REVEALING PALESTINE:

GENDER, RACE, AND ACTIVISM AFTER THE SECOND INTIFADA

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Abstract

The long history of Palestinian women working for social change, including women’s rights, peaked during the first Palestinian popular uprising (Intifada, 1987-1993) and continued through the second, or Al-Aqsa, Intifada. In this research project and thesis I sought to investigate some of the characteristics of the current period, after the end of the Al-Aqsa Intifada; specifically, what are some of the opportunities for and barriers to social change? Gendered division of labour within activist groups was also investigated. Research was conducted with nine research participants – six active Palestinian women and three men, living in Israel and the West Bank. Analysis is qualitative and in-depth, personal and political. Results focus on spatial barriers that create and reinforce racial and gendered systems of control, and women’s multiple approaches to layered oppression. Results also highlight ‘invisibility’ as a tool of spatial systems of control.
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1. **Introduction: Gender in revolution**

Authors such as Frances Hasso and Julia Peteet have researched and written about the significant impacts that participation in the Palestinian struggle had for women’s lives during and following the first Intifada. Fadwa Al Labadi has written about gender dynamics during the Second Intifada, in her 2003 article “Palestinian women's emancipation and the uprising for independence.” In what follows, my intention is to contextualize my research in this body of literature while investigating the period following the Al-Aqsa Intifada, connecting with the narratives of some of the specific everyday experiences of a number of engaged individuals.

This project is rooted in an interest in exploring some of the mechanisms of social change that can be effected through grassroots social movements, civil society, and/or activism. In particular, I am interested in the ways that grassroots work by Palestinians (women and men) has influenced gender relations and the social position of women within various segments of Palestinian society; that is, how and in what ways non-state-sanctioned social movements or the actions of civil societies can be tools for movement building, or a catalyst, toward women’s liberation. To that end, I have explored some questions (below) addressing women’s grassroots liberation organizing in the post-Al-Aqsa Intifada period. This project is concerned with grassroots organizing, by which I am referring to civil society activity primarily initiated and carried out by the people, as distinguished from initiatives coming from power structures such as governmental or corporate bodies. Initially, I had intended to address grassroots organizing as distinct from “peace process” (officially sanctioned) work; the two types differ widely in approaches, governmental and Western endorsement, media coverage, organizational type, and goals.
However, I discovered that the two types of work are not mutually exclusive. I am using the term “national liberation organizing” in a general way to refer to the struggle for human rights for Palestinians (mostly though not exclusively by Palestinians) and to distinguish from women’s rights organizations, which during my research several people assumed was what I meant. Though again the two are not mutually exclusive; women’s rights are human rights.

Palestinians are dispersed into various populations – generations of refugees, other Diaspora, internally displaced persons, and Israeli citizens; for my thesis work, I focused on women’s political activities and/or civil society involvement within Israel-Palestine, including internally-displaced/refugee Palestinians and citizens of Israel. I investigated some of the opportunities and barriers to grassroots political involvement and the public sphere that exist among Palestinian activist women; the gendered and specific social and legal mechanisms of change and suppression of change, cultural specifics and commonalities, and bases of solidarity and division. I recruited some men as participants as well as women, so as to facilitate comparisons in terms of gender, perspective, and experience. In my analysis, I reference (compare and contrast) my own experiences in Palestinian solidarity activism as a non-Palestinian woman in Canada.

This project is limited to a sample of experiences shared by a small number of activists with varying backgrounds. While the results will not constitute a broad representation of experiences, analysis is qualitative and in-depth, personal and political. The study is further limited to the current period (participants’ length of involvement), as one point in the historical context of the Palestinian struggle. The current context is
characterized by being after the Second, or Al-Aqsa, Intifada, and following the assault on Gaza (though I do not propose to conduct research in or near Gaza, the events have had effects on Palestinian advocacy worldwide). The current period is also marked by increased political party divisions and polarization within the Palestinian population, which many view as a continuation of a ‘divide and rule’ strategy in Israeli policy.³ Research was completed before the advent of the series of revolts in the Middle East referred to in the media as the “Arab Spring.” The Arabic word ‘intifadah’ translates as ‘the shaking off,’ and refers to the increased periods of civil society activity and resistance – recognizable stages of social movement. The last Intifada began in September 2000.

1.1. Research topics

The following are the topics I had proposed to focus on during the research project in regards to gendered anti-colonial activism in Palestine.

1.1.1. Opportunities

Elucidating opportunities, as well as barriers to activism and change, constituted the main focus of my investigation and continue to present many questions for me. Women were very active within and alongside the first Intifada in Palestine. Frances Hasso argues that not only did women play significant political roles in the Intifada; they “moreover… frequently narrate[d] their own often subversive stories about national and gender identities,” and she states that an “assessment of women’s national involvement should situate them simultaneously as actors, symbols, and authors – using, being used by, and constructing nationalism on their own terms.”⁴ In addition, a higher level of
women’s political involvement – and increased levels of political imprisonment – continued in the period following the Intifada, and Hasso argues in a later article that women’s political involvement spawned a “‘feminist generation’ that is differentiated by a gender-egalitarian ideology and high sense of self-efficacy.” On the other hand, as Fadwa Al Labadi writes, the emergence of a women’s movement within the national struggle “failed to raise women's specific social concerns,” and during the Second Intifada women may have become de-politicized to an extent. Keeping the recent and historical contexts in mind, I sought to explore how opportunities for women’s struggle may or may not arise for women, following the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

1.1.2. Barriers to women’s and Palestinian activism

What kinds of real and metaphorical roadblocks do women encounter as Palestinians, and as solidarity activists? How do different sources of barriers – the state of Israel and other institutions of power – compare in method and in their discourses? What strategies do women use to negotiate with power?

In my experiences with activism in Toronto and Nova Scotia, I have found that barriers to contested topics (such as Palestinian solidarity organizing) while sometimes quite overt, are often concealed, insidious and/or decentralized, rather than, say, involving population control or military responses. For instance, in Canada, direct and indirect barrier roles have at certain times been taken up more often by Zionist (see sec. 2) organizations and university administrations than by governmental bodies. This is done, for example, by attempting to (and sometimes succeeding) in shutting down student-organized events and mislabeling the events as anti-Semitic or partisan (i.e. as pro-
As a woman and activist, I have sometimes found myself frustratingly excluded from planning processes in male-dominated groups. And as a White-passing (for more information see section 4.1.4., Self-location), Canadian-born activist, I have not had to experience some other barriers such as fear of deportation or surveillance. In terms of mainstream perceptions, discourses surrounding women and public activities in Canada view women’s status as being largely unproblematic and having already achieved equality. In the highly-contrasting Israel-Palestine context, how are the study participants’ experiences different and similar? What are the challenges and discourses?

1.1.3. **Division of labour and power**

Mary Beth Ginter, in her thesis on “Campus Activism: Studying Change as it is Being Created; Gender, the Internet and Organizational Structure in a Student Anti-Sweatshop Group” writes about the gendered perceptions of power within a student activist group in an American context. She found that there were different kinds of power for men and women; there were greater numbers of men, who were more regular members, more vocal, and who took on core and/or leadership roles much more quickly than the women. The men also displayed a lack of understanding of gender-based analysis of problems. Women, on the other hand, participated in smaller numbers, but did most of the work. They were perceived as leaders by non-group members, but were not considered to be in power within the group; they also set agendas but their opinions were not taken as seriously. Both men and women felt that as members of a militant, leftist group, issues like sexism did not apply; that they were above such societal downfalls. I was curious to find out how such issues may play out differently and similarly in a
Palestinian context – how gender and power might be informed for activists within Israel-Palestine, from the point of view of the participants.

I was curious about what kinds of work active Palestinian women tend to be involved in, and how this may be informed by gender discourse and social expectations. In the North American context, it is common, though not the rule, for politically active women to be more involved in ‘busy work’ or other activities characterized as most appropriate for women,¹² which is often realized from within women’s auxiliary groups, secondary to the main, male-dominated groups. How does the Palestinian context compare; how are the discourses and practices around ‘women’s work’ similar and different?
2. Literature review and background

2.1. Palestine

Geographically, Palestinians are not currently a single group. Within the area under Israeli control, there are two areas under occupation in different ways, with Gaza under heavier military control compared to the West Bank. Additionally there are Palestinians living within the state of Israel who have Israeli citizenship, who are further classified. Helga Tawil-Souri writes that “Differentiating among Arab communities… has been a long-standing strategy of the Israeli state apparatus to segregate the Arab community and weaken its already minority status within the state.” The Diaspora, almost entirely made up of generations of refugees created through wars, expulsions, and subsequent emigration, lives in many countries. Perhaps half or more of the population of Jordan is made up of Palestinian refugees and their children and grandchildren, and there are many refugee camps that continue to exist throughout Lebanon. In addition, large numbers of Palestinians live in the Arabian Peninsula states and in many other countries around the world. Thus, groups of Palestinians have engaged in activism in countless locales. A fair amount of research has been published regarding the status of women, changing gender relations, and social movements (such as the two Intifadas) within Palestine as well as the refugee camps in Lebanon.

2.2. Background

Palestine came under British Mandate via the League of Nations in 1922, “an action that imposed a Western colonial and national mindset,” writes William A. Cook. Land acquisition by European Zionists had begun prior to the mandate, and by the late 1930's, the Jewish National Fund (JNF) had nearly completed an extensive and detailed
Zionism is a political and nationalist ideology based on group exceptionalism. Joseph Massad in a 2003 article further describes Zionism “as a colonial movement… constituted in ideology and practice by a religio-racial epistemology through which it apprχends itself and the world around it. This religio-racial grid informs and is informed by its colonial-settler venture.”18 Other definitions of Zionism exist; however, Massad’s is useful here as it focuses on the ideology and its history as distinct from the state of Israel itself; the present thesis is concerned more with human rights and related issues, rather than with the state of Israel (or pro- or anti-Israel positioning).

Zionism has its roots in the belief that the European Jewish population should be transferred to Palestine, that Palestine should be remodeled into Israel as a Jewish homeland and, more currently, that Israel is the “Jewish State.”19 Though Zionism forms the backbone of Israeli nationalism, Joseph Massad has traced the history to the rise of colonial-nationalist thought in Europe. Massad argues that Zionists and European anti-Semites shared the goal of eliminating Jewish populations:

Sharing a colonial project, the interests of European Jewish proponents of Zionism and its gentile advocates converges, leading to collaboration among them. The convergence of interests between Jewish and non-Jewish Zionists was a result of their shared views on anti-Semitism. Like European anti-Semites, Zionism viewed the presence of Jews among gentiles as the main cause for gentile anti-Semitism… the removal of Jews from gentile societies, that is, from Europe [was] a solution long advocated by anti-Semitic Christian Zionists. Removing Jews… and ‘normalizing’ them by creating a state for them would be, the Zionists argued, the only way to end anti-Semitism. Thus, Zionism and anti-Semitism had a unified goal – the removal of Jews from Europe – which became the basis for their shared imperial vision.20
He further writes about Zionism’s evolution to the present day:

It is important also to analyze the racial dimension of Zionism in its current manifestation, which is often elided. While Zionism in its early history presented itself unashamedly as a colonial-settler movement, it later insisted that it was nothing less than a Jewish national liberation movement which could even be viewed as ‘anticolonial.’

Massad argues however that the roots of nationalist exceptionalism lie in Christian Europe:

What Zionism remained un-ashamed about throughout its history… was its commitment to building a demographically exclusive Jewish state modeled after Christian Europe – a notion pervaded, as the following will illustrate, by a religio-racial epistemology of supremacy over the Palestinian Arabs, not unlike that used by European colonialism with its ideology of white supremacy over the natives. More recent debates about a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli ‘conflict’ rarely, if ever, discuss the question of racial supremacy.

In the present thesis, Zionism will refer to the contemporary ideology and its effects vis-à-vis human rights issues:

It is no longer contested, even among many Israelis, that the impact of Zionism on the Palestinian people in the last one hundred years includes: the expulsion of a majority of Palestinians from their lands and homes, the prevention of their return, and the subsequent confiscation of their property.

The colonial project was officially set in motion by the British government’s Balfour Declaration. Israeli historian Ilan Pappe writes that “Britain’s Mandate charter for Palestine… included, wholesale, the 1917 Balfour Declaration and, with it, Britain’s promise to the Zionist movement to secure a ‘homeland’ for the Jews in Palestine.” Meanwhile and previously, Palestinians were pursuing the right of self-determination that was promised by the mandate system after World War I.
During the 23 years following the Balfour Declaration, the Jewish population in Palestine increased from 11% to 31% via legal and illegal immigration (during the same period, the Muslim population saw growth from approximately 760,000 to over 1 million, but a drop in percentage from 78 to 60%. There was also a Christian minority). In 1947 the British government relinquished control of Palestine to the United Nations for resolution by the Special Committee on Palestine. Ilan Pappe writes that David Ben-Gurion already had a plan for Palestine in place by 1947, “Plan Dalet” (“Plan D”), which “called for their [Palestinians’] systematic and total expulsion from their homeland.”

The UN General Assembly Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947, known as the Partition Plan, proposed a two-state solution for Palestine: liberal democracies with economic federation, with the exception of Jerusalem as an international city administered by the UN. Pappe argues that

It is clear that… the UN totally ignored the ethnic composition of the country’s population. Had the UN decided to make the territory the Jews had settled on in Palestine correspond with the size of their future state, they [sic] would have entitled them to no more than ten percent of the land. But the UN accepted the nationalist claims the Zionist movement was making for Palestine and, furthermore, sought to compensate the Jews for the Nazi Holocaust in Europe. As a result, the Zionist movement was ‘given’ a state that stretched over more than half the country.

The Palestinian leaders boycotted the UN proceedings, on the principle of being an indigenous population refusing to relinquish their country to a “settler community.”

The Nakba (the “catastrophe” of 1948) was carried out between December 1947 and May 1948 by Zionist forces and organizations. Among other events, the Nakba involved violent “show[s] of force,” sniping, acts of terror, assaults on Palestinian towns, “emptying” of towns, and massacres including the infamous Deir Yassin
Massacre, committed against Palestinian civilians. Large numbers of people fled the violence,\textsuperscript{35} believing they would soon return. The Jewish Agency declared the state of Israel in May 1948, and the state was quickly recognized by the USA and USSR.\textsuperscript{36}

According to Al-Awda-The Palestine Right to Return Coalition, 34 massacres were documented. Al-Awda estimates that 531 Palestinian towns and villages were destroyed – about fifty percent, and several additional Palestinian cities were cleared of inhabitants. Approximately 13,000 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces and an additional 737,166 Palestinians became refugees through forced evictions.\textsuperscript{37}

Many refugees experienced violence and displacement again in the war of 1967, when Israel began its ongoing occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Robert Bowker cites an estimate that 323,000 refugees were created or re-created in 1967 (this figure includes 113,000 second-time refugees from the events of 1948).\textsuperscript{38} Al-Awda estimates that there are presently 834,000 refugees and their descendants as a result of the 1967 war (includes population growth).\textsuperscript{39}

Al-Awda claims that “one in three refugees worldwide is Palestinian.” The organization estimates that there are 7.2 million Palestinian refugees, more than 4.3 million of whom are registered with the UN, and an additional 355,000 internally-displaced Palestinians (displaced within present-day Israel). Destroyed villages have been systematically built and planted over, and hidden by park lands.\textsuperscript{40}
2.3. Pre-Intifada

In contrast to mass media stereotypes of Middle Eastern women as passive victims lacking agency, women's activism and/or popular resistance in Palestine, though operating both within and against patriarchal structures, is widespread, not without precedent, and pre-dates academic literature on the topic.

The history of the Palestinian women’s movement dates back to at least the 1920’s. In her 2003 book *The Nation and Its 'New' Women: The Palestinian Women's Movement 1920-1948*, Ellen L. Fleischmann writes that although women's activities were well reported in local media at the time, they were mostly absent in historical literature until the early 2000's. Fleischmann's historical work, which links the pre-1948 women's movement with nationalism, colonialism, and Third World feminism, describes and analyses women's emergence into the public sphere well before the more commonly recognized wave of public emergence during the first Intifada that began in 1987. Julie Peteet also says, in “Women and the Palestinian Movement: No Going Back?” that it began in the 1920's, though Nabila Espanioly states that Palestinian women have a history of more than 100 years of activism.

Fleishmann cites Rosemary Sayigh's plea to build the body of historical literature in her 1987 article “Femmes Palestiniennes: Une histoire en quête d'historiens” (Palestinian women: a story in search of historians) as Fleischmann's inspiration for her book, quoting that there is a “vast disparity between the long, rich history of Palestinian women's involvement in the national struggle of their people and the writing of this history.” Sayigh explains that although historical works were lacking, there was a vast
quantity of material available that dealt with the topic of the women's movement directly and indirectly in the form of unedited archives, press reports, family archives, photographs, inaccessible published sources, and oral sources.48

Peteet writes that the movement became “dispirited” between 1948-1963 in the wake of the Nakba and resulting fragmentation of Palestinian society, started to regroup in 1960 with the establishment of the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) under the banner of the PLO.49 During this time, one of the major roles of women activists was “mass work,” a term that encompassed a variety of social welfare roles and political mobilization; in this, women were a majority.50

2.4. First Intifada

Authors such as Frances Hasso and Julia Peteet have researched and written about the significant impacts that participation in the Palestinian struggle had for women’s lives during and following the first Intifada,51 1987-1992. Women's roles were central to the uprising. Al Labadi writes:

The momentum of the national resistance movement pushed many women and women’s organizations to the forefront of the national struggle. The first uprising in 1987 provided the impetus for Palestinian women’s activities in the process of women’s politicization and socialization... Women’s participation in street actions provided a basis and a model for new types of popular committees that included mass-based organizations.52

In addition to political demonstrations, women’s roles included protecting boys and young men, confronting soldiers - often to rescue sons or others’ sons - and stone-throwing. Gender roles and “the division between combatants and non-combatants” were more “fluid” partly because the struggle was not limited to ‘borders’ but occurred within
the community and home – “clear sexual division in war… usually disappears when there is no clear difference between ‘battlefront’ and ‘homefront.’”⁵³

The women’s movement experienced another crisis in the intervening years between the Intifadas, in the wake of the occupation and Oslo “peace process.” As well, the period was marked by self-criticism for falling short of ambitions.⁵⁴ There was significant effort to re-orient the movement toward greater independence from the national struggle – “using the rudder of ‘women’s interests first.’”⁵⁵

2.5. Second Intifada

The Second, or Al-Aqsa Intifada, began in September 2000. Compared with the first, the Al-Aqsa Intifada was characterized by a higher degree of violence toward Palestinian civilians,⁵⁶ as well as a much higher level of violent resistance, which alienated many women activists.

