The Logic of (dis)Order

How the Discourse on Peace, Conflict and Development Serves to Reproduce
Inequity, Injustice, Violence and War: The Case of the Israel-Palestine Conflict,
the Oslo Peace Accords and the Interim Period of 1993-2000

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Abstract

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Abstract: This thesis is primarily concerned with the thinking, writing and
speaking on problems of peace, conflict and development. It explores how the
historicity of development thinking, guided by the assumption that economic
prosperity yields peace and social security, functions primarily as a deployment of
power: a regime of knowledge. It argues the discourse (concepts, ideas,
assumptions) on, or ways of thinking about, peace, conflict and development
obfuscates the root causes of conflict, and reproduces inequity, injustice, violence
and war. It seeks to illustrate the gap between how development thinkers and
practitioners come to know a problem, and how that problem is experienced on
the ground. The case of the Oslo Peace Accords and Interim Period will show the
dependency of contexts of "complex emergency" on external agents and agendas
of development, and their assumptions, concepts, and ideas, necessarily
rearticulates a local, historical, institutionally embedded dependency, and deep
social divisions.

September 22, 2008

Acknowledgements

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Chapter 1

Introduction

My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not the same thing as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do [...] I think the ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger —Michel Foucault[1]

Posing the Problem

According to the United Nations, two-thirds of countries in the world suffer from latent tension and violent conflict.[2] The greatest threat to the prevention, management, and reconciliation of conflict and war is no longer posed by inter state actors. Rather, multiple social, political, economic, ideological, and cultural dynamics draw a wide assortment of people into various forms of collective violence (Reychler and Paffenholz (eds) 2001; UN 2005b). Today, intra-state war and conflict, humanitarian crises, and the crimes of genocide and terrorism are considered the greatest threats to global peace. Regional conflict, religious militancy, resource scarcity, environmental degradation, human rights violations, preventative diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, unipolarity, and the role of non-state actors, are just some of the pressing issues currently on the international peace agenda (Holtz 2002; Rotham 2002; Carment and Schnabel (eds) 2003; Siram and Wermester 2003).

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[1] Quoted in *The Foucault Reader* (1984), 343
[2] See <<www.un.org >>

The field of international development interacts with the field of Conflict Management in the area of the effects and outcomes of war and conflict. The literature on development in the 1990s is dominated by the theme of the spread of war and conflict and its devastating impacts and effects on development and peace. Indeed, international development agencies and their donors are increasingly caught up in contexts of complex emergencies, characterized by protracted crisis and the collapse of the state (Uvin 1998, 1999, 2001; Gervais 2003; Baare and Uvin 1999; Barakat and Chard 2003; Bryant and Kappaz (eds) 2005; Debiel (ed) 2002). The processes of international development interact with the international peace agenda through three main areas: conflict prevention, humanitarian intervention and response, and peacebuilding (Bryant and Kappaz 2005, 1-31).

The role of donor agencies, agendas, and strategies is to contribute to conflict resolution (conflict prevention) with the aim of expanding/creating a political space, or an effective capacity, for peace (peacebuilding) (Doyle and Sambis 1999; Lederach 2001). The focus of development efforts in the area of peacebuilding is to encourage an effective capacity for peace through the advancement of political and civil rights; economic, social, and cultural rights; and the right to development (Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 1992, 1994; United Nations 2005b). It is effective when it addresses the root causes of violence and conflict. Full reconstruction of states and societies, resettlement of displaced persons, rehabilitation of victims and perpetrators, implementing justice, are just a few

examples of emerging pertinent development problems (Bryant and Kappaz 2005, 1-31; world Bank 1997, 1998; UN 2005b).

There is a growing consensus among multilateral and bilateral donor agencies that intra-state conflict is often the result of structural inequality, inequity and injustice (World Bank 1997; OECD 1997). As stated by the OECD, "humanitarian assistance cannot substitute for sustained political commitment and action to avert crisis and support peace" (OECD 1997, 1). Turning attention to the structural factors that create conditions of (sustained) conflict and violence has taken the form of "conflict prevention" – eliminating sources of conflict that prevent the creation of peaceful societies precondition to development. Indeed, international organizations, donors, and international financial institutions have intensified, diversified, and broadened their intervention and response to situations of conflict in the post-Cold War (Baare and Uvin 1999; Uvin 1999).

The early 1990s seemed to provide a solid basis for a 'peace optimism': positive peaceful developments in international relations within and among nations, notably the achievement of the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords; the United Nations invited new members to join and the European Union expanded; Nelson Mandela was elected as President of South Africa in 1994, formally ending a century of apartheid rule. Yet the perception of success was soon to be interrupted by a resounding reality of widespread, unparalleled violence and conflict, that literally decimated millions of civilians, thousands of communities, entire countries, and whole regions: the war in the now former Yugoslavia blindsided the international community; anarchy, conflict, violence, genocide, state failure,

HIV/AIDs ravaged the African continent; the Asian markets collapsed and peace

agreements, namely Oslo, fail.

The Israel/Palestine Conflict and the Oslo Peace Accords (1993)

The signing of the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between Yassir Arafat and the PLO

team, and the State of Israel, represented by Yitzak Rabin, was celebrated by the

international community as an historic reconciliation to one of the twentieth

century's most enduring conflicts: The Israel/Palestine conflict, rooted in the

protracted Arab/Israeli Conflict and the 'Palestine Question'. Rabin and Arafat's

famed, albeit forced, handshake in front of the White House, symbolized not only

the potential, but the ability for third party intervention, through mediation,

preventative diplomacy, and negotiation, to yield comprehensive peace

settlements. At the time, Oslo was widely regarded by the international

community as an archetype of conflict resolution, and represented the zenith of a

peace optimism that spans from 1989 until the mid-90s. Two years later, Rabin is

himself assassinated by an extreme nationalist, and by 2000, violent conflict is

fully restored between Israel and Palestinians with the outbreak of the October

2000 El-Aqsa Intifada.

Critics of the Accords, namely the Palestinian people themselves and their

partners, were quick to point out in as early as 1993 that Oslo did not represent a

just peace, and therefore could not represent a sustainable peace. Instrumental

issues, such as the right of return for Palestinian refugees, the status of Jerusalem,

and the settlement of Israeli communities in the West Bank and Gaza had not been resolved but were instead postponed for future negotiations through the nomenclature of 'Final Status Issues'. The absence of these core issues from the final peace agreement ensured the failure of the peace accords, which when all told, took seven years to completely unfurl.

The outbreak of the second intifada effectively destroyed any prospects for the implementation of the Oslo Accords and resolution on "final status" issues such as the right of return for refugees and the settlement of the Israeli communities in the West Bank and Gaza. Moreover, the more than three years of Israeli "reprisals" for and "security measures" against the intifada inter alia military incursions, air strikes, and extra-judicial killings, combined with the destruction of thousands of homes, institutions, agricultural lands and other means for livelihood – have resulted in the radicalization of political attitudes and the "de-development" of the Palestinian Territories (Ajluni 2003, 64).

The Research Problematic

There is much debate on the ability for international development as a theory and/or practice(s) to help prevent conflict and war and promote peace (Lederach 1999, 2003; Lagerquist 2003; Yapa 2002; Kippers-Black 1999; Rahema and Bawtree (eds) 1997). Development theory, how it is conceptualized and how it materializes, is the engine to all matters, manners, and practices of international development. It embodies not only the logic and motive behind the policies and prescriptions of international donors, international financial institutions, multi and

bilateral organizations, and states, but it also defines and engenders the relationships between these bodies, and they to their beneficiaries. This research will show how donor preference for explicitly attempting to "influence core social and political dynamics of governance, reconciliation and justice," with the aim of preventing conflict and building cultures of peace, is widely debated as having negative unintended consequences on beneficiaries (Uvin 2001, 177). Donor assistance and its aid monies are constitutive to development in post-conflict and peacebuilding processes, and as the case of Palestine will show, the increased scope of donor involvement in such contexts raise critical questions, as decision-making power over resource allocation, priorities, and project design rests largely in the hands of donors and their related apparatuses. As such, the dependency of contexts of "complex emergency" such as Palestine on external agents and agendas of development, and their financial institutions, often rearticulates a local, historical, institutionally embedded dependency, and deep social divisions (Lagerquist 2003; Said 2001; Samara 2001).

The thinking and practice of peace breaks down into four sets of issues that relate to development theory: philosophical, political, economic, development. For over fifty years, global peace has been conditioned upon the economic prosperity of state actors in the international system. This assumption has defined the parameters for action, in thinking and in practice, for both international development and international relations. Through this paradigm, peace is understood as both the absence of violence and social stability and is considered a precondition to economic development. In turn, economic development is

considered precondition to human or social development. Alternately, development theory is concerned with conflict that makes conditions for economic development difficult if not impossible. Conflict is understood as an obstacle to any kind of development, or in other words, a negative condition of peace. Translated into practice, this means development mechanisms – aid/assistance, technology and knowledge transfers, and the all-important 'development project' – do not typically take hold until *after* conflict cease.[3] Thus, broadly speaking, the aim of international development is to encourage peace and dissuade conflict through economic opportunity.

The hegemony of economic prosperity-as-peace as the preferred understanding of and solution to crisis and conflict now takes the form of 'globalization' -- the filter through which all current development thinking and practice must pass. Adopted by almost every field of inquiry, its meaning varies between professional points of view and motivation. Broadly speaking globalization describes a process of increasing global political, economic, cultural, ideological, and technological integration, intensifying capitalist expansion, dissolving borders with trade, and the political and economic rise of transnational corporations (TNCs) (Bhagwati 2004; Sklair 2002; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001). Throughout the 90s, international organizations and national governments, namely the United States, pursue broadly a common strategy for dealing with widespread chaos, crisis, and violence based on the assumption that liberalizing states through legal, political, economic and social reforms would foster and promote peace and

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[3] In another view, in times of conflict, any and all existing development expertise is evacuated from the conflict zone.

security within and between states. In the political realm it meant democratization, and in the economic realm, privatization and deregulation.

Widespread criticism has drawn attention to the differential effects of globalization on Northern and especially Southern economies, labour, productivity, culture, and social welfare. In short, these literatures attempt to prove the gap between policy and prescription, one the one hand, and their effect, on the other; or in other words, the living gap between theory and practice. They show how the forces, processes, and practices of globalization contribute to an overall decrease in human security, human rights and welfare, and increasing conflict and war (Gai 2000, Petras and Veltmeyer 2001; Logan 2002; Yapa 2002; UNCTAD 2006).

When policies and processes of globalization are grafted onto contexts of conflict and deep division the differential effects are further intensified. Throughout the interim period (1994-2000), neoliberal economic policies and the structural adjustment and democratization programs they require, having recently been packaged through the social reality of 'globalization', form the basis of the World Bank/IMF peacebuilding agenda in the Territories. Indeed, the economy of the Palestinian Authority (1993-2000) is unique because it is alone in having been designed, from its very onset, by the policies and prescriptions of external actors and globalizing institutions: namely, the World Bank and IMF (Samara 2001). Under Oslo, these institutions consider the PA economy the engine to peace and prosperity in the semi-autonomous Palestinian territories, and they take authority over its control and design. This peacebuilding agenda is articulated as the

integration of the PA economy into global markets through increasing foreign investment and financing in the territories, and creating labour-intensive export production (World Bank 1999; Samara 2001).

The purpose of this research is begin to create a language to articulate the 'gap' between the knowledge about a given 'development problem' and the reality of the problem as it is itself experienced on the ground. The guiding development issue this research addresses is the relationship of conflict to development: if peaceable conditions and elimination of structural violence are precondition to development, how can economic development, let alone sustainable development occur in contexts marked by deep divisions, asymmetry, and animosity? This research is indeed part of a massive literature (development, conflict, and peace), but one that is distorted, paying disproportional attention to certain aspects, with virtual silence on others. It is also surprisingly uniform, given the scope and multidisciplinary nature of the literature.

The purpose of this inquiry is to assess and evaluate the conceptual divisions and distinctions related to terms 'conflict', 'development' and 'peace', the relationship of these three concepts, each to the other, and the how the operational aspects of theses terms define the conflict and development agenda and establish the parameters for action. Defining the conceptual parameters of this research will be critical to its practical operation to policy and decision-making. The scrutiny of policy is critical to this research because policy guides and reflects a deeper understanding of the problem at hand. In development practice, policy

aims to reform social and political institutions and development markets (World Bank and Brynen 2000).

The gap between the perception of peace and the reality of conflict can be measured by ideas and concepts missing from dominant theory and thinking, as it can be measured by ineffective policies and prescriptions. For example, absent from development literature in general and the development literature on conflict and peace in particular is a critical study of theories of power and relations of power, and a critical study of the concepts 'justice', 'peace', 'conflict, and 'peacebuilding' as concepts, themes, or issues. 'Justice', 'peace', 'conflict, and 'peacebuilding' are interpreted in the literature largely in their technical/operational form (political elections and good governance, law and order, peace agreements). There is a virtual silence around these concepts in dominant development thinking vis-à-vis their philosophical, moral, ethical, and psychological meanings: fairness, equality, equity, harmony.

Indeed, development theory and, therefore, development practice are often isolated from the political processes of conflict prevention that mitigate peacebuilding efforts. It is not surprising then that the critical development literature on conflict and peace is rather scant relative to other areas of development interest (gender, globalization, the environment, micro enterprise). Conflict and peace are borrowed concepts – considered under the authority of international relations, political scientists, and political institutions – onto which development theory grafts its explanations, concepts, and solutions. Thus, development literature vis-à-vis global conflict, despite its intentions to promote

and facilitate peace, tends to be descriptive and reactionary to conflict dynamics, and not critical and responsive. It is largely characterized by identifying and exploring the multitude of ills accompanied by conflict and war (famine, forced migration, human rights abuses, environmental degradation, etc) and identifying obstacles to implementing policies and strategies (failure of the state, corruption, spoilers). Consequently, the literature reads at times voyeuristic, at other times, opportunistic.

These qualities of the development literature on conflict and peace raise critical questions, as decision-making power over resource allocation, priorities, and project design rests largely in the hands of donors and their related apparatuses (Uvin 2001; Gervais 2003; World Bank and Brynen 2000): If development theory is selective when it comes to its conceptual parameters, to what degree can its knowledge base (paradigms, strategies, and schools of thought) serve to understand development problems? If development theory (or ways of thinking) avoids issues of power, how can processes and practices or development positively interact with the on the ground realities posed by deeply divided societies? These questions begin to articulate the gap between theory and practice, "between rhetoric and reality, between declarations and deeds", in international development (UN 2005b, 36 para. 34).

Thesis Statement

This thesis is about the choices we make. To this end, it is primarily concerned with the question, how do we as development thinkers and practitioners come to

know a 'development problem'? What is it we know and how do we know it? Whom does this knowledge benefit? For this reason, this thesis is primarily concerned with the speaking, thinking, and writing about problems of peace, conflict and development. This thesis argues the knowledge base provided by the conventional thinking on conflict and war is insufficient for providing authentic meaning about a given conflict, and in turn, results in knowledge deficiencies in the conventional thinking on development and peace. It will argue the biggest threat to international peace and security, or the root cause of conflict and war, is how those empowered the make decisions on matters relating to conflict and war think about conflict and war.

The guiding principle of this research is that for sustainable peace and development to succeed in any conflict sensitive context, but in particular Israel/Palestine, these processes will require a deeper understanding of the relationship between ideas and power and knowledge to the production of development thinking and practice, vis-à-vis issues of peace and conflict and the reproduction of violence and conflict. The aim of this research is to reveal how power, privilege and influence operate through the deployment of knowledge and strategies in international development and international peacebuilding strategies, and to show how ways of thinking about peace, conflict and development are the domains and mechanisms for the reproduction of dependency and conflict. The objective is to analyze development as a form of knowledge in terms of power. It will scrutinize how development theory creates knowledge and how this knowledge interacts with other forms of knowledge (in continuity or

discontinuity) on peace and conflict. It asks, given a specific organizational structure, how and why do authorities of 'development' establish 'a knowledge' of development in deeply divided societies? It will argue mainstream development discourse obfuscates rather that illuminates root causes of conflict because it is predicated on certain assumptions which in turn reproduce conflict.

· This research establishes a link between knowledge and social injustice (structural violence). It will involve inquiry into literatures that are preoccupied with development, conflict and power. Thus, a clear link can be made to social effects on the ground: how does the idea of development work? What is its relationship to conflict? Of central concern, exploring the different knowledge on peace, conflict and development and how they shape and inform strategies for conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and sustainable development. This research will be applied to the case of the conflict between Israel/Palestine and the Oslo Accords/interim period. The role of knowledge as regimes of power in the Israel/Palestine relationship, sources of and influences for these regimes, and how they operationalize power relations will be explored. The central role of 'narratives' is crucial when concerned with knowledge production. As such, respective national narratives political narratives, narratives of representation, and cultural belonging will be explored.

This thesis is primarily interested in power relations and their exercise and effect. To this end it borrows from post-modern theory and asks, in a specific type of knowledge, in a specific truth, rooted historically, what are the most immediate and local power relations at work? How do they make possible the kinds of

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knowleges at play and conversely how were these knowledges used to support power relations? How do these power relations change by their very exercise? How do these relations link together to one another according to the logic of one great strategy? (Foucault 1978, 97). I argue the connection is as follows: knowledge is not only the means to understanding a particular 'development problem', it is the problem itself. For this research, knowledge is not about what is being said, (it is not useful as syntax), but how all that is said is *articulated*; meaning, how it is organized, selected, prioritized, arranged selected into a coherent way of saying something about a problem (it is useful as comprehension).

Thus knowledge is understood to denote both a process (such as peacebuilding, or economic liberalism) and a project (such as a peace agreement or development project) for understanding. Knowledge is both the problem and the solution; the obfuscation and the optic for seeing our way out. It is both the subject of this thesis and the method; the object of analysis and the means for analysis. Knowledge is explored in a fourfold manner: first, why ideas are implemented (relates to how conflict is understood); second, how these ideas are conceptualized (relates to the relations of power and their functions); third the character of relationship between actors, positions of authority, those empowered to act and how they act; and fourth, knowledge is explored as a process of selection — what is said and not said, what is known and what is left in the dark.

The thesis of this research is twofold (i) development knowledge in peacebuilding contexts reproduces and makes legitimate a logic of social

inequality which in turn reproduces unresolved contradictions and negative attitudes between conflict parties, and relationships of dependency; and (ii) development knowledge can be a means to resolve conflict nonviolently and redress social inequality and injustice because it has the potential to reconstitute a language for enunciating the historical, material, and emotional dimensions of conflict, activating norms such as responsiveness and enduring relations of mutuality and respect.

In the case study this thesis will explore the link between the globalizing agendas of the international donors in post-Oslo Israel/Palestine and the reproduction of structural dominance considered endemic to cultures of violence and conflict. To this end, Palestinian development under Oslo will be explored as an "encounter" between donor agendas and their discourses of globalization and peacebuilding, PA elite interests and their discourses, and Israeli security interests and their discourses of control (Lagerquist 2003). This research illustrates how throughout the duration of 'the peace process', the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority was "dominated by Israeli economic policies" and "subordinated to the prescriptions of international financial institutions" (Samara 2001, 1). Thus the peacebuilding agenda of the post- Oslo period is understood as rearticulating the asymmetrical relationship between Israelis and Palestinians.

The thesis prescribes that problems of development, peace, and conflict should be approached in the following manner. First, assume that the conflict is evolving, morphing, dynamic, sensitive, turbulent, and emotional. Second, apply multiple mixed strategies sensitive to various stages of a conflict. Third, account

for and understand the ideological issues at stake (on the ground realities). Four, the development community needs to take a more activist approach to conflict resolution, action that is responsive not reactive, strategic not technical, deployed as a process and project of justice. This approach assumes everything is political and therefore stresses the importance of being able to show the conflict constituents tangible gains from cooperation and conflict management. It also stresses the importance of strengthening groups more prone to nonviolence and cooperation. Jentleson (2003) calls these actors "cooperation constituents" (35). In turn, the paradigm for thinking and writing, and therefore knowing, about conflict is refocused on relationships; development is relationships, peace is relationships, conflict is relationships – between individuals, states, and systems.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework constructed by the author identifies the ideas used for this research. These ideas contain the guiding assumptions of this research and are defined by concepts. The working ideas of this thesis are as follows:

Ideas Matter

This research is guiding by the assumption that ideas matter. Social constructivists argue ideas matter because they have material effects (Miller and Holstein 1993; Mbembe 2001; Mamdani 1998). For this thesis, concepts reflect relations of power: what a concept means rests largely on its interpretation (Talentino 2003).

Where concepts come from, who authors them, the contexts from which they emerge, and the knowledge they disseminate is instrumental to their understanding and meaning. Thus, concepts provide key frameworks for political decisions (Carment and Schnabel (eds) 2003). This thesis will show the international system is guided by norms; these norms fashion concepts; concepts define relationships (distribution of wealth, allies, power). People are represented by concepts and where one is aligned conceptually determine one's power to influence one's fate.

Knowledge creation is by nature the object of a political struggle because it poses the question of power

A guiding assumption for this thesis is that to concern oneself with knowledge creation is intrinsically political (Adams (ed) 1992; Foucault 1977, 1978). It is to begin a course of study at a place of radical skepticism about truth and facts and how they correspondence to knowledge: to approach a development problem from this perspective is to reject the 'intrinsic good' or 'value' of facts (Kippers-Black 1999; Said 1977, 1978; Brigg 2002; White 2002). It calls for an interest not only in 'what' is *known* but 'why' and 'how' and to what effect. It shows academic knowledge, established as objective, scientific, impartial is instrumental in the reproduction of colonial forms of subjugation and administration (Bove 1992, 6).

Development is a form of knowledge linked to material entitlements

Development theory is a social science discipline and therefore favours categories, selectivity, and principles of order and reason. Complex human experience (conflict, war, peace) is measured and analyzed through scientific discovery. This research is guided by the idea that development theory is a deployment of power because power is exercised through the process of selecting or choosing. This research endeavours to identify what is selected/chosen and why, and who benefits or loses (Barakat and Chard 2003; Jones 2004; White 2002).

There can be no development without peace and there can be no peace without justice. Therefore there can be no development without justice

In the context of this research, justice is a development focus, understood as a social issue, encompassing both socioeconomic and sociopolitical justice. In this way, sociopolitical and socioeconomic justice is considered two sides of the same coin, herein referred to as "social justice". It presumes the origins of conflicts are rooted in socioeconomic and socio-political injustice. Therefore peace is concomitant to a just and an equitable society and instrumental to freedom. The underlying assumption of this thesis is that peace is constitutive to social justice and social justice is constitutive to peace. A guiding assumption of this research is that peace and its processes and projects tend to treat the symptoms (manifest violence) and not the disease of conflict (structural violence). In other words,

peacebuilding and conflict prevention focus on the form, not the content of a given conflict.

Economic liberalization—the dominant model for peace and prosperity— engenders conflict rather than encourages peace because it reproduces asymmetrical power relations

Donor involvement in peacebuilding contexts is an exercise in deploying relations of power onto a preexisting matrix of power relations (Lagerquist 2003). This idea guides the research, challenging the very assumptions and core values of the development enterprise. It shows the economic liberalization as peacebuilding model is predicated on a paradox: economic liberalization requires and fosters competition which contradicts the need for social cohesion and reconciliation in contexts of conflict and deep division (Paris 2003). As such, processes of liberalization and their accoutrements (human rights, gender quality, free elections, peace education) exacerbate and inflame structural inequalities and social asymmetries endemic to cultures of conflict. This research draws out the role of power relations between donors and agents of peacebuilding (third party intervention) and the recipients of assistance and intervention: how and why and to what end relations of power are articulated and received is brought centrally to the research endeavor.

Structural violence (sociopolitical and socioeconomic injustice) represent the origins of conflict as well as sources for its resolution

Peace scholars emphasize that structural violence is embedded in our very language structures: the way we think and communicate (Boulding 1996; Gorsevski 1999; Galtung 1969, 1975). Structural violence is 'indirect' and less visible in that it refers to violence built into the social fabric through institutions, policies, attitudes, norms, values, assumptions (Reychler and Paffenholz (eds) 2001; Galtung 1975; Boulding 1996; Uvin 1998). Structural violence can be understood as the absence of access to means of production, to health and nutrition, to empowerment through participation, justice, to information and education, to dignified social relationships, cooperation and equity. Examples of structural violence include, but are not limited to, endemic poverty, gender discrimination, centralized state authority and power, and ethnic stratification (apartheid, ethnic democracies). For this thesis, violence means more than physical harm (armed violence) and includes psychological violence, intended to produce mental suffering or to spread fear and hate, and cultural violence, intended to legitimize abuse and oppression – violence is approved in the name of a legitimizing discourse (religion, nationalism, political ideology) (Reychler and Paffenholz (eds) 2001; Galtung 1975; Lira 2001).

