

**ANTI-History:**

**Toward an Historiographical Approach to (Re)assembling Knowledge of the Past**

By:

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## Abstract

### **ANTI-History: Toward an Historiographical Approach to (Re)assembling Knowledge of the Past**

By: Gabrielle A.T. Durepos

This dissertation sets out to answer the call for the historic turn in organization studies by creating an alternative methodology for history, one that I have come to call *ANTI-History*. In the development of this alternative historiographic approach (viz. ANTI-History) I have drawn on insights from three distinct literatures: (1) the sociology of knowledge, (2) Marxist and cultural theory historiography, and (3) actor-network theory. The collective and iterative insights drawn from these literatures are developed over the first 4 chapters to constitute ANTI-History in chapter 5. The viability and performativity of this new approach is then explored in the following three chapters (chapters 6-8) by way of analysis of archival and other materials relating to the history of a specific organization – Pan American Airways (PAA). The three empirical applications of ANTI-History seek to historicize different facets of PAA’s past, including an early attempt by key players to write a founder-funded history of the organization (chapter 6), its founding (chapter 7), and representations of its development in the early years, from 1927 to 1940 (chapter 8). The ultimate aim of the thesis is to develop a new approach to historiography that stresses the need for history to be understood as the socially constructed effect of the interest-driven politics of actor-networks; a crafting of history through the privileging of empirical traces over pre-existing theoretical assumptions; an emphasis on following actors around to understand how a socio-past *holds together* as a network; and a realization of the emancipatory potential of history through its situation in a process of the pluralization of history. Originally a response to Booth and Rowlinson’s (2006) call for a *historic turn* in management and organizational studies, the development of ANTI-History sets out to meet the challenge of developing a methodology capable of simultaneously historicizing and theoretically engaging the field. In the process, I argue, this thesis has implications for business history in particular and historiography in general in the development of an alternative methodology for studying the past.

September 18<sup>th</sup>, 2009

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## Chapter 1: Introducing the Theory and Performativity of ANTi-History

*“Les faits sont faits” (Gaston Bachelard as cited in Latour, 1993: 18)*

### 1.1 Introduction

The call for more historicized research and theory, and a greater understanding and development of organizational history, are some of the many issues that form what has been termed the *historic turn* in organization studies (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006; Jacques, 1996, 2006; Kieser, 1994; Üsdiken & Kieser, 2004). In responding to that call, this dissertation contributes generally to the broad critique of the ahistorical nature of management and organization theory, but more specifically it sets out to address the need for more historicized research (Kieser, 1994) and alternative ways of writing and conceptualizing history (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006).

The aims of the dissertation are twofold. First, it sets out to develop an alternative historiographical approach that I will call *ANTi-History*, which draws on and fuses elements from the sociology of knowledge literature (SoK), Marxian and cultural theory historiography, and actor-network theory (ANT). Second, it seeks to empirically perform ANTi-History in a study of a selected organization -- Pan American Airways (PAA). That is, this dissertation involves the development of a new theory of the past and its application to management and organizational theory, with an emphasis on showing how the theoretical and empirical realms iteratively inform each other.

In this chapter, I begin by situating the thesis within extant literature on the historic turn to illustrate the motivators for the dissertation. I then introduce the thesis, including

the nature of its two main contributions: (1) the research process and (2) the site of the study, including PAA as an organization and the PAA archive at the University of Miami's Otto Richter Library<sup>1</sup>. I next outline each chapter, in which I explain the subject, purpose, and an explicit illustration of the main contributions of the chapter to the overall dissertation. Finally, I offer some preliminary reflexive thoughts on the socio-politics inherent in the construction of the dissertation as well an acknowledgment that my ideological, temporal, and spatial situatedness has influenced the character of the dissertation.

## **1.2 Introducing the Motivators for the Dissertation**

Though scholars from various traditions (Marxist, empiricist, Rankean, positivist, postmodern) have each developed distinct manners of knowing their past, most would agree with the postmodern depiction of history as knowledge of the past (Jenkins, 2003). Perhaps less agreed upon is the postmodernist suggestion of the purposive and interest-driven nature of history as socially constructed knowledge of the past that has the potential to guide and govern the present meaning-making activities of a given collective. Recently, the potential insights offered through infusing organizational studies with a more historicized approach have become of interest to organizational studies scholars, who have termed the movement the *historic turn* (Clark & Rowlinson, 2004; Jacques, 2006; Kieser, 1994; Rowlinson, 2004; Üsdiken & Kieser, 2004). Such insights have been supported by the realization that organizations are effects or products of their past and thus are shaped by their past. Among other things, it has been suggested that history can help us understand

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<sup>1</sup> Hereafter referred to as the PAA archive.

the intricate workings of organizations as well as provide a heuristic to comprehend the present condition of actors within organizations, the organizations themselves, or the context within which the organization operates.

### ***1.2.1 The Historic Turn in Organization Studies***

Drawing on the observation that excursions by organizational researchers into history have become a rarity, Kieser (1994) noted the study of organizations as notoriously ahistorical. In an effort to reorient the study of organizations in a manner that is more historicized, it has been suggested that the current North American *scientific* rhetoric of organization studies (i.e., presenting the field as the outcome of objective, scientific study), dominant since the 1960s, be questioned (Clark & Rowlinson, 2004; Üsdiken & Kieser, 2004). As Jacques (2006) contended, one of many implications of the current scientific slant of organization studies has been an overemphasis on conducting deductive analyses followed by efforts at their falsification. The consequence of the overemphasis on certain types of questions (positivist in nature) has been the denial of the relevance of other observations, including the notion that the framework or paradigm in which research is conducted will not only influence the meaning infused into the data but also inform the conclusive interpretation of that data. Jacques went on to stress that a historical understanding of the various frameworks used by researchers, as well as drawing on paradigms of research in a manner that acknowledges their historicity, can enable researchers to reflect on and show how the research paradigm from which they are situated influences the nature of their research. Thus, what is suggested as a necessary precondition for assessing the adequacy of a research paradigm is a historicisation of that research

paradigm. Achieving this has become rather complicated due to what Booth and Rowlinson (2006) referred to as the *universalism* and *presentism* that also currently dominate organization studies research.

Booth and Rowlinson (2006: 6) suggested that results and conclusions of organizational studies research are presentist in that they are often reported in a manner that would assume the organization to which they speak exists in a “decontextualised, extended present.” That management of an organization and the organization itself are often presented as universal suggests that it is assumed in management research that such entities have always been as they are now, that they are unchanging regardless of time and location (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006). As part of the historic turn, Booth and Rowlinson suggest that the universalism and presentism in organization studies be problematized, and they discuss the many benefits that can be gained by conducting research that is situated within its historical context. However, the stated need for situating research within its historical context remains a contested project because of the very scientism of the field, that is, it is not simply a question of research strategy but the deep-rooted paradigmatic thinking that informs such a strategy (Jacques, 2006).

As a result of the ahistorical character of organization studies, an appeal has been made for a greater engagement of organization studies with the academic field of history (Üsdiken & Kieser, 2004). It must be stressed that although the historic turn calls for a turn toward history, it does not propose a turn toward any type of history or any type of contextual analysis. As Rowlinson (2004a) noted, the historicisation of organization studies cannot be fulfilled through making space in existing studies for the purpose of depositing lists of facts of the past, which are assumed to speak for themselves. Jacques

(1996: vii) showed the need for a specific type of organizational history where it is acknowledged that “contemporary management knowledge forms a culturally and historically specific way of thinking about work and society.”

Jacques (2006) stated that much scholarly work is needed to show theorists the potentially constructive role of historicized investigations. Adopting a hopeful tone, he suggested that if our work today is done well, organizational historians of tomorrow will have the necessary tools that can enable the possibility of historicized research. Those tools or strategies could include (1) more critical and ethical reflection in the craft of organization studies (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006); (2) disturbing “the false necessity” (Unger, 1987) or the apparent naturalness of organizations and organization theory (Ermarth, 2007; Kieser, 1994; Üsdiken & Kieser, 2004); (3) addressing the relevance of philosophers of history and historiographers, such as Michel Foucault and Hayden White, for management and organization studies (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006); (4) a concurrent engagement with the atheoretical character of business history (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006; Jacques, 2006; Kieser, 1994); (5) a questioning of the emergence of organizational history as a distinct field of research (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006); (6) the engagement of management history and management education (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006); (7) scholarship that renders transparent its ontological and epistemological assumptions (Jacques, 2006; Lamond, 2008); and (7) the development of alternative historical styles, alternative methodologies, and alternative methods of writing (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006; Ermarth, 2007). It is to a brief illustration of each of these that I now shift my focus, followed by a discussion on how ANTi-History attempts to answer each stated concern.

*Critical and ethical reflection:* According to Booth and Rowlinson (2006), critical reflection on the craft of organizational history suggests questioning the very categories of *history*, and *historiography*. It involves questioning the grounds upon which historical knowledge is created, inquiring as to who benefits from a specific interpretation of the past, who is given a voice, and who is spoken for. It also involves writing in a voice that is transparent in its illustration of what it deems *good* and *detrimental* ways of constructing history. To that end, an important element of an alternative approach (viz. ANTi-History) should include a reflexive historiographic theory that sets itself to the inherent task of not only questioning the socio-politics of knowledge but also *writing in* the socio-politics of the construction of historical analysis within the analysis of a given area of study itself. Arguably, such an approach should involve clear attempts by the researcher to situate themselves as part of their research and illustrate how their presence acts as an active force in creating and influencing the history that is told. As such, a clearly expressed consciousness concerning what is deemed *good* and *detrimental* knowledge of the past, I will argue, should be an important element of such an approach.

*Disturbing the assumed naturalness of 'history,' 'historiography,' 'organizations,' and 'organizational research':* It is suggested (Ermarth, 2007; Kieser, 1994), that these categories of thought on which scholars draw to construct research are not essential entities given in the order of things (Foucault, 2007) but instead have assumed their distinct present character “*by virtue* of their past” (Kieser, 1994: 610). Thus, informing the construction of these categories of thought through reference to past iterations allows one to think of their creation as an active process (of changing meaning) as opposed to deterministic preconstructed thought. Seeing the categories of thought as active constructions opens up

the opportunity for conceiving of them as ever changing, of ascribing alternative connotations to them to broaden their meaning and further establish their *conditions of possibility* (Ermarth, 2007). Keiser (1994) noted that organization studies as informed by a historicized focus lessens the potential for deterministic analyses and encourages an activism within researchers to search out alternatives for organizational design, theory, and research. Here, by drawing on insights from the sociology of knowledge literature, ANTi-History seeks to problematize the very categories of thought from which they stemmed (history, historiography) by historicizing them (i.e., seeing them as having undergone a process of construction and reconstruction over time). Through historicizing these categories of thought, ANTi-History sets out to reveal them as active creations and, in the process, disturbs their air of naturalness.

*Insights from the philosophers of history and engagement with the atheoretical character of business history:* The more specific plea for consideration of the work of postpositivist (Prasad, 2005) historians (e.g., Hayden White) and philosophers of history (e.g., Foucault) is linked to the call for a more theorized, or at least retheorized, approach to business history (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006; Jacques, 2006; Kieser, 1994; Rowlinson, 2004a). As Rowlinson (2004a) noted, business history is too often done through adopting a tone of realism that does not question its own grounds for being. Few business historians draw upon rigorous data gathering (as Rowlinson (2004a) noted, few have followed Foucault into the archive) and analysis techniques (Jacques, 1996; Rowlinson, 2004a). Business history is instead treated as a repository of facts, whose causal linkage is not examined but simply assumed (Rowlinson, 2004a). Jacques (1996: 17) blamed this on the “truth-trap” and the overemphasis on hypothesis testing that currently dominates business

history, arguing that it has rendered irrelevant certain bodies of thought, including history and the sociology of knowledge, for providing new and important insights for management research. With this in mind, I have tried to develop an approach to the study of the past—ANTi-History—that draws on insights from a number of traditions, including the work of philosophers of history (Karl Marx, Michel Foucault) and historians (Hayden White, Keith Jenkins) as well as those who have contributed to the literature of the Sociology of Knowledge (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Kamenka, 1983; Mannheim, 1953a, 1985; Marx & Engels, 1996) and actor-network (or ANT) theorists (Latour, 2005b; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Law, 1994): The various insights and theoretical precepts having been carefully woven together through a focus on the conceptualization of management research, history, and historiography as embedded in contexts of the past. As I will show, ANTi-History is an attempt to answer the criticism of atheoretical business history by offering an alternative approach to historiography that simultaneously takes into account the contextualized character of organization *and* of history itself.

*The emergence of organizational history as a distinct field of research:* Booth and Rowlinson (2006) make at least two key points: (1) that organizational history should be formed and acknowledged as a distinct field of research and (2) that historicized ways of conducting research should not be limited to organizational history scholars but that all scholars engaged in organization studies should adopt a historicized style of conducting research and writing. Whether organizational history is to emerge as a distinct field of research is of less concern, I would argue, than the development of a research strategy or historiographic approach that is of use to scholars who may contribute to this new field. ANTi-History does not directly address Booth and Rowlinson's (2006: 5) call for a "link

between the history of management thought and the teaching of management and organization theory” but does, however, offer the possibility for historicizing management knowledge. The management educator can then draw upon historicized research to aid him or her in teaching in a more contextual manner.

*Rendering ontological and epistemological roots transparent:* Recent discussions in management and organizational history have included arguments for management history scholarship to render transparent its ontological and epistemological roots (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006; Lamond, 2008). In a recent issue of the *Journal of Management History*, for example, Editor David Lamond (2008: 309) discussed the “importance of having an understanding of, and appreciation for, the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of scholarship.” Among other noteworthy points, Lamond (2008: 310) stated that considerations of an ontological and epistemological nature are missing from current doctoral theses with the result that historical accounts are presented as “self-evident” rather than the outcome of a series of decisions made by the historian. In a similar vein, Jacques (2006) stressed that historical analysis done well should acknowledge the existence of competing theories and assess the available alternatives for crafting research. One could argue that, by acknowledging their philosophical assumptions as well as the existence of alternative philosophical bodies of thought, researchers will be more likely to recognize the partiality of those philosophical assumptions as well as the partiality of their chosen theories and concepts. By virtue of this, researchers may be more able to contemplate the use of alternative ways of doing research. As I will later demonstrate, inherent in ANTi-History is the capacity for transparent reflection on its own epistemological and ontological roots and the acknowledgement of the (ANTi-History) researcher of his or her own

partiality by recognizing that they are using one alternative of many ways of doing history and historicizing research.

### ***1.2.2 Answering the Call for the Historic Turn in Organization Studies***

In terms of this thesis and the resulting ANTi-History approach, the most resonant issue in the call for the historic turn has been the stated need for alternative historical styles, methods of writing, and methodologies (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006). This raises two related points— one *disciplinary*, in the need for writing the history of management thought or history of organizations; the other *epistemological*, in the need for the development of alternative methods of writing that can accommodate the need for historically informed management knowledge. Booth and Rowlinson (2006: 9) note that if “experiments in historical styles of writing using multiple methods are to be encouraged, then both methodological essays and detailed empirical, historical, archive-based research with copious notes listing documentary sources need to be accommodated.”

This thesis sets out to tackle both related points by contributing to the development of empirical accounts of business history and in a way that addresses the call for the development of alternative methodologies and styles of writing. Specifically, ANTi-History is performed empirically through drawing on extensive archival research from the PAA archive.

Finally, it is stressed that answering the call for the historic turn is not only important, but necessary. Possibly the most prevalent reason is that the lack of contextualized and historicized analysis that currently dominates organizational studies research leads to portrayals of organizations and research that is falsely necessary (Unger,

1986), natural and essential. Carving a space for change or emancipation from present social structures or organizations that are constraining is more of a possibility when (a) one conducts research that acknowledges and discusses the changing nature of events over time, which suggests the possibility for a present condition to change; and (b) the multitude of events discussed, explained and *informed* in relation to their specific context of emergence. A historicized approach to research can enable one to adopt a different *perspective* to understand contemporary events, one that is *informed* not only by what happened in the immediate past but one that can inform those occurrences as well as our present condition. More substantially, a historicized approach to research is impossible without styles of writing and methods that are designed for that purpose.

### **1.3 What is ANTi-History and its Contribution?**

This dissertation offers two main contributions, the first, is theoretical in the development of an alternative approach to historiography called *ANTi-History*, and the second concerns the empirical performance of ANTi-History, which draws on PAA archival materials to (re)assemble the socio-past of PAA (I assume, as does Jenkins (1991), that *the* past can only ever be reconstructed through plural accounts or histories).

ANTi-History, itself is the outcome of an attempt to develop a new historiographical approach for constructing knowledge of the past that draws on insights from the sociology of knowledge (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Kamenka, 1983; Mannheim, 1985; Marx & Engels, 1996), Marxian and cultural theory (which includes postmodern) historiography (Green & Troup, 1999; Gunn, 2006; Jenkins, 1991, 1995, 2003; Jenkins, Morgan, & Munslow, 2007; White, 1973, 1985), and actor-network theory (Callon & Latour, 1981;

Latour, 2005b; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Law, 1992). Beginning with an acknowledgment of the postmodern distinction between *past* and *history* (*past* is understood as all that has occurred prior to a present condition; *history* is story or knowledge of that past), an ANTi-History approach incorporates insights from the sociology of knowledge to understand the activity of knowledge creation of a past as communal, interest driven, socially constructed, political, and situated. To *do* history through tracing the numerous traces of the past, ANTi-History draws on the method implied in actor-network theory (ANT). ANTi-History is informed by a modern (postrealist) ontological assumptions and social constructionist (antipositivist) epistemological assumptions. It is dedicated to a relational, textual, and contextual performance (as opposed to a description) of the constitution of *truth(s)* and *facts* to empirically show how the social context in which a textual trace is embedded influences the ordering of many traces into a *flavored telling* of history. Through drawing on ANT, the ANTi-History approach (re)assembles the constitution of the socio-historical past by tracing the many associations that act to hold that socio-historical past together. However, in the (re)assembly of the socio-historical past (henceforth *socio-past*), ANTi-History is not guided by a priori assumptions concerning the constitution of a given socio-past; it does not begin by assuming as given what it wishes the analysis to show. Thus, ANTi-History does not begin a (re)assembly of the constitution of a socio-past by starting off with the assumption that certain associations within the past exist; instead, it encourages following the series of actors around as they engage in political acts, negotiations, enrollments, and translations, as they seek to form networks. The approach maps out the series of performativities of socio-past actors as they engage in network formation.

ANTI-History draws on actor-network theory to assume *history* as an effect of situated (ideological, spatial, and temporal) actor-networks. Embedded in ANTi-History is the assumption that heterogeneous actors (Latour, 1993) are active political agents who seek to enlist others onto their cause to render that cause more durable (Latour, 1991) and create networks (Law, 1992). If networks are composed of extremely aligned actors, this network is understood as an actor due to its ability to act as one (Law, 1992). Through networks acting as one, the actors forming that network often conceal the series of negotiations and political tactics that enabled them to act as one (Callon & Latour, 1992). Often, this leads to a network becoming taken for granted as one, concretized, fixed entity. ANT scholars have referred to these seemingly unitary entities as *black boxes* or *punctuations*, which consist of individual elements and processes that have become hidden through their unification (Latour, 1987). ANTi-History suggests that history, or the construction of knowledge of the past, can be understood through this process of black-boxing or punctuation. For example, the series of socio-politics that are active in the construction of a history text are concealed in the writing and publication of the text.

ANTI-History places much emphasis on privileging the empirical over the theoretical when (re)assembling the socio-past and it cautions against letting the theoretical or epistemological grounds of a theory give an a priori certainty to empirical findings. Furthermore, ANTi-History specifies that the methods that are derived to study the past should stem from the empirical analyses of that past. Though the sketch of ANTi-History in this dissertation occurs first, followed by its empirical application, it must be stressed that it is through the empirical analysis of the archival materials that the historiographic approach of ANTi-History was developed. Even though the textual layout of the chapters

in the dissertation present the development of a theory, followed by its empirical application. ANTi-History was developed in a manner that is consistent with what it proposes, namely that of privileging the empirical over the theoretical by not using theory to give an a priori certainty to empirical research.

### ***1.3.1 The Research Process***

The research process through which ANTi-History *emerged* was part of a broad research project funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), Grant 410 2004 1551. Four researchers spent a total of 95 days at the PAA archive. As one of the researchers, my own participation was as the project's research assistant, spending two separate 5-day visits at the archive. My duties, which varied over the 3 years of my employment, included participating in the data collection process at the archive, ordering and maintaining the archival materials gathered by the research team, as well as reading various PAA histories and PAA related source materials. Using the Endnote software program (<http://www.endnote.com/>), I constructed a database to order the PAA archival materials and researcher notes. The preliminary focus of the SSHRC grant was on the gender of airline culture but—due to the rich and extensive character of the PAA archive—other areas of research also became of interest for the research team, including the role of myth, organizational strategy, and pioneering in the making of PAA (Durepos, Helms Mills, & Mills, 2008a, 2008b); the role of the organization and the discourse of the Cold War (Hartt, Mills, Mills, & Durepos, 2009); discourses of organizing and gendered substructures (Dye, 2006; Dye & Mills, 2007, 2008,

2010); and what was to become the basis of my thesis, the development of histories of the history of PAA (Durepos, Mills, & Helms Mills, 2008; Rowlinson & Hassard, 1993).

### ***1.3.2 The Site: PAA as an Organization (For Doing History)***

The organization of PAA offers a valuable site for both the study of *history* and the study of the *craft of history*. PAA is considered a pioneer in aviation and a pioneering organization (Durepos, Helms Mills et al., 2008b). PAA began operations in the latter part of 1927, and the company terminated operations in 1991. Its lengthy 64 years of operation offers a rich opportunity for organizational scholars to view a diversity of organizational processes, including the organization's reaction and efforts throughout two World Wars, the Great Depression, and the Cold War. Popular histories (this concept refers to both a stylistic convention among particular historians and in this instance, those histories within the public domain which tell the commonly told story) of PAA (Bender & Altschul, 1982; Daley, 1980; Josephson, 1943; Turner, 1976) credit the 28-year-old Juan Trippe as the founder and illustrate his successes and trials as the company's CEO for a majority of its existence. PAA's claimed list of *firsts* include the inauguration of the first international flight by a United States airline carrier, which took off from Key West, Florida, and flew to Havana, Cuba, in 1927; the inauguration of the first commercial transpacific flight (1935) and transatlantic flight (1939), as well as the first successful around-the-world flight (1942). During World War II, PAA carried military personnel and cargo and built airports in 15 countries around the world as well as trained pilots as part of the war effort. PAA corporate materials also lay claim to the development of economy passenger service in 1950 and a pivotal role in the inauguration of the *jet age* in 1958. The most notable reason

why PAA offers a valuable site to study *history* or the *craft of history* is that it has an extensive archive. I would note, however, that the processes of performing an ANTi-History analysis can never rely solely on the archive and that it problematizes the archive as a privileged modern western construct.

### ***1.3.3 The Site: The PAA Archive***

The PAA archive is located at the Otto Richter Library in Miami, Florida. This archive contains approximately 1,500 cubic feet of files organized in about 1,500 boxes, including the Charles A. Lindbergh letters; logbooks; manuals; technical reports; speech files (of past presidents, etc.); administrative files (including documents on operations and labor negotiations); historical files (past histories written of PAA, articles on notable accomplishments, photos to be included in the history); public relations and promotional materials; scrapbooks, prints, and ephemera (compiled by staff members of newspaper clippings, etc.); publications and internal house organs (including *Pan American Airways*, *New Horizons*, *Clipper News*, and the *Sales Clipper*).

Though the history of this archive is not fully known, the earliest mention of its inception is in a letter dated July 27, 1981, from Ione Wright (historian and wife of a deceased PAA pilot) to Ann Whyte (secretary for the PAA history project - Wright, 1981). It can be inferred from the personal correspondence that, around 1981, the University of Miami began making direct appeals to retired PAA employees to deposit their papers in the special collection of the archive to be preserved, organized, and rendered available to interested scholars (Wright, 1981). In articles published in a journal for retired PAA employees in 1996 and 1997, it was suggested that the PAA Historical Foundation (a

foundation set up by PAA to preserve memorabilia and fund the PAA history project) had been active in assembling boxes of documents pertaining to every facet of the past of PAA (Pan Amigo News, 1996). The PAA Historical Foundation eventually donated approximately 600 boxes of PAA materials to the Otto Richter library at the University of Miami (Pan Amigo News, 1997). Nine hundred boxes of PAA *history* were further donated in 2007.

To date, four known published histories of PAA exist (Bender & Altschul, 1982; Daley, 1980; Josephson, 1943; Turner, 1976). The four histories are remarkably similar in style and content. Each bound, or fix, the history of PAA through marking its beginning as 1927. Each order the telling of the tale of PAA around the heroic pioneering acts of men involved in business leadership, aviation, and technology. In order to trace the socio-politics of the development of the past, I focus on Robert Daley's (1980) history because of its intimate relationship with PAA (it was company funded and drew largely on materials developed within the airline) and various actors associated with the internal PAA History Project. Through research at the PAA archive, the initial manuscripts, drafts, and personal correspondence, as well as other traces pertaining to the crafting of Daley's (1980) history dating back to 1957, were surfaced and traced. In essence, these various traces were illustrative of the socio-political acts of the various actors who were involved in the creation and subsequent publication of this history. The traces illustrated the actors in the act of negotiating *what was to be the history of PAA*. My initial reaction to these traces was one of interest concerning the degree to which the content of what became Daley's history of PAA was influenced, altered, and in some instances even censored, by the actors involved in its construction.

Thus, my research at the PAA archive was informed specifically by my interest in the production of what came to be known as Robert Daley's 1980 history of PAA. To gather insights on the construction of this book, I initially scanned the entire list of boxes held at the archive, but selected only boxes whose titles were suggestive of my interest. The production of what came to be Robert Daley's (1980) history of PAA was commonly referred to in the archive, by the actors themselves, as the *history project*. Drawing largely on the method of actor-network theory, I sought to follow the actors around (i.e., those people who had a more or less direct interest in the development of a company history of PAA). For example, I traced the personal correspondence of the multitude of actors involved in the construction of, what began as, Daley's (1980) history book. As I followed the actors around, I made certain they guided my way. If a detail concerning the PAA history project was mentioned in personal correspondence, I looked for it in the archival boxes. If an actor intimately involved in the PAA history asked an assistant for a reference, I too sought out the reference. Through the personal correspondence of these socio-political actors, I got insights as to how they felt the PAA history should be written, who should write it, who should be privileged within it, what stories of PAA should feature in it, what year the PAA history should end, how it should be funded, and which actors would be endowed the last word (e.g., PAA's CEO or the author?). I attempted to understand the emotions involved in their disagreements, their failures at finding a suitable author for the history book or enlisting a publisher. I witnessed their endless politics. I not only traced the socio-politics of the actors engaged in the construction of a PAA history to understand how they negotiated their history, but I also (re)assembled how these socio-political actors *actively constructed their past* through writing the history, and it is through theorizing the

manner in which the socio-politics of these actors were performed that ANTi-History was, in large part, developed.

#### **1.4 Reflexive Thoughts and My Situatedness**

*Reflexivity* refers to a researcher's capacity to reflect on the socio-politics inherent in knowledge production. It specifies that researchers not only acknowledge, but actively write-in (i.e., include, make evident), how their situatedness (ideological, spatial, and temporal) affects the knowledge they produce (Gunn, 2006). In an effort to offer a reflexive dissertation, I suggest my *being* as an active socialized effect of a modern Western society. My educational experiences (undergraduate, master's degree, and doctoral studies) have not been interrupted by engagement in full-time paid work. Though it is not possible to know how or to what degree this research has been influenced or altered due to my situatedness, the noteworthy point is that the dissertation is an effect of my situated *being*.

#### **1.5 Overview of the Thesis: Ordering my Thoughts**

The remainder of the thesis includes an interrogation and review of key literatures from the sociology of knowledge (chapter 2); Marxian and cultural theory historiography (chapter 3), and actor-network theory (chapter 4). Drawing together insights from these key literatures, I then develop a detailed outline of ANTi-History (chapter 5), followed by focused empirical applications that serve to perform different aspects of ANTi-History, including writing in and the socio-politics of the construction of Daley's 1980 history of PAA (chapter 6); the problematization of *beginnings* and *ends* in the PAA history, and the

general craft of history (chapter 7); and the pluralization of history through an examination of PAA and its relationship with the Colombian airline *Sociedad Colombo-Alemana de Transportes Aéreos* (SCADTA) (chapter 8). Finally, in the last chapter (9), I offer some conclusions and insights regarding future research.

## 1.6 Summary

In summary, this dissertation involves the development of an alternative method for studying organizations in context—ANTi-History—and its empirical applications, which have been developed primarily as an attempt to address the call for an historic turn in organization studies. As such, in its attempt to grapple with issues of historiography and the past, the thesis has potential beyond management and organization studies, specifically in the fields of history and cultural studies, and gender studies but I will leave that to further research.

ANTi-History attempts to address the call for the historic turn in management and organizational studies through critical reflection and reflexivity of the scholar; questioning the false necessity or assumed naturalness of organizations and theories of organization; fusing business history and historical theory; rendering transparent its epistemological and ontological assumptions; satisfying the need for philosophically transparent scholarship; and, notably, developing an alternative manner of writing (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006). The extent to which I have succeeded in producing an alternative historiography – or ANTi-History, capable of addressing most if not all of the aspects of the call for an historic turn, can be judged in the remaining chapters of the thesis.

## Chapter 2: Sociology of Knowledge Literature Review

### Toward Conceptualizing *Knowledge* as Socio-Historical

*“Such a stylized solution, and there is always only one, is called truth. Truth is not “relative” and certainly not “subjective” in the popular sense of the word. It is always, or almost always, completely determined within a thought style. One can never say that the same thought is true for A and false for B. If A and B belong to the same thought collective, the thought will be either true or false for both. But if they belong to different thought collectives, it will just not be the same thought! It must either be unclear to, or be understood differently by, one of them. Truth is not a convention, but rather (1) in historical perspective, an event in the history of thought, (2) in its contemporary context, stylized thought constraint.” (Fleck, 1979: 100)*


*“...the world is known through many different orientations because there are many simultaneous and mutually contradictory trends of thought (by no means of equal value) struggling against one another with their different interpretations of ‘common’ experience.” (Mannheim, 1985: 269)*

#### 2.1 Introduction

ANTI-History is a historiographic approach, in which history is understood as *knowledge* of the past. To arrive at this point and to relate it to an understanding of how knowledge and its various purposes in social life are constituted and legitimated I turn first to the Sociology of Knowledge (SoK) literature. In this chapter the issue of knowledge, and its relationship to the past and history is explored through a questioning not only of knowledge per se but also of the cultural conditions of modernism and its effect on knowledge creation, i.e., questions about the conditions under which knowledge of knowledge is created. To this end, using Fuller’s (2002) distinction between *old* and *new* wave SoK, I delve into the various bodies of thought to explore the effects of modernism,

of its theoretical outcomes, draw implications for our understanding of knowledge, and assess these implications for an alternative approach to historiography. This process allows me to address the distinction between epistemology and the SoK, as well as develop an argument for an *amodern* approach to knowledge creation. The chapter ends with insights on knowledge that will be used to inform how to create knowledge of the past (history) and the potential performativity of ANTi-History (see figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 – Contributions from the Sociology of Knowledge literature for ANTi-History



### 2.1.1 *(Re)assembling the Past of the SoK*

The following account is my (re)assembly (Latour, 2005) of the SoK literature. It begins with a discussion of the cultural conditions of modernism and its effect on knowledge creation. I continue the (re)assembly of the SoK literature by focusing first on the *old wave* of the sociology of knowledge, anchored largely around the work of Karl Marx and Karl Mannheim, and then the *new wave* sociologists of knowledge (Fuller, 2002: 13) with a focus on the contributions of Robert Merton, Michel Foucault, the “French School,” (Collins & Yearly, 1992: 309), and ANT. Next I examine the interrelationship between the term *epistemology* and *sociology of knowledge* in an effort to disassociate the terms and suggest that ANTi-History is not an epistemology (even though it is a theory of knowledge of the past) but is instead rooted epistemologically. Finally, and crucially, I examine the possibility for an “amodern” (Latour, 1993: 47) approach to knowledge creation and conclude the (re)assembly of the SoK literature with a discussion and listing of some specific insights on knowledge creation that will inform ANTi-History (see figure 2.1).

In tracing the constitution of past knowledge, I am not, as in a standard literature review, merely assembling the various strands of thought that have been collectively grouped under the banner of SoK. Instead, I am (re)assembling a story of this literature that is a specific effect of the interrelationship of my situated self and some of the various strands of thought that I have actively followed and traced (although not all traces followed have been drawn upon to write this chapter).

The specific emphasis on, what I am calling, *(re)assembly* draws on the notion that an event, a history, a technology, or even a literature (any heterogeneous material or

trace) can never be assumed to have an essential or *irrefutable* objective existence given in the order of things (Foucault, 2007) but that the character of listed materials is continuously altered through their (re)telling. Thus, in my *(re)telling* or *(re)assembly* I do not begin by assuming as given the constitution of a specific, fixed literature called the SoK, which tells unchanging tales of that supposedly given school of thought. Instead I follow specific traces of this literature that I feel will give me insight on *knowledge* that I can then use to theorise how to construct *knowledge of the past*.

## **2.2 The Cultural Conditions of Modernity/Modernism and the Institutionalization of Knowledge**

The task of tracing the constitution of the literature of the SoK began with a search for distinct ruptures or discontinuities in this body of thought to understand the constitution of our present modern condition for knowledge creation (e.g., why do we create knowledge as we do today). A *rupture* is a visible transition experienced by a heterogeneous network or collective whereby the appreciation of a given type of knowledge gives way to the privileging of another. One such rupture is the Enlightenment, which is often marked as the beginning of modernism (Gunn, 2006). If we assume the term *modernism* is associated with a particular type of scholarly tradition or socio-cultural formation (Prasad, 2005: 215), one question that can aid in tracing the constitution of the SoK literature may be: *What are the implications of modernism as a body of thought, and a socio-cultural condition for influencing the practice of knowledge creation?* Through the answer to this question I intend to make the case for an amodern

approach to knowledge of the past. I begin this discussion below and continue in section 2.6.

### ***2.2.1 Modernism and the Enlightenment***

The Enlightenment and modernism have been identified as having had far-reaching consequences for our present condition in which a specific type of knowledge is privileged. Described as the passage of the humanities to its adult stage (Rabinow, 1991), the Enlightenment as discussed by Kant refers to both a period of time and process whereby individuals have the potential to be released from their immaturity in that they are liberated from a thoughtless and “foolish obedience” (Rabinow, 1991: 36). The release from their immaturity is made possible through an individual’s embrace of a specific type of knowledge, and Kant noted that it is this embrace that establishes the potential for emancipation. This process described by Kant is one in which individuals come to make use of reasoned thought to guide them in navigating circumstances in which pre-calculated ends are sought (Foucault, 2007; Rabinow, 1991). The collective attitude associated with modernism has been identified as rooted in the ideals of the Enlightenment (Rabinow, 1991). Thus, the most prevalent feature of modernism has been its emphasis on rational thought as informing the construction of rational knowledge, which, as Mannheim (1953b: 86) contends, has found “its clearest and most extreme application in the exact sciences.”

In general, modernism has been described as a socio-historical formation, a historical category, a way of being, and a philosophical body of thought with specific ontological and epistemological implications (Gunn, 2006). Though there is a wealth of

literature describing the characteristics of modernism, what is noteworthy for this analysis is twofold. First, modernism represents a break, or a disconnect with the past. At this rupture, in the very least, we can trace the transition of a socio-collective as one guided by a worldview informed by magic, faith, superstition, and tradition, to one that privileges rational thought and knowledge based on reason, science and societal progress (Gunn, 2006; Habermas, 1981; Mannheim, 1953a). According to Habermas (1981), the privileging of progress has enabled the moderns as a socio-collective to actively create a particular view of the past from which they have broken away and now collectively identify as its antithesis. Viewing themselves “as the result of a transition from the old to the new” world (Habermas, 1981: 3), from the backward to the forward looking (Gunn, 2006), the moderns collectively identify with the belief inspired by the natural sciences that technological, moral, and social betterment is infinite.

Second, the socio-cultural condition of modernism has largely been a point of interest for theorists who seek to understand the “categorical apparatus” (Mannheim, 1985) by which present institutionalized knowledge is ordered. Gunn (2006) characterizes modernism as a cultural condition with implications for guiding thought and knowledge creation. He argues that modernism has provided the socio-cultural conditions for the development of a particular conceptual or categorical apparatus. This has two implications. First, the socio-cultural condition modernism has enabled the creation of distinct categories or spheres of thought (categorical apparatus). Second, the categorical apparatus particular to modernism orders the knowledge it creates according to its own categories.

Theorists such as Max Weber marked Western modernism as the separation of knowledge into autonomous spheres, categories, or formations of which noted examples include science, morality, law, and art (Collingwood, 1956; Gunn, 2006; Habermas, 1981). The creation of various isolated spheres of knowledge was then understood to act as an expedient for knowledge production (Gunn, 2006). Efficient knowledge production was fostered by the possibility for the emergence of specialized professionals and experts who, through dedicating their focused energies on a sphere, could enhance and progress knowledge in that sphere. The rise of these professionals was arguably assisted by the creation of a communal logic specific to a professional designation, or a way of being that was particular to each discipline and that governed the norms of a group. A professional group's established norms, as well as its sphere's inner logic, also governed the group members' *way of knowing*. Thus, professionals create knowledge as well as train novices by guiding them in their sphere's inner logic. With this came the institutionalization of various knowledges (Gunn, 2006; Habermas, 1981; Mannheim, 1985; Weber, 1995).

The institutionalization of different knowledges had profound societal effects; it was in part responsible for the rise of the *expert*, which in turn fostered a schism between the knowledges available to be known to the expert and those knowable to the layperson. It also arguably led to an enrichment of the quality of life for individuals who could gain from the contributions of expert knowledge. But for the condition of knowledge in modern society, this led to an unquestioned acceptance of a deeply engrained ordering of categories of knowledge whose logic is largely a product of the hands that were instrumental in its creation—the moderns. The *categorical apparatus* or *spheres of*

*knowledge* through which the moderns have come to *organize* their societies and universities have been suggested as self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating (Chia, 1996). These spheres of knowledge are largely a rational creation (Foucault, 2007; Habermas, 1981) dedicated to the progress and privileging of the creation of rational knowledge. Also, the consequence of modernist tendencies of unquestioningly accepting the notion that *rational knowledge* is *given, natural, or essential* has acted to further legitimate the internal logic of ordering particular to this categorical apparatus.

This debate provides an important starting point for ANTi-History, namely that knowledge is not *the*, or even *a*, representation of some fixed truth but rather the outcome of a series of socio-cultural processes. Therefore the relationship between socio-cultural processes and knowledge production needs to be further explored by way of the development, use, and naturalization of categorical apparatus or ordering in constructions of knowledge. Specifically, given the relationship between History (as a discipline) and modernism (see chapter 3), there needs to be an exploration and an active acknowledgement of the influence of modernist thinking on notions and study of the past. This will form the basis of my argument for an amodern approach.

In anticipation of the discussion on amodernism, it is noted that modernism has been associated with a realist ontology and a positivist epistemology, and it is to a discussion of these two points that I now shift my focus.

### ***2.2.2 Ontological Considerations of Modernism***

As has been noted, modernism has been associated with ontological realism (Chia, 1996; Jenkins, 1995; Lyotard, 1993). Burrell and Morgan (1979) describe realism

as a theory of being, which suggests that the social world exists independently of our mental appreciation of it and is “made up of hard, tangible and relatively immutable structures” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979: 4). Thus, “for the realist, the social world has an existence which is as hard and concrete as the natural world” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979: 4). It is an ontological approach that is associated with an attitude of “certainty,” objectivity, facts, as well as “worldly,” “universal,” and “unbiased truth” (Jenkins, 1995: 7-8). Lyotard (1993) suggests that the conditions of modernism premise a need for mind matching, in that knowledge of a phenomenon that is created in the mind or the imagination is done so with an effort to match the phenomena in its present form. However, Chia (1996: 39) notes that when we “rely on the Cartesian dualism of objects and their representation, we remain in the grips of the ideology of representation.”

### ***2.2.3 Epistemological Considerations of Modernism***

Ontological claims carry with them epistemological consequences. This means that our choice of worldview (ontological commitment) has implications for how we are to gather and construct knowledge about that worldview (epistemological commitment). The ideology of representation associated with ontological realism fuels the emphasis on creating knowledge that accurately and objectively mirrors what is “out there” (Chia, 1996: 47). Modernism has been associated with the epistemology of positivism, which seeks “to explain and predict what happens in a social world by searching for [laws], regularities and causal relationships between its constituent elements” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979: 5). The growth of knowledge is seen as a cumulative enterprise in which new and tested insights are added to the existing stock of knowledge (inductivism).

### ***2.2.4 Implications of Modernism as Socio-Cultural Formation for Knowledge Creation of the Past***

In summary, modernism is a socio-cultural formation that:

(1) has had a drastic impact on what is collectively assumed as worthy knowledge (i.e., that which is deemed rational);

(2) applies rational thought in the active creation of an ordering scheme according to which knowledge is to be constructed. This scheme is visible in the segregated academic disciplines in a given university, of which *SoK* and *history* are examples;

(3) assumes an ontological realist worldview and creates knowledge about this world view according to a positivist epistemology. These in turn support the ideals of modernism; and

(4) has been responsible for socializing and normalizing students and society in thinking and acting along the same segregated divisions found in the academy as well as privileging a realist ontology and positivist epistemology.

Arguably modernism is a thought collective, and various disciplines or categories of thought, including *SoK* and *history*, as well as the rational internal logic of their associated *categorical apparatus*, are effects or products of modernism (Gunn, 2006: 129). Noting that modernism is a socio-cultural formation that has had a profound effect on our current condition of knowledge, I now turn to a discussion of *SoK*. This discussion will be useful in informing a *theory of knowledge of the past*, and the insights will be used in conjunction with *historiography* (chapter 3) to assemble an alternative theory of knowledge of the past, namely, ANTi-History. I will note here that ANTi-

History is aligned with Jenkins (1995: 10), who disputes modernism as our natural condition and attests to the “end of modernist renditions of history.”

### 2.3 The Old Wave of the Sociology of Knowledge

The roots of the SoK have been traced back to 19<sup>th</sup> century German and French social scientists (Merton, 1968), particularly the work of Marx and Durkheim. Hobsbawm (1997: 65) credits Karl Marx “as the virtual inventor of the sociology of knowledge,” but Scheler has been noted as coining the term *sociology of knowledge* (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).

Following Marx, the early generation of SoK theorists adopted the idea that consciousness is determined by social being and that *there is a relationship between thought and the deeper reality underpinning thought* (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). This makes one question the viability of the dominant epistemology associated with modernism which purports the quest for objective and disinterested knowledge. Nietzschean insights suggested that the “perspective of human thought [is] an instrument in the struggle for survival and power” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967: 7), hinting to the importance of the study of perspective. From the work of Dilthey SoK scholars gained an understanding of all perspectives of thought as relative, in that historical situations can only be understood as based on their own terms and that thought is always located in a specific social situation (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), which makes one question to viability of the dominant ontology associated with modernism: realism. In terms of French scholarship, Durkheim provided a social analysis of *categories of thought* (Merton, 1968), similar to what Mannheim (1985) calls a *categorical apparatus*. I now

turn to a discussion of the task and purpose of the SoK to continue to flesh out the viability of our socio-cultural condition of modernism for constructing knowledge – and specifically, knowledge of the past.

### ***2.3.1 The Task and Purpose of the SoK***

Broadly speaking, the old wave scholars sought to analyze the relationship between knowledge and existence, between social action or relationships and thought. Also of concern was the relationship between theory and modes of thought (Mannheim, 1985). Simply put, these scholars were concerned with understanding “the relationship between human thought and the social context within which it arises” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967: 4). This was done to foster an understanding of how social relationships influence thought (Mannheim, 1985). Mannheim (1985) maintained that one way of understanding the nature of knowledge was by questioning the motives or interests of its creators (Fuller, 2002). In general, there was agreement about the empirical focus of the field to understand the process by which knowledge is socially generated, transmitted, diffused, and grows (Merton, 1968: 543). Many SoK scholars focused on seeking to understand the process by which subjective knowledge and meaning of one’s reality became transformed into a seemingly objectifiable reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Given the observable differences already in existence across societies in terms of what each takes for granted as “knowledge,” Berger and Luckmann (1967: 3) theorized the process by which any body of knowledge came to be established across a collective as “reality.” The question to which Berger and Luckmann (1967) felt the efforts of the SoK scholars should be dedicated was “How is ‘reality’

constructed?” These scholars theorized that the processes in which knowledge is socially generated, which contradicts insights from the dominant epistemology of modernism: positivism. This provides a starting point for ANTi-History, in which it will be shown in chapter 5 assumes that knowledge of the past is socially generated. To understand what types of knowledge is worthy of analysis by ANTi-History, we continue to draw insights from the SoK.

### ***2.3.2 The Types of ‘Knowledges’ Worthy of Analysis by SoK***

The types of knowledges deemed worthy of analysis by SoK scholars included common sense, everyday knowledge, and theoretical knowledge. The analyses were not restricted to the genesis of theoretical knowledge or the character of theoretical knowledge. It was feared that a sole focus on theoretical knowledge would neglect the rich social fabric upon which any society is dependent for the construction of meaning (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Furthermore, it was noted that the emphasis of the SoK should be on understanding all knowledges that are taken for granted by a society, because “the theoretical foundations of reality, whether they be scientific or philosophical or even mythological, do not exhaust what is ‘real’ for the members of a society” (Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 15). Hence, all forms of thought, including common sense and theoretical thinking, constitute and contribute to the historical and cultural aspects of what a collective assumes as their *reality*. On the basis of this, the word *knowledge* in SoK assumed broad connotations. *Knowledge* was characterized as including any cultural product such as “ideas, ideologies, juristic and ethical beliefs, philosophy... technology” (Merton, 1968: 510) as well as folklore and historical,

political, and the social sciences. Each of these ways of characterizing knowledge was suggested by Mannheim as existentially determined (Merton, 1968). Though modernist scholars may disagree with this broad characterization of what is deemed as worthy knowledge (moderns privilege rational knowledge), postmodern scholars have agreed with the old wave SoK scholars in what they view as worthy knowledge. This is evidenced in Lyotard's (1993: 18) suggestion that "knowledge is not only a set of denotative statements, far from it ... It also includes notions of 'know-how,' 'knowing how to live,' 'how to listen.'" ANTi-History follows these contributions from the SoK that concern (a) what counts as knowledge and (b) how to conceptualize knowledge: as a socio-cultural product. To understand how knowledge could be conceived as *cultural*, the SoK scholars looked to the relationship between knowledge and its existential basis.

### ***2.3.3 The Relationship Between 'Knowledge' and the 'Existential Basis' in the SoK***

The relationship between knowledge and its socio-cultural existential basis (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Mannheim, 1985; Merton, 1968) was of key interest to SoK scholars. Here

the most substantial contribution to the emergent SoK was Marx' and Engels' work on understanding the relationship between the knowledge of a given socio-cultural collective and its existential basis (Merton, 1968; Seliger, 1977). Marx and Engels postulated that the relations of economic production (base) in a given society determine the ideational realm, which is constituted of the social, political, and the intellectual superstructure; (Kamenka, 1983; Marx & Engels, 1996; Merton, 1968; Perry, 2002). Early SoK scholars drew on the notion that the economic base of a society precedes its ideational

superstructure, as a point of departure (Seliger, 1977) to show that the material economic condition of individuals influences their consciousness and distinct way of knowing. This assumption allowed SoK scholars to theorize *thought* and *knowledge* each as an active effect of a given socio-economic condition that is situated spatially and temporally. Mannheim (1953b, 1985) drew largely on Marx and Engels to suggest the necessity of exploring the genesis of plural modes of thought and the social groups from which the mode of thought stems. These insights provide another important point of departure of ANTi-History whose task is exploring how different social groups come to develop *different ways of knowing* their pasts.

Though there is considerable agreement concerning the existence of a relationship between knowledge and its socio-economic condition, points of disagreement emerged between old wave SoK scholars. To begin, there was disagreement concerning whether different forms of knowledge could be respectively related to different bases (Merton, 1968). This point addressed the observation that the relatively *advanced* or *modern* social cultures had established the possibility of the development of varied types of knowledges. Engels noted that given that the ideological superstructure is comprised of different types of knowledges, including the political, the intellectual, and the social, each had the potential of exhibiting a distinct connection to the material base (Merton, 1968). Although the issue was not directly taken up by Marx, he did hint at the natural sciences as an example of a type of knowledge that has an individuated relationship with its economic base. Following Marx, Mannheim (1985) argued that the existential determination of the natural sciences was distinct from that of the social sciences. Mannheim (1985) excluded the natural sciences from being existentially determined but

theorized the social sciences, including historical, political, and everyday thought, as existentially determined. Durkheim, on the other hand, sought to answer the above concern by focusing on the categories of thought in place within a given society. He suggested that the variation in the genesis of categories of thought of a given socio-collective show that they are historically rooted social creations. Durkheim noted that as societies change, so too do their categories of thought to reflect the new knowledge being produced by that society. He further specified that all categories of thought come from our social experience (Law, 1986). ANTi-History is constructed from these insights, and thus suggests the academic category of history as a historically rooted social creation that is an effect of and particular to our given modern Western society.

The second point of contestation concerns the different way in which knowledge could be understood as related to its existential basis. Marx and Engels assumed a causal, linear relationship, whereby the economic base provided specific conditions upon which the ideational realm developed (Law, 1986; Merton, 1968). Perhaps more in line with what Merton termed an *organismic relationship*, Scheler, Sorokin, Merton, and latter-day SoK theorists emphasize the iterative nature of ideas and their socio-cultural structure (Law, 1986; Merton, 1968). Mannheim (1985), on the other hand, suggested placing less importance on theorizing how thought is connected to the material conditions of a society. Instead, he emphasized, as does ANTi-History, that what is important is the effect that different social settings have on the development of thought.

