Problematizing Crisis: Re-reading Humanitarianism as Postcolonial Organizing

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List of Abbreviations

FRN – Federal Republic of Nigeria
IFRC – International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (formerly known as the LRCS, see below)
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross
LRCS – League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
NRC – Nigerian Red Cross
RCRCC – Red Cross Relief Coordination Center
Abstract
Problematizing Crisis: Re-reading Humanitarianism as Postcolonial Organizing
Adam Rostis

This dissertation challenges the taken-for-granted status of humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontières. I will problematize humanitarianism and argue that the continued existence of humanitarian organizations relies upon a certain historical construction of humanitarianism: one in which humanitarianism has always existed and is universally applicable. In my experience working with humanitarian organizations, I have observed that these organizations are selective of the type of suffering that receives attention. Empirical studies of humanitarianism note that the suffering it purports to alleviate is increasing although aid is now highly organized, funded, and globalized. These observations inform the key question of my problematization: what purpose does the humanitarian organization serve? I will explore this question through a Foucauldian genealogy of humanitarianism. Genealogy is a method of historical inquiry that decenters common sense by looking for points of intersection and change that give rise to new historical trajectories. I have bounded this search within the European colonial era (18th to 20th century) and the Biafra War of 1967-1970. Not only do these periods expose the contingent and constructed nature of humanitarianism, but they are coincident with significant points in the histories of the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontières. The Red Cross emerged during the colonial period while Medecins Sans Frontières arrived in the aftermath of the Biafran war and the height of African decolonization. The role of colonialism in the humanitarian organization will be made apparent, and will
facilitate an interpretation of the results of my genealogical inquiry using postcolonial theory. I found that the humanitarianism discourse serves a function in establishing subjects such as helper and victim, guiding these subjects' behaviours, and creating a hierarchical relationship between them. This illustrates that humanitarianism is not an exclusively caring practice but rather it is a discourse that dominates and regulates populations through discipline. Thus, my contribution to organization studies will be the re-reading of humanitarianism to show that humanitarian organizations serve as global disciplinary institutions.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction and Outline of the Dissertation

“How was it that a set of beliefs and motivations that were so ‘progressive’ in the context of other contemporaneous beliefs and motivations could translate so readily into a failure to identify and to listen, an insistence on cultural superiority, a determination to prescribe other peoples’ behaviour, and a refusal to recognize the legitimacy and value of difference?”

-Lambert & Lester (2004, p. 337) on the colonial philanthropists

Outline of the Dissertation

In this dissertation, I will take a critical approach to the humanitarian organization as a central but under-theorized feature of the organization of work. As a critical historical project, I will write a genealogy of humanitarianism by looking for historical intersections that have given rise to humanitarianism in its present form. My main interest is to explore the question of how humanitarianism has become a taken for granted social construction aimed at alleviating suffering. In so doing, I seek to understand the effects on people and organizations when humanitarianism is wielded as a weapon of common sense. These effects are ironic and hidden because a humanitarian event is closely associated with a sense of urgency that compels individuals to accept radical change but at the same time it silences resistance to change. For example, the forced mass evacuation of people in the name of public safety remove them from harm’s way in the case of a cyclone or tidal wave. Evacuations or relocations can also remove people from arid land and place them in a supposedly more fertile farming area in the case of a famine. However, these so-called common sense moves are sometimes resisted by the victims, often futilely, because the evacuees or victims understand that they will
never be able to return to their homes once the disaster is over. The result is the exact opposite of change: the preservation and reinforcement of existing power relations under the guise of neutral humanitarianism. The persistence of humanitarian organizations over a large path of history is due to what appears to be a continually increasing need for the care of individuals suffering due to war or disaster. Their longevity also speaks to the value of humanitarianism in preserving the existing order of things. However, their very persistence provides a convenient mechanism with which I can open a space in the common sense discourse of humanitarianism by simply taking note of curious intersections between the emergence of humanitarianism and other historical events. In particular, I argue that the trajectory taken by humanitarianism is co-incident with that of colonialism and decolonization. It is not only the fact that humanitarianism, colonialism, and decolonization occurred within the same historical space, but also the interaction of their discourses that enables me to entertain critique. Using postcolonialism as a theoretical framework, I will also argue that resistance to humanitarianism has yet to be realized as a tactic for re-inserting agency into the humanitarian discourse.

My specific contribution will consist of an elaboration of the discourse of humanitarianism to demonstrate some counter-intuitive behaviours of two well-known representative humanitarian organizations: the Red Cross and Medecins sans Frontières. I chose these organizations for two reasons. The first reason is to understand the somewhat contradictory experiences I had working for the Red Cross as an expatriate delegate in Africa. I will expand on these experiences shortly, but suffice it to say for now that they center on the mismatch between the
expectations and experience of being a Red Cross worker. The second is that the histories of the two organizations intersect with colonial and post-colonial periods in a way that provides a useful analytical framework. I do not wish to simplify or ignore the problematic nature of colonialism as an object of study: this complexity is given extended treatment in the literature (see for example Young, 2001). However, I will look at the specific period of European colonization of Africa from the late 19th century up to decolonization in the mid 20th century (roughly 1860 to 1968). There is, in this period, an intriguing overlap between colonialism and the formation and change of those two well-known humanitarian organizations. The formation of the Red Cross is closely associated with the Battle of Solferino in 1859. Its organizational development was shaped through subsequent decades of European conflict, most notably World Wars I and II. But, what is conspicuously absent from the Red Cross formation stories is that it was formed by colonial European powers in a Europe that was actively colonizing.

The history of the formation of MSF coalesces around a period also associated with war: the Nigerian Civil War (also known as the Biafran War) of 1968 to 1971. This was a post-colonial war in that it followed after the decolonization of most African states and was at the end of most African independence struggles. In contrast, the lineage of the Red Cross is such that it was created with the consent of, and existed alongside, colonial states using state power and sanction to achieve humanitarian goals (Moorehead, 1999). Indeed, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) today holds pseudo-state power through its guardianship of international humanitarian law (Forsythe, 2005). For
example, a state would have the right through its diplomatic representatives to visit its citizens detained in foreign jails. So too does the ICRC have the right to visit prisoners of war. Further examples of this pseudo-state power includes the right of ICRC delegates not to bear witness in front of international tribunals, the recognition of ICRC delegates as representatives of a ‘state’ through the granting of diplomatic status while on mission, and the ICRC being party to the Geneva Conventions (a document signed by states). In contrast, MSF was formed as a reaction to the failure of this state-based approach, during the height of decolonization. The differing experience of colonialism in the Red Cross and MSF provides an opportunity to understand how historical representations and contemporary experiences of organization have been shaped by colonialism.

Through this examination, I will show how humanitarianism is woven into our thinking about organizations and society. I will describe how humanitarianism requires us to believe that a set of extraordinary circumstances exist requiring immediate attention, and justifies what Nietzsche has called an excess of history (Nietzsche, 1985). This excess hides contingencies, contexts, and alternative explanations with the result that they are forgotten as inconvenient extras thus staunting any debate over the validity of a claim or idea; in this case, the claim is the naturalness or taken-for-granted nature of humanitarianism. I will develop the intellectual problem of humanitarianism by arguing that the continued existence of humanitarian organizations is dependent upon the historical construction of humanitarianism such that it appears to be a static principle that has always existed
in its current form and is based upon universally-accepted values, principles, and beliefs.

My contribution to organization studies will be made through problematizing this taken-for-granted status by exploring the question: what purpose does the humanitarian organization serve? This answer to this question may seem obvious as the stated purpose of humanitarian organizations is very clear. For example, the mission of the ICRC “is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance” and to “prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles” (ICRC, 2011). Similarly, MSF’s charter claims that the organization “offers assistance to populations in distress, to victims of natural or man-made disasters and to victims of armed conflict, without discrimination and irrespective of race, religion, creed or political affiliation” (MSF, 2011).

However, both the literature and my own experience while working for the International Federation of the Red Cross in Africa provides reason to doubt the degree of correspondence between the stated intentions of humanitarian organizations and their actual practices. For example, during my tenure in the Red Cross, the organization privileged the development of global campaigns against HIV/AIDS and malaria over other equally deserving competing demands such as endemic, grinding poverty. I also witnessed massive mobilization of resources in response to those affected by natural disaster while the responders ignore the poverty and disease that exists perpetually before and after the event. It is paradoxical that although humanitarianism appeals to the supposedly universal
principle that we are all human, and therefore all equally deserving of help, it has been my experience that humanitarian aid is very selective of the type of suffering that will receive attention.

My observation is echoed in the literature: MacFarlane & Weiss (2000, p. 113) note that humanitarian responses “are frequently late in coming... and selective.” The literature notes that humanitarian aid has become progressively more organized, funded, and globalized yet it has not reduced the suffering that it purports to alleviate. For example, Marten (2004, p. 75) argues that the failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide was because humanitarian response “to terrible suffering did not prove a strong enough impulse to overcome the desire by states to save their political capital, their economic resources, and the safety of their troops for areas of the world that were more central to their national security interests.” In famine and conflict, De Waal (1997; 2004) and De Waal and Omaar (1993) note that there is tremendous difference between what is stated and what is achieved, and this finding is echoed in other areas of humanitarianism through a substantial ‘failure of aid’ theme in the literature ("Growth of aid and the decline of humanitarianism", 2010, p. 253; Kennedy, 2004; Lautze, Leaning, Raven-Roberts, Kent, & Mazurana, 2004; Maren, 1997; Polman, 2010; Rieff, 2002; Robertson, Bedell, Lavery, & Upshur, 2002; Strömberg, 2007; Terry, 2002).

Another motivation for this research is that the humanitarian organization is an under studied aspect of organizations. This is surprising given the extent to which these organizations are involved in people’s lives, and the amount of trust and legitimacy with which they are given and imbued. Beck (1999, p. 44) argues that
NGOs have a "blank cheque for an almost unlimited store of trust" because of their pure public image. Fiering (1976, p. 196) notes that "of all the great themes of eighteenth-century social thought, humanitarianism has received the least study in intellectual history." Lambert & Lester (2004, p. 324) argue that a "critical, postcolonial reappraisal" of those "who constituted the nexus of globalized philanthropy in the early nineteenth century is long overdue." Bankoff (2001, p. 19) suggests that "[i]nadequate attention... has been directed to considering the historical roots of the discursive framework within which hazard is generally presented" and that this framework is told within a story of "them and us, where the 'us' is the West... and the 'them' is everywhere else."

For all these reasons, I believe I am justified in taking a postcolonial theoretical stance and including a postcolonial analysis of the Red Cross and MSF as they are both part of the emergence of organized global humanitarianism as a result of their earlier predecessors. Therefore my contribution to organization studies will be made through closing this gap in the literature by exploring the question: what purpose does the humanitarian organization serve?

I will answer this question through an examination of archival material and an application of Michel Foucault's genealogical approach to history. I will show that humanitarianism is a historical construction and that it has, and always will, be subject to change. This implies that there is room for resistance to humanitarianism in its current form.

Foucault's genealogy instructs us to look for this change in historical points of intersection that give rise to new historical trajectories. I believe that the
European colonial era (18th to 20th century) and the Biafran War of 1967-1970 were two such intersections that enable us to see the contingent and constructed nature of humanitarianism. I have selected these events for three reasons: first, that the success of the colonial period was in part based on couching its violence under the guise of a humanitarian, civilizing mission; second, the colonial period gave rise to a diversity of formal humanitarian organizations; third, the Biafran War represents the height of the decolonization period in Africa, and it witnessed a fracture and disruption in the taken-for-granted status of the Red Cross as the de facto representative of global humanitarianism. Biafra is particularly important because during the war, a new form of humanitarianism emerged through the acts of individuals resisting the existing humanitarian order in a hybridization process well known to postcolonial scholars. These individuals included both so-called recipients of humanitarian aid, and those who were involved in implementing the humanitarian action. I will therefore look that particular intersection in some detail through the lens of postcolonial theory. The key aspect of postcolonial theory for my work is that organizations are blind to existing practices that have had their origin in colonialism because of the pervasiveness of the colonial period: it influenced all aspects of the lives of both colonizer and colonized. As a method, genealogy decenters common sense and so, combined with postcolonial theory, I believe it is well-suited to re-read the practices of the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontières to show the extent to which they are postcolonial organizations.
Why Postcolonial Theory and Humanitarianism?

I believe there are three main justifications for studying humanitarianism using postcolonial theory. "No Borders" slogans notwithstanding, the encounter between humanitarians in the post-1950 era and the populations they intend to serve is one that is primarily, but not exclusively, between the West and the rest (De Waal, 1997). That is, it largely reflects a primacy of an established Western epistemology and politico-economic order and the drive to establish this primacy globally in what is termed the underdeveloped countries of the South through the process of development. It is not exclusively a West/non-West divide because there are examples of massive humanitarian action in the recent past in former Soviet republics of Chechnya and Yugoslavia. These regions are not generally considered underdeveloped or lumped under the Third World rubric. However, the manifestation of humanitarianism appears to be the same. A study done on MSF's work in Russia demonstrates that the same types of attitudes expressed by MSF in Africa were also expressed in Russia including the differing treatment of expatriate versus national staff (Shevchenko & Fox, 2008). Postcolonial forms of humanitarianism may be possible, in a manner similar to postcolonial African governments.

However, humanitarian practice does range over countries and populations that were once ruled by distant European powers in a period and process known as modern Western colonialism (Banerjee & Prasad, 2008), which I will refer to from here on as 'colonialism.' Colonialism was extensive and long-lasting: it ranged over
most of the planet's geography at its height, and has a history of about 500 years (Banerjee & Prasad, 2008). Colonialism "involved the subjugation of one people by another" (Young, 2001, p. 15) and it was an extraordinarily diverse in its approach to subjugation and methods of administration depending upon the colonizing country and the intention of the colonizer (Young, 2001). In other words it was not a homogeneous practice. Neither is humanitarianism, as I will show in the genealogical exploration in later chapters. And so this co-incidence of humanitarian practice and colonial practice in targeting the same specific populations and geographies is the first reason that I believe there is justification in somehow linking humanitarianism with colonialism. This should happen within a framework of theory that seeks to describe the on-going and pervasive effects of colonization. This theoretical framework is known as postcolonial theory.

The key phrase in my description of colonialism relevant to the study of humanitarianism is that colonialism is on-going and pervasive. Colonialism was not just another form of domination: it was so extensive and has such a long history that Young (2001) and Banerjee and Prasad (2008, p. 91) argue that it "is an episode of particular significance in human history [my emphasis added]." Postcolonial theory reflects upon this significant phenomenon and is a framework for interpreting and analyzing the condition of former colonies and colonizers. It should be highlighted that the postcolonial theory being adopted in this dissertation is of a different character and intent than other attempts to study and understand Western colonialism. There is a range of approaches that can be found in schools or
academics calling themselves 'Africanists', or 'Islamists', or 'Orientalists.' Perhaps Edward Said's *Orientalism* (Said, 1979) is a starting point for understanding these approaches that depend upon, in part, a dichotomization of the Other and the Westerner into categories such as 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' (Banerjee & Prasad, 2008).

However, I adopt a postcolonial theory that instead critiques Western values and epistemology and examines the continuing effects of colonization. While there is no longer an *overt* process of holding land and directly ruling populations, there remain "elements of political, economic and cultural control" (Banerjee & Prasad, 2008, p. 91). This on-going form of latter-day colonialism is referred to as *neo-colonialism*. One practice that extended from the colonial to the neo-colonial is the duty to care. In the colonial period, this is the belief that the colonizing power has an obligation to civilize and improve the colonized. In the post-colonial, these become neo-colonial practices under one or the other banners of development, democratizing, or rescuing (from war or disaster). To be clear: neo-colonialism differs from colonialism in that they both describe a set of dominating practices and discourses from the West, yet neo-colonialism does not refer to those practices and discourses that support holding foreign land through the use of direct physical force. Postcolonial theory holds that part of the success of colonialism and neo-colonialism is the insidious nature of its practices and discourse over a broad sweep of time such that it has now become common sense (Banerjee & Prasad, 2008) and therefore largely indistinguishable from the non-colonial. Young (2001, p. 6)
contends that "the values of colonialism seeped much more widely into the general culture... than had ever been assumed. That archaeological retrieval and revaluation is central to much activity in the postcolonial field." The second justification for studying humanitarianism with a postcolonial framework is precisely the ability of postcolonial theory to retrieve the history of and re-evaluate the nature of taken-for-granted practices.

In this dissertation I am concerned with my intuition, informed by personal experience and the literature (see for example de Waal (1993; 1997)) that humanitarianism is a taken-for-granted practice with an unproblematic past. This practice is played out in organizations. Therefore, the third and final justification for a utilization of postcolonial theory is its ability help to problematize humanitarianism, and in particular that it provides a point for analysis of its effects within humanitarian organizations. As Prasad (2003) notes, the point of departure for understanding the relevance of postcolonialism to organizations is the process of defamiliarization. This is the turning of the familiar into the unfamiliar thus exposing “new aspects and meanings of common-place organizational phenomena... [and] may even enable us to see an old organizational phenomenon in a radically new light” (Prasad, 2003, p. 29). The ability to defamiliarize is facilitated by theoretical frameworks that shed new light on old ways of looking at things (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000). Therefore, as a theory that critiques, re-evaluates, and seeks to explain the taken-for-granted, postcolonial theory would seem to be an
ideal defamiliarization tool for humanitarianism and the practices of humanitarian organizations.

Before I can complete this discussion of why I believe postcolonial theory can be used to inquire into humanitarianism, I must also acknowledge that there is considerable room for confusion here due to terminology: is there really such a difference between postcolonial, post-colonial, and neo-colonial, together with their various 'isms'? Witness the potentially frustrating wrestling with terms in analyzing an organization using postcolonial theory: is it neo-colonial? Is it formed in the post-colonial? Does it display colonial or neo-colonial tendencies? There is also the question of the term imperialism and its relation to colonialism and colonization.

One answer to the question of terminology is to enumerate, problematize and utilize the terms within their correct context. For example Shohat (1992) eloquently describes the various instantiations of the term ‘postcolonial’ and ‘post-colonial’ and their ‘isms.’ She contends that the terms are problematic, in that they need to be “interrogated and contextualized historically, geopolitically, and culturally” and that each “addresses specific and even contradictory dynamics between and within different world zones” (Shohat, 1992, p. 111). Young (2001, p. 29) also enters into a detailed analysis of the terms, and defines imperialism as “the exercise of power either through direct conquest or (latterly) through political and economic influence that effectively amounts to a similar for of domination: both involve the practice of power through facilitating institutions and ideologies.” The difference between imperialism and colonialism being that the former was “driven
by ideology and a theory of sorts, in some instances even to the extent that it can operate as much against purely economic interests as for them” whereas the latter (colonialism) was “according to pragmatic needs, and generally run according to the interests of business or settlers” (Young, 2001, p. 27).

But Young (2001) also argues that when viewed from the perspective of the colonized, it hardly matters what the terms mean: the end result was domination. This leads to another approach to terminology of a more pragmatic nature and it is the one that I have chosen to follow for this dissertation. I follow the convention adopted by Prasad (2003) and use the term ‘post-colonial’ to refer to the period following the end of colonization, although it is problematic in itself to suggest that colonialism has in fact ended. Therefore, I understand the ‘post-‘ period to refer to the end of major European colonization in Africa and Asia at the end of World War II and later up to the present. I will use ‘postcolonialism’ to describe the study of the effects of colonialism on countries, individuals, and organizations in the post-colonial period. And, for further clarity, I will refer to a ‘postcolonial’ organization as one that harbours neo-colonial practices unawares.

What is the Intellectual Problem?

I have already claimed that there is a certain paradox to the current humanitarian discourse that gives rise to the intellectual problem at the centre of this dissertation. The outline of this paradox can be found in the discourse of humanitarianism. This discourse begins with my claim that humanitarianism has
become an accepted contemporary social force. Many of its tenets have become enshrined in laws such as the Geneva Conventions, and formal organizations exist that are dedicated to the pursuit of humanitarian objectives. Thus humanitarianism has all the appearances of a structure that has and will always exist. However, while it is plausible that humanity has a latent and ancient ability to organize to help those in need, the creation of formalized helping structures, as exemplified by organizations such as the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontières (MSF), is relatively recent (Kirschenbaum, 2004). This mirrors other aspects of formalized life where tradition was replaced with codified practice (Foucault, 1995) that over time coalesced into a broader discourse; in this case, the discourse of humanitarianism. This discourse is such that there is now an expectation that the humanitarian organization will act to relieve suffering and assist the so-called vulnerable (be they states or individuals) that do not have the resources to help themselves. This was not always the case as suffering is a contingent concept: consider, for example, the case of “benign slavery” (Fiering, 1976, p. 208), the forcible separation of children from their parents for humanitarian reasons as part of the Indian residential school policy in Canada (Sitara, 2008), or the disciplinary institutions for the mad (Foucault, 2006). Further, I believe that the continued existence of the humanitarian organization depends upon this ordering of the world that produces victims and helpers. It is also a discourse that does not easily admit critique: the organization imbued with legal or moral legitimacy and a mission to help, heal, or rescue has seemingly little that can be criticized. This view is reinforced through statistics, often in the form of line charts that alarmingly
approach asymptotic values showing ever increasing numbers of natural disasters and more and more vulnerable people requiring assistance (see for example Eshghi & Larson, 2008; Founrouge & Gunn, 2008). Therefore, the paradox is that humanitarianism is selective, that there continues to be suffering, and that humanitarianism has not been terribly humane.

The second component of the intellectual problem is to propose a mechanism by which this paradox is perpetuated. In 'One Dimensional Man' Marcuse argues that the task of social theory is to examine other possible manifestations of society that have been denied because of historical developments. These other possibilities continue to “haunt the established society as subversive tendencies and forces” (Marcuse, 2002, p. XLII). Humanitarianism operates through Marcuse's notion of repressive desublimation: this holds that individuals forego future and/or indirect satisfaction or pleasure in favour of direct and immediate satisfaction. In a desublimated society, individuals accept whatever is offered to them: sublimated (delayed or indirect) options are repressed, and individuals accept only the choices that are provided to them. It is repressive because individuals accept the choices given to them by society (e.g. war, consumption, career, politicians, products, aspirations) even though they are aware of the manufactured nature of these choices: their needs are otherwise met so effectively, and the society so smoothly administered that they ignore the inability to choose outside of the options given them. In other words, there is no dialectic, nor is there an expression of dissenting opinion. Individuals cease to struggle for opinions, thus become one-dimensional. Marcuse proposes that emancipation will result from an attempt to grasp the whole
situation and recognizing the role that tolerance, satisfaction, and comfort play in repression.

Similarly, it is suggested that everyone knows that various stories of crisis that underpins humanitarian intervention are manipulated and manufactured, but we all accept these fictions because of various mechanisms that exist to make it acceptable, whether it is saving lives or responding to crisis. Genealogy, as the method employed in this dissertation, enables humanitarianism to be understood as a mechanism by which other social possibilities are actively denied. I will show that colonialism persists in humanitarian organizations and has desublimated any real changes in how the victims of power or disaster are treated by society. Through an examination of the trajectories of humanitarianism, I will argue that humanitarianism justifies and enables the continued inequality of nations and people by providing people (from the West) with immediate gratification of the desire to do something for a starving (or dying) stranger. In other words, it desublimates the action of providing meaningful, lasting equality through the availability of humanitarian organizations that make available accessible mechanisms (donations, voluntarism, letter-writing campaigns) to instantly provide relief for the helper when presented with a crisis (e.g. disaster, distant war). Thus, just as colonialism justified violence towards people and expropriation of land through the argument of a civilizing mission, humanitarianism justifies continued inequality through the assuagement of continual, worsening crises.

I would like to be clear that I recognize the possible existence of various cultural instantiations of the compulsion for one person to help another in a time of
crisis. For example, the duty to tithe incomes in an Islamic culture (Krafess, 2005), or the notion of *harambee* in East Africa (Ngau, 1987) are but two examples of what could be equivalent to some form of humanitarianism. However, my interest is in humanitarianism as developed in Western thought. In particular, I am interested in the humanitarianism of the post Second World War period: one that is embodied in formal organizations that capitalize upon some supposedly inherent duty or desire to help others and translates this into a managed response to suffering due to disaster or war. I would like to take one example to illustrate this as a managerialist process: that of hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005 (Rostis & Mills, 2010). Katrina is a particularly good example because it provides a well-known example of a major disaster that exposed the underlying logic of the approach taken by formal organisations in the management of disasters.

The popular media has presented the decisions made by government leaders during the Katrina response as being confused and irrational. However, it is possible to look beyond these popular representations. For example, government officials were all operating under laws and policy that limited their ability to take decisive action. Further, the individual decision-makers all worked within formal response organisations such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). When approaching the management of a disaster, these organisations take a highly rational, positivistic approach in that they attempt to understand and diagnose the problem, rely upon pre-defined rules and policies, adopt formal roles for individuals involved in the response, and utilise a centralised decision-making system. Understanding that response organisations are structured this way, it then seems
reasonable to suggest that the disaster management system did exactly what it was expected to do. In this light, the much talked about failure of the response to Katrina can therefore be recast as a success. It is the logical outcome of a bureaucratic, rational approach to the management of a chaotic and ambiguous environment (Takeda & Helms, 2006). FEMA is one example of a disaster management organization that is a machine bureaucracy. It has a hierarchy of authority, a high division of labour, and centralised decision-making. It is best suited to an unchanging environment; however, in a disaster the environment is unstable and chaotic. Major disasters are rare occurrences but the organisations must persist even in the absence of crisis. In the Katrina disaster, therefore, FEMA behaved as it was designed; that is, to be intolerant of rapid change, to seek approval of authority before making decisions and to apply rules rigidly when making decisions.

There are also many manifestations of the larger idea of helping within which humanitarianism is situated. I have earlier provided some discussion about the meaning of these terms. However, I will not attempt to investigate or connect them to the genealogy of humanitarianism except as they directly or indirectly appear in the humanitarian archive. In other words, my intention is not to construct a taxonomy of helping as this runs counter to the epistemology of this dissertation, and is contrary to the methodological approach of genealogy where origins and progress are discounted.
Decentering Common Sense: Genealogy as Method

As mentioned earlier, central to this dissertation will be the development of a genealogy of humanitarianism. Through archival research of primary and secondary source documents from government and non-governmental organizations this genealogy will reveal the effects of constructing humanitarianism as a unique, extraordinary, and urgent event. The goal is to understand how humanitarianism works to block individual agency in this sphere of social life. The use of genealogy and an understanding of how discourse and power inform humanitarianism produces an ironic twist to the notion of humanitarianism: genealogy contends that "humanity does not tend to move from a state of barbarism to one of civilized governance, but from one form of domination to another" (Prasad, 2005, p. 247). Further, categories such as the powerful and the powerless are not static, but constructed as a result of the presence of power (Prasad, 2005). The irony, of course, is that humanitarianism is popularly regarded as a civilizing force rather than yet another site for a struggle over discourse.

Genealogy is associated with the work of Michel Foucault, and his extension of ideas put forth by Nietzsche in The Uses and Abuses of History. The core of these ideas is to seek an answer to the question ‘what is our present?’ (May, 1993). His major concern was with the production of discourse (Prasad, 2005), which is understood to be “any organized body of statements...and utterances governed by rules and conventions of which the user is largely unconscious” (Macey, 2001, p. 200). These rules do not simply govern the production of “signs (signifying
elements referring to contents or representations)" but they indicate “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course, discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things” (Foucault, 2002, p. 49). More importantly, he was interested in the internal rules of production of discourse, or those that govern what can and cannot be said, what counts for truth and what does not (Prasad, 2005). These internal rules or discursive practices result in discursive effects: for example madness or sexuality. The particular discourse and the appearance and disappearance of discursive effects are the result of the presence of power and power struggles (Prasad, 2005). For Foucault, genealogy was the method utilized to expose discursive effects and the presence of power in his examination of the prison in *Discipline and Punish*. Through a review of that work (Foucault, 1995), and various secondary sources (see for example Barratt, 2008; Jacques, 1992; Kendall & Wickham, 1999; Prado, 2000) that either utilize or attempt to understand and analyze his method, it seems that there are two major features of genealogy that make it into a unique method and thus distinguish it from traditional histories. First, genealogy is concerned with a history of the present (Castel, 1994; Meadmore, Hatcher & McWilliam, 2000). It relies on a second feature, problematization, to understand how present problems (e.g. humanitarian crises) have come to be defined and understood in their current form. It does not view the present as solidified. Instead, the present is only the current of a series of subjugations and thus describes how the present subjugation emerged and descended from a series of discontinuities that could have, under different circumstances and in a different context, produced a different present.
In genealogy, the utilization of history to explain the past is eliminated in favour of a contingent and contextual approach. This requires a suspension of belief in current views of knowledge acquisition, and the development of a deep suspicion about any natural and self-evident truths about the subjects and objects of interest. As such, genealogy is rooted in poststructuralism (Prasad, 2005); that is, it rejects talk of metaphysical origins to discourse while supporting the view that there can be multiple, fluid meanings (Macey, 2001). In contrast, a method of historical analysis that seeks only to explain the past will further entrench current conditions. A genealogy as described by Foucault is, as mentioned, a history of the present: it seeks to understand how the present has come to be organized. Historical events are popularly considered to be linked together into a rational, linear progression from an origin towards the current order of things. Genealogy holds that truth is created and re-created over time (May, 1993).

**Using Genealogy in Problematizing Humanitarianism**

Genealogy is a method of suspicion and critique that attempts to defamiliarize and re-examine any object or method of knowledge production (Hook, 2005). It rejects any sense of coherence or systemization with the goal of trying to uncover the construction of a logical narrative or explanation of how the past occurred. How has popular knowledge been repressed, and how has struggle and conflict resulted in the privileging of certain stories? The context of these struggles, once revealed, can unseat the power/knowledge dynamic. Genealogy, as a method,
enables humanitarianism to be understood as a mechanism by which other social possibilities are actively denied.

In sum, Foucault's genealogy rejects a linearity of explanation and uncovers the silences, accidents, and intersections that have resulted in a taken-for-granted approach to knowledge; it acts as a counterweight to a process of forgetting created by an excess of history. These other ways of knowing are part of the silenced voices of the history of humanitarianism; seeking out these silences should be part of the empirical work of the dissertation. The method of genealogy relies heavily on archival research, and for practical reasons, this dissertation will situate the exploration of humanitarianism within the archives of two specific organizations: the Red Cross and Medecins sans Frontières. It is important to note that 'the archive' for Foucault is a decentralized construct. It is not only a physical container embodied in libraries and national 'archives' but it is the belief that discourse is scattered everywhere and traces of its development can be found in multiple locations. This would include existing literature, histories, documents, and practices of organizations. In practical terms for this dissertation, it means that the traditional chapter of literature review is part of the examination of the archive. That is, all that has been written about humanitarianism, including academic texts, are part of the Foucauldian archive.

Genealogy speaks considerably about the notion of the archive. For Foucault, the archive in its broadest sense is everywhere and not restricted to the four walls of an archival office of any one organization. Therefore, traces of constructs such as madness, discipline, or sexuality should be found in multiple places; Foucault's
genealogies draw upon this feature and sweep quite broadly across sources, historical periods, and people. I will also consider the archive to be a decentralized concept and will look to document the notion of humanitarianism from multiple sources. As mentioned, I will constrain the search for non-academic material to the physical archives of the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontières. The intersection of these two organizations at a critical point of post-decolonization in Africa, together with the close association of the Red Cross and the height of European colonialism provided me with the moment of insight into the problem of humanitarianism. Therefore, I believe my limitation of the genealogy to these two organizations is justified because of the postcolonial theoretical framework I have selected.

With all this in mind, the idea of humanitarianism will be problematized to uncover how it has been reified. Diluting common sense in this fashion will show how alternative explanations and solutions have become submerged in an excess of history. In crafting a genealogy of humanitarianism, it will be postcolonialism that will form the theoretical framework because of the way crisis views victims, and because the most exposed to crisis are in nations that have experienced colonization.

**Theoretical Framework - Postcolonialism**

The humanitarian trajectory sketched out earlier echoes the well-understood colonial discourse with its duties to care, improve, or better the lives of the
colonized. To understand this colonial discourse, it is necessary to review the nature and extent of colonialism that had its origin in Europe from the 17th to 20th centuries. By the start of World War I, a few European nations held huge amounts of foreign land as colonies. Global power on a scale never before seen was concentrated in the hands of a few European nations including Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, and Germany. European societies were organized, in part, to administer and extract surplus value from vast tracts of foreign geography and their subjugated distant populations. However, there was more to colonialism than the profit and power bestowed on Europe: postcolonial scholars claim that imperialism and colonization have more interesting and analytically useful properties beneath their surface, and that these are relevant and applicable even today (Prasad, 2005). When combined with the observation that colonialism left virtually no aspect of social and economic life untouched, it is further claimed that colonialism's retreat in the independence struggles following World War II have left a residue of markers of colonial practices in social and political life (Said, 1994). These residual practices will now be enumerated with the intent of using them as signposts in the exploration of the current practices of humanitarian organizations.

On the surface, domination appears to be the central practice of colonialism. However, domination is not peculiar to the colonial period, so what is it about this particular form of domination that made it so successful? Furthermore, how was consent gained amongst both colonizer and colonized to maintain distant rule? Perhaps part of the answer to these questions lies in colonialism being sold to both colonizer and colonized as being done 'for a good reason'; that is, to improve the
lives of the colonized. In this sense, colonialism affected not only the colonized, but the colonizers: a sense of duty was evident in European society that this domination was in fact a civilizing mission enabled by viewing the colonized as inferior or subordinate (Said, 1994), but redeemable through a process of civilizing or development.

This conception of the colonized as being at the receiving end of the West's duty to improve may also have allowed the West the space to imagine itself. In other words, colonialism enabled the West to understand itself in relation to what it was not, to judge itself in relation to what it does not do, and to see possibilities in relation to what others do not have (Said, 1994). However, resistance to colonial rule, authority, and the conceptualization of the colonized as being inert and objectified was also a defining feature of colonialism (Said, 1994). What is apparent from all of these practices is that the border between colonizer and colonized, between domination and resistance is an artificial one. Colonialism was not something that was done to the Other without effect on the colonizing society, and resistance did not suddenly appear at an appointed time in history. It is also suggested by postcolonial scholars (Prasad, 2005; Said, 1994) that the border between the colonial era and today is also artificial: if sought after, the residual markers of colonialism can be found today in the routines of organizations. I contend that they are notably present in the practices of humanitarian organizations engaged in contact with crisis.

Humanitarian crises themselves can be considered uncharted territory, often playing out on the same borders that were once colonized by Europe. Crises present
organizations with a ready stock of souls to be discovered and rescued, be they tsunami survivors or the victims of financial disaster. Discovery implies a purposeful seeking of something that we know is there, but not yet found: it is awaiting the right method, instrument, or circumstances (Mignolo, 2007). If it is the case that when "something is discovered, it loses its own history" (Mignolo, 2007, p. 26) then there should be implications for how discovery, genealogy, colonialism, and crisis are understood. Mignolo (2007) contends that it is not enough to simply recognize the history and legacy of colonialism on people and institutions as scholars like Said (1994) have argued. Nor is it enough to resist the effects of colonialism in a violent manner suggested by Fanon (2004). Mignolo (2007) argues that emancipation can only be achieved through the realization of a different epistemology that comes from the knowledges silenced by colonial practice. However, this does not completely supplant existing knowledge in the manner of a frontier pushing into different and unknown territory. Mignolo suggests that border epistemology is a more apt conceptualization of what will result. The border is a space where two different territories meet, and are allowed room to mix and move while retaining their fundamental characteristics (Mignolo & Tlostanova, 2006). The practical implications of this for my dissertation is to suggest a mingling of postcolonial theory, border epistemology, discovery, and resistance. This suggestion begins with the assertion that colonialism has interesting and analytically useful properties beneath its surface that are relevant and applicable even today (Prasad, 2005). These residues of colonialism will be used as signposts in the exploration of humanitarianism. However, it is thought that there will be an
opportunity to extend postcolonial theory by giving fuller consideration to the idea that humanitarianism presents the West with continual opportunities to perpetuate discovery.

Outline of the Chapters

In Chapter Two, I will describe the methodology that will be used in this dissertation to expose the taken-for-granted status of humanitarianism. A historical construction of humanitarianism that looks unproblematically for origins of the practice is much in evidence. That this process is at work is evident from the founder histories that permeate the histories of the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontières. These mainstream approaches to history silence the contextual, contingent nature of the humanitarian concept, prevents challenges, and silences resistance. A poststructural history of humanitarianism, in contrast, problematizes the origin-seeking approach and instead looks for contingencies and accidents that result in its emergence. Genealogy is one of these poststructural approaches that problematize knowledge; that is, it establishes a concept as a product of processes that show its utility in perpetuating relations of power. Rather than restricting itself to one particular historical trajectory, a genealogy examines the entire archive in the belief that the sedimentation of a range of historical documents will show these contingent events. I will situate the genealogy of humanitarianism within the humanitarian archive. This includes the physical archives of specific humanitarian organizations, such as the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontières. But, the archive
is also understood to be the canon of documents such as existing historiographies and literature written about humanitarianism.

In the third chapter, I will begin to problematize humanitarianism through an examination of the humanitarian archive. This chapter looks at existing historiographies and other academic literature on humanitarianism and the humanitarian organization. What I will first show is that the contemporary understanding of humanitarianism as a static, unquestionable, and taken-for-granted concept is only the current iteration of a discourse of humanitarianism that has changed over time. These elements of the archive show first that formal humanitarian organizations are contingent organizations; in other words, they were the result of unintended intersecting events. This is in contrast to the prevailing view that humanitarianism is a static structure that has and always will exist. The archive also shows a certain paradox in humanitarianism through two observations: first, that the long history of humanitarianism implies that it has been ineffective in alleviating human suffering. This is bolstered by empirical studies that show an increasing expenditure on humanitarian organizations, their increased role in providing the services of the state, yet a continued increase in those affected by disaster and war. Second, that humanitarian interventions have often not been terribly humane.