Sustainable peace cannot be reconciled with the perpetuation of social injustice;

Just (symmetrical) power relations are the basis for the capacity for a society to

manage conflicts nonviolently (the foundation for sustainable development)

This research is guided by the normative idea that peacebuilding must redress the structural inequalities in political, economic, and social systems in deeply divided societies (Uvin 1998; Lederach 2003; Talentino 2003). The aim of conflict resolution strategies such as peacebuilding and conflict prevention is the creation of a just and equitable society whereby social relations are more or less symmetrical in terms of political, economic, social, and cultural power. It assumes only deep and locally owned social and political dynamics can render the kind of justice required to address structural dominance and exclusion (Boulding 1996, 2001; Cousens 2001).

Methodology

This research is concerned with accounting for the guiding assumptions, the norms and values, the principles and logics, and the core concepts of theories of peace, conflict and development since 1950. Therefore, for this research, the source of data is various forms of discourse. Discourse, for this research, refers to that which is spoken, written, known, and understood and its sum effect. With Macdonell (1986), this thesis takes the position that all human action is discursive in nature. Discourse refers not only to utterances, but to understanding: "Discourse is not about objects: rather discourse constitutes them" (Sheridan

1980, 98). In this way, discourse is understood not as a referent, a sign of something else, but is itself intrinsically the meaning, the message spoken (Adams 1992). The kinds of discourse used in this research are institutional, ideological (aim to promote change for the interest for a group), theoretical (aim is to convince people of 'the truth', describe and explain), and programmatic (action-oriented, policy prescription). They were accessed from intergovernmental organizations, governmental and non-governmental organizations, scholarly research, United Nations related bodies, international financial institutions, and civil society organizations.

The methodology for this research is a form of comparative discourse analysis. The gap between development theory and practice (the politics of development) in relation to the lived reality of 'peace' and 'conflict' is the locale or domain of analysis. This link is worked out by analyzing the speaking and writing of the actors involved, how this is 'enunciated' and deployed, and the motive for each respective position: who is speaking, why, under what authority, to what aim, and to what effect. Through juxtaposing the thinking on peace, conflict, and development, with the material benefits, or 'lived reality', of these discourses, in this case, the Oslo Peace Accords and interim period, 'the gap' between how peace/conflict prevention is spoken and deployed and how it is experienced 'on the ground' is revealed. What will be shown is peacebuilding-as-development constitutes a 'negative space' for peace that in turn, reproduces asymmetrical relationships of power and dependency, and ultimately the root causes of the conflict at hand.

The method of this research is discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is an analytical interpretation of discourse — a "carefully argued interpretation" rather than an "exhaustive characterization" (Martinussen 1997, 318). Discourse analysis is useful to unravel the relations between power and powerlessness and in identity formation processes: "it can capture the linguistic articulation of ethnic and other identities which is a central pre-condition for their politicization" (319). Discourse analysis is also useful as an analytical tool to grapple with contemporary society and its problems because it provides entry into an analysis of the "linkages between power, knowledge, institutions, the state, intellectuals, and the control of populations" (Bove 1992, 6).

This research adopts a Foucauldian discourse analysis (1978). For Foucault, language is an event not an activity. He shifts attention away from the 'statement', the words spoken or written, to the 'enunciation', the context in which they are uttered and the status or position of their author. His critical interest is in the laws operating behind the formation of words, or in other words, how 'discourse' is operationalized. For Foucault, discourse has a tactical function: power and knowledge are joined together in discourse (100) and further, discourse transmits and produces power (101). Of central analytical focus: the variation and effects of the distribution of discursive elements, according to who is speaking, their position of power (the right to make them), and the institutional context in which s/he happens to be situated and the position of subjects in the discourse. In doing so, Foucault shows discourse is an asset in that it poses, fundamentally, the question of power. (Bove 1992; Sheridan 1980)

Indeed, a central analytical tool for this research is Foucault's theory of power (1978). His theory of power begins with a paradoxical assumption: power is simultaneously interpersonal or relational, subjective, and intimate, as well as structural, abstract, objective, and impersonal. Foucault offers a way of thinking about power that enjoins two distinct properties: "subjects acting upon themselves and others" and a "complex strategic situation in a particular society" with which individuals are engaged (Foucault 1978, 93). In doing so, Foucault expands the conceptual borders of 'power' to include its productive, reproductive, and 'polymorphic' qualities. First, he abandons the assumption power as a simple denotation of binary brute force: "cease to conceive of [power] in terms of law, prohibition, liberty and sovereignty" and with it a "[...] negative representation" (90). To understand power solely as an imposition obscures more than reveals how power operates, as it tends to exclude or obfuscate the incorporative, inclusive, and productive qualities of power. Rather, Foucault re-conceptualizes power as "polymorphic" in its exercise, constituting multitudes of discourses, manifesting many different forms, through which mechanisms of power act simultaneously (9).

For Foucault, power is better understood as a "process", a "multiplicity of force relations", that "support" each other and form a "chain" or "system" (92-93). Power is "omnipresent" because it is produced from one moment to the next, in every relation from one point to another: "power is everywhere because it comes from everywhere (93)." In this way, power is not considered an aberration, but ubiquitous to social life. The law, political, social, economic institutions and

their policies, and social hegemonies like customary norms (social, religious, and gender roles) and mainstream attitudes, are a few examples of different strategies through which these force relations take effect. For example, as Foucault points out, notions of 'common sense' and 'normal' have privilege of unnoticed power and this power produces instruments of control which can both include and exclude social members.

In the *History of Sexuality*, Foucault advances five central propositions from his definition of power which serves as the basis for the analysis of this research. First, power is not fixed but fluid, "exercised from innumerable points in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations" (94). Second, relations of power are concomitant to other types of relationships, such as economic processes and knowledge relationships. Their intersection reveal, what Foucault calls, the "divisions, disequilibriums" inherent to these relationships, and have a "directly productive role" in re/creating their internal conditions. Third, because there is no binary of ruler and ruled, power comes from below as well as above. Families, small groups, and institutions are an important basis for "wide ranging effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole" (94). Fourth, power relations are both "intentional" and "nonsubjective" both internally derived and externally imposed. While Foucault acknowledges the exercise of power does not necessarily imply choice of an individual subject, "there is no power exercised without a series of aims and objectives (95)".

This leads to Foucault's last supposition, which is the exercise of power necessitates the exercise of resistance. The relational character of power relations

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allows for a plurality of forms of resistance. In Foucauldian analysis, there is no binary of relations where there is a dominant discourse and an excluded discourse; only a "multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies" (101). What is of concern is their distribution and their reconstruction: with what is said and not said, what is permitted and what is forbidden, what is silenced and concealed and what is revealed and known. "Silence is a shelter for power", says Foucault, because it "anchors prohibitions" and "provide for obscure areas of tolerance" (101).

Discourse analysis is messy business: it is an intrinsically unstable and complex process that is neither a "uniform" nor "stable". It can be both and instrument and effect of power; it can also be a locus of resistance: "a starting point for an opposing strategy" (101). In this way, discourse and its analysis is intrinsically dissident to calcified hierarchies and asymmetries in social relations and their institutions, policies, norms, values, and ideas. It is this characteristic that proves most useful to thinking about problems of development, peace, and conflict, and ultimately, theories of development vis-à-vis peace and conflict.

Structure of the Thesis Argument

Chapter Two presents a review of the literature on the thinking and writing on peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and development as practice and thought. As such, this chapter presents a broad discussion on how peacebuilding and conflict prevention are discussed, spoken, and thought about. This discourse is juxtaposed with development theory and donor involvement in the promotion of peace and

prevention of conflict. This chapter begins with an overview of contemporary peacebuilding from 1989 to 2000 It then provides a broad discussion on the issues of peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and peacebuildng. It discusses how peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and development strategies are implemented. It provides a literature review of theories of peacebuilding and conflict prevention and how they relate to development, exploring the logic of their associated assumptions, beliefs, and ideas. The principal concern for this literature review is the degree to which it helps us better understand how and what we know about peace, conflict and development and therefore peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and development. It provides an historical exposition of the concepts peacebuilding and conflict prevention and development; the aim is to illustrate the meaning of knowledge and its functions, its properties, and characteristics

Chapter Three presents a review of the literature on the thinking and writing on peace, conflict, and development as concepts, in an effort to present and interpret the literature, to show the different schools and positions on peace, conflict and development. It will unmask the major theoretical influences that shape these concepts over the last sixty years in an effort to present and interpret the literature on conflict, peace, and development as concepts and ideas, showing their different schools and positions, unmasking the privileged ideas, assumptions and beliefs relevant to the understanding of a given conflict. Through this analysis, working ideas on the nature of knowledge on peace, conflict and development is generated; these ideas relate specifically to the nature of development. This chapter concludes with findings to suggest that the thinking

and writing on conflict, peace, and development is driven by the mechanics of their respective discourse and not the problem at hand. It identifies and organizes the functions and logics of their discursive articulation with the aim of establishing a further framework for understanding the discursive dimension to conflict and conflict prevention. Moreover, it shows how discourse is linked to material entitlements.

Chapter Four presents an overview of the Israel-Palestine Conflict through a historical perspective. This chapter does not simply provide a litany of facts and data, but attempts to present the Israel/Palestine conflict through the lens of social relations: the basic building blocks of conflict. This chapter focuses on the character of Israel/Palestinian relations vis-à-vis power as the entry point for understanding the broader scope of Israel/Palestinian Conflict. Thus, it presents data on the historical, political, economic, social character and context of Israeli/Palestinian relations. It also presents the various narrative positions, influences and effects resulting in the Israel/Palestine. An analysis of the major narratives of the Israel/Palestine Conflict provides an application of the discussion presented in Chapters Two and Three.

Chapter Five presents a discussion on the Oslo Accords and their framework for peacebuilding during the Interim Period. It provides historical approaches to building peace in Israel/Palestine. It shows how the Accords reproduced structured dominance in the territories and how they function to as a form of power in order to contain, control Palestinian claims to sovereignty, independence, autonomy.

Chapter Six presents both the function and effect of development initiatives and efforts in consolidating peace during the interim Period. It draws the link between the aims and objectives of development during the interim period and their material effects.

Chapter Seven presents the study's findings and conclusions. It will suggest that a critical study of discourse and power and relations of power become central to the development research endeavour.

Chapter Two

Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and International Development:

An Overview of the Literature

Introduction

This research begins with a literature review that is primarily concerned with the thinking, speaking, and writing about peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and donor development in their operational and theoretical forms: in concept and in their relation to problems of development, peace, and conflict. As such, this chapter will present a broad discussion on how peacebuilding and conflict prevention are practiced, spoken, and thought about. This chapter will present an overview of peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and development as peacebuilding efforts between 1989 and 2000. It will then present the thinking on each concept as an evolving phenomenon through a review of the literature. This review will attempt to asses the conceptual merits of peacebuilding, conflict prevention and development. The principle concern for this literature review is the degree to which it helps us better understand how and what we know about peace, conflict and development as concepts, and therefore peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and development as policies, prescriptions, and practices.

What is Peacebuilding?

Since 1989, the concept of peacebuilding has gained widespread acceptance in academic and political circles. While the notion of peacebuilding was originally conceived as an integral part of United Nations' (UN) efforts in the promotion of global peace and resolution of conflict, there is a clear consensus in the literature that the early 90s in many ways 'discovered' peace (Crocker *et al* (eds) 2001; Carment and Schnabel (eds) 2003). Indeed, there has been a long tradition of peace scholarship, peacemaking, and conflict management – the United Nations was created for the very purpose of preserving global peace – nonetheless, 'peace' and 'peacebuilding', in idea and practice, was marginalized in academic circles, political networks and institutions, and centres of power. The fall of communism and spread of democracy and capitalism, combined with emerging intrastate conflicts through the 90s brought peace and peacebuilding to the fore of the international agenda.

Peacebuilding in the early 1990s referred to a series of activities intended to help countries recover from violent conflict. During the 1990s, the concept and practice of peacebuilding evolves to include the prevention and mitigating of violent conflicts within societies, as well as helping them to recover (Boutros-Boutros Ghali 1992; Aksu 2003). Broadly, peacebuilding refers to sustained, long-term efforts to strengthen the prospects of internal peace, after conflict ceases, and decrease the likelihood of recurring violent conflict. It includes conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict strategies. It involves a range of activities from monitoring, humanitarian aid, development, conflict

resolution, and conflict transformation. The overarching goal is to enhance the indigenous 'capacity of a society to manage conflict nonviolently'.

Peacebuilding focuses on the political and socio-economic context of conflict (not military and humanitarian) and it seeks to find the means to institutionalize the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The strategic aims of peacebuilding include building human security through democratic governance, promoting and advancing human rights, particularly the human rights of women, rule of law, sustainable development, equitable access to resources, and environmental security. By the mid-1990s, the notion of peacebuilding, and its oft-cited companion conflict prevention, is centrally placed on the international agenda.

What is Conflict Prevention?

The functioning of conflict prevention as an operational and structural response to emerging war, conflict, and crisis, begins first with understanding the character of the global context (1989-2000). The post Cold War international system undergoes a paradigm shift which transforms not only the system itself but the very concept of conflict and war: the international system shifts from a bipolar to a unipolar power structure, dominated by American hegemony, and its concomitant democracy and capitalism, and yielding increased global insecurity and instability. Traditional interstate conflict is replaced with intrastate conflict and war carried out by non-state actors; conflict within states, wars of or on citizens, often between social groups. There is also a rise in economic and

environmental conflicts. The determinant of conflict shifts likewise from ideology to identity, giving rise to such concepts as 'civil conflict', 'civil war', and 'ethnic conflict' to denote the emerging forms of violence and conflict. War is disproportionately experienced by the Developing South: 80 % of the world's poorest 20 countries have suffered intense conflict, political violence, and/or war in the last fifteen years.[4] The primary sources of conflict in the Third World are "more likely to derive from internal rather than external variables" (Levy 2001, 20). Resource shortages, threats to economic subsistence, as well as tenuous political legitimacy, are oft-cited sources for conflict in the Developing South.

Unlike the cold war system, the post cold war system is unique for a 'lack of a clear enemy'. The level of brutality and destruction on civilians is another new, regular feature of the international system. To this day, the United Nations reports that currently roughly 25 million people are internally displaced worldwide, one third of which are" beyond the reach of aid systems"; 11-12 million people are refugees; Over 40 million people infected with AIDs; More than 1 billion live below the 'extreme poverty line' ($1/day) while 20, 000 people die worldwide/day from the effects of poverty (UN 2005b, 4 para 9).

Conflict resolution embraces the process of conflict management from conflict settlement to peacebuilding. The resolution of conflict includes the activities of enforcement, negotiation, mediation, settlement, implementation, and consolidation (Crocker *et al* 2001; Kriesberg 2001; Jentleson 2001). Cold war conflict prevention strategies take the shape of preventative action. Strategies are shaped by the 'sovereignty principle' and focus on cycles of prevention: prewar,

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[4] See << www.worlbank.org >>

pre-escalation, and post war prevention. Through the 1990s, conflict prevention comes becomes largely synonymous with preventative diplomacy, the resolution of conflict through peace agreements, as well as the processes of implementation and consolidation of agreements. Peacekeeping emerges as a central operational tool for preventing the escalation of conflict and for consolidating peace agreements. Three main principles guide the logic of peacekeeping: mutual consent, no force/self defense, and impartiality. By 2000, preventative diplomacy has come to mean response to address the rapid escalation of horizontal and vertical spread of conflicts, the role of private sector activity, and inclusion (to some degree) of track two diplomacy.

Overall, strategies for preventing conflict can be organized into two broad categories: operational and structural approaches to conflict prevention. Operational approaches tend to be geared for the short term and emphasize strategies that seek to end or reduce violence. For example, preventative diplomacy is an operational response to conflict prevention, premised on incentives provided by outside actors to change the behaviour of the conflict parties. Operational approaches cannot change the initial conditions that lead to conflict (Levy 2001; Jentleson 2003, 2001; Vayrynen 2003; Talentino 2003).

Structural approaches to conflict prevention emphasize long term strategies that aim to address the root causes of a conflict. The focus is on capacity building in conflict prone societies; capacity building is central to the strengthening of conflict prevention (Carment and Schnabel 2003, 19). Structural conflict prevention strategies focus on human security, development and conflict

transformation, and are generally applied over a range of actors and issues. The end goal is to transform the conflict over time. It is through structural conflict prevention strategies that theories of conflict and development and peace form to make peacebuilding (Lederach 2001; Ball 2001; Paris 2001).

What is Development?

In political peace processes and peacebuilding, the role of donor agencies, their agendas and strategies, is to contribute to the prevention and resolution of conflict, and the creation of critical peace-enhancing structures (UN, World Bank, OECD). The role of external support is to supplement not substitute local efforts to achieve a sustainable peace. Donors contribute to long term conflict prevention strategies (peacebuilding) in three key areas: knowledge base (e.g. World Bank's watching brief methodology); mandates and time; resources – creating funding windows. The overall objectives are twofold: to empower governments and civil society (World Bank 1999). The role of donors is to create sustained partnerships with and between conflict parties, local stakeholders, and civil society actors. To this end, creating durable peace and promoting sustainable poverty-reducing development require multiple actions and approaches on a variety of fronts. Technical assistance should also incorporate the experience of other countries that have gone from war to peace transitions. Ends donors seek include responsible, accountable, transparent, governments; strong civil society; accountable security forces; and poverty-reducing development.

The preferred means for persuading peace in peacebuilding and "conflict-sensitive" approaches to development is through the advancement of political and civil rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and the right to development (Barakat and Chard 2003). In practice, the preferred means for creating an "effective capacity for peace" takes the form of social and economic development, namely through encouraging legal, political, and social reforms. Development assistance provides the opportunity for those reforms considered necessary to "change past systems and structures which may have contributed to social and economic inequalities and conflict" (OECD 1997, 3). Change is measured by improvements in indicators such as increased household incomes, health (caloric intake, increased mortality rates), literacy and access to education, political pluralism and free media (Boulding 1996; Boutros-Ghali 1992; Symonides and Singh 1996).

Speaking Peacebuilding: The United Nations

The United Nations (UN) is a key actor in creating knowledge about peacebuilding. Its concepts, ideas, theories, strategies form the basis of all peacebuilding activity. The UN is the sole collective security organization in the international system and its primary purpose and function is to maintain international peace and security. *The Charter of the United Nations* (1945) also identifies developing friendly relations, international cooperation on social, economic and humanitarian issues, and promoting human rights as crucial to maintaining global peace and security. The UN takes as its basis for articulating

peacebuilding the concept of peace. Peace in concept is understood as evolving, complex, multidimensional, and interrelational. To express the evolving idea of peace, the UN has assembled four key concepts that define the parameters for a four-phase strategy to resolving conflict: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Sitkowski 2006). Value is added when these strategies build consent and cooperation (Boutros-Ghali 1992).

The UN considers peacebuilding a broad, interactive, multi layered concept, favouring such terms as "evolving", "interdependence", and "coordination". Long standing, traditional UN peacebuilding instruments include preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping (Sitkowski 2006). UN peacebuilding missions (collective security operations) take three forms: peace enforcement (observer, buffer, force); peacekeeping (observer, buffer); and observer (passive observer).

In theory and in practice, peacebuilding and conflict prevention are treated as two sides of the same coin: the task is to first seek a political peace through agreements (preventative diplomacy), and then, through peacebuilding efforts, identify and effect change in the "attitudes of conflict parties" (Moawad 1996, 187). As Nazli Moawad (1996) points out, "agreements terminate conflicts, relationships implement agreements" (179). In this approach, the human being, rather than the state, is centrally placed as the subject and ultimate beneficiary of all efforts aimed at the creation of a common cooperative system of security. The conceptual apparatus known as 'Development and Peace' translates to creating the "necessary condition for effective government, social, and economic

advancement" (Mbaku et al 2001, 4). In practice it means, involving 'ordinary people' in the peace processes and empowering local communities through strengthening relationships.

Boutos-Boutos Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* (1992) lays the groundwork for all post cold war preventative action. It provides a basis and the first broad framework for international peacebuilding and informs all UN peacebuilding and disarmament work. In it, Ghali reflects on preventative diplomacy within a range of conflict management techniques that include peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding and on confidence building, arms control and deployment. Post-Cold War conflict resolution features two key phases. The first is the 'peace process;' a political process that seeks to stop patterns of violence through various forms of response, from sanctions, to diplomacy, to intervention, optimally culminating in a 'peace agreement'. The second is the creation of a 'space for peace' wherein social, economic, political, and cultural spaces are created for 'being together' so as to strengthen, consolidate, and facilitate the peace agreement on the ground. This phase refers to the efforts to address the root causes of conflict with the aim of building a sustainable, durable peace.

The peace agreement represents a sign of "mutual consent" for peace between the conflict parties (Stedman 2001). It is the presence of this consent that gives the peace agreement power to be implemented which in turn creates spaces for peace. This phase focuses on and favours short-term strategies and has an operational emphasis. The second phase refers to the implementation and consolidation of the peace agreement or peacebuilding. Peacebuilding focuses on

and favours long term conflict prevention strategies, the structural transformation of the conflict, involves third parties or external actors and international organizations, and promotes strategies that facilitate and consolidate peace. In sum, peace agreements represent short-term solutions to conflict resolution whereas peacebuilding represents long-term tasks that contribute to addressing the root causes of conflict.

Agenda for Peace identifies the absence of democratic approaches to conflict resolution and lack of mutual respect as sources for conflict leading to violence and war. Of primary importance, action is called to "eliminate the sources of conflict" which develop in the context of deep social divisions and injustice. Through the 1990s, the United Nations focus on creating a normative framework for comprehensive, integrated peacebuilding, linking issues such as gender equality, human rights, health, education and the environment to cultivating sustainable and durable peace. *The OECD Guidelines on Peace, Conflict and Development Cooperation* (1997) and the *UN Secretary General's report on Priorities for Post-Conflict Peace-Building* (1998) put peacebuilding and conflict prevention at the forefront of the international agenda. The aim is the prevention of conflict at its root, thus preventing the great costs of upheaval (OECD 1997, 1). *In Larger Freedom* (2005) offers a new articulation, encapsulating the idea that development, security and human rights go hand and hand (para 12-17).

Epistemological shift

Turning attention to the structural factors that create conditions of (sustained) conflict and violence represents an epistemological shift in the thinking on peace and conflict from conflict settlement (1960-1880s) toward conflict prevention (1990s) – eliminating those sources of conflict that prevent the creation of peaceful societies considered precondition to development. Acknowledging that conflict is the consequence of intra structural conditions, and not solely external/internal aggressors, reflects a shift in the very concept of peace – from 'non-war' or an absence of violence – to 'positive peace', the elimination of structural violence, and the creation of patterns of cooperation and integration (Galtung 1975, 1996; Moawad 1996; Gorsevski 1999).

Agenda for Peace (1992) heralds this epistemological shift. Of importance, it established guidelines on issues such as justice, security, reconciliation, and governance, issues hitherto considered beyond the development mandate (Baare; Shearer; Uvin; Scherrer: 1999, para 74). Peace organizations and related institutions such as UNESCO make the argument that a peace based solely on political and economic arrangements cannot affect a secure and lasting peace. Peace must therefore be founded, "upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind [sic]" (Symonides and Singh 1996, 9). As noted by the OECD, violence engages 'basic values' and 'interests' of society's members (OECD 1997). The formation of "well-informed, democratically minded, and responsible citizens" is crucial for the construction of internal and international peace (Symonides and Singh 1996, 13). Thus, the prescribed aim for peacebuilding is the creation of "a

culture of peace." The creation of a culture of peace is understood as the creation of peaceful, nonviolent behavioural patterns and skills (Symonides and Singh 1996). For Elise Boulding (2001), "building sustainable peace is not just a matter of direct intervention through mediation. It also requires direct intervention through development and relief aid, media coverage, and any other activity relating to existing or potential violent conflicts" (xii).

For Moawad (1996), building a culture of peace involves changing attitudes, beliefs and behaviours (177). Analytical emphasis shifts to the cultural context of peaceful behavior in everyday life – partnerships, family life, values and rituals, relationships of trade and exchange, associations and manners of organizing. The right to express one's subjectivity is a freedom requisite to creating a culture of peace; to express one's subjectivity is to employ one's reasoned agency, to effect change and interact with one's environment.

This epistemological shift marks a critical boundary, a fault line, in the thinking, writing, and speaking of peacebuilding, conflict prevention and development. All literature since 1990 is influenced by this shift either in small or significant degree. Of central concern in the literature is the degree to which external actors are involved in matters of inequity, injustice, and abuse and the form that intervention takes. It is a fluid boundary: the discourse on peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and donor development will show that the thinking and writing on peacebuilding ebbs and flows along this fault line, at times in continuity with and at other times, in discontinuity with the idea of positive peace.

Speaking Peacebuilding: The Scholarly Literature on Peacebuilding

The scholarly literature on peacebuilding comprises two broad schools, literatures that focus on the operational/technical understanding of peacebuilding and literatures that focus on the structural understanding of peacebuilding. In the former, debates on peacebuilding focus on the requirements for successful peacebuilding (enabling conditions) and the construction of durable political settlements (peace agreements) in societies that have experienced prolonged civil strife as a result of deeply embedded divisions/cleavages (Hampson 2001, 387; Stedman 2001). There is no consensus on the successful requirements, or appropriate methods and means to end violent conflict and create peace. Nor is there consensus on what the political aims of such interventions should be. Different perspectives on these issues reflect different assumptions about the fundamental nature of conflict and the social, political, economic, military, humanitarian dynamics of conflict processes (Hampson 2001, 387-388). Other (realist) perspectives are based on competing assumptions about the appropriate timing for intervention and the overall effectiveness of third party intervention (Jentleson 2003; Vayrynen 2003).

