

**THE CRIMEAN WAR  
ITS ORIGINS AND ITS DIPLOMACY**

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Disagreement over the Orthodox Christians.....	27
Nationalism in Turkey.....	28
Lord Stratford's Control over the Turks.....	29
Menshikov's Sened of May 5, 1853.....	29
The Turkish Rejection.....	30
Lord Stratford's Action of May 19, 1853.....	30
Departure of Russian Legation.....	31
<b>3. THE GREAT POWERS.....</b>	<b>32</b>
The Economic Importance of Turkey.....	32
Nicolas's Reliance on British Neutrality.....	32
Lord Stratford and Aberdeen.....	33
Lord Stratford and Nicolas I.....	34
British Policy in the Near East.....	35
Austria's Position.....	36
A Clash of Personalities.....	38
Russia occupies the Principalities.....	38
Clarendon warns Brunnow.....	39
Austrian Objections to the Occupation.....	40
Austria and Prussia.....	41
Anglo-French Fleets in Turkish Harbors.....	41
The Vienna Note of July, 1853.....	42
Russia Accepts.....	44
Turkey modifies the Note.....	45
The Nesselrode Interpretation.....	46
Turkish Declaration of October, 1853.....	47
Flagstaffs in Constantinople.....	48
Anglo-French Fleets in the Golden Horn.....	49
Omissions.....	51
The Note of December, 1853.....	52
<b>4. THE NEGOTIATIONS AT VIENNA.....</b>	<b>53</b>
Sinope.....	53
Reaction in England and France.....	53
Division in the British Cabinet.....	54
The Allied Declaration of Intent.....	56
Palmerston re-enters the Cabinet.....	56
The Note of January, 1854.....	57
Russia breaks with France and England.....	57
Queen Victoria's Declaration of January, 1854..	58
Napoleon's Letter to Nicolas, January, 1854..	58
Austrian Course of Action.....	59
Clarendon's Demand of February, 1854.....	61
Austria and Prussia.....	62
Nicolas advises the German Powers.....	63
Prussia's Stand.....	64
Hübner's Fears.....	65
Austrian Neutrality.....	67
Fourtales in London.....	68



Prussian Aspirations.....	68
Austro-Prussian Alliance.....	69
Declaration of War.....	70
Teschen.....	71
Austro-Turkish Alliance.....	71
Silistria and Giurgevo.....	72
Nicolas and Moldavia.....	73
The Four Points.....	74
Russia evacuates the Principalities.....	74
Allied Aims in the Baltic.....	74
5. AUSTRIA AND THE FOUR POINTS.....	76
Buol asks for War Aims.....	76
Austrian Fears.....	76
The Draft Treaty of October, 1854.....	78
The Polish Question.....	80
Tripartite Treaty of December, 1854.....	81
Palmerston needs Re-enforcements.....	82
Cavour and the Convention of January, 1855.....	83
Buol and the Lesser German States.....	83
The Crimea.....	84
The Press and John Roebuck.....	85
Napoleon III - Generalissimo.....	85
The Third Point.....	86
The Counterpoise Plan.....	88
Russell and Drouyn de Lhuys.....	88
The Flight of Austria.....	90
Sevastopol capitulates.....	91
6. THE PEACE CONFERENCE.....	92
The Polish Question.....	92
Bourquency and Buol.....	95
The Allied-Swedish Defence Alliance.....	95
The Four Points of December, 1855.....	96
Nesselrode and the Four Points.....	97
Gorchakov's Attempt at Rapprochement.....	98
Frederick William.....	99
Russia and the Fifth Point.....	100
A Meeting at the Winter Palace.....	100
Peace and Paris.....	102
The Articles.....	102
Triple Treaty of Guarantees.....	103
Sweden and the Baltic.....	104
Hatti-Humayan.....	105
Declaration of Paris.....	105
Cavour and the April Session.....	106
7. CONCLUSION.....	107
The War - a Turning Point.....	107

Austria and the Czars.....	107
Napoleon III.....	108
Poland and Italy.....	109
Roumania.....	110
Stuttgart and Weimar.....	111
Orsini.....	112
Conspiracy Bill of January, 1858.....	112
Flembières.....	112
Prince Napoleon and Alexander II.....	113
Italy.....	114
Villafranca.....	114
Austria and Prussia.....	115
Russia.....	115
The Mediterranean.....	117
The Eastern Question.....	119

<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>	<b>120</b>
--------------------------	------------

<b>INDEX.....</b>	<b>126</b>
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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

When Ibrahim, the son of Mahomet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, invaded Turkey in 1832 in the hope that a new dynasty could be established at Constantinople, it was Russia who seized the opportunity to come to the aid of the Sultan, Mahmud II. It was not so much the disembarking of Russian troops and the anchoring of Russian squadrons at Constantinople which created the furor in European diplomatic circles, as the treaty which was secretly agreed to at Unkiar Skelessi on June 8, 1833.

This was the epitome of Russian intervention in Turkish domestic affairs for not only did Unkiar Skelessi provide for the closure of the Dardanelles should Russia become involved in war with any European power, but it also meant that the Russian provinces in the Black Sea region would be safeguarded against possible attack. As a recompense, Russia guaranteed the Ottomans that Turkish shores and territories would be protected by Russian sea and land forces. More important, however, was the reaffirming of all previous treaties between the two nations. Russia had gained the ascendancy and was now in a position to control the foreign policy of the Turks for under the articles of the agreement, Russia could repudiate any Turkish treaty not in agreement with Unkiar Skelessi. In effect then, the Sultan became the vassal to

the Czar.

Europe became alarmed at this latest Russian move, and

this empire, in appearance at once so colossal and compact, was not merely great but growing: with a growth only the more formidable that it was gradual: expanding unchecked and apparently irresistible at the expense of every state bordering upon its frontiers. Great as had been the acquisitions which Alexander had made to the empire towards the North and West, they were hardly greater than those which Nicolas had already made towards the East and South. And this incessant process of advance was the more disquieting that as yet no Power or combination of Powers had ever finally succeeded in compelling Russia to disgorge what once she had made her own. Last straw of all, the monster was threatening to become amphibious: recent reports showed that the Czar had put his fleet into a 'wonderfully efficient State'.<sup>1</sup>

Because of the Franco-British opposition to the latest transactions between Russia and the Porte, Czar Nicolas I of Russia decided to strengthen his position by concluding a secret agreement with Austria. By the Convention of Münchengrätz, September 20, 1833, Russia and Austria agreed to maintain Turkey as long as possible, but should the end come for 'the sick man of Europe', they would divide the spoils between them.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>F. A. Simpson, Louis Napoleon and the Recovery of France (London: Longmans Green & Co. Ltd., 1960), p. 222.

<sup>2</sup>"When any state adjoining Russia showed signs of breaking-up', it normally became an object of affectionate solicitude on the part of its mighty neighbour. No matter how long the illness, so that the patient spared himself all effort such as might unduly tax his waning strength, he could count in all bedside attentions upon the inexhaustible patience of the East. But suffer him at this stage to show signs of setting his house in order for himself, and the self-summoned physician would at once pronounce death imminent and inevitable. And in such circumstances Poland before and Persia afterwards could testify to the accuracy of the imperial diagnosis." *Ibid.*, p. 220.

As Utkiar Skelessi was to run for eight years, it was not until July 13, 1841, that the Convention of the Straits reverted the control over the Dardanelles back to Turkey by which the Sultan was to close the Straits to the warships of all the powers.

The settlement of 1841 was chiefly to the advantage of Great Britain, but there was a reverse side to it. Nicolas had not obtained much from defending the integrity of Turkey in the hope that Turkey might fall slowly but more surely under Russian influence. After some years, the emperor began to think of a more drastic solution: the partition of Turkey. His failure to obtain the closing of the straits in time of war showed him that the Powers would not give up their right to enter the Black Sea at the sultan's request.<sup>1</sup>

Russia, therefore, fluctuated between the desire to protect, so it seemed, and the desire to partition Turkey. When Nicolas was able to extend his control over the affairs of the Ottomans, such as through Utkiar Skelessi, he was content to permit the Sultan to live in relative calm. However, when the Turks began to show antagonism, such as was demonstrated after 1841, Nicolas fomented troubles between the Ottomans and their Christian subjects.

To promote his plan for partition, Nicolas journeyed to England to obtain British sanction. Throughout the eastern crisis, Viscount Henry Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, had worked closely with Russia, the power whose independent action he most feared. British foreign policy in the Near East had not been

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<sup>1</sup>E. L. Woodward, The Age of Reform, 1815 - 1870 (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1949), p. 228.

purely anti-Russian although after the Crimean War it became so. In his conversations with Sir R. Peel, the British Prime Minister, which took place from May 31 to June 9, 1844,

England and Russia determined to maintain the Ottoman Empire as long as possible in its condition at the time (which was a weak condition, but not too weak for the security of British and Russian interests in the Near East if internal reforms were effected); second, it was agreed that a preliminary understanding would be reached concerning the details of partition if in future it became evident that Turkey no longer could be maintained - or, 'if we foresee that it must crumble to pieces,' as was the phrasing of the Memorandum on the point. Like the alliance of Münchengrätz, it was stated in advance that the terms of succession of Turkey should neither threaten the security of either contracting party nor endanger the maintenance of the European equilibrium. If, however, accidental or precipitate dissolution of Turkey occurred in advance of such preparations, or an attack by any power threatened the existence of Turkey - Russia and England would concert as to their common course of conduct. In these conclusions with England, Tsar Nicolas simply extended the principles of his agreement with Austria but corrected the most serious defect of the Convention of Münchengrätz by the provision that the terms of succession in Turkey were to be arranged in advance of the actual dissolution of the discrepant empire.<sup>1</sup>

The Crimean War was to be fought to halt the progress of Russian aggression rather than protect a corrupt Turkey. For,

inside its ever-expanding frontiers - a fact perhaps most ominous of all - it was the very essence of the Muscovite rule, as seen from Europe, that it consistently sought to obliterate by subjection to its orthodox slavonic servitude cultures both higher and more European than its own. Hence this huge half-barbarous Power, hanging like a pall upon the confines of civilisation, seemed then, as a century later, an instrument less fitted to leaven Asia with Europe, than to submerge Europe once more with Asia.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Vernon J. Puryear, "New Light on the Origins of the Crimean War," *The Journal of Modern History*, III (June, 1931), p. 225.

<sup>2</sup>Simpson, p. 223.



Constantinople continued to fascinate the policy makers of Russia. The control of the Straits would link up the Black and Mediterranean Seas for Russian commercial and military purposes. It would increase her preponderance in the Balkans and throughout the Levant. However, it was also apparent to the Russians that the European powers would never permit such inexcusable aggrandisement. Austria would never yield any of her influence in the Balkans, France would never be deterred from her ambitions in Egypt and the Levant, and Britain was determined to protect her trade routes to India. Since arrangements had been made with Austria and Britain to facilitate the partition of the Ottoman Empire, Nicolas decided to forego immediate demonstrations militarily for a more cautious infiltration at the Porte. He chose to bide his time and to await new developments which might provide a reasonable excuse for armed intervention.

To secure the Catholic vote in France, Louis Napoleon had re-established the temporal power of the Popes in Rome and now came forward to re-assert French and Roman Catholic rights over the shrines in the Holy Lands. It became not only a question of national interests but the personal desire of Louis Napoleon in that he avowed to smash the Holy Alliance of Austria, Prussia, and Russia and stem the rise of Russia's power in Turkey. Consequently, in May of 1850, he instructed his ambassador in Constantinople to demand a renewal of the Latin rights which had been granted under the Capitulation of 1740 and of all firman which had been issued to the

Latins from that date. This situation was aggravated further by the fact that Louis Napoleon, at the beginning of December, 1852, assumed the title Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, much to the consternation of Nicolas I.

In January of the following year, Nicolas approached the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, Sir Hamilton Seymour, with the thought of partitioning Turkey in accordance with the agreements which had been reached in London in 1844. He had not taken into consideration, however, that although Peel's government had committed itself to such a course of action, that the British cabinet of 1853 would not necessarily harbour the same thoughts on the matter. The unfavourable reaction in Great Britain to the Seymour conversations created the proper atmosphere for an Anglo-French rapprochement and a mounting fear of further acts of aggression on the part of the Russians towards Turkey.

By January, 1853,

the time seemed to the Tsar to be ripe for the final settlement of the Eastern Question: the Montenegrins cried for aid to the Head of their Church and the father of their race; the Orthodox Christians of the Balkans clamoured for deliverance; the Greek priests of Palestine called aloud for the recovery of the keys conceded to the Latins. Accordingly, early in January 1853 orders were issued for a concentration of Russian troops on the frontiers of the Danubian Principalities. Nicolas I was, of course, well aware that in making this military move he was throwing down a direct challenge to Napoleon III; but he had no fear whatsoever of anything that the French could do, provided that Great Britain remained neutral in the struggle. And he had the most perfect confidence that she would so remain, if not positively and actively befriending him in the matter. For, first, he was on terms of exceptional cordiality with the British Court; secondly, he believed that Great Britain had ceased to be militant, and had, under the influence of Cobden



and Bright, become entirely commercial and pacific; and thirdly, he knew that Aberdeen, the new British Prime-Minister, detested Napoleon III, and was extremely well-disposed towards himself. May more, he thought himself justified in assuming that Aberdeen approved of the policy which he was about to pursue.<sup>1</sup>

By the end of May, 1853, Nicolas had ordered his troops across the Bosphorus into the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. By this move he hoped to maintain these Turkish provinces as 'material guarantees' in intimidating the Sultan to accept the demands as proposed by Prince Menshikov. Through this special emissary, Nicolas had been striving to obtain a secret treaty which would deprive the Sultan of his control over the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and thereby cede to Russia a virtual protectorate over the Orthodox Church in Turkey. Encouraged by the strong willed and wily Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador at the Porte, the Ottoman government had refused Menshikov on this important point, and this action at Constantinople served to weld the British and French nations into an 'entente cordiale' on behalf of Turkey. Their unity of purpose was made manifest by the Franco-British fleets dropping their anchors in unison in Besika Bay, outside Constantinople, early in June.

In Great Britain, public indignation at the Russian action was fomented by the press. David Urquhart's "Free Press" of Shaf-

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<sup>1</sup>Sir. A. W. Ward and G. P. Cochrane, (ed.), The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. III (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1923), p. 343.

field, portrayed Russia as the anti-Christ. Under the editorship of J. T. Delane, "The Times" became an untold force in formulating a public opinion which, according to Kinglake, forced England to declare war against Russia.

The Czar was to experience his greatest disappointment with his allies of Minchengrätz. Austria became most desirous of preventing conflict between East and West. However, because of her geographic position, her internal conditions, and her ethnic problems, she was forced to confine her activities purely to the diplomatic. Vienna became the seat for most of the consultations.

King Frederick William IV of Prussia was prevented, so he said, by religious scruples from siding with Turkey. However, the aggressive designs of the Czar prevented an understanding with Russia. In reply to the western powers who sought his intervention, he replied that his position was to be one of impartiality.

himself and Austria in keeping France in check. Let any sort of co-operation be regarded by both powers as dependent upon a previous agreement regarding Turkey. The standing secret discussions with the British ministers a complete agreement on all remaining problems, notably the Turkish, was reached during the visit. Great Britain and Russia determined extremely their own common problem through a partition of Turkey. This decision was simply the result of an admission of the fact that by land, Russia smothered over Turkey a preponderant position by sea, England occupied the same position. Isolated, the nations of these two powers might do a great deal of harm, combined it was to much gain."

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Verona J. Sawyer, "New Light on the Origins of the Crimean War," *The Journal of Modern History*, III (July, 1931), p. 221.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE MENSHIKOV MISSION

In June, 1844, Czar Nicolas I of Russia completed a visit to England which was of great diplomatic magnitude. At that time Sir Robert Peel was Prime Minister, Lord Aberdeen the Foreign Secretary, and the Duke of Wellington the Commander-in-Chief of the forces. Their conversations with Nicolas resulted in a memorandum which, in effect, supported Nicolas in his claim as the protector of the Orthodox Christians throughout the Ottoman Empire, and to reach agreements with the Sublime Porte without prior consultations with France. At the same time, Nicolas made further proposals dealing with the partition of the 'sick man of Europe'.

The Tsar unfolded in undisguised fashion his fears for the preponderance of France in Northern Africa and in the Levant, and urged Wellington, Peel, and Aberdeen to co-operate with himself and Austria in keeping France in check. Yet any sort of co-operation was regarded by both powers as dependent upon a previous agreement regarding Turkey. In the ensuing secret discussions with the British ministers a complete agreement on all outstanding problems, notably that of Turkey, was reached during the visit. Great Britain and Russia determined amicably their most common problem through a partition of Turkey. This decision was simply the result of an admission of the fact that "by land, Russia exercises over Turkey a preponderant position; by sea, England occupies the same position. Isolated, the action of these two powers might do a great deal of harm; combined it may do much good".<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Vernon J. Puryear, "New Light on the Origins of the Crimean War," The Journal of Modern History, III (June, 1931), p. 224.

The outcome of the discussions was an understanding which consisted of three parts.

The verbal agreement made while Nicolas was in England; the Nesselrode Memorandum which summarized in written form the points of agreement on the most hazardous Anglo-Russian friction zones; and the ministerial letters of confirmation of the Memorandum, exchanged between Nesselrode and Aberdeen, with the attendant correspondence.<sup>1</sup>

French and Russian demands upon the Porte were based on a dispute over the Holy Places in Bethlehem and Jerusalem. The insurrections which led to the independence of Greece and the resulting call to the Mohammedans to defend their faith forced the Christian powers to intervene on behalf of their protégé. The Latins turned to France who had been accorded the right to protect and represent them at the Sublime Porte,<sup>2</sup> whilst, Nicolas I considered it his mission to be the father and protector of the Orthodox Christians under the terms of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, July 21, 1774. This treaty was confirmed by the Atnali Kavak Convention of March, 1779, and later reasserted by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, July 8, 1833.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 224.

<sup>2</sup>"The latest capitulation, or special concession had been that of 1740, which granted, among other things permission to all 'Christian and hostile nations' to continue to visit Jerusalem under the protection of the French flag. France thus spoke for all Catholics of Europe in 1740." Brison D. Gooch, "A Century of Historiography on the Origins of the Crimean War," The American Historical Review, LXII (October, 1956), p. 35.

The position of France as the protector of the Latins in the Holy Lands had suffered through her policy of neglect for approximately a hundred years. Whilst she disregarded her commitments to the Latins, the Orthodox Church was increasing her control over the Holy Places through firmans permitting her to repair and occupy an increasing number of shrines. By 1850, the Latins were complaining that in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, in the Tomb of the Virgin in Gethsemane, and in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, the Orthodox Church had consistently encroached upon their rights. In the Church of the Nativity, the Latins had enjoyed from time immemorial the right to maintain an altar and a silver star in the Grotto. Through the intervening years, the Orthodox Church had gained control over the shrine and began demanding the Grotto itself.

With the increase of importance of the Orthodox Church at the Porte, France began to renew her claims over the Latins. She objected to the firmans which had been granted to the Orthodox Church on the grounds that they had been issued in contravention to the Capitulations of 1740. It was also argued that these concessions were in fact a treaty with France and could not be abrogated without her consent. Of the firmans which had been granted to the Orthodox Church, it was pointed out that they were not in reality treaty rights and could be revoked at the pleasure and convenience of the Porte.

In 1850, Napoleon III became anxious to gain Catholic

support at home and on May 5, ordered M. de La Valette to Constantinople.<sup>1</sup> The fiery and ambitious La Valette, during the next few months, pressed for a new recognition of the Capitulation of 1740. Under strong exhortations from his government he began to use threats of intervention by the French fleet.<sup>2</sup> Intense rivalry between the French and Russian diplomats ensued. If the Sultan tried to pacify France, he brought down the wrath of Russia. At first, the Porte attempted to gain time by being dilatory. When this failed, she attempted to concede something to both parties. In so doing, however, the Porte was forced to become inconsistent and rendered decisions to the two powers which were couched in dif-

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<sup>1</sup>"Louis was in no sense a good Catholic; but he was the heir of the Second Empire, whose Catholic party had committed him to two ecclesiastical gestures: Oudinot's march on Rome, and Lavalette's successful demand for the restoration of the rights claimed by the Latin (Roman Catholic) monks in the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem, and in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. It may have been true, as he told one of his ministers, that 'the idea of establishing Christianity where Infidelity now exists' had always appealed to him: for there was nothing in him to be attracted, as Napoleon had been, by the militarist monotheism of Islam: but the necessity of holding the Catholic vote and the support of the Midi - especially of the Levantine traders of Marseille - swayed him more. And if the Turkish adventure could be carried through with England and against Russia, what better proof could the world have of his determination to reverse the pattern of Napoleonic diplomacy." Simpson, p. 147.

<sup>2</sup>"The Turks concluded that in the last resort the French fleet could defeat the Russians, even if the latter were united with the Ottoman fleet. Fear of French power had become greater in Constantinople than fear of Russian power and hence, Taylor, concludes, "swift Russian action became imperative unless her twenty-year policy of maintaining the Ottoman Empire through fear and threat were now to be abandoned." Briscoe Gooch, p. 36.



ferent and oft-times contradictory terms.<sup>1</sup>

Stated in bare terms, the question was whether, for passing through the building into the Grotto, the Latin monks should have the key of the chief door of the Church of Bethlehem, and also one of the keys of each of the two doors of the sacred manger and whether they should be at liberty to place in the sanctuary of the Nativity a silver star adorned with the arms of France. The Latins also claimed a privilege of worshipping once a year at the shrine of the Blessed Mary in the Church of Gethsemane, and they went on to assert their right to have a cupboard and a lamp in the tomb of the Virgin<sup>2</sup>, but in this last pretension they were not well supported by France; and virtually, it was their claim to have a key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem instead of being put off with a key of the lesser door which remained insoluble, and had to be decided by the advance of armies, and the threatening movement of fleets.

Diplomacy, somewhat startled at the nature of the question committed to its charge, but repressing the course of emotion of surprise, 'Ventured', as it is said, 'to inquire whether in this case a key meant an instrument for opening a door, only to be employed in closing the door against Christians of other sects, or whether it was simply a key - an emblem; but diplomacy answered that the key was really a key - a key for opening a door, and its evil quality was - not that it kept the Greeks out, but that it let the Latins in.'<sup>2</sup>

In February, 1852, the Porte made concessions to France regarding the Holy Places and immediately violated these agreements by issuing contradictory firmans under pressure from the Russian ambassador in Constantinople. The Pasha of Jerusalem was secretly ordered not to yield the keys to the Latin monks in Jerusalem in compliance with Russian demands. To pacify the French, the latest

<sup>1</sup>The Turks had an endless capacity for going back upon their promise and acquiescing in measures which they had no intention of carrying out." Simpson, p. 243.

<sup>2</sup>A.W.Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea, Its Origins and an Account of Its Progress down to the Death of Lord Raglan (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1864), I, 51.

firmly to the Russians was not to be given a public reading. On December 22, 1852, the Latin Patriarch was permitted to replace the silver star in the Sanctuary of the Church of the Nativity. In conjunction with this, the key to the main door of the church and the keys to the doors leading into the Sacred Manger were also handed over to him.

