The Uncommon Enemy:
First Nations and Empires in King William's War

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King William's War, 1688-1699, is generally described as a North American subsidiary of the Nine Years' War, 1689-1697. However, the North American hostilities started earlier and stopped later than the fighting in Europe. Further, King William's War was not a straight contest between the European powers in North America. It included two parallel fights, one between the English and the Wabanaki, and the other between the French and the Houdenasaunee. The independent local conduct of hostilities between these groups, the neglect of the conflict by European powers, and the internal divisions within the parties to the war, all establish important distinctions between King William's War and the Nine Years' War.

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Preface

About a century ago, Frederick Jackson Turner offered his collection of essays, *The Frontier in American History*. Although his argument was quickly synthesized and reshaped by other historians, Turner's work remains a milestone in the historiography of contact and colonization in North America, particularly in the West. However, the body of Turner's collection opens not with a discussion of the West, but with a discussion of “The First Official Frontier of the Massachusetts Bay”. This area, to the north-east of the early New England settlement, was a frontier which has a history well-suited to the richest of Turner's prose—a place of "coarseness and strength" and of "restless, nervous energy". In his turn, Harald Prins describes this same area as a place where "ambiguity reigned supreme" and where "uneasy accommodation could turn quickly into violence."

This region, called Wobanakik or the Dawnland, stretched through present-day northern New England and into what are now the Maritime provinces of Canada, as well as into what is now southern Quebec. Wobanakik was home to a number of First Nations—Mi'kmaq, Wulstukwiuk and Wabanaki—who together comprised a loose polity called the Wabanaki Confederacy. Their geography suggests their situation: they were literally set in competition with other native groups, the Wabanaki leaders were manoeuvring to

maintain primacy in Wobanakik by the end of the seventeenth century. Part of their response to the situation was military: the raiding now recalled as King William's War.

King William's War was fought on land in North America between 1688 and 1699. Although it overlaps the Nine Years' War in Europe and the Atlantic, it was generally not fought as a direct contest between the two European colonies, but rather as a war with two major fronts: the English fought the Wabanaki, and the French fought the Houdenasaunee. These were campaigns generally waged as petite guerre – raids of relatively small and irregular forces burning supplies, taking prisoners or ambushing the enemy were the mainstay operations of the war. The primary focus here will be on the heart of this irregular war between the Wabanaki and the various English colonies at Eastward”. The French-Houdenasaunee conflict and the infrequent direct English-French combat in the Northeast do also feature in this study. Other campaigns in the Americas, such as the English expeditions to the West Indies and the conflict in Newfoundland, do not feature in this study for two reasons: first, they are properly part of the Nine Years' War rather than King William's War; and second, they are at a significant geographic remove from the theatres of King William's War.

The distinction used here between the Nine Years' War and King William's War is sharp, and it is based on direct metropolitan involvement in military operations, both in direction and in expenditures. This is a fair standard for the time: the resources of the British and French empires could reach their colonies with substantial military strength, and those evolving empires of culture, environment and commerce could be realized in the tangible presence of external force, as in operations in Newfoundland, or in Hudson's Bay. This was not the experience of colonists either in New England or New France during King William's War. The Nine Years' War made direct combat between the
colonial powers permissible—it gave sanction to act on local grievances—but such direct attacks were exceptions in the campaign. The Glorious Revolution spawned concomitant uprisings in New England which destabilized the region and made the English colonies more vulnerable to attack. Despite this relationship between the contests, there were significant local elements that distinguish King William's War from the Nine Years' War.

The historian J.M. Sosin identified as a troublesome presumption "the primacy of local experience" in historical scholarship. With due regard for that caution, there are several suitable tests to establish the local nature of the war: the independence of local conduct of hostilities, the degree of neglect of the conflict by the centres of empire and the presence of internal divisions within parties to the war. By examining these three factors, each as a subsequent chapter, this study will demonstrate the essentially local nature of King William's War and distinguish it from the Nine Years' War. Exposing the local character of King William's War also reveals the strongly independent participation from each of the major parties: the Wabanaki, the Houdenasaunee, the colonial French and the English colonies.

There are a few notes to be offered on usage and terminology adopted for this study. The first issue is with the name of the conflict, "King William's War": as a Eurocentric title long associated with a historiography that diminishes the local context of the fighting, it does pose difficulties. However, it is the conventional name for the war, and so offers immediate linkage to the historiography for historians. Alternative names, such as "Anglo-Wabanaki War", introduce other problems, not the least of which is proposing a refined definition of the war that merits a new name. Beyond that, any new

title will likely silence different aspects of the complexity of the war. In the case of "Anglo-Wabanaki War", the title elides the Wabanaki relationship with the French, the English relationship with the Houdenasaunee, and the direct warfare between the French and Houdenasaunee. For these reasons, the conventional name is used in this study.

Besides the name of the combat, there are issues of conventions for the names of the combatants. Names of First Nations are reconciled to as faithful a rendering of indigenous self-identification as possible: Wabanaki rather than Abenaki, Houdenasaunee for Iroquois, Wulstukwiuk for Malicite, and so on. Any other approach would be inconsistent with the aim of the study to address the self-direction of these very nations in King William's War.

The rendering of quoted prose is always an issue for scholars confronting records from the early modern period. This study replaces antiquated characters and abbreviations in dealing with historical quotations. Heavier modification of the text is not needed for French or English sources from this period, and runs the risk - as any process of transliteration does – of creating interference with some part of the literary character of the historical source.
Chapter I:

Historiographical Introduction

Why does King William’s War appear in the historiography as a sidebar to the Nine Years' War? First, the evolution of the history of Wobanakik has only recently begun to expose natives as actors in the past. A survey of documents from contact and colonization through to recent historical treatments reveals a growing appreciation of First Nations agency in historical events; Wobanakik was primarily a native place at the time of King William's War.1 Secondly, the history of warfare in the period of contact and colonization has a long record of silence, subjugation or trivialization of the aboriginal voice. The nature of First Nations military independence in the Northeast is still in an early stage of debate among scholars. Study of the region is complicated by historians' strong adherence to theories of depopulation by disease, strategic retreat and military conquest of the region. The result is Wobanakik's historiography of disappearance – essentially, a documented silence.

The history of Wobanakik, especially from the period of contact, makes that silence seem odd: locating a voice from the era of contact for the First Nations in North American North-east is not difficult. Determining the authenticity of that voice may be more difficult. Karen Kupperman discussed shifting depictions of First Nations at the time of contact as revolving around the interest of the author, and illustrated well how both positive and negative descriptions were employed by colonizers.2 The motives for

1 Bruce J. Bourque, Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 156-159.
desiring this contact could be complex: commercial, spiritual, imperial and other interests were all at play in the European endeavours in North America, and accounts of contact are often weighted with the need for self-justification. Further complicating present engagement with contact is the uncertainty surrounding the evolution of the process itself, as David Quinn indicated in England and the Discovery of America, 1481-1620. However one might date or situate contact in North America between First Nations and Europeans, the initial records of contact are Eurocentric and feature the “savage” as visible and workable in their concept of the European New World.

Two of the staple works in the history of contact deal directly with interactions in the Northeast. One of these works is Marc Lescarbot’s History of New France. An enormous portion of the work, relates to the First Nations – one book is devoted exclusively to the topic. Lescarbot’s accounting of the First Nations varies widely, but they are acclaimed in places, praised in comparison with Europeans, and held up as compatible with the European New World. Other early contact records from the Northeast follow this pattern of injecting the familiar into their narratives of contact with the First Nations. One striking example of this is missionary Chrestien Le Clercq’s report of “cross-bearing” native people: he imputes the Christian meaning to a symbol in use with that band from long before French contact. Although Le Clercq is far less laudatory of the First Nations than Lescarbot, his writing frames many episodes that are meant to demonstrate the compatibility of Europeans and First Nations. Olive Dickason points out the colonial missionaries’ adherence to the theological conception of aboriginal North

4 Marc Lescarbot, The History of New France (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1914; c. 1618), translated by W.L. Grant.
5 Chrestian Le Clerq, New Relation of Gaspesia. With the Customs and Religion of the Gaspesian Indians (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1910), trans. William Ganong, 188,
Americans as "perfectible" spiritual beings.6

A number of the other early records of contact were in the style of travel literature, meant to introduce the reader to as big a space and as broad a range of marvels as possible. These descriptions are often overtly tailored to accomplish specific ends, such as justifying expenses for exploration or military action, inviting investment for trade or promoting the potential for missionary work, but they do offer deliberate descriptions of the physical environment. One of the best-known examples of this in the Northeast is Nicolas Denys' Description géographique et historique des costes de l'Amérique septentrionale.7 Supplementing these contemporary accounts with the findings of more current research has produced a number of significant studies that emphasize the geographic context of contact, including William Cronon's Changes in the Land8 and an interesting work edited by G. Malcolm Lewis: Cartographic Encounters.9 These works show that the interaction between humans and their environment has entered the currency of historical thought as a contact or encounter in its own right. Lewis' Cartographic Encounters includes a reflexive element, examining the alterations and incorporations in the study of cartography that have complicated any present effort to study First Nations mapmaking. Recently, biogeographical approaches have featured in some popular works that deal with the broad questions of the role of physical environment in the history of contact and colonization.10 The attention that early narrators of contact paid to the

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10 For example, Jared Diamond's Guns, Germs and Steel: the fates of human societies (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997).
culture, environment and society of the First Nations makes some of this new scholarship possible and further, it suggests the utility of joining historical and anthropological study - ethnohistory. That junction is not a new phenomenon. Martin, Quimby and Collier’s *Indians Before Columbus*\(^\text{11}\) - now more than fifty years old – illustrates the fact that ethnohistory and other historical work informed by anthropology belongs in a longer tradition of confluence between the disciplines.

The narrators of early journeys succeeded in promoting North America back to their home audiences, and contact steadily shifted to colonization. The strivings and tensions in this period have excited a catalogue of histories – but not for Wobanakik. Research dealing with this region in the past must often have seemed to be leading to a cipher: historians’ interest in the aboriginal people of the area was often desultory if the topic was not dismissed outright. Colin Calloway, while introducing *After King Philip’s War*, rued the long omission of First Nations actors from the historiography.\(^{12}\) P.-André Sevigny, in his history of the Wabanaki, argued that the problem in the historiography goes further than documentary silence: “[e]n désintéressant de la sente des Abénaquis, les historiens modernes ont permis la perpétuation de nombreuses équivoques a leur sujet et la plus néfaste, héritée en droite ligne de l’ère coloniale concerne sûrement leur identité et leur localisation a cette époque.”\(^{13}\) Until recently, the historiography of Wobanakik in the seventeenth century has been sparse, but studies by authors such as Emerson Baker, Kenneth Morrison, Bruce Bourque and Robert Grumet have all taken advantage of

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interdisciplinary scholarship to begin correcting this deficit.\textsuperscript{14} However, the majority of available historical studies focus on the written record, and for Wobanakik, the absence of European settlers to record the experience means that little survives. What documents do persist are centred on fleeting European presences in the area – French merchants, for example, or missionaries. Even the effort to settle in Maine left only a fragmented record, largely by dint of the involvement of colonists in other centres. Of the First Nations, there was little.

Among the best-known of the missionaries who worked at the time of contact were the Jesuits, whose correspondence – the Relations – constitutes one of the principal historical sources for investigating European interaction with First Nations. At times, the Jesuit records range into the mode of the “noble savage”, whose piety might shame the civilized Christians. Father de Crespieul attributed the following quote to Frenchmen in his company: “ah mon Pere combien y a t il de frantjois qui ne feroient ce que ces bons sauvages font pour Lamour de Dieu.”\textsuperscript{15} However, as laudatory as the Jesuits might be of their new charges’ apparent devotion, they could be scathing in their dismissal of First Nations traditions. Father Jean de Lamberville wrote that the native healers (“les jongleurs”) used nothing but “des sottises et des impertinences” to fight illness.\textsuperscript{16} Of their feasts and ceremonies, Father de Lamberville stated “je nay Rapportée que pour faire voir la folie et Letourdissement de ces pauvres barbares.”\textsuperscript{17} The resulting picture from this mixture of praiseworthy zeal and backward culture is one that legitimises missions and denigrates the First Nations as historical actors – relating directly to historiographical

\textsuperscript{14} Baker; Morrison; Bruce J. Bourque, Twelve Thousand Years; Grumet, Northeastern Indian Lives.
\textsuperscript{16} Thwaites, Jesuit Relations", Vol. 60, 186.
\textsuperscript{17} Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, Vol. 60, 192.
Eurocentrism. They are frequently described in terms that are nearly child-like, or, as in the anecdotes of baptism and birth above, literally featured as children in the missionary accounts. These attitudes provoked a resistance on the part of First Nations that is not always clearly communicated in the European written record, especially in Wabanaki groups whose motives for going to a mission, as noted by Kenneth Morrison, were complex and often had little relation to conversion.\textsuperscript{18}

Distortion, appropriation and dismissal of the aboriginal voice in these records is pervasive, and it is occasionally explicitly acknowledged. Father Pierson's relation of 1676 discussed an Houdenasaunee diplomatic visit, and rejected out-of-hand the expressed reason for the embassy (alliance in war) as a pretext, preferring instead his own explanation that the Houdenasaunee intended to ruin the mission. In this case, a native group took direct action on its own behalf and gave a reason for that action, but their explanation survived only in a highly mediated form in European documents.\textsuperscript{19}

The Jesuit missions, and even the Relations themselves, have spawned quite a body of scholarship. J.H. Kennedy said of the Relations that they were "weapons of eloquence and persuasion, of the essence of the missionary task...but they were also truthful documents."\textsuperscript{20} Kennedy, in the same paragraph, labelled the Relations as propaganda, which he earlier defined as "dissemination of information".\textsuperscript{21} This oddly dichotomous description from an admiring critic exposes the tensions involved in the Relations quite well: however learned the European authors of these texts might be, there are many interests at play in creating the reports. However, Carole Blackburn has

\textsuperscript{19} Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, Vol 60, 210.
\textsuperscript{21} Kennedy, \textit{Jesuit and Savage}, 78.
recently observed that the Relations ultimately cast aboriginal groups as ahistorical.\textsuperscript{22} Through the machinery of language and description, Jesuits removed a sense of change over time in First Nations groups, substituting descriptions instead that suggested natives were frozen in the habits of their ancestors. The Jesuits' dismissal of oral history and traditions — a general trend of the time, but especially relevant in the Catholic Church, with its powerful affiliation to the concepts of “word” and “text” - was a crucial part of this erasure; indeed, recovery and study of oral and non-traditional sources of history have played an important role in disabusing historians of the paradigm of unchanging, pre- and ahistorical First Nations life prior to European contact.\textsuperscript{23}

The ahistorical rendering of First Nations actors is at odds with many documents of contact, which did feature aboriginals as actors in their own regard. However, the natives were defined within European constructs. Many of these contemporary accounts do ascribe familiar and compatible characteristics to First Nations, but to be compatible with European concepts can be a powerful negative. Bernard Sheehan discussed “the tension between idea and reality in Anglo-Indian relations” in his work, \textit{Savagism and Civility}, and his discussion of the way First Nations were accorded compatibility with notions of ignoble savagery indicated the dangers of subsuming First Nations into European constructs.\textsuperscript{24} Sheehan pointed out that, within the construct of ignoble savagery, the settlers perceived of First Nations that “their only grip upon the world seemed to be the undifferentiated rage that they released upon anyone who anyone foolish enough to come within reach” and that ultimately, Indians could be understood to

\textsuperscript{23} Blackburn, \textit{Harvest of Souls}, 54-55.
“become agents of demoniacal ruin.” This “degeneration”, and the risk the settlers perceived of becoming savage in their wild environment, was an ever-present and debated issue. John Canup pointed to King Philip's War as “proof that 'civil behaviour' had failed as an Indian policy” and that the war “gave them an opportunity to try uncivil behaviour”, a kind of sanctioned savagery.

One genre of historical study that can achieve a tightly focused illustration of historical agency is biography. Historical biography requires close examination of an individual in context, and it is a field that has been enriched greatly over the past few decades. In the area of Wobanakik, a number of scholars have created strong and vibrant scholarly engagements with figures of importance to First Nations history, as well as revisiting well-known figures in the community of European settlers. Historians now reflect on the identity of trans-gendered servants and murderous schoolteachers along with colonial leaders. The approaches borrowed from literature, psychology, anthropology and other disciplines inform the recent work and create opportunities for innovation. The stated aim of these studies of individual identities often includes the desire to use the subject as a foil, illuminating their surroundings in the course of pursuing the narrow study. Effective biography relies on appropriate contextualization of the individual (and the concept of a person singular) in their community. This remains a challenge for historians tackling First Nations subjects, and is an area that may be assisted by further anthropological scholarship. In part due to this difficulty, some facets of the

more daring identity explorations are speculative – perhaps even counter-factual. Bunny McBride's *Women of the Dawn*, a treatment of four significant historical Wabanaki women, is an example of a biographical resource in this mode – part fiction, part history.\(^{28}\)

Biography has a long reach in the historiographical canon. One surviving narrative of contact is interesting in this regard: Thomas Church's account of King Philip's War.\(^{29}\) Church's account, *The Entertaining History of King Philip's War*, revolved around his father, Major Benjamin Church, and so is a transparently vested biography. Nevertheless, the work included discussion of native peoples as both allies and opponents, criticized the sale of natives for slavery and separated the motives of various First Nations. This document of contact in combat is a testament to the full and passionate participation of the native people in their history. One striking passage in this regard is the account of Major Church's negotiations with Awashunkes, female sachem of the Sacconet, shortly before King Philip's War.\(^{30}\) Although the account lacks corroboration, it is significant that Church depicted his father bearing respect for particular First Nations leaders and fostering peaceful partnership. Even if we presume that the benevolence of Benjamin Church is little more than a device of an interested author, the mode of presentation of the First Nations in this instance still remains: they are, in a major primary source in the historiography, presented as capable partners for New England settlers.

Church's work is biographical, but it is also a military history. Other military histories are focused on the deeds of First Nations; King Philip's War is an obvious

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30 Church, *King Philip's War*, 75-83.
example of an historical event that requires even from the most blinkered historian the inclusion of aboriginal military actors. However, the nature and nuances of inclusion varied greatly. In the apt phrase of one historian of the colonial wars, "Each of the European rivals created its own disciples and devils among the redskinned natives."31 The same historian, however, went on to state that King Philip's War ended "tribal life and the fur trade" northeast of New England.32 Considering that the phrase comes in the introduction to a history of colonial war from 1689 on, one is left to wonder at the internal contradiction in this premature dismissal of aboriginal groups from a history that is expressly theirs, as is plain in the later accounts in the same work of the effective raids launched by Wabanaki parties, and the war waged by Massachusetts against the Wabanaki in the 1720s.33

The erratic standard for inclusion of First Nations as actors in historical scholarship has had consequences within and outside the discipline of history. For example, one anthropological study of the aboriginal population of New England prior to contact is built on an odd mixture of critical and uncritical historical argument. The author juxtaposes certain aspects of the "noble savage" trope with rather sharp assessment of a few historical authors. The author warns that, "[f]or a fair appraisal, one must discount the diatribes of the Puritan divines" while including in his narrative idyllic characterizations of Indian life – no orphan neglected, no burglary, dogs sagacious and faithful, and so on.34 Interspersed in this identifiably flawed historical construct are valuable observations and useful analyses, such as on the high degree of native

33 Peckham, Colonial Wars, 44-48; 84-85.
agricultural cultivation in Wobanakik.\textsuperscript{35} Interdisciplinary integration has further challenges that have affected the historiography of the region. For example, inaccurate demographic information on the aboriginal population of the Wobanakik has compromised historical study for generations. Early studies of native populations in the Northeast suggested a total number around twenty thousand; newer studies have advanced estimates as high as one hundred thousand. That five-fold increase has significant consequences for studies related to depopulation by disease, for example, or on the scale of migrations of First Nations. Neal Salisbury offered a thorough discussion of the evolving understanding of aboriginal population size in \textit{Manitou and Providence}, but the work is now more than two decades old.\textsuperscript{36} Another example of the challenge of interdisciplinary integration might be drawn from the role archaeological and anthropological disciplinary prejudices regarding material culture have played in the neglect of rigorous studies of the Northeast – a neglect that reinforced the flawed notion of First Nations disappearance in historical endeavours. David Lacy described the myth of under-occupation and its consequences while offering new evidence of native use of the mountains in Vermont.\textsuperscript{37} Lacy remarked that the missed opportunities for studies of the Northeast were in part the product of a “twentieth-century, Euro-american view” that discouraged study of places that were not ‘civilized’, such as mountains.\textsuperscript{38} Sites can also be missed or mis-interpreted by archaeologists based on the masking of variability by the use of overly broad categories in the assessment of an area and its cultures.\textsuperscript{39} Even if a

\textsuperscript{35} Russell, \textit{Indian New England}, 15, 146.


\textsuperscript{38} Lacy, “Myth Busting”, 119

\textsuperscript{39} Julia A. King and Edward A. Chaney, “Did the Chesapeake English Have a Contact Period?” in Dennis B. Blanton and Julia A. King, eds., \textit{Indian and European contact in context: the Mid-Atlantic Region}. 

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site is uncovered and thoroughly researched, the artifacts may offer incomplete and problematic information, such as in the case of medical assessment of prehistoric period First Nations remains. Further, there is some argument that early ethnography and anthropology may have played a role in rendering still some voices from the past, especially with regard to finer granularities of study subjects, including individuals. These peculiar challenges of interdisciplinary study have played a part in the evolution of the historiography of silence and omission for the First Nations of the North American Northeast.

Interdisciplinary methods have offered historians massive amounts of new information and informed new approaches to existing sources. However, the wealth of new data from these studies is often offset by their scope. Many of the newer approaches or forms of analysis produce scholarship that is narrowly focused, such as identity studies or archaeological exploration of a limited site. It can be difficult to expand these arguments into a larger field of application. This has affected the historiography in that works proceeding from newer approaches that attempt a comprehensive re-introduction of the Wabanaki into the broad history of the region are still few.

Overturning the notion of aboriginal disappearance has been an important recent focus for scholars of King Philip's War and its aftermath. The raiding that started in 1688 is an effective illustration of the presence and action of Wabanaki groups in the Northeast; this proceeds logically from James D. Drake's recent history of King Philip's War.

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War, in which he described the Wabanaki as victorious after fighting on until 1678. Drake's treatment of the war built on a number of sources that challenged the once-standard teleological description of the end of King Philip's war as a breaking of native power in the Northeast. One of the most striking challenges to this interpretation is John Easton's "A Relacion of the Indyan Warre". This source was written at the time of the fighting as a critique of the settlers' readiness to war. It is remarkable in that it exposed an aboriginal voice that is largely absent from other contemporary accounts. Easton was a magistrate who served both as attorney-general and governor of Rhode Island during a long career, which included a meeting with native leaders (including Metacom) immediately prior to hostilities in King Philip's War. His record of the meeting included a number of serious grievances of the First Nations against the English settlers, ranging from uncontrolled cattle grazing to treaty construction, legal standing, liquor sales and proselytizing. His representation of the plaints and the negotiation was peppered with phrases that reinforced how effectively the native delegation engaged in diplomatic exchange. For example, when Easton and others attempted to persuade the native people that their complaints might be resolved without war, the First Nations response was "they had not herd of that way" but Easton went on to state "we had Case to thinke in that had bine tendered it wold have bine acsepted" - that is, if the settlers had a concrete proposal for how to mediate the conflict without arms, the First Nations would have been open to it. This example of the potential for First Nations leadership and agency in their own affairs, including military matters, is directly relevant to consideration of King William's

44 Easton, "Relacion", 10-12.
45 Easton, "Relacion", 11.
War only a decade later. The remainder of Easton's short relation is in a similar spirit, highlighting points of blame in both settlers and First Nations and providing illustrations of successful and peaceful cooperation to resolve the escalating disputes between natives and settlers. His conclusion is striking: “new England prists thay ar so blinded by the spiret of persecution...that thay have bine the Case that the law of nations and the law of arem s have bine violated in this war”. Easton's family apparently moved to Rhode Island due to religious differences with authority in New England; that animosity probably informed his writing. Nevertheless, Easton's account of his contact gives voice and presence to the First Nations in a way that other and later historians did not. Since corroboration is not available, it is difficult to deem the work entirely trustworthy, but the arguments that he claims were offered by King Philip and his peers are consistent with grievances aired by other native leaders of the time. Further, it is credible that a native leader who adopted the name “Philip” and had some history of co-operation with his neighbours, native and colonist, might have used this manner of measured diplomacy.

Recent scholars have provided accounts that substantiate the ability of native leaders from this era and region to use the institutions of the settlers to advance their own ends. John A. Strong wrote of Wyandanch, a sachem of the Montauks, that “he spent that last twenty-two years of his life moving adroitly between two cultures... Another important aspect of Wyandanch's success was his growing familiarity with English legal institutions, which he used to advance his own interests.” Wyandanch's leadership predates King William's War, which suggests that by the end of the seventeenth century, the process of native accommodation within colonial structures was founded on several

46 Easton, Relacion", 17.
47 Lincoln, Narratives, 6.
generations of development. There is a well-known example of successful diplomacy from the outbreak of King Philip's war: Awashunkes' manoeuvres for the survival of her people. Ann Marie Plane described Awashunkes as "the leader of a still vital people, rather than the discouraged queen of a defeated remnant." Each of these examples strongly suggests that presenting King William's War as a conflict between empires and their local surrogates is omitting an interesting inquiry: what were the Wabanaki leaders doing in the conflict, if not participating and leading? This heritage of effective work within settler institutions by aboriginal leaders is indicative of the need for a reconsideration of the nature of King William's War.

The value of that reconsideration was apparent more than a century ago. Frederick Freeman, a nineteenth-century Congregational clergyman, evinced a powerful sensibility to the lost aboriginal voice. For example, in reference to the massively destructive raid against the Pequots of May 1637, Freeman stated that "Indians have been regarded as proverbially barbarous; but that the more frequent and greater barbarities of their enemies were often the cause of their rage and desperation, cannot be doubted." In a footnote, amid text that is similarly evocative of the horror of the destruction wrought by Captain John Mason and his army, Freeman sardonically offered Cotton Mather the sobriquet "learned and pious" before quoting Mather's description of the event. The intentional inversion of the concepts of civilization and barbarity is implicit, but it is clear. This inversion is a theme throughout the work, and Freeman used every device to illustrate the contrast, including the treatment of found or captive children.

50 Frederick Freeman, Civilization and Barbarism, illustrated by especial reference to Metacomet and the extinction of his race (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1878), 62.
51 Freeman, Civilization and Barbarism, 61.
52 Freeman, Civilization and Barbarism, 25.
made his awareness of the historical obfuscation at the expense of First Nations clear late in his work: "That the Narragansetts spared, when they could, if they would, have destroyed, is a fact which has not been so assiduously kept in view." Freeman also remarked that "[t]aking into consideration the fact that the records of all Indian treaties were penned by white men, and that Indians had no Hubbard, Mather, or Church, to indite for them their tale of woe, he is venturesome who will assert that all treaty transactions have been fairly told." This awareness of mediation in the sources extends Freeman's summary offered in the course of discussing Metacom's death, where he argued:

"That the very worst thought of Metacomet, the execution of which he ever attempted, was to prevent the occupancy and absorption of his entire domain and the complete humiliation and extinction of his race, needs no demonstration beyond the facts furnished by the colonists themselves. They were chroniclers not only of their own doings, but of what they chose to say of Indians."

While the advent of identified ethnohistory has been rightly credited as a landmark that opened many new routes of inquiry into contact and inter-cultural encounters of the past, Freeman's work demonstrates that more than a century ago, a scholar using nothing more than a patient and close reading of sources could overcome some of the mediation of the sources and offer a more balanced treatment of native historical agency.

Among recent scholarship specifically addressing First Nations historical actors is Robert Grumet's *Northeastern Indian Lives, 1632-1816*. Grumet's collection stands well as a marker for the reshaping of traditional historical biography in the period of contact and colonization. Broader studies such as Gordon Day's *The Identity of the St. Francis Indians* highlight the role a community "biography" can play in resolving confusion and

53 Freeman, *Civilization and Barbarism*, 145.
54 Freeman, *Civilization and Barbarism*, 173.
55 Freeman, *Civilization and Barbarism*, 155.
contradiction in the historiography, especially where a group has little space to communicate its own record. In some sense, biography – often derided as the mode of “great man” histories – is an excellent bellwether for the radical reshaping of the historiography of the Northeast. One work that is emblematic of the change is Jean M. O’Brien’s *Dispossession by Degrees*, another community study. Centred on the small New England towns of Praying Indians, and especially Natick, O’Brien’s study illustrated the devolution from the triumphant inclusiveness of the founding of these towns to exclusion, persecution and assumption of the land and structures. These events are physical and geographical metaphors for the historiographical treatment of the same native people. O’Brien’s work spoke directly to some central concepts of contact and colonization, including the idea of ‘wilderness’. Her reflection on the subject fits well with the nature of Wobanakik at the end of the seventeenth century: “However much it seemed to the English a wilderness, the landscape was shaped by the Native peoples to whom it was home.”

Another work that proceeds from the reconsidered nature of power and identity in contemporary scholarship is Klein and Ackerman’s *Women and Power in Native North America* – even the title communicates the challenge of the work to conservative historiography.

Despite the many excellent and innovative studies recently offered by military historians, the field is still associated by some with a lingering conservatism. This may be in part due to the generally slow inclusion of social science influences in the field. James D. Drake has offered an oblique response to the issue, stating that “of all forms of

human interaction, war arguably most defies the predictability of social science. Nevertheless, new approaches in the broader field have exposed the military historiography of King William's War as generally reflecting a pattern of silence, subjugation or trivialization of the First Nations role.

Recent studies of early modern warfare in North America are developing a more nuanced approach to First Nations warfare. For example, the historiographical debate regarding tactical acculturation versus the primacy of European methods and warfare in North America has expanded to study acculturation from the indigenous perspective with the work of Patrick Malone. The present study does not enter the historiographical debate on tactical acculturation versus importation. In King William's War, leaders who excelled in only a single tradition or method of warfare suffered setbacks if unable to adapt their methods. For example, Major Benjamin Church, who enjoyed success in the use of ranging patrols, suffered defeat (and embarrassment) after attempting a siege of Pemaquid. The operation lasted only thirty-six hours. Sir William Phips' expedition against Quebec of 1690, cited in a recent article as an indication of the need for New England settlers to use the methods of European wars, is intriguing as an historical precursor to later assaults, but the immediate result was disastrous. Further, the expedition did not bring the New Englanders the prospect of peace afforded them by successful frontier raiding. In the period of King William's War, primacy in military

60 Drake, "King Philip's War", 11.
matters did not hinge on wholesale adoption of one or the other of the methods of warfare. Success relied on flexibility - the ability to apply appropriate military methods as required.

