A Reflective Analysis of War Rape through the Lens of Hegemonic Masculinity

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Abstract

This thesis is an exploration of the nature and prevalence of sexual violence in large scale conflicts. It is written with a reflective standpoint as an innovative methodology, drawing on the work of Heather Smith, and the conversational nature present in the Feminist International Relations literature it draws on. The theoretical framework used is a lens of dominant gender concepts, most notably hegemonic masculinity. It analyzes the militarized nature of popular masculinity, and in turn reflects on how these notions of masculinity are embedded within ideas of war and military. Then the thesis explores the concept of hegemonic masculinity and how it relates to the production of gender in society, and in turn how these models contribute to violence, war, and war rape. The overall findings of this thesis are that hegemonic masculinity contributes to an arrangement of society that allows for high levels of not only rape, but war itself. The evidence used to come to these conclusions also suggest that there is hope of ameliorating the problem of sexual violence in war, but in turn that this would necessarily come with a reduction of war itself.

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I. Introduction

I have always found rape to be a difficult concept to grasp. I believe that struggling to understand the existence of rape is common not only as an academic enterprise but also as a day-to-day occurrence. As we go about living our daily lives, we are confused as to how it can be committed with the regularity that we hear about it. It is a horrible atrocity and yet it seems to continue indefinitely despite a greater push to punish those who commit rape. There are seemingly always new offenders and new victims. We try and address problems to do with the culture around rape, to change the narrative, and to ameliorate the problem, but it persists. Rape is a problem that is recognized not only in the domestic context but also in the international arena.

I have chosen to focus my thesis on rape as it occurs in settings of war and armed conflict. Rape has seemingly always occurred during war. As I am completing my undergraduate studies, this is something I have come to understand as true -- as an uncontestable fact. In school I was taught that historically the idea that armies could, and did, rape the women of a defeated population was an accepted norm; that women were considered part of the victors’ prize. Moreover, a population under siege understood that their women were likely to be raped if they were to lose. Victims of rape are often left behind after a point of conflict, leaving further lasting damage on a population. Despite being somewhat aware of this problem, my education led me to a point where my understanding was rocked. The scale of sexual violence in war was beyond anything I had imagined. Atrocities of mass rape have been committed by soldiers and combatants in overwhelming numbers. I find it difficult even now to wrap my brain around the sheer enormity of the problem that I have delved into in this thesis. I do not doubt that most
people, while understanding the large numbers cited herein, can never truly grasp the vastness of the experiences of the victims. The way I look at rape not only has been changed by the very process of studying it, but also has been a product of who I am and how I learn.

I write this thesis as a reflective piece because I cannot separate myself from my research. Although I spend time examining historical examples, and attempting to explain some of this behaviour with theoretical frameworks of masculinity, I weigh these against my own perspective because this line of inquiry has called into question my own understanding of what it means to me to be a man. I draw inspiration for this from the work of Heather Smith (2010) who argues that the very heart of the critical feminist enterprise is that we recognize that learning is primarily about intersubjectivity and not objectivity. We do not conduct research in a vacuum; we produce important analyses through self-reflection; and we gain knowledge through a process of reflexivity. “Reflexivity is important … for explaining how we come to be gendered and sexual subjects who take part in the interactive processes through which we produce a shared sense of reality” (Rahman and Jackson, 2010, 165-66, as quoted in Keeble, 2016, 20).

I acknowledge that men can be victims of sexual violence, just as women can be perpetrators. Nevertheless, the majority of cases involve women as the victims of men, and this thesis reflects that in its focus. I have struggled in this endeavour to separate rape from sex. Rape is a crime that is sexual in nature, but it is an act of violence, not sexuality. I have tried to maintain this understanding while thinking about the connections between sex and violence in rape. In my eyes it seems a perversion of our oldest natural instinct. The act of coupling or mating is an animal instinct that we have always carried with us. I have always found any suggested instinct toward violence as an alien feeling to which I cannot relate. Much of our culture revolves around our sexualities. Even marriage is a formalization of human coupling, to
celebrate a lasting bond between people. Much of our culture, be it art, poetry, music, and film, all relate back to our instincts in this way. But this is not what rape is. Rape is an attack that simply mirrors sex in its intimate contact between two people. In this, it perverts the values I see celebrated in our sexuality. It dehumanizes victims, destroying something to which we attribute great value. It takes away sexual agency, and demoralizes those who understand the personal and political worth of intimacy (see, for example, Keeble, 2016).

What follows is a systematic analysis of select literature that explores the questions I raise. Why do men commit rape? How does this understanding translate to war rape? Furthermore, what is the connection between this and war itself? In each section I attempt to unravel one piece of this puzzle, and draw connections as I go. Although Smith (2010) argues that reflective writing can be seen (although wrongly) as anecdotal, seemingly unorganized, and even “messy,” my reflective analysis is clearly research-derived and systematically presented, because in most cases I choose insights from individual pieces of feminist literature to make my case point by point.

The second section attempts to provide historical context. Our understanding of rape in war has changed relatively rapidly within a span of the last 70 years. It is now recognized as contravening international law, not only as a war crime, but also a crime against humanity. I will begin with an overview of some historical examples of rape in war, both to set the context and to demonstrate different conditions under which sexual violence can occur. Following that, in the third section I will draw on feminist International Relations literature to situate the concepts of masculinity addressed in this thesis in a framework of militarization. This understanding of gender is crucial to the rest of the thesis.
In the fourth section I will narrow still further to explain the relevance of hegemonic masculinity in the framework established thus far, and how it can help to explain both aggression in war and sexual violence in war. A greater understanding of hegemonic masculinity is where I begin to find answers to my overall inquiry. Finally, in the fifth section I assess possible solutions to the problems posed by how my understanding has developed in the thesis. The understanding of masculinized social structures is troubling, but ultimately not insurmountable, and this section deals with possible changes to that effect.

As I have alluded to thus far, this topic was difficult to approach. I find the question of identity impossible to escape. I was driven by a need to understand something that seemed so foreign to me, but that seemed to be entwined in our collective understanding of men. I could not understand what made men “men,” if it involved such atrocious undercurrents of violence. The portrayal of men in popular culture is often inscribed with violent tendencies, and this portrayal lends itself to real world definitions of masculinity.

This issue has proven to be profoundly complex, but within an analysis of social gender structures it began to come clear to me that sexual violence in war is consequential. However, that does not mean it has to be accepted. Although we have taken steps from an international legal perspective through the prosecution of rape as an international crime, there is far more we can do by changing the dominant concepts that perpetuate rape in war. This dominant concept is hegemonic masculinity, and it is by changing this that we can change our expectations. When this is accomplished, I believe that we can then expect a reduction in sexual violence in war.

