The rise of Islamism in Turkey: 
Failure of Kemalism or a New Development Alternative?

by

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A Thesis Submitted to
Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
the Degree of Master of Arts 
in International Development Studies 

February, 2011 

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Abstract

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Abstract: This thesis examines the rise of Islamism in Turkey over the last three decades. It explores the increasing role of Islamism in Turkey in society and politics in detail in the context of the religion and development. Moreover, it investigates if and to what extent the Kemalist socio-economic and political development is related to the rise of Islamism in Turkey. The thesis attempts to explain the varied characteristics of Islamism in Turkey and interrogates the circumstances that make judgments on the implications of Islamism to development in Turkey extremely complex. Is the increasing influence of Islamism a reflection of socio-political failure of Kemalism or is it an alternative form of development? This is the question examined in the thesis.

February 7, 2011
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Chapter One

1.1 Introduction

Turkey is a truly fascinating country with thousands of layers of cultural traits and political synergies which illuminate Turkey's uniqueness. It is possible to write extensively about each of the economic, political and social issues in Turkey since its foundation as a republic in 1923. It has been a challenging and adventurous undertaking to attempt to single out a specific problematic in Turkey's society and divorce it from the complexity which characterizes Turkey. In this context, certain political, social and cultural occurrences and specifics have been left out of this thesis when considered not immediately relevant to my topic.

Turkey's geographic position places it into a unique spot on the international arena. Turkey is the socio-political and religious crosswalk between the West, with its commitment to secularism and modernity\(^1\), and the East, with its Islamic roots and traditions. Turkey consists of an approximately 97% Muslim population\(^2\), but embraces at the same time a form of secularism which strictly separates religion from politics and

\(\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\) Although the controversial meaning of the term \textit{modernity} is discussed and contested in great detail by numerous scholars (see Çinar, 2005), in this context modernity is understood as a West-orientated, secular, nationalist ideology. Upon Turkey's creation as a republic, its founder envisioned a modern society as one whose socio-political and economic values were orientated around those of Western Europe:

There are a variety of countries, but there is only one civilization. In order for a nation to advance, it is necessary that it join this civilization. If our bodies are in the East, our mentality is orientated towards the West. We want to modernize our country. All our efforts are directed toward the building of a modern, therefore Western, state in Turkey. What nation is there that desired to become part of civilization, but does not tend toward the West. (Çinar, 2005, p. 5)

\(\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\) The World Christian Encyclopedia (2001) summarizes the religious groupings in Turkey as follows: Muslims 97.2%, Nonreligious 2.0%, Christian 0.6%, Orthodox 0.3%, Independent 0.1%, Protestant 0.1%, Roman Catholic 0.1%, Atheist 0.1%, Buddhist 0.1% (p. 752).
furthermore sees the role of religion as restricted to the private spheres of individuals. Consequently, Turkey has no official state religion. Upon the creation of Turkey as a republic in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, its founder and first president, the six principles of Kemalism have been adapted. These six principles of Kemalism have been introduced into the constitution in 1931 as the “definition of the character of the Turkish state” (Altunışık & Kavli, 2004, p. 21).

![Diagram of Kemalist ideology]

**Figure 1-1: The six arrows of Kemalism**

*Source: Mehmet, 1983, p. 50*

Republicanism symbolizes the beginning of Turkey’s nation-state and the break with the past. It defines Turkey as a constitutional republic. Secularism aims at being the defining symbol of Turkey and the new nation-state. Populism symbolizes that the state places its sovereignty in the hands of Turkey’s people and stresses Turkey’s society as classless. “Thus the regime was not thought to be based on any classes, [...] but on the Turkish nation” (Altunışık & Kavli, 2004, p. 22). The emphasis on nationalism and “Turkishness” aims to serve as the foundation of the new nation-state. Statism/Étatism describes the statist economic reforms which the Kemalist establishment adapted during the 1930s. Statism refers to the Turkish state as the regulator of the major economic activities. Revolutionism/Reformism signifies the government’s commitment to reform traditional institutions and values with modern ones (p. 22).
At the same time, Islam is an important social identity for the majority of Turks. The debate about the role of religion in the public sphere splits the population and often leads to heated debates and tension. The conflicting visions over the type of society Turkey should have with regards to the place of Islam in public space has created "deep social fissures" in Turkey's society (Yavuz, 2003, p. 5). While the religious part of the society accuses the Kemalists of dictating to them about how to exercise their beliefs, the Kemalists fear that Islam will become the defining socio-political character of Turkey and pose a serious threat to secularism. Islam's influence on politics is perceived as one of the greatest risks to the Kemalist character of Turkey. Consequently, in 1997 the military shut down the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) on the grounds of violating the principles of secularism and undermining the secular character of Turkey through a policy of "creeping Islamicization" (Cooper, 2002, p. 120).

The most recent point of tension was the election of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, abbreviated AK Parti or AKP) which won the national elections with 34.4% in 2002 and 46.6% of votes in 2007. The election of the AKP is of a highly controversial nature. While various scholars of Islam and politics consider it to be progress for Turkey with regards to democracy (Naim, 2008; Yavuz 2003), Turkey's secular intellectuals, politicians and Kemalism supporters fear that this will be the demise of secularism and democracy in Turkey. Both the secularists/Kemalists and those who want to see Islam more incorporated in the public space feel that their allegations are justified. The media, academic literature and public debates present these opinions and tensions. On the one hand, some academic scholars interpret Kemalism in Turkey as "state controlled [...] top-down westernization" (Yavuz, 2003, p. 5), and as "secular
authoritarianism" which failed “to respect the legitimate role of Islam in public life” (Nairn, 2008, p. 184). On the other hand, academic literature recognizes “the fearfulness and distrust over its (the AKP’s) true intentions by the Kemalist secularists in Turkey” (Jongerden & Casier, 2010, p. 3). Hence, the debate about the place and role of Islam in public space “has clearly taken on a heavy political significance over the past several years” (Gökarıksel & Mitchell, 2005, p. 148).

In spite of the Kemalist establishment’s efforts to create a nation that is secular, modern and in which religion is restricted to the private spheres, the visibility of Islam in Turkey’s society and politics has increased over the last three decades (Alam, 2009, p. 354). Thus, this thesis attempts to investigate why Islam has gained importance in society and politics in Turkey during this timeframe. To describe this phenomenon, the term Islamism will be applied. In this context, some clarification of the meaning of the term Islamism is required. The term Islamism is defined as using “selective postulates from Islam so as to constitute its political project, especially in the formulation of an alternative national identity and the assertion of a new sense of nationhood” (Çinar, 2005, p. 9). Consequently, an Islamist is someone whose Muslim identity is at the centre of his or her political practice. However, this does not mean that Islamism is always reflected in the same form but has rather various internal differences (Alam, 2005, p. 353). Thus, this thesis will investigate the nature and the reasons for the increased visibility of Islam in society and politics in Turkey which is manifested in the rise of Islamism in the social and political space in Turkey.

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3 An in-depth analysis of the terminology and meaning of Islamism will be conducted in Chapter Two, section 2.3. titled What is Islamism?
At this point it is crucial to point out that my thesis does not intend to evaluate the ideology and achievements of Kemal Mustafa Atatürk. Atatürk is considered a national hero in Turkey, and this thesis does not aim to assess or cast judgement on Atatürk’s ideology or achievements. Furthermore, this thesis also does not attempt to discuss the virtues and failures of the ideology of secularism in general and does not make any generalizations about secularism. In a broad sense, this paper rather attempts to discuss the socio-economic and political space in Turkey and its outcomes on development. At the same time, this paper does not glorify religious extremism or make any judgement about the Sharia and its concepts. This paper rather attempts to explain the role and importance of religion in societies and the reasons for the rise of Islamism in society and politics in Turkey. This paper is a descriptive analysis rather than a prescriptive study of Islamism in Turkey.

1.2 Research Objective

The objective of my thesis is to find the reasons for the rise of Islamism in Turkey which has occurred over the last three decades. I will analyze how the Kemalist establishment in Turkey is connected to the increased visibility and influence of Islam in society and politics. The purpose is to find the reasons why Islam has gained in importance in Turkish society and politics. The statement of my thesis is: The rise of Islamism in Turkey is mainly provoked by the Kemalist establishment because it failed to provide economic and social development to the majority of Turkey’s population. I expect to find in my research that the documented rise of Islamism in Turkey is closely connected to the failure of Turkey’s Kemalist establishment to first create a secular nation-state that is in accordance with a majority Muslim population, and secondly, to
provide adequate economic and social development to Turkey’s population. Consequently, I expect to find that the rise of Islamism serves as a motivation to formulate an alternative development plan for Turkey’s previously marginalized society.

1.3 Methodology

In the broad sense, this thesis will be a qualitative research. Instead of a quantitative study, a qualitative study will be conducted for a variety of reasons. First, my study of the relation between the failure of Kemalism in Turkey and the rise of Islamism is a study of a specific socio-cultural occurrence in a specific geographic context. According to Neuman (2006), researchers conducting qualitative research “emphasize conducting detailed examinations of cases that arise in the natural flow of social life. They try to present authentic interpretations that are sensitive to specific social-historical contexts” (p. 151). Secondly, my thesis requires a nonlinear research path which is often used in qualitative research. The advantage of a nonlinear research path is its effectiveness for acquiring a feeling for the meaning of the data collected (p. 152). Thirdly, in qualitative research all events and occurrences have an impact on the issues that are researched and must be considered for the research project. According to Neuman (2006) “qualitative researchers emphasize the social context for understanding the social world […]. It also implies that the same events or behaviors can have different meanings in different cultures or historical eras” (p. 158). Thus, the qualitative approach is necessary for this research. Denzin and Lincoln (1998) summarize the necessity of this research to be qualitative by stressing “qualitative researchers are committed to an emic, idiographic, case-based position, which directs their attention to the specifics of particular cases” (p. 10).
This thesis will include a case study of Turkey to understand the distinct, complex, social context with which this research deals in order to "retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events" (Yin, 2009, p. 4). Perecman and Curran (2006) describe a case study as a method which "investigates a person, institution, or society rather than people, institutions, or societies more broadly" (p. 170). The case study is not a data gathering approach but rather a methodological one (Berg, 2004, p. 251). In this context, this case study will specifically focus on the socio-economic development approach of Turkey's Kemalist establishment and the particular form of Islamism occurring in Turkey's political and societal spheres. My case study will focus on the views of the various groups which are involved in the shaping of Turkey's socio-economic and political development. This case study attempts to present the opinions and demands from various groups and explain their views on the issues of Islamism and development within a secular democratic order.

In more detail, my case study will be of a descriptive nature. A descriptive case study addresses the questions of how and why (Berg, 2004, p. 257). These types of case studies deal with links which need to be traced over time, rather than focusing on single incidents or short-term occurrences. In the context of this research, the how and why questions aim at answering how and why Islamism has gained strength in Turkey in the last three decades. A crucial aspect of my case study is its generalizability. According to Berg (2004), "when case studies are properly undertaken, they should not only fit the specific individual, group, or event studied but also generally provide understanding about similar individuals, groups, and events" (p. 259). Thus, my case study of the relation between the rise of Islamism and Kemalism in Turkey provides a broader
understanding for the rise of Islamism in secular nation-states with majority Muslim populations. The notion of generalizability is based on the assumption that human nature and behavior is relatively predictable and gives the case study a crucial value (Berg, 2004, p. 260). This thesis will also be relying on a case study since my research deals with issues that are contemporary, namely the current process of the resurgence of Islamism in Turkey over the last three decades.

My thesis will be a library study based on written documentation. Texts provide rich and easily accessible data which deal with the topics and issues that are addressed in this thesis. It is not the primary aim to criticize the texts presented (although this might happen indirectly), but to analyze them in order to reflect the propositions that exist in academic texts concerning the reasons for the rise of Islamism in Turkey. Since this thesis describes Turkey’s Kemalist development on the social-political and economic levels and its relation to Islamism, library research will provide me with historical documents and allow the examination of large-scale trends.

Nevertheless, I am well aware of the shortcomings of library research. Dunsmuir and Williams (1992) indicate in their book, How to do social research. Sociology in action series, the potential shortcomings of a library study. The most crucial shortcoming of this library research is the difficulty to detect biases in written documentations and the concern as to whether or not data can be totally separated from the context of its collection. My research recognizes these limitations. However, the data acquired proved to be sufficient to provide a credible conclusion to the research question.
For the purpose of this thesis, research has been carried out by using evidence from a variety of primary and secondary sources. For the literature review and theoretical constructs, most of the data was accessed using library resources, as well as online databases and journals. Kragh (1987) defines primary sources as “a source that stems from the time about which discloses information and as such has a direct connection with the historical reality” (p. 121). In contrast, “secondary sources were written by people with indirect knowledge. These writers relied on primary sources or other secondary sources for their information” (Rozakis, 2007, p. 39). My primary and secondary sources will include articles, archival data from government documents, books, published surveys by non-governmental agencies, studies from non-governmental sources, newspapers and statistics of private and governmental agencies about the Turkish state.

Academic literature needs to be consulted for this thesis as it offers debates about the reasons for the rise of Islamism in Turkey. In order to strengthen the arguments proposed, as well as check their validity, it will be necessary to consult surveys and statistics which will strengthen or challenge the arguments presented. In this specific case, it is necessary to analyze surveys which illustrate Turkey’s population’s views about religiosity, their willingness to support Islamic movements and their opinions with regards who can offer them better economic and social development. With regards to analyzing surveys, Perecman and Curran (2006) stress that when using existing data from surveys, it is crucial to assess its quality, its sources, possible biases, and the appropriateness with how it relates to one’s subject. Furthermore, it is important to

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4 I am aware of possible biases and political agendas of the media such as the Turkish and international newspapers. I will attempt to carefully regard the data extracted from these sources and use its contents only as supplements to the arguments presented when possible.
question who collected the data and for what purpose. The authors stress "sometimes the announced goal of a survey can influence the type of responses elicited" (p. 121). Moreover, it is crucial to analyze the sampling method and the response rate, and to look at how key questions are worded and defined. Finally, it is important to analyze who developed the questionnaires and how and whether or not the survey procedures have been well documented. Thus, through the analysis of academic debates and existing data from surveys, I hope to provide a credible argument about the reasons for the rise of Islamism in Turkey.

1.4 Thesis Development

The outline of my thesis is as follows. This introductory chapter will be followed by Chapter Two, a literature review which summarizes the current academic debates with regards to the importance of religions in the development of societies. Furthermore, Chapter Two presents the current academic ideas as well as the discussion about the form and reasons for the rise of Islamism in majority Muslim countries in general and in Turkey specifically. Finally, the literature review presents the academic debate with regards to the specifics of the socio-economic development by the Kemalist establishment in Turkey in relation to the rise of Islamism.

Chapter Three is an empirical study of Turkey since its foundation as a republic in 1923. The empirical study consists of a historical overview of Turkey since 1923 in the light of its Kemalist ideology. Furthermore, the empirical study puts great emphasis on the socio-economic development projects of the Kemalist establishment and its social and economic outcomes for the majority of Turkey's population. Another crucial aspect of
Chapter Three is the empirical study of Islamism in Turkey in the political and social spheres. In this context, political parties which have been accused of having an Islamist agenda will be analyzed. On the societal level, the empirical study will focus on the character and agenda of Islamically oriented movements among Turkey’s population.

Chapter Four consists of a discussion which brings into dialogue the arguments presented in the literature review of Chapter Two and the outcomes of the empirical study of Chapter Three. The discussion of Chapter Four centers on the key issues presented in Chapters Two and Three, such as the correlation between religion and development, the reasons for the rise and character of Islamism in Turkey, and the Kemalist socio-economic developments in relation to the rise of Islamism. The study of these issues will be compared between the academic debates presented in the literature review and the results of the empirical study of Chapter Three. Furthermore, Chapter Four will offer a conclusion and discuss the findings of this research project. The final task of Chapter Four will be then to offer recommendations for future research related to the topic of Islamism in Turkey.
2 Chapter Two - Literature Review

The rise of social and political movements which are Islamically oriented are well-documented occurrences in various Muslim countries in the last three decades. Calvert (2008) speaks of an “exhibited heightened religiosity within the context of doctrinally and socially conservative mass movements” within Muslim populations in the recent decades (p. 1). When investigating the crucial question of why the visibility and importance of Islam in society and politics has increased, the search for this answer takes us back to the basic foundations of societies. What role does religion play in the dynamics of societies and what is the link between a society’s religion and development? Ver Beek (2002) acknowledges that religion is a crucial, if not the most crucial element of a society which not only shapes values and traditions, but also serves as a force for social and political movements. Furthermore, religion is a great contributor towards the development of a society, as its norms and values shape attitudes towards economic, social and political development (Marshall, 1999). While nowadays development thinking and practice increasingly acknowledge religion’s role and contributions towards development, this aspect of societies has been largely neglected in development thinking over the last five decades. In this recent past, central development models centered on modernization and principles of modernity (Haynes, 2007). In regards to the rise of Islamism in Muslim countries, academic debates seek to explain this phenomenon.

Academic literature looks at the development models promoting secularisation, modernity and economic globalization and how these adapted and related to Muslim populations. The country of focus is Turkey. Turkey serves as a unique example as it is located at the crossroads between the Middle Eastern culture and religion, and the West’s
culture of secularism and modernization. In 1923, Kemal Mustafa founded the Turkish Republic and introduced a form of secular democracy which aimed at restricting the role of religion to the private sphere and thus restricting it from socio-political influence. However, over the decades, social and political movements oriented towards Islam nevertheless remained on the surface and gained in importance over the last three decades. Thus, this thesis seeks to explain the rise of Islamism in Turkey which gained in influence and importance over the last three decades.

2.1 Definition of Religion and Development

2.1.1 Definition of Religion

Giddens (2001) defines religion as a “set of symbols, invoking feelings of reverence or awe, and is linked to rituals or ceremonials engaged in by a community of believers” (p. 531). A similar definition is given by the cultural and social anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) who defines religion as:

(1) a system of symbols which act to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. (p. 90)

Talal Asad (1993) challenges Geertz’s definition of religion, stating that finding a universal definition of religion is not possible because the understanding of religion is influenced through the historical processes and cultural backgrounds of societies (p. 30). Asad (1993) disputes Geertz’s meaning of symbols since a symbol carries no meaning outside a given community. The author stresses that “a symbol is not an object or event
that serves to carry a meaning but a set of relationships between objects or events uniquely brought together as complexes or as concepts, having at once an intellectual, instrumental and emotional significance” (p. 31). The author rejects the defining of religion due to two main reasons: (1), due to the differences in the historical and social processes of societies and (2), due to the fact that the idea of religion itself is a product which emerged in Europe in the seventeenth century (Asad, 1993, p. 37). Deneulin and Bano (2009) argue that before the seventeenth century the word religion was virtually unknown. Christianity at that time was not thought of as one religion but as the only religion of the world. The idea of religion evolved through Christian missionaries who travelled to new continents and encountered rites and practices unknown to them. Attempting to label such unknown practices in comparison to Christianity set in motion the defining of religion (p. 60). Furthermore, the Reformation in the sixteenth century and the discussion of what constitutes proper Christian practices “gave the final impetus for the need to define what religion is” (p. 60). Consequently, once religion was defined as a set of beliefs and practices, various beliefs could be compared to each other.

Lincoln (2003) challenges Asad’s rejection of defining religion due to its Christian context of emergence arguing that “because languages are historical products in continuous evolution this does not mean that one cannot grasp what a language is and how it is constituted” (p. 2). Instead, Lincoln suggests four main characteristics which should be included when defining religion:

First, religion contains a discourse with transcendental concerns above the human, temporal and contingent world […]. Second, it involves a set of practices which embody the religious discourse. Third, it requires a community whose members
construct their identity with reference to the religious discourse and its practices [...] Fourth [...] the existence of an institution that regulates, reproduces or modifies religious discourse, practices, and community while always reaffirming their transcendental value. (p. 5)

Deneulin and Bano (2009) describe religions as “traditions of thought” which are founded on “fundamental agreements” and which evolve over time in societal contexts (p. 62). The authors stress the importance of regarding religions as evolving traditions rather than static mechanisms. Seeing religions as traditions will enable the understanding of how religion is embedded in societies and how these traditions have been formed due to historical and societal processes. The authors argue that “conceiving religion as tradition means analysing how its adherents interpret its fundamental tenants and embody them in relation to the specific contexts in which they live” (p. 64).

Within the context of society, Balchin (2003) makes a distinction between faith and religion where he considers faith to be a private belief system, and religion to be a collective understanding of identity (p. 40). While Balchin distinguishes between faith and religion to separate the collective dynamic from personal belief, Holenstein (2005) differentiates between spirituality as “the individual experience and spiritual life,” and religion as “an institutionalized set of beliefs and practices administered by hierarchy and - in the cases of abrahamic religions, also based on holy books as written sources” (p. 2). Holenstein’s, as well as Balchin’s distinctions are reasonable differentiations since the debates about faith and spirituality are then clearly separated from the debate about religion and its implications for societies.
2.1.2 Definition of Development

Young (1997) offers a comprehensive definition of development as being “a complex process involving the social, economic, political and cultural betterment of individuals and of society itself. Betterment in this sense means the ability of the society and its members to meet the physical, emotional and creative needs of the population at a historically acceptable level” (p. 53). Longewe (1991) adds to Young’s definition, stating that “development is also about meeting the needs of those that are most in need, and about increased participation and equality. Development is therefore also concerned with enabling people to take charge of their own lives and escape from poverty” (p. 2). Longewe’s definition indicates that development should serve to reverse poor circumstances and empower the most marginalized groups.

Ryan (1995) offers a similar view in the meaning of development, as suggested by the International Development Research Centre: “change that improves the conditions of human well-being so that people can exercise meaningful choices for their own benefit and that of society” (p. V). These definitions contain a variety of human conditions that need to be existent for development to take place. In accordance with these definitions, the Human Development Report (1996) describes development as “a complex concept, based on the priority of human well-being, aimed at ensuring and enlarging human choices which lead to greater equality of opportunities for all people in society and empowerment of people so that they participate in – and benefit from – the development process” (p. 5). Haynes (2007) understands development as an economic, political, moral and psychological compass “focusing on societal stability, security, and relative prosperity, with political, economic, social, moral and psychological dimensions” (p. 4).
The definitions of development given above shall suffice to demonstrate that development of a society should embrace all aspects of human life and should have positive effects on all members of that society.

2.2 Religion and Development

The foundation of this section of the literature review will include the discussion about religion's role in society, its influence on the values of cultures and its role in social movements. Furthermore, once the academic contributions concerning religion and society are introduced, religion's role in development thought and practice will be analyzed based on the analysis of the contributions of academic scholars.

2.2.1 Religion's Dynamics in Societies

Sardar-Ali (2002) argues that religion is a crucial part of an individual's and a group's identity which directly contributes to the group dynamics of societies (p. 62). A group's values and traditions are promoted by a society's culture of which religion is a part. Holenstein (2005) offers a comprehensive and well grounded definition of culture. "Culture embraces the totality of all the creative solutions that a group of people find in order to adapt to their natural and social environment – but also to do justice to the requirements and need of the soul" (p. 2). The author combines in her definition the material and non-material entities of life which form a culture.

