
DESCARTES AND THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH

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F O R E W O R D

The aim of this study is to examine that portion of the philosophical doctrine of René Descartes containing his reaction to and alternative for the traditional theory of human knowing which shall be called the "Correspondence Theory of Truth", for reasons to be set down shortly. The study is divided into five main sections as follows:

Chapter One is the introduction which first draws a distinction between the ancient or classic "Correspondence Theory of Truth" and a modern theory of the same designation. Having made this distinction, the introduction then proceeds to give an historical sketch of the traditional theory of knowledge. Chapter Two provides a more elaborate account of the classic Correspondence Theory of Truth, giving justification for the terminology "correspondence". Chapter Three contains Descartes' reasons for his reaction against the correspondence theory. Chapter Four examines critically Descartes' alternative for the position he attacks. The Fifth and final Chapter compares Descartes' theory of truth with the classic theory of truth.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The terminology, "Correspondence Theory of Truth" is ambiguous. Our first task, therefore, will be to clarify it. The "Correspondence Theory of Truth" which is the object of this thesis is not the one so-well-known to the moderns, the one, for example, to which Bertrand Russell firmly subscribes.¹ By "Correspondence Theory of Truth" Russell means the theory of truth "according to which the truth of basic propositions depends upon their relation to some occurrence, and the truth of other propositions depends upon syntactical relations to basic propositions."² And he goes to point out that this theory bifurcates into epistemological and logical theories, which can be described very briefly as follows. The epistemological theory holds that a proposition is true if it corresponds to some experience; if it does not, it is neither true nor false. Russell is not all blind to the fact that, if one were to take this theory seriously, he would be curtailing the field of knowledge; for, evidently, "Facts" belong to a larger

class of things than merely what can be experienced directly, which is the reason why it is innane to cling to pure and straight empiricism.³ For a more comprehensive theory of knowledge, one is obliged to adopt a logical-correspondence theory which maintains that the basic propositions do not have to come from experience, though if they do not have their origin there, they cannot be known.⁴ In this theory, all propositions are either true or false. Thus, the two theories differ in relation to the law of exclude middle, which obtains in the logical theory, but not in the epistemological theory. Russell does not find the logical theory tenable because it involves metaphysical difficulties, difficulties which, however, lie beyond the scope of the present paper. Suffice it to say that, as Russell himself implies, the modern version of the Correspondence Theory of Truth leaves one in a dilemma.⁵

The Correspondence Theory of Truth of which the present thesis will treat in connection with Descartes, however, is the traditional one which was developed at the very time when philosophical speculation took its roots in ancient Greece. For present purposes it is not necessary to determine exactly which man began to speculate about knowledge, but if we succeed in locating the crudest and the most primitive expression of a theory of knowledge, our aim will have been met. And in this task we do not

have to search beyond Democritus of Abdera.

Democritus believed that material things were composed of small particles -- atoms -- which continually dart forth and reach the soul. He believed, too, that the soul is made up of similar atoms⁶ and, by implication, that it is by being impressed by the atoms of things that the soul acquires knowledge. Thus, we see implied in this primitive theory one of the principles of knowledge -- that like is known by like -- although Democritus himself is wrong in thinking of the soul as material. To say that like is known by like is to imply that there is a correspondence between what knows and what is known. In Democritus' theory of knowledge, the correspondence is between a sensible, material soul and a sensible thing. Democritus' theory of knowledge is therefore to be characterized as an extreme form of sensism.

Another warrant of the classic correspondence theory, but one at an opposite extreme from the sensism of Democritus is the position of Plato who refuses to accredit the sense with any knowledge because he fails to find there in any stability and necessity, characteristics which for him, are essential to knowledge.⁷ While acknowledging sensation as a form of knowledge, Plato subsumed it under intellection.⁸ Because he did not see any essential union between the soul and body, and because of his belief that what is material cannot

affect what is immaterial, Plato denied that intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things; if the body with its sense organs in any way affects the intellectual soul, it is to arouse it to acquire knowledge through an innate principle.⁹ Knowledge for Plato, then, both intellectual and sensible, takes place by participating in separate species called Ideas or Forms. The mode of participation is similar to that of a copy participating in the model.¹⁰ In other words, Plato holds that knowledge involves a kind of similitude or likeness. And observing that the intellect is completely immaterial, he thought that it could not know material or corporal things, but only their Ideas or Forms which are immaterial, just as the intellect is immaterial.¹¹ Not differentiating between a principle of knowledge and a principle of being, by erroneously thinking that a thing has the same kind of existence in being known as it has in itself, in a word, not knowing anything about the process of abstraction, Plato had no choice but to teach a naive realism. But Plato was quite right in holding that there is correspondence between the knower and the known, and because of this, he is to be reckoned a direct proponent of the correspondence theory.

A midway position between the extreme sensism of Democritus and the highly spiritualistic position of Plato is that of Aristotle. Aristotle teaches that all

our knowledge, sense and intellectual, has its origin in the senses; that intellectual knowledge is made possible by disengaging an incorporeal form from material things.¹² The soul is adequately equipped for this task,¹³ for it has "one part which makes all things" and another which "becomes all things".¹⁴

It is not the place here to explain what Aristotle means by the assertion that there are two parts in the soul, or how the soul disengages an incorporeal form from matter or any other problems present in and suggested by his theory of knowledge. All these questions will be taken up in the next chapter where a full account of his theory of knowledge will be undertaken; for it is our firm belief that to study Aristotle's theory of knowledge is to study the classical correspondence theory in its most mature and authoritative form. To elucidate the Aristotelian position, however, it will be useful to have recourse to Thomas Aquinas who, in the Middle Ages, took up the correspondence theory and developed it in a very sophisticated, systematic and extensive way, following closely the line suggested by Aristotle. This being the case, it is hoped that the reader will not be confused if Aristotle and Aquinas are referred to indiscriminately in what follows.

CHAPTER TWO

AN EXPOSITION OF THE "CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH" BY ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS

The traditional Correspondence Theory of Truth defines truth as "adaequatio rei et intellectus." Although Aristotle does not define truth in exactly these terms, his several definitions of truth are in substance the same as "adaequatio rei et intellectus",¹ as a close examination of them can reveal. The definition of truth as "adaequation rei et intellectus" is accorded a very prominent place by Aquinas, and it is through him, Maritain thinks, that this definition has become classic.² According to Aquinas, the definition of truth as "adequation" or "correspondence" of thing and intellect was formulated by Isaac Israeli,³ whose book, De Definitionibus,⁴ Aquinas cites on at least two different occasions. Despite Aquinas' insistence on attributing the authorship of the classic definition of truth to Israeli, recent research has not been able to corroborate Aquinas on this point.⁵ Even though the authorship of the definition of truth as "adaequatio rei et intellectus" be

in dispute, however, what is important is to show that in substance it is equivalent to the one given by Aristotle,⁶ That task will be held in abeyance for the time being, since the pressing business now is to give the account of knowledge provided by the Correspondence Theory of Truth.

"All knowledge comes from the senses" this is the principle from which the Correspondence Theory of Truth takes its departure and to which it constantly returns. As here enunciated, the principle is a kind of short formula for Aristotle's own enunciation of it.⁷ Since, according to Aristotle, all knowledge originates in the senses, how is intellectual knowledge to be accounted for, since the same Aristotle maintains that the intellect is separate?⁸ The first thing we should investigate is what Aristotle means by "the intellect is separate". Let it be noted in the first instance that Aristotle is not speaking in terms of physical or spatial separation -- that the intellect is here and the senses there. He means by "the intellect is separate" that the intellect has an operation in which the senses and the body do not share. This operation is intellection or understanding -- a purely immaterial activity, which takes place independently of a bodily organ. He proves the separateness and uniqueness of this activity by the following observation. Over - stimulation of sense - powers through excessive sensation,

wether of sound, light, odour or smell, weakens the sense power if it does not destroy it altogether. Nothing of the kind happens to the intellect. For after taking part in highly intelligible and abstract exercise, the intellect is better able to grasp less intelligible thing.⁹ But all this granted, Aristotle still maintains that even intellectual knowledge originates in the senses. Let us see how he can take such a firm stand.

While disposing of the problem of the separate character of the intellect, the above answer has created a new one. The statement that intellectual activity is an "immaterial " activity implies that the intellect is an immaterial faculty. We know that sensible things, like the sense-organs, are material. The new problem which arises is precisely this: How can the material (sensible things) be know by that which is immaterial (intellect)? Aristotle is not very clear on this point. He says:

... in the case of objects which involve no matter, what thinks and what is thought are identical... In the case of those which contain matter each of the objects of thought is only potentially present.¹⁰

The potential object of thought, Aristotle goes on to say, is made actual by disengaging it from matter.¹¹ But as yet, he does not say how. In another place he says that there are two elements in the soul; one which

becomes all things and the other which makes all things. As to how what is immaterial is disengaged from what is material, or how the soul through one of its parts makes all things, Aristotle does not elucidate. For clear and lucid answers to these questions we can, however, go to Thomas Aquinas, one of Aristotle's greatest commentators.

Intellectual knowledge is possible, explains Aquinas, through what he calls the process of abstraction. He admits with Aristotle that there are two elements in the soul, one active and the other, passive. Aquinas names these agent and possible intellect, respectively.¹³ The function of the agent intellect is to abstract intelligible species¹⁴ from the phantasms. By "phantasm", Aquinas means a material image found in a corporeal organ.¹⁵ The intelligible species so abstracted is immaterial (since it is a product of an immaterial activity of the agent intellect). The intelligible species or forms are impressed upon the possible intellect, which is then brought from a state of potentiality to one of actually knowing.¹⁶ Thus, thanks to the process of abstraction, the intellect can know material things, not as singulars but as universals. As St. Thomas puts it:

And therefore it is proper to it [the human intellect] to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, yet not as existing in such matter,

is to abstract the form from individual matter
 which is represented by the phantasms.¹⁷

Now "to know what is in individual matter, yet not as existing in such matter" is to know universally. Thus, abstraction and universality with regard to knowledge are seen to go hand in hand.

But how are we to conceive the process of abstraction of intelligible species from the phantasm by the agent intellect? Both Aristotle and Aquinas have tried to answer this question for us. Aristotle envisages the agent intellect as a light which "makes potential colours into actual colours."¹⁸ That is, the agent intellect for Aristotle is related to the phantasms as light is related to colours. For Aquinas, on the other hand, process of abstraction is not quite as simple as Aristotle seems to represent it. Aquinas says:

Not only does the agent intellect illumine phantasms, it does more; by its power, intelligible species are abstracted from phantasms. It illumines phantasms because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so through the power of the agent intellect phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction of intelligible intentions from them.¹⁹

In another passage, Aquinas suggests that in the process of abstraction, the agent intellect acts as the efficient cause, while phantasms act as the material cause

of intellection.

But since the phantasms cannot of themselves immute the possible intellect, but require to be made actually intelligible by the agent intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather is in away the matter of the cause.²⁰

As it might by now be apparent, the Thomistic doctrine of abstraction by which intellectual knowledge is made possible is not after all, entirely original. One can urge that it is found in Aristotle, albeit in an implicit and latent form. Aristotle's work "to disengage" almost suggests Aquinas', "to abstract". The drawback in Aristotle seems to lie in the fact that he does not explain how abstraction or "disengagement" of the immaterial forms from matter takes place. But there is also another shortcoming I find in both Aristotle and Aquinas: the relationship between the phantasms and the senses -- both external and internal -- is not clearly spelt out by either.

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It was said earlier that the principle: "all knowledge comes from the senses" forms for the Correspondence Theory of Truth not only "the point of departure" but also "the point of return". It has been explained how it forms "the point of departure". Let us now explain what we mean by "the point of return". By this expression

we mean that since actual knowledge is of the individual, the intellect understands nothing without turning to the phantasm. This is how Aristotle expresses it: "The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the images (phantasms)";²² or, as he explains more fully: "... when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image; for images are like sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter."²³ And Aquinas expresses the same point as follows:

All the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the sense and the imagination. And, therefore, for the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive²⁴ the universal nature existing in the individual.