The third point of contestation concerns the question of motives or interests in knowledge production. SoK scholars expressed disagreement over the function played by the interest/motives of knowledge producers on the actual produced knowledge. Most

ascribed to the idea that a change in the interests or motives of knowledge producers led to a change in knowledge. Whereas Marx provided a more general theorization concerning the function of knowledge (as a control mechanism over aspects of society), Durkheim was criticized for not accounting for social interests in his sociology of knowledge (Law, 1986). Fuller (2002: 12) noted that the first incarnation (of the so-called *old wave*) of the SoK provided a straightforward theorization of the process of knowledge production in which it was assumed that all knowledge is value laden and interest laden, but it also was simply assumed that the “dominant class interest” would dictate whatever passed for knowledge. ANTi-History draws from these insights in that it assumes that all knowledge of the past, its construction as well as its dispersion is value and interest laden. And, that there is an association between an actor’s interests, values and the knowledge that they come to privilege. Because an actor’s values and interests are rooted in a collective’s ideology, I now shift the focus to the role of ideology and its part in the process of knowledge production.

#### ***2.3.4 Discussing the Notion of Ideology***

Mannheim noted that SoK is a theory of the social, or existential, determination of thinking that does not occur historically according to immanent laws and is not given in the order of things but instead arises “out of the collective purposes of a group” of which individuals are participants (Mannheim, 1985: 268). To illustrate how ANTi-History draws on these insights from Mannheim to suggest that all knowledge of the past arises out of the collective interest and purposes of aligned actors, I turn to a discussion of ideology.

Mannheim's (1985) notion of ideology draws largely on Marx but what makes Mannheim's understanding of ideology distinct is his association of ideology with what he has termed *perspective* and *thought style*. It should be noted that Mannheim's notion of *thought style* is used interchangeably with the concepts of *thought model* and *style of thought*. *Thought style* refers to a collective's shared *perspective*, a pattern of thought or various forms of thought that are particular to a time, place, and social background. As such, he noted that it is possible to trace a particular thinker to a given period by assuming that that thinker is a representative of a thought style existing at a place and time. Mannheim (1953a) was one of few to conduct empirical scholarship linking a specific knowledge to a situated (temporal and spatial) collective. He has sought to assess the changing nature of thought styles by studying them as they grow, develop, unite, and fade. Mannheim attested that "the *analysis of meaning*" should be "the core of our technique," because words used by different collectives (even in geographical proximity) assume different meanings, and it is these "slight variations of meaning" that "provide the best clues to the different trends of thought in a community" (Mannheim, 1953a: 77). ANTi-History draws on these insights to suggest that various communities of thought are capable of developing different ways of knowing their past due to their ideology.

Instead of using the word *ideology*, Mannheim (1985: 266) often uses the word *perspective* to refer to a subject's whole mode of conceiving as situated within a thought style and determined by their historical and social setting. Mannheim (1985: 272) noted that *perspective* refers to more than a determination of thinking; it "signifies the manner in which one views an object, what one perceives in it, and how one construes it in his

thinking.” Perspective is partial (there is an acknowledgment that one’s mode of conceiving is not shared by all), detached (there is an acknowledgment that one may adopt a way of seeing from another thought style), and multiple (there is an acknowledgment that many perspectives exist in a shared time frame), and it can inform a collective’s thought processes when shared across a group. Though Mannheim (1985, 1953a, 1953b) has noted that the previous existence of a multiplicity of independent cultures and groups has made for the existence of many distinct and independent thought styles, he suggested that the decrease in isolation of countries has led to an increased homogeneity of previously distinct thought styles. Mannheim noted that when collectives who subscribe to varied thought styles enter into debate, it is the task of SoK to create a bridge of common basis to foster understanding. Thus, for Mannheim, SoK is dedicated to more than a mere analysis of the genesis of knowledge but is also dedicated to de-authorizing seemingly unitary and *total perspectives* by illustrating the thought styles from which they are rooted as partial, multiple, detached, and, limited. The implication of this insight for ANTi-History has been to acknowledge that actors, who do knowledge of the past, do so as participants in a perspective that is shared but partial, detached and multiple.

Mannheim (1985) showed that we can associate any given *perspective* to an epoch or situation because situated (time, place) social processes infiltrate perspectives. He (1985: 270) suggested that every “epoch has its fundamentally new approach and its characteristic point of view and consequently sees the “same” object from a new perspective”. We can infer from this that the same word, concept, or gesture has the possibility for adopting different connotations when used in various situated collectives.

Furthermore, the various developed concepts and categories of thought, and the meanings attached to them by a situated group, can be understood as interest-driven creations in that their inception was to suit the needs of a socio-collective. Mannheim (1985) noted that a *perspective* is influential in the construction of an associated *categorical apparatus*, which refers to the abstract categories of thought established by a society to order everyday action. It is important to note that not all competing perspectives are equal in the genesis and rise of dominant perspectives. Mannheim (1985: 275) gave the example of the genesis and rise of the natural sciences as a distinct thought style that was incommensurable to the thought style shared by the peasant class but whose dominance is shown in its construction of the *categorical apparatus* associated with Western modernism. Similarly, we can assume, as it will be shown using ANTi-History that history is one such category constructed according to the interests of certain actors who privilege a specific way (realist) of doing history.

Insight is also offered concerning the nature of the relationship between a thought style and the carriers of thought styles. It is shown that even the smallest changes in a thought style will be reflected in the fate of an associated collective. Mannheim (1985) suggests that thought styles do not appear out of nowhere but instead may be either latent until they are activated by their social carriers or that social carriers may be influenced by other thought styles, which causes them to alter their own. Even though Mannheim had no intention of formulating a causal theory of the relationship between a thought style and a socio-setting, Merton (1968) criticized Mannheim for his less than sophisticated and unsubstantiated analysis of the relationship between thought styles and their social structure. For Seliger (1977), the two problems associated with Mannheim's theory of

ideology concern (1) the lack of focus given to politics and the unequal force that political bodies may have in shaping ideology and (2) Mannheim's failure to specify the terms and conditions that allow some category of thought to achieve maturity and dispersion over others. Though ANTi-History has been mostly concerned with the former, it shifts the focus slightly to the effect of the ideological embeddedness of (political) actors on their knowledge creation of the past. Because Mannheim's notion of ideology has often been accused of knowledge relativism, and because it has been stated that ANTi-History draws on many of Mannheim's insights on ideology (which means that it could also be accused of knowledge relativism); this brings us to the discussion on relativism and relationalism in the SoK.

### ***2.3.5 Relativism and Relationalism in the SoK***

*Relativist knowledge* refers to a type of knowledge whose value can be assessed only when understood in accordance with another knowledge claim or one's perspective (used in a general sense, not in Mannheim's sense); thus, this view extinguishes any possibility for absolute truth (i.e., referring to a type of knowledge that is unconditionally valid). The way that Mannheim avoided relativism is by claiming that his SoK is relational (Mannheim, 1985; Merton, 1968). Mannheim (1985) showed that all knowledge is to be understood in relation to the historical-sociological thought models from which it originates, "which is confined to a given time and situation" (Seliger, 1977: 132). Thus, a given assertion can be seen as accurate, valid, or true according to the norms and conditions ascribed by a thought style, but it cannot necessarily be assumed to be true across thought styles. This means that the domain in which we can assume a

knowledge claim to be valid is specific to the situated socio-collective in which the knowledge claim was initially made (Fuller, 2002). As Mannheim (1953b: 39) noted, to “say that a certain creation of the mind can be explained with reference to its period is far from involving a relativistic stand as to its validity.” Thus, Mannheim aimed for a relational truth (Seliger, 1977). What the above discussion means for ANTi-History is that the theory draws on Mannheim to show the task construction of historical truths is untenable. Instead, knowledge of the past is to be understood in relation to the socio-historical thought models / collective from which it originates. Thus, ANTi-History draws on Mannheim to suggest that knowledge can be conceived as relational. In a following section I will draw on these insights to fully flesh out relevant assumptions of knowledge that can be used to inform ANTi-History.

In the next section, I continue my (re)assembly of the SoK by focusing on the contributions from the *new wave* scholars. These will be used in conjunction with the insights from the *old wave* scholars to flesh out an alternative theory of knowledge of the past.

#### **2.4 The New Wave of the Sociology of Knowledge**

The *old wave* and *new wave* scholars of the SoK are united in their general interest in *knowledge*. Though members of the old wave of the SoK were concerned with *all types* of knowledge, the new wave scholars were perhaps more influenced by the types of knowledge privileged in our modern condition. Their focus is on the

constitution of *rational* knowledge as produced by modern Western natural science and the subsequent processes in which *rational* knowledge becomes privileged.

#### **2.4.1 Robert Merton and the Structural Functionalists in SoK**

Robert Merton (1968, 1973) is credited as the most prominent of scholars associated with the structural functionalist school in the sociology of science. Merton was concerned primarily with fostering a sociological understanding of the enterprise of natural science (Godfrey-Smith, 2003: 122) and sought to do this through empirical study and the establishment of facts (Merton, 1968). This school of sociology is concerned with developing, establishing, and using reliable research techniques that focus on short-term studies and produce sound data analysis. Merton (1968: 502) feared an instance in which his field would be defined and informed through a historical focus, and he noted that in the instance where there are “different interpretations of the same data ... scientific colleagues regard this as a sign of an unstable resting point, casting doubt on the reliability of observation as well as on the adequacy of interpretation.” Merton felt that reliable results were possible only through full methodological and analytical consensus of scholars involved in a given study. Merton’s sociology of science focused on the dispersion of scientific ideas on specific audiences.

Through his studies, Merton saw science as a social enterprise (Godfrey-Smith, 2003), whose goal is the progression of qualified and specialized knowledge (Sismondo, 2004), which acts to stabilize society. His sociological focus on the natural sciences led him, in the 1940s, to outline four norms of institutionalized science. Merton described these norms as values that govern the natural sciences. These include (1) universalism,

(2) communalism, (3) disinterestedness and, (4) organized skepticism (Collins, 1983; Godfrey-Smith, 2003; Sismondo, 2004). *Universalism* refers to the notion that scientific claims are not evaluated on the basis of who made them (race, ethnicity, etc.) but are either true or false on the basis of other criteria established by the scientific thought collective. *Communalism* refers to the notion that scientific knowledge is communally owned and shared and serves the ends of science. This implies that how one's insights are used are not within the control of the researcher. *Disinterestedness* means that scientists are expected to disengage their personal motives or interests from their research activities, implying that scientists act in the best interest of the progress of the scientific enterprise as opposed to being swayed by their own gains. Finally, *organized skepticism* refers to the tendency of the scientific enterprise to distrust the legitimacy of results and new ideas until they have been proved accurate. Merton noted that the scientific enterprise acted according to its own reward structure in which recognition is prized (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). Merton's ethos of the scientific enterprise became the subject of criticism in the 1970s; concerns included the accuracy of Mertonian norms and their flexibility (Sismondo, 2004).

#### ***2.4.2 The Strong Programme and the SoK at the Edinburgh School***

In the 1970s, the so-called *Strong Programme* (SP), based in Edinburgh, reacted against the wide dispersion of Mertonian structural-functionalism (Collins, 1983; Whitley, 1972) and ANTi-History is aligned with the nature of the reaction as well the insights fostered through the reaction. Interdisciplinary in nature, the SP comprised philosophers, historians, and sociologists who set out to foster a sociological

understanding of the contents of scientific knowledge (Sismondo, 2004). This group was headed by Barry Barnes (1982) and David Bloor (1991) (Godfrey-Smith, 2003: 126), but it also included Steve Woolgar (Latour & Woolgar, 1986), Harry M. Collins and Steven Yearly (1992), Steven Shapin, and, Simon Schaffer (1985). Preferring long-term studies, the SP was concerned with the genesis of facts as opposed to the creation of factual knowledge. To guide the construction of knowledge of this group, David Bloor (1991) established four rules to govern the SP scholars. These included the notion that sociological analyses of scientific contents be (1) *causal*, in that scholars seek to establish the conditions that enable the possibilities for certain states of knowledge; (2) *symmetrical*, in that all forms of scientific knowledge, whether accepted as proven (true) or unproven (false), would warrant the same sociological curiosity and be explained on the same terms; (3) *impartial*, in that both sides of dichotomous knowledge would be relevant for analysis; and (4) *reflexive*, in that the types of explanations applied to the scientific knowledge in question could be applied to itself.

The SP sought to analyze the scientific method to foster an understanding of how views of science came to count as correct within a given society (Collins, 1983). The practice of the natural scientist came to be viewed as little different than that of sociologists or historians in that all scholars were shown to be governed by socio-cultural rules stemming from and associated with their respective community of practice (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). Through many empirical studies, the SP scholars sought to show that scientific knowledge was not *discovered* or *found* but instead *manufactured* by the scientist. Scientific knowledge became treated as *cultural* (Law, 1986), and this opened up the debate (as it had with the *old wave* scholars) concerning the motives or interests of

scientists in the manufacture of knowledge (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). The SP became associated with relativism (Collins, 1983; Godfrey-Smith, 2003), which, as initially explained, refers to the notion that there exists no single set of rules entitled to administer the validation of beliefs. The SP postulated that the natural sciences created knowledge that could be deemed valid only according to this enterprise's own internal rule of governance. Therefore, instead of the popularly held view that the sciences held special authority that transcended all norms (universal), it was suggested that the products of science could be shown valid only from the inside of the enterprise (similar to that suggested by Mannheim). Empirical studies of scientific controversies sprang up in which connections were sought between a given scientific controversy and its external socio-cultural context. Whitley (1972) and Mulkey (1969) sought to open the *black box* of scientific knowledge, highlighting that although the inputs and outputs of scientific knowledge were observable, the specific processes and contents of scientific knowledge were a mystery. As following sections will show, the insights from the SP have been influential in crafting ANTi-History. Some of these include allowing for symmetry in analyses of knowledge (for ANTi-History, the focus is on symmetry of knowledge of the past), and the assumption that knowledge must be understood in relation to a given enterprise or socio-collective. The SP has also been influential for ANTi-History because it is an antecedent to the method that informs ANTi-History: ANT. Because Science & Technology Studies is closely related to ANT and because some studies in this field have focused on some form of *history*, we now turn to this body of thought.

### ***2.4.3 Science & Technology Studies***

The SP view of the scientific enterprise and the sociology of scientific knowledge was extended to knowledge about technological artifacts and taken up by Science & Technology Studies (S&TS). Largely a social constructivist view of knowledge focused on the “meaning making activity of the individual mind” (Crotty, 2005: 58), S&TS scholars saw knowledge production as instrumentally laden as well as a social and an active process. Through empirical studies these scholars sought to show the products of science and technology (which are situated in the past) as non-natural but instead cultural, given that scientists were active in the creation of meaning about natural phenomena (Sismondo, 2004). The focus of S&TS became understanding the sources and meanings of technologies under study, and to do this scholars adopted a symmetrical approach to their sociological studies of scientific controversies (Sismondo, 2004). Insights from S&TS dispersed broadly across many disciplines, including psychology, geography, environmental studies, education, management, cultural studies, and accounting (Sismondo, 2004). For ANTi-History, this body of thought is interesting due to its focus on knowledge as instrumental as well as a social and an active process. Though some insights have been drawn from the SP and S&TS to inform ANTi-History, these bodies of thought are not without their criticisms and it is to these that I shift the focus.

### ***2.4.4 Criticisms of the SP and S&TS***

I discuss three criticisms of the SP and S&TS that are relevant for ANTi-History, though more have been waged. First, the hint of realism that underpins social constructivist accounts (Sismondo, 2004) in S&TS and the SP has been questioned.

Second, studies conducted from the SP and S&TS have been accused of providing simple context based explanations of scientific controversies. To elaborate, the criticism has been that the SP and S&TS use the context in which a scientific controversy occurs to provide a deterministic explanation of the workings of the controversy. Furthermore, the SP and S&TS studies have been criticized for assuming the context as unchanging (Law, 1986). Third, the SP and S&TS scholars have been criticized for the lack of distinction made between the interests of the creators and users of science (Fuller, 2002).

Although similarities can be drawn between the aims of the SP, S&TS and ANTi-History, the latter has been developed with consciousness intent to not reproduce these criticisms. For example, ANTi-History is not restricted to analyses of scientific knowledge, and it places a high emphasis on the role played by the *interests* of knowledge creators of the past. Because I wish to move away from the hint of realism that underpins the social constructivism of the SP and S&TS, I now turn to a discussion of Michel Foucault to continue to flesh out insights for ANTi-History.

#### ***2.4.5 Contributions From Michel Foucault***

Michel Foucault shared similar interests as the new wave of the SoK, but from different philosophical assumptions (poststructural). The common thread that flows through Foucault's vast philosophical work has been his interest in the status of certain knowledges and their associated ideological (Foucault problematizes this word) functions (May, 2006; Rabinow, 1991)—what some scholars have termed the *history of ideas* or *knowledge* and their connection with the past.

Whilst most scholars, who share Foucault's interest in the history of ideas, go about their analysis by searching for origins (one example could be a search for the origins of social thought) to then link the origin of an idea with a present incarnation of that idea, Foucault's approach differs (Danaher, Schirato, & Webb, 2003). What differentiates Foucault's scholarship from others is his denial of origins, continuity and progress. Foucault's (1982, 2007) scholarship, focused on describing the character of, what he calls *epistemes* that can be compared to broad formations of history where there is evidence of a dominant mode of thought (worldview) that guides the manner in which individuals govern their thoughts and actions. Epistemes cannot be explained by reference to a single body of knowledge (natural scientific knowledge) that is characteristic of one's age, or a spirit (capitalism), or the dominance of an individual in influencing a series of events (e.g., Adolf Hitler, Mao Tse-Tung -- Danaher et al., 2003). Instead, an episteme refers to, and renders obvious, the *order of things* embedded in or characteristic of a distinct historical period (May, 2006). Foucault's episteme refers to what orders or organizes; it is what permits us to say or do certain things and is the mechanism that allows others to look and hear what we say and call out as *normal*. Epistemes are an unconscious, taken-for-granted ordering mechanism that govern individual and collective thought processes, action, and sensemaking as well as what makes certain things fall within the realm of possibility and others within the realm of impossibility (Danaher et al., 2003). Because knowledge and *truth* are produced through epistemic formations, they are not understood as essential or ahistorical constructions. The character of knowledge or facts created through an epistemic formation act to reaffirm the naturalness and continued character of an episteme. For Foucault, the

episteme is a site where power is enacted in the struggle in the creation or valid knowledge or truth. This provides further support for ANTi-History' instance on showing what is deemed a legitimate knowledge or truth as something that is constructed through our dominant categorical apparatus, which as discussed below, is an effect of modernism.

Foucault's empirical analyses on epistemic formations led him to establish a number of broad epochs of epistemic coherency in the human sciences that are each associated with a temporality (White, 1985). The ends of various epochs are, to Foucault, ruptures of consciousness. Epistemes do not follow a linear and progressive course such as Kuhnian paradigms (1962), and the nature of connections among them are unknowable (White, 1985). One of Foucault's noted epistemic formation is associated with modernism in which Foucault "views the whole effort of modern man to represent reality realistically as a total failure" (White, 1985: 236). The modern epistemic formation has been understood as allowing the possibility for the creation of a *categorical apparatus*, which refers to the categories of knowledge by which modern Western society is ordered and governed (Foucault, 2007). Foucault showed that the development of modern empirical forms of knowledge do not follow the smooth continuist schema for which they are popularly acknowledged but instead are subject to sudden take-offs and discontinuities that are effects of broader rules of coherency that flow from regimes of power situated within epistemic formations (Rabinow, 1991). Foucauldian studies of the 19th century have shown the category of knowledge associated with *history*, for example, as a product of a modern episteme (White, 1985). Furthermore, it has been noted that the *rules of coherency* particular to the modern episteme have imposed limits on the

conditions of possibility of the academic domain of *History* (Ermarth, 2007; Jenkins, 1995, 2003). Foucauldian analyses have also enabled scholars to understand themselves as effects of the very *discourses* that they are documenting (White, 1985). Foucauldian scholarship has been influential in developing an alternative theory of knowledge of the past, especially in its emphasis that the historian must be understood as a part of the story of the history she is telling. Foucault is also relevant for ANTi-History because of his noted influence on ANT (Fox, 2000), on which ANTi-History draws. Through a discussion of Foucault will be taken up again in chapter 3, we now turn to a brief discussion of ANT as it too has been used to describe the constitution of the social, or knowledge as an effect of the social.

#### ***2.4.6 The French School and Actor-Network Theory***

ANT's antecedents include many of the bodies of thought described in this chapter (SP, S&TS, and Foucauldian). This section maps ANT's emergence and relevance as a theory of the constitution of interest-driven knowledge production.

ANT stems primarily from the scholarship of Bruno Latour (Latour, 1987, 2005b; 1986), John Law (1986, 1992, 1994), and Michel Callon (1986b), who formed the French School in their break from the SP at the Edinburgh school. ANT's antecedents include bodies of thought that were largely dedicated to showing scientific knowledges as socio-cultural products, with early ANT empirical work adopting an anthropological approach to laboratories (Collins, 1983; Latour & Woolgar, 1986). It must be stressed that ANT in use today has not been restricted to the analysis of scientific knowledge. Instead, it has been used to show the power dynamics in the constitution of *facts* (Callon & Law, 1982;

Law, 1994). ANT has been used to show the task of writing as ordering work (Law, 1994), which, through *black-boxing* (Whitley, 1972), conceals its context of creation. It has been used to trace the interest work, enrollment, and counterenrollment of actors as they actively negotiate what gets included in a *company history* (Durepos, Mills et al., 2008) or work that is to be submitted for publication at a major journal (Callon & Law, 1982). A full discussion of the method of ANT and its implications for ANTi-History are taken up in chapter 4.

## **2.5 The Relationship Between Epistemology and the Sociology of Knowledge**

So far, I have mapped the (re)assembly of the various bodies of thought associated with the *old* and *new* wave of the SoK without mention of the possible relationship between the SoK and the body of thought associated with epistemology. Because epistemology and the field of the SoK show remarkable similarities, it is important to unpack their relationship (Fuller, 2002; Mannheim, 1953b) in order to support the points that a) ANTi-History is grounded epistemologically but is not, in and of itself, an epistemology; and b) ANTi-History cautions against letting theoretical insights (epistemology) give an a priori certainty to empirical findings.

### **2.5.1 Epistemology?**

Epistemology is understood as a theory about theories of knowledge and has been described as dedicated to the fostering of insight into the assumptions of the grounds of knowledge, or knowledge about knowledge (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Crotty, 2005;

Johnson & Duberley, 2000). It illustrates criteria by which we can formulate what constitutes warranted and/or unwarranted knowledge (it must be recognized that the statements constituting this sentence are themselves epistemologically rooted).

### ***2.5.2 Comparing SoK and Epistemology***

Mannheim (1953b) discusses how the respective tasks of epistemology and the SoK differ, and I offer the points that are relevant for ANTi-History. First, epistemology is seen as prior to and guiding thought about the social sciences. However, it must be stressed that every theory of knowledge (epistemology) is influenced by the specific temporal and spatial character of the field of science from which it has stemmed. On the basis of this, we can assume that in the instance where there is the emergence of new forms of knowledge, the new forms of knowledge have grown out of existing forms of knowing. According to Mannheim, we *should never* assume that the emergences of new forms of knowing depend on a formal epistemology to assume legitimacy. As Mannheim suggested, empirical investigations always precede the emergence of different ways of knowing and even the development of a formal epistemology. Akin to Kuhn (1962), Mannheim understands methodological and epistemological revolutions as *sequels* and the *consequence* of revolutions in empirical procedures. This assertion has far-reaching implications for our purpose of outlining assumptions of knowledge for ANTi-History, namely, we must exert caution so that we do not misapply our epistemological assumptions to give an a priori certainty to findings.

Though Mannheim (1953b) suggests that epistemology and the SoK have their respective tasks, he notes that epistemology may be well informed by insights from the

SoK. Mannheim outlined that the old epistemology was largely theoretical and that new conceptualizations of epistemology, as informed by the SoK, could possibly exist alongside it. This new epistemology would have to recognize and account for the activist elements of all knowledge, in that the *perspective* (an embodied microcosm of ideology) of an individual that forms styles of thought, are active forces in the production of knowledge, thus, *knowing* as *activistic* as opposed to *knowledge* as static. Also, Mannheim (1953b) stressed that epistemology should be recognized as partial (one theory of knowledge does not account for all ways of knowing that constitute a given time and place), thus there is the possibility for the emergence of alternative epistemologies and this leads to the existence of plural epistemologies (there are many theories of knowledge and ways of knowing). Mannheim (1953b: 30) suggested that history offers a multiplicity of “co-existing theories of knowledge,” and it is therefore less the point to choose a correct epistemology but instead the focus should be on mapping them out and thus, considering their existences equally possible. Also, Mannheim (1953b) theorized that conflict will arise as two individuals from differing thought styles create different knowledge about the same object. In this likely instance, Mannheim suggested one will seek to translate another’s interest to the terms of another. This points to the political aspect at play in the emergence of different ways of knowing, which is central to ANTi-History.

It is stressed that although ANTi-History is not itself an epistemology, it is rooted epistemologically and informed by insights from the SoK. Before listing and discussing these insights, we now take up the discussion that opened this chapter on *amodernism*.

## 2.6 Toward an Amodern Approach to Knowledge Creation

The discussion of the old and new wave scholars of the SoK has allowed us to draw many insights concerning their conceptualization of *knowledge*. In general, it can be stated that both old wave and new wave SoK scholars have been dedicated to showing the relationship between human thought/knowledge and the social context in which it arises. On the basis of theorizing the relationship between knowledge and its social context, SoK scholars have suggested *knowledge* as activistic (something we do), communal (arising in groups of actors), ideological, situated, positioned, interest driven, and relational, as well as materially heterogeneous.

Arguably the insights on knowledge offered by SoK scholars contradict what has come to be considered as privileged knowledge in a modernist framework. I now turn to two arguments that suggest modernist conceptualizations of knowledge as limited: (1) that the current state of *decontextualised knowledge* that plagues organization studies and was instrumental in the call for the *historic turn* (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006) is an effect of the overdominance of privileging modernist conditions of *knowledge* and (2) that the *dominant mode of ordering* knowledge or the *categorical apparatus* particular to Western modernism is in part responsible for the creation of *decontextualised knowledge*.

The first argument suggests that modernism as a socio-cultural formation emphasizes the privileging of the creation of a type of knowledge that assumes a realist ontology and specifies the purpose of the researcher as accurately representing that reality in an objective and rational manner. These conditions of knowledge creation force the researcher to deny the possibility of contextual influences on a phenomenon of study.

Furthermore, these modernist conditions force the researcher to deny the possibility that their situated self (time, space and ideology), that is, their specific contextual factors, influences the knowledge they produce. Thus, a detrimental implication of the socio-cultural formation of modernism on knowledge creation has been the emphasis and privileging of decontextualised knowledge. It is suggested that adopting insights concerning knowledge from the old and new wave of the SoK can aid in the (re)contextualization of knowledge creation. These insights include understanding knowledge as activist, communal (from a community of thought or thought styles), and situated (ideologically, spatially, and temporally) and positioned, interest driven, materially heterogeneous, and relational. Furthermore, the incorporation of these insights into knowledge will enable an initial addressing of the call for the historic turn in organization studies.

The second argument concerning the limiting nature of the socio-cultural formation of modernism on the condition of knowledge creation pertains to the *ordering of knowledge* according to the *categorical apparatus* particular to Western modernism. Foucault (2007) discussed modernism as an epistemic formation whereby the rise of a distinct *categorical apparatus* acted to impose a false necessity on the *order of things* and *ordering of knowledge*. Taking up this point, Latour (1993) suggested that *we have never been modern*. He suggested that the moderns have fuelled a ridged categorization scheme for ordering knowledge. As a result, knowledge creation about nonhuman phenomena became the focus of the natural sciences, and creating knowledge about humans became the charge of the social sciences.

It must be stressed that rational and objective knowledge, which we have observed as privileged within a modernist condition, is much more easily produced by natural scientists who are charged with the study of nonreflective phenomena. Criticized as epistemically challenged, the social sciences struggled in the emulation of natural scientific methodologies in hopes of the creation of rational and objective knowledge (Popper, 1960). Latour (1993) suggested that the constitution of, and an actor's experience of, the social world does not mirror the categorical apparatus created by a modernist episteme. Instead, he suggested that the social is constituted of hybrids, which are heterogeneous actor-networks. As will be shown in chapter 4, actor-networks are heterogeneous in that they are composed of interrelated human and nonhuman actors who are engaged in socio-politics in hopes of enlisting actors onto their cause. Latour's question is: *How does one go about the study of materially heterogeneous actants within a modernist framework in which a crucial philosophical assumption and precondition for study is the categorization and isolation of like phenomena?* Latour asks: *How do we study the interrelationship between the various heterogeneous (human and nonhuman) actors that make up the hybrids?* On the one hand, Latour celebrated the moderns and their meticulous efforts at producing endless documentation, accelerating the rate of production of goods and cultural traces as well as their extensive efforts at creating knowledge about phenomena. On the other hand, he condemned as illusionary their attempts at rationality, objectivity, and universality. He attacked modernist attempts to create knowledge about phenomena that is ordered according to socially constructed categories of thought, which specify isolating those phenomena in order to study it.

Latour criticized that phenomena had to be placed in artificial conditions to study its constitution.

The above assertions have implications for the Habermas (1981)-Lyotard (1993) debate in which the fulfillment of modernist ideals was contested. In this debate, Habermas suggested the modernist project as worthy of pursuing, whilst Lyotard suggested it as futile. Lyotard suggested a reorientation for the condition of knowledge toward that of postmodernism. However, it can be argued that postmodernism can also be understood as a condition of modernism, a category of thought created by the moderns and thus a part of modernism (Latour, 1993, 2005b; Lyotard, 1993; Perry, 2002). Lyotard (1993: 78–80) contested this claim, offering that “a work can become modern only if it is first postmodern. Postmodernism thus understood is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant.” According to Lyotard (1979), the condition of thought associated with postmodernism is one that is absent of a rigid structure, and out of this arises the possibility for alternative structures or categorizations, a condition associated with modernism. Lyotard’s (1993) point is that out of postmodernism arises modernism. As a reaction to this, Latour (1993: 131) suggests that because postmodernism has evolved largely as a reaction to modernism, and work within this body of scholarship is carried out in reaction to modernism, postmodernism is and always will be within the grips of modernism. Thus, Latour stressed that postmodernism is faulted because of its continuous subjection to, and influence by, modernism.

It is with the above in mind that Latour (1993) suggested and theorized amodernism. One consequence of amodernism is the disturbance of the long lasting divides between the study of human and nonhuman worlds. He suggested that it is futile

to study the constitution of social life by putting humans in one category and nonhumans in the next when they appear to us in daily experience through hybrids (heterogeneous networks). Though this discussion will be taken up again in the following chapter, it is noted that ANTi-History is rooted in amodernism.

## **2.7 Specific Implications of SoK to Inform ANTi-History**

Building on the various discussions and debates discussed above, I will now lay out the insights that inform the craft of ANTi-History (see figure 2.1).

### ***2.7.1 Insights on Knowledge From the SoK That Can Inform Historical Knowledge Production***

Many of the insights discussed in this section draw largely on Marx and Mannheim (1985, 1953) and include assumption of knowledge that can be used to inform knowledge of the past.

#### ***2.7.1.1 Activistic Elements in Knowledge***

The first consequence of the SoK for the craft of history is that of recognizing the inherent activism of all knowledge. Briefly put, all knowledge production is a social activity, and by virtue of this all knowledge is “infused with activity” (Mannheim, 1985: 296). As such, the noun *knowledge* may be more accurately and usefully construed as a verb, *knowing*.

### 2.7.1.2 *Knowledge as Situated and Positioned*

The second insight is the acknowledgment of knowledge as situated and positioned. *Situated knowledge* refers to knowledge as developed, residing, and dispersing differently according to time (specific period) and place (physical location). *Positioned knowledge* refers to that which is historically, culturally, and politically located. As Mannheim (1985: 293) noted, the position of a point of view refers to the complex “conditions of emergence and existence which determine the nature and development of an assertion.” Mannheim also suggested that the perspective of the asserter must be taken into consideration when assessing positioned knowledge. Perspective, according to Mannheim (1985: 266), is akin to an embodied microcosm of ideology and refers to a “subject’s whole mode of conceiving things as determined by his historical and social setting.” Perspective is multiple, because different individuals have the capacity to ascribe different meaning to same objects. Perspective is also partial in that what a given group accepts as absolute may appear to an outsider as knowledge that is conditioned by that group’s distinct situation.

### 2.7.1.3 *Ideology: Toward a Characterization of Ideological Pluralism*

The third insight is an acknowledgment and acceptance of ideological pluralism. *Ideological pluralism* refers to the notion that multiple ideologies can be in existence within an epoch (epoch bound) and across (transcending) epochs (Seliger, 1977). An inclusive notion of ideology refers to a deep-seated set of beliefs and assumptions. Seliger (1977) suggested that multiple ideologies existing within an epoch or across epochs may show commonalities in their mutual sharing or mutual refutation of dominant

assumptions, morals, and beliefs. Whilst the ideology associated with a time and place may change and morph, perhaps because it interacts with other extant ideologies, particular aspects of the belief system may persist in the formation of an altered ideology. The consequence for knowledge of adopting a pluralist view of ideology is that because a group's deep-seated belief system influences what that group takes for granted as valid and legitimate knowledge, a pluralist view of ideology would attest that in a given epoch and across epochs there are simultaneous and equally valid ways of knowing, each rooted in respective ideologies. In short, acknowledging a plurality of ideologies can provide the necessary conditions for the emergence of different ways of *knowing*.

#### *2.7.1.4 Communal (Distributed) Nature of Knowledge Production*

A fourth insight is the communal or distributed nature of knowledge production. The term *distributed knowledge* implies that knowing is not embrained, that it does not reside in an individual mind, but is instead disbursed throughout the situation in which the knower is located. Thus, knowledge is understood as distributed across a community of *knowers*. As Mannheim (1985: 268) noted, "actual attitudes which underlie the theoretical ones are by no means merely of an individual nature. ... Rather, they arise out of the collective purposes of a group with underlie the thought of the individual."

#### *2.7.1.5 Emergence of Communities of Knowing: Some Are More Dominant Than Others*

Knowledge is understood as distributed across a socio-community. This is the fifth insight. If we assume an activism of knowledge creation, we must also acknowledge that ways of knowing and knowledge creation are communal. This means

that the creation or sustaining of a manner of knowing is an activity in which a group of actors are engaged. The notion that particular forms of knowing emerge in variously situated socio-communities has assumed different labels, including *thought models or styles* (Mannheim, 1985), *communities of science* (Kuhn, 1962), *thought collectives or thought styles* (Fleck, 1979), *communities of practice* (Lave & Wenger, 1991), *epistemic cultures* (Knorr Cetina, 1999), and *epistemes* (Foucault, 1982). The various terms used to express this idea illustrate the importance of its connotation; communities of knowing are embedded in various ideological formations. Plural ideological formations give rise to plural communities of knowing. In the emergence of communities of knowing it must be noted that some actors (political, religious) may be more influential in negotiating the character of the manner of knowing that crystallizes for a given socio-community (Mannheim, 1953b).

#### *2.7.1.6 Knowledge Creation Is Interest Driven*

The sixth insight states that not all actors are equally influential in what crystallizes as a legitimate knowledge in a community of knowing. This suggests that knowledge is interest driven in that the sites at which knowledge is created are characterized by endless politics. Actors, who are either similarly or dissimilarly situated ideologically, negotiate what later becomes the shared understanding or sense of knowing.

Mannheim (1985) noted that actors who share a thought style can potentially create different meaning about the same phenomena or actors with different ideologies can ascribe to a mutual manner of knowing a phenomenon. The interest-driven acts of

actors engaged in the type of situation described by Mannheim (1985) can be explained through two concepts from the literature on ANT which are also central to ANTi-History. The first is referred to as *enrollment*, and the second is referred to as *counterenrollment*. *Enrollment*: actors with similar ideologies engage in negotiation and politicking whereby each puts forth their interests and one actor enrolls the other into his or her cause; actors who are situated in dissimilar ideologies engage in negotiations whereby one actor seeks to translate the other to a common denominator. The latter instance is possible only if at least one actor acknowledges his or her positionality and the partiality of his or her ideology; *Counterenrollment*: actors with similar ideologies engage in negotiation and politicking whereby each puts forth their interests but actors fail in enrolling one another into a cause; actors who are situated in dissimilar ideologies engage in negotiations whereby one actor seeks to translate the other to a common denominator but fails and no shared understanding or ideology is fostered. In this latter instance, actors are incapable of acknowledging their positionality and possibly assume their ideology as absolute (shared universally). It is important to note that actors are in a constant state of negotiation informed by their interests, but some actors are more influential in this than others.

#### *2.7.1.7 Communities of Knowing as Materially Heterogeneous*

The seventh insight suggested that the socio-political actors that are engaged in the craft of knowledge are heterogeneous. Briefly put, as actors engage in political work in hopes of rendering their cause stronger, or influencing dissimilarly situated ideological actors with intent of imposing their ideology, they enroll human and nonhuman actors.

As a result of this, it is possible to conclude that the formation of communities of knowing or networks depend on the alignment of both human and nonhuman actors. Thus, networks or communities of knowing are active effects of the alignment of humans and nonhuman actors (Latour, 1993). This assumption illustrates the limitation of modernist categories of thought that suggest that humans and nonhumans be studied and understood in isolation of one and other. Because our daily living illustrates that we experience humans and nonhumans in constant intersection, the quest of creating knowledge of these two spheres in isolation is futile. Arguably, it is important to view knowledge creation as an effect of communities of knowing that are materially heterogeneous.

#### *2.7.1.8 Categorical Apparatus Is a Product of a Historical Construction*

The eighth insight is that the categorical apparatus associated with the thought style of modernism is a social construction. Latour (1993) hinted at this idea when he suggested that we have never been modern, in that the categorical apparatus that dictates that human and nonhumans be studied in isolation of one and other is a modernist creation. He noted that because the moderns are concerned with an accurate representation of phenomena their project is futile given that our social appears to us in daily experience through a combination of human and nonhuman interactions. For our purposes in fostering an understanding of knowledge, it is suggested that the categorical apparatus that is particular to a given society has been socially constructed through the interest-driven acts of a community of actors. After a considerable period of time, there is potential for the structure of the abstract categories that govern that socio-collective to

take on an air of naturalness that in turn conceals the interest-driven process in which it was initially created. Thus, the various organizing principles of a given socio-collective come to appear as far removed from the daily political struggles that are occurring within its realms. The level of abstraction (beyond which a given theory or knowledge does not progress) reached by a given socio-collective is indicative of the degree of sophistication reached in the knowledge creation efforts of a given socio-collective or community of knowing.

#### *2.7.1.9 Knowledge and Folding Through Elapse of Time (Knowledge Is Nonprogressive)*

The ninth insight suggests that continued knowledge creation be understood through a process of folding as opposed to progression. This suggests that the process of knowing does not develop in accordance with inherent and predetermined laws, it flows not from the nature of things but instead, as Mannheim (1985) suggested, from an existential realm. Also, the process of knowledge does not develop linearly, in which one instance is followed by a completely separate, albeit more advanced instance. Instead, it is suggested that we look at communities of knowing as situated ideologically, spatially, and temporally, through a process of folding. This means that we try and understand a community of knowing as enveloping all previous incarnations of that very community of knowing. In this, we can see how previous socio-historical periods have become folded into that community of knowing.

#### *2.7.1.10 Knowledge as Relational*

The tenth insight refers to understanding knowledge as relational. Drawing largely on Mannheim (1985, 1953a, 1953b), knowledge construction is not to be understood as embrained, which would suggest it as the cognitive product of one individual, but instead as relational, whereby *knowing* is fostered through actor relationships and interactions. Furthermore, every way of *knowing* is to be understood in relation to the socio-historical conditions from which it stems.

#### *2.7.2 Using Insights From the SoK to Inform the Task of the Researcher*

Whereas the points discussed above pertain to insights informing assumptions about knowing, the next points refer to the consequences of these insights for the researcher engaged in crafting knowledge, and for the purpose of ANTi-History, crafting knowledge of the past.

##### *2.7.2.1 Truth or Accurate Representation?*

The first consequence for the researcher pertains to an acknowledgement of the problems involved in associating *knowing* with *absolute, universal, or eternal truth*. That knowledge can assume a status of universal, absolute, or eternal truth means that it is deemed as true regardless of time, place, or collective. It is possible to counter the possibility of this claim by suggesting Mannheim's notion of *relational truth* as an alternative.

Drawing on Mannheim (1985), *relational truth* refers to the idea that a given assertion or way of knowing may be *true* for a given socio-collective that is situated ideologically, spatially, and temporally. However, relational truth holds that this same assertion may not hold *true* for an alternative socio-collective that is differently situated ideologically, spatially, and temporally. Thus, for our purposes it may be more useful to understand knowledge as *accurate* to refer to Mannheim's notion of *relational truth* for fear that the popular connotations of the word *truth* will confuse the issue.

#### 2.7.2.2 *In Tracing the Genesis of Knowledge, Premise the Empirical Over the Theoretical*

As a second consequence, the researcher who is engaged in creating knowledge of the past is encouraged to be guided primarily by the empirical realm followed by the theoretical. I support this by reiterating Mannheim (1985), who suggested that new forms of knowing grow out of existing forms of knowing. The developments of new forms of knowing are not initially dependent on acquiring legitimacy from an existing epistemology (formal theory of knowledge). It is suggested that because knowledge develops out of empirical investigations, then such empirical investigations are somewhat responsible for the slight alterations of formal theories of knowledge. Mannheim (1985: 289) noted that "revolutions of methodology and epistemology are always sequels and repercussions of the revolutions in the immediate empirical procedures for getting knowledge," and because of this, a theory must never be applied to give an a priori certainty to data. This means that we cannot begin the task of creating knowledge about a phenomenon (using empirical knowledge) by assuming as given (using theoretical knowledge) what we wish for that very analysis to show. Instead, in our attempt at

creating knowledge about a phenomenon we must let the actors speak louder than our theories and follow their traces to wherever they take us (Latour, 1987). Thus, we trace their trajectory to (re)assemble their constitution (Latour, 2005b).

#### 2.7.2.3 *Problematizing 'Imposing the Plot'*

Because it has been suggested that we follow our subject of study wherever it will lead us, the third consequence for the researcher illustrates the problematic of *imposing the plot*. Representationalist approaches for creating knowledge that are rooted in a realist ontology suggest that it is possible to create knowledge about a phenomenon or an (past) event that mirrors it in exactitude. However, this assumes that a given event or phenomenon already has a *plot* or an inherent order and that our task is to create knowledge that portrays that *plot* accurately. Given that knowledge construction about a given phenomenon or event is an effect of the interrelationship between a situated researcher, and the variously situated traces that the researcher is following, the plot of the given phenomenon or event must be viewed as a (re)construction or a (re)assembly. Given that the plot is largely an effect of the interrelationship of the researcher and her empirical traces, it is not possible to assume its character prior to having followed the traces as it is through following the traces that the plot stems.

#### 2.7.2.4 *Transparency*

This brings us to the fourth consequence. Drawing on Mannheim's (1985) insights on relational truths and partial ideologies, it is suggested that, for three reasons, researchers voice their ideological, spatial, and temporal situatedness: (a) to transparently

acknowledge their situatedness in the hope of illustrating to a given audience that the knowledge in question is an active effect of the interrelationship of interest driven negotiations and the various traces followed (ensuring transparency); (b) to acknowledge their situatedness for the purpose of communicating that any approach cannot be assumed as absolute or eternal, thus illustrating that knowledge is relative and *accurate* according to the norms and standard of the community from within which we are researching (relational truth); and (c) acknowledging that knowledge of a phenomenon is situated, to show the partiality of that knowledge and assume the possibility as well as welcome other accounts of a same phenomenon that may be varyingly situated (partiality). This invites the possibility for the emergence of a plurality of ways of knowing a phenomenon.

## 2.8 Summary

This chapter has presented a (re)assembly of the literature on the SoK by beginning with a search for ruptures or discontinuities in what has counted for worthy knowledge in our society. Situated as an effect of the categorical apparatus of modernism, the literature of the SoK was discussed by focusing primarily on contributions from the old wave and new wave sociologists of knowledge. In an effort to disassociate *epistemology* from *SoK*, both terms were discussed. The implication of modernism for the condition of knowledge was discussed and illustrated as limited. Through this process, preliminary thoughts on a condition of amodernism were offered. Finally, 14 contributions from the SoK literature were listed and discussed (see figure 2.1) as insights on knowledge creation that will inform our understandings of the *past*

and, ultimately, of ANTi-History. *Historiography* and *history* are the focus of the next chapter to flesh out contributions that can be used with these collective SoK insights to conceptualize ANTi-History.

## Chapter 3: Historiography

*“It is the artist, and not nature, that is responsible for what goes into the picture. In the same way, no historian, not even the worst, merely copies out its authorities” (Collingwood, 1956: 236)*

*“History constructs the intellectual framework that comprehends it.” (Bachelard as quoted in Lechte, 2008: 3)*

### 3.1 Introduction

From a discussion of the production of knowledge per se we now move to an understanding of knowledge of the past, through a (selective) review of the literature on historiography. This will help to position ANTi-History through a (re)assembly of select communities of thought that have, in varying ways, contributed to knowledge creation about the *past*, *history*, and *historiography*. Once again, I do not begin by assuming that there is an irrefutable, unchanging literature associated with historiography, I acknowledge that *beginnings* and *ends* are fictive constructions that aid the creator of history in their (re)assembly and I stress that the bounding of this *history of history*, as well as the meaning extracted from the analysis of given traces, is my purposive (re)assembly.

The (re)assembly begins with an attempt to describe focal terms from the *discourse* of history (Brown, 2005). Various communities of thought that have contributed to the craft of *knowledge of knowledge of the past* are mapped out and discussed including key *realist* (i.e., Enlightenment, Rankean, empiricist, positivist, and mainstream scholars as well as Marxist historiography), *interpretive* (as exemplified by R.G. Collingwood); and *anti-realist* historiography (i.e., the body of work collectively referred to as *cultural theory* that encompasses postmodern and poststructural theorists such as Hayden White, Keith Jenkins and Michel Foucault) scholarship. I will use this

review to establish the parameters of ANTi-History, and summarize the various insights that can contribute to this alternative approach to historiography.

### **3.2 Nondefinitive Boundaries Around Key ‘History’ Concepts**

First, it is important to state that, as Jenkins (2003, 1997) suggests, the current connotations of *history* (the subject of the past) are constrained by its *institutionalization* through History (the discipline that is privileged with the determination of *history*). Thus, Jenkins argues, in order to liberate *history* from History, any definition of *history* must necessarily be understood as a socially conditioned effect of the institutionalized discipline of History. In that vein, this section is dedicated to defining focal terms from the discourse of history, including *the past*, *history*, and *historiography*, in ways that are to be understood as non-definitive and socially constructed. I do this with the understanding that (a) I am contributing to the potential that defining any concept further constrains our understanding of that concept and (b) there is no uniformity of understanding of the definitions of these concepts across the literature encountered in this chapter but that (c) defining these terms in a transparent way will help show their socially constructed nature and (d) illustrate what is understood of these terms through ANTi-History.

#### **3.2.1 Characterizing the Concept of ‘Past’**

To liberate the notion of *history* from its constraining connotations, cultural theorists suggest disassociating the term from that of the *past*. If we understand the *past* as referring to the period prior to our present condition (Jenkins, 1991, 1995), and *history*

as our knowledge of the past, it becomes less of a possibility to conceptualize *history* and *past* through a realist ontology in which *history is the past*. As Collingwood (1956) notes, because the past is vanished, our consciousness and knowledge of it can never be subject to *verification* whereby our memory of a set of events is compared with the *real* events, to ensure an accurate representation. However, to deny the past's existence outside of our mental appreciation of it -- to deny its existence in hard, tangible form -- does not constitute a denial of the past altogether. It is instead an effort to stress the past as a "dimension of the human consciousness" (Hobsbawm, 1997: 10) and refute the possibility of its existence "apart from our consciousness of it" (White, 1985: 39; Jenkins, 2003). This does not counter that what happened before our *now* actually happened, but again, it is to stress that since yesterday's elapse, all we have of yesterday are (a) persistent traces, (b) our memory of how those traces were ordered, and, (c) the meaning we ascribe to the ordered traces (Jenkins, 1991; 1995). To that end, we can begin to formulate a meaning of the term *history* that is liberated from the meaning of the term *past* and consequently liberate it from the meaning it has assumed through the discourse of History.

### ***3.2.2 Characterizing the Concept of 'History'***

As has been mentioned, I use the term *history* to denote knowledge of the past. The term *History* on the other hand, is understood as a modern, Western, socio-constructed academic category/discipline dedicated to the construction of knowledge of the past (Gunn, 2006; Jenkins, 1991; 1995). Drawing on insights from the SoK in which it was proposed that all knowledge is activist, and acknowledging that history is

knowledge of the past, Jenkins (1991, 1995) suggests the craft of history as an activity, something that historians do, that is, an active sensemaking construction. Although the historian is engaged in constructing knowledge of the past, the activities of the historian take place in the present. Thus, history is the active ordering of knowledge of the past done by the historian, and it is an effect of the interrelationship of the situated (ideological, temporal, spatial) historian and her traces. It should be stressed that I do not propose that all knowledge of the past counts as history. I follow Jacques (2006) who notes that for histories to be taken as such they must draw on scholarly citations whose validity is not unquestioningly assumed, must order traces of the past in a topical manner as opposed to an unquestioned chronology, and, must render transparent its theoretical approach.