In this context, Holenstein (2005) acknowledges three aspects of religion that have a crucial influence on the culture of a society. First, religion provides a metaphysical meaning to a group's belief system and expectations of well-being. Second, religion
shapes individual and collective conduct and attitudes towards economic behavior. Third, religion promotes social and political values for cohesion in societies. Tarrow (1998) accentuates religion's role in culture and society and its influence on social, economic and political shaping. Tarrow (1998) considers religion of crucial importance as it reacts towards social, political and economic issues within societies. "Because it is so reliable a source of emotion, religion is a recurring source of social movement framing [...] religion provides ready-made symbols, rituals, and solidarities that can be accessed and appropriated by movement leaders" (p. 12). Deneulin and Bano (2009) expand on the idea of religion's significance in culture and argue that religion is one of the most crucial elements for the development process within societies since religion offers the moral foundation for norms and values. As the authors see it, "development activities [by religious groups] arise out of attempts by religious communities to live a 'good life' in accordance with the fundamentals of the religion in the contest in which its adherents live" (p. 74). The efforts for development derive from religious traditions and religions' relationship with the transcendent. A very crucial contribution is offered by Deneulin and Bano towards the religion and development debate when placing religion at the core of development due to its ideology, norms and values. "Development work is an expression of how [religious] traditions attempt to live their fundamentals in response to the social, economic and political context Islam or Christianity is practised" (Deneulin & Bano, 2009, p. 74).

More broadly, religion plays an integral part in promoting social capital. The definition for social capital is summarized as "internal social and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that govern interactions among people, and the institutions
in which they are embedded” (Khan & Bashar, 2008, p. 4). Smidt (2003) characterizes social capital as a “set of moral resources” that facilitates the co-existence in communities (p. 4).

A wide range of academic literature analyzes the interconnectedness of religion and social capital. Wuthnow (1996) and Putnam (2002) research the influence of religion on the relationships within communities and the positive dynamics of social capital on social, political and economic development. With regards to religion’s influence on the economic development of societies, thinkers such as Adam Smith (1991), Max Weber (1992) and Karl Polanyi (2001) viewed religion as social capital which has great influence on the dynamics in economic processes. With regards to social development, Stolle and Rochon (1998), as well as Verba, Scholzman and Brady (1995) look at the positive outcomes of collective actions enabled and facilitated through social capital. Coleman (1990) argues that one of the most crucial attributions of social capital on collectivity is the “prescriptive norm that constitutes an especially important form of social capital within a collectivity [...] that one should forgo self-interests to act in the interests of the collectivity. A norm of this sort, reinforced by social support, status, honor [...] is the social capital which builds young nations” (p. 311). The advantages of social capital are summarized as follows:

Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievements of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. [...] For example, a group whose members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive
trust in one another will be able to accomplish much more than a comparable group lacking that trustworthiness and trust. (Coleman, 1990, p. 302)

Religion hereby is categorized as civil social capital, which contributes to increased networking among the population. According to Khan and Bashar (2008), “religion acts as a catalyst for accumulation of social capital” (p. 4). In this context, religion contributes significantly to the structures and values of society through the promotion of attributes such as work ethics, social values, and morals which can all contribute to positive dynamics for the development of societies. Khan and Bashar (2008) emphasize the potential of religion as social capital for societies due to religion’s value systems:

Religion may increase levels of trust and reduce levels of corruption and criminal activity. Besides, religion may lead to better health level by discouraging sinful activities as drugs, overeating, gambling, alcohol, etc. For instance, alcohol and gambling are strictly forbidden in Islam [...]. Religion exerts positive impact on human capital by enhancing education level. Individuals are encouraged to be literate so as to be able to read scriptures and religious teachings. (p. 4)

Smidt’s (2003) book at the same time argues that religious congregations are concerned with the well-being and safety of their communities and act as a “basic social safety net” (p. 19). Furthermore, the active participation of religious groups towards the well-being of their communities must be seen as a “key element for acquiring human and social capital” (p. 20). Khan and Bashar (2008) conclude in their paper about the relationship of religion and development that “the relationship between religion and
development is likely to be complementary as long as religious beliefs and practices promote ‘moderation’ rather than ‘extremes’” (p. 1).

While Holenstein’s (2005) views on religion’s contributions towards the development of societies are mostly positive, the author nevertheless highlights that religion has the potential to both encourage and obstruct development. The author’s insistence that “religions […] can be effective as ‘angels of peace’ as well as ‘warmongers’” stresses the complexity of the impact of religion on the development processes in societies (p. 3). Holenstein offers several features of religion’s nature which might serve as tools for the misuse of power. The author highlights the totalitarian nature of religion, its potential to promote intolerance, violence, hate towards non-members and political exclusion as potentials of religion:

Religion is focused on the absolute and […] thus it can take on totalitarian characteristics. Religious convictions that lay claims to absolute and exclusive validity leads almost inevitably to intolerance […]. Religion can increase aggressiveness and the willingness to use violence, by reason of the symbolic values added that is provided by the sanctification of ‘profane’ motivation and aims […]. Ethic-cultural and cultural-religious differences can easily be harnessed for the domination strategies of identity policies. The spiritual and material resources of religious institutions can be abused for power interests. Leaders of fundamentalist movements lay claim to a single and absolutist religious interpretation at the cost of all others, and they link their interpretation to political power objectives. (p. 4)
The enormous power of religion on a society’s dynamics is exemplified in Appleby’s (2000) book, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation*. In the book, Appleby describes how both terrorists and peacemakers can come from the same community and how different individuals from the same religious community can use religion for opposite purposes such as submission and empowerment. Appleby stresses the ambiguity of religion as something that might evoke opposite courses of action among religious followers:

At a given moment any two religious actors, each possessed of unimpeachable devotion and integrity, might reach diametrically opposed conclusions about the will of God and the path to follow: Violent as well as nonviolent acts fall readily within the range. (p. 30)

Deneulin and Bano (2009) agree with this dual potential of religion’s influence on societies recognized by Appleby and Holenstein, asserting that “religious people and faith-based organizations are notable as agents of advocacy, funding, innovations, empowerment social movements, and service delivery” (p. 61). At the same time, religion can serve to promote violence and hierarchical leadership structures. Along the same lines of understanding, Ter Haar (2007) explores the relationship between society and religion extensively and is particularly concerned about the dynamics religion can carry with regards to conflicts. The author considers religion to be a major constructor of society and culture, and at the same time, “a social and cultural construction” (Ter Haar, 2007, xii). Ter Haar (2007) situates religion as a maker of ethical, social, or political stability and at the time identifies its potential to contribute to and regulate social violence (p. xii). In accordance with Holenstein, Deneulin, and Bano, as well as Appleby,
Ter Haar (2007) stresses the opposing forces of religion, and its political force in social movements:

Religion can promote discourses of oppression that regulate relations between genders, generations, classes, or other social groups. It can also provide models for an ideal society and for ideal relations between genders and groups. Religion can become a tool in the service of freedoms, whether political or existential. (p. xii)

The author then explains that external forces inspire the creation of new religious movements and emphasize that the newly created religions then have the potential to become the source of new conflict themselves:

Growing violence, political oppression and poverty may contribute to the emergence of new religious movements that are seen to promise a better future for those who are suffering, but that may themselves become the cause of serious new conflict. (Ter Haar, 2007, p. xii)

Huntington (1996) also acknowledges religion as a crucial force for the development of societies. The resurgence of religion proves that, “in the modern world, religion is central, perhaps the central force that motivates and mobilizes people” (p. 27). The same crucial realization comes from Ter Haar (2007), who concludes his introduction about religion and society by arguing that religion is a crucial characteristic in our times and carries an enormous influence worldwide. The author argues that, “religion, we may conclude, is set to be a major force in the twenty-first century” (p. xvii). This realization is in accordance with scholars dealing with the rise of Islamism
which is becoming an increasing phenomenon since the 1980s, as will be discussed in detail in the section 2.3. of this literature review.

The realizations stressed in this section are crucial to establish the relationship that religion plays in the dynamics of societies. The literature rightly argues that religion is a crucial force that serves to create, but also challenge, socio-economic and political structures. This is an important realization that serves to explain the question as to why Islam could serve as a source to mobilize people and challenge political structures of nation-states. This section has established the significance of religions on the values and dynamics of societies, and has furthermore recognized it as a crucial motivator for social mobilization with the potential to either enhance development or obstruct development.

### 2.2.2 Religion in Development Thinking and Practice

Selinger (2004) strongly asserts that religion is the central aspect of any culture and must be addressed if successful and sustainable development is to take place (p. 524). In accordance with Salinger, Marshall (1999) stresses the decisive role of religion in development:

The world of religion has been an unacknowledged and often unseen force for many development practitioners in the past [...]. Yet religion is such a pervasive and vital force, that the tendency to ignore it has had important and even grave consequences in some situations. (p. 304)

Selinger (2004) supports the direct correlation between religion and development, rightly arguing that economic growth as the only consideration for a country’s development has been proven wrong. The core argument for the failure of development
in developing countries is the disregard for culture and especially religion as a crucial aspect for development. The author stresses that “in not unpacking culture, social and political scientists have excluded a vital dimension in social theory that applies directly and importantly to development theory” (p. 524). Holenstein (2005) has a similar consideration for religion and its impact on development:

Religion and spirituality are sources of world views and views of life; they constitute creative political and social forces; they are forces for cohesion and for polarisation; they generate stimuli for social and development policies; they serve as instruments for political reference and legitimacy. Development co-operation cannot afford to ignore religion and spirituality. (p. 4)

Ver Beek (2000) is another scholar who considers the religious aspects of life a crucial element in societies of developing countries. After reviewing articles about development thinking and development practice, the author concludes that this aspect of people’s identity has been largely ignored. Ver Beek (2000) sees this marginalization of religion in development thinking and practice resulting in a lack of understanding of the complexity of societies’ structures. “The result of this silence is a failure to explore and understand an integral aspect of how Southern people understand the world, make decisions, and take action” (p. 31). Ver Beek (2000) argues that ignoring the correlation between religion and development can only be considered as anti-development since development thinking which ignores the foundation of a society’s culture cannot bring effective and sustainable development. Ver Beek (2002) explains that religion’s role within the development debate is being consciously ignored despite its prevalence and importance in most developing countries (p. 36). In the table below, Ver Beek (2000)
illustrates the underrepresentation of religion in development journals for the years 1982-1998 using the First Search bibliographic database.

Table 2-1: The distribution of development journals across subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journals: 1982–1998</th>
<th>Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Development</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Development Studies</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Developing Areas</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ver Beek, 2000, p. 37

Selinger (2004), while referring to Van Beek’s study as limited, confirms Van Beek’s findings through her own research which proved similar results concluding that, “the limited literature available demonstrates the different ways in which the development community chooses to view religion” (p. 525).

When researching the crucial question of why religion is being ignored in development theory and practice, Ver Beek (2000) offers several points of explanation which deserve consideration. One reason might be the fear of imposing a religious development perspective that is not in accordance with a society’s values system. The author draws the example of religious organizations using development programs, attempting to impose their religious view on a community. Hence, Ver Beek (2000) concludes that “practitioners may avoid the topic entirely so as to avoid any perceived imposition” (p. 40).
A second reason to avoid religion in development thinking and practice is based on the fear of conflicts motivated by religion such as in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and the Balkans. Ver Beek (2000) concludes that “one apparently safe response is to avoid the sensitive topic” (p. 40). Nevertheless, Ver Beek (2000) counteracts this argument stressing that development thinking and practice does not hesitate to address sensitive topics such as gender issues, the environment, and ethnicity as a necessity to development, while steering completely away from dealing with religion. The author argues that ignoring religion is unacceptable in development thinking and practice and warns that without increased attention to religion “development efforts will fail in their attempts to sidestep an issue which permeates life in the South, will fail to avoid the conflicts which result, and will fail to learn about and encourage people to tap into a potentially powerful source of strength and hope” (Ver Beek, 2000, p. 40).

Lastly, the avoidance of religion in development thinking is attributed to the scientific and secular culture of development academia and the economic/materialist focus of development. This argument seems to carry the most weight as an explanation for the avoidance/absence of religion in development thinking and practice. Marshall (1999) contributes to this argument when writing about the World Bank’s stance towards development. The author stresses the traditional divide of the World Bank between religion and economics, and the Bank’s focus on economic progress as a priority. The author emphasizes the disregard of religion in development thinking and practice, arguing that, “by statute and practice, the World Bank and other traditional development actors have tended to divorce what were seen as political dimensions from development work, thus sticking to technical issues and arguments” (Marshall, 1999, p. 347). Elaborating on
these arguments, Selinger (2004) supports Van Beek’s and Marshall’s observations, arguing that the tradition to separate nation-states from religion “has institutionalized the divide between religion and development” (p. 526). Herbert (2003) puts modernization at the heart of the secularization theory which consequently abandoned the role of religion in society, and from development thinking and practice. “Modernization is at the heart of secularization theory: it is the deep structure leading to long-term decline of the social significance of religion” (p. 35). Included in the various discussions about secularization and the decline of religion is the argument of Esposito and Watson (2000), that “modernity basically has often represented so much confidence in man’s power, theoretical and applied, that any reference to the transcendent or spiritual was felt to be redundant” (p. 17-18).

With regards to religion entering the development landscape, Marshall (1999) believes the connecting link occurred during the 1990s. Throughout the 1980s, Marshall considers religious leaders and institutions to be the most vocal critics to “challenge this traditional removal of the worlds of religion and development” (p. 348). Another crucial rapprochement of religion to development was the disappointing outcomes of economically orientated development programs. Consequently, those disappointments opened the space to consider alternative thinking regarding development. “Growing awareness and appreciation of the complexity and difficulty of the task of social and economic development in turn gave rise to reflection about causes of poverty, a broader quest for understanding, recognition of past errors, and new thinking” (Marshall, 1999, p. 348-349).
Haynes (2007) explains the consideration of religion in development thinking as being inspired by global processes which diminished the belief in secularization. The globalization process and a global religious resurgence “have encouraged the belief that religion can play an important role in the achievement of desirable development outcomes in the developing world” (p. 2). Globalization is the greatest contributor towards the academic and developmental acceptance of religion because of its “economic, social and developmental ramifications” (Haynes, 2007, p. 2). These negative economic outcomes of globalization have encouraged religious communities to address these shortcomings through their own resources. Haynes (2007) considers the “well documented religious resurgence in many parts of the world” in the last three decades as a reaction to the global economic processes and its negative outcomes (p. 3). Consequently, “there is now widespread acceptance that desired development outcomes can more likely be achieved if the energies and abilities of various non-state actors – including faith-based organizations, can be tapped into” (Haynes, 2007, p. 3).

Deneulin and Bano (2009) underline the necessity to include the role of religion in the development discourse. This, consequently, will challenge the current thinking about development and the contributions of religion towards it. The authors rightly consider this to be a necessary rethinking as the considerations for religion’s role in development has largely been neglected:

Re-establishing the role of religion in human development in the developing world necessarily implies challenging the modernist assumptions of secularism and positivist rationalism, social sciences based on European modernism, which in the
religious view have proved to be inadequate to produce necessary answers and, as a result, need to be reformed and rethought. (Deneulin & Bano, 2009, p. 63)

In accordance with Deneulin and Bano, Ryan (1995) makes three crucial recommendations in the search to integrate religion into the development debate and thus to improve the development paradigm: (1), the opinion of locals should be included when creating a development paradigm for a given area, (2), the local and ethical paradigms should be integral parts of development research projects, (3), the global ethic for human development should derive from practical experiences instead of rational theories (p. 39). In this respect, Johnston (2001), founder and president of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, argues that the failure of the developed countries to recognize religion as a crucial force of social identity has negatively affected development outcomes. Johnston (2001) calls for a reassessment of religion in development thinking, arguing that, “the world can no longer afford to overlook the significant contributions that religious and spiritual factors can bring to resolving conflict” (p. 45). Selinger’s consideration for religion in development discourse supports Johnston’s and Ryan’s proposals. Selinger (2004) believes that religion is key for successful development to occur:

Thus, culture, and the way religion has fed into it, are highly significant for successful development to take place, and while it is by no means wrong to see religion as a spiritual force, in the context of development strategy and in seeking to influence its agencies we must focus on the social and structural side to religion. (p. 538)
The author concludes her influential article about religion and development by warning that although development thinking concerning religion is changing, these changes are nevertheless insufficient. Consequently, unsuccessful development outcomes will be the only result while religion is not considered on equal stand with economy and politics as variables for development:

Until we are able to appreciate truly the role of religion in this domain, rejecting the ultimate centrality of economic growth and instead recognizing religion as a social force that cannot be separated from the economic and political spheres, international development strategy will not succeed in creating effective sustainable development. (Selinger, 2004, p. 540-541)

Selinger’s evaluation and future prognosis deserve substantial acknowledgment. The religiously based social and political movements and conflicts directly reflect the influential and crucial role of religion in societies and its potential for political and social mobilization. They directly display the necessity to acknowledge and incorporate religion into development thinking and practice.

The current literature concerning the role of religion in development suggests two significant aspects. First, most scholars agree that religion plays a crucial role in the shaping of societies and their values. Second, the literature suggests that religion has been mistakenly disregarded in development thinking and needs to be included in development practice if development is to be successful and sustainable. The literature rightly argues that modernization and secularization thinking largely excluded religion from the public spheres and from development theory. As will be discussed in the latter part of this
literature review, the exclusion of religion's role in development thinking and practice is also illustrated in Turkey's secularization process. Religion itself did not go away, but was excluded in discussions and plans for secularization. As has been convincingly demonstrated by scholars, the enormous power of religion still has great influence on the mobilization of people, and relates to the presence of religious forces in Turkey today.

2.3 What is Islamism?

2.3.1 Defining Islamism

As established in the previous section of this literature review, religion is a significant part of society and carries great importance in the promotion of moral values and social behaviors. A very contemporary issue within this debate is the increased importance of Islam in society and politics in Muslim countries. To describe this phenomenon, the media and the academic literature have been using various term such as Islamic revival, Islamic activism, Islamic revivalism or political Islam. Others attempted to unify the various characters of social and political movements orientated on Islam as Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic extremism or Islamism (Calvert, 2008, p. 1). The term used in this thesis and increasingly employed by scholars and journalists when talking about Islam's role in society and politics is Islamism. In the broad sense, Alam (2009) interprets Islamism as an "assertion of Islam in the public-political sphere" (p. 352). Sayyid (2003) offers a similar definition and additionally stresses the multi-facetted character of Islamism:

Islamism is a discourse that attempts to centre Islam within the political order.

Islamism can range from the assertion of a Muslim subjectivity to a full
reconstruction of society on Islamic principles [...] An Islamist is someone who places her or his Muslim identity at the centre of her or his political practice. That is, Islamists are people who use the language of Islamic metaphors to think through their political destinies, those who see in Islam their political future. This should not be taken to mean that there are no shades of opinion within Islamism, that it is some kind of monolithic edifice without variations or internal differences. (p. 17)

The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World offers a similar definition:

Islamists [...] are committed to implementation of their ideological vision of Islam in the state and/or society. Their position is often seen as a critique of the establishment and status quo. Most belong to Islamic organizations or social movements. (The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World)

Ayoob (2008) considers Islamism as a form of “instrumentalization” of Islam for political objects by individuals, groups or organizations (p. 2). While in some debates, the term Islamism is used, in other instances the literature refers to Political Islam which Guven (2005) defines as “the influence of Islam on political and the socio-cultural structure of the country” (p. 1). Within this context, Islamic scholars such as Gülen (2009) suggest that both terms, Islamism and Political Islam, are referring to the same movement and are therefore synonymous. Esposito (1999) summarizes the features of the resurgence of Islam and Islamism in predominantly Muslim countries as follows:

The indices of Islamic reawakening in personal life are many: increased attention to religious observances (mosque attendance, prayer, fasting), proliferation of religious programming and publications, more emphasis on Islamic dress and
values, the revitalization of Sufism (mysticism). This broader-based renewal has also been accompanied by Islam's reassertion in public life: an increase in Islamically oriented governments, organizations, laws, banks, social welfare services, and educational institutions. (p. 10)

While Karakas (2007) stresses the creation of an Islamic state as the main goal of Islamism (p. 3), the definitions suggested above do not include such a goal as a necessity when defining Islamism. Calvert (2008) stresses that the view on Islamism as a monolithic organism which functions in all circumstances in the same patterns is misleading (p. 1). For most of the authors, Islamism adjusts to contemporary needs and situations and can vary in its goals and characteristics. Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, the term Islamism will be applied as defined by Alam (2009) and Sayyid (2003), as multi-faceted in character and ranging from negotiating Islam’s role in society and politics to the goal of creating a fully Islamic state in accordance with the Sharia.

There is a further differentiation when describing social and political movements as being Islamic or Islamist. The academic literature offers three different approaches to the application of the terms Islamists and Islamic: (1) some authors use these terms interchangeably. While Esposito (2010) describes the Welfare Party as an “Islamic Party” but later talks about the achievements of some “Islamist parties” (p. 63), Alam (2009) refers to Islamic and Islamist movements without any differentiation. (2), authors such as Yavuz (2003), refer to all social and political movements oriented on Islam as being Islamically orientated and do not use the expression Islamist movements. (3), other authors (Çinar, 2005) make a clear distinction between the terms Islamic and Islamist, referring to Islamic as a view, a life-style, and a practice which makes reference to Islam
as a religion but is not part of the Islamist ideology. Alternately, Islamist movements are distinguished by having a political agenda (p. 13). Within this category, Karakas (2007) refers to the term Islamic as “primarily a socio-cultural and ritual dimension” which describes the thought and actions as based on the value system of the Quran (p. 3). The author thus describes Turkey as a secular state with an Islamic society.

Consequently, where some literature applies the wording of Islamic movements, others describe the same phenomenon as Islamist. This difference in terminology is best exemplified by Ayoob (2008,) who cites the term “non-Islamic” of another author and puts in brackets “read ‘non-Islamist’,” in order to stress his own preference in terminology (p. 98). When working with different authors, both terms Islamic and Islamist might be applied in this thesis to describe Islam’s influence on society and politics. Thus, the various definitions of Islamism stress the insistence on a political agenda by various agents such as individuals, social or political groups and organizations. It is also important to recognize that Islamism has no single character but rather a wide range of characteristics, goals, and strategies to achieve its objectives.