Consolidating peace debates centre on the process from moving to conflict settlement (peace agreements) to conflict resolution to conflict transformation (peacebuilding). These debates focus on the operational choices made to foster peace, for example prosecute of war criminals or establish Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs). Of interest, there is a growing expansion of

this literature focusing on consolidating peace as a form of social engineering (Uvin 1998; Carment and Schnabel 2003).

The literature that takes a structural understanding of peacebuilding is divided into debates on the conceptual merits of peacebuilding (the limitations of peacebuilding as technical response) and the enabling conditions, or requirements, for successful peacebuilding (Reychler and Paffenholtz (eds) 2001). John Paul Lederach (2001) describes peacebuilding as "an organic ecosystem" rather then "political event or agreement" (842). He observes a shift in peacebuilding from a narrow and hierarchically defined political event or agreement to an open, organic definition. He advocates for a systemic view of conflict systems and a multi lens approach to conflict analysis.

Luc Reychler (2001) argues the aim of peacebuilding is "to transform conflicts constructively and to create a sustainable peace environment" (12). 'Sustainable peace' refers to "a situation characterized by the absence of physical violence; the elimination of unacceptable political, economic, and cultural forms of discrimination; a high level of internal and external legitimacy or support; self sustainability; and a propensity to enhance the constructive transformation of conflicts" (12). Transforming a conflict addresses all the major components of the conflict including changing the 'opportunity structure' and the strategic thinking involved. Thus "effective communication", "peace-enhancing structures" and an "integrated moral-political climate" ('we-ness') are precondition to sustainable peace (13-14). Reychler highlights the need to pay closer analytical attention the

"political-psychological" variables at play in transforming conflict: "concepts, dogmas, habits, attitudes, emotions, and inclinations" (14).

Rebecca Spence (2001) defines peacebuilding as "those activities and processes that focus on the root causes of conflict, rather than just the effects; [and] encourage and support the participation of indigenous resources in the design, implementation and sustainment of activities and processes" (137-8). Wendy Lambourne (2004) defines peacebuilding as "strategies designed to promote a secure and stable lasting peace in which the basic human needs of the population are met and violent conflicts do not recur (3)." This definition takes a "long-term focus and incorporates the goals of both negative peace (absence of physical violence) and positive peace (absence of structural violence)" (3). For Doyle & Sambanis (1999), the aim of peacebuilding is expanding the "space for peace". Peacebuilding strategies then ultimately aim to create a 'political space', or rather, an 'effective capacity' for building and sustaining peace (1). Additionally, strategies 'should' address local roots of hostility, the local capacities for change and the "net specific degree of the international commitment available to assist change" (1).

This literature advocates for an approach to peacebuilding that activates the conflict context from the ground up, favouring long-term solutions that focus on social justice, redressing inequity and structural violence, and modes of reconciliation. This approach is people-based and requires active engagement with the values, norms, and ideologies that underlie a conflict. Indeed, the literature

that takes a structural understanding of peacebuilding brings notions and issues concerning justice to the fore.

Wendy Lambourne (2004) argues justice and reconciliation have historically been considered as competing objectives in the process of making and building peace. Preference for using globalizing policies and concepts in the practice of peacebuilding and conflict prevention, and the increasing focus on international justice, has meant the goals of justice and reconciliation have been adapted without adequately analyzing the concepts and how they are best achieved in different conflict circumstances and cultural contexts (Lambourne 2004; Pankurst 1999). Her work shows the international community increasingly refers to the need to promote national reconciliation and resolve tensions, but rarely defines what that means. Most writing on international law and transitional justice does not include any analysis of the various types of justice and their relationship to reconciliation or conflict resolution. For Lambourne, "both justice and reconciliation are fundamentally significant goals that need to be addressed in the design of successful post-conflict peacebuilding processes and mechanisms" (2).

Donna Pankurst (1999) argues there is an overall confusion about the relationship between justice, reconciliation, conflict resolution and peace. Justice is a complex concept with substantive, symbolic, economic and social, legal and psychological meanings. Rama Mani (1998) advocates three categories of justice which are necessary for reconciliation and peacebuilding: legal justice, rectifying justice and social justice (5-8). For Mani, justice may be retributive, restitutive or restorative, and different people have different priorities in relation to justice. For

some, an apology is required, for others, an acknowledgement of the harm done is required before forgiveness is possible.

John Paul Lederach (2001) identifies socioeconomic injustice as an instrumental obstacle to peacebuilding. For Lederach, at issue is broadening our understanding of peacebuilding to include conflict transformation, restorative justice and socio-economic development: we have not adequately developed a peace-building framework that reduces direct violence and produces social and economic justice. He turns attention to the social meaning of reconciliation; involves righting wrongs nonviolently and understanding the "deeper psychological and subjective aspects of people's experiences" (842). Thus reconciliation is based on building relationships and requires a process of reconstructing identities (842).

For Lederach, reconciliation is first about people and relationships – real people in real situations. It refers to a process of change: reconciliation goes beyond the resolution of a particular issue, and toward a framework that embeds the issue in the context of a broader system of understanding including the root cause(s) that underlie the expression of conflict. Reconciliation requires linking the content of a particular issue with the systemic patterns and structures that have historically guided and defined the relationships; seeking change in root causes (847-848). In sum, reconciliation enables a deeper understanding of the conflict and possibility to change the deeper patterns and causes of conflict in the relationship.

Nonviolence theory assumes a long-range approach to problem solving and conflict resolution. Non-violent peace-minded attributes include tolerance, intellectual generosity and respect. Also, finding and expressing one=s voice is an important part of fostering a community based on the 'values of peace making' and 'harmony' (Lagerquist 2003; Boulding 2001; Galtung 1996). There is a growing literature by practitioners directly involved in protracted conflicts that argues that attitudinal change requires a change in procedures, roles, and structures of conflict parties, including the development of institutional capacity at the local level dealing with conflict (Hampson 2003, 395-396). For Elise Boulding (2001), peacebuilding NGOs must, "learn to collaborate in the field rather than compete for resources" (x). The task for peacebuilders is to seek out local peacemakers, faith groups, women's organizations/groups, teachers, health professionals, and elders. As per Boulding, "No peacebuilding can be effective if it is not based on the best insights and resources of local communities in conflict situations" (x).

In summary, peacebuilding debates suffer from a hegemony of technical understanding, and lack of specificity about the relationships between the conditions that lead to conflict and the effect of third party intervention: there is little consensus about what constitutes success. It is rife with theoretical antagonisms, namely, reconciling short term needs for the cessation of conflict and recovery with long term needs of addressing the root causes of conflict. Overall. peacebuilding is a broad "concept in search of a policy" (Carment and Schnabel 2003, 1). As a policy concern, it lacks meaningful infrastructure for

implementation as compared to other policy concerns such as humanitarianism, democracy, development, and arms control. The prescription is theoretical: to broaden the conceptual parameters of peacebuilding by expanding the conceptual parameters of conflict prevention.

Speaking Peacebuilding: Scholarly Literature on Conflict Prevention

Traditional conflict prevention finds its roots in the notion of deterrence. Bernard Brodie *et al* first develop theories that form the dominant deterrence paradigm – preserve the peace through fear of retaliation. In the 1950s, then United Nations Secretary General Daj Hammarskjold originates modern preventative diplomacy, refining the aims of preventative action in the 1950-60 annual report to the General Assembly, *Preventive Action.* Wanting to strengthen the world organization's preventative role, he contended that early engagement of the UN could replace external interventions, "forestalling the destructiveness of conflict created by external military intervention and arms transfers" (Vayrynen 2003, 47). This could be achieved by employing both uni- and multi-lateral channels to arbitrate, mediate and encourage dialogue between conflicting parties. The aim was "to fill the vacuum conflict creates and emphasize the importance of regional security" (47). The first UN peacekeeping operation was UNEF (1956), deployed in the Suez Canal to separate belligerents (Israel, Egypt). In 1982, UN SC Javier Perez de Cuellar called for more systemic use of the Security Council to prevent the escalation of conflicts and provides the basis for current UN-based approaches to risk assessment and early warning.

The pinnacle of conflict prevention work was the *Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict* (1998). The Carnegie Commission advocates that conflict prevention connotes a way of thinking; a state of mind, perhaps even a culture that permeates the activities of all those engaged in the implementation of preventative policy, be they NGOs, states, regional and global organizations (Carment and Schnabel 2003, 12).

The scholarly literature on conflict prevention is dominated by foreign policy and political science experts. It is differentiated by how conflict is defined, either as set categories or as context. The literature is marked by different understandings of the concept of conflict: rationalist, determinist, purposivist, liberal. Broadly, the literature focuses on the structural conditions for conflict, systemic conditions for conflict; structural and systemic sources of conflict. In turn, conflict prevention strategies are differentiated as technical/operational response and/or structural response to conflict (Cousens 2001; Doyle and Sambanis 1999; Sisk 2003; United Nations 2005b; Carment and Schnabel (*eds*) 2003).

In response literature, debates are political, practical, and ethical in nature. Much of the debate tends to focus on the use of force; intervention debates are concerned with coercive versus non-coercive forms of response. Ethical debates focus on coercive and non-coercive methods of intervention to affect a conflict (Yugoslavia) and bring advancement toward peaceful settlement. Less attention is paid to other strategies and instruments ranging from formal diplomacy to track-two interventions (Crocker *et al* 2001, xxiii). The thinking on intervention and

response to conflict is best characterized by the divide (debate) between realist and liberal interpretations of the sources of conflict.

The realist position is differentiated by 'soft' and 'hard' schools of thought. Hard realists employ a narrow range of intervention strategies (use of force) to restore order, whereas soft realists employ policy options including diplomacy and mediation. The liberal position employs different schools of thought guided by the idea that trade promotes peace. The liberal school favours governance-based strategies and addresses the psycho social dimension to conflict: "The success of preventative action seems to depend critically on the political contexts, and the ability for policy makers to read it correctly (Vayrynen 2003, 48).

Much is written and said about the logic and merits of conflict prevention in both its operational and structural forms, little said about its implementation. Talentino observes, with the concept of conflict prevention, an interpretive tension exists with on the one hand, a meaning of conflict prevention that denotes short term, immediate, judgmental and a long term, structural, latent and patient interpretation on the other. In the later, attitudinal change is a protracted and indeterminate undertaking. Changing attitudes involves both strategic operational responses and long term strategies (Carment and Schnabel 2003, 15). In turn, 'capacity building' emerges as a central theme: institutions need to obtain a better understanding of both long term structural and operational strategies. As such, individuals who work there need to understand how they can use the political tools available (19).

For Bruce Jentleson (2003), responses to the deficiencies in current conflict prevention thinking to ineffective strategies have tended to narrow the definition. What is required is to broaden the meaning, make it malleable as policy, and therefore applicable to a variety of conflict cases over different phases of conflict. He prescribes adopting a multi layered, multi discipline, multi-sectoral approach to conflict prevention (35). There is a growing body of literature and support for the expansion of the definition of conflict. In this view, conflict varies between contexts as do the issues at stake, and the phase of conflict, timing, is of particular attention. There is a growing consensus around the idea that our tools for understanding conflict are not useful: theories, concepts, ideas, strategies, models; definitions describe. In the literature on conflict prevention, there is a tendency to draw dichotomies between realism, idealism, interests and values (definition of world order is shaped by values) (30).

In summary, conflict prevention is an evolving, morphing concept that refers to both long and short term strategies, strategic and responsive to conflict. The aim is a change in attitude among its end users. As a concept, conflict prevention is "in search of a policy" (Carment and Schnabel 2003, 1). As a policy concern, it lacks meaningful understanding for implementation. The field is rife with theoretical antagonisms, namely, theoretical and operational division between conflict prevention (short-term operational/technical response) and peacebuilding (long-term, structural response). At issue in the literature is a need for a greater understanding of the dynamics of conflict and how they interact with development intervention. At issue in the practice of peacebuilding is whether

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policy tools address systematic or structural conditions of a given conflict. As concepts, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and development exhibit a conceptual tension between a short term, immediate, judgmental understanding and a long-term, structural, latent and patient interpretation. The prescription is idealistic: broaden the conceptual parameters of theory.

Speaking Peacebuilding: Third Parties and External Actors: Donors and International Development Community

The literature on development and conflict is divided into two main debates: the Crucible Argument and the Instrumental Argument. In the former, conflict is considered instrumental to development insofar as "development," *sin quo non*, seeks change. This idea guides the position that political conflicts give rise to development; conflict is understood as a catalyst for political change leading to development. The change required and the best means to achieve said change will involve either structural or strategic change. The underlying assumption of this argument is that humans are innately prone to conflict. Nazli Moawad (1996), argues conflict has both positive and negative properties, and is the guiding forces of productive change (182). He goes on to argue that conflict does not always denote a battle of competing self interests or desires, but may be used to clarify, transform, or create a relationship (183).

The Instrumental Argument considers political and social stability a requirement for any kind of development. The guiding idea is there can be no development in the presence of conflict. Peace, not conflict, is instrumental to

development and is therefore the key condition for development to occur (World Bank; UN; USAID; OECD). For Tim Unwin (2002), the idea of development implies progress, however defined. Thus warfare is the antithesis of progress and therefore cannot be readily incorporated into a development-oriented theoretical scheme. Consequently, development programs and strategies are grafted onto contexts of conflict with borrowed concepts: development theory relies on the conventional wisdom on peace and conflict to guide is thinking and practice.

When speaking conflict in the context of the Developing South, for much of the literature, conflict is synonymous with 'civil war'. In the literature 'regional' and 'ethnic conflict' is the greatest cause for conflict and violence in the world. These conflicts challenge preventative action and peacebuilding, undermining the bipolar or dual model of conflict that privileges state borders and national interests. In so-called 'ethnic conflicts', borders are blurred and boundaries between enemy and ally are lost. Jay Rotham (2002) describes these as 'existential' conflicts whereby recognition of the legitimacy of the one is a threat to well-being and existence of the other.

The development literature on peacebuilding and conflict prevention identifies three main challenges facing countries seeking war to peace transition: strengthening political institutions, providing a safe environment, and promoting economic and social revitalization. To this end, the literature reveals two central themes. The first is strengthening political institutions and supporting and transforming the security sector. In a post-conflict country, security is widely seen as the crucial element for any reconciliation and long term development to occur it

requires both ending the insecurity resulting from war and new forms of (criminal) insecurity (OECD 2001, 22). This literature addresses the link between causes of war and inadequate political governance: it is guided by the assumption that there can be no such political development without security of individuals, social groups and society as a whole. The second theme addresses appropriate strategies to promote economic and social revitalization. It focuses on the challenges to creating sustainable, poverty-reducing economic development and social development. Indeed, there can be no sustainable, poverty-reducing economic and social development, without political development that has one of its objectives a reasonably equitable sharing of the fruits of development. In short, "sustainable, poverty reducing development requires due attention to both economic and political governance" (Ball 2000, 36).

Critics of the development enterprise argue development theory follows its own priorities and logic, existing outside and beyond local social and political dynamics, and placing too much emphasis in its prescriptions on technical assistance. Others explore how development theory and practices rely on universal narratives to manage and administer its multitudinous 'development problems'. In this literature, the failure of the 'Peace Process' and subsequent failure of development agency to 'consolidate' peace on the ground, through the 90s, is linked to the "tendency," as Peter Lagerquist (2003) illustrates, of development projects to obscure issues of power and control (5). This is illustrated in the tendency for aid assessments and measures of development to rely on macroeconomic indicators of growth such as GDP, changes in household

incomes, and rates of unemployment; the methodology of IMF growth indicators and projection data operate on the principled condition of *assuming no crisis* (Ajluni 2003, 68). For Laguerquist, this is due to the tendency of donor agencies to deal with issues of power and control as technical problems responsive to technical development solutions.

Central to development debates today is the idea that human rights underlie and motivate development efforts, in general, but particularly in war to peace transition (Bredel 2004). The notion of a human rights approach to development is prominent in the literature, especially in the work of international organizations. Criticism of this paradigm is that in this approach, development only serves to identify the recipients of development as "rights holders" (syntax). Yet, this rights-based approach to resolving deeply embedded conflict is easily and readily grafted onto the globalization agenda of aid conditionality, deregulation and privatization through the rubric of "democracy", "good governance", and "economic growth".

Globalization is a nebulous, shifting term. Globalization is explained and described in its literature through its differing perspectives on its properties and processes, revealing four key themes. First is whether globalization is inevitable process or an entirely new epoch (Sklair 2002). The second theme in the literature explains globalizations as increasing global interconnectedness, matched with restrictions imposed on the nation state (deregulation), intended to curtail its intervention in the pursuit of unfettered economic growth and the freeing of capital (Desai 2000). Third, firms and mobile capital have new power as the

providers of success in the global economy. The fourth theme explains globalization in terms of technological advancement as its central defining feature. Despite its conceptual ambiguity, the hegemony of 'globalization' has lead to its wide acceptance as a "social reality" (World Bank; UN 2005b, 5), and consequently, the "tacit acceptance of its assumptions" (Petras and Veltmeyer 2000).

Despite the normalizing of globalization as a 'social reality', growing criticism has drawn attention to the differential impacts of globalization on Northern and Southern economies, labour, productivity and social welfare. Through this lens, critical literatures have emerged focusing on 'globalization as strategy': the political, social, economic, cultural and ideological dimension (Sklair 2002; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001; Choussudovsky, 1997). In these literatures, 'globalization' is often used in conjunction with the term 'neoliberalism' as a description of the prevailing orthodoxy of socio-economic organization. Neoliberalism describes fiscal policies that aim to integrate national economies into global markets, with private sector development, and public sector reform, with the aim of providing a stable legal, regulatory policy framework conducive to private investment and 'productive activity' (World Bank 1999, 2000). Neoliberalism prefers deregulation, privatization of services, and unrestricted flows of capital.

The negative socioeconomic effects of globalization are often illustrated through the impact of widespread privatization of education, heath services, utilities, etc. Neoliberalism is oft linked to increased poverty, decreasing wages,

increasing unemployment, environmental degradation, imperialism and Western hegemony in these literatures. Indeed, by 1996, several leaders from developing countries describe how globalization and liberalization had forced their local companies out of business and marginalised their economies at the 9th session of UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 1996). Leaders such as Tanzania's President Benjamin Mkapa, who reported to UNCTAD that countries undergoing liberalization and privatization under World Bank/IMF policies have "suffered heavy social costs" including job losses, cuts in health care and education and increased social and political instability (Khor 1996).

Other literatures show the attempt to meld democratic reform with economic reform has ambiguous implications. The encounter between Western capital and the Third World has not been a mutual exchange: "the process has always been orchestrated by strong hegemonic forces to solidify the interests of global capital" (Logan 2002, 2). In these literatures, 'globalization' is often aligned with 'colonialism' and 'imperialism' (Petras and Veltmeyer 2000, 2001). For these critics, 'globalization' like its antecedent 'colonialism', perpetuates socioeconomic dysfunction. Logan argues, third world economies become fragmented, as select actors and classes are co-opted into the global system, and the majority of people become increasingly marginalized: "Third World economies are being systematically relegated to oceans of poverty which are attached to the capitalist mainstream largely through he activities of a few capital cities, export-processing zones and miscellaneous mining and agricultural projects" (3)

The source of the conflict lies in the neoliberalism position that the dissolution of the state-market bond is "an unproblematic requirement for the political and economic survival of the Third World" (Logan 2002, 2; Kapstein 1998-99). This is problematic because the neoliberalism position contends the dissolution of the state-market bond is "an unproblematic requirement for the political and economic survival of the Third World" (Logan 2002, 2; Kapstein 1998-99). In peacebuilding contexts, this is crucial, as state-strengthening and nation-building are part and parcel of post-conflict reconstruction and rebuilding; international aid is condition to anti-corruption measures, reduction of state bureaucracy, human rights monitoring, and democratic elections (World Bank and Brynen 2000). Furthermore, the role of human rights in socio economic change in the Third World contradicts the neoliberal call for the state "to abdicate its welfare obligations" (2). As Logan points out, concepts such as 'human rights' and 'democracy', are "selectively expendable" in the globalization project (2). Indeed, globalization discourse as peacebuilding disfigures the social body, deepening ethnic divisions and widening social cleavages.

Roland Paris (2001) challenges the assumptions of liberalization as post-conflict peacebuilding. He argues the assumption that liberalizing states necessarily fosters peace is rooted in a theoretical paradox: democracy and capitalism both encourage and require competition, thus in peacebuilding processes, competition is the privileged agency for curbing, limiting, ending inter-communal tension and conflict. Paris argues for institutionalization before liberalization.

'Economic growth as peacebuilding/conflict prevention' will remain for some time to come as the preferred solution to crisis and conflict (Collier 2000; World Bank 1999; 2003). Yet, as the OECD points out, while prolonged economic decline is a source of conflict, economic growth *does not* prevent or resolve violent conflict, but can intensify it (OECD 1997). Peter Uvin (1999), for the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) argues, "Aid managers need to face up to the political nature of all aid;[…][D]evelopment discourse can be used for many political purposes;… this involves recognizing that perceptions matter as much as facts in aid impacts; [and] who gets which piece of the cake is as important as the total size of the cake" (4).

In conclusion, with the concepts of conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and development, a conceptual tension exists between a short term, immediate, judgmental understanding and a long term, structural, latent and patient interpretation. External actors in processes of peacebuilding are engaged in highly political, highly privileged activities and therefore require an understanding of knowledge as power, in function and form. The next chapter explores the deployment of this power through a study of the concepts development, peace and conflict.

Chapter Three

Conceptualizing Conflict, Peace, and Development:

An historical overview

Introduction

The basic building blocks of understanding knowledge as power are concepts. Concepts provide key frameworks for political decisions. For Andrea Talentino (2003), the meaning of concepts rest largely on how they are interpreted. The international system is guided by norms and these norms fashion concepts (Jentleson 2003, 30). In turn concepts define relationships (distribution of wealth, allies, power). The guiding assumption of this research is that ideas matter because they represent the quality of our knowledge about a given problem. As such, this chapter will present a broad discussion on how the concepts 'peace', 'conflict', and 'development' have historically been discussed, spoken, and thought about. In turn, it will present a review of the theories of conflict, peace, and development that constitute the foundations for knowledge that underscore the international agenda, guiding all thinking and action.

Understanding Conflict

The conceptual logic of the interrelationship between peace, conflict, and development lies in the concepts and theories of conflict. Theories and concepts of conflict are spoken largely by authorities on politics and social science: political science, sociology, psychology. The discourse on and around the phenomenon and concept of conflict is massive, including scholarly work, institutional documents, empirical data from the field. The sources are wide-ranging: states, institutions, NGOs, academics, practitioners, and dissidents. The discourse of conflict incorporates a broad range of disciplines and inquires into all aspects of conflict: individual, social, political, economic, philosophical, and ethical.

The study of international conflict takes as its subject violence, war, social conflict, genocide. Theoretical approaches to conflict can be divided into two broad themes: theories of war and theories of social inequality. Theories of social inequality are concerned with societal processes of conflict, competition, organization, disorganization and control. Theories of interstate and intrastate war are useful for understanding how conflict and its varying manifestations are understood and made known in an orderly international structure. They are primarily concerned with theories of strategic interaction and bargaining and seek to explain how states interact and respond to each other (Levy 2001, 5).

Conflict as concept and study is bounded by two opposing assumptions about the origins of conflict: innate depravity and constructivist. The innate depravity assumption assumes that humans are innately (biological essentialism)

prone to violence within and among groups. In turn, innate depravity assumes that war is an inevitable if not logical or material function of human nature as it is the most elementary way of asserting power and controlling one's environment. This assumption is embodied in the work of Darwin – Social Darwinism accepts the assumption that struggle is inevitable as a function of progress--and later Freud, and guides realist thinking about conflict.

The constructivist assumption assumes conflict is not innate to humans, but constructed by both external and internal forces. The *Seville Statement on Violence* (1986) positioned that warfare is a peculiarly human phenomenon and posits language and culture, not biology, as reasons for war. Thus, conflict is both actual and apparition, artificial and organic. Karl Marx, Emile Durkeim, Adam Smith, Quincy Wright, Johan Galtung are seminal contributors to the study of conflict as structure. Stubbs, Maitland and Tout studied the interaction between power, consent, freedom and obligation (Howard 2001, 30). Emile Durkeim contributes to the debate with his studies on the division of labour resulting from European industrialization. His analytical concern is with social change processes in the long term, or, the social consequences of economic growth. For Durkheim, separation, specialization, and social change inevitably cause widespread *anomie*, a feeling of rootlessness and aimlessness, a lack of sense of place or belonging.