In Chapters Four and Five, I will continue the problematization of humanitarianism by exploring in detail the work of the Red Cross in Africa during decolonization and during the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970, otherwise known as the Biafran War, as two points of emergence. In contrast to Moorehead, who argued
that the Red Cross didn’t have much involvement in Africa prior to Biafra, I will show that it was intimately involved in the decolonization effort. As a post-colonial war, Biafra is important for several reasons: it ‘bookends’ the colonial humanitarian period and it witnesses the large-scale explosion, as from out of nowhere, of direct, individual action in the lives of suffering strangers. As a site where local knowledge has been discounted, Biafra demonstrates the effects of humanitarianism as a contest of power. I will also begin an examination of Medecins sans Frontières as a humanitarian organization at the other end of the colonial period, and as a product of the Biafran conflict. Medecins sans Frontières is an organization of a time where colonialism purported to end, but it also marks the beginning of a postcolonial role for humanitarian organizations.

In Chapter Six, I will consider my research questions in light of the archival findings. I will claim that humanitarianism fails for two reasons. First is because it is a problematic practice. That is, it is set up to serve a purpose beyond that which it claims to do. That purpose is to act as a disciplinary institution in the management of human relations. Second, our construction and understanding of humanitarianism leads to certain outcomes, and those are not necessarily the ones that it purports to achieve. This will open up into a broader discussion drawing in ideas and explanations from the existing literature. I will finish with some concluding thoughts in Chapter Seven.
Chapter 2 - Methodology

"...what form of knowledge, after all, is sufficiently singular, esoteric or regional to be given only at a single point, in a unique formulation? What learning could be so well—or so badly—understood to be known only in a single time, in a uniform manner, in a single mode of apprehension" (Foucault, 2006, p. 163)

Genealogy

In seeking a methodology to investigate the paradox of humanitarianism, I have concluded that genealogy is the most appropriate choice. In this chapter, I will justify and explain this choice. Genealogy is a method of historical critique that is the product of work done by Michel Foucault, who in turn built on the genealogical critique of morals performed by Nietzsche (1989). Since genealogy is an historical method, I need to at the outset of this chapter, clarify what I understand the terms ‘the past’, ‘history’, and ‘historiography.’ The past is an “absent object of inquiry” (Collingwood, 1956; Jenkins, 1995, p. 18) that exists only as traces in archives and other places where records are stored. These traces are from the past, they stand in for the past, but they cannot speak for themselves. History is the “various accounts constructed about the past by historians” (Jenkins, 1995, p. 16). Historiography then is a consideration of the difference between the past and these accounts of the past known as history (Jenkins, 1995). In other words, it is a methodology to investigate the past in order to write about it. Historiography is problematic because the historical record, the way of accessing the past, is itself historicized and the result of previous interpretations and methodologies (Jenkins, 1995). Some of
these interpretations may present the past as being unproblematic, straightforward, and taken-for-granted. Genealogy defamiliarizes taken-for-granted knowledge by rejecting the ahistorical, coherent, systematic production of knowledge. Through an examination of the descent, emergence, and trajectory of events, it attempts to uncover other explanations that have been hidden in the construction of a logical narrative or explanation of how the past occurred. How has popular knowledge been repressed, and how has struggle and conflict resulted in the exclusion of particular parts of history? For example, in his studies of madness, discipline, and sexuality Foucault demonstrated that questions regarding their existence as concepts today can be answered through an understanding of their past (Fink-Eitel, 1992).

It is my contention that humanitarianism requires a similar treatment and that it represents a novel and as yet untried approach to critiquing the concept. Before I can describe how genealogy will be used, I must first spend some time reflexively describing my decision to take an historical approach to my study of humanitarianism and the humanitarian organization. I will then explain the theoretical placement of genealogy and contrast it with mainstream histories to demonstrate the advantages of the former in studying humanitarianism. From there, I will outline the method of genealogy drawing upon lessons from Foucauldian genealogies carried out in *The History of Madness* and *Discipline and Punish*, as well as insights from genealogies performed in the organizational literature (Jacques, 1992) and advice from the writings of Foucauldian scholars
(Castel, 1994; Kendall & Wickham, 1999; May, 1993). Finally, I will return to my research question and show how the method of genealogy will be utilized to answer it.

In a somewhat ironic turn given genealogy's disdain for origins, I will have to start with the origin of my interests in humanitarianism and my central intuition that lead me to adopting a historical method. This core of this intuition is that humanitarianism, as an ostensibly caring practice, has a curious mix of the ahistorical and historical that hides the purposes beyond care for which it serves. To phrase this differently, one could say that historical accounts “confuse the origin of a practice with its purpose” (Spinks, 2003, p. 70). My intention is to use genealogy to re-read the history of humanitarianism and to disentangle origin from purpose.

**Reflexivity and Personal Context**

In practicing genealogy, it has been said that the practitioner “is produced by what he is studying; consequently he can never stand outside it” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 2000, p. 124). The implication for my research is that I must acknowledge my own involvement. From 1999 to 2003, I was a delegate with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). I worked as an expatriate in Harare, Zimbabwe and was consciously aware of my status as a white male from Canada working in a highly paid, privileged job relative to Zimbabwean nationals. I was one of many expatriate Red Cross workers who held the privileged
title of 'delegate' in contrast to Zimbabweans who were referred to as 'local staff.'

My job was to manage a project that experimented with the use of information and communications technologies to determine if they could improve the ability of the Red Cross to prepare for and respond to disasters. This project took place in multiple countries in southern Africa including Namibia, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, Angola, and Lesotho. During my time in Zimbabwe, there were multiple events in the countries of southern Africa that received the title 'disaster.' These included tropical cyclones, refugee displacements, drought, and flooding. There were also events that caused hardship for the citizens of the countries of the region, but these events did not receive the title 'disaster.' A non-exhaustive list of these included poverty, HIV/AIDS, and political instability. Often, it seemed that the wishes of 'local staff' to elevate these non-events to event status were met with resistance by the organization. The contrast between the attention paid by international organizations to something labeled 'disaster' versus the ignorance of 'non-disaster' was a paradoxical one: humanitarians could choose which form of suffering received attention. Of course, there was not an actual process of deciding what gets labeled with the disaster title, but rather there was an inability of a subset of human problems to be heard and be considered valid; this can be categorized in terms of their admissibility to a certain discourse.

To be clear, expatriates were not deliberately uncaring or unaware of the differential treatment of suffering. But there was a lack of awareness that the crafting of the Red Cross organization as neutral and impartial acted to separate the
organization from its surrounding milieu or environment. Another facet of this crafting was the perpetuation of mythical foundation stories of men like Henry Dunant and Bernard Kouchner. Dunant was the founder of the Red Cross, Kouchner the founder of Medecins Sans Frontières. These men are portrayed as having single-handedly forged the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontières respectively out of the ashes of human tragedy. Thus, humanitarianism admits of founder histories (Booth, Clark, Delahaye, Procter, & Rowlinson, 2007; Rowlinson & Hassard, 1993) that conveniently ignore context and other intersecting events that helped shape its emergence. For organizations, part of the appeal of founder-based histories are their straight-forward narrative nature that allows one to skip over other intersecting events that may form a competing narrative to the one the organization seeks to perpetuate (Rowlinson & Hassard, 1993). In the case of the Red Cross, Henry Dunant figures prominently in the Red Cross sponsored histories of the organization. For example, the ICRC (2005, p. 6) writes that it “owes its origins to the vision and determination of one man: Henry Dunant” and that following the Battle of Solferino, Dunant “appealed to the local people to help him tend the wounded, insisting that soldiers on both sides should be treated equally.” That the equal treatment of the wounded reaches back to the organization’s founder helps enshrine, simplify, and reify the historical origins of the concepts of neutrality, impartiality, and humanitarianism itself by making them appear to have the weight of history behind them. That Dunant was traveling through Solferino “on business” (ICRC, 2005, p. 6) is mentioned, but what is omitted is that his reason for traveling was to find Napoleon III (who was directing the French side of the battle) to seek his
help in rescuing Dunant's business interests in French colonial Algeria (Moorehead, 1999).

Humanitarian organizations make appeals to history in justifying their decisions. Again, the Red Cross often recites the “Seven Fundamental Principles” of the organization, which were adopted as policy quite recently (circa 1965) but which are portrayed as reaching back to the ‘founding’ of the organization and the story of how its founder, Henry Dunant, conducted himself during the Battle of Solferino. The principles of voluntary service and impartiality are portrayed as reaching back to Dunant’s attempt to treat all the wounded soldiers equally regardless of their uniform, and to the local citizens’ volunteering of their services in helping Dunant. Thus, the story of the principles is closely associated with the foundation story. A similar trend is seen with Medecins Sans Frontières, as the ‘founder’ Bernard Kouchner claimed his desire to be an active, vocal witness and advocate in the suffering of others is co-terminus with his experiences during the Biafran war. The resulting concepts of témoignage or ‘active witnessing’ and ingérence or ‘duty to interfere’ are presented as being part of the tradition of the organization, whose origins can be found in the foundation of Medecins Sans Frontières (Allen & Styan, 2000). However as (Vallaey's, 2004) discovers, the foundation story of MSF is problematized and questioned by Bernard Kouchner: the man most closely associated with the creation of the organization. It is also problematized by others who were present at the outset of the organization: “MSF was born through a fortuitous encounter between the veterans of Biafra and other
volunteers mobilized by a professional journal after the tidal wave in Pakistan in 1970. The anecdotes fuel the myth: Biafra created MSF” (Vallaeyys, 2004, p. 112). The alternate reality is that the ‘founding’ of MSF is more of an accident than a purposeful attempt. This is in line with the expectations of a genealogy: it is accidents and random occurrences that give rise to emergences rather than any purposeful reading of history.

To understand these appeals to history, it is helpful to think of these founder-based histories and histories based on origins as having an excess of history. Nietzsche (1985) described the state of an excess of history as one in which the contingencies, contexts, and alternative explanations for the present are viewed as inconvenient extras and thus are forgotten. As a counterweight to this process of forgetting, genealogy uncovers the silences, accidents, and intersections that have resulted in a taken-for-granted approach to knowledge. Therefore, history is important to my analysis of humanitarianism because of the way that history is used to justify certain approaches to humanitarian action. A lack of history too is important: concepts such as humanitarianism that are seemingly devoid of history are portrayed as being transcendent and immovable. I would like to unseat these views and re-read humanitarianism in another fashion. I do not intend to present one alternative history of humanitarianism that is better than the dominant history currently circulating in places such as the Museum of the International Red Cross in Geneva or in the popular imagination. Neither do I intend to correct any supposed
mistakes in a particular reading of history. Rather, my goal is to engage in a critique of humanitarianism through the application of a genealogical method.

What is Genealogy?

Genealogy turns the reader's attention away from the importance of the origin stories of institutions towards the discovery of random accidents and rifts in history that give rise to changes in old perceptions and emergences of new orderings of society. These accidents continue always, and it directs us away from supposing that history is on a linear path towards some form of end state (Pushkala Prasad, 2005). Critique is at the heart of genealogy. The methodology begins with normal, seemingly inconsequential events or experiences and draws from these narratives the process by which they have become inconsequential or normal (Jacques, 1992). One can turn, for example, to Foucault's description in 'Discipline and Punish' of the torture of Robert Damiens. Damiens was the 18th century Frenchman who attempted to murder Louis XV. Foucault shows how this was an event that was considered normal in its time, yet it clearly is not normal for us. Foucault shows how the application of torture to the body, far from being considered cruel, was a sign of sovereign power in the context of the time at which it occurred. In another example, this time in The History of Madness, he documents the changes in our understanding of the mad from that of wise mystics to medical patients. In sum, these stories show the contingent nature of practices.
In my case, humanitarianism is considered a 'good' practice that operates neutrally and opposes war, suffering, and the effects of disaster on human society. People should be rescued, and soldiers should be spared death if injured. This state of affairs, however, was once considered extraordinary (See for example Moorehead (1999) for the 'creation' of the Geneva Conventions). Genealogy documents how these kinds of changes in society occurred that moved the extraordinary into the mundane (Jacques, 1992). The question that results is that if concepts such as discipline or humanitarianism were once considered remarkable, and are now normal, then is it not equally likely that that which we now take for granted could be replaced by something else?

At some level, we can see the effects of the enlightenment and modernity in this linear approach to history: the belief in progress and the ability of humans to continually improve the conditions of life. So, in contrast to those who study history as the inevitable, continual addition of progress resulting in some kind of end state, there are other approaches that suggests that there is no end to history because there was no zero point and no intentionality. Genealogy is one of these other approaches. As one of these scholars, how did Foucault arrive at this view of history? What is the basis for arguing against intentionality and for the importance of history? The answers to these questions provide insight into the theoretical basis of genealogy. I believe it is worthwhile expending some effort in exploring the answers to these questions for two reasons. First, it will situate the theoretical framework for this dissertation as the methodology of genealogy is wedded closely
to genealogy's philosophical underpinnings; in other words, my theoretical stance must be the same as that of genealogy. Foucault's genealogy can be situated within the poststructuralist tradition. Without wanting to engage in a lengthy return to the first principles of social theory, I believe that any discussion of poststructuralism is necessarily dependent upon understanding structuralism, not least because Foucault was a student of Louis Althusser (Foucault, 1996, p. 21), one of the French structuralists of the mid-20th century and one can see traces of this influence in Foucault's work (see for example Margolis (1998, p. 39)).

Foucauldian scholars might respond in chorus that Foucault's work resists any kind of classification (see for example Dreyfus & Rabinow, 2000; Prado, 2000). My intention here is not to oppose these claims, but rather to provide context to genealogy as a method having traces of structuralist and poststructuralist theory. This is important because genealogy is not simply a technique for analyzing data. In fact, one is hard pressed to distill technique directly from Foucault's genealogies. Rather, it is more productive to view genealogy as a critique of social relations and concepts. Understanding the theoretical underpinnings genealogy will enable me to show what specific methodological techniques can be applied to the data.

The second reason is that there is a danger of appropriating a popularized version of genealogy and selecting only those elements that are relevant to my particular interests. This danger has been noted by Weatherbee, Dye and Mills (2008) who argued that the intent of the theorist becomes diluted when organizational scholars have taken a common sense, practical approach to complex
theoretical stances and have adopted them as methodological tools. This is all so more the case with Foucault, as his work touches on organizations, institutions, and individuals and his insights do have very appealing face validity and are ripe to be “de-contextualized, simplified, and quite often misapplied” (Weatherbee et al., 2008, p. 148). Therefore, the point of departure for this explanation of my choice of methodology is a contextualization and ‘complexification’ of genealogy beginning with an understanding of structuralism leading into a discussion of the poststructuralist turn that eventually leads to a description of genealogy. My goal is to convincingly explain my understanding of the genealogical method.

The Theoretical Basis of Genealogy

Both structuralism and poststructuralism make critique of the human subject, of historicism, of meaning, and philosophy (Sarup, 1993). Structuralism is concerned with a discussion of appearance, reality, structure, and essence. It is occupied with notions of discounting the origins of a thing, displacing the centre to the margins, and avoiding any totalizing statements. Poststructuralism problematizes structuralism by critiquing structuralism’s claims of intentionality of the subject; in other words, poststructuralism holds that the subject is constructed by social processes and is not really at liberty to form its own direction. Poststructuralism is part of the linguistic turn in philosophy; namely, the view that realities are constructed through language and that this construction determines what counts as truth or valid utterances (Norris, 2005). These utterances are broadly called discourse. To describe discourse in one phrase: it is the collection of
statements that can be said about something, which is of course in contrast to what is actually said (Jacques, 1992; Prasad, 2005).

For example, consider again the idea of 'madness.' The current discourse on madness describes it as a medical condition or an illness. It would currently be difficult to discuss madness using anything other than the accepted view; to return to discussing those with mental illness as the 'wise fools' that Foucault recounts in 15th century Europe would not meet with much success. There are those, though, who may choose to push the boundary of the discourse on madness by talking about it as an intersection of ill health and social perception. For example therapies exist that deal with schizophrenia not by medicating the schizophrenic but through encouraging them to listen to the other voices they hear and to accept these voices as part of their being (Romme & Escher, 1993). Thus, this approach would be in the category of a statement that is actually said, yet not admissible to the discourse.

Moving on from this, the structuralist approach holds that meaning is determined by what the speakers of a language decide is admissible. Underneath the words spoken or text written is a structure or a true essence that can be uncovered. Poststructuralism problematizes structuralism by arguing that the text does not have a true meaning waiting to be unlocked through the correct application of analysis (Norris, 2005; Prasad, 2005). Rather, the poststructuralist uses language and the concept of discourse to instigate changes in how we think about modernist notions such as science, philosophy, and in particular for this dissertation, history (Prasad, 2005). Through an analysis of discourse, poststructuralism tries to
understand the history behind how something is admissible and the power relations that produced these rules of admissibility (Jacques, 1992).

Consider the human body in poststructuralist thought: it is only a physical, real object that has no meaning on its own. It gains status as a doctor, lawyer, victim, humanitarian or any other label through its participation in society (Jacques, 1992). In other words, the physical body becomes a subject through the application of discourses about what it is to be a part of society. Since these discourses are not constant throughout history, the meaning attributed to a label and thus to a body will change over time as discourses emerge and submerge (Jacques, 1992). Similarly, poststructuralism will not admit that there is an innate human nature precisely because a body takes on a specific role in society through a process of socialization, and this role will be different depending upon when and where the body exists in a particular society (Jacques, 1992). Again, a body is given subjective meaning through socialization.

Not surprisingly, then, poststructuralism eschews any sweeping statements about what life, social relations, history, or anything else 'is' or 'ought' to be. Following on from this reasoning I will show that humanitarianism, like other forms of social organization in modernity, relies considerably on the maintenance of statements or discourse. I would like to clearly lay out my understanding of this latter term as it figures large in Foucault's genealogy and thus in my exploration of humanitarianism.
Discourse

Doing a genealogy involves re-reading parts of the archive to observe "broadly held cultural assumptions" (Jacques, 1992, p. 102) and occasions where the relationship changed between a concept's meaning and the specific practices it implied (Jacques, 1992). Re-reading implies that the archive as currently read gives rise to the intolerable practices that motivates a genealogy. It implies that there is another way of interpreting and understanding history. But, this re-reading is not an attempt to uncover or correct the true meaning of history. Jacques (1992) has culled from Foucault's genealogical work some guidelines for re-reading, which is, in effect a guideline for conducting a genealogy.

The first is to read between the lines of a document to understand what has made it possible for an author to make a statement. In other words, I must understand the rules of admissibility to a discourse leading to an understanding of what makes something acceptable as knowledge. Second, contextualize and place the document within a broader historical picture. Third is to look for discontinuities where common sense ceases to be common, or where the nonsensical becomes common sense. This is the dividing line, on either side of which "the structures used to frame what can be known each appear nonsensical when viewed from the other side" (Jacques, 1992, p. 104). Fourth is to recognize that there could also be changes in other discourses resulting from the discontinuity or rupture; look for these changes. Finally, the discontinuity and emergence of new discourse should also produce new subjects as a result of the rearrangement of social relations; look for
the emergence of these subjects. What becomes apparent from Jacques' (1992) approach is that discourse is key.

The term *utterance* is used to refer to speech, writing, dialogue, or a constituted body of knowledge; discourse is the collection of all utterances about a particular idea (Prasad, 2005). Underlying any discourse is a set of assumptions that may overlap with other discourses and change over time (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 2000). For example, the discourse of management holds that organizations consist of managers and employees within a certain ordering system such as a hierarchy. At one extreme discourse is considered not just as a descriptive tool but a mechanism by which a reality is formed (Abercrombie et al., 2000). Discourse about any particular idea will determine what is and is not admissible, legitimate knowledge about that idea; in other words there are discursive rules that determine what gets admitted to a discourse (Prasad, 2005). It is not so important to understand if a discourse is valid or true. Rather, these concerns are overshadowed in importance by discursive effects; that is, how a discourse manifests itself in practice (Prasad, 2005). Discourse, then, is more than just a collection of statements: it is productive because it has an effect and produces something as a result of its existence (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). A discourse is a way "of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and the relations between them" (Weedon, 1996, p. 105).

For example, the discourse relating to education produces the student and the teacher and what it means to 'learn'. The medical discourse produces the doctor
and the patient, but also an understanding of what ‘illness’ and ‘health’ should be. One must be careful though to realize that prior to the discourse of education, there was undoubtedly something akin to learning and in all probability there were students and teachers, but they may not be at all recognizable to us as such. There was also sickness and health before the medical discourse, but these concepts may have been understood as being something completely different. The key point is that while there may have been something like ‘illness’ and ‘education’ prior to our current understanding of them, the concepts weren’t hanging in space waiting for the current discourse to name them and give them their currently recognizable form (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). This space, where concepts supposedly exist in a pure, unfettered form, is called the non-discursive and it is an admittedly small space. This is so because one is hard-pressed to find something that is not discourse. Often many concepts in physical science are considered non-discursive; for example, gravity appears to be non-discursive in that (it is believed) it existed even before Newton came along and applied a discourse of observation, mathematics, and rationality to suggest that it is the product of some unseen, attractive force acting in a predictable way. However, there is no way of determining whether the scientific discourse of gravity is any better than one produced by religion, to give but one example (Latour, 1987). This is not, of course, to suggest that gravity doesn’t exist. However, the point is that the explanation for what gravity “is” is itself socially constructed. The explanation for gravity could equally be something else. My point is to try and problematize that which is taken for granted, not to suggest that those
things don't serve a purpose or 'exist' but only to say that there are other possible explanations.

In the case of humanitarianism, to say that the act of spontaneous helping is innately human is to appeal to a natural phenomenon of human behaviour. But is natural human behaviour simply part of the discourse of psychology, or anthropology, or behavioural science? Just like gravity we have no way of comparing the innate kindness of human behaviour against other discourses that might say that human behaviour is inherently cruel and vicious. This may be demonstrated in the humanitarian discourse through statements that say laws are needed to rein in inherently brutal behaviour, and those statements saying humans are inherently kind (See for example Kirschenbaum, 2004). This discourse parallels the framework developed by Burrell & Morgan (1985) in which the study of social relations can be categorized into the sociology of regulation or the sociology of radical change. Of the former, the hallmark of society is one of "underlying unity and cohesiveness" (Burrell & Morgan, 1985, p. 17) while the latter sees "deep-seated structural conflict [and] modes of domination" (Burrell & Morgan, 1985, p. 17).

In a humanitarian context, one can read Henri Dunant's Memory of Solferino to see an example of a humanitarianism driven by observations of the brutality of humans and nature: this is the society of radical change. At the other end of Burrell and Morgan's spectrum, Kirschenbaum (2004) and Solnit (2009) provide examples of a society of regulation where humanitarianism flourishes in social relations that are formed through cooperation in the face of trauma.
All this serves to return the discussion to the poststructuralist claim that there is no transcendent form, no ‘essence’ of gravity, illness, criminality, or innate humanitarianism waiting to be discovered. Attempts to ground humanitarianism in a deeper, non-discursive reality are doomed to failure because we can also find this deeper reality to be discursively produced. There have been attempts to go back into history and look for an origin of humanitarianism, to somehow show that some foreign and ancient strain of humanitarianism existed at some other point in time in an effort to give humanitarianism some kind of transcendent quality. One example of this attempt is the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Museum in Geneva where patrons are led along poignant displays of humanitarian effort at various points in history and in different cultures. I will return later to the Red Cross Museum in my discussion of discourse, but the point here is to say that all these attempts at looking for the non-discursive will also fail because there too we can find discursive mechanisms involved in the production of these ‘pure’ forms: these earlier, supposedly pure concepts are produced by discourse using discursive mechanisms (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). These mechanisms include books, laws, conversations, research articles or any number of activities or objects that talk about them in some way. These discursive mechanisms construct humanitarianism.

An example relevant to my work on humanitarianism is that of the discourse of madness outlined in Foucault’s ‘History of Madness.’ At various points in history there have been different interpretations of madness. Earliest understandings of madness were that the mad were imbued with some sort of unearthly, philosophical wisdom; later, that they had an absence of reason; and contemporarily that they are
ill and thus the target of medical categorization requiring specific treatments (Foucault, 2006). All of this to say that each period represents a specific discourse of madness. It would be difficult to see how the current discourse, for example, would entertain any serious discussion from those who believe the 'mad' are wise. One can also see how the discourse of madness at the current juncture in history overlaps with the medical discourse, and how difficult it might be to determine whether and where the discourse of madness finishes and the discourse of medicine begins. I will argue that there is a humanitarian discourse, the edges of which can be seen in the construction of identity positions such as vulnerable, victim, humanitarian, donor, and receiver.

**Genealogy as Methodology**

With the theoretical basis for genealogy somewhat solidified, I can now turn to describing Foucault's method of history – how to conduct the genealogy. I will outline the method, provide some guidance on its usage and then describe my approach in reading the texts I examined for the genealogy. Foucault did not leave a methodological text from which people could understand how to utilize genealogy. Therefore, one has to rely on secondary interpretations of his work (Castel, 1994; Kendall & Wickham, 1999; May, 1993) as well as examples of the methodology in practice (Jacques, 1992; Jacques, 1995) to understand the method of genealogy.

This method, it has often been said, is to write a history of the present (Foucault, 2002; Gutting, 2005; May, 1993). The reason for beginning with the present, and specifically with some aspect of the present, is that there are many
things in the present that are, in Foucault's word, 'intolerable' (Gutting, 2005). The intolerability of things is found in institutions or practices that are lodged in a seemingly permanent fashion in the present as oppressive features of society. A history of the present embarks on a re-examination of these features to demonstrate their contingent and impermanent nature. Although Foucault is a poststructuralist, it is helpful to return to Foucault's structuralist roots to perhaps see the genesis of this approach in the structuralists' disdain for origins. It is the structuralist view that appearance belies the underlying form, and further that each element of a system does not exist in isolation, but gains its meaning in comparison to other elements. This theoretical framework provides the context for the genealogical approach. It is important to understand this because the question of why is any particular thing considered intolerable does not seem to have been answered in the genealogical literature.

For example, when looking at Foucault's genealogy of discipline, the intolerability of prisons and the lack of prison reform is given as one motivation for embarking on the work (Gutting, 2006; Mills, 2003). But how do we know that the current state of prisons is in fact intolerable beyond the knowledge given by his opinion? This brings up a problem of relativism: how do we identify intolerability when there are no objective criteria? It is certainly common sense to me, given my experience, as a member of my culture, at this point in human history that capital punishment as a sentence for prisoners is intolerable. However, for others, or for myself given an unknown future context, this might change. The answer to this concern about what justifies the label of intolerability might be to consider as
intolerable any practice, institution, or concept that presents itself as being as natural, taken-for-granted, or permanent.

In another example, Gutting (2006, p. 10) shows the outline of developing such questions in areas such as madness “How could we do anything except set up asylums to treat the mentally ill? How to deal humanely with criminals except by imprisoning them?” In the case of my present work on humanitarianism, one could conceive as intolerable the various humanitarian imperatives: “How could we not consider the survivors of a disaster as vulnerable? How could we not but help the starving except by feeding them?” This seems to be a much better, and productive, guide to identifying questions that are amenable to genealogy. It is also in agreement with the poststructuralist underpinnings of genealogy. And so, in genealogy, we must examine the process that has resulted in a particular representation of a thing within a social group, and to understand the assumptions that make the discourse about that thing possible (Jacques, 1995). But how is genealogy actually done in practice?

**The Practice of Genealogy**

*Historiography*

There is a considerable amount of historical work required in conducting a genealogy, and these provide the justification for any claims made in a genealogy (Gutting, 2006). This includes not only the work of detecting the un-inevitability of current institutional forms or concepts through identifying accidents, contingencies and random occurrences, but also in examining the broader scale of historical
development that can be found in existing histories (Gutting, 2006). At the same
time, genealogies are not intended to be what a realist would consider a complete
history, but rather they are selective in their mining of the archive with the goal of
uncovering artifacts that help understand the present (Flynn, 2006). It must be
recognized that Foucault uses the term ‘archive’ to refer to the way in which
statements are formed within a society at a given point in time (Prasad, 2005). In
other words, it works with the details of history to discover how a discourse
emerges and persists (May, 1993). However, genealogy is archival in its method in
the more common sense of the word: it is “gray, meticulous, and patiently
documentary” (Foucault, 1984, p. 76) and it involves working within physical
archives and with primary and secondary source texts (Mills & Helms Mills, 2011).

The archival nature of genealogy implies that existing methods for accessing,
searching, and documenting archival research can be used (see for example Hill,
1993). This includes the understanding of archival sedimentation: that materials
are collected, kept, and then deposited into archives in an unsystematic manner, and
therefore create multiple layers of documentation with various incomplete (or
eroded) sections (Hill, 1993). Thus, while the use of archives by genealogy brings
with it the strength of existing archival methodology, it also presents a weakness:
the limited completeness of the archival record. However, genealogy confronts this
with another strength: the ability to use existing histories both as a supplement to
missing primary sources, and as a counterpoint to its own genealogical project
(Prado, 2000). It does not dismiss existing histories; on the contrary, these can
provide welcome bridges between long periods where there are no primary sources and in this sense a strength of genealogy is its re-use of history. Supplemental to this re-use of history is that those histories that point to a continuous and unfolding historical picture are useful for genealogy in that they serve to contrast the accidents and contingencies displayed in a genealogical approach. Another way of viewing this is that these written histories are themselves discourse and serve as useful guides to dominant accounts of reality at different points in time.

There is one other imperative noted by the literature that has implications for method: the past is no better or worse than the present or future (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). Therefore, history should not be used to get to the pure origin of a concept, unfettered by any subjective interpretation: this is precisely what genealogy attempts to avoid. In other words, genealogy calls for a suspension of judgments other than those other than the reader need to be suspended in genealogy (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). These second-order judgments grant an object a status from the authority of some other author, and give the object a deep meaning rather than the collection of a series of details (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). This is not to say that existing histories cannot, or should not, be used; indeed, one of the criticisms of genealogy is the appearance of supplanting historiography (Castel, 1994). On the contrary, existing histories provide critical missing pieces in genealogical analysis, especially given that genealogies can span large time periods, and accessing primary sources for the entire study would be prohibitively difficult (Castel, 1994).
Another target of the genealogical methodology is the misplaced belief in the importance of hidden meanings, and a caution to avoid any certainty that diligent interpretation will lead to a greater subjective truth (Durepos, Mills, & Helms Mills, 2008; Hook, 2005; Mills, 2002).

Descent and Emergence

As discussed briefly in Chapter 1, if the question posed by history is ‘what is our past?’ then genealogy in contrast asks ‘what is our present?’ The response to this question involves a departure from traditional histories in two significant ways. First, genealogy does not portray the present as the inevitable outcome of a select series of past events. Second, it relies on establishing a relevant problematization to understand how the present has come to be defined and understood in its current form. For the genealogist, the present emerged and descended from a series of discontinuities that could have, under different circumstances and in a different context, produced something quite different. The result of a genealogy is that the present loses its inevitable and natural feeling, and in its place is a sense of the many trajectories from which the present has been derived (Meadmore et al., 2000). The accomplishment of these two features is achieved through an examination of the descent and emergence of various historical trajectories.

Descent deconstructs the taken for granted nature of the present enabling the genealogist to identify the pre-contexts of the taken-for-granted. It involves investigating and understanding the various pieces of an event or concept to
demonstrate that contingencies, accidents, and mistakes were encountered along the road to its emergence as a given or inevitable fragment of knowledge (Hook, 2005; Meadmore et al., 2000). The appearance of unity is seen instead as a myriad of singular events spread across multiple domains (May, 1993). While descent disturbs the given, emergence points out the interaction of the details of descent that have resulted in their appearance as a given (Hook, 2005; Meadmore et al., 2000). Emergence can be thought of as opposing the logic of culmination; that is, culmination views the present as the endpoint of a chain of events while emergence views the present as "merely current episodes in an unstable chain of subjugations" (Hook, 2005, p. 19). Put another way, emergence views history as a struggle of multiple forces, with no clear goal or evidence of progress, struggling for dominance (May, 1993).

Taken together, the utilization of these tools of analysis enables the genealogist to demonstrate that the present is no more the product of an inevitable series of events. It also should highlight the argument that the combination of current conditions will appear to be just as contingent at some other point in the future (Meadmore et al., 2000). In other words, genealogy removes the comfort of the present as a natural and better place than the past. In sum, genealogy "reintroduces history back into history" (May, 1993, p. 77) and produces an effective, actual history. It is effective because genealogy is a history without constants: it traces struggles, not developments; it is characterized by a struggle for interpretations, not a culmination of ideas into a better form of knowledge; it is a process of contingency, coming together, and dispersion (May, 1993). Therefore,
the strength of genealogy is its ability to move beyond linear explanations of how
the past resulted in the present, while its obvious methodological limitation is the
painstaking and laborious nature of archival research. Genealogy has been critiqued
as lacking an epistemology (May, 2006), and as displacing the work of 'real'
historians (Castel, 1994). It is the case that in genealogy the utilization of history to
explain the past is eliminated in favour of a contingent and contextual approach.
Genealogy requires a suspension of belief in current views of knowledge acquisition,
and the development of a deep suspicion about any natural and self-evident truths
about the subjects and objects of interest. A history that explains the past further
entrenches current conditions, whereas a history of the present seeks to understand
how the present has come to be organized. In genealogy, then, history is used to
understand how the present has come to be. It disturbs the notion that historical
events are linked together into a rational, linear progression from an origin towards
the current order of things.

According to May (1993) this search for origins makes three errors. First, an
origin is contingent on the belief that there is a purposeful unfolding of events, that
there is a motive force that has somehow brought things to their logical conclusion
in the present. Second, the beginning of a history is imparted with a grandness of
departure as if everyone viewing the beginning event knows that this will be the
beginning of history. Finally, an origin assumes a purity of an initiation, a moment
when we can understand the fundamentals of something, untainted by history.
Genealogy rejects this view of origins in favour of more than one knowledge, and in
search of multiple circumstances, contingencies, and contexts (Hook, 2005). As a critical approach, genealogy can regard the past as a means for improving the present, rather than being preoccupied with detailing, critiquing, or manufacturing a history that causes us to ignore the present (Foucault, 1995).

**Problematization**

The problematization of the present is at the core of genealogy. Castel (1994) explains that institutions, propositions of a philosophical, scientific, or moral nature, regulations on behaviour or conduct, or indeed anything that is produced by discourse are key to understanding what Foucault meant by problematization. Problematization does not create an object, or explain something that already exists. Rather, it enables the products of discourse (the institutions, propositions, or regulations alluded to above) to be seen for what they are (in Foucault's mind, at least): the sites of claims to truth, and the ways of governing the behaviour of others. Problematization thus reframes the conduct of historical analysis to understand how it has transpired that the present has come to be accepted as inevitable or natural. The idea of the problematization is clarified in light of the previous discussion of poststructuralism. Concepts are not isolated containers or islands, but they exist in relation to one another and in the manner in which they are used (Althusser, 2005). Therefore, one can look at the conditions by which a concept has come into being, or rather the history surrounding a concept in order to understand it (Patton, 1978). As well, a concept exists because of the rules or grammar that must be followed or used in order for it to be understood (Patton,
Reading a text symptomatically is one way to obtain a problematic. By this it is meant that one should examine the text to determine what is not said; in other words, to identify the absences (Assiter, 1984).

However, while there are other interpretations of events, problematization is not a license to re-write history (Castel, 1994). It must also make a contribution beyond that which has been made by other disciplines to the same topic (Castel, 1994). Furthermore, recasting a problem in terms of the history of how it has become seen at the present time has its own issues as discussed by Castel (1994). First, one should be wary of projecting today's concerns onto the past as today's problems and concerns will be different in the future. In other words, be wary of viewing the present as static. Second, using a genealogy as a justification for searching back to the beginning of recorded history is fruitless: problematizations emerge at a specific point in time. A feature of the genealogical approach is that the researcher cannot, and should not claim to have examined the entire archive (Poster, 1987). Third, problematizations do not repeat themselves, but occur as background noise in a continuity of other events and emergences. The problematization emerged at a particular point in time: it does not emerge then disappear only to emerge yet again. Fourth, in a particular span of history, a problematization may appear to be insignificant against the backdrop of other events or emergences that carry greater weight at the time. Fifth, as a problematization spans large historical periods, the method of studying a problematization must rely on primary and secondary sources. Thus, it will often involve the re-reading of historical documents as well as secondary sources from historians.
Another potential limitation is an epistemological criticism (May, 1993). There is a danger that once revealed, repressed knowledge and history can be adopted back into the dominant discourse. Genealogy does not propose to replace one truth with an even better truth. Rather, it targets any knowledge that has been afforded status to demonstrate that the taken-for-granted has not always been as such (Hook, 2005). Genealogies do not produce ‘truth’ if the production of that truth mimics the same processes used to produce the knowledge that it is attempting to combat, however they do want to produce a logical argument (Hook, 2005). Genealogy aims to produce an effective history that takes into account the multiple struggles that take place in any beginning. Rather than implying any sense of objectivity or realism, an effective history does not presume any continuous, goal-driven path historical path (Dean, 1994; Foucault, 1984; Gutting, 1990; Hook, 2005; Windschuttle, 1998). As Foucault (1984) describes it, an event in an effective history “is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it...the entry of a masked ‘other’.” This conceptualization of history guides the practice of genealogy.

Doing Genealogy: How to Read the Texts?