However earned, military success silences historical actors: people die. Jill Lepore's study, *The Name of War*, revolved around the language and histories of King Philip's War, and she addresses the issue of source material for military events well. Lepore voiced a simple and powerful argument: "If I die, your word... is almost as important as my wound, since you alone survive to make meaning of my death."

Proceeding from this understanding of the power of language - a statement that aligns with Easton's pointed reference to the absence of any native narrators or historians - Lepore's work examines how the language and execution of King Philip's War evolved at the time and in the immediate histories of the conflict. The silencing of the aboriginal voice in the history of King William's War gains a certain immediate gravity in light of Lepore's argument.

The practice of surveying King William's War in the absence of specific First Nations actors is certainly linked in some way to the literal silencing of so many native participants during the war, whether as casualties of shot or famine or disease. The dismissal of the aboriginal voice from the historical record and the subsumption of King William's War into a European conflict are linked phenomena: since they rarely have an historical voice devoid of European intervention, First Nations in Wobanakik are not always seen as independent agents. The textual norm - continuous and often decisive European linkage in aboriginal affairs - is assumed to be accurate. This flawed

64 Lepore, *The Name of War*, x
foundation encourages the inference of persistent European leadership.

Military history does have substantial contributions to offer other modes of the discipline; non-traditional historical studies may be substantially weakened if they bypass First Nations military history. Carl Bridenbaugh's *Cities in the Wilderness* implied, even in its title, the invisible nature of the First Nations to his urban history of early European America.\(^65\) Bridenbaugh managed to span the wars of late seventeenth century and the raids and conquests of the early eighteenth century with hardly an aside in his text, so his omission of First Nations may be symptomatic of a tightly focused piece of scholarship. Even so, eliding the role of First Nations in urban life in early America bypasses some key controversies of urban New England - for example, illicit trade, which was rife at the time.\(^66\) For that matter, the growing study of aboriginal slavery in North America might also have featured in the work. The omission of First Nations also conceals the costs of continual low-level warfare in lives and resources and obscures major events in the history of the cities, such as the conflicts which destroyed many small settlements. One might expect that at least in matters of defence, First Nations would enter consideration. However, Bridenbaugh writes:

"In the seventeenth century each little colonial community was constantly threatened from without, on land by Indians... Military activities of a sort were, therefore, familiar to them from the beginning. More significant for their development as future cities were the measures they took to maintain the laws within their bounds and to protect themselves against disorderly, law-breaking and criminal inhabitants."\(^67\)

In the space of a few lines, Bridenbaugh sweeps aside the unique demands and

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\(^67\) Bridenbaugh, *Cities*, 63.
considerations of colonial defence, the complex effects of military service, the creation of
forts and of the industry of arms on the cities. The First Nations themselves, as a military
power, are demoted to a role that is beneath consideration — somewhere on the far side of
dealing with pickpockets and horse thieves. King Philip's War makes a surreptitious
appearance as a source of refugees — and that is all.\textsuperscript{68} In \textit{Cities in the Wilderness}, the
aboriginal voice is utterly absent. Not only are aboriginal villages and towns ignored,
even those of the Praying Indians, but their influence on their neighbours is dismissed.
Ignoring military history can perpetuate silences in history.

The people who inhabited these cities record the presence of the First Nations
around them in a multitude of ways, but these first-hand accounts — particularly from the
time of King William's War, when relations were tense between the neighbours - often
focus on failed communication and misunderstanding between settlers and aboriginals.
Conflict occasioned distortions of the depicted Indian. “The Present State of New-
England” by Nathaniel Saltonstall, recorded First Nations voices in grunts and pidgin
English, with the circumstances casting the owners of these stilted words as either
buffoons or brutes.\textsuperscript{69} For example, Saltonstall offered the following example of combat
between natives and settlers:

“...Captain Moseley plucked off his periwig...As soon as the Indians saw that, they
fell a Howling and Yelling most hideously, and said, Umh, umh me no stawmerre
fight Engismon, Engismon got two Hed, Engismon got two Hed; if me cut off un
Hed, he got noder, a put on beder an dis; with such like Words in broken English,
and away they all fled...”\textsuperscript{70}

This literal distortion of voice in a primary document of contact is reinforced by the
writing of several major colonial authors contemporary to the events. Of these, nowhere

\textsuperscript{68} Bridenbaugh, \textit{Cities}, 83.
\textsuperscript{69} N.S. (attributed to Nathaniel Saltonstall), “The Present State of New-England With Respect to the
\textsuperscript{70} N.S., “Indian War”, 39.
are the effects of Easton's "spiret of persecution" among the clergy and leadership of the colonies more stark or apparent than in the writing of Cotton Mather. His "Decennium Luctuosum" is an historiographical staple, dealing specifically with the decade-long conflict, King William's War. Mather's dates in his title are of specific interest: as a local narrator, he delineates the conflict as from 1688 to 1698, rather than the European timeline of 1689 to 1697 which has since become habitual in the historiography. The chronological break indicates some uniquely local elements to the conflict, even if we allow that parts of the fighting were subsumed in imperial designs.

The dates of the war are not the only aspect of Mather's text that seem to emphasize a local character for King William's War. For example, the work contains a chapter engaging witchcraft and the supernatural. This was a timely subject for the 1690s in New England, but it was somewhat divorced from the context of Mather's "sorrowful decade" of warfare with the native people until he established a link by introducing the Indians as "...horrid Sorcerers, and Hellish conjurers and such as Conversed with Daemons." Mather does not merely contradict the optimism of earlier religious leaders that encountered the First Nations, he literally demonized First Nations as agents in a "Prodigious War, made by the Spirits of the Invisible World upon the People of New-England, in the year, 1692". For this argument, Mather produced an example of a town whose inhabitants encountered – but were unable to shoot or otherwise effectively engage – a small number of French and Indian "Unaccountable Troublers". As the contact stretched over two weeks, Reverend John Emerson – quoted at length in Mather –

71 Cotton Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum: An History of Remarkable Occurrences in the Long War, which New England hath had with the Indian Salvages from the year 1688, to the year 1698, faithfully Composed and Improved", in Lincoln, Narratives, 242. John Demos' Entertaining Satan and Mary Beth Norton's In the Devil's Snare are further references in this regard.
72 Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum", 242.
concluded that the town was not raided “by real French and Indians, but that the Devil and his agents were the cause of all the Molestation”.73 Mather's prose rendered the First Nations as alien and sub-human in more conventional ways throughout, using devices such as his description of sachems signing a ceasefire with their paws, or describing native homes as kennels.74 His creation of this phantasmal foe built on prejudices describing the First Nations religions as devil-worship or idolatry and reduces and distorts the presence of the natives in the historical record.

The historical diminution of the role of the First Nations reinforced itself: as early historians reviewed the available primary sources, the accounts reflected the European and colonial emphasis. The contact narratives were adopted uncritically in several generations of histories, and the biases of the authors and the absence of an aboriginal voice were maintained and perpetuated. The effects of this cycle are visible in many later histories, including Samuel Adams Drake's The Border Wars of New England. Drake recalled and then deliberately countered virtues enumerated by authors such as Lescarbot; he admits in his introduction that native populations may have been treated unjustly, that some part of their fate might be deplored, but “...at the moment when we are ready to admire the red man's noble traits, his ferocious cruelty, that rage of blood... disenchants us.”75 Drake's history of the raids proceeded in sensational fashion with the tales of goodwives and children taken by the “terrible redskins”.76 By far the strongest contrast between the encouraging language of the early reports of contact might come from a passage of Drake's. On the subject of settlers taken captive, he remarked that “...not a few

74 Mather “Decennium Luctuosum”, 228 and 230. 
76 Drake, 132-133.
preferred to remain with the savages, thus furnishing a homely, but apt illustration of the ease with which so-called civilized beings relapse into barbarism... not one of these renegades would have made a useful citizen." It was indeed a long step from the celebration of similarities and commonality of the contact narratives to the work of Drake. Drake's work is transparent and unapologetic in its condemnation of the native way of life as doomed, victim of an inexorable process.

One of the most influential North American historians in the field of early modern history was Francis Parkman. His grand and sweeping narratives on the topic of contact and colonization, which were written two decades after Freeman's work, profited little from the balanced voice Freeman found for First Nations actors. His work on New France is built on the primary sources of Lescarbot, Champlain, the Jesuit Relations, and other colonial documents. In these sources, the native voice might be minimized or altered. In Parkman's synthesis, that voice is extinguished. Parkman made much of the general character of the groups acting in his history, and his description of natives (apparently Wulstukwiuk) as a "fickle and bloodthirsty race" communicated how he conceived of their place as firmly external to a civilized New World. There is no sense of the First Nations proceeding to war based on reasonable conditions. It is worth noting that Parkman is no more nuanced in his presentation of the major European nations: the French "bore themselves in a spirit of kindness contrasting brightly with the rapacious cruelty of the Spaniards and the harshness of the English settlers." Parkman wrote with flair and his enjoyable prose has proven quite durable. This means that his distortion and silencing of the native voice has affected the historiography and also broader culture,

77 Drake, 136.
78 Francis Parkman, Pioneers of France in the New World (Toronto: George N. Morang & Company, 1899), 98.
79 Parkman, Pioneers of France, 98.
even popular fiction and film. Albert Marrin, for example, opened an educational book on the French and Indian Wars with a nightmarish account of the 1690 raid on Schenectady. The villagers are presented as “simple, industrious folk” whose only defence were “two snowmen with broomstick-muskets”. The French and Indians descended on them with a “war whoop”, and Marrin carried on his lurid tale: “Always screaming, Settlers died in their beds — shot, stabbed, and clubbed by unseen assassins. By daybreak, sixty people, including infants, were dead.”80 His description of Indian life included the assertions that “fighting was no crime, nor, for that matter, were stealing and murder”, and that “Indians always drank to get drunk... it puffed up his pride... [h]e also became a killer.” 81 This is a work of the late nineteen-eighties rather than the nineteenth century, and yet this image was presented to youth as authentic and historical.82

One of the first modifications of the treatment of First Nations presence was to replace silence or dehumanization with a model of subjugated participation: if the First Nations were to have a place in an account, it would be as subordinate or vassals. In this vein, sources such as captivity narratives and contemporary histories of the events cover King William's War in some depth, but they often assign these actions to an overarching colonial structure, eliminating or minimizing the role of local and native leaders in brokering peace and in entering combat.

The foundational documents for historical research in the period of King William's War also generally describe the First Nations as subordinate or subjugated. These documents are the collections of colonial records, English and French, and comprise a

81 Marrin, Struggle for a Continent, 9, 35.
rich array of correspondence, government or legal documents, and so on - the authors and purposes were so varied that the collections defy rapid historiographical summary. Their essential characteristic, however, is that they were created by people external to the First Nations - often people who presumed (not always accurately) some authority either with or about the First Nations. The English CO5 and French C11 collections are vested and mediated documents - and yet they are the most comprehensive and reliable historical sources available on the period. Both have one crucial common aspect in the context of King William's War: their texts do not often touch Wobanakik, despite its strategic location for commerce and security. The resources spent to exert European authority over the area in this time were sparse, and what efforts the settlers made to reach into this area were frequently local in derivation. For example, in the areas that were cultivated by settlers, the practices and methods – as well as the economic environment of the activity – could be substantially at odds with European norms regarding dealing for land and its relative worth.83 Another factor militating against textual inclusion for Wobanakik is that the physical region was not under the same degree of settlement pressure as other regions bordering on the English colonies.84 The relative lack of European interest and participation in the region does not reconcile well with the historiographical norm of conflating the hostilities in the area with a broader and European conflict. The minimal European presence or investment in the land “at Eastward” suggests the importance of the local grievances in King William's War.

The collections do feature documents of dealings with First Nations in a variety

of contexts, including arrangements for peace, providing for war, negotiating land use or sale and petitions of all kinds. The aboriginal voice in these documentary collections is always drawn out by European contact of some sort. That very fact creates a climate of secondary if not subordinate context for First Nations in the texts. As Joshua David Bellin has remarked, "the Indian presence is at once more elusive and more decisive than scholars of colonial texts typically allow." 85 Ann Marie Plane notes of colonial records that "what Englishmen expected determined in part what they could see and describe." 86

The recent fostering of academic openness to resources such as the oral tradition of First Nations permits some recovery of the textual loss: Colin Calloway and Neal Salisbury's introduction to Reinterpreting New England Indians and the Colonial Experience speaks clearly both to the gap between these ways of knowing and to the benefits of encouraging their intersection. 87 In the interim, the caution that "all American texts are contested and contrived between cultures" offered by Bellin is most apt. 88

The record of subordination is further reflected in recent histories, such as Colin Calloway's studies of the Wabanaki. Calloway describes King William's War as a "North American counterpart" to a broader war. 89 He describes Wabanaki participation as "French-directed Indian attacks... in which the Wabanaki served as the shock troops of the French war effort." 90 Interdisciplinary work that builds on subordinating historical models can uncritically demote the level of First Nations agency in historical events.

88 Bellin, "A Little I Shall Say", 76.
90 Calloway, Western Abenaki, 95.
Robert Grumet's survey, *Historic Contact*, ranged over the northeast quite broadly and devoted a short space to the Wabanaki. Grumet embraced the tenet that King William's war was fundamentally linked to the Nine Years' War and reinforced that judgement by depicting Dummer's War as distinct from other border wars of the period, as it "was not part of a wider international conflict." This presumption of imperial influence was maintained by the description offered by Daniel Mandell of the outbreak of hostilities. Though Mandell cast the conflict locally, the role of First Nations in the fight was diminished: "[w]ar flared between New England, New France and Indian allies". Further, Mandell dated the conflict to September of 1689, which aligns with the Eurocentric calendar of wars, rather than with the local start of raiding in 1688. Despite assigning the struggle to an overarching European influence, Mandell underscored the local tensions that informed Wabanaki raiding, including the settler's voracious consumption of land and the descent of land releases to individual deals, rather than occurring a band or higher level. Aline S. Taylor's biography of the Baron St. Castin also offered a view of the raiding in local context.

The third historiographical tendency with regard to First Nations military agency is trivialization. This is perhaps the most pernicious trend in the historiography, because it has the outward semblance of dignity: one might allow that First Nations launched their own raids, for example, or had sensible goals for war. However, the military action is devalued by analysis to the point of being inconsiderable, self-destructive or futile. Much

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93 Mandell, *Frontier*, 70-71.
of the historiography in this spirit – and in particular public historical memory – recalls conflicts between natives and colonists in the mode of Douglas Leach's account of King Philip's War, *Flintlock and Tomahawk*: an inevitable struggle between the progressive, growing settler civilization and backward Indian tribes. Leach set the tone for his treatment of King Philip quite early in the work: he remarked that after the negotiations of Taunton in 1671, King Philip and his men left “weaponless, like little boys deprived of their slingshots at school”95 Among Leach’s conclusions is the statement, “[t]hose Indians who survived the struggle of 1675-1676 were forced to recognize the stark fact of English supremacy.”96

Alden Vaughan’s interpretation of the Pequot War is another example of the use of agency in an analysis that ultimately trivializes First Nations history. His argument that the Pequots have a share in the blame for their own demise certainly seems to reclaim a role for the Pequots as historical actors. However, it is a flagrantly apologetic argument that is phrased and presented as such: “It may be hoped that the troubled conscience with which the modern American historian often views our past relations with the Indians can find some balm in contemplating an episode in which the white man groped for workable formulas of friendship and justice, and in which he was not solely responsible for their ultimate failure.”97

King William's War itself is frequently diminished or dismissed in the historiography of the North-east or of European empires. Where the French participated,

96 Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk*, 245.
their military efforts have been summarized as a "strategic blunder".98 Ian K. Steele has described King William's War in the Northeast as the second Abenaki War, a step for which this study must acknowledge its debt, but dismisses independent peace negotiations by Wabanaki leaders as "fraudulent" and the significant military role of natives living in the French colonies as "peripheral to the Abenaki's own war".99 The monolithic construction in which Steele renders the parties to King William's War resulted in his analysis derogating or discrediting the multitude of local influences and actions in the conflict.

One crucial element in the historiography of trivialization or dismissal of King William's War was the Treaty of Ryswick. The settlement summarily ordered reversion to status quo ante bellum in North America, regardless of the military outcomes. Relative to the attention paid to other overseas possessions or to naval and commercial assets, King William's War was bypassed and dismissed in the treaty process.

Despite the long trend in the historiography towards silence, subjugation or trivialization, there are a range of works in the historiography that support an appreciation of First Nations military actions as independent. Joseph Marrault, in his nineteenth-century history of the Wabanaki, claimed that they were able to function as a military adjunct in raids against the Houdenasaunee in 1687 while also amassing sufficient strength a few years later to "moquer des menaces de leurs ennemis" - in this case, the English settlers.100 His work depicted Wabanaki warriors as a persistent and noteworthy military presence in Wobanakik throughout King William's War, including participation

98 W.J. Eccles, Frontenac, the courtier governor (Toronto:McClelland and Stewart, 1968), 270.
and leadership in notable raids such as against Pemaquid in 1696. Allen Trelease argued that the Indian allies of the colonial powers handled the Wobanakik theatre of the conflict as quite apart even from other nearby border regions within the colonies that were contested during the war.

Armstrong Starkey, in his study of warfare from this period, highlighted the effective and independent nature of much First Nation military activity. He opened his survey with a narrative from the raid against Fort Bull in 1756. This anecdote served to underscore the diverging aims of French (Canadian) and native warfare, and the compromises and collaboration a leader had to undertake to combine successfully European and First Nations forces. Starkey offered arguments relating to the First Nations adoption of firearms, including the proposition that the wholesale endorsement of superior firepower – combined with far more effective training – indicated the many First Nations actually surpassed European military forces in the use of the European's own technology: firearms. At a fundamental level of skills and training, at a broader level of tactics, and at a high level of strategy and the definition of war aims, the demonstrated military independence and capability of First Nations all over North America demands renewed inquiry into Wabanaki raiding from 1688 to 1698. Starkey also observed that the complexity and misunderstanding surrounding the North American colonial wars suggested “even to a very traditional military historian, the importance of multicultural studies as an agent of humanity in war.”

101 Marrault, Abenakis. 222.
104 Starkey, Warfare. 22.
military potential and ability are reinforced by Baker and Reid's reassessment of native power: they proposed a situation of Wabanaki strategic military strength and capability at the turn of the eighteenth century, versus contemporary non-native vulnerability.\textsuperscript{106}

James Pritchard made note of the "disproportion, ambiguity, and complexity of the Nine Years' War in America."\textsuperscript{107} The turn of phrase was well-chosen: between the local conduct of the war, imperial neglect and internecine divisions, King William's War did not lack for complexity. This study will resolve some of that complexity by exploring each of these three themes. The result is a clear picture of King William's War as a fundamentally local conflict, quite distinct from the Nine Years' War.

Chapter II: Local Conduct

War did not break out in North America in 1689. Neither did war end in North America in 1697. The argument still offered by some historians that the military roots of the war were in Europe rather than America, that “[p]eaceful relations between frontier neighbours could be ruptured arbitrarily as the result of diplomatic breakdowns between London and Paris”, has some truth but does not adequately capture the conflicted state of relations in North America in their own right. At the end of the seventeenth century, the Wabanki, the Houdenasaunee and their neighbours, the colonial English and French, were involved in complex contests that were quite independent of European influences. Three factors will serve to demonstrate this uniquely local character of King William's war. The fact of widespread combat in North America well before the declaration of war in Europe is the first indicator. Second, the prosecution of the war, in style and in specific operations, is identifiably local rather than imperial. Finally, fighting in North America was sustained well after word of the Treaty of Ryswick arrived. From start to fighting to finish, King William's War had a marked quality of independence from the Nine Years' War.

The hostilities of King William's War did start earlier than is generally appreciated. In the late 1680s there were many conflicts simmering in North America, well in advance of any European eruptions. In Wobanakik, English settlers had been routinely ignoring a 1685 agreement with the Wabanaki, flouting provisions regarding the

fishery and crops. 2 This slight had provoked sporadic Wabanaki raiding along the frontier, and about twenty Wabanakis were seized in 1688, suspected of killing a few cattle after they had complained of crop damage. 3 This seizure by a magistrate was offensive to Wabanaki groups, who retaliated by taking prisoners of their own. 4 Also in 1688, a raid by ten or twelve natives, first on natives living near Springfield, and then on English settlers at Northfield, resulted in a pursuit being mounted by colonial militia. 5 There were other local provocations all over North America. Relations between the Houdenasaunee and the French were in a sharp decline after a raid against Fort Saint-Louis in 1684. The governor-general at the time, Joseph-Antoine Le Febvre de La Barre, led an expedition against the Houdenasaunee in the same year. The objective in meeting the Houdenasaunee in force was to bring them to terms and thus secure the trade of the pays en haut and the colony proper. 6 However, La Barre was himself compelled to seek terms; besides illness among his French troops, his native contingent was compromised due to the development of the practice of mutual non-aggression between Houdenasaunee groups. 7 The situation again reached hostilities under La Barre's successor, Jacques-René de Brisay de Denonville, who raided the Seneca in strength in 1687. Ian K. Steele has said of this event that Denonville had "halted English intrusion into the Western fur trade, demonstrated French power, built a garrisoned blockhouse at Niagara, and started a

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2 Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney, Captors and Captives: The 1704 French and Indian Raid on Deerfield (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 81.
5 CO5/905, Letter from Francis Nicholson, Boston, 31 August 1688, 19v.
7 Jon Parmenter, “After the Mourning Wars: The Iroquois as Allies in Colonial North American Campaigns, 1676-1760”, William and Mary Quarterly 3rd Series, 64, no. 1 (January 2007): 44-45, 47. This practice was a factor in coalescing Houdenasaunee military power in the late seventeenth century, although it did not hold through King William's War.
The decline in French relations with the Houdenasaunee touched the Wabanaki directly: in 1684, the Jesuit missionary Jacques Bigot was rescued from a mishap in his canoe, and "le canot qui nous secourut fut celuy que Monsieur le General envoie a L'Acadie promptement pour y porter ses presens et Inviter tous les abnaquis qui restent a Lacadie pour se venir Joindre a ceux que nous avons Icy et aller en guerre avec les francois contre les Iroquois." Another North American conflict, that of Hudson's Bay, marked a significant turn in 1686 with Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville's success in leading thirty French soldiers and sixty colonial irregulars against the English posts. In short, there was plenty of fighting, and some of it quite serious, in North America before the European War of the League of Augsburg started. Sir William Phips, military commander of two expeditions against the French and later colonial governor of Massachusetts, offered an address to the inhabitants of Port Royal in 1690 after accepting their fort's uncontested surrender. Phips made a point of highlighting the fact that the local violence antedated any imperial incitements: "sundry of our vessels being taken, and our men Detained Prisoners by yourselves, without any Provocation on our part, and that before any War was declared between the two Nations."

King William's War was provoked and resolved in large part at the local level, in a chronology that overlapped with but was apart from the Nine Years' War. The divergence of the two conflicts has manifested itself in the historiography in curious ways. David Lovejoy, in his history of the Glorious Revolution in America, described the

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8 Steele, Warpaths, 137-138.
9 Jacques Bigot, "Journal de ce qui s'est passé dans la Mission Abnaquise depuis la feste de Noël 1683 jusqu'au 6 Octobre 1684", in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents (Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers Company, 1900), Vol 63, 56.
10 Steele, Warpaths, 137.
11 William Phips, "Address at Port Royal", in Phips, A Journal of the Proceedings in the Late Expedition to Port Royal (Boston: Benjamin Harris, 1690), 9, reproduced in CO 5/855, no. 109.
escalating raids happening at the time of the Boston uprising of 1689 as a "phony war in Maine". At that time, King William's War can not be placed solely in the context of a contest between the English and French crowns, and so historians are left either to confront the issue of First Nations military ability in the region, or to dismiss the fighting as marginal, peripheral to the colonial empires. The local nature of the fighting is one of the reasons the early phase of King William's War is trivialized in this way, but another major factor is the unconventional prosecution of the war.

King William's War was waged as a petite guerre rather than a contest of formed bodies of troops; even in the actions where large masses of soldiers were used, the operations were irregular and focused on goals of that peculiarly local kind of warfare. John Grenier offered a definition of petite guerre that included "taking of prisoners; ambushing and destroying enemy detachments... and, most important, destroying enemy villages and fields and killing and intimidating enemy noncombatant populations." In that light, the actions of all combatants in King William's War were generally consistent with petite guerre, particularly the land operations in the Northeast. Grenier isolated ranging patrols against Wabanaki villages as the only effective land warfare offered by New Englanders during King William's War. Patrick Malone, in his The Skulking Way of War, emphasized the role of "Indian allies and borrowed military practices", such as ranging and forest warfare, as crucial to colonial military success. This reinforces the local nature of the war: operations that succeeded on land were generally planned locally and conducted within a unique model of warfare apart from European traditions. Grenier

14 Grenier, First Way of War, 36.
singled out payment for scalps as a developing part of the New Englanders' warfare in the late seventeenth century.\footnote{Grenier, \textit{First Way of War}, 39. Grenier does not assert any origins of scalping. For that history, see James Axtell and William Sturtevant, "The Unkindest Cut, or Who Invented Scalping?", \textit{William and Mary Quarterly} 37, no. 3 (July 1980): 451-472} This bounty structure reinforced pecuniary motivations for fighting during King William's War that had nothing to do with the European conflicts of the day. Another aspect of \textit{petite guerre} is evident in the orders given to Major Benjamin Church, an experienced New England soldier and ranger, for his 1692 raid in Wobanakik. Church received explicit instructions to seize prisoners - "men, women or children" - and to "take care and be very industrious by all possible means to find out and destroy all the enemy's corn, and other provisions".\footnote{Instructions for Benjamin Church from Sir William Phips, Pemaquid, 11 August 1692, in Samuel G. Drake, ed., \textit{Thomas Church, The history of Philip's war, commonly called the great Indian war of 1675, and 1676 also, of the French and Indian wars at the eastward, in 1689, 1690, 1692, 1695, and 1704} (Exeter, NH: J. & B. Williams, 1834) 210-211. CIHM Microfiche Series no. 48405} It is interesting to note that the orders issued include a reference to the Crown only once, and that in the context of Phips' titles, and not again in either the orders or the close of the instructions.

James Pritchard has dismissed the frontier raids against villages as "strategically empty".\footnote{James Pritchard, \textit{In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 336} That assessment was probably accurate from the point of view of the home countries of the respective colonial empires. Whether Schenectady or Lancaster was sacked, after all, had little bearing on the conflict in Europe. However, King William's War was fundamentally local, planned and fought based on considerations that were indigenous to the Northeast. The raiding practices of the Wabanaki, and of the Houdenasaunee, forced colonies to over-commit to defence. At a local level, raids that could scare a populace into demanding a garrison were strategically effective, in that the garrison represented some part of an opponent's strength that had been baited into stasis.

The raids, or the predictable reaction to the raids, blunted the ability of an opponent to
fight by consuming men, arms, money and provisions, none of which were easily available in either colony.

The raiding war between the Wabanaki and New England was serious, even allowing for exaggerations in the complaints of the correspondents. A correspondent of John Usher's reported on the damage, but did not give numbers with any precision. Their estimate was that the attacks against Cochecha, Sagadahoc and Saco cost the settlers more than twenty deaths, many more taken prisoner, and monetary losses of tens of thousands of pounds. The correspondent, James Lloyd, noted that “the Eastern parts were formerly under the protection of New Yorke who are not now in a fitt Posture to Protect them”.19

Edward Randolph, formerly a royal agent and customs collector in the colonies under James II, echoed this sentiment of vulnerability: he alleged that “[t]he French have above four thousand good men about Canada” and offers his expectation that “upon the news of the Bostoners reassuming their old government (no care being taken for the out towns and Provinces) they will join with the Indians and in a short time swallow and be Masters of that part of the country” in his notes on the situation.20 In his commentary, he offered a direct indication of imperial French involvement, claiming that the cycle of raiding begun in the summer of 1688 had included a party of Wabanakis that killed settlers, took prisoners and destroyed cattle while in the company of a French priest.21

Randolph's narrative was coloured by his situation at the time: he was jailed after the uprising in Boston thanks to a history of conflict with local figures during his tenure as a customs collector. Nonetheless, he confirmed the raids and their toll on the settlers and linked them to the contemporary paralysis of the local government. The local context is

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19 James Lloyd to Thomas Princely, forwarded by John Usher, 10 July 1689, CO5/855, 33-34.

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particularly significant: the English and the French were not yet at war although the situation was delicate. Louis-Hector de Callière, governor of Montreal, proposed to reduce to Houdenasaunee threat by attacking New York, but met with polite redirection from Versailles, urging the pursuit of the war against the Houdenasaunee with what soldiers were already in Canada and habitants; an attack on New York might be considered “si on estoit certain d'une rupture avec les anglois.”22 This uncertainty was also apparent in the instructions from Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Seignelay and Minister of the Marine, to Denonville: “il est bien important que vous preniez toutes les précautiones que vous estimerez convenables pour éviter toute sorte de surprise, et vous mettre en estat de ne rien craindre de leur part.”23 This disjunct between local fighting and the ambiguous European situation indicates the need for a strongly local interpretation of the hostilities.

Despite the local provocations and in the absence of declared imperial conflict, the assumption that the Wabanaki military action was directed by the French persisted in the English colonies, leading in 1690 to Phips' sojourns against the French. The local nature of the hostilities were again highlighted by Phips in the often-quoted demand for the surrender of Quebec in 1690, where he asserted that:

"The warrs between the two crownes of England and France doth not only sufficiently warrant: But the destruction made by the french, and Indians, under your command and Encouragement upon the persons and Estates, of their Majesties subjects of New England, without provocation on their part, hath put them under the necessity of this Expedition for their own Security and satisfaction."24

23 Minister to Denonville, Versailles, 20 March 1689, reproduced in Jean Blanchet, ed., Collection de Documents Relatifs à L'Histoire de la Nouvelle France (Quebec: A. Cote et Co., 1883), 448
One of the best-known early raids shows both the mode of the fighting (*petite guerre*) and the local motivations and leadership for combat in King William’s War: the governor of New England and New York, Sir Edmond Andros, attacked the trading post of Jean-Vincent d’Abbadie de Saint-Castin in Pentagoet in 1688. Saint-Castin was a French merchant resident in the area, and his role in sustaining good relations with the natives of Wobanakik was of value to the French colonies despite his being on the periphery of French colonial influence. Louis-Alexandre des Friches de Meneval, governor of Acadie throughout King William’s War, mentioned in 1688 that Saint-Castin had finally adopted personal and commercial conduct acceptable to the colony.  