II. Setting the Stage

The act of rape has been around as long as humans have existed, and it seems that this has always been an accompanying feature of violent conflict. As long as humans have committed
acts of war, combatants have committed rape. The motives behind such acts seem to range from chaotic acts of violence within the landscape of armed conflict, to deliberate tactical choices on the part of commanders or state leaders.

In this section I will outline the historical context of the discussion of sexual violence in war. I will do so by giving a few prominent examples of the current era from World War II up to the present along with some relevant associated statistics. I will then discuss the changes made in law around the subject, beginning with the code of conduct for soldiers in the United States, and finally with the efforts made by international organizations to address the problem.

Sexual violence in armed conflict is defined in several ways. It is considered a weapon in and of itself, used to demoralize enemies and dilute ethnic populations. It is both a mass crime and an extremely individualistic one. It is a crime of terror. Yet it has only been recently recognized as a war crime in the last few decades (Ellis, 2006, 227). The development of rape as something separate from more commonly discussed acts of war (e.g. fighting or killing) has been a recent development in human history.

To elaborate, before its establishment as a crime against humanity, rape was often considered one of the spoils of war. It has been classically illegal since the Lieber agreement in 1863, wherein the United States officially laid out what rules of conduct soldiers would be held to during armed conflict. Rape was addressed in the Lieber code as a “crime of ‘troop discipline’” (Ellis, 2006, 227). The Lieber Code of conduct evolved into the first international laws of war through convention, as it was intended initially just as an American tool but later extended beyond this. The method of definition employed in this legal book very much depends on the language of women as victims because it cites the need to protect women so they would retain their honour. The different interpretations on the severity or how to deal with acts of rape
ranged from troop discipline to outright ignorance on the part of commanders, but there was nothing in terms of legal prosecution, whether locally or internationally. It was not until after World War II that we began considering the consequences that spoke to our humanity (Ellis, 2006, 227-228).

In our current time period I start my examination at the beginning of World War II. In December 1937, Japanese troops invaded the Chinese city of Nanking (sometimes Nanjing) in a brutal assault that would come to earmark war crime prosecutions in later tribunals in the Pacific theatre (Brook, 2001, 673). This event was collectively known as the Rape of Nanking, in recognition of both the overwhelming domination by the Japanese and the sheer amount of actual rape committed by combatants on the field. It was a massacre and although Japanese troops destroyed key documents at the end of the war, scholarly estimates put the number of dead around 300,000 in the city of Nanking (Brook, 2001, 681). Reports of widespread looting and rape were even more difficult to define in exact numbers, but the estimated number of rape victims (specifically women and girls) is between 20,000 and 80,000 over a period of several weeks (Fiske and Shackel, 2015, 124).

This event was prosecuted in the eventual International Military Tribunals for the Far East (or Tokyo Trials) and was significant in that it addressed rape at all. This was of course, not the case for all examples of rape during World War II. As the war ended, the Soviet troops that conquered Berlin committed mass amounts of rape against German women. Estimates put the number of women and girls that were victims of rape in this example at around 130,000, of which ten percent are believed to have committed suicide (Messerschmidt, 2006, 706). These cases of rape were never prosecuted, likely due to the nature of the Soviet forces being part of the Allied victors at the end of the war.
The conditions under which these two cases occurred were very different. In the Tokyo Trials, Japan was found to have committed a War of Aggression, and moreover, Japanese foreign minister Hirota Koki was found to be criminally negligent in not addressing the ongoing atrocities in Nanking (Brook, 2001, 683). In fact, despite the Tokyo Trials not being explicitly mandated to prosecute crimes of rape, the convenors chose to use these examples to prove the complicity of Japan’s aggression. Unwittingly these trials set an important precedent for the way we look at rape in war by showing some international consensus regarding rape as a terrible crime, and one worth prosecuting.

This is in stark contrast to the assault on Berlin. The final push into Berlin was seen to be an act of the Allies ending the war against the Nazis. There was a sense of relief in the world as the Nazi regime came to an end. There is no record of the Soviets being given explicit instruction to commit mass acts of rape, but they were free to conduct themselves as they saw fit outside of battle. Messerschmidt notes that Stalin was known to be “amused by the idea of Red Army soldiers having ‘some fun’ after a hard war,” and although Messerschmidt acknowledges the fact that there was no explicit military strategy involving committing rape, he notes that there is a connection between this occurrence and an overall masculine strategy driving the war (Messerschmidt, 2006, 707). This strategy was one of domination, and it allowed for mass rapes due to its primary tools being violence, degradation, and humiliation.

On top of the Rape of Nanking, the Japanese government was known to have placed over 200,000 women and girls in camps for the purpose of sexual slavery in occupied areas. They were known as “comfort women,” and the camps were put in place for the Japanese troops to use. Unfortunately the Tokyo Trials did not include any acknowledgment of comfort women and
these were not among actions that were prosecuted. Comfort women are still seeking retribution and acknowledgement today (Ellis, 2006, 228).

After the Second World War, there was a burgeoning development of international organizations, not the least of which is the United Nations (UN). The dialogue that sprang forth was of international human rights, and although not all member states have actively enforced these ambitious tenets, the emergence of the UN Declaration on Human Rights marks an emergence of collective goals. In 1949 the Geneva Convention dealing with the treatment of prisoners of war established the first protections against rape for women (Ellis, 2006, 229).

The next examples were different for me, as I can remember them from my lifetime. The post-Cold War period was initially anticipated to be a period of de-escalation of conflict, and therefore a period of decreased war. This has not proven to be the case, and there are a few notable conflicts with mass amounts of rape. The ethnic conflict in Rwanda in 1994 posed a significant challenge for UN peacekeepers who were not authorized to engage in helping to stop the slaughter. Romeo Dallaire led this team, and was a witness to many atrocities. I had the privilege to hear him speak of these experiences in 2015. The horror that he conveyed was not the least of the factors that pushed me on the journey to this point of research.

Sexual violence occurred en masse amid the context of genocide that was being committed by the Hutu tribe against the Tutsi people in the Rwandan conflict. Lee Ann Fujii (2009) describes a systematic approach by aggressors wherein they used government facilities and records to locate the residences of Tutsi families and would proceed to rape the women and girls and kill the men (Fujii, 2009, 89).

In her research on Rwanda, Jennie Burnet (2012) places the number of women raped in that country at 49.4% of the population, but that in this frenzy of ethnic cleansing, women on
both sides of the tribal divide were likely to be victimized in this way. Burnet cites instances of forced relationships and marriage among these (Burnet, 2012, 98-99). Despite these “relationships,” Burnet emphasizes that rape was used as part of a conscious strategy by the perpetrators to “terrorize and control women, girls, and other civilians” (Burnet, 2012, 98).

