similarly, to cover the expenses of each injured person, they developed a sponsorship project based on the idea of brotherhood that occurred after Hijra (migration) of Prophet Muhammed from Mecca to Medina. “We took this Islamic idea, where a family that is well off partners with an injured for his treatment, just like the people of Medina partnered with the people of Mecca.”

Hezbollah suggests its ability to implement such a broad range of social services is due to its ability to draw on the community’s stocks of social capital. Given that most NGOs and multi-lateral organizations strive to improve the effectiveness and efficiency with which they engage in social service delivery, the question arises, how effectively and efficiently does Hezbollah deliver these social services?
3.5.2 How does Hezbollah ensure effectiveness and efficiency of social service delivery?

Seven respondents discussed how Hezbollah ensures the effectiveness and efficiency of social service delivery. Some argued its low salary scale results in brain drain and a decline in the quality of services. Others contended this is not an issue due to the moral fibre of its members. Efficiency was generally attributed to the absence of corruption, bureaucratic delays and high salary costs. The use of sound project management principles was also described as a contributor to project efficiency.

Moubayed argues the organization faces a challenge in ensuring technical expertise remains current and that qualified staff are retained in light of its non-competitive wages and narrow labour pool that only employs members of Hezbollah (as cited in Harik, 2004:91). The third respondent from the Islamic Health Society disagrees, explaining “We use management principles and medical protocols to the highest degree and conduct training workshops, often in collaboration with the American University of Beirut and the World Health Organization to keep staff up to date (Fieldbook-28/12/07).” Moubayed also found in Jihad al Binaa, staff undergo regular training through an established engineering and consulting firm (as cited in Harik, 2004:91).

The third respondent from the Islamic Health Society attributes the effectiveness and efficiency of the social service network to the fact that people are willing to sacrifice individual gain in pursuit of the collective good,

We have a concept called *Intima*, which helps explain why we are so effective and efficient. You can either work just because you want the salary or because you are passionate about what you do and don’t care about the salary. *Intima* means you want to give yourself to benefit the society...because you see people need your help...it’s a collective understanding based on religion and beliefs...We could get higher salaries
if we work outside, but skills are kept sharp here and people work for less money due to intima which prevents brain drain. One staff with intima equals ten without as they'll stay here even in the war... (Fieldbook-28/12/07).

This is corroborated by the respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s agricultural sector (Fieldbook-17/01/08) who similarly explains, “One joins Jihad al Binaa to give, not to get, so money and lower salaries are not a problem, we join to help the poor farmers. This is a reflection of local culture, values and vision.” The second respondent from the Islamic Health Society suggests Hezbollah’s social service network is highly effective because it is developed and implemented by local community members. “When a people are affected by need and also have the spirit to help, his duty towards his people makes us focus on effectiveness and success of our work (Fieldbook-27/12/07, pm).”

Assessing the efficiency of Hezbollah’s social services, the Mayor, who partners with Hezbollah on municipal development projects, explains, “When we deal with Hezbollah, it is because they are more efficient and straight, with no bureaucracy, no corruption and they are honest (Fieldbook-23/01/08).” The respondent from Mu’assat al-Jarha argues the lack of corruption is due to “the moral fibre and quality of the people that work here.” The respondent provides the example of a recreational facility built for those injured in the war.

…it was a million dollar project. Many contractors tried to offer me bribes so they may get the project. So I kicked them all out. Similarly, the fighter can stand in front of a tank armed with just a gun and not feel afraid, it’s that same moral fibre. Therefore, we don’t take bribes and there’s no corruption (Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08).

Several respondents attributed Hezbollah’s efficiency to their sound project management skills. When discussing local partners on the ground, the Mayor finds
when they [Hezbollah] say they will do something, it gets done on time....They study the timelines before starting a project and then keep to the timeline. In fact, they study everything very carefully and know if they can achieve the objectives. This careful study enables quality of work, which is always high (Fieldbook-23/01/08).

The respondent from Mu'assat al-Jarha adds, “We have good organizational skills. We double and triple check the quality of our work (Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08).”

According to Moubayed, Jihad al Binaa is well organized, with a short chain of command a strong sense of teamwork and uses management techniques and processes such as weekly progress reports. Jihad al Binaa conducts weekly, monthly, bi-annual and annual meetings to assess progress, review and update operational plans and exchange ideas, ensuring staff participation in the decision-making process. They also have annual retreats where staff develop the upcoming budget and work plan. Jihad al Binaa also establishes cost-share agreements with local partners, encouraging greater participation and making project success more likely when the local community has a stake in the project (as cited in Harik, 2004:91).

3.5.3 What accountability mechanisms are in place?

An essential component of an effective and efficient project would be one that assures accountability to donors and recipients. Four respondents addressed the question, what accountability mechanisms are in place to ensure funds designated for social services go to the intended place? Respondents discussed the importance of trust and lack of corruption. Most respondents stressed the influence of religious beliefs, or the fact the administrators of Hezbollah’s social services are themselves marginalized people from the community and that any form of corruption or acquisition of luxury items would be easily visible by the organization or the community.
Deeb (2006) argues Hezbollah’s electoral success was due to their reputation of being a ‘clean’ and capable political party. According to the respondent from *Qard al Hassan* (Fieldbook-19/12/07), the local people trust the organization to the extent that they are willing to keep $13 million of their savings in their trust, knowing they can access their money whenever they want. The respondent adds, this speaks volumes about their accountability, not just of *Qard al Hassan*, but of the whole organization.

The second cleric (Fieldbook-29/12/07) argues Hezbollah has two accountability mechanisms, the first is fear of God and the second is the watchful eyes of the entire community, which ensures no waste, extravagance or corruption. One respondent explained throughout Hezbollah’s heartland, most shops and street corners house donation boxes that fund Hezbollah’s activities. The blue boxes solicit donations for the social service wing and the red boxes collect donations for the military wing, which helps ensure funds go to the intended place. Some social service boxes are further marked to indicate if the money is for the welfare department, hospitals, etc. The first and second clerics (Fieldbook-26/12/07; Fieldbook-29/12/07) explain the community is also able to see the results of the money they donate and how it helps people. They contrast this with foreign associations where the donors are not present to provide any oversight and witness the outcome of their contribution.

According to Ghorayeb (2002:17-18), Hezbollah frowns upon the accumulation of excess wealth. Hezbollah upholds poverty and deprivation as moral virtues and just as Imam Ali (A.S.) shunned wealth in favour of a humble life, so too did Khomeini and Hezbollah’s leaders. “So ubiquitous is this theme in Hizbu’llah’s political thought that it has become institutionalised as a norm to which Hizbu’llah officials must adhere
The first cleric (Fieldbook-26/12/07) and the first respondent from the Islamic Health Society explain, all Hezbollah staff are poor or lower-middle class and in Hezbollah,

everyone knows everyone, so if someone buys a luxury item or their financial situation improves drastically, then people know and then the department responsible will conduct surveillance and an inquiry into the matter (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am).

The second respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-27/12/07, pm) argues corruption amongst Hezbollah members would be illogical because they are from the same community that would be benefiting from the social services.

3.6 Hezbollah’s Role in Addressing the Structural Environment

The data suggests Hezbollah strives to implement an effective and efficient social service network, however, the question remains; do these services ultimately keep the status quo intact, while taking away attention from structural issues? This section first asks, does Hezbollah’s social service network cushion the rollback of the state? Second, does Hezbollah bridge social capital and succeed in bringing the community voice to the national level? Third, does Hezbollah engage in social dissent in a bid to alter structures? Fourth, how do Hezbollah’s armed activities impact the structural environment? Fifth, how has Hezbollah impacted the sense of pride in the local identity?

3.6.1 Does social service delivery take away attention from structural issues?

This section begins by first, exploring the motivations behind Hezbollah’s social service delivery. Second, we consider whether the social services are cushioning the rollback of the state. Third, we ask, is Hezbollah lobbying the government to take over
these services or is it moving towards a decentralized approach in which the community assumes a greater share of the states role?

The literature provides various explanations for the motivation behind Hezbollah’s provision of social services. Qassem (2005:85) argues that governmental neglect and the community’s deprivation is so great that if it were not for the community’s provision of social services, tens of thousands would undergo social crisis of a large magnitude. According to Hamzeh (2004:42-43), Hezbollah’s social services thus prevented class conflict, which Hamzeh suggests inadvertently kept uneven power structures intact. In contrast, Qassem and Abdar Rahman Koya argue the provision of social services did not take away attention from addressing structural issues and instead made resisting the structural constraint of the Israeli occupation more endurable (Qassem, 2005:86; Koya, 2007:24, 34). The Hezbollah parliamentarian claims Hezbollah had to focus on the society’s needs, which must be satisfied so that community members can be active participants (Fieldbook-30/12/07). Humphreys (2008:A21) suggests providing social services is correlated to Hezbollah’s popular support while Shay (2005:67) writes that Hezbollah used social service delivery to undermine the government and become a state within a state. The respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s reconstruction unit argues,

In the west, they think Hezbollah does reconstruction to become popular, this is false...In the dahiyeh [Southern Suburbs of Beirut], Bekaa and junoub [South Lebanon], the people and the community and Hezbollah have an intimate relationship, it’s spiritual, not material. When Hezbollah took responsibility to construct, it is not to be popular but it did it as a duty (Fieldbook-25/12/07).

According to an incident relayed by other informants indicative of this ‘duty’, a family living in Europe had a villa in the border area of Lebanon which was damaged during the
war. The family received a letter in the mail stating that repairs for their home will be completed by Hezbollah at no cost.

*Qard al Hassan’s* provision of interest-free loans *Jihad al Binaa’s* reconstruction campaign and rural extension work and the Islamic Health Societies opening of new hospitals were all described as means to fill gaps in government services (Fieldbook-19/12/07; Fieldbook-24/01/08; Fieldbook-25/12/07; Fieldbook-27/12/07, am; Cavanaugh, 2007; Noe, 2007:405). The second respondent from the Islamic Health Society explains, “When the Lebanese army didn’t do their job, we did it and similarly, when the health ministry doesn’t do their job, we have to do it (Fieldbook-27/12/07, pm).” The third respondent from the Islamic Health Society explained “due to the states absence, Islam pushes us to provide these services as we cannot just watch our people die without any services due to poverty (Fieldbook-28/12/07).” The respondent from *Jihad al Binaa’s* reconstruction unit (Fieldbook-25/12/07) similarly argues Hezbollah’s social service wing “was in response to government policy of neglect and not some Hezbollah policy or agenda to decentralize all power away from the government.” The second respondent from the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation (Fieldbook-24/01/08) adds, since 1991, the aim of Hezbollah’s parliamentarians has been to provide social services for the local community but the government’s priorities have been to provide the opportunities for the private sector. As a result, Hezbollah provides these services themselves and this is how they create political space.

According to the first respondent from the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation, it would be ideal if the government did take over service provision in
such areas as they may be able to provide more substantial loans or play a greater role in job creation as,

All of Hezbollah’s programs have not stopped urbanization to Beirut. Why? The schools employ maybe a dozen people, the hospitals and polyclinics also have limited staff. Although they provide loans to small businesses, these are capped at $5000 which is insufficient...(Fieldbook-22/12/07)

At the same time, Fneish (as cited in Cavanaugh 2007) argues the state should not be responsible for providing all social services as he sees space for decentralization and a strong civil society that operates on the grassroots as that would be more in touch with the community’s priorities.

The data suggests Hezbollah has lobbied the government to provide a greater role in the delivery of social services (Harik, 2004:89). The second respondent from the Islamic Health Society explained,

We do our own research and gather our own statistics based on our own indicators and get results and lobby the government to carry out its responsibility, but they don’t, and then we have to fill the gap, while we continue to lobby them...If the government provides a service that is enough for the people, then we don’t provide this service (Fieldbook-27/12/07, pm).

This is corroborated by the respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s agricultural unit who explained,

In the 1980s, the government was totally absent so we supplied electricity and water. At the end of the civil war, the government began to do this, so we gave up working in electricity so the government can assume responsibility. When the government took over electricity, we concentrated on agriculture, as they only focused on banks and the service sector, neglecting rural development. In the 1980s, we worked in garbage removal, but now it’s the government that took over their responsibility in this area (Fieldbook-17/01/08).
Nasrullah claims they would relinquish their activities in any area where the state decides to assume a role.

Today, I see clearly about reconstruction and other issues, and the state is listening: where we have built a hospital, if the state builds a hospital, we will close our hospital; where we have built a school, if the state builds a school, we will close our school...We are not an alternative to the state, but where the state is absent we must be present... (Noe, 2007:406)

In the literature, Hezbollah has been labelled a state within a state that seeks to erode the government’s legitimacy by assuming their role in local community development. According to the data, Hezbollah appears to negotiate a fine line between seeking decentralization of state power and wanting the state to assume a greater role in national defence and service delivery. The following section explores to what extent Hezbollah has been able to bring the local voice to the national level and bridge social capital.

3.6.2 Bridging Social Capital

This section first asks, is Hezbollah trying to bring down a state system perceived to be unfair or are they seeking to work from within the system? Second, has their participation in parliament increased their ability to impact national structures? Third, have they succeeded in bridging social capital across sectarian lines to advance common interests?

Altering the system or working from within?

According to Ghorayeb (2002:88-89), Hezbollah rejects the “values, beliefs, institutions and social structures’[10] of Western society.” Ghorayeb explains this is because Hezbollah is against their colonial, imperial and hegemonic practices, yet Hezbollah does not seek to replace structures through radical change and violence on the
domestic front as the chaos that may ensue is considered more oppressive than the oppressive state being replaced. Ghorayeb (2002:22-24) rationalizes radical change on internal affairs would create a weakened environment that would invite external aggression from Israel and would also detract attention from Hezbollah’s ‘liberation priority’, to resist occupation. As a result, they seek to maintain public order and avoid any actions that could result in a state of chaos.

**Parliamentary Presence**

Hajj Muhammed Raad explains in an interview with Ghorayeb at the time of its inception, Hezbollah was a revolutionary movement that opposed the Lebanese system and sought to change it. However, the Taif Agreement’s redistribution of power within the state’s structure made it possible to work for structural change from ‘within the system’ (Ra’id, 1998).

government corruption in parliament and therefore enhance social justice. Nasrullah states, “Regardless of the resistance … there are internal issues that are important to the people in the political and economic spheres, and in their daily lives… (as cited in Noe, 2007:6-7).”

The questions remains, what kind of change has this brought about? According to Qassem (2005:204), Hezbollah opposed a realtors development plans to uproot 50,000 people from the Ouzai river basin, successfully opposed plans to open a wholesale supermarket in the Ghobeiri residential area that would have negatively impacted the self-sufficiency of local business owners, advocated for teachers and labourers as well as the employees of Middle East Airlines and called for the establishment of a regional developmental council to reflect local concerns. It also opposed the construction of a bridge in the Ouzai area that would have had detrimental effects on the area and stopped the use of polluting diesel-powered vehicles while ensuring the interests of their drivers and owners were also met. According to the Hezbollah parliamentarian (Fieldbook-30/12/07), their presence in parliament has enabled them to address structural issues such as lobbying the government to assume its responsibility in social service delivery. It has enabled Hezbollah to block decisions from the government and other parties from being imposed on the community. It also enabled the bridging of social capital across sectarian lines. The respondent explains, Hezbollah and its allies formed a coalition in the government and while it may not have strongly influenced parliamentary decisions, their MPs claim they have stopped things from getting worse⁴, while consistently representing

⁴ For example, Hezbollah objected and voted against budgets proposed by three successive governments in 1992, 1996, and 2000 that ignored rural development.
the peoples interests such as pushing for government investment in neglected areas such as agriculture and industry. Qassem (2005:193) argues it has also enabled them to table budgetary measures in favour of the deprived.

**Bridging the Sectarian Chasm**

The Hezbollah parliamentarian describes parliament as an arena to create bridges between different communities and with foreign governments, adding, “The real change occurs where there’s direct contact or shared interests between the people and the parliament (Fieldbook-30/12/07).” Qassem (2005:180, 193) explains, Hezbollah formed a coalition in government comprising of Shia, Sunni, Catholic and Maronite MPs, describing the inter-sectarian relations formed in the political realm as one of the benefits of having a presence in Lebanon’s parliament. Qassem adds, this enables communities to collectively discuss issues, address misconceptions and promote greater understanding.

Describing a role in bridging social capital, Qassem (2005) explains Hezbollah also engages in various interfaith activities including official visits with the several communities including the leaders of Catholic, Orthodox, Assyrian and Armenian communities provided they did not have any relationships with Israel. Nasrullah adds, Hezbollah delegations also sent Christmas greetings to Christian families in the South and West Beirut and the Bishop of Ba’albaak (as cited in Noe, 2007:65).

The data suggests Hezbollah is far from a revolutionary movement seeking to overthrow the system and instead seeks to work for change from within. Hezbollah’s parliamentary presence is one method through which they seek to bring a local voice to the national level. The following section explores whether Hezbollah engages in any other acts of passive resistance to further their community’s agenda.
3.6.3 How does passive resistance affect the community's development?

This section explores whether Hezbollah is active in the area of social dissent or passive resistance to understand if and how they impact the structural environment affecting the local community's development. According to Harik, Hezbollah often mobilizes residents of the Southern Suburbs of Beirut for strikes and protests. In December 1991, Hezbollah encouraged the formation of residential and professional groups in each quarter of the southern suburbs to press the government for action on the water problem (Harik, 2004:89). In December 2006, there was

... a massive peaceful protest gathering in downtown Beirut....half a million Shi'a and Christians ...vowed to stay put until the government succumbed to pressure and either accepted a national unity government or agreed to call elections...perhaps the most profound importance of the December protest...will be as a model for collective action in other Arab locales...(Norton, 2007:157)

Some respondents also described Hezbollah's social services network as a form of passive resistance. According to the respondent from Jihad al Binaa's reconstruction unit,

Hezbollah is part of this society. All the activities support the resistance in the end, the existence of universities, or development of 'ilm [knowledge], of people going to school, of people making life merely go on, etc., all are a form of resistance (Fieldbook-25/12/07).

The respondent from Jihad al Binaa's agricultural unit also described their agricultural activities as a form of passive resistance (Fieldbook-17/01/08). The third respondent from the Islamic Health Society similarly explained,

Hezbollah is a reaction to occupation. Resistance is providing healthcare, rehabilitation, building schools, etc. Why? Because the enemy wishes that we do not get an education. When I was 13 years old, the IDF blocked us from going to school, markets were closed, two to three people were killed everyday. Going to school was resistance. Hezbollah similarly
has a system of resistance, not just an army, but a system (Fieldbook-28/12/07).

The Mayor also suggested making life go on is itself is a form of resistance. The Mayor explained,

one week after the war, we opened the Monday market... This was to show normalcy and to help peoples lives continue. Electricity was worked on 24/7 so it may be quickly restored. We were at the office day and night, helping move donations, helping people, etc. Electricity was on and it was a big war, a resistance to rebuild (Fieldbook-23/01/08).

Ghorayeb finds, as a result of Hezbollah’s social dissent activities, it has transformed from a narrow resistance movement to a broad based social movement (see Al-Maokif) while Harik (2004:2) describes Hezbollah as a moderate, mainstream political party with a resistance wing.

The literature suggests Hezbollah is active in the area of social dissent with participation in unions and other non-violent means of action to bring about change. The following section will explore the implications of this dual role in which on the one hand, Hezbollah is described as a political party or a social movement that provides social services but at the same time continues to engage in armed struggle.