There followed a series of threats and counter-threats.

Count Carl von Nesselrode, the Russian Chancellor, wrote to Baron Philip von Brunow, the Russian ambassador to Great Britain, threatening a possible use of force. The Russians were prepared to assist the Sultan against the French if he carried out their demands. The British ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir Hamilton Seymour, notified his government that the Czar had ordered one hundred forty-four thousand men to the frontiers of the Principalities. Further to this, the Russians accused the Grand Vizier, Mehmet Ali, and the Foreign Minister, Fuad Pasha, as sympathizers of France. France threatened with a blockade of the Dardanelles, in fact the Charlemagne breached the Straits and brought La Valette back to Constantinople. The French ambassador had been recalled by Napoleon III in January over the furor which had been created in Europe by his assuming the dynastic numeral. The Russians attributed the worst designs to Napoleon III and his desires of fulfilling the dreams of his predecessor, the first Napoleon.



It had been apparent for some time that the Russians had changed their methods in realizing their designs on the Straits.

To assist them in their task, ambassador at St. Petersburg, in

almost every gifted and accomplished Russian who might be travelling in foreign countries used to receive instructions of some kind from his government, and was enabled to believe that, either by collecting information, or in some still more important way, he was performing a duty toward the state.<sup>1</sup>

Russian ambitions were further strengthened through a tremendous religious zeal. For,

love of country and devotion to the Church had become so closely welded into one engrossing sentiment, that good Muscovites could never sever the one idea from the other; and although they were by nature a good-humored race of men, they were fierce in the matter of their religion. They had heard of Infidels who had torn down the crosses from the Churches of Christ, and possessed themselves of the great city, the capital of the Orthodox Church; and as far as they could judge, it would be a work of piety, with the permission of the Czar their father, to slaughter and extirpate the Turks.<sup>2</sup>

On December 25, 1852, Messelrode received a communication from Reschid Pasha suggesting a treaty or convention. The contents of this letter was forwarded to Nicolas and in January a special envoy was ordered to Constantinople. Nicolas requested that this treaty should guarantee the immunities and privileges as already accorded the Orthodox Church under Kuchuk Kainardji.

In January, 1853, Lord Aberdeen assumed the office of Prime

<sup>1</sup> Kinglake, I, 56.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

Minister and Lord John Russell that of Foreign Secretary. The rise of Aberdeen to the Prime Ministry prompted Nicolas to speak to Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, in a series of conversations which began in January and ended in the middle of February.<sup>1</sup> Nicolas reminded Sir Hamilton of his agreements with the British government dealing with the partition of Turkey, and that Aberdeen would support him in his claim.

The tsar felt he had achieved a concrete agreement with Great Britain; in effect, he thought Great Britain was now an ally of Russia. He believed he had pinned Aberdeen down to a binding and specific understanding - in fact this was exactly what he had achieved, that the tsar misunderstood this point was a real tragedy.<sup>2</sup>

In accordance with these arrangements, he would

reduce the Ottoman empire to Asia, give the Principalities and northern Bulgaria to Russia, independence to the rest of Bulgaria and Serbia, the littoral of the Archipelago and of the

<sup>1</sup>Aberdeen was in an awkward position. He had signed the secret agreement with Russia. He knew that the Czar was acting under the impression of British policy which had been allowed to go uncontradicted for years - an impression namely that Britain, while not desiring the break-up of Turkey, would not oppose it. And Greville, knowing nothing of the inner significance of his words writes:

July 12, 1853:....<sup>3</sup>Clarendon tells me that he has no doubt Aberdeen has on many occasions held language in various quarters, and was calculated to give erroneous impressions as to the intentions of the Government, and he thinks that the Emperor himself has been misled by what he may have heard both of the disposition and sentiments of the Prime Minister, and of the determination of the House of Commons and the country at large to abstain from war in every case except one in which our honour and interests were fully directed'. Philip Whitwell Wilson (ed.), The Greville Diary, (London: William Heineman Ltd., 1927), I, 468.

<sup>2</sup>Erison Gooch, p. 55.

Adriatic to Austria, Egypt and perhaps Cyprus and Rhodes to England, Crete to France, the Aegean Isles to Greece, and make Constantinople a free city, with a Russian garrison on the Bosphorus and an Austrian on the Dardanelles.<sup>1</sup>

When Seymour conveyed the gist of his conversations with the Czar to his government, Lord Russell informed him that England would not be a partner to such a partition of Turkey without the previous permission of the Great Powers. If England performed such an act it would jeopardize her attempts to avoid the break-up of Europe through war. On the other hand, the British government would not enter into agreements regarding the partition of Turkey without previously consulting Russia. Lord Clarendon, who succeeded Russell, in February, reiterated these views and declared that such a partition could only come about through a congress of the Powers.

Actually, England had no real religious interests in Turkey, it was generally felt that as long as the Porte governed the Christian rayas with moderation, then on a purely religious basis the status quo should be maintained. Her interest was primarily one of economics as she desired to maintain her preponderance in Asia Minor and Europe.<sup>2</sup> The Prime Minister regarded the Russian

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<sup>1</sup>Agatha Rams, "The Crimean War," The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. I, The Zenith of European Power, 1830 - 1870, Edited by J.P.T. Bury (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 471.

<sup>2</sup>"Great Britain was indifferent to the rights of the Greeks and Latins over the Holy Places, and equally suspicious of Russia and France." Woodward, p. 203.

fleet with more alarm than existing conditions in Turkey, for the Russians posed a threat to Constantinople, the Straits, and ultimately the Mediterranean.<sup>1</sup>

Russia felt that the British were selfishly blocking the normal expansion of their empire. Everywhere that Russia sought an egress to the sea, there stood the British navy. The North Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean, all of these were held in the grip of the British fleets. In consequence of this, Russia for years concentrated on the Near and Middle East until her frontiers touched those of Persia and Afghanistan.

Whilst Nicolas was conducting his conversations with Seymour, Turkey was forced to amass troops in Montenegro to suppress an attempt at rebellion on the part of the populace. Aware of Russia's persistent search for an excuse to interfere in Christian and Moslem warrings, Austria temporarily occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina and ordered Omar Pasha to remove his troops. At the same time Count Leiningen was dispatched to Constantinople where he demanded the cessation of hostilities, the removal of Omar's troops, and the settlement of border difficulties. The Austrian government moved swiftly in anticipation of possible Russian intervention.

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<sup>1</sup>In Nicolas Englishmen were beginning to perceive the most formidable opponent of all civic and national liberties: and Kossuth's eloquence had inspired many of them with a conviction that sooner or later Russia must be fought if freedom was to be saved." Simpson, p. 222.

They didn't have long to wait, the Czar ordered Turkey to remove her troops and as the Austrian action was in accord with his own policy, it appeared that the Czar was about to use a denial to Leiningen as a *casus belli*.<sup>1</sup> On February 23, he informed Frans Joseph, Emperor of Austria, that he would provide armed support if the Austrian demands were not met. In the meantime Leiningen had been successful and on February 14, Turkey yielded to the Austrian demands. By so doing, Turkey removed the Russian threat. At the same time, the British government refused a convention as proposed to Seymour by Nicolas. Nicolas, therefore, lost out on two counts - a possible British alliance and a *casus belli* for a war with the Ottomans. Nevertheless, the Czar could not shake his idea of a partition which would resemble that which had resulted in the complete domination of the Poles under Catherine.

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<sup>1</sup>In the Ottoman empire, the third and weakest of the great eastern powers, nationalism had begun to operate in three ways. It stimulated the Balkan Christians to a new desire for freedom from the Muslim yoke, it led them to rebel against the religious and secular hellenization which had resulted from the control of administration and religious life by the Phanariot Greeks; and, as everywhere among subject peoples, it entailed a rebirth of cultural life, a rediscovery of past history and the gradual differentiation of one little-known Balkan peoples from another. But since these nations were relatively small and materially weak it also raised the question how far they could hope for complete autonomy and whether liberation from Turkey must not involve domination by Russia or Austria, Turkey's European neighbours by land." J.P.T. Bury, "Nationalities and Nationalism," The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. I, The Zenith of European Power, 1830 - 1870. Edited by J. P. T. Bury (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 240.

He desired, therefore, to send a special emissary to Constantinople, and to press his demands upon the Porte using as a pretext the dispute over the Holy Places. Since the Leiningen mission ended successfully, this seemed the appropriate time to extract further concessions.

On March 15, 1853, Prince Alexander Menshikov arrived at the Porte. Besides being related to the Czar, he had held a number of key positions in Russia and was a favourite at the court. He had fought against Napoleon thirty years before; he had held the position of Minister of Marine and had been governor of Finland. He was chosen over Count Alexis Orlov and Count Messelrode as Nicolas now desired that diplomacy should yield to a show of strength. He arrived at the Porte accompanied by Vice-Admiral Korniloff, the commander of the Black Sea fleet, and General Rudiger, the Chief-of-Staff for the land forces. The impression was created that Menshikov had control over the Russian military forces in the Black Sea area. Information was also received that General Dannenburg was threatening Moldavia with two army corps and that the Black Sea fleet was prepared to sail from Sevastopol. Locally, Greeks lined the route which the Prince would take to the suburb of Pera which gave further credence to the importance and nature of this visit. Later, Russian officers conducted reconnaissance missions throughout the Ottoman Empire as far as Smyrna and Thessaly.

It was the official custom on their arrival at the Porte that all emissaries were to present themselves to the Reis Effendi,



the Minister of Foreign Affairs, along with their credentials. Men-  
shikov refused to abide by this custom and Fuad Pasha, the Minister,  
was forced to resign. The Grand Vizier asked Colonel Hugh Rose, the  
British chargé d'affaires, to request the British admiral at Malta  
to order the fleet to Vourla. The request was recognized but on  
March 6, the British government countermanded Rose's orders and the  
fleet returned to its base. The French chargé d'affaires, Count  
Vincente Benedetti, was more successful and Napoleon ordered his  
fleet from Toulon to Salamis on March 20. When the Russians vehe-  
mently objected, Napoleon sought a concert with England. In con-  
formity with the British policy of non-intervention in Ottoman  
affairs, Napoleon proclaimed a similar course of action and declar-  
ed that he also desired to preserve the integrity of the Turks. When  
Napoleon ordered the movement of his fleets, reaction in England  
was immediate. In writing to Queen Victoria, Lord Aberdeen infor-  
med her of the embarrassment in which the French government found  
itself after having taken such a course of action.

Because of the understanding which had taken place in 1844,  
Russell warned France against any drastic move which she might be  
contemplating. When Russell was approached regarding an alliance,  
he did not hesitate to inform Napoleon that he was averse to such  
a move and that there was nothing to fear as Nicolas would do  
nothing in Turkey without the previous consent of England.

However, when

Admiral Hamelin left Toulon, M. His de Birtenval in Brussels

informed the Belgium foreign minister that when 'Austria and Russia appeared to have won victories over Abdul-Majid' France would invade Belgium.<sup>1</sup>

The French threat had been made on March 22, the same day the French squadron left Toulon while that of England remained in anchorage at Malta. The opinion thus accepted by the British government was that France was trying at any cost to re-establish a unity of action between the two maritime powers.<sup>2</sup>

In the meantime Russell was succeeded by Lord Clarendon in the Foreign Office and he advised Belgium to become prepared for any eventuality. On March 23, Clarendon

addressed to Russia his famous dispatch which terminated the negotiations that had been inaugurated by Tsar Nicolas relative to the partition of Turkey. The reason given was that eastern complications would reopen treaties binding Western Europe. Two days later Clarendon told Malowski, the French ambassador in London, that England was not taking the part of Russia in opposition to France.<sup>3</sup>

It was necessary for Napoleon to divert the warring factions at home and to increase the prestige of France which had not recovered since the congress of 1815. By this time, the Morning Herald which was owned by Lord Palmerston, and the Press, which had recently been purchased by Benjamin Disraeli, were calling for the impeachment of Clarendon and Aberdeen on the grounds that they had become accomplices of Russia in her Menshikov demands. Napoleon took advantage of the vacillating conditions of the British cabinet to press forward his desires for a concert with England. His wish

<sup>1</sup> Puyyear, p. 232.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 233.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.



was made more readily attainable as Aberdeen was,

against his better judgement, consenting to a course of policy which he inwardly condemned, that his desire to maintain unanimity at the Cabinet led to concessions which by degrees altered the whole character of the policy, while he held no hope of being able permanently to secure agreement, I described the Queen's position as a very painful one. Here were decisions taken by the Cabinet, perhaps even acted upon, involving the most momentous consequences, without her previous concurrence or even the means for her to judge of the propriety or impropriety of course to be adopted, with evidence that the Minister, in whose judgment the Queen placed her chief reliance, disapproved of it. The position was morally and unconstitutionally a wrong one....She might now be involved in a war, of which consequence could not be calculated, chiefly by the desire of Lord Aberdeen to keep his Cabinet together: this might then break down, and the Queen would be left without an efficient Government, and a war on her hands.<sup>1</sup>

It now became apparent that England was contemplating such a move as Napoleon desired and the belief gained momentum that the only way to save Europe was in concert with France. Further to this the fact that they alone possessed the navies which would be required to do the job demanded such a union. However, the error was made in not giving previous notification of their intentions to Austria and Prussia with whom they were supposedly in complete accord. This action resulted in a breach in the unanimity which had previously bound together the Four Powers in their common task. Napoleon realised his ambition but in accomplishing it he destroyed the harmony which had existed between the powers in Europe.

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<sup>1</sup>A.C. Benson and Viscount Escher (ed.), The Letters of Queen Victoria: A Selection from Her Majesty's Correspondence between the years 1837 and 1861, (London: John Murray, 1907), II, 454. Memorandum of Prince Albert.

The agreements which had been arrived at during the summer of 1853 were based on the ulterior motives of Napoleon III. The Emperor agreed to uphold the British policy in Turkey under the provision that England unite in an 'entente cordiale' with France in lieu of concerted action on the part of the Four Powers. In conjunction with this, state visits were arranged at which time, April 16, 1855, the Emperor was received by Queen Victoria with the same accord as would have been rendered to any other reigning sovereign. This was aimed at Nicolas I who had not received Napoleon with the usual civility as befitted brother monarchs. At the same time this visit presented Napoleon with an opportunity to erase any misgivings which were being entertained by the British on his methods of ascending to power.

When the British recalled their fleet and showed their disapproval of the French decision, Nicolas was appeased by the English gestures but the French move ledged Russia and France in opposing camps. Napoleon wavered at the critical moment and rather than war he ordered a mediate to Constantinople in the person of M. de La Cour. On April 5, 1853, the wily Lord Stratford de Redcliffe arrived at the Porte as the British ambassador.

Towards the close of the year 1832 Palmerston had promoted Sir Stratford Canning to the embassy of St. Petersburg: an unwarrentable act on his part since the Czar had already privately intimated to him that Canning was the only man in England to whose appointment he would object. The fact of this previous protest was however generally unknown. Hence it was a matter of general amazement when after the announcement had actually been gasetted and when Stratford had already received numerous letters of congratulations upon his appointment, Nic-

olas took the unprecedented step of refusing to receive him at St. Petersburg. Stratford on his part refused to ease the position by an act of voluntary retirement: so the harassed Premier sent him as a special envoy to Madrid, accredited indeed to the King and Queen of Spain, but still styled in his letters of credence 'Ambassador to the Emperor of All the Russias'. And ambassador in partibus to the Czar (who meanwhile had to content himself with a mere charge d'affaires at Petersburg) Stratford insisted on remaining for two years; refusing, for the greater annoyance of Nicolas, a permanent transfer to the Spanish embassy; since this acceptance of it would have ended his phantom tenure of the more coveted post. It is probable that Palmerston resented the rebuff to which he had gratuitously exposed his friend: it is certain that Stratford felt himself to have been outrageously used by Nicolas. This is not to accuse him of any conscious intention of gratifying a private vendetta at the cost of a European war. But such memories did no doubt contribute to his conviction 'that there could be no real settlement in the Near East until the pretensions of Russia had been publicly repudiated and until the Tsar had sustained an unmistakable defeat either in diplomacy or in war. If without war so much the better, but by war if necessary'.<sup>1</sup>

During the latter part of March, 1853, Menschikoff informed

Seymour that the Czar desired to settle only the question of the

Holy Places and that he desired no further concessions from the

Turkish government. Whilst these discussions were taking place,

Menschikoff was acting upon orders from St. Petersburg and was se-

cretely negotiating for further capitulations from the Porte. He

was attempting to extend the Kuchuk Kainardji agreements whereby

the Orthodox Church would be placed completely under Russian pro-

tection without reference to Turkey at all.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Simpson, p. 232.

<sup>2</sup>On March 22, 1853, Aberdeen wrote to Queen Victoria, "Lord Aberdeen has seen the instructions of Prince Menschikoff, which relates exclusively to the claims of the Greek Church in Jerusalem;

There were two clauses which formed the focal point for the Russian demands. According to article (VII), Turkey had promised to protect the Christian rayas within her dominions and to allow the Russian ambassadors to make representations on behalf of the Church of Galata. On the basis of this article, the Russians were claiming the right to represent and protect the communities of Christians throughout the Balkans. Menshikov was attempting to have this article extended to that degree whereby Russia would be able to interfere in the internal administration of the Ottoman Empire.

Under article (XIV), Russia had been allowed to construct a church in that quarter of Constantinople which was known as Galata and to keep it always under her protection. As a recompense for this broader capitalation, Menshikov guaranteed to put a fleet at the disposal of the Sultan and would supply four hun-

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and although these conditions may humiliate Turkey and wound the vanity of France, there is nothing whatever to justify the reproach of territorial aggression, or hostile action". Benson and Escher, II, 441.

And further, Queen Victoria answered her Prime Minister on the following day, "the Queen has received Lord Aberdeen's letter of yesterday, and returns Lord Cowley's. Everything appears to her to depend upon the real nature of the demands made by Russia, and the Queen was therefore glad to hear from Lord Aberdeen that he found nothing in Prince Menshikoff's instructions to justify the reproach of territorial aggression or hostile ambition. Still the mode of proceeding at Constantinople is not such as would be resorted to towards a 'sick friend for whose life there exists such solitude.' This ought clearly to be stated to Baron Brunnow, in the Queen's opinion." *Ibid.*, II, 442.

dred thousand men if Turkey came under attack from any of the European powers. He demanded that the greatest secrecy be maintained regarding this part of his negotiations and threatened to withdraw if the Porte divulged the plan.

The Russian demand was separated into two points for discussion - the Holy Places and the rights of the Orthodox Christians. Amicable arrangements had been arrived at between the parties on April 22, 1853, dealing with the Holy Places.

According to the terms of the arrangements thus affected, the key to the Church of Bethlehem, and the silver star placed in the Grotto of the Nativity, were to remain where they were, but were to confer no new rights on the Latins, and the door-keeper of the Church was to be a Greek priest as before, but was to have no right to obstruct other nations in their right to enter the building. The question of the procedure at the tomb of the Blessed Virgin was ingeniously eluded by the device spoken of, for the priority given to the Greeks was treated as though it resulted from a convenient arrangement of hours rather than from any intent to grant procedure, and it was accordingly arranged that the Greeks should worship in the Church every morning immediately after sunrise, and then the Armenians, and then the Latins, each nation having an hour and a half for the purpose....The Gardens of the Convent of Bethlehem were to remain as before under the joint care of the Greeks and Latins. With regard to the cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, it was arranged that it should be repaired by the Sultan in such a way as not to alter its form; and if in the course of the building any deviation from this engagement should appear to be threatened, the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem was to be authorized to remonstrate, with a view to guard against innovation.<sup>1</sup>

With regards to the Orthodox Christians, Stratford advised the Porte that,

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<sup>1</sup> Kinglake, I, 104.



The demand of Prince Mentschikoff should be resisted, but that at the same time there should be shown as much of courtesy and forbearance, and so great a willingness to go to the utmost limits of safe concession, and to improve the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte, that the Turks should appear before Europe in a character almost angelic.<sup>1</sup>

As in other nations, nationalism began to make itself felt in Turkey. It set the stage for the defiance which Turkey began to manifest to the Russians and the contempt which they illustrated to the latest demands of Menshikov. Coupled with this was the feeling, on the part of the Turks, that they would receive the backing of Britain and France. The physical presence of Stratford hardened the determination of the Turks and baffled the attempts of Prince Menshikov.<sup>2</sup> The British ambassador was of unknown influence behind the determination as began to be shown by the Sultan. Menshikov realized that he was not dealing with the Sultan alone but indirectly with Lord Stratford as the Turks sought his advice at every turn of the road. It was because of this that the Czar had instructed Menshikov to complete his business at Constantinople before the English ambassador had a chance to return.

It was a well known fact that the hot tempered but expertly

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., I, 114. Menshikov was attempting to gain control over the Patriarchate of Constantinople, thereby giving to Russia a protectorate over the Greek Church in Turkey.

<sup>2</sup>Stratford "dominated the sultan and his advisers by his force of character, knowledge of words, and imperious will. His authority was immense". Woodward, p. 243.

adroit diplomat struck fear into the minds of the Turks. Yet they regarded him as an unwavering friend and, rightly or wrongly, he attempted to advise them along those lines which he considered to be for their own good. It was through this respect for his counsels that they kept nothing from him and immediately supplied him with copies of the Russians' every demand.

Although Menshikov agreed to minor alterations to his demands in their form or wording, he adhered unwaveringly to his original intention. As Nicolas recognized the futility of reaching what could be a satisfactory solution for Russia, he instructed his emissary to break off diplomatic relations and return immediately to St. Petersburg. On May 5, Prince Menshikov forwarded to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the draft of a convention. This outlined the previous agreements regarding the Holy Places, but, under a different article, Russia would have secured forever the rights and immunities over the Orthodox Church. Menshikov requested the immediate acceptance of the convention and attempted to force its passage by making his stay in Constantinople a condition of its acceptance.

On May 12, 1853, Mustapha Pasha and Reshid Pasha became the Grand Vizier and Minister of Foreign Affairs respectively. They regarded the Russian demands as being incompatible with their existence as a sovereign state. From the Russian point of view, it simply enlarged a principle which had already been granted. Lord Stratford, however, visualized the Czar's claim as a right of

intervention into the internal affairs of every Turkish province. He foresaw the ease with which any Orthodox cleric could claim that some privilege had been varied or withdrawn. If the Sultan permitted the continuance of this arrangement through treaty agreements he would forfeit much of his sovereignty to the Czar.

On May 17, 1853, the Grand Council of the Sublime Porte overwhelmingly rejected the Russian demands by a vote of forty-two to three. It did agree to conclude, in the form of a sened, those points which had been agreed upon but rejected those which would give the protection of the Orthodox Church to the Czar in perpetuity.