Meneval does mention that Saint-Castin was married, but not to whom: he had married the daughter of a prominent Penobscot sachem, Madockawando, consistent with the encouraged French practice of métissage. In Acadie, the ties born of intermarriage between the French and First Nations were strong and spanned several generations: the admixture was sufficient and of such local value that the British urged marital ties between their settlers and the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet when they took possession of Acadie in the early eighteenth century.  

Saint-Castin’s value as a local French asset had attracted the prior attention of English authority. New York governor Colonel Thomas Dongan had alleged in 1684 that the merchant had taken up on property that was under the English crown. Little came of the pressure then, but the imprecision of the border between the colonies continued to cause friction between the colonies – indeed, Meneval’s relation of affairs in Acadia of September, 1688, opened with a long discussion of the contest between the colonies over...
the region.\textsuperscript{28} The European concepts of authority over the region generally neglected an important reality: the area was settled by Wabanki groups, not by Europeans. Since Saint-Castin was their kin by marriage, certain First Nations, and especially the Penobscots, had loyalties in their own right to him – and so the ill-considered raid by the New Englanders provoked a reaction that had little to do with imperial relations. Saint-Castin's value to Wabanakis in the area was not just by way of kinship: he was a source of provisions that were crucial to their well-being, and by striking at him, Andros also assaulted a basic means of support for the First Nations nearby. The blow was made particularly sharp by Andros' destruction of other provisions and damage to other Wabanaki villages while ranging in Wobanakik. Andros' raid – itself in response to earlier, sporadic border confrontations - was a catalyst for retaliation and escalation by the Penobscots and their allies at the end of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{29}

Andros' 1688 raid provoked further skirmishes in the same year, but the disarray of the summer of 1689 afforded the First Nations new strategic opportunities against New England. In a letter forwarded by John Usher, a Boston merchant and adherent to Andros' government (later lieutenant-governor of New Hampshire), to the Board of Trade, his correspondent states that Madockawando "seeing the Governor in prison and the land in confusion... is become our Enemye with many of the Pennecooke Indians with others."\textsuperscript{30} If there was an opportune time for the sachem to seize a military advantage, it was while the Committee of Safety tried to rule. The Committee, set up in the immediate wake of the overthrow of the dominion government, was not stable. It and the other fragmented and vulnerable governments of New England were not in a position to respond effectively

\textsuperscript{28} Letter from Meneval to Seignelay, 10 September 1688, AC, C11D, vol 2, 96-97.  
\textsuperscript{29} Samuel Drake, \textit{The Border Wars of New England, Commonly Called King William's and Queen Anne's Wars} (Williamstown, Mass: Corner House Publications, 1973) 10.  
\textsuperscript{30} Forwarded correspondence of John Usher, 10 July 1689, in CO5/855, no. 16.
to military action. Randolph offered a brief narrative of the situation subtitled with the assertion that New England was in “imminent danger of being overrun by French forces.”

Later, Captains John Alden and James Converse, provincial officers charged with redeeming captives from natives, received instructions that included a telling description of the contemporary weakness of the colonies. The officers were to remind the First Nations that “...notwithstanding the advantages they have had upon the English partly occasioned thro their own Security and want of Subjection to order by reason of our unsetlement...” the security of New England would shortly improve with the advent of supplies and personnel from England. That help was not forthcoming.

Randolph's fear of French intervention was not without some substance: the raid on Saint-Castin's home in Pentagoet had the potential to be a serious breach between the colonies. The response of the governor of New France indicated that, from the perspective of the colonial government, the diplomatic damage was not severe. Denonville mentioned his surprise at the violence to Andros as a passing remark, and expressed his hope that affairs had been put right with Meneval. Although his language was purposeful, Denonville delegated involvement and passed by any personal role in a confrontation over Wobanakik, even when a French subject - an asset of some worth to the colony and to their Wabanaki allies - was threatened. The distance between the concern of the French colonial leadership and the military situation of the Wabanaki was illustrated in the same letter, wherein Denonville devoted a much more thorough written response to the depredations of a privateer or pirate. The aggressors were identified by

33 Denonville to Andros, 29 September 1688, AC, C11A, vol 10, 78v.
the New Englanders as pirates, some of whom were later imprisoned by Francis Nicholson, a captain of infantry and lieutenant-governor of New York under Andros. In this instance of provocation, Denonville did not refer the matter to the judgement or jurisdiction of another colonial official: he stated his expectation that Andros would take all steps to obtain a just resolution for the French. Denonville's stronger language, personal interest and more detailed response showed that, in his estimation, the raid against Saint-Castin's fort ranked well below the privateering vessel. That one of the seminal events of King William's War was dismissed so quickly at the colonial administrative level indicates the importance of engaging the conflict in the context of the local and native leadership and in terms other than as a colonial theatre of a European war.

Both the French raid on the Houdenasaunee and the English raid on Pentagoet wound up being examples of striking an enemy where they were not – although both also nettled the targets enough to trigger strong military responses. The raids also reflect the bifurcated nature of King William's War: French versus Houdenasaunee, English versus Wabanaki. Denonville did write to the Minister on the subject of the Andros raid late in October of 1688, and in that note he reflected that "l'esprit et les sentiments de Dongan ont passé dans le coeur du Sieur Andros qui... peut estre plus dangereux par ces souplesses et ses douceurs que l'autre n'estoit par ses emportenrs et violences." Denonville recognized a potential threat from Andros, but did not yet conceive of their relationship to that governor in terms of combat.

In the wake of Andros' raids, Madockawando and other Wabanaki leaders plainly

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34 Letter from Francis Nicholson, Boston, 31 September 1688, COS/905, 21-22
35 Denonville to Andros, 23 October 1688, AC, C11A, vol 10, 78v.
had a very different relationship with the English governor than the French. They were taking the fight to the settlers in New England, motivated not only by the raid against Saint-Castin but also by the privations that the raid had caused them over the winter of 1688, thanks to the burning of crops and destruction of other provisions. They pressed their irregular war against the disadvantaged colonists, raiding frontier settlements and garrisons to good effect, causing alarm among the English settlements. This provoked the memory of King Philip's War among settlers, an event that profoundly shaped their conception of native military power. Nicholson mentioned this explicitly in August of 1688, saying that "some places were afraid of the Indians in their neighbourhood and that others were very much alarm'd at the moves from Northfield (for they have not yet forgot the Cruelties of the Indians in the warr they had with them about 12 or 13 years ago)". Nicholson wrote his letter in the wake of a thorough review of the frontier towns' security, in part provoked by the increase in raiding. Nerves on the frontier were on edge – the sense that natives "had not carryed themselves of late to the English as formerly" and the observation of "strange Indians" contributed to an abiding unease. Andros lost little time identifying the raiders as "Indians from Canada" and taking the issue up with the French governor directly, although there was no evidence of French involvement.

A deposition taken in 1690 at Boston stated, "after the Report of sd Andros Robbing one Casteen a french man at Eastward, we never did see any Indian Come to our Plantation...but in a hostill manner", a contrast, the deponents say, to a history of regular trade. The historian P. André Sévigny suggested the sensitivity of Andros' target when

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38 Letter from Francis Nicholson, Boston, 31 August 1688, CO5/905, 20-21v
39 Letter of Sir Edmond Andros, New York, 4 October 1688, CO5/905, 24v
he described Saint-Castin’s home as being “surtout en centre nerveux de guerilla abenaquise pour tout l'Acadie.”\textsuperscript{41} This influence must have been apparent to New Englanders; in the wake of Port Royal’s surrender to Phips in 1690, instructions were issued to Captain John Alden emphasizing that he was to “treat with Mr St Casteen for the Recovery of the Captives, and promise him the Return of his Daughter in exchange for them.” St. Castin’s daughter had just been taken captive, and was brought on board ship on 19 May 1690. Alden’s instructions also noted, “If there may be an honourable peace with the French and Indians, you are to promote it in your Discourse to Mr Casteen”\textsuperscript{42} The perception of Saint-Castin’s role in the escalating hostilities might be best encapsulated by historian Colin Calloway’s citation of a local name for King William’s War: “Castin’s War.”\textsuperscript{43} It is significant to note that the Massachusetts colony had appropriated the authority to make peace in this war so early – an act that was inconsistent with English policy and interests.

The Andros raid had local motivations based on the value Saint-Castin had to the French, but the consequences were understood in terms of the effect the raid had on the Wabanaki. Perhaps the most serious result was felt over the winter of 1688-89, when the destruction of provisions reduced many Wabanakis to great need. A letter forwarded by John Usher to the Board of Trade reported that Madockawando had been “undoubtedly come in hither [to Boston] with a designe to Submitte himself and mediate in behalf of the Eastern Indians” prior to the overthrow of Andros.\textsuperscript{44} In like vein, Randolph lamented

\textsuperscript{41} P.\textsc{André Sévigny, Les Abenaquis: Habitat et migrations (17e et 18e siecles) (Montreal: Les Editions Bellarmin, 1976), 141.

\textsuperscript{42} Instructions to Captain John Alden, Port Royal, May 1690, in Phips, Expedition to Port Royal, 12, in COS/855, no. 109.

\textsuperscript{43} Colin Calloway, New Worlds For All: Indians, Europeans, and the Remaking of Early America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 163.

\textsuperscript{44} Forwarded correspondence of John Usher, 10 July 1689, in COS/855, no. 16.
in 1689 to the Lords of Trade and Plantation that “the Eastern Country was well-secured, and the Enemy brought to such extremities, that they were coming in to deliver up the Chief Rebells and submit to mercy.”

Still others, including inhabitants of Maine, stated that the combination of effective garrisons and the privations of the winter of 1688-89 had “reduced [the Indians] to that want & necessity both for provision and ammunicôn that in all appearance they would in a very short time have submitted at mercy or been wholly subdued and overcome.”

While it is unlikely that Wabanaki leaders had any intention to submit in the European sense, Madockawando was in Boston under conditions of safe conduct within a week of the uprising in Boston. The Council was undertaking negotiations, apparently with a reasonable expectation of success. About a month after the uprising, they noted that Madockawando had agreed to mediate a treaty of peace between the First Nations and the English settlers.

From the First Nations perspective, the negotiations were warranted as the damage and danger to some communities was manifest and serious in the wake of the Andros raids and the difficulties of the winter, but the privations that pressured for negotiation were also a cause for retaliation. Some Wabanaki leaders saw an opportunity for that return stroke in the confusion after the Boston uprising of 1689. Another account, by Colonel Charles Lidget, cited the restrictions on trade in firearms in particular as a pressure on the First Nations in the Northeast and stated that “the Cheifs of them came to make supplication for a Peace in the month of April 1689 a few dayes before the

45 Randolph to the Board of Trade, Boston, 8 September 1689, CO5/855, no. 33
46 Petition and Address of the present and late inhabitants of the Province of Maine and County of Cornwall, 25 January 1690, CO5/905, 96-97
48 Minutes of Council of Safety, 13 May 1689, in Moody and Simmons, eds., Glorious Revolution, 75.
revolution there happened and the Indians not finding whom they expected to apply to
returned in a few dayes and continue a warr to this time". There is a hint of the brevity of
the visit in the Massachusetts Council minutes. On the 23rd of April, 1689, five days after
the uprising, the Council had arranged for a local present for Madockawando and the
other native sachem (unnamed in the minutes) who had accompanied him, and next day
sought a boat to carry them home.49 They were also given a letter for Saint-Castin,
apparently to make some reparation for Andros' raid.50 This awareness of the source of
their military distress was also reflected in Lidget's introductory description of the war: it
was, in his words, "a warr with the Indians assisted by the French."51 The explicit
identification of the First Nations as the agents of the war, and the French only as
logistical support, underscores Lidget's understanding of the military threat as local and
indigenous, not imperial or colonial in the immediate sense.

The raids of 1688 and 1689 between New England and Wabanaki groups, and in
particular the raid against Saint-Castin, are an indication of the degree of mutual sense of
menace between the groups, a response to the threat as much as to the real danger the
other might pose of hunger and privation or destruction and captivity. The petite guerre
that Andros waged against the Wabanaki in 1688 did pressure the native leaders to seek
peace – but his overthrow in April 1689 proved the undoing of those gains. Locally, this
raid was successful against New England's target: the Wabanaki, not the French.

Another raid early in the war was undertaken with objectives that were quite apart
from imperial direction: the June 27, 1689 attack against Dover, New Hampshire, that

49 Colonel Charles Lidget, "Memoir Touching Trade With the Indians", February 1693, CO5/857, no. 33;
Minutes of the Council of Safety, 23 and 24 April 1689, in Moody and Simmons, eds., Glorious
Revolution, 59-60.
50 Pulsipher, Subjects Unto the Same King, 257.
resulted the death of Major Richard Waldron. In this specific case, a unique rationale for the First Nations role in the raid is often advanced – revenge at a time of vulnerability. In 1676, Major Waldron invited natives, and in particular, Pennecooks, to a meeting in Dover. This played to the sentiments of some of the Wabanaki leaders, most notably Wananalancet, who promoted peace with the English. Waldron took a large number of his ostensible guests as captives; these were sold into slavery. This act has been described as the provocation for the raid; following this characterization, the raid is an act of revenge by Pennecooks against a man who had abused their trust in war and in trade.

The charges that Waldron was perfidious in trade with the neighbouring First Nations have proven difficult to bear out beyond Drake's description of the manner of Waldron's torture and death, but if Waldron's contentious manner in dealing with his own council and colonial authorities are a fair measure, the report of burgeoning native ill-will towards him is credible. Antagonistic trade relations might have provided a more immediate (albeit less severe) provocation than events of fifteen years past. The commercial relationship should inform an analysis of causes and motive, but straight colonial market-economic arguments about the causes for war in North America, although long entrenched in such models as the “Beaver Wars” concept of Houdenasaunee policy, have come in for some hard re-examination in recent scholarship.

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52 See, for example, Pulsipher, Subjects Unto the Same King, 256.
53 Haefeli and Sweeney, Captors and Captives, 80.
54 Haefeli and Sweeney, Captors and Captives, 82.
55 Samuel Adams Drake, The Border Wars of New England, (Williamstown, MA: Cornerhouse Publishers, 1973; c. 1897), 22. Regarding Waldron's contentions in the colony, the letters of Governor Cranfield from late 1682 through 1684 are a rich (albeit personally vested) account, and the correspondence illustrates another aspect of the disjunct between colonial and local authority in America in the years leading up to King William's War. See Cranfield's letters of 1 December 1682, in United Kingdom, National Archives, Calendar of State Papers: Colonial Series (Vaduz: Kraus Reprint, 1964), 11:342 (hereafter cited as CSPCS); 30 December 1682, CSPCS, 11:361; 10 January 1683, CSPCS, 11:368; 23 January 1683 CSPCS 11:373; 27 March 1683 CSPCS, 11:413; 16 January 1684, CSPCS 11:575-578; and 14 May 1684, CSPCS 11:633.
analysis has indicated that raiding for furs represented only a small part of overall Iroquoian military action; Gilles Havard, in his *Great Peace of Montreal of 1701*, found that the French colony placed maintaining good relations with aboriginal allies ahead of straight economic calculations.\(^5^6\) Waldron did not share this priority with his colonial neighbours - he certainly had a confrontational military history with First Nations. During his service in King Philip's War, Waldron ignored overtures for a peaceful exchange of captives from a Penobscot leader, Mattahando. Instead, "Waldron's soldiers killed the chief and twelve others and captured four, including Madockawando's sister"; he also had command of a force that attacked Wabanaki villages along the Kennebec in 1676-77.\(^5^7\) This acrimonious history shows that Wabanaki groups had their own motivation for the raid, quite apart from any direction of French Canada.

This freedom and ability of native groups to strike according to their own interests did not always enter into the understanding of New Englanders regarding the outbreak of war in the last decade of the seventeenth century. The perception of New Englanders after the raiding began was that the "French in Canada are the chief promoters of this massacre."\(^5^8\) The fall of Pemaquid in 1690 reinforced this belief in French support for the First Nations raids, as an officer among the defeated defenders reported "the Indians all well armed with new French fuzees, waistbelts and cutlasses, and most of them with bayonet and pistol."\(^5^9\) The reports on the Pemaquid raid offer another interesting observation. Despite the inflammatory descriptions usually offered of the First Nations


\(^{58}\) Nicholas Bayard to Francis Nicholson, 5 August 1689, in CSPCS, 13:116, no. 320

raids in New England reports, in this case the terms of the surrender of the fort are described as “faithfully performed”. All the men and women of the fort were allowed to walk free upon their surrender, the defenders left under arms, and a sloop was provided to carry them off.60 Pemaquid fell to Wabanaki and French forces again in 1696. Captain Wentworth Paxton (formerly commander of HMS Newport) reported the presence of two French men of war and a force of some five to six hundred native warriors and one hundred French soldiers on land, including Saint-Castin.61 Saint-Castin's presence is of some note on this raid, as he drew about half the native strength with him: two hundred Penobscots and fifty Mi'kmaqs.62 The presence of Mi'kmaq warriors seems to be exceptional in these raids and may reflect increasing Wabanaki efforts to establish alliances with their neighbours as a response to pressure from New England.63 The strong participation by native warriors can be linked to an offence by Captain Chubb, commandant of the New England garrison at Fort Pemaquid: under false pretence of being willing to parley, Chubb had killed several influential Wabanakis in February of 1696, including Edgeremet.64 Pritchard cites the success as French, and based on strong seaward support.65 However, the sheer numbers of First Nations warriors and the poor condition of the fort at Pemaquid suggest that the ships, while valuable, were not essential to the Wabanaki-French victory. Rather, the garrison feared Wabanaki reprisals for the killings of native leaders at the fort earlier in the year, and pressured their commander to

61 Letter, Boston, 15 August 1696, COS/859, 72; “Narrative of the taking of Pemmaquid by the French in August 1696”, COS/859, 98-99
62 MacDougall, Penobscot Dance of Resistance, 74.
64 J.C. Webster, Acadia at the End of the Seventeenth Century. (Saint John: The New Brunswick Museum, 1934), 16
65 Pritchard, In Search of Empire, 346.
Concomitant reports of native actions against the forts at Saco and Salem illustrate the military potential of the First Nations late in King William's War.

The taking of Fort Loyall at Falmouth in 1690 provides another illustration of the independence of local action and the complexity of the alliance the French had with their Wabanaki allies. John Thomas Hull characterized the attack as “not one of those ordinary savage attacks... it was an event of of far greater importance in its inception and results”; he contended that the destruction of Fort Loyall was part of a plan approved from Versailles by Louis XIV. This is not consistent with the fact that the French officer in command, René Robinau Portneuf, elected to attack the fort contrary to the explicit orders of Louis de Buade, Comte de Frontenac, the governor-general of New France. He carried out his attack with about ten times the number of native warriors as French men: he had but fifty men from the colony, and four to five hundred Wabanakis. Further, the French soldiers were not regular troops, but habitants, and the raiding force had left Quebec with only about a tenth of its final native strength – they drew somewhat on the fly from Wabanaki communities, counting in part on the leadership of Saint-Castin and Madockawando, who brought about one hundred warriors to the assault. Despite the small traditional military presence, Portneuf used European assault tactics with success, including moving the attacking force up to the walls of the fort via trench. Although the operation was not petite guerre in this sense, the irregular forces marshalled for the attack speak – in part – to why it still fits with the character of King William's War as distinct from the Nine Years' War. The motivations those forces had for joining the assault.

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66 Bourque, Twelve Thousand Years, 168.
67 William Stoughton to the Board of Trade, 24 September 1696, COS/859, 96v.
69 W.J. Eccles, Canada under Louis XIV, 1663-1701 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), 176.
expands on the local character of the operation.

Why would Wabanakis participate in such strong numbers against this difficult target, and allow the other raids (such as against Salmon River or Schenectady) to go without their reinforcement? Although the garrison was understrength when the force arrived, Fort Loyall had been, until only a few days prior, held by a strong company of men – about sixty not including the officers. This was an adequate number to even make a few of the out-garrisons effective. The key to the strong Wabanaki involvement may lie in the identities of the native leaders who participated in the assault. Madockawando and Saint-Castin had their recent history of provocations with New England, but several of the others were among those wrongfully seized at Saco in 1688: Hope Hood, Higon, and the Doneys. They had been imprisoned at Fort Loyall until Andros ordered them released in an attempt to defuse the hostilities that were a direct result of their incarceration. After that, Robin Doney’s wife was killed during Major Benjamin Church’s expedition of 1689. Besides reflecting on the motives of the Wabanaki, this raids also casts light on the French reliance on Wabanaki military power. The French could not or did not often marshal the modest strength required to convene and lead raids in Wobanakik and against New England strongholds, but when they did, they needed Wabanaki military collaboration to make the operations viable. Moreover, although the raid was consolidated and executed under the French – and Portneuf’s good use of siege tactics indicates that he retained effective leadership – the Wabanaki had their own reasons for lending their strength against specific targets.

Although the Fort Loyall raid shows French-Wabanaki military collaboration, it is important that the independence of the early Wabanaki raiding be acknowledged. Despite

70 Hull, Fort Loyall, 65.
71 Hull, Fort Loyall, 64.
the body of argument to the contrary, King William's War in New England was not fought by natives on strings from Quebec or Versailles. There are a variety of materials that suggest that many of the military raids launched in the region were not planned or orchestrated by the French colonial authorities; rather, the raids were a welcome surprise to the French, run quite independently by the Wabanaki. Jean Bochart de Champigny, the intendant of New France, wrote in late 1689 that “...les abenaquis ont pris en plein jour le fort de pimcuit ou il y avoit vingt pieces de canon et quatorze autre forts... et pris ou tue deux cent anglois.” He identified many of the raiders as being Wabanaki, and from the mission villages; John Gyles' narrative of being captured at Pemaquid during the same raid identifies divisions among the First Nations raiders, naming some as local and others as strangers. In any case, fall of the fort was news to Champigny; no French forces are accounted to be involved by either French or captive accounts of the raid. This absence is particularly stark given his pedantic attention to identifying those involved in military operations elsewhere. The paradigm of inter-colonial war in North America does not reconcile with this French disjuncture from the warfare in Wobanakik.

At the outbreak of King William's War, the reaction by the French to news of the hostilities in Wobanakik extended even to disbelief in the capabilities of the First Nations to mount such a sweeping and effective set of raids. This French mistrust of the reports of the Wabanaki on their military achievements apparently persisted for some time. According to a report sent by William Vaughn upon the redemption of captives in early 1691, Madockawando and other leaders had, after a raid involving some two hundred men, “sent 2 captives away to Canada to Satisfie the french with the truth of this Exploit,

72 Champigny to the Minister, 16 November 1689, AC, C11A, vol 10, 247.
73 James Hannay, ed., Nine Years a Captive, or John Gyles' Experience Among the Malecite Indians, from 1689 to 1698 (Saint John: Daily Telegraph Steam Job Press, 1875), 9. Reproduced online at http://www.canadiana.org/ECO/PageView/24033/0003

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they formerly not believing the Indians report of what Service they doe against us."74 This illustrates a specific lack of French involvement, but it also shows that both the French and the New Englanders misjudged the military potential of the Wabanaki Confederacy at a time when, according to Samuel Sewall in Boston, Wobanakik was becoming the "Seat of warr."75

The absence of the French from the early part on the war in Wobanakik suggests their weakness in the area. They depended on the First Nations there to maintain a bulwark for the colony. French military dependence on the Wabanaki in Wobanakik was evident in Champigny's 1691 instructional letter for New France, which included an assessment both of the military capacity of the French colony proper and of its reliance on allies and its outlying posts to bolster its strength. His description of the priorities of military effort ranged from reconstituting forts to palisading towns; his intelligence assessment warned of raiding parties against the French.76 Champigny's reflection on the role of the Wabanaki is interesting: he stressed the importance of continuing presents to the Wabanaki to assure their ongoing military operations, which he described as quite successful.77 This emphasis on presents — and the corresponding military alliances with First Nations that might be solicited by adhering to native diplomatic norms — was reflected in French policy even before the outbreak of European hostilities. The deteriorating situation with the Houdenasaunee led in 1688 to a war expense estimate of thirty thousand livres for the French colonies in North America to provide presents for native allies. Colonial government was not the only authority that recognized the value of

76 Champigny, "Memoire Instructif sur le Canada", 10 May 1691, AC, C11A, vol 11, 262v-263v, 265v
77 Champigny, "Memoire Instructif sur le Canada", 10 May 1691, AC, C11A, vol 11, 266.
strengthening ties with the Wabanaki by way of diplomacy. Expenses for presents were endorsed alongside renewed fortifications in the 1688 proposal of the Compagnie des Peches Sedentaires de l'Acadie, who were doubtless smarting from a New England raid against one of their facilities.78

This diplomacy had to be rigorously maintained during the war. In October of 1693 Frontenac dispatched a military officer, Claude-Sébastien de Villieu, to take a detachment of troops and rekindle the petitie guerre by the First Nations of Wobanakik against New England settlers.79 As Villieu moved through various posts in Acadie, he had to meet the demands of the First Nations both in the diplomatic form – presents, feasting, and oratory – and also in strict terms of providing war materiel before they would provide any military support. Native leaders also occasionally refused a straight exchange, taking time apart to deliberate, sometimes into the next day. Where this happened, it suggests a measure of the difficulties the French were having in maintaining effective military alliances in the area: even leaders who agreed to meet the French colonial officers and accepted their hospitality or gifts might still openly debate and refute the wisdom of acceding to the French desire for their belligerence against the English. Some circumnavigated inquiries into their diplomacy with the English – with whom several major leaders had established peace – by stating that they were only interested in commerce with New England and “qu'ils n'attendoient que l'occasion pour leurs faire la guerre”.80 The implications of the situation were not lost on the French: they were at that moment using commerce as a means to diplomatic and military agreement with native leaders. Their awareness of their own diplomatic vulnerability was reflected in the

78 Funds for war, 1688, AC, C11A, vol 9, 175v; Compagnie des Peches Sedentaires de l'Acadie, 1688, AC, C11A, vol 10, 191.
language of the report, which took pains to sever the mention of native trade with the English from any possibility of further relations between them that would be detrimental to the French. The French had used commercial exchange as a means to creating further contact with First Nations that were distancing themselves from alliance or cooperation; this was in accord with the practice of diplomacy among First Nations. For example, in August of 1690, Frontenac entertained a number of senior native leaders at Montreal. The Ottawas attended, but their address “ne roula que sur le commerce. Ils demandèrent plusiers fois qu’on leur fist bon marche des choses qu’ils vouloient traitter, on le leur promit.”81 The accompanying Hurons were less direct and apparently indulged in more diplomatic language, but still closed by urging the French to give the Ottawas the favourable trade they requested. The Ottawas received the goods they requested - and also hatchets, symbols of the French desire that they make war on the Houdenasaunee and the English.82 Frontenac received explicit instructions on the relationship with the Ottawas in 1690, along with an allowance for trade with them, as, in the estimation of the French, “l’importance de ce commerce doit engager les Sieurs de Frontenac et de Champigny a ne rien oublier pour entretenir une bonne correspondence avec ses sauvages.”83 Unfortunately, the colony's pursuit of stronger commerce led to French supplies being bartered with traditional enemies of the Ottawas and to disrupting the routine Huron and Ottawa trade networks, an awkward situation at best.84

By the mid-1690s the level of active diplomacy and independent warfare of the First Nations began to make an impression on some of the English settlers; they had begun to conceive of their struggles in completely local terms, and defined by First

82 “Relation par Charles de Monseignat”, November 1690, AC, C11A, vol 11, 27v
83 The King to Frontenac and Champigny, 1690, AC, C11A, vol 11, 144v.
84 Eccles, Canada Under Louis XIV, 189.
Nations activity. One example of this is the Massachusetts Colony's address to the Crown of October 31, 1694, in which the military situation of the colony was defined in terms of "fresh Eruptions and desolations made by the Eastern Indians... being animated and supplied by our ill Neighbours, the French." This was not a description of an imperial or colonial enemy fighting at the behest of a Crown in Europe – it was a statement of both the manner and the context of King William's War as local.

Like their neighbours in New England, the worst toll of the renewed aboriginal petite guerre the French suffered at the time of King William's War was the collapse of tentative, but positive, relations with their First Nations adversaries. The gradual acceptance of some French missionaries and pressures of simple need as well as competitive trade had driven the Houendaunee to begin tendering for collaboration with the French, but reformation of English trade (in part by Andros while he governed New York) and the aggressive response by La Barre and his followers had almost completely eroded the process. Word of the Anglo-French conflict cemented Houendaunee opinion and turned their policies against the French. That conflict in North America was touched off, not by the Nine Years' War in Europe, but by the many local provocations. The Nine Years' War facilitated the shift in attitude on the part of the Houendaunee, but the prime factors in their declining relationship with the French were of North American, not European, origin.

One important marker in the decline of French-Houendaunee relations was La Barre's embarrassment at the hands of the Houendaunee during his disastrous

85 The Humble Address of the Council and Assembly of your Majesties' Province of the Massachusetts Bay in New England, 31 October 1694, CO5/858, no. 41.
87 Steele, Warpaths, 140.
expedition of 1684 must be noted, along with the Houdenasaunee raid on Lachine of August, 1689, which was executed when French forces were short of supplies, short of pay and still understrength in the wake of a brutal epidemic of smallpox. That raid created a situation in which the “Upper Indian Allies” of the French, according to Charles de Monseignat, then Frontenac’s first secretary, “n’avoient plus reconnu en nous les mesme francois entre qu’il ce voir protecteur, et qu’ils Croyient pouvoir les deffendre contre tout la terre, il ne leur avoir paru qu’un a ssoupissourons universelle de Nostre pars”. This led to First Nations formerly allied to the French reaching a peace with the Houdenasaunee and bypassing the French entirely.