3.6.4 How does armed struggle affect the community’s development?

After the Taif Agreement, all militias in Lebanon were forced to disarm. Hezbollah was allowed to continue to bear arms arguing they are a resistance movement. Norton writes, “This position enjoyed with though not unanimous, support in Lebanon, where the Israeli occupation was seen as an impediment to the country’s recovery (Norton, 2007:83).” This section first asks, what are the implications of Hezbollah disarming? Second, is it a contradiction to simultaneously engage in armed struggle
while providing social services? Third, what type of development has taken place in the community since the Israeli withdrawal in 2000? Fourth, why is the state not taking over responsibility for defending the land? Finally, will Hezbollah go out of business in the absence of a state of conflict?

According to Hamzeh (2004:88-89), Hezbollah has several features of a guerrilla movement with the distinction that in order to participate in fighting, members must first successfully undergo the greater jihad before they are allowed to participate in the lesser jihad. Qassem defines jihad as 'struggle' describing the greater jihad as the struggle with one's inner self, 'towards the victory of virtue, justice, human rights and uprightness' and the lesser jihad as armed struggle (Qassem, 2005:36). Hamzeh (2004:88-89) adds Hezbollah fighters are unique from many guerrilla movements in that they are extremely disciplined with banditry and such activities being non-existent. This is corroborated by Leenders who writes during the July 2006 war, many shopkeepers returned home to find IOUs from fighters who stayed behind during the war, followed up with prompt payments.

**Implications of Hezbollah Disarming**

According to the third respondent from the Islamic Health Society, Hezbollah’s armed struggle creates an equilibrium,

...if the IDF bombs us, they know we will respond similarly, which creates stability and security for us....but now if we disarm, they could re-occupy and prevent us from an education, life, development, etc (Fieldbook-28/12/07).

The second respondent from the Islamic Health Society similarly argued,

Development either happens in conditions of peace or in conditions where there is a balance of power...since the balance of power cannot be
achieved through classical armies, the resistance becomes necessary (Fieldbook-27/12/07, pm).

The second cleric argues, "If there's no resistance, then there's occupation and under the occupation, there's no development (Fieldbook-29/12/07)." Nasrullah argues the military wing is directly associated with Lebanon's stability and ability to develop arguing disarming now,

would place Lebanon and its people at the mercy of the same Israeli firepower under which they lived for decades, and would rob them of their freedom and sovereignty, and of their right to decide their own future and opportunities for development (Noe, 2007:330).

Analysts have argued the armed resistance also creates instability, negatively impacting Lebanon's development. This will be further explored in the following section.

**The contradictions of simultaneously engaging in armed resistance and providing social services**

The first respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am) argues there is no contradiction in simultaneously engaging in armed resistance and providing social services explaining,

We had only one choice to resist in order to live...So we work for development day and night, the Zionists usually destroy our infrastructure and organizations and we rebuild them and people here are with this work, 100%.

The evidence suggests the July 2006 war had an overwhelmingly negative impact on Lebanon's development. The war came at a time when Lebanon was just beginning to overcome its war zone stigma and had attracted a record numbers of tourists. As a result of the war, losses to the tourist industry for that season are estimated at $2 billion while infrastructure damage was estimated at $4 billion (Norton, 2007:132, 152). The second
respondent from the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation argues while the Israeli aggression does affect the Lebanese economy negatively, Lebanon’s worst economic crisis’ are due to corruption and mismanagement by the government. However, Hezbollah argues it tries to cover the economic losses that ensued with equal zeal with which they fought Israel, describing the challenge of rebuilding Lebanon as the next victory they would like to achieve. On this note, Nasrullah states, “Completing the victory,” he said, “can come with reconstruction.” (as cited in Kifner, 2007). This sentiment is echoed by Ali Bazzi, Mayor of Bint Jbeil who states, “We were victorious over Israel…Now we have to rise to the occasion that follows.” As a result, Hezbollah swiftly provided approximately 15,000 Lebanese who became homeless as a result of the war, with one years rent and furniture until their homes are rebuilt (Worth & Fattah, 2006:2; Norton, 2007:140; Kifner, 2007).

The data suggests armed struggle creates a balance of power that creates a stable environment conducive for community development. The following section will consider this further by reviewing what type of development has occurred in Lebanon following the Israeli withdrawal in 2000.

Community Development following the Withdrawal

Respondents described the ability to access natural resources, a dramatic increase in institution building and investment in south Lebanon as significant changes following the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. The second respondent from the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation, Nasrullah and Harik all discuss Lebanon’s ability to access its own water sources as a significant progression in their development following the withdrawal (Harik, 2004:159; Fieldbook-24/01/08; Noe, 2007:347). Discussing the
liberation of the Wazzani River in South Lebanon, the second respondent from the
Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation, “For decades, there were no water
projects in these regions due to Israeli threats.” The second respondent from the
Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation boasts since the withdrawal, they have
been able to implement the Wazzani river project, which provides drinking water to thirty
villages. The respondent attributes this change to a balance of power created by
Hezbollah. “The Israeli’s said there will be more military action if this project
continues... Hezbollah said there will then be a military response (Fieldbook-24/01/08).”

According to the first respondent from the Islamic Health Society, before the
liberation, more than half of the south was under a miserable economic situation.

It was hell for people just to get to the hospital before 2000 and it was also
very dangerous to travel outside your community to Beirut for instance to
access medical facilities. After 2000, accessibility has increased greatly as
now communities that do not have medical facilities travel in safe
conditions to access these services.... And these centres are slowly
reaching more and more communities...After liberation...we opened one
hospital in the liberated area as well as 12 new health centres (Fieldbook-
27/12/07, am).

The respondent from Qard al Hassan (Fieldbook-19/12/07) similarly explains prior to the
2000 withdrawal, Qard al Hassan only had one loan office, which was located in Beirut,
making it very inaccessible due to the danger and the costs involved in traveling to
Beirut. After the withdrawal in 2000, they were able to open a branch in most cities and
towns.

According to the respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s agricultural unit, the armed
resistance provides people with a sense of security while enabling investment in their
lands.
...Before liberation, many villagers in the occupied belt could not work their lands and there was no investment in the communities... people fled their land and came to Dahiyeh [Beirut’s southern suburbs] due to insecurity and became wage labourers...after liberation, they can go freely to their land (Fieldbook-17/01/08).

This is corroborated by the first respondent from the Islamic Health Society who argues, “After liberation, the development situation improved in the entire south, many returned to their houses, many established businesses and various development projects were implemented.” The second respondent from the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation adds, “looking from the time period of 1967 to now, the most development happened in the south between 2000 and 2007 (Fieldbook-24/01/08).” This is evidenced by all the development at the border, including restaurants, businesses and villas being built. Even the government is playing a greater role in development in the south after the withdrawal with projects such as the Litani river dam and road construction underway to connect villages.

**The State Takes Over**

The question arises, why does Hezbollah not allow the state to take over the defence of Lebanon’s sovereignty to address any possible threat of re-invasion and effectively maintain a balance of power? According to the third respondent from the Islamic Health Society,

If you read the speeches of Syed Hassan [Nasrullah] and our political leadership, you will see Hezbollah wants Lebanon to have a strong army that can provide all the security we need against Israeli occupation and threats of Israeli attacks that Lebanon needs (Fieldbook-28/12/07).

The Hezbollah parliamentarian argues,

Like people in a sea, who have to learn to swim, we aren’t waiting for a vessel to save us...if the army could defend us, we would gladly leave that
up to them. However, the army does not have the planes, tanks or funding so there is no way it could face the IDF which has the backing of the US (Fieldbook-30/12/07).

According to this respondent, the US has prevented the army from being equipped and they threaten the countries that provide arms to the army as they say it is a threat to Israel.

As stipulated in UN Resolution 1702 that ended the July 2006 war, the Lebanese army was in fact deployed to South Lebanon, however, Norton writes, given that approximately half the army are Shia, many of them support Hezbollah. This is confirmed by some of the army’s generals who stated they will work in cooperation with Hezbollah (Norton, 2007:141). Nasrullah adds Hezbollah will facilitate the army’s role in defending the homeland, and would limit Hezbollah’s responsibility to the Shebba Farms area (as cited in Noe, 2007:383). Haklai (2006) strongly criticizes this interrelationship between Hezbollah and the army, stating, “Hezbollah has an independent militia that challenges the authority of the Lebanese government, rather than a foreign occupier of Lebanese territory.” Haklai adds the priority should be to strengthen the state if stability is really the desired goal.

Nasrullah hints at Hezbollah putting down its arms, “when the region is free, protecting Lebanon’s sovereignty will be the government’s responsibility and Hezbollah will not engage in any armed activity at that point (see Nasru’llah).” When describing what he means by the region being ‘free’, Nasrullah states it means Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, the Golan Heights and the return of Palestinian refugees to their land as the 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon should have the right to their homes and property rather than to be settled in Lebanon (as cited in Noe, 2007:203-204).” Qassem adds, Hezbollah will continue to “confront and fight” Israel until they leave occupied
Palestinian land (Jaber, 1997:59-60).” Yet Fnaysh assures, “...in the event of an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizbu’lllah would not ‘take any action or confront the Zionist threat [in a manner] that would harm the interests of the Lebanese people.’” (Fnaysh, 1997b). Ghorayeb (2002:166-167) rationalizes that Hezbollah will continue to confront Israel non-militarily after they withdraw from Lebanese land, as they would avoid jeopardizing Lebanon’s freedom.

**Hezbollah’s Shelf Life in the Absence of Conflict**

According to Jorisch and Blanford’s introduction in Noe, by forcing Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, Hezbollah is eroding its own *raison d’être* (Jorisch, 2004:76; Noe, 2007:11). When asked if Hezbollah needs conflict to continue to justify its existence, the third respondent from the Islamic Health Society explained, “The majority of our members are highly educated, not ignorant. They can be active members of society (Fieldbook-28/12/07).” According to the Hezbollah parliamentarian, “for Hezbollah, the hope would be to put all of its resources towards community development and social services but unfortunately, these resources have to be diverted from this towards the resistance (Fieldbook-30/12/07).”

According to Nasrullah, if Hezbollah’s only intention was to ensure its own continuity, then they would have bought into the generous offers of US aid, the release of all their political prisoners and political recognition if they stopped their resistance and stopped supporting Palestine (Noe, 2007:12; Noe, 2007:260-261). Nasrullah states, “We of course rejected their proposals, because our acquiescence to America’s demands would simply have meant abandoning our faith, our people, and our history (as cited in Noe, 2007:260-261).” Ghorayeb (2002:53) argues Hezbollah’s long-term survival
exists in its political role. Nasrullah similarly suggests Hezbollah's existence is not threatened by Israel withdrawing from their territory as Hezbollah will continue to exist in other spheres,

It is beyond doubt that we are a resistance, and this has been testified to by martyrdom and blood. At the same time, we are a political, social, economic, and cultural movement (Noe, 2007:182-183).

According to the respondent from Mu’assat al-Jarha, when asked, would Hezbollah go out of business with no conflict? This respondent stated,

“Hezbollah isn’t a group, it’s the community and so it doesn’t need conflict to exist.” The respondent shared the following story. “In the battle of Sifin, Imam Ali A.S. went to pray in the middle of the heat of the battle and the people asked him, ‘now he’s going to pray?’ He said, ‘why are we fighting them? It’s to get them to pray? So we should pray first now.’ So we provide humanitarian work for the same reason. The resistance is humanitarian, its’ to protect our resources, our land, our water...resistance for the sake of resistance is insanity (Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08).”

The literature continues to debate whether the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 can be attributed to Hezbollah’s armed struggle or a combination of other factors. However, the data does seem to suggest the combination of Hezbollah’s armed activities and social service network have resulted in a sense of pride in the local community that had been lost during the centuries of victimization endured by the Shia community. This shift will be further explored in the following section.

3.6.5 How has Hezbollah contributed to the community’s self-image and cultural identity?

When discussing Hezbollah contribution to the community’s self-image and cultural identity, some respondents attributed this shift to what they described as military victories. Some respondents contrasted the detrimental effect of the
marginalization experienced on the community’s self-image with the high level of pride that now exists in the community. Other respondents attributed the increase in community pride to the level of self-sufficiency achieved through Hezbollah’s social services.

The respondent from Mu’assat al-Jarha states during life under occupation, “There was an illusion that the Israeli army was a huge undefeatable force, but once we came face to face, we saw they can be defeated (Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08).”

Similarly, the Mayor adds, 

Everyone was afraid of Israel, they attacked us with planes and tanks. We proved with our power that we can live harmoniously and face Israel... No one wanted to help, so with our own hands, our faith, our spirit, we built everything here (Fieldbook-23/01/08).

Emphasizing the importance of creating pride in the community’s identity, the respondent from Qard al Hassan explains,

Hezbollah, with the office were able to return to this society its self worth, and its dignity, despite its poverty, they are not ashamed, they created confidence in the society, which they didn't have before. When someone establishes an identity for themselves, they know where they want to get, and then they start achieving unbelievable goals. There's a hadith, whoever knows himself, they know their God and when they know their God, nothing becomes hard, there's no hardship in life (Fieldbook-19/12/07).

The Hezbollah parliamentarian explains,

What the people want is to live with honour, pride and dignity. The government used to neglect the people and even used to shame them and the occupation contributed to this, it shamed the whole population. When the occupation was defeated, the people regained their sense of pride and honour (Fieldbook-30/12/07).

The second respondent from Hezbollah’s consulting agency explained,

“Hezbollah and other Islamic organizations created infrastructure where there wasn’t any
and this contributed to pride in the local community and identity.” The second respondent from the Islamic Health Society gave the additional example of Hezbollah’s role in the educational sector.

There were no schools in the south, as all government money went to the Christian and Sunni areas, the Shia went outside of Lebanon and built ourselves and now we have good expertise in all fields and with the victory of 2000 and 2006, we told the world, the poorest people in Lebanon make a lot of things from nothing (Fieldbook-27/12/07, pm).

According to the third respondent from the Islamic Health Society,

People from the south, went outside Lebanon and brought back capabilities and resources to invest in the community...Now if you look at the resources of the Shia community, they are increasing starkly which has a positive impact on all of Lebanon...We have engineers with Jihad al Binaa. We have doctors with the Islamic Health Society, all of these resources are being used from the local community, the opposite of brain drain... (Fieldbook-28/12/07)

Norton writes,

The present abundance of associations in the Shi’I community is an essential part of the construction of a modern, confident notion of identity, and a spirit of activism and volunteerism...stands in contrast to earlier, rampant acceptance of deprivation among the Shi’a (Norton, 2007:108).

Similarly, the first respondent from the Islamic Health Society stated, “We have this notion here, to be independent and to make your own bread by yourself and to make it good, if our community provides for everyone with everything they need, this produces pride (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am).” Norton explains,

A Shi’I friend, in 2004, told me that, ‘there are no needy people in al-dahiyya,’ implying that the rich fabric of social and charitable organizations meet the needs of people who would otherwise be impoverished. A safety net exists today that simply was not there before, and many Shi’a take pride in knowing that they have helped to build it (Norton, 2007:111).
Although the data suggests the identity of the Shia of Lebanon was transformed from one of shame to one of pride, the question arises, did the Shia really succeed in doing all of this on their own or were they merely the lucky recipients of a generous benefactor?

3.7 How do international relationships & attitudes affect the community’s development?

3.7.1 Funding Sources

The literature suggests Hezbollah has various sources of income including aid from Iran, *khums* (religious tax), donations, foreign remittances, businesses, investments and criminal activity. When obtaining approvals from gatekeepers in the field, the researcher was advised that no questions related to funding would be entertained.

**Religious Tax**

All Muslims are required to pay (alms) *zakaat*, while Shia are also required to pay *khums*, a tax on one-fifth of their excess income (Deeb, 2006). According to Hamzeh (2004:63), *khums* is a significant source of Hezbollah’s funding, which is paid to a *Marja-e-Taqlid* (Highest rank Islamic scholar) (Koya, 2007:67) such as Khamenei or Fadlallah. Jaber explains these funds are then distributed to charitable organizations to assist the poor and oppressed (Jaber, 1997:151). Deeb (2006) adds they are also transferred to Hezbollah’s social service network, in addition to the *zakat* funds which are given directly to charitable organizations. While *khums* is paid by hundreds of thousands of Shia globally, the amounts collected remain undisclosed. The head of Hezbollah’s social welfare program, Hajj Hussein al-Shami, suggests the amount collected is comparable to a wealthy nation’s domestic budget (Jaber, 1997:151).
Donations and Foreign Remittances

Hamzeh (2004:63) describes donations as another important source of Hezbollah’s funds, which includes collection boxes (Jaber, 1997:151), fundraising breakfasts (Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08) and foreign remittances from Lebanese Shia in West Africa, Latin America and the Persian Gulf (Norton, 2007:13-14), totalling nearly $2.5 billion in 2001 alone (Hourani, 2006:27; Norton, 2007:3-4).

Iranian Funds

Shay, Jaber, Jorisch, Noe and Harik assert Hezbollah receives significant amounts of Iranian aid (Jaber, 1997:150-152; Jorisch, 2004:xiii; Harik, 2004:81; Shay, 2005:132, 222; Noe, 2007:92). In 2000, Nasrullah acknowledged Iran provided significant levels of aid to fund Hezbollah’s social service network (Nasrallah, 2000b). According to Hamzeh, under Rafsanjani and Khatami’s presidency, Iranian aid to Hezbollah was significantly reduced (Hamzeh, 1997:48; Hamzeh, 2004:63). Deeb (2006) writes, Hezbollah continues to receive military support from Iran, adding while Hezbollah receives aid from Iran, it is without conditions attached and Hezbollah’s decision making process remains autonomous. Kahil (2007:65, 74) adds while Hezbollah’s closeness to Iran is undeniable, their proximity to the Arab world should not be understated. According to Harik (2004:3), Hezbollah is seeking to avoid internal resentment and accusations of being an Iranian proxy in the region. As a result, Shay maintains, they are trying to reduce their dependence on Iranian aid and are aiming for self-sufficiency. Shay argues Hezbollah is aiming to achieve this self-sufficiency by engaging in criminal activity (Shay, 2005:223).
Criminal Activity

Shay (2005:141-142, 224-225) says Hezbollah deals in counterfeit money and the smuggling of narcotics and that Hezbollah has been suspected by Israel of liaising with Israeli citizens to get classified information in exchange for drugs. According to Shay (2005:71), one cell is engaged in credit card fraud to fund Hezbollah’s military, while another stole luxury cars and smuggled them to Lebanon and Eastern Europe. Shay adds (2005:69-70), according to secret documents held by CSIS, Hezbollah laundered hundreds of thousands of dollars in Canadian banks to purchase military equipment.”

According to Hezbollah, they are trying to attain self-sufficiency in terms of their funding but they claim they are trying to do so through businesses and investments.

Hezbollah’s business and investment portfolio

The Hezbollah parliamentarian, Jaber, Hamzeh and Koya explain Hezbollah has a finance side that makes investments locally and internationally, which include real estate, banking and currency exchange. Profits are then re-invested in the social service network (Jaber, 1997:151-152; Hamzeh, 2004:64; Fieldbook-30/12/07; Koya, 2007:24). Hezbollah also operates a range of businesses including ice cream parlours, supermarkets, restaurants (Koya, 2007:24), construction companies, travel agencies, (Hamzeh, 2004:64), bakeries, bookshops, farms, fisheries and factories (Jaber, 1997:151-152), which contribute to the Party’s income.

While the nature of Hezbollah’s funding streams seem to have evolved from the recipients of Iranian dollars towards a desire to attain greater self-sufficiency, the question arises, how has this shift affected their international standing?
3.7.2 Impact of the ban on the local community’s development

Since 1997, Hezbollah has been branded a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the US. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, George Bush signed Executive Order 13224 labelling al Qaeda a terrorist organization of ‘global reach’. Neither Hamas nor Hezbollah were initially mentioned (Norton, 2007:75-77). While Hezbollah’s military wing is banned in five countries, its social service wing is banned in three, the US, the State of Israel and Canada. According to Nasrullah, the ban only came about after Hezbollah repeatedly rejected US offers of aid and political recognition in return for putting down their arms (Noe, 2007:258). This section first asks, how has the ban affected the local community’s development and has it reduced Hezbollah’s ability to partner with external NGOs and multilateral organizations? Second, did the ban have a political impact on Hezbollah?

