

**International Non-Governmental Organizations and the Business of Development:
An examination of the Third-Sector's Programming Value in Zambia**

Glenn R. Shaw

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Masters of Arts in
International Development Studies

Saint Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia

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Abstract

“International Non-Governmental Organizations and the Business of Development: An examination of the Third-Sector’s Programming Value in Zambia”

By Glenn R. Shaw

Numerous researchers have suggested that international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) remain inherently valuable to human development programming, yet some theorists express real concerns about many organizations’ developmental usefulness. Guided by the hypothesis that INGOs do add value to development initiatives, but at a potential cost to their own autonomy, this study evaluates the donor/INGO relationship in Zambia between the Swedish development agency SIDA and their partner Diakona, as well as the comparable relationship between USAID and their respective partner PACT.

The study further inquires how development programming might be transformed or revised as a result of these relationships, and notes differences which exist between the donor’s behaviour when dealing with INGOs, and whether these differences make for a more successful programming environment. Ultimately, the study finds that INGOs indeed add value, but can be, at times, influenced or even detrimental to development initiatives if not appropriately managed.

May 06, 2009

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Please excuse any omissions however, and trust that it was not due to minimal assistance offered, but rather time that has minimized my powers of recollection. Rest assured, if you do remember me, than it is well likely that I indeed stand upon your shoulders.

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Chapter I
Introduction & Methodology

“I have owed you this letter for a very long time -but my fingers have avoided the pencil as though it were an old and poisoned tool.”

– John Steinbeck, Letter to his literary agent, found on his desk after his death in 1968

“He who wished to secure the good of others, has already secured his own”. - Confucius

Introduction

Billions of dollars in western resources are spent on international development initiatives every year. These initiatives target developing countries in order to assist in improving living standards. However, a widely shared perception exists that since development programming first began in 1949 living conditions have failed to improve for many throughout the developing world. Heavily criticised in the 1970s for this failure to improve the quality of life in the third world, donors began looking for alternative means to implement their development initiatives. One such method was the utilization of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) to assist in design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects and programs. This has created what could now be fairly described as a ‘development industry.’

Considering this industry and its perceived disappointments over the last 60 years the question arises whether the delivery of development aid is more effective when donors utilize INGOs. Given the current modes of resource distribution, choices for partnership, and established methods of implementation within the industry numerous arguments exist in support of the donor-INGO partnership. It is suggested that INGOs better reflect the perspective of the poor on the ground in contrast to large western governmental agencies. INGOs are also thought to be far more flexible in their programming and not as prone to corruption and incompetence as third-world governmental partners. INGOs are also a step away from the public scrutiny that often

intimidates western bureaucrats. Further, INGOs are utilized as an easy way to outsource large sums of cash directly to programmes that include the poor. Together these arguments suggest that without a significant INGO presence many donors would become overwhelmed by their own internal bureaucracy, host governments would fail in their capacity to deliver services and issues of corruption and accountability would dominate programming to the point of collapse. These arguments suggest that INGOs add value to donor programmes. But other analysts have expressed concern about the potential loss of autonomy that may arise from the dependence of INGOs on donors.

To explore this tension the study evaluated the donor/INGO relationship in Zambia between the Swedish development agency SIDA and their INGO partner Diakona, and the relationship between USAID and the INGO PACT. The study asked how development programming has been transformed or revised as a result of the relationships that exist between donors and INGOs. The study also asked whether noteworthy differences existed between USAID and SIDA's behaviour when dealing with INGOs, and if so, whether these differences made for a more successful programming environment.

USAID and SIDA are both large donors in Zambia; both regularly pursue programming through INGOs globally; but these donors hold conflicting reputations internationally. USAID disburses more development resources than any other organization globally, yet its legitimacy and motivations have frequently been a topic of debate and criticism. SIDA on the other hand is regularly perceived as a beacon of altruism but has been critiqued for its implementation practices. Ultimately, both

organizations have been criticized for failing to achieve real change in the lives of their beneficiaries.

The choice of Zambia has been a strategic one. Zambia is one of the poorest countries globally and continues to experience serious developmental challenges. Yet Zambia has not had a significant conflict in modern history, is rich in natural resources and agricultural potential, and has received more development dollars per capita than almost any other nation in history. Despite this, the south-central African country holds one of the world's lowest life-expectancies; one of the highest HIV prevalence rates globally; one of the highest infant and child mortality rates, and is home to 1.3 million orphans in a country of only 11.4 million people. Zambia must therefore be seen as one of development's most puzzling quandaries, and as such, is an excellent petri dish in which to examine the effect of INGOs on development initiatives.

Guided by the hypothesis that INGOs add value to development programming but potentially at a cost to their own autonomy, a literature review was conducted to gather data on what theoretical and empirical experience has been revealed about the use of INGOs in development initiatives. Secondly, SIDA and USAID history and policy materials orienting their work with INGOs was examined. Thirdly, interviews were carried out with senior and junior programme officers working for the USAID and SIDA Zambian field offices, as well as with programme officers from PACT and Diakonia Zambia. The governance and democratisation sector was selected as the focal point for the personnel, programmes and materials reviewed.

Chapter 2 reviews the literature. Chapter 3 introduces the development context in Zambia and the work of USAID and SIDA there. Data from the interviews are reviewed

and compared in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes that the cases examined support the hypothesis that INGOs do provide programming value to donors but do so at a cost to their own autonomy.

Chapter II
Literature Review

What are international non-governmental organizations?

This section reviews theoretical and empirical literature about INGOs, donors, and their mutual relationships' concerning development programming initiatives. By identifying the numerous theoretical positions which examine INGOs and donors, and providing a range of suppositions on the roles, activities and value of donor/INGO partnerships, a baseline of existing thought on these organizations is provided.

The emergence of INGOs

INGOs can be defined as organizations which exist somewhere in the relationship space between 'beneficiary' countries in the 'south', and donor agencies in the 'North.' For this study, INGOs are defined as northern-based NGOs which actively implement development programmes in underdeveloped countries. Why should northern-based NGOs be examined separately? According to the literature, INGOs retain several distinct characteristics from their southern sisters (Tvedt 1998).

Firstly, INGOs and their personnel generally hold a distinct face amongst marginalized groups in developing countries. In short, INGO staff have had access to more education and are often from wealthier backgrounds. This disparity adorns them with the implication of greater access to resources and political power, and these differences must undoubtedly affect the manner in which they implement their programs (Alger 1990; Werker and Ahmed, 2007.)

Secondly, INGOs are not historically embedded within the indigenous tribal, ethnic or political environments of the beneficiary populations they serve¹ and are

¹ While INGOs are often in fact linked tribally, ethnically or politically to the environment they work in, i.e. through relationships with local gate keepers; central government agreements; or even their home

generally given more leeway by tribal, ethnic or political powers *within* the state. For example, while operating in an ethnically tense environment such as Rwanda, an international NGO will often not carry the same baggage as a tribally connected local counterpart. If the INGO holds no direct tribal or ethnic links within the region it will not be directly party to any troublesome history² (Candler 2000; Tripp 2001).

Thirdly, INGOs at times hold extensive political power within home donor states and so hold the potential to exercise political influence over selected donors (Raustiala 1997; Streeten 1997; Olsen, Høyen & Carstensen 2003; Zinnes and Bell 2003).

Finally, some of the largest INGOs have global budgets which may be equal to or greater than many smaller donor agencies, and are thus attractive to governments of beneficiary states (Robinson 1989; Alger 1990; Postma 1994; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Friedman, Hochstetler & Clark 2001; Friedman, et al. 2001; Mundy & Murphy 2001). Ultimately, INGOs do exist and operate as separate entities from beneficiaries, the private sector, donors and local NGOs, and so can be evaluated as a distinct entity

The historical reputation of INGOs

Consistent in the literature is the notion that donors use INGOs on the basis of reputation. What is the evolution of this reputation? The following are very brief components of INGO's reputation based on organizational history for better or worse, and how past trajectories have affected their current standings.

country's foreign policies, it should be fair to state that they are generally linked in very dissimilar manners than their southern cousins who of course have lineages, indigenous politics and varying levels of status in their native country.

² This argument does not however, encompass the potential of an INGO being perceived differently due to beneficiaries' external perspective on the organization's political, cultural or political origins. Such as an American NGO working in Rwanda.

One critical issue for INGOs is that of frequently displaying disappointing results. As many projects and programmes have achieved few tangible goals over the last 30 years, a growing disillusionment in the development industry as a whole has been fostered (Postma, 1994). Ultimately, economies or quality of life have simply not improved in most underdeveloped countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, most African states' development indicators have dropped to catastrophic levels since the 1970s which has only aggravated criticisms of development programming.

Yet despite a perceived history of underachievement, some theorists place large significance on the grassroots origins of INGOs who are seen to be motivated out of genuine concern for the global human condition (Alger, 1990). The births, histories and organizational behaviours of organisations such as the International Red Cross Committee (IRCC), Medecines Sans Frontieres (MSF) or Oxfam suggest that there is reasonable truth in the idea of a benevolent development industry (Terry, 2002). While these organizations are certainly not above critique, each has frequently shown itself to pursue the betterment of humanity and be motivated by intentions of 'doing good.'

Subsequently, INGOs have been seen as offering a 'comparative advantage' to development programming because they have traditionally been able to deliver 'added value' that other agents could not or do not. Some theorists argue that the growth of INGOs is due to this usefulness in meeting need and that perhaps INGOs do serve a very real purpose in development with their own growth being proof of this (Sanyal, 1997; Brinkerhoff J. 2003; Werker and Ahmed, 2007).

So the evolution of INGOs is complex and no simple labels or equations may be applied. Nonetheless, patterns do exist. Accepting that INGOs began as benevolent

grassroots organisations who fill gaps which donors and governments could not is a primary concept. And understanding that a murky history of accusation and complicity also accompanies INGOs is pragmatic. All of the above provide the necessary background and caveats to the following sections on INGO characteristics.

Arguments for the use of INGOs

Currently, development research and theory continues to grapple with a perceived 'crises in development' and questions persist concerning issues of accountability, sustainability or what exactly the means and ends of international development might be (Esman 1980; McAuslan 1996; Martinussen 1997). Do INGOs deliver better development programming? Plausible data exist to suggest that INGOs do.

Perceptions of INGOs, their comparative advantage and implementation value

A common perception is that INGOs exist out of genuine compassion and work for the betterment of the beneficiary populations they serve (Sanyal, 1997; Candler 2000; Fulcher 2000; Brinkerhoff, J. 2003; Werker and Ahmed, 2007). As mentioned previously, INGOs sprang from a tradition of charitable grassroots movements and it is this foundation upon which their reputation for good will is based. Prevalent throughout the literature are numerous theorists, such as Brinkerhoff and Costen, who write about the INGO world as a generally value-laden environment populated with those committed to an agenda of human or environmental betterment:

This new set of actors [INGOs] generally has an agenda that stresses empowerment and people-centred development, which means that the value facet of development management emerges more strongly at the forefront (Brinkerhoff and Costen, 1999: 351).

With the reputation of moral high-ground, INGOs tend to be viewed as trusted partners and as such hold a distinct advantage over other counterparts. These contemporaries include the private sector which is generally viewed as looking only to turn profit; developing country governments which are often perceived as being rife with corruption; or donor agencies who have neither the capacity nor political will to implement projects (Fisher, 1997; Tvedt, 2002). As Raustiala notes, this trusted status places INGOs in an exceptional position as intermediaries who can build bridges between other agents and players:

The central assets with which NGOs bargain are legitimacy, transparency, and transnationalism. An equally important facet of bargaining...is the linkages NGOs create between global and local needs and actors. (Raustiala 1997: 725)

Beyond their grassroots origins and trusted status, INGOs' reputation for genuine goodwill may also correlate directly to their ability to target those most in need. This attribute could be vital to INGOs' survival as even staunch critics of the development industry recognize that an ability to target poor populations is an essential comparative advantage in the industry (Chambers 1983; Gran 1983; Hyden 1986; Fisher 1997; Mequanent 1998; Finkel 2002). For example Riddell grudgingly notes that INGOs are better positioned to reach the poor, at least relative to the organizations which often finance them:

As official aid is, at least initially, provided on a government to government basis, it is not easy for a donor to target its aid directly to specific groups of poor people (or to poor individuals), though some have certainly managed to do so for a proportion of aid disbursed. One preferred and increasingly popular way of reaching the poor is through Non-Governmental Organizations – supporting their projects and programmes. (Riddell, 1999: 320)

Riddell is not alone in his assessment. Many other theorists agree that INGOs perform well as mediators between donors, governments, and frequently hard to reach poor communities – sometimes in an essential capacity. As Jennifer Brinkerhoff documented in her observations of donor interactions in both Pakistan and India, INGOs played a vital role in programming designed to work with difficult to reach cohorts:

Their [INGOs] participation was deemed necessary to project objectives because of their ability to reach into the community and particularly to target groups and regions that can be politically and socially difficult, such as adolescent girls. (J. Brinkerhoff 1999: 110)

In order to better understand how or why the INGO world developed this comparative advantage, it is useful to consider why the use of INGOs came about in the first place. David Korten, in his examination of the professionalized civil society of the 1970s, located considerable flaws in how donor organizations sought to implement resources. Korten found that a major issue for many donors centred around their own inability to design solutions for the poor:

Projects currently in vogue present[ed] difficult problems which remain[ed] to be solved and their solution [was] inhibited by programming procedures better suited to large capital development projects than to people-centred development. (Korten, 1980: 481)

Korten argued that donor organizations simply do not have the systemic organizational capacity to directly target the people they looked to assist and, as a result, began to search for solutions outside of their own institutions. As he illustrates in Table 1, donor organizations are not organizations conducive to working with the poor. Considering the restrictive, bureaucratic limitations of many donor organizations, it is not surprising that anecdotes abound of the NGO world's exceptional capability in accessing

the needy. Consequently, INGOs now have a reputation for being able to target the poor more effectively than donors.

Table 1: Contradictions in foreign assistance programming	
Poverty-focused rural development involves projects which are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small • Administrative and personnel-intensive • Difficult to monitor and inspect • Slow to implement • Not suitable for complex techniques of project appraisal 	Donors remain impelled to prefer projects which are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large • Capital-and import-intensive • Easy to monitor and inspect • Quick to implement • Suitable for social cost-benefit analysis
Source: Korten 1980: 484	

Another feature of INGO programming that suggests a more effective approach to implementation is the advantage of flexibility and innovation in programme design and implementation (Gran 1983; Streeten 1997; Murphy and Mundy 2001; Takao 2001). With one foot planted squarely in the educated, technologically booming developed world and the other fixed firmly in beneficiary communities, INGO personnel are well placed to gauge what might be most needed in programming. All the while being flexible enough to plan, amend, revise, modify, or simply change what they need to, as they need to (Alger 1990). As Murphy and Mundy note, '[INGOs] derive "their legitimacy" from their ability to make demands in terms of collective needs [and] from their innovative capacity to suggest ways to meet these needs' (Murphy and Mundy 2001). This flexibility is a feature which few government agencies could ever hope to replicate, but which they would easily understand as a vital asset for many successful development initiatives.

A fifth critical capability for INGOs is their perceived ability to build capacity amongst target populations – a vital component of sustainable programming (Martinussen, 1995; Finkel, 2002). As western development programming continues on wearily, calls for greater sustainability grow louder with every dollar spent. The realization that programmes which build capacity are essential to the creation of long-term success has not been lost on funding communities. While assessing relationships between northern and southern NGOs in African development, Postma observes the potential for greater accomplishment might largely be located in capacity building exercises:

By strengthening, for example, the assessment capabilities, information systems, and governing structures of national NGOs, their non-national partners could help to assure effective and efficient delivery of goods and services, as well as render more sustainable and permanent the organization itself. Investing in and consolidating organizational systems and structure would make further, future assistance easier to deliver. The benefits of institutional assistance would last longer and permeate more broadly and deeply into the community. And in a north-south partnership, goals and objectives would be co-determined. (Postma, 1994: 448)

So with the reputation of being trusted by beneficiaries, whilst at the same time able to target poorer populations with innovative programming and implementation and the ability to build capacity, it is easy to understand why INGOs are perceived as attractive in the international development environment. As found below, a further appealing characteristic to many donors is that INGOs are often strategically viewed as the lesser of evils while evaluating potential partners.