Gender dynamics during the Second Intifada are examined by Fadwa Al Labadi, in her 2003 article “Palestinian women's emancipation and the uprising for independence,”⁵⁷ and by Penny Johnson and Eileen Kuttab in their 2001 article “Where Have All the Women (and Men) Gone? Reflections on Gender and the Second Palestinian Intifada.”

The widely-reported trigger for the outbreak of the revolt was then-member of parliament (later prime minister) Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa mosques. Although the reasons for revolting ran much deeper, Sharon’s visit was not an insignificant act. Nabila Espanioly, a Palestinian Israeli author and activist, writes,
“Seeing Sharon... enter al-Aqsa... with his entourage of protectors harmed not only the feelings of Muslims among us Palestinians, but all of us – Christian, Muslim, and secular (like myself).” Moreover, the visit was more political than religious, and 'the political is personal;' politics may be a pastime for groups of privilege, but for subaltern groups like Palestinians it is daily life, because an oppressor group that has defined itself as separate wields power over one's freedom. Espanioly writes that Sharon's act “was intended to provoke, intended to deliver the political message 'we are the power, and it is we who decides what belongs to us.'” There were many demonstrations the following day, which the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) tried to suppress violently.

Importantly, the Camp David talks had failed just a few months previously. The Palestinian leadership had been confronted with a final American proposal that would have meant large forfeits on almost every front and acceptance of situations counter to international law, such as the right of return for refugees and colony dismantlement.

The underlying reason for the revolt was the entrenchment of the occupation. Avram Borenstein summarizes four of the processes that were part of this development and which precipitated the second spike in the Palestinian movement: closures and checkpoints between the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and Israel, the growth of checkpoints within the OPT that increasingly separated population areas into bantustans, the rapid and illegal expansion of Jewish Israeli settlers and settlements within the OPT, and the increasing violence, theft and vandalization of land by settlers against the population. Soon after the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel began construction of the separation barrier, also known in state propagandist terms as the...
‘security fence,’ and by many activists as the ‘apartheid wall’ (regarding use of the term ‘apartheid,’ please see section 6.2.). The wall is perhaps the most visible tool of separation, though it also creates invisibility. At eight metres in height, the wall is twice as tall as the Berlin Wall. It is over 800 kilometres long but is under constant construction (change) and is for the most part on the West Bank side of the Green Line. The wall not only serves to “incarcerate” the Palestinian population but also “radically constricts the flow of population (and goods).” There is also a separation barrier surrounding Gaza. Checkpoints and various kinds of physical barriers also divide people and control movement for Palestinians.

The nature of women’s activism changed during the Al-Aqsa Intifada compared with the first. Women’s roles included care for family and community members, participation in funerals, trying to keep their sons safe, and support roles for demonstrations. Women were less involved in confrontations and direct resistance in the more militarized, less community-based Second Intifada compared with the first. Furthermore, Al Labadi argues that women were actively depoliticized by the male élite who “encouraged the marginalization of Palestinian women and promoted the ‘defeminization’ of Palestinian political activity.”

The Intifada was not geographically confined to Palestine, but was also reflected in a growth in activity of international Palestinian solidarity. At its beginning, I was entering the third year of my undergraduate in Middle Eastern Studies in Toronto. The following September, Palestine solidarity activism was both overshadowed and reinforced as massive anti-war activities got underway, in the period leading up to the attacks on Iraq.
and Afghanistan. Israeli Apartheid Week started as an initiative of the Arab Students’ Collective at the University of Toronto in 2005 and quickly grew into its current form, a well-organized international series of events held yearly in several cities, such as film festivals and public talks.

2.6. Current period

Certainly much has changed since the 1980’s. Fleischmann\textsuperscript{70} writes that in her research experience, there was a general lack of awareness about women's involvement, even among Palestinians, and that during her study, contacts would refer her to men instead of women. Non-Palestinians would respond “I didn't know there was [a Palestinian women's movement].” Although there are no identical experiences, mine has been somewhat different: I have found that most Westerners tend to lack awareness of Palestinian realities, but have a general impression of Middle Eastern women as stereotypically passive and overly domestic. However, among Palestinians, everyone I have had contact with has been highly aware of women's involvement. During my research project, several men were particularly proud of ‘their’ (“our,” i.e., Palestinian) women; perhaps this pride is meant to serve as 'proof' (to a Westerner like myself) against stereotypes surrounding Arabs and gender.

I would like to contextualize my research in this body of literature and investigate the current period, while connecting with the narratives of some of the specific everyday experiences of a number of engaged individuals.
3. Theoretical perspectives

3.1. Background

I was involved in Palestinian activism in Toronto and in Halifax for several years. During my undergraduate studies, I began with a major in International Relations (IR), which, in my opinion, offered a limited perspective on the actual workings of politics in the world. In particular, I felt that IR’s dominant framework blinded itself to many of the realities of political change. Dominant IR paradigms view the world as made up of nation-states that are fairly uniform in population and which move around and ‘bounce’ off each other, depending on the forces at the ‘top’ – militaries, leaders, and so on. IR theoretical frameworks are problematic in that “they are,” in the words of Noam Chomsky, “substantially refuted by the facts,”71 as well as willfully ignorant of popular or grassroots politics in most circumstances. When I began my second major, in Middle Eastern Studies, I encountered perspectives among some of the professors in the department that contrasted greatly with those in the field of IR. I began learning about different kinds of social movements (class, national, urban, rural, women’s) – a kind of approach that does not seem to have a space in IR theory. I began to discover the importance of influences from the ‘bottom up’ – the grassroots. During this time I started to think about gender, and about how the position of and attitudes toward women seems to change as a result of social movements. I started to notice a trend – that there appear to be many differences between grassroots activism or movement from the ‘bottom up’ on the one hand, and state-sponsored movements on the other. The two Palestinian Intifadas, the Algerian Revolution, and the Kurdish national movement could be examples of the first, and the Turkish national movement and social changes promoted by the Shah of Iran.
prior to the 1978-79 revolution\textsuperscript{72} examples of the latter. It seemed to me that social movements and non-state-sanctioned civil society also exhibited a strong tendency toward change in the direction of women’s liberation, to the extent that women’s movements sometimes took place alongside the ‘main’ action, while state-sponsored changes resulted in more circumscribed roles for women, diminished status, and the use of the image of ‘woman’ as a tool in nation building, regardless of the presence of state-sponsored ‘feminism’ and/or Westernization policies.

3.1.1. \textit{Feminism and Orientalism}

Beginning in 2007 as a student of Women and Gender Studies at Saint Mary’s University I have had the opportunity to explore feminist theoretical frameworks. During this learning process it has become more clear to me that as a feminist from the ‘West,’ I must make genuine efforts to avoid perpetuating ‘feminist’ Orientalism. Edward W. Said partly defines Orientalism as

\begin{quote}
a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident.’ …the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories [and]… social descriptions… concerning the Orient, its people, customs, ‘mind,’ destiny, and so on.\textsuperscript{73}
\end{quote}

It is imperative to explore Orientalism as a discourse in order to “understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient.”\textsuperscript{74} Some aspects of the complex relationship between Orientalism critiques and feminist studies are explored by Lila Abu-Lughod in a 2001 article.\textsuperscript{75} Western feminists have tended to employ a Eurocentric, essentialist image of global women in the name of solidarity based on ‘sameness;’ a position that has been well
criticized. Middle Eastern and other ‘third-world’/‘postcolonial’ feminists have “challenged the hegemony of Western agendas by rejecting the construction of women as a unitary, global category… (the idea that sisterhood is global).”\textsuperscript{77} Conceiving of women in the terms of global unity has proven to be problematic because of the tendency of feminism originating from and specific to the interests of White, middle class Western women to “graft” itself as a “universalized picture” onto women in general, regardless of place of origin, class, culture, and other differences. However, the aspirations of non-Western feminists “do not necessarily coincide with the interests of feminist projects in Western states and women's movements.”\textsuperscript{78} In fact, many Middle Eastern women do not wish to self-identify as feminists because one of the differences in context between Western feminism, originating in a dominant culture/economy, and Middle Eastern ‘feminism’ is that in the latter, the struggle against patriarchy exists in tandem with indigenous and national struggles (please see sec. 3.2. and 3.3. for additional discussion regarding patriarchy, feminism, and cultural context). The Palestinian movement is one such struggle which has often seen the rejection of “norms and values perceived to originate from outside indigenous culture,” which could be considered to be “inauthentic forms of legitimization.”\textsuperscript{79}

3.1.2. \textit{Identity politics}

An opposite but similarly problematic concept is identity politics; a kind of solidarity based on difference from mainstream, powerful groups and on similarity with those identifying with or identified by specific markers such as race, sexuality, and so on as members of the in-group; for example, ‘Black feminists’ as different from ‘feminists.’ Identity politics and solidarities of difference can have useful aspects, such as the
formation of a medium for working to challenge “specific forms of oppression”\(^8^0\) and layered oppression, such as racism and/or homophobia and/or disability discrimination (among other kinds) in conjunction with patriarchy. Many Middle Eastern feminists have made use of the model of difference in order to claim independence from Western feminism.\(^8^1\)

However, specific identity solidarities are problematic on a number of fronts. Firstly, they reproduce and perpetuate the problem they seek to remedy, which is the exclusion of those who do not fit the markers of the in-group; Chris Weedon writes that “perhaps the main problem with identity politics is the tendency to define identity in particular fixed ways which ultimately work to exclude many of those women that the group in question wants to reach and represent.”\(^8^2\) In other words, no group can be made of uniform people, no matter which characteristics and standpoints are chosen as the basis for solidarity. Another problem is an epistemological one; the locations of subordinate knowledges are re-valued not inclusively, but in a simple reversal of the mainstream view, so that “in the 1980s,” identity politics came to be based on the “authenticity” idea that “…the more marginal the group, the more complete the knowledge.”\(^8^3\) A third way that the identity approach falls short is that the work of solidarity based on difference misses the target. As Heidi Safia Mirza explains:

The solution within this conceptualization of oppression was to change personal behavior rather than wider structures. In a time when what should be done was replaced by who we are… the freedom to have was replaced by the freedom to be… Identity politics offered no radical way forward.\(^8^4\)

In addition to themes of identity and difference originating in non-Western feminisms, Uma Narayan shows that the West has also imposed its “‘package picture’ of
cultures” upon the world, which neatly compartmentalizes and essentializes groups, viewing them as homogenous in their intents and aspirations. While this attitude has its roots in colonialism, it often persists in Western feminism. Narayan writes that although “many contemporary feminists are attuned to the problem of imposing Sameness on Other women, [many] fail to register that certain scripts of Difference can be no less problematic.” Such discourses are blind to differences within “packaged” cultures by assuming homogeneity within the group, as well as to strands of similarity between groups.

Subsequently, as the markers of identity that define the group may be set, to at least some degree, by the hegemonic group that the marginal group is attempting to challenge, it is problematic that identity politics often performs a simple reversal, reinforcing the classification system. To what degree do identity politics reproduce the “package picture?” For example, Weedon notes that it is racism that defines the classification of as well as the hierarchization of people based on skin colour, naming those of colour as inferior. So while it is necessary and useful to oppose hegemonic power on the grounds it defines, it is not the only way to do so. Thus, it is important to also break out and move beyond the classifications created by Power.

Finally, Jamie Mayerfeld has argued, convincingly in my view, that all types of group identities (such as nationalisms) are potentially dangerous. He postulates that by its nature, group identity increases the risk of acting in a harmful way (such as through violence) in the name of the group, through group justification of the personally unjustifiable.
Thus, identity politics, while useful to a certain extent, position fractured solidarity based on increasingly differentiated identities over a climate of collaboration, exclusion over inclusion, and authenticity over shared dialogue.

3.2. *Relational multicultural feminism*

Relational multicultural feminism (RMF) offers a framework with some potential for moving beyond the pitfalls of both Orientalist feminism and identity politics. In the work of Ella Shohat, she advances RMF as “A relational understanding of feminism… a nonfinalized and conjunctural definition of feminism as a polysemic site of contradictory positions,”[^89] a “multiperspectival approach” that would move among ideas and forge connections between spaces while avoiding a proselytizing, universalizing Western feminism as well as local feminisms that suffocate under cultural relativism.[^90] Moreover, “the project of relational multicultural feminism has to be situated historically and geographically as a set of contested practices.”[^91]

Shohat identifies an epistemological 'apart-ness' maintained by “disciplinary borders” and “conceptual boundaries”[^92] in Women’s Studies and Area/Ethnic/Postcolonial studies, in that women and gender issues that concern other-than-Western and White groups are normally isolated “within ghettoized and geographically defined discursive spaces such as area studies,”[^93] so that “the majority of women in the world can only be found in the margins of most curricula, fenced off into the Bantustans called area studies.”[^94] Western-based gender and sexuality studies, on the other hand, “can deploy a largely unconscious, nationalist exceptionalism,”[^95] or “a star-
striped nationalism with a tan, a nationalism in drag, a rainbow nationalism” that fails to recognize the relevance of its own group identity valuations.

In addition to knowledge ghettoizations based on geography and space, Shohat explains that time is often compartmentalized as well. For example, postcolonial studies privileges the previous two centuries, but she supports “grounding the discussion in a longer history of multiply located colonialisms and resistances, tracing the issues at least as far back as 1492.” Temporally-linked ruptures between feminist approaches from the Westernist context and the Middle East contribute to the further ghettoization of discourses.

As an antidote for these problems, Shohat advocates for the desegregation of knowledges and the creation of dialogical spaces and linkages between normally-segregated discourses, so that “illuminating dialogue” can be created between them. A relational multicultural feminist approach would resist cultural relativism and the separation of areas of study according to space and time and would instead attempt to view communities “in relation,” “stressing the horizontal and vertical links that thread communities and histories together in a conflictual network.” A RMF would operate by “linking, delinking, and relinking, at once spatially and temporally,” integrating that approach so that it “thus becomes part of adversary scholarship working against taboo formulations, policed identities, and censored affiliations.” This can be done, she argues, not by imagining equivalencies and sameness, but by examining how and in what ways communities “parallel and intersect, overlap and contradict, and analogize and allegorize one another” across time and geography. Shohat contends that RMF would
promote mutable and itinerant work “rather than lead us into immobility,” and that “such articulations of contradictions help us chart the conflictual positioning of women in the contemporary world.”\textsuperscript{103, 104}

In what follows, I attempt to link academic fields and spaces, through discussion of associations between gendered spaces, racialized spaces, and reproductions of these forms of power, control, and resistance in cyber space.

3.3. Article review

Deniz Kandiyoti’s article “Bargaining with Patriarchy”\textsuperscript{105} addresses women’s experiences with different forms of patriarchy in non-Western contexts, including the Middle East. “Bargaining with Patriarchy” makes a move against Western feminism’s sometimes harmful discourses, but is complicit in the equally imperialist tendency toward cultural ‘packaging.’

This article was an early (1988) move away from ‘sameness’ of women and toward recognition of difference of feminism and patriarchy. Kandiyoti stated in a later piece that in the time period leading up to the publication of “Bargaining with Patriarchy” only two main frameworks for feminist analysis were being employed; Marxist and radical feminist (and related frameworks), the proponents of which were concerned with “Capitalism and Patriarchy,” respectively. She also noted that the article had been a success because of “an instant recognition of the phenomena [she] was describing, especially on the part of [her] colleagues in the South,” but that the piece was “analytically flawed.”\textsuperscript{106} Despite its flaws, many of which I will discuss here, I think the basic premise of the article is useful.
In “Bargaining with Patriarchy,” Kandiyoti seeks to complicate the idea of patriarchy to work toward a “more culturally and temporarily grounded understanding of patriarchal systems,” so as to move toward an understanding of differences in women’s experiences of oppression by contextualizing differences of experience and discourse, as well as different strategies for working against patriarchy (what the author terms “bargaining”). Kandiyoti endeavors to translate meaning across cultural and geographic contexts, attempting in a broad way to “culturally and temporally” situate the system of power against which feminisms exist in struggle, illustrating how opening up feminist theory to a multiplicity of perspectives can lead to a greater understanding of patriarchal systems and women’s varied “strategies and coping mechanisms” within those systems.

The author problematizes the term ‘patriarchy’ in order to illustrate that it is not monolithic, but that it takes different forms and solicits different strategies of resistance, and in particular, that Western feminists’ conceptions of ‘patriarchy’ are not unquestionably applicable across all cultural and geographic contexts. Rather, “a more culturally… grounded understanding of patriarchal systems” would contribute to a greater understanding of women’s differences in experiences of oppression and choices.

The author compares two very broad geographical groupings; the “sub-Saharan African pattern” and “classic patriarchy,” which she suggests constitutes the dominant order of gender relations in the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia.