In 1994 the United Nations passed Security Council resolution S/RES/955 to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). This resolution was an attempt to address the mass slaughter as a violation of international humanitarian law; however where the UN had failed to intercede to prevent or alleviate the violence as it occurred, this was somewhat of a stopgap solution. It was intended to demonstrate to the world that prosecution was a serious option, and therefore would act as a deterrent to those who would commit such mass atrocities.

The inclusion of rape in the prosecution was initially left out, but the testimony of witnesses prompted the prosecution to investigate further. With the encouragement of the “Tribunal’s only woman judge, Navanethem Pillay,” new evidence was heard regarding sexual violence (Ellis, 2006, 232). Due to this late addition, the act of rape was redefined to include more than just acts involving forced penetration or even physical contact, and moreover this was the evidence that initially established that rape could be considered an act of genocide (Ellis, 2006, 233).

The ICTR was, however, another ad hoc tribunal as there was not yet a permanent court to deal with international crimes of this scale. Through the 1990s more sexual violence was occurring in the Bosnian conflict, as part of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. The country of Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic state established as a home for (literally translated) “Southern Slavs” after displacement and depopulation had ravaged much of the European continent in World War II. Nevertheless ethnic conflicts emerged, culminating in the Bosnian war from
1992-1996. This example is notable again because of the sheer number of rape victims within the context of the war, but also because of the demonstrable systematic nature of sexual violence as a weapon of war.

More than any other example in history, rape was employed as a tool for ethnic cleansing through the establishment of rape camps mandated by the government. The Serbian nationals who were responsible had the intent of diluting the ethnic populations of other groups by forced pregnancy. Although not limited to one particular ethnicity, the majority of these instances were committed by Serbs against Muslim women. The research of Snyder asserts that the historically patriarchal society of the region assigned ethnicity based on the lineage of the father, so forced pregnancy would effectively eliminate the racial heritage of the mother (Snyder, 2006, 189-190).

Fiske and Shackel (2015, 124) argue that it is difficult to tell exact numbers of rape victims in the Bosnian conflict because the idea of ethnic dilution coupled with the existing social stigma of being a rape victim led to massive underreporting. They estimate the number of victims ranged from 25,000 – 50,000, but that most were raped more than once, and in fact many were raped daily during periods of captivity within rape camps. Moreover, a vast majority (96%) of these cases were accompanied by additional physical torture (Fiske and Shackel, 2015, 124). Again, the United Nations established an ad hoc tribunal for the prosecution of crimes committed in this war, and it was called the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Fiske and Shackel, 2015, 126).

The ICTY added to legal understandings of sexual violence not only by connecting forced pregnancy to the nature of genocide, but also by establishing precedent for the prosecution of sexual violence as crimes against humanity (Ellis, 2006, 234 - 235). These notions played heavily into the establishment of statutes for the International Criminal Court.
The most recent example is the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that began in 1998. Stacey Banwell (2014) writes of this conflict as unique in the sense that it began after the two aforementioned tribunals (ICTR & ICTY), and on top of this, after the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998. As a result, the entrenchment of laws against sexual violence in war should have been much more understood, and yet this has apparently not deterred actors from committing these crimes in the DRC. Banwell cites Laura Sjoberg in stating that it is an illusion “to think that an immunity principle actually protects women,” in the context of women as non-combatants (Banwell, 2014, 49). Although many attempts have been made to initiate peace processes, the violence is ongoing in the region, and that includes the act of rape. Banwell gives multiple examples of research into the numbers of victims, but presents no single number. Each estimate is based on a specific year or range of years, but nevertheless each one encompasses tens of thousands (Banwell, 2014, 48).

As stated previously, the process by which our understanding of rape as a war crime changed very gradually. The Tokyo Trials prosecuted crimes of rape against some despite the fact that it was not specifically in the mandate of the tribunal. Nevertheless, the sexual violence committed by the Japanese was atrocious enough to gain the attention of the court, establishing that this could become the focus of prosecution in the future. Unfortunately this tribunal did not prosecute the forced prostitution of the comfort women (Ellis, 2006, 228). The focus was beginning to be on sexual violence, but it was barely there.

Ellis asserts that it was a slow process of acknowledgment by the various international prosecutions that led to the eventual inclusion of rape in international law. Various changes in the definition of rape came in the form of different lines of inquiry: for example whether forced penetration was necessary, whether proof was required, or whether consent could somehow be
demonstrated by the defense (Ellis, 2006, 229-230). The ICTR and ICTY were the first courts to prosecute rape as a war crime, and the ICTR was the first to acknowledge rape as a crime against humanity (Banwell, 2014, 45). This acknowledgement marks a shift in our perception of rape as a war crime. These tribunals were in the 1990s, but crimes against humanity had been established decades earlier in 1949 in the Geneva Conventions (Ellis, 2006, 226). Ellis cites the existence of the ICC in its current form as testament to how far we have come in the last century. We have made important strides in defining rape, and now have these definitions codified in international law (Ellis, 2006, 239).

Overall it has been a journey of improvement for humanity as the changes in the last century are relatively rapid within the entire history of our society. This is fitting with many other social changes that took place during the twentieth century. Just like other aspects of social change, however, any changes seem to be tenuous and progress is far from over. It is through acts of acknowledgement that change happens. However we must look deeper than simply the atrocious nature of these acts to discover the true gendered root of this problem.

III. Seeing War as Gendered

How gender is defined often depends on the particular theoretical perspective of any given researcher. R.W. Connell (1995, 67) calls the task of defining gender impossible when attempting to lay out a scientific definition. Instead a scientific method of investigation lends itself better to defining gender relations which points to understanding masculinities and femininities. Masculinities can then be defined as “configurations of practice structured by gender relations.” Thus, “masculinity as an object of knowledge is always masculinity-in-relation” (Connell, 1995, 44).
I have come to find this to be an important starting point for my study because I am using one form of understanding masculinity as a lens through which to analyze sexual violence in war. It is crucial to remember that hegemonic masculinity exists only in relationships of gender. This applies to all things that can be demonstrably “gendered,” and in this section I will lay out some of these relationships to explain the gendered nature of war itself.

Acts of sexual violence occur in war, and just as war is a political act so too then are acts of sexual violence in this context. In all of the forms it can take, rape in war is always about power, not sex, and as such we will need to first define the gender relations within the concept of war itself. This section will take a broader examination of the gender dynamics within war before I discuss the more specific dynamics of rape.

