Do we really care whether our beliefs are true? : an examination of the arguments found in chapter five of Stephen Stich's The fragmentation of reason

Abstract

This thesis is a critical examination of the arguments found in Chapter Five of Stephen P. Stich's book, The Fragmentation of Reason. Generally speaking, Stich's books is designed to deconstruct some significant aspects of philosophical thought commonly found in the style of philosophy referred to as analytic, particularly analytic epistemology. His goal is to both reveal how analytic philosophy and epistemology fail to provide adequate guidance in evaluating and improving our cognitive reasoning strategies, and to ultimately offer a philosophically pragmatic methodology which he feels is superior in this respect. In the process of this deconstruction, Stich criticizes two important features of analytic epistemology, two features which form the foci of this thesis--truth and true beliefs. He asks if we really care whether our beliefs are true or not? By the end of Chapter Five, his answer is a resounding, no. With this conclusion in hand, Stich makes an argument for there being lots of competition for truth and true beliefs. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)