Sources of Conflict Literature

Until 1914, war was largely perceived as a matter of social fact: an acceptable and oftentimes necessary means to settle disputes. By the 18th Century, this attitude

shifts, due largely to the creation of state systems, and the use of war to consolidate or expand power within the international system: the function of war shifts from biology to rational strategy (Howard 2001). Underlying theories of inter and intra state war is the norm that sovereign states are the basic and indispensable building block of the international system. The main concern for states is whether there is clear and present danger to sovereignty. The main issues for the management and resolution of conflict are respect for sovereignty and the consent and cooperation of conflict parties (Levy 2001, 6). The logic of the international system is that imbalance of power in the international system leads to conflict and war.

Quincy Wright's *Study of War* (1941) is the first seminal modern work on the causes of war. He claimed "civilized war is primarily a function of state politics" (144). In this view, war is a function of state monopoly on violence. War begins "with conscious and reasoned decisions based on calculation, made by both parties, that they can achieve more by going to war than by remaining at peace" (Howard 2001, 37). Rousseau held a similar view, identifying sovereign states as the source for wars while Hobbes pointed to their creation as a source for peace. In this view, states are able to moderate or eliminate conflicts because of the mechanism of legitimacy of authority and social control.

Since 1914, explanations for war and its meaning have predominantly focused on the causes of war and conditions for peace. This literature bounded by opposing fundamental assumptions about conflict and its manifestations: the primordial view and the purposivist view. The primordial view operates on the

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logic that since there has always been war there will always be war and therefore assumes an overwhelming inevitability to conflict. In this view, so-called 'ethnic conflicts' are understood primarily as violent manifestations of fixed, inherited, and deeply antagonistic, historical identities. In this analysis, the end of the cold War stripped away the "constraining effects" of bipolar geopolitics, releasing historical hatreds to their "natural" states of conflict (Jentleson 2003, 27). In this view, powers tend to take a hands-off approach; conflict is understood as fixed and its analysis tends to be event-driven.

In the purposivist view, conflict is understood as the result of calculations and motives by conflict parties. The purposivist view operates on the logic that war is a construct, not a function of biology. In this view, conflict does not represent historical inevitability, but calculations and motives by the conflict parties. This view is concerned with how and why identity-rooted tensions become deadly. The purposivist view operates on the logic that the dominant dynamic in contemporary conflicts is not historical inevitability, but, decisions made by conflict parties. The literature on conflict tends to draw dichotomies between these two views, manifested in the realist and liberal paradigms. The literature on the causes of war is dominated by the realist paradigm.

The Realist Paradigm

The core realist hypothesis is that "international outcomes" are determined by, or at least, constrained by the distribution of power between two or more states. The general realist proposition is that states act "to advance their interests, defined

primarily in terms of security" (Levy 2001, 8). Thus, the distribution of power between states is the "primary determinant" for "regional and ethnonational conflict in the contemporary world" (8).

This body of literature incorporates several distinct theories, all of which hold the same core assumption: sovereign states are key actors in the international system and they act as rational actors to advance their own interests, namely, security, power, and wealth (7). The leading realist explanation for conflict and war is the balance of power theory, which posits maintaining an 'equilibrium of power' in the international system is the instrumental goal in the pursuit of global peace. The primary aim is to avoid hegemony, the dominance of one or more actors, in the international system. This theory explains how states will act to accumulate arms and form alliances in response to threats, perceived or actual, to their interests (7-12).

Howard (2001) identifies ideological, economic, and popular wars, balance of power wars, wars to assist allies, and wars in defense of rights. Geffery Blainey (1973), a reductionist, claims all aims of war are "simply varieties of power. The vanity of nationalism, the will to spread ideology, the protection of kinsmen in an adjacent land, the desire for more territory [...] all these represent power in different wrappings. The conflicting aims of rival nations are always conflicts of power (149)". In this view, conflicts arise from conflicting claims, interests or ideologies (Howard 2001, 32).

The liberal paradigm is shaped by liberal international theory. Liberal international theory constitutes "a set of broad theories" which "share a broad set of assumptions" that operate on the guiding principle that the conditions for conflict in the international system can be influenced to increase the likelihood of peace and decrease levels of warfare (Levy 2001, 9). Conflict, therefore, can be changed, contained, managed, or even resolved. The primary components of the liberal theory of peace are free trade, democratic political systems, and international institutions. Liberal theory promotes the hypothesis that commercial liberalism and democratic political systems promote peace. Adam Smith and David Ricardo are early proponents of the idea that trade promotes peace arguing it generates economic advantage for both parties, while war leads to a loss of benefits of trade (Levy 2001; Kippers Black 1999). Liberal theorists further postulate that prosperity, the material benefits of trade, creates a culture that supports that trade and thus the peaceful conditions that sustain it. 'Society level' liberal theory draws from Kant's liberal theory of democratic peace which posits states that are democratic in their composition are less likely to go to war. This theory explains how creating democratic political structures enhance the conditions necessary for peace; it incorporates 'the democratic norms model' and the 'institutional constraints model' (Levy 2001, 9-11).

Mercantilists and economic rationalists criticize the liberal economic theory of war. They argue the contrary, that peace creates the conditions necessary for trade and prosperity, not trade and prosperity create conditions for peace. Another

theme of criticism is that war expands wealth and power, and trade is not enough to stop that. Indeed, the question then becomes, whether international trade has a negative effect on international conflict. Lastly, this body of criticism points to the potential destabilizing effects of economic asymmetries; globalization and its imminent forces of free trade and privatization is an efficient strategy for wealth accumulation, not necessarily wealth distribution. A central issue in the literature is the need for scholarship to pay attention to the conditions under which trade promotes peace or exacerbates conflict (Levy 2001, 11).

In conclusion, conceptualizations of conflict have been dominated by the realist paradigm which functions with a fixed understanding of conflict – there is an inevitability to conflict which restricts the degree to which an external actor or force can influence it. There tends to be a narrow scope to the understanding of conflict as illustrated in the preference for single variable analysis in the literature. The lenses for understanding conflict posit causal analysis only on the most visible, or in the case of social systems, those vested with higher or formal power (Lederach 2001, 842). As Bernard Brodie (1973) claims "any theory of war in general or any war in particular that is not inherently eclectic and comprehensive, [...] is inherently bound for that reason to be wrong".[5]

Understanding Peace

The conceptual logic of the interrelationship between peace, conflict, and development lay in the concepts and theories of peace. Theories and concepts of

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[5] quoted in Howard (2001), 32

peace are spoken articulated by authorities on politics and social science: political science, sociology, psychology. The discourse on and around the phenomenon and concept of peace is smaller in scope and influence compared to conflict. It includes scholarly work, institutional documents, empirical data from the field, peace agreements, declarations, and resolutions. The sources are wide-ranging: states, institutions, NGOs, academics, practitioners, and dissidents. The understanding of peace incorporates a broad range of disciplines and inquires into all aspects of conflict: individual, social, political, economic, philosophical, and ethical.

Peace as concept and study is bounded by two opposing assumptions about the origins of or conditions for peace: negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace means 'non-war' or an absence of violence. The dominant realist paradigm for thinking about conflict is guided by negative peace -- the assumption that peace means an absence of violence. Critics like Johan Galtung have widely pointed out the absence of war does not necessarily equate an absence of conflict. As such, *peace as non-war* is ineffective as a conceptual foundation for understanding both peace and conflict because it does not take into account factors such as geographic location, operations of power (economics, military, political), nor does it necessarily reflect an absence of hostility, discrimination, and positive, constructive relations between actors.

Positive peace refers the absence of violence and the creation of patterns of cooperation and integration (Galtung 1975 &1996; Moawad 1996; Gorsevski 1999). Positive peace evaluates both the cognitive and evaluative components of

peace. For example, peace can be used to describe the internal conditions in a society between groups, organizations, and social structures, or between an individual and his or her natural environment. Positive peace expands them parameters of 'peace as non-war' to include the elimination of 'structural violence', and the creation of patterns of cooperation and integration (Galtung, 1975 & 1996; Moawad, 1996; Gorsevski, 1999). Comprehensive peace, an emerging conceptualization, expands the notion of positive peace to include the absence of physical, organized violence, and the absence of structural violence: "Peace is absence of violence of all kinds, direct (physical and verbal), structural, cultural, directed at the body, mind or spirit of some other human being, human or not" (Galtung 1996, 77). These understandings of peace give rise to a fourfold classification of relations between two nations: war (organized group violence), negative peace (no violence, but no other form of interaction either, best described as peaceful coexistence), positive peace: some cooperation interspersed with occasional outbreaks of violence, unqualified peace: an absence of violence is combined with a pattern of cooperation (Galtung 1975, 29). To this end, a 'logic of peace' operates on emotional, moral and ethical levels of reasoning, often existing beyond the boundaries of 'civilized' order and logic which often involves arbitrary or superficial groupings and systematic thinking (Boulding 2001).

Peace scholars focus their attention to the causes or war, the conditions for peace, analysis of conflict processes, and the roles of NGOs and civil society in working for disarmament. Nazli Moawad (1996) offers an historical overview of Peace Studies (180-181). The First Wave (50s and 60s) is influenced by the

geopolitics of Cold War and the arms race. Peace Studies was initiated as a scholarly pursuit primarily at research institutes and through a few graduate programs. Peace research at this time is dominated by the conception of negative peace; it focused on the issues of the bi polarity, the Cold War, armistice, and the arms race, and especially disarmament (Galtung 1975). The Second Wave (70s) is influenced by the counter- cultural currents of 1960s: American youth culture, the Civil Rights movement, the nuclear threat. Throughout the 1970s, universities begin to develop undergraduate programs in peace studies. The Second Wave of peace research is referred to as an awakening of sorts and marks an epistemological break with traditionally thinking about peace. Peace research of the second wave is shaped by the concept of positive peace and worked to critically uncover positive peace: it focused on global oneness (Galtung 1975; Moawad 1996, 180-181).

The third wave (1980s) of peace research is influenced by widespread poverty and deterioration of "Third World" and increasing war and conflict. Peace Studies during this time is a beneficiary of increased private and state funding and the rise of liberalism -- rights-based approaches to social science, institutional arrangements, and effecting structural change (Moawad 1996). The third wave heralds a paradigm shift in Peace Studies whereby its underlying assumptions fundamentally change, moving beyond the dialectic of negative/positive peace. Scholars of a comprehensive peace identify the shift in the literature on peace as follows: from an emphasis on issues of conflicts to the emphasis on identifying and effecting change in the attitudes of the conflict parties; from attention to states

to the acknowledgement of the rights of individuals; from traditional processes of conflict resolution to cooperative processes (Moawad 1996, 187). It focused on issues of structural violence and positive peace.

Johan Galtung (1975) is a seminal contributor to the thinking of peace and conflict. Galtung's work is influential for how he distinguishes between 'negative peace' – the outcome of efforts is to stop physical or personal violence (direct violence) – and 'positive peace' – the outcome of efforts is to end indirect structural and cultural violence (indirect violence) that threaten the economic, social and cultural well being and identity of individual human beings or groups. Galtung draws attention to concepts of asymmetrical and symmetrical conflict, personal and structural violence, and the latent and manifest aspects of conflict.

UNSG Daj Hammarskjold's work on preventative action established the first benchmarch in international peace policy. The guiding logic of Hammarskjold's policy was to keep great powers out of regional conflicts. Indeed, preventative action stems from "a more general logic that external interventions could be avoided or tempered if a region was made more autonomous in terms of security"; neutralization of the conflict zone was the principle tool of preventative action (Vayrynen 2003 47-48). Hammarskjold's approach is limited because it covers only horizontal conflicts, whereby salient borders are crossed and excludes the vertical escalation of conflict. The distinction between the two types of conflict lay in their "relationship with the principle of sovereignty" (Carment and Schnabel 2003, 48). In the former, sovereignty is violated, setting into motion the offence-defense cycle. In the later, third parties are more reluctant to get involved

and there is more of a tendency to let parties fight it out (48). The policy aim of preventative action after violence has started is to forestall its horizontal and vertical escalation (48). Such policies may be required after the signing of a peace agreement to facilitate the consolidation of the peace agreement, the conditions for peace, and sustainable long-term peace.

The key issue in conceptualizing peace is in its relationship to justice: "Sustainable peace cannot be reconciled with the perpetuation of social injustice. Justice though will not achieve reconciliation if it merely secures revenge" (Boulding 2001, xii). Lederach (2001) describes what he calls the "justice gap" whereby there is a reduction of violence yet access to resources, participation, and human rights are not met. In his view, justice needs to account for suffering (requires responsibility taken). At issue in theories of peace is expanding the frontiers of knowledge: "For peace is a problem of social organization, and the theory of peace and war will someday be subsumed under the general theory of social organization" (Galtung 1975, 30). Conceptualizing peace in mainstream practice has lacked a strategic dimension which challenges at core the very assumptions that guides the logic that reproduces conflict.

Understanding Development

'Development' refers to a discipline for academic study (international development studies), a field for employment (projects and programs of international donor agencies; NGOs), a global plan or enterprise (the development project; globalization), and a concept. As a concept, it is simultaneously opaque

and fluid; it functions like a shape-shifter, morphing, as it incorporates new ideas and lexicons, shedding others. According to Knippers Black (1999), development has no precise meaning, nor any generally accepted definitions (1). It has "as many potential meanings as potential users (15). Nonetheless, a common theme emerges despite the fluidity of its meaning: broadly speaking, development implies 'enhancement' which can translate into progress and/or change. What this change means, and how it is best achieved, provides the entry point for a conceptualization of development as a concept and an idea (or body of ideas); diverging interpretations of development as a concept begin with diverging interpretations of the development problem.

While the idea development is a ubiquitous, social fact; any review of the literature on development will reveal a vast and diverse landscape of thinking and writing on the subject. Theories of development cover a wide range of fields of inquiry – economics, sociology, ethics and philosophy, political science – and its meaning varies between professional points of view and motivation. In this view, development as a concept then is understood to have multiple meanings as opposed to a fixed definition. What complicates the study of international development for Kippers-Black is, "the commonly adopted meanings and thus explanations and strategies do not simply differ from diagnosis to prescriptions, they are almost always diametric opposites" (15).

For this reason, postmodern perspectives offer a utility to understanding the roots of development as a way of thinking. Indeed, postmodern scholars of development have focused attention on historicizing the idea of development

theory as a *response* to official development assistance is of critical concern. In this view, the study of development and underdevelopment is emphasized historically as a response to official development practice, following rather than leading development thinking (action precedes thinking). The following section offers an historical perspective to the concept of development in order to show that while the notion of development may be fluid, its assumptions are fixed: development as a concept is highly contested, representing a particular set of historical choices.

Development as Universalism

The notion of 'development' emerges after the Second World War as both a project to reconstruct war-ravaged Europe, and as a universal process to be applied to the former colonies and newly independent states. Indeed, development denotes not only concept but category, a method of organizing states and their peoples: to become developed, one must first be underdeveloped. The introduction of development heralds new global divisions: First World, Second and Third World (and now Fourth Worlds of migrants and refugees) nations and a new professional field, International Development. These newly created global distinctions are both political and economic in nature—marking the borders of Cold War politics and the boundaries of global economic status. In turn, the field of international development and its theories mirrors these political and economic distinctions.

Development theory relies on universal narratives to manage and administer its multitudinous development problems. Historically, development discourse has been preoccupied with processes of development, its strategies and outcomes, and how these processes can be better implemented. Thus, theories of development are forms of knowledge concerned with explaining problems (economic and political) of development and the developing (Third) world. They analyze facts and data related to process of development, and seek to provide answers and offer solutions to these problems. Models of development explain complex ideas yet they are simplified representations of a whole body of diverse ideas and facts. Development models are instrumental to understanding development; they represent general ideas about development and are the tools that make analysis possible. The utility of a development model is contingent upon its practical applicability and cost effectiveness.

There is a widespread tendency to assume a widespread applicability to theories of development. The idea of conditioning global peace on economic prosperity has defined the parameters for the idea of development, for both international development and international relations. To this end, peace (the absence of violence) is considered a precondition for economic development, which is in turn precondition to advancing transformative human and social development. The nation-state is considered the logical political unit in which populations were mobilized toward processes of modernization and the European model was the preferred model for economic stimulation. World War II lays the ground work for a new economic global system; the post-War development

project tended to prefer policy prescriptions that introduced banking and national accounting systems, education, private property, stock markets, legal systems, and public infrastructure to newly-formed states. The architects of the development project operate on the assumption that industrialization and modernization are legitimate development goals for all peoples and all states, including and especially newly emerging (post-colonial) nation states.

The hegemony of this thinking underscores all international development activity and has resulted in deep divisions within development thinking; counter strategies to development emerge emphasizing human development, social justice, and equity. The development schools of the 50s and 60s had a tendency to look at developing countries as "fundamentally similar", and considered logical to "generalize about them as one type of society" (Martinussen 1997, 11). Rarely was this form of 'development' concerned with political or social considerations that influence development processes. In sum, the development project (1950 to present) represents a particular set of historical choices based on assumptions, rather than an inevitable evolutionary path. The historical evolution of the concept of development becomes of critical importance in an inquiry into how development is known.

The Crisis of Development from 1990 to the Present

The development literature of the past decade and a half has focused on the 'crisis of development'. This literature associates the development project with words such 'impasse' and 'post-development'. The guiding assumption of this literature

is that the assumptions, ideas and concepts of development are highly contested and only serve to benefit those who have the power to exercise them. The overall theme of this literature is that our tools are not useful: theories, concepts, ideas, strategies, definitions that describe and explain development obfuscate the reality of their actual exercise. These literatures take as their analytical focus relations of power in the development project; how issues of power in development contexts are managed with a hand's-off approach of non-interference (Lagerquist 2003; Uvin 2001; Gervais 2003). This literature has a moral dimension the increased scope of donor involvement in such contexts raise critical questions as decision making power over resource allocation, priorities, and project design rests largely in the hands of donors and their related apparatuses (Uvin 2001; Gervais 2003; Lagerquist 2003). For others, the problem lies in the evaluative process: indicators for measuring peace and development omit crucial social, political and/or 'ethnic' forces in social contexts: expediency, efficiency define the evaluative measures for the effectiveness and success of development initiatives.

Another critical stream indicates the issue is in the theory: donor preference for Western Enlightenment discourse to explain peace and conflict presumes individuals act as free rational actors, and ignores the multiplicity of forces, some competing, others in companion, which determine actors behave in particular ways. To this end, 'discourse' is a useful tool in because it addresses the *rationalities* that underscore donor response to 'development problems'. As Peris S. Jones (2004) points out, rationality is embedded in discourse; a function of logic, discourse establishes the 'optics' for understanding a given reality and sets

the parameters for action and intervention. The term 'optics' in this sense refers to the 'gaze' deployed to coherently organize the problem at hand and 'determine' the best course of action: 'developmentalism', 'economism', 'feminism' and 'Orientalism' are common examples of 'optics'. For White (2002), 'discourse' is a useful analytical tool for development because it links 'meaning' to 'material entitlements' (407). In this view, 'development' as discourse denotes the conceptual apparatus deployed by development institutions and the programs and outcomes, either in terms of spurring positive structural transformation, or sustaining a long-term improvement in human welfare. Thus 'discourse' represents the relationship between logic (theory) and action.

Development as Economism

The authorities on development, namely international financial institutions, national governments and their development assistance agencies, and populist scholars favour economic discourse for its analysis and solutions to development problems. In this view, economic growth is precondition to development. Early theories of development were largely theories of economic development and tended to revolve around identifying and creating conditions which either promoted or dissuaded economic growth. Current mainstream conceptualizations characterize development as globalization: the process of increasing global political, economic, cultural, ideological, and technological integration (Lal, 2000). This is in keeping with the dominance of economic theories of

development to speak the language of development. From early modernization theory, to dependency theory, to liberal economic theory, development is disproportionately spoken through the language of economics.

Economic development as a strategy to include the former colonies into global economic and political arrangements emerges in the era of the decolonizatiom. The political and intellectual response to decolonization linked human development to national economic growth. The key 'ingredients' of the early development project include: modernity, technological advancement, telecommunications, western knowledge, economic growth and output (McMichael 2000). Hence 'the need to develop' is applied universally to describe the former colonies – where they have been, where they are going – from underdeveloped to developed, or in other words, from 'primitive' or 'traditional' to modern. In a post-colonial world, non-European cultures had to be destroyed or transformed. Within this model, social systems perceived to be 'backward' are inappropriate foundations for societal modernization. Indeed, 'tradition', 'culture', 'poverty' markers of 'Third-Worldness' are considered obstacles to development (Rostow, Lerner). As Brigg (2002) argues, the historicity of development thinking and practice symbolizes efforts to reconfigure the globe and reconstitute the colonies in the form of "institutions, funding and resource flows, philosophical propositions about the possibilities and desirability of social change modeled on the West" (427).

Initially, development policy aimed at reducing the living standard gap between 'First' and 'Third world nations'. To this end, 'development' was, and

still is for the most part, measured using national accounting (GNP) and a rising standard of living (per capita income, commodity consumption, health, literacy). Prescriptions for economic development have key normative assumptions: that 'living standards' represent universal, common values and principles, with the industrial North serving as the growth standard for the economic South; that 'economic development' can be quantified or measured with a monetary index; that the common destiny of a society is increase monetary flows and commodities, and that non-monetary, non-commodified social systems are considered backward and traditional.

The debt crisis (1970s and 1980s) shifts the problems of development from national to global concerns, creating new assumptions about economic 'development'. The invisible hand is replaced with a heavy-handed approach to manipulating developing economies through structural reform. The introduction of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in the 80s and its emphasis on aid conditionalities and privatization heralds the era of globalization. In the language of globalization, 'development' is associated with the ability to compete in global markets. The main agencies for facilitating this kind development are market 'experts': Bretton Woods officials and corporate elites. White (2002) argues 'development' is increasingly identified as a project of Western capitalism: the central issues occupying dominant development discourse are the geopolitical interests of states, international capital, and regional power blocs (408).

Indeed, scholars, specialists, case studies, national accounting reports illustrate, the development as globalization project has deepened further the

cleavages created by the global division of labour and asymmetries in North/South economic arrangements. Globalization represents a policy agenda that favours market-led rather than state-led development, the liberalization of trade, a comparative advantage axiom, and the consolidation of global governance (rise in power of TNCs and banks). Consequently, globalization has resulted in the bifurcation of global labour, the increase in informal markets, the legitimacy crisis of state organizations and financial instability (McMichael 2000; Ellwood 2001). As African scholar Mahmood Mamdani (1997) argues, the universal application of development models (i.e. Marshall Plan, SAPs, EPZs) tends to understand "experiences as a series of approximations, as replays, understudies, that fall short of the real performance," lacking an "original history and authentic future" (9). Development can be understood as seeking the "most appropriate translation, the most appropriate fit" (12). In this view, every act of imposing a 'model of development' is an act of translation.

Development as power

White (2002) turns attention to 'development' as a mode of knowing or a set of regimes for the production of knowledge, as it fundamentally rests on notions of difference: traditional/modern, primitive/civilized, subject/citizen (413). Moreover, the development gaze tends to re/create a fixed reality whereby the 'Other' (developing world) is simultaneously 'known' and 'foreign', included and excluded. In this way, 'development' can be articulated in Foucauldian terms of

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power, as a "complex strategic situation" simultaneously constituting forces of normalization/inclusion and forces of domination/exclusion.

Indeed, to articulate the power of development only in terms of brute force and domination is to underestimate and obfuscate its powers of incorporation. For White, "the secret of development's power" rests in its capacity to "enlist others to its own agenda" (410). The basis for this power lies in the process of selectivity that serves as the engine of development discourse. Lagerquist (2003) argues development can be seen as discourse insofar as it "permits some things to be known, others to be elided", and as such, the gap between the 'language of development' and 'lived realities' is "fraught with problematic politics and tenuous assumptions" (18). It is a determining silence however; the absence of key concepts/issues such justice, race/racism, non-violence resonates.

Many scholars have turned critical attention to how the language of development is itself rooted in the colonial encounter both literally and metaphorically (White 2002; Mbembe 2000; Fenton 1999; Uvin 1998). For some scholars, the development project is a reinterpretation of the project of colonialism. In these literatures, development's mission is to emancipate colonial subjects from their 'primitive' condition, and exploit their resources for the benefit of 'progress.' These authors pay critical attention to the perspective of the 'Other': the experience of 'South', or the citizens of the former colonies. In this view, the concept of development is expanded to include the experience of the colonized and the global dysfunction of colonialism to which the development project is easily and readily grafted.

These literatures highlight important features of the global context of the newly emerging development project. First, colonialism socially, economically, and politically reorganized the colonies. Of primary importance, the dependency and asymmetry created through colonialism's economic model: specializing the extraction and production of raw materials and primary products from the colonies. In turn, European manufacturing expands output, as their products became industrial inputs and foodstuffs for the colonies. This system reorganized the world, as it actively disorganized the colonies (underdevelopment), through its preference for export monoculture (exchange of manufactured goods for primary crops). Furthermore, these literatures draw attention to the affect of colonialism on labour: indigenous populations were moved or sold to meet the growing demands of productivity. In sum, these literatures highlight the outcomes of colonialism to include: the exploitation of wealth and resources of the colonies; the marginalization and genocide of indigenous people; the extraction of labour and cultural resources (treasurers); response by colonial subjects (submission, resistance, suicide) and racism (McMichael 2002; Mamdani 1999)

Despite the apparent disintegration of imperialism and colonialism, and the emergence of development, freedom, and human rights, global economic, political, and social arrangements continue to reflect unequal arrangements of power (Chambers 2005; Rahnema and Bawtree (eds) 1997; Uvin 2001). Indeed, after WWII, post-colonial states found themselves materially disorganized, economically stagnant, and without political legitimacy, while capitalist centers enjoyed the 'golden age' of growth and progress. Early critics of the development

project tend to blame this disparity on uneven global economic structures which favour power and wealth (ECLA, dependency theory). For example, early strategies of development aimed at the former colonies tended to favour specializing in exports, as determined by dominant forces (primary goods), but made these developing economies vulnerable to changing prices. For others, the development project designed for the newly-emerging colonies both implicitly and explicitly subordinates the 'developing world' as it guaranteed the continued intervention of the North to the South, favouring northern capital and interests. As Steve Fenton (1999) observes, "the politics of recognition will often be allied to the politics of redistribution" (90).