Thus, *history* is a medium in which the historian brings to light her ordering of traces through adopting one of many available conventions that have been developed by a historically minded community of thought (Ermarth, 2007; Jenkins et al., 2007; White, 1973). If we acknowledge that (a) *history* is ideologically situated knowledge of the past, and (b) society provides the potential for the coexistence of ideologies both across and within epochs (see chapter 2), then it is suggested that (c) two historians who are situated in distinct ideologies would likely order and inform the meaning of historical traces differently. This means that historians embedded in different ideologies would likely *do history differently*. I will return to these observations later.

### 3.2.3 Characterizing the Concept of ‘Historiography’

Jenkins (2003) notes that the *past* is a set of shapeless, unordered traces that has little meaning unless it is informed by a situated historian. This brings into question the set of acceptable *methods* that can inform the specific ordering of traces. Calling this *historiography*, most historians agree to it as a “disciplined means” (Jenkins, 1995: 17) in which communities of thought engage in creating norms, procedures, standards, and methods, whose legitimacy and validity are a function of the community, to guide knowledge creation of the past. It can be argued that *historiography* refers to the philosophically informed methods that are (a) constructed and (b) used by historically minded communities of thought in their craft of history.

### 3.2.4 What Is the Task of the Historian; Who Is the Historian?

Because the *past* cannot tell the historian which aspects of itself are worthy of study, or which traces should be followed, fleshing out the task of the historian is pertinent. Surprisingly, there is a large degree of alignment between varyingly situated (Marxist and postmodernist) historians concerning this matter. Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm (1997: 59) suggests that the task of the historian is one of investigation that is informed by “recognized criteria of scholarship.” Specifically, Hobsbawm (1997: 209) notes that it is the task of the historian to “construct the jigsaw puzzle” out of relevant “fragmentary information,” followed by an explanation of the information. Similarly, postmodern historian White<sup>2</sup> (1985) notes that history is as much *invented* as found in the sense that meaningful knowledge of the past is possible only when the historian (a)

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<sup>2</sup> There is some debate around how to classify White’s theoretical positioning. Here I am following Brown (2005) who characterizes White’s intellectual journey as moving from structuralist to postmodernist over his career (see also Jenkins, 1995).

decides on which traces to follow, (b) orders such traces, and (c) informs the ordering of traces through a suggested meaning. White also notes that it is the task of the historian to study the past in a manner that can inform present problems.

### ***3.2.5 What Is the Purpose of History?***

Whereas there is considerable disagreement between varyingly situated communities concerning legitimate ways for carrying out historical analyses, most historians agree about the purpose of history. The purpose of history has been described as informing human self-knowledge (Collingwood, 1956), a manner of illuminating the present (Wren, 2005) or showing how contemporary society can learn from the past (Hobsbawm, 1997; MacMillan, 2008). Nonetheless, the different approaches to historiography indelibly shape the manner in which the past informs the present. It is to those different traditions that I now turn. In the following sections I review the dominant tradition within historiography to illustrate some of the key problems with extant literature and flesh out insights that will inform ANTi-History.

### **3.3 Realist Historiography**

Realism has been described as the dominant ontology of modernism (Jenkins, 1995; White, 1973). Realist historians and historiographers are united in their assumption that both history and the past exist in hard, tangible form that is independent of the historian's constructions. In order to ascertain some of the key problematics of historiography to establish the basis of ANTi-History, this section examines insights from five realist historiographic perspectives. Scholarship from a realist ontology has been

suggested as limiting (see chapter 2) and because of this, the problems of realist historiography are taken up in a following section (3.5) to show its implications for ANTi-History.

### ***3.3.1 The Enlightenment and Historiography***

Enlightenment historiographers are considered the root of modern (professional) historiography (Collingwood, 1956) and as such merit attention. Their contribution to the study of history was to move the craft away from a belief system viewed as partial and subjective to one that was seen as universal and objective; from histories written to advance the interests of elite classes to history written to “guide reflection” of the past (White, 1973: 58); from forms of history dominated by *clerical religion* (Collingwood, 1956) to the development of objective truth about the past; from histories constructed from *irrational* pre-Enlightenment beliefs based on fables, legends, and myths to *rational* Enlightenment ideas to explain the present in terms of the past (Collingwood, 1956; White, 1973). The emergent historiography in the Enlightenment era was seen as, a forward-looking approach, based on reasoned action, that consequently made rational thought possible. History for these Enlightenment scholars was understood as the beginning of the modern scientific ethos, in which the superstitions of past primitive minds would become irrelevant when the rational mind could forecast necessary or rational societal developments (Collingwood, 1956). The Enlightenment scholars understood history as the documentation of the development of reason within a given society, and this knowledge creation would be guided by reason and rationality. What was sought was a universal history, which could be used to abolish all irrationality in the

development of human nature, leading to a future in which all problems of life would be solved (Collingwood, 1956).

What this approach to history also created, however, was a historiography that masked and normalized its realist ontological assumptions; unquestioningly linking construction of the past to a search for its accurate representation (White, 1985).

### ***3.3.2 Rankean Historiography***

Whereas the early thoughts of Enlightenment scholars on history were influential in the creation as a secular discipline of study, the development of *professional* standards to guide the field has been credited to Leopold Von Ranke (Gunn, 2006). Like the Enlightenment scholars who reacted against the dominance of religion (Green & Troup, 1999), Ranke established what many now consider “historical objectivity” (Novick, 1988:1–2 as quoted in Gunn, 2006: 8). Ranke felt that history should assume a title of *science* (White, 1985), a study of the past characterized by an extreme objectivity. Ranke sought to view the historical field in its immediacy, to show what *really* happened without any trace of the historian’s judgment of that past (Geyl, 1962; Green & Troup, 1999; White, 1973). Banishing any trace of the historian, Ranke set out to establish the reality of the past, by highlighting the difference between fact and value, history and fiction (Cousins, 1987; Gunn, 2006; White, 1973, 1985). Historical facts, evidence, or traces, according to Ranke (and subsequent Rankean scholars), were understood as existing prior to the historian and independent of his interpretation. Personal memoirs and accounts of an event written after the event were discounted by Rankean scholars as valid sources of evidence (Green & Troup, 1999). Only by drawing on primary sources

and subjecting those to close critical scrutiny was the historian able to construct the past *accurately* (Green & Troup, 1999; White, 1973). Thus, Rankean history privileged an inductive method of reasoning, and rigorously verified historical evidence, as well as an insistence on capturing history in absolute terms (Green & Troup, 1999; Ankersmit, 2007; White, 1973).

The norms surrounding the craft of *history* developed by Ranke and Rankean scholars were largely influential in the institutionalization of History as a discipline in which there is (a) *one way* of writing history (objectively); and (b) that all should aspire to *capture and uncover one history*. The discussion on ANTi-History (in chapter 5) will show that the institutionalized aspects of History are problematized through ANTi-History.

### ***3.3.3 Empiricist Historiography***

Ranke had much influence over the rise of empiricism in historiography (Gunn, 2006). Empiricism is both a method of inquiry and a theory of knowledge, which states that “knowledge should be derived from the material world” (Green & Troup, 1999: 1). The empiricist values inductive analysis, objectivity over subjectivity, history as a science as opposed to fiction or an art, an impartial search for the truth, an accurate reconstruction of past reality, and the idea that new evidence can guide disagreements of interpretations of the past (Perry, 2002).

As a leading defender of empiricism in historical practice, Geoffrey Elton sought to define the boundaries of history and historical analysis (Elton, 1997; Green & Troup, 1999; Jenkins, 1995). Elton was largely concerned with the professionalization of

historical analysis and believed history should be taken up only by trained historians (Jenkins, 1995). Though Elton was against the portrayal of history as a series of generalizations or laws, and felt that reaching an ultimate truth is impossible, he felt that all historians should aspire to truth. According to Jenkins (1995), Elton postulated that the historian should never have the last word and he saw the purpose of history as twofold: (1) to widen the possibility of the living by exposing them to experiences outside of their present condition and (2) to demonstrate the unpredictability of all human actions and thought, in order to illustrate the free will of humans through plotting their course in history. For Elton, the professional historian was one who, through training, had acquired proper skills to manipulate the evidence for the purpose of understanding and illustrating the past on its own terms (Ibid., 1995). On the basis of this, Elton advised future generations of historians, to beware of the dangers of bias and ideology in tainting their historical illustrations. Elton saw language as an important medium for representing the past as it *actually* occurred and to that end encouraged historical writing to be as clear as possible (Ibid, 1995). Elton's notion of the professional historian was one who writes disinterested and impartial accounts of the past and whose labours are guided by a search for the truth (Elton, 1997). The way in which *truth* was to be established was through the careful evaluation of historical evidence.

The archive became an important site for the empiricist's research (Green & Troup, 1999). Proper history, according to Elton, was to be found in the sources where the truth of the past lay. Sources or traces of the past were, therefore, assumed as important media for telling the historian what happened (Jenkins, 1995). In the analysis of historical materials, Elton and other empiricists believed that historians should not

impose an a priori understanding of theory on the evidence but rather should let the *history* arise out of the materials (Green & Troup, 1999; Perry, 2002). Curiously, Elton and the empiricists were careful not to impose theory on historical records because they believed that the overall study of history should be guided by methods that are constant and universal (Jenkins, 1995).

Though an ANTi-History approach is not sympathetic to realist scholarship (see section 3.5), and to Elton specifically (because of his belief in: the possibility of truth, the establishment of strict professional training for historians, disinterested historians, history as a science, objective analysis only, etc.), it is stressed that ANTi-History is aligned with Elton's emphasis on the useful nature of the archive and the empiricist view that knowledge should be derived from the material world.

#### ***3.3.4 Positivist Historiography***

Possibly the most extreme incarnation of the scientific study of history is positivist historiography. Positivism assumes that history is subject to general laws and is the opposite of fiction. It views different interpretations of the past as errors due to ideological distortions or inadequate factual data (White, 1985; Collingwood, 1956). Positivist historians seek to ascertain the facts that will inform history and, on the basis of the generalizability of these facts, frame laws that can be used to analyze further facts (Collingwood, 1956). Throughout this task the positivist historian seeks to maintain her impartiality and establish objectivity in that facts are to be understood independently of each other as well as free of the historian's bias.

Popper (1960) theorized the possibility that the social sciences could fully emulate the dominant epistemological (positivism) and methodological assumptions of the natural sciences. Though he believed that the social sciences could never fully emulate the natural sciences (anti-naturalistic), he suggested that the social sciences should continually aspire to espouse pro-positivist (pro-naturalistic) tendencies. He based and justified the pro-naturalistic tendencies of the social sciences on the commonality of the social and natural science, namely that each represents a branch of knowledge. Because of this, Popper suggested that the social sciences privilege empirical analyses, in which the generation of theory is based on experience, is predictive, seeks to reduce observational bias and is focused on explaining social dynamics or movement guided by laws or forces. The consequence for history is that positivist historians sought to apply pro-naturalistic tendencies to historical analyses.

Of interest for our subsequent discussion of ANTi-History, Popper was also aware of the *ultimate* problems of applying a natural science approach to the social science, suggesting that the social sciences, due to their study of reflective phenomena, would continually espouse anti-naturalistic tendencies, that the social sciences could never produce generalizable theories because specific circumstances only arise within a single historical period and the belief of generalizability would mean a disbelief in the capacity for societies to change. He also felt that because of the perpetual state of change of the phenomenon studied by social scientists, experimentation and establishing reliable knowledge through experimentation would prove impossible; that, due to the complexity of social science phenomenon, the establishment of predictions and exactitude would be unattainable; and that the quantitative methods used in the natural sciences to establish

causal explanations may be futile for the social scientist who sought to foster causal explanations of social entities—he believed that such explanations would fall short in fostering the intimate understanding needed to comprehend the complexity of social science phenomenon. This provides useful starting point for a discussion concerning the limiting nature of positivism (dominant epistemology of modernism) for the craft of history. ANTi-History is sympathetic to the problems outlined by Popper, which stem from applying natural scientific frameworks and assumptions to phenomena in the social sciences.

### ***3.3.5 Positivism as Mainstream Historiography***

Notwithstanding the kind of critique anticipated by sympathetic scholars (such as Popper) positivist history was the dominant form of historiography across the modern Western world as early as the 19<sup>th</sup> century and through to the present time. In some ways that prominence is evidenced in generations of historiographers trained in positivist conventions who, nonetheless, have attempted, without success, to justify history as “a form of knowledge distinct from natural science and yet valid in its own right” (Collingwood, 1956: 134).

Today positivist historiography is considered the mainstream of history (at least in North America and Western Europe) and has been adopted by other academic disciplines seeking to do history, such as business or management history. As such, analysis of its contours is critical for any attempt to contextualize theories and understandings of management and organizations. In many ways, the historical turn in management and organizational studies hinges on the character of the historical analysis that is applied

(Booth and Rowlinson, 2006). There is danger in compounding ahistorical theories of managing and organizing with atheoretical accounts of contextual or past events.

The development of ANTi-History as an alternative historiography stems in part from the noted problematics of positivist historiography. Some scholars have remarked that positivist historiography is “anti-theoretical” (Jenkins, 1995; Jacques 2006), “linear, progressive, teleological and truth-centered” (Jacques, 1996: 14). I suggest that one detrimental implication of positivist/mainstream historiography for management studies has been the stifling of reflexivity. For example, positivist historiography postulates a type of writing and thinking that emphasizes the necessary progressiveness (constant embetterment), and naturalness, of the development of management. In turn, this acts to suggest that the present constitution of management is inevitable and that it is the best possible form (Jacques, 2006). ANTi-History has been developed as a reaction to this criticism, as evidenced partially in its emphasis on reflexivity.

### **3.4 The Left Wing of Realist Historiography**

Not all realist historiography is positivist. Marxism, drawing on post-Enlightenment beliefs of rationalism and progress, developed in the same intellectual realist space. However, in Marx’s search for the drivers of social change he not only took realist historiography in different directions but also, as we saw in the last chapter, developed important insights into the relationship between material existence, social relationships, and the production of knowledge. It is to how those insights informed knowledge of the past, and their contribution to ANTi-History, that we now turn.

### ***3.4.1 Marx and Marxist Historiography***

The contribution of Marxism to historiography is widespread. Marxism developed alongside of, and was influenced by, other communities of thought, including positivism (Hobsbawm, 1997) and Rankean historiography (Perry, 2002). The importance of Marxism to history was noted by Hobsbawm (1997), who stressed that no other approach can enable an understanding of human history in its totality. Yet Marxist scholars are by no means a homogeneous group, as each draw on Marx in differing ways. Furthermore, Marxism embodies a wide range of approaches and subjects of history (Hobsbawm, 1997; Perry, 2002). Many Marxists today take Marx as a starting point to craft history, yet Marx did not conceptualize historiography in the manner in which it is known to us today (Giddens, 1971). Most of his work on this subject was *embedded* in his political (*The German Ideology*) and economic writing (*Das Kapital*) (see Hobsbawm, 1997; Giddens, 1971; White, 1973).

Prior to World War II, Marxist historians had not joined the academy in substantial numbers, and the legitimacy of their scholarship was questioned. They were viewed more as political activists than dedicated scholars (Perry, 2002). Nonetheless, over time, the work of Marxist scholars have had an important impact on the social sciences in general and historiography in particular, including the work of Lenin (1947), Trotsky (1964), Lukacs (1971), Gramsci (1978), and the Frankfurt School (Held, 1980). The post-war era saw the rise of notable Marxist historians, including the *British Communist Party Historians Group* (1946-1956) and the work of Christopher Hill (1972), Eric Hobsbawm, and E. P. Thompson (Perry, 2002; Green & Troup, 1999; Thompson, 1991); French Communist Party theorists Jean-Paul Sartre (1963) and Louis

Althusser (1970); and the post-Marxism of Frederic Jameson (1984). These theorists range far and wide over the issue of the relationship between knowledge and human agency, from the existentialism of Sartre to the structuralism of Althusser. Sartre grounded the idea of knowledge (especially self-knowledge) in individual attitude and reflection, acknowledging, at least at one point, the role of history in shaping self reflection (1963) but ultimately rejecting history as a form of bad faith (1991) that overly determines a sense of self. Althusser, on the other hand, stressed the need for a more structural approach to history by downplaying the role of human agency (Green & Troup, 1999; Wheen, 2007). Somewhere in the middle of this debate Gramsci's notion of hegemony served to mediate the role of material life, agency and the structuring of knowledge production through a focus on cultural practice<sup>3</sup>. Moving outside this debate, with its roots in modernist thinking, Jameson (1984) has attempted a fusion of Marxism with postmodernism (see also the work of Marsden, 1999). This is in contrast to the critical theorist Habermas and his attempts to work through the modernist project (see chapter 2). I will return to the substance of these debates later in the search for an alternative historiography.

### ***3.4.2 Contributions From Marx and Marxist Scholars/Historiographers***

In the following section, I review and discuss the insights from Marxian historiography that will be used to inform ANTi-History. To foster an understanding of these insights and their implication for ANTi-History, I begin with a general explanation of the *dialectical* and *historical materialism*.

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<sup>3</sup> Gramsci's work, as a result, has become important for cultural theorists and cultural historians (Brown, 2005)

### 3.4.2.1 Marx's Use of Hegel's Notion of the Dialectical

Marx drew on Hegel in his analysis of history (Collingwood, 1956). Hegel, according to Marx and Engels (1996), saw all history as the history of thought. However, contrary to Marx (and Engels), Hegel viewed history as distinct from the material conditions of society or nature, seeing historical processes as following logical transitions informed by reason and history as ending in the present as opposed to the future (Collingwood, 1956).

From Hegel, Marx adopted the belief that all historical development was rational, but Marx explained historical development as based on the material conditions of a society and specifically economic and societal factors (Collingwood, 1956; Marx & Engels, 1996). Marx criticized Hegel for his focus on *idealism* as decoupled from the material conditions of a society and insisted that men can only be understood in relation to their *real* material condition. Though Marx insisted on the importance of both the ideational and material realms in societal analyses, he privileged analyses that focused primarily on the *material conditions* of society upon which were based understandings of *idealism* (Marx & Engels, 1996). Whereas Hegel sought to break away from historical naturalism in which all history was assumed as having natural causes, Marx subjected history to types of explanations akin to those used to explain natural phenomena. For Hegel, the world existed in ideational form, but for Marx the ideational consisted of variations or interpretations of the material world reflected in the human mind (Marx & Engels, 1996; Wheen, 2007).

Noteworthy amongst Hegel's contributions is his understanding of history as subject to a dialectical process in which the existence of one phenomena generates the possibility of its contradiction (Perry, 2002; Wheen, 2007). Marx's notion of the dialectical assumed, as did Hegel's that all phenomena are contradictory and that contradiction drives change. To understand the process of change, analyses must not be limited to the internal working of phenomena but instead should focus on the relationship between phenomena. Also necessary to understand change was the need to foster an appreciation of how phenomena relate to broader societal processes because the former assumes meaning by virtue of being understood as part of its whole (Marx & Engels, 1996; Perry, 2002). However, whereas Hegel assumed the human spirit as the subject driving historical development, Marx assumed that historical development was driven by human activity, such as the forces and relations of economic production. Thus, notions of the *dialectical* in Marxist analyses refer to the nature of the transitions of economic modes of production, caused by contradictions between the forces and relations of production and the subsequent reflection and adjustments in the ideational realm of a collective of workers (Marx & Engels, 1996; White, 1973). Specifically, it is the succession of the various societies, cultures, and political systems that are reflected in the ideational realm (superstructure) as a result of reacting to transformations in the material economic realm (base). According to Marx, each mode of production contained the germ of its contradiction that would eventually lead to its destruction (Green & Troup, 1999; Marx & Engels, 1996).

### 3.4.2.2 *Historical Materialism*

Marx' materialist conception of history stresses the primary role of the current material condition of a society (materialism), before (but in interaction with) ideologies or politics, as driving human consciousness. Historical materialism, therefore, stresses that conflict in the relations and forces production drives historical development (Hobsbawm, 1997; Marx & Engels, 1996). Historical materialism begins with the acknowledgment that men enter a society that has a pre-existing economic structure that reflects its stage of development (Marx & Engels, 1996). The relations of production that constitute the economic structure of society form the base of a given society, and it is according to this base that the ideational, political, and intellectual realm, called the *superstructure*, is formed. The mode of production of a given society (base) then gives rise to, and conditions, the intellectual, social, and political (superstructure). Marx sought to understand all history through the various stages of economic development within a given society and its subsequent reflection in the ideational realm.

As has been hinted in chapter 2, these insights have important implication for the development of an alternative historiography. *Historical materialism* suggests, contrary to empiricist, positivist and mainstream historiography, that the material conditions of a collective can never be understood as divorced from the ideational realm of that collective. The implication for ANTi-History is to emphasize that the *relationship* between the contextual conditions (material conditions) and the intellectual, social and political realm of those who do history. Contrary to empiricist, positivist and mainstream historians who believe in disinterested research, Marxist scholars and ANTi-History postulate that all history is influenced by the material conditions of a society.

### 3.4.2.3 *Base and Superstructure*

The relations between base and superstructure have been widely used to explain the history of ideas (Hobsbawm, 1997; see also chapter 2), but in a unidirectional relationship, whereby changes in the economic base (composed of material forces and relations of production) are seen to give rise to changes in the ideational superstructure (ideas, political ideas, and social consciousness; Seliger, 1977). ANTi-History departs from a unidirectional view of change in ideas whereby the material conditions of society give way to the formation of ideas in a collective.

### 3.4.2.4 *Class, Class Struggles, and Class Consciousness*

Marx theorized the economic base as preceding and influencing the ideational superstructure. Essentially, he outlined a theory of class, class interests, and class struggle, of which the last assumed a central role in the process of historical development (Green & Troup, 1999; Hobsbawm, 1997; Perry, 2002). He argued that “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle” (Marx & Engels, 1964: 57).

Noteworthy is that Marx and Engels (1996) stressed that in a given society, not all classes exert the same degree of influence in terms of shaping the ideational realm. They stated that the “ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling *material force* of society, is at the same time its ruling *intellectual force*” (Marx & Engels, 1996: 64). Thus, the class that controls the material means of production “has control at the same time over the means of mental production”, which

means that subsequently, “the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it” (Marx & Engels, 1996: 64).

ANTI-History draws on these insights from Marx and Engels. Noteworthy for ANTi-History is the Marxian emphasis on the unequal distribution of influence that is exerted amongst actors in a collective who shape the ideational realm, including what passes as legitimate knowledge and specifically, knowledge of the past.

#### *3.4.2.5 History as Science*

Marx felt that he could explain the historical development of societies through an economic analysis. While some scholars have suggested that Marx applied a scientific lens to understand historical development, this is not widely accepted (Perry, 2002). But there is agreement that Marx sought to construct a theory that could explain the transition of societal forms by drawing on a careful mixture of theoretical and empirical observations. The scientific analysis of historical development been taken up by structuralist Marxists (Althusser, 1970) as well as Hobsbawm but refuted by humanist Marxists such as Thompson (Perry, 2002; Thompson, 1991). This debate has been taken up by cultural theorists and is discussed below.

#### *3.4.2.6 Variations of Marxist History*

Marx and Engels have been shown as primarily concerned with economic history (Wheen, 2007; Perry, 2002). It is evident from *The German Ideology* that their depiction of history was a reaction to *German Idealism*, which they felt neglected the role of the material conditions of society to which humans had been subject throughout history.

Marx and Engels (1996: 59) stressed that German Idealist thought (e.g., in the work of Hegel) excluded the “relation of man to nature.” Because of this, Marx and Engels (1996: 59–60) noted that the German Idealists had “only been able to see in history the political actions of princes and States, religious and all sorts of theoretical struggles, and in particular in each historical epoch have had to *share the illusion of that epoch.*” Their critique was that the German Idealist versions of history had been confined to history of the ideational realm and by virtue of this to the ruling classes (princes, religious peoples) who disproportionately shaped the ideational realm of a society (Marx & Engels, 1996).

Marxist scholars have crafted histories that focus on various subjects. Examples include social history (Thompson, 1991), history from below or grassroots history (Hill, 1972), and cultural history. The dominant strand that runs through these various types of histories is their focus on the marginalized, and their emphasis on acknowledging the power dynamics in historical analysis. Both of these points offer important contributions for ANTi-History.

#### *3.4.2.7 Contributions From Edward H. Carr*

Edward H. Carr’s (2001) book, *What is History?*, offers one incarnation of Marxist history, which has been widely dispersed across North America (Jenkins, 1995). In it, Carr suggests that history is not about constructing accounts of the past that are fact driven, whereby the shaping hand of the historian is downplayed in the ordering of facts. Instead, he believes that the historian is active in shaping history and suggests that the academic discipline of history is overly dominated by Rankean, positivist, and empiricist scholars. Reacting against these three groups of scholars, Carr stresses the need to

differentiate among *events*, *facts* of the past, and *historical facts*. Whereas the empiricist and positivist would suggest that the *events* of the past stem naturally from the *facts*, Carr shows that *historical facts* are *facts* by virtue of being positioned as such by the historian (Jenkins, 1995). Drawing on Collingwood (1956), Carr postulates that facts are not pure, rather, they are shaped by the mind of the recorder; in the process Carr draws attention to the historians' interests in constructing the facts. Carr showed that we must situate ourselves within the mind of the historian whose facts we are using, stressing that we must simultaneously acknowledge our situatedness, since our view of the past is shaped by our present condition.

Carr (2001) illustrated the task of the historian as mastering the past by way of understanding the present. He denied history as objective; suggesting instead that history is a process of interaction between present minded historians and facts from the past. Though the notion of *fact* is somewhat contested in ANTi-History, the alternative methodology draws on many of the insights from Carr, including the notion that the historian is active in shaping history.

#### 3.4.2.8 Evolutionary History/Progress/Change Oriented/Activist

A common theme that unites Marxist scholars has been their explanation of change in historical development as forward looking or *progressive*. As with Marx and Engels's application of Darwin's theory of evolution to explain societal development and humanity (Marx & Engels, 1964; Perry, 2002), Carr (2001) and other Marxists understood history as espousing an inherent movement or direction, in which the current societal and economic condition had within it the seeds of a progressed incarnation.

Though Marx explained economic movement and progress as the backbone of all change (Marx & Engels, 1996), Marxist scholars have applied the notion of progress to historicize different types of phenomena (Hobsbawm, 1997). ANTi-History problematizes progressive analyses of historical development, or societal change as explained by inherent movement or direction.

#### *3.4.2.9 Implications for Ideology*

Contrary to empiricist or positivist historians, who sought objectivity in historical analysis, Marxist historians acknowledge ideology as playing a role in the shaping of history (Hobsbawm, 1997; Merton, 1968) and ANTi-History draws on this contribution. Because Marx understood the ideological realm (superstructure) of a society as determined by the economic realm (base), Marx and Marxist scholars have been accused of *economic determinism* (Hobsbawm, 1997; Perry, 2002; Wheen, 2007). In its simplest incarnation, this accusation leveled against Marxists suggests that these scholars are seeking out and using immutable laws that deny free will and serendipity in history to explain inevitable societal transformations (Perry, 2002). Marx was also accused of *reductionism*, in which it was suggested that he explained the workings of large-scale complex phenomena (historical development of society) as entirely a result of one of its constituent parts (conflicts particular within the economic base; Perry, 2002; Wheen, 2007).

These charges have been countered by stressing that Marx simply understood the economic base as *preceding* the ideational superstructure, as opposed to explaining all of historical development deterministically (Giddens, 1971). As Giddens (1971: 21)

explained, Marx felt that human “consciousness is conditioned in dialectical interplay between subject and object, in which man actively shapes the world he lives in at the same time as it shapes him.” Nonetheless, the important points for the development of an alternative historiography are that (a) Marxist scholars stress that all historical constructions are ideological and (b) classes exert a disproportionate influence on the character of a governing ideology and are disproportionately influenced by a governing ideology.

#### *3.4.2.10 Starting Off by Assuming as Given What We Wish to Explain*

In conjunction with insights on the subject matter of history, Marx offered prescriptions for the building of historical arguments. Marx critiqued styles of explanations that assertively and prematurely assumed as given what it was that the very analysis had been set out to prove or conclude. Thus, Marx felt that one could not assume as given what was set out to be explained. He was scornful of “asserting as a fact, an event, what it should deduce” (Kamenka, 1983: 133). Marx suggested that historical analyses should not prematurely present “as history, what has to be explained” through an analysis of societal development (Kamenka, 1983: 132-133).

A similar point was made by Latour (2005b) who criticized the *old sociologists* for beginning their analyses by taking for granted the existence of societal forms, when it was an explanation of those very societal forms that they had been tasked to perform. Latour accused these styles of analysis as overly certainist in that they assume the *conclusion* prior to embarking on the research journey that may lead to a conclusion. Thus, the conditions of possibility concerning the *conclusion* are prematurely shut down.

Latour (2005b) is also similar to Marx in his emphasis on premising the empirical (material) over the theoretical (ideational) in analyses. Marx notes that one should not seek to “explain practice from the idea but” instead explain “the formation of ideas from the material practice” (Kamenka, 1983: 182).

Both of these ideas are central to ANTi-History and to the nature of historical explanations sought for through ANTi-History. If the historian lets the empirical traces of the past (premises the material/empirical) guide his or her construction of theory (ideational) about that past, it is less possible for that historian to begin the analysis by assuming as given what he or she wishes to show through that analysis. This is because the analysis will be subject to the traces being followed and not to the preconceived idea of the ordering of those traces.

#### *3.4.2.11 Emancipatory Potential of History*

Marx envisioned his theory of the history of societal development as providing the potential for men to liberate themselves from their current condition and realize their full humanity (White, 1973). Marx’s statement in the *Theses on Feuerbach* that philosophers have only thought about the world, but the focus should be on changing it, suggests that a mere understanding of the world is insufficient but that the test of one’s understanding of the world lies in that person’s capacity to change it (White, 1973).

The emancipatory potential of historiography, I argue, is a crucial element for any alternative and critical historiography. However, to develop that point we need to explore the limitations of the Marxist notion of history as emancipatory.

The criticism, drawn from the debate between Marxists and poststructuralists, has far-reaching consequences for the development of ANTi-History and two are noted here. The first refers to knowing what counts as facts, and the second concerns the subsequent analysis of those facts. Whereas Marxists have assumed facts as existing in hard, tangible form and as evidence of the past, the postmodern scholars have placed more emphasis on the meaning ascribed to *traces* by the historian to discount that facts may have an inherent meaning. What this means is that postmodern scholars view the potential for multiple interpretations of traces or facts and herein lays the site of emancipatory potential. The plural interpretations of facts or traces can lead to plural histories and liberate actors who are subject to potentially constraining interpretations of their past. Because Marxist historians do not clearly differentiate the *past* from *history*, postmodern scholars have criticized Marxist scholars for their belief that the *past* can stand in for *history* and have sought to redress this by stressing *history* as *knowledge of the past*. ANTi-History draws on Marxian thought that history has an emancipatory capacity, but draws on postmodern and cultural theory to inform how history can be emancipatory.

### **3.5 Problems With Realism in History/Historiography**

Following Jenkins (1991, 1995, 2003) I suggest that history cannot be seen as standing in for the past. Instead there is a need to decouple and differentiate the terms. Though insights from the realist historiographers have been drawn to inform ANTi-

History, it is stressed that all history informed by a realist ontology is flawed due to the inherent problems of realism. I turn to a brief discussion of these.

History constructed from a realist ontology, with its associated quest for objective and representative knowledge of the past, has been accused of being *certainist* (Booth and Rowlinson, 2006; Jenkins, 1995). This criticism argues that it is impossible to assume *certainly* that our knowledge of the past can accurately represent the *past as it was*. *Certainist* assumptions neglect the acknowledgment that history is an effect of a historian (a) who is situated; and (b) whose situatedness influences the *framing* of historical traces, stories, and narratives. By acknowledging the influence of the hand of the historian in ordering historical traces, the authority of *certainist* histories is questioned. Through this, history loses its certainty in that history becomes knowledge of the past that is always subject to interpretation (Jenkins, 1995; Rosenstone, 2007). It has also been suggested that because all history is interpretation, the possibility of obtaining truth about the past is denied (Jenkins, 1995; White, 1973)

In his influential work, *Metahistory*, White (1973) suggested that historians should collectively acknowledge the discursivity of history. This means that the many communities of thought dedicated to the craft of history should recognize their coexistence whilst acknowledging that each community offers different ways for doing history. White showed that any given historical approach is part of a broader discourse, which he termed *Metahistory*. The implication for realist historiography is a need to acknowledge that realist history offers one of many ways of *doing history*. This implication is difficult for realist historiographers to accept given that it contradicts what is inherent in any scholarship informed by a realist ontology, including realist history:

that we should strive to represent the past accurately through history, that history and the past should be one and the same, that there is one past and one history. These criticisms of realist historiography form part of my development of an amodern, anti-realist ANTi-History.

### **3.6 Toward an Interpretive Historiography**

That there are many problems with realist historiography highlights the need for history conducted from an alternative ontological approach. R.G. Collingwood offers an alternative historiography, one that is rooted in interpretivist thought. Although this approach is less constraining than realist historiography for the purpose of developing ANTi-History, it is not without its limitations. It is to a discussion of his insights and potential for ANTi-History that I now turn.

R.G. Collingwood (1956: 228) stressed that modern historical inquiry has developed within the “shadow” of the natural sciences, and through this it has been both helped and hindered (1956: 228). Collingwood faults positivist histories for their overt scientific slant but he suggests that history may be deemed a science if the latter refers broadly to an organized body of knowledge. He (251–252) saw history as a special kind of science “whose business is to study events not accessible to our observation.” Collingwood suggested that we can derive knowledge about unobservable events by relating them to other *evidence* that is both “accessible to our observation” and associated with the event of curiosity. The type of history advocated by Collingwood is about asking informed questions while acknowledging that the nature of the questions will

influence the type of evidence collected as well as the ordering of the evidence. The purpose of history for him is for human self-knowledge, which humans can draw upon to situate themselves within what has occurred prior to their existence.

Though the above insights are useful to develop an alternative historiography, the following are more problematic. Particularly troubling for the purpose of ANTi-History is the cognitive nature of Collingwood's historiography. For example, Collingwood assumed that all history is knowledge of the historian's mind and he suggested that for an event to be known historically someone must first be acquainted with that event, must remember it, and must state his or her recollection of it, and this recollection must be accepted by others as plausible. What is insightful for ANTi-History is Collingwood's emphasis that history is not a series of facts about an event that occurred in the past; instead, history is facts becoming known in the present through a historian rethinking the peculiarities of an event to foster an understanding of that event. History for Collingwood is "an activity of thought, which can be known only in so far as the knowing mind re-enacts it and knows itself as so doing" (218). However, the mere re-enactment of another's thought (memory) does not count as historical knowledge. Historical knowledge is that which is re-enacted in the present and is acknowledged as shaped by the situatedness of the historian. Thus, Collingwood discounted the possibility of truth in history. He illustrated that there are similarities between the novelist and the historian in that each are engaged in the construction of stories and narrative of events, but he suggested that historians are constrained in that they must construct their narratives according to a set of pre-given formulations or structures.

According to Collingwood (1956), the task of the historian consists of selecting facts from numerous authorities that he then re-enacts in his own mind. The historian draws on evidence that counts as such if it is critically contemplated. For Collingwood, the subject matter of historical knowledge is unlimited to all that can possibly be re-enacted in the historian's mind. Through acquiring self-knowledge from the historical analysis, Collingwood suggested that the potential for emancipation lies in the individual's capacity to expand his knowledge outside of his present condition and thus potentially liberate himself from his current situation by virtue of knowing the existence of alternatives.

Though many of Collingwood's insights are useful for ANTi-History, such as the acknowledgement that the historian is situated, that history is re-enactment of past thought that occurs in the present, his rejection truth, and his theorization of the emancipatory potential of history, some insights are limiting. In particular, the overly cognitive nature of Collingwood's historiography contradicts insights from the sociology of knowledge which suggest all knowledge (including knowledge of the past) as a collective activity. Postmodern thought and cultural theory have also offered anti-realist insights on historiography and may suggest more fruitful insights to inform ANTi-History.

### **3.7 Cultural Theory and Conditions for Historiography**

In this last section of the (re)assembly of the historiography literature I describe a broad body of historiographical scholarship that I collectively refer to as *cultural theory*

(Gunn, 2006). It begins with a brief sketch of cultural theory and the textual turn, continues with an outline of influential cultural theorists for historiography, and finally sketches a number of contributions from cultural theorists that have aided in conceptualizing historiography. ANTi-History draws largely on cultural theory (see figure 3.1) and in this section and the following chapter, it will become evident how.

### ***3.7.1 Sketching Postmodern/Cultural Theory Historiography and the Textual Turn***

The term *cultural theory* refers to a broad body of thought that includes postmodern, poststructural, and postcolonial theorists, cultural anthropologists and structuralists (Green & Troup, 1999; Gunn, 2006). Possibly the only common thread that runs through all cultural theorists is their study of cultural forms or products that include, but are not limited to, texts, practices, language, knowledge, and rituals. *History* as a category for knowledge and an object of knowledge is of interest to the cultural theorist who questions how this academic category is constituted. Cultural theorists are united in their anti-positivism and in differing degrees have been influenced by certain facets of Marxism (Foucault, 1982; Perry, 2002), including the belief that all history is interest driven and that historical analyses provide emancipatory potential. Cultural theorists reject the notion that history is subject to general laws and as a result contradict the specific Marxist and positivist belief that history follows a single logic or line of development over centuries.

Cultural theorists comprise postmodern and poststructural scholars. *Postmodernism* refers to an intellectual, artistic, and cultural tradition and scholars from this tradition are usually united in their critique of modernism (Jenkins et al., 2007), in

terms of refuting reductionism, essentialism, and, universalism (Green & Troup, 1999). Postmodernism has been described as a tradition that embraces pluralism. Pluralism does not simply imply a tolerance for a multitude of interpretations but instead is an active refuting of a foundational and universal *one best way* and an embrace of variously philosophically grounded ways of reading or interpretations (Jenkins, 2003; Jenkins et al., 2007). Thus, postmodernism is concerned with an active destabilizing of the taken-for-granted and authoritative narratives that act to govern a given society (Ankersmit, 1997; Lyotard, 1993). Poststructuralism as a body of thought is often subsumed within postmodernism and shares with the latter body of thought its critique of modern Western meta-narratives (Prasad, 2005). Often associated with the work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, poststructuralists are concerned with destabilizing truth claims by illustrating them as socially constructed and showing the multiple meanings that can be generated from the reading of a cultural product such as the text. Poststructuralists question the conditions of production of a text to understand how the creator's interests have influenced the text's production (Green & Troup, 1999). Poststructuralists are concerned with the process by which a text assumes privilege.

Within this tradition, different theorists have argued for a *textual* (Jenkins, 1995), *cultural* (Gunn, 2006), or *linguistic turn* (Perry, 2002), in the social sciences (Perry, 2002). Among other suggestions, the textual turn advocates a move away from interpreting our social world through realist ontology and instead argues that social reality is accessible and exists primarily through texts and other cultural products (Ankersmit, 1997).

The consequence of the textual turn for historiography has been an acknowledgment of the denial of a past material world of reference to which history could correspond and suggests that history exists only within the historical text (Jenkins, 1995). Poststructuralists have thus become increasingly curious of the text as an interest-driven construction. By virtue of this, poststructural scholars have sought to place the text within its context to outline the nature of its contours and assess its conditions of creation. For the poststructural scholar the text exists as an effect of its context (Fox-Genovese, 1997; Green & Troup, 1999).

Though influential cultural theorists have been plentiful, this section focuses on the work of cultural theorists who have contributed to historiography and whose insights I draw upon to construct ANTi-History. I focus on the scholarship of White (1973, 1985), Jenkins (1991, 1995, 1997, 2003, 2007), Foucault (1982, 2007), and Lyotard (1993).

### ***3.7.2 Insights From Postmodern Historiography***

In this section, I flesh out fifteen themes from cultural theorists' contributions to historiography, to anticipate how these themes will be used to construct ANTi-History.

#### ***3.7.2.1 Answering the Question 'What Is History?'***

To the question *What is history?*, cultural theorists have answered: History is knowledge of the past, and they have suggested that the past is all that has occurred prior to our present condition. I would note that ANTi-History draws on the cultural theorists' description of *past*, *history*, and *historiography*.

### 3.7.2.2 *Antithetical to Upper-Case History*

Postmodernists have largely opposed *upper-case history* (i.e., the notion of History as past events that are understood by reference to “a general schema of historical development usually construed as... progressive” Jenkins, 1997:5); calling the notion of the *proper* historian (e.g., Elton, for example) an “etiquette,” rather than a theory of knowledge of the past (Jenkins, 2003: 37). Though in fundamental disagreement with this conceptualization, Jenkins (2003, 1997) understands the *proper* historian as the professional academically trained historian, who privileges empiricist, factualist, objective, and documentarist methods of historical enquiry and who engages in the study of the past for its own sake. The proper historian seeks to produce disinterested, neutral, and linear representations of the past where the facts are understood to speak for themselves and explanations are privileged over interpretations (Ermarth, 2007; White, 1985). As a critique of the proper, upper case historian, Jenkins (1997; 2003) offers that given explanations always imply a form of interpretation, and interpretations are subject to variation, this suggests that there are many ways that history can be done. And, that these are subject to the ideological position of the historian. Jenkins goes on to critique the viability of assuming that objective history is possible by stressing that the proper historian’s quest for providing neutral and nonideological explanations of history only act to reveal the proper historian’s specific ideological situatedness. To counter this, postmodern scholars suggest that because ways of constructing knowledge of the past, whether Marxist, positivist, empiricist, mainstream, or postmodern, are informed by deep-rooted philosophical belief systems, they must necessarily be ideological. This fits

well with the concept of ANTi-History that assumes that all historians are ideologically rooted, which problematizes the viability of a nonideological *professional historian*.

### 3.7.2.3 *History as Science or History as Art?*

The question of whether history is an art or a science has also been taken up by cultural theorists. Perhaps the only historian to view the social world as socially constructed, whilst assuming that history is a science, is R.G. Collingwood (1956). He identifies history as a science because it is a form of thought in which one's investigations are informed by academic conventions. White (1985), on the other hand, suggested that the *sciences* and the *arts* offer different lenses on the world or inform different worldviews. He suggested that the historian's task is akin to that of a novelist, who selects traces of the past and orders them to infuse them with meaning (Jenkins, 1995; White, 1985).

Perhaps a more pertinent manner of describing history is as a discourse (Fox-Genovese, 1997; White, 1973). Here, the discourse of history can be seen as constituting all the various manners of writing history that are offered by communities of thought who exist in tension. As has been noted, White (1973) has called the discourse of history *metahistory* and has shown the multiple manners for crafting history as forms of narrative discourse, each with prescriptions for researching the past (some include: what counts as a worthy method, what philosophical assumptions must inform the study) and writing (reflexive writing, third-person writing, etc.). Another proponent of the idea of history as discourse is Bennett (1987), who illustrated quite convincingly the possibility of Marxism

after poststructuralism. Bennett showed that this would entail Marxist historiography taking into account its own discursivity.

#### 3.7.2.4 *History as a Discourse and Implication for 'Truth'*

If history is acknowledged as discourse, then it becomes unviable for the situated historian, who acknowledges their discursivity (as situated in and of the discourse of history), to think it possible to produce *absolute historical truths*. Drawing on Mannheim (1985), it is possible to understand each historically minded community of thought as situated (spatially, ideologically, and temporally) and involved in the production of knowledge of the past that is (a) an effect of their community of thought and that (b) can be understood as *accurate* according to the norms and standards that are both established and guide that community of thought.

A consequence of this is the problematization of any assertion that knowledge of the past is the *absolute truth* of the past. For example, it is problematic for a historian of a distinct tradition to craft history and assume its status as *absolute truth*, but it is less problematic if a historian of a distinct tradition accounts for her history as one version of many (in that the historian acknowledges that her history is an effect of her tradition) that constitute the discourse of history and asserts that this account is accurate or *true* according to the tradition from which it has stemmed. This is suggested as less problematic because the historian has accounted for the discursivity of the field, the partiality of her knowledge of the past and has illustrated her situatedness as part of a discourse. I suggest that this makes a particular *telling of the past* more palatable.

Poststructural scholars have shown incredulity toward the establishment of *absolute truth*. According to Foucault, the notion of *truth* is a socially constructed system of ordered statements and procedures that, by virtue of having been established as privileged, participate in the governance and regulation of bodies in a society (Rabinow, 1991). Regimes of truth are effects of societies; that is, societies are active in the process by which certain discourses are operative in ascribing value judgments to be associated with certain statements, procedures, or positions. For example, in our modern Western society the scientific discourse has been operative in establishing rigorous regulatory norms that guide knowledge creation in which certain statements are positioned as *true* and others as *false*. Suggesting regimes of truth as socially constructed, Rorty has sought to undercut the *certaintist* nature of discourses active in the production of truth. Cleverly, Rorty suggests truth is a very well-established lie (Jenkins, 1995), whose plausibility is sustained only when one subscribes to ontological realism. In light of the textual turn, Rorty argues that the quest for establishing truth is irrelevant and suggests using the term truth only if it denotes “good by way of belief for definite assignable reasons” (Jenkins, 1995: 104). ANTi-History is aligned with poststructuralist and cultural theorist thought on *truth*.

### 3.7.2.5 Postmodern Historians' Insights on Ideology

On the basis of the above discussion, it is suggested that any assertion that hints at the plausibility of truth must also account for the ideological situatedness of the knowledge that has assumed the status of *truth*. Foucault has reminded readers that the term *ideology* is constraining in nature because of its Marxist connotations of *distortion*

and opposition to *truth* (Rabinow, 1991). Regardless, postmodern scholars have drawn on *ideology* to illustrate all knowledge as positioned and an effect of a distinct deep-rooted belief system (Jenkins, 1995; White, 1985; Mannheim, 1985). For example, Jenkins (1995) suggested that no study of the past is innocent ideologically, whether situated within the left (Marxism) or the center. ANTi-History draws on postmodern and SoK insights on ideology to suggest that (a) all traces of the past are situated ideologically, (b) historians are situated ideologically, and (c) history is an effect of the interplay of the ideologically situated historian and her traces.

#### 3.7.2.6 *Insights From Michel Foucault: Archeology, Genealogy, and Discourse*

Foucault maintained that history is an activity that is an effect of the present. For Foucault, history acts as a form of power in that it controls perceptions of the past (Green & Troup, 1999). History, then, is less a method than a mode of thought that is particular to our modern condition and its socially constructed academic conventions (White, 1985). Foucault (1982) is critical of *history* as a total cultural category that acts to impose an ordering scheme on materials that it deems worthy for knowledge creation of the past. His notion of the *document* offers an example. He suggests that the conventions of *history* organize, distribute, and manipulate the document to read into it what has been said or done by people in the past. However, Foucault notes that modern history has been the creator of the *historical document*, in which all traces of the past are manipulated to usable historical form so as to be drawn upon and described in the construction of *history*. Foucault (1982) suggested that history not only produces the document but also establishes continuous relations out of discontinuous elements,

whereby order is created out of disparate elements and boundaries are fixed. *Modern History* has produced methodological laws to smoothen the linkages, to create order of what were once disparate phenomena.

Foucault has been termed *anti-historical* because of his problematization and questioning of the modern academic category of *History* (White, 1985). Foucault wrote about the past in a way that questioned the very intellectual framework that has created this category of thought (White, 1985). Because of this, Foucault's (2007) histories are as much about our knowledge of the past as they are of our societal categorical apparatus and its effect on our collective consciousness. The many categories of knowledge (e.g., madness, discipline, psychiatry, Foucault, 1988, 1995) that orders our knowledge on a given subject are Foucault's subject of analysis in his *histories*. Because of this distinct manner of understanding the past, Foucault wishes to replace *history* with *archeology*, the main task of which is the study of discourse and the history of ideas (White, 1985).

Archeology does not imply a search for beginnings, origins, or endings; it does not seek to describe the beliefs held by a collective or their norms. Instead, archeology implies a search for discontinuities, for discursive formations and their constitutive practices as ordered according to taken-for-granted rules (Foucault, 1982). Archeology is not linear or temporal, it does not try to grasp the moment in which a phenomenon emerges or to restore what has been thought. Archeology must examine events in their own "evident arrangement" (Foucault, 2002: 236) to understand their relation to one and other. Thus, archeology treats a given intellectual epoch as a site of "dig" (White, 1985: 240), in which what are unearthed are the various ordering mechanisms that provide the conditions of possibility for how a phenomenon can come to be known. Foucault called

the site in which one can conduct a “dig” the *archive*. Before moving onto an explanation of Foucault’s notion of archive, I note that ANTi-History draws on Foucault in the problematization of beginnings and endings in history, as well as his emphasis on understanding actors in their own “evident arrangement.”

The *archive*, according to Foucault, is constitutive of the system of discourses that are operative within a given socio-historical collective. To know an archive is to foster an understanding of its various operative discourses that act in subtly ordering *knowledge* and provide the conditions by which it is possible to *know* a social phenomenon (McHoul & Grace, 2003). The various discourses that operate within a given socio-historical formation provide the *rules* for conduct or are the taken-for-granted ways of knowing that allow individuals to think, write, and speak about social phenomena or practice in a given way (McHoul, & Grace, 2003). Thus, in many senses, because we are constituted by the various discourses that operate within our own socio-historical temporality, it is not entirely possible to *know* these discourses or the various degrees in which we have been normalized through them (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). As White (1985) noted, each epoch of modern Western society has itself been the subject of operative discourses, which have allowed for the conditions of possibility in which certain types of knowledge were formed and assumed privilege.