As we have historically associated war with manhood, it is easy to begin with this idea of war as masculine. Again I cite my own experiences in that it seemed obvious enough to me that the lay observer might be inclined to just agree that war is clearly masculine and leave it at that. Despite the concept of militarized masculinity being new to me in my research process, it was not wholly unfamiliar. However, with the revelation that masculinity depends on a relationship with an “other” (femininity in this case) my understanding began to grow.

Maya Eichler (2014) looks into the concept of militarized masculinity as an important factor in our understanding of the connections between the masculine gender and war. She states that “Militarized masculinity, at its most basic level, refers to the assertion that traits stereotypically associated with masculinity can be acquired and proven through military service or action, and combat in particular” (Eichler, 2014, 81). This notion recognizes the historical fact that most actors in war have always been (and continue to be) men. Men have been soldiers and combatants as well as political leaders inciting war (or acting in self defense), whereas women
have more traditionally been part of the “home front,” representing the alternative to men in battle (Cohn, 2013, 1).

Carol Cohn sheds light on this simplistic analysis, and reminds us that the experience of war and relationship to war is in fact quite varied for different women across time (Cohn, 2013, 1). “‘Women,’ of course are not a monolithic group” (Cohn, 2013, 2), but in fact half of the population of the planet, with many factors contributing to each individual identity. The fact that they are women is just one shared trait. All of these differences illustrate that we must be careful not to generalize, even when talking about women and their relationship to war, because “the diversity of women’s experiences of and relations to war is due to both diversity among women and diversity among wars” (Cohn, 2013, 2).

Cohn goes on to define gender in a complementary way to Connell, in that it is a way of “categorizing, ordering, and symbolizing power, of hierarchically structuring relationships,” (Cohn, 2013, 3). In this, we see that gender is in fact about power relations (and therefore political) themselves, and these relations depend on a hierarchy of norms associated with masculine and feminine.

J. Ann Tickner (1992) presents a way of looking at war as masculine by addressing the security dilemma as raised by International Relations scholars, arguing that the capabilities of a state (in this case security) are measurable primarily in relation to other states. The security dilemma is that more security for one means less security for others as it is inherently a zero sum game. Tickner references the foundational work of Kenneth Waltz’s *Man, The State, and War* for this explanation (Tickner, 1992, 35). She brings gender into her explanation in a few ways.

First, Tickner discusses criticisms of Hans Morgenthau’s seminal work, *Political Man*, which, as a foundation for much of International Relations theory, is only a “partial
representation of human nature, abstracted from the behaviour of men in positions of public power,” (Tickner, 1992, 37). This essentializes humanity down to a specific prescription of maleness that does not in fact represent the experiences of all people. Tickner then defines this notion as hegemonic masculinity, and asserts that the dominance of a masculine concept applied to international relations necessarily has a “devalued femininity” that accompanies it, furthering evidence of a relational construct (Ticker, 1992, 37 -38).

To further illustrate her argument, Tickner uses examples to demonstrate that the violence of war is not a natural feature of men, as some might assume, but as a result of a social construct. “Because military recruiters cannot rely on violent qualities in men, they appeal to manliness and patriotic duty” (Tickner, 1992, 40). The appeal to a masculine (or simply not a feminine) sexual identity is a primary motivator in cases of recruitment, training, and even battle. Our traditional association between men and violence is not dependent “on men’s innate aggressiveness, but on the construction of a gendered identity that places heavy pressure on soldiers to prove themselves as men” (Tickner, 1992, 40).

I have not found it to be a difficult leap in logic to connect all of this emphasis on masculinity in military training to the prevalence of sexual violence in war. As easily as we can now demonstrate that it is constructions of gender that are used to bring out violence in male soldiers, I can say that it must be a furtherance of the same that leads to war rape. Just as war is an act of violent dominance, so too is rape. With these understandings it has become clearer to me that my initial question was leading much deeper than simply “what causes men to commit rape during war?”

E.L. Zurbriggen (2010, 538) tells us that hegemonic masculinity is an underlying factor for the very existence of war, and that it is this connection that leads to the prevalence of rape
just as much as it leads to the existence of war at all. Similarly to Tickner above, Zurbriggen asserts that traditional masculinity relies on existing as an antithesis to femininity. These include inexpressiveness (of emotions), independence, and aggression. Moreover, she argues that being masculine relies on an avoidance of being seen as feminine (Zurbriggen, 2010, 540).

Zurbriggen points out the prevalence of these ideals in military recruitment material, and the value placed on these concepts in appreciating what a soldier should be. “Status and Achievement, Toughness and Aggression, Restricted Emotionality, Self-Reliance, and Dominance/Power/Control,” are five dimensions she identifies as creating the best possible soldier (Zurbriggen, 2010, 542). We can see now that these characteristics of a soldier overlap pretty plainly with her ideas of hegemonic masculinity, and in the same vein it becomes even clearer that these connect to notions of war.

Indeed war itself as a political act is one of dominance. It necessarily requires a move of power by one actor asserting itself on another. War is an act of aggression in most cases, although a state of war exists for those on defense as well. Nevertheless it is important to recognize the parallel between power and dominance in war, and its emphasis on traditional masculinity. Moreover, as I will talk more about in the next section, we need to recognize the parallel between these factors and sexual violence.

The concept of a militarized masculine citizenry is not new to the twentieth century. J. Ann Tickner references Machiavelli’s citizen warrior and the emphasis that he placed on the virtue thereof. In fact, Machiavelli employed this notion of virtue to the final degree of giving one’s life for one’s country being the most noble thing one could do (Tickner, 1992, 39). Tickner also connects Machiavelli’s emphasis on the necessity of an “other” to the “oppositional relationship to a devalued femininity” (Tickner, 1992, 38), just as Zurbriggen emphasized. In
fact, Machiavelli explicitly states that fortune (or chance, luck, or fate) is “a woman [and that it is] necessary […] to conquer her by force.” This narrative relies heavily on notions of masculine and feminine to back up his claims. This is true, however, of our idea of war today.

Laura Sjoberg (2013) describes the gendered nature ascribed even to technology of war, weapons, or even tactics themselves. She tells us that certain “offensive developments” have been “celebrated for their link to masculinity,” and goes on to cite examples of bigger better bombs (Sjoberg, 2013, 227). The capacity for destruction is one aspect of this, and fits with the notion of dominance prescribed to masculinity. On top of this, Sjoberg discusses the penetrative nature of certain weapons.