Palestinian economist Adel Samara (2001), like many critics of globalization, accepts the 'social reality' of this economic phenomenon, while drawing attention to its differential effects in and on advanced capitalist countries and developing countries. He does so by employing a centre-periphery model to describe relations between global economic actors. In this view, Western capitalist countries and their satellites "benefit from the liberalization of trade, access to expanded markets and the free movement of capital and goods (though not labour power)" at the expense of the Third World (1). Samara argues that in post-Oslo Palestine, the Palestinian Authority is largely externally created and financed by the capitalist centre (United Sates) and its financial institutions (World Bank and IMF). Oslo was born when globalization dominated, as it still does, international relations. The United States, emerging as the sole global superpower, assumes its place as the main controller of globalizing financial institutions. As the lead

'sponsor' to the peace process, the US emerges as the central 'partner' and author of the post-Oslo peace process.

In summary, the thinking, speaking, and writing about development, peace and conflict is dominated by 'one-size-fits-all' models and single-variable analysis. The thinking, writing, and speaking about development peace and conflict avoids their normative, qualitative dimensions. Moreover, our ideas fail to properly explain problems of development, peace, and conflict because they rely on highly contested fixed assumptions. Indeed, the thinking, writing, and speaking about development peace and conflict avoids discussion and analysis of power relations: internal to the conflict dynamic and external. Asymmetrical relationships are a condition of injustice; therefore conditional to peace and justice is redistributing power toward symmetrical relationships of power in conflict contexts. Development functions as power to the degree in which it is in continuity with asymmetries of power. Development functions as justice to the degree in which it is in continuity with symmetries of power. As such, the dependency of contexts of "complex emergency" on external agents and agendas of development, and their financial institutions, rearticulates a local, historical, institutionally embedded dependency, and deep social divisions.

Chapter Four

Understanding the roots of the Israel/Palestine

Conflict (1880s to the present)

Introduction

This chapter will initiate the case study for this research, the Israel/Palestine

Conflict and the Oslo Accords and the interim period. To begin this research and

analysis first begins with an understanding of the conflict dynamics: the character

of relations between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Gershon Shafir and Yoav

Peled (1998) argue any analysis or attempt to understand Palestinian and Israeli

relations involves a broad-based theoretical framework that consists of historical

and current socio-economic models. This chapter will present the relationship

between the conflict parties in a historical perspective to present and effects.

Analytical focus will placed on key actors, documents, ideas, strategies, and

concepts that shaped this conflict from the outside, and how these forces influence

conflict within and between populations. It will present the key sources for the

creation and maintenance of this conflict and how this relationship was structured

and spoken, in policy and theory. The conditions for this conflict are then

identified through key voices.

Overview

The protracted conflict between the Jews of Israel and the Arabs of Palestine has been considered a threat to global peace and security for nearly over a century. From the point of view of the United Nations, the 'Palestine Problem' is a major source of danger for world peace and international security; it is a centre piece of international politics, diplomacy, and peace, academic study and research, social movements, journalism, and general interest. This conflict has special features; it is asymmetrical meaning (political, economic, military, social) power, influence, resources are disproportionately shared. Like many modern conflicts, the Israel/Palestine conflict is existential in nature; the very existence of Israel and Palestine are contrary to the existence of the other. Indeed, the relationship between Israel and Palestine and their respective peoples is characterized by the principled refusal of each to recognize the other. In the literature, the importance of both parties of this conflict to recognize each other as legitimate, as an enemy and as a partner in peace negotiations, is considered the precondition to resolving conflict and building peace.

Since the 19th Century, Western European encounters with the 'Other', local or abroad, have been framed in terms of 'Questions'— The Native Question, The Woman Question, the Jewish Question, The Eastern Question and the Palestine Question. The United Nations serves as a central information system for the Question of Palestine. It functions from the logic that the Palestinian people have the inalienable right to self determination and sovereignty. To this end, the United Nations has generated a critical volume of information which has

strategically functioned to bring the Palestinian perspective into the grand narrative of the conflict. *The Origin and Evolution of the Palestine Problem* (1990), published four years after the outbreak of the first intifada, is a first attempt by the United Nations to comprehensively chronicle and document the roots of the conflict from the perspective of Palestinians. It represents an initial attempt to include Palestine narrative into the grand narrative of the Israel-Palestine conflict. It is an important document not only for its content but for its perspective (analytical focus). It tells the story of the Jews and Arabs of Palestine through the voices of the actors involved; memorandums, correspondences, letters; the documents that defined the policy for Palestine; the effects of these policies; and the tracing of patterns violence with attempts at peace. The Division of Palestinian Rights (1993) was established in 1993 to provide the public with full text documents and access to information. Indeed, much of the work of the United Nations has been to broaden the parameters of understanding the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Such work provides an entry point into a broader historical perspective which takes as its analytical focus the deployment of power, through the lens of relationships, in creating, manifesting, and reproducing conflict.

Early Zionism 1880 – 1917

Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation, the rest we shall manage for ourselves—Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State*, 1896

The character of relations between contemporary Arabs and Jews, in what is considered historical Palestine[6], finds its roots in the early Zionism – a movement to create a uniquely Jewish national identity. Indeed, the defining characteristic of the Israel/Palestine conflict is the encounter between Zionism and indigenous Arabs, considered unique to the region (UN 1990; Said 1978, 1979). Zionism represents an ideology, and a political and social movement. The Zionism movement emerged with the rise of the discourses of political liberalism and political Zionism in 19th century Europe and in response to centuries of anti-Semitism and violence experienced by Jews in Western and Eastern Europe, Russia, etc.

For centuries, the Jews of Europe represented minority populations who were subject to severe restrictions of belonging in their host societies. The emergence of European liberalism, and its promise of universal rights and equality, assured its Jewry that economic, social, and political assimilation would be the engine to end anti-Semitism (UN 1990, 5-6). The appeal of liberalism was well received among Western European Jews, who tended to self-identify with their host nations rather than as members of a distinctive ethnic group. Yet while Western European Jews experienced an increasing integration into national life, Eastern European Jews experienced a strengthening of their 'alien status': they endured virulent anti-Semitism and persecution by pogroms, resulting in their

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[6] Historical Palestine refers to the land area which today constitutes Israel/Palestine. Its boundaries extended from the Mediterranean Sea to TransJordan (Jordan), from the Red Sea to Lebanon. These boundaries mark not only land, but time, denoting the period preceding the creation of Israel (1880 to 1948).

mass migration and displacement. It is this experience that brokers public and political appeal and acceptance for Zionism.

The thesis of the early Zionist movement was that liberalism and legislation could not alone deliver justice to the Jewish people. For Zionists, 'emancipation', in the model of liberal nationalism, by design, obfuscated anti-Jewish sentiment, discrimination and exclusion (UN 1990, 5-7). Early Zionist writers (Herzl, Pinsker, Weizmann) based their theory on the assumption that European psychological bonds to racism are stronger than legal bonds to equality: "anti-Semitism is so deeply rooted a prejudice that it can never be eliminated by legislation" (Cleveland 2000, 235). The objective of Zionism was thus: Jews must seize and settle an independent Jewish state in order to end their perpetual alien status.

The existence of Jewish nationality and the absence of a Jewish state is the ideological basis for political Zionism. Indeed, political Zionists like Theodor Herzl, argued that Jews constitute a nation -- sharing a common history, religion, and psychological bond – but lack a political state wherein they can freely express their national culture (235-236). For them, the solution lies in achieving state sovereignty. The First Zionist Conference in Basle (1889) established the World Zionist Organization and declared the goal of Zionism: to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.

To this end, there existed within the Zionist movement a clear understanding for the need to shape a legitimizing discourse to rationalize and materialize their objective: the development of Palestine as a 'national homeland

for the Jews'. A concerted effort to reconfigure the demographic makeup of Palestine in favour of a substantial Jewish presence was considered critical to the success of the movement. The aim was to create a viable Jewish presence and a viable claim to the land. Thus evolved the primary strategies of the Zionist movement: land transfers and mass migration – the pillars of the Zionist project in Palestine. Early Zionists were able to draw on the deep psychological link Jews in the diaspora held for the Holy Land in order to build a political movement. For example, 50 thousand diasporic Jews immigrate to the Holy Land during the nineteenth century and their presence came to personify and symbolize the ancient spiritual Jewish link to Palestine (UN 1990, 7).

Since the 1880s, grassroots Zionist organizations, whose common objective was to assist Jewish settlement in Palestine, helped facilitate early Jewish immigration. The Lovers of Zion served as a central organizing agency and helped fund small agricultural settlements. Notably, it popularized the Zionist campaign: *a land without a people for a people without land.* The Jewish National Fund (JNF), was "chiefly responsible for negotiating land purchases" to accommodate the newly arrived immigrants (Cleveland 2000, 248). It did so largely from absentee Arab land owners; for example, the Sursock Family of Beirut is infamously known in the literature for having sold some 50, 000 acres to the JNF in 1920 (248). The purchased land was leased "exclusively" to newly-arrived Jewish immigrants for a "nominal rate" (248; UN 1990, 29-33). As well, The JNC provided start-up capital for immigrants so they could immediately initiate agricultural projects. In all, these early immigration strategies were highly

successful: from 1919 to 1923, Jewish immigration totaled 30,000; by 1929, it totaled 232, 000; and by 1939, the population of Palestine grew by more than 400,000 Jewish residents (UN 1990, 33).

In reality, Palestine, then under the control of the Ottoman Empire, was comprised of an indigenous Arab population of more than 500,000 residents whose ancestors had inhabited the Holy land for more than 1,500 years. This population comprised both Christians and Muslims, and constituted 90% of the region's population. Roughly two thirds of the Arab population was peasant-based and agrarian and farmed on lands owned by absentee landlords. Arab residents experience the negative effects of the Zionist project: dispossession, expulsion, and dispersal. Consequently, unemployment and poverty grew, as well as the displacement of Palestinians from rural areas to urban centers, and ultimately, to other countries. As observed by Zionist Ahad Ha'am early in the twentieth century (1910s): "I can't put up with the idea that our brethren are morally capable of behaving in such a way to humans of another people, and unwittingly the thought comes to mind: if it is so now, what will be our relation to the others if in truth we shall achieve at the end of times power in Eretz Yisrael" (UN 1990, 7).

Politics of Privilege: British Influence and the Mandate Years (1922 to 1948)

The four Great Powers are committed to zionism. And zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future

hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700, 000

Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land—Lord Balfour, August 11, 1919[7]

The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was a catalyst for the creation of the

'Palestine Problem'. By the early Twentieth Century, the 'Eastern Question'

consumed European politics as the Great Powers scrambled "to establish control

or spheres of influence over territories of the declining empire" (UN 1990, 2).

Early Zionist leadership, particularly Chaim Weizmann, knew the importance of

gaining international support for a Jewish state. This was important for several

reasons: to consolidate divergent Jewish opinions about Zionism, to draw support

from the European powers to harmonize the Allies' policy with the aims of

Zionism, and to gain international approval and sanction for legitimacy (UN

1990).

World War I and the formation of the League of Nations consolidated the

aims of the Zionist movement with geopolitical strategic interests of the Allies. In

the British Government, David Lloyd George, Arthur Balfour, Herbert Samuel,

and Mark Sykes have great sympathy toward the Zionist movement and its aims.

These men serve as crucial links to authority and decision making power for the

early Zionist leadership. Chaim Weizmann is an important advocate and activist

for the Zionist movement who is instrumental in opening up official channels to

the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine. Chief Secretary of the War Cabinet, Mark

Sykes, in the words of Weizmann was "one of our greatest finds" (UN 1990, 8).

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[7] A memorandum to Lord Cuzon from Lord Balfour (1919) *The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem 1917-1988*(1990), 20.

He guided their work into "more official channels" and counseled them on "delicate diplomatic negotiations (8). Zionist leaders like Weizmann focused on stresseing the strategic (comparative) advantage of a Jewish State in Palestine: an effective guard of the Suez Canal and "a bridge between two civilizations" to interpret Western ideas in the Eastern countries (8).

The Balfour Declaration (1917), authored by Lord Arthur James Balfour, is considered *the* cornerstone document to understanding the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. This document designs Arab/Jewish relations in Palestine. Indeed, it forms the juridical basis for Zionist claims, formalizing the intentions of political Zionism, and representing the policy position of the British government prior to and during the Mandate years (1920 – 1948). The *Declaration* has three key features. First, it contradicts promises made to the Arab Leadership in the *McMahon Letters* (1911) in which autonomy in Palestine was promised to Arab leaders in exchange for support during the WW I. Second, it expressed a commitment to a political organization (the Zionist Organization) and movement (Zionism) whose declared aim was to resettle Palestine with non-Palestinians. Third, its commitment is given at a time when Palestine is formally still part of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, "the ambiguities and contradictions with the Declaration contributed heavily towards the conflict and goals and expectations that arose between Palestinian Arabs and the non-Palestinian Jews" (UN 1990, 13).

The McMahon Letters (1911-14) between Sir Henry McMahon and Sherif Husain, Emir of Mecca, assured Arab control over Arab countries; "Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the

regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca" (UN 1990, 3). Later the British position is that this promise never included Palestine. So far as Palestine is concerned, the British were determined "that no people shall be subject to another" and made claims for equal status between both peoples. Letters made public in 1939, shortly after, a committee of British and Arab representatives finds Britain had no right to dispose of Palestine (3).

The *Declaration*, while not formerly considered a legal document, nonetheless fully legitimized the Zionist project for Palestine, as well as its aims and principles, and served as the philosophical and operational basis of the British Mandate. Of significance, it provided for the establishment of a Jewish National Colonising Corporation for the resettlement and economic development of Palestine (UN 1990, 9). The establishment of this organization formerly operationalized and legitimized early Zionist efforts to reconfigure the demographic makeup of the population of Palestine in favour of a substantial Jewish presence.

The *Declaration* explicitly states that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine", or "the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country" (UN 1990, 5). Yet this aim is clearly incompatible with the Jewish settlement of Palestine. A central strategy of the Zionist movement was to purchase land directly from Arab elites, resulting in the eviction of Palestinian residents and their exclusion from economic life. For example, Article VII of the Constitution of the Jewish Agency: Land Holding and Employment Clauses,

expressly prohibited settlers from hiring 'non-Jewish' help (UN 1990, 29-33). Although denied means for earning a living, Palestinian Arabs were still required to pay British taxes. Moreover, this clause further prohibits non-Jews from holding land leases. To this day, 'Non-Jews' –including Arab citizens of Israel and Palestinian residents of the occupied Palestinian territory – are not entitled as a matter of social fact to buy, hold, own, or lease land (Golden 2002; Zureik 2003).

Dissent within the British Government represented a minority view. Sir Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India, and the only Jewish member of the British Cabinet was the foremost Jewish critic of the political aims of Zionism (UN 1990). Montagu argued Judaism was a universal faith, distinct from nationality. He wrote a secret memorandum later made public about his concerns that the political aims of Zionism will create division, discrimination, alienation: "[…] Mohammedans will be regarded as foreigners in their own land" (UN 1990, 12).

Indeed, the 700,000 strong indigenous people of Palestine, having inhabited the lands of Palestine for two preceding millennia, whose "desires and prejudices" were of no concern to Lord Balfour, were formally excluded from these negotiations. The *Balfour Declaration* was interpreted by local Arab communities, and by those abroad, as a violation of their inalienable right to exist. In a 1920 protest, citizens of Nazareth declared to the British Administrator in Jerusalem, "[...]we are the owners of this country and the land is our national home" (UN 1990, 2). The Arab community contended the Declaration represented

an infringement of the assurances of independence given by the Allied leaders in return for their support during the war (UN 1990).

The British Mandate

As part of the post-war redistribution of territory among the Allied victors, the League of Nations placed then Ottoman Palestine under British administration in the form of the Mandatory Power. Under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Mandates System is established. All Arab countries including Palestine were considered Class 'A' Mandates, meaning independence was provisionally recognized. This Article further states that, "the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory" (UN 1990, 20). The final disposition of Palestine was decided by the Allies at the San Remo Conference (1920) to be placed under British authority, "passed by mutual consent into British tutelage" (20). Only in Palestine does the Mandates system lead not to independence but conflict.

The British Mandate (1920-1948) was intended in principle as a temporary arrangement until such time as Palestine attained full status as a fully independent nation. The character of this proposed nation of Palestine was made explicit by Lord Balfour in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference, "Palestine shall be placed under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment there of the Jewish national home and ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous Commonwealth" (UN 1990, 6). Indeed, the principle

thrust of the Mandate was implementing the *Balfour Declaration* and establishing a Jewish national home.

In sum, the principal authorities in shaping Palestine were the British Government and the Zionist Organization and its leadership. The central characteristic of the Mandate period was reconstituting Palestine through the processes of immigration and land purchasing. Jewish immigration to Palestine signifies the realization of inalienable and natural rights of the Jewish people and the interruption of the inalienable and natural rights of Palestinian people; and both a positive presence (a taking of place) and a negative presence (erasure from place, removal from place). In sum, the British government policy explicitly favored the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, characterized by the *Balfour Declaration*, and operationalized through the British Mandate.

Early Conflicts

The Arab people of Palestine pre-1948, be it Christian or Muslim, comprised over 90 per cent of the population and inhabited 97 % of its land. The transformation of historic Palestine into a Jewish homeland represents the comparative advantage of the denial of the reality of Palestine in favour of modern principles of growth, development and modernization. In consequence, Arab peasants were pitted against an antagonist who is in a superior position. Arab resistance to the encroachment of Jewish immigration began in the late 1900s. The earliest report of abuses by Jewish immigrants on Palestinian inhabitants was in 1914 (UN

1990). Initial forms of Arab organized resistance takes the form of non-violence: November 2, 1918 nonviolent protests marked first anniversary of Balfour Declaration. The first formal declaration of Arab opposition to the plans being made for Palestine was in 1919, and accompanied reports of "intense anti-zionist feelings" in Palestine and Syria. The first anti-Jewish riot was in April 1920 in Nazareth in response to San Remo. The official response was to dispatch a local Commission of Inquiry which did not publish its findings.

Riots and violent clashes culminated in the Jaffa riots (1921) which marked the one year anniversary of British Administration; Jewish settlers responded with *Havlaga* (restraint); the British authority responded with a Commission of Inquiry. The Western Wall riots (1929) resulted in over 200 dead and 600 injured. The British Authority responded with military intervention to restore control. A Commission under Sir Walter Shaw was dispatched and the *Shaw Report* is created. It reported a profound change in Arab Jewish relations and attitudes toward the other. This report also revealed the unrest of 1921 which was not reported a decade earlier. *The Shaw Report*:

> In less than ten years, three serious attacks have been made by Arabs on Jews. For 80 years before, there is no recorded instance of any similar incident. It is obvious then that the relations between the two races during the past decade must have differed in some material respect from those which previously obtained. Of this we found ample evidence. The local Commission which, in 1920 and

1921respectively, enquired into the disturbances of those years drew

attention to the change in attitude of the Arab population towards the

Jews in Palestine. This was borne out of the evidence tendered during

our inquiry when representatives of all parties told us that before the

War the Jews and Arabs lived side by side if not in amity, at least

with tolerance, a quality which to-day is almost unknown in Palestine

(UN 1990, 35).

For the Palestinians, violence and conflict represented "[...] among the

Arabs of Palestine discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and

economic causes [...] connected with Jewish immigration, [...] and their

conception of Zionist policy" (UN 1990, 35). From 1933 to 36 violence grows,

yielding the birth of Jewish extremism and the role of terrorism in attacks against

the British Government. Other forms of resistance included the Arab revolt of

1936 – a general strike of Palestinian workers – as well as the emergence of

associations and civil society groups: unions, women's organizations, political

organizations. The leading authority in Arab resistance to first Zionist and then

British authority are Muftis and Senior Arab officials. The 1936 general strike was

called by the Arab High Commission, headed by Mufti of Jerusalem; resistance

begins to take form as a national movement. As the strike prolongs, violence

builds: attacks on British troops, police posts and Jewish settlements; sabotage of

roads, railways, pipelines. The British authority responds with curfews, mass

arrests, collective fines, and parts of the Arab Quarter of Jaffa are demolished for

the purposes of 'urban improvement' but revolt could not be suppressed. Jewish response shifts from *Havlaga* to reprisal. Ultimately, the Royal Commission sought third party intervention from Arab neighbours to mediate the conflict and they do.

Early attempts at conflict resolution were enacted through the office of the British Royal Commission, who sends envoys and information missions regarding the nature of hostilities. Early commission findings included a belief among Arabs' that the *Balfour Declaration* implied a "denial of the right to self-determination" and "their economic and political subjection to the Jews" (UN 1990, 35). The King-Crane Commission (1919), consisting of Americans Henry King and Charles Crane (Britain and France nominate no members) was an important document in support of Palestinian concerns. King and Crane met with Arab nationalists, including representatives from Lebanon and Palestine who presented their resolution on the fate of Arab countries. This resolution included the first formal declaration of Arab opposition to the plans being made for Palestine (UN 1990, 19). The Commission recommends, "[...]serious modification of the extreme Zionist programme for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews" (19). It also noted reports of intense 'anti-Zionist' feelings in Syria and Palestine. Also of significance, the Commission notes that to realize the Zionist programme would require military force and rejects the 'historical real estate claim' to the land.

The Shaw Report, as stated earlier, offered further insight to the dynamics and dimension to the growing conflict. *The Peel Report*, which investigated the

1936 violence, brought with it 58 death sentences for Arab dissidents and further rebellion. Further contributing to the problem, the British authority also vacillated in its Jewish immigration policy –introducing the *White Paper*, for example—in an attempt to placate Arab resentment and anger. This document only deepened the conflict by increasing tension and bitterness for the Jews. This became especially poignant during the 30s as German policies for Jewish extinction take root, and thousands of European Jews attempted to flee to Palestine, only to be turned away at Tel Aviv/Jaffa and sent to Cyprus. Ultimately, the British hand Palestine over to the United Nations in 1947 to seek a solution and resolve the conflict.

Counterpoint attempts to yield peace between Jews and Palestinians began to emerge in the early 1920s. At the grassroots level of the Israel-Palestine conflict, Arab and Jewish women have historically been at the forefront of peacemaking. Simona Sharoni (1995) argues informal and formal networks created and supported by women of Israel/Palestine have, "historically supported inter-communal relations among Jews, Muslims, and Christians in the Arab world" (132). They have, for example, historically mobilized on the basis of the ethic of nonviolence as a means for resistance and community building. They have also established underground schools, and now, teach democracy, conflict resolution and peace strategies to youth and children (Plyler 2003; Giacaman and Johnson 2001; Svirsky 2003).

In short, sources for the Palestine Problem (1880 to 1948) include: the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, Anglo Arab understandings on Arab

independence (the Hussain-McMahon Letters), geopolitical influence and advantage of the European powers, the Balfour Declaration, Zionism and its immigration and land policies, early abuses and impunity; the Mandates system; institutionalized, racialized discrimination and enmity (internal social divisions), and the responses to the conflict by the British authority.

The Making of a Nation: Eretz Y'Israel 1948 to 1967

Your name will no longer be Jacob. You have struggled with God and with men, and you have won; so your name will be Israel.[8]—Genesis 32:28

World War II and the Holocaust crystallized the aim of Zionism into actual form: a home land for the Jews in historical Palestine. On May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion declares Israel a democratic Jewish state. On May 15, 1948, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, TransJordan, and Iraq invade Israel (Cleveland 2000; UN 1990). The war lasts until December and results in the expansion of Israel's territory, the total defeat of Palestinian Arabs, and the collapse of the UN proposal for peace.

At the time of Israel's Independence, the Palestinian population comprised 67% of the population of Palestine. The War of Independence (1948), or what Palestinians call *al-Nakba* – the great disaster – caused 780, 000 members of the pre-1948 Palestinian population to flee their villages and towns to neighbouring Arab states: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria. Those who could emigrate fled to Europe, the Persian Gulf States, or North America. At the time, the United

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[8] In Hebrew, Israel literally means 'fights with God': 'Isra' – 'fights' and 'el' – 'God'.

Nations envisioned a solution of repatriating Arabs back to the areas from which they fled. However, The Government of Israel's immigration program during the years 1948 to 1951, under Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, rendered that plan moot: The Israel Government brought over 600,000 Jews of the diaspora back home to Israel (Cleveland 2000, 338). To accommodate the rapid waves of immigration Israeli authorities 'absorbed' 'abandoned' Arab land and property, taking over villages, urban dwellings and businesses (339-41).