Foucault’s work has largely been focused on the constitution of the subject as the site within which various discourses operate (this is in sharp contrast to ANTi-History which is concerned with the social past). Genealogy has been described by Foucault as a type of analysis that “can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework” (Rabinow, 1991: 59). It is possible for this form of history to account for the

constitution of discourses, knowledges, and their operation through subjects. As with archeology, genealogical analysis challenges the pursuit and identification of origins and endings. Genealogy suggests that the identification of *origins* is premised on the assumption that this *state* precedes our present in a manner external to our being or consciousness (Rabinow, 1991). Thus, what is conventionally called a *beginning* in history, and it is stressed that this is important for ANTi-History, is not an *origin* but a mere dissolution of an alternative *state*. Genealogical analysis does not seek to trace the past and to show its continuity; it does not seek to tie our past linearly to our present condition. Instead, genealogy documents the ruptures and the accidents whilst illustrating that “truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents” (Rabinow, 1991: 81). The site at which the series of events that constitute *history* are inscribed is the body. According to Foucault, the body wears its historicity; it is imprinted by the series of discourses that are operative within it. Though ANTi-History draws on Foucault’s scholarship to problematize continuity and the search for origins, it is stressed that ANTi-History is different because it is not concerned with the constitution of the subject but instead is concerned with the constitution of the socio-past.

Foucauldian notions of history have not been without their criticisms. Rowlinson and Carter (2002), for example, criticized the adoption of Foucauldian history for organization studies, pointing out Foucault’s “impenetrable style,” “ambivalence to truth,” “neglect of relevant historiography,” and “questionable historical explanations” and for “getting historical facts wrong” (Carter, McKinlay, & Rowlinson, 2002: 519). Despite these criticisms, sound scholarship drawing on Foucauldian analysis has been

done in organization studies (Jacques, 1996), and ANTi-History draws on Foucault's scholarship.

### 3.7.2.7 *Insights From Hayden White: Metahistory*

Though Foucault has broadly influenced cultural theorists, White's (1973, 1985) influence has been more directed toward historiography in terms of redirecting scholars from a focus on *truth* toward a postmodern emphasis on the socially constructed nature of the *historical form* (Ankersmit, 2007). White's (1973) *Metahistory* is dedicated to illustrating the constitution of modern Western history as composed of many thought collectives, and he has sought to lay out their historical development. Thus, *Metahistory* presents a systematic theory of historiography, a typology of historiographical thought or discourse. In some ways, *Metahistory* provides the opportunity to take stock of all the various modes of historical explanations developed in the 19th century. Through showing the various means in which history is done, White illustrated that history is constitutive of narrative discourses whose contents are as "much invented as found" (Jenkins, 1995: 134). White suggested that his typology (which classifies the discourse of history) is useful because it (a) puts forth a manner for comprehending the various modes of crafting history, illustrating their similarities and dissimilarities; (b) helps mediate between competing ideologically situated communities of thought; and (c) illustrates the partiality of each approach in that each historically minded community of thought acknowledges that they offer one of many methods for crafting history. Through extensive descriptions of each type of historiography, White showed the various ways in which Ranke and Marx, as well as other historians, *emplot* or *do* history according to

their respective conventions. He illustrated that his theory of tropes outlines a manner for classifying and explaining the prevailing styles of historical thought in the modern Western world. White constructed a detailed framework of at least 19 categories and subcategories that he then uses to classify all forms of historical thought. He suggested that varyingly situated historians all adopt respective, and relatively permanent, story forms or molds that they continuously use to order their traces of the past and *do* history.

In all of the modes of historical thinking, White shows the situatedness of the historian either by identifying the rules of that historian's respective convention, or temporality, as affecting the nature of the tale told (Jenkins, 1995). In this way, White (1973) illustrated the various *tropes*, or style of thought, that historians can use to guide them in constructing their historical narrative. In a similar vein Jenkins (1995) suggests that, contrary to the empiricists' belief of letting the *facts speak for themselves*, it is impossible to *find* history. Jenkins follows White in his belief that history is created according to pre-established molds or story forms. This does not deny the existence of *facts* or *traces* of the past, but suggests that the manner in which the traces are to be ordered will vary according to the communities of thought involved in history who will, according to their conventions, use their preformulated tropes to emplot the past.

White (1973) also makes the point that the historian begins her craft of history by extracting traces of the past, which are chosen on the basis of her historiographical convention. Following this, the traces of the past are emplotted into a chronicle according to a mold or form prescribed by the historian's style of thought. This then becomes a narrative when it is read, recognized, and interpreted by a given audience. He suggests that the various forms or tropes that historical analyses may take are known to

both the historian and the audience who are each participants in a respective socio-culture that allows for shared understanding (partially due to the known form that the story takes). He went on to say that the various types or configurations in which histories are ordered are themselves cultural products or artifacts that assume plausibility within respective audiences. The actual configuration or mold according to which the history is ordered comes to convey a message beyond its content to the audience who has been sensitized to its form (Jenkins, 1995). White (1973) suggests that an audience's recognition of the configuration or mold by which history is ordered is a precondition for the effective dispersion of a history. ANTi-History draws on this insight to offer some elementary thoughts on the conditions that allow for the favorable dispersion of history.

#### *3.7.2.8 Ordering: The Craft of History as a Process of 'Disciplined Orderings'*

This brings us to the discussion of the need for historians to acknowledge that *history* constructs the intellectual framework, the categorical apparatus that comprehends it (Bachelard, as cited in Lechte, 2008). This argument revolves around two issues. First, *history* is a socially constructed category of thought; it is an effect of the ordering of knowledge by modern Western societies (Foucault, 2002), which has assumed what Unger (1986) terms a false necessity. What this means is that history, understood as an essential, natural, and necessary category of thought, needs to be questioned. For example, Foucault (2002: 139) showed the false necessity of other modern categories of thought when he wrote, "Historians want to write histories of biology in the eighteenth century; but they do not realize that biology did not exist then, and that the pattern of knowledge that has been familiar to us for a hundred and fifty years is not valid for a

pervious period.” This means that the category of thought we call *history*, as we know it today, has not always been as we know it but instead has assumed its distinct essence as its story (i.e., the story of the modern Western academic category for knowledge of the past that we call history) has been continuously (re)assembled. As an example, this chapter is partly responsible for constructing and reinforcing what we take for granted as history today.

The second point around which this argument revolves is that the many incarnations of *history*, as offered by different communities of thought dedicated to its craft, offer precise *modes of ordering* knowledge of the past (Foucault, 2002; White, 1973). These *modes of ordering* are akin to *rules* that the historian can draw upon to transform knowledge of the past into culturally recognizable forms or molds, in the hope that these will be absorbed by various audiences (White, 1973). This is to stress that the historical coherence that a reader may experience when engaging in a *history* was not found within the traces as the empiricist would suggest. Instead, the coherence is created and imposed by the historian according to various norms given to her by her community of thought (Jenkins, 2003). However, the historian then goes on to draw on these very norms to order, create, and make sense of her craft of *history*. Thus, historians are very active in constructing the intellectual framework (the categorical apparatus of history) that comprehends itself (knowledge of that categorical apparatus with all its various *norms* and guiding principles for doing knowledge of the past). In this process, the role that the activity of *naming* plays must not be marginalized. For example, we *call* creating knowledge of the past along with the multitude of conventions developed to create knowledge of the past *history*. When a name is associated with an entire set of seemingly

disparate social activities, material phenomena, norms, beliefs, and emotions, it acts to (a) tie disparate elements together, (b) contribute to its *ordering*, (c) offer the possibility of solidification or concretization of that name as associated with its connotations, and (d) open up the possibility for that name and its connotations to come to appear as natural or given in the order of things (Foucault, 2002). In chapter 4, a similar idea which stems from the ANT literature called *punctuation* is described. ANTi-History draws ANT and the process of *punctuation* to understand how history is constructed.

#### 3.7.2.9 *Emphasis on Discontinuity and Rupture*

If historical coherence is an effect of the ordering hand of the variously situated historian, what must be emphasized of the past is its discontinuous constitution (Jenkins, 1995; White, 1985). Drawing on Foucault (2002), White (1985: 50) suggested that the historian “serves no one well by constructing a spacious continuity between the present world and that which preceded it.” Instead of providing ordered knowledge of the past, or historical analyses that present disparate traces as continuous, White suggested our need for a historical analysis that educates us about the discontinuities of the past. Therefore, “the great problem presented by such historical analyses is not how continuities are established, how a single pattern is formed and preserved ... the problem is no longer one of tradition, of tracing a line, but one of division, of limits; it is no longer one of lasting foundations, but one of transformations that serve as new foundations, the rebuilding of foundations” (Foucault, 1982: 5). Foucault (1982) advocated a new *history* that develops its own language for describing discontinuity, for discounting stable states

in favor of their transformations. This is not entirely different than the relational approach to sociology offered by Bruno Latour (2005b).

Latour suggested shifting our sociological curiosity from the constitution of stable states, from our descriptions of the micro or the macro, the institution or the organization, to the process whereby one seemingly stable state becomes disconnected from its stability to be transformed. With this emphasis on discontinuity in historical analysis, the past can be seen as constituted as endless discontinuities. ANTi-History is dedicated to this view of history. Historical continuity would suggest knowledge of the past as stable, fixed, or concentered. It would suggest knowledge of the past as interpreted by various audiences as unchanging through the process in which it is interpreted. Likewise, historical closure is possible, that the historian can have the last word, and that what is suggested as knowledge of the past can be transferred objectively to an audience. Understanding history as fixed neglects the power of interpretation that lies within given audiences, it neglects that communities of readership engaged in absorbing histories do so with their interests at hand. ANTi-History draws on ANT to show the construction and dispersion of history as the interest driven act of actor-networks.

#### *3.7.2.10 The Craft of History as Interest Driven*

The postmodern historiographer questions the drive for value neutrality in history as is suggested by modernist realist historiographers. Instead, postmodernists suggest that the craft of history is interest driven. Accordingly, White (1985: 104) suggested that history is never “history of” but always “history for.” The postmodern scholar is concerned with whose interests are served through a certain historical analysis and whose

are marginalized. As will be shown in chapter 5, ANTi-History draws on the postmodern historiographers (as well as Marxist thought on the disproportionate shaping of the ideological realm) to illustrate how the interests of those who do history come to shape that history.

### *3.7.2.11 Destabilize Authoritative Interpretations of the Past; Voicing the Silenced*

One way to destabilize authoritative interpretations of the past is to question the interests that are served by a particular historical telling. Questioning the interests served by history opens the potential for looking at whose interests were marginalized by a particular history and invites the possibility of voicing those accounts. In this way, the questioning of monolithic knowledge of the past seeks to illustrate the possibility of constructing alternative accounts of the past (White, 1985). It introduces the need for pluralizing knowledge of the past (Gunn, 2006) through exposing it to various interpretations. It is at this specific site in which the emancipatory potential of history lies, namely, in liberating collectives of a history that has been imposed upon them, through the introduction of the possibility of alternative history.

However, showing the interest-driven nature of all history and introducing the need for the construction of alternative history or plural histories is not enough to illustrate the liberationist potential of history. The realization of the emancipatory potential of history lies in the continuous (re)assembly of past traces into plural histories. ANTi-History has been constructed as an approach to history that focuses on *(re)assembling* the constitution of the socio-past.

### 3.7.2.12 *The Postmodernists' View on Historical Traces or Evidence*

This brings us to a discussion concerning *historical traces* that revolves around two points. The first point concerns the postmodern historian as discounting the possibility of historical traces in acting as transparent representations of the past (Ankersmit, 1997; White, 1985). As Jenkins (1995) notes, traces of the past do not contain in and of themselves a very specific type of historical information; traces from the past do not carry an intended meaning into the present; instead, that meaning is imposed on them by the historian. This is not to deny that various traces can give rise to various questions of the past, which can guide the historian in her analysis (Ankersmit, 1997) but it is to suggest that the traces cannot speak for themselves. As White (1985) pointed out, there are traces, and then there are interpretations, but traces do not carry within them pre-given interpretations.

The second point about *historical traces* concerns their socially constructed nature. White (1985) noted that modern realist historians treat their *facts* as *found*, implying that historical traces are waiting to be discovered. Jenkins (1995) also suggests that the status of *historical* that becomes associated with *traces* or *facts* is one that is imposed by a historian when it is decided which *traces* will be drawn upon to construct a history. Finally, White contends that the type of questions asked by the historian will enable her to decide which traces to historicize, and the meaning imposed on the traces, the specific role that the trace will play in the historical analysis, and the types of justifications that will be fostered through using the trace, will be largely influenced by the community of thought from which the historian stems.

### 3.7.2.13 *The Archive as a Privileged Western Site for Research*

To most (non-poststructuralist) historians, the archive is understood as a site that acts as a repository for traces of the past. In the modern Western parts of the world the archive has assumed much privilege in that it is the site in which *historical traces* are *contained* (Gunn, 2006). Recently, both Jenkins (2003) and White (1985) have suggested that the archive is a socially constructed site with very specific institutionalized rules for selecting and ordering traces of the past. The archive has been deemed a location that acts to govern what counts as valid traces of the past, by virtue of including given traces in its collection and excluding others. And, because certain traces are included in the archive, there is the potential that these can come to have historical status, or that a historian can take them as worthy to be included in a historical analysis. These points are not without contestation. One example is Rowlinson (2004b) who suggests that a common misconception concerning archival research is that organizational members collect and order their historical traces before granting a researcher access to the collection. Furthermore, Rowlinson (2004b) notes that another common misconception of archival research, especially on the part of organization researchers, is that history and the archive consist of a repository of facts that can simply be used to counter or confirm theories. Rowlinson stresses that history is akin to a craft where a historian forms a narrative in light of the traces in the archive.

Acknowledging the suggestions for conceptualizing the archive waged by Jenkins (2003) and White (1985) as well as Rowlinson (2004b), five points are put forth that have been incorporated into ANTi-History: (1) traces included in the archive do not assume a historical status by virtue of their inclusion in the archive; (2) though the archive is a

useful site for conducting research, we must acknowledge that if the archive is maintained by trained archivists, then the archival materials included have been ordered according to the conventions of the archivist; (3) not all collections of materials saved and held by an organization are maintained by trained archivists; (3) but the ordering of the traces in the archive, if they are maintained by archivists, is ideological in that it reflects modern Western archivist conventions; (4) the ordering of the traces in the archive is not value free, nor is the ordering *natural*, and (5) the archive is *not the only* site on which a researcher can draw to inform his historical work of the past. These points are intended less as harsh criticisms and more as points of caution that if acknowledged will aid the researcher in conducting more reflexive research. Whilst acknowledging the implications of these points, ANTi-History suggests the archive as a useful site for (re)assembling the socio-past.

#### *3.7.2.14 Questioning the Eurocentricity of Historical Constructions*

A concern for the postmodern historian, and perhaps more specifically for the postcolonial scholar, has been questioning the Eurocentricity of historical analyses. Postmodern historians suggest knowledge of the past as positioned, and because the craft of history has largely been taken up by modern Western historians, history is understood as reflective of its values and practices (Goody, 2006; White, 1973). Goody (2006) suggested that the various conventional ways for knowing the past, such as through specific use of historical concepts, the application of periodization schemes, the privilege of reason, and use of the archive, reflects Western thought. Goody illustrated that through drawing on Western *ways of knowing* to create knowledge about a given non-

Western collective's past, Western historians impose their ordering schemes on a non-Western past. Goody stated that the various histories created in this manner are largely Western constructions, which are then imposed on a non-Western collective who may not have what the Westerner may recognize as *sophistication* to develop their own knowledge of the past. Alternatives for de-privileging the Eurocentricity in history have been theorized by Chakrabarty, who suggested calling into question the categories that are used in Western historiography, such as reason, temporality, the archive, and so on (Gunn, 2006). Another manner in which the Western historian can lessen the authority assumed of Eurocentric history is by writing reflexively.

#### 3.7.2.15 Reflexivity


Reflexivity is a hallmark of cultural theorists engaged in history (Gunn, 2006). In its simplest incarnation, *reflexivity* refers to the process by which researchers situate themselves as part of their research to show the reader how their personal situatedness has affected the research at hand. Through reflexivity, the researcher wishes to show how her presence affects the nature of the research that is produced. It is one way of ensuring the transparency of the politics inherent in knowledge creation. White (1985) advocated the necessity of historians to acknowledge the community of thought from which they are writing. In many senses, what is required is a historiography in which reflexivity is inherent. To that end, ANTi-History centrally embraces reflexivity.

### 3.8 Summary

This chapter has provided a (re)assembly of the various communities of thought that have contributed to the literature of history and historiography. I began with a nondefinitive analysis of key terms that pertain to the discourse history, followed by a discussion of historically minded communities of thought organized around their ontological assumptions. Modernist communities of thought guided by a realist ontology were first discussed, followed by an illustration of postmodern or cultural theorist communities thought guided by anti-realist ontological assumptions. For an illustration of the specific contributions from literature of historiography that will be used to inform ANTi-History, see figure 3.1.

In chapter 5, ANTi-History will be illustrated as an alternative approach to mainstream historiography that draws upon, contributes to, whilst moves from, these current debates in the literature. Thus, chapter 5 provides an outline of ANTi-History as an approach to historiography that is informed by insights (a) on knowledge from the sociology of knowledge literature; (b) from the literature associated with the cultural theorist's historiography; and (c) from actor-network Theory. It is to a discussion of the latter that I take on in the following chapter.

Figure #3.1 – Contributions from the Historiography literature for ANTi-History



## Chapter 4: Actor-Network Theory

*“Historians, as portrayed in historical texts, can move freely in the past, possess knowledge of the future, have the ability to survey settings in which they are not (and never will be) involved, have access to actors’ motives, and (rather like god) are all-knowing and all-seeing, able to judge what is good and bad. They can produce histories in which one thing is the ‘sign’ of another and in which disciplines and ideas ‘burgeon,’ ‘mature,’ or ‘lie fallow.’ Our own historical interest . . . does not attempt to imitate that of professional historians. We do not attempt to produce a precise chronology of events in the field, nor to determine what ‘really happened.’ . . . we hope to provide an enriched study of the past which avoids some of the basic contradictions and lack of symmetry characteristic of much history of science” (Latour & Woolgar, 1986: 107).*

*“ANT claims that it is possible to trace more sturdy relations and discover more revealing patterns by finding a way to register the links between unstable and shifting frames of reference rather than trying to keep one frame stable” (Latour, 2005: 24).*

### 4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I examine the third of the three key strands that inform ANTi-History, namely, Actor-Network Theory, or ANT. As I will make clear, ANT, despite its own peculiar problems and deficiencies in regard to history per se forms a pivotal part of what I see as an alternative to mainstream historiography. Hence the *ANT* in ANTi-History.

The chapter begins with a brief overview of the historical roots of ANT, followed by a description of the method of ANT as well as a consideration of its ontological and epistemological assumptions. The chapter ends with a discussion of the neglect of history by actor-network theorists before closing with an outline of the main contributions of ANT for an alternative historiography.

## 4.2. Actor-Network Theory

ANT, as developed by Latour (1987, 2005b; Latour & Woolgar, 1986), Law (1986, 1992, 1994), and Callon (1986a), is not limited to, but can be applied as, a methodology that offers specific ontological and epistemological insights to understand the construction of knowledge. It is a theory that is primarily dedicated to a *performance* of the constitution of the social (Latour, 2005b), to show how the social *holds together*. ANT assumes that knowledge is a product of social ordering, it thus can also be understood as a theory of the socio-politics of knowledge creation. For the purposes of this research, ANT will be examined as a methodology that is useful in fostering an understanding of knowledge creation as an effect of heterogeneous actor-networks (Law, 1992).

As Latour (1983) noted, ANT initially developed from studies that were dedicated to an anthropological analysis of laboratories. In their early work called *Laboratory Life*, Latour and Woolgar (1986) were intrigued with the laboratory as a site dedicated to transformations (Sismondo, 2004). Laboratories were sites where many disparate materials (chemicals, small animals, people, typewriters, pencils, complex machinery) came together to be transformed into scientific reports and journal articles that contained *truths and facts* (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). The initial studies of laboratories were devoted to understanding what happened in the process of transformations, what *processing* transformed the series of disparate materials into an ordered, coherent, and finished product. Latour and Woolgar saw these *processes of processing* as an enterprise in fact building in which the end products (facts, truths) hid all human participation. Because

scientific knowledge had enjoyed a wide audience and unprecedented societal status due to its objectivity and disinterestedness (Merton, 1973; Ravetz, 1971), these laboratory studies were dedicated to exposing the subjectivity of scientific knowledge by illustrating its social and political genesis (Pickering, 1992). Ultimately, Latour felt that these studies would yield keys to the sociology of ordering of social life.

As has been previously noted (see chapter 2), this approach by Latour, Law and Callon (*The French School*) is the variant of ANT that is in common empirical use. It is largely dedicated to showing scientific knowledge as socio-cultural product. ANT has been used to trace the constitution of the social and of knowledge, which is understood as an effect of social ordering (Callon & Law, 1982; Latour, 2005a; Law, 1994).

ANT is a theory about how actors engage in network formation. Specifically, it is about the way in which social materials join together in creating and reproducing or altering social patterns. ANT assumes the social to be constituted of actors, and actors are described as any material that has the capacity to act upon or alter another (Law, 1986). According to Latour (1983), actors continuously partake in political work, through engaging other actor's interests, mobilizing their interests, *translating* those interests, and finally *enrolling* actors in taking on the same cause. A cause is made stronger when actors and their interests have been translated (i.e., the process whereby interests become aligned through one actor showing his or her capacity to assign roles to other actors, see Law, 1992). As Latour (1983: 144) notes, "who is able to translate others interest into his own language carries the day." Through translation and the systematic alignment of actors, networks are formed. The degree that actors making up networks are capable of sustaining an extreme alignment of interests, according to an

overarching cause, they begin to act as one, or a *single point actor*, *punctuated actor*, or *black box* (Akrich, 1992). If a network is capable of sustaining an extreme alignment of its actors and if it is capable of acting as *one*, it comes to be viewed as an actor, rather than a network. In this way actors can be understood as networks and networks can be understood as actors. Because a network's capacity to sustain an extreme alignment of its actors is precarious, networks are said to oscillate between a status of *actor* and *network*. This explains the textual depiction of a hyphen found between *actor* and *network* in the term *actor-network theory*.

Through observation of relational activities of actors, ANT theorists constantly focus on the manner in which actors become networks and networks become actors. The phrase *assuming a relational lens* refers to focusing on the relationship of actors, and at how actors engage one another. Thus, instead of looking at the activities of a single actor, a relational approach would focus on what happens between actors, to see how one actor is altered by virtue of interacting with another actor. The focus is on the relations established between actors to see how they form networks through politically engaging the interests of other actors.

Where actors are proven durable and persistent in their relational activities, such as engaging in political strategies, the enlistment of durable actors (Law, 1992; Law & Mol, 1995), and ensuring alignment of enrolled actors, the complex mode of ordering initially making up the network is potentially forgotten. This is because a given actor can be understood to stand on behalf of the complex mode of ordering that initially made up a network. In other words, a given actor can come to represent a particular complex set of relationships without those relationships being viewed as an act of representation. For

example, the reading of this thesis gives every appearance of an engagement with my authorship but what is hidden from view are the complex relationships – the dissertation, the committee, the external examiner, exposure and involvement in the journal *Management & Organizational History*, etc., that constitute the written form before any given reader. However, to the degree that the actor eventually comes to conceal the social complexity that has allowed for its emergence, that actor can be understood as a black box, or a form of seemingly fixed social entity rather than ultimately existing as a series of fluid entities of unknown duration and interpretation. Through this process, actors often take on an air of timeless permanence and may potentially be viewed as concrete. Using the act of writing as an example of network formation and black boxing, Law (1994: 31) described writing as “work, ordering work. It is another part of the process of ordering. It grows out of a context. It is an effect of that context. But then it tends to go on to hide that context.”

Embedded in the ANT view of the social as relational is the assumption that the social is materially heterogeneous in that it is made of human and nonhuman actors (Brigham & Corbett, 1997). This does not mean that human actors are privileged over nonhuman actors (Latour, 1992; Law, 1991, 2001). Instead, from an ANT perspective, both are endowed with the capacity to alter each other’s courses of action. Also, a relational lens means looking at how in society, the material, and non-material actors are inextricably intertwined. The focus then becomes looking at the relationships established between humans and nonhumans to understand the nature of their interconnectedness. By shifting the focus from an analysis ordered around human and nonhuman categorization to one that looks processually, insight is offered concerning the

interrelationships of human and nonhuman actors. These insights are rooted within an amodern ontology.

Material delegation offers an example of an interrelationship between human and nonhuman actors. *Material delegation* refers to the delegation of a task usually assumed by a human actor to a nonhuman actor (Singleton & Mulkay, 1993). An *inscription*, in which a human actor transfers information to a written document (non-material actor) can provide an example of a material delegation. Thus, the task of delivering information previously held by the human actor is *delegated* to a nonhuman actor. Inscription devices are durable (e.g., books outlive their authors), portable, and capable of reaching mass audiences through less effort than what would be required of a human actor engaged in a same task. Because they can be circulated widely through little effort, they provide the possibility for disseminating information and conducting interest work on behalf of their respective network.

What has been interpreted as the lack of privilege given to human actors in ANT, because of its focus on symmetry in the study of humans and nonhumans, has received substantial criticism (Reed, 1997). Law (1992) notes that the lack of differentiation between objects and people among ANT scholars is an analytical stance, not an ethical one. In defense of ANT, Law suggests that this distinction does not imply that humans be treated as non-reflective machines but instead that both humans and objects are produced through a process of co-interaction in networks, *thus should be studied in a manner in which their co-influence is highlighted*. As I will argue later, this approach is an essential part of an amodern approach to social thought and a search for new ways of conceiving social life based on amodernist thinking.

The ontological assumptions of ANT have been described as *relational materialism* (Law, 2005; Sismondo, 2004) or *amodern* (Latour, 1993). ANT is considered a material theory in the sense that it assumes the social as constituted of interacting material/physical and non-material/social phenomena. Instead of studying the social as separate from the material/physical, the ANT theorist assumes that the social is constituted of interacting social and material phenomena, and these phenomena can be understood only relationally. Thus, ANT is considered a relational theory in that ANT theorists insist that conceptions of the social are not embraced within actors (Blackler, 1995) but are instead (re)produced through a patterned network of heterogeneous relations (Law, 1992). Social ordering, patterning, or orchestration is described as processual in terms of the formation of networks and actors, and the task of the researcher becomes demonstrating the performativity of actor-networks. This undercuts relentless modernist tendencies of imputing ontological concreteness onto our understanding of social processes (Chia, 1995, 1996; Latour, 1983). As opposed to understanding the social as a noun, ANT proposes understanding the social as a verb, a process of becoming that is emergent (Chia, 1995, 1996; Law, 1994, 2001). Instead of focusing on what happens cognitively or behaviorally, ANT looks at what happens relationally, that is, between actors, to understand how they are connected (Law, 2005) and how they change through interactions.

The epistemological assumptions of ANT are anti-positivist and largely informed by social constructivism. The ANT theorist assumes the construction of knowledge as a social activity where situated, interest-driven actors are engaged (Callon & Law, 1982; Law, 1992). Claims of *truth* and *falsity* are not sought out by ANT theorists, as they go

about their empirical analyses. Instead, the specific character and constitution of *truth* and *false* claims, as well as *texts*, *facts*, or *knowledge*, are treated as sociologically curios, i.e., something to be understood rather than accepted as given. Rather than understanding these as fixed entities, the ANT theorist understands their make up as a consequence of the relations, in which they are located. As such, their constitution is understood as the product of the performativity of a series of actor-networks (Law, 2005). As Fleck (1979: 100) noted, “Truth is always, or almost always, completely determined within a thought style,” implying that a collective with a situated shared thought style takes much responsibility for giving rise to and shaping a particular textual account. Thus, ANT is not focused on static entities but rather on the displacement, movement, association, and dissolution in which actors engage as a result of their interactions. It is concerned with how the small become big and how the big become small (Latour, 2005a), with how truth claims are constructed and how they lose legitimacy. ANT is concerned with how the most mundane objects are made complex by understanding them as a “product of a set of diverse forces” (Akrich, 1992: 205). Based on this, network formation is never to be understood as an end state but instead as in constant fluctuation and change (Calás & Smircich, 1999).

ANT is symmetrical in analysis in that it does not privilege one account over another; it does not describe big actors to the neglect of small actors (Law, 1991). It approaches assumed *true* and *false* accounts of knowledge with the same sociological curiosity to understand the manner in which these accounts are crafted. Whereas a *positivist* analysis of the social would seek only to understand accounts that are shown as distinct, substantial, or *true*, ANT is committed to both the exciting and the mundane and

“to explain competing view points in the same terms” (Callon, 1986a: 196). Because it is processual in outlook, ANT can be used to explain the epistemic terms from which competing views have emerged.

Perhaps the most criticized consequence of understanding the social as processual and in symmetrical terms (Reed, 1997) is ANT’s rejection of dualisms (Latour, 1993; Law, 1992, 2005; Law & Mol, 1995). Modes of thinking ordered around dualisms, including the micro and macro distinction, mind and body, as well as agency and structure, are dissolved. Instead, the materiality of the social is treated as effects given through the processual nature of networks (Law, 2005). To the ANT scholar an unwanted effect of understanding the social in dualistic terms is the tendency to subsequently privilege one category over the next.

Closely tied to a refutation of thought based on dualist categorization is ANT’s rejection of social reductionism (Law, 1992). Reductionist accounts of knowledge creation or the social assume that a small class of phenomena is at the heart of, and thus drives, every social process. Reductionist accounts of the social seek to explain a large class of phenomena based on few variables and often assume processes as linear and causal (Bryne, 1998). In that ANT’s outlook on the social is processual, dividing social phenomena in heaps to understand the former as completely explained by the latter is rejected (Law, 1992). As will be expanded on in the following paragraphs, ANT problematizes the tendency to begin an analysis by assuming as given what it wishes to explain. It does not hypothesize as to the relationship between two variables, or make inferences about the nature of the causality between variables, but instead follows associations to understand how the social is ordered, to trace its constitution (Latour,


2005a). The social is understood as a recursive process, continuously acting upon itself as both a medium and an outcome (Law, 1994).

ANT offers some insight concerning reflexivity and knowledge creation. The argument is that the representation of research, the act of generating knowledge about a chosen subject, is incomplete without an analysis of how the researcher's presence flavors the research. A given representation of research shapes, influences, and participates in further processes of ordering, but it is important to note that given representations order the social for an audience who potentially accepts that account as legitimate knowledge. Ultimately, representation is not possible without ordering (Law, 1994). We as researchers are involved in the process of ordering; this means that we are not separate from the social processes we study. Because researchers are effects of the pattern of relationships upon which they stand, ANT scholars suggest that readers actively engage in questioning the social's pre-given order and why/how a particular account of knowledge construction is created over others. The process of research, which consists of creating knowledge about a chosen area, is understood too as an interactive effect of which the researcher participates. Thus, the researcher is not a neutral disinterested bystander but a human actor who seeks to expose social processes, whose nature she is concurrently engaged in influencing (Law, 1994).

Because ANT theorists assume that their role in the research process influences the research itself, they believe that the specific character of the constitution of the social is performed through our academic efforts that seek to describe it. In other words, society is performed through our various academic endeavors to define it (Law, 1986). Because ANT theorists are actively involved in the creation of their social orchestration,

it is impossible for them to begin their analysis of the landscape of the constitution of the social by assuming that there is a definite unchanging social structure or social constitution. Thus, ANT theorists cannot begin their analysis of the constitution of the social by assuming that it is given in the order of things. They cannot begin their analysis by assuming as given what they wish for our analysis to perform, and the goal of their analyses is to *(re)assemble* the manner in which the social is constituted (Latour, 2005b). These various insights form an important core of ANTi-History and are summarized in figure 4.1.

Figure #4.1 – Contributions from Actor-Network Theory for ANTi-History



### 4.3 The Problematic of ANT Approaches/Absences to History

Surprisingly, given its focus on *reassembly*, ANT has not been drawn upon to develop a historiographic approach. Nonetheless, as the chapter's opening quote attests, there is some early recognition of the potential of ANT as an alternative method to mainstream history in reassemblies of the past, and various empirical studies that draw on ANT have looked at the construction of past scientific facts, or the constitution of specific technologies, which are arguably situated in the past, see for example Law's (1994: 52-72) discussion of "histories, agents and structures." Regardless, ANT has not really been developed in a conscious way to deal with and problematize *history*, the *past*, and *historiography*. ANTi-History is my attempt to build on and refine those ANT insights into an alternative historiography.

Those ANT informed studies that have focused on some element of the past or of history differ from what I attempt to do in ANTi-History in at least four respects. First, some of these studies have been dedicated to the history of technology (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987) but draw on an unreflexive use of history and historiography. These are problematic as in contrast to ANTi-History, they do not: a) acknowledge the situatedness of the researcher and his role in shaping the history; and, b) unpack the power dynamics that were involved in constructing the dominant story of the technology to which the analysis is dedicated. Second, other studies that have used ANT to focus on the past have drawn on a variant of ANT that assumes a stronger *materialist* or *realist* ontological standpoint (Bijker et al., 1987; Czarniawska & Hernes, 2005). The problems associated with constructing knowledge from a realist standpoint (informed by modernism) are

plentiful (see section 2.6). These studies stand in contrast to ANTi-History, which assumes a *relational* lens.

Third, other studies that have used ANT are considered less historiographical in nature because they do not mention (are not dedicated to constructing a history), and by virtue of this, do not even create an opportunity to problematize the concepts of *history* and *past* (Brigham & Corbett, 1997; Callon & Latour, 1981). For example, Latour (2005) explicitly stresses that he is interested in the constitution of the social. He is concerned with the *present condition*, this stands in sharp contrast to ANTi-History which is concerned with the constitution of a *past condition*. The fourth point is related to the third, and suggests that alternative studies have not developed or used ANT as a specific historiographic method that draws upon and simultaneously addresses current historiographic debates. As a result, it is suggested that previous studies have used ANT to study past scientific controversies rather than to move beyond the specific ordering modes of the categorical apparatus of *History* (viz. historiographies) to develop an alternative method of dealing with the past.

Moving beyond the discussion above concerning the absence of historical analysis in ANT, I stress that ANTi-History is not simply about using ANT to do history. For example, ANTi-History involves a multitude of insights on knowledge construction (SoK) and is informed by insights from cultural theory historiography, which are not taken up by ANT or used to inform

studies that use ANT to look at past scientific controversies. As I will discuss in chapter 5, I believe that ANTi-History provides a way to craft history that is not limited

to the constitution of past technologies, but problematizes the concepts of *history* and *past*, and addresses current debates in cultural theory historiography.

#### **4.4 Summary**

This chapter has provided an overview of ANT by focusing on the specific facets of the method of ANT that will be used to inform an alternative historiography. The absence of history and historiography in current ANT scholarship was noted to illustrate the potential for ANTi-History. The contribution of ANT, in conjunction with insights from SOK and historiography, is the subject of chapter 5.

## Chapter 5: ANTi-History

*“Stories are part of ordering, for we create them to make sense of our circumstances, to re-weave the human fabric. And as we create and recreate our stories we make and remake both the facts of which they tell, and ourselves . . . This means that histories must be treated as modes of storytelling and ordering. They mix and match from the available collection of cultural bits and pieces. And as they circulate they tell us at least as much about day-to-day ordering struggles as they do about ‘real’ history” (Law, 1994: 52).*

*“ANT claims that it is possible to trace more sturdy relations and discover more revealing patterns by finding a way to register the links between unstable and shifting frames of reference rather than by trying to keep one frame stable” (Latour, 2005: 24).*

### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter draws on and fuses insights from the SoK literature (chapter 2) and the historiography literature – specifically Marxist and cultural theory (chapter 3), but also achieves that fusion through elements of actor-network theory, which was centrally discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter, those insights are drawn together through an outline of ANTi-History that describes its ontological and epistemological assumptions, the method of ANTi-History, implications for researchers, and some preliminary thoughts on the archive as a site for carrying out research, drawing on the emergent ANTi-History. Some summary thoughts are then offered on ANTi-History and its potential application, which is explored in the following three chapters (6-8).

ANTi-History, I contend, is an alternative historiography to the mainstream that can be used to understand the constitution of the socio-past of any actor-network, including an organization, technology, truth, ritual, fact, textbook, culture, practice, and so on. My

discussion is anchored around five focal points: (1) ontological assumptions, (2) epistemological assumptions, (3) the mechanics or method of ANTi-History, (4) implications for a researcher who may use ANTi-History, and (5) elementary thoughts on the archive as a site for conducting research. I begin by addressing prior conceptualizations of the term ANTi-History followed by the reasons why the term was chosen to describe an alternative historiography.

### ***5.1.1 Addressing Prior Conceptualizations of the Term ANTi-History***

Although there is evidence of prior conceptualizations and uses of the term *ANTi-History*, the term has not been used in a way that suggests similar connotations to those associated with ANTi-History. For example, in Greco-Roman historiography the Greeks used the term *ANTi-History*. More recently, Foucault has been termed anti-historical (White, 1985) and although he (1982) used the term *ANTi-history* in *Archaeology of Knowledge*, he did not develop an explicit or an extensive explanation of the term. Others have used the concept of ANTi-history to denote that the history of philosophy differs little from philosophy itself (Lavine & Tejera, 1989). However, the development of ANTi-History in this dissertation is unlike any previous uses of the term.

### ***5.1.2 Reasoning the Term ANTi-History***

The term *ANTi-History* assumes its name for at least four reasons, namely, ANTi-History (1) is anti-*history* in the sense of denying the possibility of pre-given stories of the past (history) awaiting discovery; (2) is anti-*History* in the sense of questioning the limitations imposed by the academic category of *History* upon doing history; (3) is anti-

*history* but *pro-histories*; and (4) draws on ANT, thus ANTi-History. I now discuss each of these in turn.

The first of these points argues that ANTi-History is an approach that denies the possibility of pre-given stories of the past (history) awaiting discovery (see chapter 3). Thus, a research processes focused on developing a historical analysis would not begin by assuming as given what the researcher wishes for that very analysis to show. In applying ANTi-History it cannot be assumed that there is a history per se, or pre-ordered knowledge of the past with a given plot that is awaiting to be discovered. Arguably, it cannot be assumed that the traces being followed actually lead to a pre-ordered story that is to be unearthed in its entirety. Instead, we need to assume that the researcher's role in the tracing of the constitution of the socio-past has an active influence in the *ordering* of those traces of the past into history. Alternatively, it should arguably be assumed that the stories that arise from an ANTi-History account are ordered effects of the interrelationship of the situated historian and his or her situated traces. To draw on ANTi-History, thus, would mean placing a strong emphasis on the privilege of empirical observations of the socio-past by *following the traces* of both material and human socio-political actors, thus *heterogeneous actors*. This would be done in an effort to (re)assemble the constitution of the social by looking at the actors relationally (between actors) to understand how one actor's interests were altered as a result of interacting with another as well as which networks were built as a result of these interactions.

ANTi-History is also anti-*History* in the sense that there needs to be a questioning of the limitations imposed by the modern Western conventions of the academic category of *History*. Thus, the research process should not be constrained by

the institutionalized academic categorization of History as a social science and its associated *rules* for creating knowledge of only *social* phenomena. In my discussion of the SoK, I characterized our modern Western categorical apparatus as one that ascribes the study of material and nonmaterial phenomena to different isolated academic spheres, and in a discussion of historiography I brought up the issue of which sphere *history* as an academic discipline should belong. This leads us to two pertinent issues that need to be explored.

The first is that, historically, *History* has been deemed a social science and thus dedicated to knowledge creation of social or non-material phenomena. The second, and I suggest, most pertinent is that the modern Western categorical apparatus that orders our knowledge creation activities is limiting. This means that the issue should be less about which type of phenomena the academic category of *History* is dedicated to as its focus for knowledge creation. Thus, it is not about whether *history* should be dedicated to isolated knowledge creation about either material or nonmaterial phenomena; instead, the issue is that the academic category of *history* should not be limited to creating knowledge about social phenomena because it is *classified* as a social science. *History* should be refocused toward creating knowledge about the interrelationship of material and nonmaterial phenomena. As Gunn (2006: 186-187) puts it, it “is not simply about bringing *nature* back into the historical picture so much as attempting to decipher the interrelationship between human and non-human worlds.” To that end, ANTi-History is dedicated to tracing the constitution of the socio-past and does this by (a) assuming the socio-past is constituted of heterogeneous actors and (b) following the traces of these heterogeneous socio-political actors to (re)assemble their constitution.

That the (re)assembly of the various traces of a socio-past into story can take on varying forms, depending on many factors, including the situatedness of the historian, brings us to the third point concerning the naming of ANTi-History. It rejects the notion of a singular authoritative history in favor of *plural histories*.

This brings us to the fourth point, that from an ANTi-History perspective the pluralization of history draws on the method implicit in actor-network theory.

## **5.2. Ontological Assumptions of ANTi-History**

ANTi-History is proposed as a theory that is informed by amodern ontological assumptions. The discussion that follows begins with an explanation of (1) an *amodern ontology* and continues by way of discussing four implications of this, including ANTi-History as (2) anti-reductionist and non-dualist, (3) concerned with disturbing the ontological priority associated with history, (4) ascribing to a view of social change that understands it through a process of *folding*, and (5) a relational approach to the constitution of the social.

### **5.2.1 ANTi-History as Amodern**

ANTi-History is informed by amodern ontological assumptions in that it avoids drawing on preformulated modernist tendencies for ordering and knowing the social world. It is important to stress at this point that both modernism and postmodernism as socio-cultural conditions have specific implications for the various ontological assumptions of those who are subject to or live within these given socio-cultural

conditions. This means that the various socio-cultural conditions associated with a collective iteratively inform assumptions of the nature of the social world held by that collective.

As has been noted in chapter 2, the moderns, on the one hand, have operated according to a realist view of the social world (Jenkins, 1995; Latour, 1993; Lyotard, 1993). The postmoderns, on the other hand, have operated largely according to anti-realist ontological assumptions of the social world. Latour (1993) noted that the moderns, as informed by a realist ontology, have been responsible for developing and imposing an a priori categorization scheme on understandings of the social. The modernist categorization scheme, among other things, states that the social world be understood as composed of human actors and the physical world as composed of physical actors and that each be studied in separate realms. However, the moderns accept and encourage using ontological assumptions (realism) that are particular to the physical world for the understanding of the social world. This categorization scheme is limiting in that in our daily interactions in society—for example, in organizations, institutions, government, and, politics—we interact with both human actors and nonhuman actors. Furthermore, we are placed in limitless situations where both these realms influence one another. A view of the social world based on the isolation of one type of actor, whether human or nonhuman, will miss the effect that human and nonhuman interactions likely have on one another. Because postmodernism as a category of thought is an effect, a creation of modernism, it too is understood as limited (though not futile). To the degree to which it is reactive to a modernist framework, it is defined by it and thus constrained by it. Latour (1993) noted that because the categorization scheme constructed by and particular to

modernism has acted in separating and isolating phenomena (human and nonhuman) that in society quite visibly operate together, we have never been modern. Thus, Latour proposed that we move to a state prior to the categorization scheme imposed by modernism, one he calls *amodernism*.

The amodern scholar does not impose a preconceived categorization scheme, framework, plot, or ordering scheme on the series of traces and actor-networks for which he or she is (re)assembling. The implication for the historian informed by amodern assumptions (i.e., a researcher who uses ANTi-History) is to be cautious by acknowledging preconceptions and not assuming, as pre-given (that the social world is composed only of social actors), what the analysis should show. The scholar informed by amodern ontological assumptions does not assess the social world in a manner that discounts the role of nonhuman actors. The task is to (re)assemble the social without assuming that it has an embedded order or that it is composed of only human actors.

### ***5.2.2 Anti-Dualism and Anti-Reductionism***

An implication of informing ANTi-History through amodern ontological assumptions is the rejection of conceptualizing the social world as ordered around dualisms and viewing it in an a reductionist manner. Arguments within the social sciences that are ordered or organized according to dualist modes of thought have been criticized for their oversimplified explanations of the complex workings of the social. Bachelard noted that dualist modes of thought fail to account for phenomena as part of or as an effect of a “fabric of relations” (Lechte, 2008: 7). ANT rejects dualist modes of thought (Law, 1994), and ANTi-History is aligned with this view. Instead of looking at

the social as constituted of dualisms, including micro–macro, mind–body, agency–structure, ANTi-History focuses in a relational manner on the process in which the micro becomes the macro and it draws on ANT to inform its concern for treating and understanding the social as an effect of materially heterogeneous actor-networks (Law, 2005).

ANTi-History is also aligned with ANT in that it rejects reductionist modes of conceiving the social. For example, positivist historiography, scientific histories and other mainstream historiographies have all been accused of reductionism in historical analyses because they present a series of events of the past as occurring in a linear, chronological fashion and as a direct result of few mechanisms. In this way, the complexity of one event embedded in the past is explained by the historian as based solely on the previous event. ANTi-History, on the other hand, does not provide explanations or predict specific occurrences of phenomena through crafting research that illustrates the occurrence of complex phenomena as a direct and sole result of a few mechanisms.

### ***5.2.3 Disturb the Ontological Priority Associated With History/Process of Objectification***

Another implication of the amodern ontological assumptions of ANTi-History is its quest to illustrate the consequences associated with modernist renditions of crafting knowledge and history. Historiography in the 19th century was developed and dominated by bodies of thought that privileged realist ontological assumptions. The consequence for these bodies of thought is their belief that there is *one* social world and that their task is to represent this world accurately. Through privileging the emergence of

a singular and truthful interpretation of the social world, realism leads to an unquestioned acceptance of a singular, monolithic representation of the social *reality*. However, *realism* can be understood as a socially constructed and self-perpetuating mode of thought due to the degree to which it does not, by its very nature, question its own grounds for being. As Jenkins (1995) noted, it is too certainist in nature. It is not that such histories are not situated ontologically but that, through not rendering their ontological positioning transparent to an audience, they assume an impression of neutrality.

Another concern of ANTi-History is to illustrate that the quest for *truth* is a consequence of ascribing to a realist approach to historical analysis. Through showing the constitution of *truths* as composed of socio-political actor-networks, ANTi-History seeks to deprivilege universal *truths* in favor of plural interpretations of the social. This means denying the possibility of impartiality or disinterestedness in the craft of historical knowledge because it assumes that these ideals (truth, impartiality, disinterestedness) have emerged as part of a realist framework. It sees that *truth* is unobtainable even if individuals could put their biases and interests aside, which of course they cannot, because of the assumption that all knowledge construction is interest driven. ANTi-History assumes that *impartiality* in research represents an impossible attainment given that the situatedness of the historian or social scientist will invariably be at play in terms of guiding the choice of method used and the manner of representing *facts* and therefore will always *bias* results. The presence of the researcher as well as his or her respective academic convention will always influence knowledge creation.

As previously discussed, perhaps the most consequential aspect of adopting a realist ontology to inform history is the tendency to assume and aspire to knowledge of the past as accurately mirroring or representing the past. Conflating *knowledge of the past* and the *past* denies the role of the historian who is actively involved and influences the construction of knowledge of the past. It denies that the historian interprets, orders, and (re)assembles traces of the past based on her situated conventions to give the reader an interpretation of the past. ANTi-History, on the other hand, draws on the postmodern distinction between *past* and *history* and assumes that the *past* has gone and thus cannot be said to *exist* in a realist ontological sense. Through this distinction, ANTi-History does not deny the continued existence of various tangible manifestations of the past that the researcher calls *traces*. By denying the existence of the past in a realist ontological sense, ANTi-History does not seek to de-privilege or deny the past or the dead but instead to suggest that acknowledging alternative and plural conceptualizations of the past may provide liberationist potential. The ANTi-History approach involves (re)assembling history with a healthy lack of certainty. In line with Jenkins (2003), the researcher is careful not to attest any certainty that their representation of the past mirrors the past *as it happened*. ANTi-History embraces the notion that a historical account should never be settled, fully accepted, or feel comfortable; instead, it should wear its precariousness transparently (Jenkins, 2003).

#### **5.2.4 Folding History**

A further implication of embedding ANTi-History in an amodern ontological lens is adopting an understanding of change through a process of *folding*, as opposed to a

progressive or a teleological explanation of how the past led to the present. Conceptualizing the historical development of a society based on notions of progress was introduced primarily by Enlightenment scholars. This assumed that a change meant social and moral embetterment (Habermas, 1981). Thus, notions of progress became associated with change for the *better* or for *improvement*. However, the notion of *progressive knowledge* or *achieving progress through knowledge* has implications. The idea that change is guided by immanent laws and develops toward a preconceived end state is inherent in a conceptualization of change as progressive (Mannheim, 1985). ANTi-History denies the possibility of a given society as developing toward a pre-given and perhaps utopian (better) end state. Nor does it attempt to prove or advocate the idea that prior changes in a given social condition can be displayed in a linear fashion to explain the present constitution of the social. Instead, ANTi-History understands the constitution of the social as enveloping all of its prior conditions (Kamenka, 1983: 180), which is what is meant by *folding*, whereby the new envelops the old, and as Bachelard noted “intellectual generations are nested, one within the other” (Bachelard as quoted in Lechte, 2008: 5). The noteworthy point for ANTi-History is that the constitution of the socio-past encompasses or envelops all previous periods. All prior periods are *folded* into a period of study, and previous periods account for its distinct constitution.

### ***5.2.5 Relational Approach—No Beginning and No Last Instances, Process of Becoming***

The last implication of embedding ANTi-History in an amodern ontology is the need to emphasize an understanding of the social that is relational. *Relationalism* refers to an understanding of social phenomena stemming from and informed by its specific situation or temporal period (Latour 2005a; Mannheim, 1985). A relational emphasis discounts absolutist and universal understandings of the constitution of given phenomena. ANTi-History assumes that ways of comprehending the social are partial, as they are informed by a particular mode of seeing that has stemmed from a distinct community of thought or actor-network. Because many communities have each developed individuated modes of understanding their social, these must be understood in relation to their origins. The existence of plural ways of making sense of the socio-past necessitates that actors acknowledge their mode of seeing as partial; this means that it is not shared in an absolute sense across all other communities.