Yavuz (2003) offers a comprehensive description with regards to the typology of Islamic/Islamist movements. According to the author, “Islamic movements seek to reconstitute identities, institutional structures, ways of life, and the moral code of society through participating, influencing, or controlling cultural, educational and economic spheres” (p. 23). The author distinguishes the goals of such movements as ranging from state-orientated (vertical Islamic movements) to societal-oriented (horizontal Islamic movements). Their strategies vary from legal to illegal (p. 27).
Table 2-2: Typology of Islamic/Islamist movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Repertoire of action (strategies and means)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vertical</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-oriented;</td>
<td>Reformist: Participation in the hope of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elite vanguard;</td>
<td>controlling the state or shaping policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social change</td>
<td>through forming their own Islamic party or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from above</td>
<td>in alliance with other parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: education, legal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>system, social welfare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Horizontal</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society-oriented;</td>
<td>Societal (everyday life-based movements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>associational;</td>
<td>Groups using the media and communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identity- oriented;</td>
<td>networks to develop discursive spaces for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social change</td>
<td>the construction of Islamic identity;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from below</td>
<td>seeking to use the market to create heaven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: media, economy,</td>
<td>on earth; viewing Islam as a cultural capital;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(private)</td>
<td>use of associational networks to empower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Outcome:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome: withdrawal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Yavuz, 2003, p.28

The state-oriented Islamic movements (vertical movements) are usually of authoritarian and elitist nature. These movements hope to correct the problems of society by taking control of the state through the enforcement of a “uniform, homogenizing religious ideology” (p. 28). These types of movements are more likely to form when the state is either oppressive or in the process of opening new opportunity spaces (p. 28). Furthermore, vertical movements mostly consist of people who perceive that nationalism and religion should be part of the framework of a nation-state (p. 29). The main objective of these movements is, according to Yavuz (2003), “the total transformation of society by means of state” (p. 29). There are two strategies as to how state-oriented Islamic movements achieve their goals of accessing power and transforming society:
revolutionary and reformist. The revolutionary vertical movements reject the legitimacy of the prevailing political system and use illegitimate means such as violence and aggression in order to establish an Islamic state in which the Islamic law is applied (p. 29). Reformist vertical movements participate in the political process and use legitimate means such as formation of Islamic political parties or alliances with other parties in the hope of gaining control of state or control to shape state policies. According to Yavuz (2003), reformist vertical Islamic movements mainly focus their priorities for social change in the spheres of education, law, and welfare (p. 30).

Society-oriented Islamic movements (horizontal movements) seek to change society from within by utilizing the market and media to change the habits of individuals and social relations. Yavuz (2003) subdivides horizontal movements into two categories: everyday life-based movements (societal movements) and inward-oriented contemplative movements (spiritual/inward movements). Societal movements are focused on influencing individuals and society with the aim “to develop new arguments for the construction of newly imagined identities and worldviews” (p. 30). They view Islam as cultural capital and aim through the usage of media, economy, and the information industry to create supportive networks. Societal movements seek to empower society through the establishment of Islamic associations. According to Yavuz (2003), “Islamic practices and ideas are utilized to legitimize alternative practices and life styles” (p. 31).

The spiritual/inward movements are described as a “highly individualistic approach to social change” (p. 30). Such movements see the individual’s redemption as the key to social change. Individuals in such movements seek to raise social consciousness by deeply engaging in religious rituals such as prayers, fasting, or reading the Quran. Yavuz
(2003) describes such movements as “inner and micro-level mobilization as the key to social change” (p. 30). Spiritual/inward movements are described as withdrawn from public life in order to engage in an inward-focused personal transformation.

The categorization of the Islamic/Islamist movements offered above gives a well-documented overview of the role Islam can play in society and politics. While these definitions allow for a clarification of terms, it has to be stressed that in actual life, agendas of social and political movements can overlap, evolve, and incorporate a variety of socio-political views. While the definitions divide the attributes of Islam-orientated movements into distinct features, in reality these divisions are fluid.

Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, the term *Islamism* will serve to describe the phenomenon of the increased visibility and role of Islam in society and politics. While some definitions of Islamism imply the creation of a fully Islamic state as its goal, this thesis applies the term *Islamism* in a broader sense, ranging from negotiating the role of Islam in society and politics to the complete construction of a nation-state based on the Sharia. Finally, the terminologies of *Islamism* and *Islamic* will be used interchangeably in this thesis when referring to Islamically oriented movements in society and politics.

### 2.3.2 Situating Islamism

When placing Islamism into a time frame, most of the academic literature situates its rise in the 1970s and 1980s. Guven (2005) attributes the rise of Islamism in the 1970s and 1980s to the loss of credibility of left-wing and nationalist agendas of secular governments in countries of the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. Huntington (1996) confirms the historical positioning, arguing that, “in 1995 every country with a
predominantly Muslim population, except Iran, was more Islamic and Islamist culturally, socially, and politically than it was fifteen years earlier (p. 111).

Kramer interprets Islamism as a reactive movement embedded in a wider global context suggesting that, "Islamism is a response to ideologies that emerged in the modern West-communism, socialism, or capitalism" (Middle East, Quarterly 1999). The rise of Islamism was a "vehicle of opposition" and a "counter-movement or source of opposition to the existing authoritarian–secularist regimes" (Guven, 2005, p. 2). Esposito & Voll (1996) emphasize the demand for a "popular participation in the political process" as the cause for the Iranian revolution in 1979 (p. 4). Secular governments with majority Muslim populations are confronted with the choice between policies that repress or integrate greater population participation at the risk of either losing power or being overthrown if choosing the wrong policies. Such was the case in the Iranian Revolution. In most cases, Islamist movements gained popularity when the population "began to question the effectiveness and validity of the prevailing ideologies" (Esposito & Voll, 1996, p. 6).

Ter Haar and Tsuruoka (2007) describe this opposition in the form of religious resurgence "as a kind of opportunistic infection that has set in at the present weakened stage of the secular nation-state" (p. 11). The core argument for the weakened secular nation-state is globalization. According to Ter Haar and Tsuruoka (2007), globalization has weakened the secular nation-sate in two ways: first, economically, through the global reach of the trans-national nature of businesses and financial institutions, and secondly, through globalization's erosion of national identity and unity (p. 11). Onis (2001) concludes that "political Islam, in much of the Middle East, can be regarded as a regional
manifestation representing the interests of losers, groups that are excluded from material benefits of globalization” (p. 282). Along the same line of explanation, Toprak (1993) argues that religion can be seen as a reactive force to global capitalism and the economic exploitation and suppression of poorer countries by the West (p. 243). Vertigans (2003) supports Toprak’s argument stating that, “suspicion and resentment of imported structures including secular prescriptions of imported solutions for recovery have also been a consequence of Islamic nations’ involvement in the global system” (p. 10).

Tamimi and Esposito (2000) describe the rise of Islamism in reaction to the failed secular path stating that, “some critics talk of the collapse or bankruptcy of secularism and the need to replace it with religiously based states” (Tamimi & Esposito, 2000, p. 1). In the case of Turkey for example, the secular establishment has continuously disadvantaged large parts of the population on economic and social levels. Yavuz and Esposito (2003) argue that this marginalization has a direct influence on the Islamist resurgence. “Secularism as an intellectual and political project in Turkey has a long history of differentiating, marginalizing, and excluding large sectors of Turkish society. In the examination of Islamic social movements, one needs to take this exclusionary history of secularism into account” (Yavuz & Esposito, 2003, p. xiv).

An interesting debate within academic literature relates to the argument that processes of modernization are factors for the resurgence and rise of Islamism. Vertigans (2003) argues that features of modernity such as individualism, reduced solidarity, growing inequality, materialism, perceived corruption and population mobility were important setoffs for the politicization of Islam in Muslim countries (p. 10). The author stresses that, “these actors have arguably led to the reassessment of the perceived Muslim
failures, a re-evaluation of former glories and the repoliticization of Islam” (Vertigans, 2003, p. 10). Tapper (1991) agrees with Vertigans’ argument, affirming that Islamist “movements are seen as expressions of Third World reaction to the materialism and secularism associated with Western and Soviet civilizations” (p. 22). Huntington’s (1996) contribution to literature on Islamism offers support to Vertigans’ and Tapper’s argumentations. The author considers the Islamist revitalization to be a coping mechanism of Muslim populations towards modernization. Huntington (1996) affirms that “the Islamic Resurgence is both a product of and an effort to come to grips with modernization” and consequently, “Muslims feel the need to return to Islamic ideas, practices, and institutions to provide the compass and the motor of modernization” (p. 116).

Ayubi (1991) approaches the modernization argument from another angle. The author argues that the processes of modernization set off the rise of Islamically oriented social and political movements not because the population rejected the values and outcomes of modernization but because “they desired it so strongly and yet could not get it”. Consequently, “they hate modernity because they cannot get it” (Ayubi, 1991, p. 176). Within this debate, both argumentation approaches seem to contain certain validity. While the values and features of modernization might stand in contrast to the Islamic cultures of Muslim populations, the failed integration of these values into Muslim societies might have also contributed to an increased counter-movement to the virtues and features of the modernization process. The argument of failed secularism and modernization is a substantial consideration that seems to give a credible explanation of why a rise of Islamism is occurring in Muslim majority countries. The resurgence of
Islam in politics and society in the most modernized Muslim countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria, Tunisia and Turkey stand as proof for the modernization/secularization failure theory (Tamimi & Esposito, 2000, p. 3).

Along the lines of oppositional forces to global capitalism, Vertigans (2003) considers the demise of communism as a crucial factor in the resurgence of Islamism. The downfall of the Soviet Union and, with it, the communist opposition, ‘limited the options for people dissatisfied with current systems who wanted radical changes” (Vertigans, 2003, p. 10). The author validates this argument by disclosing that the end of the Soviet Empire resulted in the formation of more Muslim nation-states. Consequently, “the new states provided believers with greater freedom to practice, promoted religion, and frequently providing support for political ends that have ultimately contributed towards an increase in radical Muslims” (Vertigans, 2003, p. 10). Within this context, Huntington (1996) confirms the downfall of communism and the Soviet Union as crucial to the rise of Islamism as an opposing force. He affirms that “their strength was in part a function of the weakness of alternative sources of opposition” (Huntington, 1996, p. 114). He expands the argument of the lack of alternatives towards authoritarian regimes and emphasizes that liberal, democratic opposition groups failed to achieve popular support among Muslim populations. The author concludes that “this failure has its source at least in part in the inhospitable nature of Islamic culture and society to Western liberals” (Huntington, 1996, p. 114).

At the same time, the literature allows for a contrary explanation concerning the relationship of communism and Islam. Islam, they claim, was used as a tool of opposition against the rise of communism. According to this argument, Islamism’s domination as an
alternative choice for opposition is the notion that at some point or another each of the
governments used political Islam to counteract the spread of communism. Most of the
Muslim countries provided finances to Islamist movements and groups which allowed
Islamist groups to expand their influences within societies and on political levels, and
thus enabled them to be considered as sole alternatives for reforms in their countries
(Huntington, 1996, p. 115). Furthermore, Huntington (1996) argues that secular
opposition is more vulnerable than religious opposition since “the latter can operate
within mosques, welfare organizations, foundations, and other Muslim institutions which
the government feels it cannot suppress. Liberal democrats have no such cover hence are
more easily controlled or eliminated by the government” (p. 115). While these arguments
seem to be opposing and contradicting each other, it seems rational that both occurrences
contributed to the rise of Islamism in the last three decades.

Huntington (1996) discusses the Muslim population growth as another reason for
the rise of Islamism. He argues that disproportionate young populations in Muslim
countries had significant political consequences. According to Huntington (1996), the
“young people are the protagonists of protest, instability, reform, and revolution […]. The
availability of large numbers of often unemployed males between the ages of fifteen and
thirty is a natural course of instability and violence both within Islam and against non-
Muslims” (p. 117). Ayubi’s (1991) argument stands in contrast to Huntington’s
assumption. When analyzing the political autonomy and power of age groups, Ayubi
(1991) has argued in previous academic writings that in Middle Eastern societies,
political participation was mostly closed to the young populations and in the hands of the
older society members (p. 218).
Another interesting consideration explaining the rise of Islamism in Muslim countries is the new financial and political self-confidence. Ayubi (1991) regards this as one of the most crucial developments which allowed a successful adaptation of Islamism among social movements and in politics. According to the author, the oil boom of the Muslim countries has strengthened Muslim countries’ political and financial self-confidence with regards to how countries should be governed. The oil boom’s related successes motivated Muslim populations “to think about doing things their way” (Ayubi, 1991, p. 178). Huntington (1996) supports Ayubi’s reasoning and points to the oil boom of Muslim countries as a crucial contributor to the Islamist revival:

The Saudi, Libyan, and other governments used their oil riches to stimulate and finance the Muslim revival, and Muslim wealth led Muslims to swing from fascination with Western culture to deep involvement in their own and willingness to assert the place and importance of Islam in non-Islamic societies. Just as Western wealth had previously been seen as the evidence of the superiority of Western culture, oil wealth was seen as evidence of the superiority of Islam. (p. 116)

Güalp (2001) has used the above logic in his argumentation that Islamism allows Muslim populations to challenge the values and beliefs of the West. The author argues that “the recent rise of Islamism can be seen as part of the post-modern condition which allowed for questioning of the unquestionable truths of Turkey’s Westernization project” (Güalp, 2001, p. 443). Vertigans (2003) follows a similar line of explanation for the rise of Islamism serving as an opposing force to Westernization. The author stresses that the “Islamic critique of the Western paradigm is part of a wider concern about its ability and suitability that Muslim groups have been able to utilize” (Vertigans, 2003, p. 10).
Although Vertigans (2003) does not consider Islamism itself as a postmodernist tool, it is however possible to "use the post-modern condition to attract support" (p. 11). The author concludes the discussion about Islamism as a post-modern tool of opposition by concluding that, "the expansion of postmodernity into the traditional discussion of Islam is a consideration which can offer rich explanations about the appeal of Islamism among Muslim countries as well as explain the attraction to a radical form of Islamism on the global level" (Vertigans, 2003, p. 11).

Selinger (2004) argues that the modernization theory marginalized the role of religion in public and ordered it into the private sphere. Postmodernity provides the opportunity to reassess the secularization theory and the role and influence of religion (Selinger, 2004, p. 531). Thomas (2000) warns that thinking within the modernity framework will prevent the understanding of resurgence and rise of religion since the 1980s. In Thomas’s (2000) words: “We risk misunderstanding the global resurgence of religion if we apply a modern concept of religion to non-Western societies” (p. 816). Thus, according to Selinger (2004) and Thomas (2000), the postmodern approach allows recognizing religion as a construction of identity in societies.

Ayoob (2008) points out in his analysis about Islamism that the applications of social and political movements vary significantly from country to country depending on their internal socio-political situation:

It is only natural that political Islam is manifested largely as a national phenomenon. The discrete national manifestations of political Islam are due to the fact that there is wide diversity within the Muslim world in terms of socioeconomic
characteristics, culture, political systems, and trajectories of intellectual development, making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the political expression of Islam developed in one context to be replicated in other locales. (Ayoob, 2008, p. 153)

This argument should receive substantial consideration. While many reasons are valid for the rise of Islamism in Muslim countries, the country-specific economic and socio-political situations need to be analyzed in order to pinpoint the specific reasons for the rise of Islamism in a particular country. The concept of Islam in public spaces varies greatly depending on the religious, economic, social, and political landscape of the countries (Esposito, 2010, p. 11).

As has become evident, economic, social, and political reasons are significant factors that need to be present in order for individuals and groups to embrace Islamism. Ayoob points out very rightly that the form of Islamism depends on the internal factors of individual countries. Hence, it is necessary to analyze the economic, political and societal factors existing in Turkey, in order to understand and highlight the reasons for the rise of Islamism in that specific setting.

2.4 Turkey’s Kemalist Establishment in Relation to Islamism

As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, the characteristics of Islamism are country-specific and adjust to the socio-economic and political landscape of a country. Before examining the specific character of Islamism in Turkey in the next section of this thesis, this section will look at the particularities of the Kemalist establishment in relation to the rise of Islamism.
Secularism is one of the foundational principles of Turkey’s republic. The main principle of secularism is the insistence on the separation of public and private spheres, especially the separation between state-based institutions and those associated with religion and family (Casanova 1994). The strict separation of “church and state” is considered a “precondition for a modern democratic republic and a liberal society” (Gökariksel & Mitchell, 2005, p. 150). Munby (1963) characterizes a secular society as a pluralistic, tolerant society in which religion belongs to the private sphere (p. 34). The commitment to secularism aims at promoting equality within a society, the breakdown of social barriers such as class distinctions, and to enforce respect for individuals and minorities within the society (Munby, 1963, p. 36). According to Casanova (1994), secularization insists on the confinement of religion to the private sphere (p. 182). Karakas (2007) considers secularism to have been generally accepted “as a normative model and integral part of the modern constitutional state” (p. 7).

Gökariksel and Mitchell (2005) argue that although the definition of secularism and secularization theory is often attributed to be universal and placeless, it is nevertheless “shaped by geographic and historic configurations of religious difference, social structures, political power and visions of modernity” (p. 151). Thus, the authors clearly demonstrate that secularism as a political ideology is uniquely constructed and implemented depending on the country-specific context.

Turkey’s concept of secularism thus has its own distinct features which are unique compared to the interpretations of secularism in other countries. Following the French model of laïcité (Turkish: Laiklik) within the context of the secularization process, Turkey’s Kemalist establishment insisted on the absence of religion in politics and all
public spheres (Naim, 2008, p. 197). However, Turkey’s model of laicism aimed at not only strictly separating religion and state affairs, but also bringing religion under the state’s control. The two most important state institutions to control religion have been the Ministry of Education, which monitors the national education, and the State Directorate of Religious Affairs established in 1924. This institution has the role of promoting interpretations of Islam in accordance with the principles of Kemalism with the aim “to help create a modern republican subject and develop the modern state” (Gökarıksel & Mitchell, 2005, p. 152). According to Karakas (2007), laicism in Turkey had its goal in the secularization and modernization of Turkey’s society and the state (p. 8). The constitution of 1937 proclaimed that “in a laicist order [...] religion is freed from politicization, is discarded as an instrument of power, and is assigned the proper and honourable place in the conscience of the citizens” (Karakas, 2007, p. 8).

Sayyid (2003) describes Atatürk’s objective for Turkey to represent “a new country, a new society, a new state” in which Islam would be preserved as a private code of ethics rather than as a state power (p. 63). Yavuz (2003) argues that secularism in Turkey was envisioned to represent progress and civilization, and Islam’s role in Turkey had to be recreated to be “a secularism friendly Islam” which could be employed for “the realization of a modern and secular Turkey” (p. 46). Secularism has been considered the main character and cornerstone of Kemalism in Turkey and thus, in Yavuz’s (2003) interpretation, the securing of secularism has “manifested as fierce hostility to public manifestation of Islam (p. 46).

Tamini and Esposito (2000) consider Turkey a special case as it is “the only secular option in the Muslim world” based on its unique history of commitment to secularism
and the separation of Islam from the public in a society that is considered 97% Muslim (p. 4). Atatürk’s belief was that only a secular democracy can provide modernity and progress to Turkey. This belief is clearly reflected in Turkey’s constitution, which makes ten references to secularism (Naim, 2008, p. 188). Secularists in Turkey distinguish strongly between religion and politics. Özbudun (1984) summarizes Turkish secularists’ view about a secular state and its rejection of religion in any public and political sphere:

Theocracy is the system in which laws are made by Caliphs and Sultans who are regarded as the Shadows of God on earth. Clericalism refers to the acceptance of traditions, claimed to be originally instituted by God, as unchangeable laws and to the belief that these laws can be interpreted only by spiritual authorities, believed to be the interpreters of God…. The state that is completely freed from these two characteristics of the medieval state is called the Modern State. In a modern state the right to legislate and to administer directly belongs to the people. (p. 42)

Yavuz and Esposito (2003) refer to Turkey’s form of secularism as based on the faith “in the primacy of politics and in the ability of politics to reconstitute society” (p. xvi). All education was placed in the hands of the Ministry of Education after the foundation of Turkey as a republic. Mosques and religious institutions were controlled and financed by the state. All reforms served the purpose to “break ties of the past and create a nation with a new secular culture” (Naim, 2008, p. 198). According to various academic scholars, herein is the first crucial reason for the increased visibility of Islam in society and politics to be found. While the secularist ideology aimed to subordinate religion, the majority of the population emotionally and mentally never internalized that hierarchy. Yavuz (1997) observed and evaluated this power struggle between secular
ideology and the religious mentality of Turkey’s population. “Because secularism did not separate religion and politics, but rather subordinated religion to the political realm, it promoted the politicisation of Islam and struggle between secularists and Muslims for control of the state” (Yavuz, 1997, p. 65). According to Cooper (2002), Turkey did not aim at suppressing or extinguishing religion, but rather to place it in the private space. Cooper (2002) affirms that the secularists’ approach towards Islam cannot be viewed as anti-Islamic but is rather “motivated first and foremost by the desire to protect the state in its current form, and not, [...], by opposition to the Muslim faith” (p. 121). Yavuz and Esposito (2003) consider Turkey’s subordination of religion into the private realm as a core principle of Mustafa Kemal, whose focus on progress and modernity regarded the public exclusion of religion to be a necessity:

The Kemalist position [...] on secularism can be summarized in the following way: modernity and democracy require secularism. Islam [...] was neither secularizable nor privatizable. Thus, in order to bring modernity, Islam had to be kept under strict state control or confined to personal conscious. (Yavuz & Esposito, 2003, p. xiii)

When analyzing the Kemalist establishment in relation to the rise of Islamism in Turkey, various academic scholars consider some of the socio-economic aspects of the Kemalist establishment as possible reasons to explain the rise of Islamism in Turkey’s society and politics.

With regards to the creation of the Turkish state, Waxman (1997) identifies this process as one in which the population was a passive and silent observer who had to adapt to a new form of governance previously not known to them. With regards to the
Kemalists creating a new modern republic after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Waxman (1997) argues that Kemalists “favored a paternalistic state, in which authoritarianism was exercised in the name of future democracy” (p. 5). Nonetheless, in spite of the regime’s commitment to secularism and modernity, the identity of the majority of secular Turkey remained religious. Waxman (1997) stresses that, “despite the persistent tensions and conflicts between secularists and Islamists in Turkey, the vast majority within both camps share a belief that Islam constitutes an essential aspect of ‘Turkishness’. For both, to be a Turk basically means being a Muslim” (Waxman, 1997, p. 22). Mehmet (1990) thinks that in the “Turkish psyche there is still a split personality” (p. 17).

Hashemi (2009) further accentuates the specific particularities of secularism in Turkey. Secularism should be a bottom-up approach, deriving from the dialogue between the state the people, “from within civil society, based on democratic negotiation and bargaining over the proper role of religion in politics” (Hashemi, 2009, p. 2). In Hashemi’s opinion, countries with a Muslim majority population need to be included in the formation of secular reforms if harmony between state and society is to take place. The author emphasizes this necessity by arguing that “in developing societies where religion is a key maker of identity, in order for religious groups to reconcile themselves with secularism, a religious-based theory of secularism is required” (Hashemi, 2009, p. 2). Hashemi (2009) considers this to be one of the conflicts that can explain the rise of Islamism since this form of secularism undermined people’s feelings of identity. Hashemi (2009) strengthens Mehmet’s argument by emphasizing that, “the rise of political Islam in Turkey can partially be explained as a counterreaction to Kemalist secular policies that
were imposed on a religious society – 99.8 percent of whose people are Muslims – in a top-down manner, to the exclusion of Turkey’s Islamic identity” (Hashemi, 2009, p. 45).