There are several noteworthy points in the article, such as an analysis of why when bargaining with patriarchy, rural women are often opposed to liberatory transition. She suggests that this is because the securities of “old normative order” are often not visibly or quickly replaced with “empowering alternatives.” However, in this section,
Kandiyoti ignores the possibility of reasons other than security for women to resist changes to gender norms, such as resisting influence from the West. This is most apparent when she discusses women under Khomeini who embraced veiling\textsuperscript{111} at a time when nationalist sentiment in Iran was highly opposed to perceived Western influences. It seems to me that this omission is due to a lack of understanding of the role of what Tami Amanda Jacoby terms “subordinate nationalisms” coexisting with women’s struggles in places such as Iran and Palestine; in societies under systemic forms of oppression, ‘men’ as a group are not perceived as the only source of oppression.\textsuperscript{112}

Another problematic point in “Bargaining with Patriarchy” is that while describing “classic patriarchy,” Kandiyoti displays some markings of a classic Orientalist in her approach to ‘knowing’ and speaking for the Other. The article essentializes women, particularly Muslims; she states at one point that she has not “exhaust[ed] the range of possible responses available to women,” and that her description represents the “ideal-typical,” but she does not explain her position well enough to avoid her general presentation of women and two types of patriarchy as uniform across countries, classes, ethnic groups, and so on.\textsuperscript{113} These two categorizes of patriarchal systems as presented by the author are very broad. In the first type is placed the Middle East, in which she includes Pakistan, actually part of South Asia; Turkey and Iran, all of which have very different histories of gender relations. Also included in the first type are South and East Asia, including India and China. Kandiyoti groups this massive area under a singular “ideal-typical” mode,\textsuperscript{114} for the purpose of contrasting it with the second type, patriarchy in sub-Saharan Africa.
Kandiyotı historicizes the Western context but constructs the rest of the world as existing in temporal stasis – even though the main thrust of the piece is an argument in favour of contextualization. The author presents Middle Eastern and Asian women as able to make one or two choices, while Western women are afforded much greater agency and diversity of thought and perception.\(^{115}\) In her concluding remarks, Kandiyotı implies that the contemporary situation in the Middle East and in South and East Asia are equivalent to the historical version of Western patriarchal structures.\(^ {116}\) It seems to me that article therefore suffers from an Orientalist treatment of ‘time.’ Authors such as Amanda Jacoby have shown how time is used in the construction of the Other, even within gender studies, by granting Western women historicization as a part of contextualization of agency but not extending that privilege to ‘Third World’ women, who are thus “either reified out of their socio-temporal context, or are regarded as wholly determined by their cultural and religious traditions.”\(^ {117}\) As discussed below (section 4.1.1.) Johannes Fabian argues that the ‘Third World’ is often constructed as Other through discourses of their contemporaries as somehow existing in a historical way, not in temporal synch with the ‘modern’ world,\(^ {118}\) and Moroccan feminist Fatema Mernissi discusses how such discourses are tools of neo-imperialism.\(^ {119}\)

“Bargaining with Patriarchy” is a feminist article that clearly makes an attempt to work from (or towards) a ‘Third World’ perspective, but the piece is also problematic from a ‘Third World’ perspective on a number of counts. While researching and writing, I have asked myself how I can eliminate such issues. One response to this question is that one should maintain a level of uncertainty, avoiding confidence that all problems can be eradicated, and that I must be continuously vigilant in minimizing the effects of
imperialist, totalizing, or otherwise Othering discourses in my work. One of the ways I can work on this is by learning more about Middle Eastern and other post-colonial feminist theories. I also wondered if the article could have been improved if the author had engaged in critical self-reflection and self-location, which she did not (some reflection took place in a later published interview\textsuperscript{120}). Barbara Fawcett and Jeff Hearn argue in their article that when researching others it is important for the researcher to use self-reflexivity and “an awareness of the social location of the author and the topic,” in addition to locating/contextualizing the subject of study, in order to avoid exploitation and Othering.\textsuperscript{121}

“Bargaining with Patriarchy” was a step in the right direction, in terms of attempting to complicate the perception of women, feminism, and patriarchal structures in non-Western contexts. However, there are also several problematic aspects of the piece, some of which I have discussed here. The article fails to take into account a major feature of contextualization that is highly relevant to post-colonial feminism: subordinate nationalist struggles; the author makes broad essentializations of women and patriarchal structures across geography, class, and so on; and historicization and agency is granted to Western women but not to ‘Third World’ women.

Another, more recent article (2006), “Headscarves and Porno-Chic: Disciplining Girls’ Bodies in the European Multicultural Society,”\textsuperscript{122} serves, in my view, as an example of relational multicultural feminist perspective and points to the kind of segregation critiqued by Ella Shohat. Co-authors Linda Duits and Liesbet van Zoonen seek to bring together and compare debates over women’s religious Islamic wear (hijab,
*neqab*, or *burqa*) and West-linked porno-chic clothing (‘sexualized’ fashion including belly shirts and visible undergarments). The two clothing styles had previously been discussed as separate issues, but Duits and van Zoonen juxtaposition the two debates, attempting to elucidate the links that exist and uncover their relationality. Both discourses relate to the issues of control over girls’ clothing, debates by authority structures over girls’ bodies, and denial of girls’ agency:

Despite the widely different appearance of girls wearing headscarves or porno-chic, both groups of girls are submitted to the meta-narratives of dominant discourse: the state, school, public opinion, parents and other social institutions ‘resignify’ their everyday practices as inappropriate.

The authors do not suggest that the two issues are the same, but that there are connections. In fact, there are several differences noted by the authors, such as the xenophobic and Islamophobic influences on the debate concerning the *hijab*.

By bringing together for analysis two discourses to which seemingly opposite groups of girls are subjected, the authors “demonstrate that… girls’ bodies… have become the metonymic location for many a contemporary social dilemma: of the multicultural society when it concerns the scarf; of feminism and public morality when it concerns porno-chic.” Duits and van Zoonen explain that the two issues, as well as men’s clothing choices, have all been considered as completely separate by the schools’ administrations and in popular discourse. Porno-chic wear is confined within gendered discursive spaces relating to sexuality, morality, and agency. Debates around the *hijab* on the other hand relate to ‘ethnic’ or ‘multicultural’ issues, with the gender aspects of the debate circumscribed under the discourses regarding the ‘ethnic’ Other: “multicultural excess” and European nationalism, religious practices of the Other, and perceptions of
gender inequality bounded up with racism and Orientalism. It is particularly telling that in the published academic debate about agency that this article spawned, Rosalind Gill appears to be very uncomfortable with the correlation of discourses made by Duits and van Zoonen. In Gill’s article, “Critical Respect: The Difficulties and Dilemmas of ‘Choice’ for Feminism,” she re-segregates the two issues by dealing with only the porno-chic debate for the main thrust of her arguments, defenestrating the ‘ethnic’ women’s issues out of the house of ‘real’ feminist debate (‘agency’ in this case). When Gill does address the hijab side, she engages in re-ghettoization – Gill provides a list of reasons why talking about Muslim dress is “risky” and argues that correlating the two debates is “dangerous.” Most of the reasons she provides are valid, but are potential problems rather than actual flaws in Duits and van Zoonen’s article. Gill writes about Muslim women in the Netherlands as “Third World women,” even though they are living in a Western European country, which seems to send them out to the Other geographical locations before bringing them back to Europe a page later. This type of erasure of connections is identified by Shohat (mentioned above). Also, Gill makes a further distinction by affording personal agency to the Muslim women under discussion – “exploring what the headscarf means to women who wear it is… important” – but not to girls-in-general; she argues that girls (except those who use Muslim dress?) should not be viewed as “autonomous, freely choosing female subject[s].”

Linda Duits and Liesbet van Zoonen’s article provides an example of the kind of links (but not complete or fixed comparisons) that can be useful in the move toward relational multicultural feminism. Rosalind Gill’s article, by contrast, highlights a few of
the ways that the study of gender gets isolated “within ghettoized and geographically defined discursive spaces such as area studies.”\textsuperscript{130}
4. Methodology

Research methodologies, based on epistemological positions, are the ways that research methods are used. There is no “right” way: several authors stress the importance of seeking truthfulness in a multiplicity of stories and methods in feminist methodology as preferable to the traditional perspective of looking for a universal “Truth.” Lorraine Code argues that “the most viable strategy for feminist research” is to stop looking for a single method; rather, she recommends “an experimental pluralism.” Leslie Brown and Susan Strega write about the necessity of multiple paradigms, and Dorothy Smith concludes an article on feminist methodologies with the metaphor of the sociologist as “inside the whale.” She says that because the sociologist is inside a whale that is made up of the “coordered activity” of a “multiplicity of subjects,” in order to strive toward feminist methodologies the sociologist must “commit herself to an inquiry that is ontologically faithful, faithful to the presence and activity of subjects and faithful to the world of actualities of the world that arises… in the ongoing coordering of our actual practices.”

Thus, feminist research methodologies can include but are not limited to making efforts to: include participants in the research (instead of objectifying ‘subjects’ of study), breakdown the researcher-researched dualistic hierarchy, continually question oneself and use reflexivity as a researcher-writer, use the research alongside action in the interests of the studied group, work with an intent of furthering the interests of the group rather than with an intent that is potentially harmful, make use of one’s own experiences, and to locate oneself and recognize one’s influences in the research and writing process rather
than attempt to ‘erase’ or make ‘invisible’ the researcher. My intention is to incorporate these concepts into my work.

Initially, I was unsure as to which kinds of research questions I could pursue, and how. I was interested in finding evidence of the changing position of women and the specifics of those changes, and thought that I might explore the topic of women’s status as a result of and in the period since the Al-Aqsa Intifada (the Second Intifada uprising, which began in 2000) in Palestine, because the first Intifada had a significant and documented effect on women’s roles and involvement in the public sphere. To that end, I felt that oral histories and/or participatory action research (PAR) would have been particularly useful. I wanted to integrate my activist and academic interests, and find a research path that could be beneficial in some way to the struggle of the Palestinian people. PAR seems to me to have few solid ‘rules’ as a practice and needs to be modified depending on the situations encountered in each project in order to keep with the spirit of the approach. However, I thought that PAR would be an appropriate methodological approach because of these two main components: one, the breakdown, at least to some extent, of the researcher-researched hierarchy through researcher participation, self-disclosure and/or identification with the participants; and two, the goal of creating or contributing to social action as a result of the research activities.\textsuperscript{136}

However, there were a couple of features of my research plan that would not mesh with the methods of PAR and oral history. For one, the time I was able to devote to conducting research for the project was limited, and optimally, PAR requires a considerable investment of time for participatory action. Secondly, I afterward developed
a specific line of inquiry and analysis for the topic that is better suited to ethnographic interviewing rather than the related method of oral history collection. The latter method is a more open-ended and less structured interview format that is more appropriate for inquiries that seek to privilege the voice of the participant with minimal interpretation. Nevertheless, I will seek to incorporate some of the aims of oral history collection, as I discuss in the article review in section 3.3.

4.1. Feminist anti-oppression ethnography

To employ feminist, anti-oppression ethnography means the application of research as a method for social justice work.\textsuperscript{137} It requires a commitment beyond the project at hand – the researcher is also a participant through and beyond the study, challenging power relations with the work as well as via the research process. Karen Potts and Leslie Brown write:

Committing ourselves to anti-oppressive work means committing to social change and to taking an active role in that change. Being an anti-oppressive researcher means that there is political purpose and action in your research work. …Anti-oppressive research involves making explicit the political practices of creating knowledge. …It is about paying attention to, and shifting, how power relations work in and through the process of doing research.\textsuperscript{138}

Potts and Brown also note that even a well-planned research project changes as it progresses; that part of being an anti-oppressive researcher is questioning one’s approach as the project unfolds:

When you are on a road trip, you often run across opportunities and obstacles that didn’t exist on your map. Modifications to the plan are made within the context of your purpose… Similarly, a research design is a dynamic plan that gets tweaked and altered along the way. The process is shaped by the design, which reflects the goals of the research.\textsuperscript{139}
In the process of researching opportunities and barriers in Palestinian women’s activism, I learned much more about its context and amended my direction accordingly, as reflected in the outcomes (sections 5-7). I experienced a number of barriers, such as disparaging thoughts about my lack of capacity to create change regardless of my commitment as a researcher and activist, and restrictions by the university regarding where I was allowed to travel while gathering data. From the beginning I was distinctly aware that the research process was of benefit to me (toward my degree) but not the participants, as we were all mostly powerless to create change at least in the short term. This awareness became more acute during the research process and my return to Canada, and seemed to me to be counter to the intention of anti-oppressive research. However, Potts and Brown write “The term ‘data’ in its origins means ‘gift.’ From an anti-oppressive perspective, we see data as a gift that participants bestow and we work to respect those gifts.”

Ethnography is a method both ideally suited and counter to feminist methodology. They are aligned in that ethnographic writing tells a story that is partially true, made of partial histories and cultural truths; it is also a new story. James Clifford argues that “Ethnographic truths are… inherently partial – committed and incomplete,” and that moreover, a “self-conscious” and “serious” “rigorous sense of partiality can be a source of representational tact.” Ethnography also values experience, interaction, context, intersubjectivity, and self-reflexivity.

Feminist ethnography requires methodological reflexivity and problematization of the research process, which helps uncover many of the methodological and epistemological challenges that ethnography presents to feminist methodology. In Judith
Stacey’s discussion of some of the complexities of feminist and ethnographic research and their contradictions, she argues that the quest for respect and equality in ethnographic research conceals underlying inherent exploitation of the researcher-participant relationship.  

4.1.1. Othering and time

A specific challenge that I would like to highlight here is elucidated by Johannes Fabian in his book *Time and the Other*. Fabian critiques concepts of time that have been used by mainstream/Western anthropology to reinforce the objectification and Othering of their ‘subjects’ of study, such as through the framing of contemporary groups of people as living in the past. Fatima Mernissi further critiques Western constructions of time in “The Muslim and Time” in her book, *The Veil and the Male Elite*. She discusses the ways in which Arabs have been framed as looking for redemption in the past (backward-looking) and that Western neo-imperialism uses time as a tool of homogenization: “The post-industrial Western society obliges all other cultures to fall in line with its rhythm. Through its time-rhythm, which standardizes behavior whatever the place or culture, the West manifests its domination of our era.” My intent is to be aware and critical of othering in its various forms.

4.1.2. Including men in gender-based research

I included men as research participants, and I believe that this is methodologically important for the following reasons. As mentioned above, in subordinate national contexts such as the Palestinian struggle, patriarchy is not the only or main source of oppression for women; Zionism affects Palestinians of all genders – thus, working in
solidarity with men is essential. Secondly, men’s perspectives on gender relations served
as a useful comparison and supplement my analysis of women’s perspectives. In addition,
there is a myriad of positive possibilities for men’s roles in changing gender power
relations. In “Transforming our interventions for gender equality by addressing and
involving men and boys: a framework for analysis and action,” Michael Kaufman
advocates for greater inclusion of men so that feminist action encounters less male
resistance, to help improve opportunities for men to work as allies, and because there
“need to be systematic and systemic efforts to change the lives of men and boys if we are
to change power relations at their root.”149

4.1.3. Feminist interviewing?

Interviewing and transcription also require problematization, and are further
addressed in section 4.2.3. The interview process has been questioned by some authors
such as Amy Best,150 in her article on race and feminist interviewing. Best examines and
challenges the reproduction of race in the interview process, and in particular, she looks at
how ‘whiteness’ is perpetuated during interviews while seeming to be invisible as a race
and as a construction, “unusually unmarked and unnamed.”151 Susan Tilley takes an in-
depth look at the transcription process and questions assumptions about its accuracy and
its freedom from transcriber’s influence in her article “‘Challenging Research
Practices.’”152

4.1.4. Self location

Feminist epistemologies reveal the partiality of truths, which highlights the
importance of locating the researcher-writer. The storyteller is part of the story. As
Absolon and Willet assert in “Putting Ourselves Forward: Location in Aboriginal Research,” “neutrality and objectivity do not exist in research, since all research is conducted and observed through human epistemological lenses.” Acknowledging subjectivity does not compromise academic rigour but instead validates knowledges and holds researchers and writers “accountable for their own positionality.”

Absolon and Willett both self-identify as Aboriginal persons who were “dismembered” from their nations by patriarchal (and racist) Canadian legislation, and who are in the process of “re-membering.” In the course of writing this thesis, I myself have been participating in a re-membering process at the community/group level – the Acadian population as Métis. I am an Aboriginal person as a member of the Acadien-Métis Souriquois community; additionally I have Irish and Arab ancestry – I am descended from a number of communities of Nova Scotia, my home. But

location is more than simply saying you are of Cree or Anishinabe or British ancestry; from Toronto or Alberta or Canada; location is about relationships to land, language, spiritual, cosmological, political, economical [sic], environmental, and social elements in one’s life.

From my experiences, I feel that I am simultaneously or variously a member of dominant White culture as well as on the margins – this unsettled location partly informs my world view in a variety of ways, but my location is not my essence. I grew up learning a strong sense of community and family, for which I am privileged. I am a rural woman living in a patriarchal culture and in a city; and a middle-class, able-bodied person living in a world that privileges those qualities. My mother tongue is a privileged language. The loss of two other languages of my grandparents was in the context of societal and internalized
discrimination, though I speak some Acadian French and am a student of Arabic. I have further identified and located myself variously throughout this text.

4.2. Method

I conducted interviews using digital voice recording and note taking, with nine adult participants, two-thirds of whom were women and one-third men, who are active in the Palestinian movement. The interviews were semi-structured; I asked specific questions but I followed the lead of the participant in the progression of the interview, the determination of which parts should be emphasized, and in the length of the interview. I also encouraged participants to contribute any information about which I have neglected to inquire. My approach is informed by feminist methodologies, as briefly discussed in the preceding section (refer to Appendix IV for the list of interview questions, and for ethics approval please see final page).

At the beginning of the interview, I provided the set of questions and reviewed them with the participant. I then asked the participant to address the questions in the manner that she or he finds most appropriate – emphasizing or de-emphasizing aspects of the question set. In question 11 (“How does women’s involvement in Palestinian organizing/activism impact on women’s positions, within their families, communities, at work, and/or among friends? Please feel free to include personal experiences in your response.”), I left the question open so that it addressed the individual’s involvement and/or the participant’s perspective on Palestinian women’s activism as a collective. I did not know whether each participant would wish to identify primarily as an individual self or a community member, and I did not want to make an assumption of strong sense of
individualism in identity. In the recent article, “Product and Producer of Palestinian History: Stereotypes of ‘Self’ in Camp Women’s Life Stories,” Rosemary Sayigh examines how self-identity is “inherently ambivalent as sites of both subjection and resistance.” During her research involving politically active women in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, she found that the majority, though not all, of the participants identified collectively rather than individually.