The mode of fighting in King William’s War focused on damage to and awareness of the general population of the enemy. Hunger, sickness, and shortages were weapons in the practice of this petite guerre. The mode of fighting, as well as specific raids, including the Andros raids in Wobanakik, the Dover raid against Waldron, and the strikes against the forts at Pemaquid and Falmouth all operated to create pressures on the parties to the war. War discontent – even war hysteria - was a reality for the combatants, and that led to movements for peace or neutrality. Some aspects of the local negotiations for peace will be examined in their place as evidence of internal divisions, but one important peace should be remarked upon here: the Treaty of Ryswick.

The situation after peace agreements were concluded constitutes the third factor illustrating the independent local conduct of hostilities. King William’s War as fought between the English and the French, nominally ended in when instructions regarding the peace negotiated at Ryswick reached the colonies in November of 1697. A full year

88 Eccles. Canada under Louis XIV. 155-163.
90 Usher to the Board of Trade, 12 May 1698, CO5/908, 8-9.
later, in November of 1698, the Massachusetts colony was still trying to negotiate a prisoner exchange with the Kennebecks, along with a treaty of submission to the English Crown.91 Despite the ostensible peace there had been raiding over the summer, including the seizure of new settler captives “at the Eastward”.92 The prisoner exchange diplomacy – again, generally apart from European authority – proceeded over time; in terms of authority, the various colonial governors occasionally communicated with each other about the exchanges, but this did not alter the basic need to negotiate with First Nations for release.93 Indeed, at least one effort by Richard Coote, Lord Bellomont and the new governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, to interpose himself in the prisoner exchange apparently met with a clear statement from the Houdenasaunee that they would handle it themselves: “nous en sommes les maitres et nous voulons leur mener nous mesmes quand il nous plaira.”94 Another major point of the negotiations, submission by First Nations to a European Crown, was not forthcoming, as is plain from the Jesuit Jacques Bigot’s account of a prisoner exchange in 1699. Bigot states that the English asked the Wabanaki to send away their French missionaries in exchange for English. This demand appears to have piqued the Wabanakis there present:

“La proposition des Anglois les a tellement irrités, qu'ils ont répondu que l'Anglois eut à sortir de leurs pays, qu'ils ne souffririoient jamais, qu'ils s'y établisse... Les Anglois en on mal use d'ailleurs, et retenant depuis trois ans, malgré leur parole donné plusieurs fois, deux Abnaquis, par lesquels ils ont retiré des mains de ces sauvages plus de trente Anglois, promettant toujours de rendre ceux qu'on leur avoit demandé, et cependant n'en avoit encore fait rien.”95

There were still clearly strong conflicts and mistrust between the neighbours, and this was

91 New England Minutes of Council, 15 June 1698, CO5/786, 121.
92 Usher to the Board of Trade, 12 May 1698, CO5/908, 8-9.
93 General Correspondence, 20 October 1698, AC, C11A, vol 15, 36v
94 General Correspondence, 20 October 1698, AC, C11A, vol 15, 36v
reinforced by Bigot’s admission that the Wabanaki were still capturing and killing English people. Callière responded with instructions for Bigot, although it is questionable how much direction the Wabanaki might have taken at this point, having both continued their own raiding after the peace and clearly having been willing to start a peace process without reference to or direction from Quebec, let alone Versailles. Callière told Bigot that he saw no impediments to the peace negotiations between the Wabanaki and the English settlers, as the French were no longer at war themselves, but he did want an opportunity to discuss the situation with Wabanaki leaders.\(^{96}\) In short, the colonial French were on the outside of the process. Bellomont stated in his opening address to the council that he “should be glad you would think of ways to ingage the Neighbour Indians in a Trade with you... that their Friendship and fidelity may be secured to the Crown, and then they will be no longer Thornes in your sides.”\(^{97}\) It seems the thorns were not pulled by the Treaty of Ryswick’s trivializing \textit{status quo ante bellum} treatment of North American colonial disputes. The status quo in North America prior to the European war was First Nations raiding and war, so perhaps the terms of the Treaty did take literal effect, albeit not with the intended result.

An entirely separate process of negotiation was required to end the local war, as it was not adequately addressed by the terms of Ryswick. Massachusetts despatched Major James Converse and Captain John Alden, officers of some experience on the frontier in both military and diplomatic capacities, to treat for the return of English captives in the “Eastern parts.”\(^{98}\) Converse seems to have been a sound choice, as he was requested a year later by First Nations representatives who came to Massachusetts to request that

\(^{96}\) Callière to the Minister, 2 May 1699, AC, C11A, vol 17, 26-26v.
\(^{97}\) New England Minutes of Council, 2 June 1699, CO5/786, 145.
\(^{98}\) New England Minutes of Council, 22 September 1698, CO5/787, 90.
“things might be settled, and that they might enjoy a free trade as formerly.”99 By December of the same year – although the mandate to recover captives persisted, indicating more work was needed in that area of negotiation – Converse was sent out again, this time in the company of Colonel John Phillips, to the “Eastern Indians” for the purpose of “bringing the Indians to a new Submission and recognition of their obedience to the Crown of England &c.”100 Difficulties in negotiations and sporadic raids kept hostilities on the boil between Wabanaki leaders and the English settlers well after the Treaty of Ryswick had been signed in 1697. During 1697, far from entering a denouement, the New Englanders' perception was that their war was coming again to a head, with the Massachusetts Council issuing orders to bolster the readiness of the militia and to prepare the garrisons and fortifications for defence.101 The Massachusetts Council also was taking care of its relations with First Nations. When the colony received a letter by way of Governor Benjamin Fletcher in New York from “Schackhooke Indians” complaining that two were put to death for a murder in the county of Hampshire and that two more were being held, the council urged a complete sharing of information with the First Nations “to the end that the Sachems may receive satisfaction that the Indians suffered justly, being clearly convicted of committing that murder.”102 The attitude taken by the council with regard to relations with First Nations is an interesting indicator of the colony's perspective on its vulnerability in the wake of King William's War.

The colony's precautionary measures to improve defence were well-taken. In September of 1697, a minor French amphibious raid was repelled by local natives at Cape

99 New England Minutes of Council, September 1699, COS/787, 123.
100 New England Minutes of Council, 13 December 1698, COS/787, 94.
At the same time, a ranging patrol of several companies, including some forces from Connecticut, engaged with 200 French and Indians to Eastward. The engagement came in the wake of a successful native raid against Lancaster in mid-September. Twenty people were killed or made captive, "principally occasioned through the security and invigilance of the Inhabitants neglecting to keep up their watches and scouts and going abroad unarmed." An expedition was mounted to pursue the French and Indian raiders, and did engage the forces near Pemaquid. The First Nations and French contingent retreated effectively, skirmishing until they could take to canoes.

The pressure was not off New England after that raid was beaten back. The winter of 1697-98 saw a few more raids, including attacks on Andover and Haverhill that provoked an unsuccessful pursuit by one hundred militia. The sporadic raiding continued into the summer of 1698; two experienced frontier officers from Massachusetts were given money "for the Supply of Jo English (an Indian) and his Family with Cloathing as recompense for his good service in giving Intelligence of the Enemies motion." English had been wounded and taken prisoner while serving with the colonial forces "against the Indian enemy and Rebels"; he was brought from Canada in the company of native warriors with "some French joyned", but escaped and gave information on the targets for this party. A small detachment was bound for Deerfield while the remainder were poised to raid along the Merrimack. The frontier war still rolled on, European conflict or peace aside, although it was slowing.

The French colonies also still had a major military problem that was not solved by

104 New England Minutes of Council, 14 September 1697 CO5/787, 62-62v
106 New England Minutes of Council, 14 June 1698, CO5/786, 120.
107 New England Minutes of Council, 13 June 1698, CO5/787, 81v.
the European treaty. The hostilities between New France and the Five Nations were an immediate and persistent threat to the colony, and their fighting started before and continued after the Treaty of Ryswick. In 1698, Frontenac regaled visiting native allies from the West with assurances of their commitment to war, saying in part that he had not buried the hatchet with the Houdenasaunee, “au contraire je suis resolu de les fraper plus fortement que jamais.” He went on to promise that “je ne fera jamais de paix avec eux, que l'ou mes enfans ny soient generalement compris.” This was a constant worry to First Nations allied to the French colonies – that they would be excluded from a peace, particularly a peace with the Five Nations, and so left vulnerable – mirroring the complaint of New Hampshire versus Massachusetts, that one region’s peace only left other areas more susceptible to attack. New France, whatever the terms of Ryswick, was not at peace in 1698.

In July of 1699, just as the spirited Frontenac had declared to his First Nations allies, the war was still on in North America. Two years after the treaty that had apparently ended hostilities for the colonial dimension of King William’s War, the Kings of England and France sent letters enjoining a “cessation of all Acts of hostility on either side, and a disarming of the Indians.” The lack of a clear resolution of the conflicts in North America caused the New Englanders to tread lightly around their native neighbours; even “words dropt by some of [the natives] occasioning a fear and jealousie that they were meditating of Mischief” provoked an impressive reaction, as happened in February of 1700. A rumour of a potential alliance between native groups to fall on New England had come to the attention of the colonial governments. The Massachusetts Council requested Major John Tyng to invite Wattanuman, then a sachem of the

108 General Correspondence, 20 October 1698, AC, C11A, vol 15, 29v.
109 New England Minutes of Council, 3 July 1699, COS/787, 112.
Pennecooks, to come to Boston to speak with the Governor. The opinion of another officer who knew the frontier well was also advanced as an authority: Major Benjamin Church had sent a letter to the Governor on the 20th of February, affirming that the native people in his area (Bristol) “protested their ignorance of any consult or design of the Eastern Indians or any others against the English”. The Council also resolved early in March “that the Province Gally be imployed on a Trading voyage with the Eastern Indians, and for the suppressing of unlawful traders, and that there be borne in pay upon her only sixteen men, including the Captain and all other Officers.” The limitation on crew for the vessel is intriguing; in the context of the manifold efforts of the council to conciliate and redeem relations with the First Nations, it seems likely that this was a further effort to make the voyage as unimposing as possible. When Alden and Converse were sent out by the council for negotiations with First Nations in Wobanakik, the council recommended that “a suitable vessel be taken up” - likely enlisting the service of one of the warships in the area – in order to make an impression of force to support their discussions. When confronted with even the rumour of a serious resurgence of First Nations military action, humility seems to have been rather more the method. By the spring of 1699, Isaac Addington, judge and secretary of the Massachusetts Council, confirmed that there was a peace with the First Nations in Wobanakik and the captive exchanges were making progress.

The fascinating aspect of the elaborate and sophisticated response of the Massachusetts council to even this whispered threat is that it reflects on their conception of the recent war. When juxtaposed to their response to French bluster (and some

111 New England Minutes of Council, 1 March 1700, CO5/787, 139.
112 New England Minutes of Council, 1 March 1700, CO5/787, 139.
113 Isaac Addington to Mr Popple, Boston, 7 February 1699, CO5/908, 135-136.
When the French made official threats and acted on them, the council passed an order “strictly forbidding all and every of his Majesty's Subjects within this his Majesty's Province by any wayes or means whatsoever, directly or indirectly to treat, agree, accept, receive or take any permission or License from the French in Acadie or Nova Scotia or from any Officers or Ministers of the French King...” They also passed the letters and claims of the French on to the Board of Trade, leaving it to the European authorities to deal with each other.

This was a brash response – but the New Englanders could get away with it versus the French. The colonists' conception of where the local military potential lay was not with the French – their traditions of warfare revolved around the fear of Indians. The prospect of a First Nations combination had the council trying every route it could - notably, in modes consistent with First Nations diplomacy – to mend fences. That fence-mending was literal, as well: the Council immediately began to see to defenses: it ordered that fortifications be repaired and watches kept at settlements, and began laying in supplies and planning laws for gathering an army again. Consider John Usher's statement of 1696: “One Major Church with four hundred men went from Boston instead of lookeing after the Enemy went to a place near Menis inhabited by the French, who had submitted and sworn allegiance to King William.” So – who was the enemy? Not the local French, although the argument that they posed no threat because they had sworn allegiance was either conscious sophistry or unimaginable naivete (and considering Usher's politics, the former is more believable). Neither could Usher, a man of some

115 New England Minutes of Council, 22 December 1698, CO5/787, 94v.
116 Hinderaker and Mancall, At the Edge of Empire, 59-62.
118 Usher to the Board of Trade, Boston, 23 October 1696, CO5/859, 124.
experience in the colonies, have expected a ranging patrol to operate against the French at Canada. The target Usher was inferring that he named "the Enemy" was local: the First Nations of Wobanakik. That was New England's war: landward, and Eastward.

That Eastward focus took Andros to Pentagoet in 1688, in response to a border conflict that was erratic but escalating with the English settlers' incursions within Wobanakik. Both the raid and its provocations precede declared hostilities in Europe. The Wabanaki assault on Dover had causes dating back fifteen years, and even as harsh critic of native warfare as the historian Samuel Drake allowed that the raid showed a discriminating, targeted violence.\(^{119}\) The collaborations of the French and the Wabanaki against English strongholds in Wobanakik begin to show the accommodation between the allies, and the French dependence on their First Nations allies to exert force. Each of these raids mattered but little in an imperial construction of King William's War, but in the context of a serious local contest for power in Wobanakik, each had identifiable merit. The relative vulnerability of the parties to the war revealed by these raids, however, suggests the next major factor in exploring the local nature of King William's War: imperial neglect.

\(^{119}\) Drake, *Border Wars*, 23.
Chapter III:

Imperial Neglect

Historian James Pritchard described the attitude of the French minister in charge of colonies towards the fighting of King William's War as follows: "Seignelay himself viewed hostilities in the Americas as local in origin and best left to colonial leaders to deal with as they saw fit."\(^1\) Another scholar, J.M. Sosin, offered an argument that the growth in provincial autonomy within the British Empire "resulted as much, perhaps more, from inconstancy, neglect, and parsimony in British administration as from colonial maturity", and he placed the development of this autonomy as beginning during King William's War.\(^2\) On both sides, English and French, the conflict in Wobanakik—and, for that matter, on North American soil—was almost entirely neglected during the period of the Nine Years' War. That neglect is made apparent by examining three aspects of colonial and imperial activity in King William's War: strategy, deployment of forces and the commitment of funds. Finally, the effect of neglect in these three areas can be demonstrated with reference to two specific military operations during King William's War: Phips' expeditions to Port Royal and to Quebec.

French strategy and military planning at the time neglected Wobanakik and the conflict of their allies, the Wabanaki, with the English settlers. As Armstrong Starkey has pointed out, the alliances that the French had forged with First Nations were their "most

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\(^1\) James Pritchard, In Search of Empire: The French In the Americas, 1670-1730 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 114.

important military asset” in colonial North America. However, New France’s leaders conceived that the fulcrum of colonial authority in North America lay in the area of the Great Lakes, and influence in that area was shaped by relations with the Houdenasaunee. Therefore they directed the majority of their energies into that theatre, and presumed upon Wabanaki strength to support their presence in Acadie.

Callière anticipated a layered threat to French colonial interests arising from the persistent English ties to the Houdenasaunee. In the his letters Callière made explicit that the his intention in advocating renewed expeditions against the Houdenasaunee was not to make war on the them directly, but rather to eliminate the cause of their differences and to re-establish good relations between the French and Houdenasaunee. This distinction might have been too nice to survive the rigours of military confrontation, and the underlying logic – that the threat of the Houdenasaunee would be removed if only their ties to the British were severed – passes by the possibility that the Houdenasaunee might have their own reasons to wage war. Denonville had led an expedition of more than two thousand men, including Callière, against the Senecas in 1687. Although the force did not come to a decisive engagement with the Senecas, Denonville succeeded in doing a great deal of damage to their villages and provisions. With this only a few years past, it seems likely that there was a more profound problem in French-Houdenasaunee relations than Callière’s proposal acknowledged, and the experience of that raid did lead Callière and Denonville to propose the destruction of New York as the English colony was an easier target than the Houdenasaunee. The nature of that problem – the aggressive Houdenasaunee policy towards the French and their allies through the eighteenth century

3 Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 86.
4 Callière to the Minister, January 1689, AC, C11A, vol 10, 260-260v.
5 Callière to the Minister, January 1689, AC, C11A, vol 10, 21v

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is the subject of José António Brandão's *Your Fyre Shall Burn No More*, in which Brandão argues for an understanding of Houdenasaunee action as indigenously shaped, albeit "essentially hostile" to New France.6

Callière's military proposals also reflected on his concept of the war in the simple geographic circumscription of his stated strategic goals. Wobanakik did not enter his calculations of war. The neglect was odd considering the strong and recent record of Wabanaki and other Northeastern First Nations in turning back Houdenasaunee attacks by force of arms, and their inclusion in the 1687 raid against the Houdenasaunee by Denonville.7 The English settlers did not make a corresponding error – they sought direct Houdenasaunee aid in Maine against the Wabanaki at the outbreak of King William's War.8 That request for assistance is a further illustration of the fundamentally local character of the conflict: the colonists turned to local and indigenous military power to provide assistance in their fighting.

In 1687, Denonville recorded an outline of the war against the Houdenasaunee. In it, he wrote that there was nothing as dangerous to the colony "que la Guerre, et que la durée est capable de la ruiner."9 He went on to voice an argument that has been transmitted in the historiography and mirrors a common narration of First Nations war-making: "Monsieur Dongan soutient l'ennemy, et luy envoie des armes et des munitions, reunis les cinq nations, et les anime a nous faire la guerre."10 The depiction of the Five Nations as surrogates, as subordinates, has not held up well over time. They

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6 José António Brandão, *Your fyre shall burn no more* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 130
8 Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 164.
were politically sophisticated, strong in arms, and often reflected an awareness of their own position at the fulcrum of the colonial struggle in the New World. This significance translates into Denonville's writing: his tight focus on the Houdenasaunee is to be expected, given the subject of the memoir, but the language and style emphasizes that the conflict with the Houdenasaunee was prime in Denonville's mind. The Wabanaki were mentioned only in the context of their readiness for combat with the Five Nations and the utility of maintaining missions in Wobanakik for securing continuing allegiance.11

The French strategic orientation at the outbreak of King William's War centred on their conflict with the Houdenasaunee, but even that combat was placed outside the scope of the Nine Years' War and the contest between the European powers, as was evinced by the belts presented to messengers by Ourehouare. Ourehouare was an interesting choice as an ambassador: he was a captured Houdenasaunee war chief who had been sent to work as a galley-slave in France after a treacherous abduction by the French.12 Nevertheless, he issued a message (accompanied by a belt of wampum) to the Five Nations which stated in part that "que cette guerre ne les regarde point".13 Since this message was being despatched in the company of a French officer the intention of severing the local and immediate conflict from the European theatre has not only the imprint of Ourehouare but the implicit authority of the colony as well. Frontenac's careful cultivation of a relationship with Ourehouare during the voyage to Canada must have included hope for this kind of diplomatic result.14 The value of this declaration as a device for gaining advantage over the English is transparent, but the explicit statement

12 Dictionary of Canadian Biography, s.v. "Ourehouare". Available at http://www.biographi.ca
remains to be considered. As a mechanism for eliciting greater security for the French – and therefore as a part of their war effort – the message borrows credibility from the evidence cited by Ourëhouare: that the French at Schenectady did not harm the Houdenasaunee warriors that were there, not even to the extent of taking prisoners. The construction of the message as a denial of Houdenasaunee interest in the war remains ambiguous; nevertheless, the diplomatic effort is indicative of the French sense of danger from the Houdenasaunee. It also passes by the abstraction of the war with the English. Neglect pushed the colonial French to adopt modes of diplomacy and interaction consistent with First Nations in order to meet their strategic needs.

This strategic direction inland at the start of the war was maintained by early and shocking military pressure from the Houdenasaunee, such as the large raid against La Chine. Although factions of French support had gained great strength among the Houdenasaunee earlier in the seventeenth century, by the time of La Barre and Denonville's raids, neutrality and affiliation with New England were ascendant.\textsuperscript{15} The Houdenasaunee did not participate in strength in the land arm of the 1690 assault on Quebec – there had been substantial sickness among the Western nations. The steady toll of disease and war halved their military strength from the 1670s to the 1690s, and the relationship with Governor Fletcher of New York proved tumultuous and acrimonious.\textsuperscript{16} Although the potential – and the will - of the Houdenasaunee to raid and fight dwindled during King William's War, they had drawn the strategic focus of the French early in the war, and so the large expeditions that the French did mount were sent against them, rather than in support of the war in Wobanakik.

\textsuperscript{16} Richter, \textit{Ordeal}, 175.
French neglect of the conflict in Wobanakik was exacerbated by the confused situation in New England. The return of Sir William Phips from England in 1692 was construed as an indication — supported by naval vessels and troops from the Crown — that New Englanders were rallying for another attempt against Quebec. A number of internal factors, such as the weakness of Montreal’s fortifications and the understrength French military units, seemed to support this analysis. The French were not wrong about Phips’ expressed intentions: he positively badgered the Board of Trade to support a new push against Quebec after his appointment as governor. However, the experience of the 1690 attempt had soured the colony on that mode of warfare. In 1693, when an expedition against Placentia in Newfoundland was put forward by the Crown as a possibility, the council of the Massachusetts colony declined to participate, citing “the sore contagion and mortal sickness wherewith the ships had been lately infected.”

The lack of strategic focus on Wobanakik may be linked in part to the long-running ambiguity over the borders between the French and English “possessions”. The correspondence exchanged over borders, boundaries and interpretation is extensive, but the French King’s comment on the situation in 1689 places this issue well:

“...il fut fait réponse que les Anglois ne prétendoient rien sur le fort de Pentagouet ny sur le bord septentrional de la riviere... Mais les choses ont depuis bien changé, et les mauvaises dispositions de la part des Anglois augmenteront encore à présent qu'ils sont sur le point de declarer la guerre à la France.”

At the time the local conflict broke out, Wobanakik was the subject of negotiations between the crowns, but those European negotiations were not moderating the situation of local conflict. There is little indication that either colonial authority or the First Nations affected were aware of the potential for changes in the imperial or colonial view of the

17 “Memoire sur Canada”, AC, C11A, vol 12, 133.
19 The King to Denonville and Champigny, Versailles, 1 May 1689, in Blanchet, Manuscrits, 448.
land of the Northeast. The letter is also of note as it cautions on the possible outbreak of fighting about a year after the area it references has already gone to war.

Contention over borders was not limited to the margins of empires. Christopher Almy, in May of 1694, submitted a petition to the Crown requesting that the borders between Rhode Island and Massachusetts be clarified “so that their Majesties' subjects may live at peace one with the other”.\(^\text{20}\) Although that border did not feature directly in the conduct of the war, the distraction and the conflicted nature of authority in the area is important to note, particularly as the situation was paralleled on Massachusetts' border with New Hampshire. Phips sought to consolidate the border along the Piscataqua River – where New Hampshire had their only serviceable fort and also good facilities for shipping – and John Usher, as Lieutenant-Governor of New Hampshire, opposed this border definition.\(^\text{21}\) Ambiguity of possession also meant that the responsibility for defence was unclear among the colonies.

Absent an imperial strategic grasp on the area, either in planning or definition, the colonies had to count on their own strength to satisfy most of the needs of the war. That imperial neglect has a foil in the profound concern local leaders voiced regarding the ongoing hostilities. Even their conception of the hostilities, though, reflected a local rather than European strategic view. For example, French separation of Houdenasaunee agency from English imperial direction is reflected in a letter of 1688 from Quebec; the author records that “le Roy D'angleterre a donné ordre au Colonel Dungan Gouverneur D'orange de negocier la paix entre nous et les Iroquois” and that such an agreement would prevent Dongan from continuing to arm the Houdenasaunee.\(^\text{22}\) This demotion of a First

\(^{20}\) Petition of Christopher Almy, Rhode Island, 15 May 1694, CO5/858, no. 29.
\(^{21}\) Usher to the Board of Trade, Boston, 14 July 1693, CO5/924, no. 27.
\(^{22}\) Anonymous Memoire, 30 October 1688, AC, C11A, vol 10, 86v.
Nation to a proxy for warfare – rather than an equal or an ally – was consistent with the arguments Denonville offered concerning Houdenasaunee aggression against the French. He repeated in several places his belief that Dongan manipulated and sustained the hostilities and contrasted this with his military straits: many French forts and garrisons were either neglected or abandoned, diminishing the possibility of an effective French military presence based on defence. What is more, prior to an official declaration of hostilities in Europe, Denonville was forbidden to launch expeditions against the English.\textsuperscript{23} The direction not to raid further impaired the ability of the French to operate within the context of a local fight.

The conceit that First Nations were operating as proxy warriors for a colonial adversary has survived in the historiography, with King William's War described it as a theatre of the Nine Years' War that had devolved into a fight waged "clandestinely by means of surrogate Indian allies".\textsuperscript{24} This depiction persists in the historiography despite being at odds with a growing collection of evidence. For Denonville, though, this was in line with his first concrete strategic appraisal of the situation of the French colony. As the historian W.J. Eccles argued, Denonville understood “that the English of New York were a greater, if less immediate, threat to Canada than were the Iroquois.”\textsuperscript{25} Another valuable reflection of an understanding in France of the relationship between the Houdenasaunee and English settlers may be found in Frontenac's instructions of June, 1689, which state in part that:

\begin{quote}
"les Anglois qui habitent cette contrée se sont avisez... de soulever les nations Iroquoises, sujets de Sa Majesté, pour les obliger à faire la guerre aux Francois,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{23} Denonville, "Memoire De l'Estat Present Des Affaires de Canada", 27 October 1687, AC, C11A vol 9, 122v-123v.
\textsuperscript{24} See for example the chapter, "Wars in the East", in Francis Jennings, "The Founders of America" (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), 208 ff.
\textsuperscript{25} W.J. Eccles, \textit{Frontenac, the courtier governor} (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1959), 176.
qu'ils leur ont fourni pour cet effet des armes et des munitions, et cherché par tous moyens, même au préjudice des ordres du Roy d'Angleterre et de la foi des traités, à usurper le commerce des Francs dans les pays dont ils sont en possession de tout temps.”

In this case, the blame for inciting the Houdenasaunee, and the consequent hostilities, was largely placed with local English settlers, and not framed by French colonial authorities as an effort spearheaded by the English crown: even the accusation of proxy warfare was placed in a context that is outside European contests. The observation that the local English colonial leadership would carry on the conflict even to the extent of disobeying orders of the English crown, although not inconsistent with the experience of the two colonies, further reinforced this separation of the concept of surrogate hostilities from metropolitan influence. The roles of those colonial centres in North American hostility was distant and ambiguous: consider Denonville's instructions of 1688, in which he was advised that a treaty process “pour terminer les différents et contestations qui sont entre les francois et les anglois en amerique” would begin early the following year. Both fronts of King William's War were at least in sporadic fighting when this missive was sent.

Nevertheless, both colonies voiced expectations of peace with their neighbours, informed by the fact that the colonial powers had signed a Treaty of Neutrality in 1686. It seems the treaty was mainly valued in North America as a means to quantify the offences of the opposing colony. Dongan's exchanges with French messengers feature tit-for-tat allegations of ambushing officers, illegal trade with or arming First Nations, all contrary to the Treaty, or sonorous pronouncements such as “the French do not allow the Seneca's

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26 Instruction a Monsieur de Frontenac sur l’entreprise contre les Anglois, 7 June 1689, in Jean Blanchet, ed., Collection de Documents Relatifs à l'Histoire de la Nouvelle France (Quebec: A. Cote et Co., 1883), 455.
27 Instructions to Denonville, 8 March 1688, AC, C11A, vol 10, 38.
Country to belong to the English."\textsuperscript{28} For all that the 1686 treaty was flouted, it was not without its proponents: the French colonies in the Windward Islands became so isolated and bereft of aid during the Nine Years' War (contemporaneous to King William's War) that their governor proposed reactivating the treaty.\textsuperscript{29}

The strategic direction of the colonies, as well as their concept of relationships among their First Nations and European neighbours, took away from their collaboration with their allies. The simple lack of recognition of indigenous grievances and the reliance on a model of surrogate warfare compromised the ability of the colonies to engage in effective diplomacy with the First Nations and continues to plague the historiography. King William's War was neglected in terms of direction and strategy by the European empires. That situation was made worse by two other species of neglect: a lack of military forces committed to the fight, and a lack of funds for the war effort in North America.

Forces were a challenge for both European colonies during King William's War. Frontenac remarks in a letter of 1694 that "sa Majeste n'a pas voulu nous envoyer des troupes cette annee ny augmenter nos fonds."\textsuperscript{30} It is significant to note that the war with the Houdenasaunee – not the war in Wobanakik – featured as Frontenac's first priority in addressing the military situation of the colony, although of the English, he noted "leur dessin estoit de venir nous rendre un Seconde Visite a Quebec". As it happens, except for a serious skirmish south of Montreal in 1691, New Englanders did not carry the war into New France again after Phips departed from Quebec in 1690.\textsuperscript{31} However, Frontenac did

\begin{footnotes}
\item[28] Abstract of transactions between Col. Dongan and the French Messengers from the Governor of Canada, 1688, CO5/905, 15-16v.
\item[29] Pritchard, \textit{In Search of Empire}, 311.
\item[31] Pritchard, \textit{In Search of Empire}, 337.
\end{footnotes}
touch on the English threat in the context of the colony's funds, which had been insufficient to meet the obligations of improving the built defenses of Quebec. The state of the fortifications and their inadequacy in the event of an attack was a recurrent theme in Frontenac's letter of 1694, along with requests for reinforcement.\(^{32}\) One of the principal military successes Frontenac noted in the same letter was raiding by First Nations allies, including Wabanakis, which had resulted in almost two hundred captives from the enemy. The next year, Frontenac renewed his appeal for increases to his forces:

"Si les affaires de Sa Majesté ne luy on pas permis cette année de nous envoyer des recrues, je ne savois m'empêcher de vous conjurer de vouloir bien faire tous vos efforts pour nous en procurer l'année prochaine. Nos troupes diminuait tous les jours..."\(^{33}\)

Requests for soldiers or for funds to support for the costs of the war were not always met well in France. One of the most compelling documents dealing with the military situation of the colonies during King William's War is Champigny's long defence of expenses offered in November of 1693 to the minister of the marine, Louis Phélippeaux, Comte de Pontchartrain. The letter reveals something of a gap between the strategic necessities and operational needs of the French presence in North America, and the understanding in Europe of the situation. For example, with regard to requests for more soldiers, Champigny noted that there had been an excessive number of cadets under sixteen among the troops received by the colony from France, and he requested an explicit order to limit this in future, although without citing any specific reasons.\(^{34}\) The regular soldiers, he stated, "sont employée a travailler et a procurer des profits aux officiers, dont la plus grande partie ne sont presque jamais à leur compagnie et ne font

\(^{33}\) Frontenac to the Minister, 4 November 1695, AC, C11A, vol 13, 284v.
\(^{34}\) Champigny to the minister, Quebec, 4 November 1693, AC, C11A, vol 12, 275.
aucun service”. When the soldiers did perform military tasks, they were generally garrison duties – without experience, regular soldiers were not able to perform their duties in the rigorous conditions of frontier campaigning. This lack was apparent during a New England raid against the fort at Menagoche (on the river Saint John, across from La Tour's former location). A French officer, Robert Chevalier, then commanding a small detachment in the defence, “à fort bien fait son devoir à la descente des anglois à Mennagoesche mais qu'ils este mal seconde par les 26 hommes qui estoient avec luy dont la pluspart estoient des soldats nouveaux venus qui sont tres mauvais.”