But how do we know that the intellect turns to the phantasm in order to have actual knowledge? According to Aquinas we know experientially that this is so; and he gives two proofs:

1. People of weaker intellects "fail" to acquire perfect knowledge through universal conceptions... unless things²⁵ are explained to them singly and in detail.
2. To instruct the uneducated we often have to have recourse to²⁶ "sensible examples".

We must now consider why, if at all, the Correspondence Theory of Truth is so designated. On this point we shall refer to St. Thomas' preference for this theory's definition of truth over all the others known to him.²⁷ What motivated his preference for the definition of truth as "adaequation intellectus et rei", appears to be the fact that this definition of truth is more informative than others in that it refers to the two aspects of truth: truth as residing primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things.²⁸ The other definitions of truth refer to only one aspect of truth as Aquinas' comments on each indicate. For instance, he says of Hilary's definition: "Truth makes being clear and evident" that it "pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect". And of Augustine's definition: "Truth is a supreme likeness, without, any unlikeness, to its source," he says that it refers "to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect,"²⁹ etc. But in regard to "the definition that Truth is the equation of thought and thing", he says that it "is applicable to it under either aspect."³⁰ Since in an equation we can start from either side, it is immaterial whether the Correspondence Theory is expressed as "adaequatio intellectus et rei", or as "adaequatio rei et intellectus".³¹ But, granted the equation between thought and thing as stated by the Correspondence Theory of Truth, one must explain

how it is still held that truth is primarily in the intellect, and only secondarily in things. Aquinas explains it as follows:

When a predicate is used primarily and secondarily of many things, it is not necessary that which is the cause of the others receive the primary predication of the common term, but rather that in which the meaning of the common term is first fully verified. For example, healthy is primarily predicated of an animal, for it is in an animal that the nature of health is first found in its fullest sense. But inasmuch as medicine causes health, it is also said to be healthy. Therefore, since truth is predicated of many things in a primary and a secondary sense, it ought to be primarily predicated of that in which its full meaning is primarily found.³²

Truth, then according to Aquinas should be predicated essentially and primarily of the intellect but only secondarily of things insofar as the latter are the cause of truth in the intellect. A parallel and even more explicit text on this point is found in the Summa Theologiae:

Although the truth of the intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that the essence of truth should be there primarily, any more than that the essence of health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal for it is the power of

of medicine, and not its health that is the cause
of health³³

In emphasizing the essential role of the intellect in regard to the concept of truth; Aquinas says: "... if by an impossible supposition, intellect did not exist and things did continue to exist, then the essentials of truth would in no way remain."³⁴ Of things he says that they could not be true unless they conformed to some intellect.³⁵ Returning from what must have looked like a long digression, we must now address ourselves directly to the question of how to justify the title: "The Correspondence Theory of Truth."

The Correspondence Theory of Truth as we use the expression, then gets its title from its definition of truth as "adaequationintellectus et rei". The word "correspondence" is not the only but just one possible translation of "adaequation": others are "equation", "adequation", and "conformity".

That there is a correspondence or conformity between intellect and thing is suggested - if not clearly expressed - in the account of how we come to know provided by the Correspondence Theory of Truth. An explicit teaching on the correspondence of intellect and thing in an act of knowledge is consciously and deliberately offered by St. Thomas in the Summa Theologiae^{35a)} and the Disputed

Question on Truth.³⁶ In both works, the teaching is occasioned by the question whether truth is to be found only in the intellect composing (joining) and dividing (separating). We propose to examine St. Thomas' answer to this question as carefully as possible.

The expression "composing and dividing" in this context is, for Aquinas, the same as making a judgement -- affirmatively or negatively. It is being contrasted with apprehending simple essences or "knowing what a thing is".³⁷ Truth, according to Aquinas, is not properly speaking to be found in simple acts of apprehension of either, the intellect or the senses:

In forming the quiddities of things, the intellect merely has a likeness of a thing existing outside the soul, as a sense has a likeness when it receives the species of a sensible thing. But when the intellect begins to judge about the thing it has apprehended, then its judgement is something proper to itself - not something found outside in the thing.³⁸

A parallel passage in the Summa Theologiae reads:

Truth, therefore, may be in the sense, or in the intellect knowing what a thing is, as in something that is true; yet not as the thing known is in the knower, which is implied by the word truth; for the perfection of the intellect is truth

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as known.

It is in the act of composing and dividing or judging, that the intellect perceives its conformity with the thing:

But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing what a thing is. When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then it first knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from, the thing signified by the subject some form signified by the predicate.⁴⁰ Knowing the conformity between the knower and the known — this, according to Aquinas, is what constitutes truth. "To know this conformity [viz., between the intellect and thing], he says, "is to know truth."⁴¹

This passage, besides showing how there is a correspondence or conformity (the two words are used synonymously) between intellect and thing -- thus vindicating the title "Correspondence Theory of Truth" -- makes reference to other important points worthy of comment.

The first is that the senses, while knowing, do not recognize that they conform to what they know:

But in no way does sense know this (viz; its conformity to the thing). For although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which it itself is apprehending concerning it.⁴²

The word "but" in the preceding quotation is used contrastingly in reference to this fact. Although St. Thomas does not tell us here why the sense does perceive its conformity to the thing, he does so elsewhere. The reason is that "those cognitive powers which are not subsisting, but are acts of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each of the senses."⁴³ This explains why truth is not defined in reference to the senses.

The second point relates to something we have already come across -- that in an act of knowledge it is not the forms or species which the intellect knows but the thing through these forms; that is, the forms act as means to knowledge (quo), and not as knowledge itself (quod).⁴⁴ Aquinas makes reference to this teaching when he says: "When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then it first knows and expresses truth."⁴⁵

The third and last point has to do with the relationship between the Correspondence Theory's definition of truth and the Aristotelian definition. We saw earlier⁴⁶

that it is in terms of composing and dividing that Aristotle defines truth. And we have just seen that it is in terms of composing and dividing that Aquinas explains the correspondence between the intellect and thing. It would seem, therefore, that even though Aquinas did not include Aristotle's definition of truth along with the others he mentions ⁴⁷ he (Aquinas) was not unaware of it. In support of this inference we have the view of Jacques Maritain that, transmitted by one compiler or other, the definition of truth as "adaequatio rei et intellectus", is to be traced back to Aristotle. ⁴⁸ So, whether we are speaking about the definition of truth in terms of the intellect composing or dividing or about as "adaequatio rei et intellectus", we are speaking about the same thing.

The Correspondence Theory of Truth as just set down at some length is going to be challenged, and bitterly attacked by Descartes. As far as he is concerned, it can be shown with very little labour that the whole doctrine is untenable, because built on a false principle; for in order to destroy an edifice, one need only destroy its foundation. We have seen that the Correspondence Theory of Truth is built around the principle that all knowledge has its origin in the senses. Descartes is going to attempt to prove this principle false. It will be interesting to see in the ensuing chapters the

reasons he gives for his rejection of the correspondence theory, as well as the position he suggests as an alternative.

CHAPTER THREE

DESCARTES' REACTION AGAINST THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH

Nowhere in his works, at least as far as I know, does Descartes directly and explicitly mention or attack the Correspondence Theory of Truth. But it can be established that a condemnation of the state of philosophy as it prevailed in his day is an attack on the Correspondence Theory. With even stronger reason can it be established ~~that~~ an attack on Aristotle is an attack on the Correspondence Theory. For if Aristotle is not the originator of the Correspondence Theory, he is at least one of the most representative and the staunchest upholders of the theory. The contention that Descartes's attack on the general state of philosophy as it prevailed in his day and his particular attack on Aristotle are attacks on the Correspondence Theory is based on the fact that at this period in the history of philosophy we know of the existence of no other theory of knowledge. Since it can and will be shown that

Descartes made the above-mentioned attacks, it can also be concluded that he was reacting against the Correspondence Theory of Truth.

Descartes says that, of the various branches of philosophy, he had to some extent studied logic.¹ Although he does not make explicit remarks about having studied other branches of philosophy, one can infer safely that he did study whatever philosophy was a normal programme of studies at La Flèche in his day. Indeed, such an inference is corroborated by the very thorough research Etienne Gilson has conducted into this matter.

The actual dates of Descartes' entrance at La Flèche, as well as his departure from there, are not known for certain; but from a study of Descartes' voluminous correspondences and from information provided by his biographers, Gilson has been able to fix Descartes' stay at La Flèche as 1606 - 1614.² According to this reckoning, Descartes spent eight or at most eight and half years at La Flèche. The normal period for completing studies at La Flèche was nine years. The first six years were spent studying the Humanities and the last three, philosophy.³ Since our aim is to probe into Descartes' philosophical studies at La Flèche, we shall confine ourselves only to the last three years of study there.

The study of philosophy at La Flèche was broken

down as follows:

First Year: Logic. This study was based on the works of Aristotle, e.g., De Interpretatione, Prior Analytics, etc.

Second Year: Physics. The first eight books of Aristotle's Physics were studied.

Third Year: Metaphysics. The students were introduced to Aristotle's De Generatione and the De Anima. In addition, during this last year, moral philosophy was taught as a supplementary course.⁴

The fact that Descartes was at La Flèche for less than the required period of nine years should not lead one to conclude that he did not study all the prescribed philosophy courses. In a letter to an unnamed person, he says that he will always be thankful to his former teachers for having taught him the entire course in philosophy.⁵

If this were not the case, Descartes' very bitter criticism of the state of philosophy in his day would be less than just being based on very scanty information. For the sake of this thesis it must be affirmed that Descartes had studied other branches of philosophy besides logic. That Descartes had studied metaphysics or certainly that he was familiar with a text in use at La Flèche for instruction in this subject area is explained by his quotation from Aristotle's De Anima.⁶ An attempt to account for Descartes' unrelenting, and at times, harsh criticism of Aristotle's theory of knowledge (as will be shown

shortly), would hardly be possible without reference to his acquaintance with the De Anima.

We shall now present Descartes' criticism of the philosophy of his day as he knew it. He states his general criticism as follows:

I shall not say anything about Philosophy, but seeing that it has been cultivated for many centuries by the best minds that have ever lived, and that nevertheless no single thing is to be found in it which is not subject of dispute, and in consequence which is not dubious, I have not enough presumption to⁶ hope to fare better than other men had done.

However, seeing that all the other sciences borrow their principles from Philosophy, as he tells us later,⁷ Descartes saw very clearly that he could not simply sit back and bewail the woes of philosophy. Of all the sciences,⁸ Physics interested Descartes the most, and for its success he would shop at nothing -even the reformation of philosophy which at this juncture seemed so necessary. We should be perfectly clear at this point about the precise nature of Descartes' major criticism of philosophy as it existed in his time: it was that he found nothing in it that was not subject to controversy and dispute and hence, dubious. He says it had been built on such a fragile basis that it itself could support nothing.⁹ This led him to think that the first and the most important thing

was to revolutionize philosophy which could then be used as the foundation for physics and all the other sciences; and by implication, at least even here, it seems clear that the desired result of this revolution was to provide for philosophy the certainly it lacked, as measured by the presence of controversy and dispute with respect to its findings, to eliminate controversy and dispute from philosophy, and replace them with a universal consensus which would itself be the sign of certitude and truth for this discipline.

In looking back to his school days, Descartes finds that there were three subjects --logic, geometrical analysis and algebra --which could be put to use in pursuit of the plan he had in view.¹⁰ Singling out logic in particular, he finds that it contains rules and precepts which, properly employed, must lead to the discovery of truths. Little wonder then that he severely censures the schools for corrupting logic which, among them

... is only a dialectic which teaches us to make the things that we know be understood by others, or even to repeat, without judgement on them, many words respecting those that we do not know, thus corrupting¹¹ rather than increasing good sense....

Although Descartes does not tell us what he means by the word "Schools", one thing is very clear: whenever he refers to the "Schools", he does so with great contempt

for the word and everything it stood for. My opinion is that for Descartes, the word "Schools" is synonymous with "Scholasticism". The reason for Descartes' contempt is due, I surmise, to the fact that in his time Scholasticism had degenerated quite considerably. There are at least three examples we can present in support of the degeneracy of Scholasticism at that time.