The ban’s material impact

Six respondents discussed how the ban on Hezbollah’s social service wing impacts the local community’s development. The respondents argued the ban has no material impact as Hezbollah has never relied on the west for its activities. Hezbollah also boasts of continuing partnerships with a host of foreign NGOs and multilateral organizations, which appears to further undermine the ban’s material impact.

According to Hamzeh (2004:64-65), while discussion of banning Hezbollah’s social service wing increased, Hezbollah ensured its funds were only kept in Lebanese banks, which reduced the material impact of the ban when it finally came. In response, the US has threatened Lebanon with economic sanctions if it does not freeze Hezbollah’s

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5 Australia and the United Kingdom have banned Hezbollah’s military wing, while Canada, Israel and the US have banned Hezbollah in its entirety.
funds in Lebanese banks (Harik, 2004:2, 181), however, the Lebanese government has yet to comply (Hamzeh, 2004:136). According to Nasrullah, "...we have no assets in the party’s name, and everything we receive by way of contribution we spend immediately, because our needs exceed our income (as cited in Noe, 2007:258).”

Further suggesting the ban has little material impact and a flow of US funds would do little to affect Hezbollah’s capabilities, Jihad al Binaa’s Director of Projects in South Lebanon, Fouad Noureldine, dismissed Bush’s pledge of $230 million for Lebanon’s reconstruction stating, “If they were to give us all the money in the world, we would not take it...They will not be able to buy our hearts. We are receiving billions now through our traditional channels. We don’t need American money (as cited in Worth & Fattah, 2006:2).” The respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s reconstruction unit stated, “The boycott did not have any impact as for decades, the west never helped since the start (Fieldbook-25/12/07).” The first respondent from the Islamic Health Society similarly stated, “The ban has no effect because we do not want western help or aid, we want to be independent (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am).” This sentiment was also echoed by the second respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-27/12/07, pm) as well as the respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s agricultural unit and the Hezbollah parliamentarian (Fieldbook-25/12/07; Fieldbook-30/12/07).

The Hezbollah parliamentarian (Fieldbook-30/12/07) and the third respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-28/12/07) claim Hezbollah received aid from external donors after the July 2006 war. The first respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am) claims Hezbollah also continues to partner with the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF. This is corroborated by several pieces
in Hezbollah’s print material including the Islamic Health Society’s sticker campaign promoting landmine awareness, which was funded by the Norwegian Popular Aid agency (Islamic Health Society 2006, Landmines Sticker Campaign). During the July 2006 war, the Islamic Health Society also coordinated the collection of donations and grants with several external bodies including: the World Food Programme; the European Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs; Doctors Without Borders; the International Red Cross; UNICEF; UNHCR; WHO; the Malaysian Relief Society as well as delegations from Europe, Turkish, Sudan and Qatar (Islamic Health Society 2007:16-17).

The Hezbollah parliamentarian maintains when such external aid does come, the conditions related to this aid have not affected Hezbollah’s independence (Fieldbook-30/12/07). The third respondent from the Islamic Health Society similarly argued Hezbollah was invited to attend the Paris 3 summit and to provide aid, which “Hezbollah will only accept if there are no conditions attached as that is our policy (Fieldbook-28/12/07).”

Worth and Fattah further explore Hezbollah’s partnerships with foreign NGOs suggesting the intended negative material impact of the ban has been undermined. Worth and Fattah explain when groups like the US-based Mercy Corps partner with the municipality, “…they cannot be sure their aid is not going through Hezbollah.” (Worth & Fattah, 2006:1) Muhammed Abdullah, the Deputy Mayor of Khiam who coordinated Mercy Corps’ donation of food and water to Khiam explains, “You can make a separation between what we [the municipality] do and Hezbollah…But of course there is coordination (as cited in Worth & Fattah, 2006:1).”
Several respondents described an indirect funding relationship between Hezbollah and funding agencies from the global north. The third respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-28/12/07), the respondent from the UNDP (Fieldbook-15/01/08, pm) and the respondent from UNICEF (Fieldbook-15/01/08, pm) all stated following the July 2006 war, the European Commission for Human Rights (ECHO) and several EU countries directed their aid contributions to the UNDP, which works in partnership with Lebanese municipalities. The Mayor explains the municipality plays an intermediary role, coordinating partnerships between foreign NGOs or multilateral organizations and local partners. The third respondent from the Islamic Health Society (Fieldbook-28/12/07) explains these local partners can include Hezbollah’s social service institutions, adding that many of the municipal elected representatives are Hezbollah members or supporters. According to the second respondent from the Consultative Center for Studies & Documentation (Fieldbook-24/01/08), Hezbollah also has an entire department that manages coordination with 125 municipalities in the south and Bekaa. When asked about why the UNDP partners with municipalities knowing the local partners submitting proposals could be from Hezbollah NGO’s the respondent replied, “The humanitarian agencies in the UN differentiate between people and their politics, they are all treated as humans (Fieldbook-15/01/08, am).” David Holdridge, Mercy Corps’s emergency coordinator for Lebanon describes partnering with Hezbollah-elect municipalities as a grey area.

Explaining why foreign organizations choose to partner with Hezbollah either directly or in-directly, the respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s agricultural unit argues,
We know the ground and where and how to intervene to be more effective and efficient because we are from this community, we are the sons of these farmers. We are the people (Fieldbook-25/12/07).

This is corroborated by Worth and Fattah who suggest, Hezbollah’s “...reputation for delivering those services honestly is unmatched, making it that much harder to circumvent.” The Mayor (Fieldbook-23/01/08) similarly says he does not belong to Hezbollah but his municipality coordinates with them because they are the most trustworthy.

The ban’s political impact

The respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s reconstruction unit (Fieldbook-25/12/07) argues, “the problem [with the ban] isn’t material, the problem is political.” The Hezbollah parliamentarian adds, “When the Canadian people see there is a ban, it tries to isolate Hezbollah as the Canadian people perceive it to be negative (Fieldbook-30/12/07).” Haklai speaks strongly in favour of the ban, cautioning,

If Hezbollah were to be taken off the list at this particular point, Canada would be sending the message that it was accepting of Hezbollah having an independent militia, attacking a neighbouring state without the consent of the Lebanese government and, ultimately, representing Lebanese interests no less than the Lebanese government. That is a wrong message to send when a democratically elected government is challenged by an independent militia. Given that Hezbollah's actions have terrible consequences for all of Lebanon, such a misguided step is all the more severe (Haklai, 2006).

The Hezbollah parliamentarian contends, “What is more important is that Hezbollah is not a terrorist organization according to the UN or the EU (Fieldbook-30/12/07).” The respondent from Mu’assat al-Jarha stated, “The ban doesn’t affect us, but there is a sense of bitterness because we do the best work on the ground and instead of being given a
flower, we are banned (Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08).” The respondent from Jihad al Binaa’s agricultural unit also argued,

according to their [the west’s] own values, we should not be banned. I believe we are practicing what they preach in terms of land liberation, confronting invasion and [improving] local community development. These western states should adhere to their own values and look at this region through this lens and stand with the victims and not with the aggressor (Fieldbook-25/12/07).

While the data suggests the ban has not affected Hezbollah’s ability to operate on the ground, the political message it has sent is undeniably clear, there is little tolerance for dual role movements that simultaneously engage in armed struggle and social service delivery. The following section will contrast this dual role of Hezbollah with the theoretical framework on social capital. We will use the framework to assess Hezbollah’s ability to expand the local community’s sense of agency by implementing a poverty alleviation program with the movement’s ability to alter the structural environment that contributes to the local community’s marginalization.
Chapter 4 Discussion: From the icecream man to the zilzal

"You can disagree with the way but not with the causes."
- Subcomandante Marcos, 1 January 1994

We now analyze Hezbollah’s dual role using the concepts of mainstream, alternative, and local community development, in addition to pivotal concepts in the theory of social capital formation. We begin by exploring how well development theorists account for Hezbollah’s notion of ‘community’ and ‘local community development’ and, considering the diverse nature of the communities, we also discuss whose interests are being represented by Hezbollah. We then explore how well social capital explains Hezbollah’s ability to emerge from the depths of marginalization to provide a thorough social service network. By comparing social capital, social movement, political space and alternative development perspectives, we seek to understand how Hezbollah mobilizes the local community to impact the broader structural environment. We also discuss the correlation between Hezbollah’s dual role and the surge of pride in the local identity. This leads us to analyze whether Hezbollah’s links with Iran and its transformation of the local culture disqualify it from being considered an endogenous development movement. Finally, we delve into the legitimacy of dual role movements found in Latin America, Africa and Asia to determine if according to development theory, it is a contradiction to simultaneously engage in armed struggle and the delivery of coping mechanisms.

4.1 Is Hezbollah’s ‘community’ a shared space or a conflict-ridden identity?

In this section, we explore if community is a place or an identity and what distinguishes communities from social organizations. Several theorists define
communities geographically (Gallaher & Padfield, 1980; Iseyin & Wahab, 1996:58; Kaufman & Alfonso, 1997:9; Veltmeyer, 2001b:35) others describe it as an identity (Iseyin & Wahab, 1996:58; Moore [1996] as cited in Hyland et al., 2005:4-5; Kaufman & Alfonso, 1997:10; Halperin, 1998:5). Recognizing communities are intensely diverse, some loosely define it to mean both, a place and an identity, arguing individuals can simultaneously identify with a diverse range of communities (Kaufman & Alfonso, 1997:9; Halperin, 1998:5; Tönnies as cited in Veltmeyer, 2001c:27). We apply these theoretical perspectives to local definitions of ‘community’ where some respondents describe community as a geographic place (fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08) while others argue any group of people with shared religious affiliations (Fieldbook-26/12/07) or political goals (fieldbook-01/02/08 and 20/01/08; fieldbook-19/12/07; Fieldbook-29/12/07) constitute a community. The dichotomy of the oppressed versus the oppressors that pits the worlds marginalized against the exploiters (Ghorayeb, 2002:17, 19; Jorisch, 2004:15; Hazmeh, 2004, p.42), further suggests there are no geographic limitations to a community while in contrast, the data also indicates Hezbollah is becoming increasingly nationalistic (Ghorayeb, 2002:84; Kahil, 2007:74). Further pushing the elasticity of the term, we also explore if a community organization can be classified as a social movement.

**A shared place**

Gallaher, Padfield, Iseyin, Wahab, Kaufman, Alfonso and Veltmeyer argue communities are geographically defined (Gallaher & Padfield, 1980; Iseyin & Wahab, 1996:58; Kaufman & Alfonso, 1997:9; Veltmeyer, 2001b:35). This affirms the notion shared by several respondents that the borders of Lebanon provide a geographic
delineation of ‘community’ just as the boundaries of each region and town do
(Fieldbook-29/12/07; Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08). Applying Gallaher, Padfield, Veltmeyer, Kaufman, Alfonso and Iseyin & Wahab’s perspectives to the case study, following the process of urbanization and experience of occupation that pushed many Shia Lebanese into Beirut’s southern suburbs, it is unclear if these individuals would have to identify with their new geographic locale, or do they continue to identify with the community they originated from? Perhaps a process of self-identification would be more accurate, which leads us to conclude ones sense of community bares close affinity with an individual’s identity, opposed to a geographic place.

A conflict-plagued identity

Kaufman and Alfonso (1997:9) acknowledge a community must have a shared source of identity, which Moore and Helperin explain could include shared values. Iseyin and Wahab (1996:58) add a community has a shared purpose. Despite having some common denominator, be it a place or an identity, Veltmeyer, Macdonald, Kapoor, Larrison and Hadley-Ives concur that communities are affected by uneven power relations (Veltmeyer 2001b:41; Macdonald, 2001:206; Kapoor [2002] as cited in Dorsner, 2004:368; Larrison & Hadley-Ives, 2004:55). Several respondents reflected an identity-based perspective defining communities as groups with unifying goals that bring together individuals with diverse priorities suggesting Hezbollah and its supporters form a single community (Fieldbook-26/12/07; Fieldbook-29/12/07; Fieldbook-19/12/07). This affirms Iseyin and Wahab’s perspective that communities have a shared purpose as well as Veltmeyer, Macdonald, Kapoor, Larrison and Hadley-Ives’ position that communities are intensely diverse. Several respondents from Hezbollah defined the local
community along religious lines, suggesting the Shia sect constitutes a single community. Considering adherents of a single religion or sect have a shared identity and shared values, this also lends weight to the perspectives of Iseyin, Wahab, Kaufman, Alfonso, Moore and Helperin. As the Shia have a shared experience in Lebanon characterized by discrimination, occupation and urbanization, it seems likely they would develop shared values as an outcome of these processes. By suggesting a community has shared values opposed to a shared space, Moore and Helperin’s theory also helps explain historic and structural reasons why a community may be geographically disjointed as values can transcend geographic divisions and can also be a product of shared experiences.

**A place and an identity: recognition of communities as intensely diverse spaces**

Kaufman and Alfonso’s use of the term ‘community network’ is useful in describing communities as both a place and an identity. It recognizes each community comprises of multiple layers of intersecting communities and that within any given geographic area, an individual can be part of multiple communities. This concept is identified by Tönnies (as cited in Veltmeyer, 2001c:27) who distinguishes the community, a place of mutual obligation and source of organic identity from a society, a space we may voluntarily choose to participate, based on common interest. Respondents have described Hezbollah as a community (Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08), which conflicts with Tönnies’ perspective that seeks to distinguish communities from social organizations. Our case study reveals it is one’s organic sense of identity that pushes individuals to join specific types of social organizations and the relationship between the two is highly interconnected. Respondents from Hezbollah described there being layers of communities and that a single individual can have membership in many communities.
including the national, regional, municipal level as well as religious, political and sectarian levels (Fieldbook-19/12/07; Fieldbook-29/12/07). Kahil (1997:74, 97) adds by changing the way in which Hezbollah self-identifies from an Islamic Resistance movement to a Lebanese Resistance movement opened up participation to various sects and factions. This implies recognition of Lebanon’s diverse composition and an understanding that the national community encompasses various ethnic, religious and geographic communities meaning one community may span across several towns or villages. We find communities by there very nature house a diversity of perspectives and affiliations, further lending weight to Veltmeyer, Kapoor, Larrison and Hadley-Ives’ description of communities as intensely diverse places (Veltmeyer, 2001b:41; Kapoor [2002] as cited in Dorsner, 2004:368; Larrison & Hadley-Ives, 2004:55). The waves of structural and historic changes that occurred in Lebanon resulted in new layers of community being created illustrating that far from being encapsulated in time, the local community is both dynamic in its growth and diverse in its composition.

**Dichotomy of the Oppressed vs. the Oppressor**

Veltmeyer (2000:22-23) says community development must be small in scale. Moore (as cited in Hyland et al., 2005:4-5) says a sense of community is unattainable on a global scale and Hyland et al. (2005:4) add a community should be smaller than the state. This theoretical perspective conflicts with Hezbollah’s dichotomy of the oppressed versus the oppressor which groups people of different sects, religions, ethnicities and nationalities in the category of the oppressed (Ghorayeb, 2002:17, 19). While this dichotomy is inclusive, encompassing a range of identities, values and languages, the question arises, are these ties limited to solidarity or is a sense of ‘community’ present?
There appears to be a contradiction with Hezbollah’s reconciliation of the local community as a community along with its notion of a transnational community. When the discussion focuses on the local community, Hezbollah recognizes itself as distinct from those beyond its borders, which is evidenced by its increasingly nationalistic tone as described by Kahil (2007:74) and Ghorayeb (2002:84). Kahil (2007:84-85) finds several forms of Hezbollah’s cultural productions ranging from their videoclips, Jerusalem Day parades and car ornaments began featuring a Lebanese flag in addition to the Hezbollah one, a marked shift from Hezbollah’s early days where such nationalist overtones were absent. Hezbollah also seems to over-simplify the power relations that would happen within the camp of the oppressed. This lends weight to Veltmeyer (2001b), Hyland (2005) and Moore’s (1996) perspective that a community must be relatively small in scale and that bonds of solidarity do not automatically result in a sense of community. While it may be useful to build social capital and form alliances across a diverse range of groups, it is unclear how uneven power dynamics are addressed at this grassroots level. It seems on the one hand, Hezbollah romanticizes the ranks of the oppressed as free of such cleavages, which O’Malley (2001:27, 206) warns many community development approaches tend to do. On the other hand, Hezbollah recognizes class conflict as an issue of the day (Ghorayeb, 2002:17-18; Hazmeh 2004:42-43).

The question arises, is Hezbollah a community or a social movement? With a centralized chain of command, strict membership criteria, affiliation with the Shia sect and its slow metamorphosis into a political party, Hezbollah does not share the qualities of a social movement enumerated by Della Porta and Diani. Vahabzadeh (2003:22) argues such definitions are Eurocentric and disregard movements of the global south. McCarthy
and Zald suggest a social movement can in fact have a formalized organizational structure and typically has specific goals (McCarthy & Zald 1987 [1977]:20). Several respondents from Hezbollah also defined communities as groups with shared goals, suggesting according to McCarthy and Zald, Hezbollah could be classified as a social movement while other social movement theorists would strongly disagree.

Similar to social movements, a community may advance community development while resisting exploitation and domination although the converse is also true; it may replicate the exploitation intrinsic in the capitalist system, particularly if it ignores internal power dynamics. In order for the former to be true, a community must act as a place of resistance, brought together by a common goal to work in the collective interest despite intense divisions within the several layers of community that one may be member to. This may be the operating principle behind Hezbollah’s dichotomy of the oppressed and mirrors the challenge of new social movements to unite an array of groups with very diverse agendas under a single common banner. The greater challenge is when aligning with social movements, how can such coalitions represent the priorities of the diverse groups and communities that join and how can local communities ensure their issues will transcend to the national level amongst such an assortment of causes?

4.2 Diverging tendencies in Hezbollah’s local community development framework

This section will determine how well Hezbollah’s local community development activities coalesce with mainstream and alternative understandings of local community development. Mainstream theorists tend to limit community development to social and economic development (Iseyin & Wahab, 1996:62). Alternative development theorists
argue development should be more holistic and may even include spiritual development (Rahnema, 1992:126; Kaufman & Alfonso, 1997:10; Ife, 1997:132, 133). Others insist it should be sustainable (Max-Neef, Elizalde, and Hopenhayn [1965] as cited in Veltmeyer, 2001a:48; Korten 1987:300; Won-Jeong, 1995:330; Veltmeyer, 2001a:48). We apply these notions to local definitions of development, where Hezbollah appears to strive for a series of diverging tendencies. First, they strive for tangible and material forms of development but then also struggle for abstract forms including development of the afterlife. Second, they believe in continuous growth and development while shunning an excessive accumulation of wealth. Third, they view armed struggle as a facilitator of stability although it could also contribute to the cycle of violence.