So far, I have justified my choice of genealogy to study humanitarianism. I have explained my central intuition regarding the manner in which humanitarian organizations use history to freeze a representation of humanitarianism, and stated
my goals of describing how humanitarianism has become taken for granted and subsequently understanding the purpose that humanitarianism serves. I have explored the various claims from the genealogy literature claiming that genealogy is a decentering, critical historical project. I believe that this level of analysis shows that genealogy should be well suited to unfreeze humanitarianism.

It is also clear that genealogy relies upon an exploration of the archive, in the Foucauldian sense of the word. Within the archive, I am interested in identifying discourse: how discourse arises, what effects discourse has, and what purpose is served by discourse. The question now is how to pull all of this together into a coherent and defensible approach to investigating my research question. An analogy to travel might be helpful in explaining the current situation of methodology in my dissertation: at this point I know my current location and my likely destination, however there is a mountain range in front of me and I am not certain if I should go around it, dig a tunnel, or go over it. All that is to say that there is a huge gap in the genealogy literature between genealogy as an approach to history, and genealogy as a historically oriented method. I will attempt to close this gap by looking at existing genealogies and supplement this with what references to method I can find from the genealogy literature.

In other words, now that the overall practice of genealogy has been described, I can turn to the process of doing a genealogy. As mentioned earlier, Foucault left behind no methodological textbook. However, the wealth of empirical and theoretical scholarship on genealogy provides a more than adequate roadmap. I
content that this provides the broad direction in which genealogy proceeds. That is, it defines the use of history, the archive, and identifies what to look for when conducting a genealogy: I have examined this in the previous section. It leaves out, though, the techniques of how to read the archive, whether that archival material is text, images, conversation, interviews, or any other container for ideas about a concept. In the case of text, it is one thing to say that one must 'read between the lines', but quite another to understand which approach to choose in doing this.

I suggest that being able to unearth and understand the various discourses at work are key to the method, and this will involve an investigation of the individual texts and documents within an archive. In other words, I will uncover the conditions of possibility for humanitarianism as an historical event or rather to "describe the various bits and pieces that had to be in place to allow something else to be possible" (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 37). How then, does one read a particular text to determine what qualifies a series of statements as being a discourse?

Kendall and Wickham (1999) illustrate an approach to identifying discourse. The first step is somewhat tautological in that one has to recognize a discourse by identifying a body of regularly organized and systematic statements. A statement can be words, but also physical objects. Thus, a refugee camp or policy document can equally be considered statements. Humanitarianism appears to be discursively constructed in that there are regular, systematic statements of what it is to 'help' someone: there are laws and documents that speak to humanitarianism and there
are physical sites that make humanitarianism evident (e.g. refugee camps, humanitarian institutions, symbols). The second step follows on from this recognition that there are things that make a discourse (such as humanitarianism) physically evident. The task is to identify the rules by which statements are produced. To find these rules, one looks at the public aspects of the production of discourse in laws, policies, newspaper articles, conversation, and ritual. It is important to note that the production of discourse is not dependent upon a subject (ie. a person). In other words, I will be able to find the rules of production of the humanitarian discourse not by looking at specific people, but in specific institutional practices.

The third step is to understand how a statement is deemed admissible to a discourse; this follows on from understanding the rules of production. But, the key difference is that by understanding what is admissible to a discourse, we are in effect understanding what is not sayable. For example, the discourse of gravity only admits statements that deal with mass of the objects and their distance from each other. Any statements about gravity being "god's will" or "magic" might have been appropriate to a different era, but not the current one. Thus, we can also identify how something becomes sayable within a discourse. Step four concerns the novelty of 'new' statements. It is similar to the other steps in that if we know how statements are produced, and how statements can be limited, then we should know how new statements can be made. In this step you can "present the inventiveness of discourses, the way they invent new forms of person, like the mentally ill and the
criminal, and the way they invent new categories for understanding human nature, like sexuality” (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 45). The newness is accomplished not through the activity of one or more people, but through public institutions. In the case of humanitarianism, this guides us away from founders such as Dunant or Kouchner and instead draws us towards the refugee camps, feeding centres, disaster sites and various laws and policies.

Finally, it is necessary to recognize that practices produce discourse, but they are also always about material objects. That is, practices are always material and discursive. So, for example, in humanitarianism what are the rules that make a practice material and a discourse? The materiality of the practice of humanitarianism involves the provision of care, but this happens under the discourse that people are vulnerable and cannot care for themselves. The material objects and institutions themselves are non-discursive, but they operate within discourse(s) that interpret them as being and operating in specific ways. The traces of these practices are contained within the archive.

For each text examined, I will also employ the principles of Foucault's archaeological approach. Archaeology has been described as Foucault's method of examining statements that are within the archive (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). Foucault’s archaeological turn precedes his genealogy, and the method of archaeology is contained within the genealogical approach (Prado, 2000). The added contribution for genealogy is that suggests that it extends archaeology by exposing the taken-for-granted Gutting (2005). To do this, genealogy concentrates
on the differences and changes that occur within history, and maps out the relationships between things that have been said and how those statements are visible in physical manifestations such as institutions; these physical manifestations are referred to as ‘visibilities’ (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). Visibilities result in statements about practices, and these statements about practices (albeit perhaps different statements) in turn give rise to visibilities that reinforce practices (Kendall & Wickham, 1999).

Two examples clarify this concept. The first is the prison, where the physical institution of ‘prison’ is a form of visibility and the practice of ‘correction’ are statements about what to do about people who have transgressed the law. However, as Foucault shows in *Discipline and Punish*, the existence of the prison was not the result of statements about correction. In fact, the prison existed for other purposes (e.g. to give skills to those without work) but its existence gave rise to ideas (statements) about how to fix law-breaking citizens. These statements lead to transformations of the visibilities (the prisons) and so on.

My other example is that of humanitarianism, and at the outset I will state that I believe humanitarianism and humanitarian visibilities operate in ways similar to the prison example. The institutions of humanitarianism such as refugee camps, war zones, or disaster relocation sites are visibilities. These existed prior to any notion of ‘humanitarianism’ but they gave rise to humanitarian statements in, for example, Dunant’s *Memory of Solferino* or the Geneva Conventions. The humanitarian statements in turn produce the visibilities in, for example, the
organization of relief. These visibilities also have an effect on statements, where we can see changes to the idea of humanitarianism in the creation of new organizations such as MSF. Knowing this general approach to the archive, how then can I conduct myself within the archive? Kendall and Wickham (1999) suggest that archaeology as an approach to the archive attempts to do at least seven things, and I will illustrate each with its applicability to humanitarianism as a guide to how to investigate the archive and read the texts I encounter.

First, archaeology "charts the relation between the sayable and the visible" (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 26) to uncover "the dynamic, mutually conditioning relationship between words and things" (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 27). I could therefore look for sets of statements that make up humanitarian organizations including the sayable (policies, news releases, principles, newsletters, letters, correspondence) and the visible (the buildings themselves, refugee camps, symbols, flags, images of suffering, advertisements, logos). Second, archaeology analyses the relation between statements: how are statements ordered? What is the framework within which statements are made? For example, international humanitarian law provides the framework for how people should conduct themselves in war. The Red Cross, as the designated guardian of international law takes these statements and uses them to order how governments conduct themselves in war. Governments in turn order the conduct of citizens and refugees in war as a result, and combatants and victims order their conduct. Third is to understand and make explicit the rules by which statements can be used and repeated. What procedures are used by
humanitarians, governments, and ‘victims’ to use some statements rather than others that may be just as justifiable? For example, what is it, exactly, that allows the repeatability of the statement that people who have experienced a disaster are said to be vulnerable rather than resilient (see for example Furedi, 2007a; 2007b)? Fourth is to “analyse the positions which are established between subjects... in regard to statements” (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 26). How do statements produce subject positions, that is, “ways of being and acting” (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 27)? For example, the statement that those who have experienced a disaster are vulnerable produces the vulnerable person, the helper, and a set of expectations for behaviour for each subject. For the vulnerable person, the expectation might be that he or she cannot do anything but wait for help, while for the helper there is the expectation that everyone must be cared for. Fifth is to “describe 'surfaces of emergence' - places within which objects are designated and acted upon” (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 27). The surfaces of emergence would include places where emergency happens. Any site of disaster or war, and any refugee camp, relocation centre can be the domain. There, people become raw materials that can be acted upon by medicine, journalism, public health, education, nursing, or any other number of disciplines to produce any kind of subject (patient, starving child, student, refugee, humanitarian, delegate, donor). Sixth is “to describe 'institutions', which acquire authority and provide limits within which discursive objects may act or exist” (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 26). The humanitarian organization has authority, some through international law and others through moral suasion, to limit how responses to emergencies occur. Finally, archaeology
seeks to "describe 'forms of specification', which refer to the ways in which discursive objects are targeted. A 'form of specification' is a system for understanding a particular phenomenon with the aim of relating it to other phenomena" (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 26). Humanitarianism provides a vocabulary and concepts through which we can judge whether something is a disaster, whether someone is a victim, and how someone else can help.

Therefore, within the archive, there are specific guidelines that can be followed in examining texts and documents. Recall that the archive is the "general system of the formation and transformation of statements" (Foucault, 2002, p. 146). As I discovered during my exploration of the method of genealogy, it is not possible within the limits of any specific analysis to examine the entire archive; Foucault is clear on this point. Thus, I will situate myself within specific and manageable sections of the archive, and to draw upon a convenience sample of the archive dealing with humanitarianism. I am, of course, using the term 'convenience sample' in a purely metaphorical manner to give some idea of the approach taken to keep this work manageable. What I am doing is examining in detail a few points of rupture in order to make my contribution to the literature. In a way similar to Foucault's examinations of discipline, biopower, and madness I am demonstrating the changes to the idea of humanitarianism at several points that are likely to be productive. There may, of course, be other points and approaches that are equally as productive but I am basing my selections on my personal experience with certain institutions and practices; these I outlined in my reflexive exploration of the
intuitions that have guided this dissertation. I will structure my investigation based on the story told earlier of the creation of Medecins Sans Frontières in the aftermath of the Biafran Civil War. This story allows for investigation of these two specific institutions.

The first point of entry into the archive will be the Red Cross. This is an organization, an object of investigation, as well as a research site because it is a visibility that gives rise to statements, but it also houses an archive in the physical sense of the word. This archive forms part of the broader archive of humanitarianism when considered from Foucault’s interpretation of the term. I have summarized the accounts of the formation and present form of the organization given in Moorehead (1999) and Forsythe (2005, 2007) to provide a brief outline of the organization; this should help to understand it as a research site.

In 1864, it was agreed to establish national societies dedicated to caring for battlefield casualties, and to enshrine the principles and conventions of these societies in international law (Moorehead, 1999). The emblem used to identify the neutral volunteers on the battlefield was a red cross on a white background, the reverse colours of the Swiss flag; eventually the organization came to be uniquely known by this symbol, and the committee eventually became today’s International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Moorehead, 1999). The power of the agreement between states gave the Red Cross leave to intervene in conflict, obliged armed forces to respect the neutrality of Red Cross volunteers, and compelled nations to accept the establishment of Red Cross national societies (Forsythe, 2005). Since its
creation in 1864 the Red Cross has diversified outside of armed conflict and this causes some degree of confusion for outsiders to the organization as the Red Cross is actually three different organizational forms: the International Committee (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) are both based in Geneva, and the National Societies are based in each of the 186 member countries (ICRC, 2005). The two "international" organizations are often referred to as the International Red Cross, and the other organizations as the National Societies. By agreement amongst the International Red Cross, the IFRC focuses its attention on natural disasters and recovery from conflict, while the ICRC has the guardianship of international humanitarian law and concerns itself almost exclusively with conflict and issues surrounding conflict (Forsythe, 2005). The International Red Cross refers often to its network of national societies and a legion of volunteers in disaster relief and recovery.

I chose Medecins Sans Frontières as another specific organizational site. The formation story of this organization is that it was a reaction to the inability of established humanitarian organizations (such as the International Red Cross) to help vulnerable people during the Biafran civil war of 1967 to 1970. The expectation was that the parties in that conflict would behave rationally according to principles tested in over 100 years of European wars. However the Biafran war was fought in the media as well as on the battlefield and in effect both sides utilized civilians to convince the world of the rightness of their cause. In Biafra the template for provision of assistance did not fit with contemporary reality. And so, a new
organization was formed with a new approach to humanitarianism. Médecins sans frontières values its independence from state sanctioned humanitarianism above all, and it always struggles to maintain vocal opposition without completely isolating itself from state structures that enable it to reach affected populations. Over time, Medecins Sans Frontieres established principles that would differentiate its humanitarianism from the established order. Its medium for action is Western medicine practiced on individuals, but its method is agitation, disruption and advocacy to change the conditions under which suffering can occur.

However, the environment in which Medecins Sans Frontieres operates reflects an evolving discourse of disasters and a change in the roles of state and non-state actors. Specific principles guiding its work include the right of access to victims, independent assessment of humanitarian situations and monitoring of effectiveness of interventions. Medecins Sans Frontieres also seeks to avoid the organizational bureaucracy that its founders believe hampered the humanitarian relief efforts in Biafra. As such, its organizational structure began and remains in a somewhat fractured state with operational cells existing in various so-called developed countries. Each Medecins Sans Frontieres organization functions somewhat separately, often times at odds with each other, but are held together by the common principles mentioned above. It is a loose federation with each country office operating independently and producing its own annual report. However, there is an international body, Médecins sans frontières International, made up of representatives of each of the national organizations but the decision-making
components of the organization exist exclusively in the West. The non-Western countries form the theatre in which Medecins Sans Frontières operates, but they do not seem to figure into the organizational structure. Therefore, the Medecins Sans Frontières power structure roughly bisects Western and non-Western countries.

The Physical Archive: Problems with Access

My research strategy for choosing archival material was to look for events where both the International Red Cross and MSF were involved. I was also interested in looking at material from the ICRC and the IFRC from the Biafran civil war, as I believed that it indicated a point of rupture in humanitarianism. When comparing the International Red Cross and MSF, the International Red Cross had the clearest rules for access to its physical archive. Both the IFRC and the ICRC are headquartered in Geneva, and both have physical archives with policies related to public access. The IFRC has a 30 year moratorium on accessing material, while the ICRC's is 40 years. This means that I could have access to certain material dealing with events occurring before 1979 for the IFRC, and before 1969 for the ICRC. In practical terms, this meant that although I could access material on Biafra within the IFRC archive, I was not permitted access to Biafra era materials from the ICRC. This was somewhat disappointing in that the ICRC was the key organization involved in the Biafra conflict. There was, however, a considerable amount of material from the ICRC contained within the IFRC archive. In addition, I was able to access declassified material produced by the United States State Department and contained within a specialized microform collection concerning the Biafran War. This material
consisted of "cables and letters sent and received by U.S. diplomats and embassy personnel...transcripts of speeches; and reports and observations on political, military, and social affairs." Some of this material included third-party reports of Red Cross activity in Biafra. Therefore, despite not having direct access to the Biafra material in the ICRC archives, I was able to fill in the gaps through the archival material in the IFRC, together with third party reports. In total, I examined 2670 pages of documentation from these two archive sites, and their source, content and date are summarized in Appendix A. The physical archives of MSF, however, were a much greater challenge.

There does appear to be an organized collection of archival materials within MSF housed within different parts of the organization. I approached three components of MSF to ask for permission to access their archives, but was not allowed access in all three cases. MSF Canada claimed that they would have no material of relevance to my research, and suggested I contact MSF International (based in Geneva). MSF International responded that their archives were not open to the public, and further that the 'history' of the organization was already being done by another group of researchers. MSF International suggested that I refer to existing documentation and histories. The 'oldest' component of MSF is MSF Paris, and this organization responded to my initial request for access that I would have to justify how the research would benefit the organization. After responding to this request on two separate occasions, I did not receive any further reply to my response. In short, I was not able to gain access to any MSF archival material.
housed within the organization. Therefore, I will have to rely on existing histories, publicly available documents, and statements made about the organization by third parties. This material too is summarized in Appendix A. Fortunately, this is not a significant obstacle for a genealogy as the notion of the archive transcends individual organizational archives. Interesting evidence of this in practice comes from my search for material on Biafra, the Red Cross, and Medecins Sans Frontières within the physical archives of the National Archives of Canada. There was certainly material on all of these within the National Archives and I examined 277 pages of documentation. But the material on Medecins Sans Frontières had been sealed by the donor, and I was not able to access it.

A Note on Translation

Since the ICRC is a Swiss organization headquartered in Geneva, and the main author of the documents I examined was a native French speaker, the bulk of the archival material from the ICRC was written in French. For MSF, the material examined was mostly in English. I have a working ability to read and speak basic French, and so in most cases I translated documents from French to English myself. To be clear: I did not translate each piece of archival material examined from French to English. I would read the French version of an item, and I would translate only those parts of it that were of interest. However, in situations where I was uncertain of the author's intent in a specific document, I relied upon the services of a professional translator to translate the entire document for me.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have outlined how genealogy could be utilized as a method in the study of the humanitarian organization. I began by reflexively discussing how I arrived at my intuition relating humanitarianism and history: namely, that an ahistorical representation of humanitarianism prevents an examination of the other purposes that they serve in society. I stated my goals of describing how humanitarianism has become taken for granted and subsequently understanding the purpose that humanitarianism serves. Genealogy seems to be well suited as a method for a critical study of these organizations, as it seeks to understand what is left unsaid, and to expose the evolution of organizational practice from the excess of history. I have also described my approach to examining the archive and my rationale for situating my dissertation within specific institutions. I explored the various claims from the genealogy literature claiming that genealogy is a decentering, critical historical project. These claims show that genealogy should be well-suited to unfreeze humanitarianism. My first task will be to problematize humanitarianism using existing histories. This will be somewhat similar to a traditional literature review. It is also clear from the analysis that this problematization is an exploration of the archive, in the Foucauldian sense of the word. Within the archive, my interest is to identify and analyze discourse: how discourse arises, what effects discourse has, and what purpose is served by discourse. Through genealogy, I will locate and analyze this discourse. My second task will be to apply genealogical analyses in an examination of the archival material
of the Red Cross and MSF. Through this, I will be looking at the genealogy of humanitarianism through specific points of rupture: Biafra and decolonization of Africa. It is through an examination of these specific points that I will make my specific contribution.
Chapter 3 – Problematizing Humanitarianism

“I was a mere tourist with no part whatever in this great conflict” (Dunant, 1939)

Humanitarianism: Why is it Problematic?

In this chapter, I will begin the task of problematizing humanitarianism through an examination of existing histories that form the archive. Recall from Chapter 2 that problematization reframes history in an attempt to understand how it has transpired that the present has come to be accepted as inevitable or natural. (Bornstein & Peter Redfield, 2007) illustrate this point by asking us to imagine a team of doctors arriving during the Spanish attack on the city of Tenochtitlan pleading with soldiers on both sides to spare civilians. This, they say, indicates the “historical specificity” of humanitarianism and leads to the question “[w]hat is it about the present... that casts the care of strangers in such a leading role?” (Bornstein & Redfield, 2007, p. 2).

This question supports the genealogical approach taken in my dissertation, as genealogy is fundamentally concerned with problematizing the present. Problematization involves the identification of absences (Assiter, 1984), but should be wary of re-writing history, making errors of historical fact, or projecting today’s concerns onto the past (Castel, 1984). It must be emphasized that my intention is not to write or re-write a history of humanitarianism: this has been attempted by others (see for example Smyser, 2003). As a genealogy, the goal is to write a history of the present in order to understand how humanitarianism occupies its current
In addition, one should not attempt to examine the entire archive or search back to the beginning of recorded history (Poster, 1987). It will, however, often involve the re-reading of historical documents as well as secondary sources from historians. In this chapter, I will limit myself to the examination of these secondary sources whereas subsequent chapters will examine primary source documents. What is important to remember in both chapters is that events relevant to a particular problematization may appear to be insignificant against the backdrop of other events or emergences that carry greater weight at the time.

In the problematization of humanitarianism, I am interested in the conditions by which the concept has come into being and the history surrounding it (Patton, 1978) in order to understand its function, or perhaps its lack of function. Why problematize humanitarianism? What will the problematization of humanitarian discourse reveal? Two observations answer this question and also motivate my work. First is the observation that humanitarianism has become a celebrated, accepted, and taken for granted contemporary social force for good. My evidence for this belief is found in the presence of long-standing formal organizations dedicated to its pursuit (of which the Red Cross and MSF are but two examples); in the fact that many of its tenets have become enshrined in laws and policies such as the Geneva Conventions and United Nations resolution 43-131 (the former sets out the ‘laws’ of war, while the latter is meant to ensure that relief organizations have access to victims of international disasters (Aeberhard, 2008)); and in the formal appreciation and legitimization of these organizations through awards and
recognition such as the numerous Nobel Peace Prizes awarded to the Red Cross and MSF. Through laws and physical structures humanitarianism is made to appear to be a concept that has and will always exist. But can humanitarianism be understood in other terms through trajectories that are hidden and lost in time and history that view it as a changing and changeable phenomenon? This is particularly important as static concepts such as humanitarianism have physical effects: in some places, humanitarian assistance has been in place for decades and suffering seems to be prolonged beyond the impact of the initial crisis that gave rise to the assistance program (Jamieson, 2005).

My second observation is also a research question for this dissertation; namely that humanitarianism has given rise to massive, organized structures of helping that are largely unexamined: but, given their lack of overall success in reducing suffering, what purpose do they serve? Hardt (2000, p. 136) argues that humanitarian organizations are "some of the most powerful pacific weapons of the new world order." In 2003, for example, humanitarian assistance programs accounted for some $66 billion of foreign aid spending (Jamieson, 2005). However, the impact of these organizations on saving lives and reducing suffering is questionable. Jan Egeland\(^1\) (1987, p. 111) writes that "traditional aid and external 'experts' have often aggravated the problems, instead of preventing them." Jamieson (2005, p. 151) claims that the policies of humanitarian organizations

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\(^1\) Egeland writes with some authority on the issue as he went on to become United Nations Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator from June 2003 to December 2006.
shouldn't be universally accepted as good and that "we should be more cautious about such policies than is often thought." Others echo this sentiment noting that "just like any other industry, the aid industry must be examined... in how it operates from headquarter level to field level. It seems increasingly obvious that many aid agencies sometimes act according to their own best interests rather than in the interests of individuals whom they claim to help. Although many aid agencies do important work, humanitarianism is no longer the ethos for many organisations within the aid industry" ("Growth of aid and the decline of humanitarianism", 2010, p. 253). The complex mixture of development aid, war, disaster, and humanitarian assistance has resulted in a growing tolerance for suffering: it takes more than the average disaster or war to mobilize humanitarian organizations and in some cases this mobilization of action perpetuates or extends the conflict beyond its natural end point (Lautze, Leaning, Raven-Roberts, Kent, & Mazurana, 2004). In some cases, it is easy to measure effectiveness: medical and population health interventions in refugee camps and disaster zones have specific and measurable indicators. However, the effectiveness of non-medical humanitarian interventions such as intervening where human rights are being violated are more difficult to assess (Robertson, Bedell, Lavery, & Upshur, 2002).

Therefore, in the face of evidence of the mixed effects of humanitarianism, the nobility of the ideal of reducing suffering means that humanitarianism should not be excused from critique. The goals and statements of humanitarian organizations are taken as universal truth. Perhaps as a nod to similar processes
that occur in another 'universal' ideology, De Waal (1997, p. 65) refers to the elites occupying humanitarian organizations as the “humanitarian international”; the other ideology of course being socialism and the “Socialist International”. De Waal goes on to argue that there was an expansion of humanitarian organizations and humanitarian action in the 1980s and 1990s. Further, he suggests that crises of war or natural disaster permitted humanitarian organizations an excuse to intervene into nations in a similar way that financial and debt crises permitted international financial institutions to intervene in countries and impose programs of economic and social adjustment. According to De Waal (1997) the universal acceptance of humanitarian values, together with the need to ‘do something’ during a crisis permitted humanitarian organizations to operate with little accountability.

Despite this, or perhaps because of it, De Waal (1997) believes that problems in the operationalization of humanitarianism were noted early in the 20th century. These included a lack of preparedness, lack of information, a failure to coordinate, and poor use of technology. He also notes that these same problems exist today. I suggest that this could mean two things: one, that the problems are intractable, or two that it provides evidence that humanitarianism is used for purposes other than that which it presents itself. This suggestion stems from Foucault’s (1995, p. 272) comment in Discipline and Punish that the question to ask when one observes continual failure is not ‘Why do things continue to fail?’ but ‘What purpose is served by continual failure?’ In other words, continual failure allows us to see the systems that are perpetuated by and have a vested interest in continual failure. I believe that
the continual failure of humanitarianism opens a window to those systems, and one purpose of my dissertation is to explore that open window. However, failure is only a useful device for the exploration of humanitarianism, and the notion of failure is itself a problematic concept. This is because the labeling of something as a success or a failure is the result of a discourse that provides the conditions of possibility for using those terms.

**Entering the Open Window: Humanitarianism and Related Concepts**

To begin this exploration of humanitarianism, I note De Waal’s (1997, p. 66) belief that the history of humanitarianism is “long and complicated” as written through the actions of missionaries, religious societies, and social movements that fought against oppressive practices such as slavery. He suggests that these are “important ancestors of contemporary humanitarian action” (De Waal, 1997, p. 67). My examination of the contemporary discussions of the history, nature, philosophy, and ethics of humanitarianism are in agreement with De Waal. I will examine these ancestors, or trajectories, as part of the emergence and descent of humanitarianism and make some additional contributions. As an overview of what is to follow, I note that the literature shows much that has been said about humanitarianism and similar terms related to ‘helping.’ The spectrum of helping might include philanthropy, charity, volunteerism, and altruism. Each of these has a definition and contribution to the understanding of the act of helping.
Stamatov (2008, p. 5) has described humanitarianism as “institutionalized patterns of action... oriented meaningfully towards the welfare of distant strangers” and “the manifestation of the same social pattern... comprised of constituents or adherents of social movement organizations... who engage in actions towards the welfare of beneficiaries at a distance.” It is “sustained interest in media reports of distant suffering” (Stamatov, 2008, p. 12) and “the impulse to alleviate suffering” (Bornstein & Redfield, 2007, p. 2). It “emphasizes the physical (and increasingly the psychological) condition of suffering people above all else... with well-being conceived through species level needs and health” (Bornstein & Redfield, 2007, p. 5). It is “inherently presentist; the lives and welfare of those now living fundamentally matter and cannot be conscionably sacrificed in the pursuit of other goals” (Bornstein & Redfield, 2007, p. 6), and therefore “the widespread inclination to protest against obvious and pointless physical suffering” (Fiering, 1976, p. 195). It is “a structure of feeling, a cluster of moral principles, a basis for ethical claims and political strategies, and a call for action” (Bornstein & Redfield, 2007, p. 27). The call for action is often met through charitable acts. Charity ameliorates the conditions of the poor but it also increases “people’s dependence on those they should be criticizing... [postponing] an awareness of what is really needed as well as the likelihood that the necessary means could actually be mobilized to effect the needed changes” (Van Til & Ross, 2001, p. 121). Related to charity is the notion of poverty and attempts to end it through development. As Bornstein and Redfield (2007, p. 4) observe, development “is dominated by the economic end of political
economy" and "seeks to confront... poverty" so that the material wealth of an individual improves.

What these definitions reveal are several trajectories of humanitarianism that I will examine in more detail. One trajectory is the link between Christianity and humanitarianism. Initially, the concept of humanitarianism made no sense given the emphasis that the Church put on the role of God in determining the lives of humans. This view eventually gave way in the face of a more benevolent God, together with the emergence of a role for the individual in determining his and others' fates. I will begin, though, by examining another trajectory as embodied in the suffering stranger concept, where helping impulses are initiated through the knowledge that there is distant suffering.

The Suffering Stranger

When confronted with the knowledge of strangers facing certain death as a result of starvation in a distant land, an individual may feel passing sympathy, and may have the means to forestall or prevent the death of at least one of the distant strangers, but not feel compelled to take any action. The explanation for this behaviour resides in the inability of the individual to act without taking extraordinary and complex steps that are outside of daily routine. While the individual has the potential in theory to perform these tasks, more often than not she does not do so. But the feeling of guilt for non-action is not as strong (or perhaps
it is even non-existent) as it would be in the case of passing a dying stranger on the street of her native city.

Haskell (1985a) suggests that the reason for this behaviour is the lack of appropriate recipes or techniques in the mind of the individual that enables them to perform complex tasks to achieve distant action. Haskell (1985a) also proposes four preconditions flowing from this analysis that highlight this particular trajectory of humanitarianism: the shared belief that helping strangers is the right thing to do; the feeling that one is somehow involved in the suffering of strangers; that the individual has the ability to somehow stop the suffering through a recipe for intervention and; that these recipes are sufficiently accessible and easy to use such that not using them would be so out of the ordinary that psychological stress would cause the individual to feel somehow complicit in the suffering condition of the stranger (Haskell, 1985a). By following this trajectory, humanitarianism can be understood as the resulting expansion in the boundaries of moral responsibility brought about by specific historical changes that had individuals develop larger and more ambitious recipes for action. One of the suggested candidates for this historical change is the rise of capitalism and the market economy (Haskell, 1985b, 1985a).

Linking the market, capitalism and humanitarianism seems difficult because of the popular impression of the aggressiveness and self-serving interests of those involved in capitalist enterprise. However, Haskell (1985b) notes that the brutality of life before the market is easily forgotten, and refers to Weber's "The Protestant
Work Ethic and the Rise of Capitalism" when he suggests that capitalism has more to do with restraint and rationality than aggression and greed. There are two key and inter-related lessons taught by the market that lend support to the expansion of individual recipes for action: the importance of promise-keeping and the need to be mindful of the distant consequences of individual action (Haskell, 1985b). The first of these was associated with the rise of contract law and the associated legal and ethical mandates to fulfill what has been promised between strangers in business. Contracts also resulted in increasingly complicated transactions, often times between individuals and groups operating at some distance (Haskell, 1985b). Related to this idea is the forestalling of profit and immediate reward for some future and remote benefit; the market provided a stabilizing mechanism whereby this idea could be realized (Haskell, 1985b). It is argued that those individuals who took note of these lessons were imbued with a broader sense of the impact of their actions, together with a greater ability to develop complex techniques or recipes (Haskell, 1985b). It is this argument that ties back to the pre-conditions for humanitarianism, and ultimately to the appearance of humanitarian organizations. Rather than relying upon the happenstance occurrence of charity at the level of the individual, Haskell (1985a, 1985b) is suggesting that an evolution in perception spanning many decades established the preconditions for the development of humanitarianism.
Religion and Humanitarianism

Another trajectory of humanitarianism holds that the concept emerges uniquely as a nineteenth century word as an amalgamation of the ideas of humanity, charity, and benevolence (Core, 1950). In his exploration of Christianity and humanitarianism in England, Core (1950) argues that Christianity had a major influence on this unique emergence, and more importantly that Christianity is inherently humanitarian. This is in contrast to Moorehead's (1999, p. 51) claim that humanitarian ideals of an organization like the Red Cross "had not religious overtones and clashed with no religious tenets" even though the founders of the organization "were all practicing Christians." In addition, the creation of Red Crescent societies in Muslim countries following the insistence of the Ottoman Turks in the late 19th century lends credence to claims that religion does influence humanitarianism (Forsythe, 2005). The evidence for Core's (1950) position is that an underlying narrative of the Bible's New Testament readings is that of social justice and humane treatment of others (Core, 1950). However true this might be or might not be, one cannot help but observe that this fundamental Christian morality was not always witnessed in the history of Christianity due to the church's theology and practice. In other words, humanity applied the humanitarian scriptures in a decidedly un-humanitarian fashion.

According to Core (1950) there were four elements to this theology and one element of practice that suppressed essential humanitarian practice in Christianity.
Of theology, the first was a concept of God as a harsh and vengeful deity. This resulted in a feeling of restraint among Christians that inhibited a humanitarian spirit. Second was the sacramental system created by the Christian church that inserted a distance between God and humans. Not only did these religious practices estrange people from direct knowledge of the inherent humanitarian character of their faith, but it also recast acts of benevolence and charity in terms of their importance in saving the soul of the charity-giver. That is, humanitarian acts have a proximate intention of helping someone else, but an ultimate intention of helping the helper. These acts could be seen in traditional Corporal and Spiritual Works of Mercy and through the Canon Law that required the performance of charitable deeds. For example, sacraments such as confession could require a charitable act to absolve the confessor of his or her sins. Third was that the Church's teachings called on people to focus on the next world (ie. heaven or hell) and not present existence, and further that current inequalities and suffering could be justified as part of God's design or even that present and future conditions were predestined and not subject to change through human action. Fourth was the view that humans were only helped through the intervention of God, and so individual human action was at worst without effect and at best was initiated by God and not the individual. Finally, when looking at practice, the Christian church sought to limit the availability and translation of the Bible. When combined with the general lack of literacy, the result was that few could read for themselves the inherent humanitarianism of Scripture and the extent to which the church had not followed its teachings.
Core (1950) then explains how changes inside and outside of the Christian church lead to the rise of humanitarianism. Of those within the Christianity, a gradual change in the understanding of God as a caring deity seemed to be key. This increased the extent to which humans were optimistic about themselves and each other. Further, Christianity began to allow a recognition of the conditions of the current world into its teachings, so that a preoccupation with the next world no longer exclusively dictated its morality. In addition, an increase in literacy was occurring due to the requirements of participation in industrial economy. This, combined with an increased availability of Biblical texts opened the reading of the Bible’s humanitarian nature to more people. The breakdown of the class system and an increase in communications methods meant that knowledge and thought could more easily be transmitted across distance and social barriers. What resulted was the emergence of a humanitarian ethic in the Christian church and in society.

Core (1950) notes how this unleashing of humanitarianism from the bonds of the Christian church’s control manifested itself in individual and institutional forms through a belief that humans, while not perfect, could be motivated to support acts that could improve society. Merit, hedonism, and altruism were the hallmarks of 19th century humanitarianism. One could achieve merit in God’s eyes through humanitarian acts, and the hedonistic pleasure generated in the individual through commission of these acts further reinforced their commission. Humanitarianism was reified through organizational forms such as prison reform, visiting the sick, prisoners, soldiers and sailors, and the abolition of the slave trade. It was through
disaster, oppression, and poverty that religion began to assert an activist humanitarian stance. Events such as London's Great Fire, the terrible conditions of hospitals and prisons, and the demonization of the slave trade moved humanitarianism from ethical principles, discussion and intentions to social action. As an indication of the extent to which it had entered the imagination of 19th century, Core (1950) notes that writers began to narrate the plight of the oppressed and lower classes and to document their emerging sense of connection with humanity. I will return later to this idea of literature and humanitarianism and explore it in more detail.

However, the limitations of Core's (1950) study are that it is restricted to humanitarianism in England, and it looks exclusively at Christianity's impact on its emergence. This tends to paint humanitarianism as an exclusively Western phenomenon and indicates some internal contradictions in humanitarianism: namely, that humanitarianism portrays itself as being universal (See for example the Red Cross 'fundamental principles' (Forsythe, 2005), or MSF's droit d'ingérence and organizational charter (Debrix, 1998; DeChaine, 2002)) yet its origins are described in Christian faith and culture. Other faiths are implicated as having humanitarian qualities and characteristics, but these are seemingly apologetic attempts at inclusivity by the dominant occurrence of humanitarianism. For example, the International Museum of the Red Cross and Red Crescent displays examples of humanitarianism in other faiths immediately upon entry to the museum exhibits (see Mayou, 2000, pp. 8-12 for images from the museum showing this layout).
addition, Islam has been noted in the literature as having humanitarian character, although it appears as if the motivation for humanitarian acts in Islam are similar to those noted by Core (1950) in Christianity. For example, Krafess (2005, p. 341) remarks that “[w]hen a Muslim undertakes a humanitarian action he does so primarily as an act of worship, to be nearer to God. He expects a reward in this life or in the hereafter...He firmly believes that making a donation to help the needy erases his sins and will serve as an intercession in his favour to avoid the punishment of the grave, the tests on the Day of Judgement and the flames of hell.”

Fiering (1976) expands the discussion beyond religion and England, but also confirms many of the religious origins of humanitarianism. He suggests that philosophers and thinkers from outside of the Christian church influenced the notion of humanitarianism. Further, he places action at the heart of his definition of modern humanitarianism: action being protest against obvious and pointless physical suffering. Fiering (1976) echoes several of Core’s (1950) observations. First, that until the 18th century self-interest or ego motivated much humanitarian activity, and as we have seen this was due to the interest in repenting from sin through benevolent actions. Second, Fiering (1976) also attempts to situate humanitarianism through its etymology by suggesting that its origins are in words such as sympathy and humanity: this suggests an ordering of conduct such that true human nature is identified with natural affection, kindness, and compassion for others while unnatural feelings are associated with pleasure in witnessing suffering. Thus, Fiering (1976) argues that a notion was developing that compassion was
irresistible in contrast to a notion of human nature based on Hobbes where conflict was inevitable.