Epistemologically, Maritain draws attention to this degeneracy in regard to the notion "objective being". The term "objective being" was the subject of much controversy among the Scholastics in the 16th century. The Thomists understood by the term "objective being" a mere being of reason; the Scotists took it to mean more than a "being of reason" -- a kind of quasi-entity.¹² Among those who took part in the debate were two eminent Jesuit Scholars - Francis Suarez (1548 - 1617) and Gabriel Vasquez (1551 - 1604). Vasquez took sides with the Scotists. His definition of truth as "the conformity of thing and objective being" was severely criticized by Suarez. According to Dalbiez, Descartes must have become familiar with the controversial doctrine at the Jesuit College of La Flèche.¹³ When the time came for Descartes to choose sides and declare himself, he sided with the Scotists and Vasquez. According to Maritain, Descartes' use of the word "idea" is an adaptation of the term "objective being" of the Scotists¹⁴ and Vasquez.

Maritain (in what appears to be a pure value judgement) blames idealism on the meaning the Scotists and Vasquez attach to the term "objective being" and, consequently, on Descartes's meaning of the term "idea". The odium Maritain sees in the terms "objective being" and "idea" is their tendency to connote that in being know, a thing exists as a little image or picture in the mind, a position Maritain rejects flatly.¹⁵ For Maritain, the above are some of the reasons why it is justifiable to call Scholasticism in the time of Descartes degenerate or decadent.

Theologically, too, the Schools were not immune from decadence. To illustrate this we need not look any further than Vasquez again. He taught that the blessed in heaven do not see all possible creatures in beholding the divine essence. If they did, he contended, this would mean that there is a necessary connection between creatures and God. God, the First and uncreated Truth, would depend upon creatures and created truths, a quite erroneous contention.¹⁶ Thence, Vasquez's rejection of it. But this does not make Vasquez right, either.

Vasquez's error is not so much in his logical reasoning as in his starting from the wrong end of dependence: the dependence is not of God on creatures, but of creatures on God, as Maritain points out.¹⁷ To hold this, however, does not necessitate the abandonment of the eternal, created verities. The latter are so "dependent upon the

primary truth that in order to do away with them, the primary truth itself must be abolished", as Maritain¹⁸ argues.

A second theological example, very similar to the above, is even more apt in that it involves Descartes himself. Francis Suarez (~~1548 - 1617~~), another Spanish Jesuit, is acclaimed by many as one of the most influential disciples of Thomas Aquinas. In spite of that, however, he has one doctrine which is quite un-Thomistic. He teaches that the eternal truths are true independently of God. Here are Suarez's own words:

Again, these propositions are not true because they are known by God, but rather they are so known because they are true. Moreover no reason may be given why God should of necessity know them to be true, for should their truth proceed from God himself, that would be by mediation of God's Will, and that being so, they would not then proceed from necessity but voluntarily.¹⁹

Descartes challenges him on this doctrine, and in the course of Descartes' exposition of his own position we see emerge his doctrine of the will, both divine and human. For Descartes, the good and the true are not so in themselves; on the contrary, they are so only because God wills them to be so.

... God did not ~~wille~~ to create the world in time because he saw that it would be better thus than if he created it from all eternity; nor did he will the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles because he knew that they could not be otherwise. On the contrary, because he worked to create the world in time it is for that reason better than if he had created it from all eternity; and it is because he willed the three angles of a triangle to be necessarily equal to two right angles that this is true and cannot be otherwise; and so on in other cases.²⁰

Although Descartes does not mention Suarez by name while presenting the counter doctrine relative to the divine will, it should not be urged that it is not the latter's doctrine which is under attack. In fact, Descartes was familiar with Suarez's Disputationes Metaphysicae treating of the contraversial doctrine. He quotes D. M. 9, 2, 4 in justification of his use of the term "materially false" in regard to ideas, saying "... the only reason why I call that idea materially false is because, since it is obscure and confused, I cannot decide whether it displays to me something outside my sensation or not ..."²¹ Descartes then goes on to say that he is using the term "materially false" to convey

the same meaning as Suarez's. From these examples, it is apparent that Descartes' criticism of the "Schools" was in some way justified.

Having observed at some length Descartes' general attack on philosophy in his day, let us now turn to his particular criticism of Aristotle. There are four ways, Descartes tell us, by which most men come to the possession of knowledge. They are: 1) through notions so clear in themselves that they can be had without meditation; 2) through the senses; 3) by conversing with other men; 4) through reading authoritative books. There is yet a fifth way, Descartes adds, which is reserved to the few top minds found in every society. These men, - - whom we may rightly call geniuses - - investigate the knowledge of things through their causes. It is these men, Descartes remarks, who have been given the name "Philosophers".²² He mentions Socrates, Plato and Aristotle as typical examples of such philosophers. Yet he finds that, in spite of all their labour, none of these people produced a philosophy free from errors. What could be the reason for that? None other than that their principles were all wrong. Even worse for Aristotle, according to Descartes, he borrowed his principles from Plato:

Aristotle, on the other hand, had less candour, and

although he had been Plato's disciple for twenty years, and possessed no other principles than his master's, he entirely changed the method of stating them, and proposed them as true and certain although there was no appearance of his having ever held to be such.²³

So far, our presentation of Descartes's criticism of the Correspondence Theory of Truth has been very generally and based. It is possible, however, to present a more direct and explicit text on this point, Descartes cites the Schoolmen as teaching that "there is nothing in the understanding which has not first of all been in the senses."²⁴ As we know, this is the explicit teaching of Aristotle in the De Anima²⁵ with which, as we have shown,^{25a} Descartes was well familiar. Descartes' comment on this teaching is that it is untrue because the ideas of God and of the soul are not derived from the senses.^{25b}

But why is Descartes opposed to Aristotle principles and in particular to the epistemological one we have cited above? Before presenting Descartes's answer to this question, let us first look at what he takes to be a true principle. For Descartes a principle is true if it meets the following criteria: 1) it must be very clear; 2) from it we should be able to deduce new truths.²⁶ Now the Aristotelian principles, in his view, were simply

assumed without being perfectly understood,²⁷ i.e. they were not clear. And since, in order to be clear or evident, conclusions must be deduced from equally evident principles, it is little wonder, according to Descartes, that the Aristotelian principles led to no progress²⁸ "in all the centuries in which they were followed".

The above are the reasons Descartes gives for his opposition to the Aristotelian principles. The latter failed to meet the criteria of true principles (as envisaged by Descartes, of course) and therefore they must be rejected as false.

Having rejected the Aristotelian principles — and in particular those relating to the origin of knowledge — Descartes proceeds to establish his own principles.

It is while watching Descartes develop his principles of philosophy that we shall see him provide an alternative to the correspondence theory.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRINCIPLES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHY: HIS ALTERNATIVE TO THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY

1. The Methodic Doubt

As has been seen in the preceding chapter, Descartes' reaction to the philosophy of the Schools was at first negative. He stated:

... and considering how many conflicting opinions there may be regarding the self-same matter, all supported by learned people, while there can never be more than one which is true, I esteemed as well-¹nigh false all that went as far as being probable.

Later, in the formulation of his own position, he will take a more positive approach in the search for certitude, and resolve that

... it was necessary for me to take an apparently opposite course, and to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could detect the least ground of doubt, in order to see if afterwards there remained² anything in my belief that was entirely certain.

Under this uncompromising desire for certainty³ a

first result is that the whole of sense knowledge becomes suspect, and for two reasons. Our eyes, for example, deceive us respecting sizes of things, as when they depict the sun to be as small as a ball; in regard to distances, as when a mountain many miles away looks to be only a few miles from us; and with regard to shapes of things, as in the case where a stick dipped in water appears bent. All these errors can be described as taking place in a normal eye under normal conditions. Many more errors must take place in the case of a diseased sense-organ; for example, to the victim of jaundice everything tastes bitter. The second reason for Descartes' sceptical attitude towards the senses is found in the observation that in a dream we "feel or imagine innumerable things which have no existence".³

And seeing that "all that up to the present time I have accepted as most true and certain I have learned either from the senses or through the senses," Descartes resolves to embark on what his commentators refer to as "universal doubt:" that is to say, to deny all propositions for which he can find the least ground for doubt. On the other hand, since such an undertaking could very well be interminable, Descartes conceives an ingenious mode of approach, which consists in attacking not each and every proposition as it stands, but rather the principles on

which each proposition rests.⁴ And since, as he has just told us, all his former knowledge came from the senses, Descartes resolves to make the denial of sense - knowledge the first postulate in his philosophy.⁵

He admits frankly that in proposing to deny sense knowledge he was "serving a stale dish" and not claiming originality.⁶ But there is a distinguishing mark between Descartes' doubt and, for example, that of Montaigne and the Academicians. The latter two doubted because they did not deem it possible to have true knowledge; their doubting was a last resort and permanent. Descartes' doubt, on the other hand, was undertaken with the purpose of seeing "if afterwards there remained anything in my belief that was entirely certain".⁷ That is, Descartes doubt was a "methodic" one, from which he wanted to depart as soon as he had discovered even a single indubitable truth. Let us see how well or ill he succeeds in his endeavour.

2. The "Cogito, Ergo Sum"

Descartes gives the impression that while he was busily occupied examining one proposition after another and discarding each as false, he chanced upon this one: "Cogito, ergo sum," ("I think, therefore I am"), known in short as the "Cogito". Whether it was by chance that Descartes discovered the cogito will be investigated

subsequently.

Examining the cogito closely, Descartes discovered that it was the very kind of proposition he was looking for --indubitable. Consequently, he thought he could make it the first principle of his philosophy. Descartes offers the following reasons for considering the cogito indubitable. In the first place, he shows that existence is necessarily entailed in every act of thinking:

... then, examining attentively that which I was, I saw that I could feign that I had no body, and that there was no world nor place where I might be; yet for all that, I could not pretend that I was not. On the contrary, I saw from ~~the~~ the very fact I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it⁸ very evidently and certainly followed that I was.

In the second place, even supposing the existence of a malicious genius, Descartes argues that the former can deceive him about the truth of all other matters, but not that of existence. He argues:

But there is a deceiver or other, very powerful and very cunning who always employs his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then without doubt, I still exist even if he deceives me; and let him deceive me as much as he will, he will never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something.⁹

Descartes ends the above argument by concluding that the proposition: "I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it".¹⁰ Expanding on the same conclusion he says: "I am, I exist, that is certain. But how often? Just when I think; for it might possibly be the case that I ceased altogether to exist."¹¹ This explains why the cogito takes precedence over sum or existo, and also why the proposition "Cogito, ergo sum," is abbreviated to the cogito.

Before proceeding to examine the uses to which Descartes puts the cogito, let us look at some objections advanced against it. The first and obvious thing a critic would like to know about the cogito is its originality, and one of the first to express criticism about the originality of the cogito was Arnauld. He finds that Descartes' cogito in the form "Dubito, ergo sum" which is equivalent to the cogito, as we have shown above,¹² is very much like what St. Augustine calls in De Libero Arbitrio, II, 3, a clear proposition, i.e., the fact of one's existence. Arnauld's implication here is that Descartes is plagiarizing St. Augustine. Without either denying or confirming his indebtedness to St. Augustine, Descartes -- somewhat facetiously -- contents himself with thanking Arnauld for quoting St. Augustine in his (Descartes') favour.¹³

Actually, there are far too many textes where St. Augustine employs the cogito argument to allow one to credit Descartes with accidental discovery of the cogito, particularly since there is every reason to assume that Descartes was familiar with the works of Augustine. The Augustinian cogito most directly resembling the Cartesian cogito is that found in De Civitate Dei, XI, 26: "Si enim fallor, Sum".¹⁵

Another point to be made in connection with the great similarity between the Augustinian and the Cartesian cogito is the fact that both Augustine and Descartes availed themselves of the indubitability of the cogito for similar reasons: to overcome scepticism, to prove the spirituality of the soul and to prove the existence of God.¹⁵

The indubitability of the cogito, according to Descartes, seems to lie in its unique and privileged position. The Englishman, Thomas Hobbes, was one of the earliest people to challenge the cogito's supposed unique position. Considering only the form in which the cogito is stated, i.e., looking at the proposition only syntactically, Hobbes thinks that he can criticize Descartes by substituting "walking" for "thinking" in^{15 a} the proposition. Hobbes wants to know whether the resulting proposition "I walk, therefore I am" is indubitable.