4.2.1. Data collection

Data was collected via a brief (twelve day) research project I conducted in late May 2009 in Israel. The project consisted of primarily single one-on-one interviews that lasted between 45 to 70 minutes each. Nine participants contributed, eight of whom were active in at least one organization. Three were involved with the same community centre, but some were involved in up to three different organizations. One participant was independently active in the community.

Recruitment was made through personal and activist contacts and via the organizations participants with which participants worked. Contact was made by phone, email, and in person when able (within Israel), as approved by the Research Ethics Board (REB). I am indebted to the contacts as well as to some of the participants for their eager assistance with the recruitment process. An activist contact facilitated phone contact with a refugee rights organization in the West Bank; one of the organization’s volunteers agreed to participate via a digitally recorded phone interview. That participant then facilitated contact with a number of other individuals working within the organization as well as with networked organizations; these connections resulted in recruitment of three
additional participants. The two participants living in the Negev were recruited in person and by email through mutual activist contacts; these interviews were conducted in person. A participant in Jerusalem was recruited and interviewed in person in Jerusalem; contact was made via mutual activist contacts. Finally, one participant from the West Bank was able to meet me in Jerusalem for an interview arranged via a contact who traveled frequently between the West Bank and Israel. All interviews were conducted in English (for more information please refer to sections 4.2.3., “Interviewing and Transcription,” and 4.2.4., “Language”).

No study sample is homogeneous, and this project's is no exception. Due to time constraints, selection of participants was mostly based on contacts and availability rather than on considerations such as particular towns or organizational affiliations. Thus although five were from the same community, and three of those from the same family, two were from towns a day’s trip away from the former, and one was from Jerusalem – all areas having varied specific experiences with the Israeli state and living conditions. The division of statuses, as defined by the state, between various groups of Palestinians, is a strategy that is comparable to the (former) South African Apartheid's system of privilege based on race (addressed in section 6).¹⁵⁸ In the present study, for example, three of the participants had Israeli citizenship and the others belonged to groups that lack a citizenship or formal passport. However, while the state created and enforces physical and legal divisions between groups of Palestinians, all Palestinians within Israel and the OPT are subject to racist state policies (see section 6), daily oppression, and enforced adverse living conditions – just in different specific forms and to different degrees. For example, residents of the OPT must endure checkpoints and closures, while people in the
unrecognized villages are denied schools, hospitals, and running water (among other injustices and human rights violations). Because selection of participants was not controlled for location, affiliation, or class, and because the research project was small and specific to these nine individuals, the data is highly qualitative and specific, though many of the participants’ experiences are not unique.

4.2.2. *Interview questions*

I formulated the interview questions in specific ways that I thought would relate directly and indirectly to the topics of inquiry, which were, briefly, opportunities and barriers to women’s and Palestinian activism, issues of power and gender, and gender and the division of labour (as they relate to Palestinian activism). I reviewed a draft of the questions (and the project in general) with a contact person in Israel and with two other fellow activists, all of whom are Palestinian Canadians, and made the suggested edits.

The first question I asked all participants related to the informed consent process. I intended the introductory questions to serve as ‘icebreaker’ questions and for general information, but the responses to these turned out to be more informative and relevant than I had anticipated. For example, some of the participants answered the question “Where are you from?” with not only their city of birth and residence, but also emphasized the towns their families/communities originated from within 1948 Palestine, of which their grandparents would have been the most recent residents. This theme highlights the communal versus individual aspects of Palestinian culture, and moreover the strength of collective memory that has likely been fortified in spite of, rather than erased by, the passage of time.
Questions 6, 10, 11, and 12 relate directly to the first topic; opportunities for women’s involvement, and 16 relates indirectly. The questions explore some of the reasons why the participants decided, or what encouraged them, to become involved in activism – their personal opportunities (6), what they think might encourage others besides themselves (10 and 11), and whether their involvement could be related to social pain or gain (12). In addressing the second topic, barriers to participation in women’s and Palestinian activism, questions 10 to 12 were also used, as well as number 7, which addresses more conspicuous and concrete barriers such as arrest and the daily realities of the occupation. For the third topic, which addresses how relations of gender and power are discursively informed, I asked questions 8, 9, and 12 through 16. Questions 9, 12, and 16 relate to the issue of the level of women’s involvement, while 13 to 16 indirectly address issues of gender and power within activist groups; I had hoped that discussions resulting from these questions might bring up, for example, themes regarding hierarchic structures, or perceptions and expectations about leadership and gender roles. I had intended question 8 to supplement the third and fourth research topics (power, division of labour, and gender), in order to explore, for example, whether ‘getting stuck’ with the ‘busy work’ was a gender issue for the participants. Instead, number 8 produced responses relevant to the first and second topics (opportunities and barriers) about gender roles, employment, and community involvement. I also discovered that the definition of “grassroots work” that I had included in the question was insufficient in the current Palestinian context because of the increasing NGO-ization (see section 5.3.) that is funded by governmental bodies (in particular the European Union). I had also anticipated addressing gender and the division of labour via questions 6, 13, and 16. From the
responses, it now seems to me that labour is divided at least as strongly along generational as gender lines. Question 12 proved to be poorly formulated, as it generated confusion to the point of being unusable.

On interviewing, Ellen L. Fleischmann writes of her early experiences:

When I began rather self-consciously to 'interview,' I narrowly focused my questions on the formalities and details of the women's movement without realizing the importance of trying to weave together the texture of women's everyday, personal, individual lives. I did not hear the stories at first because my own research agenda and expectations obstructed the hearing process; the stories women told me had little to do with my 'topic.' I unconsciously attempted to impose... 'a type of narrative shape... and a pattern of remembering.'

I began my research project with, to summarize the question set addressed above, an agenda of discovering how and why some women become involved in activism, and about the gendered dynamics of their involvement. However, during the period of research I began to realize the “importance of trying to weave together the texture of women's everyday... lives” – the intertextual narratives of existence – which my question set could barely address. In the context of Palestinian life, the feminist adage “the personal is political” is starkly relevant; in fact, given the relative freedom of political practice and publication, it may be more appropriate to say that the personal is more controversial than politics.

4.2.3. Interviewing and transcription

It is important to problematize the interview and transcription processes, even though employing methods without questioning the researcher’s epistemological position is still widely accepted, and many researchers continue to work with traditional assumptions of what constitutes Truth and how Truth can be ‘discovered’ and presented
through the research and writing process. Feminist epistemologies have challenged traditional or underlying assumptions about the ‘pure’ transmission of information, interpretation, and ‘truth,’ in order to uncover biases that researchers have traditionally claimed to be non-existent (countering claims of non-bias).

Transcription presented some challenges. I wanted to transcribe as closely as possible to what I could hear in the recording, and to preserve the ‘voice’ of the participants’ responses. However, transcription is never an exact replica, as discussed by Susan Tilley in “Challenging Research Practices.” Vocal inflection, atmosphere, and so on are mostly immune to textual reproduction, and the nuances of Arabic expressions included in the (English) contributions are not easily translatable. The dialects of English ‘as a second language’ are less clear in writing than when expressed verbally. In the end, I decided to preserve what I could of these characteristics, and edited phrases only when necessary for ease of comprehension. Thus, as with any transcription project, it is unavoidable that the researcher’s/transcriber’s interpretation is written into the text to some extent.\textsuperscript{161} I also left most English ‘errors’ unaltered, so long as the quote would still be clear for readers. One of the participants’ contributions was directly transcribed during the interview, rather than captured on the digital voice recorder (participant’s preference).

The interviews were conducted in English, which all of the participants spoke as a language second to Arabic. For transcriptions from Arabic and Hebrew words, I have followed convention, rather than a particular style. For example, I have written “Nakba” and “Intifada” but “Adalah” with a final h, even though all three words end in \textit{taa-marbutah}. ‘Ain and hamza are shown as ‘ or absent.
For the most part, I eliminated from quotes some parts of speech that are both repetitious and cumbersome in written English; commonly, filler words such as *ya’ni*, and redundant personal pronouns, i.e. in “women, they…” I eliminated “they.”

Language issues present a filter through which knowledge can be shared. In a mixed-language context, the researcher may learn the language(s) of the people she wishes to involve in her study, in the interest of breaking down the researcher-researched hierarchy, especially if the researcher is located in a culturally-privileged position (white/“Western,” English-speaking), rather than subscribe to the notion that the onus is on the subject to know the dominant language. When learning a particular language to a functional degree is not practical, then the researcher can proceed using another method to challenge the researcher-researched hierarchy, such as through collaboration with a translator in the research and writing process, and/or by demonstrating an interest in learning the language. In my case, three years of Arabic language study are insufficient to possess a functional level of fluency; however I believe this demonstration of interest and commitment helped challenge the researcher-researched hierarchy, and establish rapport with participants.

Because of my language limitations, English ability was one of the factors in recruiting participants. I do not know to what extent this factor influenced the outcome of the research project; however I did not find that English accessibility was a problem for recruitment of participants, though English ability was much less common in the Negev Desert. Translation and interpretation were options but not necessary for the interviews.
There were a few occasions when language was a discernible factor. Through an interpreter I learned that Ruba was the only person who spoke English at a women’s cooperative in the Negev with which I had contact, and was thus the only participant I recruited from the organization. I contacted another participant from the Negev via a Jewish Israeli (Palestine solidarity) activist who graciously referred me to Senaa’, an English speaking Palestinian Israeli activist. Both Ruba and Senaa’ have university degrees, the former from a Jewish university and the latter studied in London, UK. Thus, although higher education is common among Palestinians, the language bias in the project possibly contributed to the fact that all of the participants except for one possessed some post-secondary education. At least one participant learned English through prisoner-organized education.

4.3. Ethical considerations

The present research project conforms to Saint Mary’s University Research Ethics Board (certificate appended at end).

It is important to respect possible ethical considerations outside of the formal process. Another ethical concern for me will be to avoid Orientalist feminism (discussed above) as well as cultural relativism. The Tri-Council Policy Statement contains a section on research involving Aboriginal peoples, and although it is intended for use when doing research with Canadian Aboriginal people, it seems to me that many of its points would be important when conducting research involving Palestinians (or anyone). For example, some of the recommended “good practices” include “examin[ing] how the research may be shaped to address the needs and concerns of the group,” and “respect[ing] the culture,
traditions and knowledge of the Aboriginal group.”¹⁶² This ethical consideration requires a long-term investment that must begin well before the institutional ethics review, and I hope that I mitigated any Orientalism and cultural relativism on my part through my background in Palestinian solidarity activism, with which I have been involved in Canada for a number of years. Additionally, I have critically studied Orientalism through several courses I have taken towards both the current graduate program in Gender Studies and my undergraduate major in Middle Eastern Studies. I must make every effort to avoid harmful frameworks of thought because I am more likely to be prone to participating in such discourses from my location as a feminist from the West (as well as middle class, mostly White, heterosexual and able-bodied). Therefore, in my efforts to avoid perpetuating harmful discourses, it is necessary for me to continue to learn about Orientalist/Western feminism, cultural relativism, and Middle Eastern feminism. As a specific example, I learned though my reading on Middle Eastern feminism for my final paper for the Feminist Theories course that due to the history of liberation struggle in the Palestinian context, which cannot be divorced from the women’s struggle, that including men is considered to be important. This is because patriarchy is not the only main source of oppression in that context; all genders also share the experience of national/ethnic oppression. The importance of including men is a point that has been raised by activists in my experience, and I incorporated it into the design of my research.

Although it was likely not possible for me to overcome all potential ethical problems while conducting research, I believe that by remaining aware of the issues and vigilant in my actions I was able to avoid potential problems.
4.4. Introduction to the participants

The participants were Palestinians, from different backgrounds and involved in activism in diverse ways in their varied communities, through volunteerism and/or their employment. Participants were recruited via organizations and contacts as outlined in the REB application (recruitment script appended). Five of the participants grew up in the same community, two were from other nearby cities, and two others were from different recognized townships in the Negev Desert. I had aimed for a ratio of two thirds women and one third men, which was achieved with six women and three men participants. Seven of the participants had completed post-secondary education, two were current university students, and one had very little formal education. All of the participants had varied Muslim backgrounds. For confidentiality, the real names of the participants were not recorded and are not included here; false names are used instead. Participants are presented in the order of interviewing.

Although at least three of the participants, one woman and two men, appeared to me to be committed activists, known and respected for their work in their communities, all of the participants were “ordinary”\(^{163}\) – though each unique – activists. Some of the participants emphasized that most people in their community were involved in its betterment in some way, and often employed narratives that invoked collectivity when speaking about their work. This included often privileging the ‘we’ over 'I' (one who was educated in London, and who was independently active was an exception to this), speaking about the group's work, or their work within the group when asked about “your” work ('you' is both singular and plural, and while it connotes singularity in English, that is
not the case for native speakers of Arabic), and the use of ‘we’ as in, “as Palestinians” (the latter is also a political statement\textsuperscript{164}).

Labib, mid-30s, granted me the first interview. He is a longtime activist who is engaged in organizing work to try to save his neighbourhood in Jerusalem from standing demolition orders. His work has included participating in projects to inform the local and international publics and to challenge the orders in court. He continues this work despite, or perhaps because of, serving several stints in prison totaling ten years, probable torture, intimidation from the Shin Bet (internal Israeli governmental intelligence), violence from IDF soldiers, and witnessing similar hardships faced by his colleagues and neighbours. Labib received no formal education after grade six, but learned history, English as a second language, and other subjects from informal educational projects organized among the prisoners. He is employed outside the organization, and is devoted to ensuring his children’s education despite a severe shortage of schools.

‘Emad, 36 at the time of the interview, is a director of a refugee centre. His background is in journalism and media. He has been active in the Palestinian movement, through media work and a student union, since 1987, during the first Intifada. He told me that because of this work, he has been arrested seven times, and has spent a total of four years in Israeli prisons. While in prison he experienced torture during interrogations, including sleep deprivation and restraints, and like Labib, he participated in prisoner-organized educational groups.

Yousuf, being in his early twenties, is part of the “new generation,” which is roughly equivalent to the third generation refugees. He is studying social work at
university and also serves on the elected administration board of the same refugee centre for which ‘Emad works. Yousuf introduced me to ‘Emad, Abeer, and ‘Alia.

Abeer, 26, is a graduate student, an accountant, and a “new generation” refugee. She works with a women’s and family support centre that provides educational programming relating to women’s rights and empowerment, and support services for “marginalized” (rural) areas, particularly for women who have been exposed to domestic and sexual abuse. She has been involved with community organizations for four years.

Reem, 23, is an apprentice lawyer. She volunteers with three human rights organizations to help develop her career in law and to work on rights education. She is a “new generation” refugee as well. She teaches seminars on women’s rights, international law, and other topics in a number of cities, and is working on creating a legal clinic for women and workers. She has not been arrested, but her home has been briefly occupied by the Israeli military on two occasions. During one of the occupations the soldiers used her home as a temporary ‘base’ from which to ‘observe' civilians in the refugee camp where she lives. Such commandeering of homes is a terrifyingly frequent occurrence in the OPT, infrequently reported in the media. In the period of the Second Intifada, an unprovoked soldier shot her brother in the street (he fortunately survived).

‘Alia, 46, has been active in the Palestinian movement for more than three decades, beginning in sixth grade, when she was a student in an overcrowded UN school in a refugee camp. A former social worker, she heads a women’s and family support organization, and holds a Master’s degree (MA) in disability counselling. She was involved with the Communist Party, which later became the Palestinian People’s Party.
(PPP), and a students’ alliance. She is the sole woman in this study who has been arrested; the first time was when she was 15 years old. ‘Alia also spoke of time in prison as a site for learning from the other (women) prisoners, but was the only one who spoke in some detail about the hardships of imprisonment in Israeli jails, such as torture, separation, fears, and attempts to break the spirit.

Ruba, mid-twenties, lives with her parents in the “Jewish city” of Beersheba, but works with a women’s weaving cooperative in Laqye, one of seven “recognized” Bedouin “concentration townships” in the Negev Desert. She attended a Jewish school, obtained a degree in Middle Eastern Studies at Ben Gurion University, and plans to study for a second degree, possibly researching the unrecognized towns of the Negev.

Senaa’, 38, has a BA in marketing from a university in London, three years of studying medicinal desert herbs at a college in Beersheba, is presently studying Education at an Israeli university, and plans to pursue a Master’s degree in Desert Studies. She was one of two Palestinian women I met in Israel who completed post-secondary studies in England, and both said that it was difficult to gain acceptance for going overseas from their families and/or communities. Senaa’ also faced challenges when she returned from England and refused arranged marriage. She spent a considerable amount of time working through the issue with her parents because she did not want to leave the community; she said to me, “I belong to here.” Her parents have a polygynous marriage. Senaa’ lives in Tel Sheva, a Bedouin concentration township in the Negev with a high degree of poverty and population density, where she works on community building activities, particularly
with children. She works independently of an organization but has connections to the Regional Council for the Unrecognized Bedouin Villages in the Israeli Negev (RCUV).
5. Gender and space

“Colonial society... appears to be a one-sided form of ‘putting “natives” “in place’ for good.” -- Fanon

5.1. Introduction

The nature of Palestinian liberation organizing has changed over time. The 1967 Oslo Accords began the process of institutionalization and official regulation of the Palestinian movement, with the creation of the Palestinian National Authority as a pseudo-governing body in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The current period is characterized by national and women's activities increasingly moving toward organizing within non-governmental organizations – NGO-ization – and away from the grassroots. Thus, much of the activism in Palestine falls somewhere between grassroots and sanctioned civil society. This kind of activism is not on the far end of a scale of ‘grassroots;’ it is commonly funded at least in part by governmental bodies (i.e. the European Union), and in some cases functions as a kind of governmental welfare branch; but at the same time Palestine is not an independent country. Since 1967 it has become two non-contiguous territories under brutal military occupation, which is these days also subject to apartheid and in Gaza, a brutal siege that included a civilian massacre. The residents are mostly long-term refugees without formal citizenship. Hence, the organizations, like the Palestinians themselves, are in an existential twilight zone that is far from state-sponsored nationalism.
Compared with sanctioned social movements, grassroots social movements, beginning at least from the post-colonial period, have tended to be characterized by including greater space for women, through increased access to public space, choices, or social status for women. Although movements in various places and times have had unique histories, some examples of this general trend are the anti-colonial movement in Algeria, the first Intifada, and the Kurdish national movement. Changes to gender relations were closely allied with a collective need for greater participation by women in some aspects of the liberation struggle. Additionally, women were not just along for the ride but have also used such movements to help gain greater agency, not just as women but also as women members of their group and its struggle.