Like Core (1950), Fiering (1976) notes the emergence of a benevolent God as key to unlocking the humanitarian instinct of humans: a humane God gave people the authority to be benevolent. However, Fiering (1976) also argues that the emergence of benevolent feelings within people preceded the discovery of a benevolent deity. This is in contrast with Core's (1950) belief that the Church's repositioning of God from vengeful and harsh to compassionate enabled Christians to see themselves as also being capable of compassion. While God was still at the centre of these developments, it was through a different mechanism. Fiering (1976) believes that there was a psychological component to compassion, albeit mediated through the will of God that humans should see compassion as a revelation of His will. These thoughts echo philosophers such as Thomas More who believed that nature and human nature were divine revelations. The passions, according to More, have purposes. In the case of the suffering of others, they caused feelings of compassion that in turn revealed what God expected of us; namely, to alleviate that suffering. According to Fiering (1976), egoism, or the preoccupation with the self without any thought of benefiting others was in conflict with natural predispositions to be disturbed at the sight of suffering, disaster, or calamity. It was a point of fact, according to Fiering (1976), that by the middle of the 18th century, egoism was itself unnatural and internal feelings of compassion guided people to the moral course of action and virtues that God intended. Why was this the case?
Foucault in his History of Madness gives an explanation in discussing the treatment of poverty during the 'great confinement' of the poor, insane, and others who were ostensibly not able to care for themselves. He notes that the place of religion and God was such that a fixation on the hereafter was replaced by a focus on the purpose of the poor in the present. The poor were poor because of God's will: their lives "bore the signs of his ire" (Foucault, 2006, p. 55). Charity served a purpose not for helping the poor necessarily, because that would be counter to God's plan, but rather of showing the helper's faith in trusting God's plan through the act of helping. In other words it was "not the good work itself that provided the justification for such [charitable] actions, but the faith that connected it to God" (Foucault, 2006, p. 56).

Fiering (1976) suggests that humanitarianism in the 18th century was treated as self-evident fact. He also finds that the notion of an irresistible compassion was not more than 100 years old in the 18th century. It is one trajectory of humanitarianism in that it set up human nature to be inherently compassionate, benevolent, and natural. There was an unbounded optimism and confidence in humanity in the 18th century, in contrast to the pessimism noted by Core (1950) resulting from the Church's theology and practice. This optimism, or meliorism (Murphy, 1955) is the belief that the world could be better through human action and intelligence. The idea of better, however, is a purely human construction and susceptible to change and interpretation.
Humanitarianism and Colonialism

In an analysis that has similar elements to Haskell’s capitalism thesis, Lambert and Lester (2004, p. 322) argue that contemporary humanitarianism depends upon the “channels of compassion” created by colonial humanitarians that linked the West with the colonies. They believe that by understanding the network of humanitarianism during the colonial era that we will have a better understanding of how and why the West continues to intervene in former colonial nations. Colonial philanthropists did not oppose Empire. Rather, they thought that Empire could bring a positive change to the world. Their motivations could be religious and spiritual or secular. If the former, then the philanthropists’ participation in the civilization of the colonies would bring them rewards in the afterlife. If the latter, then their argument was based on a sense of patriotic essentialism; for example, it was “un-British” to utilize slaves. A similar, and much earlier, impulse occurred with the Spanish monarchy and their concern to end slavery and to take steps to protest the interests of the Indians of South America (Eakin, 2007; Williamson, 1992). In addition, there was a link between domestic problems and colonial philanthropy founded in a new concern for the underprivileged no matter where they were. As an example, Lambert and Lester (2004) cite the movement to provide education to children in Sunday Schools so that they could read Bibles. This in turn provided an outlet for philanthropic “propaganda” (Lambert & Lester, 2004, p. 324) about the colonies that was justified on the basis that there is something inherently human about everyone, no matter where they were. It also illustrates that the
continued existence of a movement promoting literacy for the purposes of understanding the Bible that stretches back to much earlier times as examined previously in Core (1950).

The condition of the colonies was not hidden, despite the great distances and the lack of rapid communication. In fact, there were networks of colonial philanthropy in existence that allowed for the circulation of humanitarian ideals (Lambert and Lester, 2004). Thus, philanthropy was spatially and physically present in the colonial world. These networks consisted of diverse means and modes of transmission including ships and railways that made up the slave trade system, as well as the movement of capital and raw materials on ships between colonial ports. Through these means of transmission came information about the welfare of the colonized from people such as sympathetic colonial officials, and occasional travelers to the colonies.

However, the networks of philanthropy were challenged by those with a different conception of Empire: it was "never unitary, never stable, always contested" (Lambert & Lester, 2004, p. 327). The challengers included those with business interests in the colonies who profited from slavery or from other forms of exploitation. Their arguments against philanthropy were variously based on notions that the humanitarians didn’t ‘really’ understand the nature of the colonized, and that someone distant (in colonial capitals, for example) couldn’t ‘truly’ understand the local situation. In other words, philanthropy was not taken for granted as a universal good: it could be challenged.
The important things to note here are threefold: first that philanthropy and humanitarianism have not been universally accepted and unchallenged. I recognize that I may not personally agree with the reasons for which they were challenged, but there is evidence of challenge within the archive. Second, that the notion of doing something for the betterment of humanity obscured the fact that the mechanism by which that was carried out (imperialism) was fundamentally violent and oppressive. Third, that the concept of humanitarianism pre-dated the existence of formal humanitarian organizations.

**Humanitarianism and Suffering**

Humanitarianism is circumscribed by perceptions of what is and is not suffering. In other words, the degree to which feelings of compassion were generated was dependent upon the individual, and even on popular sentiment. Fiering (1976) gives the example of benign slavery as something that might not generate compassionate feelings. Humanitarianism is also an ordered activity in that there are different possible outcomes to feelings of compassion. Fiering (1976) notes that these could include concern for others’ misery, relief that we ourselves are not suffering the same fate, and a feeling that we too could encounter such suffering in the future. Fiering (1976) suggests that the emergence of humanitarianism was an historical event in its own right, and was instrumental in the emergence of a new social type that he calls the ‘man of feeling’ (sic). While
nature was seen to be responsible for the humanitarian type, Fiering (1976) claims that we would not associate it with culture.

In 18th century England, a sensibility was emerging that extended compassion and concern towards suffering individuals. Sensibility was the term given to an innate understanding of the difference between good and evil (Halttunen, 1995). This included compassion for “previously despised types of person including slaves, criminals, and the insane” (Halttunen, 1995, p. 303). A process of civilization emerged in which compassion was promoted and brutality was sanctioned; the archetype for this period was “the man of feeling” (Halttunen, 1995, p. 303) who represented the behaviours that were to be emulated by others. Halttunen (1995, p. 304) argues that humanitarian sensibility had its origins in reactions to religious views that pain and suffering were natural and a “redemptive opportunity to transcend the world and the flesh by imitating the suffering Christ.” It was traditionally believed by medicine and Christianity that pain was inevitable and suffering was “a vital part of the body’s natural healing process” (Halttunen, 1995, p. 309). However this changed in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. There was a growing view that pain was “loathsome and unacceptable” (Halttunen, 1995, p. 310).

An illustration of the extent to which the belief that humanitarianism somehow ‘exists’ within the individual is Fischer’s (1973) psychometric humanitarian rating scale. He applied statistical modeling to the list to derive five ‘factors’ underlying humanitarianism. These include nontraditional
humanitarianism, a humane attitude toward animals, humane treatment of criminals, social responsibility, and a helping attitude. Fischer's (1973) work is no exception but is representative of similar humanitarian scales developed by Eron (1955) and by Steenbergen (1995). These approaches illustrate a belief that humanitarianism is more or less present within the psychological composition of an individual, and therefore it can somehow be measured. Scales are developed by finding and grouping together statements and utterances regarding a concept and then asking people to confirm that the statements reflect what they understand the concept to mean. For example, Fischer (1973) developed his scale using items culled from newspaper editorials to populate the list. Therefore, these scale studies provide an insight into people's understanding of humanitarianism. Using Fischer's (1973) study, but without wanting to range through all seventy-eight of his scale items, I have listed some characteristics which are illustrative of these kinds of modernist insights into humanitarianism. According to Fischer's (1973, pp. 160-161) scale, the 'humanitarian' would agree that...

"A person who is suffering from an incurable disease ought to be allowed the choice of dying painlessly from a drug injection"
"While some animal experiments are for the benefit of man, I would be willing to protest against any research agency that was careless or cruel to animals"
"Not even the worst crimes justify the death penalty"
"I would like to take part in a social action program for aiding needy or unfortunate persons"
"I feel bad about turning down a beggar who asks for a handout"

...while the 'humanitarian' would not agree that...

"Homosexuals ought to be removed from society in some way, by keeping them in mental hospitals or prisons if necessary"
"I would not be too concerned if, while driving a car, I accidentally killed a wild animal such as a rabbit or squirrel."

"It is necessary to use extremely harsh penalties to prevent certain crimes, even in the most "civilized" countries."

"If you happen to witness an accident or crime these days, the best thing to do is leave the scene and keep quiet about what you have seen or heard."

"You can get into real trouble being a "Good Samaritan," and are better off steering clear of others’ problems."

Halttunen (1995) underscores the role of literature, art, and drama in promoting this kind of humanitarian sensibility. These media utilized the story or image of the sufferer, but also exploited the feelings of the observer. There was a line, frequently crossed, between watching or reading about the alleviation of the suffering of others as a pleasure, and as a painful experience. In other words, books, images, and plays about the humanitarian impulse displayed “an aggressive kind of voyeurism” (Halttunen, 1995, p. 309). Common suffering in Europe had been reduced and people experienced “a growing distance from suffering” (Halttunen, 1995, p. 309) and when people read about others suffering, they make a comparison between the sufferer and themselves allowing them to appreciate the good fortune that they currently enjoy. Over time, the need to have more shocking and extraordinary events and situations portrayed created the genre of “sensationalism...a degraded commercial tendency to pander to public excitement in the face of particularly terrible or shocking events” (Halttunen, 1995, p. 312). This was predicated by the humanitarianism of the time that identified “a range of formerly unquestioned social practices as unacceptable cruelties and demanding that virtuous people...endeavour to put a stop to such practices” (Halttunen, 1995, p.
Haltunnen (1995) argues that literature and art evolved through depictions arousing sensation (of pain and suffering) and then the need for more shocking scenes resulting in sensationalism. She also argues that the humanitarians distanced themselves from the latter, and so in any depiction of pain and suffering, the details were strategically omitted for fear of inflicting “terrible moral damage on the spectator” (Haltunnen, 1995, p. 330); thus they were in a contradictory situation of having to display images that they felt were morally wrong.

**Humanitarianism and Literature**

In the 18th and 19th century there was a flowering of literature with humanitarian narratives (Fiering, 1976; Rozario, 2003; Whitney, 1939). Literature was obsessed with humanitarian ideas, and humanitarianism used literature to train people how to be compassionate (Rozario, 2003). For example, Whitney (1939, p. 159) argues that in the 18th century, humanitarianism was “a fundamental revolution in the thought of the English people” and it explains “the spirit of the romantic literature of the day.” Central to this revolution was the notion of romanticism, which was a concept concerned with a “discontent with things as they were, an enthusiasm that reminds one of the Renaissance, a faith in the ability of mankind to accomplish whatever he sets his hand to, a passionate love of humanity and of Nature” (Whitney, 1939, p. 161). Philanthropy prior to the 18th century sought to “augment the sum of pleasures” (Whitney, 1939, p. 160) against a backdrop of suffering that was believed to be unchangeable. In contrast, the
humanitarian movement of the 18th century was different: it had the goal of diminishing "the sum of evils" present in the world, rather than simply admitting that not much could be done (Whitney, 1939, p. 160). Evil being some transcendent concept or force that opposes goodness, that creates suffering, and destroys rather than creates life. Eighteenth century humanitarianism was individual, personal, and unofficial: neither the church nor government was involved in any organized implementation (Whitney, 1939). There was, interestingly, a feeling that the State and the Church were stagnant and ineffectual and therefore not going to take "responsibility for the moral and spiritual welfare of its people" (Whitney, 1939, p. 167) and so individuals took the responsibility upon themselves. The combined efforts of individuals in resisting evil resulted in tangible results and laws. For example, the elimination of slavery and the Factory Acts that restricted work hours, and reduced child labour (Whitney, 1939).

What we learn from this is that literature and humanitarianism are connected and the one had an influence on the other. Thus, the notion of the transmission of knowledge of suffering as a motivator of humanitarian action is not uniquely a 20th century activity. This is also confirmed in other parts of the archive, in particular the discussion of humanitarianism and colonialism. We can also see that there are appeals to a transcendent force as a reason for acting in a humanitarian manner. In this case, evil is the motivator: the reduction of evil is the goal. The transcendent and universal power of humanity and of humanity's ability to change conditions is also evident. This takes over from the notion that conditions
on Earth exist for a reason, and things will be better in the next life. The state as a weak institution is also noted, well before any contemporary idea of failed states or disinterest on the part of nations to act to alleviate suffering. Thus, we see an impetus for individual action.

These narratives were not of the suffering or plight of groups or masses but rather of the individual who was part of the larger group and more importantly about how the reader could be somehow connected to the fate of the suffering individual (Laqueur, 1989). This, he claims, was a reflection of the empirical turn where cause and effect could be rationally pieced together. He goes on to suggest that the popularity of these humanitarian narratives were such that the humanitarian ideals they espoused were taken for granted, assumed, and unspoken in this period.

**Humanitarianism and the State**

Sitara (2008, p. 2), like Core (1950) observes the paradox that humanitarianism was not particularly humane but rather a “regulatory discourse...a discourse of domination.” She claims that the humanitarian and the needy were transformed into a hierarchical relationship where the humanitarian occupies a position superior to those needing rescue and knows what is best. Based on her study of humanitarian practices in Canada in the 19th century, she provides examples of policies and programs that removed native children from their families in order to save, civilize, and otherwise rescue the children from continued
barbarity; anti-vagrancy approaches that made the provision of food contingent on the poor doing work for the state; and the creation of industrial schools that removed poor children from their families under the argument that they would be saved from their existing conditions and a continued life of poverty. What Sitara (2008) shows is an emergence of a humanitarianism discourse that was embedded within state institutions. This discourse provided a moral argument that justified the state's right to rule over specific populations. This argument is echoed in the colonialists' civilizing mission that formed part of the justification of the entire colonial project; that is, colonization was done because it was a project that would do good for the uncivilized. According to Sitara (2008), humanitarianism is legitimized for much the same reason.

**Humanitarianism and the Border**

The idea that humanitarianism is more concerned with distant versus proximate suffering somehow implicates borders and boundaries in yet another trajectory. Humanitarianism is directed outwards, and the idea explored in my discussion of Christianity and humanitarianism (see for example Core (1950)) that it is done for egotistical purposes or that it has implications for personal salvation are largely forgotten. A defining characteristic of humanitarianism is that it acts without respect for borders. Stamatov (2008) argues that the notion that compassion and helping should ignore borders has its origin in the moral component that motivates humanitarian action, and this morality is rooted in the
Christian duty to care detailed by Core (1950). Distant strangers become the moral equivalent of kin through church activities such as the exchange of information from missionaries or the giving of gifts. The giving of gifts such as clothing or food enabled the consideration of the poor in another country not as strangers, but as a fellow Christians deserving of attention. It also attracted people to the Church and helped increase the numbers of parishioners. Stamatov (2008) argues that humanitarianism continually emerges under different guises, but always with the same root: that of border crossing action at a distance.

O'Neill (2008) argues for the consideration of mutual aid as an innate aspect of humanity, and extends the boundaries of helping beyond that of religious origins. He notes the existence of associations and groups that were an adaptation in response to the fragmentation of society due to migration and change. The argument begins to emerge that the state could no longer cope with, or chose not to cope with, the increased demands placed upon it. Voluntary associations filled this gap as part of the so-called natural helping response of humanity. Those who helped are considered donors and engaged in philanthropic activity.

Philanthropy

The humanitarian act, insofar as it is the giving of something to another person, can be considered an act of gift giving. The humanitarian gift may be material goods, money or it may be the use of money and goods to save lives or improve health. Thus far, the various trajectories of humanitarianism I have
examined have displayed directionality to this flow of gifts: from donor to recipient. However, Sitara (2008) demonstrated that the humanitarian gift is not freely given: there are obligations and expectations attached to it, although these are obscured by the generosity or apparent selflessness of the offering. This suggests another layer to the humanitarian relationship that contributes to the problematization of humanitarianism: this layer is developed through the notion of the gift.

In a study of gift giving across multiple cultures, Mauss (1969, p. 1) finds that it is a "total social phenomenon"; that is, it is not a discrete, individualized activity that can be considered in isolation, but it is instead expressed simultaneously in multiple institutions including religion, the law, and the economy. The act of spontaneous giving may appear to be disinterested because "[in] theory... gifts are voluntary but in fact they are given and repaid under obligation" (Mauss, 1969, p. 1). The potlatch of the Haida people of Northwest North America is given as one extreme example of gift giving that is apparently disinterested, and perhaps incomprehensible or irrational because of the manner of the giving. The apparent irrationality in the potlatch is observed as gifts between members of the society are given to the point of excess, and often gifts are destroyed and wasted rather than exchanged or used (Mauss, 1969, p. 4). However, Mauss finds that the purpose of this form of giving and even wanton destruction of gifts is not disinterested but used to establish a hierarchy. Therefore he concludes that rather than being pure and without purpose, gifts establish obligations in that we "must always return more than we receive; the return is always bigger and more costly" (Mauss, 1969, p. 63).
In the case of the potlatch, the positioning of individuals within a hierarchy is the cost of accepting the gift. But to what extent can the behaviours in cultures such as the Haida of Northwest North America be used to understand others? In reflecting on the potential differences between the Western and the so-called primitive cultures and civilizations that came before it, Mauss (1969, p. 73) further wonders whether we are “certain that our own [contemporary/Western] position is different and that wealth with us is not first and foremost a means of controlling others?”

This question is taken up by (Kapoor, 2008, p. 76) who, like Mauss, finds that “[g]iving most often involves recompense... interest, debt, credit... some form of recognition: a symbolic return, a thank you, the expectation of a thank you.” Kapoor suggests that part of the recognition of the gift of humanitarian aid is the inclusion of conditionalities; that is, help is given provided the recipient agrees to certain political or economic changes that are in the donor’s interest. However, Ostrander (2007) challenges the notion that philanthropy is fundamentally a social relation under donors’ control. He argues against a view that the flow of resources is from the giver to the receiver and primarily benefits the latter. Instead, he suggests that the recipients shape this relationship, albeit in an unequal fashion. Both Kapoor (2008) and Ostrander (2007) claim that the donor relies on the recipient for ontological status; that is, the existence of the donor is only possible through the existence of the Other. Therefore, human agency is a fundamental consideration in philanthropy (Ostrander, 2007) and the donors are considered to have more agency than the receivers. If one believes in this view, then the limiting factor is the
willingness of donors to give rather than the availability of normatively appealing or necessary situations in which to donate (Ostrander, 2007). Certainly, a key component of the philanthropic relation is the image of suffering or need (Kevin Rozario, 2003), but Ostrander argues that even that is weighted in favour of the donor who lends legitimacy to the need or event through the attention that they pay to it. What role then for the recipient of aid?

Van Leeuwen (1994) gives the poor (and their benefactors) more credit and sees charity, poverty, and humanitarianism as a series of strategies that are (somewhat) willingly entered or negotiated by both the victims and the helpers. He also views charitable bodies as the sites of this negotiation. He would agree with Sitara (2008) that charity and humanitarian policies acted as a means of social control, stating that "poor relief was intended to safeguard public order. Destitution for the many might easily lead to discontent" (Van Leeuwen, 1994, p. 593), but he also argues that there were other strategies available to the 'elites' including raising wages, creating temporary employment schemes, workhouses, or out-and-out repression. Why then choose charity? One reason is economic because the costs of philanthropy "were less than those of other means to maintain public order and protect property and lives" (Van Leeuwen, 1994, p. 593). But, a certain amount of morality or 'civilizing codes' are included along with charity because "poverty was thought of as a moral problem, a consequence of a seamy way of life. To give assistance without attaching moral conditions would only reproduce squalor" (Van Leeuwen, 1994, p. 594). Similarly, the poor had other (albeit limited) strategies and
accepted charity if “it was profitable to do so. It was a survival strategy, a means of increasing their chances to survive” (Van Leeuwen, 1994, p. 590). The rich and the poor were linked together: “the problem of the poor was their poverty; the problem of the rich was the poor” (Van Leeuwen, 1994, p. 607). For the ‘typical’ rich landowner the availability of a stock of poor was advantageous in that there was always surplus labour, and that through the giving of charity to the poor, the rich could be viewed favourably and “social standing grew among his peers and villagers, despite his actions as an employer” (Van Leeuwen, 1994, p. 609). This observation is also noted in one other exploration of humanitarianism; namely that the humanitarian act can “be an alibi for other forms of oppression” and permits someone to feel “virtuous without having to trouble over such matters as low wages [and] unsafe workplaces” (Rozario, 2003, p. 442).

Thus, even though humanitarianism serves a social purpose, and the poor and the rich enter into some form of social bargaining, we cannot conclude that “sympathy and humanitarianism have always been socially beneficial” (Rozario, 2003, p. 442). Mauss’ notion of humanitarianism as a gift helps to understand this in more detail. What all this suggests is a more nuanced understanding of humanitarianism beyond the distant suffering stranger concept by arguing that the relationship between donor and recipient is much more complex than a donor recognizing and acting upon a distant need. Most importantly, from the point of view of enabling the recipient and resisting the discourse of humanitarianism, is the idea of recipient strategies for engaging in a social relation with a donor.
Contemporary Humanitarianism

Twentieth century scholars seem to believe in the sentiment that humanitarianism is an invention of the 18th and 19th centuries (Bornstein & Redfield, 2007; Fiering, 1976; Quaife, 1918; Stamatov, 2008; Whitney, 1939). There seem to be only a few attempts to situate it in earlier periods. For example, Quaife (1918) writes of the efforts of Hugo Grotius (the 16th century Dutch jurist) to develop rules for war, and notes that the Red Cross has punctuated these efforts and extended them even to the non-Christian world. We have seen how the ideal of humanitarianism existed across eras in one or the other form: either as Christian morality, colonial duty to improve, or philanthropic mission to rescue the poor. Therefore, the embodiment of humanitarianism is not exclusive to any one organization but emerges at different times and in different organizations. In The Rise of Modern Humanitarianism Parmeelee (1915) suggests that there must also be a pre-modern or what he calls a primitive version of the concept where compassion was limited only within groups or tribes. Despite this claim of some prehistoric humanitarianism, he observes what he believes is a ‘sudden’ appearance of the concept in the early 20th century. This is manifest in things like prison reform and laws of war, and of the latter the Red Cross is specifically singled out. He offers various suggestions for this sudden emergence. Included in these are some ‘thing’ that has acted to simply make people more humane, Christianity and other religions, the coming into existence of morality, modernity, and colonization (Parmeelee,
1915). Of all these, he favours modernity and the role of science as the most likely explanation. Science, and evolution in particular, has demonstrated common origins of humans, and thus decreased the claims of difference (Parmelee, 1915). His analysis also hints at precursors of globalization that were factors in the emergence of humanitarianism such as a global division of labour and mass communication that increased the knowledge of events in throughout the world. Interestingly, his prospects for the future of humanitarianism are also tinged with globalization as he suggests that it will only succeed when science, commerce, and industry have made the interests of people more alike no matter where they are located (Parmelee, 1915).

What, though, has been the character of humanitarianism in the 20th and 21st centuries? I will provide some examples of humanitarian action as a means of illuminating the emergence of the humanitarian organization as part of the administration of the public. According to De Waal and Omaar (1993), in Somalia, the needs of an entire country have become the responsibility of aid agencies. Their power and influence are hidden and helped by their messaging: that they are saving helpless people belies the fact that taken together, they have access to more resources than the governments affected by disaster and war (De Waal & Omaar, 1993). The humanitarian approach to disaster relief, predicated on the delivery of aid and the creation and marketing of a vulnerable population, runs counter to empirical evidence for how disasters actually get solved; namely, by democratic accountability (De Waal, 1997; De Waal & Omaar, 1993). In particular, (De Waal,
1997) offers a body of evidence that shows that where there is political accountability for the impact of a disaster, there exists a much more robust disaster response. But for humanitarian organizations, disaster can only be an apolitical phenomenon where humanity, not local citizens, responds to victims that are without power and so dependent upon someone else (De Waal & Omaar, 1993). Fundraising is key to this response, and the image of the humanitarian organization is central to their success. This organizational image, and the images of suffering are tightly controlled and their marketing messages are never questioned by the public. This is in sharp contrast to marketing messages for commercial products (De Waal & Omaar, 1993). The source of stories for messages must be simple and accessible, and so rarely come from non-English speaking people. Therefore the context of the problems in specific countries become lost as they are subsumed into the argument that suffering is a common human quality, that it is the same everywhere, and that there is a common response to all suffering.

Similarly, Hendrie (1991) describes a spontaneous repatriation of famine refugees from the Sudan back into Tigray (Ethiopia) in 1984. In 1984/85, there was a famine in Ethiopia, and one of the centres of this famine was in Tigray, Ethiopia. During the same period, there was an on-going war for liberation of Tigray by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Many of the famine-affected people lived in areas controlled by the TPLF. In a situation that foreshadows my impending discussion of the 1966 Nigerian civil war (Biafra), international aid was sent to the Ethiopia government that was then viewed as the only legitimate representative of
the country. There were limited relief supplies available in rebel-controlled areas, so the TPLF responded by establishing its own relief efforts. The strategy for these efforts combined use of international relief together with implementation of local drought-coping strategies. These strategies involved migration during the dry season, and planting during the rainy season. Migration was accomplished through areas protected by the TPLF, through Tigray, to the area of Eastern Sudan where it was hoped the international community would respond to the refugees. It was not possible for assistance to be delivered to the famine-affected people in Ethiopia because the Ethiopian government refused to allow access to the population by international organizations. Once the rains returned, the migrants would also return to plant crops for the coming growing season. However, when viewed from the outside through the lens of the humanitarian discourse that sees only victims, humanity, and an apolitical natural cause to the disaster, the massive migration of people was perceived as a chaotic flight of helpless victims from war and famine. Programs were established to care for the lives of the victims seemingly without knowledge of the strategy being employed by the migrants. In later work, Hendrie (1997b) observed that the refugees were no doubt concerned about physical survival. However, they were also concerned about their economic survival as it was dependent upon their return to their origins to begin planting when rains began. This parallel strategy exists elsewhere, and has been noted by Malkki (2002) and Lubkemann (2008), yet remains largely unheard of in the humanitarian
agencies as it is not part of their view of how suffering, helping, and recovery should play out.

There is a particularly French perspective on contemporary humanitarianism as embodied by organizations like MSF. The organization emerged from the intersection of several currents: tiersmondisme, Biafra, and the 1968 Paris student riots (Allen & Styan, 2000; Taithe, 2004). Tiersmondisme is the view that the so-called Third World represented the global proletariat, and it held aloft their anti-colonial struggle as an indication that Marxism could be rescued from certain failure (Allen & Styan, 2000). Biafra will be discussed at length elsewhere in this dissertation, but suffice it to say for now that many authors writing about humanitarianism feel that war in Nigeria signaled a break from the conventional, embedded, state-sanctioned approach to humanitarianism (De Waal, 1997; de Montclos, 2009; Moorehead, 1999; Smyser, 2003). Without wishing to smooth over the complexity of the 1968 student riots, its contribution to MSF’s formation lies in the rejection of accepted values and the rise of open debate (Allen & Styan, 2000; Taithe, 2004). Perhaps more importantly, there was a break with the religious notions of charity and the call for more secular aid. MSF was created in this atmosphere, but it prospered and developed during a period when state sovereignty was frequently set aside in the interests of a right to intervene on behalf of victims no matter what the resistance to this intervention might be (Allen & Styan, 2000). Earlier in the 20th century, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set out a humanitarian code that built the foundation for the adoption of notions
such as the droit d'ingerence. Therefore, the idea of humanitarianism without borders was not exclusive to the post-1968 period, but traces can be found in other developments earlier in the century.

The Creation of the Humanitarian Organization

Kirschenbaum (2004) develops part of the problematic of humanitarianism through an examination of disaster management organizations. It is variously claimed that the frequency of disasters is increasing, that this increase happens naturally, or that there is some inherent process of disaster creation that is rapidly accelerating (Bankoff, Frerks & Hilhorst, 2004; Bankoff, 2001). For example, the IFRC claims that in 2007 approximately 201 million people were affected by disasters resulting in damages nearing $63.5 billion (IFRC, 2008). They also claim that in the past decade more than two billion people were affected by natural disasters alone (IFRC, 2008). Alarming suggestions are made that rapid technological revolution, globalization with attendant interconnectedness of events, increase in terrorist and subversive activities, emergence of nation-states often after violent confrontations, climate change causing new weather patterns, increasing mobility of humans and animals heightening the risk of mass epidemics, and exponential population growth resulting in use of marginal lands—have all contributed to growing number of disasters and crises (Alexander, 2006; Giddens, 1990; IFRC, 2008; Shrivastava, 1993). No longer, it is claimed, can organizations and governments hope for stable and predictable patterns of continuity
These claims often begin arguments for an increased need for organizations and experts able to understand and manage these events. In other words, the number and intensity of disasters has been increasing, together with the number of people affected by the events and this has been met by a technical and organizational response.

However, Kirschenbaum (2004) argues that this is due to the desire for legitimation amongst managers of disaster organizations, and this drives a process of defining more and more events as disasters which in turn creates a need for larger human and financial resources. Further, Kirschenbaum (2004) claims that organizations have not been effective in meeting their goals of mitigating the effects of disaster. He concurs with observations by (Furedi, 2007b) that events currently described as being disasters were at one time considered to be normal, expected, and thus were not disasters. Kirschenbaum (2004) claims that these organizations unseat a natural, latent ability within people to survive disasters. This reflects a larger, totalizing process of modernization in which institutions replace tradition (Foucault, 2009). For example, Furedi (2007b) contrasts two examples of floods that occurred in England: one in the 1950s and the other in the 1990s. The floods of the 1950s were devastating to the population, but they were met with a sense of stoicism and resiliency. They were characterized as being part of the natural flow of life, and the population adapted to the event and moved on from it. In contrast, a flood in the 1990s saw the population being characterized as vulnerable and traumatized even though fewer people died. Furedi (2007) claims that a rhetoric of
vulnerability has usurped a rhetoric of resiliency, and that this has been driven by
the sudden emergence of the psychological evaluation of survivors as fragile,
traumatized and in need of care. Kirschenbaum (2004) also notes that it is not
surprising to find modernity’s influence in the creation of disasters that never used
to be exist: in other words there has been an erosion of the border between disaster
and normality. Through science and technologies of observation and
communication such as satellite imagery and the Internet, disasters can be
discovered in remote places and with a rapidity that allows them to feed into the
news cycle and become disaster events. That disaster knows no borders is also
evident in the proliferation of international humanitarian organizations in the 20th
century in, for example, the creation of the United Nations Department of
Humanitarian Affairs. According to De Waal (1997, p. 71), who looks specifically at
famine as a humanitarian concern, UN organizations have “contributed to the
internationalization of responsibility for famines” and enable “a retreat from
domestic accountability in famine-vulnerable countries.” De Waal (1997) also
concludes that the UN agencies themselves have no responsibility for their results,
which seems to transform disasters into an event for which no one has
responsibility, not even the victims who are, according to the discourse, helpless in
the face of the event.

Therefore, humanitarianism has become institutionalized: it has been
removed from the personal and made organizational. How and where did and does
this happen? Perhaps, as Solnit (2009) writes upon reflecting on the 1906 San
Francisco earthquake, disaster affords people the opportunity to be free: free from institutions, free from laws that assume that society tends to disorder in the absence of rules. In disaster, Solnit argues that people see the unimportance of organization. This may be why order is often imposed violently in the face of mass informal organizing in the aftermath of disaster. For example, in the post-earthquake San Francisco of 1906 Solnit (2009, p. 34) noted that the military authorities who were put in charge of keeping order perceived their job “as saving the city from the people, rather than saving the people from the material city of cracked and crumbling buildings.” This impacted upon emergent helping behaviour of citizens. One depiction of this impact was an episode of soldiers who fired a warning shot at a survivor after seeing him “picking over the rubble of a ruin... The man ran, and a soldier shot him dead. He had been trying to free someone trapped in the rubble” (Solnit, 2009, p. 39). In another “[a] woman told a cadet that a grocer invited the crowd to help themselves before the fire got his store, and a solider bayoneted one of the invitees who was leaving laden with groceries” (Solnit, 2009, p. 39). In the fire that followed the earthquake, citizens attempted to save what they could using their own means while the organized, formal structures of helping were convinced that neighborhoods had to be deliberately dynamited or burned down to stop the spread of fire. This was a struggle between the “successful firefighting efforts... by groups of citizens armed with buckets of water, with shovels... with whatever came to hand” who were “committed to saving as much as possible through hands-on methods” of firefighting and the “reckless technological tactics of the occupying
forces [of the military], convinced that their strategy of destruction could save structures and neighborhoods elsewhere" (Solnit, 2009, p. 42).

Another example comes from hurricane-ravaged New Orleans in 2005. (Solnit, 2009, p. 261) recounts one story of people trying to cross over a bridge from downtown New Orleans to Gretna; on the Gretna side there was food, water, and transport. A large group of survivors were at the New Orleans Convention Centre: the official evacuation shelter as dictated by the city’s disaster plan that unfortunately turned into more of a holding camp for those unable to leave the city. A group of about 200 of those lingering at the Centre decided to cross the bridge to Gretna to escape the terrible conditions, only to be met by official resistance from “armed Gretna sheriffs [that] formed a line across the foot of the bridge... they began firing their weapons" and the crowd fled (Solnit, 2009, p. 261).

In a final contrast of the perceptions of disaster as chaos requiring outside expertise versus disaster as impetus for societal innovation and cohesion, Golash-Boza (2010) provides the example of the 2010 Haitian earthquake. She notes that there was massive destruction of structures and a huge loss of life, giving rise to the perception that it could be alleviated only through massive assistance from foreign militaries and non-governmental organizations. Instead, she notes the creation of tent cities by the survivors and that “despite the poor conditions, there was order and community. People arranged their tents into straight lines, left spaces for public use, and organized a security crew to watch over them at night and to ensure that cars did not trample people sleeping in the streets” (Golash-Boza, 2010, p. 6). This
echoes my earlier discussion of Hendrie's (1991) critique of outside expertise and local knowledge in the Tigrayan (Ethiopian) famine relief operation; namely that people are often able to look after themselves, much to the dismay of organized humanitarians.

These examples are not selected merely to illustrate my point: they are reflective of a scholarship in emergent versus organizational responses to crisis (see for example Srinivas, 2010; Tierney, 2007; Tierney, Bevc, & Kuligowski, 2006). Quarantelli and Dynes (1977) concluded that disaster responses can be categorized into informal, emergent, and coordinated responses. The latter two are centered within organizational structures, while the former is characteristic of citizen or individual responses. The management of disaster by organizations has evolved into an all-hazards approach; that is, while each disaster has unique features, it is believed that the effects and impact are similar and require a standard arsenal of response activities including search and rescue, evacuation, and relief (Granot, 1998). Therefore, despite popular opinion that a managed, organized response is optimal, it is often cited that an improvised response is most common (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977). What all this serves to illustrate is an insight into why people are estranged from owning their disaster: the fear of losing the ability to manage people on the part of the managers. In this sense, the disaster is made into a crisis of a loss of authority, control, and expertise.
Conclusion

Through the problematization of humanitarianism, I have begun to shed light on a call in the literature to show that humanitarianism is not "a timeless truth but an ideology that has had particular functions and taken different forms at different times in the contemporary world. It is crucial to locate any discussion of the concept and its political impact historically" (Edkins, 2003, p. 254). I believe I can frame the problematic of humanitarianism as laid out in this chapter by returning to Burrell and Morgan's (1985) paradigmatic description of the study of social relations. To simplify greatly, they claim that individuals are either sovereign or they are produced through their relations with others: this is the voluntarism-determinism spectrum of human nature. The other spectrum of social relations for Burrell and Morgan (1985, p. 17) is that of the cohesion of society: one end of the spectrum asks "why society tends to hold together rather than fall apart" while the other looks at "explanations for the radical change, deep-seated structural conflict, modes of domination." If the problematization in this chapter is viewed using the lens of social cohesion and individual voluntarism then the understanding of humanitarianism is based on a search for commonalities amongst individuals to explain how things stay together. As a result, the question that characterizes the problematization might be 'why does humanitarianism occur?' In other words, if people are inherently compassionate, why do we need formal humanitarian structures? On the other hand, if the problematization is viewed through the rubric
of ‘why don’t things fall apart?’ then humanitarianism is expected because an individual’s own existence is dependent upon the actions of others. In this case, the question is ‘why does humanitarianism not always occur?’
Chapter 4 – The Humanitarian Archive – The ICRC in Africa

Africa – The Cradle of Humanitarianism?

In her history of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Carolyn Moorehead states that prior to the Nigerian Civil War (the “Biafran War”) of 1968 the “International Committee [of the Red Cross] had never been greatly involved in Africa” (Moorehead, 1999, p. 614). While my examination of the humanitarian archive supports Moorehead’s claim that Biafra was a key event in the trajectory of the Red Cross and in humanitarianism, I have also found that the ICRC was greatly interested in Africa as evidenced through a persistent effort to persuade newly formed post-colonial governments to adopt the Geneva Conventions and establish Red Cross national societies. The ICRC could see the writing on the wall signaling the imminent end of colonial Africa. Perhaps an indication of this can be found in its instructions to its “Delegate General” for Africa, where the ICRC instructs George Hoffmann to “establish relationship[s] with... qualified representatives of indigenous organizations” (Hoffmann, 1964d). So, the ICRC engaged with future African leaders in detention, as well as with the colonial governments that imprisoned them but that would soon be replaced with the African leaders in their prisons. Therefore, it is the decolonization of Africa in general, and the conflicts that ensued, that provide a series of intersections where I can demonstrate the contingent nature of humanitarianism.
In this chapter, I extend my exploration of the humanitarian archive by examining the physical archives of the Red Cross. I will examine the Red Cross in particular as a representation of the humanitarian organization during decolonization through archival material during this period. George Hoffmann was one ICRC delegate in particular that was involved with Africa during decolonization, and I will explore the correspondence he contributed during this period.