On the morning of the 19th, Lord Stratford assembled the representatives from Austria, France, and Prussia. From the talks which ensued,

it then appeared that there was no essential difference of opinion between the representatives of the four Great Powers. None of them questioned the soundness of the Porte's views in resisting the extreme demands of Russia; all acknowledged the spirit of conciliation displayed by the Sultan's Ministers; all were agreed in desiring to prevent the rupture; all desired that the Emperor Nicolas should be enabled to recede without discredit from the wrong path which he had taken; and were willing to cover his retreat by every device which was consistent with the honor and welfare of other states.<sup>1</sup>

As the Porte had consistently and resolutely declined to accept his demands, there was nothing for Prince Menshikov to do but to comply with the Czar's instructions to withdraw. On May 22,

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<sup>1</sup>Kinglake, I, 121.



1853, the Imperial Legation left Constantinople leaving only the Director of the Commercial Department at the Porte.

#### CHAPTER 3

#### THE GREAT POWERS

Russia consistently reached out for the European provinces of the Ottomans as they commanded the approaches to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles - the commercial links between the Black and Mediterranean Seas. With the acquisition of the Crimea and the northern sections of the Black Sea coast, Russian settlement of these new areas - the New Russia - resulted in an increase in grain production, especially in wheat, so that it now placed third in total Russian exports. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Odessa and Taganrog surpassed the Baltic ports in the value of farm products shipped through them.

The Ottoman Empire was a major grain producer as well. However, British merchants favoured the Turks for both commercial and political reasons. Turkey was a free-trading country and the British, by favouring and encouraging the Turks, were able to consolidate their predominance in the trading block of Europe. Britain therefore, was determined to maintain her position of favour at the Porte and the Russian grain producers, who held important positions at St. Petersburg, were determined to upset this British monopoly.

It was apparent that Russia was operating on the belief that England would not indulge in hostilities, especially against

the Russians. To him, both the English people and their government were to interested in commerce, their feelings, so he thought, were summed up by their Prime Minister when Lord Aberdeen reiterated an

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Russia consistently reached out for the European provinces how the Prime Minister could carry his country into a conflict of the Ottomans as they commanded the approaches to the Bosphorus which would cross from a difference in wording between the Bosphorus and the Bosphorus - the commercial links between the Black and Turkish seas. Further to this, he felt that the Turkish approach Mediterranean Seas. With the acquisition of the Crimea and the which had been taken on the advice of Lord Aberdeen, Nicholas was northern sections of the Black Sea coast, Russian settlement of these new areas - the New Russia - resulted in an increase in grain production, especially in wheat, so that it now placed third in total Russian exports. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Odessa and Taganrog surpassed the Baltic ports in the value of farm products shipped through them.

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It was apparent that Nicholas was operating on the belief that England would not indulge in hostilities, especially against

the Russians. To him, both the English people and their government were too interested in commerce. Their feelings, so he thought, were summed up by their Prime Minister when Lord Aberdeen reiterated on so many occasions his hatred for war. The Czar could not understand how the Prime Minister could carry his country into a conflict which would stem from a difference in wording between the Manahikov and Turkish notes. Further to this, he felt that the Turkish opposition had been taken on the advice of Lord Stratford. Nicolas was aware of the 'behind the scenes' diplomacy of the British ambassador and his 'papers of advice' to the Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the various Secretaries of State.

Through the actions of Lord Stratford, the whole problem was changing insofar as England was concerned. Through his consistent approval of Lord Stratford's manoeuvrings, Aberdeen had relinquished his role as a neutralist and had aligned his government on the side of Turkey. Through his ambassador at the Porte, he had been advising a declining power to resist the encroachments of a growing one. Such a course of action could only lead inevitably to very serious consequences. The backwardness of Aberdeen and his government contributed largely as a cause for the gathering storm. All of Stratford's acts were approved by the government, and for the most part, by the general public as a whole. As a seal of approval, the fleet at Malta was placed in his charge and the admiral was instructed to recognise those demands made of him by the British ambassador. Orders had been detailed to Admiral Dundas on

June 2, 1853, to sail to the Dardanelles at which time the fleet moved to Besika Bay. When the French and British governments moved their fleets into Turkish waters, they relinquished their control over them and delegated to their ambassadors unrestricted latitude of action.<sup>1</sup>

Stratford's control at the Porte served to aggravate the situation as it increased the hatred and bitterness which the Czar felt towards him. To Nicolas, the protection of all Christians, even those of the Orthodox faith over which he regarded himself as Pontiff, was not being exercised by the Sultan but by his hated enemy. In the various courts of Europe he made known in no uncertain terms his charges against Lord Stratford and credited him with the failure of the peaceful solution extended by Menshikov. Nicolas could not rest with such thoughts and his only remedy was to set in motion a more forceful course of action.

Russian expansion throughout the Black Sea area seriously threatened British trade routes to India. If Turkey became weakened

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<sup>1</sup>June 13, 1853: "...The great event has been the sailing of our fleet from Malta to join the French fleet at the mouth of the Dardanelles, to the unspeakable satisfaction of the French government, who desire nothing so much as to exhibit to all Europe an entente cordiale with us; and Malewski said to me that, however, the affair might end, this great adventure they had at all events obtained. The Emperor of Russia, will be deeply mortified when he hears of this junction; for besides that it will effectually bar the approach of his fleet to Constantinople, if he ever contemplated it; there is nothing he dislikes and dreads so much as the intimate union of France and England." Wilson, I, 466.

Russian or French control over these routes would be a disastrous blow to British dominance in commerce.<sup>1</sup> Britain was determined to protect her routes and to maintain her power in economic affairs. However, in doing so Russian expansion was being thwarted. The Straits were the only year-round water route from her southern provinces to the west.<sup>2</sup> As England zealously guarded her trade routes to India, Russia was just as careful not to let the Straits fall into the hands of a strong and hostile power. Russia protected her interests by arming the Crimea and advancing into the Danubian Principalities.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>While the Tsar was on his voyage to Great Britain, a new Anglo-French difficulty arose through the publication of a brochure, 'Notes sur les forces navales de la France', written by Prince de Joinville, which spoke of the possibility of attacking English coasts and burning English cities. Also on May 26, 1844, the Journal de Débats published an article which indicated an official French belief that Russia was building a great Asiatic state to menace British India. In two succeeding leading articles, the London Times ridiculed the contention." Paryear, p. 223. Transcaucasia and those regions north of India became future areas of discord between Russia and Britain.

<sup>2</sup>The Black Sea had become a basic route for European trade. "Through Constantinople and Trebizond (in Asia Minor) British trade had rapidly increased until by 1852 Britain was an equal participant in areas that in 1840 were Russian monopolies. A commercial battlefield had been established and since British trade depended on confidence in the power ruling the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, the diplomatic position of Great Britain could never be seriously in doubt. Russia clearly could not be expected to allow the door to remain open for British competition if it were in her power to close it." Brison Geoch, p. 49.

<sup>3</sup>Competition appeared after the treaty of Adrianople had freed Moldavia and Wallachia from the obligation to sell to the Turks at set prices. The Principalities by 1840 were exporting

For years, Great Britain had debated what her policy toward Russia and the Near East should be. She might co-operate with Russia, peacefully partition the Ottoman Empire, and divide the trade of the area with Russia being thus assured preponderance in Russian markets for decades; or she could support the Ottoman Empire, thereby jeopardizing the British trade with Russia but achieving a dominant position in the trade of the Near East and checking Russian commercial expansion.<sup>1</sup>

The Power most directly exposed to Russian encroachments upon European Turkey was Austria. Russian domination of the Principalities would extend the sphere of Russian influence along her southeastern frontiers. Austria watched this area guardedly where, as even in her own case, a strong Slav population was bound to Russia. There was always the danger that the south-Slavs of Austria would support the Russians or the Slavists of other regions which could bring about the downfall of the Habsburg dynasty. This was precisely what certain pan-Slavists had hoped to accomplish and the Austrians were fully aware of the fact that Nicolas would not hesitate to use these Austrian subjects to full advantage.<sup>2</sup>

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wheat on British and Austrian ships to nations that had previously used Russian grain exclusively; and by 1854, the export of grain from Moldavia and Wallachia was equal to that exported by Russia. With this in mind, the Russian occupation of the principalities had added significance. Meanwhile, Russia's protective system was working to Britain's disadvantage. The British were being replaced in Russian domestic consumption; and, in the textile industry, producers of both nations were in direct competition. Ottoman consumption of British manufactured items grew at a tremendous rate after 1839.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50.

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup>A committee of Russian statesmen appointed by Czar Nicolas in 1829 to examine the results of the probable break-up of the Turkish Empire. They reported, contrary to Russian traditional



As the representatives of German interests, Austria was responsible for the control over the Lower Danube - the outlet for the products of central Europe. By the terms of Adrianople, September 14, 1829, Russia had agreed to the maintenance of free navigation on the Danube and was awarded the Danubian Delta in return for the commitments just mentioned. As long as the Delta was under Russian domination, however, the Austrians feared the danger that non-Russian commerce would be halted or that this area would provide the base for operations against the whole Danubian Basin.<sup>1</sup>

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policy, that it was desirable to preserve the integrity of the Turkish Empire. If Turkey dissolved further, they said, with a good deal of prophetic insight, strong small Balkan states would be formed, and Russia would prove unable to influence them. On the other hand, she already had treaty rights and influence in Turkey as it was, which she could increase by economic control and peaceful penetration. If Russia was to seek territory it should be in the direction of Armenia or Baghdad, not Constantinople. Nicolas grumbled but accepted the report, and his policy was for ten years the status quo and the integrity of Turkey." A.J. Grant and Harold Temperley, Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (1789 - 1950), 6th edition. Revised and edited by Lillian M. Fenson (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1952), p. 205.

Conflicting views are also held on Austrian economic interests. Puryear finds that Austria had more interests in common with Great Britain than with Russia. Her interests in Danubian shipping is obvious and it was she who really forced the evacuation of the principalities. However, Austria had never co-operated with Great Britain in tariff matters and had even forced closure of the Ottoman ports to the British. Since the treaty of Adrianople, Russia had been responsible for keeping the mouth of the Danube open for traffic; but on numerous occasions silting had occurred and Danubian exports virtually halted, resulting in British complaints and protests to the Russian foreign office." Brison Gooch, p. 51.

work, and probably, according to his analysis, it was understood very in the press. His constituents tell him that a majority of the House of Commons, would support his and a similar policy." Wilson, II, 187.

There was also a clash of personalities. Nicolas regarded Napoleon III as a 'parvenu' and refused to recognize the dynastic numeral. Towards Franz Joseph, Nicolas was domineering. The Czar felt that the Emperor of Austria owed his throne and the continuance of his Empire, and rightly so, to Russian assistance rendered during the violent year of 1848 - 1849. On the other hand, Napoleon hoped to restrict Russian expansion in the Balkans but desired even more the destruction of the Holy Alliance which blocked his principle of nationalities. As time showed, his threats to Austria to raise rebellions throughout the Empire were extremely numerous. It is probable that his desires against the Austrians were foremost to those of supporting Turkey.

The dispositions of the Russian forces along the Pruth served as the necessary implement whereby the bluff of Menshikov, which had not been successful, could be supplemented. By the end of May, he had moved his forces into Wallachia and Moldavia.<sup>1</sup> Although these provinces formed a part of the Ottoman Empire, they were held as tributary divisions as each was governed by a prince, called a

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<sup>1</sup>Palmerston wanted war at once: over the occupation of June 28, 1853:...It appears that Palmerston proposed on Saturday last that the entrance of the Russians into the Principalities should be considered a casus belli, in which, however, he was overruled and gave way. The Cabinet did not come to a vote upon it, but the general sentiment went with Aberdeen and Clarendon, and against Palmerston.

July 14, 1853:...It is evident that he (Palmerston) is at work, and probably, according to his ancient custom, in some underhand way in the press. His flatterers tell him that a majority of the House of Commons, would support him and a warlike policy.<sup>2</sup> Wilson, II, 467.

hespodar, rather than from Constantinople itself. Unlike Turkey, who had relinquished her right to military intervention, Russia had obtained from the Porte the right to mass troops in these provinces for the purpose of quelling any insurrections. On July 2, 1853, Nicolas exercised this right and occupied the Principalities, as the Russians later stated, as a precautionary measure. At the same time, Austria was invited to occupy Herzegovina and Serbia but the invitation was declined.<sup>1</sup> In anticipation of the Russian move into the Principalities, Nesselrode addressed a note to the Porte requesting the Turkish government to comply with the Russian demands, as previously set forth by Nenshikov. Should the note be rejected, then the armies of Russia would hold the Principalities as a security. Before the Porte could answer the note, the British fleet was ordered from Malta and took up a position in Besika Bay. The British fleet joined that of the French and this solidarity of purpose on the part of the two countries prompted a speedy rejection of Nesselrode's note by the Ottomans.

Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, had cautioned the Russian ambassador in London, Baron Brunow, of the danger of an impending rift in Anglo-Russian relations over the occupation of the Principalities. However, the Czar was given further indications

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<sup>1</sup>The Convention of Minchengrätz of 1833 provided for concerted action on the part of Russia and Austria in the maintenance of Turkey as long as possible. The two powers also agreed to cooperate in the eventual partition of Turkey." Puryear, p. 221.

of Aberdeen's peaceful intentions when the Prime Minister countermanded Clarendon's words of advice. The Czar felt that this move only served to strengthen his belief that his occupation of the Principalities would not provoke open resistance on the part of England. It was made under the impression that no country would move against him without the concurrence of England that he, of his own volition and without the advice of Nesselrode and against that of Count Orlov, ordered the occupation of the Principalities.<sup>1</sup> He continued in his belief that England would not, and could not, move against him because of his previous arrangements with her.

Austria became alarmed at the Russian intention of sending troops into the Principalities, and through Count Carl von Buol-Schauenstein, the Foreign Minister, the Austrians made known their feelings to the Czar. Russia could be faced with an attack by neighboring Austrian troops through Transylvania and the Banat. It became clear that Russia would be forced to maintain an extended line of military preparedness along the complete length of her Austrian frontiers. On June 17, Count Buol declared the unity of Austria and England. In both Vienna and London, it was felt that the maintenance of an independent Turkey was the safest road to

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<sup>1</sup>On June 13, 1853, Greville had noted that "his Majesty is now greatly excited that nothing can stop him, and he told Seymour the other day that he would spend his last ruble and his last soldier rather than give way. Still he professes that he aims at no more than a temporary occupation of the Principalities, and renounces all purpose of conquest." Wilson, II, 467.

peace. As Baul declared, Austrian intervention would become necessary because she was interested in the maintenance of free navigation on the Danube but would uphold the intervention only through words of diplomacy and not by any show of force.

Austria was given moral support by Prussia when on May 30, Berlin notified St. Petersburg that Menshikov had gone beyond what was considered proper diplomatic principles and that the course which Russia and her diplomat had adopted was most unfavorable. In consequence of which, the Prussian envoy at Constantinople had united with the representatives of France, Austria, and England, against Russia.

However, below the level of parliamentary debate and diplomatic protocol, a feeling of antagonism toward Russia had developed in Great Britain. Russia's role as the exponent of repression and absolutism (proved since 1844) was a new element abhorrent to the British. Furthermore, the vast size of Russia, a Russia still growing, added to the general conception of a large, devouring monster. With a rampant serfdom and obscurantist Christianity, actually a threat to civilization, Russia symbolized despotism and reaction. The crowning feature, in British eyes, was that Russia was threatening to become an amphibious Mediterranean power - and this was too much.<sup>1</sup>

When the Anglo-French fleets moved into Turkish territorial waters in June, the Russians charged the allies with an aggressive act against the Ottomans. As a consequence, they based their occupation of the Principalities on the theory that this action was

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<sup>1</sup>Brisson Gooch, p. 57.



a counter-stroke to the allied action, Clarendon invalidated the statements of the Russians in that the Russian occupation was prior to the allied strategem and that the fleets were in the Turkish waters with the consent of the Sultan. The ordering of the fleets to Turkey ameliorated the Austrian stand, however, and they did not move their forces into the Banat as had been expected. Rather, they preferred diplomacy to armed force and Buol summoned the Four Powers to Vienna to discuss the situation.

The Four Powers met in the Austrian capital and in July, 1853, framed that document which became known as the 'Vienna Note'. The contents had been negotiated under the guidance of Napoleon and Buol.<sup>1</sup> On completion, it was submitted to the representatives of the Four Powers at which time it was suggested that it should be proposed by Austria, as the chief negotiator, and that it be forwarded by the Porte to the Russian government. The chief concern

<sup>1</sup>Not only was peace in general at the moment strongly desired by France, but the prospect of this particular war was doubly and trebly distasteful to her. To devout Bonapartists it seemed a shocking thing that the new Napoleon should at once seek the alliance of the victor of Waterloo. Napoleon's Russian campaign moreover had inspired France with a profound conviction of the invulnerability of Russia; surely it was foolish, as M. Hugo suggested, to begin one's empire with 1812? The fact was that Napoleon III regarded England and not Russia as the main cause of his uncle's downfall; and for that reason among others he preferred the English to the Russian alliance as the corner-stone of his own foreign policy. But France as a whole ascribed Napoleon's ruin to the Russian expedition, and his punishment only to England. For the accident which had thrust on England the thankless task of being Napoleon's gaoler had kept alive anti-English sentiment in France long after popular feeling against Russia had subsided. Throughout the



of the Powers was to satisfy the demands of both France and Russia without sacrificing the sovereignty of Turkey. All avenues had been exhausted by the contracting parties to fully satisfy these demands, and when all was ready copies of the Note were forwarded to St. Petersburg and Constantinople on July 28, 1853, for approval or re-draft. Acceptance of the terms, however, was pressed for by the Four Powers.

Whilst Napoleon was following this course of action, on July 13, August 19, and September 21, he was exhorting the British to move the combined fleets first to the Dardanelles, then to the Golden Horn and finally into the Black Sea itself.

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Crimean War therefore Louis Napoleon, by the unstinted expenditure of his personal popularity, was engaged in forcing France, in alliance with the nation whom at the time she most disliked, into an attack upon the nation whom she held least capable of being attacked successfully. It was a testimony to the immense hold which he had on French public opinion that the Emperor should have succeeded in rallying it to such an adventure in such company at all. The limitations of Russian sea-power did genuinely concern Englishmen; but it left France entirely cold. And since England had insisted as a condition of the alliance that neither country should make annexations in any circumstances, the French were inclined to feel that they were fighting in a foreign cause with a stipulation in advance that they should not be paid for it. Nor was there even in France any real religious enthusiasm for the war such as a crusade on behalf of fellow-Christians naturally engendered in Russia. The dispute as to the Holy Places, it is too often forgotten, had been settled satisfactorily nearly a year before the war began; and the Turk had seldom the attraction for Catholics that he had for Protestants or Jews. Of the clerical and reactionary parties Orleanists generally were bitterly anti-British, and the Legitimists were pro-Russian to a man. In point of fact those who in France disapproved of the war least were probably the Socialists and Liberals; to bring down Russia was to set despotism tottering everywhere, and the same fact which made the war hateful to clear-sighted Royalists made it welcome to clear-sighted Republicans." Simpson, p. 243.

There were a number of related issues which now became apparent. Once again the powers had intruded into what the Czars had always considered their sole prerogative -- the Russo-Turkish conflict. By the very fact that Nicolas accepted the Note, he performed the same act for which he had severely criticised Alexander I. The situation was now worse as the fate of the Ottoman Empire had become the concern of the European courts. Moreover, Austria was leading the concert of the Western Powers and had not given her support to the Meshikov mission as Russia had done for the Bainsingen. As Austria was being supported by Prussia, it heralded the collapse of the Eastern Triple Alliance.

The draft of the Note, which had been forwarded to St. Petersburg on July 26, was accepted in its entirety on August 3.<sup>1</sup> When the news of the Russian acceptance reached Vienna, the diplomats believed that peace was assured.

Early in August the Vienna Note reached the Sublime Porte. The Turkish government saw in it the very reason which broke off the Meshikov discussions -- the protectorate of the Orthodox Church.<sup>2</sup> When Constantinople was informed of the Russian acceptance

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<sup>1</sup>The Vienna Note was shown privately to Russia; naturally the Russians accepted it when it was sent to them officially. The Sultan had no opportunity for criticism; the note was presented to him for his signature." Woodward, p. 249.

<sup>2</sup>The Note was shown to the Turkish ambassador at Vienna. The ambassador approved of it; he could hardly take upon himself the risk of rejecting it. Reschid denied that the Turkish ministers at Constantinople knew the contents of the note. It is pos-

on August 12, their belief became strengthened that the Note was a concoction of Nicolas. In compliance with specific directions from his government, Lord Stratford informed the Porte that England saw nothing offensive in the Note which they had endorsed and desired its immediate acceptance by the Turkish government. However, it would appear that the British ambassador had given to the Turkish ministers, by one means or another, some indication of his displeasure with the wording.<sup>1</sup> On August 19, it was decided that the Note was not acceptable in its present form and three modifications were suggested.<sup>2</sup> The Turkish stand was given spontaneous support by a display of religious and nationalist fervour which occurred when Russia invaded the Principalities. In mid-August, 15,000 troops were conveyed by the Egyptian navy and placed at the disposal of the Porte.

sible that the Turkish ambassador may have been afraid to admit that he had seen the note. In any case the sultan could complain with some reason that he was asked to sign a document affecting his sovereign rights without the chance of stating his case. Clarendon admitted that 'the Turks who are about to contract an engagement have a right to look closely at its terms, and we should not be justified in cramming down their throats what they declare they can't digest.' Woodward, p. 249.

<sup>1</sup>It thus appears that the refusal of Turkey to accept the unmodified Vienna Note and thereby to ensure peace, was so far from being Louis Napoleon's revenge on Nicolas, that this 'resentful parvenu' was deeply displeased and disappointed at the narrow failure of his pacific solution. But that the Czar did indeed owe his present rebuff to a casual act of arrogance in his past seemed probable enough. Only it was an older injury to a stronger man for which he was now to pay the penalty." Simpson, p. 232.

<sup>2</sup>Count Buol brought the French, British, and Prussian min-

The British government submitted the Turkish modifications to St. Petersburg. At first Nicolas was inclined to accept the Turkish alterations but yielded to Nesselrode who imparted to the original draft the very interpretation which caused it to be refused by the Turks, and for which Stratford was accused of misinterpretation. What Russia still desired, and what Turkey refused to grant, was the protection of the Orthodox Church in Turkey.

In September, a Prussian newspaper carried a confidential commentary on the Note and the Turkish amendments. It pointed out the fact that the Russians attached a new meaning which had not been intended by its architects. On September 22, the story was widely circulated by the press in London. It produced instantaneous reac-

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isters to find a formula of compromise. The Vienna Conference adopted the text of a note framed to conceal in ambiguities the extent of the Tsar's legal interest in the protection of the Orthodox Church. The Tsar agreed that if the Sultan would sign the note as drafted in Vienna, and send it to him by a special messenger, he would regard the incident as closed....It required a rigorous mind like that of Lord Stratford to see in the refinements of drafting that separated the Vienna Note from the Turkish modifications the difference between the maintenance and destruction of Turkish sovereignty. Vienna proposed, for instance, that the Turks should 'remain faithful to the letter and spirit of previous treaties'; Constantinople replied that they would 'remain faithful to their stipulations'. The Tsar refused these amendments." Robert C. Binkley, Realism and Nationalism, 1852-1871: The Rise of Modern Europe, William P. Langer, (ed.), (New York:Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1935), p. 172.