As ANT scholars have emphasized, assuming a relational lens also means discouraging the dissection of entities and encouraging a focus on the intersections of phenomena to understand how one phenomenon changes in relation to another phenomenon. Through a relational focus on the interactions of phenomena, on what happens between the actors that make up the socio-past, the possibility of immobile forms whose existence is independent of a context or absolute is denied. Adopting a relational lens, ANTi-History denies the possibility of beginning or end states. The actor-networks that constitute a socio-past are never understood as sewn up, unchanging, or concrete, instead, the focus is on how one phenomenon is transformed into the next, on how one actor is altered through engaging with the next. ANTi-History focuses on the

relationships that sustain networks, to understand their continuous changing nature. Therefore, the socio-past and its constituent actor-networks are understood through a process of becoming. ANTi-History sets out to do history by tracing the performativity of ever-changing actor-networks that constitute the socio-past, but it also acknowledges that the ordering of the performativity of actor-networks into a coherent narrative/history does not represent an end state. As well, ANTi-History assumes that the (re)assembly of the socio-past is itself precarious, uncertain, and at the risk of being (re)figured or (re)assembled by a reader who reads-in the history in a manner influenced by his or her interests.

The construction of the past, through a relational lens, is closely related to understanding the socio-past through the process of *folding*. We can never assume this construction as having a beginning state or an end state because folding is understood as continuous and fluid. For example, it is assumed that our present experience, make-up, sense of *now*, will get folded into a future state. Instead of searching for beginnings and ends, we must focus on the construction of the social as a continuous process of becoming, of perpetual change where complex folding is at play.

### **5.3 Epistemological Assumptions of ANTi-History**

ANTi-History is not an epistemology because, as Mannheim (1985) noted, epistemology is usually understood as prior to, and guiding or informing thoughts about, the creation of knowledge of a phenomenon, nor is it a theory of knowledge. Instead, ANTi-History is rooted epistemologically in the sense that the theory has embedded assumptions for guiding how knowledge of the past can be crafted (Jenkins et al., 2007).

In recent postmodern discussions, describing history as an *epistemology* has been discouraged due to the *certaintist* and *modernist* connotations of the term *epistemology* (Jenkins, 2003). Too often, *epistemology* is understood as giving an a priori certainty to findings or it is used un-reflexively as opposed to loosely and transparently guiding research (Mannheim, 1985). Though ANTi-History is grounded epistemologically, the approach should be used in a way that is transparent of its epistemological grounding. ANTi-History assumes that all other epistemological frameworks are historically and socially conditioned; plural (positivism and postmodernism co-exist); and, last, not absolute but partial. What this means is that it assumes that a single problem, concern, or question about a phenomenon can be answered in numerous ways. This depends on the theory of knowledge to which one ascribes so long as it renders transparent its epistemological assumptions, acknowledges its partiality and the possibility of other analyses that are informed through equally plausible epistemological grounds, without falling into a hopeless relativism.

### ***5.3.1 A Simultaneous Addressing and Problematization of the 'Past' and 'History'***

First, ANTi-History draws on postmodern historiography and cultural theory to make the distinction between and problematize notions of *past* and *history*. Understandings of the past, as discussed in Chapter 3, do not deny or deprivilege the past but, contrary to modernist tendencies, emphasize that the *past* does not exist in a realist ontological sense. This means that our ideas of it or our ordering of traces of the past cannot be checked or verified the way one may verify scientific hypotheses (Collingwood, 1956). *History* is understood as knowledge or story of the past. *History* is

done by (re)assembling the constitution of the past by ordering its traces, followed by ascribing an interpretation to the ordering to create a narrative. However, as Jacques (2006) suggested, history is not any story in past tense. ANTi-History acknowledges that histories must contain cited scholarly work that has been held to scrutiny. ANTi-History draws upon a theoretical and transparent approach. It views history as an active process that takes place in the present and is told through the historian's voice, which is a socio-political effect of a situated actor-network (made up of the historian's conventions, training, etc.). ANTi-History also views *history* as a punctuated actor-network that is capable of conducting interest work in terms of influencing how other actors of the social interpret their past and their present condition.

### ***5.3.2 Knowledge of the Past as Socially Constructed***

The second epistemological assumption of ANTi-History is that all knowledge of the past is socially constructed. Drawing on Marx, Mannheim (1985), and Berger and Luckman (1967), ANTi-History assumes that the existential basis of humans is influential in the meaning-making process that gives rise to knowledge creation. Because history is *knowledge of the past*, and because ANTi-History assumes all knowledge to be the social construction of actors who are active in meaning making, it follows that ANTi-History assumes history as socially constructed stories of the past by actors (possibly professional historians) who are active in meaning making.

### ***5.3.3 The Socially Constructed Categorical Apparatus of History Acts as a "Disciplined Ordering"***

The third epistemological assumption of ANTi-History suggests that the categorical apparatus, or the academic category, of *history* is itself socially constructed and acts to order the *ordering* activities of actors (historians and their products) engaged in history. As Bachelard (as quoted in Lechte, 2008: 3) put it, “History constructs the intellectual framework that comprehends it.” Thus, history is a socially constructed academic category; it is but one part of an entire categorical apparatus constructed through a modernist condition that now orders everyday action (Foucault, 2007; Mannheim, 1985). However, historical conventions have an effect on historians and the specific character of knowledge of the past that they construct; so the socially constructed academic category of history acts to *discipline* the historian who is active in ordering of past traces into narrative.

#### ***5.3.4 Activistic Nature of Historical Knowledge***

ANTi-History is informed by a fourth epistemological assumption which specifies that all knowledge is activistic. That is, knowledge of the past is not a thing to be contained within an academic category but it is something that actors *do*, rather than *have*. To iterate the activism inherent in all knowledge, the verb *knowing* has been suggested as opposed to the noun *know*. *Knowing* is infused with activity; it cannot be divorced from the activities that give rise to it. Therefore, ANTi-History assumes that knowledge of the past is an activity in which actors are engaged, which is in line with other scholarship, including Mannheim (1953b, 1985), the Strong Programme, Science & Technology Studies, actor-network theorists, as well as Foucauldian analyses.

### ***5.3.5 Communal, Distributed, and Partial Nature of Historical Knowledge***

The fifth epistemological assumption of ANTi-History specifies that all historical knowledge be understood as *communal*, *distributed*, and *partial*. Communal historical knowledge implies that the act of *knowing the past* cannot be understood as cognitive or embedded within one individual mind but instead must be understood as dispersed, distributed, and shared throughout a collective of situated actors. Thus, distinct ways of *knowing* the past are each understood through the collective activities of communities. Drawing on ANT, ANTi-History calls the collectives that give rise to specific ways of knowing the past *actor-networks*. Using ANT, ANTi-History understands the processes in which *knowing* occurs as subject to the socio-politics of negotiation, enrollment, and translation of actor-networks. Furthermore, inherent in ANTi-History is the assumption that ways of knowing are partial. ANTi-History denies the possibility that an actor-network can have an absolute form of knowing; instead, ANTi-History assumes that because a distinct manner of *knowing the past* is an effect of an actor-network, and because actor-networks do not necessarily always understand how other actor-networks have come to *know their past*, ways of knowing the past must necessarily be understood as partial.

### ***5.3.6 Knowledge of the Past as Situated and Positioned***

The sixth epistemological assumption of ANTi-History suggests that all knowledge of the past is both *situated*, and *positioned*. The first means that knowledge is an effect of the socio-politics of actor-networks, and influenced by the specific circumstances of its time and place. The second assumption refers to the influence of

historical, cultural, and political factors influencing what comes to count as valued knowledge. Therefore, it is understood that ways of knowing the past are active effects of actor-networks who are situated both temporally and spatially as well as positioned culturally, politically, and historically.

### ***5.3.7 Symmetry—All Accounts Are Given the Same Curiosity***

The seventh epistemological assumption draws on insights from the Strong Programme to suggest that all forms of knowledge should warrant the same curiosity, or be analyzed symmetrically. ANTi-History is used to (re)assemble the constitution of a socio-past into history and should examine all ways of knowing that have been developed by actor-networks with the same curiosity. This means viewing all forms of knowing, including what actor-networks have established as *truth* and *false* on the same terms, and doing this with the same sociological curiosity to foster a sense of how that status of knowledge was acquired and is sustained.

### ***5.3.8 Plural Knowledge of the Past Through Plural Ideology***

The eighth epistemological assumption explains and legitimates the possibility of plural knowledge of the past by illustrating it as an effect of varyingly ideologically situated actor-networks. ANTi-History understands the notion of *ideology* in a non-restrictive manner, referring to both a deep-seated belief system that guides a group of actors and the process by which systems of meaning are created (Mannheim, 1985; Seliger, 1977). Quite important for our purpose of justifying the emergence of plural ways of knowing the past, Seliger (1977) notes that multiple and coexisting ideologies

(ideological pluralism; epoch bound or epoch transcending) give rise to multiple communities of knowing or “modes of thought” (Mannheim, 1985). Based on this, ANTi-History views actor-networks as situated ideologically. Because ANTi-History assumes all history is a socio-political effect of actor-networks, it acknowledges that the deep-seated belief system, in which the actor-network is situated, will influence what comes to be assumed as legitimate *ways of knowing* by that actor-network. It follows that ANTi-History assumes that actor-networks, who are situated in different ideological foundations, will give rise to different ways of knowing their past. On the basis of this, history must necessarily be understood as plural.

ANT has neglected addressing the issue of ideology and its implications for the socio-politics of actor-networks. It is stressed that one implication of ideological pluralism for ANT, and ANTi-History, is that it may account for the failure of network formation. For interest work to occur, actor-networks must be embedded within one shared ideological formation. Therefore, a shared ideological framework is a necessary precondition for the emergence of successful interest work of actor-networks who are engaged in negotiating their past and doing history. It follows that actor-networks who do not share the same ideological foundation may privilege different wants.

### ***5.3.9 Toward a Historiographical Approach That Legitimizes Plural Construction of History***

The ninth epistemological assumption refers to understanding history as plural. ANTi-History emphasizes the need for legitimating the construction of plural knowledge of the past as well as pluralizing knowledge of the past. It seeks to craft plural knowledge by tracing the constitution of the socio-past of differently ideologically

situated actor-networks. Thus, ANTi-History should write into history the tensions that exist among varyingly situated actor-networks that have each developed individuated ways of knowing their past.

### ***5.3.10 Emancipatory Potential of ANTi-History***

The tenth focus for ANTi-History is related to its epistemological grounding and concerns its emancipatory potential, since ANTi-History seeks to disassociate the *past* from *history*. This gives rise to the acknowledgment of history as non-unitarist interpretations of the past (Ermarth, 2001, 2007; Jenkins, 2003). By anticipating a disconnect of the terms *past* and *history*, ANTi-History has the potential to present the plural accounts of that past in tension. In this manner, all knowledge of the past is recognized as partial. Pluralizing history provides the potential for liberating actors from interpretations of the past that constrain or disenfranchise their interpretations of their past and allows them to find comfort in their emergent shared interpretations.

This opens the conditions of possibility for historical analyses. In this way, ANTi-History does not assume as a given what the analysis should show. As Latour (2005b) noted, certaintist tones for creating knowledge confuse the answer with the analysis. ANTi-History is careful not to impose a pre-constructed plot on a given set of traces of the past but instead follows the actors and their traces to (re)assemble the constitution of the socio-past. In this way, actors are given a voice. This means that ANTi-History privileges the empirical traces being followed over the theoretical mindset of the researcher doing the following.

ANTI-History engages in the craft of history in a transparent and reflexive manner. And it assumes that emancipatory potential lies in questioning the eurocentricity of current histories and possibly rewriting or (re)assembling history from an alternative perspective through the use of alternative methods. Thus, emancipatory potential lies in acknowledging history as a modern Western product.

### ***5.3.11 Toward an Ethical Knowledge Creation***

The eleventh epistemological assumption focuses on questioning the possibility for constructing knowledge of the past that may be considered *ethical*. The question of ethics in epistemology, which concerns what is considered good knowledge and non-oppressive knowledge, is one to which ANTi-History is sympathetic. While ANTi-History doesn't propose what constitutes an ethics of knowledge, it does actively question the eurocentricity of historical knowledge.

## **5.4 ANTi-History as a Method**

The aim of ANTi-History is the development of a critical alternative to mainstream novel historiography. To that end, I propose that this new approach offers insight into methods that historians can use to craft knowledge of the past. In this section I will layout ten assumptions of ANTi-History that constitute and help inform its usefulness as a method (see figure 5.2).

#### ***5.4.1 A Focus on the Constitution of the ‘Social Past’ as Made of Actor-Networks***

As a methodology for the study of history, ANTi-History focuses on the constitution of the *socio-past* as opposed to the constitution of the social (Latour, 2005b) or the constitution of the historical subject (Foucault, 1982, 1997; May, 2006; Jenkins, 2003). It intersects with aspects of postmodern historiography and Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy, as well as Latour’s ANT but is different than these. Postmodern historians have focused on constructing history that views the constitution of the subject and its precariousness as fundamental (Jenkins, 2003). In Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy, for example, the study of the “constitution of the subject across history” (Foucault, 1997: 150) assumes a central focus, and he notes that “[In]sum, the aim of my project is to construct a genealogy of the subject” (Foucault, 1997: 152). Foucault centers on the subject and assumes it as a vehicle for studying and gaining insight into the various discourses that operate through it and have shaped it. Foucault (1997: 150) made the point that the study of the constitution of the subject has not been an easy task because “most historians prefer a history of social processes [where society plays the role of subject].” Latour (2005b), on the other hand, is interested in the constitution of social processes as performed by actor-networks, but he cannot be assumed guilty of Foucault’s (1997: 150) accusation that “Most historians prefer a history of social processes [where society plays the role of subject].” This is because Latour (2005b) is less interested in the historical study of social processes but is instead focused on the constitution of a present social condition. Thus, Latour (2005b) is focused on how the (present) social is performed through the social relations or socio-politics of actor-networks. To reiterate, ANTi-History is not focused on the constitution of the subject

(Foucault, 1982, 1997; May, 2006; Jenkins, 2003), or the constitution of the social (Latour, 2005b), but instead is interested in tracing the actor-networks that constitute a socio-past.

Drawing on ANT, ANTi-History is interested in tracing the actor-networks that constitute a socio-past, whereby the past is seen as composed of actors, who are understood as having the capacity to alter the course of other actors. Actors who have engaged in socio-politics successfully and thus have enrolled other actors in their cause are understood as having formed networks. When all the actors forming a network align their interests, they can be understood to act as one actor. There is continuous oscillation between actors becoming networks and networks becoming actors. ANTi-History seeks to map the socio-past by following the series of socio-politics of actor-networks, to understand how they construct their past.

#### ***5.4.2 The A Priori—Do Not Begin By Assuming What You Wish to Explain/Imposing the Plot***

The second point concerning the method of ANTi-History concerns the problematization of the a priori when tracing the actor-networks that constitute a socio-past. Using ANTi-History means exercising caution to not let one's preconceptions of the past impose itself on the ordering of the traces of the past. It means not imposing a pre-given plot to order the traces of the past; neither does it begin the historical analysis by assuming what that history will eventually show. Akin to empiricist and postmodern historians, ANTi-History specifies, in the task of constructing knowledge of the past, one should be cautious in terms of imposing an a priori understanding on the traces to be followed (Green & Troup, 1999; Perry, 2002). Therefore, ANTi-History has no inherent

and preformulated ordering prescription that is to be imposed on the activities of actor-networks but rather suggests following their socio-politics to see how they map out. Drawing on insights from the postmodern scholars, ANTi-History seeks to liberate *History* (the academic category with specific conventions) from its own history (the past of the academic category where the strict academic conventions were set in place) to create new forms of telling that surprise and liberate us from history that is an effect of strict historical conventions. ANTi-History does not impose a generic ordering structure or pre-given plot that was inherited through conventional academic training to transform traces of the past into history.

ANTi-History problematizes the existence of predetermined histories that the historian is expected to discover or unearth. A historian's effort to *unearth the history* suggests that stories of the past are given, have plots, and are essential as well as unchanging. ANTi-History offers that actor-networks are not performed according to following preconceived plots; neither do they map out their socio-politics prior to engaging in them. The complexity of the social makes this task impossible, and thus the existence of pre-given plots guiding actors is refuted. Actor-networks are plot-less until they engage in socio-politics; thus, they create their plot through performing socio-political acts toward achieving a desired purpose. Furthermore, ANTi-History suggests that the plot of the socio-politics of actor-networks is a retrospective construction. And, the (re)assembly of this retrospective construction is the task of a researcher who may use this approach.

ANTi-History draws on Marx (Kamenka, 1983) and Latour (2005b) to suggest exercising caution in creating analyses that confuse the question (how is the socio-past

constituted?) with the answer (the constitution of a socio-past). It is not limited to the analysis of a specific domain (the human world, the material world) but instead can be led by actor-networks, perhaps across domains.

Foucault (2007, 1982) and Derrida (Prasad, 2005) are offered as contrasting examples to an ANTi-History approach. Whereas Foucault (2007, 1982;) is engaged in describing the discursivity of phenomena by showing how various discourses operate through and constitute the subject, Derrida (Prasad, 2005) is concerned with deconstructing textual products to expose their construction as interest-laden effects of modernism. The task of ANTi-History is dramatically different in that it does not assume that a given phenomena (socio-past) as *already constituted*. It acknowledges that history and knowledge of the constitution of the socio-past is performed through an actor's effort to define and characterize it. The last point illustrates another difference between a deconstruction analysis and Foucault's archeology. Whereas the latter two approaches focus on either deconstructing a text to show the power relationships at play or describing the discourses that are operative within a subject, ANTi-History not only exposes the power dynamics in the constitution of history but *(re)assembles* the history. ANTi-History not only offers the capacity for critique but also that of *doing* history in a way that *builds in* the critique, which brings us to the next point.

#### ***5.4.3 (Re)assembling/Tracing the Associations of the Social Past/Emphasis On Performativity***

A third implication of the method of ANTi-History is its emphasis on performativity that is, doing history by (re)assembling the socio-past through tracing the

associations of actor-networks. As postmodern historians have stated, the past is already gone, and because “nothing ever repeats itself exactly,” (Jenkins, 2003: 23) our task for constructing history is always one of (re)assembly. With ANTi-History, the past is (re)assembled by following and mapping the traces, socio-politics, and, assemblies of actor-networks to map out series of performativities. And, historical knowledge is not viewed as embrained, rather it is communal and an effect of the socio-politics of actor-networks.

#### ***5.4.4 Premise the Voice of the Actors; Premise the Empirical Over the Theoretical***

The fourth point pertaining to the method of ANTi-History specifies privileging the voice of the actors over that of the historian and premising the empirical over the theoretical when (re)assembling the traces of the socio-past. Following Marx, ANTi-History aspires to “not explain practice from the idea but explains the formation of ideas from the material practice” (Kamenka, 1983: 182). Following Mannheim (1953b, 1985), ANTi-History assumes that distinct ways of knowing the past by actor-networks grows out of existing social conditions in which the actor-network is a participant. Thus, these forms of knowing, which are effects of actor-networks, do not need to be legitimated by a formal epistemology. As Latour (2005b: 9) noted, “the actors’ objection to their social explanations offer the best proof that those explanations are right.” Thus, in following the actor-networks that constitute a socio-past, ANTi-History encourages privileging the voice of the actors over that of the researcher. This means that the actor-network should speak louder than the voice of the trained historian. In this way, the iterative nature of the empirical and the theoretical is recognized.

#### ***5.4.5 Constitution of Actor-Networks as Materially Heterogeneous***

The fifth point concerns the implication that the socio-past is constituted of materially heterogeneous (nonhuman and human) actor-networks. Though this theme is drawn specifically from ANT, postmodern historians have specified a need for a historiography that does not ignore the “world of things” (Joyce, 2007: 90). ANTi-History understands actor-networks as materially heterogeneous and is dedicated to a relational understanding of the relationship between human and nonhuman actors that constitute the socio-past. The constitution of the socio-past through socio-politics, dispersion, and punctuation are drawn from ANT and are explored in the next three sections. They warrant special attention as core processes in the *making of histories* (see figure 5.1).

#### ***5.4.6 History as an Effect of the Interest-Driven Socio-Politics of Actor- Networks***

This sixth point, illustrates the assumption that *history* is an effect of the interest-driven socio-politics of actor-networks. While postmodern historians have suggested that history is knowledge of the socio-past that can be plural and political, ANTi-History adds that the activity of knowledge creation of the socio-past is subject to the socio-politics of actor-networks. As illustrated in figure 5.1, actors negotiate the interpretation of the past by conducting interest work with other actors. Actors are engaged in network building through the enrollment of heterogeneous actors for the purpose of creating an interpretation of the past that can be considered *strong* and *durable*. Networks in which knowledge of the past is constructed comprise many interacting actors, including not only

historians, archivists and their traces, but also the archive itself, and objects such as computers, paper, popular books, and so on. Only when the heterogeneous actors making up a network have become aligned in their interpretation and knowledge of the past, history is possible.

#### ***5.4.7 'History' as a Punctuated Actor (Black Box)***

As a seventh point concerning the method of ANTi-History, *history* is understood as a *punctuated actor* or a *black box*. As depicted in figure 5.1, history is possible through the extreme alignment of the various actor-networks who were actively engaged in negotiating interpretations and knowledge of the past. ANTi-History stresses that an interpretation of knowledge of the past or history can be possible only when all of the actors involved in its creation have aligned both their interests and their various interpretations of the past. ANTi-History draws on ANT to suggest that history is a punctuated actor that conceals the series of relations and socio-politics of actor-networks that have enabled its formation. History can be understood as a material delegation in that the task of telling a story of the past that was previously held by a human actor is now delegated to a nonhuman actor. Because histories are often inscribed or written, materially delegated histories can also be understood as inscription devices.

#### ***5.4.8 Initial Thoughts on the Potential for Favorable Conditions of Dispersion of a 'Punctuated History'***

The eighth issue refers to the potential for the favorable conditions of dispersion of *history as a punctuated actor*. This issue concerns the specific conditions that allow

for a favorable and wide dispersion or absorption of a history by a collective. I suggest that histories or knowledge of the past disperse and gain legitimacy to the degree that their content is plausible, accepted, and shared by a collective. Again, drawing on ANT, ANTi-History understands the conditions that allow for the dispersion and absorption of a *history* through the socio-politics of actor-networks. ANTi-History suggests two possibilities for the dispersion of *histories* (see figure 5.1). In the first instance, the history (as an actor) is successful in conducting interest work and enrolls other actors into accepting the story it tells of the past, and thus the history is understood as successfully dispersing across actor-networks. In the second instance, actor-networks read into the history with their interests at hand and thus enroll the *history* onto their cause. The two paragraphs below explain each instance in turn.


In the first instance, ANTi-History suggests that histories disperse to the degree that they are capable of enrolling actors into their cause of accepting a given story of the past as plausible or legitimate. This means that the *history* engages in interest work, where it seeks to translate alternative interpretations of a past held by other actor-networks into that of its own. The *history* enrolls actors into their cause of *knowing the past* in the manner prescribed in the history. If the history is successful in enrolling actors in terms of those actors accepting the history's given story of the past, the history is said to *disperse*.

In the second instance, actor-networks read into the history and they enroll the *history* as an actor dedicated to making their cause and their network stronger. Drawing on Bennett (1987), ANTi-History suggests that the specific manner in which a history is read depends on the ideological, spatial, and temporal situatedness of an actor-network

(Bennett (1987) calls this a culture of readership). This is in line with postmodern historians, who have suggested that there are no beginnings and no endings in history (Bennett, 1987; Jenkins, 2003; Rigney, 2007). *History*, therefore, is denied a fixed or a closed meaning because it is subject to the continuous interpretations of situated (ideologically, spatially, temporally) actor-networks who engage with it and read into it with their interests at hand. This means that an actor-network's interpretation of *history* may never be faithful to the tale told.

Figure #5.1 – Illustrates the iterative nature of the socio-politics of actor-networks and knowledge creation, punctuation and dispersion.

\*\* What is described below is subject to enrollment and counter-enrollment



#### ***5.4.9 Acknowledge and Expose the Potential Instrumentality of Historical Accounts***

The ninth implication suggests that ANTi-History should acknowledge and expose the potential instrumentality of all historical accounts. It assumes that the process of constructing history can be understood through the interest-driven socio-politics of actor-networks. ANTi-History views *history* as purposive and potentially instrumental because the socio-politics of actor-networks are understood as enacted, with the goal of exerting influence; that actor-networks are purposive as well as exerted toward achieving a desired use or end; and the effect of actor-networks is viewed as creating a *history as a punctuated actor*.

By tracing the socio-politics of the actor-networks involved in the construction of history, we can ask questions such as which actors were involved in the history's creation, on whose terms was the history created, who benefits, and who is marginalized from a particular interpretation of history? By following the socio-politics of actor-networks, ANTi-History can expose the interests of the actor-networks who were involved in the construction of a history. Ultimately, ANTi-History is interested in ensuring transparency in the craft of history, whether that means illustrating the interests of the actors of an already-published history or (re)assembling history in a manner that is transparent.

#### ***5.4.10 Transparency of the Socio-Political Conditions of Creation of History***

The final point concerning the method of ANTi-History pertains to ensuring that the (re)assembly of a socio-past is performed transparently. It is suggested that any given history should be written in a way that exposes its conditions of creation. This means

that histories must render transparent the socio-politics of the actor-networks that were involved in the construction of the history. As I have suggested, the punctuation of a history leads to the concealment of the socio-politics and the series of relations that allowed for the emergence of the history and its punctuation. To further this thought: history grows out of the socio-politics of an actor-network but then goes on to hide those socio-politics. ANTi-History suggests that socio-politics and techniques of power should be written into the history to show the history as a socially constructed, ordered, political, and situated (ideological, spatial, temporal) product.

### **5.5 Implications for ANTi-History and Research Practice**

Ultimately, the task of ANTi-History is one of (re)assembly of the constitution of the socio-past by following the traces of actor-networks. In this section, five implications of using ANTi-History are discussed as well as their consequences for a researcher. I acknowledge that ANTi-History has not been used and the following paragraphs that speak to the consequence of using ANTi-History for a researcher are premature. Also, I acknowledge that any discussion of the *use of ANTi-History* risks objectifying the theory. On the other hand, I believe that a discussion of the role of any researcher who uses any theory is necessary for purposes of reflexivity. Thus, the presence of the researcher and her effect on the research must not be simply assumed but overtly discussed. And because I feel that simply mentioning that *the researcher's presence has an effect on the research* is not enough, the following paragraphs spell out the specific implications of the researcher who would use ANTi-History on the research.

### *5.5.1 Situatedness (Spatial, Temporal, and Ideological) of ANTi-History*

The first implication that I discuss that concerns a researcher who may use ANTi-History is that she would have to acknowledge her positionality and her spatial, temporal, and ideological situatedness. Using ANTi-History means acknowledging that all researchers are positioned historically, culturally, and politically. Furthermore, it means acknowledging that the positionality of the researcher influences the craft of history. However, understanding the historian as positioned does not mean that we can understand the historian as deterministically shaped by her positioning. It is suggested that her training as a historian and her capacity to craft histories illustrates her iterative relationship with her positioning. To explain further, she is positioned within a context but is endowed with the capacity to alter that context by altering the meaning making of actor-networks through (re)assembling and dispersing histories.

In applying ANTi-History we need to view the researcher as situated temporally, spatially, and ideologically in that she cannot be understood as separate from the contextual conditions from which she has stemmed and in which she has matured as a historian. Thus, the specific temporal period in which the researcher has matured and conducts historical analysis will influence the nature of the historical analysis. A historian draws on the scholarly resources and traces that are available at this time to form his historical analysis. For example, a historian operating in the 1920's may not have drawn on Foucauldian archaeology, because Foucault's notion of archaeology was developed in the 1970s.

The researcher is acknowledged as spatially situated in that he is from a specific geographical location, whose norms and culture will invariably influence his craft of

history. The historian's *ideology*, which refers to a deep-seated set of belief systems shared by a group, will influence the historian and his (re)assembly of the socio-past. The implication for understanding ideology as *plural* (Seliger, 1977)—that is, the mutual existence of ideologies within one epoch or across epochs—is that there will be differing ways of knowing/doing history based on the ideological setting of the historian. This means that historians who are embedded in and from differing ideological settings will have different sets of assumptions and belief systems from which they draw to inform their history. Drawing on postmodern historians (Jenkins, 1995; 2003; White, 1985), the researcher who may use ANTi-History cannot understand the historian and her craft as distinct or decoupled from her lived time, place, and ideology.

### ***5.5.2 Understanding The Researcher as an Effect of an Actor-Network***

The second implication of ANTi-History is an acknowledgment of the researcher's self as a punctuated actor-network. Drawing on ANT, and implicit in ANTi-History is an understanding that a researcher is an effect of an actor-network that has been capable of enrolling actors into a network, extremely aligning the interests of its actors and acting as one. The researcher is understood to stand on behalf of the series of relations and experiences that constitute it. Following this, the researcher is an effect of various actors, including her academic training, her technology, ideology, education, past, conventions, traces, and political influences. However this actor-network (of which the researcher is a part) is precarious; it oscillates between acting as an actor (punctuated actor) and a network. It can never be understood as sewn up or complete as the

researcher is continuously engaged in interest work to either maintain the alignment of his actors or enroll other actors that will render his cause stronger.

### ***5.5.3 History as an Effect of the Interplay Between the Ideologically Situated Historian and***

#### ***Ideologically Situated Traces***

This brings us to the third implication of ANTi-History as a means to (re)assemble the socio-past. It is suggested that ANTi-History acknowledge that histories are effects of the interplay of the situated historian and her traces. I have noted that a researcher can be understood as a punctuated actor and thus as an effect of an actor-network that is capable of maintaining extreme alignment of its actors and thus acting as one. The researcher has also been described as positioned and, situated ideologically, spatially and temporally. Understanding *history* as a punctuated actor-network has also been suggested. Based on this, ANTi-History assumes that *history* is a punctuated actor-network that is constituted of actors that include a situated researcher and the many traces of the socio-past for which she is (re)assembling into history. Thus, the use of ANTi-History to construct a *history* is active in conducting interest work to follow traces, translate them into her cause, enroll the traces, order the traces, impose a meaning on the traces, and then maintain an extreme alignment of those traces so as to provide the possibility of a punctuated actor-network or history. The researcher is active in the choosing of her traces; through conducting socio-political work, she picks traces that she feels are durable and enable her to give her history a given flavor. The researcher is also active in the ordering of her traces in that once she has enrolled traces of the past, she actively sets out to assemble those traces to construct a history. Though traces of the past

are necessary actors to be enrolled for the craft of history, the researcher is also engaged in enrolling other actors to enable her (re)assembly of the socio-past, such as research funding, human support, technology, coffee, and so on. It must be stressed that the series of socio-politics for which a researcher who may use ANTi-History is engaged will be influenced by the situatedness (ideological, spatial, and temporal) of that researcher. Thus, the history that is understood as a punctuated actor is constituted of many actors, including a situated researcher and her traces.

#### ***5.5.4 Writing Reflexively***

ANTi-History requires reflexivity in the (re)assembly of history. *Reflexivity* refers to the capacity for a researcher to reflect on the politics inherent in knowledge production and in a given interpretation of knowledge. It assumes that the researcher is aware of her situatedness (ideological, spatial, and temporal) and how this affects the knowledge she produces (Gunn, 2006). As has been noted, *history* is understood as a punctuated actor that conceals the socio-politics of its enabling actor-networks. The enabling actor-networks of *history* have been suggested as constituted of many actors, including a situated researcher and her traces. Because the situatedness of the researcher has been deemed influential in her choosing of actors and alignment of those actors to (re)assemble the socio-past, the situated nature of the researcher as well as her ordering hand must be illustrated to the reader. Thus, the socio-politics of the actor-networks of a given history must be written into the history by way of showing how these have influenced the history. Writing in the socio-politics of the enabling actor-networks of a punctuated history is one manner of ensuring reflexivity.

### ***5.5.5 ANTi-History Research and the Enrollment of the Researcher***

The fifth implication of ANTi-History suggests that the researcher can either be enrolled by an actor-network whose fundamental aim is constructing a history or enroll actors on behalf of the history that she is engaged in (re)assembling. The latter point suggests that the researcher, who acts on behalf of a given actor-network, conducts interest work and seeks to translate other actors whom she feels will enable her to achieve her *punctuated history*. Materials of the social or other actors in which the historian is interested may include previous histories, documents, a ticket of entry into an archive, archivists, photocopying machines, paper, ink, a plane, car, telephones, other historians, conference proceedings, and so on. Thus, the researcher who may apply an ANTi-History approach would be understood to conduct interest work to enroll actors in the hopes of the emergence of a punctuated history.

## **5.6 The Archive**

In this section I discuss some preliminary thoughts on the various sites at which traces of the socio-past may be encountered in the performance of ANTi-History. Embedded in an ANTi-History approach is the assumption that the archive is a useful site for encountering traces of the socio-past. I understand the archive as having two distinct connotations.

In the first, according to Jenkins (2003) an archive is a socially constructed site, where traces of the socio-past are brought together, assembled, stored, and ordered according to the conventions of trained archivists and librarian. It is suggested by

postmodern historians that the traces of the past that are assembled in the archive do not point to the past itself. Instead, they can be used, ordered, and interpreted by an historian to gain insights into the socio-politics of past actors (Ankersmit, 1997; White, 1985). On this note, Rowlinson (2004b) cautions that a misconception of archival research is that the organization deliberately orders materials before making them available to researchers, with the intent to control and perhaps even distort the view of the organization that might be revealed through the analysis of company documents.

The Pan American Airways (PAA) archive is an example of this type of archive where materials documents have been brought together, ordered by archivists, and sorted. Researchers are welcome to draw upon the documents to inform their research. At this archive, there was no evidence of distortion or deliberate withholding of materials.

The second meaning of the term *archive*<sup>4</sup>, which ANTi-History draws upon, is based on Foucault's notion of the *archive* as the assemblage of the sets of knowledges that are enacted in a given period and that are drawn upon to order our condition reference (Foucault, 1982; May, 2006). According to Foucault, an *archive* is an embedded set of rules, practices, and techniques by which we are unconsciously governed but that allows for the establishment of certain statements, norms, and controls (Flynn, 1996; McHoul & Grace, 2003). Foucault (1982) noted that it is impossible for us to describe our own *archive*, because the modes and rules of speech that suggest its description are effects of the very *archive* that they are being used to describe.

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<sup>4</sup> Note: following Mills & Helms Mills (2009), I have italicized Foucault's notion of the *archive* (as a social condition or set of unconscious rules) to distinguish it from the commonly used notion of an archive (or site, location, or even building, where certain documents and materials are collected together).

Inherent within an ANTi-History approach is the assumption that the *archive* (a social condition or set of unconscious rules associated with a place and time) may offer a space or a site to observe the socio-politics of that actor-network and that an archive (a physical entity where disparate materials are collected together and housed) can serve as a potential site of elements of an *archive*. I will now discuss how the latter -- archive -- can be understood in relation to ANTi-History.

### ***5.6.1 The Archive as a Site of Calculation and Site of Translation***

ANTi-History draws on ANT to suggest the archive as a center of calculation and a site of translation. The archive, understood through both stated connotations discussed above, can be understood as a preordered repository of material and non-material actors of the past. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the materials are preordered by the organization (Rowlinson, 2004b) but by the convention of archivists who box and catalogue the traces. It must be stressed that many collections of materials have not been subject to the hand of trained archivists but have been assembled by organizational members and thus, reflect what these members thought as relevant keep. Actors are drawn together in what Law (2001: 8) called a “centre of calculation.” Information is collected, gathered, assembled, and brought together in one location where all that is relevant to a given subject can be made visible so as to understand how the actors can be assembled. The archive is a point of assembly of actors, networks, materially delegated actors, and inscribed actors that pertain to a given actor-network. If an actor wishes to learn about a phenomenon he or she can either gather traces of that phenomenon, or more simply pass through the archive. To elaborate, the archive becomes an indispensable,

durable actor through which one can pass to acquire more about a given subject. The archive can be understood as translating the interests and influencing the multitude of actors that pass through it. Following this, it can be understood as a site of translation. In turn, the archive is a useful site for tracing the socio-politics of the actor-networks (Latour, 2005b).

### ***5.6.2 The Archive as a Modern Western Manicured Creation?***

The archive, as suggested by Gunn (2006: 172) is “a local, western supposition rather than a universal reference point.” Histories, archives, historical conventions, and commonly used historical periodization were constructed by the modern Western world (Foucault, 1982, 2007; Goody, 2006; White, 1985). Chakrabarty (2007; Gunn, 2006) suggested these as Eurocentric in that they reflect the dominant values and belief of the modern Western world. As such, the archive can be understood as a privileged modern Western creation. The archive has assumed much privilege within the circles of modern Western historians in the sense that the legitimacy of histories that do not draw on research conducted in the archive is often questioned (Chakrabarty, 2007; Gunn, 2006). Inherent within an ANTi-History approach is an acknowledgment that the archive is a modern Western construction and that it should be used reflexively.

### ***5.6.3 Using the Archive Reflexively***

The last point concerning the use of the archive refers to a call for its reflexive use. If the archive is understood as a modern Western actor-network, whose construction is subject to socio-politics, an ANTi-History framework would suggest that the socio-


politics inherent in the archive be written into the (re)assembly of the socio-past to illustrate the influence of the socio-politics of the archive on the actual construction of the history.

### **5.7 Summary**

This chapter has focused on introducing and discussing ANTi-History, including its ontological and, epistemological assumptions, ANTi-History as a method, and the implications for its use as a research tool. I concluded with a discussion on the archive as a site for (re)assembling traces of the socio-past. For a graphical depiction of ANTi-History, see figure 5.2.

In the next three chapters (6-8), I apply an ANTi-History approach to an understanding of the history of PAA to illustrate not only the application of the method but also the problems of constructing organizational histories.

Figure #5.2 – The Assembly ANTi-History from Three Literatures



## Chapter 6: Writing Transparently the Socio-Politics of History

*“...Think I can explain some of the apparent discrepancies with what the records show. Too often, I’m afraid, we wrote not to reveal, but to conceal. The airplane was such a frightening thing we had to go to lengths to put the most attractive face on things, so as not to frighten off the politicians whose votes we needed, or the public. In the process, there were gaps in the records. Stark survival necessitated some stratagems; there were times when we had hardly gotten the minutes of the last month’s meeting composed to meet the needs of the upcoming session. Sometimes we had to invent; our cause depended more upon sympathetic understanding than it did on truth in the absolute!” (Letter from William van Dusen, director of public relations, to John Leslie, PAA Vice President and head of the history project, 1972a; my emphasis)*

### 6.1 Introduction

Although the empirical applications of ANTi-History (in the next three chapters) draw on all facets of the outlined approach, I set out to highlight certain facets more prominently than others. In this chapter, for instance, the prime focus is on ensuring transparency in history as I use ANTi-History to (re)assemble the socio-politics of the creation of Robert Daley’s (1980) history entitled *An American Saga: Juan Trippe and his Pan Am Empire*. In doing so, I will draw on PAA archival materials as well as four popular published histories of PAA (Bender & Altschul, 1982; Daley, 1980; Josephson, 1943b; Turner, 1976).

I begin with the assumption that histories are effects of the ordering processes of the socio-politics of various actor-networks, while recognizing that historical accounts are necessarily flavored by their specific conditions of creation. Following this, I use

ANTI-History to write in the socio-politics of the condition of creation of Daley's 1980 history so that they are rendered transparent. By focusing on the actors' interests, maneuverings, negotiations, politics, attempts at enrolling durable actors and, ability to act in alignment and publish what becomes taken for granted as Daley's history of PAA, I have attempted to (re)assemble the constitution of Daley's history by using the PAA archive to follow the various actor-networks involved in its creation. It is suggested that though the interest-driven socio-politics of engaged actor-networks influence the tale told, these socio-politics are concealed after Daley's history is published.

### ***6.1.1 A History Is Authored: Robert Daley and An American Saga***

According to the jacket of *An American Saga*, it is “the story of the man who virtually single-handedly opened up the world to commercial flight: Juan Trippe. Teeming with adventure, international intrigue, and financial manipulations, *An American Saga* reveals how a sky-struck young man of immense ambition and vision took a single-engined seaplane carrying mail 90 miles from Key West to Havana and expanded the operation into the vast world-wide airline... This fascinating book brings to life those hazardous early flights—and the struggle to build a unique organization capable of guiding and supporting them. World War II (WWII) presented new crises. Here for the first time is the story of how Trippe removed a Nazi threat to the Panama Canal ... And, finally, Trippe with his extraordinary foresight, brings the world into the jet age ...” The story, as the jacket informs us, was based “on extensive interviews with Trippe (who had remained silent for decades) and other participants in this exciting

drama, as well as on their private papers and Pan Am files.” In the process, the author, “Robert Daley created an enthralling narrative.”

Finally, the story and its telling is fused in an account of the author and his storytelling abilities as the book cover chronicles that “Daley is the author of fifteen previous books [and] articles, photographs, and short stories [that] have appeared in most major magazines ... [He served] in the Air Force during the Korean War, has had a continued interest in aviation, and devoted more than three years of research and writing to the making of *An American Saga*” (Daley, 1980, back cover).

Beneath this impression of an historic account written by a reputed author, Daley provides some clues to other heterogeneous actors who were involved in his construction of events. Discussing his sources, Daley refers to “primary sources: original letters and memos, diaries, contracts and agreements, etc; transcripts of CAB and congressional hearings, transcripts radio transmissions during flights, transcripts of inaugural-flight radio broadcasts, and also taped conversations between participants; logs kept by crew members; contemporary summaries of phone conversations; company histories prepared as exhibits to accompany CAB rate and route applications; proxy statements and annual reports to stockholders; books and articles, whether published or unpublished, written by the participants themselves; and about three hundred interviews conducted by the author. . . .” Daley also refers to “extensive notes” of a previous journalist—Wolfgang Langewiesche— that were never published but some of which “proved valuable to the author” (Daley, 1980: 467–468), and to Juan Trippe who, until he talked to Daley, “always refused to cooperate” with writers (Daley, 1980: 467).

I will begin by stating the specific ANTi-History facets that I focus on in anticipation of their use to (re)assemble the socio-politics of Daley's (1980) history. This is followed by an empirical application of ANTi-History and a discussion, through an explanation of specific facets of ANTi-History.

## **6.2 Review of ANTi-History as a Multifaceted Historiographic Approach**

As was illustrated in chapter 5, ANTi-History is a multifaceted approach geared toward historicizing knowledge and constructing knowledge of the past. Although what is offered in this chapter is an empirical application of ANTi-History, two noteworthy points are in order. First, this chapter and other empirical applications of ANTi-History draw on all of the facets inherent in ANTi-History. Second, all empirical applications of ANTi-History serve to highlight certain ANTi-History facets more prominently than others. Although this chapter offers an empirical application of ANTi-History in its entirety, the story pertaining to the writing of the history of PAA performed in this chapter serves to highlight and draw upon certain facets of ANTi-History more prominently than others. For instance, one facet of ANTi-History that is used most prominently in this chapter is that of ensuring transparency in history. Thus, I now turn to a brief overview of the most prominently used facets of ANTi-History in this chapter, *in anticipation of their empirical application.*

### ***6.2.1 Overview of the Most Prominently Used Facets of ANTi-History in Chapter 6***

The facets of ANTi-History that are highlighted most prominently in the empirical application of ANTi-History that follows are numerous. Included is a stated

need for disrupting the authority associated with realist ontological histories by showing all knowledge of the past as socially constructed. Using ANTi-History, the activism of knowledge of the past is stressed. In applying ANTi-History I focus on (re)assembling the constitution of the socio-past, which I assume is made up of actor-networks. In this application of ANTi-History, I seek to (re)assemble the constitution of the socio-past by setting aside my a priori assumptions concerning the nature of the constitution of that past. Thus, I do not impose a pre-created plot on the past but instead follow the actors around and trace the multitude of associations of actors to understand how the socio-past *holds together*. As I follow the actors around, I privilege the voice of the actors over that of my own. Thus, I do not use my theoretical insight to give my empirical observations an a priori or premature certainty. I follow all actors, both human and nonhuman, as they engage in interest work, acts of translation, and enrollment in their efforts at network building. I also assume that *history* is an effect of a multitude of actors that have achieved extreme alignment. A multitude of actors who are capable of achieving an extreme alignment of their interests are understood as *punctuating*, or acting as one actor. Because punctuated actor-networks eventually conceal all of the socio-politics of the multitude of actors that have enabled them to act as one (punctuate), these punctuated actors are also referred to as *black boxes*. Thus, I also assume that histories are *punctuated actors* or *black boxes* in that once they are published, the multitude of actors that have enabled their emergence and creation are erased from view and forgotten. Thus, I see myself (in applying ANTi-History) as tasked with performing the constitution of the socio-past, to show *history* as an effect of actor-networks that, through punctuation, conceal their socio-politics. And, writing in the socio-politics that gave rise to a *history*

into that very history is what is meant by *crafting transparent histories*. I acknowledge the potential for actor-networks to engage in instrumental socio-politics.

ANTI-History suggests the archive as a useful site for tracing the socio-politics of actor-networks as they *do* history. Thus, the empirical application of ANTi-History that follows illustrates the archive as a site of calculation and translation, which should be used reflexively. Having anticipated the specific facets of ANTi-History that will be used most prominently throughout this chapter, I now turn to its empirical application.

### **6.3 Using ANTi-History to Render Transparent the Socio-Politics of Daley's history of PAA**

In this section, the socio-politics of the actor-networks involved in the construction of Robert Daley's (1980) history of PAA are (re)assembled in an effort to transparently illustrate the history's conditions of creation.

#### ***6.3.1 Robert Daley's 1980 History of PAA as a Punctuated Actor***

Though many attempts at publishing a popular history of PAA have been attempted (Casey & Douglas, no date; French, no date; Morris & Smith, 1953), at least four known histories of the organization have been published as books (Bender & Altschul, 1982; Daley, 1980; Josephson, 1943b; Turner, 1976) – these latter are hereafter referred to as the popular histories. Prior to its publication as a book, Josephson's (1943a) history appeared as a series of articles in *The Saturday Evening Post*. Nonetheless, what is remarkable about the four popular histories is their similarity in terms of content and style. This is surprising given that Daley's (1980) history of PAA

was corporate-funded (i.e., sponsored by the company), whereas Josephson's (1943), Turner's (1976), and Bender and Altschul's (1982) were independently funded. Before (re)assembling the socio-politics of Robert Daley's history of PAA, the conditions of creation of Josephson (1943a, 1943b), Bender and Altschul (1982) and Turner's (1976), histories of PAA are briefly discussed.

Josephson (1943b) specifies that he constructed his history by relying on hundreds of living sources, many of whom, provided eyewitness accounts, including "Mr. Juan T. Trippe, president of Pan American Airways System" (1943b: vii). In the latter regard, Josephson noted that he is most "indebted" to Trippe "for his kindness in according me numerous and lengthy interviews and his patience in answering many questions" (Ibid.). This reference to Juan Trippe is, however, surprising given that there are no footnotes or references to support Josephson's claim; the account is at odds with others that claim that Trippe is said to have disliked Josephson's history (Bender & Altschul, 1982) and was notably more willing to cooperate with other authors in the crafting of a PAA history (Bender & Altschul, 1982; Daley, 1980).

Similar to Josephson (1943b), and Turner's (1976) histories, Bender and Altschul's (1982) PAA history was independently funded. It differed, however, from Josephson's history (1943b) in their choice and use of sources. Bender and Altschul's sources included, what they called, "independent research," which was confirmed through the use of an assortment of PAA files and documents once these were made available to the public by the *PAA Historical Foundation* in 1980. As I will point out later, Bender and Altschul's account – with its focus on the same temporal period and reliance on much the same *traces*, ends up reading much like Daley's history.

Of particular interest for the reassembly of PAA histories, is the fact that Bender and Altschul discuss the manner in which Robert Daley's (1980) history was crafted. In their source notes, Bender and Altschul describe what became known as the *history project* at PAA. They suggest that, as early as 1950, certain key PAA actors, such as Charles Lindbergh (technical advisor to PAA), initiated efforts to fund an official history of the organization. Indeed, on the basis of these efforts, numerous PAA actors began collecting materials that could be used to inform a history of PAA. However, the actual fruition of these efforts came much later, with the publication of an official company-funded history by Robert Daley. According to Bender and Altschul, one reason of the delay of an official sanctioned history of PAA, was Trippe's continual lack of cooperation to grant interviews, answer questions, or clarify the meaning of aged documents. This further contradicts Josephson's account of interviews with Trippe. Bender and Altschul pointedly note that much of the documentation, which they needed to craft their history of PAA, did not become publically available until 1980, after Daley's publication. We can note here that, for the large part, Bender and Altschul relied on materials that had been previously collected, assembled, and stored in an archive to validate their previous research to write the PAA history. On the other hand, Daley's history was constructed by drawing on materials that had begun to be gathered in 1957. Thus, the story concerning the writing of, what eventually became, Daley's history of PAA is as much a story about writing a history of PAA as it is about the construction of an archive. It is stressed that I do not assume that the way in which the PAA archive was constructed is generalizable to the construction of all archives.

I now turn to the story of the writing of Robert Daley's history of PAA. The story involves a multitude of heterogeneous actors. It is a story of actor-networks who are engaged in continuous interest-driven socio-politics to negotiate the history of PAA. It is also a story of the translation of the interests of actors, the creation of networks through the enrollment of actors, and the destruction of these networks through the counterenrollment of actors. Ultimately, this is a story of actors who punctuate, whereby a multitude of actors finally align their efforts and interests to craft and publish a history of PAA. Finally, this is a story about the concealment of the socio-politics of the actor-networks that gave rise to the publication of Daley's history of PAA, and how ANTi-History can enable my need to show the relevancy of writing in the socio-politics to ensure transparency in histories.

### ***6.3.2 Early Attempts at enrollment: Wolfgang Langewiesche Is Engaged as a Writer***

What motivated (what eventually became) Daley's history of PAA is largely unknown, although early archival documentation offers evidence that Charles Lindbergh, then a technical advisor for PAA, was instrumental in the encouragement of the funding of a history (Macy, 1968). Aligning the interests of key actors, including Trippe and Lindbergh the network (consisting of these two actors with same interests in the crafting of a history of PAA), actively pursued the task of engaging a professional writer.