Officially sanctioned, state-sponsored movements, such as the Turkish national movement, civil society activity in Iran during the rule of the late Shah, and Egyptian state feminism, have tended to curtail women's liberties by altering rather than lifting the legal and/or discursive rules of control. In other words, some additional rights were granted while others remained the same or were curtailed. In these cases, changes to gender relations were also often side-effects of the main national action, but in a different way: changing women's roles were tools of the ruling power's intended goals to achieve national gains. Turkish nationalism under Ataturk and social reforms under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's White Revolution were closely tied with the regimes' moves toward cultural and political Westernization. In the latter case, women gained suffrage and were no longer bound to veiling, but still did not have a choice over veiling – they lost the choice to wear a headscarf when it was briefly outlawed.
Considering such histories, I was curious about the current state of women’s organizing. I found that most of the participants were involved in organizing that was somewhere between grassroots and state-sponsored organizing, via NGO type organizations. Two of the participants, both women, were exceptions: Alia, from the older generation, was employed with an NGO but was also involved in grassroots work; and Senaa’, one of two Bedouin women participants, worked independently from any type of organization. Some of the participants’ contributions contained themes of hope in the possible benefits of NGO-based work, as well as the benefits of work closer to the grassroots. Other themes included national duty or expectation of women’s involvement in activism, and sentiments of opposition to social conservatism.

5.2. *Al-Aqsa* Intifada: *Invisibility*

Penny Johnson and Eileen Kuttab, in their article “Where Have all the Women (and Men) Gone?” write that during the Al-Aqsa phase of Israeli apartheid, gender informed both the system of repression and Palestinian resistance. Israeli suppression of the Al-Aqsa Intifada was characterized by very high levels of violence and targeted males in particular, especially young men and boys (children).¹⁶⁷ This dramatically increased the amount of care work required at the personal and community levels, which was mostly taken up by women.¹⁶⁸ There was less space for women in many of the more public forms of activism, and women’s “activities [were] both seemingly invisible to actual and virtual publics and widely seen by women leaders themselves as inadequate and marginalized;”¹⁶⁹ the latter sentiment reflected in ‘Alia’s contributions. Part of the invisibility and marginalization of women’s actions, which were in fact present, was due to changing roles; less front-line activity as it took on a greater component of violence,
and greater home- and community-based responsibilities in “care and coping.” Another significant component was the marginalization of initiatives such as NGO projects “which were in essence sequestered from the real locus of political power.”

Although the invisibility of the women’s movement was part of a general dearth of civil society despite its scope and volume of activity, during Al-Aqsa Intifada, write Johnson and Kuttab, “The marginalization of women and civil society from the public and political sphere [were] strongly linked.” Furthermore, Islah Jad argues that “NGO-ization” has demobilized the women’s movement and “hijacked the Palestinian national agenda of national liberation.”

5.3. Centres/NGOs

The participants referred to the social welfare, cultural, and/or women’s organizations as “centres.” I wondered about the NGO-ization of Palestine: is the packaging of women’s rights activism and women’s national activism in Palestine into full-fledged organizations and “centres” a limiting factor in the nature and possibilities of activities, discourses, and radicalism? Or, does it alternatively or additionally provide an organizing environment with potentially more stability over time, safety, international ‘legitimacy,’ or social acceptance? “After nine years in our work, we have an organization.” (Emad) These are questions that the research project touched upon, but which I would like to explore in more depth in the future; as Johnson and Kuttab write, “There is always a dilemma for feminists in responding to the question of whether the state can be a potential force for greater equality or an instrument for patriarchal oppression (or both).”
Fadwa Al Labadi and Islah Jad both trace the history of NGO-ization and its somewhat complex impact on the women’s movement to the early 1990s, during the first Intifada and the growth of international donations tied to NGO-based work. Al Labadi writes:

International funds required that programs and activities uphold the core agenda of the peace process, such as human rights, democracy, and gender training. These activities led women’s committees to move from mass-based organizations to international forums, where they lost their connection to and credibility with women. 175

Reem and Abeer’s contributions contained themes of hope in the possible benefits of NGO-based work, in speaking about their experiences working with some of the centres, expressing a narrative of professionalization rather than radicalization.

Reem, a 23 year old refugee and “novice lawyer,” felt that her own and other women’s participation in the centres was beneficial, in that involvement in activities out of the house helps her “inside,” improves her as a person, and offers her opportunities for helping others with legal issues and for personal career advancement: “Maybe today I do this work, and someday I could be a director”:

By getting involved in centres, women’s personalities become more strong. They meet people, and improve communication abilities with their husbands and children. It improves their confidence… Women are better able to tell men that they [women] can do things, they have power. Can do more good for society. (Reem)

Reem’s statements reflect Islah Jad’s arguments that the “project logic” of NGO-ization “pushes the NGO structure to be exclusive rather than inclusive” and “toward upward vertical participation, and not downward toward horizontal participation.” 176
Portions of Alia’s contributions also reflected the theme of NGO-ization as beneficial, and the narrative of professionalization:

I think now the women participation is different because there is a lot of NGOs. It’s more specialized, and more scientific, more specific about specific things like legislation, integration of gender in policy making, like elections, poverty, violence, social violence against women. There is a lot of organizations that work on this issue. (Alia)

Finally, Reem felt that women’s groups help women to participate in a wider range of fields and activities because the groups encourage women to vote, to get involved in Palestinian National Authority (PNA) elections and the executive authority, and to help select candidates. However, during other parts of the interview, when Reem listed other kinds of activities that the centres organize, such as embroidery and cooking classes, it seemed to me that not unlike women’s centres in Canada, the organizations engage in a range of activities including the maintenance of traditional gender roles as well as breaking into non-traditional activities.

An additional possible benefit of mixed gender groups that Reem cited is that they open an opportunity for discussion about gender roles; she said that many of the young boys she works with express traditional views about women’s roles, which she addresses in her educational projects. In addition, she said that women-only groups provide opportunities for participation for a subset of women who avoid mixed gender organizations. She felt that women-only groups allow women to become involved in the community in ways that are “in line with their culture and religion.” Reem thought that some women’s avoidance of mixed gender groups is sometimes preferred by the women and sometimes by male relatives (husbands, fathers, and brothers).
Rosemary Sayigh writes that “Simply examining ‘organized’ women’s actions would mean forgetting other forms of struggle.”  

Alia, who had been very active in the first Intifada, also moved beyond the narrative of professionalization and emphasized the importance of organization from the grassroots:

But I still believe because we are under occupation we need this kind of organization like mine which is popular, which has a lot of volunteers, a lot of members, and the program of this organization deals with a national issue and a social issue. (Alia) (*My emphasis*)

Further, she expressed frustration with the NGO-ization of activism.

But what happened in the NGOs, the majority of the NGOs, they put a lot of effort at the social level, because they need funds from Europe and the United States to support them, and I believe a lot of these funds, they go for nothing. Not change the women’s role or the women’s situation; just they do a lot of training, a lot of talking about gender and democracy. (Alia)

Islah Jad argues further, that NGO-ization has resulted in “a shift from ‘power to’ women in the grass roots to ‘power over’ them by the new elite.”  

Jad writes,

Within the past fifteen or so years, a mass-based, living social movement, which engaged women from grassroots organizations throughout Palestine in working for a combined feminist-national agenda, has given way to a process of ‘NGO-ization’… a term I use to denote the process through which issues of collective concern are transformed into projects in isolation from the general context in which they arise, without consideration of the economic, social, and political factors affecting them. I contend that this process is failing to empower women and that is has transformed a cause for social change into a ‘project’… which is owned and used by a small professional elite for the purpose of accountability vis-à-vis foreign donors.

Despite this new context, some of the contributions still contained themes of the need for or expectation of women’s activism, or women’s community involvement or education as a national duty. For Alia, this was one of the reasons why she felt it is important to be active outside of NGOs:
…not only the social issue – I believe we have a lot of problems on the social level that we need to deal with – but also we have national interests. We are still under occupation and we need to work with women and encourage women to become part of this movement against the occupation. (Alia)

Abeer’s contributions also contained the theme of women’s involvement in the community as a duty; she spoke in terms of an alignment with women’s interests as well:

The educated women, the women who... have strong or independent personalities – they are more involved than the uneducated women, because more uneducated women are controlled totally by the men. So maybe they haven’t… they cannot do what they want, and they haven’t awareness... that they must play a role in the community. They believe that their main work is inside the home. But the educated women, no. They believe that they have a role in the community and they must do it. (Abeer)

After my conversation with Reem, her brother wished to contribute his view that it is not men, but women who “are always saying that they have restrictions,” therefore “women should change what they think about their own roles” and liberate themselves from themselves. He expressed his frustration with women’s adherence to traditional roles, and that women use these to excuse themselves from higher education, which he saw as a national responsibility, insisting that aspirations of post-secondary education would be a requirement for him for a potential marriage partner. Reem’s brother expressed several additional opinions proscribing women’s roles within a set of rules that blends particular parts of tradition with national interests. Such discursive threads regarding the roles of women include certain areas of public participation – particularly higher learning and professionalization – for the purpose of ‘improving’ the nation. For Alia, grassroots work is important both for women’s rights and national liberation, for Abeer it is education that is important for both aspirations, while for
Reem’s brother, it is professionalization of women that is important for liberation, from which women’s rights are not distinct.

Reem and Abeer’s contributions contained themes of classification of women’s involvement in public life along linked lines of class, rurality, social conservatism, and education. Reem felt that the social situations are different in the north and south of Palestine. She thought that women in Bethlehem and Ramallah access the public sphere more; that they go outside their homes more, for work and socializing as well as activism, while society in Hebron is more conservative and “closed,” and less accepting of women’s involvement outside the home, in centres, and particularly in mixed gender organizations. Reem estimated that 40-50% of the activists are women in Bethlehem and Ramallah, and about 20% in Hebron. While there are likely additional historical or cultural contexts, the trend, whether it is present only in discourse or in fact, may be partly related to the relative level of oppression in the areas. Greater oppression may be the root of more entrenched social conservatism as a ‘protective’ measure. The election of religiously conservative Hamas in more heavily-OPpressed Gaza may be another example. Similarly, Abeer mentioned differences between more and less socially conservative areas in terms of involvement in the centres. She said, “Women in the cities maybe are more involved in social activities and these kinds of activities, but the women in the marginalized areas, in the villages, no; their participation is very, very low.” She also thought that education is a factor:

We try to activate the women [leaders] in marginalized areas and villages. Because if we can educate them and train them and empower these organizations, the organizations will be attractive for other women. So [we] train them; also educate them and raise their awareness. I believe that if the women become more educated and own more... how can I say it?... to have special skills, like
communication skills, advocacy skills, and they have more awareness about her social, her political, economic rights – all their rights – they will change their position in the community and they can practice and pressure on, for example, on policy makers to change the laws that discriminate against them. (Abeer)

Themes of social conservatism were also present, in different ways, in contributions from the two participants from the Negev, addressed in the following section.

5.4. Gender and space in the Negev

Bedouin women and girls’ relations with public space in the Negev Desert changed dramatically with the creation of the state of Israel. This topic was addressed by Senaa’, who is a resident of the recognized town of Tel Sheva, as well as by two people with whom I met in the unrecognized village of Khashem Zaneh, resident Atia el Athamin, 181 and Dr. Yeela Livnat Raanan 182 of the Regional Council for the Unrecognized Bedouin Villages in the Negev.

Bedouin tribes in the Negev led semi-nomadic lives until 1948/49. Athamin and Raanan related that both girls and boys used to tend to the camels and goats, and because of the open landscape, families were unafraid to ‘grant’ women and girls access to public spaces. Women also had private, women’s-only space within the home. However, the Nakba changed Bedouin life. The military of the new state of Israel transferred much of the Bedouin population from the land that is now Israel, through terror, destruction of villages, and violence. The Palestinians who remained were (and are increasingly) subject to population division and forced migration; Palestinians in the Negev are some of the small percentage that continued to live within the borders of Israel (i.e. not displaced to the West Bank or Gaza or as international refugees), and were given Israeli citizenship. The Bedouin population was subject to particular kinds of control: nomadism was
disallowed and the population was forcibly moved into the “Fenced Area” – a small portion of the former region, where population density drastically increased as a result. Some of the towns were “recognized” by the state of Israel, and are eligible for limited municipal services, though are actively underdeveloped while Israeli towns receive heavy state investment. Other towns are not recognized and do not appear on state censuses, cannot receive any access to municipal services, schools, and hospitals, are subject to home demolitions and threats of demolition, and are highly impoverished. High density living, according to Athamin and Raanan, has led families to place restrictions on women and girls’ mobility and access to public space. I asked Senaa’ about what I had learned from them. She responded:

It’s true, it’s true, it’s absolutely true…They say that today, the women’s status is better than it used to be before. But if we go back and see the women and men, of course, all the family worked in the same field… they went in the early morning, they came back home. The man he did the things that he had to do, the women did the food etc, and in the afternoon they go back again.

Well, when we [the Negev Bedouin] moved, women stayed at home, men had to go look for a job outside. Although today we have more education, women go to schools and some to universities and colleges, still… I think, it’s not like some people say, ‘okay, women used to not have a part in the life, and now they do.’ I don’t think so. Go really to see how the Bedouin women lived once, and today.

Today… most of the women [are] staying at home, they don’t have jobs; women who want to have work, they have to leave the village to go and look in the big cities which is very difficult for them; that’s why they don’t go. The only work for women today is [in the] education system, [for those who] went for studies and came back. Still [there are] a lot of things we’re struggling [for] as women. (Senaa’)

The theme present in Abeer and Reem’s contributions connecting relative oppression of and social conservatism within groups (though in a different context) was also present in Senaa’s contributions:
Women used to, they had more open place. Today... you’ve seen the houses, you have only like this around the houses [small alleyways between shared buildings], you can’t even go outside. Because of the disappointment from the government, today more people are closed, men and women used to wear the black thing… today many of them are really more conservative than before. (Senaa’)

Senaa’ reflected that this conservatism could be a result of the population concentration and pauperization that have changed Bedouin existence; “Maybe… [it is] because you have to hold on to something in your life.”

For Senaa’, Bedouin women’s relationship with space is problematic in three related ways – reduction in available public space, population concentration that causes families and women to feel that they are overly exposed, and increased social conservatism.

5.5. The personal is public is political: grief

One of the topics of inquiry for the research project was gendered division of labour in regards to Palestinian activism. I wanted to find out how the participants perceived ‘women’s’ and ‘men’s’ work in grassroots organizing, in terms of gender discourses and social expectations. For example, in the North American context, it is common, though not the rule, for politically active women to be more involved in ‘busy work’ or other, mostly non-leadership activities characterized as most appropriate for women, which is often realized from within women’s auxiliary groups, secondary to the main, male-dominated groups. How are the discourses and practices around ‘women’s work’ similar and different in the Palestinian context?

One significant difference between North American and Palestinian contexts is the grinding level of grief resulting from extremely high rates of killings, injuries, and torture,
overwhelming rates of arrests, and mass imprisonment of Palestinians – disproportionately male Palestinians, many of them children. When I asked research participant Yousuf, a camp resident in his early 20s, to estimate how many of his (male, youth) friends had been arrested at some point, he answered “all of them,” as well as some women/girls. Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association reported as of 1 September 2012 that “there were 4,606 Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli prisons and detention centers, including 212 administrative detainees, 7 women and 194 children.”

Though grief and loss are heavy on all family and community members, themes of grief in two participants’ contributions suggested that for them the burden lies discursively in the domain of women. Simultaneously private, public, and political, women’s obligatory but conscribed public/political grief may include expressions of both subordinate nationalist discourses as well as transposition of men’s disallowed grief. As for private and real grief and loss, I cannot pretend to understand experiences of such tragedies.

Some of the contributions from men in the research project contained a theme of denial of responsibility for gendered division of domestic and activism labour (though the interview process was not accusatory): that women could or should be more directly involved in activism work and/or pursue university education, but cannot due to other circumstances – women themselves do not want to (various reasons cited), or they compete too much with each other for positions. In Emad’s contributions, on the topic of his perspective on women’s roles, he said that he felt that women should be more actively
involved but “want” to spend their time on domestic and academic tasks, and quickly listed a couple of predictable items – studying and cleaning; though in the Palestinian context domestic roles are political roles. He then elaborated on another role of women that I had not expected: emotional work:

Girls want to care about their brothers, their mothers; also they want to cry when their boyfriends are killed by the soldiers or when they are arrested. A lot of girls here they lose their boyfriends or their cousins because of the situation. Really we have a lot of problems because a lot of women lose their husbands. ... You know, women can’t forget like men. Because... we say here in Palestine, they have a thin heart. Not like the men’s. (Emad; emphasis added)

Frequent periods of imprisonment can contribute to prolonged emotional and social impacts. When speaking about the emotional burden of mass imprisonment Emad said:

They [women relatives] don’t enjoy that time. Because they want to [go to a] wedding dance or to [a] wedding party. They feel that if they dance, that their brother or their husband will be angry about them. And they be quiet and they be like [gestures to show reserved behaviour], and at a wedding just silent… and sometimes when they see people happy, they cry. (Emad)

During the interview with Alia, she spoke to her and other women’s care and concern for male relatives (including children) who have experienced trauma:

I work with some of [the young men], and I hear from mothers. They come in to my house to ask me, ‘What can we do with our sons? They don’t like to go outside of the house. They are aggressive. They are angry all the time. They don’t like to go to school. I have two [nephews] who have been to prison, one of them works in [a refugee centre, names withheld], maybe you know him. And the other one – they don’t like to go to university. All the time they smoke. They don’t feel that they have a good life or a good future, they don’t plan; they are not aware about anything. They lost - they destroyed something inside themselves. (Alia; participant’s emphasis)

A theme that emerges from these contributions is that women carry (most of) the family/community burden of sadness and mourning.
What are the impacts of such an arrangement? Perhaps two of the impacts are circumscribed roles for women (as hinted at above for social participation), and for men, pre-determined emotional responses and/or disavowed grief for one’s son or other male bond.