While seeking holistic and spiritual forms of development as described by Kaufman and Alfonso (1997:10) and Ife (1997:132, 133), the challenge presented by Hezbollah’s notion of development of the afterlife is what may appear to run counter to the best interests of the individual or the community, may arguably be helping to meet the desire of a prosperous afterlife. Kahil (2007:90-92) relays the traditional Arabic narrative of a merman in the sea celebrating a funeral in stark contrast to the tradition on land where those attending a funeral are in a state of mourning. The merman explains to the visitor from the land that in their worldview, death is considered joyful as one is returning to their Creator. Kahil draws a parallel between this narrative and Nasrullah’s son, Hadi who died in armed struggle. Kahil says Nasrullah is popularly described as the father who did not mourn his son’s death as Nasrullah explained had he shed tears; it would then be a double standard to call upon the sons of others to join in the armed struggle. Instead, Nasrullah asked others to rejoice. Arguably, emphasizing the development of
the afterlife could open the door for the community to quietly accept policies that require
them to bare a high cost in this life out of hopes of a better afterlife. On the other hand,
extending development to the non tangible realm of the afterlife seems to facilitate social
capital, creating high levels of trust and encouraging community members to work in the
collective interest in anticipation of being rewarded in the next life. The ability for
spiritual development to facilitate social capital supports Rahnema, Ife, Kaufman and
Alfonso’s theory that spiritual development can be an integral aspect of local community
development.

The second diverging tendency in Hezbollah’s definition of community
development is their belief in continuous growth and development on the one hand and
shunning of an excessive accumulation of wealth on the other. Mainstream development
theorists concur growth can be infinite but only extend this principle to economic and
social spheres. Alternative development theorists such as Veltmeyer, Max-Neef, Elizalde
(as cited in Veltmeyer, 2001a:48), Hopenhayn (1965), Rahman (1991), Korten
(1987:300) and Won-Jeong (1995:330) argue growth should be of a sustainable scale,
This latter position is more consistent with Hezbollah’s aversion from the accumulation
The data suggests Hezbollah advocates for infinite growth and continuous development
and progress with no limit (Fieldbook-19/12/07). However, by valuing the sweat of the
worker, shunning wealth and underscoring collective responsibilities that allow
individuals to buy or manufacture anything they want as long as they do not harm the
community or harm the human experience (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am), suggests
continuous growth should occur in non-economic spheres. Hezbollah also encourages
growth of the individual, desiring constant change and evolution of the human spirit. This ideology stems from their belief that the *Mahdi* will return to restore social justice only when humankind is sufficiently sophisticated to comprehend the guidance he will bring (Abdulhussein, 2008). Both examples suggest continuous growth in Hezbollah's development strategy refers to continuous advancements in non-economic spheres and sustainable advancements in economic ones, heeding to alternative development’s requirement for holistic development that is economically and environmentally sustainable in scale.

The third diverging tendency in Hezbollah's definition of community development is a view that armed struggle is a facilitator of stability rather than a contributor to the cycle of violence. Although Iseyin and Wahab (1996:62) limit community development to social and economic development, the data suggests in our case study, Hezbollah considers the struggle to rebuild Lebanon on par with the struggle to liberate it (Worth & Fattah, 2006:2; Kifner, 2007; Norton, 2007:140) and that both are parallels in development that in their circumstance, must occur in unison. The data also reveals such fighting may undo investment in infrastructure as was the case in the July 2006 war (Norton, 2007:132, 152). Hezbollah may argue, bearing this cycle of development and reconstruction with patience may be described as a virtuous act or a form of resistance that strikes at the root of the problem. This presents a challenge to the broadly defined understandings of alternative development theorists who call for holistic development. Do they consider armed struggle an acceptable form of development on par with social, environmental and other such spheres? Or, do they limit this as Ife did, by arguing all tactics must be peaceful and what if this is not reflective of local priorities
and instead is an imposition of exogenous values and priorities?

By simultaneously striving for development of this life and the afterlife, calling for continuous improvement but placing limits on economic growth and engaging in both community building and armed struggle, Hezbollah presents a holistic approach to local community development that reflects a combination of local values and the unique local context. Given the diverse nature of the communities under Hezbollah’s de facto control, the question arises; is this a grassroots vision or one that is imposed by an articulate guerrilla movement?

4.3 Participatory development: Whose interests are Hezbollah representing?

Several theorists describe communities as intensely diverse and consumed by internal conflict (Kapoor [2002] as cited in Dorsner, 2004:368; Veltmeyer, 2001a:63; Brock et al., 2001:28, 35; Larrison & Hadley-Ives, 2004:55), rendering participatory processes unrepresentative of the broad array of community voices. Others add this process is exacerbated by external facilitators (Rahman, 1993:152; Dorsner, 2004:368) and several conclude this can be averted if the development agenda is internally driven (Rahnema, 1990:203; Rahnema, 1992:127; Garba, 1999:169). Other theorists find external intervention to be beneficial as it increases project efficiency (Ben-Meir, 2004:5, 45). This raises the question, how does Hezbollah involve community members in identifying priorities and developing community development programs? We begin by exploring the implications of consultative and top-down priority identification models as used by Hezbollah. We then consider if local animators are able to negotiate internal
power dynamics and how Hezbollah can be certain it is reflecting the priorities of the most marginalized segments in their communities.

**Consultative and top-down priority identification**

Ben-Meir (2004:5, 45) emphasizes the project efficiency aspect of community development, which he says can be attained through external facilitators but Brock et al. (2001:12) find such an approach to community participation to be largely consultative. Hezbollah relies heavily on surveys, studies and needs assessments to identify community priorities. *Jihad al Binaa*’s agricultural section studies the priorities of farmers and their families in general and project beneficiaries in particular through field visits, call-in shows and informal gatherings opposed to formal participatory workshops (Fieldbook-17/01/08). Similarly, *Qard al Hassan* compiles information on areas of need as identified in loan applications and through meetings with regional representatives (Fieldbook-19/12/07). According to Brock et al., such methods are not participatory as the method of community involvement has not been identified by service recipients but by service deliverers. What complicates this analysis is that the service delivers could also be service recipients as Hezbollah maintains they are from the community and from the ranks of the marginalized. Applying Veltmeyer and O’Malley’s (2001) perspective that communities are intensely diverse, such an approach would not address power dynamics as for the most part, only one segment of a religiously and politically diverse community is setting the agenda. The question arises, what if it is the concerns of the most marginalized that are being addressed?
Are local animators able to negotiate internal power dynamics?

Rahman (1993:127, 152) and Garba (1999:169) argue community development should organically reflect the community’s priorities, which Rahman suggests is achievable through local animators and leaders who are in touch with the masses. Rahman (1993:127, 152) also criticizes external facilitators for adversely impacting local power dynamics. Suggesting local animation also does not address internal power dynamics, Goovaerts et al. argues local organizations in conflict zones may develop an acute capacity to articulate demands but are not always representative of the community’s interests. This raises the question, is Hezbollah’s process of priority identification a top-down approach or is it led by the grassroots? Kahil finds this to be a complex relationship as on the one hand, Hezbollah and Nasruallah draw upon rhetoric to encourage individuals to embrace religion, their sense of agency and the armed struggle. At the same time, Hezbollah’s officials and animators typically hail from the ranks of the marginalized. This comes to the forefront in the personality of Nasrullah who is acclaimed across much of the Arab street as a spiritual, charismatic, and trustworthy leader (Kahil, 2007:80-81, 85). The presence of leadership such as Nasrullah points to the organic nature of the movement, suggesting Hezbollah is the outcome of the efforts of such community members. Contrasting Rahman and Goovaert’s arguments the question arises, are Hezbollah’s consultative tools incapable of imposing an agenda on the community simply because they are an organic process? The data suggests Hezbollah draws upon a method akin to Rahman’s notion of animation and in lieu of formal, inclusive participatory techniques; community input is garnered through everyday life. The Mayor explained Hezbollah is in touch with the communities priorities simply by
way of being from the community. Other respondents added they understand the communities priorities by virtue of being from the ranks of the marginalized (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am; Fieldbook-23/01/08). While Larrison and Hadley-Ives find the most marginalized in a community do not have time to participate in participatory interventions (Larrison & Hadley-Ives, 2004:55), the data suggests Hezbollah’s method of local animation may ensure their input is still factored in as community members do not have to take time out from daily survival to attend community meetings as their priorities are still captured by local animators.

**Incorporating the voice of the most marginalized community members**

If participatory methods and local animators do not represent broader community interests as suggested by Goovaert and Brock et al., the question arises; can any process ensure everybody’s interests are represented? Given the diverse nature of communities, it seems local community development can only represent the interests of certain sectors as the priorities of the marginalized and those of the privileged may often be polar opposites, meaning they cannot simultaneously be represented. This further affirms Rahnema’s perspective that local grassroots leaders are most in touch with the community’s priorities (Fieldbook-24/01/08; Fecci 2007:26-27; Fieldbook-17/01/08; Fieldbook-19/12/07; Fieldbook-17/01/08. Although no participatory process can represent everyone’s interests in diverse communities, this method of animation seems to represent the interests of the marginalized, reflecting the origins of the service delivers. However, it seems it is not only the marginalized who feel they are being represented by Hezbollah. According to informal respondents, it is not out of the ordinary to witness individuals in luxury cars loudly playing Nasrullah’s speeches and other Hezbollah songs
suggesting even the well-to-do feel their priorities are being addressed by Hezbollah. We shall now explore whether Hezbollah constructs an exclusive approach to community development that ultimately keeps uneven power dynamics intact or does social capital serve as a collective good that benefits all?

4.4 Social capital as practiced by Hezbollah

4.4.1 Does social capital keep uneven power structures intact?

In our discussion above, we explored the challenges involved in priority identification in diverse communities. We now turn to the operationalization of Hezbollah's social service network, exploring inclusivity and accessibility issues. Many theorists find social capital is more likely to benefit the socio-economically privileged (Stack, 1974; Brock et al., 2001:28; Fine, 2002:796, 799; Schurrman, 2003:1000; Miraftab, 2004:241; Cleaver, 2005; Bourdieu as cited in Wakefield 2005). Some debate whether trust is greater amongst the wealthy (Newton [1990] as cited in Foley & Edwards, 1999:141-173) or the marginalized (Veenstra, 2002:549, 556, 561-562; Brooks, 2003:42), while Putnam argues it is a resource that benefits the entire community (as cited in Wakefield 2005). Given the level of diversity at the community level, this section explores first, is social capital higher among the wealthy? Second, how does accessibility and quality compare to any alternatives that may exist? Third, what role do women play in building social capital?

Is social capital higher among the wealthy?

Miraftab (2004:239, 241), Fine (2002:796, 799) and Schuurman (2003:1000) argue social capital places a greater burden on marginalized community members whose
resources are already over-stretched. For example, while Putnam describes volunteerism as an important aspect of social capital (as cited in Warde et al., 2005:403) according to Cleaver, the chronically poor do not have time to volunteer (Cleaver 2005). According to the data, the majority of Hezbollah’s operatives stem from the low or lower-middle class (Hazmeh, 2004:76; Fieldbook-27/12/07, am). Yet they have the time to invest in their community as much of Hezbollah’s membership consists of volunteers with jobs outside of their official party duty. Volunteerism appears to be an integral part of the social service network evidenced by the 1500 volunteers involved in post-war damage assessment and 1700 volunteer’s involved in the post-war cleanup (Kifner, 2007). This is also evidenced by the regular roster of volunteers registered with the Islamic Health Society. This raises the question, how accurate is Cleaver that those from a lower socio-economic position have little time to engage in community events? In this case, bonds of solidarity and community that are formed while volunteering would be accessible to all participants, regardless of social class. Newton (1990) argues social capital is greater among the wealthy (as cited in Foley & Edwards, 1999:141-173) but Brooks (2003:42) finds religious people and those of a lower socio-economic status are more likely to make charitable donations, possibly because stocks of trust and social capital are higher amongst both groups. This explanation is supported by Veenstra (2002:549, 556, 561-562) who finds religious people have higher levels of trust, which is substantiated by the examples of Hezbollah fighters who stayed behind during the war looked after shops and peoples property without any looting. The high levels of khums and zakaat donated annually also support Brooks’ findings that religious people are more likely to donate. With $13 million of the community’s savings in its coffers (Fieldbook-19/12/07), the
Qard al Hassan loan program similarly suggests there are high levels of trust in the community contributing to the collective good by people of a lower socio-economic status, which leads us to conclude Cleaver and Newton’s theory is not supported by the data as the marginalized appear to have high levels of social capital in the form of trust and time to invest in the community. Putnam’s perspective that social capital is a collective resource for the entire community appears more accurate in our case study.

How accessible are Hezbollah’s social services?

Bourdieu (as cited in Wakefield, 2005), Cleaver (2005) and Newton (as cited in Foley & Edwards, 1999) argue social capital is more accessible to the relatively privileged. The data suggests the social service network made a range of services more accessible to the marginalized and a diverse range of communities through the subsidization of health care, school fees and textbooks (Harik, 2004:87; Jorisch, 2004:11; Koya 2007:35; Fieldbook-27/12/07, am; Fieldbook-19/12/07; Fieldbook-27/12/07, am; Fieldbook-28/12/07; Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08) This further suggests Putnam’s positivist perspective (as cited in Wakefield 2005) is more accurate that social capital is a resource that benefits the entire community and that Miraftab, Fine and Schuurman are inaccurate in their criticism of social capital putting undue pressure on the already marginalized. In marked contrast, the various forms of subsidies provided suggest these services are of greater benefit to the marginalized than the community as a whole.

Turning to whether these services are accessible to those of other religious or political persuasions, the data suggests Hezbollah has institutions in communities other than their own (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am; Hamzeh, 2004, p.88-89). The question arises, is there an expectation that those who access these services will then become allegiant to Hezbollah?
The example of a family debating between taking their injured child to a government hospital or a Hezbollah-affiliated one indicates where one accesses their social services is a highly political process. While there is no coerced form of allegiance, usage of Hezbollah's service network could be a tacit show of support and theoretically, adversaries may take a principled stand and avoid using any of their services. In practice, these services are so deeply ingrained that even filling up a bottle of water at the nearest water fountain might only have been made possible by Hezbollah's infrastructure projects and it is unlikely such activities could have any expectation of allegiance.

**Women**

One area not covered by the social capital theorists reviewed is the participation of women in building social capital. For the sake of our discussion, we will assume when Miraftab (2004:239, 241), Fine (2002:796, 799), Schuurman (2003:1000) and Bebbington et al. (2004:36-38) argue social capital keeps uneven power structures intact, we will assume this to mean differences of power between sectarian groups or political groups and between sexes in addition to the traditional understanding of socio-economic differences. According to the data, Hezbollah's social services have had a positive impact on women's access to the public sphere although this advancement has primarily been in areas traditionally dominated by women such as in teaching and healthcare (Fieldbook-28/12/07). One notable exception was the involvement of girls in the al Mahdi scouts, giving them the very same opportunities available to boys to participate in outdoor activities (Fieldbook-25/12/07). Hezbollah's agricultural sector also involves women in a meaningful manner by recognizing their role in managing the household and involving women in conservation projects, in promoting healthcare and providing them
with a range of training opportunities including how to market surplus crops (Fieldbook-17/01/08). Hezbollah’s efforts to expand women’s involvement are a tacit recognition of the uneven power structures affecting them. Kahil (2007:64) finds women are largely absent from Hezbollah’s leadership apparatus which leads us to conclude by largely limiting the involvement of women to traditional spheres also helps keep uneven power structure intact. Qassem might disagree, arguing women have an elevated position as they will be the mothers of the next generation and thus society is built through them (Qassem, 2005:46, 60; as cited in Jaber 1997:90). Applying the Husseini model to this suggests the community’s sense of agency is developed by the mother and that women play an integral role in altering structures if they raise their children to rise up against injustice.

Rather than excluding the marginalized from local community development, in our case study, the marginalized have contributed to social capital. Social services were also accessible to all community members, with several projects in place to increase accessibility for the more marginalized sectors of society.

4.4.2 How does trust facilitate the delivery of coping mechanisms and contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of the programs?

Several theorists describe social capital as a product of trust, cooperation and solidarity mobilized for the collective good (Putnam [1993]; Coleman; Fukuyama, [1995] as cited in Warde et al., 2005). This section explores the role played by stocks of trust in facilitating the delivery of coping mechanisms and contributing to the efficiency of service delivery. Theorists debate whether trust reduces corruption (Coleman and Fukuyama [1995] as cited in Wakefield, 2005), facilitates it (Fine, 2002:796), silences
alternative voices (Fukuyama, 2000:98-111; Wakefield, 2005) or lowers transaction costs
(Putnam, 2000; Roskam 2003:30). We apply these theoretical perspectives to the role
trust plays in Hezbollah’s activities by exploring first, can social capital and bonds of
trust be fostered in a conflict zone? Second, does social capital enable Hezbollah to
operate more efficiently?

Can social capital and bonds of trust be fostered in a conflict zone?

Fukuyama (2000:98-111) argues community members build social capital to
maintain their reputations rather than to foster bonds of trust. The question arises, how
can trust exist at the community level if the barrel of a gun is present? In such
circumstances, one may assume trust is coerced and individuals comply to safeguard their
personal safety. According to Nasrullah, there are no open manifestations of weapons
and the presence of armed Hezbollah fighters in community space is prohibited by
Nasrullah (as cited in Noe 2007:384-386). Kahil adds, “...Hezbollah’s weapons have not
been used outside the Lebanese/Israeli conflict, nor inside Lebanon (Kahil, 2007:55).”
Hezbollah’s positive election results also suggest there is a high level of trust in the
organization and that the community is not being coerced into supporting them out of a
sense of fear or obligation.

Does social capital lower transaction costs?

The question arises; does social capital enable Hezbollah to operate more
efficiently by lowering transaction costs as suggested by Putnam and Roskam (Putnam,
2000; Roskam 2003:30)? Does it reduce corruption as suggested by Fukuyama (as cited
in Schuurman, 2003:995) and Coleman (as cited in Healy, 2004:12) or, does it facilitate
corruption and criminal activity as forewarned by Fine (2002:796)? According to the
data, transaction costs are kept to a minimum in Hezbollah’s social service network due to low salaries and the absence of corruption. One example that emerged in the field research was the construction of the multi-million dollar Firdos recreational centre where contractors offering bribes were removed from the project. The data also indicates community members are able to see the outcome of their charitable donations and with the administrators of these programs living amongst the community, people see them living simple lives with no extravagance or sudden acquisitions of luxury items (Fieldbook-29/12/07) which they infer as an absence of corruption. In contrast, the data also suggests Hezbollah engages in corrupt forms of earning such as smuggling drugs and dealing in counterfeit money to fund their social services while other sources of data also suggest Hezbollah is seeking self-sufficiency in funding but through legitimate channels such as investments, currency trading, and donations and by establishing local businesses. According to the data, Hezbollah has gained the trust of the community, enabling them to spend less time and resources on convincing community members of an idea or building their trust (Fieldbook-25/12/07). They contrast this with foreign organizations that spend a substantial portion of their resources gaining the communities trust in order to attain cooperation or convince people to do things in a certain way. This level of trust could be an important determinant behind the success of Hezbollah’s outreach programs where the Party creates community awareness on a range of health and safety matters including the risks of smoking as well as the importance of wearing seatbelts, brushing their teeth at night, avoiding landmines and protecting the environment. Due to trust in the Islamic Health Society, community members may heed their advice but this also opens up the danger of Hezbollah being able to draw on these stocks of trust to encourage community
members to support a political agenda beneficial to the Party. However, the very basis of trust would entail if such manipulation were to be used and discovered, then stocks of trust would eventually be eroded.

These examples suggest Roskam and Putnam are accurate when they say transaction costs are lowered through social capital and efficiency is increased as suggested by Fukuyama and Coleman. The question arises, if local community development organizations are more efficient than the government in service delivery, is Roskam willing to support the activities of dual role organizations such as Hezbollah activities for the sake of project efficiency?