The notion of penetration is classically tied to all war, and more than just dominance, it is an act of inserting oneself in another. An act of invasion or annexation is the act of one state penetrating another or even subsuming part (or all) of it. The parallels here become easy to draw between not only power and dominance, but the hierarchy of gender as it is tied to sex. Just as war is an act of dominance, so too is it an act of penetration, and a comparison to sexual violence in war becomes especially notable in a study such as this.

The idea that tactics are gendered becomes easier to understand at this point. Just as gender relies on a hierarchy to exist as a framework, war is the large scale attempt at realizing that framework. The reliance on masculinity is such that all actors believe the victor will be the side that is best able to embody these traits.

The balance between dominance and submissiveness in war are clearly tied to notions of masculine and feminine, but just as war is tied to the masculine ideal, peace is tied to the feminine. Carol Cohn describes this as an example of “symbolic gender coding” (Cohn, 2013, 12). What this means is that the concepts of war and peace are gendered by the fact of being
associated with traits commonly associated with masculine and feminine, respectively. Just as the masculine element is associated with action, the feminine is linked to passivity. The same two-sided coin exists for toughness and softness, violence and pacifism, and independence and interdependence. Moreover, on top of all of these examples, it becomes clear that the feminine is defined relationally to the masculine. As a concept it seems less distinct than it otherwise would have at first, as it depends on the other for substance. In this we see that the action of gendering concepts itself falls prey to being a gendered idea, as it relies on the same hierarchy.

These two interrelated roles play themselves out in the practice of war. Traditionally women have not been combatants in war (although this is not universally true, and there are examples of women participating in war as combatants). There are examples of women assisting in wars in many ways: as intelligence officers, as message carriers, as soldiers, nurses, etc. There are examples of women being complicit in sending armies to war from positions of political power. By and large though, women are seen to occupy a space often called the home front (Cohn, 2013, 1). Their role in these situations is to keep up morale, tend to family life, take on the working roles of men that have left for war, or even ensure raising children for the next generation of soldiers, should the need arise.

This reveals one more aspect of the gendered nature of war, as we see the broader picture of women as protected and men as protectors. Protection of the innocent (family) is a masculine trait assigned to men just as much as any other. It is in a fashion, counter to notions of aggression, but serves to achieve the same result of motivating men to fight. The above examples of men as protector and women as protected on the home front are classical examples derived from various wartime rhetoric and propaganda.
War is indeed a terrible aspect of humanity. The literature discussed so far suggests that it exists as a result of our social constructs, such as gender. Despite a general understanding of war as something we collectively hate and fear, it persists in human society. This is reflective of the persistence of the masculine idealization being discussed. Carol Cohn even touches on this, as she states that “the masculine is valued so much more highly than the feminine,” (Cohn, 2013, 12) in relationship to methods of war being preferred tools to methods of nonviolence, such as diplomacy. At the same time, she obviously recognizes that war is a regrettable method, even if it is seen as effective.

It seems a certain irony, then, that concepts we value so highly, like peace, are relegated to a position less preferable to war. Any political actor in a position of leadership responsible for war will state that war is necessary only as a means for achieving peace, and yet this rhetoric seems to be at odds with the reality. If one is truly preferred, why is the other so valued to the point of being a dominant idea in our society?

This conflict of ideas is what cements the idea of gender being the basis for the prevalence of war. As Zurbriggens’s contribution seeks to expose, although men are trained to exemplify traits that are called masculine, their natural tendency is not toward violence. I find common ground with this suggestion, as it has informed an understanding of where I fall on the spectrum of masculinity. As stated at the outset of this analysis, I cannot easily relate to feelings of violence.

The action of the state on its population in creating a military relies heavily on these notions of masculine virtue, and in doing so is identifiable as an act of power. This is then identifiable as a political act, as it is also a means to an end. Presumably, as a military is created, it is intended for a purpose, even if just for security. War is a political act, and the creation of an
army is a political act, and so following this path of logic I can conclude this section by stating that I now see rape in war as an extension of the politics involved in privileging war.

IV. Conceptualizing Hegemonic Masculinity

What makes a man “a man” is a complicated question. The discussions I see in popular news media seem to suggest that for many people today, the idea is simply one of biology. The rising awareness of transgender individuals has called into question the idea that the adult male human is a man, as if it was an open and shut definition. We are seeing that it is much more complicated than this, as gender plays a huge role in our identity. Depending on methodology used (or what discipline of study to which we are referring), this may seem irrelevant. For example, medical doctors may prefer to focus simply on biology due to the physical components of the body being the primary purview of their concern. Psychologists may take the opposite approach as gender identity can have a powerful impact on mental health. From a point of study in the social sciences we know that the ways humans identify each other and self-identify is of huge importance to understanding our actions.

A study of sexual violence in war is a multi-levelled study into power relations, and as such it is of crucial importance to understand the identities involved if we are to understand the actions taking place. As stated in the previous section, war is intricately connected to the concept of masculinity. It is our emphasis on dominant notions of masculinity that bring out violence in soldiers. In this section I will flesh out the connection even further to place acts of sexual violence within the same framework. I will demonstrate that, conceptually, hegemonic masculinity is crucial to explaining the acts of sexual violence that we find so abhorrent, yet that seem to continue to exist within the state of war that persists in the world.
The term “hegemonic masculinity” was coined by R. W. Connell and discussed in the book *Masculinities* (1995) within a larger framework of multiple masculinities across a spectrum of culture and time. Connell’s study relies on (and suggests heavily) the understanding that there is no singular masculine, and that we cannot point to an example of an embodiment of this. The hegemonic aspect of the term is derived from Antonio Gramsci’s notion of cultural hegemony, as it describes the dominance between classes based on Marxist theory. One important aspect that Gramsci brought to the idea is that it includes an element of consent, wherein the dominated class or group consent to their subordination.

This holds true in cases of hegemonic masculinity, as it exists through a mechanism of social consent. Men, in a position of privilege in this structure, allow for this particular hegemony, but women are complicit in this consent as well (Connell, 1995, 79). Moreover, on the spectrum of masculinities, the subordinated forms of masculinity are complicit in their domination as well. With that stated, for the purposes of my thesis, hegemonic masculinity is a tool used to understand a social structure with the explicit goal of understanding the horrible acts of sexual violence that occur during war.