Certainly not, retorts Descartes -- almost in anger -- for it is possible for us to dream that we are walking, while in actual fact, we are lying in bed. Descartes is here implying that error and deception would result -- or at least that there would be no way of guaranteeing against them once some other activity is made to take the place of "thinking" in the cogito proposition. Hobbes' argument, then according to Descartes, fails to discern this important point; it fails to see that there is no parity between "walking" and "thinking". In Descartes' words, "there is no parity between walking and thinking; for walking is usually held to refer to that action itself, while thinking applies now to the action, now to the faculty of thinking, and again to that in which the faculty exists"¹⁶.

Descartes' answer to Hobbes seems deserving of two comments. First, how are we to interpret what Descartes calls "faculty of thinking" in the above context, seeing that he has told us earlier that faculties resembling "thinking" and "feeling" and found to exist in some bodies.¹⁷ Now, if the "faculty of thinking" is referring to some body, and we know from the First Meditation¹⁸ how much Descartes opposes the body for being the source of error and deception, how can we still look upon "thinking" as the privileged ground of indubitability? Even if we take Descartes' answer to Hobbes as it stands, which of the

three things with which Descartes identifies "thinking" really stands for the meaning Descartes has in mind?

Secondly, it does not appear so necessary that existence he deduces only from "thinking". On the contrary, "thinking" is just one of the many possibilities from which existence can be deduced. No one could make the statements "I walk", "I write", "I sing", unless one existed.

Therefore, there seems no reason why one cannot deduce existence from the act of walking in the fashion:

"I walk, therefore I exist". The whole strength of the cogito seems to rest not with the "I".¹⁹ It seems to me that Hobbes deserved a better answer than Descartes was able to provide.

Another critic of the cogito is Gassendi who construes it as an enthymeme whose suppressed major premise should be "qui cogitat est", which Descartes has not yet proved.²⁰ According to Gassendi, therefore, we have no reason to accept Descartes' cogito. Descartes, on his part, meets the objection directly, almost point blank:

But the great error here in our critic's assumption that the knowledge of particular truths is always deduced from universal propositions in consonance with the order of the sequence observed in the syllogism of dialectics. This shows that he is but little acquainted with the method by which truth

should be investigated. For it is certain that in order to discover the truth, we should always start with particular notions, in order to discover the general conceptions, although we may, conversely, start with general propositions and deduce from them particular ones.²¹

Descartes might have answered Gassendi more directly and to the point as he had answered the authors of the Second Set of Objections:

He who says, "I think, hence I am, or exist", does not deduce existence from thought by a syllogism, but, by a simple act of mental vision, recognizes it as if it were a thing that is known per se.²²

In other words, for Descartes, we always grasp particular truth first, by intuition, before forming general notions. The cogito is one such particular truth from which one may correctly infer the universal proposition: "He who thinks is".

What deludes some critics of the cogito into believing that the cogito is a syllogism is the word "therefore". These critics forget or are unaware that, besides its syllogistic function, the word "therefore" has a secondary function --, that of symbolizing the relation of entailment between terms.²³ In the case of the cogito, the word

"therefore" symbolizes a relation of entailment that so connects all conscious acts with existence that to which the characteristic of "consciousness" applies, must exist. ²⁴

Not even modern philosophers, with all their employment of logistic vigour, have succeeded in completely overthrowing the cogito. Norman Malcolm has shown that there is one level on which the truth of the cogito is unshakeable although he does show it to be vulnerable on another level. To illustrate these two levels, Malcolm suggests that we recast the cogito in the form of two related conditionals, as follows:

a) When I am aware of thinking, I am aware myself.

b) When I am aware of myself, I am aware of thinking.

According to Malcolm, these conditionals are necessarily

true from the self-defeating character of denying the

propositions: "I am not aware of myself or I do not

exist" (the cogito), and "I am not aware of thinking"

(in Descartes' broad sense of thinking which embraces

all conscious acts) ²⁵. The conditionals are true, because

it is self-defeating to deny the consequent. ²⁶ They are

necessarily true on what logicians like Malcolm and

Jaakko Hintikka call the level of "performance" ²⁷ which is

explained as follows: If ~~one~~ and the some person were to

make the assertion, "I think, therefore I do not exist",

his action or performance would be self-defeating because of the inconsistency introduced between language on the one hand, and the act of existing of the speaker, on the other. The assention "I think, therefore I do not exist," uttered by the same person is as inconsistent, meaningless and self-defeating as the act of writing something down and erasing it as one goes along.²⁸

The conditionals are not true, however, from any necessary relation between "thinking" and "myself." To show that this is the case, Malcolm takes the generalized form of the conditionals (a) and (b) above and obtains the following:

- a) When I am aware of x I am aware of myself.²⁹
- b) When I am aware of y I am aware of thinking.

Now (a) is necessarily true regardless of the value for x. "The fact that it is true when the value is "thinking", Malcolm concludes, "does not reveal any necessary relation between 'thinking' and 'myself'".³⁰ Similarly, (b) is necessarily true regardless of the value for y. That it is true when the value is "myself" does not indicate any necessary connection between "myself" and "thinking".³¹

Since, then, there is no necessary relation between the consequent and the antecedent of either of the conditionals (a) and (b), the negation of the consequent will not necessarily be inconsistent with the antecedent.

However, the second alternative which makes a conditional true is not fulfilled.³² It is on this point that the conditionals, and hence the cogito, are found not to be necessarily true. But the fact that the cogito is true according to the first alternative,³³ is in itself a matter of no small consequence.

✓+ Having secured the cogito on the firm, ground of indubitability, Descartes wastes no time exploiting its richness. First, he makes it form the basis of the criterion of truth. Looking back on the cogito he says:

And having remarked that there is nothing at all in the statement, "I think, therefore I am," which assures me of speaking truly, except that I see very clearly that in order to think I must exist, I concluded that I can take as a general rule that the things which we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true.³⁴

Now, what meanings does Descartes attach to the terms "clear" and "distinct"? He answers:

I term that clear which is present and manifest to an attentive mind in the same way as we see objects clearly when, being present to the beholding eye, they act upon it with sufficient strength. A thing is distinct when it is so precise and different from all the others that it contains in itself nothing but

What is clear to whoever considers it rightly. ³⁵

From the foregoing, we can make the following summary remarks about the importance of the cogito.

1. It was the "discovery" of the cogito which enabled Descartes to set a limit to the act of doubting.

2. Once "discovered", the cogito was made the basis -- at least a partial basis -- for the criterion of truth. I say "partial" because until he was proved that God exists and that he is non-deceiver, Descartes (given the hypothesis of the Malicious Genius) cannot accept anything as true no matter how clear and distinct. Therefore, let us now proceed to look at Descartes' ardent attempt to prove the existence of God. ✓

3. The Existence of God

At the beginning of the Third Meditation, Descartes describes the cogito as "a thing which thinks, that is to say, that doubts, affirms, denies, that knows a few things, that is ignorant of many things... that wills, that desires, that also imagines and perceives." ³⁶ How is it going to arrive at the knowledge of all the things of which it is ignorant? (Let us recall that up to now the only truth known by it indubitably is that of its own existence.) But is it possible for the cogito to deny that two plus two is four or that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles -- two matters which it perceives so clearly and distinctly? At first

sight the answer to this question seems obviously negative. On reflection, however, it is discovered that the answer is affirmative, the reason being the possibility that there could be a very powerful and Malicious Genius bent on deceiving us even in the things we most clearly and distinctly perceive. Therefore, concludes Descartes,

I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must inquire whether he may be a deceiver; for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not see how I can ever be certain of anything.³⁷

In spite of Descartes' insistence that he must prove the existence of God in order to be guaranteed of knowing truly, this insistence is not compatible with his assertions elsewhere. In one place, he says that the idea of God is innate in us,³⁸ that it is universally possessed by all men, and that no one may plead ignorance of the existence of God.³⁹ In another place, Descartes claims that the existence of God is better known than that of the sensible things.⁴⁰

Be that as it may, Descartes proceeds to demonstrate the existence of God by means of two sets of proofs. According to Descartes, "there are only two ways of proving the existence of God, one by means of the effects due to Him, the other by His essence or nature...."⁴¹ Traditionally, these proofs have been designated a posterior and a priori,

respectively.⁴² Since the a priori proof is of less importance either for Descartes' system -- as I am going to show -- or for the present thesis, I find it convenient to dispose of it first and briefly.⁴³ Since two of the three "aposteriori" proofs are not very relevant to my thesis, I shall treat them only briefly and indirectly, in a footnote.⁴⁴

The third of the "a posteriori" proofs demonstrates the existence of God through what Descartes calls the "objective reality"⁴⁵ of an idea. It is my firm opinion that this proof manifests better than any other text of his works, the nature of Descartes' theory of knowledge. (I shall not go into the reasons which have led me to this conclusion because to do so would result in an undue digression. I hope, however, that the reasons will become apparent in the course of the following exposition). We propose to give thorough treatment of Descartes' proof of the existence of God through the "objective reality" of an idea, in order to manifest his theory of knowledge.

Before entering into the proof itself, let us settle two preliminary questions. 1. Is the term "idea" of Descartes' coining, and if not, from where does he get it? 2. What meaning does Descartes attach to the term "idea"?

Descartes did not originate the word "idea". We find it extensively employed by Plato in respect to theory of knowledge, and according to him, material sensible

things are not graspable by the intellect. Instead, what the intellect grasps are the unchangeable, separates, ⁴⁶ unseen essences of things which he terms forms or ideas. Ideas are participated both by our mind (for knowledge) and by things (for being). ⁴⁷ Participation takes place by means of some likeness of Idea in the participator, in ⁴⁸ much the same way the model is participated by a copy. Plato therefore sees ideas as the principles both of knowledge and of being.

Following Plato who sees ideas as principles of knowledge and of being, ⁴⁹ Augustine and ⁵⁰ Aquinas assign these two roles to ideas existing in the mind of God. Let me present Aquinas' full position on the matter as I find it more relevant to the point I want to make, Aquina states:

So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an exemplar and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a likeness and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it is related to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it is related to all things known by God, ^{50a} even though they never come to be in time

For our immediate purpose, we shall look only at idea as

a principle of knowledge in Plato and in the mind of God, as expounded by Aquinas. The problem is to determine which of the two theories of idea was adopted by Descartes. If I may anticipate what Descartes will say about the ideas, the answer to this question is that Descartes adopted the Thomistic theory of Divine ideas. The clue to this answer is provided by Descartes himself when he says that ideas are in our mind (in contrast to the separate, somewhat "floating" ideas of Plato) and that it is through them that we know things. If the text of Aquinas cited is not very explicit about God knowing things through ideas, the title of the article in which that text appears makes no mistake about the point. The article asks: "Whether There are Ideas of All Things That God Knows?" The question is answered positively in the sed contra: "Ideas are exemplars existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustina⁵¹. But God has the proper exemplars of all the things he knows; and therefore he has ideas of all things known by Him." In both Aquinas and Descartes, we see that ideas have a representative character. In Descartes this will become even more evident when we come to look at his definition of the "objective reality" of an idea.

The second question is answered directly by Descartes himself. Descartes has given us in all three definitions for the term "idea".

1. "An idea is the thing thought of itself in so far as it is objectively in the understanding."⁵²
2. "By the word 'idea' I understand that form of any of our thoughts by the immediate perception of which we are aware of these same thoughts."⁵³
3. "I take the term 'idea' to stand for whatever the mind directly perceives."⁵⁴

The latter is Descartes' oft-repeated and, it seems, his favourite definition of "idea", as he tells us in the same place. For our purpose, however, it is the first definition which is of great interest since, as we envisage, it will play an important part in the comparison between Descartes' theory of knowledge and the Correspondence Theory.