In “Interviews with Mothers of Martyrs of the Al-Aqsa Intifada,” Nahed Habiballah writes that the women in her research project (16 women from the West Bank) felt both supported and pressured by society in their roles as mothers of youth or children who had been killed by the IDF. Social support systems included prescriptive themes for how one should process grief – or not; under occupation the tragedy of children’s deaths and displays of grief constitute private, public, and political struggle. Women’s experiences are often complex – they must care for their families and bear the burden of grief for killed, injured, and imprisoned individuals, but their care and grief can be socially limiting as well as emotionally isolating. Habiballah quotes one mother:

“Even when I wanted to cry and scream, they would not let me because they say it is a sin and he is a martyr. May God have mercy on him, that is the only thing I can do... Yesterday night, I sat with his backpack on that couch and started crying. the girls came and took the backpack away and vowed not to let me cry.”

I had a copy of the poem and cried whenever I read it, as a result the girls took my copy and hid it. They say I should let him rest. Every time I cry I would cause him to become restless in his grave. Everyone in the family had seen him smiling in their sleep. I never did. I went and asked the Sheik (religious man) the reason why I never did see him and he said because I cry. ... Yes, he said once I stop crying I will see him in my sleep. There is no day that passes without me crying over his loss. I do not know if this is how other mothers cope with the death of their children or I am the only one who cries. The Sheik told me I upset my son if I keep crying because I would be the reason for his exclusion from any event in the heaven. He said that I should stop crying and that I should eat because if I mourn his death then God will not allow my son to eat with the rest of the martyrs and my son will be sitting alone in heaven without taking part in anything that the other martyrs take part in. What can I do? I love my son and I miss him [Breaks down into tears].
The role of women as bearers of grief goes hand-in-hand with care for family members, bodily and emotionally; significantly, protection from emotional burden: “My husband is a diabetic and I did not want him to fall apart.”

Penny Johnson notes a contrast between women activists during the first and Second Intifadas. Earlier, there had been a theme of caring for and protection of children on a community/national level, but a more own-family-centric theme during the second. Johnson writes of “wives’ ceaseless activities” during the Al-Aqsa Intifada:

Significantly, these activities are almost solely on behalf of immediate family members, without noticeable extension to the wider community. This represents a marked difference from the extension of the maternal role to community activism and resistance, common in the first intifada through the claim that “all children are my sons.”

This change coincided with deeper entrenchment and increased violence of the occupation. Johnson writes, “Her struggle—and the focus of her struggle personality—is grounded in everyday survival and family responsibility rather than hopes for liberation. Indeed, her relentless responsibilities of maternal care can be seen as a response to the failures of the public world around her.”

‘Alia, as one of the older participants, one generation above al-jīl al-jadīd, the ‘New Generation’ (young adults at the time of the research project) had been active since the first Intifada. Her contributions still resonated with the extra-familial care theme, such as mourning for the current generation of young people, whilst also touching on her own and other mothers’ concerns for their own families.

Look, [prison] is a very hard place, ya’ni, very hard conditions. … Ya’ni I feel bad when I know that some people, especially the children, something breaks my heart when I see children go to prison. I know that the occupation focuses on this
generation and they [Israeli military] like to put them in prison and they torture them, they humiliate them, and because this generation [does] not have the same awareness like us, I remember, my son, he’s 22. … When I was 15 or 14, I remember that I read a lot of books; I knew many things about the world. Even about other nations, about other revolutions, in many places in the world. So when I [went] to prison, I [knew] how I can protect myself. Not to collapse, not to have these psychological problems like the children who go to prison now. What’s happening to our children and our young people, it’s really… it’s really… Not only a tragedy, ya’ni, it’s a war against us. They destroyed this generation. They destroyed them.

You know, I have a brother who has now spent twenty-four years in jail. Yes. And this jail, it’s near Haifa, there are three sections, one for children under 18 years, another for women, and another for old people. I visited 2 or 3 times in that prison; all of the women who visit their children, at the end of the visit they cry. Why? Because their children told them what’s happening inside the jail. All the time they attack them. They humiliate them. … This generation is left with a lot of problems. … It’s a very bad place that destroys people, destroys hope inside the people. (Alia)

Alia’s contribution also serves as an example of “mothers’ detailed and loving attention to physical,” and I might add psychological, “violation of their sons’ bodies,” as noted by Johnson among others. She suggests that this work “is both a response and a contrast to the routinization of violence against Palestinian bodies and a seeming global indifference to their death and mutilation.”

In contrast to some women’s experiences, Nahed Habiballah writes that boys and men often experience pressure to hide grief. Quoting a mother of a 17 year old boy who was shot and killed during the Second Intifada, “his 16 year old brother goes into the bedroom because he does not want me to see him cry… sometimes I enter the bedroom and I see [my husband] cry.” Similarly, disallowed grief immobilizes the victim’s father:

Since my son died, my husband became unemployed. He does not want to do anything anymore, he just sits there. When they buried my son, my husband wanted to be buried with him. People carried him out of the grave and they took him to the hospital because of his diabetes.
Proscription of grief may compound feelings of a “failure in paternal protection,” identified by Johnson and Kuttab, which “is amplified by the greater failure of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to protect its civilian population.” She goes on to say that “These linked failures constitute a ‘crisis in paternity’ that the militarization of the intifada tried unsuccessfully to resolve.”

Johnson and Kuttab also briefly identify though do not explore a “crisis of masculinity” during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which “‘requires much closer attention to those institutions which are crucially responsible for the production of masculine identity.’” I would postulate that the disavowal of male to male grief constitutes such a crisis in masculinity. Male to male grief poses a dilemma where on one hand, discursive permission to perform grief is essential to community or even national health. As Judith Butler writes in *The Psychic Life of Power*, in regard to another marginalized population,

> Insofar as the grief remains unspeakable, the rage over the loss can redouble by virtue of remaining unavowed. And if that rage is publically proscribed, the melancholic effects of such a proscription can achieve suicidal proportions. The emergence of collective institutions for grieving are thus crucial to survival, to reassembling community, to rearticulating kinship, to reweaving sustaining relations. Insofar as they involve the publicization and dramatization of death… they call for being read as life-affirming rejoinders to the dire psychic consequences of a grieving process culturally thwarted and proscribed.

On the other hand, grief performance outside of circumscribed norms presents a challenge to masculinity, as disavowed male to male grief may be bound to, or an institution of masculinity/male heterosexuality. As Judith Butler theorizes of another “foreclosed” and gendered expression of (romantic homosexual) love and grief, prohibition of performance of a father’s grief – and therefore love – for a son may help construct the “accomplishment” of masculinity, akin to the prohibition of grief for homosexual love in
the accomplishment of heterosexuality: “masculinity… emerge(s) as the traces of an ungrieved and ungrievable love.”

Men’s grief for the loss of their (loved) sons is also preserved in its prohibition; “conscience is never assuaged by renunciation, but is paradoxically strengthened (‘renunciation breeds intolerance’). Renunciation does not abolish the instinct; it deploys the instinct for its own purposes.”

5.6. Summary

Compared with the first Intifada, during the Al-Aqsa Intifada women’s activism and civil society in general were more marginalized, and the spaces of women’s activism became more home-centered. Since then, one feature of activism has been its ‘NGO-ization’ and corresponding professionalization over radicalization. Some participants’ contributions contained information about how work based in “centre” spaces has presented opportunities as well as barriers for change. Contributions additionally highlighted barriers related to themes of social conservatism linked to rurality, level of education, and forced population density.

Participants also narrated themes of grief as a discursively gendered role involving prescriptive roles for women; and for men, restricted emotional responses and/or disavowed grief for loss of a male bond.
6. Race and space

“The colonial world is a world divided into compartments. … The town belonging to the colonized people… is a world without spaciousness; men there live on top of each other.”

6.1. Introduction

On my way to interview Ruba and Senaa’ I traveled from Jerusalem to the city of Beersheba (in the Negev in Israel) on a large, comfortable inter-city Israeli bus. Like Via Rail in Canada, the military also makes use of transit services for personnel, but unlike Canada, Israel's IDF soldiers are drafted high school graduates, women and men, serving their mandatory two years, and they carry M-16s and ammunition on the bus with them (Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade [DFAIT] travel warning about buses in Israel only relates to the risk of Palestinian suicide bombings, which have not occurred in several years; it apparently does not consider teenagers with automatic weapons to be a risk). The transportation systems are ethnically segregated and do not connect physically or otherwise: when I asked an Israeli solidarity activist who “sometimes” rides on the Palestinian buses what would happen if a Palestinian boarded an Israeli bus, she replied that that does not happen because of the risk of violence from the other passengers. From Beersheba, I planned to travel to two nearby Bedouin “concentration townships;” first to Laqye and then to Tel Sheva, so I asked the bus driver for information on where I could catch a bus to Laqye. He looked perplexed, and suggested it was a place near Jerusalem. I replied, “No, it's a town very near here.” Trying to be helpful, he consulted with another man in Hebrew, and then understood where I
meant. He said to me, worried, “Laqye? You want to go to Laqye?! No, that is an Arab town. You understand? It's Arab. You don't mean you want to go there.” He thought there was some mistake. He gave me directions, but they were convoluted, so I asked at the information desk at the bus depot. The staff person there was more helpful, but his directions were yet more unusual. He did not know how to get there, a destination about ten minutes away. The directions were like those you might give a hiker going into a hinterland (walk to that road, then hitchhike...), but I knew that the town's residents, Arab Israelis, must have a usual method of travel. There are two transportation systems in Israel: large buses and single taxis for Jews and mini-buses and shared taxis for Palestinians (including Israeli citizens), and the systems do not connect, physically or otherwise; the men who genuinely tried to assist me had no knowledge of how Bedouins get around.

The information desk staff person tried his best to help me, directing me to a taxi stand. He said to me, “You are a young woman, and Laqye is an Arab town. Do you understand what I am trying to tell you?” I replied, “You're saying it's dangerous for me to go there?” He nodded his head and said “Yes.” I relayed that I had been there before, just not by public transportation, and that it was not a risk. At the depot's taxi stand, the Israeli driver quoted a price of 100 shekels ($33 Canadian), but I knew this was too high. After calling my contact in Laqye, I learned there were Bedouin taxis at a market only two blocks away. I took a shared taxi from there for 15 shekels ($5), and when we arrived at my destination, a women's weaving cooperative, the driver went out of his way to accompany me to the door to ensure it was the correct location and that I would not be stranded.
The perception of risk, though often containing valid concerns, can also be overlaid with Othering – with racism, and efforts at control and separation – as well as patriarchal discourses around protection. I did not say to the bus driver who had been surprised that I was not afraid to go to a Palestinian town that I was more afraid of his bus full of weapons. In *The Other Side of Israel*, Susan Nathan recalls her move to Tamra from Tel Aviv:

When I told my left-wing friends… all of them, without exception, were appalled… “You know, the Arabs are friendly to start with, but they’ll turn on you,” advised a [friend]. “You’ll be raped by the men,” said one more. Finally… “I have a telephone number for a special unit in the army. They can come in and get you if you need help. Just let me know.”

On her way to Tamra the taxi driver asks, “‘Do you have a gun?’ Why would I need a gun? I asked. ‘Because they might kill you.’ I told him he was talking nonsense.”

Avram Bornstein, a professor at the City University of New York, recounts:

...Then, as so many soldiers... have done before, he asked me, “You're not afraid?” - meaning to be with Palestinians. I gave him the same retort I gave each time I was asked this question at a checkpoint. I said, “I'm afraid of you [the plural form], the army.” Such an answer was often met with some confusion, as if I had mixed up who is who.

These experiences were informed and framed by discourses surrounding separation of Palestinians as the Other, resulting in racist categorizations of people. Additionally, racism was sometimes overlaid with patriarchal discourses about protection of young and/or White women from the “terrorist” Other. In such discourses, Arab men are viewed as being overly or unusually patriarchal and powerful over women and their movements, yet the discourses themselves are unthinkingly patriarchal and controlling of women’s activities.
But the most striking aspect about travelling to Laqye was the experience of the complete disconnect between Jewish Israeli and Arab Israeli transportation systems and towns. Both groups are Israeli citizens living in the Negev – but exist in two realities in the same time and place. The separation was invisible as there were no signs regulating who could go where, or showing which direction to a Bedouin town. An information staff person and bus driver made genuine efforts to assist me but my destination was outside of their reality, even though the physical disconnect between the transportation systems was just a road and market, a walking distance of about two blocks. What system is this? An invisible kind of apartheid?

6.2. *Apartheid*

Jews [*sic* - Zionists] wrested the Palestinian homeland from its people by force, and will – have to – ward off confronting that original sin. This, I believe, underlies the Israeli Jewish willingness to use extreme force against Palestinian civilians and the obscenely racist remarks about Palestinian parents willing to send their kids into the street. It also explains the rush to establish an apartheid-like system to distance Israelis as much as possible from the living reminder of that 'sin.'

"Souad Dajani, “Yafawiyya (I am from Jaffa).”"

The naming of Israel as an apartheid state has been gaining wider international attention. For example, some Nobel Peace Prize Laureates, such as former US President Jimmy Carter and Archbishop Desmond Tutu have made statements of comparison or named the crime, and the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem has compared Israeli colonial policy in the West Bank to South African Apartheid. The body of
literature applying an analysis of the international crime of apartheid to Israel is growing. Of note are Uri Davis’ 2003 book *Apartheid Israel* and Hazem Jamjoum’s article “Not an Analogy: Israel and the Crime of Apartheid,” which move beyond preliminary positions that analogized the Israeli system to South African Apartheid, in a longer-lasting incarnation.\(^{211}\) Eyal Weizman’s *Hollow Land* details the “spatial technologies and practices” of “a system of colonial control and… separation.”\(^{212}\)

Karine MacAllister provides a legal analysis in her 2008 article “Applicability of the Crime of Apartheid to Israel,”\(^{213}\) definitively addressing all of Israel and the OPT. Another legal analysis, but restricted to the OPT, is Virginia Tilley’s edited book, *Beyond Occupation: Apartheid, Colonialism and International Law in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.*\(^{214}\) In a 2009 article, “Who said nearly 50 years ago that Israel was an Apartheid State?”\(^{215}\) Ronnie Kasrils presents a South African perspective during which she quotes South African Apartheid “architect” and former Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd as stating “Israel is an apartheid state,” in 1963. Also in 2009, a comprehensive document emerged from the United Nations Durban Review Conference, titled “United Against Apartheid, Colonialism and Occupation: Dignity and Justice for the Palestinian People,” which contains a strategic analysis based on the *Durban Declaration and Programme of Action* adopted by the UN at the *World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance*, in Durban, South Africa, in 2001.\(^{216}\) In 2011, Badil Resource Centre published a collection of articles on Israeli apartheid in their quarterly *Al Majdal*, “Israel and the Crime of Apartheid: Towards a Comprehensive Analysis.”\(^{217}\)
Publications that critically highlight some of the responses to Israeli apartheid include Roane Carey’s edited work *The New Intifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid* and a 2012 special issue of *Al Majdal*, “Israel and the Crime of Apartheid: The Vision of the Anti-Apartheid Struggle.” Women and women’s organizations have performed large and important roles in such responses.

Apartheid affects and traumatizes women, children, and men, in similar and dissimilar ways. For example, Jeff Halper characterizes house demolition (a mechanism of Israeli apartheid) as a “double tragedy for women,” who lose their spaces in two ways – first the loss of their home, followed by a loss of status and control in the home as guests in the overcrowded homes of extended family. Women may also experience increased domestic violence. Children experience insecurity, stress, fear, and other signs of trauma.

Literally “apart-hood,” apartheid is more than racial segregation, but a complex power system legally, politically, socially, and spatially. In international law it is defined by the *International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid*, adopted by the United Nations in 1973. In Palestine-Israel, the apartheid system has long roots and was officially entrenched in the Oslo Agreements. Far from being a plan for peace, both the Agreements and Israeli’s implementation of the interim agreements were constructed on what Penny Johnson and Eileen Kuttab have termed “apartheid logic” and constitute “spatial regimes of discrimination” including the division of Palestinian territory into non-contiguous areas, Israel’s continued military occupation and control of borders and a majority of Palestinian territory,
the continued presence of and expansion of Israeli settlements, and the non-sovereign and limited powers of the Palestinian Authority.224

Between Oslo and the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israeli settler (colonizer) population, illegal under international law,225 nearly doubled,226 and are continually growing. As of 2010, the colonies plus their systems of exclusive roads and other restrictions to land access dominate more than 40% of the West Bank.227 This incarnation of apartheid has been both on a large scale and long tolerated by the international community. MacAllister concludes in part:

The ongoing exclusion of Palestinians from their homes, lands and country through internal and external displacement over the past 60 years has forced 70 percent of Palestinians to live as refugees and/or IDPs [internally displaced persons]; the largest and longest standing refugee and IDP crisis in the world today.228

A very brief discussion of some of the specific spatial characteristics of Israeli apartheid follows: the carefully planned invisibility of this incarnation of the international crime.