Connell defines hegemonic masculinity as “the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of the patriarchy,” relating to the dominant societal position men hold (Connell, 1995, 77). The emphasis on “currently accepted” is crucial to understanding the nature of the concept, as it is obviously a changing idea through time. Moreover, this reveals the emancipatory element of the concept itself. As an idea it is possible to change for the better, as it is changing itself. Connell even acknowledges hegemony as “a historically mobile relation” (Connell, 1995, 77). “Men no more than women are chained to the gender patterns they have inherited.” (Connell, 1995, 86)
The concept grew in popularity in gender studies, as Connell noted when revisiting the concept along with James W. Messerschmidt (2005). They call it “a widely used framework for research and debate about men and masculinities” (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, 835), although they note among other criticisms of the concept that it is difficult to place a model of hegemonic masculinity on any one given person. This reflects Connell’s (1995) thesis of multiple masculinities. The idea of a masculine ideal is a concept that means different things to different people, so is impossible to apply all traits within such a framework to any one person. In terms of the lived realities of men, no single man will ever embody a list of ideal masculine traits, especially as opinion on these traits will vary. No ultimate example of the personification of hegemonic masculinity exists.

Connell and Messerschmidt also point out that as the concept of hegemonic masculinity has gained momentum and been used more widely “in the huge literature concerned with masculinity, there is a great deal of conceptual confusion as well as a great deal of essentializing” (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, 836). They assert that it would be irresponsible to deny this. I acknowledge that this is a weakness within the concept in one sense; however, I maintain that there is strength in the knowledge that such a broad concept cannot literally apply to any single individual. In fact it only serves to reinforce the fluid nature of hegemonic gender concepts. Indeed they touch on the inherent negotiated femininity that comes with a social structure such as this (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, 840). As noted previously, masculinity is primarily defined as a structure in relation to the accompanying structure of femininity, and so my understanding has grown to include the idea that if one is hegemonic then so too is the other. Hierarchies of gender rely on consent of those within them to reinforce them and allow them to exist. Hegemonic masculinity is the explanation of this idea,
and logically it seems that if masculinity comes with a relation to femininity, then this femininity is hegemonic as well. The two ideas are interrelated.

It is a notable criticism of hegemonic masculinity that it is purely a way of exemplifying negative characteristics and used to explain violent behaviour (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, citing Collier, 1998, and Martin, 1998). It is important to acknowledge this, as my thesis certainly veers into a range of analysis that relies on these characteristics to explain sexual violence in war, and even war itself. However, I fall back on the fact that in seeking to promote a reduction in violence it is important to understand the root causes. Moreover I do not believe this criticism is enough to rule out the functionality of hegemonic masculinity as a lens through which we can analyze sexual violence.

Zurbriggen has already shown us the connection necessary between masculine virtues and the effectiveness of a soldier. One aspect of this is “restricted emotionality” that benefits a soldier, otherwise disinclined to kill; killing is a task necessary in war (Zurbriggen, 2010, 543). I find it is not a difficult leap in logic to see how this detachment from empathy may lead a soldier to at least have reduced inhibitions about committing rape. Zurbriggen’s primary argument is that rape and war both share a root cause in “masculine socialization” (Zurbriggen, 2010, 544), and this fits with other literature. However, just as Zurbriggen suggests that we cannot eliminate rape from war as long as hegemonic masculinity persists, I suggest that Connell’s definition of it as a historically mobile concept undermines Zurbriggen’s claim, showing her understanding to be incomplete. The very fact that the dominant factors of masculinity change over time is the key to this understanding.

Rape is an overwhelming reality in war, as discussed in the previous section. It is something that we abhor, and in fact our response to such crimes has changed over time. Yet
these acts continue to occur. As Tickner (1992) has suggested that violent qualities do not exist inherently in men, and so they must be emphasized rigorously in the process of training soldiers, she notes that “in basic training the term of utmost derision is to be called a girl or lady” (Tickner, 1992, 40). The suggestion here is that soldiers strive to prove themselves as men, fighting to better embody what it means to be a “soldier,” namely embodying characteristics of aggression and manliness. However, this entire premise relies on the gendered notion of women as victims. It suggests to the soldier in training, that if they are to continue to be like women, they will not be victors, but victims. As these concepts all rely on a hierarchical relationship, this is the opposite side of the coin in how soldiers are trained to look at women. The explicit suggestion is that the soldiers will be victims if they continue to embody feminine characteristics (as relational to ideal masculine characteristics), but the implicit suggestion is that women are victims. From my own understanding it seems a logical progression follows, from being trained to see women as victims to victimizing women in war.

Laura Sjoberg and Jessica Peet (2011) confirm this with their suggestion that the construction of an enemy has as much to do with gender as the construction of the home front. “It is important to construct the enemy as something other than the masculine ideal,” (Sjoberg and Peet, 2001, 176) for this ideal must belong to one’s own military in order to achieve victory. At the same time, the relational aspect of this gender arrangement must inherently include a feminine side, and this is represented by the state itself. Sjoberg and Peet connect the ideal of protector as masculine, to the state as feminine, but in doing so, they make another important connection to the overall strategy of attacking women. If masculinity is tied so heavily to victory in the minds of soldiers, and this is related to protecting the home, then by feminizing the other masculinity of enemy they can ensure victory. This feminization in this case takes on the form of
attacking that which the enemy is attempting to protect. “One way they do this is to render opponents’ men incapable of performing their own masculinity by targeting, killing, and humiliating ‘their’ women” (Sjoberg and Peet, 2011, 176)

The work of Lisa S. Price (2001) suggests that the act of rape in war is not an evil act in the supernatural sense of the word, but a human sort of evil, in that men committing rape act out of “comprehensible motives” (Price, 2001, 212). Although her assertion that war rape is committed by ordinary men (as opposed to caricatures of evil) is upsetting to my sense of morality, I can see within it the possibility of change. Moreover, it suggests that we are on a corrective path already, acknowledging rape as a crime in war settings, and having increased severity of prosecution and punishment. Price emphasizes that “the construction of masculinity under militarized state nationalism [that] predisposes men to be sexually violent does not negate the agency of the individual soldier-rapist. And where there is agency there must be responsibility” (Price, 2001, 225).

Indeed this is an important aspect of situating rape in war. It is acknowledged as a crime against humanity and a crime of genocide, but each act of rape remains extremely personal and individualistic. The terms of genocide and crimes against humanity may in fact obscure this fact in our minds, as they denote large scale atrocities. Certainly rape as it occurs in war fit within these definitions of mass atrocity; however, it remains important to remember the individual agency involved.

Moreover, in a thesis such as this one, that seeks to connect a fairly generalized social structure, as is hegemonic masculinity, it is easy to overlook the smallest scale. Once again, this viewpoint lends itself to acknowledging the nature of the task at hand, as having a goal of positive social change. If it is a large scale hierarchy of traditional gender roles that we are
addressing, it is easy to see how entrenched the status quo is. However, with an
acknowledgement that individuals matter, the problem is not quite so grim.