Tamimi and Esposito (2000) offer a similar explanation stressing the need of Turkey’s majority Muslim population to have a social and political space that reflects their identity. The authors see the goal of political and social Islamist movements to be “the creation of a space alongside the Kemalist westernized secular model within the Turkish secular state in which to live their lives in accordance with the Islamic culture and values” (Tamimi & Esposito, 2000, p. 9). The question of identity has been researched by KONDA in a nationwide survey that attempted to include all participants from all geographic locations, asking the interviewees about the importance of religion in their lives. The following table sheds light on how integral religion is for the majority of Turkey’s population (86.1%) who identify themselves as religious and believers.

Table 2-3: Degree of religiosity of Turks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In terms of religiosity, which of the following groups do you consider yourself to be in?</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Someone with no religious conviction (ATHEIST)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Someone who does not believe in religious obligations (NON-BELIEVER)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believer who does not fulfill religious obligations (BELIEVER)</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious person who strives to fulfill religious obligations (RELIGIOUS)</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully devout person fulfilling all religious obligations (FULLY DEVOUT)</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KONDA, 2007, p. 27

Moreover, Mehmet (1990) situates the Kemalist elite of Turkey at the centre of the ruling class, possessing monopoly power over decision-making and imposing those views on the population with the ultimate goal of “manipulating the development process in an authoritarian, self-enriching manner” (Mehmet, 1990, p. 43). This centre-periphery problematic is acknowledged by various academic scholars within Turkey’s secularism
debate. Yavuz and Esposito (2003) consider Islam a counter-force to Turkey’s secularist elite:

Many Islamic groups understand secularism as part of a strategy to preserve the authoritarian elite’s domination as it uses secularism to rationalize its exploitation and exclusion of ethnic and practicing Muslims from the decision-making processes. This forced modernization in Turkey has made Islam an important resource for challenging the secularist project. (p. xiv)

Mardin (1973) confirms the notion of the elite being in the centre of the secularist structure while the majority of the religious population, especially in the rural areas, was economically and socially outside the Kemalist establishment:

The thinness of Kemalist ideology has to be seen in the light. Atatürk was trying to do with ideology what he had not achieved through political mobilization or through a commitment to radical changes in social structure. This was a hard burden to shift onto ideology. The Turkish countryside, already suspect as separatist, was not brought closer to the centre by these policies, [...] the periphery could see that it was paying for the prosperity of the cities, that it was being given speeches as consolation, but being denied the haven of its religious culture. (p. 184)

Toprak (1981) thus concludes that the failed deliverance of economic benefits to the grass root level continuously sustained the gap between the ruling elites and the population (p. 122). According to Mehmet (1990), Turkey’s Kemalist socio-economic development can be considered a top-down project that disregarded and underestimated the cultural complexity of its society. Consequently, “the top-down development upset
traditional life-styles and support systems without replacing them with something better. It resulted in a socio-economic disequilibrium” (Mehmet, 1990, p. 41).

Mehmet (1990) further argues that the designers of the secularist development model in Turkey hoped for an economic and cultural ‘trickle-down effect’ that would inevitably lead to more social justice which would benefit the whole population (p. 42). Contrary to these expectations, the economic modernization reforms did not benefit the majority of Turkey’s population and at the same time, the cultural consideration for Turkey’s population led to “mal-development: it seemed to destroy whatever remained of the old Islamic socio-economic order without any compensations” (Mehmet, 1998, p. 42).

According to Mehmet (1990), the economic development strategies were based on state capitalism and secularist policy instruments with highly interventionist strategies. Although in economic terms Turkey’s GNP per capita grew significantly in the post 1960s, those economic benefits did not benefit the majority of Turkey’s population, but rather “enriched and empowered the ruling elites at the centre but failed to bring social justice to the masses” (Mehmet, 1990, p. 43). Mehmet (1990) points to the drastic income inequality between social classes. In 1973, Turkey’s poorest 40% of the population had an income share of 11% while the richest 10% shared 40% of the income. The author thus concludes that, “of central importance here is the failure of the leader-follower model of development strategy […] to promote social justice for the mass of inhabitants” (Mehmet, 1990, p. 43). Mehmet (1990) continues his explanation, drawing upon failed governance of secular political parties which “instead of responding to the needs of the
peasantry, these elites opted for urban-biased, capital-intensive industrialization, causing a massive rural exodus in the process” (p. 97).

Gulalp (2001) explains the rise of Islamism in Turkey’s society and politics as an attempt of individuals who were outside the ruling elite (which was represented by the Kemalists) to achieve upward mobility from which they had been excluded by the Kemalist state and ideology. Thus, “Islam has been integrated into Turkish political arena as oppositional forces” (Gulalp, 2001, p.434). In this context, Howe (2000) stresses that the main cause for the growth of Islamism “is the wide disparity in the distribution of wealth” (p. 8).

However, Mehmet (1990) asserts that the problem is not the failure of secularism per se, but rather that the policies applied have been inappropriate. Consequently, Mehmet (1990) argues that, “the contemporary wave of Islamic resurgence is more an expression of social demand for equitable development than spiritual fundamentalism [...], the response of the masses towards mismanaged state-led development strategy” (p. 40). Naim (2008) concludes that Turkey’s model of secularism has caused a great deal of discontent among the population and affected especially religious people who “are shut out of public life and denied basic human rights of education and work” (p. 221). Furthermore, he emphasizes that in order to overcome the adverse development in Turkey, a “balance must be restored between secularism, Islam, human rights as well as constitutional rights that will work for all members of the Turkish society” (Naim, 2008, p. 222).
Toprak (1995) on the other hand approaches the support for Islamist parties from a practical side:

When they vote, like voters everywhere, they calculate on the base of their 'worldly' interests such as new schools for their community, better health care facilities, plans for new housing units, developmental projects for their region, lower inflation rates, higher wages and salaries, government subsidies for agriculture etc. (p. 92)

Cooper (2002) supports Toprak's argument, pointing to the economic failure of secular parties on the one hand and stressing the political success of Islamist political parties on the other hand:

Much of the upswing in support for the Welfare Party (Refah) and its successor the Virtue Party (Fazilet), however, arose from disenchantment with the centre-right parties held responsible for the mismanagement of the economy in the first half of the decade. Refah and Fazilet have also attracted support because of their more impressive performance at local government level, particularly in the civic administration in the largest urban areas, where a significant proportion of the electorate has arrived relatively recently from the conservative countryside. (p. 121)

Thus, on the political level, a wide range of academic literature indicates that the failure of secular parties to provide solutions to Turkey's economic problems is the main cause for the rise of Islamism (Howe, 2000, p. 28). As Naim (2008) indicates, the neoliberal restructuring process of the 1980s and 1990s and the resulting economic crisis impacted the less educated and the lower-middle class more severely. The failure of
secularist parties correlates with the rise in votes for Islamist Parties such as the Refah Party and the AKP, who concentrated their campaigns on rural populations who were mostly religious, on the alleviation of poverty, and the equalization of the lower-classes with the Kemalist elite (Naim, 2008, p. 216). As Gulalp (2001) points out, the supporters of the Islamist political movements were the groups that “suffered political, economic, and ideological exclusion” by the Kemalist state and hoped to overcome it by supporting political parties with an Islamist agenda (p. 434). The most current success of the AKP was a reaction from the population who considered the AKP “as an alternative to what were widely regarded as the corrupt and incompetent parties in parliament” (Jenkins, 2008, p. 169).

Jenkins (2008) furthermore argues that the success of the AKP was a direct result of the weak secular opposition and even voters who previously voted for secularist parties gave their vote to the AKP (p. 169). Yavuz and Esposito (2003) use the case of Turkey as an example where secularism has failed to serve as an appropriate solution for development. “The case of Turkey indicates that secularism should not always be read as the telos of development and modernity. Secularism does not always evolve with modernity, development, rationality, and emancipation” (Yavuz & Esposito, 2003, p. xxii). Hashemi (2009) thus concludes that the electoral success of Islamist political parties is a reflection on the shortcomings of Turkey’s Kemalist establishment and especially that of secular political parties. The author assures that the Islamist political parties “represent an important and heretofore marginalized political constituency in Turkey, and when judged in terms of their commitment to the principles of liberal
democracy, revealingly, they have a better track record than their adversaries in the Turkish secular establishment” (Hashemi, 2009, p. 153).

The authors presented in this section hold the view that the rise of Islamism in society and politics in Turkey is a reaction to the failed state governance of the Kemalist establishment on the political, economic and social levels. Mehmet (1990) especially puts the Kemalist ideology into the spotlight and highlights the centre-periphery relations deriving from the secularist top-down approach which has created a gap between socio-political and economic levels between the Kemalist ruling elite and the rest of the population. After introducing the academic debates concerning the societal, political and economic landscapes of the Kemalist establishment in Turkey in relation to the rise of Islamism, the characteristics of Islamism in Turkey will be analyzed in the following section of this literature review.

2.5 The Rise of Islamism in Turkey

Alam (2009) describes Islamism in Turkey as ranging from formations of Islamic/Islamist political parties, such as the Welfare Party and the AKP, socio-religious movements and extremist political movements. Nevertheless, the expression of mainstream Islamism in Turkey is, in Alam’s (2009) opinion, to “negotiate the space, role and status of Islam within the Kemalist secular order” (p. 354). Consequently, the author asserts that contrary to Islamism in some other Muslim countries, Islamism in Turkey for the most part does not attempt to create an Islamic state but to renegotiate the role of Islam in society and politics. Along the same lines, Yavuz (2003) considers Islamically oriented social and political movements in Turkey to be “committed to playing within a
legal framework of democratic and pluralistic parameters” (p. 4). Thus, in spite of the prevalence of some radical Islamist groups in Turkey, the literature nevertheless largely points out that Turkey’s violent Islamist groups are marginal when compared to armed oppositions in countries such as Egypt or Algeria (Rubin, 2003, p. 41).

Referring back to Yavuz’s (2003) typology of Islamic movements, Islamism in Turkey has only a marginal appearance of revolutionary state-oriented movements such as radical groups which attempt to overthrow the state through illegitimate means. The most occurring forms of Islamism in Turkey are political movements, such as the AKP and Welfare Party, which gained power within the legal framework and are referred to as state-oriented reformist movements, by Yavuz, and societal movements which seek to reform society from within by creating Islamic associations and networks (p. 28).

The rise of Islamism in Turkey began in the 1980s. Alam (2009) considers the 1980s as a crucial period of formation for Islamism during which it defined its current characteristics and increased its influence on society and politics:

This was the decade when a fully mature and intellectually sophisticated Islamist discourse took over the intellectual leadership of the periphery at the expense of the secular nationalist intelligentsia. As a result the Islamists emerged as the dominant force in the 1990s. (p. 368)

When speaking about the rise of Islamism in Turkey, a wide academic discussion can be found about the reasons for individuals and groups to incorporate Islam into society and politics. Toprak (1987) argues that Islamists in Turkey “draw their strength from economic groups at the margins of a rapidly growing industry” (p. 230). The author
argues that individuals who support Islamism are those who felt threatened or experienced economic disadvantages through the modernization process. Sakallıoğlu (1996) strengthens Toprak’s argument of economic failures to be one of the most important reasons for the resurgence of Islamism, by describing supporters and followers of Islamist groups as being “desperately in need of an identity and economic security that a crisis-ridden Turkish economy can offer at only meagre levels” (p. 243). Based on the economic argument, Geyikdagi (1984) argues that the appeal towards Islamism will disappear once economic prosperity and stability is available to those who are marginalized. Geyikdagi (1984) regards religion as a crucial tool for marginalized and economically disempowered groups to change the status quo. Consequently, once the marginalized position has been reversed, religion as a tool for rebellion will diminish. Geyikdagi (1984) emphasizes:

When Turkey becomes an industrialized state that can provide a decent job and future to all its citizens, religion is likely to become a private matter between man and God and to lose much of its political importance [...]. Turkey is now in the midst of this painful process which is a necessary phase of modernization. (p. 12)

The author’s optimistic view about the temporary resurgence of Islamism within Turkey’s society is clearly reflected in Geyikdagi’s academic work from 1984:

Turkey is in state of rapid change from an agricultural to an industrial economy, from a stagnant to a dynamic society where social mobility is high. All these bring about a change in the social values. This state of anomie creates conflicts and insecurity to the human mind. Hence, many people try to find haven in religion and
become devout believers until they adapt themselves to the new circumstances. Subsequently, they regain their self-confidence and become more flexible in their ideas. (p. 11-12)

Although the author makes a very valid point about economic marginalization being a crucial reason for the rise of Islamism, Geyikdagı’s future prognosis concerning the decline of Islamism once economic welfare has reached all levels of Turkey’s society has oversimplified the complexity of Turkey’s socio-economic and political climate in relation to Islam.

Other authors expand their arguments for the rise of Islamism beyond the economic conditions. Heper (1981) believes that the rise of Islamism within Turkey’s society can be attributed to the failure of Atatürkism “to perform religious metaphysical functions, and, as people find their nonspiritual life dissatisfying, they need inner problems resolved” (p. 363). Ayubi (1991) and Guven (2004) follow a similar line of explanation and consider the failure of the Kemalist state to provide emotional, social, and economic means to all members of Turkey’s society as the core reasons for the rise of Islamism. Ayubi (1991) argues that, “the failure of secular nationalism to incorporate dissatisfied groups and classes […] is responsible for the emergence of Islamist movements in Turkey, Iran and Egypt” (p. 217). Ayubi (1991) expands the idea of religion serving as a defence mechanism by marginalized groups in Turkey and argues that, “when development falters and the promised rewards are not achieved, segments of the civil society rebel against the State using religion as a catalyst for mobilisation and resistance” (p. 19).
Guven (2004) interprets the rise of Islamism as a “counter-movement or source of opposition to the existing authoritarian secularist regimes”, which at the same time led to a “strained” relationship between the government and its citizens (p. 2). These assumptions are confirmed through a survey conducted by KONDA in 2007 about public opinion with regards to politics. According to the survey, Turkey’s greatest problems are poverty (70.4%) and corruption (57.2%). When asked which party could solve the most urgent problems, 34.9% of the interviewees voted for the Islamist party AKP. Secular parties received votes lower than 10% (KONDA, 2007, p. 4). These results confirm the assumption that Islamist movements serve as a counter-reaction to dissatisfaction with the Kemalist establishment in Turkey.

Another argument for the rise of Islamism in Turkey is seen in the changes of government policies with regards to Islam in public spaces in the 1980s. The literature widely agrees that the usage of Islam in society and politics as a counter-weapon to communism and the Soviet Block marks the rise and influence of Islamist groups and “let the Islamic genie out of Atatürk’s bottle” (Rubin, 2003, p. 42). During the 1980s, the Kemalist establishment has allowed Islam a more influential role in the public spheres as well as in politics “to crush the challenges from the left” (Alam, 2009, p. 365). These expansions included policies that incorporated more religious contents in national curriculums, the expansion of religious institutions that conflicted with the secular ideology, removing media censorships concerning religious contents, as well as providing Muslim “bourgeoisie” with credits and government contracts (Vertigans, 2003, p. 12). Referred to as the **Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS)**, Islam was now being viewed as a crucial component of Turkey’s socio-political development and cultural identity.
According to Caracas (2007) "these changes not only led to a nationalization of Islam, but also to an Islamization of the nation" (p. 11). Vertigans argues that, "these concessions were ironically introduced to gain ideological control of religion, but governments have conversely reduced the controls over Islamic structures at a time when they also created conditions that can be conducive to the formation and progress of opposition movement" (p. 13).

The author finds support for this argument from other scholars dealing with the rise of Islamism in Turkey such as Ayata (1993), Huntington (1993), and Sakallhoğlu (1996). Referring once again to Yavuz’s typology of Islamic movements in Turkey, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis can be considered to have served as an opportunity space for Islamic state-oriented and society-oriented movements to gain influence and strength in Turkey.

Sayari (1984) describes the appeal of Islam as more than a counter-movement to modernization. The author speaks of the appeal towards Islamism as a compensation “for the sense of homelessness following the disintegration of communal solidarities” (p. 125). Mardin (1989) supports Sayari’s argument of Islam acting as a support network within the Kemalist climate, stressing that, “we detect an aspect of Islam as communal cement and bond of solidarity” (p. 232). Sayari (1984) then unifies all considerations and concludes that all economic, social, and political factors must be considered responsible for the resurgence of Islamism. According to the author, “this explains the popularity of Islamic revivalist movements, religious orders, qur‘anic principles and fundamentalist political movements” (p. 123). Narli (1999) considers the function of Islamist movements to be an “outlet” for political dissatisfaction with the Kemalist establishment by those at the periphery of the Kemalist ruling elite in Turkey (p. 4).
While the arguments presented in this section provide validity, Vertigans (2003) argues that these validations for the rise of Islamism in Turkey are products of a Western-secular argumentation which disregard other crucial factors of Turkey’s mentality. After reviewing the current arguments prevailing in the literature about the rise of Islamism, Vertigans (2003) concludes that, “even after combining the contextual elements, the focus is still on the defensive, reactive nature of Islam to cultural and economic developments and in this sense is very much within the secularist tradition” (p. 12). While acknowledging the validity of the arguments presented, the author emphasizes that the rise of Islamism cannot be viewed as a short-term reaction to the failure of modernization (Vertigans, 2003, p. 12). The author argues that Islam encompasses norms and values for all aspects of the lives of its followers and increases the need of followers to combine the private and public spheres.

Waxman (1998) offers a similar evaluation of the reasons for a rise of Islamism in Turkey by concluding that, “the clash between secularism and Islamism in Turkey […] is not between modernity and tradition but between two contrasting visions of modernity” (p. 13). Consequently, both authors see the rise of Islamism in Turkey as a causal development based on the nature of Islam and its vision of the future, while at the same time embedding these features into the socio-economic and political context of Turkey’s Kemalist establishment. Adding to this discussion, Vertigans (2003) stresses that “the importance of culture and economics in Turkey and the wider global framework are rightly emphasized” (p. 15). He nevertheless interprets them as being “grounded in the secular paradigm”, failing “to examine Islam beyond those parameters or to address the interrelated complexities” (Vertigans, 2003, p. 15).
Vertigans (2003) strongly emphasizes that the motives for the rise of Islamism go beyond the motivation to rebel against the current status quo. According to the author, “these groups [...] are not necessarily attracted to religion for the defensive, pragmatic, or protectionist purposes that are usually associated with the phenomena” (p. 15). Vertigans (2003) thus argues for an explanation for the rise of Islamism that encompasses a variety of factors including the cultural, political, economic, as well as ideological aspects of the Turkish population. Only then will it be possible to find concrete answers that will be able to comprehend the rise of Islamism in Turkey. The author concludes that, “this is only possible by extending the framework beyond contemporary contextual analysis to include ideology, historical context, processes of socialization, and motivation” (Vertigans, 2003, p. 15).

Alam (2009) considers Islamism in Turkey to offer a post-modern dialogue which challenges the “monolithic, absolute, official Republican Turkish identity” and affects the way people imagine the role of religion in private and public lives to be (p. 370). Alam (2009) argues that Islamism in Turkey has adjusted its characteristics to time and circumstances and strongly stresses that the majority of Islamists in Turkey do not aim at abolishing the Kemalist state but rather seek to renegotiate the role and status of Islam in public (p. 372). The author considers Islamism in Turkey to fulfill the role of challenging the influence of Western modernity thought during the establishment of the Kemalist state. Alam (2009) argues that the current characteristics of Islamism in Turkey seek to reconcile the fissure between Kemalist modernity and Muslim identity:

[Islamism in Turkey] defies the popular conception of Islamism as a monolithic, anti-secular, anti-West and pro-Sharia rule. Unlike the Islamic movements in the
majority of Muslim countries, mainstream Islamism in Turkey attempts to reappropriate the Kemalist legacy, negotiate the space, role and status of Islam within the Kemalist secular order and prove the point that there is no inherent contradiction between having pro-Western policies and maintaining the Muslim identity of the Turkish Republic. [...] Mainstream Islamism in Turkey seeks a critical engagement with Kemalist modernity, not the rejection of the Kemalist order. (p. 375)

Thus, while presenting the possible reasons that might have led to the rise of Islamism in society and politics, the authors presented offer a variety of arguments. Vertigans (2003) warns that not only economic and political factors are crucial foundations for the rise of Islamism, but also the Islamic culture of Turkey’s society. So, it can be said that all variables have been significant factors that allowed Islamism to play a crucial role in society and politics. However, the arguments clearly indicate that certain shortcomings must be present in order to mobilize and motivate individuals to embrace Islamism. It seems that the most crucial factors presented by the authors are economic and social. Hence, the failure to provide economic stability and prosperity for the majority of Turkey’s population as well as the failure of the Kemalist establishment to accommodate the cultural-religious identity of the population, are important factors that led to the rise of Islamism in Turkey. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis furthermore created opportunity spaces for Islamic social and political movements in Turkey. Finally, Alam (2009) asserts that Islamism in Turkey challenges the Kemalist modernity thought and offers the renegotiation of the role and status of Islam in society and politics rather than attempting to create an Islamic state.
2.6 Conclusion of Literature Review

Religion is a crucial aspect of human’s identity. The academic literature indicates that an individual’s and societies’ identities are strongly shaped by religious beliefs and have the potential to serve as a force for social and political movements. While development thinking and practice has neglected this aspect for many decades, the development literature gives substantial proof for religion’s role and contribution to development. The most substantial cause for the avoidance of religion in development is the nature of development thinking which was founded within the modernization thought based on economic progress. The negative development outcomes in most developing countries however serve as convincing proof that development models cannot be successful if only economic conditions are examined, without considering the societal make-up and religion’s significance in them.

When investigating the rise of Islamism, the literature widely suggests that Islamism serves as a counter-movement to political, social, and economic defects. The disappointments with nation-states that are based on principles of modernization and do not consider the religious identity of their cultures, are presented as a crucial force of motivation for Islamic social and political movements to oppose the status quo. The loss of identity together with economic sufferance due to modernization and economic globalization are presented as two crucial reasons for the rise of Islamism in countries such as Egypt, Iran, Algeria and Turkey. The demise of communism as a force of opposition is another crucial reason which left the Islamist ideology as the only accessible tool known to Muslims to challenge their regimes.
When researching Turkey’s Kemalist establishment in relation to the rise of Islamism, Hashemi (2009) speaks of a top-down approach by the secular ruling elite that enforced secular policies on a society that is 97% Muslim. The disregard for Turkey’s cultural complexity and its exclusion from the creation of the secularization process caused discontent among the population and allowed the resurgence of Islamism to be successful. Furthermore, Mehmet (1990) blames the centre-periphery relationship between Turkey’s secular elite and the majority of the population as the core argument for the rise of Islamism. The access to power and resources by the Kemalist elite caused a significant disproportion in economic income and allowed Islamism to serve as a tool to bring the marginalized majority back into the centre. Mehmet (1990) stresses that this serves not as proof for the failure of secularism per se but exemplifies Turkey’s unsuccessful and mismanaged secular development model. Consequently, Mehmet (1990) asserts that the failure of the secular establishment in Turkey to provide social and economic development in Turkey directly correlates with the rise of Islamism in its society and politics.