6.2.1. Invisibility

I look out the window and see my death getting near.229 --“Unnamed Palestinian”

Though comparing Israeli apartheid with the former South African context is useful, a dissimilarity of note is the (in)visibility of apartheid to Israelis and tourists, on every front – physically/visually, legally/politically, in collective memory, and in discourse. During the research project I learned of Israeli youth, even those living in settlements, who were completely unaware of the occupation. Denial of historic and current oppression prevails; at the time of writing, some members of the Knesset were
attempting to criminalize the commemoration of the *Nakba* (the “catastrophe” of 1948) and its appearance in school text books.²³⁰ At the airport, Israeli security officials demanded an explanation of why the words “occupation” and “*Nakba*” were written in my personal notes (the latter was an apparent misreading of “Naqab,” Arabic for the Negev Desert, the southern half of Israel). While South African Apartheid was highly visible, with its infamous “White persons only” signs, in Israel-Palestine no such signs are necessary, due to the entrenchment and efficiency of the Israeli system. This is achieved via several mechanisms; just two examples are license plates and ID cards which place particular regulations on how and when one can move about based on one’s ethnic status, and which are issued in different colours. The explicit visibility of ID cards as a mechanism of apartheid was reduced by the removal of the ethnic status listing, but colours distinguish Jewish Israelis from Palestinian Israelis from Palestinians from the Occupied Territories – green cards bearing Hebrew and Arabic for Palestinians and blue cards in Hebrew for Israelis (blue cards also list nationality so as to further classify Israelis as Jewish, Arab, Bedouin, or Druze²³¹). Helga Tawil-Souri states that “Through ID cards borders are erected between Jewish and Arab people, not Israeli and Palestinian territory.”²³²

Israeli apartheid is meticulously hidden in plain sight. Uri Davis described this visual aspect of Israeli apartheid in a 2004 interview:

But the situation in Israel is significantly different when compared to South Africa in one or more important senses. First, visitors to South Africa would have been hit in the face by apartheid immediately: benches for whites, benches for non-whites; toilets for whites, toilets for non-whites; parks for whites, parks for non-whites; transport for whites and transport for non-whites.
However, the first impression of Israel to a lay-visitor would possibly be the impression of a standard liberal Western democracy... The core apartheid is veiled, and the Jewish National Fund plays an important part in the construction of this veil.\textsuperscript{233}

The Israeli system of invisible apartheid also employs a number of mechanisms to claim and segregate memory spaces, to hide apartheid from consciousness/conscience – such as regulation of words (such as “apartheid”), education, and historical commemorations of dates and places,\textsuperscript{234} among other mechanisms. I had a small taste of this at the end of my research project, when airport security personnel interrogated me as to whether I know the meaning of the word \textit{Nakba}. One of the focal points of day-to-day activism in Palestine is to keep and teach to younger generations the history of the \textit{Nakba}. In addition, at least one Israeli solidarity organization, Zochrot (“Remembering”),\textsuperscript{235} aims to promote awareness of the history of the \textit{Nakba} among Jewish Israelis – Zochrot works to “create a space” for the \textit{Nakba} in Israeli discourse. An example in Palestine is the women’s organization \textit{Kai Laa Nansa}, “Not to Forget” (or ‘lest we forget’) in Jenin Refugee Camp. This kind of ‘historical’ activism and other types of educational efforts figure prominently in Palestinian work, as it helps Palestinians to contextualize current living situations, struggles, goals, and to maintain and foster hope in the face of exhausting daily oppression. Historical-educational activism plays a major role in organizational activities and prisoner organization perhaps because it is also an opportunity – a locus of struggle that can take place even in prison, and that is possible, unlike loci that would be highly risky or not possible to carry out.
A significant characteristic of an apartheid system in physical space is the creation of bantustans – a method that was highly visible in South Africa, but made invisible in various ways in Israel and the OPT. Hazem Jamjoum writes that bantustanization is:

a process of settler-colonialism involving the forced displacement of the indigenous population from most of their ancestral lands and concentrating them in townships and reservations; dividing up the… population into different groups with differing rights; strict mobility restrictions that suffocate the colonized; and the use of brute military force…

On the legal-political aspect, Uri Davis states “The critical importance of these structures of veiling and obfuscation cannot be sufficiently emphasized.” He argues in *Apartheid Israel* that the Knesset, learning from the South African experience of “legislating petty apartheid at the surface of the law for all to see,” and mindful “that the political Zionist interpretation of the idea of a Jewish state represents a blatant violation of the terms of the… UN General Assembly Resolution 181(II),” intentionally created a dual-level system to effectively hide in plain sight the legal discrimination that arguably forms the basis of Israeli apartheid:

Rather, the Israeli legislator chose to legislate Zionist apartheid (discrimination *in law* on the basis of ‘Jew’ versus ‘non-Jew’) by constructing a two-tiered legal system. In the body of Israeli’s strategic apartheid legislation (with the notable exception of the Law of Return of 1950) there is no explicit reference to ‘Jews’ versus ‘non-Jews’ or ‘Jews only.’ Instead, the said strategic laws vest with the WZO [World Zionist Organization] and its various affiliates… the authority to carry out and facilitate Zionist apartheid discrimination on behalf of the state.

Another mechanism of invisibility/visibility is the careful design and construction of colonies ("settlements") in the West Bank. Eyal Weizman in his 2007 book *Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation* details numerous strategies for building colonies on hilltops, but there is more. Weizman explains how the geometrical shapes (circular and folded in), orientation of apartment complexes – looking inward but gazing
outward, and bright illumination at night, serve a number of “optical” purposes: to help create a sense of community as well as nationalism and discipline within the settler group; that is, as a means of “monitoring” Palestinian communities below – to be able to look at the Other without seeing, because it is the Other.\textsuperscript{240}

Another purpose is to assist in “pacifying” Palestinians.\textsuperscript{241} Colonies are highly visible to Palestinians in the West Bank – “from everywhere you can spot the settlement on the hilltop, looming, dreadfully colonial… alienated, threatening, conquering houses, lusting for more.”\textsuperscript{242}

For Israeli colonists, Palestine and apartheid are also invisible not just from within the colony, but on the way there colonists pass over settler highways from which Palestinians are barred:

\begin{quote}
Across this fragmented geography the different Israeli settlements were woven together by lines of infrastructure routed through three-dimensional space: roads connecting Israeli settlements are raised on extended bridges spanning Palestinian routes and lands… while narrow Palestinian underpasses are usually bored under Israeli multi-lane highways.\textsuperscript{243}
\end{quote}

In many places the highways have walls that help mask the fact that one is driving over Palestinian territory.

\section*{6.1. Summary}

It would be an understatement to say that Israeli apartheid presents a barrier to Palestinian activism. The system of apartheid divides and dominates physical, discursive, and historical/memory spaces. The present incarnation is characterized by invisibility; it
is hidden from view on several levels, such as the absence of signage on park benches, buses, or on the surface of Israeli law. Palestinian bantustanization is hidden, and Israeli settlement-colonies are designed to reinforce the optics of invisible apartheid, as is the colonial road system, which creates visual continuity of “Israel” into the West Bank. Apartheid affects women and children particularly harshly.
7. Reproduction of power and control in cyberspace

7.1. Information control

Many states control access to internet information ‘the old fashioned way’ via disciplinary measures, direct control of internet access, punishment of users and/or other forms of direct censorship to various degrees; in March 2010 Reporters Without Borders named China, Vietnam, Iran, Burma, North Korea, and Morocco among those states. The organization reports that internet-suppression laws and user imprisonment rates are increasing: “In 2009, some sixty countries experienced a form of Web censorship, which is twice as many as in 2008.” In North America, insidious corporate control of information media easily expanded from traditional news media to cyberspace, featuring the hyperrealization of infotainment, blurring the lines between entertainment, news, and tragedy until they are indistinguishable. With increased audience access in the internet age, information media is not only available in new ways, but also controlled by new tactics, featuring elements of both state and corporate control. This hybridized approach is analogous to on-the-ground expressions of power and occupation, which John Collins, in his book Occupied by Memory, describes as “domination, or… ‘pre-modern’ power” and “more ‘modern’ or ‘disciplinary’ power coexisting quite comfortably within structures of overt domination.” Via such ‘systemic’ style internet media control, where the ‘system’ is the power-reinforcing structure in which state, ideological, and corporate interests and methods are complementary and generally mutually indistinguishable, cyberspace is “colonized” and the “dominant discourses” of power are “re-creat[ed] and reinforce[ed].”
In the past, Israel leaned more heavily on direct and disciplinary methods of information control, restricting the import of books and magazines and through violent means. Research participant “‘Emad,” a refugee centre director with a background in journalism and media who has been active in the Palestinian struggle since the first Intifada, related his experience with Israel’s change in policies of control:

Before Oslo, when we were active, like what we are doing in our work now, we were not allowed to work as what we work now. Like to have magazines, to organize different courses, to have something about the Right of Return, about international law, about Palestinian history. Before Oslo, we were not allowed to work in the media or in a centre for the people, like we work now. But when they arrested us, they told us, you have been active, like in the student union. What we do now, it’s what we were doing before Oslo, but it cost us some time, years, in Israeli jails, because if they caught us, they put us in Israeli jails. (‘Emad)

Officials, organizations, professional unions, and many kinds of publications including poetry and UN documents remain illegal, and arrests, imprisonment and torture continue, but currently arrest is used more as a form of collective punishment and imprisonment terms are frequent. Threats and violent censure do continue in direct relation to information media under a hybrid form of information control. For example, in February 2010 the office of Stop the Wall Campaign in Ramallah was subject to an overnight attack that included information confiscation and mass arrest. Rabie Abulatifah of Al-Haq reports that direct control over internet media has increased somewhat in recent years but continues to be low in comparison to other Middle Eastern countries.

7.2. Availability

In the current system, community organizations, frequently funded by the European Union, are normalized and have de facto ‘permission’ to exist, and serve as a
major outlet and centre of grassroots activism. These organizations, or “centres for the people” are ‘free’ to, and do, publish magazines, research, blogs, and other materials online in large amounts, and distribute via email groups. There is a vast quantity of information available via the internet detailing, analyzing, visualizing, and recording Palestine, supplying evidence, credibility, and testimony. In my experiences as a user-participant of such internet networks, I am not able to read everything that comes my way via email and networking sites due to the vast quantity of available information. Palestinian solidarity networks are swamped with information – user-participants often do not need to perform web searches for news and other information.

Despite the apparent freedom of information and availability of evidence, the violent form of apartheid that the Israeli government is committing in Palestine and Israel has become more entrenched rather than alleviated. The wall is a highly visible manifestation, for which construction began in 2002 and which continues to be built and changed perpetually as a tool in ongoing land theft operations. Settlement and home demolition have increased dramatically in the last few years. How can it be, then, that vast quantities of information about the oppression of the Palestinians are freely available and continually expanded and expounded on the internet, yet it continues to be ‘unknown’? In the recent past, wide availability of information about oppression had significant (potential) influence on the progress of the situation; witness the effect of the visibility of the Vietnam War to the American public, and the extreme measures taken by the US to control access to information during the first Gulf War, when reporting was dictated by the US military so as to maintain public acceptance and indifference.
Among cyber participants – those who read, create, post, share, comment on, and so on – the internet has the appearance of a strong democratizing tool that necessarily builds upon or bypasses other forms of mass media, and leads to optimistic claims that “the oppressive acts of non-democratic states have never been so visible” and that damning evidence “can easily be accessed by an international bystander audience that increasingly take transgressions of international norms seriously and take action in response.” Back in 2002, Kurt Mills (among others) optimistically and prematurely named the internet as a tool of freedom from oppressive spaces, writing that

Territorial boundaries are rendered meaningless as bits and bytes, electrons, data, faxes, and images speed along fibre optic cable, up and down satellite links, and through the matrix of cyberspace. … In fact, the Internet shrinks time and space such that borders ‘virtually’ disappear and appear significantly less relevant.

Similar claims continue, such as this statement from March 2010 from Reporters Without Borders:

In authoritarian countries in which the traditional media are state-controlled, the Internet offers a unique space for discussion and information-sharing, and has become an ever more important engine for protest and mobilization. The Internet is the crucible in which repressed civil societies can revive and develop.

The new media, and particularly social networks, have given populations’ collaborative tools with which they can change the social order. Young people have taken them by storm. Facebook has become the rallying point for activists prevented from demonstrating in the streets. One simple video on YouTube – Neda in Iran or the Saffron march of the monks in Burma – can help to expose government abuses to the entire world. One simple USB flashdrive can be all it takes to disseminate news.

While the internet may serve as an additional organizing medium, and exposure may have a significant impact in certain other contexts, it is clear that generalized claims of mass exposure are overstated, particularly in the case of Palestine and Israel, which has a voluminous and detailed presence in cyberspace. It may be true “that in the contemporary
world authoritarian regimes can no longer hide from the gaze of the global community,” but it can be prevented from looking.

Research participant “Labib” asked rhetorically, “Who is listening?” The answer appears to be only those who are already part of Palestine solidarity and related networks offline. Thus, cyberspace serves as a continuation of real space more than or rather than a site of “potential… democratic revitalization of the public sphere… two-way communication and democratic participation in public dialogue.”

7.3. Methods of control

7.3.1. Invisibility

Lincoln Dahlberg writes that the key to cyberspace colonization is “the domination of online attention.” Attention is “arguably the most valuable resource online,” thus while subversive content is highly available on the internet, it is “largely marginalized in the competition for user attention.” Thus,

although it is relatively straightforward (for those with the resources) to get views published on the Internet, having them noticed is another matter. With millions of Web pages, and millions more messages passing through e-mail and discussion groups, being noticed by more than a handful of people is extremely difficult for most online participants. This is not the case for large media and communication corporations.

Methods of systemic internet media control – attention control – include direct and disguised advertising, maintaining user traffic within large corporate networks, various search engine design strategies, and “the constitution of cyberparticipants as consumers.” Most relevant to the present discussion, however, is the use of “recommender systems based on surveillance and profiling, and… extensive systems of links through which users are “isolated” into so-called “customized” or “hyper-
individualized”266 – or more accurately, highly genericized – classifications. Such systems have the effect of fragmenting the public into separate cyberspaces without their knowledge. Erecting such invisible walls stands at odds with the idea of “bringing together diverse positions for contestation in central public spaces”267 or a “new interconnected space”268 for “democratic participation in public dialogue”269 or “place where people engage in… the vital discussion of public issues that affect everybody.”270

7.3.2. Profiling

In the Israeli context, the availability and content of the information no longer serves as a threat to the oppressor: the arena of control has shifted. Direct control over subversive information is no longer necessary, because such methods are more publicly visible and unpalatable than the gathering of information on and profiling of any and all individuals, highly efficiently, precisely, inescapably and usually inconspicuously. The direction of control is in reverse. Lila Rajiva writes, “Both indivisible and invisible, information networks lie at the center of th[e] total state.”271 She continues (speaking of the US context),

the state inserts its rationality through the stealthy monitoring of a robotic technology, which represents the elimination of the human. In so expressing rationality without the inconvenience of undisciplined flesh, the Promethean state… arrives at that dangerous solipsism, reflected in such statements as, ‘We create our own reality.’272

Though cyberspace is home to both subversive material and mechanisms of the expansion of control, power’s “ideology moves to the center as the advance of the total state accelerates, and with it moves the staging ground of ideology—electronic communications, computer and information networks, and information technology.”273
Furthermore, this mechanism of control in reverse is hidden and thus silently “presents itself as an inevitability.”274 Rajiva further writes that

The centrality of information networks, both in their afferent (intelligence gathering) and efferent (intelligence-disseminating) aspects, underscores the importance of the spiritual—the mental, moral, and psychological elements—in the polity the Prometheans imagine. For this reason, espionage and propaganda have become central, and both operate in a manner essentially invisible to the public.275

Power’s concern is no longer the information itself, but with who uses what. With the “expansion of the state territorially into the heavens and internally into the psyche”—cyberspatially and discursively—into the social psychology of the internet—“external constraints become not merely ineffective but irrelevant.”276

Ultimately, power seeks to tighten its grip on information flows, efficiently and quietly, in its quest to control space. Writes Rajiva, “the concept of space becomes central to the Promethean ideology.”277

[The concept of space] is articulated through the ethos of competition and the survival of the fittest, the maintenance of distance between the elites and the masses. Space is the unifying concept… It is also behind the definition of everything outside the state as a lack needing to be remedied or filled.

As physical space is invisibly subjugated through occupation and apartheid, so is cyberspace.

7.4. Summary

“Cyberspace replicates, at least in part, the conditions under which certain types of interactions… take place.278 Israeli apartheid and online information are characterized by simultaneous availability and ‘invisibility.’
Internet participants, likewise restricted to the monitored space of virtuality, make use of the unique opportunities for empowerment provided by existence within cyberspace, as a medium for awareness raising, learning, and the rearrangement of social hierarchies. However, just as the separate spaces of apartheid as well as the highly visible walls provide information, there is a high degree of continuity across real and cyber spaces in the ways in which that information is ‘read,’ accessed or perceived, reproducing barriers to activism in the offline world.
8. Conclusion

The spaces and cyberspaces of Israeli apartheid are racialized and gendered systems of control, and Palestinian women’s activism, as responses to power and oppression layered along lines of gender, race, and class/rurality, uses multiple approaches.

But women have been twice veiled – as women’s and civil society participation have been more marginalized since the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, compared with the first; and as subjects of Israeli apartheid, which cloaks itself and Palestinians.

A number of the participants’ contributions contained themes related to the ‘NGO-ization’ and corresponding professionalization over radicalization of Palestinian women’s activism, including perspectives on how work based in “centre” spaces has presented opportunities for as well as barriers to change. Participants also narrated themes of grief as a discursively gendered role involving prescriptive roles for women and restricted roles for men.