INGOs – an alternative to habitually inadequate partners

Donor funding is reaching unprecedented heights in its seventh formal decade and yet global development targets such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are in

danger of remaining unmet. Consequently, academics, journalists, and advocates are critical of the fact that many bi-lateral development initiatives regularly fail due to a proliferation of endemic corruption within host governments. If the accusation is true, that donors cannot trust programming solely with host governments, it might also be argued that INGOs value as a development partner are elevated by default. When considering partnership choices – corrupt governments or INGOs - government may simply prove too difficult to manage. And in the world of international development, accusations of corrupt third world governments are abundant (Hammergren, 1999; Alford, 2000; Werker and Ahmed, 2007). For example, as McAuslan found in Kenya, donors have threatened to abandon programmes in the past when faced with associations often viewed more as a liability than a trusted partnership:

If, as is the case in Kenya and Nigeria, corruption has been so institutionalized and “presidentialised” that virtually all aid programmes are infected by it, it may be necessary to wind up the aid programme completely, as the U.S. ambassador to Kenya hinted when she said in a speech that “American money will go elsewhere if corruption is not stemmed in Kenya” or, as Baroness Chalker had indicated, confine it to humanitarian aid administered by NGOs. (McAuslan 1996: 172)

While government corruption remains perhaps the largest inhibitor to bi-lateral work with host governments, it is by no means the only impediment. A number of theorists argue that the crux of the development problem is that many third-world governments simply do not yet have the capacity or political will to facilitate, implement and sustain service delivery projects or programmes en masse (Hammergren, 1999). Subsequently, donors have frequently looked to INGOs for assistance in filling this vacuum, clearly a nod towards INGOs and their capacity. As Postma observes, the frustration of the donor community in seeing programmes regularly fail due to limited

capacity has led to a concerted effort to find alternative partners who can deliver. The most likely partners in these situations are, of course, third sector actors:

Partnership and institutional development, as academic concepts and expressed practices of NGO personnel in Africa, did not reach prominence in a vacuum. The frustrations of working with government agencies and of seeing equipment not being maintained and post-project services dwindle, encouraged greater attention to building stronger southern non-governmental development organizations. (Postma 1994: 448)

Beyond issues of corruption or capacity, a further obstacle is that the fiscal resources developing country governments have for service delivery are often not adequate to run even the most austere of programmes (Brinkerhoff and Costen, 1999). Minuscule tax bases; fluctuating global markets; structural adjustment policies; ever-present conflict; the Cold War; natural disasters and most recently the HIV and AIDS pandemic have created an environment of disparity. This is further exacerbated by the reality that most third-world governments operate on extremely limited resources to begin with. Few governments anywhere would be capable of dealing with all of these challenges. And due to the immense need of many third world countries, the third sector has found a niche in which to thrive (Robinson, 1989; Galvin and Habib, 2003). As Brinkerhoff and Costen note, INGOs have flourished not solely out of a desire to assist, but also because of the genuine need of third world governments:

The global economic and financial trends have brought new actors and new agendas onto the development scene. Predominant among them have been NGOs and civil society groups. As governments have been compelled to try to do more with less, and to cut back on state-supplied goods and services, NGOs have increasingly stepped in to fill the resulting gaps, both on their own and in partnership with the state (Brinkerhoff and Costen 1999; 351)

By delivering services in gap areas, providing much needed relief, or helping to build capacity in a host government itself, INGOs negotiate space for themselves and establish

value. While not always the friendliest of relationships, more than ever, developing country governments partner with INGOs due to a very real need (Raustiala, 1997; Sanyal, 1997; Riddell, 1999). This relationship in itself might very well suggest that if true, INGOs do indeed offer value to development programming.

While programming environments often push governments and INGOs together, donors may also strategically nurture these associations for their own needs. Donors recognize the value of a triangulated relationship, which keep them at arms length from critique. As it may be difficult to directly criticize a donor for their partnering INGO's work, it can be politically advantageous to establish relationships which offer a subtle tool for voicing disapproval or persuasion (Robinson, 1989; Galvin and Habib, 2003). If criticism comes from, or towards, an INGO rather than their donor, the opportunity for diplomatic dialogue is greater.

Finally, it is also the case that donors may view INGOs as a valuable, alternative partner in countries with ineffectual or belligerent governments. Under these circumstances, a donor may use the INGO as a proxy agent for implementing their foreign policy; as an advocate for policy change within a host country; or as a 'counterweight' to an unreceptive government (Robinson, 1989; Fulcher, 2000; Werker and Ahmed, 2007).

When considering the above difficulties of working with some developing country governments, it is not hard to believe that donors might choose INGOs as a more attractive partner. However, INGOs themselves have come under scrutiny and it has been suggested that INGO inclusion in development programming does not always add value to the equation. The following section will examine these arguments.

Arguments against the use of INGOs as agents for development

While the above outlines many INGO positives due both to their own inherent characteristics, as well as what sets them above the traditional development partners of host governments, a great deal of INGO critique exists as well. Truth be told, INGOs have received condemnation for their associations with donors, as well as for their own internal behaviours.

A common critique of the aid industry is that aid is used as a tool for furthering donor country interests. Underlying this critique is the idea that many developing countries are coerced, co-opted or manipulated into acquiescence of western foreign policy agendas and/or trade initiatives through the receipt of aid (Boone, 1996; Mondlane, 1997; Alesina and Weder, 1999; Svensson, 2000; Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007). Extrapolating further, if donors do initiate international development programmes for reasons of self-interest, then the partners they choose to programme with must also come under scrutiny.

An interesting aspect of this behaviour is that the level of self-interest is frequently proportional to the size of the donor. The larger the donor, the more self-interested their programming tends to be. For example, states from the Nordic countries - often referred to as 'small or middle powers' - are reputed to pursue pro-poor development programming free of any national agenda (Schraeder, et al., 1998). As Olson et al. point out, middle power states are often perceived differently than larger counterparts, and are commonly believed to programme for 'recipient needs' rather than self-interest:

Donor interests consist of elements such as (national) security interests, economic interests (for example, trade and investment interests) and wider political interests.

‘Recipient needs’ are related to the economic and social level of development of poor countries. According to the ‘aid-motivation literature’, the allocation of development aid from big donors, such as the US, France, UK and European Union, tends to be motivated by donor interests, whereas small- and middle-sized donors, like the Scandinavian countries, are mainly motivated by the needs of the recipients when they give aid. (Olson, et al., 2003; 113)

Subsequently, INGOs who work with small and middle-sized powers may very well behave differently than those who work with large powers. The design and quality of their programmes may also vary as a result. If large donors do in fact tend to use development aid programmes to promote their geo-political self-interests, it is not difficult to believe that by extension, donors use their INGO partners to pursue the same ends. Equally, if middle and small powers programme out of altruism, it is also not difficult to suppose that they use their INGO partners in this spirit of benevolence. How the consequences of such behaviours affect an INGO’s programming value and effectiveness remains to be seen. Nonetheless, the issues is no doubt an area of consideration while evaluating an INGO’s programming value.

Moving back to the issue of self-interested programming, some theorists suggest that self-interested foreign policy agendas are pursued through circumventive techniques. In order to achieve this, the literature offers two separate approaches. The first, and more direct method, is by channelling funds and support to INGOs who directly participate in subversive activities. In doing this, donors may support organizations, such as INGOs, who then support opposition parties and agitative civil society in order to confront a targeted government (Feldman, 1997; Alford, 2000; Tvedt, 2002). Ultimately, as it is usually not diplomatically appropriate for a donor country to interfere in the political environment of another state, the job may be outsourced to an INGO and their own on-

the-ground partners (O'Brien, 2005). This method unquestionably must affect the value of an INGO's programming.

Another and more complicated method for using aid to promote self-interest is funding INGOs to replace or replicate faltering social services in a third world country encouraged to downsize their own service delivery frameworks. This method applies particularly when structural adjustment programmes are at play (Fulcher, 2000; Takao, 2001; Igoe, 2003), and has implications for the quality and value of an INGO's programming over the long-term. Frequently, only by curtailing service delivery provision in health care, education or other service delivery programmes are many third world governments able to comply with demanding economic adjustment programmes. Afterwards, INGOs are contracted to work as surrogates for state services. The reality is however, that INGOs are actually components of privatization policies which look to scale back third world governmental frameworks, and so render them further dependant (Feldman, 1997). Under these circumstances, even highly effective INGO programmes could be called into question for both their sustainable value and impact on indigenous service delivery (Sanyal, 1997; Van de Walle, 1999; Takao, 2001). As Korten suggests, little substantiation exists that over the long-term INGOs are more effective than counterpart government programmes:

It is frequently suggested that what is needed is more private initiative in attacking the problems which government bureaucracies cannot manage. Though the view is an attractive one, there is little evidence to suggest that, when undertaken on anything approaching the scale required, private voluntary efforts are consistently more effective than those of government. (Korten 1980: 483)

Another condemnation of INGOs directly challenges their stated reputation for bringing added value to development programming, and which relates to donor behaviour

itself. Theorists such as Nicolas van de Walle suggest that INGOs are being utilized to save fiscal resources, as well as to deflect culpability from donors' programming failures. Van de Walle and others intimate that INGOs are frequently not as effective as donors suggest, but it is in the best interest of everyone involved to state otherwise (Hammergren, 1999; Werker and Ahmed, 2007). Van de Walle also notes that the current track record of outsourced programming remains strikingly similar to failures of the past when donors worked to implement programmes directly:

...it has been very tempting for donors to treat NGOs as little more than a cost-effective service provider for their activities in certain sectors. It saves donors money and allows them to avoid addressing implementation activities. In such cases, the similarity with the independent project units of the past is striking and, like them before, it is difficult to see how they can contribute to long-term institution building outside of the state. (Van de Walle, 1999: 348)

Adding to the above is the question of why donors accept INGO programmes as wholesale successes in the first place. This may happen in large part because donors sometimes negotiate INGOs into situations where achievable goals and objectives remain difficult or impossible. Due to the democratic politics of many donor countries, pressures on bureaucrats from both elected officials and taxpayers to fulfill given mandates can be enormous. As these mandates are established in London, Washington, Tokyo and other donor capitals, it is not so hard to believe that the mandates in question are sometimes unattainable. As a result, donor field offices may *need* their sub-contracted partners to appear to succeed – even when they do not, or cannot. These circumstances are aggravated when INGOs themselves do not realize, or choose not to realize, their own programme shortcomings. These circumstances could certainly affect the end value of INGO programming. If honest criticisms of INGO programming are restrained, then how might design or implementation flaws be corrected in the future?

Another critique of how this relationship might affect INGO programming value is that donors sometimes consider INGOs to be a magic solution to all problems (Tendler, 1982; Vivan, 1994). As discussed earlier, INGOs have a reputation for benevolence and close connections to the grassroots. As such, they can be perceived to be the answer to whatever developmental problem exists. This situation can be exacerbated if a donor is in urgent need of successful results. An INGO's solution can be a square plug pushed by a donor into a developmental round holed problem. This phenomenon can most certainly undermine the value an INGO might bring to the development environment. But as Igoe remarks, when donors become persuaded, converted or desperate, INGOs are seen as a panacea, and utilized no matter the outcome:

Vivian (1994) found that donors in Zimbabwe treated local NGOs as a 'magic bullet' that would find its target no matter how poorly fired. Tendler (1982), an insider to the development industry for over thirty years, has written about 'NGO articles of faith' – working assumptions that NGOs are inherently altruistic, autonomous, co-operative, efficient, empowering, participatory, and transparent. (Igoe, 1994: 866)

A further critique of the relationship and its effects on INGO programming lies in the fact that donors are under enormous pressure to disburse large sums of money. In fact, most donor agencies' primary measure of performance lies in their ability to distribute large sums of scandal free resources. In turn, INGOs are also evaluated by their ability to disburse resources. And if donors pressure INGOs to absorb greater sums of money than planned for, INGO personnel can become more engaged in spending than implementing. This situation can most certainly affect an INGO's developmental value (Hammergren, 1999; Van de Walle, 1999).

A final criticism of the donor/INGO engagement is that INGOs can be more accountable to their donors than their beneficiaries (de Waal, 1997; Hammergren, 1999;

Yasuo, 2001). INGOs are usually funded from donor capitals in distant cities and so are generally free to operate in the manner they see fit. As long as they follow the appropriate reporting methods and remain scandal free, donors are often generally satisfied. Furthermore, by employing their own monitoring schemes and managing their donors' fear of political scandal, INGOs have no immediate motivation to be accountable to the populations they work to assist. With minimal supervision, the quality and value of some INGOs' programmes must undoubtedly diminish. As Werker and Ahmed point out, unlike the public or private sectors, accountability for INGO programming is self-imposed and usually left to the INGO itself,

Non-governmental organizations deliver goods and services to a population that provides little feedback on the range or quality of product delivered. Compared to usual market or political settings, beneficiaries have a weakened ability to use market forces to penalize and reward NGOs. Citizens can vote out an incumbent from an office and consumers can choose not to purchase a product from a for-profit provider, but villagers may be hostage to the particular developmental scheme that happens to be funded by the designated local NGO. (Werker and Ahmed, 2007: 8)

Putting aside donor involvement in INGO programming, a number of other issues arise which might call into question the developmental value of INGOs. Firstly, an INGO may act from a politically uninformed vantage point caused by a lack of cultural or political understanding of the society in which they programme. For example, activist or advocacy INGOs may not always promote policy that is pragmatically sound, but rather demand the most egalitarian solutions to problems due to reasons of principle. However, these solutions can also be politically unrealistic and undermine more practical endeavours. Unfortunately, an INGO's programming might very well undermine an area's long-term development (Young, 2001).

Further criticism of INGOs stems from their potential to disrupt local civil society. A powerful INGOs' presence and resources can disturb the organic composition of the civil environment by providing artificial incentives, suggesting artificial desires, and creating an artificial sphere in which organizations could/would otherwise grow differently. By trading funding and access for association and partnership, local groups can be led by INGOs to voice opinions about political or social issues not necessarily in their immediate best interest. Furthermore, pursuit of these issues may draw attention away from more pressing needs, or even stifle southern NGO opportunities including staving off local political attention, poaching human resources or diminishing fundraising capacities (Feldman, 1997; Ohayo, 1999).

To summarize, criticism of the role of the donor/INGO relationship in development programming offers a number of contested issues. One is the belief that aid is often viewed as a tool for furthering donor country interests. Additionally, it is commonly believed that funds are sometimes channelled to INGOs to target unfavoured third world governments by offering support to friendly opposition parties and civil society. Aid can also be provided to INGOs to replace or replicate faltering social services so as to encourage states to downsize their own service delivery. Additionally some theorists critique INGOs on the basis that few have the capacity, resources or political clout to implement the scale of programmes required for substantial, sustainable, state change. INGOs are also sometimes seen as being employed to save fiscal resources for donors, as well as to deflect culpability from programming failures. INGOs have also been attacked for simply not being as effective as donors often suggest. Another significant critique of the INGO/donor relationship is that donors, at times, consider

INGOs to be a magic bullet which can mend all problems. It is suggested within the literature that these circumstances sometimes exist because donors are under enormous pressure to regularly disburse large sums of resources, which can also lead to organizational paralyses within an INGO. Adding to this, INGOs are often accountable only to their donors, rather than their beneficiaries.

From an organizational standpoint INGOs are also called into question from time to time. At the heart of the matter is the potential for an INGO to be acting from a politically uninformed vantage point, often due to a lack of social immersion. Moreover, this involvement in local civil society can disturb the organic civil environment by providing artificial incentives, suggesting artificial desires, and creating an artificial sphere in which organizations could/would otherwise grow. In conclusion, the literature suggests reasons to be optimistic as well as cautious about the developmental value of INGOs.

In the late 1960s Kjell Skjelsbaek made remarkably accurate predictions based on extrapolated INGO growth and paths (Skjelsbaek, 1971). He also predicted that the social capital and favoured status required for INGOs' survival would be traded for an on-the-ground comparative advantage, political knowledge and favours: "Qualitatively, some NGOs feel that they trade information and expertise for the dubious prestige of being on a list of selected consultants" (Skjelsbaek 1971; 437). Skjelsbaek's foretelling speaks to what some theorists have been hypothesising for the last several decades: that INGOs lose autonomy when programming with large donor agencies (Alger 1990; Fisher 1997; Tvedt 2002).

The following chapters examine two INGOs working in the democracy and governance sector in Zambia from these optimistic and critical perspectives. One INGO, PACT, works with USAID and the other, DIAKONIA, with SIDA. USAID and SIDA are two of Zambia's key donors.

Chapter III
Zambian Perspective

Zambia

Zambia is a country rich in copper and cobalt, and has excellent soil and space for agriculture. Unlike five of its eight neighbouring countries, Zambia has remained conflict free and is proudly peaceful. Equally dissimilar to most of its neighbours, Zambia's independence came relatively easily. Even its landlocked position in a region rife with conflict has at times proven to be a relative blessing for the large south central African state of 11.4 million people. As a central hub to the region, Zambia has seen its borders flooded by Angolans, Namibians, Congolese, Mozambicans, and at present, growing multitudes of Zimbabweans.³ What has trailed the refugees however, are enormous measures of international attention as well as the large fiscal disbursements that often follow.

Nonetheless, and despite the above noted advantages, as a least developed country (LDC) Zambia is home to one of the highest rates of poverty globally, with 64 per cent of the population living in destitution as of 2006 (GRZ, Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, 2006). UNDP's Human Development Report additionally notes that although Zambia's Human Development Index (HDI) has risen gradually since 1994, it continues to measure only 0.462 out of a total value of 1, and so was ranked at 165 of 177 countries globally in 2007 (UNICEF, 2007; UNDP, 2007). In fact, Zambia is the *only* country in the world for which the HDI value in 1998 was lower than in 1975.

Reasons for the above are to be found in a myriad of explanations. An early factor in the country's underdevelopment may be located in the capacity of its brain trust after independence. At the time of independence in 1964 Zambia had only 109 university graduates with which to build a functioning government (Tordoff, 1974; Meredith, 2006.)