The dispersed Palestinian Arabs were concentrated in temporary refugee camps located in southern Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and Jordan; only Jordan granted former Arab residents of Palestine citizenship (3348). By 1950, 906, 000 refugees were registered with the United Nations Relief Worker's Agency (UNRWA), a United Nations body established to operationalize social assistance to Palestinian refugees. The original UNRWA budget represented US$ 27 per individual per annum for food, shelter, clothing and medical services (347). Palestinian refugees possess an absence of legal status or political membership; their identity understood in terms of an absence from formal membership and belonging to a community. Today, Palestinian refugees number three million.

Furthermore, 160,000 Palestinian Arab residents remained after the war. According to *Adalah; the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights*, 25% of those remaining Arabs became internally displaced persons.[9] These Israeli-Arabs now constitute 20% of the total population of Israel, or roughly 1.2 million citizens. They live predominantly in Arab villages and towns, in mixed Arab-Jewish cities (Tiberius, Tel-Aviv/Jaffa), the Triangle Area (East/West Jerusalem and suburbs),

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[9] See: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel <<www.adalah.org/backgroundhtml.>>

and in the Negev (Beduin). Arab-Israelis have formal citizenship to the State of Israel under the *Nationality Law*, but are refused full belonging on the basis of ethnicity. From the state's inception, the Jewish majority viewed the remaining Arab minority with suspicion and hostility; certainly as the 'Other', as opposed to legitimate players in the newly formed Israeli polity (Weiner 1992; Yiftachel 2000a, 2000b; Davis 1995; Kelman 1999; Ghanen 2000).

For Shafir and Peled (1998), citizenship discourses are employed in competition over access to rights allocated by the state and para-state institutions. Therefore, citizenship, instead of levelling status difference, functions as a tool of stratification. Citizenship functions as power as a mechanism for domination: enforcing modes of inclusion and exclusion, differentiating legitimate from illegitimate. Citizenship is deployed as power through processes of incorporation and segregation. For example, Israeli identity cards, initiated to differentiate citizens on the basis of ethnicity and religion, identify the nationality of their holders as either "Jewish" or "Arab" for differentiation, as opposed to universally as "Israeli". Israeli nationality is equated with a specific religion for Jewish Israelis and with specific ethnicity for Israeli-Arabs. The result is the negative effect of 'Arabs' being singled out as 'non-Jewish' (Meir 2001; Manor 2001; Kelman 1999; Smooha 1997).

The War of Independence marks the transformation of historical Palestine from a colonial society to a civic society. 'Naming' became a critical catalyst for nation building and national identity-creation: it functioned to distinguish that which is legitimate from that which is not. First, Hebrew was established as the new national language, manifesting the new Israeli identity as distinctively Jewish and Israeli. The triumph of Hebrew is commonly considered a profound manifestation of the collective will of the Jewish people: the language became, "the most significant building block of the new Israeli identity" (Cleveland 2000, 341). Early identity shaping strategies included replacing Jewish Diaspora family names with distinctively Israeli Hebrew ones; Some such as Galil (of the Galilee), Shamir (rock) signified the landscape, while others such as Peled (steel) or Oz (might) signified strength and power (341).

Other strategies include the product and process of rendering from one language, into another, the physical and psychological landscape of Arabic Palestine into Hebrew Israel. To this end, the Israel Defense Forces destroy 400 Arab villages, towns, and regions, making way for distinctively Israeli communities, as part of renaming the landscape of the New Israel. This process of naming/renaming can be understood as a kind of geocultural translation (343). The epitome of this kind of geocultural translation is in the very name *Israel*. Indeed, for Zionists, the renaming of Palestine to Israel represented God's covenant to His people, chosen to live as a community, on their own land, to make

manifest the Law.[10] According to Rabbi Reuven Lauffer of the Ohr Somayach/ Tannenbaum College in Jerusalem, renaming Jacob to Israel affects a dual identity: the physical man 'Jacob' and the spiritual man, "the G-d of Jacob". In turn, this dual-identity affects a dual spiritual landscape: the physical territorial space of 'the Promised Land', and an inner subjective space, a spiritual community to which each Jew is a member. In this sense any Jewish individual who upholds perfectly the Law manifests *Eretz Y' Israel* regardless of place.[11]

This principle is embodied in the *Law of Return* (1950) which grants every Jew[12], wherever he or she may be, the right to come to Israel and become an Israeli citizen.[13] *The Law of Return* formalized the immigration of all Jews to Israel as a central engine to nation building and serves as a legitimizing discourse, considering all Jews of the world citizens of Israel. In 1970, this law was amended to expand the definition of Jew "to ensure the unity of families where intermarriage has occurred.[14] Thus *Israel* is understood to mean the spiritual, emotional, psychological community of the Hebrew people and that shared experience (Israeli citizenship), as well as a physical territorial space (landscape).

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[10] The Law as embodied in the Ten Commandments and further teachings of Moses.

[11] This concept is similar in character the Islamic concept of 'umma' — signifying the community of Muslims worldwide and the spiritual bonds that link one Muslim to another.

[12] 'Jew' here is defined as a person born of a Jewish mother or has converted to Judaism and is not a member of another religion.

[13] See Acquisition of Israeli Nationality << www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAHokdpo >> Accessed 31/03/2002, 3

[14] See: Acquisition of Israeli Nationality << www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAHokdpo >> Accessed 31/03/2002, 3

The Other: accommodating difference, differentiating legitimacy

The Zionist program had not planned for nor anticipated the existence of a large non-Jewish minority population in the future Jewish state. The question of "how to accommodate Israeli notions of social justice with the exclusivity of the Zionist ethos" was a vexing one for the Israeli leadership (Cleveland 2000, 340). Early state policy (1948 to 1967) ascribed Arab-Israelis the status "not capable of belonging". They held legal status as citizens, but held very little attachment to the collective identity of the state. These Arabs were granted formal membership but denied key rights essential to the practice of citizenship (Castles and Davidson 2000, iii). To Israeli authority, these Arabs represented a manifestation of the animosity and contempt of the Arab world within state lines, and were thus subjected to a process of assimilation and control in order 'to belong' (Ghanen 2000; Frisch 1997; Meir 2001).

Under Ben Gurion's Labour Party, the entire Arab-Israeli population was placed under military rule. Fear and suspicion of Palestinian political activism and Israeli reprisal prohibited Palestinians from forming political organizations. Tight controls and restrictions on movement (permits were required to move from village to village), prohibitions on political membership or affiliations with political groups, limitations on employment, censorship of various media publications (Cleveland 2000, 340-341). Attempts by the Palestinian community to form political parties to run for the Knesset, such as the *El Ard* (Land)

Movement were forcibly stopped and their associations outlawed.[15] Their status as secondary citizens was formalized in 1985 when the law governing elections to the Knesset was amendment to permit from participating in elections candidates deemed racist or contrary to the Jewish character of Israel (Shafir and Peled 1998). Israeli Arabs are required by law to serve the interests of the Jewish State, and its Jewish citizens, first and foremost.

Resistance to military law and other forms of state repression first take hold in 1956 with the killing of forty-nine Palestinian farmers in Kufr Kasem, returning from working their fields, by Israeli Defense Forces for violating a military curfew, unaware a curfew had been ordered on their village. The anniversary of the 1956 massacre marked the first large-scale protest of Arab Israeli citizens against Israeli state policies. Cross border raids and attacks escalated through the Sixties, as the newly formed Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) assumed the central leadership role in Palestinian resistance. Largely externally created, designed, and funded by Arab states, the PLO serves as the main mode of grassroots resistance to Israeli oppression and presence. By 1974, the PLO, lead by Yassir Arafat, is recognized as 'the sole legitimate representative' of the Palestinian people and held 'observation status' in the United Nations General Assembly.

War between Israel and her Arab neighbours through the next three decades shifted the focus of the 'Palestine Problem' from the internal dynamics between Jewish and Palestinian neighbours, to external dynamics between neighbouring

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[15] See The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel
<<www.adalah.orgb/ackground.shtml.>>

states. The 'Palestine Problem' is translated to mean the 'Arab/Israeli Conflict',

rendering mute Palestinian claims for independence, autonomy, and justice until

the 1986 Intifada. The Suez Conflict of 1956 fully places the Israel/Arab conflict

at the centre of the international peace agenda. It innovated the use of

peacekeepers for the first time, deployed to the Sinai to serve as neutral guardians

of peace. The October 1967 Israeli preemptive strike against Arab neighbours,

known as the Six Day War, brought the focus of the conflict back inward to the

internal dynamics of the conflict: it engendered the perpetual alien status of the

Palestinian people.

Palestine:[16] The Legacy of Occupation (1967 to 1987)

The asymmetrical character of Israeli/Palestinian relations today is rooted in

Israel's territorial conquests during the Six Day War of June 1967: Jordan

surrendered the West Bank and East Jerusalem (and a significant portion of its

settled Palestinian population) and Egypt, the Gaza Strip. The Israeli state found

itself in control of the then 1.5 million Arab Palestinian residents, home to these

lands (Cleveland 2000, 331). These Palestinians where neither assimilated into the

greater Israel, as this would compromise the Jewish character of Israel, nor

permitted to leave (neighbouring countries soon refused refugees). They found

themselves in political limbo and under administration of the IDF.

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[16] Of note: Palestine is not an existing state, nor a recognized autonomous entity. Consequently, throughout the literature, the area is referred to by a number of names: the Occupied Territories, The Occupied Palestinian Territories, The West Bank and Gaza Strip, WBG, Palestine, etc.

Palestine today comprises three geographically fragmented political entities: West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Its population of roughly 2.9 million people is largely traditional and predominantly rural-based[17]. Both religion (Islam) and clan play critical roles in social structure and social dynamics: paternalistic values and patrimonial arrangements form most social and economic relationships. Customary law, exercised through Shar' ia courts, controls personal status law, matrimonial and divorce law, as well as property, inheritance and dowry matters (Welchman 2003, 34-69). Palestine constitutes a dependent economy, with a high poverty rate due largely to high inflation, and ranks among low income groups such as Ghana, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. (World Bank 2000, 3-4). The political, social and economic dimensions of Palestinian society are marked by its submission to external authority.

Indeed, the 1967 occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, (and to some degree the Golan Heights) initiated a political conquest that enabled the Government of Israel to undertake, what some call, a "colossal" project of strategic, territorial, and architectural expansion into the territories (Weizman 2002, 1). This development occured literally; through territorial expansion, confiscating land, transferring Jewish populations into the territories, and displacing Arab residents; politically, through the building communities of Jewish settlers -- Israeli citizens -- in the territories, creating a human frontline; and economically, through the incorporation of the economic activities of the territories (Cleveland, 2000; Sharoni, 1995; Hiltermann, 1991).

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[17] See: Palestinian Bureau of Statistics (2001) from www.pbsc.org

Furthermore, the 1967 occupation engendered a legitimizing ideology for a legitimate Jewish presence in the territories both internationally and at home. Indeed, the State of Israel formally considers the West Bank and East Jerusalem as lands constituting a legitimate part of the inalienable right for Jews to exist and belong in their promised homeland. Until the Oslo Accords (1993), the State of Israel had never formally recognized the presence of a 'preexisting' (i.e. legitimate) 'Palestinian' people (Meir 1976). Rather, the Israeli State had 'officially' renamed the West Bank, *Judea and Samaria*, engendering Zionist ideology in and through the territories. The settler movement 1967-2003 re-established the relationship between terrain and sacred text (Weizman 2002). The topography of the West Bank becomes sceneography, forming an exegetical landscape with scriptural significance (4). In turn, the state gains unfettered access to land, and a unique vantage of utter control over the territories (Weizman 2002; Golden, 2002; Samara, 2001). For example, prior to 1948, the Jewish community owned 6-7% of the land of historical Palestine; by 1988, 80% of the land is state owned; by 2002, 93% of all land in Israel is under direct state control and put at the exclusive disposal of Jewish citizens (Golden 2002).

The Occupation and the Palestinian Economy

Indeed, the political conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip enabled not only the process of Israeli expansion, but of Palestinian integration as well (Cashden 1989; Samara 1989). The occupation was of great strategic economic value: a captive market for Israeli products and profit and a vast source of cheap labour

(Hiltermann 1991). As such, the political occupation of the West Bank and Gaza was coupled with a process of economic integration, whereby the economy of the territories is readjusted toward incorporation by the Israeli economy (Samara 1989; Hiltermann 1991). Moshe Dayan, the chief architect of this process, prescribed policies that institutionalized mechanisms of full Israeli control over Palestinians: direct military presence and economic stranglehold were the primary means to, "facilitating Israeli dominance over the West Bank and their integration into the Israeli framework" (Hiltermann 1991, 18).

First, the Civil Administration was established to coordinate every aspect of Palestinian life, denying residents basic rights and freedoms: political organizations were banned, trade unions outlawed, formal publications under strict censorship, and curfews imposed (Cleveland 2000, 356-357). Movement was severely restricted throughout the territories, requiring permit from military authorities, and the negotiation of check points. Second, Israeli occupation authorities broadly pursued a policy agenda of restricting Palestinian economic productivity overall: rejecting Palestinian licenses to start productive projects, placing bans on marketing and exporting Palestinian goods, and confiscating land. Israeli policies of land confiscation under occupation were hardest felt by independent and small producers, having by 1985, lost 54 percent of their most fertile and strategic lands to Israeli control (Samara 2001, 2).

Additionally, Israeli policies of neglect and suppression of local enterprise – for example, the banning of Palestinian agricultural exports – curtailed productivity throughout the territories. Producers from the territories, considered

potential competitors to Israeli industry, were ostensibly criminalized, while the production of crops by Israeli producers was actively encouraged through subsidies and incentives (Lagerquist 2003, 7; Samara 1989, 2001). As such, the loss of prime agricultural (productive) lands, combined with the inability for producers to compete with crops imported through, or produced by Israel, reduced the peasant class to surplus labour (Samara 2001, 2-4). In 1970, 38.7% of Palestinians are employed in Palestine; by 1986, the number drops to 25%. The aim of this process was to ensure the steady flow of cheap, unskilled, disorganized (non-union) labour from the territories to Israel; surplus labour was readily available in the refugee camps and villages (2-4).

Dayan's project assumed the erasure of economic barriers would lead to a "subsequent erasure of the geographic borders" (1949 border or Green Line):

> Moshe Dayan seems to be aiming at an arrangement in which the issue of territorial sovereignty will be submerged in the welter of economic and personal ties that will have been created in the area. [...] in this fluid creation, in the process of integration, or what the Economist calls "osmosis", particular boundaries will assume secondary significance (Hiltermann 1991, 17)

Indeed, Israeli markets were largely reliant upon cheap labour, and the creation of a migratory labour force was to replace force as a means to achieve peace: "It was believed that the improvement of economic and social conditions would be a means to minimize grievances and to blanket resentments" (17).

For critics such as Adel Samara (2001), the principal aim of the occupation was not peace but sustained dominance, adjusting "the economy of the territories to fit the interests, needs and structure of [Israel's] own economy," resulting in planned, asymmetrical relations of dependency (2). In the exchange, Palestinians, cut off from the rest of the world, were forced to seek employment in Israel who in turn seeks cheap, unskilled, labour from Palestinians. As Samara points out, 90% of imports came from or through Israel; any wages paid out by Israeli employers are returned as payment for consumer goods. Indeed, under occupation, "all Palestinian social classes are forced to interact directly with Israeli economy"; the peasant (working) class through its dependency on Israeli employers for wages, and the business class as commercial agents serving their own and Israeli business interests (2). Israel annexes to its own economy these two main classes of Palestinian society – workers and capitalists – resulting in what Samara calls, the alienation of Palestinian labour from Palestinian capital (2).

The Occupation and Labour

The International Labour Organizatin (ILO) once euphemistically described the Palestinian labour situation as "irregular", a meagre term to describe the unique political dynamic of the occupied territories. Under occupation, quotas and the need to obtain a work permit restricted the inflow of labour into Israel. Setting up labour exchanges was one way to control the flow of labour. According to official Israeli data, 5,000 Palestinians from the occupied territories were employed in Israel; in 1974, that number is 69,000; in 1986, 94,700. By 1989, the Israeli

government concedes as many as 116,000 Palestinians were regularly employed in Israel, only 45, 000 whom were regulated by labour exchanges (Hiltermann 1991, 18).

Under occupation, Palestinian employees in Israel work with minimal to no provision for their well-being; disability payments, pensions, unemployment services are safety nets provided to Israeli citizens to the exclusion of Palestinians. For example, *The Employment Service Law* allows for Palestinians to be excluded from any job that would limit Israeli employment, thus shielding Israeli Jews from unemployment. While National Insurance Fees are deduced (20% of gross pay) from both Israeli and Palestinian workers, Israeli employees receive the full 20% benefit while Palestinians receive only 2%. The remaining 18 % are to be redistributed to the territories to promote 'investment and development'. In reality, these monies were transferred to the Israeli treasury for use in Israel until "security" can be achieved for Israel (Hiltermann 1991, 22). Further, Social Security is collected from Palestinian labourers, not to provide them with a pension, but to "create equality" between the cost of an Israeli worker and a worker from the occupied territories, so as not to "give the latter advantage". Indeed, "exclusive Israeli control over the economy has helped privilege the market position of the Jewish worker, and foster ethnically-defined labour market hierarchies and segmentations" (31).

To sum up, the legacy of direct occupation has resulted in particular negative effects on the Palestinian economy: dependence on the Israeli economy for wages, a deformed relationship between labour and capital (working class and

capitalists are integrated separately into Israel, under occupation), and the weakening of the peasant class. Yitzhak Rabin states the intent clearly in 1985, "there will be no development in the Occupied Territories initiated by the Israeli government, and no permits given for expanding agriculture and industry which may compete with the State of Israel" (20).

Settlements

Today, the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem are geographically, politically, economically and socially separated by Israeli-held lands and dozens of enclaves of Israeli settlements (Weizman 2002; Giacaman 2002). Historically, Ariel Sharon was a key architect of Israeli settlement strategy. As Minister for Agriculture in the 1970s, he called for the settlement of two million Jews in the territories by the year 2000; In the 1980s, his settlement plan involved fractioning Palestinian communities into enclaves; in 1996, the Israeli government reinstated social and economic parity between the Jewish communities in 'Judea and Samaria' ascribing the same status as other 'developing' areas 'in Israel' such as the 'Negev desert' (Golden 2002). In 1998, as foreign minister, Sharon called on settlers to, "grab hilltops," before land was ceded to the Palestinians in peace negotiations. In March 2001, Sharon was elected Prime Minister on a platform that included his insistence that settlers be defended, the smallest and most isolated, to the last: "The fate of Netzarim is the fate of Tel Aviv". Indeed, Sharon's government has maintained the flow of incentives and subsidies

including, reduced bus fare, providing recreation for children, security, and even "pay settlers the cost to bullet-proof their cars" (Weizman 2002, 2).

While Jewish inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza enjoy the full status of Israeli citizenship, Palestinian residents are a marginalized majority without formal or legal political status. The Palestinian population in the territories is roughly ten times that of the Israeli settlers, roughly 2.9 million (PBSC 2000). By June 2001, the United Nations Relief Worker's Agency (UNRWA) cites 1.5 million Palestinians were registered refugees, constituting 31% of the population of the West Bank and 81% of the Gaza Strip (UNRWA 2001). Palestinian refugees (about 5 million) represented 18% of the total number of refugees worldwide; meaning, roughly one in two Palestinians in the world received UNRWA services (UNRWA 2001). In this view, the West Bank and Gaza Strip can be understood as a landscape of two competing populations – one legitimate minority, and the other, an illegitimate majority.

Israeli sociological architect Eyal Weizman (2002) argues the West Bank must be read as a narrative and not simply viewed as landscape. He describes Israeli settlements as state-sponsored islands of "territorial and personal democracy, manifestations of the Zionist pioneering ethos" (1-2). Israeli state Settlement policy post-1977 takes on three features: control, strategy, and self-defense. For example, in 1984, the Ministry of Housing published guidelines for new construction in the West Bank, calling for a "geometry of vision" whereby settlements are used as urban "optical devices" for surveillance, and the exercise of power (3-5).

Weizman's work shows that settlements, in keeping with defense strategy, are typically built on hills, heavily guarded, while neighbouring Palestinian villages are on low ground; settlements are lit 24 hours a day, so brightly, in fact, that the artificial lights confuses diurnal rhythms; Palestinian villages, in opposition, lie in complete darkness (3-5). Architectural design tends to keep 'the gaze' at the horizon line, above and beyond the Palestinian villages below. The state thesis is thus: establish a vision as a means of control, and use the eyes of settlers as the mechanism for this control: "The Settlers celebrate the panorama as a sublime resource, but one that can be edited" (4). The functioning reality is the creation of parallel geographies – First and Third Worlds– that inhabit two distinct planes, two distinct realities. Indeed, settlers represent the perfection of the policy of separation, exclusion and control over the territories by Israeli state and military power.

The First intifada (1986 to 1993) brought Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation and settlement to the fore of the international agenda again. The intifada, —which in Arabic means *shaking loose* – was largely a non-violent resistance movement to Israeli control and dominance. It stressed widespread strikes, protests and demonstrations, and the symbolic throwing of stones at Israeli military personnel (Hiltermann 1991; Svirsky 2003). In response, the IDF strategy included mass arrests, collective curfews and penalties, and violence (notably, responding to stones with rubber bullets). Of greatest importance, the intifada represented a flourishing of Palestinian civic identity-making: creating schools, universities, counter-social and political systems, and resistance to hegemony and

control. Indeed, resistance began to take the character of justice: the need for

Palestinian to achieve not only political autonomy but social justice – balancing

uneven relations and symmetries of power. Palestinian nationalism and national

claims developed and crystallized, or so was thought, into the Oslo Peace

Accords: Palestinian sovereignty and self determination would be finally realized.

Future Considerations: the El Aqsa Intifada, impasse, "Ebb and Flow"

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to the Haram al-Sharif of the El-Aqsa Mosque

compound on September 28, 2000 was the catalyst, and hence namesake, for

Israel and Palestine's second intifada. His visit met with public demonstrations

and stone throwing incidents. The next day, Israeli riot police and soldiers clash

again with demonstrating Palestinians at this Islamic Holy Site, killing four

protestors and injuring dozens more. Violent confrontations escalate: on October

10, a French television crew broadcast the killing of 12-year old Mohammed

Jamal al-Durah – caught in the crossfire between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian

Security Forces after an afternoon of shopping with his father – and broadcast it

around the world. Days later a raging Palestinian mob publically lynch four

captured Israeli soldiers at a Palestinian security headquarters: hysterical

Palestinian teenagers show the blood on their hands to the cheering crowd and

awaiting television crews.[18]

Israel's reaction was efficient, brutal, and unrelenting: border closures, 24-

hour curfews, an increase in military checkpoints, barbed wire, road blockages,

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[18] The Women's Affairs Technical Committee, *A Chronology of Crisis* (September 27, 2000-October 22, 2000) Accessed 19/03/02 <<http:// pal-watc.org/leaflet/crisis.html >>

and the building of a security fence; the extrajudicial assassinations of political leaders, as well as the shelling of residential areas, bulldozing Palestinian crops and land, and demolishing homes (Esposito 2002, xxxi). Palestinian resistance returned in kind with gun and mortar fire, roadside bombs, and unprecedented attacks on Israeli settlements, culminating in an intensive suicide bombing campaign against Israeli civilians inside the Green Line. By 2003, over one hundred suicide bombs were detonated in Israeli cities and highways, settlements and towns and 431 people were killed (Enav 2003). Yet according to the Peace Monitor, despite the incessant violence and demanding costs of the conflict, the Israel Defense Force (IDF)., the IDF privately assessed that it is prepared to continue its presence "for another five years" (Espsoito 2002, 121).

In theory, the Government of Israel's official position is that a "functioning" Palestinian civil society is central to engendering peaceful relations on the ground (UN 1993b). In practice, dismantling Palestinian civil society in order to disarm Palestinian resistance is a primary objective of Israel's military presence in the territories. The World Bank estimated that by April 2002, Israeli Defense Forces had inflicted at least some $650 million in damage to the infrastructure of the Palestinian territories: on agricultural land, public buildings, schools, private homes, hospitals, roads. The Palestinian Ministry of Housing reports some 1,600 private homes were destroyed between 2000 and 2002, while another 1, 000 were damaged, affecting some 95,000 people (Ajluni 2003, 69).

The El-Aqsa Intifada and resulting Israeli military response caused unprecedented levels of intimate physical violence, damage and destruction to

both sides. According to Israeli official data, by 2003, 525 Israeli civilians and 232 members of the Israel Defense Forces were killed by violence, namely suicide bombs, while another 3,695 civilians and 1,528 security forces were injured and/or maimed.[19] By the end of 2002, 1,970 Palestinians were killed by violence, of whom, 384 were minors under 18 years of age; another 21,500 were injured or maimed, half by shrapnel, ammunition and bomb fragments (70).

