Criminal-private-sector-corruption : Mafia involvement as brokers and patrons in construction contracts in Montreal

Abstract

Starting in 2012, several industry-insiders described a system of corruption to the Charbonneau Commission, an inquiry by the Quebec Government to investigate corruption in Montreal’s public works contract tenders. Many testified about a cartel-like system where construction companies colluded to win bids. Funds from the public contracts were diverted to corrupt bureaucrats, political parties, city engineers, and to the Rizzuto Mafia family. The relationship between private sector construction companies and the mafia is an illustration of Criminal-Private-Sector-Corruption, because it involves corruption of private sectors by a criminal organization. Morselli's network analysis model and Albini’s patron-client model will be applied to this case to better understand the nature of CPSC. This thesis argues that CPSC within the Montreal construction industry persisted over time due to the construction industries’ natural susceptibility to corruption, the use of racketeering and bid-rigging, and due to Vito Rizzuto acting as a ‘broker’ within the criminal network.