My approach to reading these letters is outlined in Chapter 2. Recall that my goal is to find evidence of discourse at work. This evidence is provided in how material objects and rules resulted in the creation of subjects and the relations between subjects. I used the method described in Chapter 2 as pieced together from existing genealogies (most notably the work of Jacques (1992)) and from Foucauldian scholars (Castel, 1994; Kendall & Wickham, 1999; May, 1993). These authors suggest that genealogy should look for discontinuities and changes in the discourse.

To that end, I will explain how a decolonizing Africa and the Biafran War in particular provide a divide on which the humanitarian discourse changed. Prior to Biafra, the Red Cross viewed war as an object: conflict could be observed and witnessed but the organization's members (the delegates) had no agency to change or prevent war from happening (Moorehead, 1999). Following Biafra, the organization and its delegates took on an active role as part of the event, able to influence outcomes.
I do not mean to imply that the Red Cross can prevent war from occurring. But in conflicts prior to Biafra, Moorehead (1999) and Forsythe (2004; 2007) in particular note that the Red Cross was detached from conflict. It visited prisoners, sent food parcels, traced missing relatives. Its process was consistent and developed in connection with the type of conflict in which it was involved. In a situation of total war (WW I, WW II) there was no outside observing public expressing shock and demanding that something be done.

The Red Cross’ contribution to war has always been the Geneva Conventions: the rules that dictate what is acceptable suffering and what is intolerable. All belligerents should know about the Conventions and the delegate’s job was to educate those who didn’t, bear silent witness to the adherence to these rules, and report on transgressions. Amelioration of dreadful conditions was the objective as the fundamental fact was that prevention of war was beyond the organization’s mandate. The humanitarian is separate from war, not part of it. Through an examination of the early archives of the Red Cross in Africa (1963-1964) I will show how the organization stood fast to these ideals during the decolonization of Africa. Later, they found that humanitarianism did not entirely work in a decolonized, postcolonial Africa. In this chapter and in discussion in Chapter Six of these findings I will show how the various interactions of a postcolonial discourse and a humanitarianism discourse produced multiple subjectivities within situated actors as well as material manifestations through archival texts that allow us access to those subjectivities.
George Hoffmann – The ICRC’s Man in Africa

Beginning in 1963, George Hoffmann was the ICRC’s ‘Delegate General’ for Africa. This role saw him responsible for liaison between the ICRC in Geneva, African governments, and local Red Cross organizations. His mission was, in part, to “establish relationship[s] with... qualified representatives of indigenous organizations” (Hoffmann, 1964m). It was a huge task, and it evidently wore upon him and his health. As he notes, “the job of Delegate General in the African Continent of today is not exactly a picnic” (Hoffmann, 1964d) and the “constant travel by jet from one climate to another and from one altitude to another is not exactly what the doctor ordered” (Hoffmann, 1964m). Despite the adversity during the course of his work he traveled to multiple African countries many of which were in the process of decolonization or were recently decolonized. To give a sense of the size of the continent and some to situate the countries and places noted in the archives, I have included a map as Figure 1 (below). I have also included a map of Nigeria and the region of Biafra as Figure 2 (below). During Hoffmann’s mission, he made contact with government authorities in different countries. He makes note of their attitudes towards Africans and Africa.
Figure 1: A political map of Africa (2010). Public domain map accessed at http://www.touristic-map.com/en/africa/africa/political-africa-map.htm
For example, Hoffmann initiated and developed contact with Jomo Kenyatta, the first President of Kenya, prior to and after the independence of Kenya in 1963.

\[\text{Public domain map produced by Eric Gaba (Wikimedia Commons user: Sting) and accessed at http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Biafra_independent_state_map-en.svg}\]
He also met with the future leaders of Zimbabwe (then known as Southern Rhodesia) and South Africa while they were in prison as leaders of the resistance in those countries. He was assisted by at least one other delegate, G. C. Senn, who works exclusively in the Congo (currently the Democratic Republic of Congo). Both Senn and Hoffmann meticulously documented their encounters in Africa, and these are stored in the archives of the ICRC in Geneva with the bulk of the material written by Hoffmann. He wrote almost daily letters to Geneva on his trips to various countries that detailed his contacts, work achieved, and progress in implementing ICRC strategy and programs in Africa. As indicated during my discussion of methodology and access, the ICRC imposes a forty year moratorium on material in its archives, so while in theory I should have been able to access documentation up to and including 1969, in practice the ICRC only permitted me access to material up to 1964. From these letters, I observed several themes that occurred regularly in his work. The first was a concern with the methods of Red Cross operation within Africa. Second was the display of colonial attitudes towards Africa and Africans. Finally, the letters revealed the use of Eurocentric paradigms and examples from European conflicts to explain African phenomenon.

Red Cross Operation

One theme of Hoffmann’s letters deals with how the Red Cross does its work in Africa. This theme includes work to teach government officials, citizens, and other individuals about the Red Cross and the Geneva Conventions in order to
"reach as vast a public as possible in Africa" (Hoffmann, 1964k). For example, he tries to show Africans at a meeting in Kenya that "there is only one Red Cross" (Hoffmann, 1964n) and he meets with military officials and government ministers in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion, the Congo, the Sudan, Northern Rhodesia, and Southern Rhodesia to argue for the delivery of Red Cross and Geneva Convention information through inclusion in school textbooks and military training courses (Hoffmann, 1963e, 1963f, 1963s, 1964f, 1964j). He also takes part in press conferences, gives interviews to newspapers and on the radio in order to disseminate Red Cross ideals. However, some countries are of more interest to him and the Red Cross than others. In Reunion, for example, he notes the "rudimentary situation of the local Red Cross and the absence of issues that might directly be of concern to our mission" (Hoffmann, Note 55, 1963) and he visits the island of Mauritius in part because of convenient airline connections that facilitated his trip to Madagascar (Hoffmann, 1963j). In contrast, Hoffmann makes repeated trips to South Africa to press for the ICRC’s right to visit political prisoners and to advocate on the prisoners’ behalf (Hoffmann, 1963q, 1964a, 1964b).

Colonial Attitudes

The archives reveal elements of colonial attitudes towards Africa on the part of the Red Cross and various governments in Africa. These included generalizations and frustrations about Africa and Africans, the use of tribalism as a simplified
explanation of African conflicts and politics, the expression of racial stereotypes and characterizations, and resistance to humanitarianism.

**African Generalizations**

Generalizations about Africa are seen in correspondence between Hoffmann and Geneva. He notes that "everything is possible in Africa and you can never be sure of anything" (Hoffmann, 1963t). Another letter, written by Hoffmann's colleague Senn, is written to Geneva to try to get publications on the Geneva Conventions in African languages. Senn notes that it is important to get the publications in the correct languages because some of the army officers might think that favouritism is being shown if their language is not represented. He writes to the information officer in Geneva saying: "[y]ou might think that I'm exaggerating, but you must know the peculiarities of the African spirit" (Hoffmann, 1963l).

Generalizations extend to African Red Cross organizations where Hoffmann states that it is "in general impossible to distinguish between different Red Cross organizations in Africa" (Hoffmann, 1964o). In an encounter with the colonial authorities in Rhodesia, Hoffmann meets Winston Field, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia who assured him "that he personally had no racial prejudice... and expressed the desire that there is no armed conflict in Southern Rhodesia" but that "today we could not predict in Africa" (Hoffmann, 1963a).
Racial Stereotypes

Racial stereotypes can be found in the archival correspondence. For example, in discussing the state of the ICRC’s operation in the Congo, Hoffmann responds to Geneva’s frustration with the seemingly disinterested attitude of the authorities in the country. He reacts, and defends, the Congolese attitude by essentializing African behaviour: “it is necessary to realize that this passive attitude that gives the impression of disinterest and sometimes almost being impolite, is an expression of African character... it is Africa par excellence” (Hoffmann, 1963b). Based on this generalization, Hoffmann makes an operational decision that advocates for victims saying that in his opinion “it would be wrong to issue an ultimatum to the Congolese. You wouldn’t get an improvement, and things would get worse. Worse still, we risk abandoning the victims” (Hoffmann, 1963b). This disinterest is present too in the Mauritian Red Cross where there is “a rather laid-back governing administration where Creole elements prevail” (Hoffmann, 19641). Another example can be found when Senn describes the situation in Nyasaland (Malawi), when he comments on “[t]he arrogant attitude of the ‘Panafricanists’ in Nyasaland” (Hoffmann, 1963n) that is directed towards Europeans and Asians. The Panfricanists are those who advocated for a united African opposition to colonialism and Westernization (Prashad, 2007). Senn thinks that the “money from the US which went to support development gave Banda too much confidence in himself”
Senn is referring to Dr. Hastings Banda who was the President of Malawi following independence from Britain.

Hoffmann expresses frustration with the inability of Africans to comprehend the Red Cross, and associates this with some essential characteristic of Africans. For example, Hoffmann notes that "neutrality is not a well understood concept in the New World" (Hoffmann, 1964i) and in Angola and Mozambique the "non-European populations show little interest for Red Cross work" (Hoffmann, 1963i). Colonial authorities also reflected racial stereotypes. In a meeting with Colonel Bathgate-Johnston, Chief Doctor of the Federal Armed Forces of Southern Rhodesian, the Colonel "expressed his doubts...that Africans will be able to understand the meaning of the [Geneva] Conventions, even when trying to educate them through simple visual methods" (Hoffmann, 1963d). In another, he discusses the Geneva Conventions with the Portuguese General in charge of the army in colonial Angola. In the General's opinion, "the Portuguese provinces in Africa currently have to deal with enemies who are nothing more than terrorists who, themselves, do not have the slightest intention of respecting international law and rules" (Hoffmann, 1964l). How can soldiers be stopped from carrying out revenge when "they have seen women and children cut to pieces" (Hoffmann, 1964l). As a result "if the Geneva Conventions are promoted, our illegal adversaries, all potential terrorists, would take it as a sign of weakness" (Hoffmann, 1964l). The General didn't want an education program to be conducted on the Geneva Conventions because the
enemies aren't equal to those who believe in the Geneva Conventions, they are "terrorists."

**Tribalism**

Some examples can be found of the characterization of African politics and behaviour as being 'tribal'. Hoffmann describes one conflict in the Congo as "a typical example of the struggle in a tribe, among the officials... [and]... traditional leaders" (Hoffmann, 1963m). He goes on to characterize the tribes as being "sub-divided between Ekundas (people of the forest) and Eswe (people of the prairie). The former are very primitive, and the latter are partly established and has engaged in agriculture, and it even has developed a self-same economic system" (Hoffmann, 1963m). He also talks about the division of this region along tribal lines and after independence how the President of the region was an Eswe and he "naturally" did things to favour his tribe. Madagascar is an exception: "[u]nlike elsewhere in Equatorial Africa, independence in Madagascar has not unleashed tribal rivalries, surprisingly enough since there were serious internal conflicts before the arrival of the French" (Hoffmann, 1963k).

**Resistance**

There is also evidence of both unconscious and active resistance to the Red Cross evident in the material. Resistance can be conceptualized as an active process based upon a conscious awareness of one's position as a subordinate as in, for
example, Fanon's (2004) call for an armed struggle against colonialism. However, there is a more problematized conception of resistance such that it is not only found “in those situations where oppositional activities lead to a thorough overhauling of existing relations of power” (Prasad & Prasad, 2003, p. 102) such as a revolution or armed conflict. Rather, resistance can also be understood as “behaviors and cultural practices by subordinate groups that... threaten to unravel the strategies of domination” and consciousness of this activity on the part of subordinates “need not be essential to its constitution. Seemingly innocuous behaviors can have unintended yet profound consequences for the objectives of the dominant or the shape of a social order” (Haynes & Prakash, 1992, p. 3). Therefore, resistance “is not necessarily an... act of political intention” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 110).

In Mozambique and Angola, I believe that Hoffmann notes an example of such unconscious resistance when he relates the opinion of the President of the Mozambique Red Cross on recruiting African volunteers to the organization. The President believed that it was “extremely difficult to involve the African population due mainly to two strong common impediments: the absence of charity spirit outside family or tribal circles, and people's unwillingness to work as volunteers without a salary” (Hoffmann, 1963g). While this example may be interpreted as certain indifference, I believe that there is sufficient theoretical evidence from the literature to cast it as passive or unconscious resistance. However, there are also examples of more active resistance in the archive. While it isn't in the form of armed struggle, it is a conscious process of resisting the work of the Red Cross on the part
of colonial governments in Africa. These governments argue that they already know enough about the Geneva Conventions in the case of Portuguese Africa (Hoffmann, 1963h) and therefore do not need a program of Red Cross education in the military or the school system. In another example, the South African government argues that ICRC humanitarianism involves interference in their internal affairs, and resists efforts to provide comfort to the families of imprisoned political activists (Hoffmann, 1964b).

**Eurocentrism**

There is evidence of a bias towards Europe and a use of European history to explain conflict in Africa. In an interesting characterization often repeated throughout the archival material, Senn compares the situation of the Asians in Nyasaland to that of the Jews in Central Europe before the beginning of World War 2, when “the [German] nationalists accused the Jews of failing to cooperate with the national aspirations” (Hoffmann, 1963n). Senn compares the President of Nyasaland to Hitler when he concludes that there is no separation between the ruling party and the government, noting that this was exactly what Hitler said after coming to power, and Senn suggests that the results will be similar in Malawi: total suppression (Hoffmann, 1963n).

Another Nazi comparison is made during Hoffmann’s work with the South African government on political prisoners. He wants to use examples from the past to try to convince the South Africans that a political prisoner should be viewed as
distinct from other types of victims. One of the examples he wants to use are the Jews vis-a-vis the Third Reich, who were innocent victims of a political pogrom (Hoffmann, 1963p). He also wants South African officials to perhaps see that their indiscriminate arrests of members of banned groups is similar to the way that "being a member of a banned group was enough to get you arrested (just as being a member of the SS at the end of the war was enough to get you arrested)" (Hoffmann, 1964c). Hoffmann uses examples of his experiences in other European or European-influenced wars, such as the intervention in Korea, to explain what the situation in Africa. He compares the state of the prisoners and the prison camps in Rhodesia to that of the prisoners in the “toughest camps of the Communist Koreans and Chinese in Korea” (Hoffmann, 1964g).

Hoffmann makes extensive use of Swiss consular officials and Swiss citizens resident in African countries. The ICRC is a private Swiss organization, and Hoffmann was a Swiss citizen who capitalizes on both of these facts by regularly seeking out Swiss nationals and consular officials to ask for their opinion on leadership and the political situation within countries. Various reviews of the ICRC confirm this observation about its use of and by Swiss political authorities (Forsythe, 2005, 2007; Gabriel & Gasser, 2003). There are seven letters in the archival material examined where Swiss officials or citizens are consulted in the course of Hoffmann’s work (Hoffmann, 1963b, 1963e, 1963i, 1963r, 1964a, 1964h, 1964j). This reliance seems to affect the work of the ICRC in Africa: in one example, Swiss diplomatic officials caution Hoffmann to not speak to Sudanese officials about
the rebellion in southern Sudan, and Hoffmann heeds the advice (Hoffmann, 1964j). Another example finds the Swiss ambassador to Ethiopia advising against a visit to Somalia because the Ethiopians might become suspicious (Hoffmann, 1964h). Swiss political influence on ICRC operations is evident as Hoffmann notes that the Swiss Chargé d'Affaires in the Congo was not keen to have the ICRC delegation closed (Hoffmann, 1963b).

The Red Cross in Biafra

I will now move on to a later period in the history of humanitarianism that is central to the idea of a rupture or change in the concept. Through an investigation of existing histories and the physical archives of the Red Cross, I will show that the Biafran war of 1966-1972 stood at the intersection of multiple trajectories and thus is a prime candidate for the investigation of emergences and change. These include the overlay of emancipation from colonialism with an internal war of secession and the mass communication of images of starvation. Most importantly for purposes of this dissertation, the conduct of the war made significant challenges and changes to so-called traditional humanitarian organizations. I first will give an overview of the Biafran conflict through an examination of various accounts of the event that depict the war as a conflict in a post-independence former colony. I will describe accounts of the response to the conflict by humanitarian organizations. Then, through an examination of the archive of the Red Cross, I will show how the organization began the response to the war in its usual way, but I will argue that it was uniquely
unprepared for the postcolonial nature of the conflict. I believe that it is because of the failure of the established humanitarian approach in Biafra that a space was created for resistance and change to these taken-for-granted nature humanitarian approaches.

The first task, though, is to try and triangulate on what is commonly accepted as the series of events constituting the Biafran War of 1966 to 1970. This is necessary because the conflict has been variously referred to as an independence war, a genocide, and a struggle against the remnants of colonialism (Diamond, 2007; Heerten, 2009; de Montclos, 2009). Therefore, to avoid favouring one particular characterization, I instead will include an examination of these various claims with the goal of showing the context of the conflict. This will set the stage for an examination of the role of humanitarian organizations in responding to the war.

**Nigeria – Independence and Conflict**

Nigerian independence from Britain was in 1960 and a nominally democratic, civilian government ruled in this post-colonial period (Meredith, 2005). Existing histories of Nigeria seem to agree that the country, like others in colonial Africa, had pre-independence borders that served colonial interests, did not reflect the cultural divisions that existed within countries, and in fact set the stage for future conflict (Meredith, 2005; Post, 1968). The histories of Nigeria seem to emphasize that the progression from independence was a path of increasing chaos; in other words, the Biafran conflict was the largest of multiple internal conflicts.
The first of these conflicts was a coup in 1966 that put in place a military government (Diamond, 2007). At the beginning of this 1966 conflict, Nigeria contained a population of some 57 million speaking three main languages and with somewhat irreconcilable differences in culture (Post, 1968). The histories of this period in Nigeria also want to emphasize that for reasons of expediency and efficient administration on the part of former colonial governors, there was an unequal division of political power such that one cultural group was favoured in the politics of the country (Diamond, 2007; Meredith, 2005). Finally, the presence of oil added a complexity to the conflict. The southeastern region of Nigeria possessed (and continues to possess) oil resources, but it was peopled by a minority ethnic group known as the Igbo (Post, 1968). This oil-bearing region of the southeast would become known as Biafra following the war of secession. Therefore, that the borders of an independent Nigeria were somewhat arbitrary served well the aspirations of people within the country who read the ‘true’ demarcation of the country somewhat differently than those in power in the capital. Thus, the war in Biafra was characterized in this instance as being a struggle against the old remnants of the colonial past. Post (1968, p. 30) summarizes the situation by saying that “[t]he weakness of the Nigerian political system...was that it never developed centripetal forces capable of counteracting the centrifugal ones.” The flying apart of the pieces of the Nigerian state had its zenith in the secession of Biafra in 1967.

The specific events of the beginning of the Biafran war have been detailed numerous times (see for example Kirk-Greene & Wrigley (1970); Meredith (2005);
Gribbin (1973)). In summary, these existing accounts detail the declaration of independence in 1967 by those in the east of Nigeria followed closely by a declaration of war on Biafra by the military government of what is referred to as 'federal Nigeria.' In the ensuing conflict, the overwhelming military power of federal Nigeria stacked the odds against the Biafrans causing de Montclos (2009) to claim that the conflict should have ended as quickly as it started. However, the official endpoint of the war was in 1970 (Heerten, 2009; de Montclos, 2009). The Biafrans were effectively surrounded by federal Nigeria, and there was no way out either by land or sea. What then prolonged the war? While recognizing that existing histories are part of the discourse of humanitarianism during the Biafra conflict, these same histories point to several factors contributing to the war. One account emphasizes the dogged determination of the Biafrans and characterizes it as a heroic, nation-building struggle with everyone, including children, contributing (Diamond, 2007). Another was the proxy Cold War that was fought throughout Africa in Nigeria and other countries such as Angola, Mozambique, and the Congo (de Montclos, 2009). Outside nations on either side of the Cold War divide supplied additional materiel and resources to the Biafrans that enabled them to extend their resistance. The eventual military success of Nigeria was through attrition: after 30 months of blockade, the population within Biafra was faced with shortages of food, currency, and commodities (Falola, 2008), while the Nigerian Army mounted final and decisive attacks that forced the Biafran leader to flee to a third country (Times, 1970). Claims were made that the war was genocidal, given what appeared to be
specific targeting of an identifiable group through the use of starvation; however, these claims were never substantiated because it was found that both sides in the conflict were responsible for the starvation (Moorehead, 1999). Before the Biafran rebellion collapsed, humanitarian organizations and humanitarian individuals maintained a sustained effort to prevent starvation and render aid to soldiers and the civilian population.

**Biafra and Humanitarianism**

De Waal (1997, p. 73) contends that “an entire generation of NGO relief workers was moulded by Biafra” and that it is both “totem and taboo... totemic...because it was an unsurpassed effort in terms of logistical achievement and sheer physical courage...taboo...[because] the ethical issues that it raises have still to be faced”. Biafra was “the first humanitarian effort dominated by NGOs” (Alexander De Waal, 1997, p. 73) and while the ICRC receives the credit for the organization of the relief effort, the combined efforts of church groups in providing aid must not be forgotten. In fact, the Joint Church Aid (JCA) delivered an amount of aid that was “surpassed only by the Berlin airlift” (De Waal, 1997, p. 73). The war itself was of no great interest initially to the press or to people outside of Nigeria (Alexander De Waal, 1997). However, the key to its eventual impact on the world was the simplification of the complexity of the conflict through images of starving children that were reminiscent of Nazi concentration camps (De Waal, 1997). Not only did this provide the motivation for people to do something for the distant,
suffering stranger, but it enabled the Biafran rebel combatants to seize upon something with which they could promote their cause (De Waal, 1997).

At one extreme, the humanitarian intervention influenced the conflict by prolonging it through the provision of food, medicine, and foreign currency to the Biafrans who were, by all accounts, surrounded by the military forces of federal Nigeria and effectively blockaded. It has therefore been argued that the natural end point of the war was extended by this outside help and thus the suffering was the direct cause of humanitarianism (de Montclos, 2009). The success of the humanitarian response as evidenced through the volume of financial resources contributed can be attributed to the claim that the Biafran war was a personal war: people witnessed images and appeals through direct media such as television and advertisements in newspapers that utilized the image of starving children to motivate action on the part of those outside of the war (Perham, 1970). If you like, the recipe for humanitarian action (Haskell, 1985a) was abundantly clear and accessible. The largest and most scrutinized of these organizations was the ICRC.

In Biafra, the archives of the Red Cross reveal several themes that will be investigated in some detail. First, there was a struggle for control between the ICRC and the Nigerian government and also with other parts of the Red Cross organization. This struggle was for control of the meaning of the war, as well as for the control of the humanitarian operation. Often, it appears as if the struggle for control extended to the recipients of aid as they were blamed as being part of the humanitarian problem in Nigeria. Second, the war in Biafra was an exceptional
event that justified the lack of success that the Red Cross had in convincing the Nigerian government and the Biafran rebels to respect the Geneva Conventions, and the Red Cross authority. Third, colonial attitudes regarding Africa surfaced in the organizational practices of the Red Cross. Finally is the emergence of elements of *sans-frontièrisme* in the attitude of the Red Cross.

**A Struggle for Control**

Biafra was a war fought between soldiers ‘on the ground’ but also between competing interests of the ICRC, the Nigerian Red Cross, the Nigerian and the Biafran governments. I have included the documents examined as evidence of this struggle in Table 1 (below). The struggle was not just over land, but it also included a struggle over the meaning of the war and over control of the massive relief operation. As the literature continually emphasizes (Forsythe, 2005, 2007; de Montclos, 2009; Moorehead, 1999) this was a highly televised and public conflict, with highly emotive imagery influencing public perceptions of the war. So the public pressure on governments and the ICRC to ‘do something’ was enormous. For example, the archives show that “general sympathy went towards the Churches, whose action appeared much more effective, and they were consequently gathering in more and more gifts” (ICRC, 1969a, p. 6). Further, there were problems in how the Western public perceived the Red Cross. For example, there was a “loss of confidence in the Red Cross among the Finnish general public” and the “American public...were in the same state of mind of those other countries” (ICRC, 1969a, p. 7).
As a result there were huge opportunities for the Biafran and Nigerian governments, as well as the Red Cross, to control the public's perception of the war. Biafra, through its use of a public relations firm, took out advertisements in major newspapers and on television to convince people that genocide was taking place, and to argue for the correctness of their independence cause. This aspect of the struggle for control has been well covered in the literature (Forsythe, 2005; Gribbin, 1973; Moorehead, 1999; Perham, 1970). However, an examination of archival material from the Red Cross also reveals a struggle between the Nigerian Red Cross and the ICRC for control of the operation. The existing literature seems to explain the conflict between the Nigerian government and the ICRC as being due to the use of the relief operation to transport weapons and other war materiel. The archival material from the Red Cross extends this explanation. It shows that the Nigerian government was interested in controlling both the meaning of the relief operation as well as the physical operation of relief, and the Nigerian Red Cross was a component of that effort to control the operation.

The Nigerian Red Cross

In its final review of the relief operation, the Nigerian Red Cross (NRC) stated that the war was complex and had multiple stages (NRC, n.d.). The NRC also stated that the "relief operation did not start with the declaration of war, it started as far back as 1963 during the flood disaster at Abeokuta" (RCRCC, 1968: 2) and that it
was the NRC that made the request for “experts to come and ascertain the type of assistance needed” (RCRCC, 1968, p. 2). The NRC “started the relief action alone, but had to secure the support of other Agencies to ensure effective operation” (RCRCC, 1968, p. 3). All this seems to be an effort at re-narrating the story of the conflict and relief effort so that it belongs more to the NRC and to Nigerians. It recasts the story from one where outside experts make decisions, and where the war and the relief effort are one and the same to one where the NRC called for outside expertise and where the war and relief operation exist under circumstances different from what those outside Nigeria might think. In effect, the Nigerian Red Cross tries to influence the narrative such that it becomes viewed as a stable organization in the midst of crisis. This stability extended to the ability of Nigerians to run the relief operation: the President of the NRC, Chief Ade Ojo, was in attendance at a meeting of senior Red Cross officials in Geneva when the topic of the disproportionate number of expatriate relief workers in the operation was raised. Ojo complained that the NRC had not been approached to help with the work, and disagreed with the low numbers of Nigerian staff quoted in situation reports (ICRC, 1969a, p. 4).

The ICRC

For its part, the ICRC attempted to exert control through its access to donors, resources, and its responsibility under International Humanitarian Law (the Geneva Conventions). It was “thanks to large scale technical assistance which had been
provided for several years by Scandinavian Red Cross Societies [that] the Nigerian Red Cross was able to work throughout the whole territory” (ICRC, 1970, p. 2). The ICRC “sent in delegations... to ensure that supplies and financial assistance, as are provided are put to the best use possible, and in accordance with the wishes of donor Societies” (RCRCC, 1968, p. 6). The International Red Cross also exerted its financial control and authority through visits of the LRCS’s financial controller who “paid a visit to Nigeria during which he had the opportunity to have a look into the financial situation and also to advise the [NRC] in the procedure of financial control” (LRCS, 1970, p. 4). Therefore, the International Red Cross acted as a gatekeeper of resources: “the ultimate authority for planning, finance and administration... was exercised by the ICRC Headquarters in Geneva” (NRC, n.d., p. 5). It was also up to the International Red Cross to decide who gets aid as “the Red Cross must see that only the needy receive relief in proportion to their degree of need based on medical intervention” (LRCS, 1970, p. 1). There were agreements in place at the international level that prevented the NRC from directly appealing to donor societies. In response to a letter sent by the NRC to all Red Cross national societies, the Secretary-General of the LRCS responded regretfully that “[y]ou know our sympathy for the cause of Nigeria and how much we want to be helpful” but “[t]here is... an agreement in force between the ICRC and the League, and you know that the ICRC have insisted that owing to the specific circumstances in Nigeria...the matter of relief to victims...should be handled by the International Committee” (Beer, 1968). It was also the ICRC that influenced the human resources used in the operation as
"the rule followed in the ICRC's close cooperation with the Nigerian Red Cross was not to place a non-African in a post until after it had been ascertained that it could not be filled by an African" (ICRC, 1969a, p. 5). Many archival documents show the ICRC's attempt to exert control through the Geneva Conventions. For example, the ICRC "draws attention to the principles...embodied in the 1949 Geneva Conventions which today are universal... the ICRC expects instructions to be given... that these rules shall be strictly applied in all circumstances" (ICRC, 1969b). In the "relief operation which the ICRC is conducting" it "expects governments and responsible authorities to enable it to continue" the operation (ICRC, 1969b). There was also an expectation that victims should behave in a certain fashion, and the struggle for control extended to placing them at fault for not behaving correctly. For example, August Lindt, the ICRC's chief delegate for the operation, noted that "[it] must be avoided...creating a refugee mentality among the beneficiaries of relief, i.e. that they become accustomed to receiving supplies without working for their subsistence. Otherwise they would end up by enjoying this situation" (ICRC, 1969a, p. 2). This sentiment echoes with an earlier time and a different context: during the Irish famine of 1845-1849, Charles Trevelyan (the British relief administrator) noted that "dependence on charity is not to be made an agreeable way of life" but it should be made "as unattractive and difficult to obtain as possible" (Woodham-Smith, 2008, p. 65). Finally, the International Red Cross and the non-Nigerian donors decided when the emergency was over: "Mr. Sverre Kilde of the Norwegian Red Cross...
maintained that as the emergency phase was over Red Cross action should be considered as concluded" (NRC, n.d., p. 5).

*Government of Nigeria / Citizens*

The Nigerian Government also attempted to control the operation. It did so by controlling access to the country, declaring that it alone would be responsible for the operation, and requiring aid workers to undergo a Nigerian familiarization program prior to beginning work. Controlling physical access was accomplished through the military and it reminded "citizens and the international community that the total economic blockade of the rebel-held areas...remains in force...The Federal Government will not therefore bear responsibility for any attempt to break the blockade" (NRC, n.d., p. 5). This move was designed to ensure that "relief organizations will not operate in such a way as to threaten the security or flout the sovereignty of Nigeria" (NRC, n.d., p. 5). It also controlled access by restricting the movement of relief workers into the country and required that "the Federal Government...must...be kept fully informed about the activities of all voluntary relief organizations...the recruitment of expatriate...staff will be undertaken with the prior approval of [the Government]" (NRC, n.d., p. 5). The Nigerian Government assumed "full control and co-ordination over all relief agencies in the country" and "[n]o relief agency will henceforth be allowed to contribute to relief operations in Nigeria" (NRC, n.d., p. 5) without the approval of the government. It instituted an education campaign for foreign Red Cross workers such that they were given "a
realistic picture of the problems confronting Nigeria...against the background of past and recent history" (RCRCC, 1968, p. 8). For its part, the Nigerian Government was also blaming the victims for the conflict's outcome. In its 'Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces' it stated that "[y]ouths and school children must not be attacked unless they are engaged in open hostility against Federal Government Forces" (Federal Republic of Nigeria, n.d.). Meanwhile, the general population was beginning to resent the refugees: "refugees are living intermingled with the local villagers... the distinction between refugee and villager is becoming increasingly difficult to make and there is growing evidence that the villagers are beginning to resent the special status of a refugee" (ICRC, 1969d).

**Table 1:** Documents examined to provide evidence of a struggle between organizations over the Biafra conflict.

| 1. Nigerian Relief Action: A Report of the Nigerian Red Cross Society |
| 2. Statement by Mr. August Lindt - Press Release No. 987b (ICRC) |
| 3. Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces (Nigerian Army) |
| 4. The Nigerian Red Cross Society: The Present Situation and the potentialities for further development of the Society - Background to the Three Year Plan 1968-1970 (Nigerian Red Cross (NRC)) |
| 5. Nigerian Relief Action: A Report of the Nigerian Red Cross Society |
| 6. A Review of the Relief Operation (Nigerian Red Cross) |
| 7. Programme of Assistance to the Nigerian Red Cross on behalf of the needy population in Nigeria: Plan and Budget 1 December - 31 March 1970 (NRC) |
| 10. The ICRC refutes the accusations levelled against Dr. Lindt (ICRC) |
| 11. Press Release No. 1053b - The Civil War Having Finished, the ICRC ends its Mission in Nigeria (ICRC) |
| 12. To Mr. Sverre Kilde: Mission to Nigerian Red Cross Society as Resettlement Expert (LRCS) |
| 13. Minutes of the Meeting Organized for the National Red Cross Societies Interested in Red Cross Action in Aid of Victims of the Conflict in Nigeria (ICRC/LRCS) |
| 14. Letter from League to Nigerian Red Cross (LRCS) |
| 15. Nigerian Red Cross Relief Operation - March 1970 (Nigerian Red Cross) |
Exceptional Circumstances

The ICRC, the Nigerian Government, and the Nigerian Red Cross make reference to the exceptional circumstances of the conflict. This claim was made in connection with various perceived or real failures of the organizations to achieve their intended goals.

The ICRC

For the ICRC, the exceptional nature of the conflict was used to explain why the Geneva Conventions were not followed, and why there was so much suffering despite the intervention of the organization. The relief coordinator for the ICRC argued that "resettlement and rehabilitation is not normally considered one of the Red Cross activities. However, it has been done in some countries where all normal administration and authorities have broken down, and no other agencies were able to carry out plans for resettlement" (Kilde, 1966, p. 1, my emphasis added). There were other limitations based on the exceptional circumstances of a civil war: "Article 9 of the first three [Geneva] conventions...does not really provide for the right of humanitarian initiative. Rather, it clears away the obstacles to the exercise of an initiative based upon an intangible spirit" (Samuels, 1975, p. 11). Nevertheless, the ICRC went "beyond the normal scope of its duties under the Geneva Conventions" and "set up one of the largest relief organizations in Red Cross history" (ICRC, 1970, p. 1). Despite this large operation, the ICRC was "bound by the Geneva Conventions" and "had no alternative but to negotiate with both parties [the
Federal Government and the Biafrans] to try and reach an agreement on an airlift during daylight... the belligerents could not agree" (ICRC, 1970, p. 2). The result of this lack of agreement, due to the exceptional circumstances of the war, was that the ICRC was limited in what it could do, and eventually it was forced to end its operation. Just to be clear: for the ICRC the war was exceptional because the organization was involved in rehabilitation work that it normally did not undertake; this included mass feeding of civilians. It was also exceptional in that a party to the conflict was not a recognized State, and that neither the recognized Nigerian government nor the unrecognized Biafran government consistently extended protections to citizens affected by the conflict; in other words, civilians were neglected deliberately. Certainly the ICRC had experience in other civil wars. For example, it was involved in the Spanish Civil War for at least three years, and there it also faced the problem of not having legal sanction to assist civilian populations (Moorehead, 1998; Forsythe, 2006). Overall, it seems that the conditions of the war caused humanitarianism to break down, not that humanitarianism (through the Geneva Conventions) didn’t work for a particular set of circumstances. This is more clearly stated by the LRCS when it observed that “[t]he structure of the ‘Biafran’ forces, with their military, para-military militia and civil defence units...made a ‘regular warfare’, abiding to the Geneva Conventions, nearly impossible. This made it difficult for the Federal Forces, also, to exercise ‘regular warfare’ and brought about retaliations. These conditions caused a break-down of basic humanitarian
principles at several occasions, a fact that will have influence on the Red Cross post-war work" (LRCS, 1968, p. 17).

*The Nigerian Red Cross*

The NRC also made the operation out to be unprecedented and unique. It stated that "[n]ever before in the history of the League [of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies] was a young Red Cross Society entrusted with so much cash and resources within such a very short time" (NRC, n.d., p. 13). It reminds us that it “had to embark upon several disaster relief operations” and not just the war relief effort such that the combined events have “drained the resources of the Society” (Ademola, 1968, p. 1). In addition, it claimed that “the Nigerian Red Cross Society had managed the situation alone as best as it could. It was a very heavy burden on the young Society” (RCRCC, 1968, p. 7). Further, it urged people to realize that “the nature of the disturbance was such that it could easily destroy any voluntary organization whose members had different tribal, political, social and religious affiliations. In the light of this, the operation must be regarded as a great success and a credit to the young Society” (NRC, n.d., p. 13). The outcome of the operation must be judged differently because the “Red Cross is not sufficiently known in any part of this country to be readily accepted on its face value and quality” (NRC, n.d., p. 7).
Government of Nigeria

The Nigerian Government too appealed to exceptional circumstances in its narration of the conflict and relief operation. With reference to the conduct of its military, it stated that the “Nigerian Armed Forces... have established a very high international reputation for high discipline...until the events of 15th January, 1966 spoilt that reputation” (Federal Republic of Nigeria, n.d.). Those events were, of course, the rebellion that created Biafra.

Colonialism

The archive reveals colonial attitudes regarding Africa that surfaced during the relief operation. These attitudes included a legitimization of the colonial borders of Nigeria, that the Red Cross had a ‘duty to care’ for victims, an essentializing of Africa, and resistance by the recipients of aid as well as by the post-colonial Nigerian government.