Salem Ajluni (2003), former chief economist for the office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, provides a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the violence on Palestinian civil society (2000-2003). First, he observed the main effect of security measures on Palestinian populations was unprecedented rates of unemployment and poverty and a matching radicalization of attitudes. In terms of households and incomes, for example, a 2002 World Bank press release reported it had assessed the poverty line in the Palestinian context at US$ 2.10 in per capita daily consumption.[20] Further, it estimated that prior to the current conflict, the Palestinian poverty rate was 21 % (1999); by the end of 2002, the poverty rate rose to 60 % with highest rates found in the Gaza Strip. [21] Indeed, income-earning opportunities lost during the first 27 months of the violence is estimated at 4.8$ billion, or 70 % of the Territories' anticipated gross national income, or equal to the entire Palestinian GDP of 1999. On a per person basis, this amounts to a national loss of US$ 1, 475

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[19] From www.idf.il/daily_statistics/english/1.gif "Casualties During "Ebb" and "Flow" since 29.09.00 Israeli Defense Force Publisher Accessed 07/04/03
[20] World Bank, *World Bank Expands Support for Emergency Social Services to Palestinians* (2002).
[21] World Bank, *World Bank Expands Support for Emergency Social Services to Palestinians* (2002).

per family of six persons, constituting an average daily loss of more than $US 7 million (Ajluni 2003, 69.)

Moreover, Ajluni reported on a USAID-funded study (2001) that found nearly 50% of Palestinians required external food assistance to help meet daily caloric requirements and more than 30 % were dependent on "food handouts" one year into the second intifada. Of those households surveyed, 53% had to borrow money to purchase basic foodstuffs while another 16.9% sold household assets. Chronic child malnutrition increased from 7.5 to 13.2% in the first year of conflict with 20% of children under five suffer from acute malnutrition. USAID found that "medical treatment in rural communities was severely interrupted due to roadblocks, affordability, or availability" (70). Ajluni adds further that education and nearly all public and private services have been either severely paralyzed or disrupted altogether.

The level of disintegration experienced by Palestinian society has been described as amounting to nothing more than the "de-development" of the Palestinian territories. Ajluni refers to the phenomenon as 'immiseration', the mass impoverishment of an entire population, which he considers, "unprecedented in modern Palestinian history" (69). The immiseration of the Palestinian people has indeed galvanized extreme political rhetoric as the new popular culture on both sides of the Green Line. The median age of the Palestinian population will remain below 20 years until 2025; three generations of Palestinians have known nothing other than occupation, violence, and control.[22] Some 75% of Palestinians, mostly children, youth and women, suffer from acute psychological disorders:

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[22] See Palestinian Bureau of Statistics (2000) <www.pbsc.org/english>

hypertension, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (Amayreh 2001, 3; Fecci 2001). Palestinian youth are undeniably traumatized, "some beyond repair" (Roy 1993, 130). For many on the ground, this characteristic of the conflict poses the greatest threat to long-term peace and stability:

> How will such children, an entire generation, be resocialized, particularly when their identity has been based on what they've been denied? How will such children be made ready to redress the problems of a waning civil society when they themselves have contributed to its demise? How can they rebuild their society when they have no real understanding of what it is that needs repair? This is the most critical problem facing Palestinian society into the future, and insofar as Gaza is concerned, the future is already knocking at the door (Roy 1993, 130).

The IDF described the relations between Palestinians and Israel post 2000 as the "Ebb and Flow" (2002), denoting the kind of characterization of relations Israelis and Palestinians have experienced since they encountered each other in the early days of the twentieth century. The effect of this characterization reproduces the historical determinism typically employed to understand this conflict. The implication is the natural relationship between Palestinians and Israelis is one of contempt and vengeance and violence: an existential dilemma.[23]

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[23] This is typified in the evocation of the Genesis story of Isaac and Ismail to explain the root causes of this conflict.

It also denotes a binary intrinsic to Israel/Palestine relations. The discourse on the Arab/Israeli conflict (1949-2003) has typically described the conflict in such a way; a binary of opposing forces locked together – point/counterpoint, action/reaction. Consequently, dominant attitudes about the means to achieve peace translate this characterization into the practice of preferred 'relationship arrangements'.

Chapter Five

Understanding Peacebuilding in the Israel-Palestinian Conflict and the Oslo Accords

We, reserve combat officers and soldiers of the Israeli Defense Forces, who were raised upon the principles of Zionism [...]; We, who sensed how the commands issued to us in the Territories, destroy all the values We had absorbed while growing up in this country. We, who know that the Territories are not Israel, and that all settlements are bound to be evacuated in the end; We hereby declare that we shall not continue this War of the Settlements. We shall not continue to fight beyond the 1967 border to dominate, expel, starve humiliate a people— Refusenik Combatant's Letter, *Courage to Refuse*, 2002

Introduction

The United Nations was just two years old when it took over responsibility for the Palestine problem in 1947. In doing so, it accepted responsibility for a 'just' solution to the problem. The UN proposed solution was partition: divide Palestine into Palestinian and Jewish states with Jerusalem its internationalized capital. This solution failed, as stated in chapter two, because of Israel's state building project to return world Jewry 'home' through immigration and building Jewish communities. Also, increasing enmity between Israel and her Arab neighbours

rendered the idea of a housing a large population of 'enemies' within greater Israel impossible. Nonetheless, peace negotiations continue to press the two-state solution as the preferred relationship arrangement for Israelis and Palestinians and a just solution to the conflict.

In the context of Arab-Israeli relations, peace negotiations have historically assumed a rights-based approach to conflict resolution whereby both groups are granted equal status. This is problematic when the character of relations between the conflict parties is asymmetrical in nature as in the case of Israel and Palestine. This approach serves as the basis of the 'two state solution': the preferred model for peace between these two peoples, endorsed by the UN. The two-state solution is based on the principle of the exchange of land for peace: two states for two peoples. This model gained popularity, through the legitimizing discourse of the United Nations (1947), as the sole practical means to broker peace at the local level between clashing Palestinian and Jewish residents in Palestine, and as a means to seek peaceful solutions to regional conflict between the new Israel polity and her hostile neighbours: Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. The basic operational principle of this model is the exchange of land for peaceful relations and political autonomy.[24] The language of this model for peace– "land for peace", "concessions" – implies a negative mutual exchange of 'giving up' or 'loss' in exchange for peace 'gains'. The UN Partition Plan failed in its attempt to resolve civil tensions: violence and enmity spread across borders to the broader Middle East and beyond.

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[24] See UN Partition Plan (1947), <www.un.org.>

Other relationship arrangements include coexistence and separation (Zureik 2003; Smooha 1997). Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled (1998) offers a model for coexistence of peace based on a common political framework. They advocate for binationalism: they assume the separation of Israel and Palestine, or in other words, Israelis and Palestinians, is not possible, nor practical. Shafir and Peled identify the traditional Israeli position as the obstacle to peaceful relations (hegemony) and stress an essential change in the character of relations between the Israeli and Palestinian nations. They call for strategies that are community based focused on inter-community relations whereby the character of interrelations can be assessed and measured.

Settlements

Since 1967, relations between Israelis and Palestinians of the occupied territories have been defined by two key Security Council Resolutions: Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) (UN 2002). These resolutions serve as the foundational principles for a "just, lasting, comprehensive peace" in the region: calling for Israel's withdrawal from "territories occupied" to its pre-67 borders (the Green Line). Indeed,

The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council have repeatedly characterized the Israeli settlement of the West Bank as "illegal" and an "obstacles to peace," and have affirmed the "inalienable right to self determination of the Palestinian People" (UN GA Res. 51/133, 1996). The central document to this position is the *Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of*

Civilians in Time of War (Article I), to which Israel is bound as a signatory. It calls for the preservation of the territorial and population integrity of lands captured during time of war. Moreover, in accordance with the Convention, land seized by Israel during the 1967 War is "inadmissible." Resolution 446 (1979), declared Israel's settlements had no legal validity and constituted, "a serious threat to a lasting peace in the Middle East." This position is affirmed in Security Council Resolution 265 (1980), in which the United Nations declares null and void Israel's attempt to reconfigure the territories in terms of territorial integrity and population, and called for the cessation of Israeli settlement activity.

UN Security Council Resolutions are often criticized for their ambiguity and lack of clear censure concerning Israeli occupation. For example, in Res. 242, the absence of the word 'the' in the phrase "territories occupied" has resulted in much debate as to which territories are being referred. For Israel, it may include the Golan Heights and Gaza, but excludes Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). For Palestinians, it refers to all territories occupied in 1967 (including West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights). Such ambiguity serves as a continuation of the tendency of external actors to influence and reproduce the conflict when brokering peace.

In December 2000, the General Assembly declared 2001-2010 the *Second Decade for the Elimination of Colonialism* which had as a central issue/concern Israeli Settlements and Israeli Practices.[25] Resolution 446 (1979) declared Israel's settlements had no legal validity and constituted, "a serious threat to a lasting

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[25] See <www.un.org > *General Assembly declares 2001-2010 the Second Decade For the Elimination of Colonialism.*

peace in the Middle East." Between 1991 and 2002, over 150 General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions were passed censuring Israeli expansionism. The Economic and Social Council has passed more than sixty-six resolutions have been passed regarding the illegality of the settlements of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and resulting human rights abuses (UN 2002; UN 2006).

The standard approach to peacebuilding in the Israel/Palestine conflict --the two state solution, a rights-based approach to peace, and the Security Council and General Assembly – as mechanisms and authorities for justice --has resulted in no peace for Palestinians or Israelis. It has not been successful in persuading Israeli compliance or bringing about a just solution to the conflict: Israel has never ceded illegal acquisition of territory; Palestinian resistance remains a form of terrorism. The impasse (2000-to present) demonstrates and represents the failure of the continuation current incarnation of this model, the Oslo Peace Accords (1993), to effect peace between these divided populations on the ground. In other words, to generate an intimate peace, a culture of peace, a peace between neighbours. Indeed, sole reliance on this model for peace represents a technical form of justice that perpetuates conflict and does not articulate peace.

Authoring Peace: the Israel/Palestine Conflict and the Oslo Accords

The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO Team [...] representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting,

comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through agreed upon political process (United Nations 1993a).

The *Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles on the Interim Self-Government Arrangements* (DOP) 'ended' 26 years of occupation, by transferring certain powers and responsibilities to the emerging Palestinian Authority (PA). The guiding principle of the Oslo Accords was "the recognition of mutual legitimate rights" as part of achieving "a just, lasting, comprehensive peace settlement" and an "historic reconciliation through agreed upon political process." (DOP, Annex). The central document of the peace Accords, the *Declaration of Principles*, was widely regarded by Palestinians at the time as "important cornerstone in the process of nation-building and achieving a just and lasting peace" (Kassis 2001, 41). It transferred the role of civil control and security in the contested occupied territories, from the Israeli Government, to Yassir Arafat and his newly-constructed Palestinian Authority (PA). The Oslo I Agreement, based "on mutual recognition" between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and the subsequent Oslo II agreement (1995), provided a legal mechanism and timetable to resolve the conflict by 2000.

The *Taba Interim Arrangements* set into place the operational principles of the Oslo Accords: the redistribution of power and responsibility to the PA with the aim of achieving Palestinian autonomy and Israeli security. Between 1993 and 2000, the PA acquires administrative jurisdiction in the small areas under control for delivering public services, law enforcement, and legislative power. The Cairo

Agreement of May 1994 vested the PA autonomous control over 60% of the Gaza Strip, and control over Jericho and its surroundings. The Oslo II agreement of 1995 extended this autonomy to include six towns and 450 villages of the West Bank. At the time of the September 2000 intifada, more than 60% of the former occupied territories are seemingly under Palestinian administration (World Bank 2000, 2).

In reality, the provisional Palestinian state engulfs Israeli settlement communities of the West Bank, itself constituting only 1.7% of the land in the West Bank with its population yet Israeli municipal boundaries and regional councils control 41.9% of the land of the West Bank. Thus the fact that the PA held authority over 60% of territories obscured the reality that their authority was restricted to territorial islands rather than lands held, and that Israel retained control under Oslo of the air space above, the sub terrain beneath, as well as ports of entry and exit, borders, roads, and ports, severely truncating Palestinian sovereignty and PA autonomy (Said 2001; World Bank and Brynen 2000). As Weizman (2002) observes, to truly understand the failure of the Oslo Accords one must conceptualize the West Bank and Gaza in three dimensions, whereby the Palestinian territories are severed, disconnected by Israel, via strategic planning and policy into "different, discontinuous layers," enacting a matrix of control, discipline, order over the Palestinian residents (1-2).

Under Oslo, Article V of the DOP called existing Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza outstanding "issues of interests" along with the status of Jerusalem, the right of return for refugees, security arrangements, borders, and

relations and cooperation with other neighbours. Article VI clearly stipulated both sides "view the West Bank and Gaza as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period" (A/48/48618). During the interim period, the number of recognized Israeli settlements remained constant in number, but their populations doubled, rising from 100, 500 in 1992 to 198, 000 in 2000 (Said 2001, 32). Nonetheless, Israel maintains its settlement policy is consistent with the Oslo Peace Accord: "Neither the Declaration of Principles nor the Interim Agreement contains any provisions prohibiting or restricting the establishment or expansion of Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza" (Government of Israel 1996). Gilead Sher, former Israeli chief negotiator at Camp David names this maneuvering strategy, "Enlarging the cake before partitioning it" and says it is directly related to the authority of the Prime Minister's office (Weizman, 1-2). Indeed, the expansion of Judea and Samaria thrived during the interim period due largely to the influence of aggressive, right-wing ministers such as Sharon in the coalition government (Golden 2002). As Samiha Khalil says to Dr. Edward Said: "[...The interim agreements] do not provide a just solution to the Palestinian Question. The Israelis are still expropriating our lands [...] forcing us to live in isolated cantons. The so-called bypass roads are separating one Palestinian area to another." (Said 2001, 33).

The Oslo Peace Accords and Economic Relationships

The Protocol for Economic Arrangements (1994) was the first ever economic accord between the Palestinians and Israeli government. The basis of this

relationship, as outlined in the Protocol, was to forge an autonomous Palestinian economy within the greater Israeli economy as a means radically modify the nature of fiscal relationships between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. Indeed, the Protocol sought to end 27 years in which "trade relations were dictated exclusively by Israel, to the detriment of Palestinians (Malt 1997, 1). This comprehensive agreement covered import policy and taxes, monetary and fiscal policy, direct and indirect taxation, labour movements, agriculture, industry and tourism (Malt, 1997). This agreement, the first of its kind between a sovereign state and an autonomous political entity, would remain for an interim of five years, until, as per the Accords, permanent political status of the West Bank and Gaza was reached.

The aim of the Protocol – to equalize the imbalance of power enjoyed by Israeli firms and business community, banks, and markets – obscured the reality of Israel's structured dominance over the West Bank and Gaza during the interim period (1994-2000). It allowed no provision for the Palestinian Authority to autonomously design its own fiscal and trade regime; the economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip remained driven by the Israeli shekel during the interim period. With no currency of its own, the Palestinian economy remained dependent upon the Israeli economy to determine prices. Consequently, Palestinians experienced no change in trade patterns, no change in employment possibilities, and increased inflation. Indeed, GNP dropped: in 1993 by 3.4%, in 1995 by 10.1%, and in 1996 by 2.9%; similarly, unemployment increased to 30%, as compared to 5% in the pre-Oslo period (Samara 2001, 3). The Protocol ostensibly

consolidated Israeli control over the territories as a captive market: locked out of and dependent upon Israel's economy, Palestinians were in a perpetual state of vulnerability to economic instability and inflation.

Under Oslo, Israeli control over Palestinian economic, political and social life was affected through the rubric of 'security concerns'. The PA administration was itself operationalized through a complex network of policing and security arrangements. Thousands of Palestinian agents were employed to perform surveillance duties on the Palestinian population, through the auspices of the IDF and American government (Said 2001, 33-34). The aim was to confine resistance to the peace process and Arafat/Israeli hegemony. Gaza Human Rights lawyer Raji Sourani, who was himself imprisoned by the PA in 1995, estimates that by 1996, 20,000 security police patrol the Gaza population of one million (Said 2001, 33). This amounts to a ratio of one police officer to every fifty residents, making Gaza the highest police per capita ratio in the world at a cost of $U.S. 500 million dollars per year during the interim period; by 1996, the Palestinian Authority is $U.S. 150 million in debt (34).

The 1996 Palestinian election, heralded by the international community as a victory for democracy in the West Bank and Gaza, is another example of how Israel's right to security superseded the political and human rights of Palestinians. For example, the electoral process was primarily operationalized through a joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee, composed of representatives from the PA and Israel. The Israeli government ostensibly controlled the electoral process, through the agency of the Palestinian Authority, because it possessed sole veto

power over possible candidates and voters (Said 2001, 33). For example, prospective voters had to register with the Committee, according to his or her Israeli identification number, and "cleared" by Israeli authorities before given the right to vote. As well, each of the 700 candidates running for the Legislative Council had to be approved by Israel, so as to exclude "racists, terrorists, anti-peace process proponents and other political undesirables" (34). For Said, democracy in this case means Israel and Yassir Arafat alone "unilaterally determine who is included and who is excluded from public life" (34). Thus Oslo enabled the Israeli authority to remain fully in control of the West Bank and Gaza despite these administrative concessions. Indeed, as Carolynn Baylies observes, "democracy cannot be retailed much less imposed on populations" where "political and economic conditions remain in dependency" (Baylies 1995, 336).

From the onset, critics of the Oslo Peace Accords argued its essential failure to redress Israeli hegemony in the territories would result in its collapse. For Dr. Edward Said (2001), the Accords represented an attempt at "[...] forgetting the past, on trying to be pragmatic, trying to fit into the Israeli scheme of things". Under Oslo, peace for Palestinians can be understood as meaning a narrative of omission; the absence of sovereign authority over its resources; an absence of legitimate political, intellectual, religious, cultural, economic, and military sovereignty; an absence of resolution on key justice issues. Indeed, the 350, 000 Israeli settlers living in the occupied territories enjoyed the full protective services of the IDF with privileges and rights denied to Palestinian residents. In sum, the Oslo Peace Accords effected a perpetuation of asymmetrical relations of power:

the dominant (Israeli) -- disciplining in character and the subordinate (Palestinian)
-- submissive in character.

The Post-Oslo Years and Shifting Attitudes

Shortly after the signing of the Accords, and in response to General Assembly
resolution 47/170 which recognized the need to promote the "independent
development" of the territories, members of the international donor community,
the PLO, as well as NGO representatives, presented the condition and character of
Palestinian civil society at the United Nations. Their findings were contained in
the document *Report on the United Nations Seminar on Assistance to the
Palestinian People: Papers and Statements* (1993). In it, Sarah Roy reported:

> Old rules and traditional expectations no longer apply. New dynamics
> now characterize life inside the territory, dynamics which threaten not
> only to destroy the uprising in its most productive forms, but certain
> aspects of society itself. The most obvious change is the greater
> lawlessness and scale of violence committed by Arabs against Jews and
> by Jews against Arabs on both sides of the green line [...] Far less
> apparent but far more ominous, however, is the increasing disablement
> and approaching breakdown of civil society in Gaza, a product of
> widening societal divisions and internal fragmentation (Roy 1993,
> 123).

The "internal fragmentation and societal divisions" of late 1993 evolve and intensify through the post-Oslo years, as documented in numerous opinion poles, sociological surveys, studies and national statistics accounting. Overall, they revealed increasing discord and tension both within and between Palestinian and Israeli residents of the territories. By 1997, the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion had found 40.8% of Palestinians surveyed favored suicide attacks against Israeli targets.

A 1999 a Jerusalem Media and Communications Center opinion survey of Palestinian households in the West Bank found 41% of respondents claimed to "trust no one" and when asked which political leader they trusted most, 42% "stated that they trusted no political group" in the territories (World Bank and Brynen 2000, 70). The Palestinians as represented by this sample wanted greater transparency, efficiency, and accountability in public institutions, namely the Palestinian Authority (PA). Indeed, only 30% of Palestinians believed they could criticize the PA "without fear" which may explain the overall increase in support for popular movements that offer an alternative to PA hegemony (World Bank, 61-84).

The Department of Strategic Analysis, as part of a national project on "Final Status Negotiations", found in a survey on Israeli settler culture in the West Bank, an overall increase in the radicalization of Israeli settler attitudes vis-à-vis Palestinian neighbours. For example, the percentage of those willing to sell their property to a Palestinian buyer dropped from 15% in 1995 to 13% in 1997, while those refusing to consider such a transaction increased from 72 to 79%t (CPRS,

1997). Moreover, 41% of respondents expressed the attitude that the peace process would worsen their relations with Palestinians compared to 36 percent in 1995.

By 2000, Dr. Nader Said of Bir Zeit University in Ramallah had found an 'ominous' and 'portending a state of unprecedented deterioration" in Palestinian society (Amayreh 2001, 2). According to Said, support for the PLO and Palestinian Authority dwindled to 36%, while support for Hamas on the ground increased (3). By all accounts, Hamas ran the best social service network in the Gaza Strip, and "some senior officials at UNRWA in Gaza acknowledged that Hamas is the only faction they trust to distribute UNRWA food donations to the people" (Roy 1993, 131). As Dr. Said observes, popular movements like Hamas have been vindicated by the second intifada: "Hamas made it clear that this [peace] process would not work and end up in a fiasco, which is exactly what has happened [...]" (Amayreh 2001, 2).

In the case of Palestinian development, there existed a clear gap between the opinion of Palestinian elites and the mass public regarding aid effectiveness. PECDAR, like many donor organizations during the peace process, devoted considerable attention to short-term job creation – schemes with little 'development effects'. International donors have "an indirect, often unintended, but still powerful influence in shaping Palestinian development and priorities" (World Bank and Brynen 2000, 15). One notorious example is the spending of millions of dollars to clean Gaza's streets (Byrne 1996). Throughout the interim period, numerous surveys and studies illustrate the views of the Palestinian public

reflects, "an excessively negative view of the impact of donor assistance in the OPT" (14). Indeed, a (1999) Japan-World Bank study found local development institutional structures were, "less successful at strategizing and were not always effectively linked to Palestinian policy-making" (35). The greatest failure, as identified in the literature, is an overall lack of continuity between development aims and practices and the day-to-day reality of Palestinians.

The Interim Period (1993-2000), the seven years following the "handshake heard around the world," provides a context for understanding the 'relationship arrangements' between Israeli and Palestinian authority, and the relationship between those arrangements and the Palestinian population. It is during this period the principles for peaceful relations of the Oslo Accords are attempted to be formalized and operationalized through strategies of economic, political and social development. In reality, the interim period consolidated hierarchies, asymmetries and domination of Israeli control over the Palestinian populations of the territories.

Chapter Six

Consolidating Peace:

Peacebuilding and Development during the Interim

Period (1993-2000)

Introduction

The West Bank and Gaza Strip is the largest recipient of non-military aid in the world, following Israel and Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively.[26] For the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian peace accord, the international donor community "mobilized substantial economic resources in the search for peace" (World Bank 1999, 1). The World Bank estimates $U.S. 4 billion of donor aid was allocated to the West Bank and Gaza Strip under Oslo, in an effort to consolidate peace via economic development and good governance reforms (1). By 2000, roughly $U.S. 2.4 billion of aid had been dispensed to assist in developing the political and economic infrastructure, considered by donors as prerequisite for developing a sustainable peace between the Israeli and Palestinian people (1).

Development assistance in the West Bank and Gaza had an express political purpose: to consolidate and encourage peace as per the principles of the Oslo Accords. Of central priority was gaining popular support for the Oslo process on the ground (World Bank and Brynen 2000, 1). Indeed, "the strong commitment of

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[26] See: << http://www.Inweb18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.n...5 >>Accessed March 22, 2002

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the international community to support progress towards peace in the Middle East" constituted the aid priority "that Palestinians experience as part of the fruits of the peace process, tangible improvements in their everyday lives" (87). The preferred means to this support was financial aid and technical support to create conditions of sustained economic and social development. In practice, this broadly constituted technical assistance, increased trade, education, healthcare and democratization (World Bank (1999b, World Bank and Brynen 2000)

The secondary means to facilitate support for peace the peace process is outlined in Article VIII in Annex VI on cooperation – The People-to-People Programme whose aim was "involving ordinary people" in the peace process (Endressen, Lena C. and Gilen, Signe 2000, 29-33). This was to be accomplished at two levels; at one level, state institutions would be activated for the purpose of increasing contact and understanding between people in both nations. In this approach, the media were to be mobilized to improve the images of the respective "other", and government ministries would be mobilized to initiate institutional changes (29-30). The second level of operation, the grassroots level, mobilized strategic actors in civil society – civil society organizations – as the tools of peacebuilding. In 2000, 22.9 million Euro was provided to this programme, including six large projects on civil society (university and media cooperation), and 13 People to People projects (Diamantopoulou 2002). To date, 76.3 million Euros have been allocated to peacebuilding programs fostering Israeli-Arab/Israeli Palestinian cooperation through joint projects and awareness campaigns promoting tolerance and peace (Endressen and Gilen 2000, 33).