4.4.3 Is there sufficient capacity at the local level for efficient and effective development?

This section explores whether giving to the community through volunteering, solidarity or cooperation contributes to the effectiveness and efficiency with which Hezbollah administers its social service network and whether any of these actions have an expectation of reciprocity. Some theorists argue personal benefit is integral to social capital suggesting people only give to the community if they will receive something in return (Bourdieu [1987], Burt [1992], and Lin [2001] as cited in Warde et al., 2005:403; Meyerson, 1994:383-399, Stanton-Salazar & Dornbusch, 1995:116-135). Others argue social capital encourages cooperation and collective action with no expectation of individual gain (Bowles and Gintis as cited in The Economist, 2003) while others suggest this spirit of collectivism suppresses the individual (Habermas [1984] as cited in Wakefield, 2005; Fukuyama, 2000:98-111). Several theorists also imply communities lack the necessary managerial and professional capacity to contribute to the collective
good (Platteau, 2002:104; Hussein, 2003:277-278; Nelson, 2007:144). Others argue traditional communities have sufficient organizational capacity (Veltmeyer, 2001a:63). Hezbollah’s effectiveness seems to be rooted in its ability to inspire members to sacrifice individual gain for the collective good. We first ask, does Hezbollah have the technical capacity to deliver social services in an effective and efficient manner and the ability to attract qualified personnel to administer community development programs? Second, what role do cooperation and solidarity play in Hezbollah’s ability to draw on social capital?

While the community is willing to volunteer their time, we explore the value of these contributions and if the local community lacks the necessary managerial and professional capacity to contribute to the collective good as argued by Hussein, Nelson and Platteau (Hussein, 2003:277-278; Nelson, 2007:144; Platteau, 2002:104). Or, do they have sufficient organizational and political capacity as suggested by Veltmeyer (2001a:63), but are prone to brain drain as argued by Moubayed (as cited in Harik 2004:90)? The data suggests Hezbollah relies heavily on project management principles to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of its social service projects. This includes involving staff in developing the annual operational plan, holding regular meetings to identify areas for continuous improvement and providing staff development opportunities in the form of retreats and training. This was corroborated by the Mayor who claimed he partners with Hezbollah because they study timelines and have sound project management practices. The data further illustrates that the literature produced by these social service agencies reflects transparent and effective management practices. For example, the Muassasat Jarha publication showed annual budgets, annual plans and
reports on how funds were spent. Social capital enables Hezbollah to attract qualified personnel to administer community development programs amidst uncompetitive wages as evidenced by doctors and engineers forego higher salaries. This lends weight to Rahman’s theory as well as the perspective of Bowles and Gintis that human nature is essentially good. *Intima* and *Iqtina* appear integral in retaining dedicated and skilled professionals whose sole motivation is to give back to their community and to sacrifice individual gain in the form of higher salaries (Fieldbook-28/12/07). This suggests Veltmeyer is more accurate than Hussein, Nelson and Platteau by arguing the local community does have sufficient organizational capacity.

The question arises, how does a collectivist perspective facilitate the effective and efficient delivery of coping mechanisms and are cooperation and solidarity features of social capital or is individual interest the key determinant? Putnam (2000), Coleman (1970) and Fukuyama (1995) describe social capital as a product of trust, cooperation and solidarity mobilized for the collective good. Rahman (1980:85, 86) argues in collective societies, individuals gain satisfaction by working towards the collective good and there is little desire to serve one’s individual interest at the expense of others. Similarly, Bowles and Gintis (as cited in the Economist, 2003) argue social capital benefits the collective because human nature is essentially good. Implicit in Hezbollah’s aversion to a state of chaos is an understanding that human nature is seen as essentially selfish (Ghorayeb, 2002:22-24), which mirrors Hobbes’ aversion to a state of nature where the only law that prevails is that might is right. However, if human nature is selfish, then people would only work in the individual interest as argued by Bourdieu (1987), Burt (1992), Lin (2001) (as cited in Warde., 2005:403), Meyerson (1994:383-399), Stanton-
Salazar and Dornbusch (1995:116-135). Applying this to our case study, we can conclude social services would only be provided if there was something to gain such as Hezbollah acquiring legitimacy in the community’s eyes. However, the data provides examples of individuals giving to the collective with no individual gain such as the Mayor who lost everything in the war while staying behind voluntarily to care for the injured and the six ambulance workers and those engaged in armed struggle who were killed. We also find several examples where working in the collective interest yields greater benefit than working individually. Rebuilding Hart Hreik demonstrates rather than each displaced person trying to individually secure their own permanent dwelling, working in the collective interest reaps greater results, enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of delivering coping mechanisms. The example also raises the concerns of Habermas (as cited in Wakefield, 2005) who cautions social capital forces conformity and Fukuyama (2000:98-111) who argues community members build social capital to maintain their reputations. This raises the question, does enabling effective and efficient delivery of social services mean imposing ideas on community members? The data suggests within Hezbollah itself, there seems to be autonomy in the decision-making process and no single vision is imposed on the administrators of these programs. This was evidenced when constructing the Firdos project; several ideas were proposed and discussed amongst Hezbollah members before agreeing upon one. This mitigates some of Habermas’ cautioning as ideas are not imposed in a top-down manner but are openly debated, however in this example; they were only debated amongst Hezbollah operatives and not with the local community. According to the data, Qard al Hassan’s loan program benefits the collective by making small-scale loans available en mass (Fieldbook-
Similarly, the Firdos project was built through community cooperation and solidarity as individuals donated building material to make the project possible (Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08), lending weight to Putnam, Coleman and Fukuyama’s perspective that social capital contributes to the collective good. These examples suggest Hezbollah draws heavily on stocks of social capital, which facilitates the effectiveness and efficiency of its social service delivery program in addition to ensuring the community is involved in identifying and implementing these projects through bonds of trust, cooperation, solidarity and volunteerism.

Through social capital formation, Hezbollah mobilized the community to use scarce financial resources as efficiently as possible to deliver a host of social services. It also ensures the organizational capacity to operationalize these services can be locally derived. While social capital may be an important facilitator of local community development that enables marginalized communities to create opportunities for themselves, the question remains, does such remedial relief ultimately keep the underlying cause of the community’s marginalization intact?

4.5 Coping mechanisms: Internalizing blame and keeping the status quo intact

The political space perspective insists development can address local matters through the provision of coping mechanisms while simultaneously pursuing a political strategy at regional, national and global levels (Shragge 1997:9; Giles & Stokke, 2000: 262; Hickey, 2003:10-11). We now contrast two possible implications of community-led service delivery; the first is whether Hezbollah’s social service wing meets daily survival needs or even enables self-sufficiency but ultimately, takes away attention from...
underlying structural issues. The second is whether it is possible to do both at the same time, have daily needs met while still being motivated to address the root cause of the communities marginalization. Several theorists have examined these issues, some suggesting local service delivery keeps the status quo in check (O’Malley, 2001:210) and depoliticizes the masses (Roy, 2004:43; Rahnema, 1992:124) and ultimately blames the marginalized for their plight (Ife, 1997:52; O’Malley, 2001:211; Miraftab as cited in Schurrman 2003:1000). Some suggest the state should retain their service delivery role (Morrison 2001:125, 126; Veltmeyer, 2001a:54; O’Malley, 2001:210; Roy, 2004:43, 45; Bebbington et al., 2004:36-38; Shaw 2006;), while others find service delivery is done more efficiently at the community level (Ife, 1997:121-122, 127; Roskam, 2003; Ben-Meir, 2004:40; Nelson, 2007:132). Writing from an alternative development perspective, Rahman (1993:194), Stiefel and Wolfe (Stiefel & Wolfe, 1994:4) argue communities may not be interested in addressing broader power structures and their priority may simply be to ensure their daily needs are met. We begin by exploring the following questions. First, do Hezbollah’s activities facilitate the rollback of the state? Second, does this social safety net blame the victims for their own marginalization and does this put the onus on them to develop, absolving all other parties of any responsibility?

**Do Hezbollah’s activities facilitate the rollback of the state?**

Shaw (2006), Roy (2004) and Veltmeyer (2001) caution when local communities provide social services, they are facilitating the policy of mainstream development to reduce taxes, rollback the state and shift responsibility for social service delivery to local communities (Veltmeyer, 2001a:54; Roy, 2004:45; Shaw, 2006). Applying this to our case study, we see Hezbollah’s coping mechanisms were not a response to the
retrenchment of the state but to the states historical neglect of the local community. The coping mechanisms served as a form of resistance to a state that was absent and to an occupation that impeded their ability to go about daily life. This is further substantiated by Kahil (2007:132) who describes Hezbollah as a product of a particular circumstance. The question arises, does it matter who initiated this community delivery of service, or is the effect one and the same, facilitating the rollback of the state and reinforcing the status quo by keeping a neglectful governmental system in place? Implying the community would be more likely to rise up against the state if they were not provided with a social safety net, Veltmeyer (2001a:54) and Roy (2004:45) argue local service delivery maintains the status quo by cushioning the states retrenchment. Considering the case study suggests Hezbollah itself delivers services so effectively, it becomes unclear why Hezbollah is advocating for a greater government role in service delivery. Fneish (as cited in Cavanaugh 2007) clarifies the state should not be responsible for providing all social services as he sees space for decentralization and a strong civil society that would be more in touch with the community’s priorities. In contrast, Morrison (2001:125, 126) argues it is in the best interest of the state to play a greater role in service delivery to maintain its sense of legitimacy. While Roskam (2003:30) and Martinussen (1997:210-212) concur that the decentralization of service delivery to the local level increases project efficiency and provides cost-effective administration, the data suggests rather than serving the interest of government, Hezbollah’s delivery of social services erodes state legitimacy. This is evidenced by several examples where social service delivery was actually assumed by the government in areas that Hezbollah had been active such as garbage collection and the provision of electricity. This leads us to conclude that
Morrison is accurate that securing state legitimacy is a greater priority from the government’s perspective than implementing the cost-saving measures hailed by Roskam. Shaw, Roy and Veltmeyer’s cautioning does not accurately account for situations such as that in our case study where the states absence precedes the structural reforms of mainstream development that called for states to cut taxes. Although the provision of coping mechanisms presumably quells the masses, this leads us to question whether the rollback of the state can happen in isolation from citizen dissent and the threat of civil unrest.

Does local community development blame the victims for their own marginalization?

Several theorists argue social capital and local community development blame the victims for their own marginalization, putting the onus on them to develop (Ife, 1997:52; O’Malley, 2001:211; Schurrman 2003:1000; Miraftab 2004:239, 241), which further detracts their attention from structural issues. The counter argument is these coping mechanisms free up peoples time, enabling them to participate in collective action that targets the root cause of their marginalization. Ife explains in mainstream development, structural factors are not factored into the analysis suggesting any individual can achieve financial and professional success in a capitalist system and failure to do so is due to the individuals own shortcomings (Ife, 1997:52). Implicit in capitalism’s glorification of the individual is the notion that individual development is both the means and end of development. In contrast, neo-Marxist dependency theorists argue structural factors are so deterministic that individuals have no sense of agency and cannot advance until the entire system is overthrown. Contrasting the pro-structural approach of neo-Marxists and the pro-agency perspective implicit in capitalism, the question arises, which position
more accurately reflects Hezbollah’s perspective? Hezbollah describes itself as neither capitalist nor socialist, but encourages continuous growth of the individual, suggesting individuals can overcome structural constraints. By positioning individual development as a prerequisite to development of the collective, Hezbollah further suggests the main constraint to development lies in the individual, mirroring the capitalist position that internalizes the root cause of marginalization. We now explore if community members are still motivated to address the root cause of their marginalization after receiving coping mechanisms and if these coping mechanisms expand their time and ability to alter the underlying structural environment. According to the data, if the local community does not bare the onus for development, then tens of thousands would undergo social crisis of a large magnitude (Qassem, 2005:85). Hezbollah further argues coping mechanisms enable community members to be active participants in society (Fieldbook-30/12/07). Several social capital theorists also argue the most marginalized segments of society are too busy to participate in local community development or collective action (Stack, 1974; Foley & Edwards, 1999:141-173; Wuthnow, 2002:670; Wakefield, 2005; Cleaver, 2005). This means if no coping mechanisms were provided, then a heightened level of deprivation would ensue and community members could be too busy to participate in collective action, which points to a moral dilemma. Should Hezbollah desist from providing social services while deprivation grows exponentially until the community rises up against the government? Or, as the historic data on the community suggests, would this continued neglect result in a sense of disempowerment and demoralization and decreased level of pride in the community identity as was the case prior to the Shia mobilization that began in the 1960s? The data suggests the re-framing
of local traditions through an activist lens resulted in the empowerment of the community however, an ideology on its own may not be sufficient to motivate the masses without community members who have time to participate in such actions and without success stories to prove the value of collective action.

By encouraging development of the individual while pushing the government to take a greater role in service delivery, Hezbollah points to both internal and external factors contributing to the community’s marginalization. The case study also demonstrates that community-led social service delivery does not keep the status quo in check. This creates the potential for a local community organization to provide coping mechanisms and also mobilize local communities to draw on their sense of agency and challenge the structures that have deprived them.

4.6 Hezbollah’s impact on the structural environment

O’Malley (2001:218) points to social movements as effective partners for local communities to alter structures and address the underlying causes of their marginalization, but there is little in his work or in the body of literature on alternative development that discusses what this entails. For this reason, we shall contrast social movement theory, alternative development perspectives, social capital theory and perspectives on political space to determine which best explains whether Hezbollah limits the involvement of communities to local issues, brings local concerns to the national level or affects broader power structures in areas such as class division, occupation and government neglect.
Alternative development perspective

Kaufman and Alonso (1997:11) and Shaw (2006) argue the local community is capable of affecting broader power structures. Critiquing the alternative development perspective, Veltmeyer (2001a:58-59, 62-63; 2001c:6, 28) and O’Malley (2001:210) suggest local community development limits the involvement of communities to local issues and reduces their ability to affect broader issues. We now discuss if Hezbollah’s mobilization of the community is limited to local concerns and if addressing the structural environment is even a community priority. Veltmeyer discusses the implications of decentralization in Bolivia where he found it restricts the local community’s engagement to local, administrative issues. We find similar examples in our case study where Hezbollah stopped a grocery store monopoly and demanded better worker rights, without addressing the underlying capitalist system that enables labour to be exploited and monopolies to undermine local businesses. Likewise, Hezbollah demanded a stop to a dam with negative environmental effects, without calling for stricter environmental regulations. Hezbollah’s mobilization around such isolated issues suggests Rahman and Stiefel may be accurate and that altering broader power structures is not a community priority as neither of these examples targeted the broader power structures responsible for the community’s marginalization. This position is further supported by Hezbollah’s aversion to both chaos and deep cutting changes that could weaken Lebanon and increase vulnerability to external attack as that would undermine their resistance priority (Ghorayeb, 2002:112-117). Bayat (2000:17, 19) argues the number one priority of Islamic movements is the imposition of an Islamic state based on a belief nothing can be done to ameliorate the marginalization of the oppressed in the
absence of an Islamic state. Bayat rationalizes community’s lack agency until they get the structure right. In contrast, although Hezbollah self-identifies as an Islamic movement, the data suggests they do not aspire for an Islamic state as a precursor to provide coping mechanisms, to alter the structural environment or as a precursor to attaining their goals, suggesting Bayat inaccurately universalizes the motivating principles of all Islamic movements.

Social movement perspective

According to the social movement perspective of Delia Porta and Diani (2006:28-29, 146), Gamson and Meyer (1996: 305) and Zald (1996:228), mass defiance and sensationalistic tactics enable agents to bring their concerns to the national and international level. Bozarslan suggests the only tools used in the Middle East when seeking to change power structures involve violent tactics. The question arises, did Hezbollah bring their concerns to the national level and did they draw on violent tactics to do so? The data suggests Hezbollah engaged in non-violent acts of mass defiance including general strikes to press for government action, risking lives to get to school and creating a social service network where none existed. Such activities highlighted the government’s neglect of rural development and absence from service delivery, prompting them to take a greater role. It also stopped harmful investment from taking place in the local community. This confirms Della Porta and Diani, Gamson and Meyer and Zald’s perspective that sensationalistic tactics are capable of bringing community concerns to the national and international level. We shall now explore the social movement perspective and the ability of local communities to alter the structural environment. Two spectrums appear in the social movement literature, the first describes structures as so
enduring that agents must passively wait until structures become temporarily weakened by some extraordinary historical event (Piven & Cloward [1979] and Brand [1990] and as cited in McAdam et al., 1996:279; Wyatt, 2004:1). Applying this perspective to our case study, we can assume the impetus to get mobilized may only exist in the right social conditions and in lieu of that, there is little that can inspire a community into action. The data confirms Hezbollah rose to prominence during an extraordinary time marked by civil war and the Israeli occupation. However, this perspective appears one-dimensional as it does not explain why at times these opportunities are ceased and at other times, they are ignored. A glimpse into Lebanon’s history reveals there were a series of extraordinary moments such as the forced relocation by the Mamluk conquerors, Ottoman rule and the French invasion, yet despite previous uprisings, the lot of the Shia’s never improved. In the post-World War II era, they only began to use their agency to bring about change well after Lebanon attained independence, a process initiated by Imam Musa al Sadr, whom according to the data, was motivated by the very same Najaf connection as the founders of Hezbollah. The second perspective is articulated by Imbroscio, Gamson, Meyer, Johnston and Noakes. They acknowledge there are moments when political space is open and affecting structures is more likely but they insist there is a balance and that agents can also create opportunities and shape structural contexts (Gamson & Meyer, 1996:276; Imbroscio, 1999:46; Johnston & Noakes, 2005:22). Johnston and Noakes (2005:22) add it is how struggles are framed that determines whether individuals will realize their sense of agency. The data suggests in previous centuries, many Shia framed their plight in a passive manner, emphasizing the destiny of their fate. By re-framing the battle of Karbala into a narrative that called on every individual who mourns Imam Hussein (A.S.)
to take an active stand against injustice, the Shia in our case study were led to struggle against oppressive structures and to create new opportunities. The impact of re-framing this narrative cannot be overstated considering the two-month long mourning period is attended by Shia of all walks of life including those from upper, middle and lower echelons of society starting from infancy until ones final days. The data suggests Johnston and Noakes’ perspective accurately explains that the manner in which social conditions are framed can create a profound sense of agency, even in very imposing structural environments. The narrative can either be framed to force passivity or to inspire action, explaining why there were several periods of openness in Lebanon’s history but no structural change was brought about by the community until the latter part of the 20th century. O’Malley insists local communities must align themselves with social movements to bring local concerns to the national level and alter the structural environment (O’Malley, 2001:218). Although it remains inconclusive whether Hezbollah is a social movement, it is clear they draw on social movement techniques of dissent and framing to engage with the structural environment. We can deduce that in lieu of local communities aligning with social movements where the risk is their issues will become lost in an assortment of causes, they may impact the structural environment by drawing on social movement tactics.

