On the reality of proper sensibles in Aristotle and some of his modern commentators

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, I want to discover what Aristotle’s position is with respect to the reality of proper sensibles. That is to say, I want to show whether or not Aristotle regards the proper sensibles as being qualities existing in objects in the way our senses report them to us. I shall fulfill this purpose by presenting an analysis of appropriate texts from Aristotle’s De Anima and De Sensu et Sensibili. The scope of my treatment of Aristotle’s position on the reality of proper sensibles is, then, confined to the material presented in the De Anima and the De Sensu et Sensibili. For these are the two works in which Aristotle gives a detailed account of his theory of sensation. The second purpose in writing this thesis is as follows. I want to take certain works by three modern Aristotlian commentators in which they speak about Aristotle’s position on the reality of proper sensibles as presented in the De Anima and the De Sensu et Sensibili and do two things with them. (1) I shall show that their presentation of Aristotle’s position on this topic misinterprets that position. (2) Then I shall show just exactly why it is that each of these three commentators has misinterpreted Aristotle’s position. The three commentators and their respective works that I shall examine here are, Aristotle by John Herman Randall (Jr.), Aristotle by W.D. Ross, and Abstraction from Matter by Charles De Konick.