³ As of December 31, 2007, Zambia continued to host over 120,000 refugees. (UNHCR, 2007)

However, many economists contend that the beginning of Zambia's developmental collapse coincided with President Kaunda's mono-economic dependency on copper in the 1970s. This reliance was wholesale, and so, early in the decade when copper commodities experienced sharp declines, the country was left with few dependable sources of revenue.

From a political-economy perspective it has also been suggested that Zambia was simply not prepared for the radical swing from Kenneth Kaunda's 'Africanist' version of socialism during the 70s and 80s, to the 1991 Presidential-elect, Fredrick Chiluba, and his wholesale shift to a free-market economy through the 1990s. This dramatic shift in economic philosophy thrust radical change onto Zambia's markets, society and people. The period is distinguished by an economic and human development 'bottoming-out' due to the closure of Zambia's parastatals, collapsing governance structures, and exceptionally high rates of inflation (UNCTAD 2005). Undoubtedly the Chiluba years were particularly grueling, also due in large part to the rampant corruption that occurred at this time (Guest 2004). And it was during this period that Zambia's HDI ranking dropped dramatically (see table 2 below). Considering all of the challenges Zambia experienced between 1980 and 2000, it is a wonder the country remained intact as the Zambian Government was dangerously close to collapse. During this difficult phase Zambians received less education, had fewer resources with which to survive, and died younger than ever previously recorded.



Human Development Index trends




Table 2: Zambia's HDI Decline (UNDP Website; 2008)

In 2001 the Presidential administration changed hands for a third time, and began its slow climb towards economic recovery. Sadly though, no evidence exists that the current economic growth and increase in wealth has begun to trickle down. Despite an economy on the rise, most Zambians continue to suffer from extreme poverty.

One explanation for Zambia's continued wealth polarization has been affixed to the country's political structures. Due to power asymmetries in the constitution, Government in Zambia have been cited as a strong example of patrimonialism (Harland, 2008; Guest, 2004.) As the constitution awards the President with extensive administrative powers, he (or she) holds the ability to appoint virtually every position of authority in the country. This includes 65 appointed Members of Parliament, a further 8 nominated Cabinet Ministers, most of the top judiciary, the police, all District

Commissioners, and virtually anyone else of influence in Zambia's Government (Harland, 2008; Muyoyeta 2006; Amnesty International, 2006.) In fact, it is believed that intimates of President Mwanawasa, including family and friends, held up to half of the senior positions in the Zambian Government (Africa Confidential, 2004.)

Significantly complicating the above is the ongoing dilemma of HIV and AIDS which has left Zambia's human resources thoroughly drained, and has further corroded the country's social fabric. With a conservatively estimated HIV prevalence of 14.3 per cent (GRZ, Zambia Demographic and Health Survey, Preliminary Report, 2007), a median age of 16 years old; a life expectancy as low as 38 years of age; an under-5 mortality rate of 202 deaths per 1000 live births; and an estimated 1.3 million orphans in a country of 11.4 million, Zambia, like much of southern Africa, has been devastated by the pandemic (UNICEF, 2000). Truth be told the effects of HIV and AIDS have vastly overshadowed any damage done by Zambia's inconsequential Governments, the region's geo-politics, the effect of commodity prices or even colonization. Simply put, the HIV and AIDS pandemic is a living, continuing and sweeping genocide.

Consequentially, as a democratic, private market LDC near the bottom of the HDI, the country has been a primary focus for donor resources. According to journalist, Robert Guest, Zambia is one of the top recipients for development funding globally, per capita, since 1949 (Guest, 2004.) In fact, between 33 per cent and 53 per cent of the national budget was funded through donor contributions through the period of 1996 to 2005 (Harland, 2008.)


Thus, despite a history of peace and an abundance of resources, Zambia remains underdeveloped. It is thus appropriate to ask why foreign aid has achieved so little in

Zambia and in what ways INGOs are implicated in that result? To gain insight a consideration of the efforts of USAID and SIDA and their INGO partner organizations in Zambia are examined based on their policy and programming literature.

Donor Reputations, Donor Cultures

One of the most noteworthy characteristics of SIDA and USAID is that they are globally significant donors, with development funding from the U.S. being the largest in terms of total sums of resources allocated, and Sweden ranked seventh (in terms of countries) globally for funds disbursed (Easterly and Pfutze, 2008). Both donors have large programmes in the majority of English-speaking Africa, and particularly in Zambia.

Shares of Gross Official Development Assistance in 2004 by Donor



(Easterly and Pfutze, 2008: 11)

However, throughout the literature there exists a considerable normative separation between the two donors when considering how and why they implement development programming. As mentioned above, the U.S. remains the largest donor of ODA, yet Sweden is in fact positioned 2nd (behind Norway) in terms of ODA contributed based on Gross National Income (GNI) percentage of 0.92 earmarked for development

programming. Conversely, the U.S. is ranked much farther below at the 21st position, with only 0.22 per cent of its GNI contributed annually (Padilla and Tomlinson, 2006).⁴ Moreover, Easterly and Pfutze assert that their research found Sweden to be very high (tied for third place with Norway) in terms of implementing aid effectively, while the United States ranked near the bottom of donor aid effectiveness,

Three types of aid are widely considered to be intrinsically not very effective: tied aid, food aid, and technical assistance...

...The most highly ranked bilateral aid agencies on skipping the ineffective channels are Switzerland, Ireland, and Norway and Sweden (sharing third place), while the lowest ranked are Greece, Australia, and the United States. (Easterly and Pfutze, 2008: 17-18)

The researchers also evaluated the OECD and multi-laterals for 'overall best practices' in delivering aid and placed Sweden reasonably high at the seventh spot but located the U.S. far lower in the sixteenth position,

Ranking of Donor Agencies on Best Practices in Aid

Donor

1. IDA	77%	
2. United Kingdom	72%	
7. Sweden	61%	
16. United States	46%	
21. Canada	44%	(Easterly and Pfutze, 2008: 21)
22. Denmark	44%	
23. Finland	41%	
24. Luxembourg	40%	

In agreement with the above, Dollar and Levin also found Sweden to be a high performing donor in terms of strategic programming, while their data indicates American funding to be much further down the list of 24 bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors. In their research they observe that Sweden ranked near the top in terms of 'poverty selectivity'

⁴ The United Nations has suggested that an appropriate level of ODA would sit at 0.7% of GNI.

policies, with USAID again being located near the bottom for how they deliberately disbursed their funding. The research suggests that American resources earmarked for human development are not always targeted at reducing poverty but rather focus on serving alternative agendas,

There are a number of bilateral donors that appear high up in the rankings for policy and poverty selectivity, such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands. However, some of the large donors in absolute size, such as France and the United States, are not particularly selective in either the policy or poverty dimension. (Dollar and Levin, 2004:14)

Further, Alesina and Weder find Scandinavian countries in general to be more oriented towards less corrupt governments, while American foreign aid interests tend to fixate on particular modes of government. In their findings they state that American funding is most often targeted at countries holding democratic categorizations. They further suggest that this in itself is a foundation for programming rather than consideration of the quality of governance in the country,

Consistently with evidence on other variables Scandinavian donors (the most generous in per capita terms) do reward less corrupt receivers. On the other hand the US appear to favor democracies, but seems to pay no attention whatsoever to quality of government of receiving countries. (Alesina and Weder, 2002: 20)

Finally Roodman, et al., place Sweden's commitment to international aid as third globally, with the United States tied for the thirteenth spot with Ireland. While scoring for aid delivery in particular, Sweden's ranking moves up a notch to fill the second position, with the U.S. falling into a tie for the 18th position (Roodman, et al., 2006)

Although much of the above quantitatively delineates Sweden and the US in terms of the quality and efficiency of their aid delivery, it does not necessarily speak to matters of motivation. Beyond the 'way' in which donors behave, is the more pressing issue of 'why' they choose to behave in the way they do. Again the literature finds that

Sweden, like many small- and middle-sized donors, works from an inclination for benevolence. On the other hand, USAID, like most of the large donors, is generally inclined to work for self-interested motivations.

Schraeder, et al. support this analysis, but also conclude that both countries' motivations are reactions to a half century of Cold War. Interestingly, they attribute the effect of communism on each country's psyche as pivotal in their respective aid behaviours. From the American vantage point, they suggest that foreign aid was utilized as weapon and tool in a global struggle against communism. However, the researchers propose that the Swedish experience, which was also rooted in socialism, grew from a sense of 'commonality' that fostered relationships with which Americans would have been uncomfortable (Schraeder, et al., 1999).

Another rationale for such a dramatic difference in each countries' psychological approach to aid must certainly also be rooted in the culture of their respective countries. Within two strong democracies it is not so hard to believe that domestic culture would inform foreign policy. And as Roodman observes when comparing the two cultures, Swedish private citizens contribute significantly higher individual donations than their American counterparts. Thus, it is implied that Swedes may approve of the act of international aid far more than Americans,

Rich nations are often compared on how much they share their wealth with poorer countries. The Nordics and the Netherlands, it is noted, are the most generous with foreign assistance, while the United States gives among the least aid per unit of gross domestic product. (Roodman, 2006: 2)

Supporting the above, and from a cultural perspective, Birdsall's research indicates that North American tax payers hold less faith in development assistance than populations in Western Europe. Consequentially, the latter's donor agencies tend to be

less open and more secretive about their programming. The author goes on to imply this phenomenon could provide cover for somewhat disingenuous activities. Speaking of North American aid in general (as well as Australia), Birdsall sheds light on how the three cultures unconsciously promote a climate of confidentiality,

Official and private agencies that develop and manage development assistance programs hesitate, with some justification, to advertise the limits of their craft. In the donor countries that finance assistance, suspicion that such assistance is wasted runs high, and exposure of a program's current shortcomings could reduce its future funding. Even if only a cover for lack of generosity, such suspicions are politically important. It is easier to limit than to expand foreign aid budgets, and in the interests of the latter, those who see and work with the urgent needs of people in poor countries have no obvious incentive to invest in long-term evaluation of what they do. (Birdsall, 2005: 11)

Birds of a feather flock together, or so the argument goes. And surreptitious donors may very well beget disreputable partners. Yet, if donors with questionable behaviour subcontract INGO's, this relationship alone does not necessarily indict a partner organization. Moreover, despite whatever behaviours a donor exhibits, either positive or otherwise, this may not necessarily affect an INGO's programmatic value. INGOs are after all, massive organizations with independent administrations who answer to their own autonomous board of governors. Nonetheless, a devious donor legitimizes calls for greater scrutiny and higher suspicions. At the very least a patron's behaviour should imply what is possible from a benefactor.

SIDA's History

In terms of developmental motivations in the literature, a genuine impression exists that SIDA operates from a perspective of benevolence and altruism as discussed previously (Streeten, 1997; Dreher, et al., 2007). Statistically, and alongside its Nordic counterparts,

SIDA is an organization that seemingly programmes generally without concern for its own commercial or geo-political needs. However, when considering the organization's good reputation for sound development programming, some researchers wonder if SIDA's utilization of NGOs is the most effective path to successful implementation. Dreher et al. found throughout their own literature review, and in their own research as well, that despite morale motives and a desire to effect change, Swedish sponsored NGOs do not often achieve their stated long-term programming goals,

“...while typically achieving their “stated and immediate objectives,” the overall development impact of Swedish NGO projects was small, with three of... four country studies even suggesting that NGO projects “did not often reach the poorest.” (Dreher, et al., 2007: 7)

Perhaps one obstacle in achieving long-term, sustainable success in the field can be attributed to organizational behaviour at home. As even the most fluid of organizations can experience difficulties attempting to operationalize programme plans, government bureaucracies may simply be too managerially ‘heavy’ to institute the type of attitudes and approaches required for successful programming. One example of this is found in Cornwall and Pratt's analysis of SIDA, which examines the agency's work to incorporate greater participatory practices. Despite a genuine sincerity to incorporate participatory philosophies, institutionalizing the practice continues to be largely unsuccessful,

Over the course of the 1990s, almost every development organization came to embrace the idea that participation is good for development. For Sida, the ideals that participation represents have deep, enduring roots. Yet, while no-one would disagree that participation is important, internal champions have found institutionalizing participation in Sida an uphill struggle. (Cornwall and Pratt, 2004: 4)

Considering that SIDA has shown real difficulty in facilitating participatory elements into its own institution, it must be wondered how the organization encourages such practices within its partner organizations.

Other SIDA failings surface in examinations of the agency's working relationships with NGOs as well. An example of this is found in an evaluation of their sponsorship of Humanitarian Mine Activities (HMA) programmes. Although the organization demonstrated an ability to remain flexible and innovative, SIDA's own analysis found weakness in other areas. Of particular interest was the finding that partners tended to be weak in terms of coordination efforts and capacity building exercises – characteristics usually considered to be INGO strengths,

Nongovernmental organizations have become the most oft-used implementation channel within mine action. An emerging, albeit less common, channel is that of national governments. A review of the strengths and weaknesses of NGOs and governments as implementation channels suggests that NGOs are particularly strong in their ability to tailor approaches to fit the needs of a given context. NGOs are also noteworthy for their abilities to develop and implement innovative responses and for the manner in which they have sought to institutionalize impact assessment. However, NGOs appear weaker in their ability to coordinate efforts with other humanitarian initiatives and have displayed little capacity to build local organizations with the potential to sustain HMA [Humanitarian Mine Activities] activities after their departure. (SIDA – D, 2006: 3)

Despite the above, SIDA's reputation as a partner is that of being accommodating and easy to work with. According to the literature, the organization is inclined to plan and work *with* partners – drawing upon their partners' experience. This remains a significant difference to the more top-down, American approach of simply hiring NGOs to implement USAID designed initiatives. In contrast to American methods, and as Berg, et al., have documented, SIDA looks to fund NGO programming initiatives on NGO terms, allowing for a potentially higher degree of NGO autonomy,

Sida has been a relatively flexible donor, allowing agencies with which it collaborates considerable freedom to manoeuvre in terms of designing approaches deemed appropriate at a particular time. At an overall level, the reactive position taken by Sida has been constructive in the early stages of HMA, when innovation in terms of trying out new approaches was vital. (Berg, et al., 2006: 69)

Additionally, the literature suggests that SIDA utilizes working relationships with NGOs regularly, and demonstrates genuine commitment to harmonious partnerships. In fact according to Paul Streeten, and perhaps in somewhat exaggeration, SIDA contributes 80 per cent of its aid to NGOs (Streeten, 1997: 207).⁵

One consequence of such a high degree of dependence on NGOs is that these relationships have been criticized for potentially utilizing INGOs as agents of Swedish foreign policy. As SIDA falls under the mandate of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose embassies in fact house SIDA country offices globally, it must be wondered how autonomous the agency can be from the concerns of Foreign Affairs. Although a number of checks and balances are built into the development funding system, Dreher, while citing Riddell, Bebbington and Peck, notes that there is the possibility that NGOs are influenced by their Swedish benefactors,

Arguably, the dependence of many NGOs on government funding shapes the incentives of NGOs in a way that renders them unlikely to become superior donors. In the case of Sweden, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) supports the NGOs' *self-defined* development activities through the so-called NGO window... Various critics suspect that government funding may have as a result that NGOs become "the implementer of the policy agendas" of governments. NGOs may then behave as state agencies so that their aid allocation would no longer be superior in terms of targeting the neediest recipients. (Dreher, et al., 2007: 5)

⁵ While Paul Streeten remains a very well respected academic this figure is controversial. When questioned about the sum, several ex-SIDA personnel – including their former Head of Department for Africa, Lotta Sylwander, found the number hard to accept, but did suggest that the organization does contribute a large sum of resources to NGOs in general. Interview with UNICEF Country Representative, Lotta Sylwander, former Head of Department for Africa, August 4, 2008.

SIDA in Zambia

SIDA's continued general budget support for Zambia in 2008, based on the one-year agreement with the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ), was \$53,341,200 USD (SEK 360 million), excluding staff and administration costs. In addition, Sweden disbursed a further \$2,897,485 USD on behalf of Norway in the agriculture sector, as well as \$17,382,140 USD on behalf of the Netherlands in the health sector. The Swedish agency and embassy combined have a staff of 19 Swedish nationals and 22 locally employed staff. In terms of Governance projects, SIDA will have disbursed \$4,550,346.67 to Zambian good governance and democratization programmes over the 2008 calendar year, and a total of nearly \$46 million US dollars in programming. (SIDA – E, 2008)

Implementing the above noted resources, the international development donor agency focuses on four separate *Country Strategy Goals* in Zambia, with Goal 3 being dedicated to the Democracy and Governance Sector,

Goal 3: Contributing to the promotion of democratic governance and the development of a society in which the state accepts its responsibility to respect, protect and provide all men, women and children with their civil, political, economic and cultural rights; and miscellaneous other crosscutting issues including HIV and AIDS. (SIDA – A, 2008)

For practical guidance on Goal 3, the agency draws its philosophical *raison d'être* from directives rooted in Stockholm, particularly from *Government Bill 2002/03:122: Sweden's Policy for Global Development*, which passed parliament in 2003. The language of Bill 122 remains convergent with SIDA Zambia's Goal 3 when rationalizing the value of the governance and democratization sector and the participation it facilitates. Addressing these issues under *Section 5.4.2 Democracy and Good Governance* Bill 122 notes that,

Further efforts should be made to develop central political principles and procedures for issues such as accountability, participation, transparency and the distribution of power. Forms and mechanisms for the prevention and peaceful resolution of social and political conflicts should be supported and further developed. (SIDA – B, 2003: 24)

Explicitly stated in online public relations material accompanying the Bill is text which directly attributes good governance, democracy and participation as a primary means for greater human development. The material further ties development directly to an assortment of issues including democratic governance; freedom of expression; an impartial judiciary; free elections; tolerance for individuals and groups; access to information; accountability; a well functioning political system; and independent media and active NGOs (SIDA – B, 2003). Interestingly, the text not simply correlates development success in the Scandinavian country with good governance and democracy, but further suggests that Sweden's experiences in government should serve as a model for global development (SIDA – B, 2003).