Social capital perspective

Writing from a social capital perspective, Schuurman (2003:1000) contends social capital has the potential to reconnect the social sphere with the political sphere. Bebbington (2002:801) and Fine (2002:798) says social capital links the micro to the meso. Putnam also argues communities can engage in building and bridging social
capital to advance local concerns. By describing it as a meso level link, Putnam, Schurrman and Fine seem to be making a bridge between agency and structures, which is substantiated by Hezbollah mobilizing the local community at the micro level to organize together to effect change at the macro level. The data suggests Hezbollah has built a coalition and networks with other communities, which brings their concerns outside of the local community and also involves them in issues beyond their local ones. Hezbollah also built relations through parliament and interfaith activities with other sects and political groups. Through these coalitions and networks, they advocated on issues such as more equitable budgets (Qassem, 2005:193) and ultimately walked out of government together in December 2006 calling for national unity, greater government representation and new electoral laws (Ghorayeb, 2007:1). This suggests according to Bebbington and Fine’s perspective, Hezbollah is building social capital and according to Schuurman’s perspective, through social capital, Hezbollah is able to reconnect the social and political sphere. We shall now explore the social capital perspective on the ability of local communities to alter the structural environment, with a focus on the structure of class divisions. Bebbington et al. (2004:36-38) argue social capital is used to keep class division’s intact. Tarrow (as cited in Harriss & De Renzio, 1997:928) adds social capital attacks the symptoms and not the causes of the problem. The data suggests Hezbollah seeks to address class division through religious charitable donations, *khums* and *zakaat*, the collection of which is facilitated through bonds of trust and social capital. The vast amount of charitable donations could be described as remedial relief, devoid of any political strategy, affirming Tarrow’s perspective and keeping class divisions intact. However, the theoretical notion behind these taxes is that individuals should give so
much that they are ultimately not in possession of excessive amounts of wealth as was exemplified by Imam Ali (A.S.) (Ghorayeb, 2002:17-18). If this theoretical model were enacted, then class divisions would be minimized. If the taxes are collected and used locally, that would also lend weight to Engberg-Pedersen’s political space argument that communities can provide coping mechanisms and alter structures by themselves, for themselves. However, the reality is social capital has not resulted in the majority of society donating the greater part of their earnings to the collective on a scale wide enough that would alter the structure of class conflict. While social capital helps bring local concerns to the national level, it appears insufficient to alter structures.

*Political space perspective*

According to Villareal (2002:80), using political space requires an understanding of political channels and institutions. The data suggests Hezbollah’s increased community presence in municipal government and national parliament enabled them to advance community priorities at the national level such as lobbying for greater investment in local communities. While Martinussen (1997:212) argues bottom-up decentralization ensures local organizations are able to make local government more aware of local needs, in our case study, the data suggests local organizations were able to have their concerns heard at both the local and national level by way of their participation in municipal and national elections. One example of such a policy position is Hezbollah’s presence in parliament which has been described by Jorisch (2004:11) as primarily intended to secure national recognition of their resistance status. Hezbollah’s ability to do so suggests they are able to effectively access political space to further their community’s interests. We shall now explore the political space perspective on the
ability of local communities to alter the structural environment, with a focus on regaining power. According to Ife (1997:56), Rahnema (1992:123), Shragge (1997:xiii) and Garba (1999; 169), empowerment occurs when communities are able to confront the status quo and regain power. The question arises; did Hezbollah succeed in altering uneven power structures by redistributing power in Lebanon? The data suggests Hezbollah’s parliamentary participation aims to change the underlying power structures responsible for their marginalization and that Hezbollah and Amal’s parliamentary presence saw the community regain power. This was exemplified when Hezbollah’s parliamentarian’s and their allies walked out of government in December 2006, preventing the parliament from functioning and eventually bringing down the entire government. This suggests the communities attained sufficient power to ensure they are no longer ignored by the government, leading us to conclude Ife (1997:56), Garba (1999:169) and Shragge (1997:xiii) are more accurate than Brock et al. in defining empowerment as taking back power from the elite. By altering traditional power structures and regaining power, the case study further supports the social movement perspective of Della Porta and Diani (2006:12) that events that transpired at the micro level can result in change at the macro level. It also suggests Engberg-Pedersen is accurate that communities can alter structures by themselves for themselves and by working from within the governmental system, Hezbollah affirms Villareal’s (2002:80) perspective that using political space requires an understanding of political channels and institutions. The data also suggests Hezbollah struggled against the structure of occupation and the eventual withdrawal had a positive impact on the community’s development. It also illustrates Hezbollah contributed to ending the structure of occupation that placed a stranglehold on the development of the
entire nation. This shift lends weight to Kaufman and Alfonso’s perspective that community organizations can empower people to change structures from the bottom up and Engberg-Pedersen’s perspective of communities altering structures by themselves. Our case study also lends weight to Hickey, Giles, Stokke, Mohan and Stokke’s position that development should include both the provision of coping mechanisms while simultaneously pursuing a political strategy. Once the structure of occupation was removed, Hezbollah built additional institutions such as schools and hospitals, the community has been able to access traditional drinking water sources and farmers were able to work their lands again in addition to a proliferation in investment across the liberated areas. The government has also pledged investment in the south in addition to private business investment that has proliferated in the previously occupied area. This lends weight to the political space perspective that addressing structures results in an amelioration of everyday development.

The social movement and political space perspectives accurately describe how a local community may have their voice heard at the national level and impact the broader structural environment. Social capital explains how local community concerns can be brought to the national level, but on its own, social capital appears unable to bring about structural change. This affirms O’Malley’s position that local community development on its own cannot bring about structural change. While O’Malley suggests local community organizations align with social movements, our case study suggests using social movement tactics may suffice and that engaging in political space also presents an important avenue to alter structures and this should be further explored by local community development theorists.
4.7 Transitioning from shame and deprivation towards a sense of pride

In the previous section, we saw that it is possible to provide coping mechanisms at the local level while simultaneously addressing broader structures that contribute to a community’s marginalization. In this section, we begin by contrasting the depths of marginalization and shame experienced by the local community with examples of the high level of pride that now exists in the local identity. We then seek to understand what contributed to this dramatic shift. Some theorist’s suggest empowerment and a sense of community pride are outcomes of locally devised, creative solutions (Carner & Korten, 1984:201; Rahman, 1993:217), or the power of local actors (Bebbington, 2002:801). Others argue the local level is generally ineffective in furthering their community’s development (Platteau, 2002:104) while others maintain external support is inherently disempowering (Rahnema, 1992:123; Ngunjiri, 1998:466-467).

In the 1960s, while Beirut was popularly referred to as ‘the Paris of the Middle East’, another story was unfolding in the South, the Bekaa Valley and the Beirut suburbs, which in stark contrast was titled the ‘Belt of Misery.’ The name not only reflects the dismal socio-economic conditions in the Beirut neighbourhood where the Shia sought refuge from military occupation and governmental neglect, but it also exemplified the sense of deprivation, shame and demoralization that characterized the local identity (Fieldbook-30/12/07). In stark contrast, an image now appears of individuals from these locales having confidence and pride in their identity and origin. This becomes obvious through a quick canvas of usernames on the YouTube Web Site where volumes of
individuals boast they are from the south (jnoub) of Lebanon⁶ and from the hundreds of
facebook groups showcasing communities across South Lebanon. This is corroborated
by the respondent from Qard al Hassan who claims Hezbollah “created confidence in the
society, which they didn't have before,” in addition to a realization of their sense of
identity and infinite potential (Fieldbook-19/12/07). This pride is indicative of an
empowered community motivated by their success in challenging the status quo and the
marginalization they endured for so long. This lends weight to Garba’s (1999:169)
perspective that empowerment occurs when marginalization is overcome. We shall now
explore what contributed to this drastic shift.

Sources of Pride

The data suggests the renewed sense of pride was an outcome of using local funds
for development projects, a conglomeration of social services that enabled independence
and locally conceived creative solutions to address marginalization. We shall explore
what role local actors and networks played in this expansion of pride. Bebbington
(2002:801) argues one of the major contributions of social capital is its emphasis on the
power of local actors and their networks. Rahnema (1992:123) suggests any form of
external dependence is inherently disempowering, while Ngunjiri (1998:466-467) finds it
is mainstream development that imposes a disempowering framework on local
communities. The data suggests the community built itself by going abroad, gaining
capabilities and resources and then either sending remittances to Lebanon or returning to
serve their communities by way of their trade. They now have engineers, doctors and

⁶ This includes Youtube usernames such as SouthLebanon, JnoubJnoub, Zahratjnoub, Amourlejnoub,
JnounLibnan, jnoubtaybe, TheJnoub, janoubi87 or from towns located in the south such as KingAytaroun
and BintBintUbeil.
professionals in every field (Fieldbook-30/12/07; Fieldbook-24/01/08; Fieldbook-28/12/07) and the capacity to operationalize the social service network, contributing to pride at the community level. As a result, the second consultant argues “The Shia are able to show the world, the poorest people in Lebanon achieved many things from nothing.” As community members share their resources, Bebbington’s (2002:801) perspective appears to accurately describe the power of local actors and their networks in contributing to social capital and enabling greater self-sufficiency and sharing of resources. However, the act of depending on remittances suggests there is an element of external dependence but rather than it being disempowering as Rahnema suggests, it appears to contribute to the community’s sense of independence as the external party in this case are from the local community. Ngunjiri appears more accurate by suggesting it is mainstream development that is disempowering and not the very act of external dependence. However, the data reveals funds are also received from Iran, countering that sense of independence. Hezbollah claims they are moving away from Iranian funds suggesting Rahnema and Ngunjiri are accurate that community pride increases through independence. However, the data indicates local pride was high even when an Iranian hand was more certainly present in funding the social service wing, which leads us to conclude that pride was initially created via external support. Kahil (2007:50-51) finds Hezbollah is politically independent and our study finds the distinguishing feature is Iranian support did not support a mainstream model of development, lending further weight to Ngunjiri’s position. The ability for the community to shift away from this funding source will ultimately reveal to what extent they are actually dependent on it.
We shall now explore whether Hezbollah’s social services aim to create self-sufficient community members. The charitable projects of Hezbollah help fill a void in government services by providing schools, hospitals, polyclinics, health awareness campaigns, small business loans and a host of infrastructure projects. They also sponsor the families of those injured or killed as a result of the war, which includes covering their post-secondary education. These projects created self-sufficiency and kept the dignity of community members intact as they did not have to ask for help or feel like a burden on society. This also created a sense of pride because services were provided by the community for the community (Fieldbook-24/01/08; Fieldbook-29/12/07). At the same time, this could be said to be creating a sense of dependency on the funding organization or on the contrary, one could argue it fosters independence as a youth who received a post-secondary education from this support can grow to become self-sufficient. The former position is corroborated by Norton (2007:108) who argues in stark contrast to the prior acceptance of a life of deprivation, the social service network has been integral in creating confidence in the local identity. In contrast to Platteau and Abraham (2002:104) who suggest the local level is generally ineffective in furthering their community’s development, these examples lend further credence to Bebbington’s (2002:801) argument that one of the major contributions of social capital is the power of local actors and their networks, to contribute to local community development.

Locally developed creative solutions

Does Hezbollah empower the broader community to bring forward local, creative solutions to address marginalization? One creative or non-traditional facet of the movement’s strategy is the provision of coping mechanisms while engaging in armed
struggle and passive resistance to alter the structural environment. This lends weight to Rahman’s (1993:217) argument there is no single path to development. The social service wing itself features several creative projects including Qard al Hassan’s loan program, sticker campaigns for health outreach, family sponsorship for the injured, agricultural call in shows, veterinary clinics, a satellite channel, community-based construction companies and restaurants, ice cream parlours and supermarkets that fund development projects. These examples suggest Carner and Korten (1984:201), Rahnema (1992:123) and Rahman (1993:136, 152, 203, 217) are accurate in describing empowerment and a sense of community pride as outcomes of locally devised, creative solutions. One challenge is that creative responses may be so distant from the norm, that they may be seen as unacceptable by those outside the community such as external NGOs and government aid agencies. For example, the data suggests the armed wing also contributed to community pride as following the withdrawal of the Israeli army, the community experienced what they describe as the euphoric feeling of being able to confront the world’s fourth largest military (Fieldbook-30/12/07). According to Rahnema, Carner and Korten (1984), this may be a creative way to develop and attain empowerment. In contrast, Ife (1997:105, 157-158) places parameters around how communities should develop, suggesting it be limited to peaceful methods.

The local community developed creative solutions to address their marginalization. Their relative success resulted in an invigorated sense of agency, a confident identity and the feeling that anything is possible. Fusing armed struggle with local community development, we are faced by the challenge presented by Ife that such locally viable development strategies simply may not be an acceptable form of
development. We shall now turn to a discussion on endogenous development, exploring if Hezbollah's local community development program is a reflection of local values or their given context and whether only those living in that locale can determine what solutions are appropriate.

4.8 Endogenous development: Between context and traditions

Several theorists argue endogenous development means reflecting the local socio-political context (Imboscio, 1999:46; Veltmeyer, 2001:2-3), others suggest it means reflecting local values and traditions (Ife, 1997:122; Johnston & Noakes, 2005:9-11; Bourdieu as cited in Della Porta & Diani, 2006:10, 81). Further pushing the understanding of endogenous development, some suggest dominant values and norms may also be altered (Eder, 1985:888; Vahabzadeh, 2003:27, 28). The previous section found Hezbollah draws on endogenous development, using creative solutions to empower the community and increase pride in the local identity. This section begins by exploring whether endogenous development strategies represent local traditions, context or a combination of both. Second, can endogenous development mean creating new traditions and culture?

Reflecting tradition

According to Bourdieu (as cited in Della Porta & Diani, 2006:10) and Ife (1997:122), endogenous development should reflect local traditions and culture. Della Porta and Diani (2006:81) add religion plays an important part in social movement framing and Johnston and Noakes (2005:9-11) find cultural symbols, values and norms influence how struggles are framed. Considering Hezbollah's supreme religious leader is
Iranian and that Hezbollah was formed following the arrival of Iran's Revolutionary Guards in the Bekaa Valley, we are led to conclude Iranian values are being imposed on the local community. The Najaf connection and the emerging Husseini model suggest otherwise, telling the story of an organically connected culture, lending weight to Bourdeau and Ife's theory that traditions have a prominent role but the question arises, what are the jurisdictional boundaries of 'local traditions'? The re-framing of the battle of Karbala from a story of ritualistic mourning into one of revolutionary remembrance and awaiting the Mahdi being re-framed as one of passive waiting, to one of actively striving for social justice to hasten his appearance (Abdulhussein, 2008) lends weight to Della Porta and Diani's (2006:81) recognition of the importance of religion in social movement framing. This also suggests local traditions can go far beyond national borders, extending as far as religious interpretations can be carried. According to Rahnema and Nomani (1990:54), the renewed Husseini model drew on a combination of Marxist ideology and local cultural stock and this stock was made more agency-oriented by framing Marxist social justice ideas in a way that resonates with the target audience. This suggests Johnston and Noakes (2005:9-11) are accurate in describing the role of cultural symbols, values and norms in influencing how to frame a struggle. This leads us to conclude religion and culture are important features of endogenous development and since religious and cultural stock often predate the state system, what is endogenous is not necessarily constrained by national borders. One possible parameter when defining what is endogenous could be to include external influences that bear an organic connection. This lends weight to Bourdieu and Ife's theory that endogenous development should reflect local traditions, as in our case study, there are traditions that
are common amongst the Shia of both Lebanon and Iran, that have influenced Hezbollah's approach.

**Reflecting both context and tradition**

Veltmeyer (2001c:2-3) describes development as a heterogeneous experience. Rahman (1993:217), Brohman (1996:325, 327) and Won-Jeong (1995:330) argue a community's historical context as well as its local values should inform its unique process of social change. Qassem's reluctance to uphold Hezbollah as a development model and insistence that Hezbollah's strategies are a reflection of their unique context reaffirms Veltmeyer's perspective that development must be a heterogeneous experience. Although O'Malley (2001:216) does not discuss the organic connection local communities may have to those beyond the borders, he concedes that development cannot happen in isolation. The irony is while Qassem considers Hezbollah to be exogenous to other organically connected Islamic communities; this contradicts the idea that Hezbollah can be organically connected to Iran. Lebanon's history is in fact very distinct from that of Iran's, with the Shia of Lebanon living under a series of foreign conquerors and experiencing centuries of discrimination, an experience that the Iranian's did not undergo. Additionally, Hezbollah undertakes nationalistic overtones although Khomeini argues there is no nationalism in Islam and in Iran, *hijab* and other Islamic virtues can be imposed by the state, while in Lebanon, there is no such imposition. Hezbollah's policies and strategies reflect the local context and several examples emerge of Hezbollah reflecting both, their own local context in addition to traditions that are shared with Iran. For example, the data suggests Hezbollah engages in armed struggle due to their unique context and were the state equipped to take over this role, then they would retract from
armed struggle. At the same time, the data also suggests there are elements of tradition or
culture informing their decision to bare arms as they concede even with a strong state
army, they would continue to confront Israel until the Palestinian refugees are granted the
right of return\(^7\) (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am; Fieldbook-26/12/07; Nasrallah, 2000a:17-18).
The data lends greater weight to Rahman, Won-Jeong and Brohman’s perspective as the
specific steps taken by Hezbollah reflect a combination of both local traditions and
Lebanon’s unique historical context. This also confirms their perspective that locally
appropriate development strategies always result in a unique process of social change

**Creating a new culture**

Writing from a social movement perspective, Della Porta and Diani (2006:81),
argue framing plays an integral role in motivating agents towards action. Eder advises
when changing structures, the context must be reflected and dominant values and norms
must also be changed. Johnston and Noakes argue frames must draw on local culture and
values to ensure the message resonates with the target audience. The question arises, is it
still endogenous development if the local traditions have been changed? Hezbollah
seems to be reflecting a radical re-interpretation of local traditions that effectively created
a new culture, which lends weight to Eder’s theory that when changing structures,
dominant values and norms must also be changed. The challenge this presents is if local
traditions are changed, can development remain endogenous? Is Hezbollah bringing

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\(^7\) According to UN Resolution 242 and 182, Palestinian’s have the right to return to their lands occupied by
Israel.
exogenous innovations to the local culture? What happens if traditions are the source of oppression or marginalization?

We shall now discuss if local traditions can be changed, or would that mean development is no longer endogenous? Johnston and Noakes (2005:23) argue movement frames may influence the social condition, opposed to frames being constructed to merely react to the given context. Applying this to the data, we find Hezbollah drew on the frames of the Najaf school, and framed both the act of fighting the occupation of their land and providing social services as a religious duty. Hezbollah altered the given social condition of their community from one of apathy to one where community members became agents of their own change and a culture of resistance and struggle emerged. By transforming the underlying culture and tradition, this re-framing transitioned the community from passivism towards embracing agency, leads us to conclude that cultures evolve, adding to the dynamism of endogenous development. While Bourdieu and Ife argue local community development should reflect local traditions, the case study suggests there is utility in re-interpreting traditions to reflect a community’s socio-political context.

We now turn to the question, is Hezbollah an endogenous movement or are they bringing exogenous innovations to the local culture? According to Della Porta, Diani, Johnston, Noakes and Eder, framing plays an integral role in motivating agents towards action. Gamson and Meyer (1996:288, 305) explain groups initially rely on sensationalistic tactics but eventually grow pragmatic as they no longer need to attract the media's attention once they become known entities. Kahil writes “Hezbollah is not an isolated movement. It is acting and reacting, adapting to changes in the social context
through a variable set of cultural performances (Kahil, 2007:132).” This is supported by
the data which suggests Hezbollah has shifted away from attracting mainstream media
attention having created their own alternative media including al Nur radio, al Manar TV
and forms of popular culture including militant video clips, music groups such as Firqat
al Wilayeh and the videogame, Special Force that pits the player against the Israeli army.
Each of these examples illustrates "new rhetoric of Hezbollah" (Kahil, 2007:116) and
frames Hezbollah’s struggle as a religious and nationalistic duty, encouraging local
community members to shift their focus beyond daily survival towards broader issues
that they consider to be at the root of their marginalization while maintaining support for
the resistance priority. These examples suggest Gamson and Meyer do not explain the
role played by local media belonging to social movements implying the local community
lacks agency to alter structures and that only the outside world can come to the rescue.
Rather than trying to get their message into mainstream media by way of spectacle,
Hezbollah created a new culture that resonated with the local audience, aiming to bring
thoughts of armed struggle into daily life. By only creating frames that resonate locally,
Hezbollah neglects to create media that will resonate globally and potentially build bonds
of solidarity as other movements have done. At the same this suggests Hezbollah has
chosen to move the local community towards action rather than seeking allies from other
parts of the world.