After having defined the term "idea", Descartes proceeds to expound his doctrine on idea, doing this is anticipation of the proof of the existence of God through the medium of the "objective reality"⁵⁵ of an idea. In the first place, he teaches that if ideas are looked upon as modifications of our minds, there is no difference between one idea and another. Examples of such ideas are desiring, willing, thinking, imagining, etc. Such ideas, Descartes thinks, can never be false for, "although I may desire evil things, or even things that never existed, it is not less true that I desire them."⁵⁶ In

the second place, looked upon from the point of view of "objective reality", i.e., as representative of something, it is possible to distinguish between several types of ideas. The mark of distinction is the reality or perfection which each idea contains. The idea of God is infinitely more perfect than that of a finite being; that of substance is more perfect than that of its mode.⁵⁷ In their objective or representative character, ideas can be either true or false. If they represent something which really exists, they are true, otherwise they are false.⁵⁸

Also, on the level of objective reality, Descartes finds that ideas can be grouped into three categories:

1. those which come from without (through the senses) and impress themselves in our minds. He calls this type of idea adventitious, one example of which is the idea of the sun as given to us by the eyes.⁵⁹ According to this idea the sun looks to be as small as a ball, and the idea cannot possibly be true.⁶⁰

2. factitious ideas: are ideas the mind can fashion at will, such as the ideas of a chimera, centaur, satyr, etc.⁶¹

3. innate ideas: as the name implies, these are ideas we can discover within ourselves, such as the ideas of the self and of God.⁶²

Returning to the question of the relative perfection

of ideas, Descartes observes:

If the objective reality of any of my ideas is of such a nature as clearly to make me recognize that it is not in me either eminently or formally, and that consequently I cannot myself be the cause of it, it follows of necessity that I am not alone in the world, but that there is another being which exists, or which is the cause of this idea.⁶³

In regard to adventitious and factitious ideas, Descartes cannot recognize anything in them of which he could not be cause.⁶⁴ It is possible to add to or subtract from these ideas. For example, we can imagine a chimera which has no serpent's tail. We also know by our intellect that the sun is much bigger than the eyes represent it.

On the other hand, Descartes notes, the idea of God as "eternal, infinite, immutable, omniscient, omnipotent and Creator of all things which are outside Himself" could not have originated from him alone, "These characteristics", he says "are such that the more diligently I attend to them, the less do they appear capable of proceeding from me alone."⁶⁵ It is not possible, as in the case of the other ideas, to add to or take anything from this idea.⁶⁶ Now,

... in order that an idea should contain some certain objective reality rather than another, it must without

doubt derive it from some cause in which there is at least as much formal reality as this idea contains of objective reality.⁶⁷

The idea of God is such that it entails so much perfection as can never be due to any finite thing. Moreover, "this idea is also very clear and distinct; since all that I conceive clearly and distinctly of the real and the true, and of what conveys perfection, is in its entirety contained in this idea."⁶⁸ From all this Descartes concludes that God must exist.

That there is some similarity between Descartes' proof of the existence of God just considered and St. Thomas' Second way of proving the existence of God is undeniable: both are based on the principle of efficient causality. Aquinas, however, in the Second of his Five Ways, ~~however~~, argues to the existence of God from a consideration of the nature of efficient cause in sensible⁶⁹ things; Descartes, on the other hand, begins with the idea of God and argues to the existence of God as the cause of this idea. The theologian Caterus pointed out to Descartes that Aristotle and St. Thomas were "not concerned with the causes of ideas. Perhaps they had no need to be, for might not the argument take a more direct and less devious course? I think, hence I exist; may I am that very thinking mind, that thing. But that mind,

that thought, springs either from itself or from something else."⁷⁰

After having proved that God exists, Descartes proceeds to investigate whether He is truthful -- for this was one of the conditions he had laid down by which he can be absolutely certain that whatever he apprehends clearly and distinctly is true. Descartes finds no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that God must indeed be all-truthful, for deception is an imperfection incompatible with the absolutely Perfect Being which God is.⁷¹

Although during the course of his a priori proof of the existence of God in Meditation V, Descartes manages to slip in the criterion of truth through clear and distinct ideas,⁷² the usefulness of the criterion there is doubtful, as Caterus hints when he asks Descartes very appropriately: How can anyone come to have a clear and distinct idea of God, the Infinite Being? Descartes answers to that question is as follows:

... those who attend to His perfections singly, and intend not so much to comprehend them as to admire them, will assuredly find in Him a much ampler and readier supply of the material for clear and distinct cognition than in any created things.⁷³

I find this answer highly inadequate. It sounds like a mystic's or a contemplative's answer at best, very

unworthy of a rationalist of Descartes' calibre.⁷⁴ Descartes' answer here is just one of many instances of ambiguity and inconsistency with which his philosophy abounds.

Nor is the above the only dissatisfaction writers have expressed towards Descartes' criterion of truth through clear and distinct ideas. As we have already seen,⁷⁵ Descartes asserts that until he has proved that there exists a God who is a non-deceiver, he can never be certain of anything. This statement, when closely scrutinized, not only appears to undermine clear and distinct ideas, but also their foundation -- the cogito. Indeed it is Descartes' failure to delineate unambiguously the respective roles of the cogito the clear and distinct ideas and the existence of God which prompted the authors of the Second Set of Objections to Descartes' Meditations to write:

... since you are not yet certain of the aforesaid existence of God, and yet according to your statement, cannot be certain of anything or know anything clearly and distinctly unless previously you know clearly and distinctly that God exists, it follows that you cannot clearly and distinctly know that you are a thinking thing, since, according to you, that knowledge depends on the clear knowledge of the existence of God, the proof of which you have not yet reached at that point where you draw the conclusion that you have a clear knowledge

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of what you are.

The writers of the Second Set of Objections are here charging Descartes with circular reasoning, which in modern times has come to be known as the "Cartesian Circle". Descartes' rejoinder to the charge of circularity is evasive since the charge purports to shake the very foundation of his system:

When I said that we could know nothing with certainty unless we were first aware that God existed, I announced in express terms that I referred only to the science apprehending such conclusions as can recur in memory without attending further to the proofs which led me to make them... Knowledge of first principles is not usually called science by dialecticians. But when we become aware that we are thinking beings, this is a primitive act of knowledge derived from no syllogistic reasoning. 77

We have here a clear indication that for Descartes, the cogito is the first principle of his philosophy.

As for Descartes' claim that he had expressly taught that the knowledge of the existence of God is required only in regard to "the science apprehending such conclusions as can recur in memory without attending further to the proofs which led me to make them", I find only a bare hint at this doctrine anywhere in his writings. In the text containing the "express" doctrine, Descartes

does not so much as refer to the word "science". That text is worthy of closer examination because, in my view, it provides one further illustration of the ambiguous roles played by the cogito, the clear and distinct ideas and the existence of God. Speaking of a geometrical truth, Descartes says:

... when I consider the nature of a rectilinear triangle, I who have some little knowledge of the principles of geometry recognize quite clearly that the three angles are equal to two right angles, and it is not possible for me not to believe this so long as I apply my mind to its demonstration; but so soon as I abstain from attending to the proof, although I still recollect having clearly comprehended it, it may easily occur that I come to doubt its truth, if I am ignorant of there being a God.

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It appears from this passage that I do not need to know that God exists in order to know that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles "so long as I apply my mind" to the demonstration of this truth. The existence of God seems to be necessary only as a guarantor that I can take as true and certain what I remember to have once "clearly comprehended". Now this is just the contrary of what Descartes told us earlier -- that nothing, no matter how clearly and distinctly comprehended (and here Descartes does not seem to be

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distinguishing between the past, present and future) can be taken⁸¹ as true unless we know that God exists. Such contradictions as these cannot but play havoc with a system intended to be as logical as a mathematical demonstration.

Contemporary writers, too, have had their share in the debate about the "Cartesian Circle". All the writers I have consulted absolve Descartes of the charge of reasoning in a circle. ~~82~~ One of them, however, Marthinus Versfeld⁸³, needs special mention. The defense Versfeld offers on behalf of Descartes in regard to the charge of petitio principii is, in my opinion, unworthy of Descartes. Versfeld sees the cogito and the existence of God as being on an equal par, the only difference between them being that the cogito happens to be discovered first, and accidentally at that. ⁸⁴ Knowing how much importance Descartes attaches to the cogito and the strategic point it commands at the threshold of his philosophy, I think he would prefer to remain charged with circularity, whether justly or unjustly, than be exonerated of it by the type of argument Versfeld adduces.

The self and the existence of God -- these are the only two principles for which Descartes has kept us in so much suspense. ⁸⁵ From them he hopes to deduce the various sciences -- physics, mechanics, medicine, ethics, etc. Since the topic at hand requires that we stay within a

very restricted area, we had better refrain from going into the whole field of Cartesian philosophy. What we ought to do at this near-final stage is compare Descartes' theory of knowledge, especially as presented in the Third Meditation (where he proves the existence of God through the "objective reality" of ideas) with the Correspondence Theory of Truth.

CHAPTER FIVE

A CONTRAST BETWEEN THE CORRESPONDENCE AND THE CARTESIAN THEORY OF TRUTH.

From the accounts offered of the Correspondence Theory of Truth and that of Descartes, it is quite obvious that the two are almost diametrically opposed. I shall begin by examining the difference between the two theories from a very general standpoint, and afterwards I shall descend to particular points of divergence.

In the first place, let us point out that the Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Cartesian position are offspring of very different kinds of parenthood. The one stems from realism, i.e., it takes its departure from the data of common sense and experience; it begins by accepting the position that things exist, that we know them through our senses and intellect; about this there can be no question. The only issue arising from this starting point is the necessity to explain how we know. It is out of the attempt to respond to this issue that the Correspondence Theory of Truth is born.

The Cartesian position, on the other hand, takes its departure from a universal doubt.-- I do not know of the

existence of anything. If I posit the existence of anything -- this is no more than an assumption, a conjecture on my part to which there is as much truth as there is in a dream or an act of wild fancy. How can I establish beyond any doubt that anything at all exists? Descartes' theory of knowledge, put in very broad terms is an attempt to answer the above question. Unlike the Correspondence Theory of Truth which is realistic in nature, Descartes' theory is critical in nature.¹ The advocates of the correspondence theory believe -- or at least assume -- that reason in its "natural state" has a capacity to acquire knowledge proper to it.² Descartes, on the other hand, does not think that reason by itself is capable of arriving at true knowledge, and must look upon God as a guarantee that what the mind perceives clearly and distinctly is true.

Thus far, the comparison between the correspondence theory and Descartes theory of knowledge has been carried on rather general points. We shall now try to make the comparison more specific by examining how each theory accounts for how the mind knows a thing, e.g., a tree.