The ICRC and the International Red Cross

The archival material reveals an essentialization of Africa. This included broad generalizations about the nature of Nigeria and Nigerians. For example, the ICRC believed that in Africa “it was easier than in Europe for displaced persons to
resettle and speedily become self-supporting, owing to the free land available and the quick harvests" (ICRC, 1969a, p. 2). This reflected the terra nullius (Fitzmaurice, 2007; Marten, 2004) conceptualization of Africa that believed that because the land on the continent was not under anyone's direct control or ownership (according to European notions of ownership), the land was therefore free from political or social claims and available to be settled. The League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (LRCS) was the name given to the precursor of today's International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The LRCS observed that the "scope for health services is unlimited in a developing country" (LRCS, 1968, p. 12) but "tribal antagonism made Red Cross work impossible in some places" (LRCS, 1968, p. 8). That the ICRC believed it had a duty to care is evident in the archival material. First, the organization had taken on the burden of costs that was "particularly difficult and heavy owing to [the ICRC's] character" (ICRC, 1969a, p. 6). It had "a responsibility to so many governments" and "appealed to the parties involved in the conflict to see to it that its impartial work of charity meets no further hindrance" (ICRC, 1969c). The International Red Cross "must see that only the needy receive relief in proportion to their degree of need" (LRCS, 1970, p. 1) but it also emphasized that it had "so far saved the lives of more than two and a half million innocent victims of war. The ICRC expects governments and responsible authorities to enable it to continue doing so until peace is restored" (ICRC, 1969b).
In a statement that is parallel to those made about African nation-states leading up to and following independence, the NRC believes that it “had managed the situation [the relief operation] alone as best as it could. It was a very heavy burden on the young Society” (RCRCC, 1968, p. 7). Similar statements were made by post-colonial governments regarding their apprehensiveness in ‘taking over’ from the colonial administration (Meredith, 2005).

Government of Nigeria and the Victims of the Conflict

The archival material reveals resistance on the part of the government and citizens of Nigeria. This resistance has also been examined earlier as a struggle for control. However, as an element of colonialism, it can also be included here. The resistance is found in the whole operation to remove the ICRC from controlling the relief operation, but it can also be found in the general population. Sverre Kilde, a LRCS delegate, noted that displaced persons had “formed their own association with a committee in each of the Provinces and they are working in close connection with the provincial officials. This association may turn out to be an advantage in the way it may be easier to collaborate. But on the other hand this association can be a heavy pressure group” (Kilde, 1966, p. 2). Perhaps part of this resistance was played out in the demand for familiar food: wheat flour, a gift from Australia, was not readily used because of “low consumer acceptance” (ICRC, 1969e) and Nigerians complained about “the foreign food being imported and their inability to prepare
them" (RCRCC, 1968, p. 9). Even the Geneva Conventions were resisted and adapted to the Nigerian context. The Nigerian Armed Forces adopted a "Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces" that was based on the Geneva Conventions, but held out certain specific exceptions such as mercenaries who "will not be spared: they are the worst of enemies" or youths and school children who "must not be attacked unless they are engaged in open hostility" (Federal Republic of Nigeria, n.d.).

Emergence of Sans-frontièrism

The archives reveals an admission by the Red Cross that "[o]ur present system of food distribution, that of distributing food on the basis of a persons status as a refugee or displaced person, may not be the optimal system" (ICRC, 1969d). August Lindt, its senior delegate responsible for the operation, notes on the eve of his forced departure from Nigeria that "it was not assistance to governments which was required, but to victims wherever they were and whatever their ethnic origin" (ICRC, 1969c). The archives also reveal that the Red Cross believed that "the Nigerian relief action was a good example that a new machinery must be created making quicker actions possible" (Beer, 1968). These may be signs that the organization has started to move away from operating strictly on international humanitarian law, or from inflexible principles, towards a more objective appreciation of the suffering of individuals who are not directly part of the conflict. This was accomplished, for example, through "objective criteria rather than a physician's subjective opinion of malnutrition" (ICRC, 1969d). These are the
beginnings of a divide in humanitarianism from which the notion of sans-frontierism will emerge.

Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have examined the archival material of the Red Cross as it relates to its activities in Africa just prior to and following decolonization; in particular, I looked at the Biafra conflict and the Red Cross involvement in that war. The war in Biafra was portrayed as an exceptional event that justified the lack of success that the Red Cross had in convincing the Nigerian government and the Biafran rebels to respect the Geneva Conventions, and the Red Cross authority. I have also demonstrated certain colonial attitudes regarding Africa that surfaced in the organizational practices of the Red Cross, as well as the emergence of elements of sans-frontièresism in the attitude of the Red Cross. In Africa just prior to decolonization, we find several themes. The first was a concern with the methods of Red Cross operation within Africa. This included indoctrination, intelligence gathering, and the Swiss influence on the organization. Second was the display of colonial attitudes towards Africa and Africans. This included racial stereotypes, the use of tribalism as an explanation, and generalizations about Africa and Africans. There is also evidence of resistance to colonialism. Finally, the letters revealed the use of Eurocentric paradigms and history to explain African phenomenon.
Chapter 5 - MSF

MSF – Results from the Archive

In my methodology chapter, I discussed the resistance I encountered in gaining access to the physical archives of MSF International in Geneva, as well as the MSF sections in France and Canada. Unlike the International Committee of the Red Cross or the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, MSF does not have a central archives or a publicly available policy setting out terms of access to its materials. This is perhaps not surprising given that MSF is a loosely organized group of European and North American sections, each operating independently and each producing its own annual report. So to understand MSF’s contribution to the discourse of humanitarianism, I elected to examine a range of publicly available texts that were available on various MSF websites. These included 16 issues of the internal newsletter of MSF France (from 2001 to 2007), together with annual reports from MSF International (from 2005 and 2008) and MSF France (from 2003, 2008, and 2009), speeches made by MSF executives, activity reports by MSF sections, and various policy statements and documents. In addition, external reports prepared for donor agencies were examined, as were some existing histories and peer-reviewed academic articles on MSF; the latter of these texts were often written by current or ex-MSF decision-makers.

In examining these texts, I have selected a number of themes that illustrate MSF’s contribution to the discourse of humanitarianism. One theme is self-criticism (or a troubled conscience according to Redfield (2001)) and critique of the
humanitarian system in which it is enmeshed. I will, however, first look at how MSF defines humanitarianism. The organization, as evidenced through the texts examined, seems to spend considerable effort in coming to terms with the idea of humanitarianism and how it is interpreted by MSF workers and misinterpreted by other organizations and states.

**Defining Humanitarianism in MSF: Simple...**

The texts examined show that MSF seeks to define and interpret humanitarianism according to its own experiences and depending upon the context in which a crisis occurs. It uses these interpretations to set boundaries around its involvement in responding to disasters and war but also to help define MSF as an organization. What is humanitarianism for MSF? As I moved through the publicly available archival material, the definition ranges from clarity to contradiction. At one end of the spectrum, things are enunciated as being clear, simple, and taken-for-granted. This simplicity is found in MSF's enunciation that it follows the principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). These principles hold that victims have the right “to receive assistance” and the same principles hold the “right of humanitarian organizations to provide assistance” (MSF, 1997). The IHL also “bestows [emphasis added] certain rights and protections” (Fournier, 2009) onto humanitarian organizations such as MSF including “free evaluation of needs, free access to victims, control over the distribution of humanitarian aid and the respect for humanitarian immunity” (MSF, 1997). Through these humanitarian principles comes a duty to “address human beings regardless of their side... no matter their
race, religion, ethnicity or allegiance" (Fournier, 2009). The alleviation of suffering is applied to the global population: one of MSF’s publicity slogans in the 1970s was that they had “two billion people in our waiting room” and later that “[t]he world was their waiting room” (Michael & Kapur, 2005). These slogans reflect MSF’s belief that people are waiting for them, and that they can extend their professional expertise to the world. The two billion people are of course the population that are or could potentially be affected by conflict and disaster, the majority of which are not in Western countries. The slogan suggests that there is an inequality that needs to be addressed. Therefore, for MSF humanitarianism is clearly “premised on the equal worth of all human beings” (F Terry, 2001, p. 1431). Additional principles guiding its work include the right to conduct an independent assessment of humanitarian situations, and monitoring the effectiveness of interventions (Biberson & Jean, 1999). Humanitarianism has an “essential motivation in the principle of humanity” (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002, p. 491) upon which MSF relies for definition in the humanity principle of the International Federation of the Red Cross: “the desire to prevent and alleviate human suffering” (IFRC in Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002, p. 491).

From these principles flow an organizational practice that is in agreement with the accepted view of disasters and conflict as temporary setbacks to progress (Alexander, 2006) in that MSF’s form of humanitarianism “aims to build spaces of normalcy in the midst of what is profoundly abnormal” (Orbinski, 1999). In this sense MSF “desperately” clings to a “simplistic model of the relief-rehabilitation-
development continuum that emerged from the studies of natural disasters" but is "rarely applicable in the new complex world order" (Michael & Kapur, 2005). For example, in accepting the 1999 Nobel Prize for Peace, MSF uses a mixture of conviction and contradiction that provide insight into its understanding of humanitarianism. This is best exemplified in the text when it is argued that as a civil society organization, MSF exists “relative to the state, to its institutions and its power” and that it will not “displace the responsibility of the state” nor will it “allow a humanitarian alibi to mask the state responsibility to ensure justice and security... Only the state has the legitimacy and power to do this” (Orbinski, 1999). However, “[h]umanitarianism occurs where the political has failed or is in crisis” and “[h]umanitarian responsibility has no frontiers. Wherever in the world there is manifest distress, the humanitarian, by vocation, must respond” (Orbinski, 1999).

In other words, humanitarianism is an end onto itself (Salignon, 2005) as MSF only should “heal people for the sake of healing people” and so its goal is “a fairly simple one... to help people survive the devastations of war” (Fournier, 2009) and provide “aid to its victims” (Weissmann, 2005). Its overall intent is to alleviate suffering (Fournier, 2009; Terry, 1999; Tong, 2004) through the practice of medicine and through the individual medical act that takes place between doctor and patient (Michael & Kapur, 2005; MSF, 1997; Taithe, 2004). This act makes the humanitarian “vulnerable” (Fournier, 2009) in the face of overwhelming firepower of armies, and his action is simple in that they are “armed with nothing more than... stethoscopes... medicines... and bandages” (Fournier, 2009). But MSF’s medical
armaments also include the "clarity of their image. It must reflect their position as outsiders to the conflict and the transparency of their intentions" (Weissmann, 2005).

For MSF, the real outsiders and those with an understanding of the true nature of humanitarianism are the disobedient French. It is disobedient because humanitarianism "can find itself in conflict with authorities, whether official or rebel, in its attempt to provide impartial assistance to populations who are in danger" (MSF, 2004). Disobedience is an essential quality of humanitarianism because "by its very essence humanitarian work involves being in tension with authorities, being subversive, and taking responsibility" (Jeannerod, 2005). It is decidedly French because "disobedient humanitarianism has Latin roots, whereby there tends to be an adversarial relationship between NGOs and governmental powers" (Michael & Kapur, 2005, p. 14; Tong, 2004). At least one MSF worker and author believes that this Latin vision is "the most coherent vision" because it "tends to bring a problem out into the public and assert itself despite tensions with authorities" (Vilasanjuan, 2005). However, there is another version of humanitarianism with which MSF struggles: the Anglo-Saxon version. This ideal "promotes in-depth analysis and the assembling of complete dossiers and favour direct relations with authorities" (Vilasanjuan, 2005).

In contrast to what humanitarianism is, MSF is equally clear on what humanitarianism is not. It is so clear on this that one MSF worker suggested that they "put restrictions on the use of the label 'humanitarian'" (Vallet, 2004a). This
reflects MSF’s belief that humanitarianism should not be complicated by things such as human rights, justice, economic betterment or any other development-oriented goals. For MSF, it is not humanitarian to “build state and government legitimacy or to strengthen governmental structures... to promote democracy or capitalism or women’s rights... to defend human rights... Nor does humanitarian action involve the work of economic development, post-conflict reconstruction, or the establishment of functioning health systems” (Fournier, 2009). Thus, aid agencies are confused and don’t understand what humanitarianism is all about because they are “often announcing themselves as humanitarian” but “they are actually geared towards supporting peace, good governance, justice, sustainable development, gender equality, and so on” (Fournier, 2009). Adding to the confusion is the belief by some that humanitarianism is “the continuation of humanitarian aid by other means” (Weissmann, 2005); that is, through armed intervention carried out by militaries to protect or help populations. This is exemplified through attempts by governments to intervene in the humanitarian world through their belief that “war can be the continuation of humanitarian aid by other means... [s]uch actions include assisting and protecting ‘good victims’... imposing economic sanctions, dropping bombs, and invading and occupying nations ‘guilty of massive violations of human rights.’ Consequently, organizations that take this position have no objection to supporting ‘just wars’ and serving the governments that pursue them” (Weissmann, 2005).
...But Complex

Despite MSF’s above opposition to the ‘just’ war, it is not fundamentally opposed to war itself. In a speech to NATO officials, the President of MSF International reassured the assembled that “MSF is neither pacifist nor antimilitary... We do not stand in judgment of either your objectives or those of your enemies... humanitarian actors such as MSF are not opposed to war [but] we are strongly committed to non-violent modes of action in the delivery of aid” (Fournier, 2009). Indeed, MSF “[does] not deny that in certain cases military action contributes to improving the fate of a population” (Bradol, 2004a). Therefore, there is much in the MSF archive that problematizes the clarity and simplicity of principles and confounds any straightforward definition of humanitarianism. For example, although according to MSF the delivery of humanitarianism is based on the equality of all, the practice of humanitarianism is dependent upon and often requires inequality. For example one author believes that “humanitarian work is intrinsically linked to expatriate status” (Vallet, 2004b) and the image portrayed of humanitarian workers by humanitarian organizations must “reflect their position as outsiders to the conflict” in order to show “the transparency of their intentions” (Weissmann, 2005). MSF has suggested that to be a humanitarian is to be vulnerable and requires sharing “times of danger” (Raynaud, 2005) with those MSF tries to help; but there is inequality in this vulnerability because the “people we try to help... are far, far more vulnerable than MSF could ever be” (Fournier, 2009). This notion of equality is but one principle that is open to interpretation as MSF is a principled
organization but it operates individually and the individual decides on action. As much as the principles are extremely important, MSF is not naive and has to be pragmatic in certain contexts. For MSF "every decision is a singular act and not made by the mechanical application of principles" (MSF, 1997) and it "encourages the idea that principles be debated in their context" (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002). It is the individual humanitarian worker that takes principles and translates how they are used in practice: "the implementation of principles in humanitarian action is patterned by organisational culture where all actors use their own agency to learn, redefine, and negotiate what happens" (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002). MSF as an organization is flexible with its principles as it "intervenes by choice – not obligation or conscription – and may decide not to be present in all crises" (MSF, 1997).

In practice, this process of defining humanitarianism results in MSF's decisions on when to get into and out of a disaster. Thus, MSF reserves the right to decide what is and is not a disaster and often is frustrated that other organizations, states, and sections of MSF itself take a contradictory position. One example that clearly describes this approach is that some sections of MSF:

"consider that a 'population without access to treatment' represents a reason for intervention in itself. We [the French section of MSF] believe that it is a consequence of a humanitarian issue, such as an epidemic, a conflict, a natural disaster... which lead us to intervene to assist populations excluded from treatment as a result of a crisis. But if, at the end of the crisis, the population as a whole is still excluded from treatment because of defects in the health system or the collapse of the country's economy, for example, we do not consider it within our realm of responsibility, unlike other sections. Take, for example, our decision to withdraw from Burundi. The country is experiencing
a post-conflict situation and suffers from widespread political and economic instability. This combination of events results in exclusion from treatment, which is made all the more serious because the population has to pay for that treatment. Is it our "humanitarian" responsibility to change the Burundian health system? For us, the answer obviously is no!" (Bertoletti & Godain, 2005).

The problem seems to be that humanitarianism requires contrast between crisis and normality. When faced with a population that "suffers the same fate as the excluded people that the MSF programme is designed to address, how do you set operational limits?" (Guibert, 2007). These types of non-humanitarian programs driven by "emotional impulse" (Guibert, 2007) that MSF would not consider responding to include changes to "the internal rules of an institution for children" or working "with actors in civilian society in Sudan on the question of the status of abandoned children" (Guibert, 2007). MSF is not bound by some commonly understood notion of a disaster or crisis because it isn't "technical issues that guide us but politics, the context of the crisis. The principle of MSF is to intervene according to excess mortality, not [simply] mortality. Even with a very high mortality rate, if it's the norm for this population, we don't go in. Because if we were following a purely medical logic, we would be in India where twenty million people are suffering from malnutrition!" (Tectonidis, 2006).

**MSF Critiques Humanitarianism**

MSF continually questions its humanitarianism and the humanitarianism of others. This is perhaps not unexpected, given MSF's anti-bureaucratic formation story, loose organizational structure, and its troubled conscience (Redfield, 2005)
surrounding its work. There are examples from the texts examined of how MSF questions the very foundations upon which its activities are based. From its outset, MSF has criticized and opposed the structures of humanitarianism. In 1970, the former veteran French doctors from the Biafran relief effort together with other physicians formed a nascent collective of what would later become MSF. The group called itself the Medical and Surgical Emergency Intervention Group (Groupe d'Intervention Medical et Chirurgical d'Urgence or Gimcu). There didn't seem to be any intention of forming a new organization, but rather the collective attempted to work within the existing structures of humanitarian organization: namely, the Red Cross. It operated, in the words of one of its members, “like a bunch of friends talking on the telephone” (Vallaeys, 2004, p. 101). It attempted to gain access to emergencies and disasters by continually bothering the Red Cross. The idea was to offer the specialist services of war surgeons who were able to respond quickly and urgently to crisis anywhere in the world. However, the risk-averse nature of the Red Cross prevented the Gimcu doctors from embarking on missions until the risk was minimized: in effect, no one went anywhere until the disaster was over. One example of this comes from a major flood disaster in Bangladesh in 1970. One of the Gimcu doctors recalls that “[w]e alerted the Red Cross. We are ready. When do we start? Answer: ‘We don’t know yet, come see us tomorrow morning, we’ll take stock.’ They said it was too risky. Eventually, they told us to come immediately to the Red Cross, and that we could go (to Bangladesh) now, because the situation was
less risky. But, there was nothing to do and we would only be something like tourists there" (Vallaews, 2004, p. 104).

This critique is still evident in later documents related to MSF. In its 2005 Activity Report, MSF International questions the very viability of humanitarianism when it comments that the world is faced “with the almost complete failure of the development-aid system” (Captier, 2005, p. 6). Another example is found in a discussion of the implications of overwhelming funding for the South Asian tsunami of 2005 compared with donors’ lack of interest in malnutrition in Niger (Allafort & Jeannerod, 2005). The authors claim that there is an “illogicality of the aid system, which is widely maintained by aid organizations themselves” because “after the tsunami, aid was deployed not in response to real needs... but rather in response to the unprecedented outpouring of emotion and the desire to spend the colossal amounts of money that had been raised” (Allafort & Jeannerod, 2005). They argue that even though the desire to help and an overwhelming emotional outpouring “is not new and cannot be criticised in itself” they claim without substantiation that “it is certainly the first time in the history of humanitarian action that the use of aid has been dictated to such an extent by pressure stemming from money and emotion” (Allafort & Jeannerod, 2005).

MSF critiques the emergence of a global humanitarian system as a drive towards an integration of humanitarianism into a power structure that includes “force, economic development or even justice” (Captier, 2005, p. 7) that will result in the weakening of humanitarian values. The organization clearly separates these
elements from its mandate: "Peace, democracy, economic development and justice are the underlying issues in, or the backdrop to, many dramas with humanitarian consequences. But they are not our fights" (Captier, 2005, p. 7). It makes clear its choice between cooperation with the global humanitarian system, and working in organized chaos: the management of disaster reduces chaos, but necessitates integration into a system that MSF has from its outset regarded as counter to serving its constituents.

**MSF Critiques Itself**

The texts examined show that MSF is engaged in criticizing its own actions. The organization views it as essential to "continue questioning the relevance of our operations... to always reflect on the humanitarian nature of our action" (Salignon, 2005). In its internal newsletter, it publishes transcripts of debates between decision-makers within the organization on various issues. For example, on the value of its work in psychological and trauma counseling (MSF, 2006), or on the reasons why it closes down certain operations (Godain, 2005). Thus, it has been noted that MSF possesses a "troubled conscience" (Young, 2001). Perhaps this troubled nature is also due to an awareness of failures on the operational front as the organization has "no doubt that we have ignored or failed in various medical issues over time" (MSF, 1997) or perhaps it is due to a questioning of its organizational structure and culture. The organization wants to resist institutional logic and bureaucracy as a matter of principle, with hierarchy and bureaucracy seen
as the major impediments to effectiveness (Allafort, 2006). Specifically, the archival material has examples of how MSF argues that it does not need "more central bureaucracy" (Buissonnière, 2005) and that its workers are attracted to the organization by its "unbureaucratic attitude... democracy, and ownership" so that "each person has a voice in the organization, and ... 'we are all a big family’" (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002, p. 497). Indeed it is argued that it is "the individual’s engagement that builds the collective. It is the essential pillar – each one of us constructs MSF over the years" (Allafort, 2006). Rigid structure is anathema to MSF to perhaps avoid being co-opted into an international aid system that can be used by former colonizing nations for political purposes (Biberson & Jean, 1999). However, the text leads us to believe that the organization still must be part of some system: "Our isolation must not lead to confinement" (Captier, 2005, p. 7). Another sign that the organization still retains some desire to be part of an international system is found in its acceptance of the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize.

The material examined also reveals that MSF devotes some considerable thought to colonialism and its position as a European organization. It recognizes that the "evolution of the international movement [of MSF] is linked to political trends in France and Europe... our state of mind was resolutely European" (Brauman, 2005). It understands that it sometimes misunderstands the nature of conflict and it sometimes relied on "simplistic ethnic or religious explanations" so that war was reduced to "a confrontation between so-called Arabs and so-called black populations in Sudan" (Bradol, 2004b). It admits that "our teams sometimes
fell into the trap of this mindset" and understands that "[the] political and social forces at work in this conflict are much more complex than interethnic hatred" (Bradol, 2004b).

MSF is also profoundly aware of the divide between the expatriate European staff and so-called national staff during field operations. The latter group are workers employed by MSF but paid in the currency of the operational country, at local wage rates, and on a temporary basis. At one of MSF's annual general meetings, the President of MSF International comments that MSF's "daily workers are not paid adequately" and that after meeting some of these workers at an MSF operation in Liberia he "was not very proud of how we treated them. Frankly, I was ashamed" (Bradol, 2004b). As a final example of this, we can see differing accountability applied to African versus European bodies; this was also the case in some of the text examined from the Red Cross. In 2008, MSF held a news conference to explain its decision to withdraw from its Somalia operation. The reasons given were the increasing number of expatriate and local MSF workers in Somalia that were being violently attacked or killed. In explaining its operations there, MSF noted that while expatriate workers were leaving, local staff would stay behind. MSF was quite clear on the numbers of Europeans that were working within the country. However, it had no idea or accounting of the local staff. MSF didn't "have the exact figure, but it's pretty huge. There are something like 600 staff throughout all the projects", but in contrast MSF knew exactly how many expatriates were
there: “I'll give you the exact figure—it was 97 international staff within the country” (MSF, 2008).

**Conclusion**

Several themes emerge from the archival material. One theme is self-criticism and critique of the humanitarian system in which it is enmeshed. MSF spends considerable effort in coming to terms with its own idea of humanitarianism: it alternately defends and criticizes its own definitions, educates its own workers on humanitarianism, and works on correcting what it feels are misinterpretations of humanitarianism by other organizations and states. MSF also expresses dissenting opinion on what characterizes suffering and on what distinguishes a victim from a non-victim. However, even within the organization there is debate on the characterization of suffering and victimhood. Perhaps the best way to characterize the archival findings regarding humanitarianism and MSF is to appropriate some phrasing from a United States Supreme Court ruling on obscenity (Stewart, 1964); namely, that it doesn't really know what humanitarianism and suffering is, but it knows it when it sees it.\(^3\) Another theme is MSF's problematic relation to victims and helpers. It espouses equality, yet believes that humanitarianism functions

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\(^3\) “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description ["hard-core pornography"]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.” Justice Potter Stewart, concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio 378 U.S. 184 (1964)
because of inequality between helper and victim. It defends the useful role of the expatriate within this function, but it is ashamed of how it ‘treats’ its own non-expatriate staff.
Chapter 6 – Discussion

In this chapter, I will examine my research questions in light of the genealogical exploration undertaken in Chapters 3 through 5. The first question is "why does aid fail?" In chapter 1, I motivated this research question through a review of the humanitarian literature exploring the limitations of aid vis-à-vis its stated intentions. Other research questions included: How has humanitarianism become a taken for granted social construction? What purpose does the humanitarian organization serve? Motivating these questions is a research problem aimed at understanding how humanitarianism has been constructed as an unquestionably caring practice that suddenly appeared as a social force due to the actions of single individuals. It is presented as a universal, common sense approach to suffering caused by disaster and war. The continued existence of and justification for humanitarianism is its construction as an ahistorical concept such that it appears to have always existed because it is based on universally-accepted values, principles, and beliefs.

In investigating this research problem and the above questions that flow from it, my method has been genealogy. Genealogy begins with a problematization. In this case, my problematization of humanitarianism deconstructs its taken-for-granted nature to show how it has become accepted as natural and inevitable. In problematizing humanitarianism, I have looked at its descent and emergence; that is, to dismantle the taken-for-granted nature of a concept through an examination of intersecting events that could have, under different circumstances, produced an
entire different present. This process will multiplex what is portrayed as historical unity to show humanitarianism as multiple singular events in a range of disciplines and fields. Rather than heading towards some pre-determined end, humanitarianism has emerged through struggle and contingency. An examination of the emergence of humanitarianism is achieved by looking at its discourse.

However, by virtue of my postcolonial theoretical stance and my choice of genealogy as method, I must also recognize that this research also forms part of the discourse of humanitarianism. In Chapter 1, I reflexively examined my participation in the discourse by noting my participation as a humanitarian professional within a humanitarian organization. Therefore any statements I make in this dissertation may have been influenced by the closeness of my own experience to that which I claim to have observed in the archives. If rules produce discourse, then this dissertation is also a contributor. I also recognize the dangers inherent in postcolonial critique and in genealogy as “the categories genealogy holds constant in any of its analyses can always be put up for investigation by another history” (May, 1993, p. 112). My intent is not to produce another truth, but rather to demonstrate that more than one understanding is possible. In other words, I am not setting out to critique something simply to give my assent to something else (May, 1993). Therefore I recognize that this work is but one genealogy in many possible genealogies: it is no more correct than any other interpretation.

In looking for a discourse of humanitarianism, I have described ways in which humanitarianism has changed. I look for the conditions by which the concept
has come into being and search for occasions where the relationship changed between its' meaning and the specific practices it implied.

On these occasions, a discontinuity or dividing line exists. A concept makes no sense if viewed through the rules used on either side of this dividing line and new subjects emerge. Therefore, I will discuss how people have become raw material that can be acted upon by humanitarianism to produce these subjects. A discourse is also signaled by the presence of a relationship between subjects as the result of statements. In other words, I will discuss how statements about humanitarianism produce ways of being and acting. Finally, discourse acts through things: foremost of these are the rules embodied in laws, documents, and other texts by which a concept can be understood. I will find these things in institutions where these physical objects are limited and authorized. Applying this method to the results presented in Chapter 3 through 5 offers several events that are candidates for discontinuity, and thus helps identify the boundaries of a discourse which will in turn lead to a discussion of each of the research questions. In summary, then, discourse can be uncovered by examining the conditions by which a concept has come into being together with any discontinuities that signal a change between a concept's meaning and the practices it incurs.

One discontinuity that shaped humanitarian discourse were changes to Christian ontology and its understanding of suffering. On one side of the divide, the current concept of humanitarianism made no sense given the role of God in determining the lives of humans. This included, for example, a belief that conditions
of the current world were insignificant in comparison to those of the next world beyond death. Further, pain and suffering were believed to be natural and imitative of the suffering of Christ. Christianity posited that pain was inevitable and suffering was part of healing. This is not to deny that benevolence existed, but rather that these actions directed towards others were motivated by self-interest or ego through the belief that such activity contributed towards repenting from sin. In contrast, the archive paints a picture of the other side of a divide where these views of suffering gave way in the face of a more benevolent God. In addition, there emerged a role for the individual in determining his own and others' fates. This was reflected in an overall change in the eighteenth and nineteenth century where pain and suffering were viewed as being avoidable and unacceptable. Therefore, the emergence of a benevolent God was key to unlocking the humanitarian impulse of humans: a humane God gave people the authority to be benevolent. It therefore became possible to speak about and act upon a humanitarian impulse.

The humanitarian impulse was hugely evident in the global reaction to the war in Biafra. This was, I believe, another dividing line. Apart from the specific line of inquiry I conducted on Biafra, evidence for my claim is found in the archival material examined refers often to this war and states that humanitarianism practices before Biafra would not recognize its counterpart on the other. The result of Biafra for the ICRC and for humanitarianism was the creation of a discontinuity: Biafra signaled a divide, on either side of which the meanings attributed to concepts and their practices were no longer interchangeable. After the war, the notions of
humanitarianism created and nurtured by the ICRC no longer made sense (Forsythe, 2007; Moorehead, 1999). Why might this be the case? Prior to Biafra, the ICRC followed behind war, visiting prisoners and rendering aid to those affected (Forsythe, 2007). This process was developed following the Battle of Solferino, the formation of the Red Cross, and then refined over decades of European conflicts (Moorehead, 1999). While European conflicts such as the World Wars that were attended by the ICRC were vast and complex, the organization could still count on a semblance of order through the so-called laws of war in the Geneva Conventions and through shared cultural and historic linkages amongst combatants, governments, and helpers. However, in Nigeria the organization could not depend upon this common ground and didn't seem to understand why this was the case (Forsythe, 2007). The war was regarded as being confusing, with no real front and with civilians intermixed into sites of conflict (Moorehead, 1999). In addition, the concept of neutrality at the centre of Red Cross humanitarianism was too inflexible to work in the context of Biafra (Forsythe, 2007).

It is my observation that this inflexibility is reflected in the fact that the Red Cross continued to argue for access to victims on the basis of its past performance without taking into account other perceptions of its intentions. These perceptions included claims that Red Cross flights were being used to ferry ammunition and war material, and that the influx of foreign currency for relief work was being used to the benefit of the Biafran government (Read, 1968). I believe that these unintended outcomes of humanitarianism together with the non-European context of the
conflict created many barriers that confounded the Red Cross. In particular, the job of convincing the Nigerian government of the utility of the Red Cross humanitarian ideal took a great deal of time and effort. As shown in Chapter 4, this work was started in the peri- and post-colonial periods in Africa by the ICRC in its attempt to instill humanitarianism into newly-independent African states. However, this work was evidently by no means complete as the Red Cross and the Nigerian government were not on the same page with regards to the nature of the conflict, with very public debates ensuing on the moral and legal right of the ICRC to intervene and help. In addition, there was dissent and confusion within the Red Cross organization itself, with the France and the Scandinavian countries arguing that the ICRC should do things not officially or legally sanctioned by the Geneva Conventions in order to prevent suffering (Forsythe, 2007).

In summary, then, the presence of discontinuities reveals an intersection of events where social relations should change and new subjects should emerge. In the case of the events cited above, one emergent subject was the humanitarian as a professional worker within an organizational structure: in other words, the professional humanitarian. Another subject created as the citizen is transformed into a victim through the action of organizations during a crisis, disaster, or conflict. Yet another is the citizen humanitarian: that is a 'man of feeling' who responds to instances of suffering in another human. In Table 2, I have provided examples of statements from the archive that exemplify my construction of these subjects. In addition, in Chapters 3 through 5 I identified a number of themes that emerged from
the archives. I have restated these themes in Table 3 and related them to the construction of different subjects. Why, though, is the production of the subject of importance to the humanitarian problematic developed in this dissertation? An example of some recent disasters serves to answer this question.

In her examination of some recent, well-known disasters such as the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, Hurricane Katrina, and the 2001 World Trade Centre attacks, Rebecca Solnit critiques perceptions of victims as helpless, dazed survivors dependent upon organizations to rescue them from their fate (Solnit, 2009). She joins with other scholars (c.f. Drabek & Mcintire, 2003; Furedi, 2007a, 2007b; Rodríguez, Trainor, & Quarantelli, 2006) who try to illustrate that it is the individual citizen rather than state or non-state institutions that serves the key role in responding to a crisis.

In the aftermath of the San Francisco earthquake, Solnit recounts the way in which citizens who survived the disaster established kitchens and shelters for other survivors. She also notes that these efforts met with resistance from the formal organizations such as the military and the fire department. The phenomenon of emergent organizations during disasters is well understood (c.f. Drabek & Mcintire, 2003; Rodríguez et al., 2006) yet, the paradoxical situation remains: formal, organized helping receives the bulk of attention and resources during a crisis. Whether it is a local or distant crisis, the story most often told recounts the role of the professional humanitarian responder working within a defined organizational structure. The object of this professional's practice is the disaster victim.
Somewhere in between these two subjects rests Solnit’s active citizen helper: what I will refer to as the citizen humanitarian.

Discourse can be found when statements produce subjects and produce a relationship between subjects. Chapters 3 through 5 provide some insight into how these ways of being and acting are produced. One obvious example of these statements are the Geneva Conventions. Less obvious, but still figuring large in the archive, is literature and its obsession with humanitarian ideas. Humanitarianism benefitted from the way in which literature trained people how to be compassionate. The archive shows that literature and humanitarianism are connected and the one had an influence on the other. Henry Dunant’s “Memory of Solferino” is but one example of this kind of humanitarian literature. In its’ formation story, the Red Cross continually reinforces the impact of this one book on the birth and development of the organization and on humanitarianism. The archive shows, however, that Dunant’s book is but one instance in a whole genre of literature that was obsessed with humanitarian ideas. In effect, humanitarianism benefitted from the availability and impact of this literature to train people how to be compassionate. The literature provided rules by which humanitarianism could be applied, and it helped created the humanitarian subjects. The questions now are: how are these subjects constituted? How do they interact? To answer these questions and describe the subjects produced by humanitarianism, I will first examine the production of the citizen humanitarian.
### Table 2: Some examples of the creation of subjects through discourse.