In line with the above, SIDA's commitment to enhancing governance and democracy in Zambia appears legitimate. Their annual report for 2007 notes that the donor not only worked with civil society for the development of government and democracy in Zambia, but also sought to implement in partnership with the GRZ in sectors including two of the three components of the Government's Public Sector Reform Programme, namely the Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Programme (PEMFA), as well as the Public Service Management Programme (PSM) (SIDA – A, 2008).

The agency's other governance and democratization programme component centers around partnerships which strengthen civil society, another mandate of Bill 122.

Under Section 5.7.2, *Civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)*, the language concerning partnerships with Swedish third sector development agencies is clear in that these relationships should occur. Yet the document remains ambiguous as to what exactly these relationships should accomplish,

There should be increased collaboration with Swedish organizations and popular movements. The role of organizations as international promoters of solidarity and cooperation should be strengthened. (SIDA – B, 2003: 55)

However, the accompanying public relations text does offer tangible reasons why Swedish NGOs are useful in development initiatives. The text suggests a number of comparative advantages which could prove useful but which focus on the public awareness and networking potential of civil society rather than on the explicit stimulation of development,

These organizations are indispensable as lobbyists and formers of public opinion, awareness raisers and public educators. They have played a very significant role when it comes to the general population's willingness to support international development cooperation. Furthermore, many organizations are important actors when it comes to the practical implementation of development programmes either within the framework of development cooperation between Swedish and foreign organizations or because of their long experience in various developing countries...

Public interest in global issues is greater than ever before, especially among young people. Global networks of new social movements are emerging, and are making an ever greater impact on the global agenda by international exchanges of information and worldwide alliances and mobilization. Contacts are made and experiences exchanged. This trend inspires hope for the future. It promotes increased global awareness and understanding, and strengthens international solidarity. (SIDA – B, 2003: 55)

Many of these comparative advantages echo positions identified in the literature review (see Appendix I). These characteristics include *1. INGOs retain a distinct, external face amongst marginalized groups; 2. are very differently linked to the tribal, ethnic or political environments of their beneficiaries, 3. Hold extensive political power within*

home donor states; 8. have an ability to target poor populations; 10. Build capacity amongst target populations; 11. offer a comparative advantage to programming; and, 17. are useful as an advocate for policy change and public education.

In the SIDA Zambia field office, support for INGOs, particularly in the democracy and governance sector, as well as HIV and AIDS, seems to be high. SIDA's *Country strategy for development cooperation in Zambia, January 2003 – December 2007*, notes that while tangible results are difficult to quantify, the donor was satisfied enough with the visible results that it called for further support to the sector,

Although it is more difficult at this stage to draw firm conclusions about programme and project objectives, joint donor support for voter and civic education programmes in the run-up to the 2001 general election is thought to have resulted in increased and broader participation. Swedish support for legal advice centres run by NGOs has also contributed to improved access to legal assistance among the poorer sections of the community. However, if Swedish support is to have a wider, sustainable impact, continued efforts forming part of a well structured, focused programme will be necessary in the coming strategy period. (SIDA – C, 2003: 12)

In Zambia, SIDA works in the governance and democracy sectors with two separate INGOs, Save the Children Sweden, and the Swedish NGO umbrella organization Diakonia. Among many other mandates, Save the Children works as to advocate the GRZ for greater children's social services and realization of rights, particularly in terms of the ratification of the Convention of the Rights of the Child. Diakonia on the other hand, acts as an administrator and conduit for Swedish civil society funding globally, and is the primary supporter for 11 separate Zambian NGOs. Diakonia supported NGOs are locally based and implement democracy and governance programmes from election education to women's rights. While both INGOs were

contacted for the purpose of this study, Save the Children was not able to participate and so Diakonia was selected as a participant by default.

Diakonia

Diakonia is a Swedish-based INGO founded in 1966 which works as an umbrella organization to disburse and administer funds for SIDA in 34 countries globally, with 400 separate local partners. The organization is 10 per cent funded through its constituency which is made up of five separate Christian denominations. The outstanding 90 per cent of the organization's resources are drawn from its partnership with SIDA. The European Union also contributes to the occasional project as well. Due to its significant association with SIDA, Diakonia's organizational concept is to act as an intermediary between the donor and on-the-ground partners throughout the developing world. In collaboration with SIDA, Diakonia works to channel funds, technical know-how, and organizational capacity to southern based-NGOs. Philosophically, Diakonia maintains a self-stated Christian value system, but is also grounded in democratic-socialist theory as evident in their mantra, "*At Diakonia, we believe in life before death.*" (Diakonia – A, 2008) Furthermore, and summing up the organization's developmental philosophy is their mission statement which asserts, "*Diakonia is a Christian development organisation working together with local partners for a sustainable change for the most vulnerable people of the world.*" (Diakonia – A, 2008). In terms of implementation, the INGO works in five separate sectors: democratization; human rights; social and economic justice; gender equality; and peace and reconciliation.

In Zambia, Diakonia has been programming since 2003, and partners with eleven different development organizations, many of which maintain a strong faith-based orientation and include, the Catholic Centre for Justice, Development and Peace (CCJDP); the Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ); CSPR - Society for Poverty Reduction; the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR); the Non Governmental Coordinating Council (NGOCC); the Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD); Women for Change; Young Women's Christian Association Council of Zambia; and, the Zambia National Women's Lobby Group. The organization in Zambia sources contributions from SIDA Headquarters in Stockholm, its own regional and global headquarters, as well as the Swedish Embassy in Lusaka. Diakonia Zambia's staff consists of four Zambians in total.

Concerning Diakonia's developmental perspective in the governance and democratization sector, the organization affirms that education, advocacy and freedom of expression are central to human development. While their website references no empirical data to substantiate their programming philosophies, Diakonia's public relation's language uses strong and clear text leaving no doubt that democratic theory underpins Diakonia's concept of development,

People must have the opportunity to influence their own lives. That requires knowledge and power, but also self-esteem and commitment. Through education and organisation, people suffering from poverty, violence and oppression can put pressure on decision-makers in different levels of the society. (Diakonia – A, 2008)

Additionally, in their *Zambia, 2007, Strategic Plan* (Diakonia – B, 2008) the organization notes it's own added values in the development process, which, among other items, include, a commitment to social justice; equal participation; partnership and networking;

a rights based perspective; and experienced staff. The above characteristics are further detailed in the document and the interpreted text illustrates the following characteristics which coincide with four matrix items found in Appendix I: *6. INGOs frequently exist out of genuine compassion and for the betterment of the beneficiary populations they seek to serve; 7. Trusted partners; 9. Flexibility and innovation; 10. Build capacity amongst target populations; and, 17. As an advocate for policy change within a host country.*

A particularly strong theme within Diakonia literature is that of partnership and association. Diakonia stresses the value of partnership and is plain about their perceived role within development. That is, Diakonia believes its fundamental role is to assist organizations in the developing world do what they feel they need to do, in whatever way they need to be assisted,

We have a living dialogue with our partners. They know what they need on the location or level where they work. It is Diakonia's task to provide that and help them meet their goals. We can contribute with money, but also with capacity building and participation in networks. In short, we want to help our partners with whatever they need to help people to achieve a life in dignity, with justice and security. (Diakonia – A, 2008)

One further, final comparative advantage Diakonia might offer is that of item number *3. Holding extensive political power within home donor states.* With five separate Christian denominations in a principally Christian nation,⁶ the organization no doubt holds lobby power in Sweden. As a result, it is in a unique position for an INGO to lobby the Swedish Government to support and participate in programmes which Diakonia views as important. Due to the above, Diakonia holds political power over one of the largest international development donors in the world. The significance of this

⁶ The Diakonia consortium of Christian denominations includes, The Swedish Alliance Mission; the Baptist Union of Sweden; InterAct; the Methodist Church in Sweden; and, the Mission Covenant Church of Sweden.

implication is that although dependent on SIDA for regular funding, Diakonia maintains ‘lobbyist sway’ in the relationship with its principal patron, and as such may maintain some autonomy in programming decisions.

USAID's History

Reviewing empirical observations of USAID, a number of consistent behavioural patterns persist. Alford points to USAID's record of regularly employing partners – including NGOs – as means for implementing aid interventions. Interestingly, the organization's methodology for programming is, at times, to plan first, and then later facilitate partnership. This approach begs the question of how an INGO might maintain its own developmental philosophies and autonomy while collaborating with a donor who has already designed and blueprinted the programming. (Alford, 2000)

USAID's reputation for independence when designing programmes can be further damaged by American foreign policy which is frequently viewed as an influence that regularly steers development interventions. Due to this, USAID is sometimes perceived as a disingenuous partner, a frequent stigma amongst implementing partners and recipients who interact with the agency. In fact, as a number of countries' experiences with American interventionism have been negative, some recipients have opted to do without – rather than accept the agency's assistance. An example of this exists in the Brazilian women's movement, where greatly needed funding was rejected due to the agency's poor reputation,

Due to the controversial history of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Latin American, many women's groups expressed conflicting feelings about accepting the funding proffered by the agency, which had been made financially responsible for much of the NGO regional preparatory process. This debate became especially heated in the large Brazilian women's movement, where USAID funding was eventually turned down. (Friedman, et al., 2001: 24)

A primary reason for negative reactions to American development programming can be traced directly back to USAID's own global history. During the period from post-World War II, to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the U.S. Government was involved

in numerous geo-political interventions, conflicts or clandestine intercessions. The root of these struggles was a war against Soviet and Chinese sponsored communist revolutions. These skirmishes were global in presence and included the Korean War, the Vietnam War, conflicts throughout Central America and the Caribbean, as well as Afghanistan, Eastern Europe, a variety of countries throughout the African continent, and the mid-East. For many of these interventions, public information on the nation's level of involvement was limited. This was especially pertinent as the U.S. Government often supported interventions or administrations which the American people might not or would not have approved. As a result, it became necessary to utilize creative means in which to deliver assistance. One channel for assistance was through the use of development funds (Easterly, 2006; Schraeder, et al., 1998.)

An indication of the effect the Cold War had on American development funding is apparent in the changes being seen in aid policy since the end of the Cold War. For instance observers, including Easterly, note a shift in the manner of delivery in U.S. development funding, a clear signal that policies have changed,

The US is the only donor with a significant increase in sensitivity to need after the Cold War (IDA actually has a puzzling *decrease* in sensitivity to need after the end of the Cold War), which is plausible since the US was the main Western protagonist in the Cold War and thus most likely to have used aid politically during the Cold War. With the US, the post-Cold War expectations are confirmed, while for IDA and the other donors they are not. (Easterly, 2006: 12)

Nonetheless old habits die hard, and the above should not suggest that U.S. development programming has been completely reformed. Security is still an issue that affects American development initiatives and the resources which follow. For example in 2002, Egypt and Israel accounted for 13 per cent of total US foreign aid disbursements

suggesting that foreign policy still dictates at least a portion of development programming (Canavire, et al., 2005: 30).

Outside issues of security U.S. development aid has also been accused of self-interest from an economic perspective. Tied aid, or the conditions in which aid disbursements are economically bound to American interests, continues to be critiqued. In response, American policy makers have chosen to ignore their detractors and simply stopped reporting information that illuminates the practice (Easterly, 2006).

Another matter concerning American aid initiatives and economic motivations relates to the practice of lobbying. Of interest is how the exercise is used to advocate Congress and Presidential administrations for the sole purpose of utilizing aid interventions to further business interests. Riddell found that aid lobbyists hold powerful sway and indeed use their influence to further American benefit through aid initiatives,

In the United States, in particular, there is a powerful and growing lobby which is arguing that aid should be used exclusively for the purpose of enhancing US trade and investment interests. Thus, the Business Alliance for Economic Development argued recently that aid should be increased by 50 per cent and used to open up markets to US trade and investment, while the Clinton Administration has focused increasingly on providing aid to Africa to achieve aims close to this perspective. (Riddell, 1999: 320)

All of the above points to a broader theoretical issue in American aid programming, the matter of neo-liberal policies and their sometimes zealous promotion. As Fulcher notes, it is neo-liberalism which motivates much of the American global exchange, and which has been regularly imposed internationally,

This movement towards neo-liberal policies has not, however, just happened because of the impact of global economic forces. It has been imposed and steered by national governments, with their particular national interests and ideologies, and the international organizations that represent them. These are dominated by the strongest economies, above all the United States, and are therefore agencies of the most powerful nation-states. (Fulcher, 2000: 530)

And global neo-liberalism is not simply an event which has happened haphazardly. Rather it is an executed series of co-optive and/or coercive policies which have been implemented through programmes facilitated by American agencies including USAID. Some theorists note, including Feldman, that along with the World Bank, USAID has been a primary organization in furthering the cause of neo-liberalism and affecting many developing countries' economic policies. This has occurred through direct manipulation of research, programme design and implementation strategies of USAID (Feldman, 1997)

American aid strategies have also come under scrutiny for poor operationalization methods. Considering USAID's self-stated interests in furthering democracy for example, Elinor Ostrom – a long-time USAID democracy consultant, has voiced strong criticism of the agency. Her main focus of critique is the agency's facilitation of elections and democratic principles in many developing countries. Interestingly though, her critique does not focus on American motivation or ideology, but more precisely on the agency's rather casual methods of simply going through electoral motions whilst attempting to facilitate democracy (Ostrom, 2000; Korten 1980).

Considering all of the agency's baggage, it is difficult to not conclude that USAID and American development initiatives have, periodically, carried a somewhat toxic global presence. Nonetheless, U.S. international development programmes are the largest development resource allocated globally and so it should come as no surprise that the agency is heavily scrutinized and critiqued. With such notable pressures it must be wondered whether capacity exists in the agency to programme for the most appropriate beneficiaries, in the most appropriate locations, and with the most appropriate partners.

USAID and Zambia

USAID initiated work in Zambia in 1977, and now implements in the sectors of Economic Growth – with 20 separate partners in 5 activities; Education – with 4 partners and 6 activities; Population Health and Nutrition – with 14 partners and 7 activities; HIV/AIDS multisectors – with 15 partners and 9 activities; and, Democracy and Governance – with 2 partners and 8 activities. The sum total of USAID's implementation in Zambia is currently 35 different activities, with 55 separate programming partners. In terms of fiscal assistance, USAID's formal request to the Government of the United States of America (USG) for 2008 was a total of over \$320 million USD for disbursements in Zambia.⁷ This assistance included, among other initiatives, direct budget assistance to the GRZ (\$17 million), Child Survival and Health Programmes (\$10 million), and the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (\$290 million). All tolled, the above is a component of a larger initiative which has seen USAID's 2008 fiscal disbursements for Africa grow by 54 per cent, to an estimated \$4.4 billion USD (USAID – B).

According to their website, USAID's Country Strategic Plan for Zambia for 2004-2010 is an approach targeted to help assist Zambian challenges and accelerate growth. Entitled "Prosperity, Hope and Better Health for Zambians," the programme was developed through partnership with the Zambian government, as well as a broad range of private sector and civil society stakeholders. The programme's objectives look to contribute directly to numerous sectors and cross-cutting areas of the government's Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan. These programmes focus on enhancing private sector capacities in agriculture and natural resources, improving primary basic education

⁷ The USG also delivers in assistance in numerous mediums including the Centre for Infectious Disease Control, the State Department, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in Africa, and the U.S. Army

quality, improving the country's health collectively, and holding the Government more accountable. The USAID website further declares that the agency 'plans to ensure gender-sensitive, people-level improvements, and information and communications technology, are incorporated throughout the portfolio.' (USAID – A) However, despite USAID's global commitment to ideological underpinnings of supporting democracy and private markets, it seems that the agency has dramatically scaled back its democracy work in the third world, and is now simply beginning to focus more or less exclusively on facilitating private enterprise. In Zambia alone USAID's democracy and governance sector programming has almost completely shut down due to marginal resources, while the organization's 2009 RFPs are calling for significant private sector development components in virtually all sectors including health.

Thinking of how USAID Zambia conducts its business relationships, the organization's global website outlines the very complicated tendering and selection process with which all field offices comply. The bulk of the agency's work is executed through partnering organizations chosen via competitive procurement processes in line with the USG's generalized procurement policy. As noted previously, implementing activities are designed specifically to achieve assistance objectives laid out in U.S. Assistance Strategies, and only then partners are selected. As noted on the USAID global website, 'Infrequently and under limited circumstances, unsolicited proposals are funded.' (USAID – C). It should be noted that this protocol is a very different approach than a model such as SIDA's, which is more open to unsolicited programming proposals. USAID Zambia, and globally, generally outlines programming goals and objectives well

before engaging with a partner such as an NGO.