On the other hand, Woodward denies that Lord Stratford influenced the Turks in their course of action. "On the other hand, the Turks knew that Stratford's every mood; his honesty and seriousness told against him. He had framed a note of a different kind; the Turkish ministers knew that he had not changed his own opinion. In any case feeling at Constantinople ran dangerously high; the sultan could not neglect this opinion. Therefore the Turks rejected

tion in government circles in England and France and aroused public indignation in the two countries. Further to this it resulted in the collapse of the concert of the powers in Vienna which caused England and France to go their separate ways leaving Austria and Prussia to conduct future negotiations.

On October 4, 1853, the Porte issued a declaration which made peace dependent upon the evacuation of the Principalities. The Russians were required to remove their troops within fifteen days, an action which they refused to perform.

the terms of the note sent to them; they proposed an addition to the central clause. The sultan would 'remain faithful to the stipulations of the treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by that of Adrianople, relative to the protection by the Sublime Porte of the Christian religion'. The Russians refused the Turkish modifications. They went beyond mere refusal. Messelrode interpreted the Vienna note as granting the whole of the Russian claims, and allowing Russia a right to interfere in the interest of the twelve million Christian subjects of Turkey. When this interpretation became known Great Britain and France could no longer support the note; Russia could hardly recede from the attitude she had taken. The Turks claimed that they had been justified in their action, and the war party threatened revolution if the sultan would not fight Russia." Woodward, p. 250.

"There were other points of difference between the ambassadors' and the Turkish notes. The ambassadors asked the sultan to promise that the Greek Church should 'share in the advantages granted to the other Christian rites by convention or special arrangement'. The treaties of Carlowitz, Belgrade, and Sistova had given Austria the right of protecting all Roman Catholics in the empire, whether they were Ottoman subjects or not. The Turkish note read '...advantages granted or which might be granted to the other Christian communities, being subjects of the Porte'. " Ibid.

"But by a fatal error the Russian Chancellor sent to Vienna a reasoned analysis of Turkey's proposed modifications, and Russia's grounds for rejecting the note. This analysis revealed the fact that Russia had interpreted ambiguities in the original Note in a sense not intended by its framers, though only explicitly excluded by the proposed Turkish alterations. England and France refused to



Developments were rapid. Omer Pasha crossed the Danube and on August 23 began operations against the Russians in that area and around Batum. On October 31, Nesselrode issued a circular to the Russian representatives in the various European courts that the Czar intended to remain on the defensive and continue his occupation of the Principalities.

With the spontaneous risings of the Ottoman populace in September, a placard was posted on the wall of a Mosque, signed by a number of theological students, calling upon the Sultan to take action against the Russians. At the same time, a petition was presented to the Cabinet and the Sultan calling for war. The Turkish ministers were fearful of impending revolution and called upon Lord Stratford to order the fleets from Besika Bay to Constantinople. Stratford refused as the request was in contravention to the Straits agreements. In desperation, the Turks turned to M. de La Cour and described the situation in terms different from those which had been used with Lord Stratford. With La Cour, they stressed the dangers which might befall French interests and French nationals at the Porte. In panic, the French ambassador exhorted Lord Stratford to act. In conjunction with the Austrian representative, they did agree that the three countries should take a joint course of action if such was deemed necessary. The

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follow Austria and Prussia in urging Turkey to accept the original Note - a Note which even the Prince Consort now condemned." Simpson, p. 236.



British ambassador would not order the fleets into the Golden Horn, as the French requested, without proof equal to the urgency. Preventive measures were adopted as he contacted the admirals concerned and ordered extra steam ships into the area. The emergency measure was taken to protect the nationals and the Turkish cabinet in case of an insurrection. When the British and French steamers (two from each power) arrived at Constantinople, the populace quieted down and conditions returned to normal.

However, M. de La Cour notified his Emperor of conditions at the Porte which prompted Napoleon to request the British government to join him in ordering the fleets to Constantinople. On September 23, Count Walewski had an interview with Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon at which time he described the conditions in Turkey as portrayed by La Cour. To that moment, the British leaders had not received any startling news from Stratford and consequently were in a dilemma. The British ministers felt that if the need had been willing to act without authority from Vienna, Lord Stratford would have exercised the authority which they had invested in him and would, therefore, have ordered the fleets into the Golden Horn. Nevertheless, Walewski pursued his original designs to a successful conclusion. On the information as supplied to the Emperor of the French, and not from that received from their own representative, Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon agreed to instruct their ambassador to order the fleet to Constantinople for the security of the French and British interests, and if necessary for the protection of the Sultan. On September 23,

joint instructions were given to move the fleets into the Dardanelles, which violated the treaty of 1841, Lord Stratford did not comply fully with these instructions until he received the cabinet's order of October 8. Previous to this, a gradual deployment of the ships took place because of the exhortations of La Cour and the Turkish Ministers.<sup>1</sup> It was not until November 15 that the British and French fleets were concentrated in the Golden Horn. Lord Stratford did not order the fleets to Constantinople as he considered the Turkish situation as being one of 'more pleasure than alarm'.

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<sup>1</sup>"On 4 October, the sultan declared war on Russia. In spite of the excitement of the Turks, Stratford still worked for peace. He disobeyed the order of 23 September about the fleet (this order reached Stratford on 4 October), because he thought that the presence of British and French ships would encourage the Turks. He received the second order; again he waited. On 20 October he persuaded the ambassadors of France, Austria, and Prussia to ask the Turks to suspend hostilities for ten or twelve days. He might have obtained this suspension earlier if the Austrian ambassador had been willing to act without authority from Vienna. This delay wrecked the plan. On 23 October Omar Pasha attacked the Russians in the Principalities. The British cabinet made one final effort for peace. Stratford was told to ask for delay. He had already done all that he could do; he persuaded the Turks not to send their fleets into the Black Sea, but he could not prevent the dispatch of a light flotilla to Sinope." Woodard, p. 252.

The Russians "did not know the Turkish naval plans, and suspected wrongly, that the ships were being sent to stir up rebellion in the Caucasus." *Ibid.*

On November 27, 1853, Queen Victoria wrote to Lord Aberdeen, "The perusal of Lord Stratford's Despatches of the 5th inst. has given the Queen the strongest impression that, whilst guarding himself against the possibility of being called to account for acting in opposition to his instructions, he is pushing us deeper and deeper into the War policy which we wish to escape. Wherefore

On October 5, 1853, the British government informed the Russians that the allied navies would not enter the Black Sea as long as the Russians did not cross the Danube and did not attack any port on the Black Sea. On the other hand, the Turkish forces obtained two minor successes over the Russians when they crossed the Danube before the end of November.

Whilst these events were taking place, Nicolas made personal visits to Franz Joseph of Austria and Frederick William of Prussia.<sup>1</sup>

should these poor Turkish steamers go to the Crimea, but to board the Russian fleet and tempt it to come out of Sebastopol, which would thus constitute the much desired contingency for our combined Fleets to attack it, and so engage it irretrievably." Benson and Escher, II, 463.

<sup>1</sup>The tsar during a visit to Olmütz late in September, made a determined effort to win over the emperor Francis-Joseph. He declared that he had not even contemplated the possibility of war. He had occupied the Principalities simply as a pledge and still hoped to avoid a conflict. His forces would not cross the Danube unless provoked. They would, however, conduct a vigorous campaign in Asia Minor. The meeting at Olmütz formed the prelude to an effort to restore the alliance of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The two emperors and the king of Prussia met in Warsaw. During a further meeting at Olmütz, Nicolas and Francis-Joseph held discussions with the Prince of Prussia. The climax was reached when in a last desperate effort to secure Prussian support, the tsar paid a sudden visit to Berlin. It was to no avail. At one moment indeed Francis-Joseph, inspired by gratitude for past assistance and by the Russian sympathies of his military advisers, had agreed to an offensive and defensive alliance of the three powers. Frederick-William, however, rejected the proposal and Manteuffel informed Nicolas that it was in Prussia's interest to remain neutral. By maintaining an attitude of neutrality Prussia hoped to render a service to the cause of peace. Manteuffel, at the same time, informed the British Minister that Prussia would sign no agreement with the tsar. The King, he explained, was haunted by fears of a French invasion of Prussia. In view of the Prussian attitude,

In Austria, the diplomats continued their efforts to preserve the peace. On December 5 a new note was drawn up in which the Four Powers offered their services as mediators. Their attempts at mediation were destroyed by the news that a fleet of Turkish

ships, with reinforcements for Batum, was attacked and annihilated by the Russian fleet at Sinope.

Francis-Joseph also resolved to await events. By the end of October Nicolas knew the bitter truth that he would get no help from either Austria or Prussia. W.E. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question: 1848 - 1871, (Cambridge, at the University Press, 1958), p. 54.

War was not yet certain; the emperor was alarmed to find that he might be faced with fanatical Turkish resistance, and that Aberdeen and his cabinet had set a limit to their concessions. At the end of September Nicolas met the Austrian emperor at Olmitz. He was ready to retract the extravagant interpretation of the Vienna note. Buol, the Austrian foreign minister, suggested the repudiation of the original note, with a statement recognising that the duty of protecting the Christian religion in Turkey had devolved on the sultan; Russia reserved to herself only the task of watching that the engagements of the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji were carried out. The British cabinet thought that this proposal was a trick arranged by Russia and Austria. Aberdeen wished, after the war, that he had accepted the proposal; at the time he believed that it did not wholly cancel the Russian interpretation of the Vienna note. The cabinet agreed with him, rejected the wording of Buol's compromise, and again ordered Stratford to call up the fleet (8 October). Simpson, p. 251.

governments for permitting their fleets to lie at anchor in the safety of the Bosphorus whilst the port of Sinope was laid waste. By his circular of October 21, Bismarck indicated that Nicolas would remain on the defensive or would at least confine his activities to the Danube. This novel action which took place within the confines of a harbour and included the destruction of the port it-

## CHAPTER 4

### THE NEGOTIATIONS AT VIENNA

During the middle of November, 1853, the Russian fleet was ordered from Sevastopol and was deployed from north to south across the Black Sea. Turkish merchantmen were boarded and their cargoes confiscated. The Russian navy stopped neutral vessels and obtained information regarding the positions and movements of the allied fleet. Russian naval action gave every impression that a victory over the Turks was desired.

On November 20, Russian naval forces were sighted off Sinope. For ten days the Russians cruised off the port. Finally, on November 30 a superior Russian force under the command of Admiral Machinoff annihilated the Turkish squadron and devastated the town. Out of 4,000 men less than 300 survived.

On December 11, news of the disaster reached London and Paris. Indignation ran high in both capitals against the unwanted slaughter, against their ambassadors, their admirals, and their governments for permitting their fleets to lie at anchor in the safety of the Golden Horn whilst the port of Sinope was laid waste. By his circular of October 31, Nesselrode indicated that Nicolas would remain on the defensive or would at least confine his activities to the Danube. This naval action which took place within the confines of a harbour and included the destruction of the port it-



self, appeared as a breach of agreement. However, the peoples of France and England had not been informed that Turkish forces had crossed the Danube and had seized the Fort of St. Nicolas on the eastern shore of the Black Sea and that they had also attacked Russian positions along the Armenian frontier. Through a lack of information on all these points, the peoples of both countries had been seriously misled. Further to this, they had also been given to believe that Sinope had been attacked without sufficient warning, whereas daily reports were made to Constantinople regarding the operations of the Russian fleets during the ten days that they stood off of Sinope. Stratford was informed of the Russian action but did not order the fleets into the Black Sea as he had not received instructions to attack the Russians should they appear.<sup>1</sup>

The British and French press whipped up a feeling of hatred against the Russians and began to demand reprisals. At the height of this furor, on December 14, Lord Palmerston resigned his post. There were two factions in the British cabinet at this time.

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<sup>1</sup>On the 17th of October, Aberdeen informed Queen Victoria that the cabinet had deliberated and "it was determined to adhere to a defensive principle of action in the East. The Fleets may perhaps be already at Constantinople; but, at all events, they are to be brought there forthwith, and to be stationed either there or in the Bosphorus unless the Russians should cross the Danube, or make any attack upon the Turkish possessions on the coast of the Black Sea. In this case, the combined Fleets would enter the Black Sea, for the defence of the Turkish territory." Benson and Esler, II, 453.

After Sinope, Queen Victoria wrote to Clarendon, "the Queen has to make one more and a most serious observation. The Fleet has orders now to prevent a recurrence of such disasters as that of Sinope. This cannot mean that it should protect the Turkish Fleet



On one side ranged the followers of Lord Aberdeen, who believed that peace could be attained if France and England continued their negotiations in the hope of being able to accept whatever might be reasonable in the Russian demands. In opposition to Lord Aberdeen was Lord Palmerston and his adherents, who believed that peace could be secured and maintained only through a strong and regenerated Turkey and that Russia should be warned that if Turkey were attacked she would be forced to contend with not just the Ottomans alone. Lord Aberdeen, the Queen, and especially Prince Albert were severely criticized for their unwarlike conciliatory approach to the whole affair and the Prince Consort was singled out as being pro-Russian.

in acts of aggression upon the Russian territory, such as an attack on Sebastopol, of which the papers speak. This point will have to be made quite clear, both to Lord Stratford and the Turks". *Ibid.*, II, 470.

"The effect upon British opinion was remarkable. The action was called a 'massacre': Aberdeen was accused of cowardice and of betraying his country to Russia. On the 14 December Palmerston resigned from the cabinet." Woodward, p. 253.

"So far as England was concerned the war was regretted by the government and demanded by the people. And it was the will of the people that prevailed." Simpson, p. 242.

"Completely different was the state of affairs in France. As in England it was the government, so in France it was the people who wanted peace. This second fact too has been obscured by another variant of doctrinaire liberalism. In general it is of the faith to believe that governments and not people are the originators of war. But in this instance republican propaganda demands not an exception in the case of France. It postulates that Louis Napoleon had just inflicted on France a government which she detested, and was forced to lessen its internal unpopularity by the distraction of a popular war. The truth is that the French people had just obtained the government they desired, and wanted above all things to be left in peace." *Ibid.*

On December 16, Napoleon requested that the British government present to Nicolas a declaration of intent on the part of the two powers. The two governments, he suggested, should inform the Czar that any attack on Turkish territory or upon the Turkish flag would be considered a 'casus belli' by them, and, to forestall any future repetition of Sinope, any and all Russian naval vessels found sailing on the Black Sea would be ordered to return to their base, and failing to do so, force would be used. In effect this would mean an outright defensive alliance with Turkey against Russia.<sup>1</sup>

On December 22, the British cabinet adopted the proposal of the Emperor of the French, and their representatives in St. Petersburg conveyed this information to Count Nesselrode. At the same time, Lord Palmerston withdrew his resignation and returned as Home Secretary. Although he had based his resignation on the difference in views which he had entertained regarding Lord John

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<sup>1</sup> Thus England 'drifted' into war with Russia. If Stratford had been in control, he might have secured concessions from Turkey which would have satisfied Russia. If Aberdeen had been master of his cabinet, he would have made almost any concession to avoid war. If Palmerston had been in Aberdeen's place, he might have obtained a Russian withdrawal from the Principalities. If Nicolas had not assumed too long that Aberdeen would keep his country out of war, the Russians might not have committed themselves to a course from which retreat was almost impossible. If the British cabinet had not suspected the Austro-Russian negotiations at Olmitz, a settlement might have been reached. If the Russians had not destroyed the Turkish ships at Sinope, public opinion in Great Britain would have been less warlike. Finally, the clumsy plan of threatening Russia at the moment when Great Britain and France were making their last offer of peace destroyed any chance of escape." Woodward, p. 253.

Russell's 'Parliamentary Reform Bill', it is significant that he resigned at the time when news reached London regarding the disaster at Sinope and withdrew his resignation, December 25, when the British government declared their unity with the French proposal.

At the same time, the Four Powers had been active at Constantinople in attempting to mediate a peace. Agreement had been reached on the terminology and articles of a new Note which was accepted immediately by the Porte. A draft of the Note was forwarded to St. Petersburg for acceptance or alteration. Whilst discussing the Note with Seymour on January 12, 1854, Messelrode informed him of the movements of the allied fleets which had entered the Black Sea on January 4. Nicolas had bided his time until he was in receipt of official notification of the deliberations which had taken place in London and Paris. The Czar had instructed his representatives in those two cities to obtain information on whether the Anglo-French fleets would also prevent the Turkish navy from violating Russian territorial rights. He further instructed his ambassadors that if the answer was in the negative they were to depart with their legations immediately. The result was that Brunnow left London and Kiselev left Paris on January 6. Within a fortnight, Seymour and Castelbajac left St. Petersburg.

On January 13, 1854, the Four Powers again decided to enter into negotiations with the Czar. Their purpose was to present once more the Note which had been drafted at Constantinople and

accepted by the Porte. To facilitate the negotiations at St. Petersburg, Baron Budberg was returned to Prussia and Count Orlov to Austria. The delegates were instructed to impress upon Nicolas that Austria and Prussia could not remain neutral in any future hostilities with Turkey on the part of Russia, and, that they intended to uphold the principles which they had adopted by the Quadruple Alliance. Queen Victoria embarrassed the two eastern nations and ruined their efforts at mediation by informing her government, in her speech from the throne, that the British people would operate in 'cordial cooperation with the Emperor of the French'. This gave the impression to Europe that Victoria would maintain a separate alliance with France in deference to the wishes of Napoleon. In so doing, she paved the way for future difficulties with Austria and Prussia.

On January 20, 1854, Napoleon addressed a letter to Nicolas. The purpose is in ambiguity as Napoleon at first suggested a limited armistice during which time further negotiations would be conducted and appealed to the Czar for a softer stand. In closing, however, he informed Nicolas that should he refuse this peaceful overture that England and France would be forced to resort to arms. In the course of this letter he spoke not only for himself but for the Queen of England as well, without to all appearances, any sanction on the part of the British monarch or government.<sup>1</sup> Naturally, the

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<sup>1</sup>That Louis had a sincere desire for the English alliance

Czar became highly indignant at this coercion and not only refused the offer to negotiate but alluded to what had happened to the French in 1812.<sup>1</sup>

The course of action which was taken by England and France might have been understandable if Austria and Prussia had demonstrated at this time a hesitancy of action or a desire to proceed their own separate ways. Austria had been asked by Nicholas to remain neutral in any Russo-Turkish war as well as in any future hostilities which might arise between east and west. Russia had helped Franz Joseph to maintain the Hungarians in subserviency and had requested Austria to remain neutral as a small recompense for his assistance. In Paris Drouyn de Lhays, the French Foreign Minister, was accusing Austria of subserviency to Russia. Count

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in general, and for co-operation with England on the Eastern Question in particular, is no doubt true....but that he had a consistent desire to lead both countries into war, is a contention which can now be conclusively disproved." Simpson, p. 230.

However, when Turkey rejected the terms of the previous Note, "Napoleon III 'did not conceal his disappointment and displeasure' from Cowley, and urged that more stringent instructions should be sent to Vienna with a view of obtaining the compliance of the Porte." Ibid., p. 231.

<sup>1</sup> Sinope had created a general desire in the English for war. "When in January 1854 the Czar's rumoured acceptance of a settlement emanating from Vienna seemed for a moment to promise peace there was no longer, as in the previous summer, a general sensation of relief: only a cry of disappointment that 'the baggar would not fight'." Simpson, p. 240. Since Sinope, the press in both countries maintained a steady stream of invective against Russia and all things and persons pro-Russian.

Joseph Hübner, the Austrian ambassador to Paris, claimed that the Russian aid which had been rendered in 1849 did not mean that Austria would side with Russia at this time.<sup>1</sup> Of all the powers it was Austria which was vitally affected by the Russian occupation of the Principalities and it would be Austria which would be most seriously affected by any clash between Russia and Turkey. From the time that Nicolas had first ordered his troops into the Principalities, Austria had endeavoured to have them removed and had consistently followed a course of action towards this end. In conjunction with this, Count Buol had worked for a consistency of aims among the Four Powers and a consistency of action by them. Proof was given to this by Austria's acceptance of Clarendon's note of November 16 and thereby affirmed her determination to unite herself with them, in their protection of the Ottoman Porte. On December 5, both Germanic powers had united themselves by protocol to assist England and France in their determination to maintain the 'status quo' in Turkey.<sup>2</sup> The note of January 13, 1854, was followed by counter-proposals from Russia and these were rejected on February 2 by the Four Powers.

<sup>1</sup>It became the primary aim of Russian diplomacy to secure at least the neutrality of the two Germanic powers, by the same token, it became the basic object of allied diplomatic strategy to draw them into the war on the side of England and France.<sup>2</sup> Mosse, p. 55.

<sup>2</sup>Count Buol, informed Westmoreland, the British ambassador to Vienna, that Austria regarded the maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Turkey as essential to her



and daily. During the latter part of February, 1854, Clarendon decided to take the initiative instead of following the other powers. In an official summons he called upon the Russian government to evacuate the Principalities within six days of the official receipt of the summons - by April 30. A refusal or omission to comply with the terms would be considered by the British government as an act which would be tantamount to a declaration of war. The intention of Austria was to have the Four Powers, jointly and in conference, determine a reasonable and just date. Instead Lord Clarendon, in advance of the other powers, dictated the date for the evacuation. The summons was sent to Lord Westmorland at Vienna and it arrived there as the counter-proposals were being received from St. Petersburg to the last attempt at mediation on the part of the powers in Vienna. The powers were hastily convened, the counter-proposals examined

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interests and would conclude no engagement with Russia barring the employment of arms against that power. Since, however, Russia had asked Austria to intercede with the Porte, Buel urged England and France to have confidence in the assurances of the Tsar that the occupation of the Principalities did not mean war. Turning aside a suggestion of England and France for a conference of the signatory powers of the Treaty of 1841 to consider ways and means of maintaining Turkish integrity. Buel proposed direct negotiations between Russia and Turkey. This was rejected on the ground that Turkey would refuse and that it would convert the eastern question from one of European interest into one of a private understanding between Russia and Turkey." Charles W. Hallberg, Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, 1852 - 1864: A Study of Austro-French Relations (New York: Bookman Associates, 1955), p. 47.

From the Principalities - April 30, and, failing a response

and duly rejected. A new note was drafted by the Austrian government and forwarded to Count Esterhazy, Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg, along with the Clarendon ultimatum. Esterhazy was instructed to support the Clarendon document and the Austrian lead was given support by Baron Manteuffel of Prussia.