Equipping what forces were present was a problem for the French: Meneval noted in his mémoire of 1688 that the thirty soldiers he received as reinforcements for Acadie had been equipped with but fifteen weapons and no bandoliers. In part because of these circumstances, the French colonies often used habitants and native allies on military operations. These irregular, local forces were prepared to operate effectively in campaigns in North America.

Using the habitants meant another set of challenges. The equipment issue remained, as these forces required a new issue of “toutes les choses necessaire pour des longs voiages ou on ne peut rien trouver que ce que l'on porte”, ranging from moccasins and canoes to munitions and food. More, their professionalism under arms – if not proficiency – was suspect. In the instance of the 1696 operation launched by Frontenac against the Houdenasaunee, the force was more than two thousand strong, including five hundred First Nations allies. However, the large contingent of settlers were eager to

35 Champigny to the minister, Quebec, 4 November 1693, AC, C11A, vol 12, 271v.
36 Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare*, 90.
38 Memoire de Meneval, 10 September 1688, C11D, vol 2, 98v.
39 Champigny to the minister, Quebec, 4 November 1693, AC, C11A, vol 12, 269.
return to their harvest – and so, the raiding cut short at destruction of two villages and the capture of a pair of elderly Houdenasaunee Christians, one of whom the French soldiers insisted on burning to death.⁴⁰ Although the damage in terms of destruction of provisions may have been considerable, failing to engage the enemy in force was a significant military disappointment for this expedition.

Frontenac had sought almost to double the military establishment in Canada, looking for an additional thousand men under arms to augment the thirteen hundred on the rolls for the year 1691. The colony's military units were already badly understrength, a situation exacerbated by sickness and want. This created a situation of forced inaction. Since reinforcements were not available, the war effort was out of the hands of the French forces for the time being, and they had to hope for the value of their investments in diplomacy. As Champigny stated in 1691,

"Comme on n'es pas en estat d'aller à force ouverte chez les iroquois... il est seulemens à propos de faire des presens à tous nos sauvages alliez, otuuaas, illinois et autres nations d'en haut pour les engager à tomber continuellement sur eux faire la mesme chose à l'égard des abenaquis, canibas et autres sauvages de l'acadie pour continuer harceler les anglois aux environs de baston comme ils on fait par le passé, toujours avec succes et avantage..."⁴¹

The French colonies lacked sufficient military force in their own right for effective defence. They had to rely on manoeuvring alliances to maintain their security – and thanks to their failures in dealing with the Five Nations, they were not dealing from a position of strength. Such neglect was not necessarily the rule for French colonies in the Americas. The French anticipated war with Spain after 1688 and so, prior to the declaration of European War, Seignelay directed both defensive and offensive operations

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⁴¹ Champigny, "Memoire Instructif sur le Canada", 10 May 1691, AC, C11A, vol 11, 266.
to begin in the West Indies. The interesting contrast here is that the military contest was undertaken at imperial behest and with imperial assets.42 This fact places the small aid for the North American struggle into better context.

During King William's War, New Englanders were generally without assistance from England. A note from Whitehall received by in Boston in July of 1696 warning of a French amphibious attempt "against some parts of America" closed with the cold comfort of a promise that "such speedy assistance will be sent as the state of affairs at home shall permit, with particular regard to the Exigencies they shall lye under."43 The situation of the English colonies might have been better if many of the former officers and soldiers had not been dismissed or jailed when the uprising in Boston overthrew the dominion government. John Trefry, petitioning on behalf of his brother Thomas, describes his brother as having joined a regiment in England for service in the colony. When the uprising took place in Boston, his brother was among those taken into close confinement. There seems to have been little substance to the imprisonment other than Trefry's service during the time of Andros' government.44 Randolph makes a rather more dismissive reference to the situation of these soldiers in remarking on soldiers who "choose rather to lye in Gaole than to serve, as many of them do".45 That unsympathetic description, and particularly the implication of choice, begs further exploration. Some part of the dispute is made clearer by reviewing a petition from a group of English soldiers who served in New England during the Andros government. Their statement revealed that they were more than a year in arrears for pay, and the internal response at Whitehall indicated that

42 Pritchard, In Search of Empire, 304
entire companies of soldiers had not been paid at all after September 1688. Whitehall's response (penned by Blathwayt) ended with the unproductive conclusion that the English soldiers could not be paid their arrears until Sir Edmond Andros arrived in England. An account of the state of four companies of soldiers taken in 1690 - standing forces from under Sir Edmond Andros' government - revealed that after the revolution in New England many of the officers had been imprisoned or turned away from service, and the soldiers, dismissed and dispersed. What soldiers were retained were not always of quality sufficient to perform their military tasks, as noted by Usher upon his arrival in New Hampshire in 1692, who found "no Gunner that understands his business, nor any to be had in the Province."

Besides the isolation and lack of aid might also characterize the state of New England's land forces during King William's War. A letter to the Board of Trade from Boston expanded on New England's vulnerable situation with a note that Boston could not raise soldiers to secure the eastern area. Efforts to press men into service failed as the soldiers "questioned their pay, some the authority for the press, and few or none went". Those who were pressed into service were of mixed military worth. Joseph Prout complained that the soldiers in Falmouth are "men of ill behaviour and take little notice of thier Commander", and that, besides the issue of discipline, they were sorely short of supplies. There was also an economic stratification to the press - men that could pay a sum could avoid service. In one particular case, a press in New Hampshire, the sum was

46 Pennington, Tyreman, Hubley and Smith, "The Petition of Christopher Pennington Corporal Francis Tyreman Samuel Hubley and Robert Smith", undated, CO5/855, no. 49; also the appended response of Blathwayt.
47 State of the Four Companies of Standing Forces in New England, 27 May 1690, in CO5/855, no. 98.
48 John Usher to the Board of Trade, New Hampshire, 29 October 1692, CO5/924, no. 20.
49 Letter from Boston to the Board of Trade, 30 July 1689, in CSPCS, 13:111, no. 310.
four pounds. Usher pressed some men of means; his stated reasoning was that they would require less material issued from the colony for their service, although the episode has the sense of the confrontational Lieutenant-Governor attempting to make examples in the community. The arrangement did not work out, with “the Rich men released, and the poor men which had been two or three months continued, all to Contradict my Warrants”, complained Usher.\(^51\)

The militia in New England had a variety of internal problems that exacerbated the difficulties it faced in either pressing men into service or finding volunteers. One significant issue for those serving in frontier units in the late seventeenth century was the quality of their leaders. Many of the officers were inexperienced; others were excessively abusive. A number of complaints survive; they include allegations of soldiers marched to death, arbitrary beatings and other abuses wrought on soldiers by their officers. Richard Hodges made a deposition against Lieutenant John Jordan in which he alleged that Jordan “...Wickedly, Divellishly & after the Popish Cruelty studdyed and Invented New Torments to putt the aforesaid Hodges...” including rather elaborate bindings and tortures in an attempt to extort a confession over a matter of some stolen foodstuffs. Many other impressed soldiers also complained of ill-treatment.\(^52\)

This wretched state of affairs among the soldiers of New England is certainly due in part to neglect during the tumult of the Glorious Revolution, but it was exacerbated by attitudes within the elites of the colonies themselves. The characterization of English soldiers offered in the revolutionary Declaration of the Inhabitants of Boston shows a

\(^{51}\) CO 5/907 Letter from John Usher to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 30 September 1696, 66

particular state of mind: "several companies of Red Coats were now brought from Europe to support what was to be imposed on us", in reference to the Andros government, and these carried on amid "repeated Menaces that some hundreds more were intended for us" (emphasis in original).²³ Some historians of the Boston uprising of 1689 contend, in the words of Lovejoy, that "[h]ardly dashed off in the heat of the revolt, the Declaration was a carefully written and eloquent document", although there is not yet consensus on the identity of the author.²⁴ The prospect that this language was carefully premeditated underscores a schism that existed between the colony and imperial England at the time of King William's War, as shown by the emphasis placed on the distinction between the colony and the geography and military of the empire's centre. The politics of the association of the military with the arrival of Sir Edmund Andros as head of the dominion government were an explicit part of the tension, as he had been accompanied by a company of English soldiers.²⁵ Colonial authorities in England were aware of the tensions between the Crown and their own colony over military matters. Blathwayt's comments on a draft charter for Massachusetts included this piquant observation:

"The power of the militia is by Act of Parliament declared to be in his Majestie. And all Officers are appointed by him or the Lieutennancy and by the Governor in all other Plantacions and not any where given to the People or officers chosen by them nor does the power of making or demolishing Fortificacions and making peace or War belong to any but the King only and ought not att such distance be trusted with any but his Governor Especially at New England where their Dependence on the Crown is thought rather an Imposicion and prejudice then a duty Incumbent..."²⁶

²³ Declaration of the Inhabitants of Boston, 18 April 1689, CO5/855, no. 17 1. The term "Souldiers" appears for "Red Coats" in some other reprints of the Declaration, such as that reproduced in Charles M. Andrews, ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, 1675-1690 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1915), 177. Whether the document as preserved in the CO5 series is the more accurate version or not is uncertain; however, the derogatory sense of being "menaced" with reinforcements is present in both versions. The version of the Declaration reproduced at CO5/905, 49 also contains "Red Coats".


²⁶ Abstract of Draft Charter and William Blathwayt's Observations Thereupon, June 1691, CO5/856 580-587; also in Robert E. Moody and Richard Clive Simmons, eds., The Glorious Revolution in...
If the construction of King William’s War as an imperial conflict can work, then – barring a precipitously strong argument of the peripheral model of empire – the colonial powers should be shown to have direct involvement or at least strong influence in the conflict as it was fought in North America. This was not the case. The colonial powers did intervene in the Americas at this time, in Newfoundland, Hudson’s Bay and the West Indies. By contrast, they made few commitments to the war in Wobanakik. The absence of this fight from their thinking and from their commitment of forces is clear and consistent. The corollary, an absence of imperial war aims from the military thinking of the colonies, is also indicative. The keen sense that the colonial leadership had for their burden in the war, and the role that cost played in creating tension between the colonies and England, is well-expressed in a 1693 communication from the Governor and Council of the Massachusetts Bay Colony to their Majesties:

“...your Princely care and regard for the safety and defence of [this province] by ordering two of your Majesties’ frigats to keep station here doth embolden us with all due Submission to Represent and lay before your Majesties the present afflictive and distressing Circumstances of this your poor People, thro the long continuance of the War, and the vast Losses and Charge drawn upon them thereby...”

The primary affliction of New England during the war was land-based. The conflict is well-characterized by Hinderaker and Mancall as “more notable for its ferocity that for its strategic impact” from the perspective of empire. Although the English colonies had suffered grievous casualties in a naval operation (Phips’ 1690 attempt on Quebec), the majority of the losses were not by way of enemy action. Piracy and privateering were

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57 Address of the Governor and Council to their Majesties, 16 Feb 1693, CO5/785, 110.
58 Eric Hinderaker and Peter C. Mancall, At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 59.
ever-present threats during the war – shipping embargoes were occasionally ordered by the colonies – but the enemy campaigns they feared, and their own military commitments, were primarily on land.59 In light of these characteristics, the partly ironic nature of the gratitude in the address sent to the Crown from Massachusetts is evident.

The English frigates were effective naval assets in the war, at least as deterrents to French privateers or men of war. However, local governments had a very different idea of the utility of naval power in their theatre compared to the imperial or naval authorities. One of the principal benefits of having a station ship at Pentagoet cited in a 1695 French memoir on Acadie was the ability to send it to “Pentogoet, pour la distribution aux Sauvages de ce quartier la, et de quinibiquy, des presents de Sa Majesté, et des marchandises”.60 Considering the French reliance upon the strength of the Wabanaki First Nations, the local use of the frigate as a prop for attempting to sustain alliances with the First Nations of Wobanakik made sense in the context of King William's War, if not the Nine Years' War.

The ships did operate in direct combat between the European powers, not just in support of the fighting of King William's War. The results of the naval engagements in this region were mixed. Among the surviving accounts of the actions of the frigates is a report of an engagement with a French man of war: this narrative reveals that a group of at least three vessels fought the single French ship. Two of the English vessels were armed with only a few guns, and were therefore not placed in the thick of the fight. Despite the description by the narrator of a fight in which the French Captain and his Lieutenant fell, and scores of French troops with them, ultimately the French ship escaped

59 One example of the shipping embargoes is that ordered on 25 October 1692, based on “credible intelligence that some French ships of war have lately been seen upon this coast.” CO 5 vol 785 New England Minutes of Council 25 Oct 1692 folio 99.
and the Rose was left so badly damaged she was unable to pursue. The later loss of the Newport was another blow, and one made more bitter with the news that the small fleet assembled to pursue the French men of war that seized her was becalmed near the enemy and could only observe their safe retreat. The French enjoyed some success at sea against the English, but, as James Pritchard emphasizes in *In Search of Empire*, “the result was ambiguous... the war also demonstrated the limited ability of naval power to increase French colonial security.”

As King William’s War smouldered on the mainland of North America, valuable French imperial military assets – warships – were systematically drawn off from that theatre and relocated to combat either in Europe or elsewhere in the Americas. With regard to naval resources, Pritchard claimed that “Seignelay had spared no thought or extra resources for the Americas” at the outbreak of King William’s War. The British committed substantial home naval resources to the American theatre in the course of the Nine Years’ War, but their major expeditions were made to the West Indies, a concerted push that weakened them in the later stages of the war and left the colonies in New England relatively bereft of aid. In March of 1697, Massachusetts council received several letters from Piscataqua, complaining that fishing ships had been surprised and seized by “Indians with some French in their company”. The raid was answered by enlisting the services of a barque, some shallops, and forty men – possibly pressed – to reclaim the seized vessels. That same naval weakness is reflected in a letter from Rhode Island’s government to the King, which reads in part,

61 “An Account of the Fight between the Rose frigatt and a French Man of Warr off of Cape Sables”, CO5/855, no. 96.
62 Addington to Blathwayt, Boston, 22 September 1690, CO5/859, 93-94.
63 Pritchard, *In Search of Empire*, 303.
64 Pritchard, *In Search of Empire*, 306.
"...there is a manifest declaration of your Majesty's and their great care of us, by giving us information concerning their Intelligence of the preparation of the French men of war fitting for these parts, and accordingly have taken such fatherly care of us as to will us to put ourselves in a posture of defence..."\textsuperscript{66}

The letter is rather biting, as it does set up a comparison between the care of the French throne in sending new ships to defend French interests in North America, and the care of the English Crown, in telling subjects to defend themselves. Even if one of the empires sent naval assets to North America, however, they were sometimes a source for tension between the colonies and imperial authority.

The circumstances of Captain William George and his command, the \textit{Rose}, are a well-known example of the conflicted and neglected character of imperial military assets in New England at the time of the revolution in government. George complained to the Admiralty shortly after the 1689 uprising in Boston that he had not “had the favour of a line from you for above Eighteen months before, except the Instructions for the regulating of Salutes, which hath been punctually observed.” The tone is best understood in light of George's predicament. He had been given up by a malcontent in his crew to be jailed by a rebellious government; news of the Glorious Revolution in England was not confirmed to George until late in May, some five weeks after the uprising in Boston.\textsuperscript{67} Amid all the tumult, the Council of Safety even tried to lure Captain George and the \textit{Rose} into their own service. This was a somewhat brash move, especially as George was of the opinion that the local government had supported mutineers among his crew. The history of the ship proper also makes this situation interesting: in 1686, Edward Randolph had traveled to Boston from England with the \textit{Rose}.\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{66} Letter from the Government of Rhode Island to the King, 21 May 1697, CO5/907, 199.
\textsuperscript{67} George to the Lords of the Admiralty, Boston, June 1689, CO5/855, 29.
Another of commander of one of their Majesties' ships – the *Nonesuch* – also came into conflict with the civil government in Massachusetts. Captain Richard Short, complained Governor Phips, impressed New Englanders without a warrant from him, and Short's "indiscreet violent methods gave great disturbance to the country for he beat two of the assembled men."\(^6^9\) The confrontation between Short and Phips was complex and became rather bitter. The antagonism did not necessarily revolve around a straight contest of Phips and Short as governor and captain. Reid and Baker cite an interpersonal dispute over commercial arrangements as an important backdrop to the outward face of the conflict. Commerce and patronage were important aspects of gubernatorial authority, and they were weak points for Phips; Short collaborated with and subsequently challenged him in exactly those areas.\(^7^0\) The ubiquitous reality of the seventeenth century navies of both imperial powers was that naval officers often "ignored the needs of colonial defence to pursue their own interests" - both in the French and English fleets.\(^7^1\) In this instance, those personal interests coincided, but then clashed, with those of the governor.

The conflict grew to be larger than the two personalities involved, and to have some bearing on the conduct of King William's War. Short, through tardiness, compromised an effort by Phips to surprise some First Nations and French on the islands near Pemaquid in the fall of 1692. Short disregarded orders and waited several days before sailing in support of Phips; he also stopped on the way to Pemaquid.\(^7^2\) Once Short

\(^{69}\) Phips to the Lords of the Admiralty, 6 March 1693, COS/857, 146; Phips to the Lords of the Admiralty, 6 March 1693, COS/857, 146v.


\(^{71}\) Pritchard, *In Search of Empire*, 311; Reid and Baker, *New England Knight*, 213.

\(^{72}\) Phips to Captain Fairweather, 21 Jan 1693, Boston, COS/857, no. 21; Phips to Lords of the Admiralty, Boston, March 1693, COS/857 no. 35.
actually arrived at Pemaquid, he and Captain Fairfax of the Conception were sent orders to remain on watch against a French man of war, and either to engage the French or to at minimum protect the fort. Both Short and Fairfax abandoned Pemaquid – an assignment Fairfax described as “a private pique” of Phips’ - and returned to Boston due to lack of provisons.73

The contest of authority unfolded poorly for Phips, even though some members of Short’s crew accused the captain of such arbitrary punishment of his crew that he impaired the service of his own ship for lack of men due to the rate of desertion.74 Phips replaced Short with an officer the crew recommended as suitable. Despite an interpersonal tension between the governor and a captain, this might be read as an instance of successful integration of the military structures: the local governor stepped in to rectify a problem with an English naval command, resolving it in a manner that seems to have been acceptable to the crew if not entirely consistent with standard naval practice, and crafted due notification to the Lords of the Admiralty.75 Some further reflection from the notes of another captain suggest, though, that the disjuncture between imperial military strength and colonial needs and authority was rather more pervasive.

Captain Fairfax (of the prize ship, Conception) wrote from Boston that his supplies were exhausted and that the pressing need for repairs (including new upper decks fore and aft) would “make her incapable for Summer Service”.76 He also complained of lack of directions for resupply, but procured credit at his own initiative. As was ordinary for smaller vessels, Fairfax unrigged and secured the ship for the winter – but winter was

73 Fairfax to Sotherne, Boston, January 1693, CO5/857, no. 43.
74 George Ireland and Joseph Pittcock to the Lords of the Admiralty, 10 Feb 1693, CO5/857, no. 25; Richard Clements, George Ireland, Matthew Carey et al. of the Nonesuch, to the Lords of the Admiralty, 16 Feb 1693, CO5/857, no. 28.
75 Minutes of the Committee of Trade and Plantation, Whitehall, 19 February 1694, CO5/858, no. 10.
76 Fairfax to the Lords of the Admiralty, 24 Jan 1693, Boston, CO5/857, no. 23.
an important season for supporting campaigns on land, and inability to operate then compromised the potential of the vessel for combined arms operations that were occasionally quite successful. Between the demands of the season and the outstanding repairs, the ship was unready for any useful duties in this theatre. Far from being an effective tool for the extension of military power, the ship's condition is but one more strong indication of the manifold neglect of King William's War by the European home countries. Beyond the issues of readiness and suitability for duty, Fairfax returned to the issue of personal contention between local New England authorities and personnel of the home navy:

“It is very apparently known by everyone that carries the face of Gentleman here that none that ever commanded any of the Majesties' Ships in this place was ever used with comon civility but in contrary basely abused. I have made it my endeavour to comply with the humours of Persons in Authority here so far as becomes a Gentleman but find that nothing that bears that name shall be so treated. I do extremely wish I could serve their Majesties in the Fleet for I am sensible I lye much out of the way of advancement wherein I might render myself more capable to serve my Country, I refer myself to your favour in removing me from this station...”

The pattern of poor relations between military representatives of the home country and the powers in New England is suggestive and – with regard to the lack of resupply and repair of vessels – the neglect hampered the war effort. Even the neglect is tainted with contention between Phips and Fairfax. Fairfax wished to have a report on the cost of repairs more swiftly but “the carpenters tell me they have lost theirs and Sir William hath mislaid his” after the carpenters gave their estimate to Phips, and not to Fairfax. The implication of at least negligence, if not interference, in Fairfax's letter again illustrates a degree of ill-will both towards the carpenters and the governor. Reinforcing this tension, Phips complained of the captains that they “intrude upon my patience and have constantly

77 Fairfax to Southerne, 31 Jan 1693, Boston, CO5 Vol 857 art 24 folio 125.
taken Council of my Enemies". This wore on him to the point that he proposed the Crown share use of an eighteen-gun yacht he had built for patrolling the coast, pointing out that his ship might pursue French privateers where the Conception could not. Even if the yacht was only used for only six months of the year, Phips believed his proposal would provide better security for the coast than the larger but unserviceable prize ship. This proposal actually accords with a reflection by the Meneval in 1688 that larger warships were not suited for some duties on the coast of Acadie and New England, and that well-armed smaller vessels might perform better as they could safely navigate some of the smaller harbours and perhaps enter the river systems. That observation also casts light on one of the reasons pointed out by Captain Short in explaining his vacating Pemaquid: that soundings indicated it was not safe.

This is not to dismiss the naval aspect of the Nine Years' War in the Atlantic. The colonies had good success with privateering at times, and they had also occasionally to order embargoes due to the pressure of enemy at sea. Further, the North Atlantic fishery was an asset of immediate worth to both European powers, as was reflected in their commitment of metropolitan resources to attacks in Newfoundland. However, to the colonies neighbouring Wobanakik, the war at sea did not offer the same immediate threat as did First Nations land raids. Naval warfare was usually undertaken in the context of the Nine Years' War, and the Treaty of Ryswick devoted some deliberate detail to restitution and resolution with regard to naval and commercial concerns. The issues and

78 Phips to the Lords of the Admiralty, Boston, March 1693, CO5/857, no. 35.
79 Phips to the Lords of the Admiralty, Boston, March 1693, CO5/857, no. 49.
80 Memoire du Meneval, 10 September 1688, AC, C11D, vol 2, 100v
fighting of the land conflict and the conflict at sea were quite apart; their origins and resolutions came from opposite sides of the ocean.

Colonial officials were occasionally compromised by their own efforts to work with naval assets, as Phips was with Short and Fairfax. His was not a unique situation: Captain Samuel Moulds, commissioned out of New Hampshire by Usher, was ordered to bring prizes in to the commissioning port, and instead took them, and therefore the profit, to Boston. The infamous example of Bellomont and Livingston’s recruitment of Captain William Kidd underscores the complex relationship between empire, North American colonial leadership and naval assets. Bellomont and Livingston recruited (or pressured) Kidd into a privateering commission, but he wound up a pirate, preying on the trade of the East India Company. At least Kidd’s depredations fell outside the North American theatre of war. Rhode Island’s privateers were so unruly that “Government can not rule them, that sober men are in fear of their lives... 'tis said that if the King don't take some present care, the Privateers will governe that Island.”

Imperial neglect left both the English and French colonies seriously deficient in effective strength on land and at sea. This was sometimes exacerbated by problems with European military assets in the North American environment. The efforts of governors, officers and men to participate in commerce outside their military duties is similarly understandable based on the lack of regular pay and limited opportunities for advancement in the colonies. All of these factors, however, gravely weakened the colonies’ military establishments. This disorder in military affairs raises the question of how the parties in North America could muster the strength to fight.

83 Usher to the Board of Trade, Newcastle, 30 September 1696, CO5/859, 109
84 Sosin, Imperial Inconstancy, 157.
The strategic misconceptions and neglect of the military forces in North America by European powers reveal their lack of engagement with the conflict in North America. The imperial purses offered little more than European garrisons or naval yards: the colonies received little aid from their home governments in defraying the charges of King William's War. In 1690, a letter on behalf of Louis XIV to Frontenac and Champigny stated rather baldly that “les affaires considerable que sa Majesté à soutenir a present ne lui permettrer pas d'envoyer en Canada de nouveaux secours de trouppes, ny de penser a l'enterprise qui avoir été proposée l'année derniere”. The advice from the Crown in light of this serious disappointment was that Frontenac “continuer la guerre par une vigoureuse defensive”. The only recommendation for taking military initiative was “attaquer les Anglois, et les Iroquois par les sauvages alliez, comme [sa Majesté] apprend qu'il a commencé” and, of the allied Houdenasaunee, “les engager à faire une forte guerre aux Iroquois ennemis.”

The French state's war effort in North America at this time, then, consisted of approval of what the Crown thought First Nations were already doing (which, it may be noted, was not at the Crown’s behest) and seeking their ongoing cooperation, to be secured by gifts. By 1691, the value of gifts and merchandise for French diplomacy with the First Nations was twenty-four thousand livres, an amount substantially in excess of the investment of between sixteen and twenty thousand livres made in the fortifications and the built defences of the colony outside Quebec. This investment should not be read as comprehension in Versailles of the diplomatic niceties of conducting enduring relations with First Nations; rather, the “gifts” were understood more in the mode of mercenary payment, an exigency of a war that afforded few other

86 The King to Frontenac and Champigny, 1690, AC, C11A, vol 11, 141-142.
options for combat.\textsuperscript{88}

Amid the climate of neglect, funding was no easier for English colonies during King William's War. The Massachusetts Council ordered compensation in November of 1692 for “several gentlemen of the Town's of Salem and Marblehead” who had privately spent more than two hundred pounds to refit a ketch for duties guarding the coast during the tenure of the Andros government.\textsuperscript{89} Officers and soldiers who had served during Andros' campaigns against “the Indian Enemy” remained unpaid on such a scale that the Council struck a committee to deal with unit commanding officers to see “that Justice should be done”.\textsuperscript{90} The new government was not faring much better: in February of 1693, the council had to order payment for soldiers be drawn against rates from towns that had not yet sent in the monies, “there being nothing in the Treasury to discharge the same.”\textsuperscript{91} In the same month, a number of the councillors advanced a loan of more than two thousand pounds to “supply the present occasions of the Government.”\textsuperscript{92} This is not consistent with understanding the war in North America as a theatre of a European or imperial conflict: besides having clear local causes and leadership, the war was locally funded. That loan by the councillors was immediately followed by an order to pay themselves back earlier personal loans to the council amounting to several hundred pounds. The largest item of the order for payments of debts was also the last noted, some eleven hundred pounds for outstanding charges related to the war.\textsuperscript{93} Although the latter was not itself a personal debt, it was only possible for the colony to pay it by using

\textsuperscript{88} Catherine M. Desbarats, “The Reality of Early Canada’s Native Alliances: Reality and Scarcity's Rhetoric”, \textit{William and Mary Quarterly} 52, no. 4 (October 1995), 613
\textsuperscript{89} New England Minutes of Council, 18 November 1692, CO5/785, 102.
\textsuperscript{90} New England Minutes of Council, 9 December 1692, CO5/785, 104.
\textsuperscript{91} New England Minutes of Council 17 Feb 1693, CO5/785, 111.
\textsuperscript{92} New England Minutes of Council, 24 Feb 1693, CO5/785, 112.
\textsuperscript{93} New England Minutes of Council, 24 Feb 1693, CO5/785, 112.
privately loaned funds. Again in 1697, faced with a debt of “seven thousand pounds, and no stock in the Treasury”, the colony turned to soliciting private advances to reconcile its affairs.\textsuperscript{94} Even the housing of the hostages that guaranteed the peace with the First Nations negotiated at Pemaquid in 1693 came as a charge to a private citizen, who then claimed it back from Council.\textsuperscript{95}

That attention to obligations from private funding, though, was not consistent. Samuel Allen, the governor of New Hampshire, petitioned the King in 1691 for permission to build a fort and restore fortifications at Piscataqua at his own cost, requesting only that the fort be provided with guns, powder and shot from the Crown.\textsuperscript{96} He specified “Defence and security of the Countrey and the Shipping Trading thither” as his principal motive for being willing to underwrite the cost personally. Guns and shot for that fort arrived from England in 1692, one of the few instances of direct and material assistance; despite the sorry state of fortifications throughout the rest of the province, there was no further aid.\textsuperscript{97} What is more, Allen was blocked by an act of his own assembly from trying to reclaim some part of his expenses from the colony. Usher railed at some length on the topic, stating at one point, “such is [the council’s] willfulness, they will neither raise money for defence of the place, nor pay Mr Allen what he demands to enable him the better to support the Government and defence of the Same”.\textsuperscript{98}

The use of gentlemen’s capital, and particularly funds from those adhering to or in the government proper, to underwrite and sustain the charges of the war, is in many ways a reflection of the mechanisms for sustaining high deficits and debt that were evolving in