PACT Zambia

Pact is a global non-profit corporation founded in 1971. The organization's self-stated mission is to 'build strong communities that allow people to earn a dignified living, engage in self-help initiatives and participate in democratic life.' (PACT – A). The organization is considerable, and presently operates more than 100 programmes in 57 separate countries, with 25 field offices functioning via 800 staff worldwide, all with an estimated budget of \$79,000,000 USD for 2006 alone. These programmes focus mainly on institution strengthening, capacity building for both community and national organizations, and management of funding resources for a long list of international development donors (PACT – B).

PACT's global mission statement affirms that the organization was founded to, 'Help build strong communities that provide people with an opportunity to earn a dignified living, raise healthy families, and participate in democratic life through, 1) strengthening grass-root organizations, coalitions and networks; and, 2) fostering meaningful and quality interaction among all sectors of Zambian society to achieve social, economic and environmental justice.' The organization's vision is to facilitate a 'vibrant nation in which relationships of trust and mutual benefit provide the foundation and inspiration for a dignified and fulfilling life.' PACT's website further states that its own value system strives for, among other characteristics, participation and inclusiveness; a respect for human rights and concern for the marginalized; informality and creative freedom; individual autonomy; to build on existing capacity; accountability

and transparency; and innovation and creativity (PACT – B). A number of these characteristics were found in the literature review to be primary strengths of INGOs.

A second noteworthy feature about PACT is the significant emphasis placed upon facilitating civil society through partnership strengthening work, capacity building trainings, and general assistance exercises,

Pact works through and with a broad range of development actors, including civil society, government and business to maximize impact and lasting change... Pact provides management training, mentoring and grants to local NGOs, community organizations, and faith-based organizations providing essential social services, elevating the voices of grassroots, and networking for greater effectiveness. (PACT – A, 6)

The organization notes that its motivation for working so closely with local civil society is the belief that the third sector is a primary key to building better, responsive and honest governments, ‘Many emerging civil societies are demanding an *end to corruption* and holding governments to standards of accountability, transparency and effectiveness.’ (PACT – B).

Concerning the organization’s Zambian field office, PACT Zambia opened in Lusaka in July, 1998 in order to implement a USAID project focused at strengthening the organizational capacity of selected health, democracy and good governance Zambian NGOs. The project specifically targeted work with the Churches Medical Association of Zambia, CMAZ (now known as CHAZ) to help the organization redefine and streamline its networked services across Zambia, as well as to build financial management capacity necessary for the organization to partner directly with USAID. As a result of PACT’s work with CHAZ, USAID qualified the organization as a local institution and signed a multimillion, multiyear cooperative agreement (Interview: Participant F). It would seem that one of PACT Zambia’s primary tasks (as well as PACT globally) is to function as a

conduit for USAID's funds which are directed at Zambia's grass-roots civil society organizations, as well as building capacity and knowledge of their local partners,

Pact Zambia is a good steward of donor funding with over 8 years of grants management experience... Pact awards grants ranging from \$5,000 to as much as \$25,000... Pact's shared values in partnering include active target audience and stakeholder (including national and local governmental bodies) involvement, building capacity at the grassroots level, strengthening community-based networks, and adding to the body of knowledge on effective responses through continuous learning and ensuring a results-oriented focus. (PACT – C)

Concerning the democracy and governance project discussed for this study, the Parliamentary Reform Project (PRP), a programme funded primarily by USAID was initiated in September, 2004 and scheduled to conclude October, 2009. However, the American Government re-designated Zambia from a 'fragile state' status to 'stabilized' and so terminated its democracy and governance programme funding early in October, 2007. Furthermore, the U.S. Government in fact completely backed out of governance/democracy programmes in 2006 globally. During the span of the project however, the organization had a total of 11 employees working in the field office, with three individuals directly focused on this particular initiative (all Zambian nationals), and four more indirectly working as advising and supporting staff (two of whom were American expatriates).

While the \$6 million (USD) project had numerous facets, its primary role was to support over 30 local NGOs in various methods of advocacy and 'watchdog' capacities, who in turn lobbied for a more balanced and decentralized parliamentary system (Interview: Participant F). The goals and objectives of the project were ambitious and broad, and sought to build governance capacities of the GRZ's ability to operate democratically,

With support from USAID, the National Assembly of Zambia and the Parliamentary Working Group of Donors, Pact serves as the executing agency of the *Parliamentary Reform Project (PRP)*, initiated to make the National Assembly a more accountable, transparent and responsive legislative body. The goal of the PRP is a “REAL Parliament for Zambia”—a Parliament that is: Representative and Responsive, Efficient and Effective, Accountable and Accessible, Legitimate and Linked. (PACT – C)

According to the USAID global website the project was a success and has had a lasting effect in segments of the country. But the website is short on other achievements or goals met,

“The goal is to allow constituents to have increased contact with government and increase the power sharing between Parliament and the people... Because of the success of this pilot project, fifteen new constituency offices will be opened in 2005, providing constituent services to a greater number of people across the country.” (USAID – A)

The above calls into question what exactly the long-term goals and objectives of such a project might have been. Furthermore, little discussion can be found concerning the programme on either PACT’s or USAID’s website, and despite numerous repeated requests to both USAID Zambia and PACT Zambia, no project documentation was forwarded. In fact, one programme officer suggested that this documentation might not yet even be completed. So it is quite likely that neither PACT nor USAID have any real data or substantiated hypothesis on whether their programme met its goals and objectives or not.

Moreover, since the termination of the PRP project, PACT has scaled back its programming, and is no longer participating in democracy/governance work in Zambia, although the organization continues to function in other sectors of Zambian programme delivery (HIV and AIDS). While searching for participants in this study, it was discovered that only one remaining employee of the INGO had participated in the PRP

programme. However, as of February, 2009, this employee had also left the organization, and so no institutional memory of the PRP programme currently exists within PACT Zambia.

Chapter IV

Data

Many of the interview discussions concerning INGO utilization were consistent with the generalizations found in the literature. However, a number of assertions found in the literature and discussed in the six interviews, were found not to apply to the cases of Diakonia/SIDA and PACT/USAID in Zambia.

All the interview participants believed that development could sometimes be used as a tool of foreign policy but none had actual examples to cite. As the Senior SIDA Programme Officer put it when referring to foreign aid's potential for interference, 'Yes, I think so, but I can't elaborate, but I think there are links. That *is* the role of the embassy' (Interview: Participant B, September 19, 2008.) Or, as the Senior USAID Programme Officer noted, 'Of course, it's [foreign interests are] the reason why we're here...Everything we do has 'elements' of self-interest... Not so much on the geo-politics however, if so, we would be putting money into infrastructure, rather than HIV and AIDS" (Interview: Participant D, September 25, 2008).

Another area where no certain conclusions were met was that of INGOs holding political or cultural advantages or disadvantages due to their external, foreign nature. All of the participants in the interviews found that INGOs are sometimes perceived as outsiders. This could be a positive or negative influence in their ability to programme, depending on the many variables at play in each context. As the SIDA Junior Programme Officer noted, 'It's a delicate balance. Sometimes you'll find that being a Zambian works against you. Sometimes you'll find that being an international is advantageous.' (Interview: Participant C, September 22, 2008). All of the participants believed that many INGOs' local approval is often based on a personality variable within each programme, project or organization, and so this factor is not always predictable.

Likewise, all the participants believed that INGOs do have a compassionate side and do exemplify benevolence, but the interviewees also argued that the organizations seek to survive and make a profit of some sort. The USAID Junior Programme Officer summed up the group's general sentiments by saying, 'I suppose so [that INGOs exhibit benevolent qualities], but it's a business. [INGOs] do have the necessary passion and interests, but they do that because they get paid very well.' (Interview: Participant E, October 23, 2008.) The Diakonia participant had similar sentiments and did not hesitate to dispel any myths about INGOs as solely charitable organizations, 'INGOs have a survival instinct as well. At certain times they have to do resource mobilization to continue in this thing as well... Yea, not just the needs of the people...' (Interview: Participant A, September 16, 2008).

Are INGOs being employed to save fiscal resources, or contracted to deflect culpability from developmental programming failures? Although this contention was a minor point, the SIDA discussions focused on how the donor relied on Diakonia to find local working partners, maintain these relationships, and facilitate programme implementation. As the majority of SIDA's on-the-ground programming in democracy and governance is implemented through Diakonia it would be fair to argue that the donor is in fact outsourcing the bulk of this sector's developmental programming in Zambia. SIDA officers also stated explicitly that no SIDA personnel in Zambia had the capacity to function in the manner which Diakonia programme officers did, and that SIDA as an organization no longer maintained these skill sets in their human resources. Fundamentally, the officers wholly agreed that Diakonia was an organization which had been overtly outsourced to do work SIDA personnel had traditionally managed, 'We

hired Diakonia as they have the means and capacity for organization, administration and to channel funds to organizations on the ground – something SIDA could not do.’

(Interview: Participant C).

As they have no internal capacity to implement this sector’s programming in Zambia, SIDA Zambia is clearly reliant on Diakonia for on-the-ground democracy and governance programming. Would SIDA Zambia have been better off maintaining their own implementation personnel? It remains impossible to know this, but as noted in the Contextual Perspectives Chapter (page 36) donors in general have had little success programming in Zambia over the past several decades. According to the SIDA programme officers, the belief is that SIDA is far too centralized and organizationally large to have the sort of impact that Diakonia would have in Zambia, and so the INGO added value to their programming.

INGO advantages

On a pragmatic level, both USAID and SIDA use their partners mainly as third parties to collaborate with government, or as liaisons for working with local partners to funnel resources, negotiate relationships and facilitate implementation. Reflecting on these relationships, both donor and INGO interview participants noted numerous advantages for development programming. The most significant of these advantages stemmed from their partner INGOs’ efficient and effective business practices which manifested as the organization being transparent; having trustworthy reporting standards; faster responses to changing requirements; a global network of specialists to call upon; technical ‘know how’; and other useful business practices.

From their perspective, both SIDA programme officers indicated that it is these business practices which inspire trust and reliance in partner organizations such as Diakonia. They noted that SIDA places significant weight on the ability of Diakonia to operate in an efficient business-like manner, and the officers made clear that this characteristic was the primary advantage of the relationship, ‘We look for organizations that have good experience in the developing world, as well as evaluating their management structures – ensuring that they are workable. We look for organizations that have more linkages/access to resources, networking and technical knowledge in comparison to a local organization’ (Interview: Participant C). The senior SIDA officer expressed similar views in terms of reasons for the donor’s dependence on their working partner,

Professionalism! They can offer good technical expertise and capacity not found within SIDA. They offer an ability to network internationally. They often hold alternative access to information that an embassy might not have – as well as the ability to express that information... The reporting is professional in INGOs... (Interview: Participant B)

The USAID/PACT participants also strongly agreed with the theme of professionalism. In fact, and according to the senior USAID programme officer, not only was this professionalism seen as desirable, it often left INGOs as the only clear alternative for many of USAID’s development programmes when considering choices against other options, such as local organizations,

Every time we put funding into a small, local NGO... Everything about them seems to be right, and you put funds into them, I mean even a small amount, and you tell them: if you can manage this well, there is more coming... Within six months, you’re not getting financial reports, and you don’t know where the money is. It’s been mixed with other money here and there, and your auditors are saying, ‘why did you do that? (Interview: Participant D)

So it would seem that the literature's claim of INGOs being a trusted partner is valid for these cases, but perhaps not in the original intended manner. Within the literature it is implied that INGOs are trusted because of their work with beneficiaries and at the grassroots level. In the interviews however, trust was ascribed to strong business practices such as reporting capabilities and reliable fiscal procedures. A very different scope of trust then hypothesized, but obviously also important.

Certainly the USAID participants believed that INGOs frequently have proven to be more transparent and accountable than host governments; invest far more into their infrastructure than local NGOs, who have little capacity to report as donors require; implement projects which the private sector do not execute; and also hold capabilities that donors such as USAID (and most others), simply cannot have due to a lack of bureaucratic capacities, will or expertise.

So INGOs have indeed created a niche for themselves. And INGOs are trusted partners. However, as expressed in all of the interviews, this trust is mainly due to their levels of professionalism, financial reporting capabilities, international expertise and reputation, rather than an efficiency or capability for working with the poor. In fact, and according to the participants, as far as trust on the ground is concerned, INGOs frequently have limited exposure to working directly with beneficiaries, and a limited understanding of the cultures in which they programme.

Another area where the participants found INGOs to have programmatic strengths concerned their relationship to the host government – the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ). In fact, nearly unanimous agreement existed when reflecting on these matters. For example, when discussing the concept of whether INGOs and governments

had need for each other in general, the junior USAID Programme Officer stated, 'I think so, because Government really can't be everywhere and do everything, so why should Government fight this...?' (Interview: Participant E). The SIDA counterpart supported the opinion, 'I agree [that government and INGOs need each other], there are certain things that make INGOs in the best position to advise the GRZ.' (Interview: Participant C). Although also in agreement, the senior USAID programme officer did offer a caveat to the supposition, suggesting that in spite of the symbiosis, this may not be the most beneficial of arrangements for long-term sustainability, 'Yes, of course [INGOs and government get along well]... But the fact that we think about them [INGOs] as a permanent presence here is a fatal flaw in our perceptions.' (Interview: Participant D).

The participants also agreed that the INGO/donor relationship was useful as a strategy as it combined organizational synergies, and was mutually beneficial. For instance, all three SIDA participants felt that the two organizations shared programmatic benefits from the relationship which often centered around a willingness to share vital information about the Zambian programming environment and about GRZ behaviours in particular. As the junior SIDA programming officer put it, 'We realize that NGOs can access government ministries in a way we cannot, so we support NGOs to work with governments. We do try to support these relationships, it is one of our main dialogue issues.' (Interview: Participant C). What was particularly meaningful about this collaboration is that the participants stated that information was equally exchanged on a mutual basis and so the organizations teamed well to expand their understanding of the programming environment and the GRZ's actions.

Similarly, whilst speaking to the relationship between USAID and PACT, the respective participants generally agreed that the two organizations often partnered well, especially while working with government. Again, a major reason for this was the regular trade of various levels of information to gain strategic programmatic advantages. The senior USAID officer even suggested that facilitating INGOs to work with government was a significant component of his job as, and in his opinion, the donor is simply a medium for the two with funds to assist, ‘The sharing of information between the two organizations was a source of advantage, it was not unusual for either the USAID or PACT Officers to pick up the phone and exchange notes.’ (Interview: Participant D).

Another useful insight from the interviews was that the donors placed weight on INGOs business practices due to a need for an alternative to government and local NGOs – for reasons of corruption. Interestingly however, while most of the participants suggested that INGOs were valued because government and local partners were often too corrupt to responsibly manage SIDA’s disbursed funds, the junior SIDA programme officer intimated that INGOs could be equally as corrupt, but were simply easier to monitor due to their strong business practices. According to this participant, the important difference is that INGOs’ greatest value to donors as partners is the financial transparency they offer – not their trustworthiness, a subtle but significantly differing point of view. ‘Within the GRZ there are a lot of politics involved and corruption yes. It is much easier to follow up on [corruption] with an INGO than government as higher levels of transparency are prevalent. However, we do realize that corruption can happen anywhere.’ (Interview: Participant C).

In terms of viewing INGOs as a suitable alternative to government, disagreement was found between some participants on whether host governments themselves lacked the capacity to programme for results, or that the concept of results are just not on the GRZ's radar in the first place. As the PACT participant noted, 'No I wouldn't say the Government doesn't have the capacity. The NGO works on targets, it has a project and the project has an end. Of course there are projects in which the Government also has an end, but that culture of the Government is not there.' (Interview: Participant F, November 6, 2008). Whichever is true (undoubtedly a mix of both), it was generally agreed that INGOs do programme for, and generally produce better expected results than Government, and so add value to developmental programming in their own way. Nevertheless, all of the participants interviewed considered INGOs unsustainable and only short-term solutions to very long-term problems. Due to these issues of sustainability, and in contrast with the literature, the participants felt that development INGOs existence is paradoxical (as opposed to emergency oriented INGOs). Nonetheless, the participants thought that donors prefer INGOs as alternative partners to Government because of corruption and incompetence issues. Governments are still viewed as the long-term solution to enhanced development in the third world.

Finally was the matter of INGOs being programmatically valuable as advocates for policy change in the country. Critical to this was the unanimous assertion that civil society was vital to creating a better government, and that civil society can do things that neither Government nor a donor agency has the mandate, legitimacy or political capability to do. The SIDA/Diakonia participants all expressed the belief that without an agent for facilitation, in this case Diakonia, Zambian civil society would most likely

remain stifled or languishing at best. Consequently, the conviction existed amongst the participants that the INGO added value to SIDA's development programming and to the Zambian political environment in general.

However, when speaking to INGOs capacity as advocates in Zambia, the USAID participants did not agree. The senior USAID officer felt there was a direct conflict of interest in contracting an INGO to advocate for change within a country – as that organization also requires governmental approval for implementation – as do all USAID partners in Zambia. However, the junior programme officer noted that, because of flaws within Zambian democracy's evolution, Governmental opposition is frequently conducted solely by civil society and NGOs, who are 'more effective in holding Government accountable than the official opposition.' (Interview: Participant E). Complicating this further are the comments of the PACT programme officer who noted that INGOs actually sub-contract and train local NGOs to 'pick up the ball and carry' advocacy programmes (Interview: Participant F).