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<th>Subject</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Selected examples of discourse that produces this subject</th>
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| Citizen Humanitarian | a 'man of feeling' who responds to instances of suffering in another human | In the aftermath of the San Francisco earthquake, Solnit (2009) recounts the way in which citizens who survived the disaster established kitchens and shelters for other survivors.  
the emergence of a benevolent God was key to unlocking the humanitarian impulse of humans: a humane God gave people the authority to be benevolent. It therefore became possible to speak about and act upon a humanitarian impulse.  
the global reaction of citizens in many countries to the war in Biafra  
the transcendent and universal power of humanity and of humanity's ability to change conditions is also evident. This takes over from the notion that conditions on Earth exist for a reason, and things will be better in the next life.  
MSF has suggested that to be a humanitarian is to be vulnerable and requires sharing “times of danger” (Raynaud, 2005) with those MSF tries to help; but there is inequality in this vulnerability because the “people we try to help... are far, far more vulnerable than MSF could ever be” (Fournier, 2009). |
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td></td>
<td>in the 18th century, humanitarianism was “a fundamental revolution in the thought of the English people” and central to this revolution was the notion of romanticism, which was a concept concerned with a “discontent with things as they were, an enthusiasm that reminds one of the Renaissance, a faith in the ability of mankind to accomplish whatever he sets his hand to, a passionate love of humanity and of Nature” (Whitney, 1939, p. 161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hendrie (1991) describes a spontaneous repatriation of famine refugees from the Sudan back into Tigray (Ethiopia) in 1984. Many of the famine-affected people lived in areas controlled by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). There were limited relief supplies available in rebel controlled areas, so the TPLF responded by establishing its own relief efforts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(continued from previous page)</td>
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<td>MSF argues that even though the desire to help and an overwhelming emotional outpouring “is not new and cannot be criticised in itself” they claim without substantiation that “it is certainly the first time in the history of humanitarian action that the use of aid has been dictated to such an extent by pressure stemming from money and emotion” (Allafort &amp; Jeannerod, 2005).</td>
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Table 2 (cont’d)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Selected examples of discourse that produces this subject</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Humanitarian</td>
<td>There was a struggle between the “successful firefighting efforts... by groups of citizens armed with buckets of water, with shovels... with whatever came to hand” who were “committed to saving as much as possible through hands-on methods” of firefighting and the “reckless technological tactics of the occupying forces [of the military], convinced that their strategy of destruction could save structures and neighborhoods elsewhere” (Solnit, 2009, p. 42)</td>
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<td>(continued from previous page)</td>
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<td>After the 2010 Haitian earthquake, one author notes the creation of tent cities by the survivors and that “despite the poor conditions, there was order and community. People arranged their tents into straight lines, left spaces for public use, and organized a security crew to watch over them at night and to ensure that cars did not trample people sleeping in the streets” (Golash-Boza, 2010, p. 6).</td>
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<td>Sverre Kilde, a LRCS delegate, noted that displaced persons had “formed their own association with a committee in each of the Provinces and they are working in close connection with the provincial officials. This association may turn out to be an advantage in the way it may be easier to collaborate. But on the other hand this association can be a heavy pressure group” (Kilde, 1966, p. 2).</td>
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<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Selected examples of discourse that produces this subject</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>the citizen transformed into a victim through the action of organizations during a crisis, disaster, or conflict</td>
<td>charity and humanitarian policies acted as a means of social control, stating that “poor relief was intended to safeguard public order. Destitution for the many might easily lead to discontent” (Van Leeuwen, 1994, p. 593)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td></td>
<td>in Canada, there were programs that removed native children from their families in order to save, civilize, and otherwise rescue the children from continued barbarity; anti-vagrancy approaches that made the provision of food contingent on the poor doing work for the state; and the creation of industrial schools that removed poor children from their families under the argument that they would be saved from their existing conditions and a continued life of poverty</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in Biafra “the Red Cross must see that only the needy receive relief in proportion to their degree of need based on medical intervention” (LRCS, 1970, p. 1).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In Biafra, victims should behave in a certain fashion. For example, August Lindt, the ICRC’s chief delegate for the operation, noted that “[it] must be avoided...creating a refugee mentality among the beneficiaries of relief, i.e. that they become accustomed to receiving supplies without working for their subsistence. Otherwise they would end up by enjoying this situation” (ICRC, 1969a, p. 2).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Victim (continued from previous page)</td>
<td>Furedi (2007b) contrasts two examples of floods that occurred in England: one in the 1950s and the other in the 1990s. The floods of the 1950s were devastating to the population, but they were met with a sense of stoicism and resiliency. They were characterized as being part of the natural flow of life, and the population adapted to the event and moved on from it. In contrast, a flood in the 1990s saw the population being characterized as vulnerable and traumatized even though fewer people died. When faced with a population that &quot;suffers the same fate as the excluded people that the MSF programme is designed to address, how do you set operational limits?&quot; (Guibert, 2007) &quot;refugees are living intermingled with the local villagers... the distinction between refugee and villager is becoming increasingly difficult to make and there is growing evidence that the villagers are beginning to resent the special status of a refugee&quot; (ICRC, 1969d) &quot;The principle of MSF is to intervene according to excess mortality... Even with a very high mortality rate, if it's the norm for this population, we don't go in. Because if we were following a purely medical logic, we would be in India where twenty million people are suffering from malnutrition!&quot; (Tectonidis, 2006).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Selected examples of discourse that produces this subject</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Victim (continued from previous page)</td>
<td>a professional humanitarian worker within a formal organizational structure</td>
<td>according to MSF the delivery of humanitarianism is based on the equality of all but the practice of humanitarianism is dependent upon and often requires inequality. For example one author believes that “humanitarian work is intrinsically linked to expatriate status” (Vallet, 2004b) and the image portrayed of humanitarian workers by humanitarian organizations must “reflect their position as outsiders to the conflict” in order to show “the transparency of their intentions” (Weissmann, 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Humanitarian</td>
<td>a professional humanitarian worker within a formal organizational structure</td>
<td>the state could no longer cope with, or chose not to cope with, the increased demands placed upon it. Voluntary associations filled this gap as part of the so-called natural helping response of humanity. According to De Waal and Omaar (1993), in Somalia, the needs of an entire country have become the responsibility of aid agencies. Their power and influence are hidden and helped by their messaging: that they are saving helpless people belies the fact that taken together, they have access to more resources than the governments affected by disaster and war.</td>
</tr>
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Table 2 (cont’d)

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<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Selected examples of discourse that produces this subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional Humanitarian</td>
<td>there was a break with the religious notions of charity and the call for more secular aid. MSF was created in this atmosphere, but it prospered and developed during a period when state sovereignty was frequently set aside in the interests of a right to intervene on behalf of victims no matter what the resistance to this intervention might be (Allen &amp; Styan, 2000)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(continued from previous page)</td>
<td>No longer, it is claimed, can organizations and governments hope for stable and predictable patterns of continuity (Farazmand, 2001). These claims often begin arguments for an increased need for organizations and experts able to understand and manage these events. In other words, the number and intensity of disasters has been increasing, together with the number of people affected by the events and this has been met by a technical and organizational response.</td>
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<td>According to De Waal (1997, p. 71), who looks specifically at famine as a humanitarian concern, UN organizations have “contributed to the internationalization of responsibility for famines” and enable “a retreat from domestic accountability in famine-vulnerable countries.”</td>
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<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Selected examples of discourse that produces this subject</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional Humanitarian <em>(continued from previous page)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>The IHL also “bestows [emphasis added] certain rights and protections” (Fournier, 2009) onto humanitarian organizations such as MSF including “free evaluation of needs, free access to victims, control over the distribution of humanitarian aid and the respect for humanitarian immunity” (MSF, 1997). Through these humanitarian principles comes a duty to “address human beings regardless of their side... no matter their race, religion, ethnicity or allegiance” (Fournier, 2009).</td>
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</table>
Table 3: Themes from the Red Cross and MSF archives and humanitarian subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Relevant Subject</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Citizen Humanitarian</td>
<td>People seek to control their own disaster / conflict response through opposing or questioning the role of formal organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Display of colonial attitudes by MSF and Red Cross</td>
<td>Humanitarian Victim</td>
<td>The colonial 'duty to care' contributes to the disempowerment of victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>use of Eurocentric paradigms by MSF and Red Cross</td>
<td>Humanitarian Victim</td>
<td>That there is a proper Western way to respond to a conflict / disaster which non-Westerners need to be taught</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalizations about Africa</td>
<td>Humanitarian Victim</td>
<td>That Africa and Africans can be made to behave in predictable and controllable ways such that it is easier for them to be at the receiving end of care as victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribalism</td>
<td>Humanitarian Victim</td>
<td>There are no other, complex explanations for African conflicts other than primitive, tribal reasons. This makes it easier to consider Africans as being objects of a caring organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF has a troubled conscience</td>
<td>Professional Humanitarian</td>
<td>The organization reflects upon itself and questions its role as an organization</td>
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Table 3 (cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Relevant Subject</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSF as a cosmopolitan organization</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>The organization exists globally, and is composed of a group of professionals</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>who consider themselves humanitarians before any other label</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>concern with the methods</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>The organization seeks to improve and monitor its work as a recognizable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Red Cross operations</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>and professional body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struggle for Control</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>That the organization feels responsible for its actions and feels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>threatened by other organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War/Disaster as an Exceptional Event</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>The organizational members are experts that can deal with specialized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>situations such as conflict and disaster</td>
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The Citizen Humanitarian

One trajectory of the citizen humanitarian is found in the archive through the emergence of a new social type called the ‘man of feeling’. I recognize the problematic use of gender in humanitarianism both from the perspective of the recipients of aid (Hyndman & Alwis, 2003), and from the construction of gendered organizations. For example, during the World Wars, the Red Cross was often portrayed as being a ‘caring mother’ or the ‘Greatest Mother in the World’ and advertisements reflected this through the image of white-gowned nurse cradling an
injured soldiers in her arms (Moorehead, 1999). However, I have retained the
gendered wording to reflect the original sense of the word as used by Fiering
(1976). The man of feeling displayed an innate understanding of the difference
between good and evil, and this extended to acts of compassion and concern
towards suffering individuals: in other words, he displayed a humanitarian
sensibility. This sensibility is in stark contrast to earlier feelings of resignation
generated from beliefs that current conditions on Earth exist for a reason, suffering
is beneficial to heavenly reward, and things will be better in the next life. In place of
the afterlife as a block to helping there were instead appeals to a transcendent force
as a reason for acting in a humanitarian manner. In the 18th and 19th centuries evil
was the universal motivator: the reduction of evil the goal. The transcendent and
universal power of humanity and of humanity's ability to change conditions
becomes more important. Later, science and evolutionary theory in particular, are
implicated in demonstrating the common origins of humans, and thus contribute to
claims that there is less difference between people across cultures and borders.
Institutions such as churches capitalized upon this belief in commonality and
motivated individuals to give gifts such as clothing or food across borders. This
enabled the consideration of the poor in another country not as strangers, but as a
fellow humans deserving of attention.

The existence of associations and groups that considered the suffering of
others were also an adaptation in response to the fragmentation of society due to
increasing economic and social change attributable to modernization and
colonialism. The argument begins to emerge that the state could no longer cope with, or chose not to cope with, the increased demands placed upon it in an industrial society. These demands resulted from the rising expectations of workers, as well as the expectations of citizens that government would also respond in a humanitarian fashion to the suffering of strangers within their own borders. Voluntary associations conveniently filled this gap as part of the so-called natural helping response of humanity. Thus the argument that the state is a weak institution exists in the 18th century, well before any contemporary idea of failed states that is so often used as a rationale for a humanitarian response in Africa or elsewhere.

Some examples of these collective efforts included the elimination of slavery, the creation of industrial schools to train the poor and the creation of legislation that restricted work hours and reduced the use of child labour. The emergence of the Red Cross and its principles of neutrality and impartiality reflects this belief in commonality of human beings through the claim that suffering is something that transcends differences; the Red Cross, however, still respects political differences and the state's power to care for its citizens. A later example comes in the form of MSF and its ethos of working without borders: it also believes in neutrality, but unlike the Red Cross it espouses a sharing in the suffering of strangers. In a paradoxical twist, though, MSF implicates a certain 'Frenchness' in its approach to humanitarianism and argues that difference between victim and helper is both productive and necessary for humanitarianism. This is evident in the debates
within the archival material over the relative pay inequities between MSF expatriates and its field staff.

Therefore, the citizen humanitarian emerged from these various trajectories of changing views on suffering, pain, and transcendent rewards versus immediate relief but also from an awareness of distant needs that easily circulated in humanitarian literature and later in broadcast media. In the Biafran conflict, the citizen humanitarian finds a full expression as evidenced through the massive outpouring of individual contributions at the behest of churches, nongovernmental organizations, and the Red Cross. Today it seems natural and almost expected that the citizen will behave in a humanitarian fashion when non-state organizations call for help on behalf of those suffering. But this was not always the case and it was through the intersection of many different trajectories and that the humanitarian discourse has produced various subject positions of the citizen humanitarian. In summary, the citizen humanitarian is the common human with common characteristics and thus able to feel commonly no matter where or who the sufferer might be. This relation between the humanitarian citizen and the distant 'other' needing help is indicative of the emergence of another subject: the humanitarian victim.

**The Humanitarian Victim**

The distant suffering stranger is one object of the citizen humanitarian's interest: the stranger at home is another. Victims have been viewed as idle
recipients of compassion, but they also emerge in a more complex, often contradictory, relationship with humanitarians. The archives show that on the one hand there is an expectation that victims should behave in a certain fashion, but on the other there is an acknowledgement that the victims have a part in the creation of their misfortune or in the construction of a situation as a disaster. The victim is now a subject for which compassion should be felt. However, this compassion is directed such that there is an expectation that help will be provided only if the helper receives something in return: in the case of vagrancy, assistance is provided if the person works in return. Perhaps what is received in return is not only physical but the victims' implicit participation in being governed, complacent and unthreatening to existing social order. During the Biafran conflict the struggle for humanitarian control of the war extended to placing war victims at fault for not behaving correctly. This is reflected in the ICRC's desire to avoid creating the mentality of a refugee as a result of the humanitarian intervention; therefore, only well-behaved, well-managed victims of disaster are acceptable.

The Geneva Conventions and International Humanitarian Law are fairly obvious components of the humanitarian discourse. They are rules that are intended to produce ways of being and acting within conflicts. During the Biafra War the ICRC expected that governments and military leaders would instruct citizens and soldiers how to behave in a conflict. It also expected governments to allow it to operate independently and assist victims. The Red Cross expected that victims and combatants should behave in a certain fashion such that the humanitarian discourse
produces the well-behaved, managed victim of disaster. However, in Biafra these kinds of subjects simply didn't behave well. These actors were placed at fault for not behaving correctly by the discourse of humanitarianism, namely by not following the Geneva Conventions and International Humanitarian Law. This extended to the Nigerian government for not allowing the free flow of aid, to the combatants for not distinguishing between victims and soldiers, and to victims for becoming accustomed to aid or using it to help fund and prolong the conflict. The struggle was not just over land, but it also included a struggle over the meaning of the war and over control of the massive relief operation. This control is in essence to dictate the rules of the discourse. However, Biafra was portrayed as an exceptional event both by the Red Cross and by others. This exceptionality justified the lack of success that the Red Cross and contemporary humanitarian discourse had in making the war behave correctly. Thus, statements about humanitarianism's failure are deemed admissible to the discourse because the war was an exceptional event.

Thus, the humanitarian and the needy are in a hierarchical relationship where the humanitarian occupies a position superior to those needing rescue and knows what is best. On one hand, humanitarianism is under donors' control, and the flow of gifts and resources is only from the giver to the receiver. On the other, the recipients shape this relationship albeit in an unequal fashion through providing legitimacy and status to the event: there can be no disaster or crisis without victims. For example, the Red Cross noted that victims in Biafra began to organize themselves into advocacy groups. This shows that there was a potential for
resistance even in the midst of a conflict where the victims were portrayed as helpless.

In further constructing the humanitarian victim MSF contributes its understanding of what constitutes a disaster. As found in Chapter 5, MSF devotes considerable time and text to debate around what a disaster looks like and to determining who should be helped. The victim is first of all vulnerable. But a victim exists not because of his or her position in society or because of existing poverty or inequality. The humanitarian victim only exists if there is a crisis or event that causes sufficient excess suffering or excess mortality. At some point when the disaster is over the subject is no longer a humanitarian victim. This point or dividing line between disaster and non-disaster is an interesting one as it represents a discontinuity within the discourse of the humanitarian victim as a subject. The dividing line is determined by discursive rules governing what is and is not a disaster.

At one end of the spectrum, a disaster is an exceptional event beyond the daily societal background noise of tragedies and avoidable mortality. A disaster is an abnormal, actual, and easily recognizable event that results in temporary setback to progress. At the other end of the spectrum, disaster is enmeshed within political and economic systems to the point where it becomes impossible to distinguish disaster from everyday existence. Thus institutions such as the Red Cross and MSF rely upon the former construction to perpetuate the subject of the professional humanitarian. A distinction must be made between the normal and the abnormal to
make a space for the helper otherwise his or her task would be largely impossible. The existence of a victim is a necessary condition of the humanitarian act, and thus contributes to the creation of disaster, humanitarianism, and another subject: the humanitarian professional.

The Humanitarian Professional

What I see in the work of the ICRC's Hoffmann in Africa is an example of someone in the role of an organizational member with a specific humanitarian role that spanned borders. I believe that this is the creation of the 'without borders' humanitarian professional, prior to the notion of current day 'without borders' organizations and the flowering of the 'without borders' terminology into common language. There were no principles in the current sense of the word; that is one word statements intended to guide field workers in doing their jobs and help outsiders understand the organization's purpose. Instead Hoffmann drew his justification from international humanitarian law and the densely worded and lengthy Geneva Conventions. These set out the rules of the humanitarian discourse. There was no evidence of internal debate within the Red Cross regarding the translatability of the Geneva Conventions to an African context. Rather there was an implicit understanding that the Red Cross and its rules would transcend any change of government. The challenge was simply to translate the words into local languages, and the innate human understanding of humanitarianism would be switched on. Like the latter-day post-colonial scramble for Africa carried out by the
Americans and Soviets, the Red Cross raced to ensure that it would continue to exist as an organization within countries on the cusp of decolonizing. The charge to independence in a decolonizing Africa meant a potential challenge to the role of the ICRC on the continent. To counter this challenge, Hoffman attempted to perpetuate the idea of humanitarianism through consistent messaging and quiet diplomacy. That there was a challenge to the ICRC can be seen in Hoffman's attempts to corral ideas that there could be more than one Red Cross, or in his challenges to the notion that there was something different about Africans that made humanitarianism ineffective or nonsensical in an African context.

Later, following the Biafran conflict, the 'without borders' humanitarian becomes embedded in the guise of the MSF doctor. This subject represents a humanitarianism that is anti-bureaucratic but hierarchical, principled yet flexible, borderless but rooted. It is easy to suggest that the 'without borders' humanitarian is representative of a post-industrial worker: a cosmopolitan. The MSF humanitarian works under principled flexibility. The so-called channels of compassion created by colonial humanitarians that linked the West with the colonies through networks of colonial philanthropy allowed the circulation of humanitarian ideals. These networks consisted of diverse means and modes of transmission including ships and railways that made up the slave trade system, as well as the movement of capital and raw materials on ships between colonial ports. Thus, the notion of the transmission of knowledge of suffering as a motivator of humanitarian action is not uniquely a 20th century activity.
Although MSF avoids the inflexibility of rules and bureaucracy, it confounds this by stating that it follows the principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and selects certain other principles from those used by Red Cross. These principles set out certain rules by which subjects are created and relate to each other. For example, MSF's use of IHL adds to the construction of the humanitarian victim as a subject through IHL's claim that the victim has a right to receive assistance. The subject of the professional humanitarian is created in relation to the victim and through IHL as the professional has the right and the duty to provide assistance free from interference from third parties to the victim-humanitarian professional relationship. MSF's Nobel acceptance speech extends the rules making the professional humanitarian subject the product of a vocation or a calling. This further separates the professional from the undifferentiated subject of the humanitarian citizen. Although humanitarianism is based on a principle of equality, the relationship between the subjects of humanitarian victim and professional humanitarian is dependent upon inequality. This inequality is created through difference: for example, due to the expatriate status of the humanitarian professional. The aura of confidentiality and privilege evident in the rules of the discourse that creates the humanitarian professional is reminiscent of practices peculiar to western medicine. The principle of humanity expresses a certain desire to prevent and alleviate human suffering, and this recalls the man of feeling aspect of the discourse that builds commonality amongst humans in their common motivation to help others. However, it is important to note that the principles of
MSF and the Red Cross and IHL itself is silent on the rights and duties of the citizen humanitarian. In the case of the humanitarian victim, these principles and laws speak only to the duty the organizations have to them, and the rights of the victims within the framework of the documents. In other words, the agency of the victim or the citizen is not part of the discourse.

**Humanitarian Organization as a Disciplinary Institution**

In examining humanitarianism, I have argued and illustrated through a genealogical analysis that people have for a long time expressed their concern over the conditions of victims of disaster or war. In contrast, I have argued that today what we call 'humanitarianism' is deemed straightforward and taken-for-granted because it is unproblematically associated with organized helping, compassion, feeling, and sympathy. Humanitarianism is a word that seems uniquely 'good' because it has only one history. Humanitarian organizations ignore the problematic aspects of its history, and often they make significant efforts to concretize it as a single trajectory.

One poignant example of this solidification of history is given was mentioned in Chapter 3: the International Museum of the Red Cross in Geneva. The museum is a physical embodiment of history. While it includes the notion that there have been multiple contributors to humanitarianism in its present form, these contributions are sidebars to the main trajectory. A detailed overview of the museum is given in the site's catalogue (Mayou, 2000) but I would like to provide a few details on the
artifacts and layout as a contribution to the discourse of humanitarianism. There are 11 main components of the museum's displays: The Written Word; Acts of Mercy; The Battle of Solferino; Foundation of the Red Cross; Toward Universality; Prisoners of War; The First World War; Between the Wars; The Second World War; 1945 to the 80s; and Today. These exhibits place borders around the notion of humanitarianism through specific events that are of significance to the Red Cross as an organization. Left out from this chronology, save for a passing reference at the beginning to pre-Red Cross notions of "Acts of Mercy" in other cultures and individuals, is any mention of a complex interrelation between different concepts that have contributed to humanitarianism. In other words, the museum organizes itself along the concept of an origin to humanitarianism and a single path toward the present. Indeed, the physical layout of the museum reinforces this belief in the body of the visitor as they are taken in a straight path from exhibit to exhibit with time and 'improvement' paralleling the visitors' path.

The museum itself is constructed of brushed, exposed concrete reminscent of a military bunker. When entering the museum, the visitor is first taken along darkened corridors and shown the origins of humanitarianism through the horrific scenes of a fictional recreation of the Battle of Solferino. The visitor watches this video in a darkened room on a huge projection screen. At the end of the video, the projection screen wall separates in the middle and automatically opens up to reveal a blindingly white, sunlit room. Sitting at a writing desk is a sculpture of Henry Dunant, writing his "Memory of Solferino." The visitor is then taken through the
remainder of the 11 components of the museum's displays. The message through these images is that the Red Cross is at the beginning of the history of humanitarianism.

In contrast, the MSF movement attempts to disavow itself of history through appeals to a transcendent, 'neutral' character of its humanitarianism that implies that humanitarians' actions have no impact on the social construction and meaning of the term. Taken as a whole, this unproblematic view of history justifies specific approaches to helping, to dichotomize people as either 'helpers' or 'victims' and to perpetuate the notion that war and disaster are simply temporary setbacks to forward movement. In other words, I believe it is the case that by working to ensure that only one history is possible, it is easier to have people confuse the origins of the practice of humanitarianism with its meaning. But, in problematizing humanitarianism I have shown that there are many trajectories of humanitarianism, and that its present manifestation is the result of the intersection of these trajectories. There are other, equally believable, manifestations of humanitarianism and other interpretations of its meaning. If the caring face of humanitarianism can be problematized and questioned, and if its taken-for-granted status is called into question, the task now is to try and understand these other purposes that humanitarianism serves.

In a similar fashion, Foucault argues in his genealogical works "History of Madness", "Security, Territory, and Population", and "Discipline and Punish" that there has long been an interest in the poor, the insane, and the criminal. We believe
that our era and our context is superior to those previous: that it is more civilized, more humane, more enlightened. Have our present efforts truly evolved from control and punishment of victims into a benign interest in improving their conditions, ameliorating their illness, or reforming their criminality? Taking a longer historical view, Foucault (1997) shows that it is equally as believable that people have also been interested in mitigating their potential impact on the exercise of power because of the potential for chaos, resistance, and change. Take, for example, the development of social medicine in France and England in the 18th and 19th centuries. In this case, the increasing urbanization of the poor meant that rich and poor often shared similar urban spaces. This brought about the potential for, and the actualization of, violent disturbances. Not only this, but these shared urban spaces were characterized as unhealthy because whenever people "came together in closed places their morals and their health deteriorated" (Foucault, 1997, p. 144).

Thus they can become the object of medical intervention. Foucault (1997) shows how these beliefs about the behaviour of the poor, together with medical interventions designed to mitigate against these behaviours, resulted in practices that were ostensibly aimed at improving their conditions. However, they also had the effect of quelling the potential for revolution, violence, and resistance. Institutions exist where these mitigative practices are carried out: the prison, the workhouse, and the hospital are examples in this instance. These are ostensibly caring institutions where concern with the fate of others has a point of application.
However, they are also institutions created to see to it that people are governed through the application of discipline. As Foucault saw it, discipline is the application of routine that is sometimes carried out within an enclosed space such as a prison, school, or factory. Skills related to production or certain aptitudes within an individual are a component of discipline: for example, the factory worker is disciplined in the sense that s/he may have a skill necessary for production, but also because s/he works obediently, regularly, and within prescribed times. The individual becomes docile because he can be "subjected, used, transformed, and improved" (Foucault, 1995, p. 136). The ostensibly caring basis of the institutions and practices are noted by (Mauss, 1969, p. 65) in observing that "innovations like the family funds freely and enthusiastically provided by industrialists for workers with families, are an answer to the need for employers to get men attached to them and to realize their responsibilities and the degree of material and moral interest that these responsibilities entail." Thus, the notion of the disciplinary institution is that it is a space within which individuals become docile, obedient, and practiced for the specific purpose of applying certain values and regulating behaviour.

I believe that humanitarian organizations are an instance of a disciplinary institution directed at a specific subject: that is, the disaster victim. In the aftermath of crisis, I have discussed earlier how the victim is constructed as being vulnerable, and requiring the attention of formal helping structures. For example, as I described in Chapter 4, the ICRC in Biafra worked to ensure that only the needy received attention, and they conducted analyses and evaluations performed by experts to
measure and determine who was and was not deserving of this attention. MSF is more specific: they note that humanitarian work is intrinsically linked to an inequality between helper and helped, and that there must be a significant distinction between a suffering population and those that surround them in order for humanitarianism to have meaning. This is despite observations that victims are more often apt to help each other through the formation of temporary emergent organizations, and have in the past been considered resilient rather than vulnerable.

But, can the refugee or disaster survivor really be considered equivalent to prisoner, delinquent, patient, or factory worker? That is, are the behaviours of these 'victim' subjects of disaster really subject to the same process applied within disciplinary institution? I believe that they are. One piece of evidence for this claim comes from the literature and shows a striking intersection between humanitarianism and discipline through the claim that disaster disproportionately affects the poor, those living on marginal lands, and the relatively uneducated. For example, Fothergill and Peek (2004, p. 103) conduct an extensive review of disasters and poverty in the United States and conclude that the literature shows that "[the] poor are more likely to perceive hazards as risky; less likely to prepare for hazards or buy insurance; less likely to respond to warnings; more likely to die... have more psychological trauma; and face more obstacles during the phases of response, recovery, and reconstruction."

Taking a more global perspective, one can find poverty and marginality implicated as responsible for individual vulnerability to disaster in the so-called
developing regions of the world (Bankoff et al., 2004; Bankoff, 2001; Blaikie, 1994). As Bankoff (2001) suggests, these regions have been constructed as being dangerous places not because of the disproportionate frequency of disaster, but because of the vulnerability of the population to the effects of disaster. The regions inhabited by these vulnerable people are therefore dangerous to themselves, but also dangerous to us in the West: they represent a potential threat to our security. On the other hand, the population of the West is not, comparatively speaking, as vulnerable because they have the resilience to be able to withstand disaster. Therefore humanitarianism, at least insofar as it is interested in the suffering of those affected by disaster, considers the poor and especially those in the developing world, to be its main constituency.

It therefore reflects an established belief that the poor are huddled masses: dangerous and potentially threatening. According to Van Leeuwen (1994, p. 593), this has been a consistent concern about the poor and has motivated philanthropic and compassionate effort, the logic being that “[d]estitution for the many might easily lead to discontent” and “relief was advantageous if its costs were less than those of other means to maintain public order.” Poverty itself as not an unfortunate and random situation, but a moral one or rather “a consequence of a seamy way of life” requiring disciplining behaviour and so to “give assistance without attaching moral conditions would only reproduce squalor” (Van Leeuwen, 1994, p. 594). In another example, Twohig (1996, p. 333) notes the manner in which doctors in 19th century Nova Scotia, Canada “served the needs of a colonial administration actively
seeking to settle natives in reserve communities" and that at least part of the reason was the fear of the spread of disease. Relief to the poor through medical intervention, in this case the indigenous Mi'kmaq population of the province, would counter this disease and also provide justification for re-settlement in areas away from the colonizers. And it is the poor, and those requiring moral education who have been precisely the sought-after target of discipline and disciplinary institutions.

Another piece of evidence flows from my earlier argument that humanitarianism has been removed from the personal and made organizational. That is, the subject of the citizen humanitarian has largely been ignored, except to support the humanitarian professional and to provide ontological status to the humanitarian victim. How did this happen and how does this contribute to the discipline of humanitarianism? Perhaps, as Solnit (2009) writes upon reflecting on the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, Hurricane Katrina, and 9/11, disaster affords people the opportunity to be free: free from institutions, free from laws that assume that society tends to disorder in the absence of rules. This would produce a subject that is or has the potential to become someone "without social moorings" (May, 1993, p. 17): in short, an undisciplined subject.

Instead, the discourse of humanitarianism produces the victim as subject for the purpose of keeping them where they are physically and psychically, rather than see them migrate away from their borders, agitate for change, suspend productive activity, or form structures in opposition to the state. For example, the Red Cross
had concerns with the formation of 'refugee groups' in Biafra that could become a pressure group. MSF suggests that there should be control over the use of the term humanitarianism to prevent its use and misappropriation by other parties. Indeed, the cosmopolitan nature of the humanitarian, operating 'without borders' enables the aid to come to the victim and gives no excuse for the victim to move from the conflict or the disaster. As mentioned earlier, there is also the persistent view that disasters are temporary setbacks on the continually moving path of development even though has been considerable evidence to show that this is not the case. The literature suggests that this view arises because disasters are considered to be the result of "natural forces... a departure from a state of normalcy to which a society returns to on recovery" (Bankoff, 2001, p. 24).

With respect to conflict, one can also see suggestions that war is natural and merely a temporary setback. The MSF archival material raises the question of whether it would be better to simply allow wars to continue according to some kind of natural path: "is it better to have a brief, decisive war which ignores humanitarian principles, or a conflict prolonged by the respect of humanitarian demands?" (Terry, 1999, p. 5). However, I believe that when viewed through the lens of disciplinary society, the persistence of this view of the temporary nature of disaster and conflict can instead be understood as the need to make disciplined subjects that quickly return to contribute their part towards production. In other words, the discipline of humanitarianism exists because we cannot allow the disorder of displacement or
dislocation: the state won't allow it. It has nothing to do with being kind or compassionate although this may be the stated intention.

The discipline of humanitarianism is borne out in the refugee camp, relocation centre, the field hospital, or in more subtle ways outside of institutions or bounded locations. These are humanitarian sites where discipline is applied: they are components of a disciplinary society. This suggestion answers some calls in the literature. Maalki (2002, p. 353) calls for historicizing humanitarianism to show that “contemporary practices of disciplining movement and segregating people are not newly emergent phenomena, but something much older and established.” Through an attempt at such an historicization by problematizing and writing a genealogy of humanitarianism, I have argued for a connection with the colonial nature of humanitarian organization. I am now also suggesting that viewing these organizations as part of a disciplinary society means that we can no longer accept the Red Cross as a neutral organization, nor can we accept MSF as an activist organization with nothing more of the victims' interests at heart. The problem of humanitarianism is not that it fails through an incorrect application of technology, management practice, or legal principles: it is, instead, the creation of the subject of victim and the subject of professional helper within a disciplinary institution that is the problem. In the refugee camp or disaster site, as one form of state structure withdraws because it is 'weak', 'failed', or 'in crisis', another form of state arises and permeates through discipline. More often than not, it is third world states that produce these sites while first world states inject discipline into them.
Further, while physical humanitarian sites are obvious points of application of discipline, it is equally as possible to consider the disciplinary practice of humanitarianism within broader, non-physical spaces. For example, Foucault (1995, p. 212) observed that “religious groups and charity organizations” have “long played this role of disciplining the population.” My genealogical exploration concurs and also suggests a disciplinary role for religion and charity through their contribution of rules to the humanitarian discourse. It is important to note that like the prison or the factory, the disciplinary role of humanitarian organizations is not directed or intentional. Rather, it is the result of “a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different origin and scattered location.... [that] converge and gradually produce the blueprint of a general method” (Foucault, 1995, p. 138). This is the core of my genealogical approach to humanitarianism. It is also important note that while Foucault uses institutions as examples of an ‘enclosed space’ to explain the function of discipline, discipline “may be identified neither with an institution nor with an approach... it is a type of power... it may be taken over... by specialized institutions” (Foucault, 1995, p. 215). While discipline can be found to act in enclosed spaces such as “the colleges, or secondary schools... the military barracks... great manufacturing spaces” (Foucault, 1995, p. 141) the principle of enclosure “is neither constant, nor indispensable” (Foucault, 1995, p. 143) but rather “it was a tactic of anti-desertion, anti-vagabondage, anti-concentration.” I suggest, based upon my exploration of the discourse of humanitarianism, that one of these
specialized institutions is the humanitarian organization and that MSF is an ideal example of this kind of disciplinary institution.

Recall from the archival investigation that MSF is keen to create a space for humanitarianism. It does so in order to impose an order upon chaos, but it is selective of where and for what this order is imposed. MSF also reserves the right to decide where to respond, and it spends considerable time debating what is and is not considered humanitarian. It seems paradoxical for a humanitarian organization to choose which crisis is worse, or to decide that one form of suffering is excessive while another is not. However, when viewed as a disciplinary institution, this paradox is explainable. For example, Foucault provides the example of a military hospital in a military port as a disciplinary institution. In a port, it was a place of “desertion, smuggling, contagion: it is a crossroads for dangerous mixtures, a meeting place for forbidden circulations. The naval hospital must therefore treat, but in order to do this it must be a filter, a mechanism that pins down and partitions... Gradually, an administrative and political space was articulated upon a therapeutic space; it tended to individualize bodies, diseases, symptoms, lives and deaths... Out of discipline, a medically useful space was born” (Foucault, 1995, p. 144). In the same way, MSF takes a chaotic situation of disaster and conflict and articulates a useful space on top of a therapeutic one. The paradox is explained by noting that it is the discipline of medicine and the docility of bodies that is the objective, not the total amelioration of suffering. Any one suffering body is as good as the next.
Therefore, humanitarianism serves a role in ensuring the separation of populations. The ironic quality of this purpose is noted in relation to the 'without borders' discourse of humanitarianism. Humanitarianism extends the colonization of former colonies by reclaiming these territories through the act of helping. My dissertation has raised more questions on borders and their role in framing the humanitarian problematic. In removing borders, humanitarianism seeks territory that is not claimed by others and tries to create its own space. Both the Red Cross and MSF have a complex understanding of borders. While MSF is popularly credited with a humanitarian function that ignores borders, it appears to erect a new and different set of borders related to defining humanitarianism, victims, and professionals. It also, at least in my case, established a border around its organizational history and archive. Ironically, the borderless organization is possessed of many borders. However, the Red Cross was operating in a borderless fashion in Africa well before the arrival of MSF. In its work during the immediate postcolonial period, the Red Cross appealed to universal ideals and attempted to apply them across national borders and cultures. In fact the ideals were not so much universal as they were European. However, this strategy is not unique to humanitarianism as it is similar to the approach taken by colonial powers in appealing to universal tenets of civilization when attempting to justify colonialism. The justification was not so much to convince the colonized population as it was to convince colonizing populations at home that the policies and practices were needed. Humanitarianism extends notions of European culture and intellectual
heritage into former colonial countries. The implication of this extension is the furtherance of colonial attitudes under the guise of organizations ostensibly meant to help victims recover from conflict and disaster. However, there is evidence of resistance to this extension, as I discussed in Chapters 3 and 4: for example, the way in which drought relief operations by humanitarian organizations were resisted in Ethiopia, and in the formation of refugee 'pressure groups' in the Biafran conflict.

Postcolonialism

Different Contexts, Yet Common Discourse

Through an examination of disaster and emergency management texts, I have thus far revealed the organizational practices of the Red Cross and MSF in responding to disaster and conflict. It seems that the differential characteristics of the organizations are overshadowed by what they have in common. Most notably, this commonality includes an underlying discourse of humanitarianism that reaches back to the formation of the Red Cross and is still discernible in organizations such as MSF that have been formed in the post-colonial period. Furthermore, while the Red Cross is sanctioned by international law, and operates in parallel with the state, MSF finds itself relying on state authority despite its resistance of this association; in particular, MSF wants the state to take on tasks outside of immediate emergency response. However, it is important to note that a state can ask or force the Red Cross to leave its territory or prevent the organization from entering a civil war
zone. Both organizations offer technical solutions to problems as they work on providing medical (ie. surgical and population health) solutions. This was hugely evident in Biafra as evidenced through my findings of medical assessments of the affected population, and the use of doctors and nurses to attend to their needs. Further, MSF is primarily interested in providing aid through the doctor-patient relationship as discussed in Chapter 5. Both organizations insist on neutrality.

This claim is strengthened by Redfield’s (2005) observation that a crisis is the best environment for matching problems with technical solutions. However, as suggested by Cooke (2003), describing these practices as neutral conceals the ways in which they help to create and sustain power relationships. This is particularly evident in failed states as the weakening of these (almost exclusively) former colonies sees a corresponding weakening of the state’s ability to look after citizens, and creates a space for Western nations, through humanitarian organizations, to offer more efficient care (Bello, 2006). However, efficiency implies a greater application of technical solutions and treating disaster, war, or poverty as only a technical problem aids in the depoliticization of the event (Ferguson, 1990). But as de Waal (1997) argues in the case of famine, the empirical evidence is that disaster is averted only when politicians and others in power can be made accountable. Redfield (2005) observes that working without borders ignores the responsibility of states to look after their citizens, and in effect it recreates colonial landscapes that have no boundaries: the constituency of MSF are those populations defined by the organization as being vulnerable, stateless or disentitled.
Postcolonial theory asserts that colonization was so pervasive that it had profound effects on the social, economic, and cultural life of colonizer and colonized (Prasad, 2005). This observation is all the more remarkable given that by the start of World War I, global power on a scale never before seen was concentrated in the hands of Britain and France (Said, 1994). European societies were organized, in part, to administer and extract surplus value from vast tracts of foreign geography and their subjugated distant populations. However, there was more to colonialism than the profit and power bestowed on Europe: postcolonial scholars claim that imperialism and colonization have more interesting and analytically useful properties beneath their surface, and that these are relevant and applicable even today (Prasad, 2005). When combined with the observation that colonialism and imperialism left virtually no aspect of social and economic life untouched, it is further claimed that colonialism's retreat in the independence struggles following World War II have left a residue of markers of colonial practices in social and political life (Said, 1994). These residues can be used as signposts in the exploration of the current practices of humanitarian organizations.

On the surface, domination appears to be the central practice of colonialism. However, domination is not peculiar to the colonial period, so what is it about this particular form of domination that made it so successful? Furthermore, how was consent gained amongst both colonizer and colonized to maintain distant rule? Perhaps part of the answer to these questions lies in colonialism being sold to both colonizer and colonized as being done 'for a good reason'; that is, to improve the
lives of the colonized. In this sense, colonialism affected not only the colonized, but the colonizers: a sense of duty was evident in European society that this domination was in fact a civilizing mission enabled by viewing the colonized as inferior or subordinate (Said, 1994), but redeemable through a process of civilization or development.

This conception of the colonized as being at the receiving end of the West’s duty to improve may also have allowed the West the space to imagine itself. In other words, colonialism enabled the West to understand itself in relation to what it was not, to judge itself in relation to what it does not do, and to see possibilities in relation to what others do not have (Said, 1994). However, resistance to colonial rule and authority, and to the conceptualization of the colonized as being inert and objectified was also a defining feature of colonialism (Said 1993; Prasad 1997). What is apparent from all of these practices is that the border between colonizer and colonized, between domination and resistance is an artificial one. Colonialism was not something that was done to the Other without effect on the colonizing society, and resistance did not suddenly appear at an appointed time in history. It is also suggested by postcolonial scholars (Prasad 2005; Said 1993) that the border between the colonial era and today is also artificial: if sought after, the residual markers of colonialism can be found in the routines of organizations. But, an understanding of these organizational routines can best be obtained by first understanding their formative narratives.
The post-colonial world has witnessed a weakening of the ability of the state to look after citizens (Agamben, 2005; Ophir, 2003; Redfield, 2005). Examples of this can be found in sub-Saharan Africa where nations have widely varying abilities to provide services to citizens. At one extreme are countries such as Somalia, with an almost complete absence of state structures, or Zimbabwe where state services are rapidly disappearing. This weakening is broadly referred to as the failure of states (Hendrie, 1991; Ophir, 2003), but may more properly be attributed to the precarious ability of many nations to manage the multiple pressures of economic decline, conflict and disasters under conditions of a limited economic base. This state of permanent emergency has challenged the established disaster discourse, and makes space for novel approaches to humanitarianism (Alexander, 2006; Bello, 2006). These approaches often include the privatization of aid and relief, and despite appearances, they are not inherently beneficial to the population affected, and may serve corporate or other interests (Banerjee, 2008). Underlying all these approaches is a discourse that views disasters as knowable, controllable and surmountable through the application of rational thought and scientific activity (Alexander, 2006; Stefanovic, 2003) and depicts disasters as sudden shocks that temporarily divert a society from a deterministic movement forward. Evidence for this view can be found in the flourishing business in “sans-frontières” organizations ranging from Reporters- to Veterinarians- to Engineers-sans-frontières. However, this discourse was challenged through observations that fully predictable events are not avoided, and that the impact of disasters varies depending upon the social and
economic condition of the survivors. Hurricane Katrina provides an excellent example of the challenge to the dominant discourse. Elsewhere, long-standing crises in countries such as Sudan or Somalia demonstrate the fragility of viewing disasters as one-time events.

As a result, international organizations now take on the responsibility for those displaced by conflict and disaster, and the refugee camp has become a symbol of the post-colonial world (Bello, 2006; Redfield, 2005). The camp is also a physical manifestation of the impact of an emergency or disaster, and has been created under the assumption these events are temporary abnormalities requiring brief periods of extraordinary intervention enabling the affected population to eventually return to normal life (Alexander, 2006; Ophir, 2003). This philosophy extends back to the creation of humanitarian organizations and the supposed cycle of disaster-relief-recovery-reconstruction that continues to permeate these organizations, despite evidence to the contrary that disorder and disruption is the norm rather than the exception (Alexander, 2006; Redfield, 2005).

As Redfield (2005) observes, working without borders, in the style developed by MSF, responds to the failure of the nation state, and clearly sets out the constituency of MSF as the organization that takes on state-like functions for those without states, or those within states who have no entitlement (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002). It also leaves room for states to ignore suffering (Bello, 2006; Redfield, 2005; Van Til & Ross, 2001) while increasing the individual's dependence on outside
assistance, thus delaying their realization of the political solution to their situation (Van Til & Ross, 2001).

Meinecke (1970) and Maclntyre (2007) develop arguments that there is now a borderless imperialism because local practices and knowledge have been replaced with those of the stranger. This does not result in greater inclusion of the local, but rather a conquest by strangers of the local. Laws that are valid for all of humanity (such as International Humanitarian Law and the Geneva Conventions) means that there can be no laws peculiar to the local situation, and so there is no check against outside ambition. This creates “an imperial administration of the stranger” (Ossewaarde, 2007) resulting in the inability of the local to set their own goals. Even though humanity is globalized, the individual human must live somewhere local. Hanging on to this locality through resistance to strangers and becoming strange is seen in forms such as “nostalgia, protest, terror and hope” (Ossewaarde, 2007). What do borders mean in a borderless world? What role is there for resistance to humanitarianism that relies on this borderless movement?

**Resistance, Stakeholders, and Borders**

A specific contribution of postcolonial theory to management research is to reveal the historical context of management practices that have their genesis in colonialism (Özkazanç-Pan, 2008; Prasad, 2003). The genealogy of humanitarianism has revealed the extent to which these organizations perpetuate colonialism by hanging on to colonial practices unawares (Kwek, 2003; Prasad, 2003). The
perceived colonial duty to look after the less advanced (Said, 1994) is evident from
the texts studied as they reveal that both organizations view disaster-affected
individuals as vulnerable people, forming vulnerable populations not capable of
protecting themselves, or even of having the ability to decide whether to accept the
care being offered.

By extension, the state is also judged on its vulnerability and capacity to
administer to its population, as evidenced from MSF’s concepts of ingérence, and
from the Red Cross duty to intervene in conflict as afforded to it by international
law. This behaviour is consistent with Narayan’s (1995, p. 136) argument that the
relative capacity or vulnerability of individuals is “contested terrain” and is liable to
variation depending upon who defines these terms. In this case, the definitions are
made within the organizations that are in turn products of former colonizing
nations. My findings echo the observation of Lambert and Lester (2004) that
colonial philanthropists did not argue against imperialism and an empire; rather,
they sought to curb the excesses of imperialism. To be clear: the practice of colonial
philanthropists was such that it wasn’t necessarily in disagreement with
colonialism, but rather tried to curb its excesses. In a parallel fashion, the
humanitarians of today don’t disagree with war, but try to curb the excesses. This
was certainly evident in the archives of MSF as described in Chapter 5, as their then-
President explicitly stated that the organization wasn’t opposed to war.

The texts revealed that this sentiment and approach still exist in the practices
of both MSF and the Red Cross as far as conflict and disaster are concerned. They
take conflict and disaster as givens and seek to curb the excesses of violence and risk respectively. Following on from this perspective, the clients of these humanitarian organizations are viewed as vulnerable, and these same organizations make decisions to intervene in contradiction of the wishes of state authority (as does MSF in some cases), or are granted authority to intervene through international law (as does the ICRC). It is therefore argued that the current practices of these organizations are extensions of a colonial past, despite their differing formative contexts and approaches to humanitarian action. What is important is not the time or context in which these organizations emerged, but the underlying discourse of humanitarianism originating in a colonial past that continues to inform their practices.

To borrow a phrase from Andre Gunter Frank (1970) who argues that development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin, I believe that postcolonial theory argues that colonialism and resistance were two different sides of the same coin. Rather than being mutually exclusive, the two were dependent upon each other for their very existence as meaningful constructs. It also implies that colonization was not an end state but contained within it the seeds of change and eventual replacement with another set of power relations through a process of resistance. Given the argument that humanitarian organizations are part of a discourse that has a common colonial past, one would expect to see some accounting of resistance within these organizations. However, the texts examined were silent on resistance implying that there is no place in the policies of the Red
Cross or MSF for states or individuals to resist humanitarianism. This is in stark contrast to empirical evidence presented in documented cases of resistance to aid; these can be found, for example, in Ethiopia during the famines of the 1980s as explained by Hendrie (1991). In this case resistance by the vulnerable was met with shocked incredulity by the humanitarian organization together with claims of malfeasance lodged against the resisters. The obvious reason for this position of the humanitarian organization and for omission of resistance in the humanitarian discourse is that resistance seems illogical and counter to the goal established by the organizations to help those populations considered vulnerable. Just as the colonized subject was the receiver of a duty to care or civilize, so the construction of the idea of vulnerability and a vulnerable person has no room for the subject to participate in the definition or their inclusion in these categories (see for example Furedi 2007a; 2007b).

Since humanitarianism, vulnerability, and aid are now ‘common sense’ how can an individual or state choose to refuse aid or define the terms with which aid is accepted? Unmasking common sense and more productively elaborating phenomenon can only be achieved by noticing what is not said, and observing that the silences within discourse contain the possibility for change (Foucault, 2002; Marcuse, 2002; May, 1993). This dissertation has used postcolonial theory and genealogy to demonstrate that these silences exist around resistance and refusal of humanitarianism. Thus, I have been able to open a space in the humanitarian discourse to include resistance and I will now capitalize on this opening and re-
imagine the individual recipient of humanitarianism from that of a passive subject of a distant duty to care into an active participant in the discourse.

Perhaps a first insight into this problem can be obtained by recalling that management theory compartmentalizes its ontology by drawing a boundary line at the organization (Burrell & Morgan, 1985; Johnson & Duberley, 2000; Weatherbee et al., 2008). Just as it is often necessary to hold some variable constant to solve an equation, the constant of the organizational equation is the individual external to the organization. This ontology has excluded relevant social actors, in particular those without voice yet still negatively affected by organizations. As an example, individuals living in communities impacted by the social and environmental decisions of industry have sought to influence decision-making so that profit yields to local interests and conditions. Thus, exclusion from decision-making results in resistance by external groups that seek to have a legitimate voice in internal decision-making that affects the world outside of the firm.

In response, organizations engage in legitimizing processes that reduce resistance by including these external groups as partners or stakeholders. But clearly organizations do not admit all to the decision-making process. In the case of disaster survivors in relation to humanitarian organizations I have argued in this dissertation that the recipients of aid have enormous legitimacy as they provide the vulnerable population so central to the humanitarian discourse, and ultimately to the existence of the humanitarian organization. Therefore, it becomes possible to admit the recipients of aid to the humanitarian discourse. In effect, I am suggesting
that resistance to the humanitarian organization is an act of decolonization in a post-decolonization period. The task now becomes one of suggesting how this resistance might emerge within the humanitarian discourse, and of what physical manifestation this emergence may take in the humanitarian organization. As a first step, what can be remembered from resistance and decolonization to guide this process?

Learning from Decolonization

Resistance as a political movement resulted in decolonization through independence from the colonizing power (Fanon, 2004; Said, 1994). However, the state that replaced the colonizer often reproduced the colonial structures of power, albeit under the guise of trying to change existing conditions, liberating the population, or seeking economic freedom. Pointing to examples from Chile and Cuba, Mignolo (1991) argues that decolonization projects were set to fail from the outset because the initial conditions were the same; that is, they used a logic that came from within modernity; socialism, in the cases of the examples above. Therefore, resistance was futile because it is governed by the same epistemology and ontology that resulted in oppression. In the case of resistance to humanitarianism, the parallel would be the establishment of local humanitarian organizations. Interestingly, the Red Cross has already taken this approach through its global network of national societies. I have argued that despite this local presence, the practices of the Red Cross still reflect a humanitarian discourse rooted
in colonialism. How then can resistance be conceptualized so that it avoids reproducing the existing discourse, albeit in a local disguise?

Mignolo (1991) argues for a solution that originates outside of modernity, and in the case of this dissertation, the solution would be separate from the logic that created and perpetuates humanitarianism. However, according to Mignolo (1991), caution should be exercised so that the result of such a delinking does not result in a furthering of the essentialism overseen by the colonial project. In decolonizing from humanitarianism, one may attempt to attribute a different set of ways of knowing about helping to the group that is delinking. This can result in an epistemology that is appropriate only to the decolonized, and stands in contrast to Western knowledge of humanitarianism which, as I have argued, views the survivors of conflict or disaster as receivers of a duty to care and improve as part of a continuing colonial discourse. In other words, a new essentialism regarding humanitarianism may emerge. Mignolo rejects the development of an equal but opposite essentialism in favour of the acceptance of more than one approach to knowledge: a hyrbirdity of knowledge. Hybridity is part of the postcolonial perspective that sees the interaction of the colonizer and colonized as being implicitly interdependent (Bhabha, 1994; Prasad, 2005). The role of essentialism is challenged by hybridity: one cannot speak of the fundamental characteristics of the Other when these are increasingly shared with the colonizer. Mignolo (2007) uses the argument of delinking and shared cultural space to introduce the concept of border thinking or
border epistemology. This notion contrasts quite sharply with the colonial ideal of the frontier.

Borders identify a geographical space between countries, defined by politics and for many places in the world, ordered as a result of colonial power sharing and not due to any logic that would respect the cultural or linguistic heritage of those on either side. But a border implies the existence of people on either side and the possibility of exchange and movement between the sides. This is in contrast to the concept of the frontier, which conjures images of pushing into the unknown and the new (Mignolo & Tlostanova, 2006). Border thinking, therefore, is achieved in part by accepting the idea of multiple perspectives. In terms of epistemologies, the frontier is characteristic of the modernist view, while the border adopts the view that multiple ways of knowing are possible. The frontier represents “the hubris of the zero point” (Mignolo & Tlostanova, 2006, p. 214). In other words, through colonialism, modernity’s legacy has been the belief that it occupied new spaces and thus was able to gain an understanding of itself through a comparison to what it is not; the zero point or point of comparison is this ‘empty’ colonized space.

Border thinking eliminates the possibility of such a comparison because it admits that there are multiple sides inhabiting the space. Mignolo (2007) claims that adopting border thinking enables the admission of multiple epistemologies. Therefore, in contrast to other resistance approaches that have utilized conflict or hybridity, border thinking recognizes the inevitability of modernity, but with the development of different (indigenous) epistemologies. This is the drive for
"epistemic rights" (Mignolo, 2007, p. 118) in which indigenous ways of knowing delink from Western standards of knowledge, but do not completely close off these other ways of knowing.

Mignolo’s (2007) idea of border epistemology has much in the way of irony when considering disaster and the many sans frontières humanitarian organizations that are involved in responding to disaster. For the humanitarian discourse and humanitarian organizations, I suggest that disasters are a new uncharted territory seized upon by the West to rule ideologically over former colonial states: disasters most often play out on the same physical territory that was once colonized by Europe. Disasters present humanitarian organizations with a ready stock of souls to be discovered and rescued, be they tsunami survivors or the victims of financial disaster. I have shown how postcolonial theory can interrogate and expand organization studies through the defamiliarization of the humanitarian organization.

**Humanitarianism and Cosmopolitanism**

It is through cosmopolitanism, I believe, that we can examine the individualism that is at the heart of the formation of the humanitarian organization (e.g. Dunant and Kouchner). But also, I believe that the cosmopolitan humanitarian organization was the outcome of the rupture of humanitarianism that occurred after the Biafran war that is confirmed and noted throughout the literature (De Waal, 1997; Forsythe, 2007; Hendrie, 1997a; Moorehead, 1999; Rieff, 2002; Taithe, 2004).
Hannerz (1990, p. 239) defines cosmopolitanism as the "willingness to become involved with the Other, and the concern with achieving competence in cultures" and Ossewaarde (2007) continues that a recognition of human goodness is a component of cosmopolitanism, but this recognition can only be achieved when the traditional containers of locality that produce the Other are no longer important. In Ossewaarde's (2007) review and critique of cosmopolitanism, he finds that cosmopolitanism begins with and seeks to achieve everywhere the blank individual devoid of name and social characteristics. Cosmopolitanism seems fundamentally concerned with involvement with the Other, and thus is of particular interest in contributing to our understanding of humanitarianism and the postcolonial. According to Ossewaarde (2007), cosmopolitanism sets out a morality of human relations where borders, localities, and strangers lose their importance. These three themes will now be explored in more detail as will cosmopolitanism's importance for humanitarianism.

Ossewaarde (2007) describes two conceptualizations of the idea of the stranger, both situated by relating the stranger to the local, and both told as stories of conflict. One conceptualization is that the stranger is an outsider: a third party bringing a neutral opinion regarding a conflict between locals. The stranger in this instance does not seek to remain, nor to be included or considered as a local. The stranger can be objective about the local situation fomenting a resolution that can be accepted by the disagreeing locals. The stranger is selected by locals and they imbue him with status and objectivity mostly because the stranger is not intending
to stay nor compete with locals. The other conceptualization sees the stranger as an immigrant to a locality who seeks to remain, and who becomes a threat to the locals. Conflict in this instance is created by the presence of the stranger, rather than being a source of conflict resolution.

How can the notions of cosmopolitanism and the two conceptualizations of stranger as described by Ossewaarde (2007) characterize humanitarianism as born in Europe and represented by the ICRC and later by MSF? Traditionally the humanitarian, perhaps as personified by the ICRC delegate, would bring a neutral, objective opinion to conflict. That the presence of the ICRC was sanctioned by international law and nation states implies that the stranger is selected by the locals. In Biafra, the opposite happened to the humanitarians: they were strangers in the sense that what they learned about European humanitarianism did not work in Africa. They were also strangers to the culture. Thus, what always used to work, no longer did and one can see this in the archives of the Red Cross through the shocked incredulity and frustration at not being able to get in relief supplies and at the questioning of the name of the ICRC. Maybe the 'humanitarian stranger' is a hybrid of both types of stranger.

The difference between the strangers is a differentiation in the conflict: in the first, the stranger sees a conflict between locals, while the latter has the stranger in conflict with locals. The latter is also a clear description of what happened in Biafra: the ICRC was not needed or appreciated. Thus, an emergence is being witnessed at the site of local resistance. Biafra was a resistance, and perhaps the
first example of this ever seen in humanitarianism, but also at the dawn of a modern humanitarianism: one that would find Africa a post-colonial playground.

Cosmopolitans are strangers to the locals, and they have a set of externally-gained knowledge and status (Ossewaarde, 2007). For locals, it is important to make acquaintance with and know neighbours, but for the stranger it is important to know things. This is how MSF and ICRC are needed: as possessors of knowledge. But also how the local is needed: through knowledge of people within the local neighbourhood to facilitate the technical work of the stranger; in the case of medical humanitarianism, this work is on the bodies (and increasingly the minds) of the locals. The cosmopolitan does not pass through a locality, but becomes a temporary member of the local group through his or her credentials as a stranger with a profession or status. Cosmopolitans are not limited by traditional boundaries such as borders, worksites, or town lines: their professional knowledge passes through these limits. This is how MSF knowledge workers move about. But it also sheds light on the MSF conception of the world: those contained by borders (the victim/the South/the poor) and those not contained by borders (the doctors/the North/the rich). The locals remain local, and the borderless remain cosmopolitan!

Locals and cosmopolitans can also be distinguished through their differing attachments to people, status, and organizations (Gouldner, 1958). The local is attached to workplaces, friends, and connections that strengthen their group position, while the cosmopolitan is attached to academic or other qualifications that allow them to have a unique career or profession. They are always ready to leave a
workplace along with their skills and knowledge whenever there is a better opportunity, no matter where it might be. Cosmopolitan strangers with special knowledge and status derived from outside the local place their importance upon "the kind of people with whom they can share their knowledge about things" (Ossewaarde, 2007).

That which is called 'globalization' sees cosmopolitans freed from locality in all senses: freedom from a specific workplace, national boundary, and identity in favour of individualized professions able to apply their knowledge at whatever point in the world it is needed. Locals do not have this luxury because they are defined by and live by their knowledge of other locals and local conditions, and these cannot move through local boundaries. As Malkki (2002, p. 352) notes "[w]hile capital and commodities, ideas and technologies, move ever more fluidly through or above the system of nation-states, people and their labour do not move freely across the globe." In other words, only the doctors are entitled to live without borders: the locals remain behind.

In the conceptualization of cosmopolitan versus local, the local survives through his or her knowledge of acquaintances created as a result of boundaries around societies, nations, or workplaces. In contrast, the cosmopolitan by definition does not need to know others in order to survive. Rather, he or she depends upon transportable knowledge; therefore, he or she thrives when these boundaries cease to be relevant. In the absence of the social control created by boundaries, a certain amount of disorganization and anxiety results. It is within this disorganization that
cosmopolitans "rule without local and national restraints" (Ossewaarde, 2007, p. 373).

The cosmopolitan is also imbued with an objectivity not present in the local. This objectivity is based on their strangeness in all places and the corresponding lack of affiliation with any class, nation, or group. It creates in the cosmopolitan a "built-in identity crisis" (Berger, 1973, p. 92). However, a lack of affiliation does not mean a lack of connectedness. In the case of the cosmopolitan, this connectedness is to the global body of knowledge about specific practices such as management, medicine, or law. The local has limited ability to access this global knowledge.

Some advocates of cosmopolitanism prefer the term world citizenship and the central desire of these citizens to associate with the Other (Hannerz, 1990). It seeks to eliminate the stranger by seeking a world of globalized humanity where everyone is from nowhere and all live under the same laws and customs. World citizens eschew institutions with roots in common experience, preferring to identify only with humanity. This prioritizes humanitarian principles and goals over those that deal with the local in all senses: families, communities, nations, workplaces.

If the media's reach is global, then few secrets can be kept for very long. In the cosmopolitan conception of the world, the suffering stranger is no longer a novelty, no longer a valid rallying point to motivate common action. This is because the knowledge of suffering is instantaneous and continuous: there is always suffering and we all have ways of knowing about it. But, our common humanity will trump any local resistance to helping. Through arguing that it is a moral duty to take
responsibility for suffering strangers, the cosmopolitan entreats locals to interact with strangers, and in effect to become cosmopolitan.

The literature on cosmopolitanism argues that humanity take over the responsibilities previously assigned to God and the nation state (Ossewaarde, 2007). Humanity has become sacred. For the nation state, cosmopolitanism is an alternative to nationalism. It holds that national borders no longer rally citizens to identify with their country since borders no longer hold back global processes such as finance, labour, or environment. As a consequence, national efforts to make a local solution will no longer work if citizens have no local ties and if these solutions are conceived only with the locality in mind. This is too narrow-minded for the cosmopolitan and instead the legitimacy of the state is increased when it includes the stranger and becomes more humanitarian (Ossewaarde, 2007).

The stranger has opened borders, making them unnecessary through the argument that there are global laws and morals based on humanity. However, the dark side of this reading of the world is the creation of "a borderless society of strangers" (Ossewaarde, 2007, p. 368). Humanitarian organizations are instantiations of this phenomenon. Just as the rise of the stranger has delegitimized the local's strength from co-workers, humanitarianism removes from locals the ability to look after themselves. The move from local coping to being housed and managed in refugee or resettlement camps is the result. Thus, an emergence of the cosmopolitan ideal is coincident with the creation of the humanitarian organization.
Chapter 7 – Conclusion

I began this dissertation by reflexively discussing how I arrived at my intuition relating humanitarianism and history: namely, that an ahistorical representation of humanitarianism prevents an examination of the other purposes that they serve in society. I stated my goals of describing how humanitarianism has become taken for granted and subsequently understanding the purpose that humanitarianism serves. My method of investigation was genealogy, and I chose this approach because it is a method of historical critique that exposes the taken for granted. To accomplish the genealogy, I examined source material from two humanitarian organizations: the International Red Cross (through material in the ICRC and IFRC archives) and Medecins Sans Frontières. Because the ‘archive’ for a genealogy is the sedimented totality of what has been said about a subject, I did not restrict myself to only the physical archives of the two organizations but also used existing histories of humanitarianism and the two organizations under study. In analyzing the texts from this larger ‘archive’, I found evidence of the discourse of humanitarianism. However, as I indicated in Chapter 2, a limitation of this dissertation was the restricted access to the physical archives of MSF. Although genealogy does posit that the totality of what is said about a subject can be found in multiple locations that does not completely limit the effects of not being able to investigate primary source documents in MSF. Therefore, this dissertation could be enhanced by re-engaging efforts to gain access to MSF or to other organizations that
were part of the periods under study: the Biafran War and the decolonization period of post-World War II.

**The Red Cross and MSF – Contribution to the Discourse of Humanitarianism**

As a result of the uncovering of discourse in this dissertation, I believe that the Red Cross and MSF contribute to the discursive formation of humanitarianism. Discourse acts through things, and in particular through rules written in laws and other texts that are used to understand and apply a concept. Clearly, as the creator and 'guardian' of the Geneva Conventions and International Humanitarian Law, the Red Cross is responsible for the production of humanitarian discourse. In a sense, the Red Cross is the guardian of the humanitarian discourse because it holds the keys to a primary object of the discourse! One can also see how the Red Cross contributes to the discourse through its connection with other objects such as its association with Dunant's book “Memory of Solferino,” its multiple Nobel Prizes, its 'principles' of operation that include neutrality and impartiality, and the internationally protected symbols of its organization (the Red Cross and Red Crescent). The impact of all of these objects is threefold: they train people how to be compassionate, provide rules by which humanitarianism could be applied, and help create humanitarian subjects. I argued that these subjects include the humanitarian victim, the citizen humanitarian, and the humanitarian professional.
MSF also contributes to the discourse through its production of objects and statements that then become available to produce these subjects. These statements are not as ordered as those of the Red Cross, and they exist in various forms but mostly as internal debate between humanitarian professionals within MSF. However, one significant contribution that MSF makes to the discourse is that a difference between victim and helper is both productive and necessary for humanitarianism. This is extraordinarily paradoxical given MSF's ethos of working without borders and its intention, as stated within the archival material examined, to identify with the victim's suffering by being close to him or her. In further constructing the discourse, MSF contributes its understanding of what constitutes a disaster and suffering. A humanitarian victim exists only if there is sufficient difference between their condition following an event and their condition prior to the event. So because the humanitarian victim only exists if there is a crisis or event that causes sufficient excess suffering or excess mortality, only some events qualify as disaster. Therefore, MSF contributes to the discourse through the construction of disasters as exceptional events beyond the daily societal background noise of tragedies and avoidable mortality.

This is borne out in its various campaigns for neglected diseases or in hesitancy in agreeing to participate in responses to 'popular' events such as the Asian tsunami of 2004. This also helps to construct and perpetuate the subject of the professional humanitarian. A distinction must be made between the normal and the abnormal to make a space for the helper otherwise his or her task would be
unnecessary. For MSF, the humanitarian professional is a subject that represents a cosmopolitan humanitarianism that is anti-bureaucratic but hierarchical, principled yet flexible, borderless but rooted. The subject of the professional humanitarian has the right and the duty to provide assistance free from interference from third parties to the victim-humanitarian professional relationship.

The organizations also contribute to the discourse through the addition of paradox and contradiction. The archives show that on the one hand there is an expectation that victims should behave according to the rules of the discourse, but on the other an acknowledgement that the victims have a part in the creation of their misfortune or in the construction of a situation as a disaster. This was seen in Biafra when the Red Cross blamed all subjects for not behaving correctly, yet the victim is now a subject for which compassion should be felt. However, this compassion is directed such that there is an expectation that help will be provided only if the helper receives something in return. During the Biafran conflict the struggle for humanitarian control of the war extended to placing war victims at fault for not behaving correctly. This is reflected in the ICRC's desire to avoid creating the mentality of a refugee as a result of the humanitarian intervention; therefore, only well-behaved, well-managed victims of disaster are acceptable. In Africa, this was not always the case.

**Postcolonial Humanitarianism**
The Scramble for the Red Cross

The work of the ICRC's George Hoffmann in Africa is an early instance of the 'without borders' humanitarian professional. Hoffmann drew his ability and justification to influence African leaders from international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions. There was an implicit understanding that the Red Cross and its rules would transcend the move to post-colonial Africa: the innate human understanding of humanitarianism would be switched on. Like the latter-day post-colonial scramble for Africa carried out by the Americans and Soviets, the Red Cross raced to ensure that it would continue to exist as an organization within countries on the cusp of decolonizing. The charge to independence in a decolonizing Africa meant a potential challenge to the role of the ICRC on the continent. To counter this challenge, Hoffman attempted to perpetuate the idea of humanitarianism through consistent messaging and quiet diplomacy. That there was a challenge to the ICRC can be seen in Hoffman's attempts to corral ideas that there could be more than one Red Cross, or in his challenges to the notion that there was something different about Africans that made humanitarianism ineffective or nonsensical in an African context.

Further, the scramble to 'possess' Africa is repeated later in the humanitarian archive. This time it is the possession of African disasters and African refugees through the humanitarian organization's privilege to name disasters and choose victims. This process reflects an extension of Banerjee's (2008, p. 1541) notion of
necrocapitalism; that is, "contemporary forms of organizational accumulation that involve dispossession and the subjugation of life to the power of death." Banerjee (2008) is interested in examining the role of violence as perpetrated by organizations in furthering Western social and economic interests. He notes that necrocapitalism is a practice "that operates through the establishment of colonial sovereignty, and the manner in which this sovereignty is established in the current political economy where the business of death can take place through states of exception" in for example the "right for some to decide that while India and Israel may be allowed to have nuclear weapons, it is unacceptable for North Korea or Iran to do so. The entities in this colonial space of exception must either be disciplined by violence or 'civilized by culture' to become normalized [my emphasis added]" (B. Banerjee, 2008, p. 1547).

**Resistance**

In practice, during conflicts and disasters, humanitarian organizations displayed the same kind of necrocapitalist colonial privilege. Yet, as postcolonial theory suggests, examples of resistance can (and should) be found. In the Tigrayan war examined in Chapter 3, the humanitarian organizations were shocked that ‘starving’ people would refuse to live in camps. In Biafra, the ICRC expected that humanitarian subjects would behave in the correct fashion. Subjects were placed at fault for not behaving correctly according to the discourse of humanitarianism, namely by not following the Geneva Conventions and International Humanitarian
Law. The Nigerian government did not allow the free flow of aid, the combatants failed to distinguish victims from combatants soldiers, and the victims were becoming accustomed to aid for survival. Therefore, the struggle was not just over land, but also over the meaning of the war and the meaning of humanitarianism. The Red Cross noted that victims in Biafra began to organize themselves into advocacy groups. This shows that there was a potential for resistance even in the midst of a conflict where the victims were portrayed as helpless.

In the discourse of humanitarianism, and in the postcolonial exploration of this discourse, I believe we can see the outlines of the debate about human nature: whether humans are the product of their world, or whether they can shape the world. Humanitarianism is no different from other social phenomenon in that it should engage people in the argument over whether society is falling apart and needs to be regulated, or whether it stays together through human interaction. If the former, then formal organization and rules are the solution. If the latter, then we should be open to constant change. However, these debates seem to be largely absent from the humanitarian discourse: disasters, conflict, and humanitarian responses are largely represented in the discourse as the inevitable product of nature, human nature and rationality. There is little, if any, recognition in the mainstream or popular view that humanitarianism is the end result of an ordering of the world that produces subject positions. Without any insight into how a practice has come about and how it persists, that practice will remain taken for granted.
The Problematic of Humanitarianism

How does humanitarianism remain a taken for granted social construction? That is, how is it that people believe that has always existed in its current form? In looking for an answer, one can examine a parallel situation: that of criminal punishment or insanity. There may have been a harsher and more violent time in the past when the criminal and the insane were treated in a less than caring fashion. However, for some reason, rehabilitation of the criminal and medical treatment of the insane superseded these other, more violent methods. The success of the clinic or the prison in managing the insane or criminal is such that it is difficult to imagine any other way of dealing with this part of the population. So too, I argue, with humanitarianism. The archive is replete with individual examples of explanations as to why humanitarianism arose: market capitalism, a caring God, the shocking motivational tales of the aftermath of war as told by a traveling businessman. But, the success of contemporary humanitarianism in responding to those in need is such that it is difficult to imagine it any other way. In other words, it is taken for granted.

I have attempted to demonstrate that humanitarianism is taken for granted by showing that it has not always been 'the way it is'; in effect, this shows that it could change again. In contrast to the universalist messages of humanitarian organizations announcing that neutrality and impartiality are values that are and have always been shared by humanity regardless of culture or country, I have found humanitarianism to be problematic. That is, it is the product of multiple historical
trajectories and it does not stem from some common root of humanity. It is a changeable discourse. Some of these changes included viewing suffering as the will of god then as being controllable by man. Another was that war is inevitable and the humanitarian organizations' job was to remind states of their legal promise to temper their violence, versus humanitarians as 'actors' able to influence the outcome: the former is shown in Hoffman's work throughout Africa at independence, while the latter certainly occurred in Biafra.

Therefore, one outcome of elaborating the discourse of humanitarianism is to demonstrate the problematic nature of the concept. It is problematic because humanitarianism as it is understood today did not begin at a particular origin in time. Rather, it has emerged from the numerous intersecting trajectories of different concepts. That is, humanitarianism is contingent upon other events, and it is equally as likely that it could have had a different meaning from the one associated with it in the present. Humanitarianism is also problematic because it is not possessed of some transcendent, ahistorical essence that was simply waiting to be discovered by a fortuitous individual. Just as our understanding of madness or criminality continues to shift due to the intersection of emergent events or ideas, so too should that humanitarianism. When the ahistorical and the transcendent are swept aside, what remains? In other words, what purpose does humanitarianism serve?

**Humanitarian Organizations as Disciplinary Institutions**
What is consistent in the archival material examined is that the discourse of humanitarianism shows that it has a function in governing behaviour. There are several examples of the use of humanitarianism to show individuals how to relate to each other. Humanitarianism also helps establish a certain hierarchical relationship between helper and helped such that the victim expects certain behaviours as does the helper. There were observations in the archival material studied that a paradox of humanitarianism has been that it has not been particularly humane. The rules of the discourse show that humanitarian organizations don't oppose war *per se*, and that victims are partly to blame for the continuation of their victimization. This illustrates that humanitarianism is not an exclusively caring practice but rather it is a discourse that dominates and regulates populations through discipline.

**Implications**

One of the main implications of my work is with regards to resistance. I suggested that humanitarian organizations displayed the same kind of colonial privilege as necrocapitalist organizations. Yet, as postcolonial theory suggests, examples of resistance can and should be found. In the Tigrayan war examined in Chapter 3, the humanitarian organizations were shocked that 'starving' people would refuse to live in camps. In Biafra, the ICRC expected that humanitarian subjects would behave in the correct fashion, and subjects were placed at fault for not behaving correctly according to the discourse of humanitarianism, namely by not following the Geneva Conventions and International Humanitarian Law. Yet, the Nigerian government did resisted this discourse and did not allow the free flow of
aid, while the combatants failed to distinguish victims from combatants soldiers all in contravention of the expectations of how war was to be fought. The Red Cross found that Biafrans began to organize themselves into advocacy groups. This shows that there was a potential for resistance even in the midst of a conflict where the victims were portrayed as helpless. All of this implies that there is room to destabilize the pillars of the discourse.

Another implication relates to the behaviour of the humanitarian organization. A more progressive and less colonial humanitarian organization would take on a different shape based on my analysis. This could be accomplished first by recognizing that there is a construction of subjects through the discourse of humanitarianism. MSF in particular relies upon inequality between the humanitarian and the victim in justifying its interventions. This is in stark contrast to the evidence from the archive that victims are able to help themselves, and that they can and often do organize without formal organizational intervention. Therefore, any organization seeking to provide humanitarian assistance should first identify local resources and local efforts and design interventions with these localities in mind. A rapid assessment mission prior to any intervention that looks for strengths rather than weaknesses would be a first step in this process. Organizations could also eliminate campaigns that re-inforce the image of the victim and instead introduce notions of the survivor, the empowered, the self-reliant and ingenious. These seem to better characterize those who have lived through disaster and conflict, yet they do not make it into the marketing campaigns of humanitarian
organizations. In other words, organizations should seek to look agency in what have until now been disenfranchized victims.

**Directions for Future Research**

I would like to address the notion of the organization as a caring or humanitarian institution. To be clear, I am at this point in the discussion *not* talking about humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross or MSF but rather about applying what I have learned about humanitarianism from these organizations to other situations. In particular, I would like to identify how the humanitarian discourse works within the organization that espouses to be humanitarian: an organization with a caring principle, or caring outlook. As I have demonstrated in my dissertation, humanitarianism is a powerful discourse that goes largely unquestioned. Therefore it can operate with a certain impunity.

There is evidence in the literature to begin building upon such an examination. In her examination of the role of the American Red Cross in China during the early 20th century, Brewer (1983) outlines how the Red Cross acted as an agent of productivity and efficiency both at home and abroad in China. She demonstrates that the American Red Cross was a "progressive agency, its programs developed and managed by the elite to eliminate waste and inefficiency in American society. Its domestic reform programs were developed to prevent or mitigate the effects of accidents in American mining, railroad and lumber industries. Its disaster relief programs existed to provide aid in returning the victims to a productive, self-
supporting role in society as soon as possible" (Brewer, 1983, p. 383). This philosophy was exported abroad in Red Cross projects in China where “a consistent theme” in the Red Cross efforts in China "was the elimination and prevention of waste and inefficiency through reform of China's leaders, its government and society" (Brewer, 1983, p. 394). I too have explored this theme of the disciplinary function of humanitarian organizations, but what is important to note here is that in Brewer's (1983) version, the Red Cross could be considered an instrument of a managerialist ethos that values efficiency. As Brewer (1983) explains, the organization represented what then-President Woodrow Wilson called “that spirit...of absolute disinterestedness, not thinking of ourselves, but thinking of the results we wish to achieve...spiritual as well as material...” (Wilson, 1979). In other words, the humanitarianism of the organization was something that other could model their lives upon in order to achieve material gain.

In addition, this dissertation has opened an opportunity for further research into 'business and society' research. The 'business and society' field is a normative attempt to look at the relationship between business activities and the social good. This relationship is considered successful if the firm’s conduct results in profit maximization within the constraints of socially acceptable behaviour and local laws (Swanson, 1999). However, this can only be applicable insofar as the laws exist and are enforceable. For failed states, in situations of conflict, or when the boundary between legal and illegal behaviour becomes blurred, the nonprofit sector's ostensible reputation of neutrality and morality give cause for them to play an
important role in business: they become stakeholders in the process. The nonprofit is considered a neutral, legitimizing partner in a private sector firm's goal of including the excluded.

However, empirical studies (Banerjee, 2000, 2008; Herzlinger & Krasker, 1987) of nonprofits cast doubt on this assertion of the inherent goodness of the humanitarian organization as a legitimizing agent and open a theoretical hole in the stakeholder concept into which more nuanced thinking about the role of humanitarianism can be introduced. This is especially important when attempting to view the nonprofit as the subject of a stakeholder analysis rather than simply a stakeholder in its own right. This is particularly important as the nongovernmental organization is itself is often used as a legitimizing instrument and not an object of analysis within stakeholder theory. By incorporating the discourse of humanitarianism into stakeholder theory and 'business and society' research, this dissertation can expand the investigation by problematizing what has to this point been an unproblematic conceptualization of the non-profit organization as an unquestionable good.
Appendix A - Archival Materials Examined

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<td>January 2007</td>
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<td>Speech</td>
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Note that other materials included extensive academic literature. This literature, along with more detailed explanations of the archival material listed in Appendix A, are provided in the References section of the dissertation.
Appendix A (cont'd)

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