Late in February, England and France invited the two German powers to associate themselves with a summons to Russia to evacuate the Principalities. This invitation brought out the latent differences between the attitudes of Austria and Prussia. Whilst the Austrian cabinet gave effective diplomatic support to the western demand, that of Prussia adopted a policy of neutrality directed against France rather than Russia. On 11 March, the king of Prussia informed Francis-Joseph of his intention to observe an absolute neutrality. He expressed pleasure at the report that Austria had decided to sign no convention with the western powers except in conjunction with Prussia. The two countries should conclude an offensive and defensive alliance for the duration of the war. Based on their common neutrality, this should provide for the joint defence of all their territories. In making these proposals Frederick-William pursued a double object. He wished to prevent Austria from joining the western powers and dragging Germany into war with Russia. He also hoped to strengthen neutral Germany in the face of possible aggression from France. Prussia would in case of need help to defend Austrian possessions in Italy in return for Austrian assistance in the defence of Germany on the Rhine. An arrangement of this kind would enable both to withstand all possible pressure from France.<sup>1</sup>

On March 16, 1854, Berlin increased her expenditures by thirty million thalers supposedly for the purpose of carrying out her part of the bargain which had been reached at Vienna. This action followed that of Austria when that country joined with Britain and France in formally demanding the removal of all Russian forces from the Principalities by April 30, and, failing a compliance

<sup>1</sup>Notes, The European Powers..., p. 56.

on the part of the Russians, to declare war without hesitation. In conjunction with this, the Austrians increased their forces along the Principalities at first by 50,000 men and then on May 15, this force was raised by another 95,000 men.

Nicolas still believed that Austria could be bound to a position of neutrality. To this end he sent Count Orlov to Vienna to secure an Austrian promise and at the same time to make known those conditions under which Russia would maintain the peace - Baron Budberg made the same propositions in Berlin. The Russians simply suggested to the German powers that they join either Russia or the western powers, or remain neutral.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Frederick William was at the centre of a turmoil which he much enjoyed. Gorlach urged him to fight on the side of Russia; Bunsen on that of the Western Powers; Manteuffel sought security by making an alliance with Austria. Bismarck rejected all three lines. He wanted Prussia to remain in isolation and to profit from it. 'Let us frighten Austria by threatening an alliance with Russia, and frighten Russia by letting her think that we may join the Western Powers'. A.J.P. Taylor, Bismarck, The Man and the Statesman (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 38.

"To Orloff's request for a declaration of strict neutrality, Buol replied that this would be possible only if Russia agreed to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, evacuate the Principalities, and not bring about changes there which would alter the relations of the Sultan to his subjects, and not cross the Danube. When asked point-blank by Franz Joseph if Russia would promise to maintain the status quo in Turkey and not cross the Danube, Orloff was unable to give a definite answer but showed him an autograph letter from the Tsar. In this, Nicolas declared that Russia would not cross the Danube so long as the attitude of the western powers or the stubbornness of Turkey did not necessitate a change. As for the status quo, it could no longer be spoken of since Turkey was completely under the influence of England and France. While declaring that he would never permit the liberated Slav subjects of the Sultan to come again under the Turkish yoke, Nicolas promised to see to it that they exercised no

In Berlin,

liberals of all shades were pre-British and anti-Russian: Bonin, the Minister of War, was not averse to a campaign at the side of the western allies. On the other hand, the military camarilla surrounding the King was filled with admiration for Nicolas I and sympathized with the Christians under Turkish rule. The King, as was his wont, tried to steer a middle course. Without actively supporting the western powers, he yet firmly declined the Russian demand for a formal promise of armed neutrality.<sup>1</sup>

The mission of Baron Budberg, therefore, ended in failure. In writing to Nicolas, Frederick William explained that his neutrality was based on religious scruples and that it was because of conscience that he refused any alliance with the western powers and Russia. However, he did advise Nicolas to yield to the demands of the Four Powers as a failure to do so would bring on an European war.

Austria became fearful and vacillating. She was loath to supplant the Holy Alliance with possibly a less durable alliance with the west. Then, too, the assistance which was rendered by Nicolas weighed heavily on her shoulders. However, none of these to Buol proved strong enough to warrant a position of complete neutrality and he concluded that Austria's position was with those

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harmful influence over the Slavs of the Austrian Monarchy. Finally, he urged Franz Joseph to maintain the old alliance of the three courts. No longer deceived as to the real aim of the Tsar and fully conscious of their threat to Austria's position in the Balkans, Franz Joseph refused to bind himself by a written engagement. The Russian proposal was definitely rejected." (January 31, 1854) Hallberg, p. 48.

<sup>1</sup> Hoese, *The European Powers...*, p. 56.

powers which were prepared to stop Russia. Although so inclined, he was unprepared to bind Austria with treaties and remained desirable of a more moderate path and the retention of freedom of action. On the other hand, Hübner had changed his line of reasoning on the subject and now began to exhort Buol to relinquish his untenable position and to reach agreements with France and England; he began to fear Napoleon's tremendous influence with the troublesome nationalities.

'For the great power,' he wrote to Buol on January 30, 1854, 'neutrality is possible only so long as its special interests and the European equilibrium are not in danger. Beyond that, neutrality becomes impossible'. Even if it were possible, argued Hübner, it would not be a wise course as it offered no assurances for the security of Austria and would frighten rather than calm European public opinion inasmuch as it would enable Russia to defeat the western powers. Neutrality was not a pledge of peace but a means of provoking a general war; whereas intervention on the side of England and France would quickly convince Russia of the wisdom of coming to terms. However, a policy of neutrality would encourage Russia to take steps which would end by making her the enemy of Austria. Predicting that Austria would disappear from the map of Europe as an independent state and would become the first vassal of the Tsar if the latter were permitted to increase his influence in the east, Hübner urged Buol to take decisive measures to check the Russian advance. 'Russia wants to advance, Austria ought to warn her to halt and to stop her even at the cost of the last soldier and her last florin. That is the eastern question. Everyone knows it. Let us have the courage to say it to Russia'.<sup>1</sup>

Hübner was fearful that either France or England would create disturbances amongst the subject nationalities of Austria. Drouyn de Lhuys persistently threatened Hübner with this point and reminded him that if France moved against Russia with the lone

<sup>1</sup> Hallberg, p. 53.

assistance of England, England would obtain the benefits of concessions rendered during the future peace talks. Further to this, de Ligny informed K bner that France would not be able to restrain England if she should call on the Poles, Hungarians, or Italians to revolt. On February 14, K bner demanded that Buol order the concentration of troops along the frontiers of the Principalities and Serbia, that Austria align herself alongside the western powers and in conjunction with this that they, in unison, demand the evacuation of the Principalities.

Austria became acutely aware of the value of Prussian support and aimed at an alliance with her. Austria was fearful that Russia would move further into the Balkans. If this should happen, Austria would be forced to move against the Principalities. Should this occur, a Prussian promise to defend Austria would deter Russia from attacking Austria.

On February 6, Russia broke off diplomatic relations with England and France. Negotiations now began for a united front of the Four Powers. War was declared on March 27 and on April 10, 1854, England and France signed an alliance and at the same time asked Austria and Prussia to join with them.<sup>1</sup> However, this effort failed as Frederick William refused to sign the convention and Napoleon was forced to announce to the Corps L gislatif that Austria had not

<sup>1</sup>Early in May (1854) the French Emperor broached this idea to Cowley; he thought that Sweden, Sardinia, and perhaps even Spain might join the alliance; and that it might be worthwhile to have them.<sup>2</sup> Simpson, p. 253.



united herself with England and France.<sup>1</sup>

At this time Austria was not prepared to give support militarily to France and England. Although she aligned herself with their policy, she was determined to maintain independent action until Russia caused her to do otherwise. Because of this, Count Francois Bourqueney, the French ambassador to Vienna, failed to obtain a written agreement for military cooperation.<sup>2</sup> This policy was further demonstrated when Buol cautioned Kibner to avoid commitments. Kibner was informed that Austria would not join the western powers until their forces appeared on the Danube and only after the peace proposals of the western powers were found accep-

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<sup>1</sup>On the 24 of May, 1854, Frederick William wrote to Queen Victoria regarding Napoleon III, "he ought to thank God that my view of Russian policy and my fidelity to your Majesty have prevented me from making him begin this Turkish War on the other side of his own frontier....I have recognized it as my duty before God to preserve, for my people and my provinces, Peace, because I recognize Peace as a blessing and War as a curse. I cannot and I will not side with Russia because Russia's arrogance and wickedness have caused this horrible trouble, and because duty and conscience and tradition forbid me to draw the sword against Old England. In the same degree duty and conscience forbid me to make unprovoked war against Russia, because Russia, so far, has done me no harm. So I thought, so I willed when I thought myself isolated....I also believe, honestly and firmly, that the character of a so-called Great Power must justify itself, not by swimming with the current, but by standing firm like a rock in the sea." Benson and Esber, III, 29.

<sup>2</sup>The convention as finally agreed upon provided that the two powers would use their influence both in order to prevent aggression in Italy against the status quo and to settle the eastern crisis and that eventually they would cooperate militarily in Italy and the east. This was left unsigned, awaiting Austria's intervention against Russia." March 21, 1854. Hallberg, p. 59

table by other European states. On February 25, France guaranteed Austria that the status quo in Italy would be maintained if Austria was prepared to give active armed support.

Negotiations designed to draw Austria and Prussia into an alliance with the western powers continued after the collapse of the four-power convention. Austria's active participation in the war depended, however, on several factors. In the first place, it would be necessary for the allies to send their troops to the Danube, for at no time did Franz Joseph consider a campaign in the Crimea. The concentration of Russian troops in the Principalities and in Poland was a direct threat to the Austrian Monarchy. Secondly, the support of Prussia and the German states was deemed necessary before Austria could run the risk of challenging the Tsar. Without such support, Prussia might take advantage of Austria's involvement in order to acquire leadership in the Bund. Finally, Vienna desired a guarantee from Napoleon that the status quo in Italy would be maintained while the war in the east was in progress.<sup>1</sup>

In December, 1853, Count Albert Pourtales was dispatched to London by Frederick William to offer the services of Prussia as a mediator in the dispute provided that Prussia was given a free rein in gaining control over the Bund and under the provision that the German and Prussian frontiers would be respected. Austria became suspicious and to no less a degree did England. However, as with Austria, Prussia also had cause to fear. The Prussians had visions of a French thrust across the Rhine and the thought of the reestablishment of the Polish Kingdom frightened them. So too, England might even attack her commerce - the Baltic fleet had sailed for parts unknown on March 14 under Admiral Charles Napier.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Hallberg, p. 58.

<sup>2</sup>An imposing fleet had been sent to the Baltic with quite

Because of these fears, Prussia sought an alliance with Austria. In conjunction with this, the Prussian missions to London, Paris, and St. Petersburg by special emissaries ended in failure.

Because of Prussia's offer of support both on the part of herself and the German Confederation, Franz Joseph called a Crown Council on March 22 to discuss Prussia's new offer and what Austria's course of action should be if France and England attacked Russia. Buol urged that Austria should act independently of Prussia, otherwise Prussia would gain ascendancy in Germany through the vacillations of Austria. He regarded the dreams of Frederick William as no less dangerous to the future independence of Austria as the Russian threat in the east.

From this, Prussia expected to derive three advantages: furthering her position in Germany through Russia, placing all the responsibility on Austria as far as the western powers were concerned and winning German public opinion to her side.<sup>1</sup>

On April 20, the Austrians and Prussians signed an offensive-defensive alliance in Berlin. Both powers guaranteed each

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unimposing results. True, the chief fortress on the Åland Islands had surrendered: but beyond the raising of its fortifications nothing permanent had been achieved. Louis Napoleon had attempted to make use of this small success as a means towards the fulfilment of his earlier proposal for the extension of the alliance. Apparently on his own responsibility, he caused his foreign minister to offer the islands to Sweden. (August 27, 1854) But Sweden was too cautious to throw in her lot definitely with the allies at this stage, though she asked them to continue their occupation of the islands. This however proved impracticable; instead it was decided at Paris that the allies should content themselves with razing the fortifications". Simpson, p. 256. Cowley to Clarendon, August 27 and 29, 1854.

<sup>1</sup>Hallberg, p. 61.

others possessions against attack, and that an act of aggression against either power would be considered an attack on both nations. However, it further stated that either power was not to conclude alliances with other nations which would not be in conformity with this new agreement. This was further safeguarded by the fact that Austria could not call on Prussia to come to her assistance unless Austria first made known her plans to Prussia and obtained her consent. However, Prussia agreed to demand that Russia remove her troops from the Principalities but would not come to the assistance of the Austrians unless Russia attempted to annex the Principalities or cross the Balkans. Prussia was fearful of France and the threat to the Rhine. She was physically and financially unable to maintain a large army in the east and one almost as large in the west. Therefore, in compliance with the agreement, Frederick William asked Nicolas to remove his troops from the Principalities on April 29, but on May 7, he asked Franz Joseph to do nothing which would involve the two powers. It must be remembered that a number of the German courts were related to the royal family of Russia and it was the threat of France which kept them from actively supporting the Russians.

In the meantime, on receipt of the British and Austrian documents demanding the evacuation of the Principalities, Nesselrode informed the British and French consuls on March 19 that the Czar refused to answer the note - such a refusal constituted a declaration of war. On March 27, the Emperor of the French informed

the Senate that the two countries were to be considered at war. On the same day, Queen Victoria announced that all diplomatic relations had been broken off and that the British government officially declared war on March 28, 1854. The Russian declaration followed soon after - on April 11. On April 14, Prince Mikhail Gorchakov crossed the Danube at three points.

On the 10th of April, 1854, there was signed that treaty of alliance between France and England which many men had suffered themselves to look upon as a security for the peace of Europe, the high contracting parties engaged to do what lay in their power for the re-establishment of a peace which should secure Europe against the return of the existing troubles, and, in order to set free the Sultan's dominions, they promised to use all land and sea forces required for the purpose. They engaged to receive no overtures tending to the cessation of hostilities, and to enter into no engagement with the Russian Court without having deliberated in common. They renounced all aim at separate advantages, and they declared their readiness to receive into their alliance any of the other Powers of Europe.<sup>1</sup>

On June 8, Emperor Franz Joseph talked with Frederick William at Teschen, Silesia. Buol had demanded on June 3 that the Russians evacuate the Principalities. During their talks, Frederick

William supported the Austrian demand and promised to press it at St. Petersburg. As a necessary condition, he asked that the Anglo-French fleets be removed from the Black Sea.

On June 14, Austria and Turkey concluded an alliance which provided in its terms that Russian troops be removed from the Prin-

<sup>1</sup>Kinglake, I, 296.

cipalities.<sup>1</sup>

On June 29, Nicolas

agreed to withdraw from the Principalities provided that Austria would not join his enemies and would prevent them from engaging in further hostilities against Russian territories. After an armistice had been arranged, Russia would enter into negotiations on the basis of the protocol of April 9th, with the exception of the last point. Despite the conditional nature of the Tsar's reply, Russian troops were recalled and on August 20th Austrian and Turkish troops entered the Principalities in accordance with the Treaty of June 14th.<sup>2</sup>

Austria was aware of the plans which Nicolas had reached with his chief adviser, Prince Paskievitch, by which the Russian land forces were to cross the Danube in the vicinity of 'its great head' and occupy Silistria, Shoumla, and cross the passes of the Balkans towards Adrianople and the shores of the Bosphorus. However, when on May 19, Paskievitch appeared before Silistria in Bulgaria and thereby put his own plans into operation, he met with such an opposition that he was forced to raise the siege on June 22. In less than a fortnight, Prince Mikhail Gorchakov was defeated at

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<sup>1</sup>In a treaty with Turkey signed on 14 June, the Austrian government promised to take all necessary measures to secure the evacuation of the two provinces. It undertook not to conclude any agreement with Russia which was not based on the integrity of Turkey and the sovereign rights of the sultan. In return, until the conclusion of peace, the Porte transferred to Austria its sovereign rights in Moldavia and Wallachia.<sup>2</sup> Mosse, The European Powers..., p. 58.

<sup>2</sup>Hallberg, p. 67. The Vienna Conference had been reconvened, and on April 9 the protocol was signed which was to guarantee the integrity of the Ottomans, the evacuation of the Principalities, the independence of the Sultan, and the regulation of political relations with Turkey which would safeguard the European equilibrium. The latter point was disregarded by Nicolas although it was undoubtedly the most important.



Giurgevo on July 7. The two successes relieved the pressure on Constantinople and the defeat of the Russians at Giurgevo left the Turks virtual masters of the lower Danube.

Russia was now faced with possible Austrian intervention and Prussia had promised Franz Joseph to put his army in readiness. When the Austrians moved their troops into the region along her southeastern frontier, she threatened the flank of the Russian army. With the successive defeats at Silistria and Giurgevo, Nicolas began to relinquish his untenable position in the Principalities, but he still entertained the thought of saving some small part of his former holdings and consequently decided to retain Moldavia. In view of this new Russian move, the Austrians sought help from France. Buol had hoped that the French would release some of their forces to be used in the Danubian area. Returning to Austria, Buol convened the Four Powers at Vienna at which time the Austrians agreed to actively support England and France in evicting the Russians from Moldavia. Whilst the meetings were in progress, Prince Alexander Gorchakov arrived at the Austrian capital with the Czar's agreement to evacuate the Principalities without further delay. However, Franz Joseph had reached agreements with the governments of England and France and the Vienna Four Points became a reality on August 8, 1854.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>That day, Buol informed the allied ministers that he was prepared for an exchange of notes establishing the Four Points as the 'allied' basis of peace. At the same time, he excused himself

The Four Powers agreed to (I) the abolition of the Russian protectorate over the Danubian Principalities, (II) the freedom of navigation on the Danube, (III) the introduction of Turkey into the 'European equilibrium', and (IV) the renunciation by the Russians of their exclusive patronage over the Balkan Christians.

With the Russian evacuation of the Principalities on August 22 and their occupation by Austrian troops, the chief pretext for the war was removed. Prussia was relieved of any commitments which she had made to Austria regarding the mobilization of her troops as a security for the Austrians. The Ottomans were freed from the numerous capitulations which had made them subservient to Russia. Although the Austrians remained poised to strike at the Russians' flank they never did take an offensive role and remained a vacillating power for the remainder of the war. There was now no further need to continue the hostilities and peace could have been had from the moment that the Principalities were evacuated. However, England and France could not and would not rest content whilst the fortress of Sevastepol harboured the Russian fleet. Next to the defence of Turkey, the destruction of that city ranked in importance.

During the same period, French designs on the Baltic once again came to the fore. As a naval power, Great Britain naturally

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from signing the proposed treaty of alliance on the plea that the evacuation of the Principalities had deprived it of its *raison d'être*. Austrian diplomacy secured a further triumph. The Four Powers formally proclaimed in notes exchanged on 8 August, limited allied war aims." Mosse, The European Powers..., p. 60.

turned to Sweden in the hope that some means could be devised whereby that power could be used by England and France. Napoleon had suggested to Cowley, that Finland would be a natural concession to Sweden as a recompense for treaty rights. On August 8, 1854, Lord Clarendon informed Cowley that this would be too great a price to pay. Eight days later, on August 16, a Franco-British fleet destroyed Bomarsund at the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia but Cronstadt defied all attempts. If Cronstadt had capitulated, Sweden would have had a great inducement to enter the war.

The British cabinet agreed to an exchange of letters turning the Four Points into a binding diplomatic instrument and to the proposed treaty of alliance between the three countries.<sup>1</sup>

In a letter to Malmström on July 2, Bunsen explained the policy he had adopted towards Russia. He declared that Austria would not conclude a separate peace with the Czar and would continue to insist upon guarantees for the integrity of the Russian Empire. If Russia refuse to evacuate the Principalities, Austria would not obtain them either by means of strategy or by force, counting on Russia's assistance. In case Russia's reply was evasive, he suggested that the western powers proceed to conclude an alliance peace proposal to St. Petersburg, which Austria would support. A refusal by Russia to accept the proposal would be the signal for Austrian troops to enter the Principalities. In a second dispatch of the same date, he gave his approval to the terms of peace suggested by George de Mevius, which called for the freedom of the Danube, guarantees for the Principalities, the abolition of Russia's protectorate over her ecclesiastical in Turkey, and the opening of the Black Sea.<sup>2</sup> Holberg, 76.

According to a dispatch of Werther, the Prussian envoy at St. Petersburg, to Frederick William IV, dated August 26th, Russia's chief objection to the Four points was in fact that they were presented at the very moment she was evacuating the Principalities.<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 164, footnote 21.

## CHAPTER 5

### AUSTRIA AND THE FOUR POINTS

On July 2, 1854, Buol requested the western powers to define their war aims. Hübner proposed that future negotiations towards an alliance and peace should centre about the Four Points.<sup>1</sup> However, when the Czar rejected the Four Points on August 26, the western powers notified Austria that she was now morally bound to enter the war even though she had committed herself not to become involved in any military operations dealing with the Four Points.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The British cabinet agreed to an exchange of notes turning the Four Points into a binding diplomatic instrument and to the proposed treaty of alliance between the three countries." Mosse, *The European Powers...*, p. 59

<sup>2</sup>In a letter to Hübner on July 2, Buol explained the policy he had adopted towards Russia. He declared that Austria would not conclude a separate peace with the Tsar and would continue to insist upon guarantees for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Should Russia refuse to evacuate the Principalities, Austria would seek to obtain this either by means of strategy or by force, counting on Prussia's assistance. In case Russia's reply was evasive, he suggested that the western powers propose an armistice and submit peace proposals to St. Petersburg, which Austria would support. A refusal by Russia to accept the proposals would be the signal for Austrian troops to enter the Principalities. In a second dispatch of the same date, he gave his approval to the bases of peace suggested by Drouyn de Lhays, which called for the freedom of the Danube, guarantees for the Principalities, the abolition of Russia's protectorate over her coreligionists in Turkey, and the opening of the Black Sea." Hallberg, p. 76.

<sup>2</sup>According to a dispatch of Werther, the Prussian envoy at St. Petersburg, to Frederick William IV, dated August 26th, Russia's chief objection to the four points was in fact that they were presented at the very moment she was evacuating the Principalities." *Ibid.*, p. 364, footnote 21.

Hübner argued that when Austria forced the Russians out of the Principalities, she also made possible an allied attack elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> However, Austria began to find herself in a position separated from the rest of Europe. She had made an enemy out of Russia; she was in danger, if she had not already done so, of losing the leadership race in Germany; and she was now faced with the prospect of making enemies out of England and France.<sup>2</sup> Buol's diplomatic success at forcing the Russians to leave the Principalities helped in convincing Franz Joseph to press for the Russian acceptance of the Four Points. Having been pressured by the Empress Sophie and believing that the success of the allies at Alma, September 20, 1854, heralded the collapse of Sevastopol, he decided to proceed with the alliance with the west and the furtherance of the discussions at Vienna on the Four Points.

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<sup>1</sup>Not only had Austria refused to convert a plan of campaign for the Danube sector but despite the rejection of the Four Points she still temporized and thus permitted the Russians to concentrate their forces in Asia." Hallberg, p. 78.