Kimberley Hutchings (2007) adds to our understanding of “othering” that is necessary in
the process of creating a hegemonic gender role. She addresses the fact that in valorizing certain
versions of masculinity, we exclude not only women, but subordinated men as well. In her
example this includes homosexual men (Hutchings, 2007, 392). This acknowledges the way in
which men are victimized by hegemonic masculinity. Men are victimized in the sense that
expectations of gender are attributed to biological sex, and thus restrictive, not just for
homosexual men, but for all men. As in the aforementioned examples describing violence as not
inherent to men, the restrictive nature of dominant masculinities is projected on to men by
society.

In this understanding it is notable that not all sexual violence in war is perpetrated by
men, nor are all victims women. Paul Kirby (2013, 95) cites a report by the US Department of
Justice suggesting that 9 percent of victims of rape and sexual assault between 1992 and 2000
were male. These reports are based on domestic crime and not sexual violence in war, and it is
cited to suggest that more attention needs to be paid to the sexual victimization of men in war.
However, Kirby also states “Rape and sexual violence are acts overwhelmingly carried out by
men against women. This much is widely accepted” (Kirby, 2013, 95).

An understanding of the role of hegemonic masculinity in war rape has proven to be
quintessential to the overarching narrative of the problems I have raised. As is apparent to me at
this point, hegemonic masculinity is tied heavily to the militarization of masculinity discussed in
the previous section. The dominance of the social structures we call gender go far beyond simply
expectations of how to act in society. They dominate our actions, and our understandings of the
very same actions. Moreover, it should be clear that not only do hegemonic gender roles dominate our politics, locally and internationally, but they are political in their very nature, as they are a demonstrable form of power relation.

Masculine and feminine notions are concepts that rely on power balance between them by their very nature. These terms have been traditionally connected to the two sexes, as it was assumed gender always corresponded with biology. In actual fact sex denotes biology and body parts, whereas gender is the part of an identity that corresponds with notions of masculine and feminine. Masculinity and femininity are also attributed to many actions and attitudes that humans exhibit. As such, they have become a paradigm by which we identify ourselves and each other. Many rely on their comfortable understanding of their own femininity or masculinity to define who they are in the world, but in doing so we all perpetuate this dominance of these concepts, and in this we project our own understandings onto one another.

It is in this projection that militaries exist within masculine normativity. The reliance on traditional masculine traits becomes the norm for militaries, and in turn militaries themselves behave en masse within the expected frameworks of masculine expectations. As soldiers are trained to exist more and more heavily within a framework of traditional masculinity, which contains within itself the dominance of the feminine, it can be no surprise that soldiers commit acts of rape. Eileen Zurbriggen concludes that “as long as there continues to be a need (real or perceived) for soldiers and war, rape can never be eliminated” (Zurbriggen, 2010, 545). She notes that this is distressing because all developed societies continue to value state security first above all else, and consequently place their faith very highly in the infrastructure of institutions of war in order to achieve peace and security. I suggest that although this pattern is indeed
disturbing and overwhelmingly entrenched in most of global society, we do have the tools to change our situation.

V. “Demilitarizing” Masculinity

It is without a doubt at this point in my analysis that the underlying social structure of hegemonic masculinity is highly connected to sexual violence in war. It encompasses our traditional values of what makes men “men,” but fails to fully answer that question. This question was a driving force behind my research, as I found it quite alien that concepts that seemed so natural to some men were so conflicted in my mind. A culture that celebrates violence does not resonate with me, nor does competition or dominance. On the other hand, I found it repugnant that concepts I valued in myself or in people in general could be seen as gendered. I refer to ideas such as independence or logical thinking, neither of which I had previously thought to be masculine or gendered.

Moreover, I have always placed a high value on developing a strong emotional intelligence, but did not see this as exclusive to other traits in myself. I saw them as interconnected, and not in terms of an oppositional relationship, as are concepts of masculine and feminine. I suppose now that this means I have always rejected traditional masculinity as a driving force in my life.

Choosing to investigate sexual violence was choosing to look into the most unrelatable concept from my perspective, as it was beyond my comprehension to how it could exist, especially on such large scales. Lisa S. Price assures us that “a common response to egregious violence, especially sexual violence, is incomprehension” (Price, 2001, 211), thus confirming that I am probably not anomalous.
Sexual violence in war is dependent on many factors, not the least of which is hegemonic masculinity. It seems overwhelmingly the case that we must challenge the assumptions of gender that dominate our society if we hope to remedy this problem, although there must remain an emphasis on the importance of the actions of individuals. We can see that sexual violence exists as a by-product of the overarching structure of gender; however addressing it presents a whole new challenge.

Maya Eichler (2014) addresses the militarized nature of masculinity. We use the term “militarized masculinity,” to explain the gendered nature of war, and how traits we associate with masculinity are necessary for war. Indeed this fits with much of the research examined within the scope of this thesis thus far. However, “militarized masculinity” has contained within the term itself an important clue. The choice of phrasing has “militarized” as an adjective, modifying “masculinity,” the subject. The inherent suggestion is that masculinity can exist in other forms, and although this has already been apparent in the works of Connell, it is Eichler’s suggestion of demilitarizing masculinity that holds the most promise for actual change.

The necessity for amelioration of war rape has been emphasized throughout this thesis, but Eichler narrows it down to one specific change. Her suggestions for action on this front include a rejection of this militarization by men. She suggests men become active in peace movements. Moreover she cites Miriam Schroer-Hippel in suggesting that a responsibility for demilitarization be placed on peace initiatives by promoting “multiple acceptable ways to be a man, reduce gender hierarchies, and demilitarize masculinity.” This must be accomplished by challenging gender dichotomies and hierarchies, and by denying privilege to “militarized or masculinized experiences, such as those of male veterans” (Eichler, 2014, 89).
It is difficult to simply suggest things like these be emphasized or encouraged without an idea of how this is supposed to unfold. Moreover, the initial criticism that rises to the surface is that this relies heavily on essentialism of men in general. It is a view that simply states men doing something different will effect change. I take issue, as it seems likely that men involved in security professions would cite peace as their ultimate goal, albeit within the structure of state security apparatus. This can be seen as paradoxical, but the situation exists nonetheless.

On top of this, Eichler’s suggestion that we reduce the valorization of activities related to soldiers or veterans approaches the issue from the wrong direction. If anything, the valorization of such activities by society is a by-product of the status quo of hegemonic masculinity. Moreover, it is crucial to remember the significance of how concepts of gender are embedded within people’s ways of self-identifying. With this in mind, I see it as likely that we valorize the soldier because we see soldiers as necessary. Moreover, they are in fact real people with families and friends. I find it unlikely that a mourning family will do anything but valorize a fallen family member. It also seems more likely from a broader perspective that society as a whole will rationalize the actions of soldiers by celebrating them as heroes, as the alternative relies on a release of values of national security.