The system of Israeli apartheid is hidden on every level but affects the lives of women and children particularly harshly. The system is obscured from view physically, discursively, and in law, and it divides and dominates life for Palestinian and Bedouin people in Israel and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Furthermore, there is a high degree of continuity across real and cyber spaces in the ways in which that information is ‘read,’ accessed or perceived, reproducing barriers to activism in the offline world.
There are a number of questions requiring further research. As I finish writing, the United Nations has just given state status to Palestine; it is too soon to know in what ways that will impact the status of women and their activities at the grassroots, within NGOs, and at the national level, and civil society in general, or even which questions need to be asked. There are also many pre-existing questions. Though there is some literature addressing the packaging of Palestinian women’s organizing into externally-funded NGOs, more is needed. The body of research tackling the topic of Israeli apartheid is gaining momentum and will hopefully continue. In addition, there is a glaring gap between solidarity activism and academic literature about solidarity, such as linkages between Palestinian activism and indigenous activism in North and South America, anti-apartheid solidarity coming out of South Africa and many other countries, Jewish Israeli solidarity, and Jewish North American solidarity, and the international Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement. Moreover there are extant barriers within academia that make pursuing such research questions a front in itself.
9. Notes

3 See, for e.g., Ghada Karmi, “Interview: Ghada Karmi, A Voice from Exile.” Middle East Policy 17. 1, Spring 2010, p. 88.
7 Al Labadi, p. 126.
8 Hamas is a Palestinian political party associated with Islamic religious conservatism.
10 Mary Beth Ginter, “Campus Activism: Studying Change as it is Being Created; Gender, the Internet and Organizational Structure in a Student Anti-Sweatshop Group.” Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 2003.
11 Ibid., pp. 107-114.
12 See, for e.g., ibid., pp. 103-4; and Christina Greene, “‘We’ll Take Our Stand’: Race, Class, and Gender in the Southern Student Organizing Committee, 1964-1969.” In Virginia Bernhard et al., eds, Southern Women: Hidden Histories of Women in the New South. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1994, p. 193.
15 See for e.g., Hasso, “Feminist Generations.”


Ibid.

Ibid.

Cook, p. 2.

Pappe, p. 30.

Ibid.

Cook, p. 3.

Pappe, pp. 27, 31.

Ibid., p. 28.

Ibid., p. 31.

Ibid., pp. 31-2.

Ibid., pp. 33-4.

Ibid., p. 56.

Ibid., pp. 58, 60.

Ibid., p. 40.

Cook, p. 3.

Pappe, pp. 27, 31.

Ibid., p. 28.

Ibid., p. 31.

Ibid., pp. 31-2.

Ibid., pp. 33-4.

Ibid., p. 56.

Ibid., pp. 58, 60.

Ibid., p. 40.


Pappe, pp. 225-234.

Peteet, p. 135.


Ibid., p. 11.

Ibid., p. 5.

Peteet, p. 135.


Rosemary Sayigh qit in Fleischmann, p. 3.


Peteet, p. 136.

Ibid., p. 139.


Al Labadi, p. 123.


Ibid., pp. 151, 155.

Johnson and Kuttab, pp. 31-2.

Al Labadi.


Ibid.
Bantustanization is addressed in section 6.2.1., “Invisibility.”


See, for e.g., <www.securityfence.mod.gov.il>.


Johnson and Kuttab, p. 37.

Ibid. p. 3.

Fleischmann, p. 220, n. 3.


Ibid. p. 3.


See for e.g., Chris Weedon, Feminism, theory and the politics of difference. Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1999, ch. 7.


Ibid.

Ibid. p. 514.

Weedon, p. 168.

Jacoby, p. 513.

Weedon, p. 168.

Heidi Safia Mirza, qtd. in ibid, p. 169.

Ibid.

Ibid. p. 1083.

Weedon, p. 161.


Ibid., p. 1270.

Ibid.

Ibid. p. 1270. Emphasis in original.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 283.

Ibid., pp. 514-5.


Ibid., pp. 278-84.

See ibid, especially p. 283.

Ibid., p. 285.

Jacoby, pp. 512-3.


“Reflections.”


Ibid., p. 103.

Ibid, p. 104.


Ibid, p. 70.
129 Ibid, p. 79.
134 Ibid, p. 142.
135 Ibid, p. 143.
138 Ibid., p. 255.
139 Ibid., p. 267-8.
140 Ibid., p. 269.
144 Stacey.
145 Fabian.
146 Mernissi.
147 Ibid., p. 17.
148 For discussion on this point, see for eg, Jacoby.
151 Quoted in Best, p. 898.
153 Absolon and Willett, pp. 97-8.
154 Ibid., p. 97.
156 Ibid., p. 98.


159 Please refer to Appendix III, Informed Consent Form, and ethics approval, final page, for more information.

160 Fleischmann, p. 19.


166 Fanon, quoted in Kipfer, p. 711.


168 Ibid.

169 Ibid.

170 Ibid.


172 Johnson and Kuttab (original article), p. 24.


175 Al Labadi, p. 126.

176 Jad, p. 16.
Own translation, from “Se borner a examiner l'action des femmes 'organisees' serait vouer a l'oubli d'autres formes de lutte.” Sayigh, “Femmes palestiniennes,” p. 15.

Jad, p. 16.

Ibid., p. 2.

Permission for inclusion of these statements was obtained through the consent process.

Atia el Athamin, personal communication. Via interpretation by Yeela Livnat Raanan, 10 May 2009.

Dr Yeela Livnat Raanan, personal communication, 10 May 2009.


Refers to traditional Bedouin women’s clothing; embroidered black dress and white head scarf; compared with a more ‘modern’ women’s style that is associated with religious conservatism; tailored, dark or neutral coloured jilbaab and close-fitting hijaab.

See, for eg., Ginter, pp. 103-4; and Greene, p. 193.


See, for e.g., Peteet, p. 138.


Quoted in ibid., pp. 24, 29.


Quoted in ibid., p. 25.


Ibid., p. 36.

Ibid.

Habiballah, p. 23.

Qtd in ibid., p. 28.

Johnson, pp. 34-35.

Johnson and Kuttab, p. 33.


Ibid., p. 135.

Ibid., p. 140.

Ibid., pp. 142-3.

Frantz Fanon, quoted in Stefan Kipfer, “Fanon and space: colonization, urbanization, and liberation from the colonial to the global city. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 25, 2007, pp. 709-10.


Ibid., p. 3.

Bornstein, p. 119.


223 Johnson and Kuttab, p. 22.

224 Ibid.


226 Johnson and Kuttab, p. 23.
“Factsheet.”

MacAllister.

“Unnamed Palestinian” quoted in Weizman, p. 111.


Tawil-Souri, p. 7.

Ibid., p. 1.


For more on erasure of places and history, see Ilan Pappe, chapter 10, “The Memoricide of the Nakba.”


Jamjoum.

Davis, p. 52

Ibid., p. 51.

Ibid. Emphasis in original.

Weizman, pp. 130-2.

Ibid., pp. 132-3.

Gideon Levy qtd. in ibid., p. 133.

Weizman, p. 12.


Dahlberg, p. 162.


“Apartheid Wall.”


“Web 2.0 versus Control 2.0”

Stayner and Davidson, p. 3.
Dahlberg, p. 169.
259 Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 161.
266 Mills, p. 74.
267 Dahlberg, p. 165.
268 Stayner and Davidson, p. 3.
269 Quoted in Dahlberg, p. 161.
270 Mills, p. 71.
278 Mills, p. 71. Emphasis added.
10.  **Works cited**


Badil Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights. *Al Majdal* 47, special issue, “Israel and the Crime of Apartheid: Towards a Comprehensive


Ginter, Mary Beth. “Campus Activism: Studying Change as it is Being Created; Gender, the Internet and Organizational Structure in a Student Anti-Sweatshop Group.” Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 2003.


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11. Appendix I: List of civil society groups

The research proposal included the following list of civil society groups though which I recruited potential research participants, as well as through other groups not on the list but which are similar in terms of membership and type of work.

The organizations are typical mainstream non-governmental (NGO) organizations. They are not political parties or militant groups. They engage in low risk activities such as advocacy, legal processes, provision of support services, and strengthening of infrastructure. Their membership is generally made up of regular civilians, including citizens of Israel.

Adalah: The Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel

- Legal and international advocacy
- Special consultative status from the Economic and Social Council of the UN
- Adalah.org
- Main office: 94 Yaffa Street, PO Box 8921, Haifa 31090, Israel
- Naqab office: 28 Reger Ave # 35, Beer el Sebe, Israel

Addameer Prisoners’ Support and Human Rights Association

- Name means “conscience”
- Protection of political prisoners
- www.addameer.org/addameer/about.html
- P.O.Box 17338, Jerusalem

Ittijah

- Union of Arab Community-Based Associations – an NGO network
- Advocacy: anti-discrimination, for improvement of basic infrastructure and services
- Special consultative status from the Economic and Social Council of the UN
- Ittijah.org
• Located in Haifa, Israel

**Stop the Wall Campaign**

• An initiative of the Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON)
• Community voice organization
• Stophewall.org
• PENGON, PO Box 25220, Beit Hanina, Jerusalem

**YWCA**

• Mission: empowerment Palestinian women; expansion of options, support for economic independence, liberation from all forms of oppression and enhancement of participation in building a free Palestinian civil society.
• www.ywca-palestine.org
• East Jerusalem, P.O. Box 20044

**Zochrot**

• Name means “remembering”
• Israeli citizens group – raises awareness of Palestinian refugees and history
• www.NakbaInHebrew.org/index.php?lang=english
• 61 Ibn Gvirol St., Apt. 2, Tel Aviv–Jaffa 64362
12. Appendix II: Recruitment script

Recruitment process and study location

Recruitment emails contained the following text, and telephone recruitment followed the same points. The text is based on the consent form/cover letter content.

REB File # 09-050

Katie Boudreau
Department of Women and Gender Studies
Saint Mary’s University
Halifax, NS B3H 3C3
Ph: 00+1+902-476-8299
Fax: 00+1+902-420-5181 (WGS Dept.)
Katie.Boudreau@gmail.com

Hello,

I hope this letter finds you well. I would like to invite you to take part in a research project, “Gender and post-al Aqsa Palestinian solidarity activism.” Your participation would be greatly appreciated.

I am a graduate student in the Women and Gender Studies Department at Saint Mary’s University in Halifax, Canada. As part of my master’s thesis, I am conducting research under the supervision of Dr Judy Haiven.

Why?

The purpose of this research project is to explore some of the mechanisms of social change that can be effected through grassroots social movements, civil society, and/or activism. In particular, I am interested in the ways that grassroots work by Palestinians has influenced gender relations and the social position of women within Palestinian society in the period of the Second Intifada. I am investigating some of the opportunities and barriers to grassroots political involvement and the public sphere that exist among Palestinian activist women.

Another goal of the project is to contribute to awareness-raising about Palestine.

Who?

I am seeking the participation of eight to twelve adult participants who are active in the Palestinian movement, approximately two-thirds women and one-third men. I am extending this invitation to members of solidarity organizations.
What?

If you choose to participate, I would request an interview with you, during which I would ask you about your work (questions are available for review). The length of the interview would be at your discretion, but I would suggest approximately one hour. The interview may be conducted all at once, or you may choose to break it up and meet more than once. My contact information is at the top of this form; if you have any reason, please do not hesitate to contact me during or following the period of research.

Confidentiality

You do not need to identify yourself at any time, whether or not you choose to participate. Whether or not you identify yourself, I will not retain a record of your real name. Contributions will be labeled anonymously. Furthermore, only your voice and not your image will be recorded. Interview recordings will be transferred securely – either transferred to DVDs and stored under lock, and/or will be electronically transferred to Saint Mary’s University under encryption. I will identify the groups with which participants work. For example, your contributions may be labeled as “activist A” from (name of group). The completed thesis will be publically available.

Potential benefits and risks

Firstly, I wish to raise awareness, even if only in a very small way, about Palestine and about barriers to civil society capacity. Secondly, I hope to contribute to the body of knowledge in regards to grassroots social movements, gender, and to Palestinian responses to the occupation.

Financial compensation will be provided indirectly through a donation of between CDN$8 and 10 (approximately ILS₪24–30) to each participant’s group affiliation.

There are no unusual risks in participating in this study.

Withdrawal from the project

If you choose to participate in this project, you may later choose to withdraw at any point. If a participant chooses to withdraw, any previously collected data will remain under the project’s consideration. Participants may also choose to change the confidentiality status of their participation at any time, and this decision will be retroactively applied to previous contributions.

More information

If you are interested in participating in this project, please reply using the information provided at the top of this form. I hope you will consider assisting me in this endeavour; it would be greatly appreciated.
13. Appendix III: Informed consent form

Project title: Gender and post-al Aqsa Palestinian solidarity activism

REB File # 09-050

Katie Boudreau
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Warmest Greetings,
I hope this letter finds you well. I would like to invite you to take part in a research project, “Gender and post-al Aqsa Palestinian solidarity activism.” Your participation would be greatly appreciated.

I am a graduate student in the Women and Gender Studies Department at Saint Mary’s University in Halifax, Canada. As part of my master’s thesis, I am conducting research under the supervision of Dr Judy Haiven.

Why?
The purpose of this research project is to explore some of the mechanisms of social change that can be effected through grassroots social movements, civil society, and/or activism. In particular, I am interested in the ways that grassroots work by Palestinians has influenced gender relations and the social position of women within Palestinian society in the period of the Second Intifada. I am investigating some of the opportunities and barriers to grassroots political involvement and the public sphere that exist among Palestinian activist women.

Another goal of the project is to contribute to awareness-raising about Palestine.

Who?
I am seeking the participation of eight to twelve adult participants who are active in the Palestinian movement, approximately two-thirds women and one-third men. I am extending this invitation to members of some Palestinian solidarity organizations.

What?
If you choose to participate, I would request an interview with you, during which I would ask you about your work (questions available for review). The length of the interview would be at your discretion, but I would suggest approximately one hour. The interview may be conducted all at once, or you may choose to break it up and meet more than once. My contact information is at the top of this form; please do not hesitate to contact me during or following the period of research for any reason.
Confidentiality
You do not need to identify yourself at any time, whether or not you choose to participate. Whether or not you identify yourself, I will not retain a record of your real name. Contributions will be labeled anonymously. Furthermore, only your voice and not your image will be recorded. Interview recordings will be transferred securely – either transferred to DVDs and stored under lock, and/or will be electronically transferred to Saint Mary’s University under encryption. I will identify the groups with which participants work. For example, your contributions may be labeled as “activist A” from (name of group). The completed thesis will be publicly available.

Potential benefits and risks
Firstly, I wish to raise awareness, even if only in a very small way, about Palestine and about barriers to civil society capacity. Secondly, I hope to contribute to the body of knowledge in regards to grassroots social movements, gender, and to Palestinian responses to the occupation.

Financial compensation will be provided indirectly through a donation of between CDN$8 and 10 (approximately ILS₪24–30) to each participant’s group affiliation.

There are no anticipated risks in participating in this study.

Withdrawal from the project
You may choose to cease participation in the project at any point. If you choose to withdraw, any previously collected data will remain under the project’s consideration. You may also choose to change the confidentiality status of your participation at any time, and this decision will be retroactively applied to previous contributions.

More information
Please feel free to contact me using the information provided at the top of this form.

I would like to send feedback to the project’s participants, and I will discuss this with you. Additionally, I hope to complete the thesis by the end of the summer and I can provide copies upon request.

Certification
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Saint Mary’s University Research Ethics Board. If you have any questions or concerns about ethical matters, you may contact Dr. Veronica Stinson, Chair of the Saint Mary's University Research Ethics Board at ethics@smu.ca or 00+1+902-420-5728.

I understand what this study is about and appreciate the risks and benefits. I have had adequate time to think about this and have had the opportunity to ask questions. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I can end my participation at any time.

To help maintain confidentiality, no signature is required

Please keep one copy of this form for your own records
14. Appendix IV: Interview questions

Introductory questions

1. Do you have any questions or comments (in regards to the project, interview process, me)?

2. Where are you from?

3. How old are you?

4. What is your educational background?

Main questions

5. Can you please tell me about your work experience and your current work, and how and why you got involved?

6. Have you ever been arrested or experienced any other personal risks as a result of your activism? Is there anything else that gets in the way of your work?

7. How many hours per week do you estimate you spend on grassroots organizing work (by “grassroots work,” I am asking about civil society activity initiated and carried out by the people, differentiated from initiatives coming from power structures such as governmental or corporate bodies).

8. In your opinion, are there many women involved in Palestinian activism, compared to men?

9. What do you think encourages or discourages women from getting involved?

10. What encourages or discourages men’s involvement?

11. How does women’s involvement in Palestinian organizing/activism impact on women’s positions, within their families, communities, at work, and/or among friends? Please feel free to include personal experiences in your response.

12. What kinds of specific work/tasks/activities do you do as an activist? What kinds of work do you observe women taking on compared with men, in general?

13. Can you reflect on the dynamics of interaction between group members or within your activist community in terms of gender?

14. In your circles, is there any dialogue about gender? If so, what are the themes of these conversations?

15. Are groups sometimes organized along gender lines (such as women’s auxiliary groups)? If so, in what ways does this help or hinder women’s involvement?

Wrap-up

16. Is there anything else I should have asked, or that you would like to add?

17. Do you have any questions?
Dear ________.

I hope you and your family are well.

I am writing to extend my thanks for your contribution to the research project “Gender and post-al Aqsa Palestinian solidarity activism” and for sharing your knowledge and experiences. Our conversations were significant learning experiences for me and I greatly appreciate the time and effort you graciously provided.

The study had the intended goals of awareness-raising about Palestine, and to contribute to the bodies of knowledge surrounding civil society and gender studies. Your participation has been of enormous assistance to me in working toward these objectives.

As mentioned, a donation of ______ has been made to ______ organization as a small token of appreciation.

If you would like to receive a copy of the completed thesis, or if you have any questions or comments, please contact me using the information above.

[Insert summary of research results/thesis outcomes]

Sincerely and gratefully yours,

Katie Boudreau
16. Appendix VI: Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDN</td>
<td>Canadian (dollar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUPW</td>
<td>General Union of Palestinian Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCUV</td>
<td>Regional Council for the Unrecognized Bedouin Villages in the Israeli Negev</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILS</td>
<td>Israeli New Sheqels</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations (academic field)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JNF</td>
<td>Jewish National Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>Member of Knesset (Israeli parliament)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPT</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
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<td>PAR</td>
<td>Participatory action research</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>Palestinian National Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMF</td>
<td>Relational multicultural feminism</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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