\textsuperscript{94} New England Minutes of Council 30 Mar 1697, CO5/786, 64.
\textsuperscript{95} New England Minutes of Council 7 Sep 1693, CO5/785, 125.
\textsuperscript{96} Petition of Samuel Allen to the King, read 27 February 1691, CO5/924, no. 13.
\textsuperscript{97} Usher to the Board of Trade, New Hampshire, 29 October 1692, CO5/924, no. 20.
\textsuperscript{98} Usher to the Board of Trade, 31 January 1693, CO5/924, no. 19.
England at the end of the seventeenth century. The use of “gentlemanly capitalism” in the pursuit of interests that ultimately aligned with those of England may be read as an interesting affirmation of P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins’ work on the nature of British imperialism at this time – in effect, that by their methods, the financiers were confirming membership in an intangible English empire.99 There are, however, some important issues with this interpretation of the cultural influences that may have shaped this response by people in New England to local military problems. Probably the simplest problem is that the necessity of paying the majority of costs of the defence of their colony created resentment among the English settlers in North America. More to the point is whether allegiance to empire trumped the burden of defending the interests of the English Crown in the minds of the colonists. The fact that the New Englanders were able to sustain high debt loads through private investment in the state’s affairs – an English mechanism – does not seem to have altered their expectation that the being subjects of the Empire would afford them direct and tangible military assistance at their moment of need, as witnessed by their many addresses to the Crown and the solicitations of their agents in England. The Massachusetts Address to the Crown of February 1693 (previously referenced with regard to the commitment of frigates) closes with a passage of slanted prose regarding the cost the colony has taken on in erecting and keeping the fort at Pemaquid. The Council stated that “we are likewise informed [this] has always been supported at the sole charge of the Crown.”100 The voice and content of this letter argue against a colonial or imperial framework for this conflict – the prose is surprisingly acid as it circumnavigates the issue of their neglect by the Crown. This was a persistent

100 Address of the Governor and Council to their Majesties, 16 Feb 1693, CO5/785, 110.
debate throughout of the war, too – two years later, the council at Boston again undertook to address the Crown regarding the cost of the garrison at Pemaquid.101

Besides built defences, manpower charges created problems for the English colonies. Costs relating to billeting or supplying soldiers serving on the frontier were not repaid promptly, and when there was payment it was at a minimal rate that did not always meet the expenses of individuals who accepted billets.102 The problem of inadequate payment for provisioning was scarcely limited to individuals, however; the council of New Hampshire – upon receiving a company of men from Massachusetts as assistance for their security, voted to spend less than half what the Lieutenant-Governor calculated would be required for them - £150 rather than £362 for the company for six months' support.103 Sometimes the costs rebounded to the individuals pressed into service due to the scarce support from councils: a petition from several men asked the council at Boston “that we may haue sum Compensation Answerable to our burthen or at least be freed from further Charges by rates”.104 The tardy payments affected others beyond regular military personnel: a surgeon retained for service had to petition for payment for his services.105 Even a well-known military figure in New England's history, Major Benjamin Church, found himself in a peculiar situation after reporting the military situation to the Massachusetts council following his patrols of 1690. No one, complained Church, “asked me whether I wanted money to bear my expenses, or a horse to carry me home. But I was forced, for want of money, being far from friends, to go to Roxbury on foot.”106 Church

101 Address of the Council to the King, 19 June 1695, CO5/785, 274.
103 Usher to Lords of Trade and Plantations, Boston, 31 January 1693, CO5/924, no. 19.
106 Letter of Benjamin Church, distributed, Bristol, 27 November 1690, quoted in Thomas Church, The History of Philip's War (Hartford: Silas Andrus and Son, 1932; c. 1716) 198. CIHM 48405.
eventually discovered that his patrols had been reported unsuccessful, and so found that
the service had taken a toll both in coin and against his reputation. In 1692, when Church
was again requested to lead a fighting patrol, part of the enticement offered was
recompense for his earlier services.\textsuperscript{107} Even once the expeditions were complete and an
officer managed to get a petition for payment before the council, it could be disallowed or
delayed by deliberations, as happened to Church and his officers in the winter of 1696,
along with Colonel Gedney (who had acted as commander of the forces sent into
Wobanakik) and Lieutenant-Colonel Hathorne (commander of forces sent to the Saint
John area).\textsuperscript{108} Remuneration for service sometimes included promises of other
entitlements, such as “the benefit of all plunder, and Indian women and children taken
Captive.”\textsuperscript{109} Usher alleged that Church, during his 1696 expedition, “plundered to the
value of many thousands” a French settlement in Acadie.\textsuperscript{110} While Church did retrieve
some cannon during this operation, the tales of riches, particularly in the effects of the
French churches, seem improbable.\textsuperscript{111}

The officers were generally men of means who could survive the expenses of
campaigning; their being out-of-pocket for some costs would not harm the colony
generally. Wholesale non-payment of the ranks, however, was detrimental both to the
immediate economy and to the future military needs of the colony. One witness
commented, “The soldiers that were returned from Eastward being disgusted at receiving
no pay spoke very insolently to their new masters, crying out publicly in the streets, “God

\textsuperscript{107} Thomas Church, \textit{The History of Philip’s War}, 208.
\textsuperscript{108} New England Minutes of Council, 8 Dec 1696, CO5/786, no. 102.
\textsuperscript{109} Proclamation of Massachusetts Council, 7 Aug 1694, CO5/785, 134
\textsuperscript{110} Usher to the Board of Trade, Boston, 23 October 1696, CO5/859, 124.
\textsuperscript{111} J.C. Webster, \textit{Acadia at the End of the Seventeenth Century} (Saint John: The New Brunswick Museum,
1934), 17.
Bless King William. God Bless Sir Edmund Andros, and damn all pumpkin States.”

Soldiers and sailors pressed into service for the 1690 expedition to Canada were paid in paper currency, which few merchants would accept in trade and the colonial treasury could not remit. Amid these circumstances – revolution, personal strife, economic uncertainties and the spectre of abuse and neglect in service – it is little wonder that neither impressment nor calls for volunteers filled the ranks of the frontier outposts. A 1690 survey of garrisons in Maine accounted for fewer than two hundred men. The weakness of the border garrisons and the lack of support for the frontier emplacements did not improve during the course of the war. When Richard Coote, Lord Bellomont, was preparing to travel to take up his appointment as Governor of Massachusetts in 1697, his memorial to the Lords of Trade and Plantations included a request for two hundred soldiers to make up the existing companies, “it being impracticable to raise men there”, as the existing companies had been depleted by desertion. That desertion rate, Bellomont proposed, was at least in part due to the fact that the soldiers were not reliably paid and that their wages were not equal to standard English pay.

Lack of manpower was a persistent problem for all the frontier English colonies. For example, in the wake of the attack on Oyster River in July of 1694, New Hampshire turned to a press to find twenty men to garrison the town; efforts to raise assistance from Massachusetts met with the response that the Constitution of their Charter Government would not permit the sending of impressed men outside the province of Massachusetts,

115 Memorial of Richard Coote, 10 May 1697, CO5/859, 266.
which seems a specious argument.\textsuperscript{116} The cost of defence, though — even in the wake of the attack — could not be raised in New Hampshire proper. Usher's speech to the council in November 1694 included the comment, intended to provoke some funding, that “if you strengthen not my hand, for support and defence of the place, if Ruin comes, the blameable cause will not lay at my door.”\textsuperscript{117}

The New Englanders attempted to address the shortfall in military strength in two ways: the first was with better compensation for soldiers. By 1696, it was necessary in Massachusetts to promise wages, provisions, care for the wounded, surgeon's services, transportation, a bounty of £50 per native man killed or taken prisoner, and a like bounty of £25 for native women and children, and even remuneration for militias from townships that took up pursuit of the enemy in the event of a raid.\textsuperscript{118} The package was limited to the duration of “the months next coming and for no longer”. The basic problem could not be addressed even with the most generous of benefits: New England lacked able-bodied men who were available to enlist in military service.\textsuperscript{119} The second method used to fill ranks surmounted this problem by calling instead on local natives, who may have made up as much as a quarter of the enlisted forces at the outbreak of King William's War.\textsuperscript{120} The wage was all the more attractive for the situation many southern New England natives at the time — extensive land pressure, suspicion and strictures on their movements.

Even if a soldier's wages and benefits were paid, the cost of the impressed person leaving their household remained to be borne. Sometimes the cost was mainly in

\textsuperscript{116} Usher to the Board of Trade, August 1694, CO5/924, no. 40; Phips to Usher, Boston, 19 July 1694, CO5/924, no. 70.
\textsuperscript{117} Usher's Speech to Council, Newcastle, 6 November 1694, CO5/924, no. 42.
\textsuperscript{118} New England Minutes of Council, 16 June 1696, CO5/786, no. 59.
\textsuperscript{120} Johnson, “Search for a Usable Indian”, 628.
business, as was the case for Edward Pegge and his servant who had been impressed. Pegge petitioned for his servant's release from military service as he was unable to conduct his business affairs, "his Said servant haveing the whole management of your petitioner's affaires while he was out of the Country."\(^{121}\) However, the cost of impressment to families in the outlying settlements could be doubly hard, as in the case of Jane Ryly. She and her husband, John, were forced out of their home in Kennebec by raiding. The Ryly family had to move to Charlestowne, where they had "nothing to maintaine them but the dayly labour of your petitioner's said Husband, who about a moneth agoe was in said Town Impressed into the Country's service, and hastned away to the Eastward, not having opportunity to Address your Honors in order to a dismission."\(^{122}\)

New England was militarily paralysed early in King William's War by the combination of the charges of the war and by the lack of available manpower. A council of war held in Maine late in 1689, in the wake of several serious raids, recommended that they "disband sevarll of the forts and only to Leave such a number of men as may be judged of of absolut necessity" in the frontier in order to manage expenses – even though they were meeting in the wake of several raids.\(^{123}\) Still another correspondent wrote that "since the withdrawal of the army the Indians have done great mischief to Eastward, and no men will go to fight them."\(^{124}\) Francis Brinley wrote to his son in early 1690 that "the French and Indians have made much mischief this spring and dayly expect more we having no force out yett to Repulse them everything still being in a Confusion."\(^{125}\)

Neglect was the norm for the European colonies in North America during King

\(^{124}\) Letter to the Board of Trade, Boston, 31 July 1689, in CSPCS, 13:111, no. 311.
\(^{125}\) Francis Brinley to his son, Boston, 22 Feb 1690, in CO5/855, no. 74.
William's War. Left to the own devices, the colonies had to muster what strength they might internally or from their neighbours. In the case of the French, they expected to exploit First Nations partnerships to gain military advantages. Though French colonial authorities were at some distance from the Wabanaki raiding, the influence of French missionaries is often credited by both French and English sources as instrumental in inciting and maintaining tense relations – and ultimately violence – between First Nations and English settlers in Wobanakik. In this light, the missions to the Wabanaki were described by Denonville as assets to the colony in that they created a favourable military situation for the French among First Nations that lived in proximity to the New England settlements. This strategic worth, however, was not indicative of a massive commitment of resources: through the 1680s, although the Jesuit presence was revived at Sillery and St. Francis, the primary focus of evangelism for that order was far to the west of any Wabanaki territory. Whatever the impact of faith and exhortation on First Nations decision-making, Denonville himself acknowledged a more material motive underlying the tensions between the colonies: he opened a letter to Seignelay in 1690 with the bald statement that “jalousie de commerce des Anglais contre les francois est la Principale raison qui rendre toujours les deux Colonies incompatibles”. Denonville also credited the Houdenasaunee with participating in that same division, pointing out that the fact of superior prices of English merchants would draw off the Houdenasaunee from French influence. The implication is that not only did the Houdenasaunee exacerbate the inter-colonial tensions by using their commercial strength, but that they also exploited the situation. This was part of a long Houdenasaunee tradition of

126 Denonville to Seignelay, January 1690, AC, C11A, vol 11, 185v
128 Denonville to Seignelay, January 1690, AC, C11A, vol 11, 185
129 Denonville to Seignelay, January 1690, AC, C11A, vol 11, 186
influencing the colonial powers by commercial pressure. For example, in 1674 mission-resident Houdenasaunee were heavily involved in smuggling furs to New England, causing a loss to the French that could not be stemmed without risking a breach of relations with that community and consequently eroding the strategic position of the French colony.\textsuperscript{130}

The French situation in North America was tenuous in part because of their extraordinary dependence on First Nations military aid. Although that often is most visible in the history in terms of numbers of warriors despatched to support military operations, one of the most crucial military supports that the French required from their allies was intelligence. They lacked settlements, ranging patrols, forts or even trading posts in sufficient numbers – especially in Wobanakik – to effect their own reconnaissance, and so the task of locating the enemy fell to their native allies. When Sir William Phips embarked against Quebec in 1690, the warning cited by Frontenac as he prepared against the assault came by way of a Wabanaki messenger.\textsuperscript{131} Intelligence also played a part in French appreciation of the value of the mission villages near Quebec: good relations, commerce and even military influence aside, the missions functioned as triplines along routes of advance against Quebec. As Denonville remarked of the St. Francis mission, “\[c\]ette mission couvre Quebec qui ne sera pas ataque qu'elle ne soit enlevé.”\textsuperscript{132} Champigny also underscored the value of this and other outlying towns in his memoir of 1691, pointing out that these settlements would avert surprise attacks and deny an enemy routes to approach the colony.\textsuperscript{133} Historians have often picked out this role of the mission communities. As regards the native inhabitants of these towns, the

\textsuperscript{130} Eccles, \textit{Frontenac}, 96.
\textsuperscript{131} Frontenac to minister, 12 November 1690, AC, C11A, vol 11, 90.
\textsuperscript{132} Denonville to Seignelay, January 1690, AC, C11A, vol 11, 186.
\textsuperscript{133} Champigny, “\textit{Memoire Instructif sur le Canada}”, May 1691, AC, C11A, vol 11, 262v.
notion that they “served as a bulwark against the English, and sometimes did good service in time of war” has endured intact from Parkman’s pen through to the present. This summary subjugation no longer seems an adequate assessment in light of the independent First Nations responses to the complex local military situation, but it communicates an important truth about the situation of the colonial French: their native allies were their shield, and their eyes.

New England faced the same military problem: a lack of effective intelligence on their adversary. Even if the New Englanders could raise an army to undertake offensive action on the frontier, it was likely to turn into a disastrous route march rather than a rout of the enemy. For example, Andros’ efforts to curb the native raiding by counter-attacks and diplomacy were dismissed as failures by his critics, who counted a thousand men under arms sent out against a native enemy thought to number around one hundred, and yet, one complaint alleged, “not one Indian killed all this while.” This challenge of locating the enemy was not new, but the confusion in leadership and their lack of effective diplomacy with their aboriginal neighbours meant that New England fought blind against its native opponents.

In 1692, on the other major land front of King William’s War, Governor Benjamin Fletcher of New York admonished the Mohawks over the failure of a joint pursuit of a French raiding party, stating, “I must advise you, that for the future you keep strict Watch, so that I may have timely Notice of the Enemy’s Motion, and you will then see how easily they will be defeated.” The bold language and the tone reflected Fletcher’s frustration over the failed operation, but the content also revealed that the governor was in

134 Francis Parkman, The Old Regime in Canada (Toronto: George N. Morang & Company Limited, 1899), vol 2, 118.

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a position of military dependency. Fletcher closed gloomily, “I doubt there is some false Brothers among us, who keeps Intelligence with our Enemies, concealing their Designs, and exposing ours...” Fletcher's speech exposes several issues in the Houdenasaunee-English military effort, including the possibility of enemy espionage, the split tasks of the “allied” forces and the strained authority for accountability.

The situation did not improve over time. Captain John March, the commanding officer of the fort at Pemaquid, left his post in January of 1695 in order to propose a solution to the ongoing dilemma of locating the enemy. Although the council initially jailed him for abandoning his post, they quickly recanted the punishment and accepted his proposal: use a captured Wabanaki man as a scout, with his performance guaranteed by the fact that the colony also held his two sons in custody. Sheepscot John, as the potential scout was known, came in front of the General Assembly immediately after the council took a decision to sell a native man charged with “divers mischiefs to their Majesties' subjects” into slavery overseas. Whether the pressure of that situation was deliberate is not clear, but the implicit threat must have weighed on John as he promised to be “very faithful and industrious”. This strategy for gaining better intelligence was accompanied by a note to native leaders charging those “as would approve their fidelity and innocence in the late outrages” to return English captives and to turn in the provocateurs. The combination of tactics did not bear immediate results. However, four months later, there was progress, as native leaders delivered eight captives to Captain March at Pemaquid, along with their promise to free the remainder within a month.

The consequences of pervasive neglect during King William's War created military issues beyond a lack of effective intelligence structures. Two excellent examples of the effects of this imperial disregard for the conflict may be found in Phips' expeditions against Port Royal and Quebec in 1690. Port Royal was in such a condition that the expedition did not even have to mount an assault to win terms, and the disastrous attack on Quebec was supported at public charge – and a great cost - by the Massachusetts colony.\textsuperscript{141}

The attack on Port Royal, mounted in response to the raids on land and sea against New Englanders, was aimed at a target that was a perfect paper tiger. Nominally a town with a fort, Port Royal was “sans fort ny aucune sorte de fortifications” and had a garrison of “soixante dix soldats chétifs, mal armez et plus mal intentionnez” who were supplemented by a total of three inhabitants reporting for the defence to the governor, Meneval – himself sorely afflicted by gout.\textsuperscript{142} Besides his physical condition, Meneval was beset by internal conflict with the lieutenant general for justice in Acadie, Mathieu de Gouttin.\textsuperscript{143} Port Royal had been languishing in neglect for some years, as is evident in Meneval's complaints in 1688: uncertain funding for necessities such as soldier's pay and fortifications left him stating “Vous voyés bien Monsieur que ce payes a besoin de beaucoup de choses et il est impossible qu'il se fasse jamais si la cour ne l'assiste puissamment... vous savez bien d'une extreme consequence par la situation pour le maintien de la colonie de quebeq.”\textsuperscript{144} Matters were not improved by the work of an engineer who spent some time demolishing parts of the fort late in 1689, only to depart...

\textsuperscript{141} Baker and Reid, \textit{The New England Knight}, 90.
\textsuperscript{142} Les Sieurs Petit, Trouvé, Dubreuil, de Meneval, “Prise du Port Royal par les Anglois de Baston”, in Blanchet, \textit{Manuscrits}, vol 2, 6.
\textsuperscript{144} Memoire du Meneval, 10 September 1688, AC, C11D, vol 2, 100.
with the works still open.\textsuperscript{145} In short, the fort and town, despite repute as a stronghold of the French in the area, was in no condition to offer a fight, and therefore Meneval accepted honourable terms immediately. The French leaders of the day alleged that Phips “fut fasché de l’honnête compromis qu’il avoit accordé, et cherchant des prétextes pour le rompre” - the unexpected weakness of the town meant that the favourable terms he had offered based on the expectation of a defence were generous indeed.\textsuperscript{146} The argument of Meneval and the others that the sorry state of the fort and of the garrison – by dint of horrendous neglect – was to blame for the loss is convincing and illustrates that even places that were nominally considered bastions of imperial strength were, at the time of King William’s War, weak and vulnerable. Despite its condition, the colonial expedition did not make any lasting inroads for the English settlers against their French neighbours. By 1695, vessels seized by French privateers were being redeemed out of Port Royal, and the Massachusetts council was obliged to permit travel to the French town it had “captured” to deliver the price of the taken vessels in the midst of people who had undertaken, in their judgement, to be subject to their government and the King of England.\textsuperscript{147} Port Royal was vulnerable, but the English Crown and colonies neglected to take advantage of the victory by creating a garrison or settlement there. That failure, and the consequent loss of any lasting military advantage, has prompted harsh historical assessments of Phips’ expedition. Pritchard summarized the assault on Port Royal as “an affair of pillage with no strategic or military objective.”\textsuperscript{148}

In 1690, the French may have been vulnerable at Quebec, too. The colony of Canada was in difficult circumstances, diplomatically described as being serious enough

\textsuperscript{145} Baker and Reid, \textit{New England Knight}, 88
\textsuperscript{146} Petit, Trouvé, Dubreuil, de Meneval, “Prise du Port Royal”, in Blanchet, \textit{Manuscrits}, vol 2 p 8
\textsuperscript{147} New England Minutes of Council, 20 Sept 1695, CO5 Vol 787 Folio 2v
\textsuperscript{148} Pritchard, \textit{In Search of Empire}, 343
to require billeting the soldiers with habitants over the winter of 1690/91. The straits of the colony were laid out for the English settlers courtesy of a report from an officer returning from being captive in Quebec for a time. Richard Smithson, a commander of a vessel operating for the Hudson's Bay Company, was held at Quebec for a year and a half, from the fall of 1689 until May of 1691, reported that when Phips and his fleet had arrived in 1690, the famine at Quebec had been so severe that people were dying for want of food.\footnote{149} Fortunately for the French, the English attackers were scarcely better off. Their concept of a combined attack with arms striking at the French over land and sea was not realized, as the landward arm of the projected assault was not even a fifth of the planned size, a circumstance the Massachusetts council blamed on the “not so Full appearance” of their native allies, and the naval arm did well to arrive at Quebec in any strength – they were without pilots.\footnote{150} Understrength from the outset, wracked by disease and met by an enemy at least equal in numbers and ensconced in fortifications, the expedition was quickly rebuffed. Further, the provisioning of the forces was short, perhaps due in part to the lack of support from the crown for the operation: the New Englanders that managed to land ran out of shot, powder and food after only a single skirmish, which they fought directly upon landing.\footnote{151} What provisions existed for the soldiers were in the hands of the masters of the ships, rather than under the authority of the soldiers' commanders, which meant that supplies went out unevenly among the units at best.\footnote{152}

Englanders to distance themselves from the war. The cost of a thousand lives and forty thousand pounds, borne by the colonies alone hard in the wake of overthrowing their governments, was staggering. What French prizes were taken at sea were seized by ships sent by Leisler from New York, whose ships did not cooperate with the larger formation — a slight that must have reinforced inter-colonial divisions. 153

Internal divisions also played a part in the French defense. Despite their success in repelling the English, the French had among their skirmishers Huron warriors drawn in part from the mission at Lorette. When these warriors discovered the strength and scale of the New Englanders' attack — and particularly, when word spread of the involvement of natives on the side of the English settlers — the Hurons “commencent a plier bagage et disent que pour eux ils s'en vont dans les bois. Nous ne pumes les arresters jusqu'au matin et nous primes le parti de les suivres dans les bois.” 154 Not only did the Huron choose their own military action — in this case, to disengage — but their decision prompted the French of the mission to accompany them for safety, rather than trusting to French soldiers in the area. It was two days before they recovered contact with Quebec and learned that the assault had been broken off by the New Englanders.

New England's response to this defeat, communicated in the address of the Massachusetts Council to the Crowns, is telling: they describe the war in general as “first begun upon us by the Cruel, and Treacherous Heathen, and since carried on by them, and our evill Neighbours the French” and they note, with regard to their expeditions against the French, that “some may seek to Misrepresent us unto your Majesty in this undertaking...we had no design but the Glory of God, and defence of your Majesties

154 Michel Germain De Couvert, “Relation de la defaite des Anglois a Quebec”, in Thwaites, Jesuit Relations, vol 64, 50.
Interest, and our own preservation.” What misrepresentation might have been made over the expeditions is unclear, but the plea does invite notice that the operation, from intent and conception through to execution, ran apart from any direction of the Crown.

That localization of the war, and sense of being bereft of aid from the home country, informed the Council of Safety’s response to Andros’ “Account of the forces raised in the year 1688 for defence of New England against the Indians”. The council offered a bit of cheek in the letter, arguing that the “occasion of our present Distress is the Warr between the Two Crownes of England and France, which prevents all suplyes from England and by the Act of Navigation we cannot have them elsewhere.” The language of the complaint is inconsistent with understanding King William’s War – or the war in Wobanakik – as imperial or colonial. The text disowned the war, challenged English law, and highlighted English military weakness.

Neglect created the circumstances in which both European colonies fought King William’s War, and they fought apart from much imperial assistance. At Port Royal in 1690, the long French neglect resulted in a defeat so embarrassing that even surrender seemed too kind a fate for the garrison. At Quebec the same year, the English colonial effort to create their own amateur amphibious assault killed more of their own men than any enemy action did in the course of the entire land war. Simple disregard by the European powers for the strategic, military and financial needs of their colonies clearly separates King William’s War from the Nine Years’ War.

Chapter IV:

Internal Divisions

The independent conduct of King William's War, and the neglect of the conflict by European powers, suggest that subsuming the war in the broader Nine Years' War is not a workable approach. The profound internal divisions within the major combatants in Wobanakik illustrate further that King Williams' War was essentially local. There was limited coherence of action between groups that were nominally united parties in the war, particularly the English colonies. These internal divisions are a strong counterpoint to any imperial framing of the war, and even to other proposed frameworks, such as King William's War as an "Anglo-Abenaki War". Seventeenth-century empires were contraptions of baling twine and tree nails; seamless colonial unity in action would be a manifestly unfair standard for judging the imperial engagement in King William's War, or that of the First Nations of the Northeast, who have an acknowledged tradition of consensus-based leadership in civil and military matters. However, the combatants offered reasonable grounds for excluding their conflict from an monolithic framework: in their politics, prosecution of the war and negotiation of peace, the parties to King William's War repeatedly compromised the war effort of their allies and ignored any commonality of interest.

If at this time there was a sense of common political identity under an English Crown in the New England colonies, it found little translation into action during King William's War. The French colonial government, perhaps based on the most suitable structures for war, was under-populated and led by men who were distracted by various
power rivalries. Acadie fared poorly: Port Royal was better sustained by Boston than by Quebec, and the allegiance of Acadians sometimes reflected that fact. There was no effective military coherence among the North American colonies of either European power. The First Nations parties to the war were not monolithic, either: the Wabanaki Confederacy was an evolving and very loose association of the North-eastern native groups that does not appear to have had a consistent role in military functions at this time. The Five Nations were a more coherent polity, but again, unity in direction was unusual.

The English colonies were profoundly unsettled early in King William's War. In Boston on April 18, 1689, a number of powerful individuals rebelled and seized control of the government. The principal stated issue — although motives from commerce to simple opportunism are offered by historians — of their uprising was the vacating of their former colonial charter and the demise of the attendant smaller and locally powerful governments. That charter had been replaced in 1686 by the dominion government under Sir Edmund Andros, in which the governments of the English colonies of North-eastern North America were consolidated. The Council of Safety styled this arrangement as a “Tyrannical and Arbitrary Power” and claimed to be “[e]xcited to imitate so Noble and Heroick an Example” as William and Mary's ascent to power in England. The revolution did provoke substantial support in Massachusetts — the colony had enjoyed many local freedoms and taken some license under the prior, charter regime — and the protests of members of the Andros government, associated as they were with the recently-

2 Bradstreet et al., “Address of the President and Council for Safety... to the King and Queen's most Excellent Majesties”, Boston, 20 May 1689, in COS/855, no. 7.
3 Bradstreet et al., “Address of the President and Council for Safety... to the King and Queen's most Excellent Majesties”, Boston, 20 May 1689, in COS/855, no. 7
deposed king, gained little traction at home or abroad. The rise of a moderate local faction as pivotal members of the new government – rather than staunch imperial authoritarians or insular theocrats – was also an important aspect of the uprising's popular support. The towns of Massachusetts Colony accepted the return of a provisional government under the terms of the former charter (and not, it is to be noted, under the Council of Safety): a month after the uprising, the towns and villages unanimously accepted Simon Bradstreet as governor as under the charter, just as per his position and authority in 1686, prior to the arrival of Sir Edmond Andros. The popular position of the government was not as sound as that vote indicated: the “Council of Safety” had been rejected by the towns out of hand, while a return to a charter commanded far greater support – but not merely as a seeking of distance from the authority of the crown. The towns' support was in part due to the wider franchise townspeople sought under the new government. The developing imperial environment available to the New England elites in the wake of the Glorious Revolution (and its concomitant uprisings) was as much of interest as a certain measure of autonomy.

New York was enmeshed in a serious internal political conflict as well: the prior government was challenged by Jacob Leisler, whose faction used vague accusations of combinations by enemies of the colony (variously including the French, Catholics and First Nations) to justify their seizure of the government. This upstart government held the colony for almost two years before being unseated by a new governor, Henry

5 Declaration of the Convention at Boston, 24 May 1689, COS/Vol 855, no. 17 IV.
Sloughter, accompanied by soldiers from England as well as loyalists from New York and Connecticut. Leisler denied Sloughter's authority and greeted his troops with shot – for which he was charged with treason and executed. During Leisler's rebellion, however, the rifts within New York had unfortunate and immediate consequences for the security of out towns.

The French colonies were enveloped in their own tumults. Between extraordinarily divisive relations amid their colonial officials, disjuncts between Acadia and Canada, and the conflict with the Houdenasaunee, the French colonies were not on a sound war footing in the latter part of the seventeenth century. Their weakness, especially in their confrontations with the Five Nations, was costing them in terms of indigenous trade, and the confluence of economic and diplomatic ties with First Nations suggests one serious toll this period took on the French in North America: their effective influence among First Nations evaporated as their ability to act as a protector or enforcer of a peace visibly waned. The French crown made no increase to expenditures in New France early in the war – the colony had to deal with the massive changes in its political situation with only the normal “peacetime” allotment of money and troops.

The internal tensions and effects of negligence were compounded by some direct tensions between the European colonies. The turbulent relationship the French colonial leaders had with the truculent Colonel Dongan of New York in the years leading up to King William's War is one important example of the many local sparks that ignited in war. The overt confrontations French leaders, and in particular Denonville, had with Dongan

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are a contrast to the studied diplomacy generally conducted with Andros of New England. More important in terms of the concept of the intercolonial divisions is the fact that the antagonism was at odds with the peace between the crowns of England and France at the time. Peace in North America was an explicit intention of the European powers during the rule of James II in England, such that they even negotiated neutrality between their colonies there should another European war erupt. The difficult relationship therefore was not consistent with the colonial or imperial direction of the time.

More, the contrast in conduct between Andros and Dongan illustrates that there was no coherence in the disposition and conduct of the English colonies towards their neighbours. Local leaders differed on the nature of their relations and conflicts with the French and with various First Nations. For example, Andros wrote in mid-1688 that the Houdenasaunee were recognized as subjects of the English King and were therefore under his protection, a position that was somewhat at odds with Dongan's disavowal of complicity in their actions. That aspect of the missive might be incendiary, but Andros closed his letter with a courteous affirmation of his attention to the treaty between the crowns after stating his resolve to see satisfaction given to the French for any injury they have suffered. This small instance begins to develop the internal divisions and the inter-colonial rivalries that plagued the major parties to this conflict, European and First Nations alike. The burden of the fighting was borne by the colonies alone, and they were taxed by the fighting to the point that they would or could not collaborate for their own military defence.