When regarding the particularities of the rise of Islamism in Turkey, the economic challenges for the majority of Turkey’s population have been suggested as an explanation. Moreover, Islamism as a tool of rebellion against the economic and social outcomes of modernity has also been presented as a valid reason. While the argument of economic, political, and social marginalization serves as a crucial explanation for the resurgence of Islamism in Turkey, the usage of Islamist social and political groups by the Kemalist establishment to oppose communist movements serves as an explanation of how Islamist movements gained power, influence and followers in Turkey. While the
Turkish government aimed at restricting religion in all public spaces during the 1970s, Islamist movements have received financial support from the government to counteract the spread of communism in society and politics. This later allowed Islamist groups to have sufficient power and support from the population to challenge their governments.

Vertigans (2003) acknowledges all points of explanation for the rise of Islamism in Turkey. However, the author argues that the resurgence of Islamism cannot be seen as a mere tool of rebellion against social, political, and economic injustice but must be rather accepted as a new vision of the future which includes the Islamic identity of Turkey’s population. Alam (2009) holds the view that Islamism in Turkey challenges the principles of modernity and offers a negotiating role for Islam.
3 Chapter Three – Empirical Study

The literature review offers various theories with regards to the specific nature of Kemalism in Turkey and attempts to explain the rise and nature of Islamism in Turkey's society and politics. The empirical study of this chapter will attempt to analyze factual occurrences in Turkey to which the theories of the literature review have been referring. This chapter will include a historical overview of Turkey since its foundation as a republic in 1923. Section 3.1 will highlight the reforms established by Atatürk and his political successors. Section 3.2 will analyze the empirical data with regards to socio-economic development and highlight their outcomes in relation to the rise of Islamism. Section 3.3 analyzes what type of Islamism can be found in Turkey’s society and politics. More specifically, it will investigate to what extent Islamism can be found in Turkey, what groups of people support and/or join social and political Islamist movements and what the agendas of Islamist movements and Islamist political parties are. Political, social, and economic features of Turkey which are not relevant to this thesis will be omitted in order to highlight those details which deal specifically with Kemalist development in the socio-political realm in relevance to Islamism in society and politics.

3.1 Turkey’s Historical Background

The Republic of Turkey has been established in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who became Turkey’s first president. His political aspirations for Turkey were clearly illustrated during one of his speeches at the beginning of his presidency:

By complete independence, we mean of course complete economic, financial, juridical, military, cultural independence and freedom in all matters. Being deprived
of independence in any of these is equivalent to the nation and country being deprived of all its independence. (Nonneman, 2005, p. 204)

Atatürk stressed the importance of Turkey’s modernization. Atatürk strongly focused on a Western-oriented state that moved away from the influence of religion in its constitutional laws (Elver, 2006, p. 278). These Kemalist reforms taking place between 1923 and 1935 all aimed at creating a secular nation-state which restricts the role of religion to the private sphere. In 1924 the position of the caliphates as religious leaders was abolished along with religious schools and religious courts. Mustafa Kemal saw the presence of the caliph-hood “as a mere historical relic that threatened the national sovereignty of the newly established republic” (Naim, 2008, p. 198). In March 1924, Qur’anic schools and public education was placed in the hands of the Ministry of Education. In April 1924, Sharia courts and laws were replaced by the European legal system. In 1926, Turkey adapted the Swiss Civil Code (Naim, 2008, p. 197). The adaptation of the Swiss Civil Code fundamentally changed laws which were previously marked by Sharia. The following seven changes in civil law are the most outstanding reforms that marked the Kemalist reformation of Turkey:

1. Freedom to choose religious affiliation.
2. The secularization of marriage. Marriages had to be performed and registered at civil authorities.
3. Introduction of principles of monogamy. Prohibition to marry more than one partner.
4. Equal rights between men and women to divorce.
5. Lifting of prohibition for Muslim women to marry non-Muslim men.


In 1925, in additional to legal and institutional reforms, Atatürk attempted to change the image of Turkish society by introducing the Hat Law, which replaced the wearing of the traditional turban (in Turkish tradition called fez) by a hat (Mehmet, 1990, p. 117). According to Mehmet (1990), “Kemal wanted to shake his countrymen out of their centuries-old habits of traditionalism, superstition and fatalism” (p. 117). Atatürk’s reformation projects is further visible by his introduction of the European (Gregorian) calendar and Sunday as the weekly day of rest. In 1928, Turkey was officially declared a secular republic and Islam removed as the official religion of the state (Naim, 2008, p. 197). Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution lays down the fundamental principles of the Turkish state:

The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble. (Constitution of the Republic Of Turkey)

On November 1, 1928, the Latin alphabet was adopted in replacement of Arabic as the official writing to be used which “represented a fundamental mental revolution; it changed the mode of reasoning of the Turks and thrust them into a contemporary world of culture. It was a cornerstone in Kemalist cultural restructuring imposed from above”
(Mehmet, 1990, p. 119). In 1930, Turkish women received the right to vote, were granted civil rights with the inclusion of political equality. The veil, which Atatürk considered "the symbol of female subordination", was banned (Mehmet, 1990, p. 119). In 1934, all Turkish citizens had to adopt a surname. Mehmet (1990) summarizes Atatürk’s reforms as a top-down approach on a society which adopted the new reforms not always understanding its implications:

Kemalist reforms were revolutionary reforms. They shook the traditional Turkish society to its very foundations. While they were generally accepted as a necessary condition for modernization—or westernization—the masses had little understanding of these terms, but they were willing, by and large, to accept them as an article of their faith in the great leader Atatürk. (p. 119)

Criticism on Atatürk’s reforms arose from various sides. Some was based on practical reasoning such as the prices of the hats, which cost as much as one third of a lowly-paid official’s salary. As a result, many farmers and impoverished people had to borrow money in order to comply with the new dress code (Mehmet, 1990, p. 119). Criticism also came from the traditionalists among Turkey’s politicians as well as from the Islamic clergy who lost their previously held power and considered “the Kemalist reforms as the work of the godless betrayers of Islam” and called for a restoration of Sharia as well as the overthrow of the “infidels” who seized state power (Mehmet, 1990, p. 120). A major confrontation between Kemalist nationalists and the Islamic traditionalists occurred in December 1930 during which the religious traditionalists provoked a riot and killed a young Kemalist school teacher. This incident resulted in sentencing thirty six religious traditionalists to death by hanging (Mehmet, 1990, p. 120).
This incident provoked the creation of policies of *de-Islamization* through the prosecution of religious critics of Kemalism. Mehmet (1990) describes the de-Islamization process as being through “often brutal oppression” and any resistance to the Kemalist reforms was prosecuted and punished through the Independence Tribunals (p. 120). The de-Islamization policy was strictly enforced throughout the 1930s until the late 1940s. Once the Kemalist reforms had been established, it was forbidden by law to challenge or question those, as well as to criticize Atatürk and the six principles of Kemalism.

Altunışık and Kavli (2004) summarize the reforms taking place during the 1920s by emphasizing that “Mustafa Kemal and his associates thus opted for a speedy transformation of Turkey through Westernisation, secularisation and social and cultural reforms” (p. 23). The Kemalist ideology is a great part of school and university curriculum and students are required to take courses with the aim to “internalize the principles of Atatürk and uphold his revolutionary legacy” (Naim, 2008, p. 200). Furthermore, all public figures and intellectuals are required to openly subscribe to the Kemalist ideology which can never be questioned or changed. Naim (2008) argues that “given these constrains, limitations, and legal restrictions, free public debate on the issue of laicism and its problems has been very difficult in Turkey” (p. 200).

Throughout the 1940s, Turkey experienced the transformation from a single-party regime to a multi-party system in which people’s votes determined the parties in power. Altunışık and Kavli (2004) consider this to be “a turning point in Turkish political history” (p. 25). The May 1950 elections illustrate Turkey’s shift from a single party rule under Atatürk, the Republican People’s Party, to a multi party system which gave Turkey’s population the power to elect the politicians to be in charge.
Table 3-1: Election results from 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
<td>3176,56!</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Party</td>
<td>4241,393</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation Party</td>
<td>250,418</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>383,282</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Altunísk & Kavli, 2004, p. 29

Significant aspects of Turkey’s history are its four military interventions in the last five decades. While historians and academics list a wide range of reasons that led to the first military coup on May 27, 1960, the official cause was the military’s concerns with the Democratic Party that held power in Turkey to be posing a threat to Turkey’s secularism and to be responsible for the worsening economic situation in Turkey. Altunísk and Kavli (2004) quote explanations offered by some of the individuals’ carrying out the coup. “The 27 May Revolution (1960 coup) was a rising up of the present generation trained by the revolution of the great Atatürk from those who, during the past ten years, wanted to upset and destroy it out of a thirst for power” (p. 33).

Naim (2008) describes the military, called Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), as a strong supporter of the doctrines of secularism and the most effective enforcer of its tenets. Turkish Armed Forces have been used by Kemalists to “advance its specific ideology of modernization, westernization, and secularism” (Naim, 2008, p. 201). In 1971, the military intervened once again into politics due to the growing violence between right-wing and left-wing parties, which destabilized the state and provoked aggression and violence among Turkey’s population. The military enforced the shutdown of various radical left-wing and right-wing parties, and limited the freedom of the press. Due to the continuous “left–right polarisation” in society and politics, the military seized
control of the government once again in 1980 and would rule Turkey for the next three years. On the morning of the coup, the army issued a statement, highlighting the reasons for the military intervention. “The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of the country, to re-establish the existence of the state and to eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working of a democratic order” (Altunışık & Kavli, 2004, p. 42).

Capezza makes a sharp distinction between the authoritarian power of militaries in countries where the military refused to give back power once they had established order, and Turkey, where the military always returned power to civilians once order and stability had been established. Capezza states that “the Turkish experience stands in sharp juxtaposition to that in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria where the military seized control and refused to relinquish power” (Capezza, 2009, p. 1). Palmer and Palmer furthermore argue that the military is a crucial force in Turkey’s democratic and secular process to counteract any radical movements which could endanger the Kemalist character of Turkey (Palmer & Palmer, 2008, p.113).

In order to decrease the communist influence and the divide leftist movements have created within Turkey’s society and in politics, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS) was introduced, situating Islam as the main, identifying force of Turkey’s national identity. An important approach to introduce the ideas behind TIS was through the introduction of religious courses in schools. According to Waxman (1997), “education was the primary sphere in which the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ was expounded” (p. 19). Furthermore, Quranic classes were opened and religious education promoted by the state. Religious
courses were made a compulsory subject in primary and secondary schools and its educational promotion added to the Turkish constitution of 1982\(^5\).

*TIS* was also performed through the financing of Islamist groups in order to enable them to decrease the influence of leftist movements in society. This policy would later be attributed as a contributing factor for the increased power of Islamist social and political groups. According to Rabasa and Larrabee (2008), the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis “provided opportunities for Islamists to expand and reinforce their own message” (p. 38). Consequently, after the 1980 coup and the introduction of TIS, political parties with an Islamist agenda increasingly appeared on the landscape of Turkey’s political life. The military intervention in 1997, referred to as *soft coup*, aimed at forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Erbakan and his Islamist Refah Party. After the military intervention in 1997 and the shutdown of the Refah Party, the military enforced various measures against Islamic/Islamist movements as well as a stronger control over charitable religious organizations and schools (Naim, 2008, p. 219).

To restrict a politicization of Islam in society and politics, there are various legal measures to control the way people practice and display religion in public. These legal measures regulate education and religious practices. They control the finances of mosques as well as employ imams. Furthermore, they prescribe men’s and women’s dress code in public areas. Naim (2008) concludes that secularism in Turkey “denies

\(^5\) Waxman (1997) quotes Article 24 of the 1982 Turkish constitution:

> Education in religion shall be conducted under state supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence or even for partially basing he fundamental social, economic, political and legal order of the State on religious tenets. (p. 19)
Muslims the right to live by their own conviction” (p. 219). Secularists, on the other hand, consider such measures a necessity to ensure that each person can live freely from religious pressures in the public spheres. Consequently, secularists stress that Atatürk and the Kemalist ideology was never aimed against religion itself and never put pressure on the personal practice of religion (Howe, 2008, p. 21).

As has become apparent, Turkey’s secular commitment is rooted in Atatürk’s conviction that separating religion from the state would modernize Turkey’s population and lead to more equality for all. By putting state control over religious institutions and education, the secular state aimed at supervising and guiding the transformation of Turkish culture into a secular society in which religion is restricted to the private spheres of citizen’s lives. Furthermore, Turkey’s history since its foundation as a modern republic has been shaped and determined by its commitment to orientate itself on principles of modernity and progress as defined by Europe. Other crucial features of Turkey’s recent history are the four military interventions in the last five decades. While the first three military coups were mostly caused by political tensions between right-wing and left-wing movements, the fourth military intervention aimed at removing the Refah Party from power on grounds of posing a threat to the Kemalist principles due to its Islamist agenda. In the next section of this chapter, the Kemalist socio-economic development reforms will be analyzed and their outcomes assessed in relation to the rise of Islamism.

3.2 Kemalism and Turkey’s Socio-Economic Development

The literature review based on the current academic discussion suggests three levels on which the Kemalist doctrines stand in relation to the rise of Islamism in Turkey. First,
most of the academic literature presented argues that the Kemalist establishment did not consider and therefore underestimated the identity of the Turkish population when establishing the Turkish republic in 1923. Yavuz (2003) argues that “after the foundation of the Republic in 1923, the secularizing, state-centric elite failed effectively to penetrate and transform traditional society, and was similarly unsuccessful in developing an alternative value system and associational life for the rural population of the country” (p. 4).

Secondly, the literature describes the relationship between the ruling elite and the rest of the Turkish population as a centre-periphery relationship based on a top-down approach which left the majority of the population outside the economic and social benefits of the Kemalist establishment. In this context, Mehmet (1990) emphasizes that “of central importance here is the failure of the leader-follower model of development strategy [...] to promote social justice for the mass of inhabitants” (p. 43). Thirdly, the literature widely suggests that the economic policies of the Kemalist establishment created a high degree of income inequality and left the majority of Turkish population impoverished. Mehmet (1990) speaks of a failure to deliver economic benefits to the majority while at the same time destroying the previous Islamic socio-economic coping mechanism in Turkey’s population:

In the end, for the masses, top-down strategy turned out to be mal-development: it seemed to destroy whatever remained of the old Islamic socio-economic order without any compensation. It concentrated wealth in a few hands, while causing mass poverty; it turned peasants, long accustomed to a tradition of egalitarian
culture based on a strong sense of community, into marginalized proletarians victimized by the capital-intensive technology. (p. 42)

The next section of this chapter will be divided into two parts, one section dealing with empirical data that highlights the Kemalist social policies in relation to Islamism and the second part dealing with the Kemalist economic reforms.

3.2.1 Kemalism and Social Development

One of the main reforms performed by the Kemalist establishment aimed at creating a modern, progressive society in which religion should serve as a personal identity in the private realm. The introduction of the dress code and the prohibition of Islamic clothing in public institutions aimed at disclosing the degree of religiosity of Turks and emphasize that religion is not an identifying factor of Turkey’s society. While the dress code refers to both sexes, it has a greater effect on women due to the headscarf that they wear as religious followers of Islam. Elver (2006) stresses that secularists consider any signs of Islam in the public sphere as a “symbol of a world view opposed to the fundamental principles of the Republic and opposed to women’s liberation” (p. 294). According to Elver (2006), the Kemalists fear that allowing women to wear the headscarf in public places, such as universities, schools and government institutions, would increase the influence of Islam in society and politics and thus pose a threat to Kemalism. Hereby secularists recall the rise of political Islam in Iran during the Iranian Revolution in the 1980s as well as the takeover of the Taliban in Afghanistan, which led to the highest degrees of political oppression. Secularist movements in Turkey associate the wearing of headscarves in public spheres with a backward development. As Göksel (2006) stresses,
“a common perception is that the rise of the religious conservative classes inevitably would take Turkey backwards” (p. 1).

This stands in contrast to religious individuals who support religious freedom as a human right and pressure the government to remove the headscarf ban from the constitution. Tuksal (2007) argues that practicing Muslims are concerned that secularism in Turkey aims at radically transforming the Islamic values and daily lifestyle attached to these values that have been shaping Turkey’s society over hundreds of years (p. 3).

The main accusations within this debate is that the prohibition of wearing the headscarf in any public sphere violates the freedom of religious expression, as guaranteed in Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution which prohibits any discrimination based on differences in language, ethnicity, religious beliefs and sex. Furthermore, it obstructs the right to education, as guaranteed in Article 42, for religious female students whose access to schools or universities is restricted due to their religious commitment of wearing a headscarf.

According to Elver (2006) “by banning the headscarf, the state is authoritatively imposing its own understanding of women’s liberties on a group who does not share the same understanding” (p. 294). Furthermore, the headscarf ban poses another problem with regards to rights of religious women. While religious men can continue to fully participate in public life and advance their careers, religious women are being

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6 Article 24 of the Constitution of Turkey from 1982 proclaims with regards to religion that “no one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and convictions” (Constitution of the Republic Of Turkey).

7 With regards to education, article 42 prescribes that “no one shall be deprived of the right of learning and education” (Constitution of the Republic Of Turkey).
discriminated against in the advancement of their professional careers. While there are no detailed statistics of how many women have been refused to enter universities due to their headscarf or female teachers who were suspended from their work in schools, it is estimated that around 300,000 to 500,000 women were directly affected by the headscarf ban in the last two decades. Tuksal (2007) emphasizes that women who cover their heads do not always choose to do so in order to make a political statement or to criticize the liberal agenda of the government. Rather, they do it for personal reasons. Thus, forbidding wearing the headscarf by law creates a political debate about personal issues (Tuksal, 2007, p. 3). A survey by KONDA with regards to religiosity in Turkey confirms this notion. The survey indicates that the majority of women wearing the headscarf in Turkey do so based on religious beliefs (73%) rather than on political motivation.

Table 3-2: Headscarf survey results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do YOU think is the reason for you, your mother or sister to cover their heads?</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious beliefs</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request of husband</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs and traditions</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habit</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request of family elders</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conform with social surroundings</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KONDA, 2007, p. 21

According to Elver (2006), the Turkish state itself has had a rather inconsistent approach to this issue. At times, it enforced strict punishment against female teachers, university students and professionals who were wearing the headscarf and expelled them from their positions. At other times, depending on the influence of Muslim parties in the parliament, the approach towards the headscarf debate was more flexible. The Council of State has supported the headscarf ban by emphasizing four main arguments. (1), the
headscarf limits the liberties of women. (2), headscarves in public places such as universities create an impression of unequal treatment before law. If students can be distinguished with regards to their religious beliefs, it might lead to unequal treatment by professors who either favor or discriminate against Muslims. The headscarf debate also reached the European Human Rights Commission (EHRC) when a university refused to give diplomas to female students with headscarves. Hereby the EHCR came to the following conclusion:

A student who chooses to attend a secular university, should accept the regulations of the university. These regulations provide a system to allow for students from different beliefs to coexist. Particularly in countries where the vast majority of the population belongs to a particular religion, exhibition of the rituals and symbols of this religion without regards to any restrictions of place and form can pressure students who do not practice this religion, or instead, belong to other religions.

(Elver, 2006, p. 296)

(3), headscarves represent a symbol of opposition to the fundamental ideas of secularism and the Republic of Turkey. (4), it is necessary to limit the freedom of religion because “a threat exists that the state would become organized according to the dictates of Islam” (Elver, 2006, p. 294). The headscarf ban continues to constitute a heated debate about its meaning. Naim (2008) suggests that secularists view the headscarf as “the iceberg of Islamic fundamentalism” (p. 209). Furthermore, any resistance or questioning about the headscarf ban by public employees such as teachers, professors, lawyers or judges is considered an assault against the Turkish secular democracy (Naim, 2008, p. 208).
At the same time, the KONDA survey emphasized that the majority of people asked do not consider the headscarf to be a political statement against secularism. 68.4% of the interviewees do not consider the headscarf to be a political symbol against secularism or a call for a religiously orientated government, while 16.7% of the interviewees do think that the headscarf is a symbol of a critique against secularism.

Table 3-3: Survey about the symbolism of the headscarf

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In your opinion, is turban a symbol, indicator or sign of antagonism towards secularism, of the desire for state affairs to be managed by religious rules? What is your opinion on the matter?</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, turban is a sign of antagonism towards secularism.</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, turban is not a sign of antagonism towards secularism.</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KONDA, 2007, p. 35

Furthermore, while 19.4% of society thinks that government officials should not be allowed to wear the headscarf, 68.9% of Turkey’s population think that the question of the headscarf in public spaces should be a free choice.

Table 3-4: Survey about headscarf in public places

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do you think about women working as state officers covering their heads?</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None of them should be covered</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whoever wishes should be covered</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of them should be covered</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KONDA, 2007, p. 41

Another conflict of identity between the population and the Kemalist establishment is displayed through the principles of governance of religion by the Kemalist government and the religiosity of the population. While Turkey’s population has been mostly Muslim
with a large population of individuals who consider their religion their primary identity, the Kemalist establishment took control over religious matters through their secular institutions. The establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs aimed at supervising religious issues in Turkey’s public spheres. The current department of Directorate of Religious Affairs prescribes the following guidelines with regards to the relationship between religion and the public sphere:

1. Religion does not dominate or influence state affairs.
2. In order to protect public order and interest, provisions are made to limit religious actions and behavior that go beyond the spiritual world of the individual and which have an effect on social life.
3. The state is given supervisory powers over religious rights and liberties as the guardian of public order and public rights. (The Presidency of Religious Affairs)

As the official declaration of this department stresses, religion and religious acts can only be exercised within the private realm and religious activities that go beyond “the spiritual world” are to be limited by the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Furthermore, any religious affairs are under the control of the government and must submit to the Kemalist order. At the same time, KONDA’s survey, which investigated the degree of religiosity and the importance of Islam in people’s lives, found the following:
Table 3-5: Religious acts of Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of worship</th>
<th>Regularly</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Performing ritual prayer (namaz)</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fasting</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to Friday prayer (men only)</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to mosque / cemevi*</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praying</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading the Koran</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KONDA, 2007, p. 24

As the table indicates, fasting (82.5%), going to Friday prayer (56.1%) and praying (75.2%) are religious acts which are exercised regularly by the majority of Turkey’s population. Those who never fast consist of 5.4% of the population, those who never go to Friday prayer are 18.9% and those who never pray consist of 2.3% of Turkey’s population. When investigating the individuals’ definition of religion and degree of religiosity, 52.8% defined themselves as “a religious person who strives to fulfill religious obligations”, 34.3% as “a believer who does not fulfill religious obligations”, 9.7% described themselves as “a fully devout person fulfilling all religious obligations” and 2.3% as “someone who does not believe in religious obligations”. 0.9% described themselves as “someone with no religious convictions” (KONDA, 2007, p. 26). Thus, to which extent does the Turkish society wishes to live their belief in public and beyond “the spiritual world” if Islam constitutes such an important aspect of the society’s identity?