<sup>2</sup>On September 26, 1854, Buol submitted a report to the Emperor. In this he pointed out that Prussia's aid could not be counted upon, that Austria's position in European affairs has not been achieved without effort and would easily be lost to please 'our German friends and allies', who were jealous of this position and 'who play a contemptible role with Your Majesty'. As it was now too late to retreat in view of the heavy sacrifices already incurred, Austria should conclude an alliance with the western powers. 'He warned Franz Joseph that 'any other course would lead to isolation and that those who believed that the Holy Alliance could be reestablished were indulging in wishful thinking'." Hallberg, p. 79.

On October 2, 1854, a draft treaty was drawn up by Count Bourqueney and Lord Westmorland.<sup>1</sup> When Hübner presented it to Drouyn de Lhays, the French Foreign Minister was indifferent especially concerning the advisability of reconvening the Vienna Conference. Although Franz Joseph had agreed to the conclusion of the alliance, he was not yet prepared to indicate the time when Austria would become an active belligerent.<sup>2</sup> Both England and France, therefore, regarded the proposals as being useless. In the Crimea, the allied armies were being decimated by cholera and mismanagement. They had to be bolstered, Austria provided the only immediate avenue from the difficulty. It would be necessary to rouse her from her lethargy by coercion. It was for this purpose that Napoleon spoke to Hübner about the advisability of reviving the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.<sup>3</sup>

Austria feared not only a Russian advance in the area of

<sup>1</sup>Though drawn up by the allied ambassadors, it was fundamentally an Austrian scheme, and was regularly referred to as such." Hallberg, p. 365.

<sup>2</sup>"The Crimean War forced the Habsburg Monarchy to the crisis of decision; and the contradictory decisions then taken determined her ultimate fate. Unable to opt for either east or west, Austria remained thereafter in a state of suspended animation, waiting for extinction." A.J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809 - 1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austro-Hungary (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1957), p. 91.

<sup>3</sup>As Prussia, Austria, and Russia had been the copartitioners of Poland, "the general effectiveness of Poland as an argument depended upon the fact of its partition, and the consequent injury threatened not only to Russia but to the two German Powers by any



the Danube but was equally fearful of an Italian advance into Lombardy. The Austrians were fully aware of the Franco-Italian dream of an united Italy and especially so of Prime Minister Cavour's desire to resume hostilities in that province.<sup>1</sup> However, Cavour needed French assistance in ejecting the Austrians and as France and England were at the time attempting to entice and threaten Austria into an alliance, Cavour was forced to hold off and on December 22, Austria and France agreed that the territorial arrangements in Italy would not be altered if she actively assisted the western powers against Russia.

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project for its reunion. It was in turn this latter threat which carried weight with the English court. The nation as a whole was influenced by a more general anxiety. Eager as England still was to weaken her foe, she was by this time yet more anxious not to strengthen her ally. For by this time the course of the war had already set France in the place of Russia as the strongest continental power: and to be the strongest power on the Continent was automatically to be invader-in-ordinary to the Island. It was the perpetual disability of British foreign policy, for this reason, that it never succeeded in destroying one source of anxiety without creating another in the process. At the moment it was just embarking upon one of those difficult and delicate periods during which it was left halting between two opponents." Simpson, p. 343.

<sup>1</sup>The allies were counting on Austria's support.... To desert them now would be disastrous, for they would seek supporters in Poland, who would rise under the national flag. 'This will permit Italy to stir. The ambitions of Sardinia will be encouraged, at first secretly, then openly. England will fight Russia in Asia, while France resumes her military traditions along the Rhine and on the Po. The secondary states will transfer their sympathies from Russia to France while Austria, embroiled in the east and the west, will come face to face with England, France and revolution, and will find herself alone in the midst of the chaos.'" Hallberg, p. 81. This is the gist of the correspondence from Hübner to Buol on October 22, 1854.

French threats to Austria regarding the re-establishment of Poland gave immense encouragement and hope to subjected Poles everywhere. Many of their military leaders had fled to Turkey where a nucleus of a national army had been created in the hope that active participation in the conflict might come about with the result that the Polish Question would receive a more favourable hearing at the peace conference.

But it was already easy at the moment to foresee that the Congress of Paris which was to wind up the Crimean War would not so much as touch on the Polish Question. In the course of hostilities, the creation of a Polish state, if only within very reduced limits, was considered notably in England: but the opposition of Prussia and Austria, whom the allies desired to gain over to their cause, soon brought about the abandonment of this idea, of which there could no longer be any question when it was a case of reconciliation with Russia.<sup>1</sup>

By October 22, Austria had one million men in Galicia, Bukovina and Transylvania. The Austrian commander in the Principality was instructed to permit the passage of Turkish troops so that they might attack Russian Bessarabia. Prussia became alarmed when Emperor Franz Joseph ordered a general mobilization of his troops in preparation for the spring offensive. King Frederick William attempted to restrain the activities of Bismarck and appealed to Nicolas to accept the Four Points. With the Russian reverses at Balaklava on October 25, and Inkerman Ridge on November 5, the allies expected that the Austrians would never enter the war. With

<sup>1</sup> O. Halecki, A History of Poland (New York: Roy Publishers, 1956), p. 238.

his reverses mounting in the Crimea, Nicolas bowed to the will of Frederick William and Nesselrode and decided to negotiate on the Four Points. On December 2, however, Count Buol compacted with Britain and France to declare war by the end of the year if Russia failed to accept her demands.<sup>1</sup>

The three powers agreed not to depart from the principles set forth in the protocols of the Vienna Conference and in the four points and not to negotiate a separate peace with Russia. They reserved the right to propose 'such conditions as they deemed necessary' in the interests of Europe. Austria promised to defend the Principalities and in the event that she became involved in war with Russia, the western powers would support her through an offensive-defensive alliance. Finally, the treaty stipulated that if peace was not established on the basis of the four points by January 1, 1855, the three powers would deliberate regarding the means of attaining their object, that is, the reestablishment of a general peace.<sup>2</sup>

The effects of this treaty were widespread. Within three months, Nicolas was dead presumably from a broken heart. He had compared himself to John Sobieski 'as the second most stupid King

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<sup>1</sup>On 2 December, the tripartite treaty between Austria, England, and France was signed...The alliance was regarded throughout Europe as an important event. It was hailed in Paris as a decisive success in Napoleon's campaign to destroy the northern coalition, 'the main object of which since 1815 has been to keep France in check'. It was to herald the end of the Holy Alliance. The tsar was deeply hurt and relieved his feelings by presenting to his vassals a statuette of Francis-Joseph which had until then adorned his study." Mosse, *The European Powers...*, p. 64.

"The necessity of keeping a large army on a war-footing had practically exhausted Austria's finances and this unsatisfactory situation could not be prolonged. Either the army must be reduced to a peace-footing or Austria must enter the war. But in order to enter the war, she requested support and since this was not forthcoming from Prussia and the Confederation, the only alternative left was to turn to England and France." Hallberg, p. 82.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 83.

of Poland<sup>1</sup> for having saved Vienna for the Hapsburgs. The French were extremely happy with the alliance as it now took the position of preponderance away from England. In writing to Buol, Hübnér compared the reasons why England and France desired Austrian military participation. To Hübnér, the alliance meant peace for France, to England it meant military assistance which was necessary for the destruction of Sevastopol and the Russian Black Sea fleet.

By the end of 1854, the need for re-enforcements forced Lord Palmerston to think of turning to Portugal, Spain and finally Piedmont.<sup>1</sup> Queen Victoria appealed to Portugal but was refused on the grounds that she had no justifiable right to do so as Portugal had had no quarrel with Russia. Spain almost reached the point of rendering military assistance. General Espartero was himself going to lead 60,000 men the following spring in the hope of regaining some portion of Spain's past glories and as a recompense to France for protecting the France-Spanish border from a Carlist invasion. England agreed, but as the war progressed Palmerston no longer felt the need for these troops.

The French government was consulted regarding Italy, and a definite request was sent to King Victor Emmanuel II. In return

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<sup>1</sup> "Though assured by France that the inclusion of Piedmont was for military purposes only, Buol could not conceal his distrust. He made no official protest but insisted that the new alliance should not serve as a point of departure for territorial aggrandisement or give Piedmont the right to be a contracting party to arrangements of a European character at the peace congress." Hallberg, p. 89.

for his assistance, Count Cavour requested that when peace was being negotiated that the Italian question would be placed on the agenda. On January 10, 1855, the Convention was signed without Cavour's request, and General La Marmora sailed for the Crimea in command of 15,000 men. By this act, Cavour gained some degree of prestige as the Sardinian force were later to act as a distinct entity under its own commander and as an ally of the other powers.

In January, 1855, Nicolas had consented to the Prussian request for further negotiations on the Four Points. The meetings which took place in Vienna early in the year were once more inconclusive. Austria was still hesitant. On January 14, Buol sought help from the lesser German states whereby they would supply contingents which would be placed under the Austrian command. Buol met with outright disapproval and if anything he succeeded only in driving those states closer to Prussia. In fact the federal contingents were placed on a war-footing but were stationed in their own cantonments to defend German territory - but against whom?

On January 26th, Napoleon appealed directly to Franz Joseph to enter the war and thus secure an honorable peace. In reply, the Austrian ruler emphasized his conviction that peace was still possible and that the Tsar would negotiate on the basis of the four points rather than carry the war a outrance against continental Europe. He assured Napoleon, however, that if the peace negotiations failed, Austria would enter the war.<sup>1</sup>

In closing the first great exhibition of Paris, 1855, Napoleon made the remark which proved a veritable bombshell to the

nations of Europe, especially to Prussia and Austria. He concluded his speech to the assembled dignitaries in the Palais de l'Industrie with the words:

Tell them, he continued, that if they desire peace they must openly express wishes either for or against us, for in the midst of a serious European conflict indifference is a bad calculation, and silence is a mistake.<sup>1</sup>

The severe Crimean winter had brought untold hardships to the men of both the allied and Russian armies. As the campaign had been expected to be of short duration, the allied forces came unprepared for a long siege. They were totally unconditioned to face the harsh surroundings which faced them on the heights before Sevastopol during that first winter. Through every conceivable lack of military preparedness, the men and animals died by the thousands and as the winter progressed, it became increasingly more difficult to supply the troops with the needed accoutrements. On November 14, 1854, an hurricane swept through the peninsula. Transports, laden with materials were swamped and the troops on the wind swept Chersonese Plateau were confronted with snow, slush, and ice. The almost impossible task of staying alive faced the troops on both sides. As a result of dysentery, cholera, improper food, and a dearth of clothing and billeting, the men died by the thousands.

For the first time, the impact of press reports from the war correspondents made itself felt throughout the nations of

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<sup>1</sup>Simpson, p. 339.



England and France. Using the newly completed telegraph line from Varna to Sevastopol, daily accounts were sent back to the two capitals. Further accounts of the hardships being endured by the troops came from their own letters to their friends back home. Public indignation reached feverish heights in London and Paris. On January 23, 1855, John Roebuck notified the House of Commons that he would move for an investigation into the administration of the War Office. During the previous fall, Lord John Russell had condemned this branch of the government when he became aware of the degree of mismanagement of the whole campaign. As he would not come to the defence of the government against Roebuck, he was forced to resign. This action precipitated a crisis in the British parliament and the Aberdeen government was defeated by a majority of 305 to 148. The people and most of the former government members turned to Lord Palmerston to take the Prime Ministry. Much to the consternation of Queen Victoria, she was forced to accept Palmerston's offer after she had first asked Derby, Lansdowne, and Russell.

In February, 1855, Napoleon decided that the need for a generalissimo over the campaign was long past due. He informed his and the British cabinets that he would go himself to the Crimea and personally take charge over the entire operations. The British attitude was one of extreme dismay as they firmly believed that he had not the slightest flair for tactics. Coupled with this was their fear, and this was supported by many of the French ministers as well, that if he followed this course of action France would be in danger

of revolt.<sup>1</sup> Austria had her own reasons for alarm in that they fore-  
saw possible dangers arising from some new encroachment on their  
interests in the Balkans. However, on April 28, an attempt was made  
on Napoleon's life in the Bois de Boulogne which alarmed him at the  
state of affairs in France and what could possibly happen in France  
if he left. Without further hesitation, Napoleon abandoned the plan.

On March 16, Austria, England, France, Turkey and Russia re-  
newed their discussions on the Four Points in Vienna. Points (I) and  
(II) were successfully hurdled but point (III) proved the stumbling-  
block. Russia refused to join collectively in an agreement to guar-  
antee the integrity of the Porte. The main impasse, however, dealt  
with the included demands that the Russian naval strength in the  
Black Sea should be reduced to four warships. Both England and France  
strongly supported this move but the difficulty lay in the inter-  
ference to Russia's rights of sovereignty. Austria attempted to

avoid the impasse by suggesting a counterplan which would permit  
sufficient warships from other nations into the Black Sea to offset

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<sup>1</sup>Combined pressure was successful and by April 26, 1855,  
the Prime Minister could write: Viscount Palmerston congratulates  
your majesty upon the decision of the Emperor of the French to give  
up his intended journey to the Crimea, which, could only have led  
to embarrassments of many kinds." Brian Connell, Queen Victoria and Her Foreign  
and Prime Ministers, 1837 - 1865, (London: Evans Brothers Limited,  
1962), p. 175.

any Russian preponderance. Russia went so far as to suggest that the warships of all nations be permitted into the Sea and thereby neutralize the Buxins completely. Lord John Russell, however, had been instructed to

insist upon strict limitations of Russia's naval power in the Black Sea or failing this to break off negotiations and demand that Austria join the western powers on the basis of the treaty of December 2nd.<sup>1</sup>

Difficulties arose when Austria refused to limit the Russian potential to a point lower than her 1853 naval strength. England held fast to her demands for limitations. To ameliorate the two views, Drouyn de Lhuys suggested the neutralization of the Black Sea. England accepted the ~~counter-proposal~~; Austria turned it down. On the refusal of Austria, Drouyn de Lhuys decided to go to Vienna.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Hallberg, p. 95.

<sup>2</sup>"Before proceeding to the Conference, the French Minister visited London for a final understanding with Palmerston and Clarendon regarding his neutralization plan. In discussions with the British statesmen two alternatives were worked out which were to be submitted to Austria before they were presented to Russia. One of these was the neutralization plan, the other called for the limitation of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea to four vessels and the opening of the Straits to the warships of England and France. Austria was to be asked to select one of these alternative proposals and to take part in the war if Russia rejected the one selected. In case Austria should refuse to fight Russia if the latter rejected one of the proposals, the neutralization plan would be presented to the Conference. Russia's refusal to accept would lead to a rupture of the negotiations." *Ibid.*, p. 96.

The results of the conference did not change anything. Buol rejected the two plans in favour of his limited Russian fleet. The delegates finally agreed on this proposal and Russia was to be formally notified of the decision. Further to this, the Straits were to be closed and Europe was to be responsible for the integrity of the Porte. However, as Drouyn de Lhuys had yielded to the Austrians, Lord Russell was recalled by Clarendon. Before leaving Vienna, however, Lord John held further discussions with de Lhuys and Buol and an agreement was reached which was to be presented to their governments for acceptance. This called for a gradual counterpoise plan whereby Russia would not exceed a set number of vessels, a guarantee of Turkish independence and territorial integrity, the closure of the Straits, permission for each of the allies to station two warships in the Black Sea after the signing of the peace, and the conclusion of a treaty of guarantee between Austria, England, and France.<sup>1</sup>

Lord Clarendon refused this suggestion, the Cabinet did likewise. Lord John could do nothing else but resign. When Napoleon visited Queen Victoria in the middle of April he was asked by Palmerston and Clarendon not to accept the plan. When Drouyn de Lhuys was faced with this dilemma he resigned from the government.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Hallberg, p. 97.

<sup>2</sup>In common with the majority of his countrymen, Lord John imagined that the Austrian proposal had been rejected at the instance, and in the interests, of the French Emperor. It was in fact the case that in his strenuous campaign for its rejection, Cowley in Paris had called in the aid of the military; at his own request he was allowed by the Emperor to be present at the decisive audience of Drouyn, which resulted in the resignation of the French statesman and the rejection of his pacific proposals. At that interview Cowley appealed to Marshal Vaillant, who was also present; the

Napoleon was faced with further difficulties. De Ligny had preferred a treaty with Austria to one with England. He believed that by continuing on this course of action, France would be left

latter 'confined himself to stating that the army would not be satisfied with a peace on those terms'. At the time, in his private despatch for the month of May 1855, the English ambassador rightly made no secret of the truth, that it was the French Emperor who desired peace, and he himself who by arduous exertions and with no little difficulty was endeavouring to avert any acceptance of the Austrian proposal, or rather of an improvement on it by Louis' own devising, whereby the Russian Black Sea fleet would be limited in future to the number of ships actually remaining at the end of the war." Simpson, p. 305.

"Lord John himself, like his biographers, discovered this fact for himself: only a few weeks later he complained bitterly that he had been deceived: that he had been 'allowed to suppose, like the public, that the Emperor's rejection had been spontaneous, instead of having been suggested and urged upon him by us." Ibid., p. 306.

"On May 21st, 1855, Parliament was told that the Conference had broken down. And Guizot (July 6th) described it to Greville as 'only a series of diplomatic blunders,' including 'a wonderful want of invention, not to strike out some new means of adjusting this quarrel.' And added Greville grily, 'I agree with him.'

The Allies (March 31st) had 'proposed the reduction of the (Russian) fleet; the Russians refused.'

Bath, July 19, 1855: "...Russia rejected it on the ground for its incompatibility with her honour and dignity. Then Russia made proposals, which the Allies, Austria included, rejected as insufficient. John Russell and Drouyn de Ligny appear to have fought vigorously in the spirit of their instructions, but when they found there was no chance of the Russians consenting to the limitations, they both became anxious to try some other plan by which peace might possibly be obtained, and they each suggested something.

As a last hope and chance, Count Buol, on behalf of Austria, proposed 'that each of the powers should have the right to maintain a limited naval power in the Black Sea.' Instead of 'limitation' of naval power, there was to be 'counterpoise'. And they

Bath, July 19, 1855: "...were the same in principle, and the only difference between them one of mode and degree. Buol's counterpoise involved limitation, our limitation was to establish counterpoise." Wilson, II, 521.

"The difference was merely one of terms. And both the Plenipotentiaries agreed to it." Ibid., II, 522.

alone to face a strong Prussia. On the other hand, Cowley insisted that Drouyn de Lhuys had sold out the allied cause and in taking this stand gave evidence of England's distrust of Austria. Napoleon did not wish to antagonize England. Yet, if he had remained adamant England would have been forced to yield. Buol felt that Napoleon could not understand why Austria failed to see the value of continuing the war. On May 28,

Palmerston gave expression to his feelings in an ironic letter to Napoleon in which he declared that if the allies were successful in the Crimea, they might demand the friendship and perhaps the sword of Austria, but if success failed them they would not even have her pen.<sup>1</sup>

The plight of Austria was reaching extensive proportions. The drain on her finances brought about by the maintenance of such large armies was reaching a critical stage. The loans which were floated to defray the expense did not meet with public support, the result was that the National Railways were sold out to a French syndicate. To ease the strain, Franz Joseph pulled out his regiments from Galicia. Through this juncture, the Russians were able to remove their troops from Poland and move them into the Crimea.

During April 9 to the 19, 1855, the bombardment of Sevastopol was reopened. As usual it brought little success. During the following months a number of incidents took place which were to affect the course of the war. General La Marmora arrived from

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<sup>1</sup>Hallberg, p. 100.



Sardinia with 15,000 men and had taken up his positions alongside the British. On May 21, the allied armies were successful in taking the Kerch Peninsula and thereby were able to cut Russia's lines of communications with Sevastopol. A united effort was proposed for June 18, the anniversary of Waterloo, and it was hoped that that great success would be duplicated in whole if not in part. However, the attack proved a costly failure and success seemed more distant than ever before. On August 16, the Russians were defeated at the Battle of the Tchernaya by a combined France-Sardinian force. From the middle of August, the Russians came under heavy bombardment. This action was increased from September 5 to the 8 as a prelude to an all out attack which was launched on September 8. During this attack, the British failed to take the Redan but the French were successful on the Malakov. As this fortress commanded the town, it became apparent that success was now at hand. On September 9, 1855, the allied forces occupied the forts, the town, and the harbour. Sevastopol had been left by the retreating Russian forces to the allied armies.

people to continue the fight, however, Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, informed Napoleon that the two countries could not agree on the principles involved. Lord Palmerston would not

**CHAPTER 6**

**THE PEACE CONFERENCE**

From the moment that Sevastopol was abandoned, diplomacy began to reach a feverish pitch. During the middle of September, 1855, the French Foreign Minister, Count Walewski informed the British government that Napoleon desired to revive the Polish affair and to have it included as one of the objects of discussion in any future talks.<sup>1</sup> As his country had become sick of war, Napoleon felt that something with more public appeal - such as the reviving an understanding with Austria, enabling the allies to mobilize birth of a free Poland - would revive the desire of the French

<sup>1</sup>During November and December, 1855, King Victor Emmanuel II of Piedmont-Sardinia and his Prime Minister Count Camillo di Cavour paid state visits to France and England. Whilst in England, Lord John Russell asked Cavour about the behind-the-scenes searchings for peace. He said,

"December 6, 1855:... I asked Cavour what was the language of the Emperor of the French; he said it was to this effect: France had made great efforts and sacrifices, she would not continue them for the sake of conquering the Crimea; the alternative was such a peace as can now be had by means of Austria, or an extension of the war for Poland, etc. The Sardinians, Minister and King, are openly and warmly for the latter course. I suspect Palmerston would wish the war to glide imperceptibly into a war of nationalities, as it is called, but would not like to profess it openly now." Wilson, II, 532.

Early in January, 1856, Napoleon "sent an urgent message to England asking 'us to engage not to make peace until the conditions respecting Poland agreed to in 1815 were recognized and fulfilled by Russia'....The manner in which England met this suggestion was such as to convince the Emperor that his ally would be no partner to a war for liberation. But if he could not make war for Poland, by Poland he would make peace. The evident repugnance with which the English government regarded the mere prospect of such a crusade was proof that here he had the means of making a

people to continue the fight.<sup>1</sup> However, Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, informed Napoleon that the two countries could only agree on the principles involved. Lord Palmerston would not

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continuance of the campaign unpalatable not only to his enemy, but to his ally." *Simpson*, p. 336.

<sup>1</sup>On November 22, 1855, Napoleon directed an appeal to Queen Victoria in which he outlined his various plans for the continuance of the war. "Three courses remained; either to make the war smaller, reducing it to little more than a mere defensive alliance, by which the allies at a minimum of expense to themselves might impose large expenditures and inconveniences on Russia; or to make the war greater, by launching a universal appeal to nationalities, with a bold proclamation of the independence as well of Poland and Finland as of Hungary, Italy, and Circassia; or to make the war end, by securing an understanding with Austria, enabling the allies to mobilize against Russia so overwhelmingly a body of troops and of public opinion, as would compel her to accept an equitable peace. The third course seemed the more attractive that it was not the allies who had been invited to make concessions to secure the support of Austria, but Austria which had voluntarily adopted and even strengthened the old terms of the allies." *Ibid.*, p. 342.