There were a variety of overt diplomatic efforts to overcome the divisions in

government and to unify the defense of the English colonies. These might have been a kind of tacit acknowledgement of the efficiency the military consolidation under the dominion government had offered both in terms of dealing with the natives of the Northeast and co-ordinating their own resources. These efforts frequently seemed sound in conception but fared less well in the chill and hunger of colonial campaigning, as with the attempt to unify commands for the expedition against Canada in 1690 or Phips' later attempts to reprise the invasion of Canada after his commission in 1692. The situation was complicated by apparent contradictions in instructions from the Crown, such as occurred in 1693, when Phips, nominally commander of all colonial militias, was ordered only to consult and advise New York's Governor Fletcher on his Canadian expedition. This careless erosion by the Crown of a consolidated colonial military authority reinforced internal divisions and hampered the overall safety of the colonies. Even when the Crown explicitly stipulated a requirement for aid between colonies, the orders failed in practice – to the cost of New England during King William's War. Phips in some sense diminished his own commission as the local commander-in-chief, granted concomitant with his appointment as governor of the Massachusetts colony: his failure, despite timely intelligence and opportunity, to consolidate forces for the defence of the neighbouring colony of New Hampshire in the wake of the Oyster River raid cheapened the office in the eyes of his counterparts. Usher, writing to Phips on that very failure, stated “how far pursuant the same is to the King's Instructions, leave you be Judge.”

Phips' position as a potential leader for the colonies' war effort did not translate into action on other occasions, either. Writing in Boston on September 18th, 1693, Phips

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14 Ward, "Unite or Die", 31.
15 Usher to Phips, Newcastle, 28 July 1694, CO5/924, 124v.

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parried an explicit proposal from Fletcher for a meeting to establish a system of aid for the common defence of the frontier in New York, stating that “I have to acquaint you that the Epidemics and mortal Sicknesses and other calamitous occurrences within this Province renders it difficult for any from here at present to attend such a Congress” - in short, that Massachusetts would not even discuss the matter at the time. A fragmented vision of the conflict is evident in Phips' declaration, “I shall not be backward to contribute what assistance I may to the defence of their Majesties' Interests in the neighbouring Governments without hazard of exposing the same more immediately under my care.”

The concept of duty to the Crown is expressed in the statement, but the notion of commonality, of shared responsibility and identity - the idea of empire - is missing. Connecticut's response to the concept of a single military commander for the colonies reflects the same individual and isolated attitude, claiming such an authority would be “hard on the inhabitants and, as is conceived, contrary to the [Connecticut] Charter”.

Besides rejecting - or simply failing to attempt - co-operation among the colonies, New Englanders refused instructions from the Crown for mutual support. Such support was directed from time to time during King William's War, as in March of 1692: “Wee [the Crown] think it responsible that and necessary that our several colonies... should be aiding and assisting from time to time to the Governor or Commander in Chief of Our said Province of New York”. Nevertheless, the Connecticut council (recipient of this instruction) did not send men or money to New York, but rather offered an eloquent if slippery explanation of Connecticut's refusal to help. Besides reasons such as a lack of

16 Phips to Fletcher, Boston, 18 September 1693, CO5/857, no. 81.
17 Winthrop, “Memorial against the uniting of the northern colonies of America under one head”, undated, CO5/859, 182.
18 The King to the County of Connecticut, 3 March 1692, CO5/905, 205v.
time, funds, the excessive distance, and so on, the inter-colonial divisions are an important aspect of the excuses offered:

“That the said Government and Company [of Connecticut] had received a letter from Her late Majesty wherein she declares She had Signified her royal pleasure to said Fletcher that in the Execution of the powers of his Commission, he does not take upon him any more then during warr to Comand a Quota or part of the militia of the said Colony not exceeding the number of 120 men, with especial direcons not to Comand or draw out more of the said Quota of the militia of the said Collony of Connecticut then he should in proporcon draw out from the respective miltias of the adjacent Provinces, so that the said Government and Company Conceived they were not obliged to send out the said number of soldiers...”

The absence of co-operation between the colonies actually extended to political predation. John Usher – then the Lieutenant-Governor of New Hampshire - reached quite a state of pique upon word in 1696 that Massachusetts was seeking to join New Hampshire to their government; after offering a litany of services he had rendered in the colony, he showed the profound divisions between the colonies and their leading personalities by stating that even though the government at Boston made motions of loyalty, they continued to press “for their old Charter, thatt is their Onyons and Garlick.”

The accusation of self-interest was brazenly, transparently vested; however, it illustrates an attempt to put another colony in bad odour with the Crown – and thus reveals another layer of the disunity that plagued the colonies during King William's War.

The English colonies did not, and often would not, offer a unified war effort in King William's War. The inter-colonial political rifts were reflected by internal tensions within their populations. The presence of minorities that were feared to have sympathy with an external enemy was another strain that challenged the combatants in King William's War. For example, the conflicted state of the population of “friend Indians”,

19 Winthrop’s Memorial in Excuse or Vindication of their refusing to send soldiers to Albany, read 11 September 1696, CO5/859, 89-90
20 Usher to the Board of Trade, Boston, 23 October 1696, CO5/859, 124.
such as those of Natick, has attracted recent scholarship.\textsuperscript{21} The burdens placed on the
native converts and allies in New England persisted and worsened throughout the war. In
1693, “friend Indians” were “circumscribed within certain limits” and “put under the
oversight of some of the English, as well for their own security, as that the Enemy may be
better known.”\textsuperscript{22} These restrictions had some substantial foundation: in 1693 and 1696,
Mohawks – nominally allies of the English settlers – raided Deerfield and Hadley, killing
several settlers.\textsuperscript{23} New England elites, particularly in the wake of the Restoration in
England, had not taken in the social-liberal influences of the changes in the mother
country. Quite to the contrary, as argued by Robert Bliss, “they discovered an organic
connection between their social survival and their ability to use public power to restrict
the freedom, economic and otherwise, of their neighbours, white, red, and black.”\textsuperscript{24}
However, the broader circumstance of oppressions did not prevent some “friend Indians”
from giving good service to Massachusetts: after the hostilities were over, the province
granted about two hundred acres to native veterans of King Philip’s and King William’s
War.\textsuperscript{25}

There was in Massachusetts another marginalized group whose presence, and
response to the fighting, challenges a straight construction of King William’s War based
on European identities: French settlers. The Massachusetts Council, in 1693, approved a
request from “the French of the Town of New Oxford” to make basic fortifications for
two of their houses, as they feared the dangers of the war. The fortifications, “for the

\textsuperscript{21} Jean M. O’Brien, \textit{Dispossession by degrees: Indian land and identity in Natick, Massachusetts, 1650-
1790} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
\textsuperscript{22} New England Minutes of Council, 1 Aug 1693, C05/785, 123.
\textsuperscript{24} Robert M. Bliss, \textit{Revolution and empire: English Politics and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth
Century} (New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), 133.
\textsuperscript{25} Daniel Mandell, \textit{Behind the Frontier: Indians in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts} (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1996), 51.
Security and Defence of the Inhabitants against the Indian Enemy”, were approved, with the provision that one Englishman was to be responsible for keeping a watch.\(^{26}\) In 1695, the Massachusetts Bay Colony sought to accumulate a list of all the French Protestants within the colony.\(^{27}\) The French were aware of enclaves that might be sympathetic (or at least submissive) to them, a fact that featured in the instructions to Frontenac on preparing to strike at the English settlements: “sy parmi les habitants...il se trouve des catholiques, de la fidélité desquels il croyt se pouvoir assurer, il pourra les laisser dans leurs habitations” although this was qualified with some cautions, including that the inhabitants should take an oath of allegiance.\(^{28}\) The court at Boston had reflected on the dangers this presence in 1691, capping any further French migration to New England, requiring a license for residence for the French resident at the time, and limiting the French New Englanders' ability to earn a living without the business first being approved by local council.\(^{29}\) One may even find strong discontent with the government right in Boston: one of the most striking reversals of the rhetoric in the contest over government in Massachusetts was offered in the petition of Boston Anglicans, who describe the charter government as “slavery and thraldom” and “extravagant and arbitrary.” Their opposition to the revolutionary government culminated by stating that the ships sent by the Crown for the defence of the colonies had been “dismantled and made wholly unserviceable”.\(^{30}\) The situation of the Anglican communicants in Boston was uncertain after the uprising, as was shown – perhaps with some additional colour – in the

\(^{26}\) New England Minutes of Council, 1 Aug 1693, COS/785, 123.
\(^{27}\) New England Minutes of Council, 12 Apr 1695, COS/785, 142.
\(^{28}\) Instruction a Monsieur de Frontenac sur l'enterprise contre les anglois, 7 June 1689, in Jean Blanchet, ed., Collection de Documents Relatifs a L'Histoire de la Nouvelle France (Quebec: A. Cote et Co., 1883), 459.
\(^{29}\) Order of the Court, General Court of Massachusetts Bay Colony, Boston, 22 December 1691, COS/858, 257v.
\(^{30}\) “The humble petition of your Majesties' most Loyal and Dutiful Subjects of the Church of England in Boston”, undated, COS/855, no. 58.
unattributed narrative, “A Particular Account of the Late Revolution, 1689”. The author contends that, among other things, a Puritan preacher “was for cutting the throats of all the Established Church”.31

The internal and external tensions created a difficult environment for diplomacy, and the governments that came to power in New England in 1689 failed to deal well with their First Nations neighbours. This political failure was lamented publicly, albeit most loudly by those who had grievances against the new governments. “The least offence to the Indians may prove fatal, yet these commissioners so little understood it that they stick at no violence to exasperate the heathen”, wrote Robert Livingston in 1690.32 Sir Edmund Andros stated that the Council of Safety “sent to Albany to treat with the Five Nations, and invited them to Boston, a most dangerous proceeding, since it revealed to the Indians the weakness and disunion of the country, thereby giving the French the advantage to subdue the Indians and attack Fort Albany.”33 Emerson Baker argued in his analysis of Anglo-Indian relations during this time that “[t]he coincidence of Massachusetts control of Maine and the outbreak of the Indian wars was no coincidence at all.”34 This argument is sound in the context of the failure of political leadership in New England, as Baker presented it. However, it also extends to the opposing side of the conflict: First Nation leadership recognized and took advantage of the weakness of the fledgling government.

The political divisions of the colonies extended to commercial conduct, as well.

32 Robert Livingston to the Governor and General Court of Connecticut, 13 May 1690, CSPCS, 13:260, no. 878.
The disastrous raid against Fort Charles at Pemaquid and its fall, discussed earlier, brought a number of recriminations over trade in Wobanakik. Some Maine settlers charged that "some short time after this change of Government the Indians were supplied with stores of War and Ammunition by vessels sent by some in Boston to trade with them, and thereupon tooke new Courage and resolution to continue the War". Captain Manning, one of the officers of the garrison at Pemaquid, was accused by a local settler of planning to surrender the fort if ever it was threatened. The substance of that accusation is weak, but what lies under the statement is pertinent: the success of the raid was unexpected, and the vulnerability of the outlying settlements and garrisons provoked unease and discord in New England. Some part of the nervousness with which the New England settlers confronted aboriginal military power is doubtless rooted in their experience of King Philip's War: fifteen years before, "the Indians were delivering a powerful and devastating attack which conceivably might have driven the English into a relatively restricted area along the coast." The settlers' demonstrated vulnerability provoked protests that the new governments did not provide as sound security as Andros. Some of those allegations escalated into outright charges of collaboration with the enemy, and both the Andros government and the Council of Safety were accused of sympathy with or supplying the very enemies that assailed the settlers. Andros was accused of setting at liberty "with many favours" those native warriors who immediately were responsible for a "great part of the mischief". To counter, one of the members of

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35 Petition and Address of the present and late inhabitants of the Province of Maine and County of Cornwall, 25 January 1690, COS/905, 96-97.
39 A.B., "An Account of the Late Revolutions in New England in a Letter", Boston, 6 June 1689,
the Council of Safety was accused of having sold powder, shot and other materiel to members of the Penobscot First Nation and to the French at Port Royal.\(^{40}\) Whatever the truth of the relative conduct of the governments, commerce in this area was nothing if not a tangled web that often had little to do with imperial interests. The crux of the complaints was that neither Andros nor the Councils of Safety could mobilize the resources of New England to provide adequate security against the military power of the Wabanaki First Nations, let alone a French and Indian combination.

The allegations of commerce, however, hint at English colonists’ efforts to improve or maintain relations with the Wabanaki that alarmed leaders in Acadie and Canada: the French military presence in the Northeast hinged on collaboration with the First Nations. Meneval warned that the New Englanders were reaching out to the Wabanakis and Kennebecks by offering “des présents de temps en temps et leur fournissent les choses dont ils ont besoin à très bon marché” which could turn to the disadvantage of the French over time.\(^{41}\) Effective diplomacy by New Englanders and First Nations did eventually neutralize the French war effort in Wobanakik, and discussion of that possibility circulated in 1690, when an anonymous mémoire published in France stated in part:

“[Les Anglois de Baston] l’ont promis plusieurs fois aux sauvages et leur ont fait des grands présens pour les engager à faire une guerre irreconcilliable; ils leur ont promis qu’ils envoyeroient cinq ou six navires de guerre dans la fleuve, qui attaqueront la colonie…”\(^{42}\)

Commerce with the enemy during wartime was not restricted to trade with the First Nations – which one might well explain as diplomacy consistent with the interests of

\(^{40}\) Letter from Boston, 29 May 1689, COS/855, no. 8.
\(^{41}\) Mémoire du Meneval, 10 September 1688, AC, C11D, vol 2, 102.
\(^{42}\) Mémoire sur la Nouvelle France (anonymous), Versailles, 4 May 1690, reproduced in Blanchet, *Manuscrits*, vol 2, 3.
empire. The trade between the nominally competing French and English colonies was a vibrant industry. In 1690, in answering an accusation of illegal trade with the French in Newfoundland, the Massachusetts Council notes “as some of us certainly know, that the last winter we could not get a Case of French Brandy in all Boston for our money.”43 The protest says perhaps more than was intended, as it confirms that the lack of the brandy was unusual. It appears that New England merchants remained willing to chance a shady market throughout the war, with the council of Massachusetts noting in late 1696 that,

“it is very evident that both the French and Indian Enemy are relieved and Succoured by the Supplies transmitted from hence unto Port Royal and other places in Nova Scotia on pretence of relieving and Supplying the Inhabitants of those parts... who notwithstanding do carry on a Trade with the Indians and hold correspondence with the French seated on the River of St Johns being open and declared Enemies.”44

The thorny issue of behaviour as subjects of a European crown in Acadie / Nova Scotia has a long history, of which this debate constitutes a small but engaging piece. The network of local trade and commerce, of local identity and allegiance, already seems to have outweighed the abstract, almost fictitious pretence of imperial authority. For Port Royal residents, the raid and the war - the comings and goings of European “masters” - were already only a sidebar to a daily reality of a far more locally defined world, with conflict and resolution that had nothing to do with Versailles or London.

Local commerce – undertaken in exception to imperial direction - might have been the diplomatic tool to ensure security or peace for the colonies, perhaps for New England as it did for Port Royal. However, the commercial relationship between colonists and Wabanaki traders had a tradition of ambiguity: early in their direct contact with each

43 Massachusetts Council, “An Answer to Mr Randolph's Account of Irregular Trade carried on since the Late Revolution by the Inhabitants of New England”, 1690, CO5/855, no. 112.
other, the Wabanaki were seen by the French as a threat to their patterns in the fur trade, and they are thought to have been at times the principal supplier of furs to New England.45 The First Nations of the Northeast used trade as a tool in their relations with the European settlers, but their trade was also dictated by simple factors such as the availability of goods that they desired. Boston merchants reciprocated the trade interest and became an important supplier of wampum to the Penobscot and other First Nations in Maine.46 More troubling for colonial authorities was the willingness of merchants to continue supplying native groups with war materiel – even during hostilities against their own colony. In August of 1695, the Massachusetts Council passed a law “to Prevent the Supplying of His Majesty's Enemies”.47 The intricacies of trade between Wabanakis and the rival colonial powers often added to the diplomatic interactions between the groups. For example, Claude-Sébastien de Villieu, a French lieutenant attached to Acadie, undertook a mission to the First Nations of Acadie in 1694 in order to reinforce relations with groups that were ostensibly allies to the French - a delicate task. The French were assured by the attending sachems that although some of their leaders had reached peaceful settlements with the English, they had done so without common consent, or only for the purpose of trade.48 However, the narrator of Villieu's mission in Wobanakik observed that there was "une Caballe pour empescher l'enterprise resolu contre l'anglois".49 That granularity within the Wabanaki leadership indicates again the importance of dealing with King William's War as a conflict that was fundamentally local, and underscores the challenges both colonial

47 New England Minutes of Council, 17 August 1695, COS/785, 558.

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powers faced in dealing with their neighbours: they were not prepared for the political
diversity of the nations living in Wobanakik.

New England, at the outbreak of the fighting, could not cope with its own new and
rather hastily developed political diversity. This had important effects on the conduct of
the war. Colonies were losing ground in the war, and the out towns were under constant
alarms. The very nature of the raiding fostered a war effort that was fragmented. Near
the end of the war, Shadrach Walton, commander for four years of Fort William and
Mary at Newcastle on the Piscataqua River, commented that his fort needed men. He
could only gather forty or fifty, and that at four hours notice, with the remainder “forced
to be in out garrisons, always on the watch against the Indians, by which great fateague,
besides the fear and hazard of the french, all that government is utterly ruin'd and lost,
without some speedy assistance...”50 Little had changed in terms of the perception of the
war over time. Walton's complaint of 1697 mirrors the frontier concerns of a 1690
petition from “present and late Inhabitants of the Province of Maine and County of
Cornwall.” The petitioners claimed that through the summer of 1688, they suffered raids
against several settlements, but that the winter campaign of 1688 brought the First
Nations in the area to such extremity that “they would have in a very short time have
submitted att mercy or been wholly subdued and overcome.” The petition went on to
term the overthrow of Andros' government “a most unhappy insurrection or rebellion”, in
that the new government left their region “without Succour or defence”.51 Residents of
Maine could recall losing King Philip's War and paying tribute to local sachems as a
recent reminder of the reality of native military power and authority in the area.52 Several

51 “The humble petition of present and late Inhabitants of the Province of Maine and County of Cornwall”,
25 Jan 1690, CO5/855, no. 55.
52 Jenny Hale Pulsipher, “The Overture of this New-Albion World": King Philip's War and the
people from Charlestown sought relief from the rule of the Council of Safety, as they were “prey to our French and Indian Enemies who in this present posture of affairs, have too great advantage against us.” A petition from New Hampshire indicated the same conditions there: in 1690, people felt that the common security that was possible under the Andros government was not being matched by the new government. They claimed to be “in a deplorable condition (without your Majesties’ speedy relief) occasioned principally (as we humbly conceive) by the unparalleled overturning of the late well-established government” which “by dismantling the forts and disbanding the soldiers” left them “beset on all sides by Indians and French by Land, and in dayly fear of the French by the sea.” Two years later, still “dayly exposed to annoyance from French and Indian Enemies”, and claiming their own local government to be unsupportable, almost four hundred residents of New Hampshire signed a petition requesting that they be subsumed under the government of Massachusetts, failing which “wee shall be exposed to ruin or necessitated to quit the Province to the Enemy to save our own lives.”

Despite the image of a seamless French-Wabanaki military collaboration in the stated fears of the New Englanders, their cooperation during King William’s War was more complex than is generally allowed. The terse declaration of the Wabanaki representative at the Peace of Montreal that the Wabanaki: “je n’ay plus de haches vous l’avez mise dans une fosse l’année derniere et je ne la reprendray que quand vous me l’ordonner” does not accord with the independence Wabanakis exercised in the war.
This tension between the rhetoric of allegiance and the practice of self-direction is writ large in the military decisions of Wabanaki leaders throughout King William's War. However, the character and composition of the raids indicate rather more independence of operation on the part of both the First Nations and the French colonial leadership than is apparent. As Cornelius Jaenen noted, bilateral accommodation rather than complete imposition was the norm in native-colonial relations. Where they existed, military alliances were no exception to this observation.

One nuance in the French-Wabanaki relationship was the contrast between their relationships between communities close to the French settlements, such as the mission villages, and communities closer to the English, such as on the Saco or Kennebec rivers. Bypassing these more distant Wabanaki groups was not out of step with how the French conceived of their alliances and their interests at the time of King William's War. In 1684, when the French enumerated their native allies who had joined them for their operations against the Houdenasaunee, the list included a count of sixty-five Christian Wabanaki “bons homes” from mission villages, but there was no mention of Wabanaki warriors from traditional lands. Or again, Champigny's letter of July 1689 opened by describing hardships associated with the constant Houdenasaunee threat and goes on to discuss in some detail the compensation and provisioning of soldiers throughout areas of French responsibility. Amid this, and even as the Wabanaki raids were being mounted in the Northeast, Champigny did not mention military action or support in Acadie or Wabanaki lands. He mentioned that Governor Andros had been overthrown and made

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56 Peace Treaty of Montreal, 4 August 1701, AC, C11A, vol 19, 43.
prisoner in New England, but again, his focus on the military consequences of this revolt was on Houdenasamou territory, not Wobanakik. Champigny eagerly sought clarification of the situation in Europe, but reflected to Seignelay that "les nouvelles que nous avons apries de l'europe m'ont persuadé que vous auriez de grandes ocupations et que vous ne pouriez songer à nous qu'un peu tard": It is strongly suggested by the omission, by the request for clarification and by the details committed to the French record that the military initiative at that time in the Northeast was not French. The direction France might give the colonies in North America with regard to the developing Nine Years' War in Europe had not yet reached Quebec by the middle of 1689, by which time New England had already suffered several serious raids. Wabanaki First Nations were dictating their own military directions.

This disengagement from Wobanakik and the consequent disparity in the way the French colony related to the conflict in Wobanakik (and the direct contest there with the English) versus that with the Houdenasamou — and the consequent level of influence they attempted to exert on their allies — was reflected in the instructions from the King to Frontenac and Champigny. Frontenac was exhorted to bring the allied Houdenasamou to Montreal, to take every necessary step in order to "les engager à faire une forte guerre aux Iroquois ennemis." The Houdenasamou, and the hope for peace or means for warring with them, recur in the letter several times. By contrast, a short paragraph deals with the situation of the Kennebecks. The mode of doing that was delegated to the Sieur de Meneval, along with a note to Meneval that the King "luy ordonne de leur faire les mesmes presents que l'année dernier." This disregard for service was something of a

59 Champigny to Minister, 6 July 1689, AC, C11A, vol 10, 234-234v.
60 Champigny to Minister, 6 July 1689, AC, C11A, vol 10, 233.
pattern between the French and the Wabanaki: after participating in raids against the Houdenasaunee, the Wabanaki of the St Francis mission returned to find, despite promises of aid in Quebec, “tous ces beaux discours n'ont neantmoins rien produit, il ny a eu que l'hôpital et les Ursulines qui ayent envoyé quelque aumône pour notre grand nombre de malades.”

This disregard for ostensible allies was an issue in New England as well. The case of New York's requests for aid from its neighbours during King William's War is most apt for illustrating this aspect of the military incoherence of the English empire in North America. In 1694, while conflict with the Wabanaki was in a lull thanks to the peace of 1693, the Council of Massachusetts Bay responded to a request for financial aid from Governor Fletcher of New York. They stated that “the vast Debt already contracted and the growing Charge within the same rendering it insupportable (on which By themselves the War has lyen so heavy) to contribute towards the charge of the Province of New Yorke”.

In June of 1695, New York was reduced to begging from other colonies to assist in paying for repairs to their jails “by reason of their poverty occasioned by the War”, which request elicited ten pounds from the council of Massachusetts. Within the next week, New York also requested more than three hundred men be raised to help protect Albany. The response from Massachusetts was sharp: a strong negative, “having not men sufficient to preserve our own Frontiers, which are of so large an extent, and to offend the Enemy, by whom we may rationally expect to be suddenly assaulted”. This diplomatic parry did not quell New York's requests for assistance, and in August, the council responded that they could not provide aid, “this Province being the chief Seat of

63 Massachusetts Council to Fletcher, 14 September 1694, CO5/785, 126.
65 Council of Massachusetts to Fletcher, 27 June 1695, CO5/785, 278.
the War, lying more exposed and being more hardly pressed by the Enemy than the Province of New York, that Province being also lately enforced with three Foot Companys under Establishment from England.66 These protests underscore the character of this conflict as local: the very limited local reinforcement by the Crown created contention between the colonies, and their despatch to New York was offered by Massachusetts as a justification for maintaining separate war efforts, rather than being a rallying cornerstone in a joint military effort.

New Hampshire drew a similarly insular response from Massachusetts, Usher noting that despite attempting to start an amicable correspondence, he could “after tedious waiteing gett noe other answer but neglect slights and reproaches.”67 Usher had a convoluted personal history with many in the Massachusetts government, and his complaint – as well as what he might have considered “amicable” in the context – is somewhat suspect. Nevertheless, the result remains: null. Although Usher noted that New Hampshire had a company of men from Massachusetts stationed with them at the time, their continuance was strongly in doubt, and indeed, in the spring of 1693, Massachusetts, “notwithstanding the Enemy's Scouts had been discovered, drew all off, and left the poor out towns to stand upon their own defence.”68 The Admiralty Office suggested reinstating the company while it reviewed (and rejected) a proposal to use a frigate to secure Piscataqua in October of 1693.69 However, Usher stated in September of 1694 that New Hampshire had received no further aid from Massachusetts – and that the Province “might be deserted, and Lefl to the Enemy.”70 The council of Massachusetts

67 Usher to the Board of Trade, New Hampshire, 29 October 1692, COS/924, no. 20.
68 Usher to the Board of Trade, Boston, 14 July 1693, COS/924, no. 27.
69 Committee for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of England, Admiralty Office, 11 October 1693, COS/924, no. 281
70 Usher to the Board of Trade, 14 September 1694, COS/924, no. 39.
even sent him word that they had ordered one hundred men to relieve New Hampshire - "but none ever came to us", remarked Usher.\textsuperscript{71} Two years later, the issue of assistance still divided the two colonies: a request from New Hampshire met with a short deflection of responsibility from Massachusetts to a naval ship, the \textit{Falkland} – in effect, passing the cost to the Crown – but, considering the Admiralty's earlier position on using a ship to reinforce Piscataqua, it seems unlikely that this worked to the benefit of New Hampshire.\textsuperscript{72}

This fractious approach shows that, besides the rivalries or divisions between colonies, there was neither in understanding nor in practice a consistent chain of command from the officials of the Empire to the military executive in North America. When Phips carried a suitable commission for the duties, it was circumvented or ignored – even by the Crown. This materially compromised the ability of the colonies to act in any sense as a coherent military force, a fact that was apparent at the time. One correspondent, Captain Stephan Sewall, wrote:

"Here are many Smal Governments... they do not neither will they afford Each other Succour and reliefe in a time of need as is most and absolutely necessary, in soo much as the French and Indian enemy doe prosecute the warr soo hard on those that lye near to them, viz New Hampshire and part of the Massachusetts, that hundreds of his Majesty's Subjects being tyred out with watching and warding and paying great taxes, they are removing away to South Carolina ad other places southward, to escape those difficultyes and dangers: soo that if his Majesty doth not put some speedy stop to those things by unifying several of the governments together, or rather by sending a Viceroy over all, that may Comand all in this difficult time of Warr; I say if there be not some such thing done I fear and tremble to think what the Event will be."\textsuperscript{73}

Another letter, from William Harrison, stated:

"The French are not ignorant of the advantage they have by the differences and

\textsuperscript{71} Usher to the Board of Trade, August 1694, CO5/924, no. 40.
\textsuperscript{72} New England Minutes of Council, 15 April 1697, CO5/787, 43v.
\textsuperscript{73} An abstract of Captain Stephan Sewall's Letter to Mr Edward Hull of London, Salem, 2 November 1696, CO5/859, 128.
jealousies of the English and their weakness in their divided states and governments, may be induced to attempt if not speedily prevent the ruine of all those hopefull plantations, one after another, of which there needs no greater indication then what they have done in the province of Main New Hampshire, and Pemaquid.\textsuperscript{74}

This very tension between factions in New England, already noted as a strategic factor in the Wabanaki decision to mount raids and as a contributing element to the settler's military paralysis, was occasionally alleged to be an immediate cause in the fall of forts or villages. Notable among these losses is the raid on Schenectady. By 1690, the French were directly involved in inciting and assembling some raids: in the case of Schenectady, the raiding force was divided equally between Canadians and First Nations warriors.\textsuperscript{75} An interesting point about this raid is that it was executed with the assistance of Houdenasaunee and Wabanaki converts, rather than with the traditional (and militarily successful) Wabanaki groups.\textsuperscript{76} Even in their successes and operating in shared geography, French colonial military efforts could pass the non-converted Wabanaki by – a situation that is at odds with the recent historical assertion that these raids marked the beginning of “French-directed Indian attacks on the New England settlements, in which the Wabanakis served as the shock troops of the French war effort.”\textsuperscript{77} However, the raid on Schenectady is not the example of French direction of native war that it is so often presented as being. Consider the description by Charles de Monseignat:

"Comme les sauvages, qui avoient une parfaite connaissance des lieux, et plus d'experience que les francois ne pouvoient se rendre a leur sentiment, ou différa a prendre une resolution jusques a ce qu'on fussse arriver a l'endroi ou les deux Chemins D'orange et de Corlard se separent, pendant cette route qui fut de huit

\textsuperscript{74} “Memoir for the uniting the northern colonies in America under one Government”, 1 February 1696, COS/859, 167.

\textsuperscript{75} Allen Trelease, \textit{Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997) 301.

\textsuperscript{76} Trelease, \textit{Indian Affairs}, 301.