As has been highlighted in this section, the reforms introduced by the Kemalist establishment in Turkey with regards to the social space aimed at restricting religion to the private realm of its followers. The purpose behind such policies was to create a society which is free from religious influences in public spaces and politics in order to
create and maintain a secular, modern and progressive society. However, in relation to the rise of Islamism in Turkey, various authors argue that policies such as the dress code and the subordinate role of religion to the government seem to stand in contrast to a society that consist of 97% Muslims of whom large numbers declare themselves to be relatively religious and who do not see religion as a solely private affair.

3.2.2 Kemalism and Economic Development

According to Mehmet (1990), Turkey’s economy underwent two main phases: the nationalist phase until 1980s and the privatization phase, also referred to by other authors as the neo-liberal phase (Galbraith, 2008). The nationalist phase was marked by etatism/statism, in which “the state assumed direct control of resource allocation by means of economic planning and public enterprise” (Mehmet, 1990, p. 126). Hence, Mehmet (1990) argues that the economy was governed by the centralist elite with little or no interference of individuals outside this group. Gradually, Turkey adopted a strategy of state capitalism. According to Mehmet (1990), “these elites consisted of the top political/military/bureaucratic leadership which shared a conviction of having saved the nation and was now dedicated to the task of leading it” (p. 128).

After 1960, during the period of import substitution industrialization (ISI), the high economic growth was governed through the “new state-sponsored capitalist class” which joined the ranks of the Kemalist elite (Mehmet, 1990, p. 128). The etatist economic strategies remained Turkey’s development approach until 1980s and “never lost its highly centralized, ‘topdown’ character: the frequent policy shifts merely reflected power struggles within these centrist elites” (Mehmet, 1990, p. 128). State monopolies defined
Turkey’s etatist economy which was directly controlled by and directly benefitted the ruling elite. Mismanaged enterprises did not have any effects on the individuals governing them and did not influence personal success in Turkey’s elite circles:

Successful management was not based on profitability. An operating loss did not mean corporate bankruptcy or personal disgrace. Pricing and investment policies were centralized in the hands of bureaucrats and politicians. Administered prices had no relation to either production costs or market conditions. Under the circumstances, loss-making SEEs [state economic enterprises] multiplied with relative ease. Political connections sheltered operational losses and managerial incompetence. In short, the SEE sector became the centre of patronage politics dominated by featherbedding and favouritism. As losses and deficits mounted, mismanagement had a cancerous effect on professional standards and worker morale. (Mehmet, 1990, p. 137)

The phase between 1960s and 1980s was defined by import substitution industrialization (ISI) and marked by rapid economic growth. ISI was based on the notion that a country can economically develop by substituting its own manufactures for items it previously imported with the help of state interventionism. ISI had been initiated by the first military coup based on political tensions and the national economic crisis provoked by extensive economic mismanagement. In spite of its successes in growth of income per capita to the five-fold, the ISI strategy was marked by highly rent-seeking behaviour.\(^8\)

\(^8\) According to Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris (2005), rent seeking refers to “all largely unproductive, expropriative activities which bring positive returns to the individual but not to society” (p. 3).
through corruption, inefficiency and mismanagement (Mehmet, 1990, p. 138). Individuals in influential positions such as powerful bureaucrats and influential politicians determined preferential regulations, tariff policies and import-export controls to their advantage. Consequently, Mehmet (1990) suggests, while the Kemalist ruling elite enriched themselves during the ISI, this development brought economic distress for the majority of the population through falling real wages and incomes. Thus, according to Mehmet (1990), the “chronic” corruption and mismanagement were responsible for the economic crisis in Turkey in 1979 and 1980 (p. 139).

Mehmet (1990) argues that the main reason why the mismanagement of the statist economy was able to last for so long was because the Kemalist elite did not have to provide accountability to the grass root levels. Thus, “the entire system of etatism, and the elitism which it institutionalized, lacked adequate checks and balances” (Mehmet, 1990, p. 144). Consequently, the mismanagement of the economy resulted in increasing wealth inequality. Turkey emerged as one of the worst countries with regards to fair income distribution (Mehmet, 1990, p. 183). At the same time, the increasing income inequality coincided with Turkey’s highest economic performance in Turkey’s economic restoration phase after the 1960 military coup. The income inequality especially affected the agricultural and industrial workers while non-agricultural, non-wage earners increased their income from 1968 to 1979. The table below identifies the income shares of Turkey’s population by occupation between 1968 and 1979:
Table 3-6: Income share across occupations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional groups</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonagricultural wage-earners</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried civil servants</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonagricultural, nonwage-earners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In industry</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In services</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP at factor prices</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mehmet, 1983, p. 58

As can be seen, while in general almost all workers’ income shares diminished in those 11 years, non-wage earners experienced an increase in their income share from 37.6% to 52.5%. Mehmet (1983) summarizes Turkey’s economic development as an exploitative system of the elite to enrich themselves on the costs of the average Turk:

At the top of these special interest groups is what might be termed the ‘Turkish economic elite’ is the top 10 percent receiving over 40 percent of the personal income. This elite, functionally associated with the bureaucratic and political elites, has controlled the Turkish grant economy not in a disinterested but in a self-interested manner: The policies and measures that have been designed have been manipulated to benefit the elite itself. (p. 58)

By 1980, because of the uneven economic development, Turkey experienced a “major demographic transformation in terms of mass migration” from rural areas to urban centres such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir (Alam, 2009, p. 364). While in 1950, 25% of Turkey’s population lived in urban areas, by 1993, this figure increased to 59% (Alam, 2009, p. 365). The migrants mostly ended up living in illegally established gecekondu, shanty neighborhoods, in unhealthy conditions at the constant risk of being evicted.

**Table 3-7: Migration to urban centres from rural areas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Rural Population</th>
<th>Urban Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>20,947,188</td>
<td>15,702,851</td>
<td>5,244,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>27,754,820</td>
<td>18,895,089</td>
<td>8,859,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>35,605,176</td>
<td>21,914,075</td>
<td>13,691,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>44,736,957</td>
<td>25,091,950</td>
<td>19,645,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>56,473,035</td>
<td>23,146,684</td>
<td>33,326,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>67,803,927</td>
<td>23,797,653</td>
<td>44,006,274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Karakas, 2007, p. 24

Consequently, the growing economic marginalization of Turkey’s majority since the foundation of Turkey as a republic is being argued as a reason for the rise of Islamism in society and politics. Mehmet (1990) argues that “for the masses, secularism and etatism, like western capitalism, appeared only as a path to mass poverty, alienation and social injustice. The Islamic option, by comparison, seemed correspondingly more attractive” (p. 146).

In 1980, Turkey launched into the neo-liberal market economy dominated by privatization and liberalization. Turkey’s government committed itself to the economic policies promoted by the IMF and the World Bank. Liberalization of foreign trade and the financial sector, deregulation, currency devaluation, privatization of state enterprises and new import-export policies accompanied the economic shift towards neoliberalism (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008, p. 7). According to Mehmet (1990), the elite power shifted “from bureaucratic elites to market-oriented political elites willing to forge new alliances with corporate interests” (p. 203).
Unemployment and labour market imbalance remained problems during the privatization phase. Real wages fell by almost 50% between 1980 and 1984, and income inequality further rose. As a consequence, Turkey experienced public sector deficits and a growing inflation. Elveren and Galbraith (2008) performed an in-depth analysis about income inequality in Turkey during the neoliberal era between 1980 and 2001. Through measurements of income by sectors, by geographic locations, and income by educational background, the authors conclude that income inequality has worsened steadily since 1980. They argue that this development is due to “the negative trend of real wages, a change in tax policies benefiting the rich, a failure of redistributive tax policy, high real interest rates, unequal education and excessive migration to urban areas due to both economic and political pressure” (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008, p. 2).

They furthermore observed that income inequality is significantly higher in urban areas than in rural areas. While the authors see the shift to neoliberal economy as an important reason for the economic distress, the authors conclude that the most unequal distributed income is non-wage income that is “mostly earned by the top quintile [top 20% of all households] and the biggest source of income inequality is the interest component” (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008, p. 2). Moreover, they observed that agricultural policies were beneficial for rich farmers producing in large quantities, while such policies limited impoverished, small-scale farmers (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008, p. 15). The authors conclude that “our findings showed that overall inequality in pay in Turkey in the post 1980 era, under the neo-liberal model, has deteriorated particularly beginning in the late 1980s” (Elveren & Galbraith, 2008, p. 27).
The following table shows the declining employment rate, labour force participation and real GDP growth rate among Turkey’s population during the neoliberal economic process between 1988 and 2001.

Table 3-8: Economic performance between 1988 and 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population growth</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth 15-64</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate (Employment/ Population 15-64)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force participation</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment growth rate</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP growth rate</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment elasticity to GDP</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Auer & Popova, 2003, p. 4

As indicated, the employment rate in 1990 was 54.5% and decreased steadily to 45.1% in 2001. The labour force participation decreased as well from 62.1% in 1988 to 50.6% in 2001 along with a decline in GDP growth (2.1% in 1988 and -7.4% in 2001).

The graph below shows youth and total unemployment rates in Turkey from 1988 to 2001.
Figure 3-1: Youth and total unemployment between 1988 and 2001

Source: Auer & Popova, 2003, p. 9

As can be seen, the latest economic developments show an increase in unemployment, especially youth unemployment. The rise in youth unemployment rate in Turkey, according to sexes from 1988 to 2001 is displayed below:

Table 3-9: Youth unemployment by gender between 1988 and 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male youth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployment rate (%)</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female youth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployment rate (%)</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Auer & Popova, 2003, p. 9

As can be seen, for both sexes, the youth unemployment under the neoliberal phase reached a new high in 2001, when 20.7% male youth and 18.3% female youth were reported as unemployed. Auer and Popova (2003) consider poverty in Turkey to be affecting specific groups and endangering them to live in absolute poverty:
Poverty in Turkey affects specific groups of the population and employment and earnings are among the key determinants of poverty risk: however, economic vulnerability is considered to be the main problem. This means that there are large numbers of people living close to the absolute survival minimum and they are the ones most susceptible to falling into absolute poverty as a result of economic downturn. (p. 13)

The highest poverty rate can be found among self-employed households working in agriculture, followed by casual work in construction, regular employment in manufacturing and self-employment in trade. These four groups combined together represent 55% of those vulnerable to poverty and 63% of the poor population in total. Crucial to note is that households with a regular income also continue to suffer from poverty. In 1997, the working poor rate was 2.6%. The authors conclude that key reasons for the rise of poverty between 1980 and 1990 were the macroeconomic changes in economy which resulted in the rise in inflation and unemployment (Auer & Popova, 2003, p. 13).

As demonstrated, Turkey experienced a growing income inequality as well as poverty. As has been already suggested in the literature review, religiosity in Turkey correlates with the degree of poverty. A survey of KONDA concludes in its analysis that people with the lowest income display the highest degree of religiosity:
Table 3-10: Correlation between religiosity and income level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In terms of religiosity, which following group do you consider yourself to be in?</th>
<th>Lowest income</th>
<th>Lower middle</th>
<th>Middle income</th>
<th>Upper middle</th>
<th>Highest income</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-believer</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believer</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully devout</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KONDA, 2007, p. 31

As can be seen, in the lowest income group, 73.3% report that they are either religious or fully devoted Muslims. With the increase in income, the degree of religiosity significantly decreases. While the table above indicates the increase in religiosity with the increase in poverty, the table below indicates that with the increase of religiosity the support for the Islamist political party AKP increases.

Table 3-11: Religiosity and AKP voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AKP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not covered</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wears headscarf</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wears turban</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wears chador</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KONDA, 2007, p. 18

The most support for the AKP (81.9%) comes from individuals who are visibly religious. This analysis leads to the conclusion that with the increase of poverty, religion plays an increasingly important role in people’s lives and at the same time these groups increasingly support political parties with an Islamist agenda. Hence, it can be argued that poverty is highly interconnected with the degree of religiosity and the support for political movements and parties with an Islamist agenda.
At the same time, the empirical data strongly suggests a direct correlation between the level of education and the degree of religiosity. The table below offers an overview about religiosity and the level of education of individuals.

**Table 3-12: Correlation between religiosity and level of education**

| In terms of religiosity, which following group do you consider yourself to be in? | Illiterate | Literate, no diploma | Primary education | Secondary Education | High School | University | Higher Edu. | Turkey |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non-believer | 1.4 | 3.0 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 4.2 | 10.5 | 9.4 | 3.2 |
| Believer | 18.3 | 16.3 | 26.5 | 37.0 | 46.2 | 51.3 | 43.8 | 34.3 |
| Religious | 67.6 | 61.4 | 59.1 | 52.3 | 43.3 | 36.1 | 43.8 | 52.8 |
| Fully devout | 12.6 | 19.3 | 12.6 | 8.9 | 6.1 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 9.7 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Source: KONDA, 2007, p. 30

67.6% of the illiterate call themselves religious and 12.6% more report as strongly devoted. This development is reversed with increased levels of education. 2.1% of university graduates consider themselves as fully devoted while an increase in non-believers can be found from 1.4% among illiterates to 10.5% on university level. At the same time, research shows that the education level strongly correlates with the degree of poverty. An extensive World Bank research about living standards in Turkey and economic vulnerability between 1987 and 1994 comes to the conclusion that “the education of household head plays a key role in determining whether the household is poor” (Yemtsov, 2001, p. 12). There is a 10 times higher poverty risk in a household which is headed by an illiterate person than a household head with higher education. In general, 26.9% of those identified as poor, were illiterate. Saatci and Akpinar (2007) characterize the group living in poverty as “poor people in Turkey had lower educational status […], lacked social and health insurance, and worked unregistered in the agricultural sector as family workers” (p. 631).
In conclusion, the empirical data presented in this section suggests that both during the nationalist phase and privatization phase of the Kemalist economic development a centre-periphery relationship between the Kemalist elite and the rest of Turkey’s population can be found. The economic policies created an elitist economic system which benefited those inside the Kemalist elite and economically neglected the population outside of the Kemalist elite. Furthermore, the empirical analysis indicates a relationship between low education, poverty and religiosity and the overall support for Islamist political parties in Turkey. This relationship between education, poverty and religiosity will be further discussed in Chapter Four.

3.3 Islamism in Turkey

Turkey’s society consists of approximately 97% Muslims. There is no doubt that Islam has always played an important role in Turkey’s cultural identity. In the 1970s and 1980s, Islamism became a critical force in Turkey’s society and politics when it attempted to challenge the Kemalist structure of Turkey. In this context, one can distinguish between two levels of Islamic/Islamist movements in Turkey: in politics through political parties and on the societal level through the affirmation of Islamically oriented movements in public spaces such as the media, organizations and associations. On societal level, Noyon (2003) describes four social strands of Islamic/Islamist movements: traditionalist Muslims from provinces, lower middle class members such as tradesmen, shopkeepers and workers, rural migrants to cities and ‘born again Muslims’ who prior to the 1980s belonged to leftist movements (p. 62). Noyon (2003) thus argues that Islamism in Turkey “has cultural, social and political dimensions that seemed to threaten Turkey’s cultural ‘progress’ and to lessen prospects for its full membership of
the Western club” (p. 54). In both, society and politics, Islamic/Islamist movements adopted “tools of Westernization and modernity” such as technology, modern business methods and most importantly democratic political means (Noyon, 2003, p. 54).

Şimşek (2004) situates the leaders and actors of Islamic/Islamist political and social movements mostly as of “newly urbanized middle class origin” (p. 123). They do however largely receive their support from the “urban poor and the destitute” and summarize their agenda as a demand for cultural and religious recognition in public spheres. Their aim is to “create an Islamic identity and way of life” (Şimşek, 2004, p. 123).

3.3.1 Islamism in Politics

On the political level, the two most recent parties in power which are controversial with regards to their Islamist agenda, are the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, abbreviated AK Parti or AKP). Cizre (2008) emphasizes the Islamic/Islamist roots of the Welfare Party which orientated its agenda on the National Outlook Movement (NOM; Milli Görüş Hareketi, abbreviated MGH). NOM was formed in the 1970s in order to promote spiritual and material development in Turkey. This political movement had a strong anti-Western, Islamist ideology which influenced the ideologies of the Welfare Party (p. 62). In 1994, when the Welfare Party won the mayorships of thirty cities including Istanbul and Ankara, Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey’s first Islamic Prime Minister indicated his religious commitment by stating that “this is a present to us from God. Refah Party will soon be in
power [...]. Our next aim is the World Islamic Unity. Istanbul is the capital of the Muslim world” (Howe, 2000, p. 27).

Howe’s (2000) illustration of Refah’s Islamist motives is based on the controversial statements made by Refah’s Parliament members. While at times its members claimed their commitment towards a secular democracy, some hardliners within the Refah Party made anti-secular statements that indicated Islamist motives of the party. The parliamentarian Hasan Mezarci announced his Islamist agenda by proclaiming that “even if only five million of us remain, a Sharia government will be established” (Howe, 2000, p. 32). Howe (2000) quotes Makovsky who summarized Erbakan and Refah’s motives as a strategic and conscious attempt to establish Sharia in Turkey:

To stay in power, he is willing to compromise in the short run [...]. Erbakan will try to do what he can – though use of the budget, government appointments, the bully pulpit – further to Islamize Turkish society and add an Islamic tone to its foreign policy. (Howe, 2000, p. 33)

Furthermore, Makovsky interprets Erbakan’s tactic to establish an Islamic state through creating an Islam-conscious society before openly reintroducing religion to politics (Howe, 2000, p. 23). In her analysis of the Refah Party, Sayari (1996) points out that one important goal of the party was to change the constitutional and legal rules regarding state control and the regulation over religion. Furthermore, the party had declared that when they would reach a two-third majority power in the parliament, it would expand the role of Islamic institutions, organizations and cultural activities in Turkish society and emphasize the teachings of Islam in the educational sector (Sayari,
1996, p. 1). In spite of Refah’s verbal assurances that the party would continue Turkey’s secular tradition, Sayari (1996) suggests that the ultimate goal of the Refah party was power expansion with a superior ideological goal:

Turkey’s Islamists believe that time is on their side and that they need to be patient. They also believe that once the secular foundations of the republic are sufficiently weakened, Islamists can proceed with their ultimate goal of creating an Islamic state in the region’s only predominantly Muslim and democratic country. (p. 1)

Yavuz (1997), on the other hand, interprets the Welfare Party as “not only a party but also a larger Islamic social movement that seeks to reconstruct many traditional aspects of society from cuisine to political exchange” (Yavuz 1997: 65). Karakas (2007) describes the Welfare Party’s rise as “within Turkey’s democratic and republican parameters” (p. II). Karakas (2007) further argues that the party’s slogan “Just Order” (Turkish: Adil Düzen) did neither make intentions to an Islamic state based on the Sharia nor criticized Turkey’s founding principles. However, the author stresses that the Welfare Party criticized the manner in which the Kemalist establishment has operated. “The RP (Refah Party) thus launched an indirect attack on the Kemalist model of state, society, and economy, which it claimed has encouraged economic and social inequalities, corruption and moral decline” (p. 22-23).

The controversy surrounding the Refah Party is especially visible through Erbakan’s behavior who before his party’s electoral success, had praised the advantages of Sharia and suggested it be implemented in Turkey, while assuring during his inaugural speech that he would “operate within the parameters of democratic order and would
respect Turkey’s laicist path” (Karakas, 2007, p. 25). Consequently, in January 1998, the Refah Party was banned by the Turkish constitutional court for “contempt of the constitutional rule of separation of state and religion” (Karakas, 2007, p. 27).

The tension between the secular establishment of Turkey and political supporters of religious display in public spaces led to a highly controversial conflict between secular politicians and the Virtue Party. After the Islamic Welfare Party was shut down, Merve Kavakci, the leader of its successor party Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) entered the parliament wearing a headscarf. This behavior led to an outcry by other parliament members who felt that this was a direct attack on democracy as well as on secularism. This incident led to the shutdown of the Virtue Party by the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, the Turkish Council of Ministers took away Ms. Kevakci’s citizenship based on breaching the law so that she no longer can represent her constituency in parliament (Elver, 2006, p. 293). With regards to this event, one commentator in the Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet wrote: “A political party is trying to bring a religion, a Sharia, which does not belong to us, by throwing a live bomb to our Grand National Assembly. This is a crime against the state” (Göksel, 2007, p. 9).

The most current controversy about Islamist movements in politics refers to the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is currently in power. AKP won the national elections with 34% in 2002 and with 46.6% votes in 2007. While it announces itself as a moderate, conservative, pro-Western party that advocates a liberal market economy and Turkey’s membership in the European Union, secularists fear its Islamist agenda. Naim (2008) states that AKP’s commitments towards EU membership, its liberal market principles and the current political course are sufficient proof that “secularist fears
seem largely unfounded” (p. 218). Furthermore, Naim (2008) suggests that the AKP introduces a better democratic system which can incorporate religion into the public spheres in contrast to secular parties which can be identified as “an authoritarian style of democracy” (Naim, 2008, p. 183). Naim (2008) argues that even if the AKP is committed to a secular government for tactical reasons, the secular system will change the mentality of the party over time and convince the party of the advantages of secular democratic governance. He states that “working within the system will actually change the party itself, and its members will come to have a more pragmatic view of the advantages of the secular system” (Naim, 2008, p. 221).

Naim (2008) considers AKP’s position as a chance for Turkey to transform secularism which can give its people a greater freedom to religion and religious institutions and thus accommodate the voices of Turkey’s diverse society (Naim, 2008, p 222). Palmer and Palmer agree with Naim in his assessment of the AKP and see in the AKP’s political agendas only two Islamist-based measures which are the lifting of the headscarf ban and equalization of Islamic schools with secular schools (Palmer & Palmer, 2008, p. 113). Furthermore, Palmer and Palmer consider contemporary Turkey and the AKP a model for the Middle East with regards to the establishment of democracy within a majority Muslim population (Palmer & Palmer, 2008, p. 114).

There is however a great deal of doubt about AKP’s anti-secular intentions and motives. Rubin (2007) stresses in his analysis about the Islamic roots of the AKP that all members of this party have been previously engaged in political parties with an Islamic or Islamist agenda. The APK grew out of the previously controversial Refah Party and Erdoğan himself proclaimed in 1994 while mayor of Istanbul “I am a servant of Shari'a”
and “the imam of Istanbul” (Rubin, 2007, p. 2). The majority of voters for the AKP consider themselves observant Muslims. Furthermore, 94.6% of the female APK voters wear the Islamic headscarf which indicates that the majority of practicing Muslims feel confidence and closeness with the principles and the Islamic image of the AKP (Jenkins, 2008, p. 178). Jenkins (2008) states that AKP’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attempted various times to introduce laws which derived from Islamic teachings. In September 2004, Erdoğan attempted to introduce a clause in the Turkish Penal Code that criminalized adultery (Jenkins, 2008, p. 174).