Indeed, Eichler’s suggestions are easy to criticize as too simple, but at the same time, she hits an important note of truth. First of all, she couples the need for demilitarizing masculinity with the “demilitarization of femininities that support militarized masculinities—be they patriotic mothers, loyal military wives, or female soldiers” (Eichler, 2014, 89). This connects the traditional acts of peace activism as they already exist to the disruption of militarized gender roles. This frames her other suggestions within a realistic context.
Zurbriggen suggests alternatively that a compartmentalization model of training soldiers may disrupt traditional training regimens. This suggestion is that soldiers be trained in self defense or group defense instead of aggressive tactics, and so fight only when necessary. Along with this, they should be trained to be “gentlemen” in all other aspects of behaviour (Zurbriggen, 2010, 545). Although this suggestion is clearly gendered in itself, Zurbriggen’s thesis was especially grim in suggesting that it is unlikely we will convince the world at large not to fight wars, and so her idea of compartmentalization works within the existing frameworks.

To suggest that soldiers be taught to be gentlemanly relies on gendered notions, both that soldiers are masculine and that soldiers are protectors. However, this suggestion works within the notion of change embedded within the concept of hegemonic masculinity. As Connell’s definition called it the “currently accepted” model of the masculine norm, Zubriggen is basically suggesting the changing of accepted masculinity. This is an important first step, and Zurbriggen attributes the real world application of techniques such as these to the reduction of sexual violence in conflict, but admits that it might not always work well. Sexual violence, as she points out, continues to be prevalent in all branches of the US military.

Both Eichler (2014) and Zurbriggen (2010) emphasize the connections between gender, war, and rape in war. As Eichler concludes, “we need to acknowledge that men and masculinities are militarized, not inherently militaristic. The link between militarism and men is socially made rather than biologically given” (Eichler, 2014, 90), a suggestion I find most gratifying at the end of this thesis. I find in this the validation of my own standpoint, as well as hope for change. Indeed, Eichler suggests that the diversity and changing nature of these ideas are of importance in our effort to overcome the problems that come with them. This fits with my interpretation of hegemonic masculinity as changing.
R. W. Connell cites the work *On War* by Carl von Clausewitz in defining war as “a social technology of rationalized violence on the largest scale possible” (Connell, 1995, 192). Indeed war could be seen as a social construction based on the conclusions listed herein, of the existence of war being based on the emergence of current hegemonic masculinity. In emphasizing certain traits of humanity, we created a system by which political actions on that scale were not only possible, but inevitable. As society became more organized on an international level, bureaucratic institutionalisation of masculine notions allowed for war to exist on the scale we saw in the twentieth century. As Connell notes, “fascism was a naked reassertion of male supremacy in societies that had been moving toward equality for women” (Connell, 1995, 193). The triumph over fascism changed the course of hegemonic masculinity in that century and led us to the point we are at now.

When I began this path of research, I did not expect my understanding of war rape to become so dependent on an understanding of war itself, but I cannot help to land at a similar point of conclusion as Zurbriggen. If I am suggesting that war rape occurs because of entrenched notions of masculinity, then it has become too clear that war exists as such a frequent occurrence for the same reason. The role of soldiers in raping was the first way I looked at this problem, but it became increasingly clear that there were more and more levels to investigate. I felt overwhelmed by the scope of what I had opened up.

Nevertheless, the overwhelming nature of the frequency of rape in war pushed me onward and I believe this line of inquiry to be very important, as this is a problem we should be able to solve. Just as the scholarship around the subject seems to indicate, I was motivated by an overall distaste for violence.
Tickner’s (1992) piece describes the Women’s International Peace Conference in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, in 1985. She tells us that there were many disagreements based on the perspectives brought to the conference by people from all over the world. These differences were due to many socio-economic factors and were reflective not only of differences in priority, but also of different ways of looking at the problems in question. Put simply, “Western middle class women” were concerned with nuclear war, whereas “Third World women” were more concerned with “structural violence associated with imperialism, militarism, racism, and sexism.” Essentially there were divisions within the meeting that prioritized security different and disagreed on what problems needed to be addressed. Most importantly though, Tickner notes that “all agreed that security meant nothing if it was built on others’ insecurity” (Tickner, 1992, 54, 55).

I highlight this, because it represents a relational opposite to the traditional notion of the zero-sum game in the security dilemma posed by realist scholars of International Relations. The idea that an entire conference could agree that security for all is the only true security flies in the face of the conventional understanding of security. This highlights a positive hope for me, and it demonstrates why security has been re-conceptualized by feminists in the field of International Relations.

With a deeper understanding of the concepts discussed in this thesis, I believe humanity as a whole can greatly reduce rape in war, but it seems to be inevitable that a reduction in war itself would come with any proposed solutions. Tickner suggests that the concept of citizen defender might come to replace the traditional warrior patriot ideal (Tickner, 1992, 60). Indeed, Tickner seems optimistic about the possibility for change in the nature of security in the world,
with the primary mechanism for change being the conversation. It is by bringing to light these imbalances inherent to “gender” that we can truly address these problems.

In this thesis I have discussed the state of sexual violence in war, as it exists on seemingly as large a scale as war itself. It is a dominant (and somewhat accepted) occurrence in the existence of war, although we have rapidly changed the way we look at and prosecute such occurrences. I discussed several examples leading from the twentieth century up to the current time.

I then examined the concepts of gender that exist in society and relate them to war and soldiers. I found that our concepts of masculinity relate quite heavily to features commonly attributed to war, like aggression, independence or dominance. However, as Maya Eichler phrases it, I find that “militarism and masculinism reinforce each other” (Eichler, 2014, 90).

I then explored deeper into this concept to see how this conclusion could help explain the connection between militarism and rape. Again, I found that hegemonic masculinity was heavily connected to the existence of this phenomenon. It is a deeply entrenched societal structure that allows such a thing to carry on.

Finally I conclude by examining some suggestions for change. Primarily the concept of disconnecting masculinity entirely from militarism seems impossible to entirely achieve, but the fact that any hegemony has an undercurrent of change within it suggests the possibility for hijacking the dominant notions of masculinity for the achievement of certain goals related to emancipation. This freeing of ourselves from the gender structure that society is embroiled within is only possible by subverting the direction of the change itself. The further involvement of women in the process seems to point toward a better future, but mostly it is important to detach from what we – specifically men like me – think we know about masculinity, femininity,
war, and peace. We can conceive of a better world only by working as one and, in particular, by subverting hegemonic understandings of masculinity.
References Cited


Additional References