Nonetheless, all of the participants agreed that at times, donors utilize INGOs as an interface for their dialogue with government, and so do act in a particular mode of advocacy. To what degree seemed to depend on the sector involved. Education for example is more likely to involve a direct donor/Government relationship, but the democracy/governance sector is an instance where an INGO might serve as a useful buffer between the donor and Government. As one USAID programme officer put it, 'The host Government will not want a donor to work with the opposition, it will be difficult for a bi-lateral to do this.' (Interview: Participant E). So the question of whether INGOs do advocacy work well, and so add value to this element of programming, is a

complex one. According to the participants, the reality is that INGOs do their best advocacy work by training local NGOs to advocate rather than implementing themselves. They also further add value by opening dialogue on a given issue with Government – in the place of, and on behalf of a donor.

Finally, INGOs also serve in an advocacy capacity as observers, scrutinizers and reporters of Government behaviours. In respect to this last point, the senior SIDA programme officer noted succinctly that, ‘INGOs serve as an excellent watchdog for Government; we certainly could not have that kind of relationship working in an embassy.’ (Interview: Participant B).

INGO Disadvantages

Although discussions with the participants cast INGOs in a generally positive light, numerous issues were identified where INGOs were an occasional source of strain on development initiatives. The sense of romanticism found in the literature about INGOs was, according to these participants, not quite true in reality. For example, numerous theorists had suggested that INGOs are well connected to beneficiaries on the ground, and have an ability to target poorer populations. Somewhat to the contrary, SIDA participants felt that Diakonia was good at targeting partners – who could in turn target poorer populations. But a direct linkage between Diakonia and poorer populations was not identified, an important distinction according to both of the SIDA officers. When considering the relationship between INGOs and the poor more broadly, the SIDA participants felt that INGOs generally had difficulty in understanding the Zambian context, and so frequently made mistakes early in their programming due to ‘being

stubborn to the local context' (Interview: Participant C), i.e., seeing themselves as the developmental experts and ignoring vital advice on how to proceed locally. Thus suggestions that INGOs have the ability to target the poor, may not accurately describe actual practices. Diakonia has the ability to partner with organizations who target the poor. As the senior SIDA participant suggested, 'INGOs are a good tool to reach out, channel funds to local organizations – if they have proper links in society.' (Interview: Participant B).

Likewise, according to the American participants, as far as any notion of targeting local populations is concerned, INGOs frequently have limited exposure to beneficiaries, and a limited understanding of the cultures in which they programme. As the junior USAID programme officer put it, 'They do not normally have the necessary local knowledge to zero in on the target populations.' (Interview: Participant E).

In this context, another characteristic which may have been exaggerated in the literature are INGOs' flexibility and innovative programming capabilities. When asked about the creativity and innovation of their INGO partner – in terms of programming and implementation, one participant stated that their partner, Diakonia, had not shown any potential for this – mostly due to the fact that they were not encouraged to do so. The interviewee noted that in the scope of programming negotiations little room existed for innovative programming. Moreover, she was surprised by the thought of an INGO offering innovation anyway (Interview: Participant C).

Similarly, USAID participants did not believe that INGOs demonstrate much potential for flexibility and innovation. What was interesting was that they implied that these circumstances may be more a case of systemic compliance than the wants or needs

of an INGO, and noted that it is often the donor funding system which does not allow for innovation. Ultimately, the participants unanimously rejected the suggestion that INGOs add innovation and flexibility to development programming. As the senior USAID programme officer stated,

No, in fact I see [INGOs] following the curve rather than leading the curve. I see very little innovation from INGOs... Like any institution, their fundamental reason to exist is, to exist. If you really want to know, go back to 1992, 1993, before PEPFAR, and see how many of those organizations were doing HIV and AIDS programmes. Now that we've got billions of dollars going to HIV and AIDS, they're all doing it. (Interview: Participant D).

A third characteristic discussed which conflicts with suggestions found in the literature is that of the INGOs ability to build capacity. None of the participants – including INGO personnel themselves, felt that this was an INGO strength. However, in the context of the Paris Agreement, the interviewees concurred that a need for capacity building exists and that a definite demand to illustrate more capacity building achievements is growing within the development industry. Looking to terminate development exercises someday, donors are searching for sustainable programmes – and at the heart of this are issues of local capacities. Yet, in an environment where the working population is dying at an alarming rate, this is a challenging goal. In Zambia, as quickly as capacities can be built, they diminish due to deaths, programme termination or human resources poaching. It would seem that INGOs are failing to add capacity building value to development programming, but they may not be able to do much about it under the current circumstances. As the Diakonia participant noted, ‘Some do build capacity, but turnover can be high... There is nothing left after a year or two.’ (Interview: Participant A).

A further critique of the Zambian-based INGOs is their conspicuous dependence on international donors as a sole means of funding. A clear example of this is the case of Diakonia and SIDA. After months of negotiation and planning, SIDA suggested that Diakonia prepare for a considerable scale-up of their upcoming five year plan and also organize their local partners to do the same. However, weeks before agreements were to be signed, SIDA informed Diakonia that they could not support this growth after all and were in fact planning to scale back resources in Zambia. As a result the INGO was forced to notify local partners of the programming contraction and is now scrambling to locate alternative funding resources. Similarly, PACT experienced a crisis when USAID pulled their funding unexpectedly leaving the democracy/governance section of the organization, and their local partners, essentially terminated.

Looking to how donors affected INGOs in terms of their ability to produce and deliver effective programming, a number of drawbacks surfaced from the interviews. One major critique was that, at times, donors coerced their partners into uncomfortable programming choices. For example, SIDA had strongly urged Diakonia to participate in advocacy campaigns for greater lesbian/gay/bi-sexual (LGB) rights in Zambia. As many of their current partners are Christian faith-based organizations (FBOs) who hold extremely conservative value systems, Diakonia staff were resistant to participation in such a programme and the result has been tensions amongst the various levels of partnership. According to the Diakonia participant, the differences of opinion have also served to alienate the organization's very conservative grassroots partners. Despite the worthiness of such a cause, under the current conservative political and cultural climate

in Zambia it is inconceivable how the endorsement of such a wholly unpopular advocacy campaign could be effectively pursued in Zambia by Diakonia.

Moreover, this corresponds with accusations that INGOs are sometimes more accountable to their donors than beneficiaries. The Diakonia Country Representative concurred with this and went on to discuss how the organization's loyalties could occasionally be divided between commitments to their on-the-ground partners and satisfying their donor's expectations:

'Sometimes... Definitely. For us it hasn't been very difficult, but sometimes we have to bend a bit. We tell our partners that they should stand by their programmes, not because of funding. At other times we really have to justify, to maintain our money requirement... We need funding to continue our programmes.' (Interview, Participant A)

Nonetheless, the participant downplayed these tensions and noted that SIDA as a donor was generally flexible enough to negate the differences and cited only the inclusion of LGB advocacy programmes as a source of relationship strain.

However, amongst the USAID participants the perception exists that INGOs are in fact most accountable to neither their donors nor beneficiaries but rather see themselves as the primary recipient of consideration. As the senior USAID programme officer noted tersely, 'INGOs can utilize donor funding to build their own capacity, rather than focusing on getting the job done... [they are] much more focused on their long-term [organizational] health, this is in direct contradiction to a private organization who is usually much more efficient in their delivery...' (Interview: Participant D). Furthermore, the PACT programme officer essentially agreed and noted that, 'INGOs have a survival instinct as well. At certain times they have to do resource mobilization to continue in this thing.' (Interview: Participant F).

Another issue which suggests that INGOs may not only be failing to add value, but which might even be diminishing the effectiveness of their development programming is that of resource distribution. In fact, all of the participants held INGOs partially responsible for Government's fiscal inability to meet programming needs. One USAID officer pointed out that an INGO which receives a \$50 million grant will often spend 40 to 60 per cent of the funding internally. The argument is that if this funding was simply sourced directly to government it would have a far more direct application to the developmental problem – and Government would have more reasonable funding to work with. This is an ironic twist to the literature's findings that INGOs are useful because many developing world governments cannot afford to maintain their programmes.

A final critique of INGOs was that the organizations did not hold any potential for macro-scale positive change. Interestingly, this view was held despite the fact that the participants generally agreed that in the democracy/governance sector the potential for immense impact did exist. The critique however, was not levelled at whether most of mainstream Zambia could be immediately affected by these programmes but rather whether there was the potential for sustainability of these exercises. As the senior USAID programme officer stated while speaking to INGOs' thoughts on sustainability, 'No, it's not even on their agendas.' (Interview: Participant D).

Thinking of even the most successful countries' histories with democracy and governance, it is clear a long-term commitment is a significant requirement. Considering the U.S. and Swedish Governments have dramatically scaled back their funding for such programmes, it must be wondered if these initiatives have or will affect long-term macro-scale change. If not, the programming value would most likely be virtually nil.

Nonetheless, several of the participants suggested that it is the collective effort, over a very long period of time, which will begin to show impacts. And this is not something any one organization or relationship can do on its own. Despite realistic cynicism, the majority of the participants held guarded hope that their programming was contributing to a better Zambian future, 'In the areas we work in we can see these issues being talked about in Zambian society now, on the radio or talk shows, so yes, these things do take a long time, but we are seeing things moving on.' (Interview: Participant F).

Chapter V

Conclusions

Revisiting the original hypothesis of whether INGOs add value to development programming as a number of researchers suggest, the conclusions which may be drawn from this study suggests that yes, the organizations surveyed generally do add value. In concert with the above, the study's literature review noted numerous, valuable INGO qualities, and a great deal of truth exists in these sentiments. But as often is the case when comparing the written word against practice, a disconnect exists. For example, although INGOs were found to be generally trustworthy, the interviews made clear that it was donors rather than beneficiaries who had placed significant trust in the organizations. And this was much more due to their transparent business practices rather than a particularly close link to the poor. In fact, and as suggested by several study participants, INGOs have very little connection with beneficiaries whatsoever. Something not at all considered in the literature.

A second positive trait INGOs were found to have was an uncanny ability to act in the various roles required, as required. INGOs were happy to be seen as collaborators, convenors, or even culprits if necessary. While it could be argued the above implies the poor character of organizations willing to do what it takes to continue funding, it may also speak to the flexibility also mentioned in the literature review. If true, this again suggests how attitudes about INGOs remain generally true, but perhaps less than accurate. Whichever the case, INGOs clearly have a role to play as mediator between various actors in development processes.

Another beneficial characteristic about INGOs was their role as advocate and watchdog. However, it would be fair to say that this function is also somewhat misconstrued when comparing theory against practice. In the literature there is an

implication of organizations who are strong willed, with loud voice and ready to critique. The reality is very different. The INGOs reviewed in this study do advocate and do support those who speak out. But their advocacy is enacted behind closed doors and is much more a gentle hand than a loud shout. It is doubtful they would retain any funders if they did much more than this.

Finally, is the reality that INGOs can simply implement tasks where no other agent has the ability, interest or mandate. And in this case, the literature was accurate. INGOs have very much carved a niche for themselves. Few local organizations have the reporting capacities to operate implement a project that most international donors require; no private firm would have the interest to involve themselves as deeply as an INGO; no donor has the will or political flexibility to do so; while government has not shown the capacity to do so. Only INGOs have solutions to fill gaps as they appear in development programming.

Have the INGOs lost their autonomy?

However, the study's original hypothesis also suggested that INGOs also pay a very real price for their specialized role in development programming. The INGOs in this study (and no doubt the majority of INGOs) are thoroughly dependent on donor support. As a result, these organizations retained limited autonomy and held very real obligations. In the case of USAID, this must certainly be true as the donor had fully designed the programme even before it looked to hire its partner. In the SIDA example, subtle pressure had been applied to their partner for compliance with the very unpopular LGB advocacy programme. More appreciably however, one organization closed its governance and

democratization programming as soon as donor funding was terminated and the other is near doing the same. These INGOs are undoubtedly extensions of donor programming.

The above also demonstrates how an INGO can undermine the organic nature of civil society and create artificial environments. If Diakonia or PACT were not entirely dependent on their donors for funding, their own Zambian partners might be better prepared to generate diversified, self-sufficient resources – rather than relying on external actors for support. As a great deal of Zambian democracy and governance civil society has come to depend on donor resources, dependency issues clearly affect their behaviour. These circumstances illustrate the potential for long-term injury and may set this sector back for a decade. In this example, INGO (and donor) involvement in democracy and governance programming may have proven a detriment and have been a disruptive energy in the country.

In line with these sentiments, INGOs remain unsustainable and draw valuable funds away from a host government – in this case the GRZ, the most likely long-term solution to development in Zambia. While an INGO might achieve goals and objectives with military efficiency over a five-year programme, the questions remains of what will happen in the sixth year. For better or worse, the GRZ remains the default solution to Zambia's developmental problems.

Another critical assessment was aimed at INGOs reputations. According to the participants in this study, INGOs do not connect with beneficiaries on the ground; do not display any flexibility or innovation; and do not tend to build long-term capacity. In fact none of their programmes showed any effort at meeting these needs whatsoever. Moreover, the participants seemed surprised that any of the above might be considered

INGO strengths. These characteristics were simply not considered to be a part of an INGO's personality.

Finally was the issue of how INGOs are sometimes perceived to be a magic bullet to all developmental problems. In agreement with the rest of his donor colleagues interviewed, the junior USAID officer said that donors do often utilize INGOs in a 'one-size-fits-all approach.' (Interview: Participant E). Interestingly the literature implies that it is the donors who frequently view INGOs as a panacea, but the USAID participant suggested that it is the INGOs who tout themselves as holding solutions to all troubles. Both scenarios appear to be exaggerations. INGOs cannot add value to programming without an accordingly suitable assessment of what the problem might be, as well as what the organization can do to solve this issue.

A final set of conclusions deals with a number of hypotheses about INGO behaviour that ultimately proved inconclusive. The participants and the subsequent data they provided were unconvincing about foreign policy as an interference in development programming. Likewise, thoughts on INGO motivations and whether their compassion was a factor in programming were also questionable. Unanimously, all of the participants affirmed that INGOs *are compassionate*, but that this was irrelevant as they still operate much like businesses.

Subsequently, the above conclusions find INGOs imperfect, but filling a glaring niche in development interventions which no other organizations can do at this time – for better or worse. Nonetheless, these entities are also a long way from the concept that originally construed them. Global civil society has become a hybrid business of sorts and should be treated as such. To think otherwise would be naïve.

Recommendations

After reviewing the study and taking into considering the political and organizational realities of INGOs and donors in the field, a number of potential actions surfaced which could be taken to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of these organizations in development programming. One step is for donors to shelter programming funds set aside for programming agreements, and stick to the spirit of these contracts. By behaving inconsistently and stepping in and out of projects as they see fit – and in an unpredictable or accountable manner, donors create chaos in programming sectors. The last thing Zambian civil society or Government needs are fickle and incoherent friends.

Another suggestion for improvement, and in line for the above, is that INGOs also need to be evaluated on their own long-term commitment to countries and sectors in which they programme. Much like donors, INGOs seem to move quickly in and out of programming environments as they see fit. While this is no doubt within their discretion, international donors should be using global assessments of international non-governmental organizations. If INGOs wish to pick up and chase funding rather than illustrating long-term commitment to populations and programmes, they should be treated solely as businesses and held to the same criteria. INGOs currently enjoy both faces of the coin as professional organizations with benevolent faces. Yet these separate sides carry very different responsibilities and privileges. INGOs have enjoyed these privileges for a very long time, at some point these organizations will need to face up to the complimentary responsibilities and be accountable for long-term development.

Lastly, INGOs must find ways to cut through the politics of development. These organizations sell themselves as advocates for the poor and vulnerable, but are sometimes shockingly quiet when they are most needed. Currently, *the* critical flaw in international development programming is that too many programmes, organizations and policies continue to be unaccountable – both in the developing world and outside of it. Donors, host governments and international agencies need to be confronted with this reality, both internationally and domestically. Until this happens, the status quo will remain.

A final word

Finally, several outstanding issues in this study should be resolved. To begin with, it is essential to state that the data and interviews collected are mere snapshots of a sub-component of Zambian civil society – in the governance and democracy sector. And this assertion speaks evermore when commenting on Zambia's third sector in all of its immense entirety, let alone the global development industry. Six interviews, a brief review of two donors and their public policies, as well as a summarized literature review barely scratch the surface of INGO's generalized contributions to development programming globally, or even just in Zambia alone.

Yet, it is important to note that these interviews do offer over 80 years of professional experience and opinions, and were given by six central personalities in the Zambian democracy and governance sectors – all of whom are acutely involved in the country's democratic and governance reform process. Their commentary provides at least anecdotal evidence of patterns in Zambia. Does the data collected in this review provide insurmountable evidence as to INGOs value in development programming? No, of course

not. Do these stories suggest clues as to what might be expected when theorizing the relationship between donors and INGOs, and more importantly, INGOs and development programming in Zambia? Perhaps.