Our discussion on endogenous development reveals several challenges. It is
unclear where the line gets drawn between respecting local development strategies and a
post-modernist ideology that suggests outsiders are absolutely incapable of commenting
on local situations. The idea of endogenous versus exogenous development also calls
into question how one determines what is endogenous in a region such as the Middle East that was only carved up along the national lines we see today after WWI. Does endogenous mean anyone outside what are arbitrarily drawn national borders or does it mean anyone beyond the local community? The data suggests even at the local level, communities are intricately connected and events in one town may have an impact on another community downstream. Clearly, endogenous development cannot take place in isolation. Just as local actions may have an impact on the broader community; actions originating outside may also have an impact on local communities (O’Malley, 2001:216). This intricacy leads us to conclude even local community development organizations have a responsibility to those beyond their local communities as well as their national borders to employ ethical strategies. We shall now turn to a discussion of what it means for local community development when organizations contravene dominant international norms.

4.9 Local community development and the implications of external support

Should local community organizations resist dominant norms when they risk attracting external support?

In Canada, the ban makes it illegal to support Hezbollah financially or to distribute any of its literature but with Hezbollah so deeply entrenched in everyday life, the ban seems very difficult to enforce. Whether it be shopping at a Hezbollah-owned supermarket, eating ice cream at a Hezbollah-owned café, disseminating one of Hezbollah’s stickers that encourages people to brush their teeth at night, sharing their brochure on the harmful effects of smoking or posting one of Hezbollah’s video clips on YouTube, one would be in violation of the ban on Hezbollah. We now contrast the
perspectives of Thoreau, Socrates, von den Haag, St. Augustine and La Boétie exploring the value of this ban and whether it is acceptable for armed movements like Hezbollah to resist dominant norms if the context calls for it.

The relevance of context when engaging in armed struggle

Similar to Socrates’ resistance to specific policies but recognition of the broader system, Hezbollah is not a radical movement and like Socrates, are not attempting to change the entire system in a revolutionary manner, but appear to be against certain aspects of the system which they seek to reform. For example, Hezbollah accords legitimacy to the Westphalian state system as it prevents a state of chaos from emerging. The state system also ensures nation states have a monopoly over the use of violence yet the Lebanese find themselves in a situation where the state is weak. Ultimately, Hezbollah engaged in armed struggle arguing this was their only option aside from silently facing persecution. Although the data suggests when fighting against foreign occupation, armed struggle may be accorded legitimacy under international law, recent decades have witnessed an expanding state monopoly over the use of violence and a declining appetite for armed struggle. In true Socratic fashion, Hezbollah went against this impending shift in international norms despite their acquiescence with the broader state structure. Extending this idea further, according to Thoreau’s individualist perspective (as cited in van den Haag, 1972:11), the only obligation people have is to do what they think is right at that time, which suggests laws could be obeyed with as much legitimacy as they can be resisted. La Boétie (as cited in Bleiker, 2000:60) stretches Thoreau’s idea by arguing the mere act of refusing to consent to the dictates of an unjust rulers means that ruler is defeated. However, La Boétie suggests Thoreau’s individualist
stance will be far less successful in resisting a system they perceive to be unfair. It is only through collective action and dissent that individuals can resist an oppressive system and failure to do so is tantamount to complying with and prolonging the lifespan of that system. Van den Haag is concerned that if the legitimacy of one's actions changes based on the context in which they operate, then that opens up society to a Hobbesian state of nature where the underlying assumption is that human nature is innately bad. This mirrors Hezbollah’s concerns with a state of chaos and their overwhelming need for law and order. At the same time, Hezbollah seems to contradict Van den Haag’s ideas by pushing an agenda of civil disobedience that challenges dominant norms and values (van den Haag, 1972:13-14). The question arises, can civil disobedience involve violence? From Van den Haag’s perspective, there is no case when resistance to an authority would be viewed as legitimate, even when it is an occupying power that may legitimately be engaged military while according to Thoreau, that legitimacy exists but it is subject to individual interpretation, which leads us to conclude in the discussion of norms, one’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter (Chomsky, 2002), as advanced in Noam Chomsky’s work, Pirates and Emperors and it is difficult to conceive of many actions that would be universally applauded. Excluding the confines of the post-modernist perspective, we are left with international law as the only universal benchmark.

**What are the implications of external support?**

Based on our discussion above, the question arises, does endogenous development mean being completely cut off from external support and if not, what are the defining parameters? Some authors find external assistance to be disempowering (Ngunjiri, 1998:466-467; Dorsner:367; Della Porta & Diani, 2006:117-126, 146). In contrast, some
encourage local communities to attract external support (Clifford, 2005:33-34). In this section, we explore why the global north aims for community development but at the same time fears Hezbollah when it appears to be providing a locally viable form of development.

Mainstream development often partners with NGOs that are structured much like themselves, overlooking NGOs that are organized in a manner that is congruent with local context, priorities or culture. In contrast, Clifford places greater value on attaining external support over doing what is locally appropriate, recommending struggles be framed in a way that appeal to the outside (Clifford, 2005:33-34). Della Porta and Diani (2006:117-126, 146) warn this means the agenda can be controlled externally. Mainstream development is often critiqued for providing aid with conditions attached such as requiring neoliberal reforms and opening up economies to the free market. However, such externally imposed policy prescriptions are often not in alignment with local priorities. The data suggests Hezbollah would qualify for greater external assistance if they disarmed, lending weight to Dorsner’s perspective that external support requires doing what is appealing to the donors and Shaw’s perspective that power is only given by external powers if the ‘right’ decisions are made. The evidence also suggests where the development agenda was exogenously determined in the global north, the programs did not reflect local values. This included western agencies conducting AIDS awareness campaigns where they taught women it is okay to say ‘no’, which according to the respondent was grossly out of step with the local context and culture (Fieldbook-27/12/07, pm). While the respondent could be naïve about the need for such workshops, this reaction suggests the delivery style and message were out of sync with what is
locally acceptable. ESCWA's broadband access program in south Lebanon was also described to be out of step with local priorities and criticized for aiming to create markets for technological goods from the global north (Fieldbook-27/12/07, am). While broadband internet also has many benefits for the community's development, this reaction suggests, the program did not come from the grassroots and was instead being imposed on the community. This example of external funding from France for a recycling plant further suggests Dorsner is accurate that funding often has a negative impact on the local community development process as it enables external forces to set the agenda (Dorsner, 2004:367). It also creates external dependence for parts and information and lends weight to Ngunjiri's argument that exogenous development encourages communities to ignore pressing local priorities (Ngunjiri, 1998:466-467).

However in contrast to Shaw and Dorsner's perspective, the data also suggests Hezbollah has received aid directly and indirectly from both the global north and the global south, while the agenda was still set locally, as Hezbollah insists they do not receive aid with conditions attached. This leads us back to the central question, what happens when the local community determines a project is most effective for their context but its run counter to the North's objectives or parameters of what is acceptable?

4.10 The existence of dual-role development organizations

We now turn to other movements that engaged in armed struggle, contrasting their role in social service delivery and targeting structures with the legitimacy accorded to them locally or internationally. We shall review the Bhoomi Sena movement in Maharashtra, India, Islamic movements in Sa'id Egypt, the Zapatista of Mexico, citizen
armies in Peru, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa, contrasting their approach and standing with Hezbollah.

**The Bhoomi Sena movement**

The Bhoomi Sena movement encouraged the active participation of community members in their endogenous development framework (Rahman, 1993:182). Just like Hezbollah, the Bhoomi Sena morphed into a political organization (Rahman, 1993:50) and mirroring Hezbollah’s notion of the ‘resistance priority’ which supersedes all other matters, the Bhoomi Sena considered their political struggle to supersede economic and social development (Rahman, 1993:39). While struggling to reclaim their land, the Bhoomi Sena movement engaged in a militant confrontation using stones and slingshots against the landowners, their private armies and the police, successfully reclaiming crops and land across several villages (Rahman, 1993:35). Just as Hezbollah’s activities created a sense of pride, the retreat of the much feared private armies bolstered a new, confident identity emerging within the Bhoomi Sena movement (Rahman, 1993:37). When the matter was brought to court, it was decided the Bhoomi Sena were legally reclaiming land that belonged to them and no charges were laid (Rahman, 1993:35). Although this parallels Hezbollah’s engagement in armed struggle to reclaim occupied land, the key distinction is while the Bhoomi Sena were struggling against an internal adversary, Hezbollah engaged an external one.

**Islamic movements in Sa’id, Egypt**

June Nash studied several small Islamic movements in Sa’id, Egypt, which provided social services and grew widely popular in elections (Nash, 2005:126, 128).
Following an arduous government crackdown, a significant number of those arrested crossed the line from passive methods of influencing government policies to militant action (Nash, 2005:133). Similar to Bhoomi Sena and Hezbollah, the Islamic movements in Sa’id sought to alter the structural environment. They initially engaged the government through passive actions, yet they were viewed as illegitimate. This suggests when internal policy and legislation are used to determine whether local groups will be accorded legitimacy, the effect is like a line in the sand that shifts from one country to another. In contrast, while engaging an external adversary, Hezbollah’s legitimacy should presumably be universally legitimate or illegitimate considering there is only body of law that governs international affairs. Internally, Hezbollah’s armed struggle is accorded legitimacy by the Lebanese government. Contrasting Hezbollah’s international standing with the legitimacy accorded to the Bhoomi Sena movement suggests there is a far greater appetite for a movement reflecting the socialist undertones of land reform than there is for Islamic movements seeking to gain political power and change the structural environment.

**The Zapatista**

The Zapatista began as an armed movement with tactics including occupying townships and seizing army ammunition (Mentinis, 2006:100-101). Duncan Earle and Jeanne Simonelli argue what made Zapatista successful was its ability to provide social services to autonomous communities, while confronting the power of the state with enough troops to seize significant spaces to strategically remind the state of the threat of their arms. The combination of these activities created a safe space for indigenous communities to develop without external interests being imposed upon them (Earle &
Simonelli, 2005:16). This parallels the situation in Lebanon where by engaging in armed struggle and delivering social services, Hezbollah created a stable environment conducive to community development. The Zapatista were met with brutal military crackdowns and they eventually dropped their use of arms to avoid annihilation.

In one of his dramatic speeches, Sub Commandante Marcos displayed a pink stiletto heel, size six and a half that was sent to the Zapatista in an aid package from the global north. Marcos used this to underscore the importance of endogenous development, demonstrating how external donors are often poorly informed of the local context and priorities (Clifford, 2005:169). Yet Menitinis argues when another armed movement, the EPR, arose struggling for indigenous rights, Marcos rationalized their use of arms was illegitimate as it was not supported by the broader civil society, a nebulous of institutions that would have never experienced the conditions of poverty, violence and neglect the indigenous population lives in (Mentinis, 2006:121). The position of Menitinis and former position of Marcos parallel Hezbollah’s involvement in activities that they perceive to be contextually appropriate but are not tolerated by exogenous entities who also have not experienced the conditions that the South Lebanese have. The question arises, does this somehow legitimize Hezbollah’s actions, or does this lead to an extreme post-modernist position that describes moral norms and values as entirely subjective and contextual?

Citizen armies in Peru

In the Peruvian villages of Cangari and Viru Viru, community members formed their own citizen armies to fight off the Shining Path. At its height, there were thousands of peasants patrolling their communities and successfully defending their communities on
countless occasions using an assortment of Mauser rifles, clubs, machetes, rocks, slings and home-made shotguns. Women served as the final line of defence, using spears tipped with kitchen-knives. The community members demonstrated their resilience by continuing to make life go on, tending to their land and their livestock, while bearing arms to ensure their safety in everyday activities. By 1993, most villages in the region had formed similar defence communities eventually expelling the Shining Path from the Apurimac Valley (Fox & Starn, 1997:226-227, 238, 240). This example illustrates a grassroots movement in which all community members collectively tended to their communities defence while simultaneously ensuring livelihoods were sustained.

Applying this to our case study, Hezbollah arguably resembles a civilian army that is similarly deeply embedded in the community. By engaging in armed struggle, the Peruvian villagers succeeded in addressing the root cause of instability and turmoil plaguing their communities, ultimately facilitating the local community’s development. In the case of Hezbollah, armed struggle similarly contributed to an Israeli withdrawal, which according to the data, also bolstered the local community’s development.

**UNITA and the Angolan war for independence**

UNITA was formed in 1966 and fought in the Angolan war for independence. UNITA also provided grassroots delivery of social services (Alberts, 1980:255). They received humanitarian support from the global north, African and Communist-dominated countries and as the proxy war between the two superpowers ensued, the U.S. government also channelled aid to UNITA. Donald Alberts explains “Until recently, there was an almost universal international political climate that favored insurgent causes as automatically just (Alberts, 1980:253-255).” In this example, armed struggle was
accorded unanimous legitimacy by both superpowers and governments from the global north. Perhaps this appetite for dual role organizations that provides social services and engages in armed struggle declined with the end of the cold war and demise of proxy wars.

**Steven Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement**

The black community in South Africa had been subjected to political, cultural, psychological and economic subordination in addition to being dispossessed from their land and intentionally neglected and marginalized by the state (Taylor, 1997:252). Just as Hezbollah re-framed the Shia duty to strive for justice, Biko’s movement called for self-liberation of the minds of the oppressed person with equal vigour as his call was for national liberation (Gibson, 2004). The Black Consciousness Movement’s emphasis on self-reliance included a multitude of grassroots community projects. It was only in the wake of the Soweto Uprising that the movement eventually took up armed struggle. Biko was killed in police custody after being detained under Terrorism Act No 83 of 1967, in which terrorism was defined as any act that may “endanger the maintenance of law and order” mirroring the Egyptian example where local laws were sufficient to delegitimize an otherwise popular movement.

**4.11 Is it a contradiction to simultaneously engage in armed struggle and provide social services?**

Our review of other dual role organizations reveals great inconsistency in the legitimacy accorded to movements that simultaneously engage in armed struggle while providing coping mechanisms. While the Egyptian Islamists, the Zapatista and Biko’s Black Consciousness Movement were subject to intense crackdowns, the Bhoomi Sena
and Peruvian citizen army were never ostracized for bearing arms. Comparing this with Hezbollah’s cross-border struggle, we shall now contrast the decentralization of civilian defence with that of service delivery and the cost of armed struggle with gains in community development. We also explore if Hezbollah is eroding its own raison d’être.

Does Hezbollah seek to decentralize national defence to local communities?

The question remains, why is Hezbollah feared by the global north? Engen-Persen says NGOs maintain a divide between development and politics rather than advocating on behalf of the marginalized. If development were to always be practiced with an advocacy frame that seeks to address the underlying causes of marginalization, then that would present a dangerous threat to the status quo and the bearers of traditional power structures. This could not only call into question the legitimacy with which a few individuals use that power to impose policies and their priorities upon the masses but it could also question the underlying system that allows wealth to be accumulated into the hands of just a few. Rahnema and Roy cautions NGOs professionalize the grassroots by providing salaried jobs to people who might have otherwise been active in resistance (Rahnema, 1992:124; Roy, 2004:42-43). The data suggests Hezbollah has many members employed by foreign NGOs who are still actively involved in resistance activities with the Party, meaning the NGO presence has not professionalized the grassroots nor has it reduced the militancy or radicalization of Hezbollah.

The source of the global north’s fear could also be rooted in the threat of local communities organizing into armed movements and presenting a further threat to the sovereign authority of the national government. Arguing from a theoretical standpoint, Lange, Quinn and Goovaerts et al. caution against establishing NGOs to provide aid in
conflict zones as they will further weaken and undermine a collapsing state (Goovaerts et al., 2005:14; Lange et al., 2003:10). Shaw says mainstream empowerment means rolling back administrative tasks and social service delivery from the state (Shaw, 2006). The question arises; can decentralization be extended to other spheres? While Nelson calls for social services to be delivered by the local community, Nelson adds other domains such as national defence must remain under state control (Nelson, 2007:132). In contrast, Hezbollah became involved in national defence and much broader issues that should be handled by the state. While Nelson’s comments are appropriate in a Westphalian world where the state is distinctive in its monopoly over the use of violence, the irony is that as the nation state steadily recedes from the delivery of social services and the NGO community increasingly steps in to cushion the blow, the government is able to maintain its power and sovereignty over the use of violence. Lange, Quinn and Goovaerts et al. present a more consistent approach that sees the state as responsible for both service delivery and security.

**Armed struggle and the true cost of war**

The evidence provides clear examples of Lebanon’s economy being adversely affected by the cycle of violence between Hezbollah and the IDF. The July 2006 war serves as the most recent example, which resulted in the cancellation of the entire tourist season, an estimated loss of $2 billion, while infrastructure damage was estimated at $4 billion (Norton, 2007:132, 152) in addition to the immeasurable loss of civilian lives. Several respondents explained one of Hezbollah’s priorities after the July 2006 war has been to re-build everything that had been destroyed, presumably, to even out the cost-benefit ratio of the armed struggle. Hezbollah argues it tries to cover the economic losses
that ensued with equal zeal with which they fought Israel, describing the challenge of rebuilding Lebanon as the next victory they would like to achieve (Bazzi as cited in Worth & Fattah, 2006:2; Nasrullah as cited in Kifner, 2007; Nasrullah as cited in Norton 2007:140). It seems Hezbollah has no alternative other than to extract the benefits of armed struggle while trying to quickly erase the costs and any contradictions that arise from simultaneously engaging in armed struggle and development. Hezbollah argues the armed struggle has created an environment of stability that enables development and investment in the south (Fieldbook-02/01/08 and 20/01/08; Fieldbook-30/12/07). The data suggests providing social services cushions the blow of living under occupation, ensuring support for the armed struggle does not wane in the manner it did when the PLO were based in Lebanon. One can either argue social services helped maintain the community’s stamina to alter structures including the structure of occupation or that the provision of social services keeps the state of war in place longer, enabling people to endure the retaliatory strikes longer.

**Is Hezbollah eroding its own raison d’être?**

According to Blanford and Jorisch, by forcing Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, Hezbollah is eroding its own *raison d’être* (Jorisch, 2004:76; as cited in Noe 2007:11). Ghorayeb suggests Hezbollah’s long-term survival exists in its political role (Ghorayeb, 2002:53). Hezbollah maintains there are many other social areas they would rather focus on and armed struggle distracts them from these activities (Fieldbook-30/12/07). Applying Della Porta and Diani’s four stage life-cycle of social movements, they begin with a heightened level of radicalism but eventually become institutionalized as support for protest and militancy declines (Della Porta & Diani, 2006:226-227). Ghorayeb argues
Hezbollah has not become increasingly pragmatic but has found new ways to achieve its goals and that Hezbollah's future lies in its political role. This would ensure their survival well after they disarm their militia. Della Porta and Diani seem to be suggesting regardless of a movement's context, they will all go through the same experience, or the same life cycle, which contradicts with the idea that social movements reflect their local context and not a theoretical model of growth.

4.12 What do our findings mean for local community development?

Is Hezbollah a community, a social organization or a social movement?

In chapter two we found theorists either romanticize communities as a homogeneous locale or view them as intensely diverse, conflict-ridden places. Our case study demonstrates the latter to be true, with the areas under Hezbollah's de facto control divided across sectarian, political and socio-economic lines. While it is subject to debate what distinguishes a community from a social organization and a social movement, we find for ideological and security reasons, participation in Hezbollah is largely exclusive to those of a specific sect and ideology and to individuals from certain geographic regions in Lebanon. It seems only those of a certain organic identity would qualify to or opt to participate in such a social organization, blurring the line between what is a community and what is a social organization. This questions the value of distinguishing communities from social organizations, particularly when these organizations are so deeply imbedded in their local communities. Similarly, we find intense debate around what type of organization can be described as a social movement. Although these semantics can also be debated endlessly, our case study suggests the more conclusive point is whether the
goal of social movements to alter underlying structures and the tactics of social movements are being employed.