In peacebuilding enterprises, the state and civil society actors, i.e. NGOs, are identified as the preferred recipients of aid dollars. Indeed, research on Palestinian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) became vital in the 1990s, in the view of the transition toward democratization, and the role these organizations play in the process of bringing about and fostering this transition. Mudar Kassis (2001) offers a definition of civil society organizations as a broad conceptual unit. In general, his term includes most non-governmental associations that tend to represent the interests of certain groups of the population and do not seek executive power, thus excluding political parties (35-47). In the Palestinian context, his definition excluded further any organization that is religious or family in nature, or that is not based on the voluntary participation of its members. This definition does include trade unions, clubs, associations, nonprofit development organizations, NGOs and research centres, and the media.

According to a comprehensive survey conducted by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS), 76% of civil society organizations in Palestine were created after 1967; the greatest growth occurring between 1987 and 1993 during the first Intifada (1987 to 1993) (Kassis 2001, 38). During these years, CSOs were established at a rate of 11.8 per year as compared to 2.3 per year 1923 to 1987 (40). The total number of CSOs in Palestine exceeds 1, 200. There are as well, 12 universities, four university colleges, 12 vocational centers and over 100 magazines and newspapers (40). This translates into one CSO for every 2, 000 people in West Bank and Gaza. As noted by Kassis, in comparison to the rest of

the Arab world, this number is close to what one would find in Egypt, considered comparatively better that any other Arab country.

For the enterprise of developing peace, Palestinian CSOs had special importance, due largely to the advanced scope of their work, and the relatively high amount of international funding they receive toward the liberalization role they are expected to play (Kassis 2001). According to the CPRS study, annually, each Palestinian adult participated in at least one activity organized by a CSO. This role was considered vital to the process of peace for affecting the political system of the emerging Palestinian state, enabling a durable peace through institutional reform. Yet the majority of civil society organizations in Palestine do work that is described as "traditional" in nature, more than of which are cultural or sports clubs (38). Women's organizations constituted only 11% of CSOs and human rights organizations, 7% (38). Trade unions represented 2.7%, with child-care, research, care of the elderly and disabled representing 1%. The majority of civil society organizations were located within the West Bank (79%), considered the most "liberal" area of Palestine outside of East Jerusalem, whereas 21% are in Gaza (38-39).

The World Bank's policy approach to the territories clearly identified the central role of 'civil society' in its development strategies. For the World Bank, "civil society" as a conceptual and operational unit was linked to good governance and democracy as preconditions for peaceful societies. Of significance, is the distinction it draws between governance as an analytical framework and as an operational concept; it limited itself to the economic dimensions of governance:

the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development.[27] In practice, this mandate was interpreted broadly to mean improving public sector management, increasing accountability (anti-corruption), and strengthening the legal framework of the state.

Indeed, democracy/good governance reform was a critical feature of the Oslo Peace process, where democratization was causally linked to the political and economic processes required for sustained conditions of peace. Aid dollars were directed toward political reform, whereby targets associated with good governance or democracy became conditions for the release of monies (Baylies 1995, 322). Targets included: functioning government machineries, a well-functioning public sector, civil service, the imposition of "democratic" multi-party elections (1996), the liberalization of institutions, and increased pluralism in public life. Capacity building in civil society was causally linked to democratization processes, through the practice of participatory development, identified as "critical to the positive impact of development efforts" (World Bank and Brynen 2000, 3). Local ownership of the development process, "is key to good development programming," claimed the Bank, and achieved through "the active engagement of civil society" (3). Yet 'participation' was often a euphemism for 'local ownership', which more often than not translated into strengthening the capacities of existing power structures (Said 2001; Samara 2001). As understated by the World Bank, the "Palestinian institutional framework for governance is unique among developing countries" [...] "given the

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[27] See: The World Bank (1992) *Governance and Democracy* << www.worldbank.org>>

very limited Palestinian control of land, and lack of control over water, transport of goods and people, or access to external markets (World Bank and Brynen, 4)".

The Oslo Peace Process and Development

First on the list of priorities was to increase the standard of living for Palestinians, and to establish the foundations for economic development in the region. On the agenda: strengthening the PA and its institutions and producing the groundwork for future sustainable economic development. The importance of "getting policies and institutions right" was to be achieved through policy reform (fiscal stability) and institutional reform (democratization) (1-2).

To this end, development assistance in the newly formed Palestinian territories is externally organized in a top-down manner. Local aid coordination structures were established by the international community in 1994-95 to increase cohesion and continuity of aid delivery. These aid coordination structures included: the Joint Liaison Committee, the Local Aid Coordination Committee and various sector working groups (World Bank 1999, 3). Prior to the second Intifada, the institutional architecture of development in the OPT (1993 to 2000) comprised a complex institutional framework of fifty or more donors, working with the Palestinian Authority and its ministries, the private sector, local governments, local committees and with local and international NGOs. At the international level, the United Nations agency UNESCO facilitates coordination among donors and sets the policy/project agenda, while the World Bank serves as secretariat and facilitates local aid coordination. Projects include workshops and

seminars on topics such as water, municipalities, public finance and legal reform (World Bank and Brynen 2000, 3-4; 1999).

The World Bank adopted a policy approach to the Palestinian territories that emphasized a desire for clear policy objectives, combined with "effective public institutions" and an "active engagement of civil society" as essential components of development to foster economic growth, reduce poverty, and improve social conditions (World Bank and Brynen 2000, 3). This rights-based approach to resolving deeply embedded conflict has been easily and readily grafted onto the neoliberal agenda of aid conditionality, deregulation, and privatization.

Immediately after the signing of Oslo, the international community led by the World Bank, drew up the Emergency Assistance Program for Palestinian infrastructure, development, and institution building. The program's principal aim was to "stimulate private investment in sectors such as industry, tourism, telecommunications, and agriculture, by channelling long-term finance to local entrepreneurs" (World Bank 1993, 4). The World Bank further created the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), whose main function was to dispense donor funds (2.4 billion pledged) as per the Bank's directive.

The principles governing the Palestinian Authority's fiscal operations were manifested in the *Protocol on Economic Arrangements* (1994). The provisions of the Protocol were as follows: the virtual free movement of goods, as well as the creation of a limited customs union, and access to Israeli markets historically excluded from entrepreneurs. The aim if this agreement was simple: the exchange

of economic freedom for peace. The Amman Economic Summit (Nov 1995) identified the role of Israel as a newly powerful entrepreneurial force in the Arab World. For the first time, Israeli business operators could seek Arab partners for industrial ventures, and purchase and manufacture consumer products and market services. The Amman Summit reflected a change in policy; the emerging role of the private sector, controlled by government policy, as a means to build peaceful relations between Palestinians and Israelis.

Yet the *Protocol* was for many critics of the Peace Process worse than the Oslo Accords for Palestinian sovereignty. First, it explicitly ignored the issue of Palestinian sovereignty over land, thereby rendering impossible any real development strategy in the West Bank and Gaza, especially in agriculture, the main economic sector. Second, the Protocol explicitly restricted the PA to specific quantities of goods that could be imported and exported, undermining the principle of trade relations as a means to building peace; by 1997, Israel exports to the territories amounted to $US 1.2 billion and moved freely, while Palestinian exports to Israel amount to $US 210 million under heavy restrictions (Samara 2001, 2). Third, the Protocol established institutional mechanisms for disseminating Israeli control over economic affairs in the occupied territories. This is illustrated in the creation of a joint economic committee which gave Israel veto power over PA requests. Moreover, the Paris Protocol further intensified the already deformed Palestinian labour situation in stating:

[...]the two sides will work towards a normal work force movement between them taking into consideration the right of each side to decide at

one time or another the extent and conditions of workers' movements in their areas. If normal movement is cut to one side, it should immediately inform the other (DOP, 281).

The result was de facto Israeli hegemony over the movement of Palestinians. For example, the World Bank has cited on numerous occasions the Israeli military policy of 'border closures' as a primary obstacle to development and peace in the territories. According to the World Bank and Brynen (2000), 120, 000 Palestinians belong to the itinerant work force, seeking temporary employment in Israel as day laborers, for whom closures meant the cessation of any means for income. Border closures resulted in dramatic increases in unemployment in the West Bank and Gaza, reaching as high as 60 % in 1999 (1). Furthermore, 50-70 % of potential revenue from the Value Added Tax (VAT) is estimated to have been lost due to closures. By 2001, losses to the Gaza Economy reached $ 3 billion (US) a day because of Israeli strictures (Said 2001, 35).

According to Sara Roy, 33% of the Palestine's poor were forced into poverty *after* the finalization of the Oslo Accords. As former Palestinian Minister of Trade Maher al-Masri states, "All economic agreements following the Declaration of Principles were dangerous and have had negative impact on the economy" (PECDAR 1997, 4). Alternately, by 1996, Israeli employment rates increased by 40% and per capita income of Israelis rose to US$ 16,690, enabling Israel to rank number 21 on the international income scale (Shafir and Gershon 1998, 2). In April 1997, Israel was added to the IMF's list of developed countries (with Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong).

It is in this context, the 1999-2003 *Palestinian Development Plan* was put forth by the Palestinian Authority, calling for an estimated budget of $ 5 billion dollars (US): 141 million to come from development financing from the Palestinian Authority, 200 million from the United States, and the remaining 93% of its budget, 4.3 billion dollars, to come from the international donor community (World Bank and Brynen 2000, 15). Between 1993 and 1998, the cumulative total of international donations to the PA reached US$ 3.55 billion in pledges and US$ 2.45 billion dispensed. In 1994, the Palestinian Authority put forth the Palestinian Development Plan (PDP), based on "the expectation that the political and economic agreements signed with Israel would be implemented in full."[28]

The PDP was intended to be implemented throughout the course of the interim period, dependent upon the condition of Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, the safe mobility of Palestinians between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the free access of Palestinian goods and services to regional and international markets (Sayigh 2000, 5). The first two years would focus on stabilizing the economy and the removal of obstacles restricting the development process. This rehabilitation period was to promote the economy's ability to absorb large investments without inflation of waste (21). The principal aims of the PDP were "the establishment of good governance via democracy, institutional transparency, pluralism and accountability vis-à-vis human rights interests" and "the establishment of a free and open market economy" (2). To this end, the PA's overall development strategy identifies the private sector as the principle engine of growth (Palestinian Public Investment Plan (PPIP) 1997, 2-3). The PDP relied

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[28] *The Palestinian Development Plan* (1999) from <http://www.moe.gov.ps/fivyr.html>

heavily on outside investors in the private sector as machineries to facilitate economic development. As Samara (2001) observes, the PA approached economic development under Oslo in conventional terms: spending tax incomes, loans, and grants on infrastructure for the purpose of enticing foreign investors and expertise (tourists, businessmen, NGO managers, PA officials). For example, most investment in the West Bank and Gaza (one billion) was for housing, mainly in towns, whereas in villages, building licenses remained in the control of Israeli military authorities. Consequently, there was little improvement in housing infrastructure by either donors or the PA (4).

Further, as per the globalizing agenda of the World Bank, the PA promoted monetary and fiscal policies that favoured external investors over local investment (Samara 2001; World Bank and Brynen 2000). Economic policies favoured stimulating private sector development and competition by encouraging the inflow of foreign capital. For example, they limited restrictions on foreign remittances and dealings in foreign currency, placed ceilings on local banks, not foreign, and the law of investment put no cap on the maximum percentage of foreign investment of joint projects, nor restricts transfers of net profits (Samara 2001, 5-6). For Samara, the PA's unquestioning adoption of neoliberal economic policies that favour "foreign capital at the expense of local capital" further weakened the local private sector (6).

Furthermore, the PA's adoption of global-oriented policies encouraged local and foreign banks to act freely regarding the transfer of public savings abroad: minimizing the size and amounts of loans, and imposing severe restrictions for

guaranteeing loans. The aim was to increase Palestine's desirability as an investment opportunity (5). However, over 70% of loans were short term and geared toward keeping clients financially solvent while real loans only account for 6%. Banks tended to encourage their clients to save and then lend their savings abroad. For example, by March 1996, bank holdings amounted to US$ 1.35 billion in individual and private sector deposits. Of this, US$ 310 million circulated in the forms of loans, while 938 million represents bank deposits abroad (7). As Samara argues, banks were not working as a vehicle for development under Oslo -- about 90% of Palestinians savings were deposited in Jordanian banks (7)

The resulting 'development' through subcontracting and privatization did not serve the population. For example, PA budgets were often used to convert the public or buy loyalty, namely through public sector employment (Said 2001; Samara 2001). Further, PA corruption extends to the private sector, where no more than five individuals in the PA's inner circle hold monopoly control over thirteen products: from petroleum to sugar to tobacco and soft drinks (Samara, 2001). Samara shows the PA operates in direct competition with local Palestinian businesses and producers, while claiming to be non-interventionist.

Moreover, PA fiscal policies favoured industry over agriculture and rural producers. They supported large and medium export-oriented industries and micro enterprise. The PA strategy offered two broad packages of assistance to encourage industry and investment in the territories: the first, border and local industrial zones which were open to capital from foreign and domestic sources; the second,

small enterprises to support these industrial zones. Samara argues, far from constituting 'economic development', these policies merely prepared the ground for a "casino economy" – corporate-led, unregulated capital investment having little to do with producing real goods and services for real people (3).

Palestinian Estate Scheme for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank

The Industrial Estate Development Program (IEDP) was sponsored by the European Investment Bank and World Bank as a template for the integration of the West Bank and Gaza into global markets (Lagerquist 2003, 5). It was initially designed to foster business "clusters" on the border between Israel and Palestine. Known as border estates, the aim of this scheme was to permit the employment of Palestinian workers by international and Israeli entrepreneurs, free from security-related restrictions of the entry of Palestinians into Israel proper. The Palestinian Industrial Development Company (PADICO) served the role of administrator. The IEDP consisted of nine border estates and six local estates. According to the World Bank, nine industrial zones were planned along the Green Line for a cost of US$ 5 billion. Public investment for the program was estimated at $US 120 million, excluding land costs (Samara 2001, 6). In support of the project, Military Order 105 (1991), "permitted for the first time free Palestinian investment in Gaza" (Lagerquist 2003, 7).

The estate scheme, analogous to hundreds of similar export processing zones (EPZs) around the developing world, was adopted by the sponsors as a 'best practice' to promote the preferred model for economic development in the West

Bank and Gaza– "government by contract" – a process of transferring power from "estate management" to "private agents" (Lagerquist 2003, 6). The nature of Israeli control over the territories under Oslo yielded a "peculiar form to this arrangement": the estate scheme enabled former Israeli security officials to remarket themselves as private facilitators of Palestinian development (6). The role of these 'facilitators' was to mediate between Israeli security apparatus and the new PA supported Palestinian economic elite. The perceived benefits of this arrangement/program included the "secularization of the Gaza industrial estate on Israeli terms", and the creation of "closure proof" areas, allowing for the free movement of goods and labour (an attempt to adapt to Israeli closures) (6).

The central policy of the estate scheme was the creation of specially sealed industrial zones that would provide Palestinian investment with easy and secure access to Israeli markets (Samara 2001). The key determinants for investment in the Palestinian territories were considered the safety of investment, the availability of feasible projects, and readily available cheap labour. Industries expected to be labour intensive, export-oriented, marketing Israel to Palestinians. Palestinian identification cards, introduced during the first Intifada (1989), became instrumental for participation in post-Oslo development, and "emblematic of an integral to the systematized method of regulation and control to which it was linked": surveillance over the Palestinian population by linking the individual to the central authority (Lagerquist 2003, 7). The governance package marketed by PIEDCO made it clear Israeli and international donors that they would have little to do with the Palestinian proto-state. Ahmad Hassasneh explains, "When I

advertise the estates I am not talking about investing in Palestine. I am talking about investing in the Industrial Estates" (11). The appeal of the estates program was that the creation of EPZs would allow development to occur as though no occupation existed at all, and in doing so, "rearticulated the Palestinians' iniquitous economic relationship with Israel" associated with the Oslo process (5).

Summary Conclusions

Reliance on peace agreements and policy rhetoric such as the Oslo Accords and Paris Protocol will surely obfuscate issues of control, power and dominance in peacebuilding contexts. Indeed, "for the World Bank, the economic delinking of the self rule areas from the Israeli economy is a contradiction of these protocols" (Inbari 1995). For Samara (2001), the aim of the Oslo peace process and subsequent interim period "was to usher in a new system reorienting the Palestinian people toward accommodation, thus limiting their goals of national liberation" (4). In the era of globalization of capital, especially Third World capital, increasingly 'ignores' nationality and national commitment. The more national capital is integrated with international financial capital, the weaker national attachment becomes. In turn, any resistance to the occupation is understood as 'against peace'. This is indicated by the conditions placed on local NGOs by donors to remove the political dimension of Palestinian development (resistance) from their policy agenda. Similarly, cooperation and coexistence with Israel, contingent for the receipt of funding, is viewed by Palestinians as co-opting

Palestinian sovereignty: "marketing Israel" through advocating normalization through joint 'cultural' and other seminars (6). The result as Peter Lagerquist illustrates, the tendency of development projects in the territories to reinvest, "a local, colonial, genealogy of development as control" (Lagerquist 2003, 5).

In sum, development as peacebuilding during the interim years represents a genealogy of power that served to satisfy Israeli security needs for control over the territories and through Palestinians. Development policies for the territories reproduced Palestinian subordination to and dependency on Israel; peacebuilding through the interim period reproduced the structured dominance of Israel over the territories, deepening further the tension and fissures that divided these two peoples. In the territories, the interim period is understood as meaning, in the development sense, protracted endemic poverty, social disintegration and fragmentation, and the expansion and encroachment of Israeli state power.

Chapter Seven

General Conclusion

This research revealed the relationship between power and knowledge through the deployment of particular discursive positions and strategies in international and regional peacebuilding, illustrated through the Oslo Peace Accords and interim period (1993-2000). When studied through the perspective of relationships, the causes and consequences of conflict between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are largely externally influenced. The historical determinism and realist paradigm that typically articulate this conflict obfuscates the relations and deployments of power which define and reproduce social, political, cultural, and cultural asymmetries which in turn reproduces enmity, despair, and dispossession. Indeed, a relationship centered analysis enables an understanding of the Israel/Palestine conflict that is constructivist in nature; it is largely created and manufactured as opposed to inevitable. As such, as it is made, it can be unmade. To this end, a relationship-centered analysis, applied to the role of international actors in the quest to bring peace to the region becomes critical to the research endeavour.

This thesis showed how processes of peace building and development, and the international aid given to promote it, interact with forces of exclusion, inequality, racism and oppression, and in turn re/create and sustain conditions for continued structured dominance, and state-sanctioned war and conflict. Indeed, the thinking, writing, and speaking about development peace and conflict avoids

discussion and analysis of power relations: internal to the conflict dynamic and external. As in the Oslo case, donor-driven development is oft criticized for following its own priorities and logic, placing too much emphasis on technical assistance, existing outside and beyond local social and political dynamics. Mudar Kassis (2001) points out, "the state, the nation, the people, and their struggles are dismissed from the paradigm or rhetorically dismissed as misguided" (35). Indeed, development theory and practice is based in social science selectivity. In development theory, power is exercised through choosing which concepts, ideas, assumptions, and values are included into the canon. What is required is to adopt an inclusive approach to development that seeks to identify what is chosen and why and what other choices can be made. What is required is integrated research on the relationship between language and power and knowledge to the production of development thinking and practice on peace and conflict.

General conclusions about the thinking, speaking, and writing about problems of development, conflict and peace are as follows. The thinking, speaking, and writing about development, peace and conflict is dominated by 'one-size-fits-all' models and single-variable analysis. The failure of the Oslo Accords and the interim period to create sustained conditions for peace, and resulting outbreak of the second intifada, is just one case where the explicit imposition of democratic processes on a culture of conflict (Israel/Palestine) has failed to yield positive development effects and conditions of peace.

'Understanding' in development, conflict and peace tends to be narrow in scope and thin in depth. Our ideas fail to properly explain problems of

development, peace, and conflict because they rely on highly contested fixed assumptions. Consequently, issues relating to justice, reconciliation, and accountability remain largely ignored or marginalized. This is illustrated through the case study of the Oslo Accords and the interim period; the renewed 'two state solution' model to reconfigure peaceful relations between Israelis and Palestinians through equal rights, democratic reform, and economic growth, only serves to further strengthen Israel's structured dominance over the territories.

Donor preference for using globalizing policies and concepts in the practice of peacebuilding and conflict prevention have taken the goals of justice and reconciliation without adequately analyzing the concepts and how they are best achieved in different conflict circumstances and cultural contexts. Very few researchers have considered the roles of justice and reconciliation in the success or failures of peace agreements and peacebuilding processes in sustaining a long-term peace. Unfortunately, the universal determinism of globalization stands in for this 'common language', just as economic growth stands in for social justice. In sum, development discourse often rearticulates a local, historical, and institutionally embedded dependency, and deep social cleavages. Further research is required that will enable development agencies to provoke new entry points for development activity and endorsement; illicit new areas for research and development; improve training and operations in the field and yield greater positive development effects 'on the ground'. In order to do so, issues of power must be brought centrally to the research endeavour.

The thinking, writing, and speaking about development peace and conflict avoids their normative, qualitative dimensions. Silences contribute to the reproduction of conflict, but also offer an entry point into resolving conflicts. Silences are the loci of lost narratives and experiences, histories and solutions, which can be harnessed for resolving deep tensions and conflicts. Indeed, development must seek to "rebuild social infrastructures, and rehabilitate the state, but also support reforms that will resolve political, ethnic and socioeconomic tensions" (Gervais 1999, 445). Indeed, a peace-centered approach offers an approach to development which places social justice on the international agenda. The productive agency of the poor and disenfranchised, their values, attitudes, and ingenuity, would take center stage, as opposed to their negative liberty.

This research concludes that development theory and practice must assume that all development thinking and practice is political in nature. Additional, development is a regime of knowledge, constituting utterances and silences. Silences are a form of power; the task then becomes unmasking that power, asking what is not spoken and why. Thinking, writing, and speaking development, peace and conflict must assume that guiding logic and assumptions are highly contested and privileged. Left unchecked, they reproduce deformed relationships as they are grafted onto various systems of ideas. The task becomes unmasking, mapping out, and integrating logics into a cohesive way of thinking that is also fluid, malleable: our concepts must 'work for' us, not 'work' us. As illustrated through the case study, concepts of development, peace, and conflict, when translated, manifest deformed variations of their meaning.

This research illustrated how discourse functions as a domain and mechanism for the reproduction of conflict. It places the role of discourse – how conflict, peace, and development are spoken, written, and thought about – at the centre of the dynamics and processes that reproduce conflict. As such 'meaning' and 'understanding' are treated as highly contested bodies of knowledge and shows that there is no such thing as neutral truth: truth is political and problematic. Truth is not fixed nor can it be contained (as violence shows us); multiple realities and therefore multiple meanings exist simultaneously. Truth ceases to be a privileged aim; rather, as discourse tells us, there are many truths and our task is to figure out as many as possible (unmasking discourses and knowledges).

The study of discourse enables for the unmasking of discourses and knowledges from various institutions "that claim to speak on behalf of everyone: we are all the same, we speak the same language and share the same knowledge" (Blackwell, 7). It is this key feature of discourse makes it and its considerations of power so useful to the thinking about issues and problems of development, conflict, and peace. This research offers the following conclusions about discourse that make its inclusion in the development canon imperative.

First, discourse is social; all speech and writing is social and is sustained by social custom. Second, commands a particular kind of organization of audience which means that for any given audience, there is a corresponding discourse. Third, discourse and its study enables for the exploration of the social and historical dimension to discourse; how discourse is set up, organized, and

deployed. This is critical because it raises the key issue of accounting for positions and viewpoints from "[...] which people speak and the institutions that prompt them to speak and store and distribute that which is spoken" (Foucault 1978, 11). Fourth, analyzing problems from the point of view of discourse redefines our understanding of institutions and policies. Indeed, institutions are understood in terms of the distribution and hierarchy of discourses. In sum, analysis is guided by the idea that words carry weight.

Discourse as a method and object of study has radical implications for all forms of knowledge. It is useful as an entry point to analysis to development thinking and practice because it enables for the capturing and study of simultaneous realities that coexist. Discourse manifests the underlying logic of our choices and how meaning is constructed; discourse has no fixed boundary; discourses bleed into each other; multiple discourses can interact simultaneously at different levels in different dimensions; discourses do not solely collide with other discourses (although the effect of their interaction can certainly be felt as a collision), they can pass through, collect, appropriate, abandon, edit, morph, change. Some discourses are abandoned outright, others wholly accepted; discourses can change but can also coexist. The discursive dimension to development is useful in exploring the continuity/discontinuity between the aims and outcomes of development strategy.

Development thinkers and practitionners must embrace the political, and reject the ideas of neutrality and objectivity. We need to become comfortable with discomfort, and uncomfortably embrace the unsettling. The tendency in

development thinking is to contain 'development problems' – in concepts, categories, paradigms, models – but what is required is a shaking loose – freeing 'problems' from calcified ideas that confine and constrict a deeper understanding of the issues facing the international development agenda. In this view, development becomes an ideology of opposition or dissent, becoming a mechanism for 'justice delivery' instead of 'aid delivery'. Indeed, the most important contribution donor development can make to the international peace agenda is to speak truth to power: that there is no one truth.

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