The earliest trace, in the PAA archive, concerning the attempt to craft a corporate funded history of PAA is a contractual agreement between Wolfgang Langewiesche and Pan American World Airways dated June 17, 1957 (PAA and Langewiesche, 1957). Among other specifications, the agreement stipulated that Langewiesche would be

compensated \$15,000 per year, for 5 years, to write a history of PAA. The contract specified that a finished manuscript be published within 2 years of completion. Langewiesche was given the responsibility of finding a publisher, while PAA reserved the rights to approve the title and publisher. The contract illustrated that Langewiesche's wife would be hired as an assistant and compensated \$5,000 per year. Travel and expenses for each of them would be absorbed by PAA.

Though the exact reasons why Langewiesche was selected as the writer for the history of PAA are unknown, his previous interest in aviation (Langewiesche, 1948) and his acquaintance with Lindbergh can be speculated as reasons. Langewiesche started the project by gathering various historical traces as well as conducting interviews with PAA actors, and through these sources, began formulating knowledge of PAA's past. Early interviews included one with Erwin Balluder, who headed the China division of PAA (Interview with Balluder, 1958), and an interview with Peter von Bauer, who operated a Colombian airline known as *Sociedad Colombo Alemana de Transporte Aéreo* (SCADTA; Interview with von Bauer, 1957) to gather insights of the 1941 acquisition of SCADTA by PAA (SCADTA, 1957).

Langewiesche engaged in socio-politics, as evidenced in his ability to secure interviews with actors relevant to PAA's past. By getting Balluder and von Bauer to agree to interviews, he was able to create a network where the actors' interests were aligned to tell the story of PAA's past. This enabled Langewiesche's crafting of PAA's history.

For reasons unknown, the research for the history was not yet complete as of 1961, and Langewiesche's original contract with PAA was revised and extended for an

additional year (Trippe, 1961). In December of 1961, and with the approval of PAA, Langewiesche secured Houghton Mifflin Co. as publisher (Leslie, 1961; as a retired VP of PAA, Leslie eventually took on the history project). He continued to conduct interest work, by contacting alternative PAA actors to engage them in the project and acquire their insights concerning various parts of PAA's past (Langewiesche, 1961; Working note on the Dutch Uncle, 1961).

### ***6.3.3 Alternative Actors Conduct Interest Work and Seek Enrollment***

As Langewiesche continued his research, other actors who had become aware of his project began contacting him. In May of 1961, Merian C. Cooper, an early stockholder and director of PAA from 1931 to 1935 (Cooper, 1961), wrote to Langewiesche to offer advice concerning how the tale of PAA should be told. With the support of Mrs. George Carey (widow of John Hambleton, early PAA stock holder, 1927–1929), Cooper relayed the necessity for Langewiesche to “get the record straight” concerning Hambleton's involvement in PAA (Carey, 1961). Both Cooper and Carey made early attempts to influence how PAA's past would be portrayed.

### ***6.3.4 (re)assembling the Traces: The Start-Up of the Historical Collection of PAA***

As early as May 1952, before Langewiesche's involvement, PAA actors from the Pacific Alaska Division began showing interest in documenting the history of the organization. Interestingly, there is no documentation from the PAA archive that shows that the PAA Pacific Alaska Division's efforts at documenting their division are connected to the Langewiesche project (which was focused on a company wide history).

In an effort to start a museum, an article was published in an internal PAA organ called the *Clipper* calling for pictures and “curios” that represent the start-up and growth of the Pacific Alaska Division (Clipper, 1952). In 1957, a date that coincides with the engagement of Langewiesche to write the history of PAA, a *Historical Program* was instituted at PAA (again, there is no evidence that the two projects are connected). The purpose of this program was to assign a curator to assemble and maintain PAA historical data in a museum called *Clipper Hall*. Noted as PAA’s “unofficial Pan Am historian for years,” Abram French was assigned the role of curator (Clipper, 1957: 13). Throughout the following years, Clipper Hall attracted many actors, including Charles Lindbergh, who donated personal materials to the collection (Clipper, 1959). In 1961, Althea (*Gerry*) Lister, a PAA employee of 33 years, succeeded French as curator and manager of Clipper Hall (Clipper, 1961). Throughout the years, the museum continued in attracting attention and historical materials, which as will be shown later, eventually became of use for crafting histories of PAA.

### ***6.3.5 The Socio-Politics and Counter-Enrollment of Wolfgang Langewiesche***

As part of Langewiesche’s continued attempts at conducting interest work on behalf of the history project, he began delegating the task of relaying the history of PAA to a material actor. In other words, Langewiesche began transcribing the history to paper (Working note on the Dutch Uncle, 1961) that would influence future accounts of the airline’s history. Using this material delegation, Langewiesche began circulating the draft of the history to various PAA actors to obtain their consent as to its accuracy and enroll them into his cause of writing the PAA history in a specific way. Though some

PAA actors at this point were confident that the PAA history would soon be published (Miller, 1964), Langewiesche's attempt at enrolling who he saw as the key actor —Juan Trippe—was futile. In a telegram from Trippe to Langewiesche in June of 1964, Trippe expressed concern that the draft was “inaccurate and could prejudice project development in this country” (Trippe, 1964). He specified that the draft article sent by Langewiesche “not be used until important corrections [are] completed” (Ibid.).

In the following years, Langewiesche continued engaging in socio-politics by asking key PAA actors, such as Trippe, for materials and help in clarifying the meaning of early documentation pertaining to the start up of the airline (Langewiesche, 1964, 1965). Although this prompted Trippe to contact a number of other key actors concerning the clarification of the start-up of PAA, little explanation of documents or events ensued (Langewiesche, 1967a; Saunders, 1965; Trippe, 1965). As a result, Langewiesche's efforts in crafting a revised manuscript for the purpose of approval were delayed, and in 1967 Langewiesche turned down any further compensation from PAA but did not quit the project (Langewiesche, 1967b, 1967c). In 1968, seeing little progress, Trippe requested clarification concerning Langewiesche's terms of employment by PAA. Verification of PAA minutes suggested the executive committee's initial authorization of the *history project* had been granted in 1957. The minutes also suggested that Langewiesche had been approved two subsequent 6-month extensions, one in 1965 and the other in 1966.

With much time elapsed since the initiation of the project, Langewiesche continued in his socio-politics, much of which resulted in failed attempts at enrolling key actors. Langewiesche focused on clarifying what he perceived as discrepancies in the

documentation of the early years (1927–1929) at PAA (Langewiesche, 1968a, 1968b). Failing to convince Trippe to be interviewed and unsuccessful in assembling key documentation, Langewiesche began expressing his desire to terminate the project in 1968 (Langewiesche, 1968c). Regardless of Langewiesche's desire to terminate the project, attempts by PAA actors to gather relevant materials continued (Gray, 1968), and PAA's absorption of Langewiesche's expenses persisted (J. C. P., 1968). In January of 1969, Langewiesche decided to terminate his involvement with the history project, and thus we can assume that he was *counterenrolled* (disengaged) from the network (Goldberg, 1969). At this point, Langewiesche began returning boxes of history materials to PAA (Eleanor, 1969). With no firm date established for the completion of the history project, the cost in 1969 already totaled \$262,907 (D. W. T., 1969).

The reasons offered concerning Langewiesche's counterenrollment from the PAA history project network were numerous. In a series of letters exchanged between Langewiesche and Lindbergh, Langewiesche expressed that he could not support "Mr. Trippe's statements with documentation, particularly so for the most important episodes in the company's history" (Langewiesche, 1969a). He stated that certain "documents or published accounts are incorrect or incomplete and at times conflict with Mr. Trippe" (Langewiesche, 1969a). In light of the previous comment, Langewiesche stated that no "book can be made that I would want to put my name to; no book that hostile critics would not tear apart" (Langewiesche, 1969a). Thus, because of excluded materials specifically pertaining to the early years of PAA, denied permission to cite Trippe and disagreement about facts and the publishability of facts, Langewiesche confirmed his termination of the PAA history project (Langewiesche, 1969b). But Langewiesche's

reasons were met with resistance from Lindbergh, who reminded Langewiesche of the clause in the 1957 contract in which it was explicitly stated that Trippe would not be quoted (Lindbergh, 1969a). Accusing Langewiesche of quitting the project prematurely, Lindbergh offered support and help in terms of reading manuscripts and getting them reviewed by Trippe. Lindbergh sought to realign the interests of Langewiesche by reassuring him of his capability to write a great book and by stressing that Langewiesche's reputation depended on it (Lindbergh, 1969a).

Partially convinced by Lindbergh's persuasion, Langewiesche again attempted to craft a history of PAA (Langewiesche, 1969c). However, feeling as though enrolling a key actor (Trippe) was truly impossible, Langewiesche wrote to Lindbergh expressing frustrations and more reasons for terminating the project. Among other points, he again stressed the lack of documentation for the earliest periods of the company's history, no documentation to support Trippe's stories, and the impossibility of supporting his stories in a history, due to his refusal to be quoted. Furthermore, Langewiesche suggested that the independent sources that did exist contradicted Trippe's view and Trippe often contradicted himself (Langewiesche, 1969c). Finally, Langewiesche said that he didn't accept that documentation pertaining to the start up of PAA did not exist and suggested that they were purposefully being withheld from him. Langewiesche described Trippe's handling of a certain set of documents that Trippe "once put in my hand, took away again, opened up, looked over, and then withheld" (Langewiesche, 1969c). In another instance, Langewiesche described a founder of PAA, who, after refusing to give him information, "looked me straight into the eye and said "Of course the true story can not [*sic*] be printed"..." (Langewiesche, 1969c). Langewiesche's reactions concerning what

he referred to as obstacles in writing a history of PAA illustrate the lack of alignment of Trippe, Lindbergh, and Langewiesche's interests. Lindbergh finally replied to Langewiesche by saying that "any objective study will show that the facts of the case do not support conclusions you [Langewiesche] have come to" (Lindbergh, 1969b). Langewiesche was finally firmly disillusioned and the history project network (the actors at the archive referred to the collection of attempts to write a founder funded history as the history project) was weakened.

### ***6.3.6 Enrolling John Leslie***

Coinciding with Langewiesche's disillusionment (or counterenrollment) was the engagement of a *durable actor* (an actor that is long-lasting, reliable and key for the success of a network), John Leslie. In early March of 1969 Leslie retired after 40 years of employment with PAA, having spent 20 of those years as a member of the board of directors and senior vice president of international affairs (Clipper, 1969, 1970). A 1970 memo from Leslie noted that he would take over the "Langewiesche Project" without compensation but with the option of eventually retaining another writer who would require approval by PAA (Leslie, 1970a). Leslie was to rely on the help of close friends and devoted *history project* actors, such as Charles Lindbergh and Willis Player (PAA Vice President of Public Relations), to edit and approve the draft of the history. Leslie's mandate was to continue in seeking "friendly negotiations with Langewiesche" (Leslie, 1970a). The exact reasons why Leslie was enrolled into the history project are not known, but his long-time employment at PAA as well as his MIT education and the

resulting thesis, which was focused on PAA and its operations, can be offered as suggestions (Leslie, 1934, 1946).

Following the announcement of Leslie's engagement onto the *history project* (Clipper, 1970; PAA Memo, 1970; Player, 1970), he enlisted legal aid (help of a lawyer) to realign the interests of Langewiesche (Goldberg, 1970) with the hope of assembling all PAA history materials (Leslie, 1970b). Leslie's continual engagement in socio-politics sought to clarify Trippe's *historical recollections* (Leslie, 1970c), and he persuasively tried to locate the materials that had been the source of continued contestation in Trippe and Langewiesche's relationship: Trippe's *sensitive documents* (Leslie, 1970d, 1970e). Possibly Leslie's legal pressure on Langewiesche, was the reason he eventually returned more boxes of history materials and a manuscript to Leslie (Leslie, 1970f).

### ***6.3.7 Following John Leslie's Interest-Driven Socio-Politics***

Leslie's efforts at network building in terms of aligning relevant actors were persistent and extensive. From 1970 to 1971, Leslie began contacting relevant actors and was contacted by actors seeking to be involved in the writing of a history of PAA.

Actors such as Ione Wright, the wife of Victor Wright (retired PAA pilot), persistently sought to develop a relationship with John Leslie by offering her services to write the history, which she described as an effective *public relations tool* (Wright, 1970a). Perhaps because of her husband's extensive involvement with PAA, as well as her interest in history (Wright, 1970a; Wright was a History Department faculty member at the University of Miami, and editor for the *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*), she lamented the need for a "definitive history based on an intelligent,

informed understanding of all the facts that would highlight the dreams, the courage, the adventures the tireless efforts” (Wright, 1970a) of PAA employees. In a series of letters that illustrates her interest in the project, Wright persuaded Leslie to involve Gerry Lister, graduate students, PAA records, memoirs, and PAA files and correspondence (Wright, 1970b). Leslie’s reaction to Wright’s numerous requests for involvement were positive, since he felt her “insights and enthusiasm will be immensely helpful to me [Leslie] in charting our course” (Leslie, 1970g). The following year, Wright was hired as an independent consultant (Leslie, 1971a) and she hired Aurora Davis as a graduate student (Wright, 1971a). Davis was tasked with assembling previous theses and other relevant materials (Leslie, 1971b). However, Wright’s degree of involvement proved to be personally unsatisfactory. She informed Leslie that, upon her retirement from the University of Miami, she would like to devote her “professional energies primarily to serving your Pan Am history project as a formally-recognized consultant in liaison and coordination with professional historians” (Wright, 1970b). Wright reaffirmed her case by stating that “Dick [Wright’s husband and ex-PAA pilot] and I have greater vested interest in that than anyone else who might have equal qualifications in our two professions...” (Wright, 1970b). Despite her efforts at assuming a formal role in the writing of the PAA history, Wright’s desired degree of involvement into the history project failed to materialize.

Between 1970 and 1971, many noteworthy actors, including university history professors, sought out Leslie to clarify details of their own research (Leary, 1970). Examples include Jules Benjamin from the University of Pennsylvania (Leslie, 1971e), Keith Buchanan from Victoria University of Wellington (Buchanan, 1971), and William

Leary from the University of Victoria (Leary, 1971a). Through correspondence with Leslie, Leary sought to clarify the creation of the trans-Pacific route and PAA's role in the China National Aviation Company (Leary, 1971a, 1971b, 1971c; Leslie, 1971c). Because Leary also provided Leslie with useful information (Leslie, 1971d) we can infer the mutual enrollment of these actors.

Other examples of Leslie's socio-politics include his attempts to enroll heterogeneous actors, including Frank Mackenzie, a retired airport engineer from Canton Island (Leslie, 1970i), ex-PAA pilot Gray, and Lindbergh, as well as Langewiesche's originally conceived book structure (Leslie, 1970h) and the remainder of history materials still in his keep (Halaby, 1970).

Leslie sought to align his interests with Trippe's by persuading him to finally outline his views on what he would perceive as a favorable history of PAA (Leslie, 1970j, 1970k, 1970l). In a 1970 conversation between Trippe and Leslie, Leslie noted Trippe as "not much interested in helping with just another, ordinary company history, or even a definitive, scholarly work" (Leslie, 1970j). Outlining the "definite image of the type of book, and author, that would enlist his enthusiastic collaboration" (Leslie, 1970k), Trippe stated that the PAA history should be a "Book of the Month Club" type publication written by an author with the caliber of Archibald "MacLeish" or Langewiesche (Leslie, 1970j). Trippe expressed to Leslie (1970j) that the main thrust of the book "should be financial and political and that "the flying" was not of much importance for this purpose." Leslie (1970j) noted Trippe as strongly preoccupied "with the aim of showing, indirectly, how this job had been done under private enterprise, sometimes narrowly escaping government ownership or control, and how it might be of

use to appeal to younger persons today to help preserve the private capital system for at least another 25 or 50 years.”

Leslie’s socio-politics were also aimed at securing a professional writer for the history that was complicated by the fact that only specific authors would satisfy Trippe (Leslie, 1970j, 1971p). Thus, when actors such as Tolbert Rice wrote to Leslie to offer support for his project (Rice, 1970), Leslie refused (Leslie, 1971r). When a self-proclaimed professional historian by the name of Bilstein contacted Leslie to offer his services for writing a “50 year history” of PAA (Bilstein, 1971), no interest was shown. And when Rush Johnson, a representative for sales at the Walsworth Publishing Co., offered his services to publish a history of PAA (Johnson, 1971), again Leslie refused.

Throughout the years of 1970 and 1971, Leslie began the task of writing the history of PAA; he began delegating the task of telling PAA’s history to a material actor: paper. Leslie could now rely on actors to read his text instead of himself telling the story of PAA. In a progress report issued by Leslie in 1971 to key PAA actors, Leslie stated that he would “be doing considerable writing and/or editing of definitive historical background, while someone else will write the so-called book(s)” (Leslie, 1971f). By 1971, Leslie’s material delegations included a draft outline of the history project consisting of two proposed volumes (History Project – Draft Outline, 1971).

### ***6.3.8 Enrolling a Valuable and Durable Actor: Wesley Newton***

In 1971, Leslie’s efforts in conducting socio-political work continued. Wright introduced Leslie to Wesley Newton (Wright, 1971a), who, had been working on a draft manuscript entitled *The Perilous Sky*, which focused on the early development of aviation

in Latin America. Because of the little amount of physical documentation concerning the early history of PAA in circulation at PAA, Leslie and Newton began collaborating (Leslie, 1971g, 1971q). Eventually, Newton drew on Leslie's knowledge of the early history of PAA by sending Leslie a full unpublished manuscript of *The Perilous Sky* (Newton, 1971a) for review. Specifically, Newton enrolled Leslie in clarifying disagreements in archival documents from the National Archive concerning the early aviation diplomacy in Latin America, of which PAA was an integral part (Newton, 1971b). Newton provided Leslie with alternative evidence concerning the start-up of PAA (Newton, 1971b; 1971c; see chapter 7). Persuaded by Newton's evidence, Leslie sought to verify the documents that contradicted the popular story of the founding of PAA (Leslie, 1971k, 1971m, 1971n, 1971o, 1972a). Upon showing the evidence to Trippe, Newton's documents were deemed accurate (Leslie, 1971h), allowing Newton to use the materials in his manuscript (Newton, 1971d). The enrollment of Newton into the PAA network strengthened it in that Newton provided necessary research for Leslie's craft of the PAA history. Newton's interests were also fulfilled in that contradictory evidence in his book was clarified.

### ***6.3.9 Continuing to Follow John Leslie's Interest-Driven Socio-Politics***

Throughout 1971 and 1972, actors began contacting Leslie for copies of the not-yet-written history of PAA (Leslie, 1971i). Others, such as former PAA Guam employee G.W. Taylor, wrote to Leslie to offer help in clarifying key points in the company's early history (Taylor, 1972). Leary continually contacted Leslie to offer resources, probe the possibility of interviewing Leslie, as well as suggest collaborating on crafting the history

of certain aviation routes (Leary, 1972; Leslie, 1971). Enrolled PAA history actors such as Lindbergh wrote to Leslie to offer support and inquire as to the progress of the book (Lindbergh, 1971, 1972). Ione Wright continued in her attempts at more intimate enrollment into the PAA history network, as evidenced in her telling Leslie that he is “an important man” in her life (Wright, 1972). Seeking the enrollment of valuable actors who could flesh out the founding of PAA, Leslie turned to retired PAA publicity officer van Dusen (Leslie, 1971j, 1972c, 1972d; van Dusen, 1971a).

Yet, despite all of Leslie’s socio-politics and his efforts at network building, in terms of enrolling valuable actors, he continually faltered. For example, responding to a request to write the history of PAA, Archibald MacLeish (an American writer, poet, and recipient of three Pulitzer Prizes) showed the degree of misalignment of his interests with that of the PAA history network (MacLeish, 1971). MacLeish, Trippe’s suggested historian, wrote “that the history of Pan-American should not be a ‘company history’ but a history of mankind’s conquest of the air with the company as protagonist” and that the man “who undertakes it must begin with a conception as large as the events with which he will find himself working, and, though he will need research and lots of it, it will have to be research which responds to his visions, not research which dictates the tale he will have to tell” (MacLeish, 1971).

#### ***6.3.10 Leslie Delegates the Task of Writing the History to a Material Actor***

In July of 1972, Leslie continued to produce manuscripts (Leslie, 1972e) with chapters dedicated to West Indian Aerial Express and SCADTA; however, the use of this material delegation (Leslie’s eight draft chapters) to enroll valuable actors, such as Julian

P. Muller of the publishing house Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., failed. In July of 1972, Leslie received a rejection letter from Muller, who informed Leslie that “many elements are missing—flights, anecdotes, and human interest.” Muller showed his lack of interest by explaining to Leslie that his draft chapters were “exceedingly dry... [a] somewhat thin and remote account” (Muller, 1972). Finally, Muller suggested that the “book would not find a public market of any size” and recommended sending the manuscript to other publishers (Muller, 1972).

Still, Leslie continued to write the history of PAA, but the lack of details concerning the start-up of the organization remained a source of curiosity. As a result, Leslie and Newton continued collaborating on the task of fleshing out the start-up of PAA (Leslie, 1972f). In an effort to redress this, Newton offered that his upcoming meeting with Senor Manuel Sosa de la Vega to clarify the early history of Mexican aviation (Newton, 1972a) may help. He also suggested that Leslie verify the accuracy of Josephson’s (1943b) history of PAA with Trippe (Newton, 1972b).

### ***6.3.11 More Socio-Politics From John Leslie***

Between 1972 and 1973, with financial support, Leslie hired part-time administrative help (Leslie, 1972g, 1972h, 1972i). Having hired van Dusen for the purpose of clarifying the company’s early history (Compensation to van Dusen, 1972; Leslie, 1972j), Leslie began receiving materials from van Dusen, which he appropriated for his own research.

The point of interest for Leslie, van Dusen, and Newton remained the founding of PAA. Seeking to clarify this, Leslie financed van Dusen’s research on the subject, but

when more discrepancies arose within the four pages of text that van Dusen offered Leslie, van Dusen suggested a “talk-session” (van Dusen, 1972a). Offering hope for an explanation of the founding of PAA, van Dusen wrote “I can explain some of the apparent discrepancies with what the records show. Too often, I’m afraid, we wrote not to reveal, but to conceal” (van Dusen, 1972a). van Dusen continued in explaining to Leslie, “The airplane was such a frightening thing we had to go to lengths to put the most attractive face on things, so as not to frighten off the politicians whose votes we needed, or the public. In the process, there were gaps in the records” (van Dusen, 1972a). van Dusen continued by explaining why the *gaps* in the records exist by offering that “survival necessitated some stratagems; there were times when we had hardly gotten the minutes of the last month’s meeting composed to meet the needs of the upcoming session. Sometimes we had to invent; our cause depended more upon sympathetic understanding than it did on truth in the absolute!” (van Dusen, 1972a).

The “talk session” suggested by van Dusen, during which Leslie took the opportunity to interview van Dusen, offered some clarification concerning the start-up of the airline (Leslie, 1972k). Judging from the interview notes, van Dusen took the opportunity to probe Leslie concerning the direction of the project (Leslie, 1972k). To this question, Leslie suggested that he was “simply trying to collect all of the authentic information in an orderly and manageable fashion. First, in the form of basic documents, including something like our tape today ... and then on each particular topic I try to write it up as best I can (but not for sale at this point)” (Leslie, 1972k: 2). Leslie continued in saying that what he sought out through his research were “some of the anecdotes and some of the sensitive points, some of the real rivalries, the real personal disaffections”

and the “human touches”” (Leslie, 1972k: 2). Failing to gather any information concerning the founding of PAA, Leslie finished the interview by telling van Dusen that he could not anticipate a “publication date and foresee just how much of this point or what point is going to get inside the covers of a book” (Leslie, 1972k: 4).

Drawing on insights from van Dusen (van Dusen, 1972b), as well as information from Newton (Leslie, 1972b), Leslie turned to Trippe (Leslie, 1972a) for clarification, but his efforts were futile. Because Newton had drawn on Leslie’s insights in crafting his *Perilous Sky* manuscript, Newton sent a draft manuscript of his book to Leslie for comments, clarification and approval for use of Leslie’s quotes (Leslie, 1973a, 1973b; Newton, 1973). Learning much from the draft concerning the start-up of PAA, Leslie took the opportunity to redress all of the comments pertaining to Trippe, to clarify any “falsehoods or misinterpretations which have been spread over the years” (Leslie, 1973c). Newton eventually published his manuscript in 1978 (Newton, 1978).

The status of the history project, and redressing any falsehoods concerning Trippe and his reputation, were on the mind of many actors involved in crafting the history of PAA in 1973. Reacting to a book by Ralph O’Neill published in 1973 concerning the history of a PAA rival airline (O’Neill had founded The New York, Rio, and Buenos Aires Line (NYRBA) in 1929 which was quickly taken over by PAA in 1930), Leslie wrote to Player, suggesting that “Burying this sort of vitriol is one of the functions of a Pan Am history—and I think the company and Juan Trippe deserve an adequate, dignified defense” (Leslie, 1973d). But with tensions at PAA mounting concerning the rising costs of the history project (Deeves, 1973), the willingness to finance the history project was strained.

In Leslie's 1973 progress report of the status of the history project, he showed the sustained support of key PAA actors such as Lindbergh and Player but struggled to justify the cost of the project, which now exceeded \$265,000 (Leslie, 1973e). Above all, the progress report stressed the need to hire and convince (thus, enroll) a professional writer (Leslie, 1973e).

### ***6.3.12 Enrolling a Professional Writer?***

Though Leslie accepted the recommendations of enrolling a professional writer, the task proved to be difficult. In 1973, Leslie managed to temporarily engage the interest of Finis Farr and he drafted a contract that stipulated that Farr would have three years to write the history (Leslie, 1973f, 1973g). When the full enrollment of Finis Farr failed because he "dropped the project" (Leslie, 1974a), both Mike Harwood (Leslie, 1974b) and Margaret Kenney (Leslie, 1975a) were contacted as potential authors, but each declined the offer. Meanwhile, actors such as Leary (Leary, 1974) and Albro Martin (Martin, 1976) contacted Leslie to offer their services to write the history, but neither were hired by Leslie.

Failing to find and hire a suitable professional writer, Leslie continued his effort to construct the history of PAA. Incessantly seeking to clarify the fine points of the history of PAA, Leslie corresponded with Wright (Leslie, 1974c); Ruth Whitman, a Pan Am librarian (Leslie, 1974d); as well as van Dusen (van Dusen, 1974). However, despite Leslie's efforts, the history remained largely unfinished – thus incomplete and unpublished.

### ***6.3.13 More Socio-Politics, Enrollments, and Counterenrollments Orchestrated By John Leslie***

In September of 1974, Leslie signed a contract with PAA that indicated him as the *formal writer* for the history, which would focus on PAA inception until 1960. The contract stipulated that PAA reserved the rights to approve the title and publisher, while Leslie reserved the option to retain a professional writer. Also stated in the contract was the need for a PAA official to approve the manuscript prior to its publication (Draft Contract, 1974).

Support for Leslie and the writing of the history of PAA ensued. For example, Leslie received correspondence from actors such as Francis Holbrook, who voiced his fear of other actors having “last word with Mr. Trippe because nothing was coming from Pan Am” (Holbrook, 1975). Holbrook assured Leslie of the necessity of voicing “Mr. Trippe’s story” and suggested that the story should have been told “long ago to offset the myths that had arisen that turned Pan Am and Trippe into a sort of dragon” (Holbrook, 1975). In 1975, Leslie conducted interviews with PAA actors such as John T. Shannon to illustrate the history of Panagra (the merged operation of Pan American and the Grace shipping company) and the early days of radio equipment (Leslie, 1975b). Leslie continued in creating history of PAA manuscripts and thus we can theorize that he continued to delegate the task of telling the story of PAA to a material actor. In 1975, Leslie produced an extensive draft of the history (Leslie, 1975c). The draft included sections on *Latin America; Building Blocks*, of which a subsection was dedicated to *SCADTA*; Trans-Pacific; CNAC (China National Aviation Corporation); and the Transatlantic Service. Each of these sections explained PAA’s relationship to either an

organization (SCADTA, CNAC) or a pioneered aviation route (Latin America, transpacific, transatlantic service).

As the financial strain of the history project on PAA mounted, and he was being continuously asked to justify (Leslie, 1975e; Payroll History PAA, 1975) and lower his operating costs, Leslie considered quitting the history project (Leslie, 1975d).

#### ***6.3.14 The Loss of a Durable Actor: The Counterenrollment of PAA***

No longer able to sustain the rising costs of the project, the PAA history project was eliminated as a PAA company expense in 1975 (Leslie, 1975f, 1975g) and the history project network suffered the loss of valuable actors: PAA and the associated financial assistance. Still enrolled in the history project network, Trippe suggested the formation of a *Historical Foundation* independent of PAA that could be used to finance the project (Leslie, 1975g). Left without funding, Leslie agreed to Trippe's terms (Leslie, 1975f, 1975g, 1975h) and drafted and signed a contract with the PAA Historical Foundation (Leslie, 1975i), which stipulated the right for Leslie to retain a professional writer for the history.

#### ***6.3.15 Enrolling Robert Daley***

In 1976, Robert Daley was engaged and enrolled, into the PAA history network (Leslie, 1976). Despite his numerous concerns including that "project still has a tremendously long way to go before it becomes ... economically viable" and that it had not "even been presented to the publisher" as well as little "guarantee that one [publisher] will come up with the money I need," Daley agreed to take on the task of writing the

history of PAA (Daley, 1976). A contract was drafted between Daley and the PAA Historical Foundation (PAA Historical Foundation and Daley Contract, 1977) that stipulated Daley as responsible in securing a publisher for the history. In 1978, Daley signed a publishing contract with Random House, Inc. (The Sterling Lord Agency, 1978). It was specified that neither PAA nor Trippe retained any editorial control over the manuscript (Daley, 1978), which is a convention of this genre of history but had been a contested issue up until this point. Leslie assumed the role of the General Manager of the PAA Historical Foundation (Leslie, 1978) for 1 year before moving to Antigua, where he continued to show support for the history project (Leslie, 1979, 1980).

#### ***6.3.16 Daley's 1980 History of PAA Punctuates***

Daley's *An American Saga: Juan Trippe and his Pan Am Empire* was finally published by Random House in 1980. Commenting on the process of the history's creation, Daley explained the exclusivity of his book in the source notes by offering that "Trippe, until now, always refused to cooperate—not only with outside writers but even with at least one he hired himself" (Daley, 1980: 467). Using ANTi-History, it can be noted that Daley dedicated only two pages in his source notes to an explanation of the socio-politics of the multitude of actors involved in the text's creation. Though Daley discusses Langewiesche's role in the history project, as well as Josephson's (1943b) account of PAA, Daley stresses that Trippe at the age of 67 "at last agreed to speak" (Daley, 1980: 467). Most noteworthy is Daley's inclusion of the point that "Full editorial control rested with the author" (Daley, 1980: 468).

### ***6.3.17 The Dispersion of Daley's 1980 History of PAA***

Though it is difficult, if not impossible, to trace the degree and nature of the dispersion of Robert Daley's history of PAA, reviews of the book were published and provide insight concerning its receptivity (Clipper, 1980; Newton, 1981).

In an 1980 interview published in the PAA internal paper, *Clipper* (Clipper, 1980: 1–2), Daley commented that the PAA story was “romantic” and he always “felt good about Pan Am and what it stood for” (Clipper, 1980: 1–2). It was suggested that “although Daley and Trippe disagreed over the content of the book (the author's contract allowed him complete editorial control), Daley viewed Trippe as one of the greatest men of the Twentieth Century” (Clipper, 1980: 1–2). When asked about his views on the finished project, Daley offered that it had been profitable for him financially and he felt that he did not think that “anyone else could have done better with as complex and important a subject” (Clipper, 1980: 1–2).

Wesley Newton reviewed Daley's book in 1981 and suggested that the “long, long awaited book is not disappointing in terms of its particular genre” (Newton, 1981: 118–119). Interestingly, Newton included in his review that John Leslie's “careful assemblage of documentation and the drafting of a more than less scholarly manuscript on PAA history undoubtedly made Daley's task easier” (Newton, 1981: 118–119). Despite Daley's instance on having full editorial control of the PAA history, Newton emphasized Daley's overreliance on Trippe and his lack of knowledge concerning Washington's aviation strategy of 1927–1931. Newton concluded his review by offering that Daley's resource would be mostly valuable when “the company allows a bona fide business history to be written” (Newton, 1981: 118–119).

In a 2006 electronic article published by the Gale Referencing Team concerning the biography of Robert Daley, Newton's comments concerning the nature of Daley's history of PAA were somewhat countered (Gale Reference Team, 2006). In this electronic article, comments were gathered concerning Daley's book from the May 1980 edition of the *Saturday Review* as well as *Publishers Weekly* (n.d.). Writing for the *Saturday Review*, Anne Chamberlain noted that Daley's account of PAA offered "a mesmerizing account of the early buccaneering days of American commercial aviation that will keep you gasping for breath, clutching for your seatbelt, and once in a while ... wiping away a tear. By the time the story winds down ... you find you've rolled through five pages of financial tables and all the chapter source notes without thinking to put on the brakes" (Gale Reference Team, 2006: 4). Discussing his approach with Robert Dahlin for *Publishers Weekly*, Daley commented that "You have to suck the reader in on the first page and never let him go.... You have to write a book that he wants to read more than he wants to do anything else in the world" (Robert Dahlin, interview with Robert Daley, p. 57; August 12, 1996, quoted in Gale Reference Team, 2006: 4).

The exact number of copies of Daley's history of PAA sold, or whether it achieved bestseller status, is unknown (*USA Today*, 2008) and the degree to which the book dispersed is unknown.

### ***6.3.18 Forming the PAA Archive at the Otto Richter Library***

Even though Daley's history was published in 1980, many PAA actors continued to show concern for the preservation of the numerous PAA materials that had been collected to craft the history (Player, 1981). In 1981, there were early signs of the

formation of an archive at the University of Miami (Wright, 1981), and in 1996 the PAA Historical Foundation was said to have paid over \$20,000 to assemble and relocate PAA boxes of history (Pan Amigo News, 1996). In 1997, the sorting and indexing of more than 6,000 boxes of materials was financed by the University of Miami, Miami Aware, the Boeing Company, and the PAA Historical Foundation. These boxes of PAA materials were moved to the University of Miami in 1997 (Pan Amigo News, 1997).

### ***6.3.19 Equal Access to the Archive?***

Prior to the establishment of the PAA archive collection at the University of Miami, PAA materials were in the keep of the History Foundation archive with archivists who stated their willingness to accommodate researcher needs. But alternative documentation from the University of Miami collection suggests that access to the PAA materials was sometimes restricted, depending on the researcher seeking access. Through tracing the correspondence between PAA actors and Dr. Richard K. Smith, Smith's lack of success in accessing PAA materials and mounting frustrations were noted. In 1979, Smith wrote a letter of complaint to Trippe expressing that he had been writing a history of PAA focused on the early years of 1929–1939. Smith was disappointed in his attempt to gather materials from PAA, which he had hoped would be his primary source of information. Instead, Smith “found PanAm to be a formidable and a most consistent obstacle to my quest for solid information” (Smith, 1979a). Smith's letter initiated a flurry of activity at PAA from actors such as Player (1979a, 1979b), who suggested that Merle Richman, the director of public relations at PAA, contact Smith. Though correspondence between Richman and Smith ensued (Richman, 1979a, 1979b),

Smith's frustrations grew, fueling his comment that "PanAm ought to be called UnAmerican World Airways because its mindsets are almost exactly the same as those in the Kremlin" (Smith, 1979b). As Richman and Player debated "whether or not the Company records are to be opened to Dr. Smith," the most pressing issue that pertained to allowing Smith access to the archive concerned who would "hold his hand while he searches" (Richman, 1979c).

Negotiations concerning Smith's access to the PAA materials continued from 1979 until 1983 (Smith, 1983a, 1983b; Whyte, 1983). Though the degree of access to materials granted to Smith is unclear, his dissatisfaction with the nature of his access was evident (Smith, 1983b). In a 1983 letter to Ann Whyte, who was involved in maintaining the PAA history materials, Smith commented that the "material which PanAm regards as an 'archives' is what I call a 'Happiness Collection,' rather like the scrapbooks cherished by superannuated actors and actresses. In other words: much foam but very little beer" (Smith, 1983b). Smith continued that the "architect of that 'archive' was the late Philip Van Dusen, the company's 'Minister of Truth' who had 'manufactured no end of empty "happiness"' about the company" (Smith, 1983b). Whether Smith visited the archive and the nature of his potential visit are unknown.

#### **6.4 Discussion of ANTi-History Themes Highlighted Through the Exemplar of PAA**

This section discusses of the (re)assembly of the writing of Robert Daley's (1980) history of PAA. As has been mention, the empirical application of ANTi-History performed in the previous section draws on certain facets of ANTi-History more prominently than others, and it is to a discussion of these facets that I now turn.

#### ***6.4.1 Disturbing the Ontological Priority Unquestioningly Associated With History***

ANTI-History approaches the *doing* of history as informed by a modern ontological assumptions. The consequences for adopting a modernist approach, which assumes a realist ontology, is that *history* is taken for granted as a given, *concrete*, *unchanging*, and sometimes an *essential* entity and the tendency to privilege *one* reality or social world and to seek to *represent* that social world exactly or truthfully as it is deemed to exist. The privileging of a realist ontology is illustrated by the various actors involved in the craft of what became known as Daley's history of PAA. The actor-networks involved in this history's creation were very concerned with uncovering the truth concerning the *founding of PAA*. To do this, Leslie engaged in numerous socio-politics to gather documentation that he believed *stood in* for the past and, when properly assembled, would accurately display what occurred in the past.

ANTI-History questions: whose version of the past are we engaged in constructing? This hints to the situatedness of all knowledge of the past and begs the need to disturb the impression of neutrality inherent in realist renditions of history. Adopting a modern ontological assumptions when engaged in history comes with many consequences, including showing *history* as an effect of a multitude of heterogeneous actors. As the empirical application of writing Daley's history shows, history is something that actors negotiate, and assuming history as a concrete unchanging entity is not viable.

#### ***6.4.2 Knowledge of the Past as Socially Constructed***

Instead of assuming history, or knowledge of the past, as a concrete, unchanging entity, ANTi-History views history as socially constructed. This is visible in the writing a history of PAA in that Langewiesche, Leslie, Lindbergh, Trippe, and other prominent actors were all engaged, though in differing ways, in constructing the history of PAA. Daley's history of PAA was constructed as a result of the interaction of these actors. It was developed and conveyed within a social context, which has specific conventions in place that acted to inform the actions of these actors as they did history. It is stressed that ANTi-History assumes all knowledge of the past as socially constructed, and because of this assumes that Daley's (1980) history of PAA as well as this (re)assembly are socially constructed.

#### ***6.4.3 Activistic Nature of Historical Knowledge***

A necessary consequence associated with the assumption of history as socially constructed is the acknowledgment of the activism of knowledge of the past. As the PAA exemplar illustrates, knowledge of the past is what actors negotiate. History is infused with activity and cannot be understood outside of the activities that gave rise to it. Daley's (1980) history is a specific effect of all of the activities of actors involved in its creation, including, but not limited to, John Leslie, Juan Trippe, Aurora Davis, William Leary, Wesley Newton, and Charles Lindbergh. The activities of these many actors have allowed Daley's history to take its current shape. Thus, Daley's history can be understood as activistic in that his history of PAA is infused with the various activities of the interactions of these actor-networks.

#### ***6.4.4 A Focus On the Constitution of the ‘Social’ as Made of Actor-Networks***

ANTI-History is interested in the socio-past in terms of how it *holds together*. To do *history* means explaining the *associations of actors* that constitutes a socio-past. ANTi-History is focused on mapping out the relations that are fostered between actors and the way that actors change as a result of their associations. ANTi-History is, therefore, interested in the *glue* that allows for the socio-past to temporarily hold its shape.

For example, Daley’s (1980) history of PAA was (re)assembled by focusing specifically on the multitude of associations that enabled it to take its shape. The multitude of associations of the actor-networks involved in constructing (what eventually became) Daley’s book were illustrated to emphasize how associations between actors act as the *glue* for the all the bits that make up the history. It is John Leslie’s numerous engagements with Wesley Newton, van Dusen, and William Leary that allowed for these actors to negotiate the *founding of PAA*, and it is Charles Lindbergh’s enrollment of Juan Trippe into the idea of crafting a history of PAA in 1957 that initiated the project. It is these, as well as many other associations, that allow for the bits and pieces of the socio-past to *hold together*. These associations must be the focus of an ANTi-History approach to (re)assemble the constitution of the socio-past.

Daley’s history of PAA is an effect of actor-networks who engaged in endless political tactics with the hope of enabling their specific causes. For example, actors such as Langewiesche, Leslie, and Wright continually conducted interest work to enroll other actors into their cause. Langewiesche was successful in enrolling certain actors,

including Balluder and von Bauer, but continually failed in enrolling Trippe in terms of convincing Trippe to be quoted or gaining access to Trippe's *secret files*. Leslie's socio-politics were extensive in that he corresponded with many actors, leading him to enroll valuable actors such as Newton, but was rarely enrolled himself in that his actions were not altered; he maintained his course to craft the history. Wright's socio-politics cannot be assumed as fully successful in that her degree of involvement onto the PAA history project was always subject to Leslie's needs. This is an example of how we can understand the crafting of the PAA history through actor-networks.

Furthering the example, actors that have engaged in socio-politics successfully and thus have enrolled other actors into their cause are understood as having formed networks. Though the ability to enroll actors onto a network allows for a stronger pursuit of a given cause, it does not guarantee that a cause will come to fruition. A focus on Leslie's socio-politics and attempts at network building provide an example. Leslie was active in network building in terms of successfully enrolling a multitude of actors, which strengthened his cause, but Leslie did not personally succeed in his ultimate goal of publishing a history of PAA. When the history of PAA was published, Leslie was supportive of the project but not a key actor involved in the actual publication in 1980.

In understanding history as an effect of the various actor-networks, what is noteworthy is the capacity for actor-networks to oscillate between being an *actor* and a *network*. The task of ANTi-History is one of outlining the process by which one becomes the other. ANTi-History assumes that history is an effect of a network that has oscillated, taking on the form of an actor (punctuated actor). Daley's history, for example, is an effect of a multitude of socio-political actors that formed a network,

achieved extreme alignment, and have the capacity to act as one. It is suggested that Daley's (1980) history of PAA is a punctuated actor in that it is an effect of extremely aligned actor-networks that now conceal their numerous socio-politics from view. On reading Daley's history, one notes little to no mention of Leslie's extensive attempts at enrolling the necessary actors by way of interviews, supporting documents, or cooperation from Trippe. Instead, all the seams of the history are sewn, and all the bits of the socio-past of PAA are ordered and rendered coherent, but the process by which the history was ordered is hidden from view. Daley's history can be thought of as a punctuated actor-network which takes on the air of a concrete entity but whose concretized status is fictitious.

#### ***6.4.5 The A Priori—Do Not Begin By Assuming What You Wish to Explain/Imposing the Plot***

ANTI-History does not impose a pre-given plot to order the traces of the past; neither is it encouraged to begin a historical analysis by assuming as given what that history will eventually show. Though this is less explicit in the PAA study provided, the need to *avoid beginning a historical analysis by assuming as given what it is we wish for our analysis to show* was kept in mind as the traces of Daley's history were (re)assembled.

At the PAA archive, I was careful in not letting my a priori knowledge guide my selection of which traces to follow or ignore. Instead, I followed the action of all the actor-networks involved in constructing a history of PAA, and let the actors guide the way. For example, when John Leslie began corresponding with van Dusen, asking for

clarification concerning the initial start up of PAA, I immediately became curious about van Dusen. I followed the correspondence between Leslie and van Dusen to understand how either van Dusen or Leslie's actions would change as a result of their interactions. I followed Wesley Newton and his meticulous research on the history of aviation in Latin America. I traced his correspondence with Señor Manuel Sosa de la Vega for the purpose of understanding how Sosa's information would inform Newton and how Newton's information from Sosa would alter Leslie's understanding of the start up of PAA.

In my (re)assembly of the constitution of Daley's (1980) text, I sought to let the actors speak louder than my voice. However, most noteworthy from the PAA study is that I have been cautious to not impose a preformulated order on the many activities of the actor-networks. Instead, I have sought to lay out their performativities as they were followed in and out of the archive.

#### ***6.4.6 (Re)assembling/Tracing the Associations of the Social Past/Emphasis On Performativity***

ANTI-History emphasizes performativity in history and assumes that the socio-past is gone. This implies that history is not only what actor-networks *do* but also what is *performed* by actor-networks. The socio-past cannot be assumed as existing independently of an actor's mental appreciation of it. Neither can we assume that an actor's recollection of the constitution of the socio-past is an objective telling of *what happened*, instead, we must acknowledge this as one of many possible interpretations of

the events or traces. Furthermore, we cannot assume a historian as capable of assembling the past as it was initially performed.

In the PAA study, I sought to use ANTi-History to (re)assemble the past by following and mapping the traces, socio-politics, and assemblies of actor-networks to outline their series of performativities. Through mapping the associations of the socio-past, we can understand how it is orchestrated, that is, how it *holds together*. And, by illustrating the numerous associations of the actors involved in the history, we can understand how the socio-past of Daley's history of PAA was orchestrated and *holds together*. Ultimately, however, the point is that as we map out the socio-politics of actor-networks we too are engaged in the performance of history.

#### ***6.4.7 Premise the Voice of the Actors; Premise the Empirical Over the Theoretical***

History is done, according to ANTi-History, by following multitudes of socio-past actor-networks around and premising the voice of the actors over that of the researchers. This means premising the actor-networks' voice and actions, over theoretical grounding. Perhaps the best example of the empirical being privileged over the theoretical or being cautious to not let the theoretical give an a priori certainty to empirical analysis is through the formation of ANTi-History as an approach to construct knowledge of the past. The theory of ANTi-History was constructed from an analysis of the empirical materials from the PAA archive.

#### ***6.4.8 The constitution of Actor-Networks as Materially Heterogeneous***

ANTi-History suggests the socio-past as constituted of materially heterogeneous actor-networks. The PAA history project was rendered more durable through the enrollment of necessary funds. These were used to secure the enrollment of other actors, such as Langewiesche, his assistant, Ione Wright, Aurora Davis, as well as van Dusen, to gather necessary research for the PAA history.

The entire PAA history project network can also be seen as enrolled by a very powerful nonhuman actor, the *history book*. The *history book* is a materially delegated actor that is collectively acknowledged as having assumed the task of telling stories of the past of a given phenomena. Lindbergh could potentially be understood as enrolled by the *history book* when he originally conceived of the idea of crafting a founder-funded history of PAA. Thus, Lindbergh's actions were altered by the allure of a nonhuman actor such as the *history book*. The notion of the *history book*, the idea of writing a history book, and the potential for an organization to then use this material delegation to conduct interest work on its behalf illustrates it as a powerful actor. Thus, it is stressed that ANTi-History assumes the socio-past as composed of interacting humans and nonhumans who are endowed the capacity to alter each other's actions. Following this, ANTi-History understands history as an effect of materially heterogeneous actor-networks.

#### *6.4.9 History as a Socio-Construction of Interest Socio-Politics (Translation, Enrollment) of Actor-Networks*

ANTI-History assumes that actors engage in political tactics to capture the interests of other actors, seek to translate their interests, and finally enroll other actors by way of changing their interests to match that of their own. The story of writing Daley's (1980) history is a story of the interest-driven socio-politics of actor-networks. One specific example concerns the initiation of the PAA history project whereby Lindbergh probed the idea of writing a corporate-funded history and captured the interests of Trippe, who became enrolled into the PAA history network. Continuing with their interest work to achieve their ultimate goal of writing a history of PAA, the PAA history network captured, translated, and enrolled the interests of Langewiesche. Initially, Langewiesche promised to be a valuable actor to the PAA history network because he brought to the network necessary skills, such as professional writing, for fulfilling the network's ultimate goal. However, as the story above shows, Langewiesche was counterenrolled from the PAA history network because his own interests of writing an accurate, document-supported, and quote-filled history were not met. Through the loss of a necessary actor, the PAA history network was temporarily weakened.

The enrollment of Leslie proved to strengthen the PAA history network because this actor conducted endless interest work to capture the interests of necessary actors to fulfill the ultimate goal of writing the history of PAA. Leslie fulfilled his interests by enrolling valuable actors such as Wesley Newton, who helped to flesh out the early periods of PAA history of which little PAA documentation existed. Leslie also enrolled

actors such as Ione Wright and William van Dusen, who proved to be less valuable in that their enrollment into the PAA history network did not alter the network substantially.

What is noteworthy of the example of PAA and the PAA history network is that the actor-networks involved were active in negotiating the past of PAA. Leslie and van Dusen, for example, engaged in correspondence whereby van Dusen sought to explain the discrepancies in PAA documentation that changed Leslie's interpretation of the early periods of PAA. Also concerned with the early interpretations of PAA were Leslie and Newton. Newton shared much documentation from the National Archive with Leslie concerning the start up of PAA. In one instance, Newton even sent an early manuscript of his book, called *Perilous Sky*, to Leslie, on which Leslie commented. These are few of the many examples that illustrate the creation of history as a result of the interest driven socio-politics of actor-networks.

#### ***6.4.10 'History' as a Punctuated Actor or Black Box***

ANTI-History assumes history as a punctuated actor or a black box. Turning to the example of Daley's (1980) history, the text was finally possible when all of the actors making up the PAA history project network were capable of aligning their interests and various interpretations of the past. When the PAA history project network achieved *punctuation*, and thus was capable of acting as one, the PAA history book became a possibility. It is important to stress that the PAA history network captured the interests of many actors, translated those interests, enrolled, and in some instances counterenrolled, many actors to achieve punctuation. The PAA history network achieved its ultimate goal of crafting a founder-funded history of PAA through enrolling Daley who conducted

interest work to enroll another necessary actor, that of Random House, the publisher. Thus, Daley's (1980) publication of the PAA history can be understood as an effect of the PAA history network's punctuation.