According to the correspondence theory, knowledge (truth) is a product of the interaction between the mind and the extramental thing. The thing is first apprehended by the senses as an individual. Then, through the process of abstraction, the thing comes to be attained by the mind immaterially and universally i.e., apart from

its individuating conditions such as size, quantity, "hereness", "thereness", etc.³ The process of abstraction is necessary because, knowledge being a correspondence of the knower and the known, or the assimilation of the known to the knower, it is impossible, as Aristotle remarks, that a thing should exist in the same way mentally and extramentally.⁴ The thing is known through its form or intention⁵ which, being of the same nature as the intellect, i.e., immaterial, can correspond to and be assimilated by it. The thing (tree) is known precisely as other -- aliud in quantum aliud; the knower remains the knower while he knows, while the known remains what it is in itself. This point must be insisted upon, seeing that knowing (the assimilation of the known to the knower) is a vastly different activity from physiological assimilation. To know and to be nourished by an apple are two quite different things. In the later case, the substance of the apple is transformed into the substance of the eater; in the former, the knower remains distinct while he knows and the known remains distinct while it is known. In knowledge, the knower and the known do not constitute a tertium quid as in the case of the union of matter and form, but each remains what it is. At no time does knowledge result in exhaustion of the known or in the increase of the knower:

To know does not consist in making anything nor in receiving anything, but in existing in a way better

than by the simple fact of being set outside nothingness.... Taken purely in itself it does not consist in the production of anything, even within the knowing subject. To know is to advance oneself in an act of existing of supereminent perfection, and that, in itself, does not involve production.⁶

In Descartes, the relationship between the thing as known by the mind and the thing in itself is ambiguous: whether we deduce the existence of things from ideas or whether the ideas in us are caused by things existing extramentally, is all very unclear. At one time Descartes says that "all our ideas or notions must have some foundation of truth, for otherwise it could not be possible that God, who is all perfection and truth, should have placed them within us."⁷ Among the ideas placed in us by God, according to Descartes, are the ideas of self and of God.⁸ He calls these two ideas innate and says that they are absolutely true.⁹

At another time, Descartes speaks as though ideas are caused in us by something existing outside of us. In the Third Meditation, Descartes give several instances of external things causing ideas in the mind:

1. ... My principal task in this place is to consider, in respect to those ideas which appear to me to proceed from certain objects that are outside me, what are the reasons which cause me to think them similar to these objects.¹⁰

2. 11. Nothing seems to be more obvious than to judge that this object ^{imprints its likeness} idea rather than anything else upon me. ¹¹
3. ... In order that an idea should contain some one certain objective reality rather than another it must without doubt derive it from some cause in which there is at least as much formal reality as this idea contains of objective reality. ¹²
4. ... If the objective reality of anyone of my ideas is of such a nature as clearly to make me recognize that it is not in me either formally or eminently, and that consequently I cannot myself be the cause of it, it follows of necessity that I am not alone in the world, but that there is another being which exists, or which is the cause of this idea. ¹³

Two points ought to be made a propos these texts. First, they recall to us Descartes' proof of the existence of God through the casualty of the objective being of ideas. The relationship between a thing and the idea it causes in us is so important in Descartes that we found it imperative to present his proof of the existence of God at great length. The extended treatment of the proof for the existence of God was undertaken not only for its own sake, but also in anticipation of the comparison now being made between the Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Cartesian theory of truth. In the

second citation above ~~that~~ Descartes refers to ideas as imprints or copies of things which, as he says later, may "easily fall short of the perfection of the objects from which they have been derived."¹⁴

I find two problems associated with calling ideas imprints or pictures of things. In the first place, if Descartes is considering all ideas in their representative character in the same way -- and there seems little doubt that he does -- how are we to conceive the idea (copy) of the self or that of God? What is the copy of the self like? What is the image of God like in the second place I find Descartes quite ambiguous about what it is we know -- things or ideas; and if things, whether we know them directly or through their doubles. One example to illustrate that we know through ideas is provided, it seems by Descartes himself in the proof for the existence of God through the objective reality of an idea although, even here, the same ambiguity still prevails, since the existence of God is also said to be known innately. In other instance, Descartes speaks as though to know things and to know ideas were equivalent:

Let us begin by considering the commonest matters, those which we believe to be most distinctly apprehended, to wit, the bodie which we touch and see; not indeed bodies in general, for these general ideas

are usually a little more confused, but let us consider one body in particular. Let us take, for example, this piece of wax¹⁵

In this particular example, Descartes is definitely identifying "bodies in general" with "ideas in general" and, by implication, "a particular body" with "a particular idea". Given all this, the way is paved for Berkeley to declare unequivocally that it is ideas that we know, and that to speak of seeing colours or of hearing sound, etc., is to speak vulgarly.¹⁶

In spite of his uncompromising reaction against Aristotle and St. Thomas -- two great advocates of the Correspondence Theory of Truth -- Descartes did not succeed in completely setting himself apart from the positions they held.¹⁷ I am here referring to the fact that even Descartes understood that as known, a thing has a different kind of existence than that which it has in itself. But as to the nature of that existence, Descartes differs radically from the two mentioned predecessors. When asked by Caterus to explain what he (Descartes) means by "to be objectively in the understanding," Descartes gives the following answer:

... If the question be, what the idea of the sun is, and the reply is given, that it is the object thought of in so far as that exists objectively in the under-

standing, he someone will not understand that it is the sun itself, in so far as that extrinsic attribute is in it; neither will objective existence in the understanding here signify that the mind's operation is here determined in the mode due to the object, but it is in the mind in the way in which objects¹⁸ are wanted to be there

In what way are "objects wanted to be in the understanding?" Here Descartes does not say that they exist there as pictures or images; neither does he say they exist there intentionally, as a Thomist would say. Instead, Descartes is content to leave his position unspecified and non-committal in this particular instance. (I say "in this particular instance" because from the preceding citation from his works, Descartes leaves us in little doubt concerning the mode of existence of things in the mind, i.e., as pictures or imprints.)

Descartes' full answer to Caterus' question ends:

"... this mode of being is truly much less perfect than that in which things exist outside the mind...."¹⁹ Having thought of ideas as copies of things (which copies may fall short of the perfection of the original -- as he told us²⁰), and being unmindful of the notion of "intentional existence", it is understandable how Descartes could easily make the above type of value judgement. As to

whether the mode of existence of a thing in the mind is more or less perfect than the mode of existence it has in itself is a question Aquinas never troubled about. He does emphasize, however, that the two modes of existence are different:

... it is quite true that the mode of understanding, in one who understands, is not the same as the mode of a thing in being; since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who understands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not materially,²¹ according to the mode of a material thing.

What the two modes of existence have in common is the form or ~~the~~ essence which makes the correspondence between the mind and thing possible. In the thing, the essence exists as an individual; in knowledge or in intentional existence, it exists as a universal.²² If it be objected that there is not parity between an essence existing as an individual in a thing and the same essence existing as a universal in the intellect, Aquinas would have the least difficulty meeting such an objection.

← Framing the objection himself, Aquinas says:

It would seem that our intellect does not understand the corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasm, For the intellect is false if it understands a thing otherwise than it is. Now

the forms of material things do not exist in abstraction from the particular things represented by the phantasms. Therefore, if we understand material things by the abstraction of species from phantasms,²³ there will be error in the intellect.

To this objection, Aquinas makes the reply:

... the intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to think that the species did not exist in matter, as Plato held.²⁴ [And this, of course, is not what happens].

From Aquinas' answer it is clear how the same essence can exist as individuated in a material thing, and how it can also exist in a state of abstraction from matter, i.e., as a universal in the intellect, thus making knowledge possible.

^xThe main and crucial difference between the correspondence theory and Descartes' theory of knowledge, in my opinion, lies in this. The Correspondence theory concentrates on the intimate relationship between the knower and known -- a relationship Maritain describes as being more intimate than that obtaining between matter and form.²⁵ The correspondence theory characterized this relationship by employing such expressions as "assimilation of the known to the knower," "conformity", "corres-

pondence," "equation" and "identity" between the mind and thing, between the knower and known.

Descartes' theory of knowledge, on the other hand, does not emphasize this kind of intimate relationship between the mind and what it knows. Instead, it is almost wholly preoccupied with deducing the existence (of things) from ideas, the reason for this preoccupation being a necessary consequence of the prior commitment to certitude as the primary essential in any theory of knowledge. This preoccupation, however, turns out to be a quite complicated business because, not only do the ideas in question have to be clear and distinct, but also we have to keep reminding ourselves that God exists. ²⁶ If in Descartes a relation obtains between the knower and known, it is like that of a thing and its copy and, as we remember him saying, ²⁷ the copy (idea) often fails to represent adequately the thing of which it is a copy.

* Descartes' initial intention to revolutionize philosophy to give it the certitude it lacked (if that were possible) is highly commendable. What one has to quarrel with, however, is the actual carrying out and the outcome of that revolution. Descartes has been acclaimed by many as the "Father of Modern Philosophy", as the man who liberated philosophy from the shackles

of theology, and gave it a more independent and autonomous existence. Granting all this the present writer is of the opinion that the moment he thought he could confer on philosophical truth the same kind of certitude as that found in mathematics, Descartes was badly serving ^{the cause of} philosophy. The underlying cause of this fallacy was Descartes' univocal conception of knowledge.

The claim that knowledge is univocally the same is falsified by the fact that we speak of many different kinds of knowledge -- of moral knowledge, metaphysical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, physical knowledge of the universe, etc., each of which has its own method of procedure, and a greater or lesser degree of certitude attaching to it. Aristotle, Aquinas and other advocates of the correspondence theory understood this perfectly. Though they did not succeed in giving to philosophy such a degree of certitude as to eliminate from it all controversy and disputes, at least they did not confuse it with some other type of knowledge; neither did they expect from its conclusions more certitude than the conclusions could warrant.

By setting too high a value on certitude in philosophy, Descartes was treading -- contrary to his wishes, and, probably without his clearly and distinctly perceiving it -- nearly the same path formerly trodden by Zeno and other sceptics. For if it so happens that absolute

certitude in philosophy is unattainable, what to do? There are two obvious answers to that question: either abandon the study of philosophy and of all the other disciplines where absolute certitude is impossible, or take a second look and re-examine one's principles and presuppositions. Descartes chose the latter course of action and learned, no doubt, that he had quite a few readjustments to make to his original principles.

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~~FOOT~~NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

1. Two other writers who believe in the modern version of the correspondence Theory of Truth are H.B. Acton, "The Correspondence Theory of Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S., vol. XXXV (1934-1935), pp. 177-194; D.W. Hamlyn, "The correspondence Theory of Truth", The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XI (1962), 193-205.
2. Bertrand Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd; 1961) p.289. In giving this definition of the Correspondence Theory of Truth, Russell is attempting to get around the naïveté of defining truth as "the correspondence of propositions with facts" as illustrated by the following example taken from Acton's paper: in the two statements: " Jack killed Jill" and "Jill was killed by Jack", Acton observes, we have one fact which is expressed in two different structures. This raises a difficulty, Acton goes on to say, a difficulty which is solved by reducing all propositions to certain basic ones, also known as "atomic propositions"; see Acton, art. cit., p. 184
3. Russell, op. cit., p. 305.
4. Ibid., p. 289.
5. Russell, op. cit. p. 293.
6. Aristotle, De Anima, I, 2(404^a5) in Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941).
7. Plato, Phaedo, p. 79A, in B. Jowett, trans. The Dialogues of Plato, 2 vols. (New York: Random House, 1937).

8. Plato, Theaetetus, p. 185E.
9. Plato, Meno, p. 84.
10. Plato, Timaeus, p. 29A.
11. Plato, Phaedo, p. 79A.
12. Aristotle, De Anima, III, 8(432a 6-8).
13. Ibid., III, 8(431^b30); C 7 Ibid., III, 4(430^a9).
14. De Anima, III, 5(430a 15).

CHAPTER TWO

1. The following are some of his definitions of truth:

1. "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not is true... " Metaph., IV, 7 (1011b26).

2. "When it [understanding] connects in one way by assertion or negation, it says what is true, and when it does so in another way, what is false". Metaph., IV, 7, (1012^a4)

3. "... he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects is in error... It is not because we think truly you are pale that you are pale, but because you are we who say this have the truth". Metaph., IX, 10 (1051b6).

2. Jacques Maritain, Distinguer pour unir; ou les degrés du savoir (7e éd. [Paris]: Desclée de Brouwer, 1963) p.169.

3. He was a physician-philosopher, and lived in Egypt (A.D. 845-940); Maritain, loc. cit. n.l.

4. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 16, 2, ob. 2 in Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. A.C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1945); also in De Veritate, I, I, c. trans. Robert B. Mulligan, Disputed Question on Truth, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952).

5. J.T. Muckle, "Isaac Israeli's Definition of Truth", Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, VIII (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1933), 5-8. In this short but authoritative paper on the source of this definition, Muckle announces that he has been unable to trace it to Israeli's De Definitionibus, or indeed, to any of his other works. The result of his research can be summarized as follows:

1. There are those who, like Aquinas, attribute the definition of truth as "adaequatio intellectus et rei" to Isaac Israeli in his book De Definitionibus. One example is J. de Tomquédec in his La Critique de la connaissance (Paris; 1929) p.512; see Muckle, art. cit., p.5.

2. There is a group of writers, e.g. St. Bonaventure in his Commentary on the Sentences, who employ this definition without indicating its source; see Muckle, art. cit., p.6.

3. There is still another group of authors who refer to a definition of truth by Israeli other than the one under consideration; see Muckle, art. cit., p.7.

4. Finally, we have the testimony of Muckle himself. Having carefully inspected three manuscripts of Israeli, Muckle was unable to come across the famed definition of truth. He cites three definitions of truth by Israeli, but finds none which is "the same either in language or meaning to the "classic definition;" Muckle art. cit. p.8.