Furthermore, since AKP’s succession, Turkey enforced its economic and political ties with Iran and Syria and hosted Hamas as political guests (Jenkins, 2008, p. 175). The AKP also politicized bureaucracy and gave employment for high-level positions mostly to devout Muslims. Moreover, the religious programs on government-owned TV channels tripled since 2006. The number of Quran classes doubled between 2002 and 2006 and in 2005 the Ministry of Education removed all references of the evolution theory from 8th grade books (Jenkins, 2008, p. 179). Rubin (2007) stresses AKP’s Islamic/Islamist agenda with regards to education. Erdoğan equalized the Islamic Imam Hatip religious schools, which enables students graduating from these schools to enter universities and qualify for government careers “despite never having mastered Western fundamentals”, which Rubin considers an essential landmark in further establishing an Islamic agenda (p. 27). After the unsuccessful attempt to abolish the headscarf ban, the APK proposed a bill to the parliament to build fifteen new universities whose rectors would be picked by Erdoğan and his party (Rubin, 2007, p. 28).
Naim (2008) and Palmer and Palmer (2008) consider the AKP’s effort to enter the European Union as a sign for a new democratic area in Turkey. Secularists, on the other hand, interpret this to be an attempt of the AKP to minimize the role of military in Turkey (Rubin, 2007, p. 36). Rubin (2007) points out that one of the many conditions for Turkey’s EU membership is the minimization of the military’s intervention in politics. The EU emphasizes that military coups are unacceptable in secular democracies and so, Turkey needs to minimize the military’s interventionist power (Rubin, 2007, p. 36).

The most recent controversy on the political level between Kemalists and Islamists was the attempt of the Kemalists to close Turkey’s ruling party AKP for posing a threat to secularism based on its Islamist motives and thus constituting a violation of the Turkish constitution. Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya, chief prosecutor of Turkey’s Court of Appeals, filed a lawsuit in the Constitutional Court (Rubin, 2007, p. 55). Tibi (2009) reports that the Constitutional Court did not order AKP to shut down but released it with a serious warning about its Islamist agenda declaring that “there is no verdict on closure […] However, in this ruling a serious warning has been issued to the party, and I hope this conclusion will be elevated and will be taken accordingly” (Tibi, 2009, p. 60). Tibi (2009) defends the court’s decision not to shut down the AKP. The consequences with its shutdown would have undermined severely Turkey’s external and internal stability as it “would have toppled the government and plunged the country into political turmoil” (Tibi, 2009, p. 61). Tibi (2009) furthermore assumes that the AKP would have re-emerged under a new name and found another way to seize power again and therefore it was more beneficial to keep the AKP in power with a stricter supervision over their seemingly Islamic agenda.
While Naim (2008) does not consider the AKP a threat to Turkey’s secularism but “the first true signs of a true democracy” (p. 167), Turkey’s previous president Ahmet Sezer declared in 2006 that “religious fundamentalism has reached alarming proportions” (Palmer & Palmer, 2008, p. 113). At the same time, Turkey’s military generals keep insisting that “the moderation of the Justice and Development Party is merely a ruse to buy time while it erodes the secular foundations of Turkey’s political system” (Palmer & Palmer, 2008, p. 110).

As has become apparent, the electoral success of Islamic/Islamist political parties such as the Refah Party and the AKP shows that a wide support for Islamic/Islamist political movements exists among Turkey’s population. These political movements gained power through legal democratic means of electoral elections. There is no doubt that these parties have challenged the Kemalist vision of laicism and are Islamically oriented. What is open to interpretation is the question as to what extent these parties seek to incorporate the values of Islam into society and politics and to which extent they pose a realistic threat to the secular democracy in Turkey. The academic debates and contesting views clearly reflect this question.

3.3.2 Islamism in Society

Besides politics, Islam also plays an increasingly important role in society. Howe (2000) states that today’s Turkey is divided into two concepts of lifestyle: the secular way of living “with its inherent freedoms and insecurities” and the lifestyle of practicing Muslims “with its certainties and strict controls” who increasingly focus their lives on the teaching of Islam (p. 2). While during the 1970s this division was mostly urban-rural, in
the mid-1980s the people from the countryside “who remained more committed to religious traditions and customs” moved to cities such as Istanbul and Ankara (Howe, 2000, p. 3).

According to Alam (2009), the rural population in urban centres “came to be over-represented in the national bureaucracy and indirectly helped in the weakening of the secular hegemony of the Turkish Republic” (p. 365). Due to the challenging living conditions in the gecekondular, various Islamic organizations, associations and movements were established. These organizations provided social, educational and medical services to its inhabitants. With regards to the role of Islam in the gecekondular “Islamic rites are reinterpreted in these new conditions to provide the cognitive means to understand the social and political world of an unfamiliar and unsettling life” (Alam, 2009, p. 365).

These shantytowns became crucial centres for political organizations to find mobilization and support for their agendas. Thus, Islamic/Islamist political movements “have flourished” in these areas (Alam, 2009, p. 365). In 1980s, around 13 million people lived in the shantytowns of which 80% could be considered as conservative religious. In this context, “Islam is an important cognitive means of communication and of community-building” (Karakas, 2007, 24). During the 1990s, the Refah Party was the only political party to have built social networks in these areas, distributed goods, arranged employment and offered scholarships to school and university students (Karakas, 2007, 24).
Thus, Turkey has witnessed an increased visibility of Islam in society since the 1980s. An example of the growing importance of public assertion of Islamic institutions is the increase of the number of mosques in Turkey. Between 1973 and 1999, the number of mosques has increased from 45,152 to 75,000 (Alam, 2009, p. 365). Communities created Islamic networks through professional and business association, women’s organizations, Muslim human rights organizations, newspapers and TV channels.

A prominent feature of the integration of Islamic values in society is Turkey’s Islamic business practices to which Koyon (2003) refers as “a blend of East and West within modern context” (p. 61). Islamic holding companies as well as economic enterprises such as banks, clothing stores and credit unions emerged in large numbers run by influential religious figures. Koyon (2003) refers to this resurgence of Islamism in economy as ‘Sharia, Inc’. Özcan and Çokgezen (2006) argue that religious teachers and community leaders played a crucial role in the growth and success of Islamic companies in Turkey as they “preached narratives of Islamic ‘just order’ constructed around honesty, intelligence and moral superiority” with regard to Islamic businesses (p. 150). “Islamists are in the process of creating what amounts to a parallel society” which are led by Islamist politicians and then trickle down to Muslim communities (Howe, 2000, p. 4). Howe (2000) cites a Muslim scholar who considers this Islamic resurgence as “the river coming back to its own bed” (p. 7). According to Yavuz (2003), Islamic/Islamist movements are a crucial point of identity for Turkey’s society allowing them to incorporate their identity in the public spheres:

By utilizing new opportunity spaces, these Turkish Islamic movements are making new actors of intellectuals, businessmen, scholars, and artists and creating new sites
of sociability. One of the major impacts of these opportunity spaces has been facilitating the emergence of private identities, commitments, and lifestyles in the public sphere. These new public spaces, along with new actors, have brought Islam to the forefront of public discussion. (Yavuz, 2003, p. ix)

While religious people do not see the Islamic resurgence in Turkey’s society as an attempt to reject modernity or democracy but rather “an attempt to come to terms with contemporary life in its global context by integrating Islamic thought and practice with modernity” (Koyon, 2003, p. 60), Howe (2000) stresses the secularists’ fears that these Islamic-based movements create a parallel society which increasingly orient its lifestyle on the principles of Islam and thus reverses the secular culture of Turkish society (p. 4). The separating views among the population between secularism and Islamism lead to tension.

Howe (2000) describes in her analysis about Islamist motivated violence the rise and increase of assassinations of secular intellectuals such as Muammar Aksoy, president of the Turkish Law society, and Bahriye Üçok, a female left-wing scholar of Islam who were allegedly murdered by militant Islamists (Howe, 2000, p. 49). Another example for religiously-based acts of violence was the murder of an Istanbul barman who had the word Allah tattooed on his arm and was assassinated by a fanatic Islamist for blasphemy. Naim (2008) also stresses discriminative incidents with regards to religious women wearing headscarves who were refused medical treatment because they were wearing headscarves (p. 212). Howe (2000) emphasizes that such incidents deepen the tension between secularists and religious people in Turkey:
The modus vivendi between secularists and Islamists is so fragile that almost any outrageous remark by any Islamist public figure – or any radical secularist for that matter – can permanently damage those attempts to establish trust between two communities. (p. 54)

At the margins of Turkey’s socio-political Islamic/Islamist movements are radical Islamist groups who think “that by using violence against the secular symbols of the Turkish state, leading secular intellectuals and journalists, and representatives of ‘Imperialist Zionism’ they will help install an Islamic state” (Rubin, 2003, p. 41). A 1997 report by the Nation Security Council of Turkey summarized the strategy of radical religious movements into three stages. The first stage is the message, which calls to persuade people “to adapt the Islamic religion, establish an Islamic state and administration, live in accordance with Islamic rules, and struggle to safeguard the Islamic way of life” (Rubin, 2003, p. 44). The second stage is the focus on community and calls for the restructuring of communities and therefore of societies to embrace values which are in accordance with Islam. The third stage is the struggle, “jihad, and call for armed struggle to safeguard the Islamic way of life” (Rubin, 2003, p. 44).

In total, there were around 300 smaller radical Islamist groups in Turkey between 1980 and 1990, with around 15,000 guerillas who received their military training in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Lebanon (Rubin, 2003, p. 52). While some groups only express verbal threats, others turn to physical aggression. Rubin (2003) indicates reports about kidnappings, assault by Islamist youth against non-religious Muslims and assassinations against secularists such as judges, lawyers and political activists (p. 54). Turkey’s National Security Council (NSC) lists 25 radical Islamic groups which vary
from each other in their origin, such as urban or rural, their roots, such as abroad or in Turkey, and their goals. With regards to their goals, "the report says these groups regard the Turkish Republic as the antithesis of Islam and consider it against their religious beliefs to form any legal organization sanctioned by the existing political system" (Rubin, 2003, p. 58).

In southeast Turkey, Islamic radicalism mostly emerged in poor towns and villages with large Kurdish populations and was mostly joined by unemployed youth influenced by Khomeini’s teachings (Rubin, 2003, p. 43). Regarding the objectives of some of the radical groups, a militant declared in an interview for the Cumhuriyet newspaper on February 16, 1993:

We are fighters of the Islamic Liberation Movement, the sword against Satan, blasphemy, Zionism and Imperialism. We have begun taking action only recently in Turkey and our move is based on pain, suffering and patience. We do not pursue a tribal cause; our objective is to establish a state for the Muslims". (Rubin, 2003, p. 44)

Another example of a mission statement is the action program of Kara Ses (Black Voice), a radical Islamist group led by Cemalletin Kaplan in Germany:

- Our Objective: Islamic State
- Sovereignty: Belongs to Allah
- Constitution: The Holy Qur’an
- Rule: sheri’at
- Source: Again, the Holy Qur’an
- The Leader and Example: The Prophet Muhammad
- The Method: Proclamation
- The Subject: The supremacy of Justice
- Instruments of Proclamation: Every legal means
• The authority of Proclamation: Divine sanction
• The style of Proclamation: Open, clear, and succinct
• Weapon: Knowledge (Holy verses, hadith, mind and logic)

Source: Mehmet, 1990, p. 101

In 1998, Turkish authorities arrested 27 Kara Ses militants on the grounds of suspicion of “kamikaze attacks” in touristic places of Istanbul and Ankara (Howe, 2000, p. 52).

One of the best known Islamist radical movements in Turkey is the IBDA-C (the Islamic Front of Fighters of the Great East). As of 2007, it has been listed as one of the 12 active terrorist groups in Turkey (Counter-Terrorism and Operations Department of Directorate General for Security). IBDA-C in its current form was founded in 1985 under Necmettin Erbakan, who would later become Turkey’s Prime Minister and whose Welfare Party would be banned due to its anti-secular motives. There is no particular hierarchy within this movement and its members operate in various subgroups in Istanbul and Ankara targeting secular public figures such as journalists and intellectuals, and symbolic sites such as churches, pubs, clubs and brothels (Rubin, 2003, p. 51). IBDA-C shares close ties with al-Qaeda and its ideology. The objective of IBDA-C is to replace the secular state with a religious rule of law first in Turkey and then throughout the world (Rubin, 2003, p. 52). IBDA-C can be considered anti-Semitic and anti-Christian in its propaganda and terrorist activities (Rubin, 2003, p. 44).

A study carried out by the Counter-Terrorism and Operations Department of Directorate General for Security indicates the age distribution and level of education of 200 militants from Islamist organizations such as the IBDA-C, who have been convicted of being a terrorist under the Turkish law.
Table 3-13: Age and education of Islamist militants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age in years</th>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>University graduates</th>
<th>high school graduates</th>
<th>secondary school graduates</th>
<th>primary school graduates</th>
<th>literate non-graduates</th>
<th>illiterates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 to 14</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 24</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 29</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 34</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 64</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Zaman, 2007

Based on this study, the great majority of convicted Islamist militants belong to the age group between 15 and 29 years old (89.5%). With regards to the level of education, the numbers are more dispersed indicating that a similar number of convicted Islamist militants were primary school graduates (19%) as University graduates (22.5%).

As already recognized in the literature review, although Turkey does have radical Islamist groups which seek to upset socio-political order through illegitimate means, their numbers are minimal compared to other countries and their presence does not reflect the overall characteristics of Islamism in Turkey. According to Alam (2009), mainstream Islamic/Islamist movements in Turkey do not attempt to create an Islamic state but to negotiate the role of Islam within the Kemalist order and do so within the parameters of the legal system (p. 354). At the same time, while most Islamic/Islamist movements operate within the legal framework, this section has also highlighted the concerns and distrust of academics and intellectuals with regards to the ultimate objectives of Islamist movements. In their view, Islamism in politics and society is slowly gaining in influence and laying the foundations for a future Sharia state. However, as already mentioned, to
which extent political Islamist parties aim at integrating Islam in society and if their ultimate goal is the establishment of a Sharia state are highly controversial questions. If the AKP will provide socio-economic and political development while maintaining the Kemalistic character of Turkey, remains to be seen.

As has become apparent, the rise of Islamism in society and politics is a phenomenon in Turkey increasingly visible since 1980s. The Welfare Party as well as the AKP clearly indicated their association to religion and Islam’s importance in all spheres of life. The assertion of Islam in society has been mainly carried out by migrants from rural areas who lived in gecekondular to deal with the challenges of their new lives in urban centres. The tension between secularists and religious people about the role of Islam in public has turned any religious acts into political symbols. In marginal proportions, some Islamist socio-political movements consist of radical religious militants who violently attempt to overthrow Turkey’s secular democratic establishment in order to establish an Islamic state in the image of Iran.

As demonstrated, Islam is used on different levels in Turkey in the attempt to change the status quo. On political level, parties with an Islamist agenda attempt to reintroduce another form of public relationship with religion than previously promoted by the followers of Kemalism. Within society, the orientation towards Islam serves to offer religious people feelings of solidarity and identity and as a coping mechanism to newly socio-economic emerged challenges. At the same time, Islamic/Islamist political and social movements are interpreted by Kemalists as groundwork with the final goal of replacing secularism in Turkey with an Islamic state.
3.4 Conclusion to Chapter Three

It has been the aim of this chapter to analyze the Kemalist establishment in Turkey with regards to social and economic policies in relation to the rise of Islamism. As has become evident, Turkey’s reforms after the foundation as a republic have been strongly orientated on Europe, or its perception of it, with a strong focus on modernization and secularism. Atatürk’s reform policies, which were centered on the six principles of republicanism, secularism, populism, nationalism, statism and revolutionism are the foundation of the Kemalist ideology. Kemalism in Turkey strongly focused on building a national identity by removing religion from public spaces. Some of the social reforms of the Kemalist establishment included the dress code which prohibits the wearing of religious garments in public institutions such as universities, schools and government buildings.

Furthermore, the government exercises control over religious institutions and reserves the right to prohibit religious movements that they judge to be politically motivated. The data analyzed in this chapter with regards to social reforms indicates that Turkey’s population is highly religious and consider their religion as a crucial component of their identity. Thus, authors such as Elver (2006), Maim (2008) and Tuksal (2007) argue that the social development policies of the Kemalist establishment concerning Islam’s role in the public space are in a contradictory relation to the cultural features of Turkey’s population.

With regards to the Kemalist economic reforms, Mehmet (1990) identifies a centre-periphery relationship between the ruling elite and the majority of Turkey’s population. An increasing income gap between the elite of Turkey and the majority of the population
as well as growing poverty has been observed. Moreover, the data also allows for the conclusion that there is a high correlation between low education levels and poverty. Furthermore, another correlation exists between poverty and the degree of religiosity and willingness to support Islamist/Islamic movements. The more economically vulnerable people are in Turkey, the higher is their commitment towards religion and their support for political and social movements oriented on Islam.

When investigating the nature of Islamism in Turkey, two types of Islamist/Islamic movements can be observed: on the political level and within society. The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, abbreviated AK Parti or AKP) are the most recent political parties in power which display an orientation towards Islam and which have been perceived by Kemalist as a threat to the secular foundations of Turkey. Consequently, the Welfare Party has been expelled and squelched by the military in 1998 for violating the principles of secularism. Its succession party the Virtue Party was shut down in 2001 based on the same reasoning. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is being critically supervised by secularists and the military and is accused of having a hidden Islamist agenda. In 2008, an attempt by secularists has been made to shut down the AKP based on the accusation to pose a threat to secularism in Turkey. The Constitutional Court has dropped the case with a strong warning regarding its anti-secular policies.

Within society, Islamic/Islamist movements have been observed. The urbanization process resulted in the creation of Islamic networks such as business associations, Muslim newspapers, TV channels and Muslim human rights organizations. Furthermore, a prominent feature became Islamic businesses established by religious figures. While the
Islamic movements are considered by religious Turks as a life style that is in accordance with their identity, secular communities, intellectuals and politicians fear that the Islamic social movements will create a parallel society and increase the influence of Islam in public spheres.

Also radical social movements with an Islamist agenda could be observed in Turkey’s society. While political parties with an Islamist agenda have used democratic means to establish their power, some of these radical groups function underground and use violence against secular symbols and secular personalities in their fight to establish an Islamic state in Turkey. Between 1980 and 1990, around 300 smaller radical groups with an Islamist agenda were found in Turkey. As of 2007, the Counter-Terrorism and Operations Department of Directorate General for Security lists 12 active terrorist groups in Turkey, four of them being radical Islamists. Although there is some prevalence of radical Islamist groups in Turkey, the literature nevertheless widely agrees that compared to other Muslim majority countries such as Egypt or Algeria, Turkey’s radical Islamist groups can be considered marginal.
4 Chapter Four – Discussion, Conclusion & Recommendations

This chapter consists of a discussion of the theories presented in the literature review and the data analyzed in Chapter Three. The aspects of religion and development will be discussed, Kemalism and its socio-economic development, the reasons for the rise of Islamism in Turkey and its specific characteristics. The aim of this discussion is to draw conclusions with regards to the central questions of this thesis which seeks to find the reasons for the rise of Islamism in Turkey in the last three decades. Moreover, this chapter offers a conclusion which summarizes the main findings of this thesis. Finally, this chapter makes recommendations for future research with regards to the rise of Islamism in relation to development.

4.1 Discussion

4.1.1 Religion and Development

As established in the literature review by authors such as Holenstein (2005), Deneulin and Bano (2009) and Huntington (1996), religion is a crucial force in the shaping and promoting of not only values, but also the structures of societies. Huntington (1996) especially argues that religion is one of the most crucial, if not the most determining factors of society dynamics. The theory of religion’s importance for societies is confirmed through the empirical data in Chapter Three. When analyzing what constitutes people’s identity in Turkey, the vast majority see Islam as their primary identifier. Moreover, 86.1% of the population in Turkey are practicing Muslims. The empirical data also indicates the growing importance of religion. While in 2003, 63.4% of
women who covered their heads chose to do so because of religious reasons, the number increased to 73% in 2007. In the recent past, the empirical data suggests an increased orientation towards Islam among Turkey’s society which coincides with the urbanization process along with the economic outcomes of globalization.

As has been researched, Islam in Turkey has become an increasing force in the media, through Islamic channels and newspapers; in society, through Islamic social centres and associations; and in the political arena, through the successful rise of political parties with an Islamic/Islamist orientation. Consequently, both the theoretical and empirical analysis indicate sufficient evidence to conclude that religion is a critical force in most societies and acts as a source for inspiration and orientation towards social and economic development and well-being, as can be observed in the example of Turkey.

Furthermore, in the literature review, Holenstein (2005) raises the issue of religiously motivated violence due to the totalitarian potential of religion. Appleby (2000) further elaborates on this issue, recognizing that both peace-makers and religious extremists can derive from the same faith community. The ideological force of religion for political purposes has also been recognized in the empirical analysis of Chapter Three. Political parties with Islamic/Islamist agendas and Islamic social movements use both democratic and legal means to challenge the Kemalist establishment in Turkey, while some radical groups use religiously-rationalized violence and aggression to disrupt political and social stability in order to achieve their goals. The data estimates that around 300 smaller radical Islamist groups existed between 1980 and 1990.

When speaking about religion and development, Ter Haar (2007) and Huntington (1996) emphasize the power of religion to motivate societies to challenge socio-political
and economic order. Chapter Three, the empirical study, presents data which supports this notion. The strongest proof derives from surveys which indicate that in the majority's opinion the main problems in Turkey are poverty and corruption, and that the religion-centred party AKP is the best one to solve these problems. As a result, this party won the most recent elections in Turkey with 46% of the total votes.

The impact of religion for social inspiration and social mobilization is indisputable when considering various movements around the world among faith communities who are dissatisfied with the role of governments to provide social, economic and political development. Faith serves as a unifying force to provide the type of development a community considers necessary. The importance of the Catholic Church in Communist Poland can serve as an example in this case. At the same time, the violent force of religion cannot be disputed when considering radical religious movements which utilize aggression and violence in order to demonstrate their discontent with the status quo.

Consequently, the realizations from Chapter Two and Three with regards to the importance of religion in societies and on their development underlines the assumption in this thesis that religion (in this case Islam), is an element of identity for the majority of Turkey’s population. Furthermore, it serves as a source of consultation for socio-economic challenges and as a source of motivation to oppose and change inadequate development. Its authoritarian nature and potential for violence is further exemplified through radical Islamist groups that use violence and illegitimate means for their goals.

4.1.2 Islamism in Turkey

The academic literature defines the term Islamism in various ways. Some insist that the creation of an Islamic state is the ultimate goal of Islamism, and thus the replacement
of all secular, and Western-oriented social and political entities. Others define Islamism in a broader sense (Alam 2009, Sayyid 2003). Badran (2001) defines Islamism as a “broad project of the political mobilization of Islam” (p. 48). The author stresses the multi-faceted meaning of Islamism as ranging from social changes within the secular establishment to the complete establishment of an Islamic state:

Within political Islam, some advocate the establishment of an Islamic state (and for some this is the distinguishing feature of political Islam), while others promote the notion of an Islamic society or community within a secular state. Still others, and this is more a phenomenon of late Islamism (1990s), behave politically to achieve the personal freedom to express their religious identity in public as they see fit. (Badran, 2001, p. 48)

For the purpose of this thesis, Islamism has been understood as proposed by Alam (2009), Sayyid (2003), and Badran (2001), implying the varied ways of asserting Islam in society and politics. The empirical analysis of Chapter Three regarding Islamism in Turkey has shown that without a doubt, “Islam is becoming increasingly visible and assertive” (Sayyid, 2003, p. 3). The broad character of Islamism is visible in Turkey where Islamically oriented social and political movements vary greatly in their agendas, actions, and goals.

