Rocks are just bad souls : Anne Conway’s privation account of matter

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dc.contributor.advisor Edgar, Scott
dc.creator Perry, Lauren Colleen
dc.date.accessioned 2018-05-11T15:02:32Z
dc.date.available 2018-05-11T15:02:32Z
dc.date.issued 2018
dc.identifier.uri http://library2.smu.ca/handle/01/27519
dc.description 1 online resource (ii, 39 p.)
dc.description Includes abstract.
dc.description Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-39).
dc.description.abstract The Cambridge Platonist Anne Conway, in her only treatise, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, articulates a complex metaphysical system, partly formed as an alternative to the mechanistic philosophy of Descartes and Hobbes. Objecting to Descartes’ dualism, Conway defends a monistic and vitalistic account of matter. However, Conway’s account of matter is notoriously difficult to understand. One reason for this is that Conway does not make her aims in the Principles explicit. Without a precise account of Conway’s aims, it is difficult to evaluate her account of matter. I argue that Conway, motivated by primarily religious aims, defends a privation account of matter. Conway’s concern is making her ontology consistent with the Christian doctrine of universal salvation. The paper concludes by considering how Conway defends her account of matter from mechanist objections en_CA
dc.language.iso en en_CA
dc.publisher Halifax, N.S. : Saint Mary’s University
dc.title Rocks are just bad souls : Anne Conway’s privation account of matter en_CA
dc.type Text en_CA
thesis.degree.name Bachelor of Arts (Honours Philosophy)
thesis.degree.level Undergraduate
thesis.degree.discipline Philosophy
thesis.degree.grantor Saint Mary’s University (Halifax, N.S.)


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