6. Although Aristotle has provided us with four definitions of truth, they can all be reduced to one definition for in formulating them, Aristotle had only one thing in mind.

7. 1. "And experience seems pretty much like science and art, but really science and art come to men through experience," Metaph., I, 1(981^a2).

2. "So out of sense-perception comes to be what we call memory, and out of frequently-repeated memories of the same thing develops experience..." Post. Anal., II, 19(100^a4).

7. -3. "[The different states of human knowledge] are neither innate in a determinate form, nor developed from other higher states of knowledge, but from sense-perception." Post. Anal., II, 19 (100^a10).

4. "Hence (1) no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, and (2) when the mind is actively aware of anything, it is necessarily aware of it along with an image; for images are like sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter"; De Anima III, 8(432^a6-8).

8. De Anima, III 5(430^a17).

9. De Anima, III, 4(429^b25-25).

10. De Anima, III, 4(430^a5).

11. Ibid., III, 5 (430^a5).

12. Ibid., III, 5 (430^a15).

13. These terms of Aquinas are close in meaning to the corresponding ones used by Aristotle, Aquinas calls one part of the intellect "agent" because it acts on material forms ("phantasms") to produce an intelligible form. By calling the other part of the intellect "possible", Aquinas means that it is in potentiality to becoming all things through knowledge; S. T. I., 79, a. 2&3.

14. "Form" is another term Aquinas uses interchangeably with "species", and in this he is following Aristotle, who gives two alternatives regarding how knowledge could be considered as taking place. "Either a thing is known in its physical being or through its form. He dismisses the former alternative as impossible because "it is not the stone which is present in the soul but its form." De anima, III, 8(432^a30).

15. S. T. I., 85, . 1, s.c.

16. Ibid., I, 14, a.2,c. It should be also noted that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms is not what the possible intellect knows (quod) but that by which it knows or understands (quo). Cf Summa Theologiae I, 85, .2.

17. S. T., I, 85. 1, c. In this passage, interesting enough, Aquinas defines the word "abstraction" in the following manner: "To know universally in a state of abstraction that is, to know a material thing apart from its individuating condition, he says, is not to know falsely. Even though the intellect knows by abstracting the intelligible species from matter it does not do so in such a way as to think that the intelligible species exist apart from matter; see S. T., I, 85, 1, ad. 1.
18. De Anima, III, 5 (430^a15).
19. S. T., I, 85, 1, ad. 4.
20. S. T., I, 84, 6, c. Cf. Disputed Question on Truth, ~~q.~~ 10, 6. ad. 7.
21. Supra, p. 7.
22. De Anima, III, 7(431^b2).
23. Ibid., III, 7(432^a8).
24. S. T., I, 84, 7, c.
25. Ibid., I, 89, 1.c.
26. Ibid., I, 89, I. c.
27. The following people have offered one or more definition of truth, as reported by St. Thomas: Augustine: "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is." De Vera Relig. XXXVI (PL 34, 151.)

27. Augustine: "Truth is a supreme likeness, without any unlikeness, to its source." De Vera Relig. XXXIVI (PL 34, 152).

Hilary: "Truth makes being clear and evident." De Trin., V (PL 10, 131).

Anselm: "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone." De Vera Relig. XI (PL 158, 480).

Avicenna: "The truth of each thing is a property of the being which has been given to it." Metaph., VIII, 6 (100r); S.T., I, 16, I, c.

It seems rather odd for Aquinas not to refer to the Aristotelian definition of truth in this instance, though he does so in the succeeding article where he asks: "Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?"

28. This is how Aquinas illustrates this point. He asks: "Whether Truth Resides only in the intellect?" S.T., I, 16, 1. He answers in the Sed Contra that "the truth true and the false resides not in things, but in the intellect. further, he qualifies his position saying: "... since the true is in the intellect in so far as the intellect is conformed to the thing understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the thing understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it, has some relation to the intellect." loc. cit (Further elaboration of this important point will be offered in the ensuing pages.)

29. S.T., I, 16, 1, c.

30. loc., cit.

31. In the text of the Disputed Question on Truth, 1, 1, Aquinas gives Isaac's definition of truth as "adaequatio rei et intellectus".

31. in the Summa Theologiae, I, 16, 2, he quotes it again but with "rei" and "intellectus" interchanged. Hence forward, is going to adhere to the formulation "adaequatio intellectus et rei"; See, for instance, in the corps of article 2 above, and in S.T.I., 16, 1, c. The reason for this preference seems to be that except in things artistic, our intellect is measured, and does not measure, things; see Disputed Question on truth, 2. Maritain, too, makes the same indiscriminate reference to "adaequatio rei et intellectus" and "adaequatio intellectus et rei"; Maritain, Les degrés du savoir, pp. 169-170.

32. Disputed Question on truth, 1, 2; C 7 S.T.I., 16, 1, ad 3.

33. S.T.I. 16, 1, ad 3. Underlining mine.

34. Disputed Question on Truth, I, 2.

35. Disputed Question on Truth, 1, 2. ^{35a} S.T.I. 16, 2.

36. Disputed Question on Truth, 1, 3.

37. S.T.I., 16, 2. c.

38. Disputed Question on Truth, 1, 3, c.

39. S.T.I., 16, 2, c.

40. Loc. cit.

41. S.T.I. 16, 2, c.

42. Summa Theologiae, loc. cit.

43. S.T.I., 14, 2, ad. 1.
44. Supra, p. 81, note 16.
45. S.T.I., 16, a. 2. C. Underlining added.
46. Supra, p. 79, note 1(3).
47. Supra, p. 81, note 27.
48. Jacques Maritain, Les degrés du savoir, 170, n.1.

CHAPTER THREE

1. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds. Oeuvres de Descartes (Paris, Leopold Cerf, 1897-1910), VI, p. 17. Henceforth the works will be cited as AT...
2. René Descartes, Discours de la Méthode; texte et commentaire par Etienne Gilson (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, J.Vrin, 1947), 103-105. To my knowledge, no one has challenge Gilson on these dates. In fact, they have endorsed by Norman Kamp Smith: see his New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes (London: Mac Millan & Co. Ltd., 1952), P. 4. Charles Adam, too, after years of hesitation, finally opted for the dates given by Gilson. See his Vie de Descartes, Appendix, t. XII, 564-565.
3. Gilson, op. cit., p. 103.
4. Gilson, ^{pp.} 118-119.
5. A.T., II, P. 377, p.378.

6. A.T., IX, p. 194. The text he quotes is that of De Anima, Book III, chap. 13 in reference to the Aristotelian doctrine that the sense of touch is primary, and that all the other senses perceive by touching.

6a. A.T. VI, p. 8.

7. Ibid., p. 8.

8. This is the opinion of Jacques Maritain. He says: "... the only thing he really cherished was his physics-- it was for his physics above all, that he wrote the Méditations, in order to assure the success of mechanism by binding its fate to that of the knowledge of the soul and of God; The Dream of Descartes, trans. Mabelle Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), p. 37. A similar, and in fact, an earlier opinion is held by Gilson in his La Liberté chez Descartes et la Théologie (Paris, 1913), p. 437. Maritain cites this work of Gilson in support of his own contention. Both men base their opinions on Descartes' letter to Mersenne dated January 28, 1641 which reads: " And I must say, between ourselves, that these six Meditations contain the whole foundation of my physics. But please do not mention that; for if you did, these who favour Aristotle would perhaps raise more difficulty in approving them; and I hope that those who read them will little by little become accustomed to my principles and will recognize their truth before perceiving that they destroy those of Aristotle." A.T. III, p. 297-298. But as Maritain reports (op.cit., p. 437), Gilson later watered down his harsh criticism of Descartes in his Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1951), 174-184. As far as I can discern, the modification of Gilson's opinion consists in rescinding the judgement which had impugned Descartes' sincerity: he no longer mentions that Descartes was using religion as a cloak to further his physics.

9. A.T. VI, p. 8.

10. A.T., VI, p. 17.

11. A.T., IX, p. 13.

12. R. Dalbiez, "Les sources scolastiques de la théorie cartésienne de l'être objectif à propos du "Descartes de M. Gilson", Revue de la philosophie, III (1929), p. 465.
13. R. Dalbiez, art. cit. p. 468, 470.
14. Maritain, Les degrés, p. 249, n.1; also his Réflexions sur l'intelligence et sa vie propre (2e éd., Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1926), p. 32, 33.
15. Maritain, Les degrés, p. 177.
16. Vasquez, Commentaria ac Disputationes in primam partem S. Thomae, Lyons, 1631, disp. 50, cap. 6.
17. Jacques Maritain, The Dream of Descartes, p. 145.
18. Ibid., p. 145.
19. F. Suarez, Metaphysicae Disputationes, 31, 12, 40.
20. A.T, IX, p. 233. (I shall not go into Descartes' teaching about the human will.)
21. A.T., IX, p. 182.
22. A.T. IX, p. 5. It is unclear to me why Descartes wants to distinguish between knowledge through clear notions which by implication, cannot be doubted, and knowledge through first causes or principles. Although he makes this distinction, Descartes does not appear very happy with the term "first causes" -- and with good reason, as we shall see below. What others call "first causes" Descartes simply refers to as (true) "principles". It is but seldom that Descartes uses the term "first causes", and whenever he does so, he has quite a different meaning. For him, the sovereign good, considered by the natural reason without the light of faith, is ~~no~~ none other than the knowledge of the truth through its first causes, i.e., the wisdom whose study is philosophy".

A.T., IX, p. 4. Later, Descartes will claim that he can know nothing for certain unless he knows of the existence of a veracious God -- which is to have faith. I do not think that Descartes would be willing to give up this claim in favour of such an isolated teaching on knowledge through the natural reason alone. Therefore, it does not appear that his distinction between knowledge through "clear notions" and through "first causes" is significant. My suggestion is that although Descartes made this distinction, he was not very serious about it. He merely wanted to show that what was designated knowledge through "first causes" was in his estimation, very much wanting, since he almost immediately begins to attack Plato and Aristotle -- two philosophers who investigated knowledge of things through "first causes". Whether or not Descartes would identify his own position with the first way of knowing through "clear notion" is not clear, since his own method of investigating truth is certainly not common, but very extraordinary.

23. A.T. IX, p. 6. Underlining mine.

24. A.T., VI, p. 37.

25. De Anima, III, 8(432^a5).

25a. Supra, P. 23. 25b. A. T., VII, p. 37.

26. A.T., IX, p. 9.

27. A.T., IX, p.8.

28. Ibid., p. 19.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. A.T., P. 8.
2. A.T., VI, p. 31.
3. A.T., IX, p. 26.
4. A.T., IX, p. 14.
5. A.T., IX, p. 126.
6. Ibid, IX, p. 103.
7. A.T., p. 31. According to Gilson, Descartes' doubt was at first analogous to the scepticism of Montaigne. It remained in that state until 1618 when his meeting with Beeckman inspired him to study mathematics and physics. See Gilson's Commentaire, p. 139.
8. A.T. IX, p. 23. Underlining mine. From the underlined words we learn that the proposition "Dubito ergo sum" is equivalent to the cogito- "Cogito, ergo sum."
9. A.T., IX, p. 19.
10. A.T., IX, p. 19.
11. Ibid, p. 31.
12. Supra, p. 88, n. 8.
13. Besides the text of De Libero Arbitrio already referred to, the following are other texts of Augustine employing the cogito argument: De Beata Vita, II, 7; Soliloquia, II, 1, 1; De Trinitate, XV, 12, 21; XIV, 10, 10; X, 10, 14; De Vera Religione, LXXIII.

14.

15. Of the ~~these~~ reasons, the first has already been treated; the third one is yet to be considered; we have no intention of dealing with the second reason.

15a. A.T., IX, p. 134.

16. A.T. IX, p. 135.

17. Ibid., p. 20-21.

18. ~~see~~, Supra, pp. 33.-35.

19. It will be shown further on that the indubitability of the cogito lies in the "performatory" character associated with the word "I".

20. A.T., IX, p. 205.

21. A.T. IX, p. 205-206.

22. Ibid., p. 110.

23. The word "entail" is a metalinguistic term, i.e., it is used in connection with second level discourse. The equivalent of "entail" in object language or second level discourse is the word "imply". The statement that "p" implies "q" is a statement in object language. In order to refer to the relation between "p" and "q", one who would have to say that there is "entailment" between "p" and "q" and this is a metalinguistic statement.