"The Emperor concluded his undiplomatic epistle on another note. 'If,' he continued, 'your majesty's government were to say that the conditions of peace ought to be of quite another kind; that our honour and interests demand a remodelling of the map of Europe; that Europe would never be free until Poland was reestablished, the Crimea restored to Turkey, and Finland to Sweden, then I could comprehend a policy which would contain an element of grandeur, and would place the results to be gained on a level with the sacrifice to be made. But to deprive ourselves gratuitously of the support of Austria, for microscopic advantages, advantages which we could always claim later, that is a step which I cannot bring myself to regard as reasonable.'" *Ibid.*, p. 343.

On December 29, 1855, "he told the Imperial Guard, recently recalled from the Crimea, that he had recalled them not because the war was over, 'but because it is only just to relieve in their turn the regiments which have suffered most'; continuing in his best oracular manner, 'there is now in France a numerous and veteran army ready to show itself wherever circumstances may demand.' To Russia and to the German Powers as well there is a world of vague menace in that phrase 'wherever circumstances may demand': it was naturally construed as one hint the more of a potential campaign in Poland." *Ibid.*, p. 349.

accept the Polish question as a justifiable excuse for the continuance of the war.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>British policy at this point regarding its own aims and those of the French began to fluctuate. In April 1855, Palmerston looked to the Caucasus and pronounced for Circassian independence from both Russia and Turkey. Russia had previously invaded Turkey from Circassia, seized Bayasid, and was now threatening Kars, the fortress which commanded the British trade routes to India, from Persia. On November 26, 1855, Cowley informed Clarendon that Napoleon would support an attack on Circassia. Yet Palmerston replied in the negative as he did not want to reduce Russian land power, the counter-balance to the rising French tide on the continent. Therefore, on November 28, Kars was permitted to fall.

Agatha Rams notes "the 'vital importance' which Palmerston attached to Kars and to Circassia now began to be shared by an angry British public.... In the Autumn of 1855 Palmerston was planning a new campaign to capture Cronstadt and drive the Russians out of Georgia and Circassia, but Napoleon, despite nationalistic language about Italy and Poland, was bent on peace." P. 484.

Greville reports that "it was universally admitted that every man in France desires peace ardently. On the former occasion (November 27, 1855) Napoleon had 'knocked under to us and reluctantly agreed to go on with the war'. He was (December 26) still 'undivided between his anxiety to make peace and his determination to have no difference with England'. One day 'it was met without difficulty that he was deterred from ordering his army away from the Crimea.'

"Hatchford, January 2, 1856:...Clarendon showed me a letter from Francis Baring from Paris the other day, which told him that the Emperor wished to make peace, because he knew that France, with all her outward signs of prosperity, was unable to go on with the war without extreme danger, that she is in fact 'using herself up,' and has been going on at a rate she cannot afford.

"another day, he and Britain-  
The Grove, December 26, 1855:...were entirely reconciled; they were now agreed as one man, and no power on earth should induce him to separate himself from England or to make any other line than that to which he had bound himself in conjunction with us." Wilson, II, 525.

Yet Wilson reports that "over this universal Armageddon, the Cabinet was divided. Palmerston's paper, the Morning Post (January 1, 1856), "put forth an article indecently violent and menacing against Prussia." Vol. II, p. 527. And further on, he reports from Hatchford on January 2, 1856 that "the speech which Louis Napoleon addressed to the Imperial Guard the day before yesterday, when they

Without concurrence from Britain, the French ambassador in Vienna, Bourquency, began negotiations with Count Buol and the Austrian government in the formulation of demands which would be made upon Russia. When the draft was submitted to the British government for ratification, it was found unacceptable. A terminology more agreeable to the British was reached by November 24, ten days later, through the help of Sir Hamilton Seymour who had just taken up residence in Vienna. Whilst awaiting the results of the Vienna meetings, the Russian government was startled by the news of a defensive alliance which had just been concluded between the two western powers and Sweden on November 21.<sup>1</sup> Under the terms of this treaty, Sweden had

marched into Paris in triumph, gives reason for suspecting that the manifesto against Prussia in the Morning Post was French, for there is no small correspondence between the speech and the article. In the article Prussia is openly threatened and told, if she will not join the allies in making war on Russia, the allies will make war upon her; in the speech the Guards are told to hold themselves in readiness and that a great French army will be wanted." Wilson, II, 529.

At the closing of the Paris Exhibition, the Bavarian Prime Minister, Freiherr von der Pfordten, approached Napoleon as an intermediary for Russia. When the Bavarian queried the Emperor regarding his true dispositions and peace, "Napoleon conveyed to the Czar his deliberately disquieting intimation. He desired peace, he said, and for the present was willing to make it on the most moderate terms. 'But if by the spring no understanding shall have been attained, I will appeal to the nationalities and in particular to the nation of Poland'." Simpson, p. 338.

<sup>1</sup>Referring to a possible treaty with Sweden, Queen Victoria wrote to Lord Clarendon on July 27, 1855—

"When a Treaty with Sweden was last in contemplation, she was to have joined in the war against Russia and to have received a guarantee of the integrity of her dominions by England and France in return; yet this clause was found so onerous to this Country, and opening so entirely a new field of questions and considerations,



agreed not to cede any territory to Russia or to permit the occupation of any part of her territory by Russian troops. As a result of these agreements, Britain and France were to assist Sweden in repulsing aggressive acts on the part of the Russians.<sup>1</sup> As a consequence, it appeared to the Russians that the neutral states, especially Prussia, would join the ranks of the belligerents against them.

On December 28, 1855, Count Valentin Esterhazy presented the ultimatum to Count Nesselrode in St. Petersburg. The Four Points formed the basis of the proposals as well as the basis for the final settlement. The new terms were to be unconditionally accepted by January 18, 1856, and that any counter-proposals would make agreement impossible. Baron Karl Werther, the Prussian representative, and Count Albin Seebach, the Saxon representative in France, urged Alexander II to accept the terms.<sup>2</sup>

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that the cabinet would not entertain it. Now the same guarantee is to be given by us without the counterbalancing advantage of Sweden giving us her advantage in the war." Benson and Escher, III, 133.

<sup>1</sup>The King of Sweden had secretly intimated to the French Emperor, his willingness to 'take an active part in the war against Russia, if the allies were disposed to attack that power seriously in the North; not unreasonable however he added that he must remain neutral if the hostilities were confined to their former distant field.' Simpson, p. 305.

"As early as July 1855 the King of Denmark had secretly intimated to Walewski that he was ready to follow Sweden in any measures which that country should decide to take against Russia." If his ministers objected, the King was prepared to release them immediately. *Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup>Though Buol was not greatly disturbed by the incident since he figured he already had the Principalities in his pocket, he was shrewd enough to realize that Austria's position would be-



Nesselrode accepted the greater part of the Austrian proposals with minor revisions but refused outright any concession of territory, as well as the newly interjected fifth point which would permit the western powers to make such additional demands as they saw fit. Alexander II informed Prince Mikhail Gorchakov, the commander of his forces in the Crimea, that unconditional acceptance was impossible and that Nesselrode had gone to the utmost limits in meeting the Austrian demands. Nesselrode feared that if Alexander II and Prince Alexander Gorchakov refused the Austrian terms that she would actively join the western powers and Russia would be placed in a serious position. Because of this, he contacted Esterhazy and suggested counter-proposals. When Esterhazy refused, the Russian

Chancellor suggested to the Czar that he unconditionally accept the Austrian ultimatum. In this move, Nesselrode was supported by General Paul Kiselev, the Minister for State Dominions, and Count Alexei Orlov, the Adjutant-General.<sup>1</sup> On January 7, Count Esterhazy

became worse if her passive policy continued. He therefore devised a plan for ending the war which he hoped would not only win back the confidence of Napoleon but would enable Austria once more to act as mediator, a position she had forfeited after the failure of the last Conference. According to his plan, the allies should propose peace terms to Russia, drawn up by England and France, but giving Austria the right to make observations before accepting them as her own. In case Russia rejected these terms, the war would continue on a restricted scale with Austria maintaining a defensive position on the Danube. Buel made it clear that Austria would not engage herself beyond this point unless her own interests were threatened." Hallberg, p. 125.

<sup>1</sup>Early in October Bourquenois laid Buel's plan before Walewski, who welcomed it with great satisfaction. Upon his return to

informed Nesselrode that any counter-proposal on the part of Russia would be considered as a refusal and that this would create a diplomatic rift between the two countries. At the same time, Nesselrode informed the Austrian representative that a note had been prepared and had been sent to Count Buol. On January 11, 1856, Buol received the dispatch of the Russian Foreign Minister and on the next day he informed Esterhazy that he was to break off diplomatic relations on January 18.

In the meantime, the Russian ambassador to Vienna, Prince Alexander Gorchakov, cousin to General Mikhail Gorchakov the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces in the Crimea, knowing that the

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Vienna, Bourquaney entered into discussions with Buol. On November 14th a tentative agreement was reached which called for the renunciation by Russia of her protectorate over the Principalities, the establishment of an autonomous government for the Christians of Turkey under the collective protection of the great powers, rectification of the Bessarabian frontier, freedom of navigation on the Danube under the control of the contracting powers, the neutralization of the Black Sea, the conclusion of a treaty between Russia and Turkey, and the admission of the latter to the European Concert. Finally, it was declared that the allies reserved the right to present additional conditions of a European interest. Acceptance of these terms by Russia would be followed by the signing of peace preliminaries, while their rejection would lead immediately to the complete rupture of diplomatic relations between Vienna and St. Petersburg and the conclusion of an agreement between the allies concerning the means to be employed in order to compel acceptance by Russia." Hallberg, p. 106.

Although Buol's terms were accepted by the French, it was turned down by the British government. The English criticized the Austrians for protecting their own interests by the first two points of the ultimatum. Palmerston was determined to crush the Russian sea power in the Black and Baltic Seas, and on a number of occasions he threw out feelers to his Cabinet to determine whether they would support him in such a move.

French were beginning to turn from Austria in their sympathy with the Italians would attempt a rapprochement with Russia, advised the Foreign Minister to refuse the ultimatum and approach the French government with concessions which would meet their demands without yielding Bessarabia in accordance with the Austrian ultimatum.<sup>1</sup>

However, Count Malewski had expected the German confederation to support the Austrian demands and that this would force Alexander II to yield. Gorchakov was correct in that Napoleon showed more interest in negotiating with Russia than in seeing that the Austrians gained control over Bessarabia. He was deterred, however, by the British government and the fact that on January 5 the Prussians had informed their ambassador in St. Petersburg, Werther, to support the Austrian demands on the condition that a break in diplomatic relations between the two countries would ensue should Alexander II choose not to accept the ultimatum.

Throughout the conflict, King Frederick William had maintained an army of some 400,000 men. However, the Prussian monarch followed the course of a second rate power much to the chagrin of his Foreign Minister, Baron Edwin Manteuffel, and the Austrians. He never became subservient to the Austrian foreign policy nor did

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<sup>1</sup>Alexander used the representatives of lesser German states in Paris as intermediaries. The Czar now desired to separate England from France in the hope that he would gain more favourable terms from France and to bring about a Franco-Russian rapprochement. The Saxon representative in Paris, Seebach, "redoubled his efforts to arrange a reconciliation between France and Russia but he was unable to bring about a rift in the alliance. Napoleon admitted to

he retreat too far from his friendship with Russia. Now, however, Count Buol needed the support of Prussia and in return for that support he proposed that the Prussians be included in all future allied deliberations with regard to Russia.<sup>1</sup> Palmerston objected but the powers agreed to admit the German nation after the conditions of peace had been arranged.

On January 5, 1856, the Russians informed Austria that they could not accept the ultimatum because of the last point - Russia should know in advance the full extent of the concessions which she was about to be asked to make. Buol reiterated his threat that Austria would be forced to break off diplomatic relations if the Czar did not accept.

On January 15, Alexander II assembled his advisors in the Winter Palace. Count Nesselrode advised the assemblage to accept the Austrian terms. He informed them that the allied plans had been laid by a council of war in Paris which would be brought into effect with disastrous results to the future of Russia. Should this plan be put into action, then the French would march into Bessarabia and operate along the Danube. This request had been made some time earlier when Buol appealed to Napoleon to permit his troops to move into the Danubian Principalities and a possible reason why Marshal

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Hübner that Russia had made advances but added "she is mistaken if she believes that I will be unfaithful to my allies, the Emperor Francis Joseph and Queen Victoria." Hallberg, p. 107.

<sup>1</sup>Actually, Austria "intrigued to exclude her from the peace congress." Ibid., p. 375.

St. Arnaud desired to move in that direction instead of going to the Crimea. If this should all come to pass, Nesselrode claimed that Austrian troops could not be kept out of the conflict with the hostilities so close at hand. Further to all this, it would be only a matter of time before Sweden, followed by Prussia and the other neutral states, would be drawn into the conflict. Nesselrode could foresee the line of struggle extending from the Black to the Baltic. He argued that should Russia refuse the ultimatum, she would possibly face an alignment of all the powers of Europe. It became the feeling of the gathering that peace should be obtained immediately before Russia lost all hope of resistance. Sooner or later she would be forced to sue for peace and Palmerston had left no doubt in anyone's mind that the longer the Russians procrastinated the more difficult the terms would be.

Other warnings were also voiced. The Russian ambassador to Paris, Count Paul Kisilev, warned that the newly acquired provinces of Volhynia, Podolia, Finland, and Poland were ripe for revolt. The dangers from a mass rebellion far exceeded anything contained in the Austrian demands. Further to this, Alexander II was aware of the situation, that a large section of the Russian nobility were threatening revolt and intrigues were being hatched against him. Peter Meyendorff, the Finance Minister, warned that a continuation of the war would lead to bankruptcy. Revenues and production of the country had fallen sharply. Further continuation of the conflict would place Russia in such a critical position that it would take

her from fifty to sixty years to recover.<sup>1</sup>

On January 16, 1856, Nesselrode informed Esterhazy that Alexander II would accept the Austrian terms. On February 25, 1856, the Congress of Paris opened and lasted for approximately a month. On March 30, the Treaty of Paris was signed.

Count Alexander Walewski acted as chairman while the French ambassador in Vienna, Count Francois Bourqueney, served as the second French representative. Austria was represented by Count Karl Buol-Schauenstein, the Foreign Minister, and Count Joseph Hübner, the Austrian ambassador to Paris. England was represented by Henry, Earl of Cowley, the British ambassador to Paris, and George, Earl of Clarendon, the British Foreign Secretary. Russia sent Prince Alexei Orlov and Baron Philip Brunnow, the former Russian ambassador to London. Piedmont was represented by Count Camillo di Cavour, the Prime Minister, and the Marquis Villamarina. Turkey was represented by Ali Pasha, the Foreign Minister, and Djemal Effendi, the ambassador to Paris. On March 18, Prussia was represented by Baron Otto von Manteuffel, the Prime Minister, and Count Maximilian Hartsfeldt.

The articles agreed upon were specifically designed to halt future Russian expansionist tendencies in the Danube Basin and in the Ottoman dominions. By articles (XX) and (XXI), Southern Bessarabia was transferred to Turkey and incorporated into Moldavia. By

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<sup>1</sup> W.B. Mosse, The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System, 1855 - 1871: The Story of a Peace Settlement (New York: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1963), pp. 28 to 31.



these articles Russia lost control over the mouth of the Danube and its tributaries. The loss of Bessarabia was a tremendous blow to Russian pride and Prince Orlov, ably assisted by Count Brunnow, attempted to exchange the fortress of Kars, in Asia Minor, for the territory which was granted to Turkey.

By article (XI), the Black Sea was opened up to the mercantile fleets of all nations and by article (XIII) the Czar and the Sultan engaged not to establish or maintain upon the coast any military or naval fortification. Thus the Straits Convention of 1841 was altered in that they were closed to all ships of war whilst the Porte was at peace. However, since the Straits and the Sea of Marmora were Turkish possessions, she could therefore maintain a small navy in that region. Although Russia agreed to these two articles she was permitted to construct and maintain vessels of light draft for policing her own shores.

Under articles (XIII) and (IX) the special arrangements of Kuchuk Kainardji were abolished. Europe now was to be recognized as the special protector of the Danubian Principalities and the Orthodox Christians throughout the Ottoman Empire.

By article (VII), the western powers were to guarantee Turkish integrity and independence. Any power or powers in conflict with the Porte were to seek the mediation of a third power before resorting to arms - a proposal made by the British which was aimed at substituting the conference table for the use of arms. As a further guarantee that this article would be strictly observed, France, England and Austria on April 14 signed the Triple Treaty of Guar-

tees whereby any attack upon Turkish soil by Russia was to be considered a casus belli, by all of the three powers.

By articles (XXII) and (XXVII), the two Roumanian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were transferred to European control although they still remained under the Ottoman rule. This arrangement had a twofold purpose - they were to separate Russia from Turkey, but, since the feeling of nationalism was exceedingly strong in the two provinces, they were to be kept separate and therefore weak so as not in themselves pose a threat to the Ottomans in the future. They were constituted twin states with common laws, common military organizations, etc., but with separate constitutions. The two Principalities requested the Sultan to unite them under the name of Roumania but he refused. The utmost concession which could be gained was that they were to be known as 'United Roumania' and that their affairs would be controlled by a joint European commission.

At the same time, March 30, a second treaty was signed whereby Great Britain and France bound themselves to protect Sweden and Norway against Russian aggression. A further agreement was reached between France, England, and Russia, by which Russia agreed not to fortify the Aaland Islands. On April 26, 1856, Clarendon informed Palmerston that the King of Sweden endeavoured to secure for these islands a complicated system of neutrality, and the restriction of the Russian fleet in the Baltic.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Simpson, p. 256.

Under strong exhortations by the great powers and especially on the part of Palmerston, the Sultan, on February 21, decreed his hattı-humayun or Turkish Reforms which was aimed at the improvement of the administration within the Ottoman Empire and would cause Turkey to take on added strength. The legislation was aimed at improving the lot of the Christian rayas as well. It followed the Tanzimat of Gulhané of November, 1839, in that the Christian and Muslim subjects were to enjoy many equalities before the law. Equal opportunity for office holding, freedom of religion, freedom in the maintenance of schools, and equal opportunities in admission into the army. The purpose of this ordinance was founded on the desire that Turkey would adopt the constitutional system of the western powers. The Ottoman Empire was accordingly admitted into the European 'community of nations' and the three powers of England, France and Austria thereby emancipated Turkey from the religious control by the Russians. The hattı-humayun could not conceivably work as religious equality struck at the very foundations on which the Mohammedan religion rested.

After the treaty of Paris, on April 8, 1856, came the Declaration of Paris which dealt with the interpretation of Maritime Law governing operations during naval warfare. These terms, introduced by Walewski, were specifically directed against England who had long resisted them. It decreed that privateering was unlawful and, therefore, to be abolished. Enemy goods could not be seized from neutral vessels unless the goods came under the category of

contraband of war. Neutral goods carried by an enemy vessel could no longer be seized unless those goods came under the category of contraband of war as well. Difficulties arose as to what constituted 'contraband of war' as this term proved extremely elastic in future conflicts. Blockades, in order to be binding, had to be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficiently strong enough to prevent access to the coast of an enemy. A loose blockade such as was imposed by Britain during the Napoleonic Wars was declared illegal. By these arrangements, unrestricted search and seizure of ships and cargoes in time of war was to be abandoned.

At the session of April 8th, Walewski suggested an exchange of views regarding questions which might disturb the European peace, such as those relating to Greece, the Papal States, Naples and Belgium. Cavour had skilfully prepared the groundwork and had succeeded in making friends with most of the delegates, except the Austrian. Clarendon, who had been won over by the Piedmontese statesman, employed strong language in condemning the government of Naples and the Papal States as well as the presence of Austrian and French troops in the Peninsula....The Austrian delegates bitterly protested the introduction of the questions and categorically refused to recognize any discussions concerning the internal affairs of sovereign states in the absence of their rulers - a principle which had been set forth in the protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle of November 15, 1818. Though Buol argued that since the congress had completed its work, there was nothing more to do than to bring the sessions to a close, he was unable to prevent a discussion. Cavour seized the opportunity to indict the Austrian occupation of the Papal States as an anomaly, as a menace to peace, and as useless in view of the restoration of order in Italy. Although the congress took no action, he won a moral victory in thus denouncing before Europe the Austrian position in Italy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hallberg, p. 109.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSION

The Crimean War marks a turning point in European history. It culminated forty years of peace and ushered in a period of hostilities which saw four major conflicts in fifteen years which resulted in the remaking of the map of Europe. At the close of the war there existed no single nation or alliance which was pledged to maintain the status quo of an European equilibrium such as had existed since the Congress of Vienna.<sup>1</sup>

For Austria, the war was a great misfortune. She had incurred the hatred of Russia as both Nicolas I and Alexander II felt Austria had betrayed them. Through her vacillations, Austria paved

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<sup>1</sup>The Congress of Paris, which ended the war of 1856, marked in meeting-place and in spirit the end of the system of Vienna. Austria was no longer an European necessity. England and France had checked Russia in the Near East without Austrian assistance; both, though for different reasons, looked favourably on Italian nationalism; and Russia and Prussia, again for different reasons, no longer cared for the conservative cause. France and Russia, late enemies, prepared to combine against Austria; this was a new version of Tilsit. Buel had hoped to win a French guarantee for the Austrian provinces in Italy; instead he had to hear Austrian rule denounced in the full Congress by Cavour. (Clarendon denounced both the Austrian and French rule in the peninsula.) He had hoped, too, to gain the Danube provinces in permanent possession, instead, the Austrian troops had to withdraw, and within a year or two, the Principalities turned themselves into independent Roumania with French and Russian encouragement. Still, though the Peace of Paris defeated the project for an Austrian Danube, it defeated the project for a Russian Danube also. Roumania became a no-man's land, a neutral possession of the mouth of the Danube and therefore more tolerable to Austria and Russia than that it should be held by either." Taylor, the Hapsburg Monarchy...., p. 92.

the way for the rapprochement between France and Russia which gave Napoleon III an excuse for his intervention in Italy and in the Principalities. As well, Austria won the animosity of England and lost her position of prestige in the eyes of the lesser German states and Prussia.

The extraordinary man who had so ably manœuvred himself to the throne of France, the 'parvenu' whose every action was regarded by the nations of Europe in the light of ulterior motives, became the arbiter for the Continent. With the close of the war, the furtherance of the cause of nationalities became the dominant part of his foreign policy.<sup>1</sup> He had reversed the decisions of 1815. Not only was there a Bonaparte firmly entrenched as Emperor, but that country had become the leading power on the Continent and Paris had become, once again, the diplomatic centre for the world. France was no longer alone. First England, then Austria and Piedmont and finally Russia became partners in alliances or ententes with Napoleon.