What is local community development?

Theorists debated whether local community development should focus on social and economic change or if it should be more holistic and locally defined, with some adding no matter how holistic it becomes, it should remain peaceful. We find that holistic development can encompass an endless assortment of areas, ranging from environmental sustainability to armed struggle and there is a tension between the notion that what constitutes development should be locally defined but that it should also remain peaceful. Not all neighbourhoods or communities are the same, at times the local context is such that development is simply not possible due to the absence of a stable environment in which students cannot safely make it to school, crops cannot be taken to the market and farmers cannot access their land. The real question is, does endogenous development mean local communities should be in charge of the development process or is there space for people from far safer neighbourhoods to place an upper limit on what are appropriate methods to develop?

Operationalizing local community development

One of the issues that arise is whether social capital is a resource more accessible to the already privileged or whether it is a collective resource. In our case study, we found it is a resource more accessible to the marginalized, resulting in networks that draw on collectivist understandings of trust, reciprocity, cooperation and solidarity for the greater good. We also found a close connection between religious values that encourage giving without expecting material return and an increase in stocks of social capital. One
issue that theorists may wish to explore further is the correlation between religiosity and social capital and whether these tendencies are greater in collectivist societies.

**Participation**

Theorists debated how any participatory methodology can ensure everyone’s interests are reflected and whether any organic participatory model is automatically inclusive. In our case study, we find Hezbollah does not facilitate participatory workshops and conduct open-ended community meetings to garner input from a diverse range of perspectives. Any such initiatives that did happen were largely consultative, using a pre-determined agenda. At the same time, we find merely coming from the same community as service recipients and living amongst them enabled community input to be collected in a more organic fashion, ensuring even the voice of the most marginalized is heard. One issue theorists may wish to explore further is whether participation can really ensure everyone’s interests are represented or whether there is merit in only representing the interests of the marginalized, as an affront to privilege and dominant strata’s in society.

**Decentralization**

Theorists also debated the merit of decentralization and the implications of local communities being relegated to handling local, administrative issues in support of an efficiency-based model. Our case study suggests the real underlying issue is what is the end of decentralization and why are we only willing to discuss the acceptability of social services being decentralized and not other public sector activities up to and including national defense?
Empowerment

We also explored how empowerment enables local communities to play a greater role in service delivery. We find a close correlation between empowerment and an increase in community pride, suggesting advancements in service delivery result in a confident identity emboldened to take on the most surmounting of tasks. We find empowerment was also a product of regaining power and service delivery on its own may not have resulted in the intense level of pride now found in the local identity lending weight to a dual role approach. One of the issues that arose is whether external dependence impacts this feeling of pride. Our findings reveal this is partly contingent on whether the external party is from the global north or the south, an issue that theorists may wish to explore further.

Structure and agency

In chapter two, we find theorists debating if an agency approach blames victims for their plight and if a structuralist approach ignores the priority of communities to begin developing today. In our case study, the causes of marginalization were not entirely internalized or externalized. Despite drawing heavily on a renewed sense of agency, the local community avoided being blamed for their plight by constantly calling on the government to assume their responsibility for service delivery, and to clean up the corrupt bureaucratic structure. We also found that engaging political space and drawing on social movement tactics enabled the local community to not only have their voice heard at the national level but to also impact the underlying structural environment. While social capital enables different communities to come together, on its own, it is insufficient to impact structures. The real issue is not whether a single theory such as social capital can
do it all, but how different discourses can come together to complete the story. Academia can go on forever critiquing shortcomings in theoretical models which only reinforces the need to draw on the strengths of different models including social capital, political space and social movement to determine how communities might act locally, while thinking globally without being blamed for their own victimization.

**Armed struggle and international norms**

In Chapter 2, different understandings emerged of what is meant by endogenous development, ranging from reflecting the context, to the culture, to both. We also found in social movement theory that cultures and traditions can change, further calling into question what is endogenous and what is a locally derived creative solution to development in an increasingly interconnected world. Similarly, we determined that tactics such as armed struggle cannot operate in isolation from the world around it. We also find that these tactics as operated by Hezbollah are an affront to dominant norms, not international law and that the viability of dominant norms will never be universal, meaning what is contextually appropriate also bares considerable weight. The real issue is defining the value of external support from the global north opposed to the global south. This could lead us to a development framework that recognizes aid distributed within the global south is more in line with local priorities with a far less detrimental impact than aid from the global north.

The last remaining question is whether the time for armed struggle is in fact over. Our comparison of dual role movements in the global south finds armed struggle enabled communities to either bring attention to their plight, challenge the structures causing their plight or solve the structural causes of their plight. Several theorists argued the time for
armed struggle is over because local communities cannot contend with the exponential might of a state army. Our case study illustrates otherwise, with Hezbollah facing off with the world's fourth largest military. From a social justice perspective, we can also draw on the Husseini model where the battle was lost as Hussein fought a much larger military force, but history reveals the war was still won by him. We can deduce that armed struggle often entails short term losses for long term gains, including fundamentally altering the structural environment. The real issue is not whether the time for armed struggle has passed, as that only reinforces the preferences of dominant norms, the real question is whether dual role movements present a way forward in international development studies.
Chapter 5 Conclusions and Recommendations

We now return to our initial research question: Is Hezbollah a terrorist organization or is it a local community development organization? According to our findings, allegations of terrorism levelled against Hezbollah remain largely inconclusive. Incidents such as hijackings where the accusations seem more substantial were limited to the time period surrounding Hezbollah’s inception. We also find that Hezbollah’s armed struggle has operated within the confines of international law; the one exception was the July 2006 war where Hezbollah stands accused of war crimes. Our findings also reveal the Human Rights Watch report that made these charges has been subject to intense scrutiny. Hezbollah is mostly guilty of contravening dominant norms in a post 9/11 era where there is an increasing weariness of armed struggle, however, dominant norms cannot serve as a universal benchmark to cast away community-based movements as terrorist entities. From the standpoint of the local community, Hezbollah is a resistance movement that has expanded the ability of historically marginalized communities to access social services. Far from reducing the impetus to alter structures, Hezbollah pursues an effective political strategy that includes advocacy, participation in parliamentary and municipal politics and protecting local communities from re-occupation. The result is a dual role movement that lies at the crossroads of armed struggle and local community development.

The question arises: Does this strategy present a way forward in international development studies or a way to prolong the status quo of a state of conflict? Our findings reveal the separation between development and politics and the provision of coping mechanisms without a practical poverty alleviation strategy ultimately keeps the
root cause of marginalization intact. We found social capital was complimentary to accessing political space and social movement tactics and together, these are effective methods for local communities to undertake this dual role. In our case study, the structural environment included military occupation. Armed struggle was used to create a balance of power and provide the stability necessary to develop. Rather than Hezbollah prolonging the military conflict to secure its own survival, the data suggests they are active in many other areas including political, spiritual and social spheres, where in the absence of conflict, they may continue to advance local community development.

The World Bank hails social capital as an important resource in the development toolbox, advising local communities to advance their own socio-economic development by drawing on local stocks of trust, cooperation, reciprocity, volunteerism and solidarity. Despite drawing on social capital in the areas under their de facto control to create a comprehensive social service network, Hezbollah has been banned in Canada, and in the US where the World Bank’s headquarters lies. Multilateral institutions such as the UN and many other national governments have maintained a distinction between Hezbollah’s social service activities and its armed struggle, rationalizing they would not place a ban on the movements humanitarian activities. This inconsistency between the World Bank encouraging communities to draw on social capital and Canada’s ban on Hezbollah’s humanitarian activities leads us to conclude the impetus behind the ban is largely political.

While Canada is acting within its sovereign authority to ban Hezbollah for political reasons, the question remains: given the data of our research, is this the right thing to do? When Canada bans organizations it disagrees with, is it promoting an
effective development strategy or is it validating the position that the global North tends to impose their norms on the global South, circumventing local priorities and community development initiatives? We have come a far way from one size fits all solutions in development to a recognition that local communities have the knowledge, capacity and insight to develop in a manner that reflects their unique context while drawing on local traditions and values to devise creative development strategies (Rahman, 1993, p. 136, 203). Canada should demonstrate tolerance and extend an olive branch by ending the ban and agreeing to sit at the same table as Hezbollah. By engaging in diplomatic dialogue with dual role movements, Canada can help promote mutual understanding and advance humanitarian work in a meaningful manner.

A political advocacy frame should be attached to all development efforts so that social movements and NGOs are no longer two separate entities. While theorists suggest the solution is for local community development organizations to align themselves with social movements, as long as we maintain this separation between development organizations and social movements, we cannot engage in a holistic form of development that pushes past the status quo to make real, enduring changes in the global south. The separation of development and politics has served to prolong the status quo of marginalization and inequality far too long.
Appendix A: Field Research Questions

Issue I: **What is Community Development in the Local Context?**
1a. How do you define 'community development'?
1b. How do you define, 'the community'?

Issue II: **How does your organization provide coping mechanisms and meet the community’s day to day needs?**
2. What services does your organization provide and who may access these programs?
3. Do alternatives exist and how does the quality of care and accessibility compare?
4. What makes Hezbollah so effective and efficient?
5. What accountability measures are in place to ensure funds go to the intended place?

Issue III: **What role does your organization play in creating Political Space and addressing the structural environment affecting its community?**
6. By providing services, do you take away attention from the root causes of the community's problems?
7. How do you view social services as part of the resistance effort?
8. How has armed struggle affected the community's development?
9. It seems Hezbollah performs the functions of a state and after the war, people started calling Hezbollah a state within a state, do you agree with this, and how do you advise me to approach this issue?

Issue IV: **How does your organization empower the community?**
10. How do you involve community members in the development, implementation and delivery of your community development programs?
11. What role do woman play in Hezbollah?
12. Are there any additional ways the community benefits through your organization, e.g., through job creation, volunteerism or through buying local products?

Issue V: **Contemporary social movements and culture: What role do local values play in the organization?**
13. How has your organization contributed to the community's self-image and cultural identity?
14. How does your organization reflect local norms and values?
15. How does Hezbollah use the political dissent to affect change?

Issue VI: **How do international relationships & attitude affect the community’s development?**
16. Does your organization have any partnership relationships with Western organizations?
17. How does the western ban on Hezbollah affect local community development?
Appendix B: Table of Social Services
Note: This table is not intended to provide a comprehensive list of all activities by the respective Hezbollah agencies but instead presents a snapshot of their activities and a summary of all relevant data found in the course of this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th># of offices</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Past Activities</th>
<th>Current projects</th>
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<tr>
<td>Reconstruction Jihad al Binaa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Provided displaced families with furniture and sufficient money to rent temporary accommodation for one year. Provided compensation to owners of businesses destroyed in the war at the amount of 20-50% of their loss.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Assisting in rebuilding 15,000 destroyed apartments. Building infrastructure, roads and small bridges. Provides 100 water tanks in the Beirut suburbs. Three hundred thousand litres of water, available daily via mobile cisterns, reaching 15,000 families, free of charge since March 1990 to present (Qassem, 2005, p. 85).</strong></td>
<td><strong>Engineers and staff conduct outreach to local farmers. Delivering scientific information to farmers since the mid 1980s.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jihad al Binaa (Reconstruction campaign)</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Built extension centres in south near Tyre, Ba’albaak and Hermel (North Bekaa) in the late 1990.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Providing farms with micro credit in the form of seeds, tools and fertilizers. Providing veterinary care including vaccinations for animals. Introducing new crops and new production methods to create jobs. Selling subsidized</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conducted post-</strong></td>
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<td>Environmental</td>
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<td>Protection</td>
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<td>Between 1988 and 1991 removed all waste accumulation in Beirut’s</td>
<td>Providing poor farmers, the environmental society, NGOs, and municipalities</td>
<td>Raising awareness on using water</td>
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<td>Jihad al Binaa</td>
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<td>chemicals, pesticides and fertilizers to farmers with proper advise on safe usage</td>
<td>war education campaigns on the dangers of cluster bombs in farm lands. Following the July 2006 war, conducted a full survey of agricultural damage and provided international and local NGOs with information to proceed to help these affected areas. Transferring knowledge for honey production and other cultivation (Qassem, 2005, p. 84).</td>
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<td>Providing agricultural credit and tractors (Qassem, 2005, p. 84).</td>
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<td>Institution</td>
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<td><strong>(Reconstruction Campaign)</strong></td>
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<td>southern suburbs at an average of 65 tons per day (Qassem, 2005, p. 83-84).</td>
<td>with half million seedlings for reforestation</td>
<td>safely. Advocating water authorities and municipalities to conserve water consumption and use. Promoting good agricultural practices and lobbying the government to take action on desertification.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Interest Free Loans</strong></td>
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<td>Qard al Hassan (The Good Loan)</td>
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<td>One branch in nearly each city or town in the Bekaa Valley, South Lebanon and the Beirut suburbs</td>
<td>One branch in nearly each city or town in the Bekaa Valley, South Lebanon and the Beirut suburbs</td>
<td>32,000 loan recipients</td>
<td></td>
<td>Providing interest-free loans of up to $5000 to support local businesses, cover medical treatment, cover marriage expenses, to buy a house or furniture with the requirement all money be spent locally.</td>
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<td><strong>Healthcare</strong></td>
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<td>Hayaa Sahiya (Islamic Health Society)</td>
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<td>4 hospitals 12 polyclinics 20 dental</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Healthcare provided to 199,261 displaced persons. Provided free medical</td>
<td>Administering policlinics to provide treatment, prescribe and provide pharmaceuticals, conduct</td>
<td>Publishing magazines on health issues. Producing sticker</td>
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<td>Institution</td>
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</table>
| centres    |              | persons       | consultations for displaced persons.  
| 10 civil    |              | during July 2006 war (IHS, 2007 p. 6).  
| defence     |              | persons       | Had specialists for mental health and shock visit displaced persons during the war.  
| centres     |              | during the July 2006 war, including those suffering of chronic ailments (IHS, 2007 p. 9).  
| that operate |              | Providing    | Distributed pharmaceuticals.  
| ambulance   |              | medicine for 202,657 persons during the July 2006 war, including those suffering of chronic ailments (IHS, 2007 p. 9).  
| and fire    |              | classes      | Offered health education classes during the war in each school housing the displaced.  
| trucks      |              |              | Sent mobile health units to remote villages.  
| (IHS, 2007 p. 8). | | provided    | Provided free medication and free health services to eight-eight schools (Qassem, 2005, p. 84).  
|             |              | specialists  | Dispatched four teams: 1) the public relations and media team to liaise with NGOs to publicize war relief needs.  
|             |              | to 3029      | 2) Health relief team for the displaced.  
|             |              | vaccinations | 3) The medicine procurement team.  
|             |              | for polio, MMR and measles for children aged 1 to 5 (IHS, 2007 p. 12) | 4) The statistics survey team. (IHS, 2007 p. 5) | Dispatched 150 medical | campaigns creating awareness on the importance of wearing seatbelts, good dental care, landmine awareness, etc.  
|             |              |              | lab tests, x-rays and provide specialists. Health centres have GP’s, paediatricians, gynaecologists, etc. | Provide regular vaccination rounds in schools (Qassem, 2005, p. 84). | Conducts education and prevention programs.  
|             |              |              |                      |                  | Anti-tobacco campaign based on a study through their research department (IHS, Before you smoke, think of those whom you love).  
<p>|             |              |              |                      |                  | Conducted research and produced awareness publication on the harmful effects of |</p>
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<td>teams consisting of 1 doctor and 1 nurse to deliver health care to displaced persons and the wounded (IHS, 2007 p. 8).</td>
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<td>smoking sheesha. Conducting disease-prevention awareness campaigns (Qassem, 2005, p. 84). Published food health guide for youth covering what food to take to school and to ensure good nutrition (IHS: Take care of what you eat) Produced landmine awareness stickers and brochures (IHS, Precautions after the war, 2006) Produced brochures and sticker on proper dental hygiene (IHS, Healthy Teeth &amp; Life).</td>
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<td>Muassassa Jarha (Institution for the Injured)</td>
<td>Created four treatment, rehabilitation and recreational</td>
<td>4250 people in total are assisted. In the July 2006 war, 400 people were</td>
<td>Conducted housing study to learn housing needs for the disabled (Muassassa Jarha: Thank you...).</td>
<td>Providing healthcare, prosthetics, psychological help, physiotherapy and insuring medical treatment. Providing permanent</td>
<td>Led the Be Strong! campaign on resuming the normalcy of life after the July 2006 war, advising people to be a role model to those around, maintain their spiritual strength, strive to be there for others, to take part in their favourite activities including listening to quiet music or going for picnics, walks or jobs. (IHS, Be Strong! 2006)</td>
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<td>Muassassa Jarha</td>
<td>distributed between Beirut, South Lebanon and the Bekaa. (Qassem, 2005, p. 85)</td>
<td>centres assisted. Helping 700 heavily injured persons with total care, which covers 100% of any costs they incur. has taken care of 3,150 injured individuals – of whom 2,307 were resistance fighters, the balance being civilians injured during the war or as a result of stepping on land mines planted in the south of Lebanon (Qassem, 2005, p. 85).</td>
<td>disability pension to injured fighters. Finding meaningful employment for the injured. Providing loans to the injured to help them start their own businesses. Providing school fees for the injured to complete university. Providing monthly allowances for cases where the injured cannot work. Providing school fees for the injured persons spouse and children through to post-secondary studies. Providing art therapy workshops. Providing fitness room and organizes sports tournaments for the disabled (Al Jarha Establishment p. 11). Providing recreation facility including a sauna, Jacuzzi and swimming pool.</td>
<td>(Muassassa Jarha: Thank you...). Elevating public awareness of issues faced by disabled persons and their rights (al jarha establishment p.13) (The Brotherhood participation project, Muassassa jarha, Bourj Barajne, Beirut 2000). Publishing stories about the injured (Muassassa Jarha: Thank you...) Conducting workshops and lectures on problems facing families of the injured (Muassassa...</td>
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<td>Jarha: Thank you...</td>
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<td>Conducting landmine awareness seminars in schools</td>
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<td>Providing recreational trips to the seaside and to Damascus.</td>
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<td>Holding Qur'an recitation competitions and providing pilgrimage trips to Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran (18 years of giving, Muassassa al jarha): Thank you...</td>
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<td>Providing computer training language courses, vocational training, arts and crafts, etc.</td>
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<td>Ensuring appropriate housing for the completely disabled (Muassassa Jarha: Thank you...).</td>
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<td>Providing microcredit loans for victims of landmines (Muassassa Jarha: Thank you...).</td>
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<td>Conducting landmine awareness seminars in schools (Muassassa Jarha: Thank you...).</td>
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<td>The Consultative Center for Studies &amp; Documentation</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>Provided educational support to</td>
<td>Collecting, analyzing and assessing economic statistics.</td>
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<td>Assisting municipalities in developing strategic development plans.</td>
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<td>Holding stationery fairs to provide school materials at</td>
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<td>16,679 students Assisting with the school fees of 6,355 students. Scholarships or grants ranging in value from 25 per cent to 100 per cent of school fees awarded to 8,024 students (Qassem, 2005, p. 85).</td>
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<td>subsidized prices (Qassem, 2005, p. 85).</td>
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<td>Emdad (The Islamic Philanthropic</td>
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<td>In 1998, the Committee followed up on 4,160 families, of which 3,519 were</td>
<td>Providing aid to orphans, the destitute, the physically disabled and to</td>
<td>Providing financial support in marriage, residence, food and education (Qassem,</td>
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Mu’assat al-Jarha (2001). al jarha establishment, Lebanon


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