24. S.V. Keeling, Descartes (London, Oxford, University Press, 1934) p. 92.

25a. Norman Malcolm, "Descartes" proof ~~that~~ His Essence is Thinking", Philosophical Review, LXXIV (July, 1965), 334.

25.b Malcolm, art. cit. p. 335. For Descartes, therefore, to deny the proposition "I am not thinking" as self-defeating as to deny the proposition; "I do not exist."

26. A conditional is said to be necessarily true in either of the following cases:

A. If it is self-defeating to deny the consequent.

B. If the negation of the consequent is inconsistent with the antecedent.

27. Jaakko Hintikka, "'Cogito, Ergo Sum' as an Inference and as a Performance," Philosophical Review, LXXII (1963), 487-495.

28. All this leads us to appreciate the fact that "to be true on the level of performance" (of a statement) and "to be true from the self-defeating character of a statement" are akin notions.

29. x and y must take different values. Also, in order to avoid meaningless statements, "myself" should not be substituted for x in (d); the same reason holds for the substitution of "thinking" for y.

30. Malcolm, art. cit., p. 336.

31. Ibid., p. 336.

32. supra, p. 90, n. 26.

33. Ibid.,

34. A.T., VI, p.33. As Descartes himself is going to show later, clear and distinct conceptions in themselves are not enough to establish truth; in addition, one must know that God exist.

35. A.T., IX, p. 44.

36. Underlining mine.

37. A.T., IX, pp. 28-29.

38. A.T., IX, p. 41.

39. Ibid., pp. 205-206.

40. Descartes' insistence to prove the existence of God would be understandable had he taken a view similar to that of most "Christian Philosophers" -- St. Augustine, St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, etc., who held that the existence of God is obscure and needs to be demonstrated. Although the existence of God may be known through the natural reason alone, i.e., reason unaided by faith, these philosophers point out that it is not so apparent and evident to all as to require no demonstration. They back their reason by adducing the fact that not all people are equipped with the necessary mental capacity, a reflexive attitude, and the necessary time to undertake for themselves the proofs of God's existence. Hence, they point out again, the necessity of revelation; and also, one may add, the responsibility on the part of theologians and philosophers to undertake, on behalf of laymen, the demonstration of the existence of God. In spite of their great effort and diligence in presenting reasons for the existence of God, the "Christian Philosophers" insist that the existence of God is rather a gift of faith than a product of rational demonstration, no matter how cogent. Consequently, their attempt to prove the existence of God is less for convincing others than for their own better understanding of what they already know by faith. Such especially is the attitude of St. Anselm in the Preface to his Proslogion; see St. Anselm: Basic Writings, trans. S.N. Dean (2nd edition, La Salle: Open Court Publishing Co., 1962), p.2.

41. A.T., IX, p. 94.

42. The traditional philosophers understood by "effects due to God" the sensible material creation as well as all observable phenomena. By "effects due to God" Descartes means the self and its idea; at least this seems to be his interpretation of Rom. I: 20; see A.T. IX, p.5. It is apparent, therefore, that Descartes' a posteriori proofs cannot, strictly speaking, be designated a posteriori without stretching the original meaning of that term to include ideas, inasmuch as they too can be called creatures; Cf.

E. Gilson and T. Langan, Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant (New York; Random House, 1963), p. 65.

As for Descartes' a priori proof of the existence of God, it follows very faithfully in the footsteps of St. Anselm's proof of the existence of God in the Proslogion, 2. Although the two men argue differently, they have this in common: both assume that "existence is a perfection. The ontological argument based on existence as a predicate or perfection, has been attacked by many critics since the time of Descartes; by Gassendi [E.S. Haldane and G.R. T. Ross, trans. The Philosophical Works of Descartes (corrected edition, New York; Dover Publications, Inc., 1955), p. 186. (This text is missing in the Adam and Tannery's edition of the works of Descartes because the latter did not authorize it for the official edition; cf. A.T., IX, pp. VII-VIII)]; by Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason trans. N. Kemp Smith (London, 1929), p. 505; and among contemporary philosophers, by Norman Malcolm (The Ontological Argument - from St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers, ed. A. Plantinga (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), pp. 138-147. However, Malcolm accepts the Ontological Argument on the ground that the idea of "a being greater than which cannot be conceived" is not self-contradictory; op., cit., p. 157.

43. This proof appears in Meditation V where we find Descartes saying that just as the essence of a triangle is such that its three angles must equal two right angles, of that the essence of a mountain is such that it cannot be conceived as not containing a valley, so also the essence of God is such that He must exist. The reason Descartes gives for this claim is that "it is not within my power to think of God without existence (that is, of a supremely perfect Being devoid of a supreme perfection)...." A.T., IX, p. 53. Though Descartes still claims that he conceives the idea of God very clearly and distinctly (A.T., IX, p. 52), the criterion of truth as previously established does not seem to play much of a role in this proof. Rather, the existence of God is arrived at by consideration of His nature (A.T., IX, p. 129). For as Descartes himself acknowledges, "it is not easy to arrive at such clearness of mind (A.T., IX, p. 129). In my view, the significance of the a priori proof of the existence

of God in the Fifth Meditation lies in its prejudicing the criterion of truth. If something can be known without being clearly and distinctly perceived, what confidence can we still retain in clear and distinct ideas as the criterion of truth?

44. One of these proofs establishes the existence of God from the fact that the self, in order to doubt or think, must live from moment to moment, requires a cause for its conservation -- a cause no less perfect than the one which brought it into being in the first place. This cause, Descartes concludes, is none other than God (A.T., IX, p. 40.).

In the second proof Descartes demonstrates the existence of God from the idea of perfection. From the fact that the self doubts, that it has ideas of many perfections lacking to it, it follows that it is imperfect. The imperfection of the self leads Descartes to conclude that there exists a being in whom nothing is lacking, i.e., a Perfect Being, and this is God (A.T. IX, p. 38). This proof, like the succeeding one, bases the proof for the existence of God on the content of an idea, a particular idea -- that of perfection. Following Descartes (Discourse IV; A.T. VI, p. 34), I am treating it separately, because it does not emphasize the "objective reality" of an idea, though it implies that kind of reality.

45. For the definition of this term, see page 94, n. 55.

46. Phaedo, p. 79A.

47. Phaedo, p. 100D. For example, it is by participating in beauty in itself that a flower becomes beautiful; and by participating in the same beauty our intellect comes to understand a beautiful flower.

48. Timaeus, p. 29A.

49. Augustine, Libero 83, Quaestiones, q. 46 (PL 40, 30).

50. S. T. I, 15, 3.

50. a. S. T., I, 15, 3, c.
51. Augustine, Libero 83 Quaestiones, q. 46 (PL 40, 29).
52. A.T., IX, p. 81.
53. Ibid., p. 124.
54. Ibid., p. 141.
55. By the "objective reality" of an idea Descartes means "that in respect of which the thing represented in the idea is an entity, in so far as that exists in the idea...." (A.T., IX, p. 124). For the origin and controversy surrounding this term, see supra pp. seq.
56. A.T., IX, ps 29.
57. A.T., IX, pp. 31-32.
58. Ibid., p. 29.
59. A.T., IX, p. 31.
60. Ibid., p. 31.
61. Ibid., p. 30.
62. Ibid., p. 41.
63. Ibid., p. 33.
64. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
65. Ibid., p. 35.
66. Ibid., p. 41.

67. A.T., p. 33.

68. Ibid., p. 36.

69. S.T., I, 2, 3.

70. A. T., IX, p. 76. As we may recall (p93, n44), Descartes had already proved the existence of God by taking this "less devious course". That he also proved the existence of God from His idea is a mark of his (Descartes') genius and versatility. It seems odd that Cateraus was speaking as though he was unaware of that other cartesian proof.

71. A.T., IX, p. 41.

72. Ibid., p. 36.

73. Ibid., p. 90. Underlining mine.

74. Cf. A.T., IX, p. 28, where Descartes lays down the condition that only those things he perceives "very clearly and very distinctly are true."

75, Supra, p. 46.

76. A.T., IX, pp. 98-99.

77. Ibid., IX, p. 110. Underlining in the text.

78. Ibid., IX, p. 56. Underlining mine.

79. ~~I ignore this note.~~

80. supra, p. 46.

81. I contend that so long as Descartes remains ambiguous concerning the respective rules of the cogito,

the clear and distinct ideas and the existence of God, he will scarcely escape the charge of circular reasoning.

82. A.T. IX, p. 56. Underlining mine.

83. Marthinus Versfeld, *An Essay on the Metaphysics of Descartes* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1940), pp. 38-56. For some of the others, see especially Harry Frankfurt, "Memory and the Cartesian Circle," Philosophical Review, LXXI, 504-511; Lynn Rose, "The Cartesian Circle," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXVI (September, 1965), 80-89.

84. Versfeld, op. cit., p. 51.

85. A.T., IX, p. 10.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. I call any position critical which sets rules and limits not only to the instruments it employs in its work but also to its object of investigation. In Descartes, critique is apparent in his criterion of truth through clear and distinct ideas. The ideas whose origin is the senses, being confused and obscure, are automatically ruled out by Descartes' criterion of truth. In a very a priori fashion, therefore, Descartes excludes the senses from the sphere of knowledge. I am not at all claiming that in Descartes the critique is as conscious and explicit as it is in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, but it may well be that the latter took its roots from Descartes' somewhat rudimentary critique.

2. Cf. Maritain, Les degrés, p. 170, n.1.

3. This process may sound oversimplified. It is no more than a theory devised for the sake of pedagogy; for in actual life, the sense and intellectual types of knowledge must be conceived to be simultaneous.

4. Supra, p. 81, n. 14.

5. The word "intention" is synonymous with the word "form" (Aristotle) and the word "species" (Aquinas). Aquinas uses the word "intention" in regard to sense knowledge saying that "for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensible organ;" S.T., I, 78, 3.c. Although, according to Hayen, L'Intentionnelle selon saint Thomas (2e éd., Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1954), p. 50, St. Thomas does not speak authoritatively on the subject of intentionality, the word "intention" must be applied with even more potent reason to intellectual knowledge. Thomists, e.g., Maritain, characterize the existence of a thing in the mind or as known as "intentional existence"; Les degrés, pp. 221fff.

6. Maritain, Les degrés, pp. 219-220. Underlining mine.

7. A.T., VI, p. 40. Underlining mine.

8. Ibid., IX, p. 40.

9. Ibid., IX, 30. In this citation, Descartes does not specifically mention, but only implies, that the idea of God, being innate, is absolutely true. Elsewhere, however, he specifically and unequivocally says so; see A.T., IX, pp. 209-210.

10. A.T., IX, p. 30.

11. Ibid., p. 30.

12. A.T., IX, p. 33 .

13. Ibid., p. 33.

14. Ibid., IX, p. 33.

15. A.T., IX, p. 24. Underlining mine.
16. George Berkeley, A New Theory of Vision and Other Essays (New York: Everyman's Library, 1963), pp. 114-115.
17. Descartes says, in opposition to Aquinas, that he did not follow the latter's method of proving the existence of God from sensible things, because according to him (Descartes), "the existence of God is much more evident than that of any sensible things;" A.T., IX, p. 85; cf. Ibid., p. 5.
18. A.T., IX, p. 82. Underlining added.
19. ibid., p. 82.
20. A.T., IX, p. 33. Underlining added.
21. S.T., I, 85, 1, ad.1. The two modes of existence could not be termed the same unless analogically, as G. B. Phelan, "Verum Sequitur Esse Rerum", Mediaeval Studies, vol. I (1939), 17 puts it: "The object is analogically the same as the thing: it is the thing as it is objectified, i.e., made an object of knowledge."
22. On Being and Essence, trans. A. Maurer (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), p. 40
23. S.T., I, 85, 1, ob. 1.
24. Ibid., ad. 1.
25. Maritain, Les degrés , p. 229.
26. I am not at all implying that we ought not to do this. However, I maintain that it is one thing to be aware of the fact of God's existence and another to