However, in order to further strengthen findings on INGOs numerous next steps for research exist. For example, what might be useful for further action would be to evaluate the relationship each INGO holds with its local partners as it takes on the role of donor itself. It might also be interesting to ascertain what will happen to each INGO's programmes, as well as their local partners, as democracy and governance funding continues to erode. Furthermore, an evaluation of the local, partner organizations 'on-the-ground' programming would also add substantial insight to how each actor truly affects Zambian development. What might additionally be useful for further inquiry would be a closer study of how donors and INGOs continue to scrutinize their own programming. In fact what was particularly striking about this study was how little donors, INGOs or the development industry are really scrutinized at all.

For example, despite claims of transparency and ease of access to information in each of their global websites, detailed information for any of the programmes in this study remained very difficult to obtain. Particularly in the case of USAID and PACT, no annual report, country report⁸ or programme report was available despite numerous repeated requests (and assurances) for this information. This is especially troubling considering the project was a multi-million dollar programme which was terminated early, and has now been closed for well over a year.

⁸ USAID does provide Zambia Annual Reports for up to 2006 on their global website, but nothing for thereafter.

Speaking more generally, regardless of the massive efforts given in researching international development initiatives, it would seem that only a small portion of researchers are currently digging into how the industry actually operates from a nuts and bolts perspective. In comparing data from the literature review against what was found in the field, it became obvious that researchers often have a very limited understanding as to how the industry currently functions. An ironic twist considering the enormous amounts of resources and energy spent convincing otherwise.

Appendices

Appendix 1: SIDA/Diakonia – USAID/PACT Interview Commentary Matrix

No.	Theory	SIDA/Diakonia Notes		USAID/PACT Notes	
		SPO: N/A	JPO: N/A	SPO: N/A	JPO: N/A
1	INGOs retain a distinct, external visage amongst marginalized groups in developing countries	<p>INGOs can also be insensitive to local contexts and cultural practices which creates conflict, they may not understand the politics of Zambia. ‘We spend a great deal of time reigning them in, to remind them of who they are talking with when dealing with the government...’</p> <p>‘It’s a delicate balance. Sometimes you’ll find that being a Zambian works against you. Sometimes you’ll find that being an international is advantageous.’</p>			
2	Very differently linked to the tribal, ethnic or political environments of the beneficiary population they serve	INGOD: N/A		INGPO: N/A	
3	INGOs hold extensive political power within home donor states	SPO: N/A		SPO: N/A	
4	Some of the largest INGOs’ global budgets may be relatively equal to or greater than	JPO: N/A		JPO: N/A	

Defining INGOs

Positive INGO Characteristics			many smaller donor agencies	<p><i>INGOD</i>: In [our] case Diakonia [globally] is 90 per cent dependent on SIDA which matches every Diakonia Swedish Kronor raised with a donation of 9 Swedish Kroner. As a result Diakonia Zambia might well be looked upon as a drain of possible Swedish funds that could go to the GRZ and so competition for the GRZ</p> <p><i>SPO</i>: N/A</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: N/A</p> <p><i>INGOD</i>: N/A</p> <p><i>SPO</i>: I hope so, but not always the case</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: I don't think so, maybe originally, but at this time I don't think they continue on with the same passion. It is now a business</p> <p><i>INGOD</i>: N/A</p>	<p><i>INGPO</i>: N/A</p> <p><i>SPO</i>: N/A</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: N/A</p> <p><i>INGPO</i>: N/A</p> <p><i>SPO</i>: Yes.</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: I suppose so, but it's a business. They do have the necessary passion and interests, but they do that because they get paid very well.</p> <p><i>INGPO</i>: INGOs do exist for the betterment of beneficiaries, but they also can impose certain issues on to a community, not bottom up and very little consultation with the community "at certain times we find we can impose certain things on the community. Very little is done in terms of trying to go to the ground in order to discuss with people what their problem is".</p> <p>"INGOs have a survival instinct as well. At certain times they have to do resource mobilization to continue in this thing as well." "yea, not just the needs of the people..."</p> <p>"But at certain times [INGO's work] can be very genuine as well..."</p>
5	In short, no one simple label or set of correlating hypothesis may be fit to describe the INGO universe. Nonetheless, several frequent patterns do exist				
6	INGOs frequently exist out of genuine compassion and for the betterment of the beneficiary populations they seek to serve				

7	Trusted partners	<p><i>SPO</i>: I would say so</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: We trust them [INGOs] with the funding, we trust them to do the work they are assigned, but I haven't seen whether INGOs are trusted with beneficiaries.</p> <p><i>INGOD</i>: N/A</p>	<p><i>SPO</i>: Yes.</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: For us, definitely. For those on the ground, it's mixed. Some do better than others.</p> <p><i>INGPO</i>: This can depend on the source of the donor, on how restrictive the funds are... The local partners have their own pattern of basic needs...</p> <p>"Yes, they are trusted by the donor communities, they are... The communities, yes, depending on the interaction..."</p> <p><i>SPO</i>: Some INGOs do, yes.</p>
8	Ability to target poor populations	<p><i>SPO</i>: INGOs are a good tool to reach out, channel funds to local organizations; if they have proper links in society</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: INGOs have an ability to target organizations which target poor populations; sometimes INGOs do NOT understand the local context initially and can be stubborn to understanding the local context. As well, they sometimes do not connect well to local organizations.</p> <p><i>INGOD</i>: N/A</p>	<p><i>JPO</i>: They do not normally have the necessary local knowledge to zero in on the target populations</p> <p><i>INGPO</i>: N/A</p>

9	Flexibility and innovation	<p><i>SPO:</i> They can link successful programmes in other countries to this area</p>	<p><i>SPO:</i> “No, in fact I see them following the curve rather than leading the curve. I see very little innovation from INGOs.” “Like any institution, their fundamental reason to exist is to exist. If you really want to know, go back to 1992, 1993, before PEPFAR, and see how many of those organizations were doing HIV and AIDS programmes. Now that we’ve got billions of dollars going to HIV ad AIDS, they’re all doing it.”</p> <p>“I’ve never seen an NGO come up with a truly innovative programme.”</p> <p><i>JPO:</i> INGOs can only be as flexible as we allow them to be.</p>
		<p><i>JPO:</i> We look for lenient structures that are not so rigid; that are able to network with other organizations globally; good technical AND cultural knowledge; flexible yes! They are willing to change at times, they are innovative... It is easier for an INGO to manage a programme rather than an organization like SIDA which is very bureaucratic</p> <p><i>INGOD:</i> N/A</p>	<p><i>INGPO:</i> “Flexibility, I don’t think so, not all of them. Some are, some I don’t think so. Innovative, there is a bit. Yes, because of the rich experiences they have else where...”</p>
10	Build capacity amongst target populations	<p><i>SPO:</i> Yes, maybe not at all levels, but to their direct partners</p>	<p><i>SPO:</i> “If I am an INGO and I see the Paris Agenda coming, I shift everything I do into focusing solely on to building local organizations capacity” (<i>Author’s comment: This is in fact, a continuing trend, both organizations interviewed, PACT and Diakonia, seemed to focus on this to a large degree...</i>)</p>

		<p><i>JPO</i>: Sometimes this [capacity building] can be difficult, there can be a divide between local and international organizations as the international organization has capacity, but no cultural understanding, and the local is still learning. To a certain extent I think they do add capacity, but this is difficult to measure. As turnover is high, capacities are more individualistic.</p> <p><i>INGOD</i>: Some, but turnover can be high...</p>	<p><i>JPO</i>: I think they do, but there are always problems with sustainability. Are the systems they put in going to last?</p>
11	INGOs have, at times, been proven to offer 'comparative advantage' to development programming	<p><i>SPO</i>: Professionalism; they can offer good technical expertise and capacity not found within SIDA; they offer an ability to network internationally; they often hold alternative access to information that an embassy might not have – as well as the ability to express that information; reporting is professional in INGOs; alternative to more corrupt local NGOs – the INGO works to monitor the local organizations</p>	<p><i>INGPO</i>: Yes they do. They do.</p> <p><i>SPO</i>: '[We partner with INGOs] because they have accounting systems, management systems, and such that we know that when we get an audit we can tell the American tax-payer, with a great deal of confidence, that if we give \$10 million dollars to CARE to do something, that... we can confidently say that, yes, they have the systems in place, the people, the ability to implement the things that we need them to do to get the job done.'</p> <p>"Every time we put funding into a small, local NGO... Everything about them seems to be right, and you put funds into them, I mean even a small amount, and you tell them: if you can manage this well, there is more coming... Within six months, you're not getting financial reports, you don't know where the money is. It's been mixed with other money here and there, and your auditors are saying, 'why did you do that?'"</p>

	<p><i>JPO:</i> We look for organizations that have good experience in the developing world, as well as evaluating their management structures – ensuring that they are workable. We look for organizations that have more linkages/access to resources, networking and technical knowledge in comparison to a local organization.</p>	<p><i>JPO:</i> USAID can be difficult to work with, local organizations don't often have the capacity to meet the difficult requirements to work with USAID, so it becomes so much easier to work with an INGO – they know what is expected, and how to deliver the desired results.</p> <p>Wider experience and expertise. Both financial systems, as well as technical expertise such as parliamentary reform, few Zambians have this experience.</p>
	<p><i>INGOD:</i> N/A</p>	<p><i>INGPO:</i> Sharing of information between the two organizations was a source of advantage, it was not unusual for either the USAID or PACT Officer to pick up the phone and exchange notes.</p> <p>Depending on the development programmes they bring in. "Donors like INGOs due to a level of confidence they bring, and the capacity. Certain levels of support a donor can bring a local NGO may not be able to manage well."</p> <p>"Confidence is based on their records (reputations)"</p> <p>Many of these INGOs are really just body shops. They contain people with many different skills and expertise that they can source globally. If USAID tried to source these people themselves it would be a great expense of money and time we just couldn't really afford.</p>

12	Alternative to corrupt government	<p><i>SPO:</i> We have examined other regional organizations, such as SADC, and found significant issues in administration and implementation, and so are re-examining these relationships; INGOs are useful partners in addition to government and intra-national/international organizations</p> <p><i>JPO:</i> In certain matters, they are a better alternative to GRZ, particularly in terms of flexibility; they are more focused in terms of what they want to achieve; within the GRZ there are a lot of politics involved and corruption yes, is much easier to follow up on with an INGO than government. Higher level of transparency are prevalent. However, we do realize that corruption can happen anywhere.</p> <p><i>INGOD:</i> I think so, I believe INGOs are a better alternative because we are more accountable, we are more transparent. Corruption is prevalent. I think we do things in a more cost effective way because we have certain values. We are an FBO and are guided by certain values. For example, I keep being told that we can't have expensive furniture because we are supposed to be representing social justice</p> <p><i>SPO:</i> Indeed, look at the health area; yes, indeed!!!</p> <p><i>JPO:</i> It is more a case of bureaucracy issues, than capacity; We did have difficulties with our direct budget support programmes last year, but had no problems with our INGO partners</p>	<p><i>SPO:</i></p> <p><i>JPO:</i> I think so. Many donors have had their fingers burnt giving directly to Government as they don't have the capacity to spend the funds. Issues of corruption and capacity exist</p> <p><i>INGO:</i> INGOs have more immediate targets, but Government is more sustainable</p> <p><i>SPO:</i> 'That's the reality.'</p> <p><i>JPO:</i> I agree. Government is not efficient and too slow. Government might want to do it, but they might never get around to doing it.</p>
13	Many developing country governments simply do not yet have the capacity or political will to maintain service delivery		

			<i>INGOD</i> : N/A	<i>INGPO</i> : "No I wouldn't say the Government doesn't have the capacity. The NGO works on targets, it has a project and the project has an end. Of course there projects in Government which also have an end, but the culture of the government is not there." <i>SPO</i> : No
14	Government's fiscal resources for service delivery are often not adequate to run even the most austere of programmes		<i>SPO</i> : Yes, particularly in the health area, not so much in the governance sector <i>JPO</i> : I agree, resources are not always adequate for GRZ	<i>JPO</i> : Overhead of an INGO can be extremely high, compared with local organizations. If the country receives \$50 million US, \$20 to \$30 million will go to the organization <i>INGPO</i> : That may be correct. Sometimes a Government may have different needs, and so can be caught with competing priorities. Usually the resources are there, but it may just be how they are used.
15	Developing country governments and INGOs do frequently have real need for each other		<i>SPO</i> : Yes	<i>SPO</i> : 'Yes, of course...' 'But the fact that we think about them [INGOs] as a permanent presence here is a fatal flaw in our perceptions.' <i>JPO</i> : I think so because Government really can't be everywhere and do everything, so why should Government fight this <i>INGPO</i> : In the health sector, I have seen real need for each other. Particularly in HIV and AIDS. So the NGOs need the government's approval to work together, and the Government needs their support. IN Governance I don't think it works so well. I don't see much cooperation there....

16	Donors facilitate cohesion between governments and NGOs	<p><i>SPO</i>: Yes, because INGOs can only act as an effective watchdog if they have links to the government</p>	<p><i>SPO</i>: Sharing of information between the two organizations was a source of advantage, it was not unusual for either the USAID or PACT Officer to pick up the phone and exchange notes.</p>
17	As an advocate for policy change within a host country; or as a 'counterweight' to an unreceptive government	<p><i>JPO</i>: We realize that NGOs can access government ministries in a way we can not, so we support NGOs to work with governments. We do try to support these relationships, it is one of our main dialogue issues.</p> <p><i>INGOD</i>: Sometimes [SIDA] brings us information which we do not know. Also, they make very clear positions as they support what we are saying</p> <p><i>SPO</i>: INGOs serve as an excellent watchdog for government; we certainly could not have that kind of relationship working in an embassy</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: We believe that for an ordinary person it is difficult for them to speak out, so we try and promote a watchdog function with our partners so we ensure people are able to participate.</p>	<p><i>JPO</i>: We work with government on the panel that selects our implementing partners so they have ownership in the relationships. I do think we work to bring them together.</p> <p><i>INGPO</i>: We all sat on the same advisory board when designing this project, there were Government representatives there, so in that sense it is true.</p> <p><i>SPO</i>: Because INGOs are implementers, it makes it difficult for them to advocate</p>

Que Site	18	Donors may view NGOs as an alternative partner while working in a state which has an ineffectual, belligerent or even hostile government	<p><i>INGOD:</i> This work is done through our partners, who have at times organized donor, partner and government meetings which have been effective. In the gender sector this has been very effective.</p> <p>Within the area of gender there has been the most cooperation between government and civil society. This has been done through a lot of networking between the stakeholders. Those working with gender violence work closely with the government. When you invite the government and donors top sit at the table it is more effective.</p> <p><i>SPO:</i> N/A</p> <p><i>JPO:</i> N/A</p>	<p><i>JPO:</i> Because of the evolution of Zambian democracy, the opposition is actually civil society and NGOs, and are 'more effective in holding government accountable.'</p> <p>Government will put pressure on the organization, rather than the donor. As agreements are all agreed to prior to implementation, there are no surprises and so Government cannot complain to donors.</p> <p>INGOs train local organizations to pick up the ball and carry it.</p>
			<p><i>INGOD:</i></p> <p><i>SPO:</i> 'It varies by sectors.' 'Any kind of private sector programme should always be funded outside of Government. If we're going to build education, than you need to focus on the Ministry of Education.'</p> <p>'Governance programmes by their nature need to be focused on building capacity of governments to work in a more transparent manner.'</p> <p><i>JPO:</i> We use INGOs as our interface to work with government.</p> <p><i>INGPO:</i></p>	
Que Site	19	Aid is a tool for the furthering of any given donor country's particular interests	<p><i>INGOD:</i></p> <p><i>SPO:</i> Yes, I think so, but I can't elaborate, but I think there are links. That is the role of the embassy</p>	

		<p><i>JPO:</i> I think it is more a political [tool], I say so because [SIDA's] budget goes through so much scrutiny and has to be approved by Gov. Ministers of the Zambian ruling party.</p> <p><i>INGOD:</i> Generally no, but this new issue of LBG [lesbian, bi-sexual, and gay] advocacy suggests otherwise. But mostly, no, the cooperating partner generally programmes towards Zambian needs; Development is a result of that, trade leads to development.</p> <p><i>SPO:</i> N/A</p>	<p><i>SPO:</i> 'Of course, it's the reason why were here.' 'Everything we do has 'elements' of self-interest' 'Our self-interests and our benevolence are intractably linked.' Not so much on the geo-politics however, if so, we would be putting money into infrastructure, rather than HIV and AIDS</p> <p><i>JPO:</i> It's a combination of things. One cannot rule out the fact that every international partner has their own interests in mind. In Zambia its about 50/50, because Zambia is not that strategic. On the other hand, [USAID] wants to maintain some stability in the region.</p>
20	Small or middle power states hold a reputation of awarding and programming for a benevolent rationale		<p><i>INGPO:</i> Its case based. They do it for a number of reasons, to promote international cooperation. Its one of the basic issue in their foreign policy – to provide assistance. There are several motives, sometimes even for political marriage on their side as well – to say that 'they are there to provide influence and get information about what's going on' ... NGO will have an activity in a certain area, and they will only procure from certain areas, so they don't forget their own. USAID always demands procurement from the US.</p> <p><i>JPO:</i> N/A</p> <p><i>INGOD:</i> N/A</p> <p><i>SPO:</i> <i>SPO:</i> N/A</p>
21	Funds are channelled to INGOs who participate in subversive activities, such as raising support for friendly opposition parties and civil society, or acting as agitators to disquiet a targeted government	<p><i>SPO:</i> <i>SPO:</i> I know that Diakonia has some ambitions to look more into trade imbalances... but I don't think it will lead to anything;</p> <p><i>JPO:</i> N/A</p>	<p><i>INGPO:</i> N/A</p> <p><i>SPO:</i></p>