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<sup>1</sup>"Napoleon hoped that the Congress would give him a chance to raise certain questions not directly connected with the peace. In accordance with his views on nationalities, he desired to effect a settlement of the Italian and Polish questions and bring about the union of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. He tried to convince Buol that something should be done for Poland and Italy and suggested that the liberal concessions given to the Poles of 1815 be restored, while Austria and France withdraw their troops from the Papal States. In view of his growing friendship with Russia, it is likely that the Emperor made his reference to Poland in order that the problem of Italy should not stand out too prominently. At any rate, Buol replied that such matters were beyond the competency of the congress to discuss, that it was for the Tsar alone to decide on concessions for the Poles, and for Austria, France, and the Papacy to arrange for the withdrawal of the troops." Hallberg, p. 109.



After the treaty had been signed, the powers turned to Poland and Italy. Although Napoleon had previously desired that Poland be given her independence and had informed the British government of his desire, he now remained content along with Britain to obtain assurances that Russia would grant some degree of toleration to the subjected Poles.<sup>1</sup>

Poland, which never forgot the part it had played in the Napoleon wars, and could always count on the sympathy of Paris, hoped for much from the victory of another Bonaparte, who really believed in what his uncle had only professed - the rights of small nations. Again, Poland was almost a combatant; had not Polish contingents set forth in London and Constantinople, and appeared in the field of Silistria? Walewski, himself half a Pole, strongly supported Louis' desire to do something for his countrymen. But, since the death of Nicolas, Louis had been set on a reconciliation with his liberal-minded successor Alexander, and therefore accepted the Tsar's offer of a more tolerant policy in Poland - an amnesty for political prisoners, liberty of worship, and other reforms - which he had promised privately to carry out.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Napoleon was determined to bring the whole question of Poland before the conference. But Count Orloff entreated the Emperor not to allow the Polish question to be discussed in Conference, and promised in return an amnesty with very few exceptions, - the restoration of landed property to its former owners, reforms both religious and civil, the reintroduction of the Polish language, and a vice-royalty in the person of one of the Emperor's brothers. So earnest were these assurances that both the Emperor and Walewski thought they might rely upon them; the Emperor moreover, allowed himself to be influenced by Orloff's plea, that the new Czar should be allowed the credit of making these reforms at the time of his coronation with the grace of voluntary concessions, instead of grudgingly and of necessity, under the plain compulsion of Europe. Three months however sufficed to show that what was not given of necessity would not be given at all; and the promises made by Russia in secret would remain unfulfilled." Simpson, p. 363.

<sup>2</sup>J.M. Thompson, Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire (London: Basil Blackwell, 1954), p. 164.

On March 6, 1856, Napoleon told Lord Cowley that

'the great fault committed by the Congress of Vienna was that the interests of the sovereigns were only consulted, while the interests of their subjects were wholly neglected; the present congress ought not to fall into a similar error.... It would be disgraceful to England and France, if they had not the will or power to establish a state of things in the Principalities that would be in accordance with the wishes of the people'.<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon wished to extend to the Principalities the system of the 'plebiscite' which had been so effectually used in his own case. England rejected the union of the Principalities on the grounds that such an act would be in direct contravention to the very reasons for her defence of Turkey. Napoleon had never ameliorated his hatred for the Turks and had entered the war only to check the aggressive designs of Russia. It was because of his fear of the growing strength of Russia that Napoleon desired to strengthen the Principalities so that they might become a barrier to future Russian designs in the region of the Black Sea and in the Balkans. The other powers had desired that the Principalities remain weak so that they in themselves would not become a source of friction with Turkey.

However, the following year, the attention of England became centred on her problems with China and in India over the mutiny there. Although Napoleon assisted England in her difficulties, nevertheless he maintained a steady pressure for the union of the Principalities. Against the wishes of England, Austria, and Turkey,

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<sup>1</sup>Simpson, p. 363.

he obtained the reversal of a falsified vote which had been extorted by Turkey from the Principalities by which they had shown a supposed desire for non-union.

In August, 1857, Napoleon, accompanied by Empress Eugénie and Malowski, visited Queen Victoria at Osborne. During his visit, it was agreed that France would drop her demands for union if in turn England would mollify her stand for the annulment of the Moldavian elections. One year later, on August 19, 1858, the Convention of Paris constituted Wallachia and Moldavia twin states. They were given a permanent alliance with common laws, a common military organization - everything but a national unity. In 1858, however, Napoleon was able to secure from the Sultan and the great powers a general recognition of the right of each of the Principalities to elect its own Prince. Both states accordingly chose the same man - Alexander Gusa. In 1861-1862, Napoleon persuaded the powers to recognize the one Prince and the fusion of the two parliaments into a United Roumanian Parliament.

On September 25, 1857, Alexander II, Napoleon III, and King William of Württemberg met at Stuttgart. An agreement

was concluded by which the two rulers promised to come to an understanding on all questions of a European interest, not to participate in any coalitions directed against the other, and to cooperate in the east and to reach an agreement in case of the dismemberment of Turkey. The Tsar made no promise concerning his position in the event of an Austro-French war over Turkey.<sup>1</sup>

On his return to St. Petersburg, Alexander II met Frans

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<sup>1</sup>Hallberg, p. 121.

Joseph at Weimar. Their conversations indicated that the two nations were on the road to a rapprochement but would never enjoy the felicitations which had previously passed between them. At best, Franz Joseph hoped to persuade Alexander from following a policy which might be harmful to Austria. The Czar had made it definitely known to Napoleon that he would not give aid to Austria in any future difficulties in which she might find herself.

On January 10, 1858, four Italian refugees from London arrived in Paris where they met their leader Felice Orsini, who had also arrived from London in possession of bombs which had been made in Birmingham. On the night of the 14th January, he made an unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Emperor of the French, in accompaniment with the Empress, whilst they attended the Opera.

France demanded action from the British government. Palmerston introduced the Conspiracy Bill on January 20, 1858, but was defeated on the grounds that England was a true refuge for liberalists from Europe and would not give up this right of asylum to satisfy a French threat. Cavour refuted Walewski's charges of intimacy. Napoleon was fearful of further vengeance and decided to help the Italian cause. Although the plot triggered French assistance in Italy, it did result in the resignation of Palmerston and the resulting public clamour against the French attempt at dictating legal practice in England which turned the British against their ally.

On July 20, 1858, Cavour and Napoleon met at Plombières. Three points were agreed upon. Austria was to be manoeuvred into a

position of declaring war by an appeal from Massa-Carrara for union with Piedmont. The Duke of Modena was to object to this move, whereupon it was to be occupied by Victor Emmanuel II. The war with Austria was to be localized to northern Italy and was to avoid any implication of the Pope and the King of Naples. At the close of hostilities, Italy was to be divided into four parts - a Kingdom of Northern Italy which would comprise Sardinia and the Austrian possessions; a Kingdom of Central Italy; the Patrimony would be ruled over by the Pope; the Kingdom of Naples would remain unaltered. Eventually, all four Kingdoms were to form a confederation under the Presidency of the Pope.

On August 4, Napoleon notified Cavour that the Massa-Carrara idea be dropped. Cavour was to force Austria to declare war by increasing her forces along the Austrian border. Lombards were to be enlisted to make Austria appear the aggressor. Malmesbury asked Napoleon to refrain from this action. Cavour submitted as Napoleon withdrew his plan, however, Austria attacked.

On September 23, 1858, Napoleon sent Prince Napoleon to the Czar. In his conversations with the Emperor and Gorchakov at Warsaw,

the Prince outlined the plans regarding the approaching war with Austria....This document recalled the entente established at Stuttgart, and referred to the unstable conditions in Italy and the probability of war between Austria and Piedmont in which France was obliged to support the latter. It declared that Napoleon would not alter the European equilibrium to his advantage or raise pretensions which might alarm Russia, England or Germany: his object was simply to gain allies which the treaties of 1815 had rendered impossible. Upon the outbreak of war, the Tsar would proclaim an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward France and concentrate on the Galician frontier an army large

enough to immobilize about 150,000 Austrian troops, while a part of the Russian fleet would be stationed in the Mediterranean. Napoleon was to make England understand that any act of aggression against Russia would be regarded as an act of hostility toward France, while the Tsar was to warn Prussia and the German states not to aid Austria. The Tsar agreed that Piedmont should be enlarged by the erection of a Kingdom of Upper Italy and approved, in advance, of the annexation of Nice and Savoy to France. In case Russia became involved in war with Austria, at its conclusion France would support demands for the annexation of Galicia to Russia and for the modification of the Black Sea Clause of the Treaty of Paris. Finally, the two rulers were not to oppose the establishment of an independent Hungarian state.<sup>1</sup>

As Napoleon was required to divert England's attention, he forthwith invited Palmerston and Clarendon to visit Paris at which time he discussed France's intention of liberating Italy. Palmerston wanted a free and independent Italy embracing the whole of the peninsula south of the Alps. Further to this, Napoleon suggested the cessation of the French occupation of Rome.

The Italian campaign was short lived. Franco-Sardinian forces crossed into Lombardy in May and June of 1859. On June 24, 1859, was fought the last battle of the campaign - Solferino.

On July 11, 1859, an armistice was signed at Villafranca. The terms of the armistice were ratified by the Treaty of Zurich, November 10, 1859.

There were a number of reasons why the war stopped abruptly. In six weeks Napoleon had waged five battles to clear Lombardy and was militarily unprepared to take the Quadrilateral. He was disturbed

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<sup>1</sup>Hallberg, p. 161. Generally, these arrangements were incorporated in a secret treaty of March 3, 1859, in very vague terms. Hallberg, p. 163.



by the thought that a strong North Italian state would be a serious rival in the Mediterranean. However, the Russian ambassador, Schvalov, had warned the Empress in Paris that Prussia was compacting with Austria and intended to send an army of 200,000 men to the Rhine.

When Napoleon contracted with Sardinia against Austria, Austria expected help from Prussia and the lesser German states. Negotiations with Prussia concluded with the agreement for two armies - the smaller to go to Lombardy, the larger one to confront Paris on the Rhine. As a concession, Prussia demanded the command of the armies on the Rhine. Austria, however, had invaded Piedmont without notifying Prussia and therefore broke the agreement. Prussia was now faced with checking Napoleon's threat to Europe and forego plans of becoming the chief German power or adopt a position of non-intervention. On June 25, 1859, the Prussian government announced that they had decided to mobilize an army for the Rhine. Austria was content with Villafranca as she was unable to muster two armies. When this fact became known, she lost a large degree of her prestige in Germany and thereby paved the way for her defeat at the hands of the Prussians at Sedowa (Königsgrätz) on July 3, 1866.

Russia had been left in a weakened state by the hostilities. Her empire was threatened by revolts both in the subjugated provinces as well as in her vast serfdom. Her foreign policy, which had been strictly followed since 1815, was now abandoned in order to rebuild her sagging economy. She began to concentrate on her inter-

nal affairs and on the development of her natural resources. Wars were to be avoided at all costs unless some act of aggression should be committed against her or unless a war would definitely accrue to her status as a nation. Because of this change of foreign affairs, she refrained from any outright agreement with Napoleon lest she become embroiled in one of his wars of liberation which could be disastrous to her own future.<sup>1</sup>

Thus Russia firmly vowed

to avoid entanglements or engagements through which Russia might be involved prematurely in another war,<sup>2</sup>

no true Russian could doubt for one moment that the recent setback was a purely temporary misfortune and that, after the necessary period of reconstruction, Russia would resume her traditional policy....There could be no doubt that the destruction of the treaty of Paris must be the immediate and long-term object of Russian diplomacy. It must be followed by a full resumption of Russia's traditional policy.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>This in itself was a significant change, for under Nicolas I Russia had been the strong supporter of the existing treaty structures, and she had, moreover, by her close association with Austria and Prussia, prevented the German dualism from degenerating into open antagonism and war. The projected change in Russian foreign policy, then, clearly threatened to weaken the cause of European order.<sup>4</sup> Gordon Craig, "The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power," Vol. X, The New Cambridge Modern History, The Zenith of European Power, 1830 - 1870. Edited by J.P.T. Bury (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 269.

<sup>2</sup>Mosse, The European Powers..., p. 74.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 75. For fifteen years after 1856, Russia played the role of a revisionist power. As Prince A. Gorchakov stated, 'Russia is not sulking, she is only biding her time.'

Russian foreign policy on the morrow of the Congress of Paris was the obvious need to break up the hostile coalition and end the isolation of Russia. The means for this lay ready at hand in Napoleon's evident desire to improve his relations with Russia. A Russo-French rapprochement must loosen automatically the ties between France and England. It must weaken the precarious friendship of France and Austria. France was the member least antagonistic to Russia in the eastern question, the only one whose interests it might prove possible to reconcile with those of Russia.<sup>1</sup>

The predominance of English sea power throughout the Levant continued to maintain and exert a tremendous influence in the whole of the Mediterranean. The increased pressure of Russian influence in the same area became a threat to British influence. Turkey played the role of buffer between the two giants so that at the close of the hostilities and in succeeding years she continued in her same function. The main point in the conflict continued to be the Russo-British struggle for supremacy.

Russian interest in the Mediterranean worried not only England. Although they regretted their position as secondary to Britain, the French did prefer the existing situation rather than see it change in favour of the Russians. Napoleon did not desire further Russian advances as it might jeopardize his plans for the

Step.

And yet, during the peace conference, Palmerston was deterred in his attempt at the annihilation of a possible Russian threat to British prestige in the Levant. The British desired the

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<sup>1</sup> Mosse, *The European Powers...*, p. 74.

neutralisation of the Sea of Azov and the destruction of the shipyards of Nicolaieff. The powers vetoed this move as the British navy had already reached over-whelming proportions. What had also increased the concern of the powers was the fact that Britain had strengthened her hold on world commerce through her vast mercantile marine. Most of the world's steamships had either been built in England or their construction had been supervised by them. In any case most of the engineers manning the ships of other nations were Englishmen from the shipyards of Britain.

And so in the years to come, both Austria and Prussia turned to France in their hour of need. Yet in 1859, Austria was at war against Sardinia which was supported by France whilst Russia began to turn against Austria after having threatened France on Austria's behalf. At the same time, Russia agreed to remain neutral in any Austro-French war. England on the other hand removed herself from the warring factions of Europe and turned her mind to things of commerce and peace.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The existence of the balance of power and the public law of Europe were jeopardized also by a growing tendency on the part of Great Britain to withdraw from continental troubles. For the English people the Crimean War had been a frustrating and inconclusive conflict which had brought little glory to British arms. In the period that followed there was a general desire to avoid risks that might lead to a new conflict. This did not mean, immediately, that Britain would abstain from intervention in continental disputes. Indeed, it was generally believed that her position as a great power implied a moral obligation to make her opinion known in European affairs. Unfortunately, it proved difficult to base an effective foreign policy upon a desire to avoid risks and an insistence upon the right to preach to Europe firmness of pur-

The Eastern Question remained unanswerable with the rising of the various national groups towards independence. Turkey, although she had compacted to rectify the evils of her ways, continued to fit the description dubbed her by Nicolas I.

pose was hard to maintain when 'conscience and reason (were) at internal war', and Europe soon diverted by the spectacle of British statesmen taking determined, and even belligerent, positions in diplomatic crises and then retreating precipitately and awkwardly when serious resistance developed." Craig, p. 269.

1. *History of the Eastern Question*, by G. P. Gooch, 1914.

2. *The Eastern Question*, by G. P. Gooch, 1914.

3. *The Eastern Question*, by G. P. Gooch, 1914.

4. *The Eastern Question*, by G. P. Gooch, 1914.

5. *The Eastern Question*, by G. P. Gooch, 1914.

6. *The Eastern Question*, by G. P. Gooch, 1914.

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8. *The Eastern Question*, by G. P. Gooch, 1914.

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10. *The Eastern Question*, by G. P. Gooch, 1914.

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## INDEX

- Abdul Mejid, Ottoman Sultan of Turkey, 3, 7, 12, 14, 22, 26, 27, 28, 30, 33, 34, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 55, 63, 71, 72, 103, 104, 105, 111
- Aberdeen, George Hamilton-Seymour, 4th Earl of, British Prime Minister from December, 1852, to January, 1855, 7, 9, 10, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 33, 38, 40, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56, 85
- Albert, Prince, of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Prince Consort of Queen Victoria of England, 23, 48, 55
- Alexander I, Czar, Emperor of All the Russias (1801-1825), 2, 44
- Alexander II, Czar, Emperor of All the Russias (March, 1855-March, 1881), 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114
- Benedetti, Count Vincenti, French First Secretary at Constantinople, 21
- Bismarck-Schönhausen, Prince Otto von, Prussian statesman and Chancellor, 63
- Bourquessay, Count François, French Ambassador to Vienna, 67, 78, 95, 97, 98, 102
- Bright, John, British Member of Parliament, 6
- Brunnow, Baron Philip, Russian Ambassador to London, 14, 26, 39, 57, 102, 103
- Budberg, Baron Andrei von, Russian Ambassador to Berlin, 58, 63, 64
- Buol-Schauenstein, Count Karl Frederick, Austrian Foreign Minister, 40, 41, 42, 43, 52, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 73, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 88, 89, 90, 95, 96, 98, 100, 102, 106, 107, 108
- Canning, Sir Stratford (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe), British Ambassador to Constantinople, 7, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56
- Casteljane, Marquis M.B., French Ambassador to Vienna, 57
- Cavour, Count Camillo di, Sardinian Prime Minister, 79, 83, 92, 102, 106, 108, 112, 113
- Clarendon, George William, British Foreign Secretary to the governments of Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, 10, 17, 18, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 75, 87, 88, 97, 98, 99, 102, 104, 107, 111



- Clarendon, George William, Earl of, British Foreign Secretary in the governments of Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, 10,17,22, 38,39,40,42,45,49,54,60,61,62,69,75,87,88,93,94,95,102,104,106, 107,114
- Cobden, Richard, British Member of Parliament, President of the Board of Trade, 6
- Colloredo, Count Frans, Austrian Ambassador to London
- Cowley, Henry Richard, Earl of, English Ambassador to Paris, 26,59, 66,69,75,88,89,90,94,102,110
- Cusa, Alexander, Prince of Roumania, 111
- Delane, J. T., Editor at the Times, 8
- Drouyn de Lhuys, Edouard, French Foreign Minister, 59,65,66,76,78, 87,88,89,90
- Espartaco, Baldomero, Conde de Inchana, Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish forces and Regent, 82
- Esterhazy, Count Valentin, Austrian Ambassador to St. Petersburg, 62,96,97,98,102
- Franz Joseph, Emperor of Austria, 19,38,51,52,59,62,63,64,69,70,71, 73,77,78,80,81,83,90,100,111,112
- Frederick William IV, King of Prussia, 8,51,62,63,64,66,67,68,69,70, 71,76,80,81,99
- Fuad Pasha, Ottoman Foreign Minister, 14,21
- Gorchakov, Prince Alexander, Russian statesman and Chancellor, 73, 97,98,99,113,116
- Gorchakov, Prince Mikhail, Russian Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces in the Crimea, 71,72,97,98
- Hatzfeldt, Count Maximilian, Prussian Ambassador in Paris, 102
- Hübner, Count Joseph Alexander, Austrian Ambassador to Paris, 60, 65,66,67,76,77,78,79,82,100,102
- Ibrahim, son of Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt, 1
- Kiselev, General Paul, Minister for State Demissions, 97
- Kiselev, Count Paul, Russian Ambassador to Paris, 57,101

- Kossuth, Louis, Hungarian patriot and statesman, 18
- La Cour, Edmond de, French Ambassador to Constantinople relieving La Valette in April, 1853, 24,48,49,50
- La Marmora, General Alfonso, Commander of the Sardinian forces in the Crimea, 83,90
- La Valette, Charles, Marquis de, French Ambassador to Constantinople, from May, 1850, to April, 1853, 12,14
- Leiningen, Fieldmarshal Count C. of Neu-Leiningen-Westerburg, Austrian diplomat, 18,19,20,44
- Mahmud II, Sultan of Egypt, succeeded by his son Abdul Mejid, 1
- Mehemet Ali, Grand Vizier (Prime Minister) of Ottoman Turkey, 14
- Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, 1
- Manteuffel, Baron Edwin von, Prussian statesman, 99
- Manteuffel, Baron Otto von, Prussian Prime Minister, 51,62,63,102
- Menshikov, Prince Alexander, Russian statesman and diplomat, 7,20, 21,22,25,26,28,29,30,33,34,38,39,41,44
- Mustapha Pasha, Grand Vizier of Turkey, 29
- Napoleon III, nephew of Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 5,6,7, 11,12,14,21,22,23,24,38,42,43,45,49,55,56,58,65,66,67,69,70,75, 78,81,83,85,86,88,89,90,92,93,94,97,99,100,,108,109,110,111,112, 113,114,115,116,117
- Nesselrode, Count Karl Robert, Russian Chancellor, 10,14,15,20,29, 39,40,46,47,48,53,54,57,70,81,96,97,98,100,101,102
- Nicolas I, Czar, Emperor of All the Russias (December, 1825 - March, 1855), 2,3,4,6,7,9,10,15,16,18,19,20,21,22,24,25,28,29,30,32,33, 34,36,37,38,39,40,44,45,46,51,52,53,56,57,58,59,60,63,64,68,70, 72,73,76,80,81,83,107,116,119
- Omer Pasha, Commander of the Turkish forces in the Crimea, 18,48,50,
- Orlov, Count Alexei, Russian diplomatist, 20,40,58,63,97,102,103, 109,
- Orsini, Felice, Italian revolutionist and patriot, 112

- Palmerston, Viscount Henry, Home Secretary in Aberdeen's Cabinet, 1852, and British Prime Minister (February, 1855 - February, 1858), 3, 22, 24, 25, 38, 54, 55, 56, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 93, 94, 98, 100, 101, 104, 105, 112, 114, 117
- Pfordten, L.C.H. von der, Bavarian Prime Minister, 95
- Pourtales, Count Albert, Prussian diplomat, 68
- Reshid Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador to Vienna, and Foreign Minister, 15, 29, 44
- Roeback, John, English parliamentarian who was responsible for the fall of the Aberdeen government in January, 1855, 85
- Rose, Colonel Hugh, English Charge d'affaires in Constantinople, 21
- Russell, Lord John, British Prime Minister and statesman. He was Foreign Secretary in Aberdeen's Cabinet in December, 1852, and Secretary for the Colonies in Palmerston's Cabinet, 16, 17, 21, 22, 57, 85, 87, 88, 89, 92
- Seeback, Count Albin L, Saxon Ambassador to Paris, 96, 99
- Seymour, Sir Hamilton, English Ambassador to St. Petersburg, 6, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 25, 40, 57, 95
- Urquhart, David, British publisher - the Sheffield "Free Press", 7
- Victor Emmanuel II, King of Sardinia, 82, 92, 113
- Victoria, Queen of England, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 50, 54, 55, 58, 67, 71, 82, 85, 86, 88, 93, 95, 100, 111
- Walewski, Count Alexander, the natural son of Napoleon I and Countess Walewski of Poland, Ambassador to London (1851) and Foreign Minister (1855), 22, 34, 49, 92, 96, 97, 99, 102, 105, 106, 109, 111, 112
- Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, British General and Statesman, and Prime Minister, 9
- Werther, Baron Karl von, Prussian Ambassador to Vienna, 76, 96, 99
- Westmorland, Lord John, British Ambassador to Vienna, 60, 61, 78