Often, punctuated actors such as *histories* conceal the many socio-politics that enabled their creation. Daley's PAA history is no exception. When one reads Daley's (1980) history, the endless maneuverings of the many actors involved in its creation are not mentioned. Though Daley's history is dedicated to Leslie, his efforts spanning from his initial enrollment into the PAA history network in 1970 onward until Daley's enrollment in 1976 are not written into the history. Leslie's correspondence with Newton, Trippe, Lindbergh, PAA librarians, and others likewise is not written into Daley's text. In the sense that published histories such as Daley's conceal the numerous socio-politics that have enabled their creation, they can be understood as black boxes.

Histories can also be understood as material delegations in that the task of telling the story of the socio-past of PAA has been delegated to a nonhuman actor. This materially delegated actor can be understood as continuing to conduct interest work on behalf of the PAA history project network. Through being inscribed and published, Daley's PAA history is capable of reaching many audiences and translating the interests of all actors in terms of informing or changing the manner in which they perceive the history. Thus, the PAA history book is capable of altering the interests and enrolling the interests of actors who read the history.

#### ***6.4.11 Acknowledge and Expose the Potential Instrumentality of Historical Accounts***

ANTI-History emphasizes the need to acknowledge the potential for all histories to be understood as purposive and instrumental knowledge creations. An example is provided from the PAA study, whereby Trippe was cautious in letting Langewiesche access certain materials that were eventually referred to as Trippe's *secret files*. It can be assumed that the content in these files were too sensitive for publication. Thus, Trippe was very selective in the materials to which Langewiesche was privy. Another example from which we can infer the potential for history to be viewed as instrumental and purposive pertains to Trippe's reaction to Langewiesche's initial manuscript of PAA's history in 1964. Trippe wrote to Langewiesche that the draft was inaccurate and "could prejudice project development in this country" (Trippe, 1964). Though it is not entirely clear what is meant by this quote, it can be inferred that Trippe felt that the information contained in Langewiesche's manuscript may portray PAA in an unfavorable manner in the public realm. Perhaps the general public or select government officials on whose votes Trippe relied would be swayed negatively by the publication of Langewiesche's manuscript because of its content. By illustrating the many socio-politics of the actor-networks involved in a histories creation, we can probe as to who is disproportionately influencing the tale told, whose story is voiced, and whose is marginalized. We can then expose the potential instrumentality as well as purposive nature of historical accounts.

#### ***6.4.12 Transparency of the Socio-Political Conditions of Creation of History***

Crafting histories in a transparent means including the conditions of creation of a history as part of the actual tale told throughout the history. Much of this chapter has

focused on rendering transparent the socio-politics of writing Daley's (1980) history and thus the numerous politics in which actor-networks engaged were traced. Enrollments and counterenrollments were noted to illustrate how these altered the PAA network. The history should wear its socio-political conditions of creation; it should illustrate whose version of the story is being told as well as how the various bits making up the story were constructed and ordered into a coherent narrative.

#### ***6.4.13 The Archive as a Site of Calculation and Site of Translation***

ANTi-History draws on ANT to suggest the archive as a center of calculation and a site of translation. The PAA archive at the Otto Richter Library can be understood as a *centre of calculation* in that it was constructed by many PAA actors who were sympathetic to preserving PAA historical documents and other bits and pieces of PAA. The archive also acts as a valuable actor to the PAA history network in that actors who wish to learn about PAA can either expend much energy in collecting all of the relevant materials themselves or satisfy their interests with less energy by visiting the archive. It is important to stress the archive as a social construction, thanks to the gathering efforts of given actors. This means that the actors who pass through the archive are privy only to the contents of the archive and are altered only by viewing the materials to which they are exposed. Their notion of PAA can potentially be influenced by the contents viewed at the archive, and the archive can be understood as a site of translation.

#### ***6.4.14 The Archive as a Modern Western Manicured Creation?***

The PAA archive at the Otto Richter Library at the University of Miami was constructed through various donations, many of which came from ex-PAA employees, PAA, and the PAA Historical Foundation. The materials donated were then sorted and ordered by archivists (at the University of Miami) trained according to Western archival conventions (the notion of the archive is a Western construct). Using ANTi-History, it is stressed that the archive is not neutral creations but that the ordering of the materials is an effect of conventions specific to our modern Western society.

The PAA study illustrates the archive as a privileged site in the eyes of historians for doing research. Bender and Altschul, for example, drew on the PAA archive as soon as it was constructed to confirm much of their research for their 1982 history of PAA. Through Richard Smith was less successful in terms of gaining access, his interest in conducting research at the archive suggests it as a privileged site for conducting research. Thus, it is important to stress the archive as a privileged modern Western construction and seek to use it reflexively.

#### ***6.4.15 Using the Archive Reflexively***

ANTi-History stresses the need for a *reflexive* use of the archive. An example, which shows how an archive can be used reflexively, is illustrated above in the PAA study. It was acknowledged that the specific archive used is a modern Western site, maintained according to the University of Miami archivists and their conventions.

## 6.5 Summary

This chapter has provided an empirical application of ANTi-History focused on (re)assembling the constitution of the Daley's text by following the numerous actor-networks involved in its creation to understand their associations. Daley's text was illustrated as an effect of the socio-politics of actor-networks that, through punctuating, concealed their socio-politics. I now shift my attention to another empirical application of ANTi-History in which the method is used to stress the need for problematizing beginnings and endings in history.

## Chapter 7: Pluralizing and Problematizing ‘Beginnings’ and ‘Ends’ in History

*“A story has not beginning or end: arbitrarily one chooses that moment of experience from which to look back or from which to look ahead.” (Green, 2004: 1)*

### 7.1 Introduction

In this chapter, ANTi-History is used to pluralize PAA’s past by writing an alternative history of its *founding*. I historicize (by contextualizing and situating the story both spatially and temporally) and pluralize (through creating a (re)assembly of the past) the uniform tale of the *start-up* of PAA told in existing histories. Such tales are largely constructed around the life of Juan Trippe, who is unquestioningly taken for granted as the founder of PAA. In this (re)assembly of the *start-up* of PAA, I seek, not only to problematize and provide an alternative account of Trippe as PAA’s founder, but also to problematize the specific nature by which historians *do* history, whereby they ascribe, impose, and thus construct beginnings and ends to bind their tales.

In so doing, I attempt to show that the historian’s hand in *bounding* a story works as a powerful instrument that can give the historian’s story a false appearance of naturalness. I illustrate the specific histories of PAA as socially constructed and through (re)assembling it, I pluralize the start-up of PAA.

I begin by showing ANTi-History as a multifaceted historiographic approach. Second, an empirical application of ANTi-History is conducted to demonstrate this, which has three parts: (1) an examination of the depiction of the *founding* of PAA in four extant popular histories of the organization (2) a look at other popular published accounts

in which the *founding* of PAA is discussed, and (3) a (re)assembly of the *founding* of PAA by following actors in and out of the PAA archive. Third, the specific facets of ANTi-History that were most prominently used throughout the empirical application are discussed.

### ***7.1.1 In the Beginning—The Making of a History of PAA***

Daley's telling of the history of PAA begins with Juan Trippe "who set to work... persuading [associates] Whitney, Vanderbilt, Hambleton, Bill Rockefeller and the rest that there was a future in commercial aviation, and that he was the man to lead them to it" (Daley, 1980: 27). As a result, according to Daley (1980: 27), Trippe "gathered together thirteen [associates]... and capitalized the new company at \$300,000. It was incorporated on June 2, 1937, as the Aviation Corporation of America... [with] Trippe... named managing director." Trippe then proceeded to invest the money of the holding company in "a newly formed New York corporation called Pan American Airways, Inc" (Daley, 1980: 31). The newly formed PAA had no planes and very little money when Trippe's company invested in it and, with his company having a controlling interest, Trippe became the president and general manager.

Daley (1980: 467) contends that prior to his account there was "no previous large-scale history of Pan Am, and no previous biography [of Juan Trippe] of any kind," yet earlier accounts by Josephson (1943b) and Turner (1976) reproduce broadly similar accounts of the beginnings of PAA and the role of Juan Trippe, although, as we shall see below, these accounts differ in some important specifics. According to Josephson (1943b: 29), Trippe's friends "confidently went along with him in a holding company venture

which was ambitiously called Aviation Corporation of the Americas.” The holding company went on to merge with two others—Florida Airways and Pan American Airways, Inc., whose “young men . . . were out of cash and had no flying equipment” (Josephson, 1943b: 29). The three organizations combined under a new holding company—the Aviation Corporation of the Americas—with Trippe heading “the operating subsidiary, Pan American Airways, Inc.” (Josephson, 1943b: 30).

In a similar vein, Turner (1976: 9) reports that the prime “driving force of Pan American through its first 40 years was its founder and president Juan Terry Trippe.” Turner goes on to (re)tell the story of the merger of the three organizations constituting the Aviation Corporation of the Americas, and their subsidiary Pan American Airways, Inc.

## **7.2 Overview of the Most Prominently Used Facets of ANTi-History in Chapter 7**

Several facets of ANTi-History are used prominently in this chapter. In particular, ANTi-History is used to illustrate *history* as socially constructed knowledge of the *past*, my intent being to disturb the ontological priority that is often unquestioningly associated with *history*. Here the application of ANTi-History serves to highlight a certain view of change in history, one that is subject to a process of folding as opposed to a progressive explanation. ANTi-History has a relational approach to history, emphasizing the need to problematize *beginnings* and *ends* in history as social constructions of interest driven actor-networks/historians. In this way, ANTi-History is used in this chapter to address and problematize the concepts of the *past* and *history*.

This empirical application draws on ANTi-History's emphasis on symmetry in research, in that all the traces and actors followed are viewed with the same initial curiosity. Of foremost importance for this application, is ANTi-History's emphasis on pluralizing history.

### **7.3 Using ANTi-History to Pluralize History and Problematize 'Beginnings' and 'Ends' In History**

I begin with a discussion of the four popular histories of PAA with a focus on how each depicts the organizations founding. Next, alternative published accounts of the founding of PAA (Fortune, 1936; Time Magazine, 1941) are illustrated. Third, a (re)assembly of the story concerning the founding of PAA is performed by following the actors in and out of the PAA archive.

#### ***7.3.1 Popular Histories and Their Depiction of the Founding of PAA***

The popular histories versions of the *founding* of PAA differ only slightly from one another. PAA is described by the four histories as founded in the United States during the summer of 1927. Aviation in the United States, in the 1920s, was in its infancy. Aerial ventures were heavily reliant on financial backing from successful *capitalists* as well as the awarding of U.S. government airmail contracts initiated in 1925 with the Kelly Act. Aviation ventures were viewed with skepticism, and investing in such ventures was commonly understood as unviable or risky. Aviation technology was in its developmental stages, the development of aviation technology was expensive, and a

fear of flying plagued the general public. As the following histories of PAA will show, the communal sentiment concerning aviation in the 1920s made for a turbulent environment in which aviation companies were just as quickly established as they were bankrupt.

PAA is described in all four histories as an airline that was formed through the consolidation of three organizations. These histories state that in the summer of 1927, PAA, Florida Airways (which folded and soon re-emerged as Atlantic, Gulf and Caribbean Airways, Inc.) and the Aviation Corporation of the America (which included Juan Trippe) were involved in negotiating for a U.S. government airmail contract from Key West (Florida) to Havana (Cuba). Forced to merge their operations in order for the airmail contract to be awarded, the emergent organization retained the name of Pan American Airways. Juan Trippe was not part of the initial Pan American Airways (which I henceforth refer to as *Pan American Airways incorporated* or *PAAI*) but entered the negotiations on behalf of the Aviation Corporation of the America (ACoA). He went on to assume the position of general manager of the newly formed PAA through the merger.

To discuss the specific way in which the *founding* of PAA is depicted, I begin by focusing on the socio-politics inherent in the specific histories to provide clues concerning the situatedness of the author and their text's conditions of creation.

### *7.3.1.1 The Socio-Politics Inherent in the Popular Histories of PAA*

Important differences that set apart the four popular histories of PAA include their respective dates of publication and the nature of their financing. Josephson's history of PAA was published in 1943, Turner's in 1976, Daley's in 1980, and Bender and

Altschul's in 1982. As noted, part of Josephson's history appeared as a series of articles in *The Saturday Evening Post* (1943a). In terms of financing, Daley's history was funded directly by PAA, whereas Josephson's, Turner's, and Bender and Altschul's were independently financed.

Juan Trippe is said to have detested Josephson's "unauthorized" history of PAA (Bender & Altschul, 1982: 526). This may in large part be due to Josephson's known leftist leanings (Belfrage, 1973; Chomsky, 1997; Lyons, 1941; Wald, 1994; Wechler, 1954; Zinn, 1990, 1997, 1999), which undoubtedly flavored the nature of his history. The details concerning the conditions of creation of Josephson's (1943b) history of PAA are not known, but clues as to the formation of Josephson's (1943b: vii) history can be found in the book's prologue, which states that his history was constructed through relying on hundreds of "participants and eyewitnesses" of all walks of life. Though Josephson stated that many actors were involved in the construction of his history, following these actors has been rather difficult because of the lack of references or endnotes in Josephson's text. Thus, it is impossible to know exactly which historical traces Josephson relied upon to construct his book as well as the ordering logic of the historical traces.

In contrast to Josephson's dearth of evident traces there is a wealth of traces in Daley's history (Durepos, Mills et al., 2008). As discussed in the previous chapter, the historical materials gathered by Langewiesche and Leslie during the period 1957 to 1980 were made available to Daley for his history and publically available for research purposes following the publication of Daley's history (Bender & Altschul, 1982). Whereas Turner (1976: 7) acknowledged "the generous facilities and hospitality afforded

by [PAA] in the gathering of material” for his book. He (1976: 7) also speaks of being “deeply indebted to the many Pan American personnel... who gave so much of their time and facilities” to assist his research. In particular, he noted the help of “the airline’s historian Miss Althea Lister... for all her work” in accessing the “photographic archives” of the airline.

Bender and Altschul (1982: 528) also relied on the PAA materials to verify their own materials, which “confirmed and, in regard to a few matters, amplified” their independent research. Their independent research drew on the papers of General Henry Hap Arnold in the Library of Congress and the personal papers of Charles A. Lindbergh, as well as military and diplomatic records of the U.S. government. Bender and Altschul also relied on numerous interviews with Juan Trippe and his wife, Elizabeth Stettinius Trippe, as well as Trippe’s sister, Louise Trippe Bradlee, and his daughter, Betsy Trippe Wainwright. Bender and Altschul commented that Trippe was responsive to questioning but that his recollections were often at odds with official documentation.

### *7.3.1.2 The Story of the Founding of PAA as It Is Told In the Popular Histories of PAA*

The stories told in the popular histories of PAA are also similar in regard to their focus and description of the pioneering activities of Juan Trippe. For example, they all mention Trippe’s Long Island Airways, which folded in 1925, and point out that until the Kelly Air Mail Act of 1925 private aviation organization relied on meager private funding. The passing of the Kelly Air Mail act of 1925, authorized the U.S. Post Office to award contracts to private companies for the transport of airmail. This spurred much activity among aviation circles, including the formation of Eastern Air Transport

(composed of John Hambleton, Sonny Whitney, Bill Vanderbilt, and Juan Trippe) which competed for a Boston–New York airmail contract. Competing for the same airmail contract was a group from Boston called Colonial Airways. The two organizations subsequently merged to form Colonial Air Transport. Shortly thereafter, Trippe was fired from his role as vice president and general manager of Colonial Air Transport, a post he had assumed through the merger. Though the details of Trippe's numerous aviation activities leading up to the founding of PAA are depicted consistently in the popular histories, the actual tale told of the *founding* of PAA differs. Daley (1980), and Bender and Altschul's (1982) histories are more similar in their description of the start-up of PAA, than Josephson's (1943b) and Turner's (1976) accounts.

Josephson (1943b) described Trippe, Hambleton, and Whitney as forming ACoAs after leaving Colonial Air Transport. In 1927, the U.S. government advertised an airmail contract to transport mail from Key West to Havana, prompting interest on behalf of ACoAs. Josephson (1943b) noted that during the negotiations for the Key West–Havana airmail contract, Trippe and Hambleton made a trip to Havana and secured exclusive Cuban landing rights from General Machado. According to Josephson (1943b), other aviation organizations competing for the Key West–Havana airmail contract included Florida Airways (organized by Reed Chambers, Eddie Rickenbacker, and financed by individuals such as Richard F. Hoyt) and PAAI (which was organized by Richard Bevier and Grant Mason). Turner presents a similar account. These two organizations had neither the proper equipment nor the financing to secure the airmail contract. What is stressed in Josephson's account is that once the PAAI group discovered that Trippe had procured exclusive landing rights in Cuba from the Cuban president, they sold out to

ACoAs (Trippe's group). Thus, Florida Airways, PAAI, and ACoAs merged under the holding company of ACoAs, whose subsidiary, called Pan American Airways, was headed by Trippe. In July of 1927, the ACoA subsidiary, PAA, was awarded the Key West–Havana airmail contract.

Daley and Bender and Altschul's accounts suggest that after Trippe, Hambleton, and Whitney left Colonial Air Transport, they formed Aviation Corporation of the Americas (ACoAs) on June 2, 1927. The first priority of ACoAs was to bid for the upcoming Key West–Havana airmail contract soon to be advertised by the U.S. government. As noted by Josephson, other aviation operations, such as Florida Airways (later called Atlantic, Gulf and Caribbean Airways, Inc.), as well as PAAI, showed interest in securing the soon-to-be-advertised contract. Josephson's account differs in regard to the initial formation of PAAI (of which Trippe played no part).

According to Daley and Bender and Altschul, military officer Major Henry (Hap) Arnold formed PAAI as a reaction to reading intelligence reports about *Sociedad Colombo-Alemana de Transportes Aéreos* (SCADTA). SCADTA was a recently established Austrian-owned and German operated (pilots, mechanics, and personnel) airline in Colombia. Headed by Austrian Peter von Bauer, plans had been voiced to extend the airline across the Panama Canal and into the United States in hopes of competing for U.S. airmail contracts. Alarmed by the threat posed to the Panama Canal by, what was views as, a "German-operated airline," Arnold enlisted Major Carl Spaatz, Major Jack Jouett, John Montgomery, Richard D. Bevier, and George Grant Mason into PAAI. PAAI was incorporated in March of 1927 (Bender & Altschul 1982) to bid for the soon-to-be-announced Key West–Havana U.S. airmail contract. Following this,

Montgomery petitioned the U.S. Post Office to advertise the Key West–Havana route, which PAAI secured on July 16, 1927 (Daley, 1980). The contract stated the commencement of airmail for October 19, 1927, but this proved to be difficult for PAAI to realize given that they did not own any planes.

Because of the lack of resources of the three organizations bidding for the airmail contract, the U.S. Postmaster forced PAAI, Florida Airways (which Daley referred to as *Atlantic, Gulf and Caribbean Airways, Inc.*), and ACoA to merge (Bender & Altschul 1982). ACoA was said to hold exclusive landing rights in Cuba (Bender & Altschul, 1982) and swallowed Florida Airways (Daley, 1980). PAAI held the airmail contract granted by the U.S. government but owned no planes and no landing rights in Cuba. ACoA retained control of the merged organizations, and Trippe was elected president and managing editor of its subsidiary, PAA (Bender & Altschul, 1982; Daley, 1980).

The histories of PAA each emphasize the early aviation activities of Trippe as well as his role in the formation of PAA. While Daley and Bender and Altschul mentioned the role of Hap Arnold, as well as the German-owned and -operated airline (SCADTA), as influencing the startup of PAA, Turner makes reference to SCADTA only in a general sense and not as a particular threat to the Panama Canal or to U.S. security. Instead, he (1976: 17) notes that in South America in the 1920s “both Germany and France, through their respective national carriers or other channels, had been active in this field.” Several carriers are mentioned, including “another German-backed company . . . SCADTA.” What is worth noting is that all the histories largely emphasize the role played by Trippe.

### *7.3.1.3 Where Does the Author of Each History Begin Their Story of the History of PAA*

I suggest that what each author of the popular histories of PAA marks as the *beginning* of their story is a socio-construction that prematurely serves to highlight Trippe as the founder of PAA. Each begin their histories with an explicit focus on Trippe's personal past. For example, Josephson begins his history of PAA by describing Trippe in his youth and his early interest in the viability of flying. Turner, likewise, devotes the beginning of his book to Trippe and his far-sighted aspirations in the field of aviation. Daley describes Trippe in his youth, followed by his early aviation ventures in Colonial Air Transport. Perhaps the most intense scrutiny on the life of Trippe is done by Bender and Altschul. Following a discussion of the post-WWII aviation regulation that features Trippe, Trippe's family is discussed going back three generations. In the second chapter of their history, Bender and Altschul describe Trippe's life at Yale, followed by an illustration of the prospects of aviation in the United States after World War I. This overt focus on Trippe, which consistently describe his heroic and pioneering acts, by each historian in the beginning of their histories of PAA is surprising, especially given that both Daley and Bender and Altschul explicitly acknowledge Hap Arnold as the founder of PAA through establishing PAAI.

### *7.3.2 Alternative Published Accounts of the Founding of PAA*

Alternative published accounts that describe the founding of PAA largely mirror the stories told above, where Trippe is unquestioningly portrayed as its founder (Berg, 1998; Fortune, 1936; Lindbergh, 1977; Ross, 1968;). The only known popular reference that counters the accepted version of Trippe as the founder is a story published in a

magazine called *Aeroplane* in October of 1967. This account serves to pluralize the story of the founding of PAA. Entitled “How It All Began,” the article explains the founding of PAA by suggesting that “Nobody is quite sure when Pan Am originated. On March 14, 1927, a company was formed with the name Pan American Airways, founder John Montgomery having been inspired by previous unsuccessful efforts of pioneer Paul von Bauer to open a mail service southward from Florida to Central America” (*Aeroplane*, 1967). Because ANTi-History suggests that an effective manner of pluralizing history is through contextualizing it, we now turn to a (re)assembly of the actor-networks who were involved in constructing the story of founding of PAA told in Daley’s and Bender and Altschul’s texts.

### ***7.3.3 (Re)assembling the Founding of PAA***

Our discussion concerning the founding of PAA has focused, thus far, on the way in which the start-up of PAA is described in the popular realm, including published histories of PAA, magazine articles, and books that feature related stories but mention the founding of PAA. In this section, I continue to (re)assemble the story of the founding of PAA by following the socio-politics of actor-networks from the PAA archive, focusing on the years 1969 through 1982. It should be stressed that these actors were directly involved in crafting what came to be known as Robert Daley’s history, as well as indirectly involved in influencing Bender and Altschul’s history. The actor-networks followed in this section were active in the construction of many historical traces used by Daley and made public after the publication his history. Bender and Altschul eventually drew upon the recently made public materials to construct their history.

### *7.3.3.1 Following the Actors and the Lack of Historical Traces*

My (re)assembly of the founding begins by following what appeared as the earliest archival trace (Langewiesche, 1969b) of the story pertaining to the founding of PAA. What is curious about the trace is its relatively late date and its subject. Given that the popular histories of PAA consistently describe the start-up of PAA in 1927 and the first trace pertinent to the start-up of PAA is 1969, this indicates a lack of traces for that period. Interestingly, the subject of the historical trace is a letter from Langewiesche to Lindbergh, in which Langewiesche expresses his difficulties in locating materials pertaining to the earliest part of the company's history (Langewiesche, 1969b).

In 1969, Langewiesche (1969c) continually expressed his frustrations to Lindbergh concerning writing the story of the founding of PAA. He stressed that for “the earliest years and Mr. Trippe’s pre PanAm career no sources exist. For others, Mr. Trippe was the only one who knew, or who acted, or who was present... There are some points in which independent sources contradicted Mr. Trippe’s view” (Langewiesche, 1969c). Furthermore Langewiesche described to Lindbergh that his reliance on alternative sources, such as PAA’s founders, were also futile. In one instance, a PAA founder shared with Langewiesche that “Of course the true story can not [*sic*] be printed.” Concerning the events of 1927, Trippe suggested that the story would “blow PanAm right out to the water” (Langewiesche, 1969c). Langewiesche concluded his letter to Lindbergh by suggesting that there may be “dynamite around which even now I don’t know about” and expressed his concern that a documented or a fully referenced history of PAA (as opposed to one without references) was impossible.

Though the lack of historical traces in the PAA archive concerning the story of the founding of PAA was striking, in 1970 mention was made of a set of manuscripts “which reflects Mr. Trippe’s personal account of some of the most critical points in the company’s history, particularly in the pre-Pan Am and early Pan Am years” (Leslie, 1970e). John Leslie, who eventually took on the history project of PAA after the counterenrollment of Langewiesche (Leslie, 1970b), noted to Najeeb Halaby (PAA senior manager) that these manuscripts concerned that which “Mr. Trippe and Mr. Langewiesche could never reach agreement” (Leslie, 1970e). Unfortunately, the whereabouts of these manuscripts is unknown.

#### *7.3.3.2 Following the Actors Around*

Leslie’s enrollment onto the PAA history project prompted me to follow him (as well as other relevant actors) around, in and out of the archive (i.e., I searched for traces from other sources: books, libraries, etc). In the years after his enrollment (1970) onto the cause of writing PAA’s history, Leslie engaged in numerous socio-politics (Durepos, Mills et al., 2008) to (re)assemble the history of PAA; writing to many PAA actors asking for documentation from the early years (1926–1931) of PAA (Leslie, 1971s). As we have already seen, he collaborated with actors such as Wesley Newton (Leslie, 1971g) and Ione Wright (Leslie, 1971a). In a letter from Ione Wright to Leslie in 1971, Wright spoke on behalf of one of her colleagues (Wesley Newton) and expressed gratitude for the earlier help from Lindbergh in clarifying “that part of Pan Am’s early history in which he [Lindbergh] played such an important role” (Wright, 1971b). It can be assumed that Newton, who was a history professor at Auburn University with an

interest in Latin American early aviation, relied on insights from Lindbergh to write *The Perilous Sky* published in 1978.

It is interesting that Newton relied on Lindbergh to write about early aviation in Latin American and PAA's role. This is because on the basis of Lindbergh's (1970) wartime journals, the extent of Lindbergh's personal and intimate recollections of the start-up of PAA is questionable. In an entry dated June 12, 1939, Lindbergh wrote of a conversation that he had shared with Hap Arnold and Spaatz in which they told him "of some early Pan American Airways history with which I had not been previously acquainted" (Lindbergh, 1970: 212). Lindbergh described Arnold as alarmed after reading army intelligence reports of von Bauer's plans to extend his German-owned SCADTA airline to the Panama Canal and onward into the United States. Lindbergh (1970) wrote that Arnold and Spaatz then organized PAAI on the basis of advice from the Postmaster General New to counter von Bauer's efforts. Thus, it can be assumed that Lindbergh's insights concerning the founding of PAA were entirely based on Arnold's account.

#### *7.3.3.3 Newton is Enrolled: Initiating the (Re)Assembly of the Founding of PAA*

In 1971, the correspondence between Leslie and Newton grew frequent because of their mutual interest in the startup of PAA (Leslie, 1971g). Upon reading manuscripts gathered for him by Ione Wright, Leslie probed Newton to clarify the meaning of a sentence taken from his dissertation (Newton, no date) that stated "United States Army Air Service effort failed, however, to promote an airline as the wedge for American aerial dominance around the Canal" (Leslie, 1971g). In his letter to Newton, Leslie illustrated

his awareness of the “reputed fact that *Hap* Arnold, Ira Eaker, Jack Jouett and Captain J. K. Montgomery were prompted by von Bauer efforts to study the formation of a U. S.-flag airline” but specified that he had “never found [this version of the startup of PAA] documented” (Leslie, 1971g). Intending to clarify this version of the founding of PAA, Leslie conversed with Trippe, who “did not seem to be aware of the Arnold part of the story and could not shed any more light on it” (Leslie, 1971k).

Newton eventually answered Leslie in 1971 with two letters that spoke of some disagreements concerning the founding of PAA, which he had come across while conducting research at the Diplomatic Branch of the National Archives. Interestingly, Newton’s (1971b) letter to Leslie was based mostly on quotes from Arnold’s (1949) *Global Mission* as well as materials from the National Archives. Newton wrote that in the mid-1920s, many European aviation operations in Latin America were perceived as a menace to the Panama Canal, SCADTA included. In 1925 and 1926, von Bauer made several trips to the United States to negotiate an airmail contract, and while there, he was interviewed by Arnold, who perceived SCADTA as a threat to the Panama Canal and U.S. aviation interests. Arnold felt von Bauer’s efforts to fly into the United States should be blocked. Newton (1971b, 1971c) , in his letters, quoted Arnold (1949) who supported the story that Arnold came up with a plan to counter that of von Bauer’s, by organizing an aviation operation called PAAI to bid for an upcoming U.S. airmail contract for service between Key West and Havana. The PAAI plan materialized, and was chartered in March of 1927. It was organized by military men Hap Arnold, Jack Jouett, and Montgomery and financed by R. B. Bevier, Montgomery, and Grant Mason. PAAI secured the airmail contract in July of 1927. In the summer of 1927, Arnold,

Spatz, and Montgomery contemplated leaving the military to dedicate their full attention to PAAI, but in July of 1927, PAAI was forced to make “concessions to the rival airlines,” (viz. Florida Airways and Juan Trippe’s group) in terms of merging their operations if they wished to keep the Key West–Havana airmail contract (Newton, 1971c). Newton (1971c) went on to write that Arnold and Spatz as well as Jouett got embroiled in the Billy Mitchell affair and, because they could not leave the military with honor, pulled out of PAAI. Newton (1967) had written an article in 1967 explaining that General William (“Billy”) Mitchell’s court-martial in 1925 was due to, among other things, his accusations of criminal negligence waged against the U.S. War Department. Mitchell had warned the U.S. War Department of the threat posed by foreign airlines situated in Latin America operating close to the Panama Canal, of which he apparently referred specifically to SCADTA.

Now aware of the relevant stories in Arnold’s (1949) *Global Mission*, Leslie (Leslie, 1971h) showed them to Trippe who confirmed “that they coincide with [Trippe’s] general recollection,” but Leslie expressed that he was still unsatisfied with his “knowledge concerning the ‘three Groups’ which were brought together to form the Aviation Corp. of the Americas” (Leslie, 1971h). This encouraged Leslie to dig further. Throughout the 1970s until 1976, Leslie continued to play a vital role in developing a corporate-funded history of PAA.

#### 7.3.3.4 Hap Arnold Establishes PAA as a Reaction to SCADTA

In Hap Arnold’s personal papers, located in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, it is stated that Arnold “Obtained air mail charter from the

postmaster general and organized Pan American Airways [Incorporated] with Carl Spaatz, Jack Jouett, and John Montgomery” (Library of Congress, 1999). The papers coincide with Arnold’s (1949) *Global Mission* as well as Newton’s interpretation with the story of the founding of PAA. Interestingly, Arnold (1949: 115) acknowledged the existence of alternative popular stories concerning the founding of PAA: “It is not generally realized that that great international air line, Pan American Airways, was not started by any rich and powerful business combine but actually was founded by three young army officers and one ex-Navy officer without a dime between them. In a sense, the formation of Pan American Airways turned out to be the first countermeasure the United States ever took against Nazi Germany.” He went on to stress that PAAI was established because Postmaster General New would have otherwise been forced to award the Key West–Havana airmail contract to von Bauer and SCADTA. Arnold (1949: 201) stressed that when “Von Bauer arrived in Washington, he could not get the air-mail contract, and (after our paper Pan American Airways had forestalled him), gave up the idea.” Arnold’s (1949: 201) mention of “our paper Pan American Airways” refers to his own and his military colleagues initiative to set up PAAI to counter von Bauer’s efforts.

#### *7.3.3.5 van Dusen Is Enrolled: Continuing the (Re)assembly of the Founding of PAA*

In the late summer of 1971, Leslie hired PAA’s retired publicity officer, William van Dusen, to conduct research on Captain John K. Montgomery (Leslie, 1971j). Montgomery’s name had provoked Leslie’s curiosity because of its frequent mention in Leslie’s and Newton’s correspondence. van Dusen assured Leslie that the “details on his [Montgomery] personal life background are sketchy at best” but that he remembered an

early trip made by Montgomery to New York to promote “a Pan American Airways” (van Dusen, 1971b). Nonetheless, in the summer of 1972 van Dusen produced a document explaining Montgomery’s role in the founding of PAAI (van Dusen, 1972c). van Dusen (1972c) largely reiterated the story told in Arnold’s (1949) *Global Mission*. He stressed that “Captain John K. ‘Johnny’ Montgomery was a principal in the cast of the original Pan American, Inc... Montgomery arrived just in time... ‘The Germans’ (SCADTA) were offering to fly U.S. mail to the Canal Zone and South America” (van Dusen, 1972c).

At the same time, Leslie (1972l) wrote to the senior VP of Government Affairs (Hittle, 1972a) to gather more insight about Montgomery but stressed that he did not wish for his inquiry to “attract undue attention or revival of old skeletons.” Leslie eventually received a letter from James D. Hittle suggesting that the “information has been hard to come by” (Hittle, 1972b) but that his assistant had gathered some records. Though Montgomery was suggested as “having been in Pan American Airways 1927–1928” (Cresswell, 1972), other searches at the National Personnel Records Center were “unable to find any record at Captain Montgomery, wether [sic] in Official Army Registers, in the publication, U.S. Naval Aviation, 1910–1970, or in the index to our Air Force Library Collection” (Ryan, 1972). For reasons unknown, Leslie (1972m) eventually terminated his search for details concerning Montgomery’s role in the founding of PAAI.

#### 7.3.3.6 *The Socio-Politics of Newton and Leslie*

One reason explaining Newton’s extensive correspondence with Leslie between 1971 and 1972 was the insight it offered to Newton, who was engaged in writing a

manuscript on aviation in Latin America (Newton, 1978). In the summer of 1972, Newton (1972c) sent six pages of the manuscript to Leslie for verification. Research for the manuscript relied on many sources, including, but not limited to, correspondence with Leslie, Josephson's (1943b) history, and the H.H. Arnold papers in the Library of Congress (Newton, 1972c). The founding of PAA described by Newton in the draft pages is similar to the story of PAA's founding mentioned in the previous correspondence between him and Leslie. Nonetheless, Leslie was asked by Newton (1972c) to verify the accuracy of a specific detail concerning the founding of PAA whereby Trippe "played a trump" and "secured from the Machado government exclusive landing rights in Cuba." Newton (1972c) revealed that he had been "unable to locate in primary sources available to me confirmation or denial of the statement." As a response to Newton, Leslie (1972f) expressed that the specific question raised by Newton "continues to trouble me also." Leslie (1972f) continued by saying that he had not "been able to find any primary evidence that Mr. Trippe obtained exclusive landing rights in Cuba from General Machado." Newton (1972b) replied to Leslie in stating that his explanation that Trippe retained exclusive landing rights in Cuba, prior to the ACoA acquisition of PAA and Florida Airways, was based on Matthew Josephson's (1943b) *Empire of the Air*. Expressing his desire to clarify the story, and unable to do so by consulting Josephson's (1943b) unreferenced book, Newton (1972b) asked Leslie "to show Josephson's statement to Mr. Trippe and ask him what exactly did occur." Newton (1972b) suggested that "Mr. Trippe, of course, would be the best of all possible sources in this matter." It is unknown whether Leslie ever verified the events by consulting Trippe.

### *7.3.3.7 The Socio-Politics of van Dusen and Leslie*

Persistently seeking to clarify the founding of PAA, Leslie continued his correspondence with van Dusen and Newton, as well as other actors, throughout 1972. In the latter part of 1972, van Dusen provided Leslie with insight concerning the nature of the start up of PAA as well as some reasons why there is little documentation in the corporate records at PAA pertaining to this period. van Dusen suggested (Leslie, 1972k) that “records weren’t very important in those days” and stressed that in the early days at PAA the need for documenting processes and minutes of meetings were largely overshadowed by the busy activities of the founders (van Dusen, 1972a). Van Dusen (1972a) explained “there were times when we had hardly gotten the minutes of the last month’s meeting composed to meet the needs of the upcoming session. Sometimes we had to invent: our cause depended more upon sympathetic understanding than it did on truth in the absolute!”

In an interview with van Dusen by Leslie (1972k), the start-up of PAA was explained though it is unsure which sources van Dusen relied upon to do so. According to van Dusen (Leslie, 1972k), PAAI (Hoyt, Arnold, Montgomery, Mason and Bevier) procured the Key West–Havana airmail contract but had no financing; neither did they own planes. Thus, the PAAI group began negotiating with the Trippe and Whitney group (ACoA), which had funding but no U.S. airmail contract. Because Florida Airways (Chambers) also had capital and was interested in the Cuba contract, they were brought into the negotiations. Hoyt, of the original PAAI, offered to split the airmail contract three ways, a suggestion that would require each group to invest \$300,000. In the

interview (Leslie, 1972k), van Dusen noted that Trippe then showed the two groups his exclusive Cuban landing rights, granted to him by the Machado government in 1925. When Leslie told van Dusen that he had no “record of any landing rights of traffic rights that he [Trippe] got in 1925,” van Dusen answered that he thought he could “dig out that story.” However, van Dusen (Leslie, 1972k) continued in saying that he had done “a lot of digging at the time in order to get the facts straight in case something happened. The story you [Leslie] tell is the one that got told—I [van Dusen] didn’t tell it originally—but it sounded so good that we stuck with it. But it couldn’t be farther from the facts.” To confirm that Trippe’s procurement of exclusive landing rights in Cuba from the Machado government was a fabricated story, Leslie (1972k) said to van Dusen: “There wasn’t any such thing?”, to which van Dusen replied: “No” but offered to “go and dig” for what really happened. van Dusen finished the interview (Leslie, 1972k) with Leslie by offering some insight explaining Trippe’s signature as president on the annual reports of the company from 1929, 1930, and 1931. van Dusen stated that there “was no Pan American Airways System and Juan was not president of anything! ... Apparently, the board and the chairman were apparently (sic) willing to have him publish the annual reports this way” (Leslie, 1972k).

van Dusen eventually followed up in an effort to clarify the story concerning Trippe’s acquisition of exclusive landing rights in Cuba in 1925. Calling the popular version an “early anecdote,” van Dusen suggested that the story had “served a useful purpose at the time, didn’t really hurt anybody, and we never bothered to set the record straight” (van Dusen, 1972b). van Dusen (1972b) went on to offer a more complex story in which he suggested that what Trippe’s group had arranged for in Cuba was the

permission (though not exclusive) to use the Havana military airport, waivers of taxes, and customs and immigration services (Leslie, 1972b).

#### 7.3.3.8 *More Socio-Politics From Newton and Leslie*

In mid-December of 1972, Leslie (1972b) relayed van Dusen's insights to Newton. Newton's and Leslie's correspondence persisted throughout 1973. Newton (1973) sent a second set of drafts of his *Perilous Sky* manuscript for Leslie's verification. Relying largely on the story of the start-up of PAA conveyed to him through his correspondence with Leslie, the story told in Newton's manuscripts was consistent with that of Leslie and van Dusen. Newton's story of the start-up of PAA, which was eventually published in 1978 in *The Perilous Sky* relied on correspondence with Leslie (1973a, 1973b), materials from the H. Arnold papers, and Matthew Josephson's (1943b) "unauthorized" (Bender & Altschul, 1982: 526) history of PAA.

In it, Newton (1978) offered a nuanced explanation of PAA's start-up by contextualizing the role of foreign aviation groups operating in Latin America and the resulting fear caused in the U.S. military. The issue was always whether foreigners would be allowed to operate over the Panama Canal Zone. Newton stressed SCADTA as one of many aviation operations in Latin America. *The Perilous Sky* offers a more detailed (though it is consistent with Daley's book, which relied on Leslie's socio-politics) explanation of the founding of PAA and describes the threat posed by von Bauer, and Arnold's efforts to stop him by forming an airline that he called Pan American Airways (Incorporated). Newton discussed the U.S. postmaster's awarding of the Key West-Havana airmail contract to PAAI but stated that this group was forced to merge

operations with other interested groups, including the financially sound ACoA (Trippe's group) and Florida Airways. Also mentioned in his account is the story concerning Trippe's acquisition of exclusive Cuban Landing rights in 1925. Newton suggests that Trippe used his possession of the exclusive landing rights for ACoA to retain control of the merged operations and secure his role as managing director of its subsidiary, PAA.

#### *7.3.3.9 Leslie Attempts to Craft a History of PAA*

In 1975, one year before Daley was enrolled to write the history of PAA, Leslie produced a lengthy manuscript of the history of PAA. Leslie's history (1975c) began with a section focused on Latin America, but according to me, the draft manuscript is difficult to follow because of missing pages and confusing storytelling. Nonetheless, Leslie (1975c: 2) tried to tell a story of how "the civil aviation pioneers, banded together under the Pan American house flag, who dreamed of conquering a sea which would unite mankind rather than divide it as the waters for so long had done—a sea of air." Leslie emphasized the roles played by Juan Trippe of ACoA and what he called Hoyt's group, thus the original PAAI, of which no mention is made of Hap Arnold. He described the story of the merger of ACoA, PAAI, and Florida Airways consistently with Newton's account but does not mention the role of SCADTA, von Bauer, and the threat posed to the Panama Canal by the foreign airlines stationed in Latin America. Though Leslie's manuscript was not published, parts of it were used by Robert Daley when he took over the history project in 1976.

### 7.3.3.10 The 'Bounding' and 'Punctuation' of Popular Histories of PAA

Robert Daley, in effect, took over the history project from John Leslie in 1976 (Daley, 1976) and eventually published a founder-funded history of PAA in 1980. Bender and Altschul relied on the same research used to craft Daley's history. Perhaps it is of no surprise that the two histories are largely similar in terms of the story told concerning the founding of PAA. Nonetheless, following the socio-politics of the actors directly involved in the construction of Daley's history, as well as indirectly involved in the craft of Bender and Altschul's history, has allowed us to (re)assemble the constitution of the two histories and to contextualize the conditions of creation of the popular histories of PAA. It has shed light on the process by which the histories punctuated, thus the process in which the actors' involved in the craft of each history were able to align their interests through numerous socio-politics and form a network that was able to act as *one*. The punctuation of history usually leads to the concealment of the many socio-politics that gave rise to that history. (Re)assembling the socio-politics of the popular histories of focus has allowed us to illustrate their socio-political conditions of creation and illustrate them as socio-constructions.

Though the details concerning the founding of PAA in Josephson's and Turner's history of PAA are somewhat at odds with Daley's and Bender and Altschul's, the four histories are *bounded* similarly. That is, in each history, Trippe's personal past is the focus, as each author constructs and marks it as the beginning of the airline's history. Following the actors around has illustrated the *bounding* of each history as the historians' active, interest-driven construction. This means is that the historian actively decided where to impose a beginning onto a story based on the nature of the tale to tell.

## **7.4 Discussion of ANTi-History Themes Highlighted Through the Exemplar of PAA**

In the following section is a discussion of the PAA exemplar through select facets of ANTi-History.

### ***7.4.1 Disturbing the Ontological Priority Unquestioningly Associated With History***

The amodern ontological assumptions that inform ANTi-History have many implications for the way histories are crafted. One notable implication involves disturbing the ontological priority unquestioningly associated with history. It has been noted that, in the modernist condition, realism as an ontological approach has been prominently used to craft history (see chapter 3), and the consequence has been the assumption that the *social world* exists in hard, tangible form and independently of our mental appreciation of it (Crotty, 2005; Jenkins, 1995). The related claim has been that it exists in a singular form; thus there is one social world. The task of the historian in a modernist condition has been to accurately represent that social world, to create knowledge of the past (history) that accurately mirrors the socio-past. The most problematic consequence of modernist renditions of history has been historians' tendency to conflate *history* and *past*, where the two concepts have been assumed to be one and the same. These assumptions lead the modernist historians to create one history, which is said to represent the socio-past. The creation of one account of the past and the unquestioned acceptance of that account as accurate leads the researcher to privilege one account of history.

ANTI-History is based on an amodern ontology that is anti-realist and it seeks not only to deprivilege dominant accounts of history but also to question the realist ontological assumptions that allow for certain accounts to be privileged as *truth*. ANTI-History assumes that the social world exists largely through one's mental appreciation of it and that history is socially constructed through the socio-politics of actor-networks. This suggests that the actors involved in the craft of history may have various conceptions of the socio-past, each having apprehended their conception of it at various points in time and situated in varying contexts. As actors engage and negotiate history, each illustrates his or her version of the past. Following the socio-politics of the actor-networks engaged in Daley's, Bender and Altschul's, and Turner's history of PAA has illustrated the socio-constructed nature of these histories. This is seen through the negotiations of John Leslie with Wesley Newton, and John Leslie with van Dusen, as well as others. Through these actors' negotiations of their knowledge of the past, they constructed historical traces that were later used by Daley as well as by Bender and Altschul to construct history. Illustrating actor-networks in negotiating their past into story of the past (history) questions the viability of the socio-past as existing independently of an actor-network's conception of the past.

#### ***7.4.2 A Simultaneous Addressing and Problematization of the 'Past' and 'History'***

Ascribing to amodern ontological assumptions, ANTI-History refutes ontological realism as a viable means by which to craft history. This means that ANTI-History understands that aspiring to create knowledge of the past that accurately mirrors the past is untenable. As with postmodern scholars, ANTI-History seeks to disassociate the past from

history, in which the *past* is assumed as all that has occurred prior to our present condition and *history* refers to our knowledge of the past. Furthermore, because our knowledge of the past is just that, we cannot assume it as standing in for the *past*. This denies the role of the historian, who is actively involved and influences the construction of knowledge of the past. It denies that the historian interprets orders and (re)assembles traces of the past based on her situated conventions to give the reader an interpretation of the past.

The distinction between *past* and *history* is illustrated through the many socio-politics of the actor-networks engaged in crafting the history of PAA. No actor could offer the *past*, because the past is already gone. What each offered were recollections of the past based on, in some instances, historical traces and in other instances memory, which was collectively assembled into history. For example, Lindbergh suggested that his knowledge of the early past of PAA was based on a conversation he had with Arnold, while Newton's knowledge of the past of PAA was informed by Lindbergh and the Arnold papers. In turn, Leslie's knowledge of the early past of PAA was informed by Newton and van Dusen, who each based their insights on Arnold. In a related vein, all of the stories told concerning *Trippe's acquisition of exclusive Cuban landing rights* are based on Josephson's history of PAA, which van Dusen suggested as a fabrication. This raises the question concerning the viability of privileging one version of knowledge of the past, and, if so, on the basis of what criteria?

#### ***7.4.3 Folding as opposed to Progressive Explanation of History***

Another consequence of adopting a modern ontological assumptions is an understanding of the changing nature of the socio-past through a process of folding. This is

best explained through a comparison of progressive notions of history. Progressive notions of history assume that the socio-past goes through a series of transformations, each state better than the previous, toward an ultimate better end state. Progressive views of history see one state as arising out of the previous state but understand each successive social state as separate from one another, as separate entities that can be depicted in a linear fashion. Progressive explanations of history are problematized by ANTi-History, which views past social changes through a process of folding. Using ANTi-History, the constitution of the socio-past is understood as enveloping all of its prior conditions so that the new envelops the old, the old gets folded into the new. This means that the period of time of interest and under question is understood as an effect of all previous periods; it is understood as enveloping all previous periods.

Through using ANTi-History and drawing on this theorization of changes in the socio-past, the representation of the *beginning*, or *founding* of PAA as a *naturalized* and taken-for-granted aspect of this organization's history is problematized. Each of the histories of PAA told a story of the *founding* of PAA. In each of these popular histories a beginning of PAA is marked that in some senses denies the contextual preconditions that were in place and allowed for this specific *founding* of PAA. Crafting history that acknowledges changes in the socio-past through a process of folding denaturalizes *beginnings* and *ends* in history by suggesting that the *founding* of PAA is one instance of the socio-past that envelops all of its previous instances. Thus, creating knowledge of the past by understanding changes in the socio-past through folding questions the demarcation of *beginnings* and *ends* and illustrates them as socially constructed.

#### **7.4.4 Relational Approach—No Beginning and No Last Instances, Process of Becoming**

Related to folding is the emphasis in ANTi-History on fostering a relational understanding of the socio-past. Instead of focusing on the constitution of a *state*, such as a *beginning* or *end*, ANTi-History looks relationally to understand how one given *state* is altered and transformed into the next. ANTi-History focuses attention on what occurs *in between states* to understand how one becomes the other. Adopting a relational lens allows for the further problematization of *beginnings* and *ends* in history, to show these as demarcations that are imposed by the historian to order a tale. ANTi-History as an approach assumes that the actor-networks that constitute a socio-past are never sewn up, unchanging, or immutable and immobile.

This relational view of history is at odds with how the popular histories of PAA were constructed. In each the historian was active in imposing a *beginning* in at least two ways. First, each was active in the choice of where to begin his story of PAA but made no mention to the reader that the choice was entirely their own or influenced by the traces upon which each relied. For example, each began with an explicit focus on Trippe's personal life. The decision of the historians to focus on Trippe was an active and interest-driven choice, made in an effort to bound (or bind) the story of PAA in a way that would highlight his role as the founder. Second, the historian was active in deciding how to tell the story of the *founding* of PAA. Each historian was active in ordering the story by marking and flavoring one instance of the socio-past of PAA its *startup*. Depending on which history one reads, the *start-up* of PAA differs. For example, Josephson described the startup of PAA without mention of actors Hap Arnold or SCADTA, Turner mentioned SCADTA but not Arnold, and no

connection is made between the two. Daley (1980) and Bender and Altschul (1982) mentioned the influence of SCADTA, Hap Arnold and von Bauer.

ANTI-History stresses that the ordering of the performativities of the actor-networks into a history does not represent an end state. Also, I must stress that I assume the (re)assembly of the socio-past found in this dissertation as precarious, uncertain, and at the risk of being (re)figured or (re)assembled by a reader who reads-in the history in a manner influenced by their interests.