		<p><i>INGOD:</i> LGB advocacy work is being pushed upon Diakonia Zambia as a [central priority], but is not particularly welcome by the INGO. As a result the organization feels strong pressure to pursue LGB issues despite tensions amongst their local partners and staff</p> <p>How much should Diakonia be involved in local advocacy, that is something that has not been figured out yet at the regional and global offices. How we use our own advocacy budgets in practice has not been figured out yet. The embassy has made no comment on this as of yet. It could turn out that they could get the backlash on this</p>	<p><i>JPO:</i> Donors utilizing INGOs to encourage opposition – ‘The host government will not want a donor to work with the opposition, it will be difficult for a bi-lateral to do this.’</p>
22	<p>Direct funding to INGOs and other civil society groups who work to replace or replicate faltering social services in a state being encouraged to downsize their own service delivery</p>	<p><i>SPO:</i> N/A</p> <p><i>JPO:</i> N/A</p> <p><i>INGOD:</i> N/A</p>	<p><i>INGPO:</i></p> <p><i>SPO:</i> N/A</p> <p><i>JPO:</i> N/A</p> <p><i>INGPO:</i> N/A</p>
23	<p>Few NGOs have the capacity, resources or political clout to implement the macro-scaled programmes required for substantial, sustainable, state change</p>	<p><i>SPO:</i> No, not what we are doing right now; Working with strategic Zambian NGOs we have strategic possibilities, but not now. This is very difficult.</p> <p><i>JPO:</i> No, I don't think INGOs have the capacity to influence macro-scale change</p>	<p><i>SPO:</i> Officer expressed concerns about the potential for sustainable programmes that can survive after funding expires, INGOs often have trouble writing themselves out of country</p> <p>‘No, it's not even on their agendas.’</p>

		<p><i>INGOD</i>: Not our INGO itself, but through our partners we have a large impact. Because of the things they research and report, because they monitor government.</p>	<p><i>JPO</i>: The sector we work in is a difficult one, its difficult to measure. Without having any scientific data to point to, the importance of the institutions we are working with ultimately impact the country. A micro project has a macro impact because of the nature of DG</p>
24	INGOs are being employed to save fiscal resources, as well as to deflect culpability from developmental programming failures, and are frequently not as effective as donors often suggest	<p><i>SPO</i>: More efficient use of funds</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: We hire Diakonia as they have the means and capacity for organization, administration and to channel funds to organizations on the ground – something SIDA could not do</p> <p><i>INGOD</i>: It would seem so, Diakonia funds 11 separate partners with SIDA's aid. SIDA could never hope to do this. But they do offer comparative advantage with this as well. Diakonia's staff have a good knowledge of the on-the-ground situation in Zambia, and so better understand the programming context and thusly fund good partners in turn.</p>	<p><i>INGPO</i>: "In the areas we work in we can see these issues being talked about in Zambian society now, on the radio or talk shows, so yes, these things do take a long time, but we are seeing things moving on."</p> <p><i>SPO</i>:</p> <p><i>JPO</i>:</p>
25	Potential for an INGO to be acting from a politically uninformed vantage point, often due to a lack of immersion within the society they programme in	<p><i>SPO</i>: N/A</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: N/A</p> <p><i>INGOD</i>: As Diakonia employs local staff, they have a unique advantage of being able to understand the Zambian context, as well as the donors philosophies and needs</p>	<p><i>INGPO</i>:</p> <p><i>SPO</i>: N/A</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: N/A</p>

26	Donor involvement – through INGOs – in local civil society, can disturb the organic composition of the civil environment by providing artificial incentives, suggesting artificial desires, and creating an artificial sphere in which organizations could/would otherwise differently grow	SPO: N/A	<p>INGPO: : INGOs do exist for the betterment of beneficiaries, but they also can impose certain issues on to a community, not bottom up and very little consultation with the community “at certain times we find we can impose certain things on the community. Very little is done in terms of trying to go to the ground in order to discuss with people what their problem is” .</p> <p>“INGOs have a survival instinct as well. At certain times they have to do resource mobilization to continue in this thing as well.” “yea, not just the needs of the people..”</p> <p>SPO: N/A</p>
27	INGOs are often considered a magic bullet, which can mend all predicaments with their particular solution	<p>JPO: N/A</p> <p>INGOD: In the case of Diakonia, the organization certainly nurtures civil society in Zambia. This however, does not speak to the long-term growth of these organizations as they facilitate an unnatural growth in this sphere</p> <p>SPO: N/A</p> <p>JPO: N/A</p> <p>INGOD: N/A</p>	<p>JPO: N/A</p> <p>INGPO:</p> <p>SPO: N/A</p> <p>JPO: INGO partner (PACT), became a lead for parliamentary reform programme. Found experience to be useful to political environment, but also had issues with a ‘one size fits all’ approach from such a large INGO.</p> <p>INGPO: N/A</p>
28	Donors are under enormous pressure to disburse large sums of fiscal resources	SPO: In our sector we have had no problems disbursing funds, we plan accordingly	INGPO: N/A

		<p><i>JPO</i>: N/A</p> <p><i>INGOD</i>: 'Sometimes it's yes... Quite early in our programme I realized the embassy was quite interested in our capacity to spend. Are you sure you have capacity to spend?'</p> <p>SIDAs reporting requirements make this a much easier task for their desk officers and partners. As the reporting is very easy, disbursing the funds must be equally easy. Moreover, Diakonia Zambia's audits have not always been conducted in Zambia in the past [making this a very easy job]</p>	<p><i>SPO</i>: No, the organizations we work with understand our processes, that is part of the beauty of working with them.</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: I wish – i.e. they don't have enough funds for this too be an issue</p>
29	INGOs are accountable only to their donors, but not often accountable to their beneficiaries	<p><i>SPO</i>: N/A</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: N/A</p>	<p><i>INGPO</i>: Funds were finished faster than when we finished our programme</p> <p><i>SPO</i>: INGOs can utilize donor funding to build their own capacity, rather than focusing on getting the job done, 'much more focused on their long-term [organizational] health, this is in direct contradiction to a private organization who are usually much more efficient in their delivery</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: DG funding had dried up in 2005 – similar to SIDA, but Governance issues remain a major impediment in Zambian development</p>

30	NGOs feel that they trade information and expertise for the dubious prestige of being on a list of selected consultants	<p><i>SPO</i>: N/A</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: N/A</p> <p><i>INGOD</i>: Sometimes... Definitely. For us it hasn't been very difficult, but sometimes we have to bend a bit. We tell our partners that they should stand by their programmes, not because of funding. At other times we really have to justify, to maintain our money requirement.</p> <p>We need funding to continue our programmes.</p>	<p><i>INGPO</i>: "INGOs have a survival instinct as well. At certain times they have to do resource mobilization to continue in this thing as well." "yea, not just the needs of the people..." "But at certain times [INGO's work] can be very genuine as well..."</p> <p><i>SPO</i>: N/A</p> <p><i>JPO</i>: I think INGOs add to Zambian development, but we could make the relationship much more efficient. He who pays the piper calls the tune...</p>
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Appendix 2: Summary of statements about INGO/donor relationships and behaviour

	No.	Statement	Author(s)
Defining INGOs	1	INGOs retain a distinct, external visage amongst marginalized groups in developing countries	Alger; Werker and Ahmed
	2	Very differently linked to the tribal, ethnic or political environments of the beneficiary population they serve	Candler; Tripp
	3	Hold extensive political power within home donor states	Olsen, Høyen & Carstensen; Zinnes and Bell; Raustiala; Streeten
	4	Some of the largest INGOs' global budgets may be relatively equal to or greater than many smaller donor agencies	Friedman, Hochstetler & Clark; Robinson; Mundy & Murphy; Alger; Friedman, et. Al.; Postma; Keck and Sikkink
	5	In short, no one simple label or set of correlating hypothesis may be fit to describe the INGO universe. Nonetheless, several frequent patterns do exist	Streeten
Positive INGO Characteristics	6	INGOs frequently exist out of genuine compassion and for the betterment of the beneficiary populations they seek to serve	Fulcher; Brinkerhoff and Costen; Raustiala; Brinkerhoff, J.; Tvedt; Fisher; Candler; Werker and Ahmed; Sanyal
	7	Trusted partners	Tvedt; Fisher; Raustiala
	8	Ability to target poor populations	Hyden; Chambers; Gran; Fisher; Finkel; Mequanent; Galvin and Habib; Werker and Ahmed; Riddell; Korten; Sanyal
	9	Flexibility and innovation	Murphy and Mundy; Streeten; Gran; Fulcher; Takao; Alger; Sanyal
	10	Build capacity amongst target populations	Postma; Fisher; Martinussen; Finkel
	11	INGOs have, at times, been proven to offer 'comparative advantage' to development programming	Brinkerhoff J.; Werker and Ahmed; Sanyal
	12	Alternative to corrupt government	Riddell; McAuslan; Werker and Ahmed; Alford
Reasons for INGOs as an alternative to governments	13	Many developing country governments simply do not yet have the capacity or political will to maintain service delivery	Postma; Hammergren
	14	Government's fiscal resources for service delivery are often not adequate to run even the most austere of programmes	Brinkerhoff and Costen
	15	Developing country governments and INGOs do frequently have real need for each other	Brinkerhoff J.; Riddell; Raustiala; Sanyal
	16	Donors facilitate cohesion between governments and NGOs	Brinkerhoff J.
	17	As an advocate for policy change within a host country; or as a 'counterweight' to an unreceptive government	Robinson; Brinkerhoff and Costen; Fulcher; Werker and Ahmed

Questionable INGO Characteristics	18	Donors may view NGOs as an alternative partner while working in a state which has an ineffectual, belligerent or even hostile government	Robinson; Brinkerhoff and Costen; Fulcher; Werker and Ahmed
	19	Aid is a tool for the furthering of any given donor country's particular interests	Schraeder, et Al.; Boone; Bourguignon and Sundberg; Mondlane; Alesina and Weder; Svensson
	20	Small or middle power states hold a reputation of awarding and programming for a benevolent rationale	Olson, et Al.; Schraeder, et Al,
	21	Funds are channelled to INGOs who participate in subversive activities, such as raising support for friendly opposition parties and civil society, or acting as agitators to disquiet a targeted government	Tvedt; O'Brien; Feldman; Alford
	22	Direct funding to INGOs and other civil society groups who work to replace or replicate faltering social services in a state being encouraged to downsize their own service delivery	Feldman; Igoe; Takao; Werker and Ahmed; Fulcher
	23	Few NGOs have the capacity, resources or political clout to implement the macro-scaled programmes required for substantial, sustainable, state change	Korten; Van de Walle; Takao; Sanyal
	24	INGOs are being employed to save fiscal resources, as well as to deflect culpability from developmental programming failures, and are frequently not as effective as donors often suggest	Van de Walle; Werker and Ahmed; Hammergren
	25	Potential for an INGO to be acting from a politically uninformed vantage point, often due to a lack of immersion within the society they programme in	Young
	26	Donor involvement – through INGOs – in local civil society, can disturb the organic composition of the civil environment by providing artificial incentives, suggesting artificial desires, and creating an artificial sphere in which organizations could/would otherwise differently grow	Igoe; Feldman; Ohayo
	27	INGOs are often considered a magic bullet, which can mend all predicaments with their particular solution	Igoe; Vivan; Tendler
	28	Donors are under enormous pressure to disburse large sums of fiscal resources	Tendler; Hammergren; Igoe; Van de Walle
	29	INGOs are accountable only to their donors, but not often accountable to their beneficiaries	Werker and Ahmed; Yasuo; Hammergren; de Waal; Igoe
	30	NGOs feel that they trade information and expertise for the dubious prestige of being on a list of selected consultants	Skjelsbaek

Appendix 3: Questionnaire

INFORMED VERBAL CONSENT

To be read prior to the interview

I am a graduate student in the Department of International Development Studies at Saint Mary's University. As part of my masters/honours thesis, I am conducting research under the supervision of Dr. John Devlin, and I am inviting you to participate in my study.

The purpose of the study is to examine the value and role which international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) play in implementing donor countries' development programming initiatives in developing countries, particularly Zambia. As a result, the study will conduct a comparative analysis between several donors, including their field-offices, and their perspectives on outsourcing/working with INGOs. The study will further evaluate the relationship between donors, INGOs and beneficiaries.

This study will be conducted through four separate means. The first component will evaluate development literature concerning INGOs and compile a list of theory which suggests typical behaviour. The second component will be an evaluation of both donors and INGO collateral material in order to better understand what each organization communicates about its initiatives. The third component will comprise of distribution of three separate questionnaires to donors, INGOs and beneficiaries. **The fourth component will be comprised of follow-up interviews based on survey results, with four being conducted with donor programme officers, and four being conducted with INGO programme officers.** I wish to initiate one of these interviews with you now.

Your participation is completely voluntary. You may withdraw from this study at any time without penalty. **Are you completely comfortable with participating in this interview?**

All information obtained in this study will be kept strictly **confidential and anonymous if so desired**. If you wish to remain anonymous, Please do not put any identifying information on any of the forms. To protect individual identities, this consent form will be sealed in an envelope and stored separately. Furthermore, the results of this study will be presented as a group and no individual participants will be identified.

If you have any questions, please contact Glenn Shaw, the principal researcher, at 0979 485308, gshaw90@hotmail.com; or Dr. John Devlin, Research Supervisor, at 519 824 4120, jdevlin@uoguelph.ca

This research has been reviewed and approved by the Saint Mary's University Research Ethics Board. If you have any questions or concerns about the study, you may contact Dr. Veronica Stinson, Chair of the Saint Mary's University Research Ethics Board at ethics@smu.ca or 011 920 420-5728.

By signing this consent form, you are indicating that you fully understand the above information and agree to participate in this study.

Participant's Signature: _____ **Date:** _____

Please keep one copy of this form for your own records.

1. Please tell me about the work you do with International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs)? Please discuss how many you work with; how much you spend with them every year; how you programme with them; how you monitor and evaluate them; etc... Please be as detailed as possible.

2. What are the specific aims and priorities of your organization in this sector, globally? Please be as detailed as possible.

3. What are the specific aims and priorities of your organization in this sector, in Zambia? Please be as detailed as possible.

4. Can you discuss the top attributes 'your organization/you' look for when partnering with an INGO? Please be as detailed as possible.

5. Can you difficulties 'your organization/you' have encountered when partnering with INGOs? Please be as detailed as possible.

6. I would like to discuss some of the following thoughts about INGOs. Please offer your thoughts on the following perceived INGO characteristics.
 - 1) INGOs generally exist out of genuine compassion and for the betterment of the beneficiaries they seek to serve**
 - 2) INGOs are generally trusted partners**
 - 3) INGOs have an ability to target poor populations**
 - 4) INGOs are flexible and innovative**
 - 5) INGOs build capacity amongst target populations**
 - 6) INGOs offer 'comparative advantage' to development programming**

7. I would like to discuss some of the following thoughts about INGOs and Government. Please offer your thoughts on the following perceived INGO/Government relationship characteristics.
- 1) INGOs are useful partners and a good alternative to Government**
 - 2) INGOs are useful as Government does not have the capacity to programme for your sector**
 - 3) INGOs are useful as Government resources for service delivery are often not adequate to run most programmes**
 - 4) Developing country Governments and INGOs do frequently have real need for each other**
 - 5) Your organization works to facilitate cohesion between Government and INGOs**
8. As an officer for a donor development agency, do you feel that development has any relationship international trade policy; geo-politics; or the general interests of your home country? Please be as detailed as possible.
9. Do any of the INGOs that you work with have the capacity to affect macro-scale change in Zambia? Please explain who and how in detail.
10. How do you monitor and evaluate your INGO partners? Please explain in detail.
11. How are your top INGO partners selected to partner with, and does your organization work in the same capacity and at the same scale with local NGO(s)?
12. Do you feel your INGO partners are effective in the tasks they are mandated to do, and why do you think this?

13. Did your sector of your organization have a difficult time disbursing funds last year? If so, why? If not, why? Please explain in detail.
14. Where and how are your programming strategies designed? Please indicate exactly who is involved in this process, i.e. are they in-country, or within your organization, or with your embassy? Please explain in detail.
15. Are you given written material(s) which assist in guiding you in your sectoral programme design, if so, do you find these materials to be effective tools? Can you list and/or forward these materials?
16. Are any of your INGO partners consulted when designing programmes? If so, please explain who and how they are consulted or contribute to the process of design.
17. Do any of the INGOs you partner with work at an advocacy level in order to affect Government programming/service delivery/the political environment? Do you feel they are effective in this role? Do you assist them with this?
18. Do you have any further thoughts on your organization and their attitudes/behaviour concerning partnering with INGOs? Please explain in detail.

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