\textsuperscript{77} Colin Calloway, \textit{The Western Abenaki of Vermont, 1600-1800: War, Migration and the Survival of an Indian People} (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 95.
jours les francois jugerent a propos de tourner du coste de Corlard, ainsy que les sauvages leur conseilloient, et l'on prit le chemin sans une nouvelle deliberation.\textsuperscript{78}

The target was chosen based on direction from the First Nations contingent, though the raiding force was initially inspired and assembled by a call for military action in Montreal. This validates the charge of French incitement, but once in motion, the native leaders in the party demanded the French define their targets. The French stated that they intended to make for the capital of New York, but "ce dessin paru un peu temeraire aux sauvages", who promptly set about trying to remove such impracticable notions from the heads of their French allies.\textsuperscript{79} The natives won the argument, and the raid fell on Schenectady. The choice, from the perspective of the raiders, was sound; the state of the town illustrates the effect internal strife had on the security of marginal settlements. A correspondent of Andros' reports, "The town was well fortified, but the inhabitants, divided by Leisler's faction, were careless and left the gates open."\textsuperscript{80} Leisler himself comments on the impact of the internal divisions – although he selects a different target for criticism, stating that other colonies had but recently drawn off some forces sent for the defence of the area.\textsuperscript{81} Leisler describes the attack as commencing late at night, and in thick snow – hinting at but not admitting surprise. About sixty people were killed and approximately thirty made captive. The force's withdrawal from Schenectady was eased by the difficulty English officials found in attempting to persuade local – and apparently allied - Houdenasaunee to pursue their league compatriots among the joint native-French raiding force.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{78} Relation de Charles de Monseignat, November 1690, AC, C11A vol 11, 10v.
\textsuperscript{79} Relation de Charles de Monseignat, November 1690, AC, C11A vol 11, 10-10v.
\textsuperscript{80} Redford to Andros, Salem, 7 March 1690, CSPCS, 13:222-223, no. 783.
\textsuperscript{81} Leisler to the Bishop of Salisbury, New York, 31 March 1690, CSPCS, 13:242-243, no. 805.
\textsuperscript{82} Jon Parmenter, "After the Mourning Wars: The Iroquois as Allies in the Colonial North American Campaigns, 1676-1760", William and Mary Quarterly 64, no. 1 (January 2007), 47.
Unsurprisingly, the most scathing criticisms in New York in the wake of the raid came from Robert Livingston, a legal clerk for the county of Albany. That station set him in natural opposition to the Leisler faction. Livingston stated in colourful terms that the schism of authority within Schenectady prevented military officers, soldiers and magistrates alike from mustering the townspeople to their own defence.83 These internal divisions fostered a climate of unease in the Massachusetts colony. One Boston merchant, writing to a friend in London, records that “[w]e are in a bad condition what with the difference that is amongst us, the French and Indians killing and destroying our outparts and scarcity of powder and ammunition. I cannot write in full by reason they are very scrupulous and know not but all letters may be broke open.”84 The allegation of espionage by way of the post was certainly in keeping with known English methods and motives of intelligence gathering in the seventeenth century. By the 1660s, the English postal system was capable of reliably intercepting personal correspondence.85

The 1690 Schenectady raid is a widely-referenced example of the relationship between the French and the First Nations allies, but that relationship is not, as it is so often esteemed, a relationship of master and hireling, or even of warlord and mercenary. One author from the time used the phrase, “The French have lately joyned themselves with the Indians” to describe the build-up to the raid on Schenectady, an apt reversal of conventional paradigms.86 The French did not always enjoy the position of leadership in military partnerships with their First Nations allies, even when they conceived of and convened the raiding party. This is borne out by the course of the Schenectady raid, one

83 Livingston to Andros, 19 April 1690, CSPCS, 13:247-249, no. 836.
84 Thomas Cooper to John Ellis, Boston, 2 April 1690, COS/855, no. 78.
of the signal military raids early in King William's War.

The paradigm of military leadership by the French needs further evaluation still: the incompetence of French partners in military efforts occasionally earned searing contempt from their First Nations allies. This was the case in 1694, when Villieu was reconnoitring Fort Pemaquid with three native allies. Joseph Robinau de Villebon, then commandant of Acadie, had an adversarial relationship with Villieu; he describes the incident as follows:

"The Sieur de Villieu nearly caused the death of the three Indians who had gone to Pemaquid on a pretext of trading; impatient for their return, he fired a pistol to recall them, and the English, who had been told by the Indians that they were alone, suspecting treachery, would have killed them if they had not given a satisfactory explanation. On leaving the fort they went to find the Sieur de Villieu, upon whom one of them fell, giving him a very severe beating."87

Another example of independent Wabanaki military operation is the Oyster River Raid of July, 1694. There were a few clues for identification of the raiding party as at least in part Wabanaki: first, the presence of Robin Doney (signatory to the Pemaquid peace of 1693); second, the report of natives in canoes heading 'to Eastward, which are judged to be persons which did the Mischeife"; and third, the separate and distinct identification of southern Indians.88 Further, an escaped captive makes no mention of French leadership (beyond the clergy) despite the presence of Villieu on the raid.89 The raid created a rift between the colonies of Massachusetts and New Hampshire: John Usher challenged Phips and his Council, who claimed peace with and the subjection of Doney, to enforce the rule of law against him.90 That challenge lay within the terms of

87 Villebon's comments for the Minister on the "Relation du voyage faite par le Sieur de Villieu", quoted in Webster, Acadia, 63.
88 Usher to Phips, Newcastle, 28 July 1694, CO5/924, 125; New Hampshire Council to Phips, Newcastle, 20 July 1694, CO5/924, no. 69.
89 New Hampshire Council to Phips, Newcastle, 20 July 1694, CO5/924, no. 69.
90 Usher to Phips, Newcastle, 28 July 1694, CO5/924, 125.
the peace Doney had signed, which provided for adjudication of offenses under English law. Usher also accuses Phips – and what gives rise to this accusation is unclear – of lying with regard to New Hampshire's relationship to the First Nations: “Am Sorrie the Countrey Continues in a way of lying and c.; that the Province would not make peace that the Indians had received Injury by taking away Cannoos, and upon Application denied them satisfaction”, to counter which charge, Usher attached notes from the deposition of three men who had traveled to Casco, the council of New Hampshire secured canoes that James and John Leech and John Rickord had taken from Casco Bay, that they prepare to make good damages, and that fishermen inquire of the “Indians at Eastward if they had taken any cannooes from them.”91 The implication from the whole swath of correspondence, though, is that Phips and his council had deceived the First Nations about New Hampshire and vice-versa, and that the Oyster River raid was at least in part both suffered and insufficiently responded to because of the actions and neglect of the Massachusetts colony government. Usher's contentions within his own government played a role in his frustration, but his comment on the performance in the wake of the Oyster River raid is most apt: “When council called and advice asked for sending to Boston for relief and defence against the Enemy, rather obstructed than forwarded, under the pretence of the warr being General.”92 That pretence has survived into current historiography; even so bilious an author as Usher would not peremptorily dismiss this description of the war if it was consistent with the experience of the colonies at the time. The colonies were not fighting a general war.

That very experience, of isolation and insular behaviour, made relief from the

91 Examination of James Leech, John Leech and John Rickford before the Lieutenant-Governor and Council of New Hampshire, 12 April 1694, CO5/924, 125v.
92 Usher to Council of New Hampshire, Newcastle, 16 August 1694, CO5/924, unnumbered. Note: only folio reproduced on microfilm between folios 135 and 140).
enemy on the frontier a significant issue for many small towns. The inhabitants of Wells, for example, petitioned not to be charged ordinary rates because of the circumstance of the war. The town’s fortifications were dilapidated and the residents were subject to frequent raids. Perhaps the most telling note of the debate, though, is in the request “that the Captain and Soldiers posted there in His Majesty’s Service may be assistant unto them in rebuilding and repairing their Garrisons as the Honourable the Commander-in-chief shall think fit.” The implication is that the militia in the town would not – without external direction – work towards making their own facilities sound, a reading that is supported by the veiled rebuke in the council’s response to the petition, ordering the military unit “so they will rebuild and further adventure their lives and Estates in standing their ground and defending his Majesty’s interests in those Eastern parts.”93 The appeals to imperial allegiance seem hollow in light of the manifest neglect of other colonies, and the authority for appeal and correction of the situation was local. Perhaps in part because of their difficulties both in supporting neighbours and in responding to military needs within their own borders, Massachusetts did also request support from nearby colonies. In 1697, the Massachusetts council solicited aid from Connecticut, asking that a company of fifty or sixty men be despatched to assist in securing the frontier, and also that Connecticut reinforce its “party of Indians now abroad in pursuit of the Enemy by adding some more to that number.”94

The stark and clear direction implied in the request to reinforce the native force belies the complexity of the relationship between English settlers and their native allies. Just as the French found on the way to Schenectady, the collaborative and consent-based native military method could often assert itself to overwhelm whatever construct of

94 New England Minutes of Council, 31 May 1697, CO5/786, no. 149.
colonial organization might have arranged a joint operation. For example, in 1692 near Schenectady, forces from New York were in pursuit of a French and native raiding party. Lacking orders, the commander, Major Schuyler, did not wish to march, but “the Indians, who threatened else to desert” obliged him to pursue the enemy with notice to his commander by way of a messenger.\textsuperscript{95} In this instance, the suborned Schuyler also had to rely on First Nations scouts for information not only on the enemy, but on operations of other allied native warriors massing nearby. That trust could be a difficult thing, as evidenced by the crossing over of First Nations warriors on both sides and the attempts of First Nations working with the French to detach the native allies from the New Englanders.\textsuperscript{96} Whatever divisions and alternate loyalties may have operated in the course of pursuing the enemy, when the fight came to securing a hasty fort erected by the French forces, the operation faltered because the settlers' militia, short of provisions, refused to prevent the retreat of the enemy. When they were finally fed and in pursuit of the enemy, the Mohawks and other English allied natives refused to close further with the enemy. Several native prisoners left behind by the French warned that their relatives would be killed if they continued to press the assault. The party was therefore “not able to make any further pursuit: But that which did most of all to discourage us, was, that the Indians had great averseness to pursue the Enemy... whereupon we marched back.”\textsuperscript{97}

The operation was something of a microcosm for the state of internal divisions amid the parties to King William’s War. In the wake of the same affair, leaders of the Five Nations, making answer to Governor Fletcher’s encouragement that they attack the

\textsuperscript{95} Nicholas Bayard, \textit{Journal of the Late Actions of the French at Canada} (New York: Joseph Sabin, 1868), 18. CIHM 24259.
\textsuperscript{96} Bayard, \textit{Journal of the Late Actions}, 19-20.
\textsuperscript{97} Benjamin Fletcher’s Speech to the Indians, Albany, 25 Feb 1692, in Bayard, \textit{Journal of the Late Actions}, 25.
French in Quebec, made a shrewd response:

“While you press us to go and attack the Enemy of Canada by Land, we expect (according to the many Promises and Engagements made to us) to hear of a considerable Force to go with great Guns by Sea, that the Enemy might be assaulted both ways, and so overcome: we press this the harder, because a great part of our Strength is now broke, and therefore take it not amiss that we push this Point of taking Canada by Sea, since it is impossible to be done by Land alone...”\(^98\)

In the same answer, the Five Nations orators offered a telling comment on the internal divisions of New England and their cost in the war effort:

“We pray that you would be pleased to acquaint our great Lord of Lords (who lives over the great Lake) of our mean Condition, and what Posture we are in, and how easy it is to destroy Canada, if all our great Lord of Lords Subjects in these Collonies would unite and joyn together...” \(^99\)

Serious political divisions existed within all parties during King William's War – but there was no effective exertion of authority to resolve them, nor was there aid from the home military to address the conflict that threw the schisms into sharp relief. Therefore, their prosecution of the war was hampered, and the resulting vulnerabilities spurred the parties to the independent pursuit of peace. Although peace efforts were discussed earlier in terms of the local conduct of hostilities, occasionally the peace settlements became a source for further conflict between colonies. One instance of this occurred between New Hampshire and Massachusetts. In August of 1693, Phips returned from Pemaquid after securing an agreement with nearby native leaders to “forbeare all Acts of Hostility against the English” and to acknowledge “their Subjection and Obedience unto the Crown of England.”\(^100\) The nature of the peace secured is debatable – whether both groups understood the terms in the same way or if the written record reflects the oral exchange of the meeting is an open question. The roster of native leaders

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\(^98\) The Answer of the Five Nations, Albany, 25 Feb 1692, in Bayard, Journal of the Late Actions. 45  
\(^99\) The Answer of the Five Nations, Albany, 25 Feb 1692, in Bayard, Journal of the Late Actions. 45  
\(^100\) New England Minutes of Council, 21 August 1693, CO5/785, 124.
experienced in dealing with the colonies in attendance - Edgeremet, Madockawando, and so on - shows that this agreement was made with capacity and authority by a substantial group of powerful Wabanaki leaders. The Council in New Hampshire seemed also to view the war – and the peace – in a local light, as made plain by Usher's complaint of October 1693:

“Since the abovesaid William Phipps without acquainting the Government; did with several of his Council make a Peace with the Indians which are in Rebellion, and have Murdered many of the Kings Subjects and not engaged this Province in the Same, Which I humbly Conceive in time may prove very prejudicial.”

This peace – beside being negotiated apart from the other colonies – illustrates the local nature of King William's War in another way. Immediately after the peace agreement was discussed, the Massachusetts Council made a telling response: it reduced the frontier garrisons, citing “easing of Charge”, and leaving only the capacity for scouting and small local reinforcements. This action – considering that there was no peace with the French – begs a few questions: who was the effective enemy in the conflict? How did the Massachusetts Colony understand the threat to their people and their settlements? The answer, from this action, seems to be that the war between the French and the English was a great deal more abstract to the Massachusetts leadership than the war with the Wabanaki. In an earlier example of a local peace leading to disarmament and disregard of the conflict, Major Benjamin Church, after leading a raid into Wobanakik in 1690 that was reputed a failure, wrote bitterly to a correspondent,

“...I am informed by Captain Andros, that yourself and most all the forces are drawn off from the eastward parts. I admire at it, considering that they had so low esteem of what was done, that they can apprehend the eastward parts so safe before the enemy were brought into better subjection.”

101 The Submission and Agreements of the Eastern Indians, Pemaquid, 11 August 1693, CO5/908, 99-104.
103 Letter of Benjamin Church to Major Pike, Bristol, 27 Nov 1690, quoted in Thomas Church, The History of Philip's War (Hartford: Silas Andrus and Son, 1932; c. 1716) 204. CIHM 48405.
With perceived relief from the threat of native warfare in 1690 and in 1693, Massachusetts colony neutered itself. Stripping away their own ability to fight is one issue – and it does illuminate the colony's consideration of the threat. The compromised safety of the colony's neighbours, however, illustrates the highly localized nature of the war and the consequent lack of coherent defence or negotiation by the English settlers.

Phips' problematic 1693 peace built on a history of conflicted accommodations between the New Englanders and their First Nations neighbours to Eastward. There were strong anglophiles in the Wabanaki community: the sustained efforts of such notable Wabanaki leaders as Wanalandet to maintain working relations with the New Englanders underscore the unfortunate cost of the descent into war. Samuel Drake noted that Wanalandet attempted to warn Major Richard Waldron of the coming raid against Dover in 1689. This is indicative of the divided attitudes among Pennacooks towards the war and between leaders as diverse as Kancamagus and Wanalandet. It is unsurprising that the nation found itself in some internal conflict. Among Penobscots, Madockawando – one of the local leaders most personally vested in the conflict - had laid aside his campaigning after only a few years to negotiate the peace with Sir William Phips at Pemaquid in 1693, and to sell land to a Phips later the same year and to another colonist in 1694. He is also mentioned a few times in the report on Villieu's mission of 1694 to rekindle the Wabanaki war effort against the English – each time, as an opponent to further hostilities. However, another influential Wabanaki leader, Taxous, still

105 MacDougall, *Penobscot Dance of Resistance*, 75; Madockawando's land deal with Phips may be found in Mary Farnham, *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, vol 8, 11.

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affirmed his commitment to war with the English – a commitment that was encouraged by Villebon early in 1694. Villebon appears to have been sensitive to the value of kinship among the Wabanaki: he adopted Taxous as his brother; Villebon also dressed Taxous in his own finest clothing. The motivation of kinship redoubled for Taxous later in 1694, when he lost a nephew in the conflict with the New Englanders. Taxous eventually prevailed in an internal power struggle; Bruce Bourque identifies two major factors that convinced many Wabanakis to renew hostilities with the English: first, a rumour of a powerful raid being assembled by the English colonists; and second, the nature of the peace and land agreements that Madockawando and Edgeremot had made with the English. The terms of the peace were stern, and included the provision of Wabanaki hostages to the province of Massachusetts, as well as native submission to English law. The land deals do not appear to have been made in a fashion consistent with Wabanaki practice: a senior sachem had the right to sell land, but this was qualified by the need for consent from lesser sachems and other natives who had a relationship with the territory. The land sales of 1693 and 1694 did not proceed from any consensus. Based on these issues, internal Wabanaki politics were taking a militant shift when he appealed for participation in raiding: Villieu's timing was fortuitous. In the context of these events, Taxous was able to convince two hundred Wabanaki warriors to join him for renewed raiding. A measure of the radical shift in internal Wabanaki politics is that  

109 Villebon to Pontchartrain, 15 September 1693, translated and quoted in Webster, Acadia, 57.  
110 Bruce J. Bourque, Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 167.  
Madockawando was eventually prevailed upon to join the raids as well.\textsuperscript{112} By the next spring, however, Madockawando was again working to achieve a prisoner exchange with Massachusetts.\textsuperscript{113} The operation of these profound divisions within the Wabanaki polity illustrate the need to evaluate King William’s War on a local level, both in terms of hostilities and in terms of the peace agreements obtained.

The local desire to quell the fighting, whatever the circumstances in Europe, was also expressed by the French. There, too, the quest for accommodation or peace met with a hard end. According to a French prisoner in the custody of Leisler in New York, they had sent five emissaries to treat with the Houdenasaunee in 1690; the messengers met a grisly fate and that particular entreaty failed.\textsuperscript{114}

Choosing to end a fight – and being deemed by the enemy to have the authority to do so - is as valuable an indication of military independence as the choice to start. It is much more difficult to assign the conflict a purely colonial context in light of the First Nations peace initiatives. The French were in need of all the military aid they might hector out of their allies – indeed, they presumed upon it for their own security. The French took reassurance in their military standing in Acadie in 1693 when a Wabanaki messenger delivered scalps and a prisoner to Quebec.\textsuperscript{115} However, the split in their alliance with the Wabanaki was apparent in the separate peaces negotiated by Wabanaki leaders with the English.

One significant factor in the Wabanaki willingness to negotiate was military fatigue. As Steele has pointed out in the context of King Philip’s War, the concept of an

\textsuperscript{112} Baker and Reid, New England Knight, 172-173.
\textsuperscript{113} “Relation du voyage faite par le Sieur de Villieu”, 26 August 1694, AC, C11A, vol 13, 153v.
\textsuperscript{114} Letter forwarded to the Board of Trade from Mr Usher, Boston, 7 July 1690, in CO5/855, no. 113.
\textsuperscript{115} Summary of news, 1693, AC, C11A, vol 12, 197-197v.
annihilating battle waged year-round was foreign to them. Although the Wabanaki may have been pressured towards peace, they also understood and used the threat of independent peace negotiations to pressure colonial authorities into providing more military support for their efforts. That support might have been manpower or it might be materiel, but in either case, the value European colonisers attached to the First Nations military actions can be measured by evaluating the success First Nations enjoyed in threatening their allies with peace. Eccles described the Houdenasaunee as waging a “peace offensive” of 1693 which both stalled the French campaign to escalate raiding against their homes and forced the English to provide greater material support. The French suspected – with intelligence from a few sources, including escaped captives – that the Houdenasaunee might use the tendering of peace negotiations as cover for offensive movements. The failed negotiations and the plausible word of attempted deception effort left Frontenac fuming and planning for renewed military efforts against the Houdenasaunee. Allied First Nations also pressured the French based on sound assessments of their situation. There are a number of indications that the Wabanaki were quite aware of their value to the French, and occasionally used it to pressure them on certain key points. For example, when, in 1690, they sought to obtain the release of a number of Wabanakis taken prisoner by Houdenasaunee converts, the route they chose to use was via the French. Their request began in studied language: “Souffrez mon pere que je vous aille interrompre un moment pour vous raconter nos peines”. The language of the Wabanaki request was no less carefully crafted when it turned to a subtle pressure against the French:

116 Steele, Warpaths, 106.
117 W. J. Eccles, Frontenac, the courtier governor (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1959), 257.
“J'apprehende que, sy on refuse de nous les rendre, mon frere qui est a l'Acadie ne
se ressente de cela et n'en ayt l'esprit mal fait, au liey que je suis sur qu'il
m'ecoutera, qu'elle mechantes pensees que cela lui ayt donne, sy on nous les
rends.”120

By 1696, the Hurons and the Ottawas, who had been seeking favourable trade with the
French in 1690, had truly broken away, having reached “leur paix avex les iroquois sans
nostre participation et d'attirer chez eux le commerce de l'anglois.”121

Some Wabanaki leaders, like Wanalanct, pursued peace in earnest quite early in
King William's War, although the process could be complicated by the tensions between
oral and written records of their negotiations. This was explicitly recorded during
negotiations on 29 November 1690:

English: Where are the English captives you promised to bring to Lt Stovers house
this day?
Indians: The English proposed it, but we did not promise to bring in the said
captives.
English: The articles that you subscribed to obliged you to bring the captives.
The article was read
Indians: The other sagamores are hunting. When they return we will bring in the
captives... we know that all Sagamores are desirous to have a constant and
everlasting peace made with the English.122

The Wabanaki leaders did not admit that the authority of the written record exceeded that
of their knowledge of the agreement; they merely passed by the reading of the articles to a
position they might have taken anyway: that the captives would be returned when all of
their leaders were available to effect the exchange. Their closing statement, indicating
their desire for peace, certainly put them at odds with the policy and provocation of the
French colony.

In 1693, native leaders were again negotiating for peace, and eventually succeeded

120 “Relation par Charles de Monseignat de ce qui s'est passe... de novembre 1689 jusqu'au mois de
121 Frontenac and Champigny to the Minister, Quebec, 26 October 1696, AC, C11A, vol 14, 119.
122 Articles agreed upon between the English and Several Indian Sagamores, 29 Nov 1690, CO5/855, no.
159. Among the leaders present or represented were Edgeremet, Warumbe and Wesumbanett.
in the summer by reaching an agreement with Phips at Pemaquid. Villebon sent word from Acadia that the Wabanaki were trading their beaver with the English, but that their contact “n'estant simplement que pour le commerce... nous a este confirme par les sauvages qui nous sont venus.” 123 Although the words are constructed in a sense that seems reassuring, this news represented another diplomatic and financial loss for the French colonies arising from the direct and independent action of native groups to maintain the primacy of their own interests. In this case, that entailed closing the raiding cycles they had started, and ignoring incitements and enticements to war.

The actions of the Wabanaki in this case continued to be in their own interest, whether in terms of seeking peace or reinforcing a raid. Denonville, in response to the disparity between his forces and the strength of their enemies (in particular the Houdenasaunee), had tried peace as a tactic in the years leading up to King William's War. Although his efforts were not rewarded with a lasting treaty, the preliminary talks and the responses of Houdenasaunee leaders indicate that, at the very least, the Houdenasaunee who troubled to journey to Montreal for talks were more open to peace with the French than they were to being dealt with as vassals of the English settlers. 124 However, the negotiations were a risk for the French: the eventual failure to reach a peace agreement with the Houdenasaunee diminished the credibility of the French colony with its First Nations allies. 125 This restricted the colonial French opportunities for diplomatic manoeuvre: the one collapsed peace placed a much larger network of French alliances with First Nations at risk, and the First Nations were willing to negotiate with each other

123 Summary of news, 1693, AC, C11A, vol 12, 204v.
124 W. J. Eccles, Canada under Louis XIV, 1663-1701 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), 159-160.
and with the English settlers in their own interest and at the expense of the French. The Mesquakie, for example, had sent members to join a French raiding party in 1688, but in the wake of the French diplomatic failure with the Houdenasaunee immediately offered a renewed alliance with the Senecas.\(^{126}\) The situation of the Mesquakie is illuminating with regard to that of the Wabanaki: the French efforts for war and peace were basically misdirected in the eyes of the First Nations at the geographical edges of their alliance network.\(^{127}\) This strategic difference required French First Nations allies to pursue their own policies of war, peace and trade – whatever loyalty or affection they professed while treating in Montreal, aboriginal leaders at the periphery of French power had to operate in the knowledge that French power ran thin around them. The peace negotiations undertaken by allies were sometimes challenged by the French, and the resulting dialogue underscores the local and highly independent nature both of hostilities and of peace during the period of King William's War. Returning to the example of the Ottawa delegation present at Montreal in 1690:

“[Louis Ateriata, orator for the French] dit aux Outaouas qu'il savoit toutte leur negotiation avec nos ennemis, qu'il y avoit este instruit par eux mesme, qu'il dissent donc sy il estoient veritablemen freres des francois pour quelle raison ils avoient voulu traitter avec L'iroquois sans leur participation. "Un des Outaouas qui avoit este avec la petit racine, chef de cette ambassade aux Sonnontounans repondu... qu'onnontio (estoit M. de Denonville) qui n'avoit pu se defendre lui mesme ny leur laissa accabler sans leur secourir, ils avoient este constrainte de songer eux mesme a leur surete et prevenir leur perte par un accommodement.”\(^{128}\)

Although the separate peace negotiations by local native leaders in the early 1690s did not endure, Wabanaki groups were distancing themselves from French policy. This matured later in a formula that recurred elsewhere in the Northeast: the desire for a neutral status,\(^{126}\) R. David Edmunds and Joseph L. Peyser, *The Fox Wars: The Mesquakie Challenge to New France* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 24.\(^{127}\) Edmunds and Peyser, *The Fox Wars*, 30.\(^{128}\) “Relation par Charles de Monseignat”, November 1690, AC, C11A, vol 11, 26
apart from the European colonies' conflicts. Neutral status was also an abnegation of
the existing Wabanaki alliance with France. This is consistent with Baker and Reid's
proposal of indigenous military power in Wobanakik evolving into a broader network of
First Nations alliances, rather than partnerships with settlers.

Internal divisions plagued the parties to King William's War, especially in
Wobanakik. Even with due regard for the flexible and developing nature of three of the
four polities that were fighting – the post-revolution English, the Houdenasaunee and the
Wabanaki – the politics, conduct of the war and solicitation of peace all strongly indicate
profound internal rifts occasionally further reveal a real disregard for nominal allies. A
monolithic construct of the combatants in King William's War does not hold up in light of
these events. This reinforces the need to appraise the war as distinct from the
contemporary European fighting.

129 Dale Miquelon, New France, 1701-1744: A Supplement to Europe (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1987), 26-27.
Conclusion

Captain Sylvanus Davis is noted in the military history of Wobanakik for his command of the defence of Fort Loyall at Falmouth in 1690. He served in King Philip's War and he was again serving with the militia shortly after the Boston uprising of 1689. Davis seems to have taken his commission seriously: for example, he was determined in pursuing proper provisioning of the frontier garrisons and forts. Besides this military experience, Davis had a long history in the Kennebec River area, and specifically on Arrowsic Island, where he conducted trade and worked as an agent for Clarke and Lake.¹ In short, Davis knew the business of war in Wobanakik, but more than that, he had an intimate personal knowledge of the area and its inhabitants dating from the 1660s on, and, because of the location of his trade, it seems most likely that he had regular contact with the Wabanaki in the area over the course of many years.

After his unsuccessful defence of Fort Loyall, Davis, along with several others, was conducted to Quebec as a prisoner. While there, he spoke with Frontenac, who placed the blame for the war on the New York government, “for the governor of New York had hired the New York Indians to come over land... and [the French] were willing to pass it by, rather than make a war with the English.”² Davis answered this in a way that outlines King William's War from the perspective of a long-time resident of the Kennebec area and a serving military officer, a commander. Davis related his response as follows:

² “Declaration of Sylvanus Davis”, quoted in Hull, Fort Loyall, 99.
“I told him that New York and Boston was two distinct governments, and that the
governour of New York must give a particular account to our King for his actions,
each for himself. He said we were one nation. I told him it was true, but two
distinct governments. Also, I told him, that the last Indian war we had a friendly
commerce with the French, and for ought I know it might have been so still, had
not they joined with the Indians.”

Davis saw King William’s War as another “Indian war” in New England. The implication
is that it was like King Philip’s War. The French were involved, regrettably, and only as
they had seconded the Indian’s cause. The trappings and language of a “clash of empires”
are simply absent from Davis’ description of how he, a commercial and military
competitor with the French in Wobanakik, conducted an exchange with the highest
French colonial official in North America. Further, Davis, as an officer who seems to
have served under both Charter and Dominion governments with success, disowns any
commonality of the war effort with New York.

During the period of warfare in North-east North America, the New England
colonists frequently referred to the French and their First Nations allies as “the common
enemy”, yet, as Davis stated, the war from 1688 to 1699 was not fought in common
among the colonies. Nor was it waged in lock-step with the Nine Years’ War. Simple
chronology bears on the nature of the war: there were numerous and serious provocations
between neighbours in North America before the European states went to war in 1689.
Once underway, though, the context of the Glorious Revolution and the broader military
confrontation facilitated the fighting in King William’s War in two ways. First, the
revolution abroad was linked to uprisings in New England that materially affected their
relations with their neighbours and their ability to fight; and second, the conflict between

3 “Declaration of Sylvanus Davis”, in Hull, Fort Loyall, 99.
the European powers did permit direct warfare between the English and French colonies in North America. Prior to this, though, First Nations including the Wabanaki and the Houdenasaunee, launched military actions independent of any European or colonial influence. Once the fighting was under way, the home countries of the empires did not extend much effective aid to their colonies in North America, especially in the context of a land war of raids and ranging patrols. That neglect can be tied directly to military weaknesses and defeats on the parts of both the French and the English. Among nominal allies – even among imperial communities of colonies – collaboration was the exception rather than the rule in King William's War. The result was a divided war, with separate land elements: Wabanaki versus English and French versus Houdenasaunee. The fragmented nature of the war was also reflected in the aftermath of the fighting: the native groups that had allied with European colonies for logistical support no longer had faith in those arrangements. The Houdenasaunee moved forward to the Great Peace of Montreal in 1701; the Wabanaki broadened their own network of alliances, including renewing trade and diplomacy in their own right with the English. 4

This outcome is consistent with the local context of the war. Examining King William's War at the local level develops a picture of evolving military and diplomatic power of First Nations at the time – strength that their colonial neighbours tried with only sporadic success to ally to their interests. The local nature of the conflict is reinforced by assessing each of the combatants based on independence of action, imperial neglect and internal divisions. King William's War occurred in the context of the Nine Years' War, but was distinct from it in important ways: it was essentially a local war.

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