In the literature review in Chapter Two, three main reasons for the rise of Islamism in Turkey have been established. (1), the failure of the Kemalist establishment to provide adequate socio-economic development to the marginalized and economically vulnerable groups provoked the rise of Islamism as a tool of opposition against the status quo and as a coping mechanism (Sakallhoğlu 1996, Heper 1981, Ayubi 1991, Guven 2004). (2), the
governmental support for Islamist groups as a counter-weapon against the rise of communists in the 1980s allowed Islamism to gain influence and power within the population and in politics (Huntington 1996, Rubin 2003, Karakas 2007). (3), Islamism has to be considered as an alternative development that challenges the assumptions of modernity and offers an alternative approach to socio-economic and political development (Vertigans, 2003, Alam 2009).

4.1.2.1 Kemalism and socio-economic development

Concerning social development, the literature review in Chapter Two suggests a discrepancy between the ideologies of Kemalism and the mentality of Turkey’s population (Waxman 1997, Mehmet 1990, Hashemi 2009). Mehmet (1990) speaks of a split in Turkey’s personality between the top-down principles of the Kemalists and the Islamic culture of the majority of Turkey’s society. The empirical study in Chapter Three indicates the same type of discrepancy. When considering that a society’s primarily Islamic value system has been replaced with a top-down approach and not with the collective choice of the majority, the rise of Islamism seems understandable. Hashemi (2009) is of the opinion that in cultures that orientate their identity on religion, an alternative model of nation-state needs to be developed via “an indigenous process of social evolution, civil society engagement, and democratic negotiation” in order to reconcile the religious society with the principles of secularism (p. 45).

Furthermore, the academic literature in Chapter Two considers the rise of Islamism to be connected to the centre-periphery relationship between the Kemalist elite and the majority of the population (Yavuz & Esposito 2003, Mardin 1973, Toprak 1981). Yavuz
and Esposito (2003) are strong advocates for the argument that the Kemalist elite established an authoritarian socio-political structure which excluded the majority of Turks from socio-economic benefits and ensured the control of power into the hands of only a few (p. xiv). The historical study in Chapter Three describes the Kemalist elite as a political/military/bureaucratic leadership structured in an authoritarian manner. Outside this elite, individuals and groups had no access to the state apparatus. Consequently, it can be argued, the Kemalist establishment created a socio-political monopoly to which the outside population had no access.

Moreover, the economic development under the Kemalist establishment is held as an important reason for the rise of Islamism (Mehmet 1990, Toprak 1981). Mehmet (1990) speaks of a mal-developed economy which was focused on state capitalism with an interventionist nature, resulting in the enrichment of the elite and a growing impoverishment for the majority of Turkey’s population. Consequently, the author argues that the rise of Islamism is a response to the economic marginalization of the Turkish society (Mehmet, 1990, p. 40). Toprak (1995) thus concludes that the explanation for the electoral success of Islamist political parties such as the AKP must be seen from a practical point of view: the voters decide for whom to vote based on which party they think can provide best social and economic means for them and their families (p. 92).

The empirical analysis in Chapter Three arrives at the same conclusion. Both the nationalist and the privatization phase have failed to provide adequate economic development to the economically marginalized population in Turkey. Between 1968 and 1979, a drastic income disparity took place between the working class, farmers, and entrepreneurs versus non-workers, whose income share grew from 37.6% to 52.5%.
(Mehmet, 1983, p. 58). By 1980, more than 25% of the urban population was living in shantytowns. Consequently, Bozdoğan and Kasaba (1997) rightly see the economic failure of the nationalist phase in connection with the rise of Islamism and conclude “thus, if the promise of development that ISI represented has failed – and together with it, faith in modernization – then the crisis of development and the rise of Islamism must be connected” (p. 54). The neo-liberal phase after 1980 brought new challenges to Turkey’s economic landscape as well. Real wages fell, unemployment grew, and changes in tax policies disadvantaged low earners which resulted in a further rise in wealth inequality. The empirical studies show a steady unemployment growth between 1988 and 2001, following the years of the neo-liberal market structure (Auer & Popova, 2003, p. 9).

Thus, it is argued that Islamism serves as a tool against the mal-development of the Kemalist establishment. Narli (1999) argues that, “Islamism has grown as a response to social, economic, and political discontent in Turkey, including foreign influences, urbanization, modernization, and secularization” (p. 30). Indeed, the history of Turkey reveals a strong correlation between the increase of Islamism and the socio-economic development in Turkey. As exemplified in Chapter Three, the urbanization process in Turkey resulted in large number of people arriving in highly populated cities such as Istanbul and Ankara. The newcomers’ orientation towards Islam served as a source of stability, networking and security. Toprak (2001) offers a vivid description of the problems Turkey’s marginalized groups faced and the appeal Islamist movements had on these groups:

Imagine yourself as someone on the margins of Turkish society, in the ranks of the urban poor, buffeted by subsidy cuts and 100 percent inflation. There appears this
party which talks about a just order [...], which denounces the exploitation of the toiling man by anonymous market forces. This was the message of the Islamic party, and it appealed to many people [...]. In the poor neighborhoods of big cities, they were there to help the sick land a hospital bed, to distribute food on freezing winter days, to provide a small present to newlyweds, to help with the cost of a funeral [...] The party also appealed to the basic urban conservatism that characterizes all rural migrants to great cities. The city lacks trust. In your small village or town, everybody knows everybody, and you can trust people. In the big city, everybody is suspect, especially the men: they might assault your daughters and wives. A political party that emphasizes traditional values, that criticizes promiscuity in gender relations, the drinking in discotheques, the wearing of miniskirts—this kind of program appeals to urban conservatism. (p. 1)

4.1.2.2 The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS) as opportunity space

Yavuz (2003) speaks of opportunity spaces as an important aspect for state-oriented Islamic/Islamist movements to gain influence (p. 28). The introduction of the TIS during the 1980s by the Kemalist establishment is listed in the academic literature review in Chapter Two as an important phenomenon in connection to the rise of Islamism. Rubin (2003) considers TIS, “which aimed at synthesizing Islam and Turkish nationalism, and promoting a state-centered Turkish-Islamic consciousness” (Waxman, 1997, p. 18), to be a crucial tool which enabled Islamic/Islamist movements financially, socially, and politically to grow in importance. Karakas (2007) theorizes that the TIS allowed Islam to be reinstituted as a public and political tool and enabled Islamically oriented social and political movements to develop their agendas and gain support from the population.
In the empirical chapter, the historical study of the Kemalist establishment towards Islamic/Islamist movements indeed reveals a shift in its approach towards Islam in the public space. The *Turkish-Islamic Synthesis* was introduced after the military coup in 1980, and aimed at counteracting the spread of communism. The military hoped to achieve this by integrating Islam into education and the national identity, and by financially supporting Islamic/Islamist movements which could counteract the leftist rise within the population. According to Toprak (2001), this allowed the Islamist movements to gain momentum and "opened the way for Islamic movements to flourish" (p. 1). Yavuz (1998) thus concludes that it was the Turkish military and their introduction of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis which allowed Islamist political parties to challenge the secular political landscape of Turkey: "In effect, the military laid the seeds for the rise of Refah (Party)" (p. 32).

**4.1.2.3 Islamism as more than an opposition**

With regards to this argument, the academic literature presented in Chapter Two proposes that Islamism has to be viewed as more than just a tool of opposition to the status quo. It rather serves as a source of identity and a vision for the values of society (Vertigans 2003, Waxman 1998, Sayari 1984, Mardin 1989). Alam (2009) suggests that the rise of Islamism must be explained through the postmodernist framework and the questioning of the modernist worldview:

Although the modernization/socio-political economy framework has some merit in explaining the rise of Islamism, it needs to be combined with post-modernism [...], which seeks a re-examination of the fundamental assumptions of European
Enlightenment/Modernity that was once declared ‘the universal path of development’. It cannot be a mere coincidence that Islamism has emerged at a time when Europe and the West have started questioning their own modernist paradigm. (p. 356)

Thus, Alam argues that Islamism must be understood as a way “people re-imagine and understand their private and public lives” (p. 370).

The empirical analysis in Chapter Three exemplifies this interpretation of Islamism. Howe (2000) speaks of the growing divide in Turkey’s society between a secular and Islamic lifestyle. The numbers of Islamic associations, businesses, and movements reflect the growing trend to incorporate Islamic values into all spheres of life. Şimşek (2004) considers Islamism in Turkey to be a movement which evolved over time from being a tool of opposition to creating new visions of the Turkish society:

It [Islamism] started perhaps as a reactive movement against Kemalism and modernism, but later it gradually turned into a proactive social movement by raising diverse issues. Similarly, it started with millenarian and utopian demands but later turned to pursue goals concerning the present and everyday life. (p. 123-124)

4.1.3 What kind of Islamism?

When it comes to the character of Islamism in Turkey, Chapter Two distinguishes between Islamically oriented movements in society and politics. On the political level, it has been found that the two most recent influential Islamist parties have been the Welfare Party and the Justice and Development Party (AKP). On the societal level, both legitimate and illegitimate Islamically oriented movements can be found in Turkey. As
analyzed in Chapter Three, various Islamic/Islamist associations and organizations have formed in Turkey which provide social services in education, health, and employment to impoverished groups. These movements operate through the media, business organizations, and education. Rubin (2003) captures this development:

As Islamist supporters moved from provincial towns and villages to urban centers, they were more likely to gain access to formal education and opportunities for upward social mobility. Islamist groups responded to the needs and aspirations of the newly urban who might be university students, professionals, shopkeepers, merchants, or workers. The groups offered food to the needy, scholarships and hostels to university students, a network to young graduates looking for jobs, and credit to shopkeepers, industrialists and merchants. Self-help projects conducted by women were particularly important to this endeavour. Financial assistance came from newly formed Islamist business elite. (p. 127)

The Islamic/Islamist social and political movements have also increasingly become a means to rise in social status. “Ultimately, the Islamic movement not only resolved problems of identity and conservative angst. It became a channel to political power, social status, intellectual prestige, and economic wealth, for people who in one way or another had been marginalized by the republican ethos” (Toprak, 2001, p. 1).

In marginal proportions, there are also radical Islamist movements in Turkey which use violence, such as the IBDA-C. Turkey’s National Security Council identifies 25 radical Islamist groups which consider Turkey’s democratic and secular establishment as an enemy to Islamic order.
In general, it cannot be disputed that Turkey has Islamic/Islamist political and social movements which all attempt to challenge the status quo. Such movements vary greatly in their agendas. While some political parties might have the goal to establish a state that corresponds more to the values of Islam and includes Islam into public space, other social movements might want to increase their participatory power in public spaces and have better access to economic and social development. On the other side of the spectrum, Turkey has radical Islamist movements (though lower in numbers than in some other Muslim countries) which aim to use violence and aggression to enforce Islamic values within Turkey's society and politics. The great dilemma is that while some of such movements stem from grassroots movements of marginalized groups, and are thus a positive instrument in the dynamics of Turkey's society, other movements promise to be harmful to Turkey's society and political stability as they seek to seize power and impose their own values on society. Consequently, the Kemalists' fear for Turkey to experience a destiny similar to that of Iran has created an aversion to any social and political movements which incorporate Islamic values, be it with positive or negative outcomes for socio-economic and political development. It is likely that this fear informs perceptions of, and overreactions to Islamic/Islamist groups.

4.2 Conclusion

4.2.1 Findings

On the whole, the empirical study of Chapter Three has supported the academic theories presented in Chapter Two. The significant importance and influence of religion on people's values and development has been illustrated and supported. Waxman (1997) stresses the interconnectedness of national identity and religion in Turkey by arguing
that, “to be a Turk basically means being a Muslim” (p. 22). Theories about religion also pointed out its ideological power. On the one hand, religion can serve as a motivator for change and a vehicle of opposition to socio-economic and political abuses. On the other hand, religion has the potential for radicalism and authoritarianism and can serve as a rationale for violence. Both notions have found support in the empirical analysis. It has been shown that Islam in Turkey has been utilized both as a social movement to better cope with economic and social challenges, and as a radical force that uses violence and illegitimate means to upset the Kemalist character of Turkey. The empirical data presented approximately 300 smaller radical groups, between 1980 and 1990, which organized bombings and assassinations to achieve their goals and to oppose the Western and secular life-style with the aim of creating a Sharia state.

With regards to the Kemalist social policies in Turkey, a discrepancy between the social policies prescribed by the Kemalists and the mentality of the population has been shown. The empirical analysis confirms this assumption. While Atatürk reformed Turkey according to his understanding of the European concept of modernity, the majority of the population were practicing Muslims who did not internalize the fast-paced modernization policies. The literature speaks of a radical transformation of Turkey under Atatürk through changes in education, and political and social order in regards to religion. Waxman rightly recognizes that the main “identity conflict” between the Kemalists and the Islamists is about the role of Islam in Turkey’s society:

Islamists prioritize Islam within their conception of Turkish national identity, and argue that the primarily Islamic nature of Turkish identity should be given concrete political and social expression [...]. Secularists argue that the Islamic element of
Turkish identity should be expressed within the private rather than the public sphere. (p. 22)

Thus, the view of what the national character of Turkey should be has to be seen as an important aspect which contributes to the rise of Islamism in Turkey. From the evaluations of the literature review and the empirical analysis it can be concluded that the disagreement about Islam’s role in public between the Kemalists and practicing Muslims must be connected to the rise of Islamism in Turkey.

With regards to the economic development in Turkey under the Kemalist establishment, the research has shown a high degree of wealth inequality and growing poverty. Furthermore, the urbanization process created new socio-economic challenges for the rural population migrating to large cities. Islamic centres and associations in those areas thus had a great appeal on the newly arrived rural population. It is no coincidence that such centres and associations were mostly established and then flourished in those neighbourhoods where the rural population settled. Consequently, the support for Islamically oriented political and social movements must be viewed in connection to the economic mal-development. Moreover, as has been shown, both the nationalist phase and the privatization phase resulted in the increase of income disparity between the elite and the majority of Turkey’s population. Through surveys it has been shown that the poverty level is strongly connected to the degree of religiosity. In the lowest wage group, over 70% of the population identifies itself as strict believers, while among the highest wage earners around 40% has the same attitude towards religion. Consequently, it can be concluded that as poverty increases, religion plays an increasingly important role in
people’s lives. Thus, economic vulnerability is a significant contributor for people to support and join Islamic/Islamist movements.

Finally, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis promoted during the 1980s constitutes the opportunity space for the increased visibility and assertion of Islam in Turkey. While the Kemalist establishment originally had banned any interference of Islam in politics, in the 1980s, the government empowered Islamist movements and promoted the presence of religion in public spheres with the hope of counteracting the spread of communism in politics and society. Thus, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis allowed Islamist movements to gain influence and power among society and in politics.

The aim of this thesis has been to find the reasons for the rise of Islamism in Turkey. Based on the research in Chapter Two and Three it can be concluded that the rise of Islamism can be attributed to three crucial aspects: (1), the question of national identity reveals conflicting views as to which role Islam should play in the public space and which national identity Turkey should have. While the Kemalist establishment promoted a secular identity for Turkey, oriented on the European conception of modernity, many within Turkey’s population wished for more integration of Islam into Turkey’s character. (2), the economic development under the Kemalist establishment created and perpetuated wealth disparity between the elite and those at the periphery of the establishment. Islamism thus served as a counter-movement to the economic marginalization and as a coping mechanism to deal with life at the periphery of the Kemalist regime. (3), the introduction of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis has opened opportunities for Islamic/Islamist social and political movements to manifest their identities and increase their influence in society and politics.
When researching the character of Islamism in Turkey, a distinction has been made between Islamism in society and Islamism on the political level. Islamism in Turkey has multiple characters and cannot be described as one monolithic movement. Turkey has various Islamist and Islamic social and political movements which all attempt to challenge the Kemalist order in various ways. While some movements attempt to establish better development in Turkey within the current political order, others aim at the complete establishment of a Sharia state in Turkey. The Kemalists’ fear that any religious movement can pose a threat to secularism and democracy in Turkey has made Islam and religiosity a subject of political debate.

Whether Islamism in Turkey can serve as an alternative development which provides better social and economic justice to Turkey’s population than the Kemalist establishment, or if it will abuse its power for its own agendas and marginalize those who oppose it, has yet to be seen. So far, as this research has shown, Islamism can be seen as a motivator to oppose the socio-economic and political Kemalist status quo. Islamism has been carried out by political leaders and influential personalities drawing their support and strength from those who have been economically and socially marginalized under the Kemalist establishment. It has yet to be seen to what extent the current AKP government can bring social and economic justice to the population as a whole, while not discriminating against those who do not support them.

A wide range of academic literature supports the notion that Turkey stands out as an example for the Middle East with regards to integrating democracy and Islam. Tamimi and Esposito (2000) emphasize tolerance and acceptance between the Kemalists and Islamists as a crucial precondition to solve the dilemma of conflicting ideas:
A marriage between Islam and democracy in Turkey can be consummated if the radical secularists stop trying to impose their preferred life-style and set of values upon the Islamists, and if the latter do not attempt to undermine by word or deed the basic tenets of the secular democratic state in Turkey. (p. 7)

What happens in Turkey on the socio-political sphere carries great importance for the Middle East and serves as a point of orientation for other countries. If Turkey succeeds to accommodate Islam and the Islamic lifestyle of practicing Muslims under a secular and democratic system, it will send out a message to Middle Eastern countries with majority Muslim populations about the compatibility of democratic-secular political systems and Islam. The Economist stresses Turkey’s importance and leading role in the Middle East to serve as a “refutation of the widespread belief that Islam and democracy are incompatible” (The Economist 2007). Yavuz (2003) considers Turkey as a crucial example which holds “long-term promise for the rest of the Muslim world” (p. 4).

4.2.2 Summary

The aim of this thesis was to investigate the reasons for the rise of Islamism in Turkey. This was attempted through the presentation of the current academic debates in the literature review in Chapter Two and through reliance on empirical studies in Chapter Three. In the previous section of this chapter, both academic theories and empirical results were compared in order to draw conclusions regarding the research objective.

In order to answer the question of why there is a rise of Islamism in Turkey, the literature review started out by defining religion and development, and investigating what role religion plays in the development of societies. Once the importance of religion in
societies was established, the literature review presented current academic debates with regards to Islamism occurring in Muslim countries within the last three decades. As has been pointed out, the form and reasons for the rise of Islamism greatly depend on the internal socio-political factors of nation-states. The literature review then turned its attention to the specifics of the Kemalist establishment with regards to socio-economic development. Current academic theories concerning the Kemalist development have been presented. The last task of the literature review was to look at the specifics of Islamism in Turkey in society and politics.

Chapter Three consisted of an empirical study which attempted to answer the research question through empirical data. Since the question focuses on the reasons for the rise of Islamism in Turkey, the first step to empirically answer this question was to outline a historical overview of Turkey since its foundation as a republic in 1923. A subpart of the historical overview was the analysis of socio-economic development under the Kemalist establishment. The empirical study then focused on the specifics of Islamism in Turkey. This section of the empirical chapter was subdivided into Islamism in politics and Islamism in society to allow for an in-depth analysis of the particularities of Islamism taking place in Turkey. The section on Islamism in politics specifically analyzed the Welfare Party and the Justice and Development Party. The section on Islamism in society focused on identifying what form of Islamism is supported by society, and what are the goals of that particular form of Islamism.

The previous section of this chapter brought together the main findings of the literature review and the empirical study. Academic theories and empirical data have
been presented and compared concerning religion and development, Kemalist socio-economic development and Islamism in Turkey.

This thesis aimed at achieving two goals: first, to add to the understanding of the rise of Islamism with a specific focus on Turkey; secondly, to research the foundation and dynamics of Islamism in Turkey. This thesis aimed to show that the topic of Islamism, secularism and democracy is not a black and white issue which offers just one answer to the problem. This thesis does not attempt to conclude that there is only one right answer when the various agents in society ask for socio-economic and political development. Rather, all of the voices within this debate need to be considered and heard and careful consideration for the complex dynamics of humans need to be taken into account. This thesis attempted to introduce some of the views of those, who seek to create alternative forms of development which is oriented on their religious belief system. This does not mean that their proposed development alternatives are supported by all parts of Turkey's society.

This thesis sought to find the reasons for a rise of Islamism in Turkey. As has been researched, Islamism has occurred as a reaction to the socio-economic development of the Kemalist establishment and has utilized the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as an opportunity to enter the public spheres in society and politics. Whether or not Islamism in Turkey can be seen as an alternative Islamic development has to be further investigated. To respond to this question, in-depth research and analysis is needed to assess the socio-economic and political development that Islamic/Islamist movements promote for Turkey.
4.3 Recommendations for future research

The academic literature in this thesis has discussed the contesting views concerning modernity and secularism on development. Turkey serves hereby as an example how secularism is being renegotiated in a culture that is religious. Thus, Turkey plays a crucial role in the negotiation between secularism and religion in modern nation-states. Turkey’s experience with Islamism carries important lessons for other nation-states with Muslim populations.

A crucial part of this thesis consisted of looking at the specifics of Islamism, its character, its history, its fragmentations, and its goals. In Chapter Two and Chapter Three, Islamism in society and politics was introduced. It would be an undertaking of great importance to research the development agendas and actual outcomes of Islamist political parties and Islamist social movements. Of particular interest for future research would be to explore the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is currently in power in Turkey. It would be beneficial to investigate its development policies and the actual socio-economic and political outcomes. Did the AKP actually provide better socio-economic development in Turkey, and if so, did it marginalize others while benefiting the previously neglected populations? Did the AKP prove to offer an alternative development while renegotiating the role of Islam in society and politics? Or did it utilize its power to impose its own values while discriminating and marginalizing those who are against it?

While this party’s agenda is observed with suspicion and considered by many to be a threat to the secular character of Turkey, it would be of great importance to look at the changes in constitutional and social policies and to what extent this party maintains the
Kemalist secular foundations of Turkey. As has been shown in this thesis, Turkey plays a crucial role in the Middle East and is considered as the bridge between the West and the East. An in-depth research of the AKP as an Islamic/Islamist party would offer a substantial contribution to the topic of Islamism as a new development alternative. Does Islamism in Turkey constitute a development alternative which promotes better socio-economic and political development? Does it propose better solutions to the position of Islam in public than the Kemalist concept? To research and answer these questions must be considered a particularly important undertaking in development studies. The resurgence of religion in general and of Islam in particular is a worldwide phenomenon which cannot be denied. Thus, Islamism’s role in development is a crucial future research objective in the field of development studies.
Reference List:


