EU Foreign Policy and the Security-Development Nexus

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A Thesis Submitted to
Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Bachelor of Arts (Hons.), Political Science.

April, 2017, Halifax, Nova Scotia

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Date:        19 April 2017
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Abstract

This essay contributes to the discussion of the security-development nexus through an investigation of securitization discourse and the ‘threat’ of state fragility in the foreign policy of the European Union (EU). It argues that the use of the security-development nexus, which operates on the notion that development cannot be achieved without security and that security cannot be achieved without development, has emerged as a dominant idea in the international system, which has altered the relationships between states and populations by posing the human being as a ‘threat’ to state security. This has inevitable consequences for both states and their citizens. Securitization theory, or the articulated ‘speech act’ of security, is seen to play a significant role in the perpetuation of the idea of ‘threat,’ which drives the pursuit of security by and for states. Both security and development as concepts have ‘broadened’ and ‘widened’ to address not only the needs of the state, but the needs of the human being as well. In this way, the emergence of ‘human security’ and ‘human development’ have set the stage for the security-development nexus in foreign policy. With this, however, the idea of ‘threat’ which has traditionally been centered on the state, has expanded to incorporate the human being. This essay uses the EU as a case study of the explicit use of the nexus in foreign policy. Not only has the EU been an influential security community on the international stage, but it has also consistently been a leader in development cooperation. With this, the EU’s definition of state fragility is examined, which reveals the trend of security operating on the terrain of human beings. This trend holds the potential to fundamentally alter the way foreign policy is made.

Date Submitted: 19 April 2017
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific countries</td>
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<td>Common foreign and security policy</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>RoA</td>
<td>Reality of Aid Network</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The ‘security-development nexus,’ or the incorporation of security discourse and development efforts, has been a driving force behind the foreign policies of states and regional political bodies, particularly since the rise of human development and human security as objectives of policy in the 1990s. Although there is a lack of consensus among academic scholars and foreign policy-makers, we may understand the nexus, generally, as the assumption that security cannot be sought without development, and development cannot be endeavoured without security (Fäust & Messner, 2005; Keukeleire & Raube, 2013, p. 556; Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 18). The rise of the security-development nexus has had considerable influence in the study of International Relations (IR) and the creation of foreign policies; this has been argued to have both positive and negative effects. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, discourse surrounding security and development became almost inseparable in many developed countries (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Howell & Lind, 2009; Simpson, 2007; Wilkinson, 2007).

Foreign policy frameworks often serve to clarify the core values and objectives of states; the discourse of these frameworks is useful for analysis in that it sheds light on how states view the world, and in turn, how they assert themselves within it. As it stands today, the international system is marked with ongoing instability, civil conflict, and poverty in fragile states; with this, the world is in the midst of what many refer to as a ‘refugee crisis,’ characterizing the forced migration of millions of people to both developed and developing countries. Additionally, the global ‘War on Terror,’ first declared by the United States in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and adopted, in practice if not in name, soon after by many Western developed
nations, has characterized the international system - and with it, has perpetuated ideological, economic, and political divides between developed and developing nations. In many ways, state foreign policies have sought to address this divide through measures of development cooperation, which encompasses both development aid and humanitarian assistance. The ongoing effects of underdevelopment, including widespread poverty, political corruption, and economic instability, have become prominent security concerns for the developed world; the consequences of underdevelopment have been seen to pose ‘threats’ to the stability of the international system as a whole. This ‘securitization,’ or framing of the ‘threat’ of underdevelopment, is not a new pattern in foreign policy; while foreign policies in the 1990s exemplified this through aspirational rhetoric which claimed the protection of human rights through humanitarian interventions, the contemporary world order reveals tendencies of protectionist, or "anti-foreign" policies in developed states to counter the 'threat' of underdevelopment (Chandler, 2007, p. 379; Keukeleire & Raube, 2013, p. 557; Wilkinson, 2015, p. 42). This linkage of security and development in policy has shed light on the underlying values of many developed states.

Nowhere is the trend of the security-development nexus more relevant than in the foreign policies put forward by the European Union (EU) (Mergenthaler, 2015, p. 173). The EU has been a significant actor on the world stage since its initial establishment as an economic and security community for European countries in the post-World War II environment. In both security and development fields, EU policies have endorsed and utilized the security-development nexus; its most obvious relationship with the nexus is seen in its incorporation of security language in development cooperation with underdeveloped countries,
particularly in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The EU has consistently maintained its status as the biggest donor of Official Development Aid (ODA), a form of international monetary assistance guided by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); this international assistance is the clearest form of relationship between developed and developing countries (EU Global Strategy, 2016, p. 3; RoA, 2006). Additionally, the EU has been an active international agent in terms of humanitarian assistance, which refers to short-term aid efforts in response to conflict and crisis. The EU’s rhetoric in both security and development discourse has attempted to address the needs of the international community while simultaneously securing its own well-being. It is undeniable that the influence of the security-development nexus has been present in EU foreign policy. For example, multiple strategic foreign policy documents explicitly argue that “there [can be no] sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace” (ESS, 2003; ESS Implementation, 2008). A consistent trend throughout these security strategies has been a focus on the ‘threat’ state fragility poses to security, both within the EU and globally. State fragility, which is “at the core of many development and regional development problems” (Grimm, 2014, p. 254), has been seen by global powers, including the EU, to lay a foundation for widespread poverty, state corruption, and terrorism. The EU has attempted to uncover the root issues of state fragility with measures of security so as to address and eliminate the ‘threat’ of underdevelopment. Here, EU foreign policy clearly demonstrates the use of the security-development nexus.

The effects of the security-development nexus have been widely discussed in both academic and policy circles, particularly in terms of its emergence as a policy instrument in the
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post-Cold War environment. This lengthy conversation has produced more questions than it has answers; academic scholars speculate that parameters cannot be built around “the nexus” because the use of such an instrument points to underlying understandings of security and development as concepts and beliefs about how the world “should be” (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 6-7). The general goal of scholars is not to fill the void of the nexus by giving it a standard definition, but instead to draw out the many ways it is seen while studying the implications of these lines of thinking (Duffield, 2010; Hettne, 2011; Stern & Öjendal, 2010). There is widespread debate on the effects of the nexus; while many policy-makers argue that the creation of a ‘nexus’ is merely a recognition of the reality of a pre-existing truth, critics draw attention to the agency of academics and policy-makers in their influence of the international system (Reid-Henry, 2011, p. 97; Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 6). The common conclusion that there is no exact definition of the nexus is really no conclusion at all; discussion remains as to what implications exist due to the use of the nexus in policy. This discussion has been arguably undercut and unfinished (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 7). Chandler, for example, argues that more research is needed in order to see clearly the implications of the nexus in policy (2007, p. 366). In line with this, the aim of this essay is not to add to the discussion of what the nexus is, but instead to focus on its implications in the current world order and what these implications may hold for the future. While much conversation has surrounded the emergence of the security-development nexus in the international system, this essay claims that, based on the evidence, the nexus has not met the ongoing global challenges of today so much as it has altered the perception of the relationship between states and human beings, which in turn drives the assumption of this essay that it will not serve the global needs of the future, but will play a significant role in the securitization of
development.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 signified a turning point in the international system; with the global “War on Terror,” Western, developed states adopted a language of securitization in many areas of their foreign policies (Chandler, 2007, p. 363; Christou, 2014; p. 367; Duffield, 2010, p. 61; Grimm et. al., 2014, p. 199). The need to overcome the threat of terrorism became the basis upon which states sought to frame the development of other states. In this way, it may seem as if there have been no major alterations to the international system since 9/11; issues of global terrorism, persistent conflict in fragile states, and widespread poverty have endured for decades, despite connections being drawn between issues of security and development in policy. This points to the matter of this essay: the concerns of today’s international environment have not been adequately addressed by the presence of the nexus. In other words, not only has the pursuit of security been an unending, “impossible promise” of states (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 19), but the challenges associated with underdevelopment have not been overcome by its incorporation of specific security concerns. Instead, the security-development nexus has been seen to distance states and regional political bodies from underdeveloped countries (Keukeleire & Raube, 2013, p. 561). Additionally, it has been seen to foster protectionist and “selfREFERENTIAL” foreign policies that have a backward effect on both development and security issues in the international system (Chandler, 2007; Wilkinson, 2015, p. 42). Although the rhetoric of these policies proclaims the well-being of underdeveloped countries and the security of human beings, the reality reveals that foreign policy driven by the security-development nexus serves to further the interests of Western states in the unending pursuit of their own security. In this sense, the nexus has perpetuated the historical power dynamic existing between developed and developing states.
This essay projects that long-term, durable solutions to issues of international security and development require more than a declaration that security and development are “inextricably linked” (UN, 2004).

The study of the security-development nexus relies heavily on secondary academic sources; a wealth of material has been published in the pursuit of both defining the nexus and uncovering its implications for policies throughout the international system. Additionally, this essay’s focus on the EU as a case study acquires information and insight from primary government and official EU documents and resources. I will begin with an historical outline of the shifting and broadening trends of security and development as concepts unto themselves. In doing so, ‘securitization theory,’ or the argument for security as discourse built on the social construction of ‘threat,’ is the lens through which this study has been conducted. This essay will then use the EU’s foreign security and development policies to demonstrate implications revealed by the nexus; security discourse, or the ‘threats’ proclaimed by the EU not only holds significance for how development cooperation is conducted, but what the EU views as a threat to its own security. With this, I will explore the widely discussed concept of state fragility as a ‘threat’ to the security of both the EU and the international system, caused by global consideration of human insecurity and underdevelopment.

This discussion seeks to shed light on ideas underlying state fragility as a threat to state security; the international system’s focus on the security and development of the human being to strengthen states alternatively implies that the human being itself poses a threat to the security of states. In this line of thought, the use of the security-development nexus in policy arguably seeks to address this security threat, which has implications on relations between states as well as the
role of human beings within states.

**SECTION I: SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT, & THE NEXUS**

Understanding what is meant by a security-development ‘nexus’ requires an historical account of how the ‘nexus’ came to be. Such a concept is made up of the various notions of security and development in their own forms and in the influences they have on one another. It is widely agreed among academic scholars (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Duffield, 2010) that the ‘nexus’ is not a stagnant concept, and that its place in policy does not have a “fixed reality” (Stern & Öjendal, 2010). Indeed, Hettne argues that security and development are “anything but static and one-dimensional” (2011, p. 46). The parameters of these terms must be defined, then, in order to create a basis upon which the foreign policies of the EU will be studied. Important to note is that security and development have typically been approached as separate bodies of policy throughout history. These policy structures are not inherently separate, however, and a brief historical overview of how these concepts have evolved allows for the formation of the ‘nexus’ to be further understood as becoming a driving factor in foreign policy. These histories have overlapping and parallel themes that contribute to their conjunction. Global consideration and rhetoric on ‘human security’ will be seen to be the driving force behind the convergence of these concepts, and will form the basis of our discussion of the ‘nexus.’

**Security**

Traditionally, security has been understood to be a motivation of states in protecting sovereignty and maintaining stability within their borders (and responding to foreign threats). In this way, the state has traditionally been the object of security, and attempts to ensure security have been manifested in military efforts (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 191; Collins, 2011, p. 61;
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Hettne, 2011, p. 33; Jackson, 2015, p. 8). The Cold War, marked by reconstruction of post-war European countries, emancipation of colonial states, and the rise of two ideologically hostile world powers, provided a platform upon which the concept of security was able to expand. This signified the beginnings of a ‘widening,’ or ‘deepening,’ of the concept of security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 15); on both sides of the Cold War conflict, states sought to secure themselves from the threat of an ideology opposite to their own. In line with Cold War thinking is the fact that the security issues of developing, or underdeveloped, countries were only addressed vigorously by the international system if they were of strategic value to the world powers (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 19). While the ‘threat’ of states was, traditionally, confined to national interest and the protection of territory and state (2009, p. 203), the new world order advanced a broadened concept to incorporate security from multiple origins, including food security, environmental security, and technology security, to name a few. These new threats to security have signified a new focus; the broadened concept of security sought to protect not only the state, but what Buzan and Hansen deem “universal concerns” (2009, p. 203), or the people within the state. Placed in this context, ‘human security’ reflects an idea that human well-being is vital to security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 36; Howard-Hassmann, 2012, p. 89). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines human security as both “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life” (HDR, 1994; Christou, 2014, p. 368; Collins, 2011, p. 62; Howard-Hassmann, 2012, p. 89). This is confirmed by the actions and rhetoric of international actors, the creation of multitudes of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the policies of states and regional bodies. A human development approach was officially tied to
the pursuit of security, and with it, issues surrounding the top-down approach taken in
development (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 191); because the human became the ‘referent object’
of security, the focus of security in study and in policy included securitizing against
has largely been a Western, liberal international project seeking to address threats to states by
ensuring the security of human beings worldwide (Richmond, 2004, p. 84). In line with this
top-down approach to security, the question rises as to whose security is being ensured (Hettne,
2011, p. 33; Jackson, 2015, p. 2-3). The trend of the 1990s was to use the need to protect human
security internationally by intervening on civil conflicts in fragile and unstable states. In this
way, security, which traditionally played the role of protecting one’s own state, became a tool for
ensuring the security of the liberal international ideal (Duffield, 2001; Jackson, 2015, p. 12;
Richmond, 2004, p. 89).

While the state has remained a key actor in the pursuit of security, the emergence of
“human security” largely characterizes the evolution of security until the current moment (Stern
& Öjendal, 2010, p. 15). Human security has not replaced the traditional understanding of
security; instead, this concept includes factors of human development and underdevelopment,
such as poverty and prolonged hunger (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 36). The rise of human
security as a global trend in the 1990s points to where understandings of security and
development have converged.

**Development**

Like security, the concept of development holds multiple understandings, each heavily
influenced both by how development policies have been implemented, and by the on-the-ground
effects of those implementations in developing countries. International development has significantly changed since its initial emergence as a form and focus of policy in the beginning of the Cold War. Additionally, it is important to note that, like security, the initial object of development was the state and was pursued in the form of state-building in the post-World War II and post-colonial environment (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 11). The initial focus of developed countries was to modernize and industrialize conditions in the surge of newly decolonized states through economic and political interventions. ‘Underdevelopment,’ defining newly decolonized nations that were left with unstable, and in some cases non-existent, political structures, was seen as a threat to an international system recovering from war (Hettne, 2011, p. 41). The possibility of widespread corruption, civil war, and poverty posed too great a threat to the progress of the international system, which developed countries sought to overcome with monetary aid and a liberal ideal that promoted economic and political reforms. In this way, modernization efforts of thriving, industrialized countries were to serve as the “path” of international progress for which Europe was considered the leader (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 11). Liberal Western ideals of democratic governance and neoliberal economic practices were, in many instances, vigorously promoted in rhetoric and enforced in development policy (Duffield, 2010, p. 60). This prescriptive approach to development, characterized as a game of “catch-up” for developing countries, however, resulted in entrenched cycles of poverty, debt, and civil conflict in developing countries (Hettne, 2011, p. 38; Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 11). Caught between two opposing ideological and military superpowers, and fastened to the international liberal system as a dual result of previous colonialism and subsequent external interventions, it became clear that development signified a top-down world order for much of the Cold War era. To counter the
effect of this history, many critical thinkers in the post-Cold War era began to promote the idea of ‘post-development,’ an approach that emphasized the backward effects of development on underdeveloped countries and charged world powers with creating and endorsing development policies that fundamentally sought to exploit the resources and citizens of developing countries rather than promote meaningful ‘development’ (Jackson, 2015, p. 11). New emphasis was put on the ‘self-sufficiency’ of states to resist the exploitative measures taken under the pretence of modernization (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 12); however, this was not without both civil and international conflict (Hettne, 2011, p. 41). In the aftermath of Cold War, the lasting effects of development practices and hegemonic influences over underdeveloped states prompted discussion on human development, or, as the UNDP states, development that seeks to provide “choice and opportunity” to all people, and “gives priority to the poor” (HDR, 1994, p. 3; Hettne, 2011, p. 34; Duffield, 2010, p. 55). Likewise, the dominant world order of liberalism exerted its influence in the promotion of universal human rights, which drew attention to the ongoing detriments to human dignity during the Cold War; in this way, popular rhetoric in the international system brought forth “human security,” or the idea that the legitimate concerns of human beings, such as access to food, shelter, and safety, were necessary antecedents to global security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 203). This approach was largely driven by the UNDP’s statement that threats to human security necessarily extend as threats to global security (Jackson, 2015, p. 9; RoA, 2006, p. 17); global threats, such as terrorism, widespread poverty, and global warming, threatened not only people in developing countries but the international system as a whole (HDR, 1994, p. 23). Out of the decade following the end of the Cold War emerged a multitude of international actors seeking to ensure the many forms of human security and with
this, a trend of legitimized humanitarian intervention in conflict states (Chandler, 2007; Hasenkamp, 2012; Hettne, 2011). What was, during the Cold War, liberal economic interventionism became a trend of liberal humanitarian interventionism (Duffield, 2010, p. 55; Hettne, 2011, p. 44).

The widespread acceptance of human security also provided a platform for the “liberal way of development” (Duffield, 2010, p. 62; Richmond, 2004, p. 89). The human security approach had the effect of enabling states to promote a rhetoric of development while adopting measures to ensure their own security. The rise of humanitarian interventions and international action in the name of human security is largely where the conversation of a security-development ‘nexus’ came from; with the rise of human security, security and development distinctly converged in policy in a way that was not yet experienced. It is clear that out of the ever-changing structure of the Cold War international system, understandings of security and development policies focused more and more on the human as opposed to the state. The language used to communicate humans instead of states as subjects of policy arguably played more of a role in international relations than the effects of the policies themselves. Political discourse has dominated the concepts of security and development and has played an active role in centering the ‘threat’ of underdevelopment on the human being instead of the state.

**Securitization Theory**

Of crucial importance to international relations is how states and political bodies communicate their ideas, goals, and decisions; this is especially relevant to security and development discourses and has been the driving force behind the emergence of the security-development nexus. In attempting to define the parameters of these concepts, their
existence as discourse cannot be ignored. As stated, the realization of ‘human security’ in both policy discourse and action has fostered discussion on the “inextricable link” between security and development as a ‘nexus’ (UN, 2004). Additionally, ‘human security’ reveals the fundamentally discursive nature of both security and development, largely based on perception and opinion: as Collins states, “the emergence of human security is one that originates in the discursive realm” (2011, p. 62). Although security and development have been linked together in some ways prior to the rise of human security, these linkages were not “carried out in the name of a nexus,” nor in “an explicit articulation of the connections” between security and development (Chandler, 2007, p. 366; Hettne, 2011, p. 32; Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 10). The discursive elements of security and development have been heavily scrutinized in academic circles, specifically the so-called Copenhagen School, which focuses on ‘securitization theory’ in IR. ‘Securitization’ indicates the theory that “the process of presenting an issue in security terms” is what makes something a security issue (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 214). This implies that said issue poses a threat to both the speaker and the audience. Securitization signifies the “social construction” of security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 215; Collins, 2011, p. 64; Jackson, 2015, p. 36); in other words, securitization occurs when an issue is presented in terms of security and is accepted as such (Keukeleire & Raube, 2013, p. 557). The Copenhagen School refers to securitization as a “speech act”; by merely speaking about security, a threat can be discursively created (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 214; Collins, 2011, p. 64; Jackson, 2015, p. 33; Waever, 1999, p. 337). These things considered, security has been a constant focus of both the state and the international community as a whole because it produces, and is produced by, fear. The drive toward security and development as a nexus has been fuelled by discourse that presents
detriments to human life as risks to security; Stern and Œjendal argue that
“(in)security-(under)development are being produced as [security] problems” in the
international system (2011, p. 108). Needless to say, securitization has been a powerful force in
the creation and implementation of foreign policy. While Waever argues that securitization
theory sheds light on “the inherently political nature” of security issues (1999, p. 334), its use as
political discourse, in contrast, also reveals an effort to make areas of policy, in a sense,
non-political by depicting them in the language of ‘threat.’ Additionally, underdevelopment has
become a key feature in securitization discourse, which, among other things, has promoted a
view of underdevelopment as “dangerous” (Duffield, 2010, p. 67). Securitization is, essentially,
what shapes how security and development are communicated to the world. This has a
significant impact on the direction taken by policy-makers; Waever insightfully notes that “the
whole theory of securitization sharpens the eye for an already implicit logic within security
discourse: the claim about existential threats and an ensuring legitimization of extraordinary
measures” (1999, p. 337). Waever’s argument begs the question of why something may be
depicted as a security threat; in this case, what under normal circumstances might be seen as a
general problem present in the international system, such as underdevelopment, becomes
characterized as an international menace, for which the foreign policies guided by the
security-development nexus seek to address. Accordingly, the language of security works as a
tool of power for whoever has a powerful political voice (Jackson, 2015, p. 36).

The Nexus

As we have seen, the discussion of the security-development nexus has emerged from,
and is influenced by, “constellation of institutions, practices and beliefs...which constitute a field
of development and security actors” (Bremberg, 2014, p. 674; Duffield, 2010, p. 56; Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 11). The view that security requires development and development requires security has been promoted by many international bodies, including the United Nations (UN), which has supported Kofi Annan’s 2004 statement that security and development are “inextricably linked” (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 5; Hettne, 2011, p. 34), and the EU, which has professed a decided commitment to the nexus in its foreign policy (ESS, 2003; EU Global Strategy, 2016; Keukeleire, 2013, p. 558). We can ascertain that the nexus is a framework within which foreign policy incorporates both security measures as well as development assistance; although security and development remain separate bodies of policies, they are used so as to “mutually reinforce” one another (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 17). Through the policy discourse, this ultimately reveals different underlying understandings and particular views of the world (2010, p. 7).

The general lack of consensus among policy-makers and international actors on the effects of the nexus makes it difficult to address issues of security and development, which renders the international system unpredictable (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 7). Keukeleire and Raube argue that in addition to the lack of consensus among experts, the use of the nexus in policy has caused some “unintended consequences” of self-protective foreign policies (2013, p. 557). From a development perspective, this trend can prove to be problematic: prospects for international development for the benefit of people become subjected to, and serve the purpose of, ensuring one’s own security. In this way, the use of the security-development nexus in foreign policy really serves as a “tool of power” (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 7). Ultimately, the development policy has been ‘securitized’ to communicate that the ‘threat’ of underdevelopment
poses a security risk to donor bodies. This discourse reveals that the EU is more concerned with addressing its own security interests through the maintenance of the international liberal order than on how the implementation of its foreign policies and development cooperation affect recipients of aid (RoA, 2006, p. 18). In this way, the security interests of donor states, particularly after the events of 9/11, have taken precedence over the focus of ‘human security’ and ‘human development’ upon which the nexus is built. Despite the post-Cold War promotion of human well-being, donor states have used the promotion of a particular form of ‘development’ to serve their own interests so as to protect themselves from a broad conception of threats, such as ‘terrorism.’

**Implications**

Several scholars have shed light on the power relations between developed and developing countries that are maintained by the use of the nexus. Chandler, for example, argues that there are no set parameters defining the nexus which “indicates that the ‘nexus’ relies more on rhetorical claims than on considered policy-making” (2007, p. 366). In other words, the discourse surrounding the security-development nexus has taken precedence over the content of policies themselves; in this way, Chandler argues that the international system is witnessing a “crisis of policy-making” (2007, p. 369). As noted above, security and development policies have traditionally been implemented with a top-down approach, even with the popular recognition of human security in the 1990s. Development aid to underdeveloped countries, for instance, has been tied closely with the liberal agendas of developed countries - or, for the purpose of this study, the EU. Duffield addresses the underlying liberal ideology of development aid:
For most of the post-Cold War period, the promise that development can promote international security has been embraced in a spirit of aid-industry optimism born out of feelings of policy innovation and mandate renewal...Rather than aid being a neutral institution, would-be recipients have come to see international assistance as an extension of Western foreign policy. (Duffield, 2010, p. 54)

From the perspective of post-development literature, the nexus has been a source of legitimation of the promotion of a liberal world order. The pattern of liberal ideological implementation from developed states through development aid has been further perpetuated by the security-development nexus. While the liberal ideal has served to enhance both the security and development of humans and states, its perpetuation behind the facade of the nexus is problematic: in this way, the nexus is not recognition of an organic relationship between security and development, but instead a pairing of separate concepts that serves to benefit one state over another. Duffield and Jackson both comment on the perpetual division between donor and recipient states, which usually falls along the lines of developed and developing. It is also argued that this notion of liberalization “lies behind the merger of security and development policy and the re-problematization of security as both the result and the precondition of development more broadly” (Jackson, 2015, p. 12). The emergence of the human being at the centre of both security and development policies has brought about the idea that underdevelopment, and particularly the underdevelopment of the human, serves as a threat to national security.

The goal of this essay is not to advocate for the elimination of ties between security and development. Indeed, throughout history, these ties have shown themselves organically; however, policies made in the name of a nexus, as Stern and Öjendal (2010) argue, take on new
political meaning and neglect durable and meaningful change in the international system. Ultimately, we should be “cautious in our embrace of ‘the nexus’ as a policy premise or even goal” (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 7) for the future (Chandler, 2007; Duffield, 2010).

SECTION 2: THE EU

Not only has the security-development nexus played a prominent role in EU foreign policy, but the EU has consistently and definitively confirmed its dedication to the nexus in European Security Strategy documents (ESS) since 2003 (Keukeleire & Raube, 2013); “Security is a precondition of development” (ESS, 2003). The EU has been a world leader in development cooperation (EU Global Strategy, 2016, p. 31; Grimm, 2014, p. 253), which includes both development aid (long-term) and humanitarian assistance (emergency assistance); relationships with developing countries are largely defined along lines of donor-recipient relationships (Duffield, 2001, p. 2; Jackson, 2015, p. 13). It is important to note that as a regional body, the EU relies on the cooperation and compliance of its member states; in this way, EU member states form their own foreign policies, while the EU itself speaks as a political body representing the group as a whole (Smith, 2002, p. 3). Smith emphasizes that EU foreign policy is a common foreign policy, as opposed to a single one among member states (2002, p. 96), maintaining the sovereignty of member states to create their own foreign policies and contribute independently to development cooperation. Critics of the EU’s existence in the international system have argued that because the EU is not a state in the Westphalian sense and is without military force, it should not play a role in foreign policy (Smith, 2002, p. 6). The reality, however, is that the EU does practice foreign policy, and in many respects, the EU acts as a state in that it has a “set of domestic values, interests and policies” (Smith, 2002, p. 7), which are projected both
internationally and in its relations with developing countries. This section will analyse the use of the security-development nexus in various EU foreign policies, in both security and development policy sectors. With this, a discussion of the implications of the nexus will follow.

Development cooperation has been seen to forward the march of foreign policy to securitization; as a policy instrument, this has significantly increased in amount and focus in the last two decades (EU Global Strategy, 2016, p. 3; RoA 2006) and has become the primary tool for the EU’s relationships with developing countries. It could be argued that development cooperation has been the language with which developed and developing countries communicate. The majority of the EU’s ODA recipients are located in Sub-Saharan Africa (EU Donor Profile, n.d.), and aid is consistently focused on human security in underdeveloped and post-conflict states (EU Global Strategy, 2016, p. 31). While humanitarian assistance refers to short-term, emergency response efforts that occur in various forms, such as peacekeeping, and emergency financial assistance, development aid refers to long-term ODA, allocated to developing countries with specific qualifications. This form of aid is primarily distributed through the OECD, whose member states largely consist of the world’s developed, or ‘Northern’ countries (Smith, 2002, p. 11). The OECD is "an institution that has been central in shaping the goals of development policy" (Dür & Elsig, 2011, p. 327). The general ambition of member state contribution has been the UN-based goal of 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI), a goal that consistently has not been met; in fact, ODA contributions have largely stagnated since 2005 and remain “woefully inadequate” (RoA, 2016, p. 225, 227). In 2016, however, the EU reaffirmed its goal for member states to meet the goal of 0.7% of GNI to ODA (Global Strategy, 2016, p. 48; RoA, 2016, p. 130, 137, 228). This signals the EU’s fervency in maintaining a strong presence in
the international system: “unfortunately, signs indicate a continued pattern of levelling off to ODA and an increasing diversion of this ODA to [donor] self-interests” (RoA, 2016, p. 126). The qualifications for ODA guide OECD member states in donor-recipient relations for the purpose of supporting “country owned development,” and poverty eradication. These specifications are in place in an attempt to ensure neutrality in development aid (2016, p. 139), however, ODA’s primary purpose of development is shifting in line with the goals of dominant state donors. In the last decade, ODA donors, including the EU, have advocated for an expansion of ODA processes to include financing of “military equipment and training for peacekeeping,” which, in addition to revealing its own security interests in development measures is subject to “wide interpretation by donors” (2016, p. 151).

In line with shifting ODA conditions, the EU itself has displayed some conditionality in its promotion of a liberal world order; its foreign policy has “the capacity to make and implement policies abroad that promote the domestic values, interests, and policies of the European Union” (Smith, 2002, p. 8). In this way, the EU’s foreign policy concentration in regard to development and security has been on the developing countries (Smith, 2002, p. 11). Although the amount of aid given has been consistent, the EU’s fervent promotion of a liberal world order, in line with a continuation of Cold War ideology, is evidenced to benefit security more so than development cooperation. The EU has focused on the inseparability of security and development in foreign policy, a strong rhetoric that indisputably implies that that which is foreign poses a threat to the security and well-being of Europeans, and that efforts to “develop” other countries serves to ensure security at home. The EU itself has noted that “‘poverty eradication’, ‘conflict’ and ‘peace’ are increasingly intermingled with notions of ‘terrorism’ and ‘security’ in the discourse
of most donors today” (EU Global Strategy, 2016, p. 9; RoA, 2006, p. 7). With this, the EU has claimed the link between security and development is to be one of the driving forces of foreign policy (EU Global Strategy, 2016, p. 50). The reality of EU foreign policy reveals the challenges faced by this regional body, both in the ratification of its security strategies on the world stage and in its security-development relationships with other regions; Hollis notes, for example, that despite the popular view that the EU is an independent world actor in development policy, indeed not enough emphasis has been placed on the influence of global norms on EU foreign policy (Hollis, 2014, p. 569). With this, it can be seen that the EU is not independent of global influences and trends.

**The Rise of the EU**

Initially created in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Union of European states was labelled as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and later the European Economic Community (EEC), and was designed to ensure cooperation between European countries so as to avoid the warfare and trauma experienced only years before (History of the EU, n.d.; Pinder, 2001; Smith, 2002). In this respect, its plans for the reconstruction of Europe in the post-war era, as well as its creation of economic cooperation between European states, prompted its agenda to incorporate development and act as a “security community” (Hettne, 2010, p. 40). In essence, the very creation of what was to be the “European Union” was in pursuit of security, for which development played a key role. In its 2016 Global Security Strategy, the EU drew attention to its need for strength as a “security community” (EU Global Strategy, 2016, p. 20). Additionally, Bremberg argues that the best way to understand the foreign policies of the EU as a regional political actor is to regard it as a “security community”
(Bremberg, 2015). For the purpose of this essay, the “EU” is used in reference to this regional body of states as it existed both before and after the Maastricht Treaty of 1993.

The initial concerns of economic trade between European states to fuel reconstruction and industrialization inevitably impacted the global market (Smith, 2002, p. 3). Pinder, for example, argues that for the EU to avoid the international economy and international politics would have been extremely difficult, as its member states have been key actors in furthering the globalization process through ‘trade and aid’ neoliberal practices (Pinder, 2001, p. 1); the EU is international by nature (ESS, 2003) and claims responsibility for security concerns both inside and outside of the Union (EU Global Strategy, 2016, p. 7, 14). Such a “union” has come with much contestation and criticism, both by member states and by the world at large; however, this merging of states has allowed them to speak with “one voice” in regard to development (Dür & Elsig, 2011, p. 323). The progression of the Cold War prompted alternative foreign policy strategies with developing countries; in line with the broadened concept of security and the deepened sense of development, underdeveloped countries posed a “threat” to the expansive objectives of the EU as an international body.

Since the end of the Cold War the EU has focused heavily on its foreign policy agenda and has played a leading role in the financial assistance of developing countries, particularly in African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries (ESS, 2003; EU Global Strategy, 2016). This focus on foreign policy stemmed in part from the popular criticism that the EU played the role of a “junior partner to the United States” (Smith, 2002, p. 13). The 1991 Intergovernmental Conference of the EU (IGC) specifically focused on the creation of a coherent and independent (from the US) foreign policy framework (Smith, 2002, p. 95); this signified the creation of the
Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) which has been the platform upon which the current mandate of EU foreign policy promotes the security-development nexus.

A key element to the commitment to external relations has been the promotion of the international liberal ideal (Smith, 2002, p. 96). This trend emerged in line with the rise of human security in the 1990s and the legitimation of humanitarian interventions in underdeveloped and unstable states. Human security became "elevated to a level of doctrine" (Christou, 2014, p. 368) and the popular Western liberal ideal was widely seen by the EU to be the only way forward; with this, aid selectivity characterized the decision-making processes of the EU as a donor (RoA, 2016, p. 152).

The creation of the CFSP set the stage for the multiple humanitarian efforts the EU made throughout the 1990s including the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Afghanistan, and East Timor, to name a few (ESS, 2003, p. 6). Pinder explains that this decade of ‘human development’ and ‘human security’ brought on a trend of security strategies which were brimming with aspirational rhetoric centred on countering ‘threats’ emerging from civil conflict and the effects of underdevelopment (Pinder, 2001, p. 5). Although the link between security and development was present in policy, the name of a ‘nexus’ was not announced until after 9/11 and the US declaration of the “War on Terror” in ESS 2003 (Christou, 2014, p. 373). In the post-9/11 era, the international system has been dominated by the security interests of donor states (RoA, 2006, p. 33); the ‘threat’ of underdevelopment has manifested into a ‘threat’ of global terrorism. In this context, the security-development nexus has served to distance donor states from the development challenges of recipient states. Additionally, “the distinction between foreign policy and development cooperation is vanishing” (RoA 2006, p. 24); securitization has shaped foreign
EU Structure

The EU’s political structure has been widely criticized for its complexity and inconsistency (Jonas, 2008; Smith, 2002) - with a “lack of leadership, continuity, consistency, and diplomatic resources” (Jonas, 2008, p. 8) - which has had profound impact on its foreign policy initiatives. With twenty-eight member states (Brexit notwithstanding), the EU has faced challenges in representing a large set of actors in addition to creating a framework that avoids overlapping responsibilities and competences (Jonas, 2008). Additionally, various ideas surrounding security and development influence decision-making differently among members: “security agencies typically emphasize the threat aspect, while development cooperation agencies focus on relationships or functions” (Grimm, 2014, p. 252). This presents a major challenge to the coherence of EU foreign policy; without a unified goal or framework sustaining a consistent mandate uncertain. What has been consistent is the EU’s dedication to securitizing against international threats.

The EU’s structure and large member state base contributes to its complexity and potential redundancy. “The EU is not a singular actor” (Grimm, 2014, p. 255); at its core, the EU is managed by three main bodies: the European Parliament (EP), the European Council, and the European Commission. Each of these have a specific purpose, however, all have input in foreign policy-making (Grimm, 2014, p. 255; Jonas, 2008, p. 8; Smith, 2002, p. 24). As it stands, both security and development policy sectors fall under the “shared competences” branch of EU policy-making; this means that policy decisions are made by the EU as a body in addition to the individual decisions of the member states that make up the body (Division of Competences,
Dür and Elsig explain that the EU’s foreign policies “are characterized by partly divided, partly overlapping competences between the EU...and member states” (Dür & Elsig, 2011, p. 325). In this way, the foreign policies of the EU differ greatly from that of the traditional state, and, indeed, are reliant upon the foreign policies of member states in determining what countries will be the focus of development cooperation.

In an attempt to address structural concerns, EU member states signed the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, which “laid the groundwork for joint external action” and attempted to strengthen coherence among decision-makers (ESS Implementation, 2008, p. 9; Grimm, 2014, p. 259; Treaty of Lisbon, 2015). In its Global Security Strategy of 2016, the EU itself states that “diplomatic action must be fully grounded in the Lisbon Treaty. EU foreign policy is not a solo performance: it is an orchestra which plays from the same score” (EU Global Strategy, 2016, p. 46). The Treaty served as an effort to promote leadership and specify a common goal of foreign policy among member states (Grimm, 2014, p. 255-256). As a result, two primary leadership positions were established within the CFSP: the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS was established in 2011 with the role of aiding the High Representative in communicating policy goals with the international community (Dür & Elsig, 2011, p. 327; EEAS, 2016; Jonas, 2008, p. 5). The changes made to the EU’s structure in the Lisbon Treaty largely focus on security objectives in relation to the international system. With this, it is evident that the EU has reformed its political structure to account for security threats and to meet its needs in the current global order.

European Security Strategies
Nowhere is the use of the security-development nexus more present than in the security strategies outlined by the EU, beginning in 2003. This original security strategy document (ESS 2003) outlined the region’s threats of the day: the rise of economic globalization, the continuation of civil conflict, and the pre-eminence of global terrorism. With this, the ESS declared itself a global actor responsible for global security (Christou, 2014, p. 367; ESS, 2003, p. 1) and claimed that “security is a precondition of development (ESS, 2003, p. 2). The publication of this document presented an attempt at a "concerted European action" (2003, p. 3) to securitize foreign policy, particularly development. This effort pointedly addresses threats emerging from both inside and outside the EU, which has been particularly evident in measures to address terrorism through policy; "Europe is both a target and a base for...terrorism" (2003, p. 3). Threat of underdevelopment is largely characteristic of the strategies outlined in this document. The ESS 2003 provides a clear idea of the EU’s popular mindset of regarding security in the years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US:

“Our traditional concept of self-defence - up to and including the Cold War - was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will be abroad...In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means." (ESS, 2003, p. 7)

The 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS 2003 reaffirmed Europe’s security goals and the threats faced, both inside and outside the region. With a continued focus on human security (ESS Implementation, 2008, p. 2), terrorism and state fragility remained at the forefront of this discussion; “state failure affects our security…terrorism and organised crime have evolved with new menace, including within our own societies" (2008, p. 1). This report states
that state fragility will be addressed “both through development assistance and measures to ensure better security” (2008, p. 8). Additionally, increasing global terrorism is pledged to be overcome through development cooperation and multilateral efforts with developing nations (2008, p. 3). Attention to the various causes of state fragility and failure have been a clear form of “threat” to the EU; although development cooperation is attributed to fragile state situations, the EU’s concern of this threat reveals security ideals that act in partnership with development. This is confirmed in the EU’s continued credence to the security-development nexus: “there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace” (2008, p. 8).

The most recent affirmation of EU security strategy is established in the 2016 document entitled “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe,” which outlines the current threats to EU security and the CFSP’s goals in combatting them. This publication, an updated version of the 2003 Security Strategy, summarizes the EU’s goals for external action, guided by the EEAS. Specifically, this security document outlines the current threats of cyber and energy security, the continued threat of global terrorism, and of course, the threat of state fragility. Particular urgency is placed on the existence and unity of the EU itself: “Our Union is under threat...we live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union” (EU Global Strategy, 2016, p. 7, 13). With this, the security strategy discusses the connection between security at home and abroad - “Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders” (2016, p. 14) - and makes the case that EU foreign affairs reflect the EU’s role as a global actor in maintaining global peace and security (2016, p. 3).

This document bears much resemblance to the Security Strategy of 2003. Terrorism
remains a core issue, and serves as the driving threat of EU foreign policy. The focus on state fragility and the threat of underdevelopment, seen so clearly in the reports of 2003 and 2008 have shifted to focus on the resilience of weak states. In other words, where development cooperation and the presence of the nexus focused largely on state- and peacebuilding in conflict and post-conflict states, the focus is now on how these development measures may promote self-reliance and independence among people and states. This approach emphasizes the need for development cooperation - both humanitarian assistance and development aid - to work collaboratively to foster long-term solutions within fragile states; this is pursued through foreign policies, “from diplomacy and [CFSP] to development and climate” (European Commission, 2016). Although the rhetorical claims have shifted between 2003 and 2016, the sentiment that state fragility, and the underdevelopment that comes as a consequence, is a threat to the security of the EU reveals that resilience still serves as a continuation of the EU’s securitization of development.

Overall, this document proclaims its dedication to outward-focused policies and the use of discretion in the creation of ‘self-referential,’ protectionist policies so described by David Chandler and Cai Wilkinson. For example, this security strategy document claims that

"In a more connected world, the EU will engage with others. The Union cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats. To promote the security and prosperity of our citizens and to safeguard our democracies, we will manage interdependence, with all the opportunities, challenges and fears it brings about, by engaging the wider world." (EU Global Strategy, 2016, p. 8)

It is evident that this power regional body is not blind to its own influence on the international
system and the “threat” of international relations should self-referential and isolated policies be put in place in foreign policy. The focus on security at home, however, undoubtedly remains a priority for which development cooperation in other states continuously construct.

In addition to the clear evidence of the link between security and development throughout this security document, the EU’s use of the security-development nexus as a basis for policy is also made evident: “we must become more joined-up in our security and development policies...in particular, we will develop stronger links between humanitarian and development efforts through joint risk analysis, and multiannual programming and financing” (2016, p. 50). The EU’s reliance on the security-development nexus is explicitly present. Additionally, when compared to the preceding security documents, it is clear that the EU has remained consistent in its security strategies since their establishment in 2003; generally the same threats exist, however, which brings light to the idea that the use of the security-development nexus has not served to create lasting, even meaningful, solutions to global challenges. In this way, the use of the security-development nexus, which has gained traction in the last two decades, serves to further the promotion of a liberal world order so expressed throughout the Cold War and the age of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s. The global “War on Terror” provided a contemporary platform upon which the West fervently promoted their liberal ideals. The ESS 2003, for example, claimed that because of the promotion of democracy and rule of law, the international system has been moved forward (ESS, 2003, p. 1), and that this remained the goal of the EU’s foreign policies and international relations. Additionally, the Global Strategy of 2016 states that “Our interests and values go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting our values in the world. At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in our interests. Peace
and security, prosperity, democracy and a rules-based global order are the vital interests underpinning our external action.” (EU Global Strategy, 2016, p. 13)

With this, the EU’s relationships with developing countries resemble the same donor-recipient, top-down, neo-colonial approach of the Cold War and the persistent advocacy for democracy globally.

**SECTION 3: STATE FRAGILITY**

State fragility is a concept that has been repeatedly referred to as a security threat in EU security strategies since 2003. Because state fragility is closely linked to underdevelopment, this trend has the potential to shed light on the effects of securitization in EU foreign policy; it is therefore worthy of investigation. ‘State fragility’ is considered by both developed and developing countries to be a loaded term that has “emotional...financial and political implications” for states (Grimm et. al., 2014, p. 197). While this term is used discursively throughout the international system, states often hesitate in using such a term directly to describe others, cautious of the possible implications it would have on state relations (Grimm, 2014, p. 260). Additionally, inconsistency among various international actors exists in regard to an agreed-upon definition of state fragility, or the specific circumstances that create and foster state fragility. The contemporary use of the term ‘state fragility’ is the outcome of decades of ever-shifting terminology - from ‘weak states’ to ‘failed states’ to ‘fragile states’ - in the struggle to accurately represent the states whose very existence as sovereign is threatened by “political disruption, institutional weakness and economic collapse” (Grimm et. al., 2014, p. 205). In this way, state fragility renders ideas of entrenched underdevelopment, including widespread unemployment, intense poverty, lack of ‘human security’ elements such as food and water, and
violations of human rights. Many use ‘state fragility’ to refer to situations of “insufficient state capacity or the unwillingness of a state to meet its obligations, generally understood as delivering ‘core functions to the majority of its people’” (Grimm et. al., 2014, p. 199). Consequently, development cooperation is a core foreign policy instrument that seeks to address and strengthen the capacities of states (Lemay-Hébert & Mathieu, 2014, p. 233).

The proximity of state fragility to development is made evident in the OECD’s consistent attention to the various elements of state fragility, despite the lack of definition it offers. The OECD is one of the main international organizations that provides in-depth study on this issue (2014, p. 233), and because this organization guides the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in the distribution of ODA, state fragility plays a key role in determining where development aid is given and how much aid is given. Specifically, the OECD’s State of Fragility Report, first established in 2005, discursively portrays fragile states as those “the furthest behind” in development (States of Fragility Report, 2016, p. 21), and uses various circumstantial development methods to determine state capacity and to judge the strength of states. In this way, the state is seen to be a core aspect of development; what we commonly define as the state is heavily influenced by the Westphalian model, or the notion that a state “enjoys external and internal sovereignty” in its existence and decision-making (Grimm, 2014, p. 254). This has served as the benchmark with which state strength and stability are measured (Grimm et. al., 2014, p. 203; Lemay-Hébert & Mathieu, 2014, p. 235). With regard to a state’s potential for fragility, the international system largely looks at what has traditionally been considered the most central characteristic of the state: its security (Grimm et. al., 2014, p. 199).

State fragility has been met by development cooperation in a variety of ways, including
immediate humanitarian assistance, military operations, and state building capacities; because the general definitions of state fragility vary in scope and lack widespread agreement, the methods of development actors to address it also vary (Lemay-Hébert & Mathieu, 2014, p. 233). In this way, definitions of state fragility "tend to rely on a set of undisclosed premises" (2014, p. 234). Recently, emphasis has been put on the goal of creating resilience in states more susceptible to fragile conditions. In other words, donor states have increasingly focused on fostering the creation of conditions within states that will ensure long-term solutions. The EU defines resilience as “the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, cope, adapt, and quickly recover from stresses and shocks...without compromising long-term development” (European Commission, 2016). This approach seeks to use development cooperation to strengthen states by addressing root issues of underdevelopment, while seeking to build institutions that will foster good governance. In analysing this method, it is seen that that state remains at the centre of concern for both security and development, while specific attention to the human serves a purpose as the foundation of a strong state; the focus on the human serves as a method of securitization, and therefore “has elements that naturally privilege” the security goals of states (Collins, 2011, p. 60).

**State Fragility in the EU Context**

The EU, being an influential member of the OECD and a major donor of ODA (Grimm, 2014, p. 252), is of significance to this discussion. Like others in the international system, the EU does not define specific parameters within which state fragility is explained. Not only this, but the EU is not guided by specific criteria in addressing this issue through development cooperation (Grimm, 2014, p. 262) and uses information and measurement criteria of other
international bodies, such as the OECD, the World Bank (WB), and the UN; as a result, EU actions in response to state fragility are often considered sporadic (2014, p. 260). Grimm argues that this oversight exists due to three factors: (1) the complex institutional structure of the EU stifles its capacity to act coherently internationally; (2) reliance on the norms of the international system for its decision-making with regard to fragile states, and; (3) reluctance to take action internationally on potentially controversial or strategically disadvantageous issues (2014, p. 253).

With regard to the EU’s institutional structure, discrepancy lies in the tug-of-war between security and development policy goals; in other words, the EU’s lack of definition for state fragility could be attributed to the fact that overlapping structures within the EU disagree on what factors create state fragility. Additionally, the presence of the security-development nexus in EU foreign policy brings to light the role played by security discourse in informing development cooperation. When state fragility is framed as a threat to the security of the EU and the international system, priorities of development cooperation are altered to bolster security. The EU’s structure has been reformed to overcome lack of cohesion among policy instruments - largely by the changes made in the Lisbon Treaty - however, the presence of the nexus as a guiding tool of foreign policy arguably perpetuates a lack of coherence.

In the context of state fragility, the EU relies on, and seeks insight from, decisions made by other international actors; this is largely seen in the EU’s reluctance to establish its own criteria for determining factors of state fragility, and instead to rely on international actors for criteria that determine state fragility. This inevitably affects decisions made with regard to development cooperation; reliance on the shifting trends and priorities of the international system shed light on the potential that the EU does not stand on a firm foundation of its own
decision-making, but is instead swayed by global trends and global threats. In this way, the unwavering determination of the EU to both recognize and incorporate security and development as a nexus into policy strategy has significant effect on what developing states receive priority in developing cooperation.

With regard to the general reluctance to affirm definitive statements about state fragility, this could reveal that, like other states and international bodies, the EU is both mindful and hesitant to label states as ‘fragile’ because it could hinder prospects for partnerships in the future (2014, p. 260). The EU is argued to lack a solid definition of “state fragility” due to the lack of consensus on the causes of state fragility. Undoubtedly, this term signifies enduring underdevelopment due to civil conflict, political corruption, lack of infrastructure, widespread poverty, and terrorism (to name a few). Development cooperation seeks to overcome the threat of underdevelopment by identifying and addressing the root problems, however this is not possible if the root problems are ambiguous. The looming ‘threat’ posed by the loaded concept of state fragility is one guided by discourse and ambiguity. With this, security discourse has seemingly taken precedence over development action.

Consistent throughout the EU’s security strategies, and reflective of how state fragility might be defined, is the global threat of terrorism, both inside and outside of the EU. The Reality of Aid Network (RoA), an independent review of international development assistance, states that development cooperation is “deeply influenced by [the EU’s] strategic values in the ‘war on terrorism’. Donor interest in many of the so-called ‘failed and fragile states’ is seen through the prism of the potential threat of the latter to Northern security threats” (RoA, 2006 p. 7). Consequently, while the EU has resisted the establishment of a coherent definition of state
fragility and has remained, at times, silent on this issue in terms of development policy, it has been undeniably vocal about the ‘threat’ state fragility holds to the security of the EU. With regard to state fragility, the question of “whose security” is being ensured by the security-development nexus is answered clearly: not only is EU security served by the use of the security-development nexus, but the international trend of top-down relationships between donor and recipient countries persists. Finally, terrorism - violent actions undergone by humans - is considered to be a state issue and a defining characteristic of state fragility. Again, there is evidence that the human is seen as a threat to state security, which arguably results in the prioritization of development for the purpose of security.

**State Fragility and Securitization**

The use of the security-development nexus in the EU reveals something significant about the dominant ideology revealed in foreign policy: from the critical pairing of security and development emerges a discursively created threat, the human being. Traditional, state-centred approaches of both security and development, which have ‘broadened’ and ‘widened’ to incorporate the needs of the human being, have fostered the view that underdevelopment serves as a ‘threat’ to the security of states, regional political bodies, and the world at large. In this way, the “securitization of human security” has placed development and state fragility under the authority of “security professionals” (Collins, 2011, p. 65). Specifically, the security-development nexus in EU policy is how we can see security operating on the terrain of human beings instead of the state. Throughout history, security - defined in terms of state military strength - has been conducted by states and for states. The broadening and widening of the concept of security to incorporate threats from numerous sources signalled a shift in the
relationship between the state and the human. Likewise, development discourse, which has traditionally been conducted by states with the goal of state building through development measures, shifted focus to the well-being and development of the human. The pursuit of human development by states to ensure their own stability by ensuring the well-being of humans has shifted the role of the human from a recipient of state security to a component of state security. The traditional state-to-state discourse - concern for the state, communicated by the state, for the development of the state, and for the strengthened security of the state - has been altered to both include and focus on the human being. The human condition, seemingly, has become considered as a potential threat to security. The imminent ‘threat’ of EU security, state fragility, has evolved to focus on the resilience of states, or capacity-building of states in order to create long-lasting solutions, can be seen in this way to be a recapturing of state-based discourse projected on the terrain of human beings as security threats.

As previously discussed, the security-development nexus as a form of EU policy has been enabled by the broadened and widened concepts of security and development. The discourse of these concepts are not only framed as the goals of states, but as the securitization of states; this has had the effect of framing complex elements of underdevelopment - including state fragility - as threats. Within this discourse, the threat of the human being reveals the ever-enduring centrality of the state’s pursuit of security. While the subject of security has broadened to include the human being, the beneficiary has not; the state, evidently, remains at the centre of this discourse. This has significant implications for how foreign policies might be created in the future; when state fragility is seen to be a human issue as opposed to a state issue, the subject of security and development policies is unavoidably altered. In the future, how the EU addresses
global terrorism, for instance, will predominantly be guided by its underlying view that the human being stands as a menacing threat to security. Further, the human being is not only at the centre of global challenges such as increasing refugee migration and entrenched poverty, but, when securitized in discourse, is also the factor crippling their solutions. Finally, the recent emergence of building *resilience*, motivates questions of how long-term self-reliance will be achieved when state populations are seen to be the undermining component of stability. While a discussion of the success of this foreign policy and development method is beyond the scope of this essay, the implications of resilience, when guided by the security-development nexus, present a future challenge for developing states; when the human being is seen to threaten the capacities of states, questions arise as to whether self-reliance is being fostered for the benefit of the people or the state. In this way, resilience as a concept, guided by the nexus, has the potential to act as a form of state building that regards the lack of resilient human beings as a risk to the state.

**CONCLUSION**

This essay uses securitization as a lens through which to study how the security-development nexus has informed EU foreign policies. With this, one of the core security threats to the EU, state fragility, brings clarity to the effectiveness of the nexus in policy. The EU’s discourse, in this regard, reveals its underlying beliefs about the state of the world at large. It is clear that security and development as concepts have the potential to overlap naturally; the shift in foreign policies, however, toward the security-development nexus, or policy conducted *in the name* of a nexus (Stern & Öjendal, 2010, p. 10), sheds light on the EU’s view that the effects of underdevelopment serve as an imminent threat to the security of both the EU as a regional
body and the international system. With this, it is evident that state fragility, and the EU’s reluctance to definitively characterize such a term, is seen more as a threat than as a subject for development. Here, the state remains at the centre of analysis, while the effects of underdevelopment and the well-being of the human being are addressed in order to strengthen security. EU foreign policy has been guided by “the politics of fear” (EU Global Strategy, 2016, p. 19); if the use of the security-development nexus in policy has interpreted the human being as the subject of ‘threat’, questions must be asked about the sustainability of such an approach. In the current moment, characterized by rapidly rising refugee migration, an increase in number and scope of terrorist attacks, and ever-increasing poverty, does the security-development nexus meet the needs of the global community today? Will it create lasting solutions to underdevelopment and the well-being of human beings in the future?

This essay has added to the discussion of the nexus in policy by shedding light on how security and development as concepts operate through powerful discourse and securitization in policy-making. The security-development nexus in policy has largely been facilitated and fostered by the emergent key role of the human being, from which certain trends have emerged; in other words, the use of the nexus in policy, as seen in the EU, is how we can see security, which was traditionally defined within the parameters of the state, operating on the terrain of human beings. The “articulation of security” has inevitable consequences (Collins, 2011, p. 66), and the implications of this line of thinking are potentially detrimental to the relationship between human beings and the state. Specifically, when humans are seen to be the threat undermining the security of states, methods of development cooperation, arguably, no longer seek to address the needs of human beings for the security of human beings, but instead seek to
address such needs insofar as they enhance state security. In this way, Chandler’s description of a “crisis of policy-making” (Chandler, 2007, p. 369) seems close to reality. While the security-development nexus has been seen by states and international bodies to hold benefits for the security of states, the effects of the securitization of development on human beings in relation to the state cannot be ignored.
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