#### ***7.4.5 Knowledge of the Past as Socially Constructed***

Knowledge of the past, and our understanding of the past that is construed on the basis of that knowledge, is reliant upon the activities and interactions of social actors as they navigate their social terrain. ANTi-History assumes that knowledge of the past grows out of a social context and cannot be understood as divorced from that social context. The PAA exemplar illustrates this point well, in that the knowledge of the past that was eventually used by both Daley and Bender and Altschul to craft their histories was negotiated and constructed out of the collective efforts of social actors, including Langewiesche, Lindbergh, Trippe, Leslie, Wright, Newton, and van Dusen. When involved in the craft of knowledge of the past pertaining to *the three groups that merged to form ACoA and created the subsidiary called PAA*, Leslie consulted van Dusen and Newton. Newton, prior to being consulted by Leslie, had sought alternative references, such as the Arnold Papers at the National Archive. Knowledge of the past of PAA was socially constructed, in that these actors were active not only in constructing knowledge but also in infusing it with meaning by actively reading PAA documentation, interpreting those historical traces as well as making sense of them in

light of alternative historical traces. These actors constructed meaning out of the historical traces and did so as informed through their situated contextual background.

#### ***7.4.6 Activistic Nature of Historical Knowledge***

ANTI-History assumes that knowledge of the past is activistic. Thus, knowledge of the past or history, according to ANTi-History is not something actors *have* (it is not embrained) but is something actors *do*. History can not be divorced from the activities that gave rise to it and it is subject to the socio-politics of actor-networks. Actor-networks negotiate their past through endless politicking and, if successful in network building, may eventually delegate their task to a material actor such as a *history text*. Leslie's engagement with actors, including van Dusen and Newton, as well as Wright, illustrates the activism inherent in knowledge construction. For example, Leslie and Newton corresponded to flesh out the *founding* of PAA. At one point, Newton asked Leslie if he could clarify the situation concerning *Trippe's acquisition of exclusive Cuban landing rights*, which prompted Leslie to then consult van Dusen. The PAA exemplar illustrates at least one instance in which the activities of the actors involved were successful in network building in that Daley delegated the task of telling the history of PAA to a material actor.

#### ***7.4.7 Communal, Distributed and Partial Nature of Historical Knowledge***

ANTI-History assumes historical knowledge as *communal*, *distributed*, and *partial*. This implies that the act of *knowing the past* cannot be understood as cognitive or embrained within one individual mind. Instead, it must be understood as dispersed,

distributed, and shared throughout a collective of situated actors. Distinct ways of *knowing* the past are each understood through the collective activities of communities. ANTi-History calls the collectives that give rise to specific ways of knowing the past, actor-networks. Each of the actors engaged in writing the PAA histories was engaged with another actor or each other to negotiate and construct the past of PAA, but each of the actor's knowledge of PAA was partial in that each knew only *a part* of the story of PAA but none knew the story in its *entirety*. For example, to (re)assemble the story of Trippe's acquisition of exclusive Cuban landing rights, Newton drew on Leslie, who consulted van Dusen. Though each had heard of the story, van Dusen illustrated that he knew more of the details of this story than the other actors. Thus, part of the tale was known to each actor (each actor had *partial* knowledge), and knowledge of each tale was distributed across actors.

#### ***7.4.8 Knowledge of the Past as Situated and Positioned***

ANTi-History stresses that all knowledge of the past is *situated* and *positioned*. ANTi-History assumes that all *knowledge of the past* is an effect of the socio-politics of actor-networks, and the manner that the past comes to be known by an actor-network is influenced by the specific circumstances of its time and place. An example of this is given by contrasting the various histories. As has been noted the description of the initial start-up of PAA are at odds. For example, two of the histories stress Arnold and SCADTA's role in influencing the start-up of PAA and each were dependent on Arnold's *Global Mission* as well as his public papers at the National Archive. Though it is not known when Arnold's papers were made public, it can be inferred that perhaps Josephson

(1943b) made no mention of Arnold in his recollection of the founding of PAA due to the fact that Arnold's 1949 *Global Mission* had not yet been published. This illustrates that history, or knowledge of the past, is directly affected by the resources and alternative knowledge of a given time and place, as well as the socio-politics of the author.

ANTI-History assumes that ways of knowing the past are effects of actor-networks and are influenced by historical, cultural, and political factors. An example is illustrated through reference to Josephson's leftist leanings, which were publically known (Belfrage, 1973; Chomsky, 1997; Lyons, 1941; Wald, 1994; Wechler, 1954; Zinn, 1990, 1997, 1999;). It is suggested that his positioning influenced the manner in which he came to know the past of PAA as well as relay it in his text. Examples of Josephson's choice of words that have suggestive connotations include his title *Empire of the Air*, in which *empire* is used. Josephson (1943b: back jacket, my emphasis) described Trippe as "one of the twentieth century counterpart of the Vanderbilt's, Hills and Harriman's who built up—and *exploited*—the continental domain of the United States." The titles of Josephson's chapters 6 and 11 use the words *imperialist* and *barons*, respectively, to describe Trippe's aviation activities. These words were specifically selected by Josephson (1943b), and their connotations evoke a particular image of Trippe and PAA that are somewhat critical of capitalism and thus of Trippe's activities as an entrepreneur. Thus, it may be surmised that Josephson's (1943b) positioning influenced the flavoring of his history.

#### ***7.4.9 Symmetry—All Accounts Are Given the Same Curiosity***

ANTI-History recommends treating all accounts of a given socio-past with the same curiosity; so all known historical traces pertaining to the *founding* of PAA were followed and studied with the same curiosity. As I followed all of these actors, I observed each with the same initial curiosity; I considered the relevance of each trace equally prior to choosing which traces to include into my (re)assembly and which traces to continue following. This means that all *ways of knowing* the founding of the PAA, as embedded within the various historical traces that I followed, were endowed with equal initial curiosity.

#### ***7.4.10 Toward a Historiographical Approach That Legitimizes Plural Construction of History***

ANTI-History as a suggested approach to the study of the past legitimizes the plural construction of history; in that inherent in the method is an insistence on disassociating notions of the *past* from *history* and the emphasis on following the historical traces or the actors around. We can assume that there are many different *histories* based on the nature of the actor-networks involved in constructing history. Following this, it is suggested that we follow all of the traces symmetrically and understand that there is a possibility that the traces we follow will lead to invariably alternative accounts of what happened in the past.

Shifting our focus to the PAA histories, the correspondence among van Dusen, Leslie, and Newton illustrates the way in which history is invariably plural when the traces of actor-networks are followed. By following the personal letters of

correspondence between Leslie and Newton in 1972, a point of contestation concerning *Trippe's exclusive Cuban landing rights* was voiced by Newton, who, other than the mention in Josephson (1943b), could not find the story supported by alternative documentation. Consulting Leslie only supported Newton's concern of the lack of documentation. By following the actors around, and analyzing traces symmetrically, an alternative version of this story emerged through correspondence with van Dusen. Specifically, he suggested the story of *Trippe's exclusive Cuban landing rights* as fabricated and reinforced that little written documentation of the story actually exists. In this way, we can understand history as knowledge of the past that is plural. Leslie and Newton had negotiated one way in which they understood the story concerning *Trippe's exclusive Cuban landing rights*, but through consulting van Dusen (and by me following van Dusen's traces) an alternative story was voiced. It is the task of the researcher using ANTi-History to follow the actors symmetrically while giving those actors a voice. In this way, ANTi-History constructs plural histories.

#### ***7.4.11 A Priori—Do Not Begin By Assuming What You Wish to Explain/Imposing the Plot***

ANTi-History does not impose a pre-given plot to order the traces of the past, neither does it begin an historical analysis by assuming as given what that history will eventually show. Instead, ANTi-History follows the actor-networks as they engaged in socio-politics and lends voice to the actors so that the actors' motives can be heard. The consequence for doing history, by not assuming as given what we wish for the historical

analysis to show, is following the actors and letting them illustrate the constitution of the socio-past.

This facet of ANTi-History is demonstrated through the four histories of PAA. The histories are guilty of not problematizing the a priori, since they are constructed by assuming as given what they wish for their historical analysis to show. They begin their stories of the past by assuming (Trippe is the founder) what it is for their historical analysis to show (that Trippe was a key pioneer in the development of PAA). These histories in some senses confuse the story (how Trippe played a founding role) with the answer (Trippe is a key PAA pioneer).

One of the many consequences of beginning a historical analysis by assuming as given what you wish for that historical analysis to show is the craft of a type of history that is extremely *certainist*. Certainist histories are problematic in that they present a story to a reader that is *determined* and *pre-resolved*, which can give a history an air of naturalness. For example, the four popular histories of PAA are certainist in that by marking the beginning of the history of PAA with an explicit focus on Trippe's personal past, the importance of Trippe as a PAA actor is stressed from the beginning. Thus, the reader is not surprised when Trippe is suggested as the founder of PAA; neither is the reader astonished by the mention of Hap Arnold's role in the founding of PAA in at least two histories (Bender & Altschul, 1982; Daley, 1980). Though two popular histories describe Arnold as founding PAA, the author's focus on Trippe emphasizes his importance and deprivilege Arnold's role in PAA. It is suggested that the four popular histories of PAA impose a pre-ordered plot on the past traces of PAA to order it into history. Thus, if history is knowledge of the past that focuses on the constitution of the

socio-past, we cannot begin our histories by assuming the constitution of that socio-past as given.

The exclusive focus on Trippe's past personal life that is discussed in the beginning of the four popular histories points to the active hand of the interest-driven historian in *bounding* a tale. Thus, the interest-driven historian, who sought to illustrate Trippe as the founder of PAA, was active in *bounding* his and her story, marking a *beginning* and *end* in a way that would support their claim of Trippe as the founder of PAA.

#### ***7.4.12 (Re)assembling/Tracing the Associations of the Social Past/Emphasis on Performativity***

An implication for doing history using ANTi-History is an emphasis on performativity. Instead of *imposing a plot* on history ANTi-History suggests following the actors around and letting them guide the way. The socio-politics of these actors is mapped to see how the actor-networks *performed* their past, in terms of how they made sense of it, how they spoke of it (through interviews), and how they wrote of it in their attempts to write histories (Leslie, 1975; Newton, 1978). For example, I followed Newton and Leslie's 1971–1972 correspondences to see how they negotiated the early history of PAA. When the correspondence between the two actors broke off, I followed the actors by reading their respective books. I compared Newton's (1978) *The Perilous Sky* and the story it told concerning the start-up of PAA with that developed through Leslie's and Newton's correspondence. Furthermore, I consulted Leslie's unpublished

manuscript of the history of PAA, to also understand how this actor was shaped through correspondence with Newton.

#### ***7.4.13 Situatedness of Historian (Spatial, Temporal, and Ideological)***

ANTI-History assumes that all researchers are positioned historically, culturally, and ideologically and that the historian is shaped by her positioning and influences the telling of the story. An example of the situatedness of the historian influencing the story told has been mentioned through a discussion of Josephson's (1943b) history of PAA, where his knowledge of the past was suggested as positioned. Josephson, as a historian, is also positioned, historically, culturally, and ideologically. We can assume that he was influenced by the time in which he wrote and that this influence flavored the specific way in which he wrote.

#### ***7.4.14 The Historian as an Effect of an Actor-Network***

Using ANTi-History, it is suggested that researchers engage in political work on behalf of the cause of writing history, in that they build a network that will make that cause stronger. An example of this can be seen in Leslie's socio-political work. Leslie conducted interest work to capture the interest of actors such as Newton and van Dusen. Precariously aligning these interests, Leslie sought to build a network that could act as one. If we focus on Leslie as an actor, we can see him as an actor-network in that he stands as an effect of, on behalf of the series of past experiences, his trials and tribulations as a long-time vice president of PAA and dedicated actor to the PAA history project. Leslie is, himself an actor-network in that his specific constitution as an actor

was shaped by the series of associations with other actors, as an effect of how he shaped alternative actors through associating with them and conversely was himself shaped through this associations with alternative actors.

#### ***7.4.15 ANTi-History and Reflexively***

ANTi-History stresses the need for reflexivity in historical analyses and it assumes that *history* is a punctuated actor that conceals the socio-politics of its enabling actor-networks, such as the historian and her political efforts in writing the history.

### **7.5 Summary**

The empirical application of ANTi-History in this chapter focused on an examination of the depiction of the *founding* of PAA in four histories of the organization and an illustration of alternative popular published accounts. The intent was to demonstrate a (re)assembly of how the *founding* of PAA is depicted by following the actors around in and out of the archive. The need to pluralize history was stressed and the (re)assembly of the start-up of PAA was mapped to denaturalize *beginnings* and *ends* in history, by illustrating the *bounding* of history as an interest driven socio-construction. In the next chapter, I continue to (re)assemble the socio-past of PAA by following the actors involved in the PAA–SCADTA relationship.

## Chapter 8: Pluralizing Knowledge of the Socio-Past

*“Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past” (Orwell, 1989: 260)*

### 8.1 Introduction

ANTI-History is used in this chapter to pluralize history by providing an alternative account to that depicted in popular histories of the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA (Bender & Altschul 1982; Daley, 1980; Fortune, 1936; Josephson, 1943a, 1943b; Time, 1941; Turner, 1976). This is done by following the socio-politics of the actor-networks in and out of the PAA archive, to (re)assemble a contextualized story of the socio-past of the two organizations. By providing an alternative account, the craft of history is suggested as an effect of interest-driven actor-networks that are situated ideologically, spatially, and temporally. I propose that the popular histories of the two organizations are plausible because of the connotations of the words *Nazi*, *German*, and *threat*, which were situated ideologically, temporally, and spatially. Specifically, these words became related in an unproblematic way (ideological situatedness) in the immediate pre- and post-WWII period (1939 and onward; temporal situatedness) in the United States (spatial situatedness). What I suggest is that the unproblematic, communal, and normalized association of the concepts of the words worked in the favor of PAA and U.S. government officials. The manufactured *German threat* was used by the U.S. government and PAA to justify and even celebrate “delousing” SCADTA (Daley, 1980: 291; Time, 1941) of its German personnel, without sound evidence of its Nazi

infiltration. More to the point, there was little evidence at this time that there was in fact a *German threat* to the United States.

Despite PAA's rapid growth in its early years of operation (1927–1931), certain factors, including the fact that aviation technology was in its infancy and the lack of formally established aviation diplomacy, halted its capacity for expansion (Bender & Altschul, 1982; Daley, 1980; Josephson, 1943a, 1943b; Turner, 1976;:). Because of the limited flying range of planes, PAA's opportunities for extending its operations into South America depended largely on its ability to negotiate landing rights in the most northern point of South America, where planes could refuel before continuing southward. Northern expansion by the foreign-operated airline *Sociedad Colombo-Alemana de Transportes Aéreos* (SCADTA), situated in Colombia (located in the most northern part of South America), had already been attempted (Arnold, 1949; Newton, 1978). But the general sentiment of xenophobia in the United States had caused the War Department to refuse U.S. landing rights to Peter von Bauer (an Austrian citizen), the owner of SCADTA, in 1925 (Arnold, 1949; Newton, 1978). Because of this, and the tensions between Americans and Colombians over the much-contested territory of the Panama Canal, PAA's access to Colombia and, thus, South America, was blocked.

Eager to gain a foothold in the northern region of South America, particularly in Colombia, Trippe negotiated a contract in 1930 with von Bauer whereby PAA purchased a controlling portion of SCADTA stock (Newton, 1978). The PAA purchase of SCADTA shares gave the almost-bankrupt SCADTA much-needed financial resources and opened PAA's access to South America. Though the PAA–SCADTA relationship remained relatively secret from 1930 until 1939, some U.S. government officials had

been aware of the PAA–SCADTA deal at the time of the transaction (Newton, 1978; Bender & Altschul, 1982). However, with the rise of Hitler’s Nazi party in Germany and the advent of WWII, the U.S. government became alarmed at foreign and specifically *German* airlines operating close to the Panama Canal (Bender & Altschul, 1982; Newton, 1978). Though the German SCADTA personnel were naturalized Colombians and little evidence existed of Nazi infiltration in SCADTA, PAA was pressured by the U.S. government in 1941 to *delouse* SCADTA of its *German threat* (Daley, 1980). The way in which the *German threat* was constructed, depicted, and used to justify PAA’s so-called “delousing” (Daley, 1980: 291) of German SCADTA personnel in the popular histories of PAA (Bender & Altschul 1982; Josephson, 1943a, 1943b; Turner, 1976;) and alternative published accounts of PAA (Fortune, 1936; Time Magazine, 1941) is largely the focus of this chapter.

The chapter is organized in several parts. I begin with an overview of the most prominently used facets of ANTi-History. The method is then applied to pluralize the socio-past of the PAA-SCADTA relationship by illustrating what the popular histories tell of their association (Fortune, 1936; Time Magazine, 1941; etc), and by tracing the socio-politics of the actor-networks in and out of the PAA archive. In the third part of the chapter I discuss the ANTi-History themes highlighted through the exemplar of PAA.

## **8.2 Overview of the most prominently used facets of ANTi-History in Chapter 8**

The analysis used to pluralize the socio-past of the PAA–SCADTA affiliation draws on a multitude of ANTi-History facets. To begin a distinction is made between the *past* (everything that has happened before our present condition) and the *history* (our

knowledge of the past) of the PAA–SCADTA relationship. The popular histories of PAA and SCADTA are suggested as instrumental. By following the socio-politics of actor-networks, as they translate the interests of other actors, negotiate and enroll durable actors to build networks, I have been able to (re)assemble the socio-past of the PAA–SCADTA relationship, and provide an alternative history.

### **8.3 Using ANTi-History to pluralize the history of the PAA–SCADTA relationship**

I begin by recounting the version of PAA’s relationship with SCADTA in the 1930s (though Newton [1978] suggests that there is evidence that Trippe and von Bauer began early negotiations in the late 1920s) throughout the early 1940s as it is discussed in the popular histories of PAA. Specifically, I focus on what the popular histories say of the supposed initial 1930 association of PAA and SCADTA, before I go on to illustrate what is said of the relationship in the period 1939-41. Following this, alternative published accounts of the PAA-SCADTA affiliation (*Fortune*, 1936; *Time*, 1941; etc) are reviewed and discussed to show their similarity to that told in the popular histories of PAA. Again, by following the socio-politics of the actors I (re)assemble the socio-past of the PAA-SCADTA relationship by providing an alternative contextualized account.

#### ***8.3.1 Popular Histories and Their Account of PAA–SCADTA Relationship***

PAA’s relationship with SCADTA was apparently well established by 1930. According to Daley and Bender and Altschul, PAA had been founded by military men such as Hap Arnold, as a reaction to von Bauer’s (the owner of SCADTA) efforts in 1925, to expand his airline across the Panama Canal and into the United States.

SCADTA's main source of revenue was aerial surveying as well as national air postal concessions. The airline owned the Colombian post offices, set its own postal rates, and benefited from air postal sales (Bender & Altschul, 1982). SCADTA controlled all traffic rights in Colombia (Daley, 1980). However, it was not astonishing that a foreign-operated airline was well established in Colombia given that French and German airlines were quickly establishing themselves across South America in the mid-1920s (Josephson, 1943b; Turner, 1976). However, a general sentiment of resentment toward *Yankees* was evident in South America, and specifically in Colombia, partly due to the U.S. government's 1925 denial of SCADTA flying rights over the Panama Canal and landing rights in the United States.

The establishment of the Air Mail Act of 1926 did not redress the Colombian resentment towards the Americans. The Act had stipulated that all foreign aircraft required permission from the U.S. State Department to fly through U.S. airspace, including that of the Canal Zone, and that landing rights would be granted to foreign planes only if reciprocity was granted to American non-military planes (Bender & Altschul, 1982). Because of the U.S. government's blockage of SCADTA's northern expansion, PAA planes were denied access to Colombian airspace and landing rights (Josephson, 1943b). This posed a major problem for PAA. Given Colombia's location as the northernmost point of South America and the limited range of planes at the time,<sup>5</sup> PAA needed to access Colombia to land and refuel before proceeding further into South America. The denial of landing rights in Colombia blocked PAA's expansion into South America, and PAA tried to persuade the U.S. State Department to grant reciprocal

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<sup>5</sup> PAA, in common with other airlines of the day, flew planes with a range of about 300 miles before refueling.

landing rights to Colombians (Bender & Altschul, 1982). However, the fear caused by the thought of foreigners operating aircraft over the Panama Canal caused alarm in certain individuals in the U.S. State Department and Trippe's request was denied.

In the late 1920s, von Bauer's SCADTA was in desperate need of financing; one reason was to modernize its planes. Fearing bankruptcy, von Bauer offered to sell SCADTA to both *Luft Hansa* and PAA (Bender & Altschul, 1982). When Trippe showed interest in purchasing SCADTA stock, Francis White of the U.S. State Department responded favorably and showed support for the acquisition (Bender & Altschul, 1982). The PAA-SCADTA relationship would allow PAA access to Colombia and allow for PAA's expansion into South America without the need for the U.S. government to grant reciprocity to foreign aerial operations.

In 1930, Trippe paid \$1.1 million for just under 85% of SCADTA's stock (Josephson, 1943b; Daley, 1980; Bender & Altschul, 1982). Paul von Bauer was left as SCADTA's president and voted the stock on the basis of Trippe's instructions (Daley, 1980; Josephson, 1943b; Bender & Altschul, 1982) due to Colombian law which dictated that airlines be majority-Colombian owned. Because the stock was in bearer certificates, held at the Commercial National Bank in the United States, the identity of its owner was not disclosed (Bender & Altschul, 1982; Josephson, 1943b). As part of the deal, von Bauer promised to withdraw SCADTA from international skies and make special traffic agreements to PAA (Bender & Altschul, 1982). Trippe, on the other hand, appeased the U.S. government by purchasing a controlling portion of the threatening foreign airline, SCADTA (Josephson, 1943b), which granted him access to Colombia, and opened the potential for PAA's expansion into all of South America.

The popular histories of PAA stress that the PAA–SCADTA working relationship was to be kept secret, since the general sentiment toward Americans in Colombia remained one of resentment due to the earlier situation concerning control over the contested territory of the Panama Canal (Daley, 1980). Though von Bauer noted that the backlash toward SCADTA would be terrible if Colombians found out about SCADTA’s true ownership (Bender & Altschul, 1982; Daley, 1980), Trippe revealed the details of the deal to Francis White as well as others in the U.S. State Department (Bender & Altschul, 1982). The secrecy of the deal also allowed von Bauer to operate and fool Colombians of his ownership of SCADTA for nearly a decade.

#### *8.3.1.1 Popular Histories and the Manufacture of the ‘German Threat’*

According to the popular PAA histories, von Bauer continued to operate SCADTA from 1930–1939 with no intention of revealing to the Colombian government or public that he had sold majority ownership to the *gringos*. In 1937, when a Colombian law to nationalize all Colombian airlines, was passed in 1937, stipulating that all aviation companies were to be majority-Colombian managed and owned within four years (Bender & Altschul, 1982), von Bauer applied for and was granted full Colombian citizenship. According to Bender and Altschul (1982), von Bauer swore to Colombian President Santos that he owned 51% of SCADTA.

With Hitler’s rise to power in Germany in 1933, the U.S. State Department became increasingly concerned about *German* aviation companies flying so close to the Panama Canal. Those in the U.S. State Department, such as Francis White, who had known of the PAA–SCADTA affiliation, had since retired, and evidence of the PAA

acquisition of SCADTA stock was buried (Bender & Altschul, 1982). When news of PAA's majority ownership of SCADTA was finally announced in the State Department in 1939, many were furious with Trippe. It was felt that Trippe had allowed von Bauer to manage SCADTA freely, and even though von Bauer was a naturalized Colombian, some felt he acted more like a *German* (Daley, 1980; Josephson, 1943a, 1943b). Francis White later testified that he had allowed the PAA purchase of SCADTA stock based on his understanding that Trippe would *de-Germanize* the airline (Bender & Altschul, 1982). SCADTA was deemed a threat to the Panama Canal in that it employed German-born pilots, technicians, and managers (Bender & Altschul, 1982). Concerning the *German threat*, Josephson (1943b: 157) recounted a newspaper columnist of the time who wrote in an alarmist tone of "Nazi fliers being trained in our Latin American Back yard to bomb the United States, while their salaries were advanced by our own Treasury through subsidies to Pan American." Spruille Braden, the American ambassador to Colombia, was outraged at the news of PAA's ownership of SCADTA and pressured PAA to reveal the nature of SCADTA's ownership to the Colombian government. Informed by a SCADTA report by a PAA employee named Grant Mason, Braden later noted that all SCADTA pilots spoke German, and "for all anyone knew, the SCADTA pilots had already scraped out a runway in there somewhere, hand constructed bombs or smuggled in bombs. A sneak attack by SCADTA planed and pilots operating off one or another of these hidden runways could wipe out the Panama Canal with a single stroke" (Daley, 1980: 295). In March of 1939, Juan Trippe was called to the State Department and was told that it was a matter of national security that the German pilots be ousted from SCADTA (Bender & Altschul, 1982).

Though some vowed that von Bauer was anti-Nazi (Bender & Altschul, 1982), in 1936 von Bauer had been summoned to the air ministry in Berlin and approached Trippe shortly afterward to re-purchase the SCADTA stock for an attractive sum. Trippe denied the request and later testified that he did so because of his fear that the *Germans* had gotten their claws in von Bauer (Bender & Altschul, 1982; Josephson, 1943b).

Attempts to rid SCADTA of its *threatening German* personnel were riddled with problems. For one, PAA's ownership of SCADTA was not known in Colombia (Daley, 1980; Bender & Altschul, 1983). von Bauer had been awarded the Order of Boyaca (the civilian medal of honor), illustrating his esteemed standing in Colombia, and he was not eager to reveal SCADTA's true ownership (Daley, 1980), especially when SCADTA's true ownership rested in the hands of Americans. A sentiment of anti-Americanism was prominent in Colombia due to earlier activities concerning the Panama Canal. Colombians learning of the American ownership of SCADTA would cause a revocation of SCADTA airmail contracts, damage to planes due to public aggression, and even loss of life (Daley, 1980). Furthermore, the so-called German SCADTA personnel were mostly naturalized Colombians, with established lives in Colombia, having married and had children with Colombian women. Under Colombian law, the termination of SCADTA personnel would only be possible if accompanied by large severances (Daley, 1980). Trippe was not eager for PAA to absorb the cost of the severances (Bender & Altschul, 1982). Furthermore, Colombian President Santos refused the replacement of all German personnel with Americans and Colombians based on the fact that all German personnel were naturalized Colombians (Bender & Altschul, 1982). Upon being informed of SCADTA's true ownership, President Santos had furiously denounced von

Bauer's Colombian citizenship (Daley, 1980). In 1940, following the advent of WWII, President Santos finally succumbed to the *German threat* and agreed to assist PAA and the U.S. State Department in ridding SCADTA of its German personnel (Bender & Altschul, 1982; Daley, 1980) and nationalize the airline.

In 1940, a secret plan was worked out in which all German SCADTA personnel would be replaced by Americans, with little disturbance to the airlines daily operations. Encouraged and supported by PAA, an anti-Nazi press campaign was begun in Colombian newspapers in the early part of 1940 (Josephson, 1943b). PAA made efforts to influence the anti-American sentiment in Colombia by advertising news of inaugurating a nonstop trans-Caribbean flight with modernized planes in which SCADTA would benefit from acquiring modern planes (Daley, 1980; Josephson, 1943b). Meanwhile, PAA employee Bill Del Valle was sent to Colombia to monitor SCADTA (Daley, 1980) and in the United States PAA vice president Rhil began interviewing and hiring American pilots and ground crew to replace the German SCADTA personnel (Bender & Altschul, 1982). The recently hired U.S. personnel filled the new *stratoliners* (modern planes) and flew to Colombia, where they paraded as tourists until they were called in by Del Valle (Daley, 1980). On June 11, 1941, Colombian military surrounded SCADTA grounds, and all German personnel were called in for a meeting at 5 p.m. by Rhil and Del Valle and promptly fired (Bender & Altschul, 1982; Daley, 1980). Daley (1980) noted that, upon being fired, many German SCADTA personnel were stunned, and some even began to cry because they had no affiliations with Germany and Colombia was their true home. The next morning, the Americans took over operations and, according to Bender and Altschul (1982: 316), "detected borings for bomb racks and

machine guns in the interiors of the fuselage.” Though Daley noted that SCADTA employed 150 Germans out of a total workforce of 800 employees, Josephson (1943b) suggested that 75 German employees were fired on June 11, 1941. The actual cost of the severance packages varies according to which history of PAA is consulted; whereas Daley suggested that the bill amounted to \$250,000, Bender and Altschul (1982) note that PAA presented the U.S. government with a bill of nearly \$1.3 million. The U.S. government absorbed the cost.

The Colombian government had for some time expended much effort at nationalizing all aviation operations in Colombia. In the so-called de-Germanization of SCADTA, SCADTA absorbed another German-owned airline called SACO (*Servicio Aéreo Colombiano*), and the merged operation was named AVIANCA (*Aerovías del Continente Americano*). Though PAA initially held 64% of AVIANCA’s ownership, plans for transferring PAA’s stock to the Colombian government were put into place (Bender & Altschul, 1982; Josephson, 1943b).

It is certain that the popular histories of PAA illustrate SCADTA, and its employment of German personnel as a threat to the Panama Canal and the *American way of life* (Daley, 1980). The way in which the U.S. State Department’s reaction to SCADTA’s true ownership is depicted in the popular histories of PAA illustrates the United States’ fear of Germans. Josephson (1943a: 14) wrote in *The Saturday Evening Post* that “Colombian citizens with names like Hans Schmidt flew SCADTA planes and, according to reports now coming in, were picked Luftwaffe boys, sent over in rotation to practice flying within two hours of the Canal Zone.” Bender and Altschul (1982) wrote that after the start of WWII von Bauer made a donation of 100,000 pesos to the local

Nazi party. What is noteworthy is that little to no evidence exists of Nazi infiltration in SCADTA. Josephson's alarmist article in *The Saturday Evening Post* (1943a) and the similar story told in his history of PAA (1943b), which warn that Nazis are being trained in the Latin American backyard, is not referenced, and thus its accuracy is difficult to assess. Furthermore, no evidence from the PAA archive was found to support Bender and Altschul's claim that von Bauer donated funds to the local Nazi party.

### ***8.3.2 Alternative Published Accounts of the PAA–SCADTA Relationship***

Widely circulated magazines such as *Fortune* and *Time* echoed stories told in the popular histories of PAA. For example, in the *Fortune* article PAA's ownership of SCADTA was made explicit. *Fortune* stated that, in 1931, Trippe had made reciprocal arrangements with SCADTA in which PAA had acquired a substantial interest in the business. von Bauer's failed attempt at expanding SCADTA northward were also specified in the article (*Fortune*, 1936). It was stressed that his efforts had been thwarted by "the late General William Mitchell," who had expressed disgust toward the U.S. State Department for allowing "Germany to establish SCADTA only three hours away from the Panama Canal." Thus, no mention of *Nazi activity* was made in the article that was featured in *Fortune* magazine. However, the article published in *Time* focused on SCADTA and stressed *Nazi activities* in South America. In the *Time* (1941) article, SCADTA was stated as controlled and operated by "avowed anti-U. S. Germans" who had "mapped and charted the Panama Canal, [and] had placed an airfield but 150 miles away, [and] could well use its heavy Junkers as troop transports, [and] bombers." *Time*

reported that, in 1940, Colombia “responded gracefully (if belatedly) to U. S. pressure by nationalizing Scadta (now Avianca) and giving 64% control to Pan American.”

In Hap Arnold’s 1949 *Global Mission*, the menace that the German-operated SCADTA posed to the Panama Canal was mentioned while stressing that, in 1940, the threat had been eliminated by PAA purchasing stock “from the Colombian Government to take the German air line over” (Arnold, 1949: 202). Wesley Newton, before he played a substantial role in crafting what eventually became Daley’s history of PAA, wrote an article in 1967 concerning PAA and SCADTA. Newton’s article made no mention of PAA’s 1931 substantial acquisition of SCADTA stock but stressed that PAA “helped to mitigate a threat to hemispheric security” by assisting in ““de-Germanizing” SCADTA” (Newton, 1967: 9). Reports of Nazi activities in SCADTA were found in a number of web-published accounts, including in a document entitled “Confidential, Organization of the Nazi Party in Colombia” (Wolfe, no date), but the legitimacy of these documents is impossible to assess.

As evident from the above paragraphs, the alternative popular accounts of the PAA–SCADTA relationship are similar to what is described in the popular histories of PAA. What is noteworthy of the *fear of Germans* rhetoric, which is stressed in both the popular histories and alternative published accounts, is that, prior to 1939, the United States experienced a sentiment of xenophobia. This sentiment was not specific to *Germans* (Newton, 1978) but extended to all foreigners. Furthermore, it is unfounded to assume that prior to the outbreak of WWII all Germans were Nazis, or that all Americans were anti-German (Lindbergh, for example, was a noted admirer of Nazi Germany; Wallace 2003). It is suggested that the popular histories of PAA and alternative

published accounts that focus on the story of the *German threat* are plausible because all of these stories were absorbed by a public whose associations of the terms *Germans* with *Nazis* and *threat* were normalized at their time of publication. As an example, the popular histories of PAA were each published between 1943 and 1982. At this point, the once-neutral United States had joined WWII as an enemy to Germany, and the perception of all Germans as Nazis, and all Nazis as the enemy, was widespread. Had the enemy of WWII been different, the general fear of foreigners fuelling the nature of the rules and regulations by the U.S. State Department may have been altered and targeted at a different enemy. That all German SCADTA personnel were Nazis and furthermore actually posed a threat to the American way of life in 1940 is far from certain. However, it is certain that all Germans were *perceived* as a threat in the popular histories of PAA as well as other accounts that reported by *Time*, *Fortune*.

### ***8.3.3 (Re)assembling the History of the PAA–SCADTA Relationship***

In the following section, I will attempt to contextualize the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA and through this illustrate that the popular histories of as well as alternative published accounts of PAA and SCADTA (Arnold, 1949; Fortune, 1936; Time, 1941) manufactured the *German threat*. This section is ordered in two parts, first I focus on (re)assembling the history of the *secret* PAA–SCADTA deal followed by a (re)assembly of the pre-WWII PAA–SCADTA relationship.

### 8.3.3.1 (Re)assembling the History of the 'Secret' PAA–SCADTA Deal

The (re)assembly of the PAA–SCADTA relationship was largely enabled by following and tracing the socio-politics of two noteworthy actors, John Leslie and Wesley Newton. Because of their shared interests in the history of aviation in Latin America, in which PAA played a substantial role, Newton and Leslie corresponded to share insights from 1971 until 1973.

On the basis of insights from Leslie and Newton's research in the National Archives, Newton was able to contextualize the 1931 PAA–SCADTA agreement in *The Perilous Sky* (1978). Like the popular histories of PAA, Newton suggested that in 1920 the Canal Zone was a very sensitive area and a prized possession of the United States, which controlled the area. With no international aerial diplomacy established between countries surrounding the Panama Canal, Newton stressed that it was widely believed in the U.S. government that *all European aviation operations* (unlike the popular PAA histories that stress only German operations) established in South America posed a threat to the Panama Canal. Similarly, Turner (1976) documented the existence of several foreign airlines that operated in the region in the early 1920s; the difference is that Turner does not present them as threatening. Though one of these aviation operations was the German-operated SCADTA, the French had also established aviation operations along the Latin American coast.

Many aviation operations probed the possibility of expansion, but with difficulty. First, the lack of international aerial diplomacy established between countries left it up to the individuals operating aerial ventures to negotiate landing rights directly with the government of a country or the airline dominantly operating within that country. Also,

the limited aviation technology available made for the use of short-range planes, which meant multiple stops on long-range flights. For example, Trippe, who wanted to expand PAA's operations into South America, needed access to Colombia as a stepping-stone. von Bauer, who operated SCADTA in Colombia, had made several trips to the United States in the early 1920s to negotiate landing rights with the U.S. government but was repeatedly denied access. Because of their shared interests, Trippe and von Bauer began negotiating in the late 1920s (Newton, 1978).

An agreement between von Bauer and Trippe was initially signed in February of 1930 (Newton, 1978). According to von Bauer, who was interviewed in 1957 by Langewiesche, one third of SCADTA stock was sold to PAA with the possibility of more shares begin sold at a later date. One thousand SCADTA shares were liquidated for U.S. dollars. SCADTA would withdraw access to international skies, giving PAA a monopoly in South America (Interview with von Bauer, 1957) at least until 1935 (Newton, 1978). Because SCADTA now had no international airline, and PAA at this point operated no airline within Colombia, the organizations would cooperate to transport airmail. It was agreed that von Bauer would continue to manage SCADTA freely until 1931 (Newton, 1978), and he placed his shares of SCADTA in a New York bank to show his willingness to cooperate with Trippe and PAA. In 1931, von Bauer had sold 83.6% of SCADTA stock to PAA (the 1961 corporate history index of PAA shows that PAA acquired 84.4% of SCADTA stock on April 10, 1931), which gave PAA majority ownership of SCADTA (CAB Docket 779 Trippe Testimony, 1943; Interview with von Bauer, 1957; Newton, 1978).

The motivators fueling PAA's acquisition of SCADTA stock were plentiful. To reiterate, the possibility of U.S. civilian airplanes landing in Colombia depended on reciprocity from the U.S. government. Trippe's deal with von Bauer allowed for PAA to expand southward into South America and thus make use of SCADTA airports and resources, refuel, and continue southward (Interview with von Bauer, 1957; Newton, 1978). The U.S. State Department was appeased because the deal allowed for American planes to fly into South America without the fear of foreign planes operating over the Panama Canal. Furthermore, the nature of the deal that PAA established with SCADTA gave PAA a monopoly in South America due to SCADTA's agreement to terminate international flights (according to Josephson [1943b], SCADTA had operated flights to the Caribbean port of Barranquilla and along the Pacific coast ports). SCADTA received much-needed financial aid from the deal and modernized its planes and operations (Mason, 1934; Newton, 1978).

Though the PAA–SCADTA deal was intended to be secret, traces from the PAA archive suggest that it was publically known in the United States and rumored in Colombia. Noteworthy is that *the interpretation* of the PAA–SCADTA deal in the United States and in Colombia differed. Knowledge of the deal among U.S. government officials was scattered and, according to Leslie and von Bauer, individuals who knew included Francis White (Interview with von Bauer, 1957; Leslie, 1972a, 1972e; Newton, 1978); President Hoover; and his Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, as well as selected members of the U.S. State Department and the Ambassador of Colombia, Olaya Herrera (who later became president of Colombia). According to Newton (1978), Francis White had approved and even encouraged the deal because of his belief that SCADTA would

soon be *Americanized*. Noteworthy is that the emphasis was placed on *Americanizing* SCADTA as opposed to what is stressed in the popular histories of PAA: *de-Germanizing* SCADTA. Knowledge of the newly founded PAA–SCADTA relationship was very public at PAA and furthermore known fairly widely in the United States. A 1931 PAA executive system memorandum stated that “Pan American Airways System has acquired a financial interest in the Scadta system” (Executive System Memorandum, 1931). In January of 1934, PAA prepared a report documenting the nature of the PAA–SCADTA relationship for the U.S. Post Office (Report for the United States Post Office, 1934). PAA’s acquisition of SCADTA was printed in PAA’s internal organ in 1931 (Pan American Air Ways, 1931: 144), and again in 1953 (*Clipper*, 1953). According to Newton (1978), knowledge of the PAA acquisition of SCADTA was also printed in *Aircraft of the Year*.

In Colombia, von Bauer had many incentives to keep the PAA–SCADTA relationship secret (Newton, 1978), but PAA archival traces suggest that in Colombia the deal was rumored to exist (Mason, 1934). In the main, von Bauer’s incentives to keep the deal secret included the general sentiment of dislike toward Americans in Colombia (Newton, 1978). von Bauer suggested in his 1957 interview with Langewiesche that “Yankee” ownership of SCADTA would have devastating effects on the German personnel and may cause political backlash in terms of cancelled airmail contracts (Interview with von Bauer, 1957: 90–91). A SCADTA report from Grant Mason in 1934, a PAA employee who had been sent to Colombia to inspect SCADTA for 4 days, suggested that Colombian government officials had “heard rumors to the effect that Pan American controlled Scadta and that, if such control were confirmed to the Government

at any time, the Government immediately would cancel the Scadta concessions and contract” (Mason, 1934). The reason for this was that even though SCADTA was operated and owned by German-born personnel, all profits from SCADTA were reinvested in Colombia (Mason, 1934). Mason (1934) stressed in his report that SCADTA, despite its German ownership, had “no relationship with the German Government.” SCADTA received no financing from the German government (Newton, 1978). Mason (1934) went on to explain that the Colombian government would oppose PAA control because PAA “is virtually a branch of the American Government and Scadta profits, under our control would be taken out of Colombia.” Mason’s arrival in Colombia to examine SCADTA operations due to PAA’s acquisition of SCADTA stock was reported in Colombian newspapers, including *Mundo al Dia* in 1931 (Newton, 1978) and *El Tiempo* in 1934 (Mason, 1934).

Newton (1978) suggested that at the time of the PAA’s acquisition of SCADTA stock in 1931 SCADTA was not a menace to the Panama Canal and would not be for some time. Throughout the 1930s, the U.S. State Department continued to exert pressure on PAA and Trippe to *Americanize* SCADTA. According to Newton (1978: 314), Trippe was “obviously more concerned over economic competition with von Bauer than Scadta’s threat to the Canal.” Though German personnel operated SCADTA, the airline was perceived as Colombian as opposed to German (Newton, 1978). In his 1934 report to PAA, Mason observed that many SCADTA pilots were German but made no mention that SCADTA pilots had Nazi affiliations. Thus, PAA’s relationship with SCADTA continued without interruption for about 10 years, until the advent of WWII.

### 8.3.3.2 *The pre-WWII PAA–SCADTA Relationship: The ‘German Threat’?*

When PAA had bought a substantial portion of SCADTA stock in 1931, Francis White of the U.S. State Department had urged the *Americanization* of SCADTA. With the passage of time (1931–1938), PAA’s ownership of SCADTA had been forgotten in the U.S. State Department. However, with the advent of WWII, the rise of Hitler’s Nazis as an enemy to the United States, and the *discovery* by U.S. officials of PAA’s ownership of SCADTA, the story of *Americanizing* SCADTA was transformed into one of *de-Germanizing* SCADTA.

In 1938, von Bauer had approached Trippe to purchase a substantial portion of SCADTA stock and for the ownership of SCADTA shares to be publically acknowledged (Interview with von Bauer, 1957). Trippe later testified to the Civil Aeronautics Board that he had refused to sell SCADTA shares to von Bauer because of his fear that the Nazis had won him over (CAB Docket 779 Trippe Testimony, 1943). Though von Bauer made no mention of Nazi allegiance in his 1957 interview with Langewiesche, the nature of his relationship with the Nazis is unknown. von Bauer did admit that the Nazis contacted him in 1938 to purchase SCADTA shares, of which he specified he was not the owner (Interview with von Bauer, 1957). However, it is possible that von Bauer’s attempt to re-purchase SCADTA stock in 1938 was fueled by the recent passing of the 1937 Colombian law that stipulated that all aviation operations in Colombia had to be majority-Colombian owned by 1942 (Interview with von Bauer, 1957). This, among other things, persuaded von Bauer to apply and secure Colombian citizenship. Also persuading von Bauer was his Austrian citizenship. Because Austria had been annexed by Germany, von Bauer would have no choice to become a German citizen. This

predicament he wished to avoid because of his Jewish roots (Interview with von Bauer, 1957).

When von Bauer confirmed with the Colombian president Santos that his newly acquired Colombian citizenship would count toward the *nationalization* of SCADTA, von Bauer further reinforced his complete ownership of SCADTA in the eyes of the Colombians. However, in 1939 there was much talk of *de-Germanizing* SCADTA within the U.S. government (Interview with von Bauer, 1957). This was influenced by Grant Mason, a member of the Civil Aeronautics Authority, who testified to the Senate committee that the German-employed SCADTA personnel were a threat to the Panama Canal (Rihl, 1941). The U.S. government was increasingly concerned about the Nazi infiltration of SCADTA and pressured PAA to redress the situation. PAA, which had looked at the situation in Colombia from a strictly commercial standpoint, had done little to change the nature of their association with SCADTA without influence from the U.S. government (Rihl, 1941). With increasing U.S. government influence, PAA began planning for the termination of German SCADTA personnel.

At PAA, George Rihl was appointed to the task of de-Germanizing SCADTA (Leslie, 1972d; van Dusen, 1972d) but soon realized that successfully completing the task would be rife with problems (Rihl, 1941). The Colombian president explained to Rihl (1941) that “Pan American would not be permitted to de-Germanize Scadta to anywhere near the extent desired.” This was because most German-employed SCADTA personnel were mostly naturalized Colombians and therefore not a threat. The Colombian law dictated for large severance packages to accompany their termination of employment, a cost that “could not be justified commercially” by PAA (Rihl, 1941). Trippe stressed that

because PAA was carrying out the wishes of the State Department, “which would not have been incurred in the ordinary operations of Scadta,” it was up to the State Department to incur the cost of the severance packages (Rihl, 1941). With concerns of WWII rising, the Colombian president finally agreed to assist PAA and the U.S. government in fully ridding SCADTA of its German personnel (Balluder, 1977; Rihl, 1941).

Del Valle, a PAA employee who was to assist in de-Germanizing SCADTA, was directed to proceed to Bogota, Colombia, in 1940 with American men who could replace the German SCADTA pilots and personnel. Rihl (1941) stressed that PAA absorbed the cost of sending American personnel to Colombia. In an interview with Langewiesche in 1957, Del Valle specified that he had been told that “the Germans are planning to blow up the Panama Canal and the problem is to prevent this while also preparing for the de-Germanization of SCADTA.”

In an attempt to prepare the Colombians of the de-Germanization of SCADTA, efforts were being made to better the Colombian sentiment toward the United States. For example, PAA had sent modern planes to enhance SCADTA’s equipment (Rihl, 1941). After much preparation, and von Bauer’s resignation in 1940 (Interview with von Bauer, 1957), PAA fired all of SCADTA’s German personnel on June 12, 1941 (Langewiesche, 1957; CAB Docket 779 Trippe Testimony, 1943; Rihl, 1941). As the German personnel were handed their severance packages, Del Valle expressed that many had tears in their eyes and lamented that “this was their country and that they had done nothing to deserve such treatment” (Langewiesche, 1957). The Colombian military troops that had

surrounded the building escorted the German personnel off the premises, and SCADTA operations resumed the following day with American personnel.

Throughout the negotiations to de-Germanize SCADTA, the Colombian president held fast to the idea that Colombia should have one great national aviation operation (Rihl, 1941). Thus, the nationalization of SCADTA was planned as SCADTA was de-Germanized. SCADTA purchased SACO (Rihl, 1941) and the merged operations assumed the name of AVIANCA in 1940. According to the 1961 PAA corporate history index, PAA's ownership of AVICANCA was decreased substantially from 1940 (when it was immediately reduced from 83.4% to 64.2%) to 1954, (when it was reported as 38.13% ownership of AVIANCA).

The question remains as to whether the Nazis had infiltrated SCADTA. According to von Bauer (Interview with von Bauer, 1957) and Leslie (Leslie, 1972e), the German SCADTA personnel were strongly German but not from a class prone to Nazism. I now turn to a discussion of the PAA–SCADTA relationship through focusing on select ANTi-History facets.

#### **8.4 Discussion of ANTi-History Themes Highlighted Through the Exemplar of PAA**

The following section discusses the empirical application of ANTi-History through select facets of ANTi-History.

##### ***8.4.1 A Simultaneous Addressing and Problematization of the 'Past' and 'History'***

The distinction that ANTi-History draws between the concepts of the *past* and *history*, as well as the consequences of the distinction, has been previously noted. The

above empirical application of ANTi-History has stressed this distinction and illustrated the possibility of creating plural knowledge of the socio-past of the PAA–SCADTA relationship. By contextualizing the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA, an (re)assembly of the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA was performed. This alternative account of the story acted in pluralizing our knowledge of the PAA–SCADTA relationship.

#### ***8.4.2 Knowledge of the Past as Socially Constructed***

The above exemplar, which pluralizes the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA, also sought to make a strong case for illustrating the socially constructed nature of all knowledge of the past. It is suggested that all the histories of PAA discussed are socially constructed stories of the past by actors (historians) who are active in meaning making. For example, traces of the actors involved in crafting Daley’s (1980) history of PAA as well as Newton’s (1978) history of aviation in Latin America were followed in the PAA archive. As previous discussions have shown (see chapter 6), the construction of what became known as Daley’s history of PAA was subject to the socio-politics of actor-networks that were very active in negotiating the past of PAA. Such actors included Charles Lindbergh, John Leslie, Juan Trippe, Wolfgang Langewiesche, and others who corresponded between the years of 1957 and 1980 to write a history of PAA.

Wesley Newton’s (1978) history of Latin America, called *The Perilous Sky*, can also be understood as socially constructed. Throughout the years of 1971 through 1973, Newton (1971a) corresponded with John Leslie (1973c) to negotiate PAA’s role in the history of aviation of Latin America. Through their negotiations it is possible to assess how their social context helped them to inform their meaning making of the past. Thus,

the actors created knowledge in a social context and as informed by the shared understandings that are enabled through that social context.

#### ***8.4.3 Knowledge of the Past as Situated and Positioned***

The popular histories of PAA illustrate the *situated* and *positioned* nature of knowledge of the past. The manner in which the histories illustrated the *German threat* was largely possible because of the situated and positioned nature of the popular histories. The popular histories of PAA were written either during WWII (Josephson, 1943a, 1943b) or in the post-WWII era. The association of the words *German* and *threat* were readily accepted during and after 1943 in the United States because the Nazis had evolved as an enemy to the United States during WWII. But, the *German threat* was never mentioned in the correspondence of actors at the PAA archive that occurred prior to this time, such as Mason (1934), who was involved in PAA's acquisition of SCADTA in 1934. The popular histories drew on knowledge readily available the time of their publication to unproblematically associate the words *German*, *threat* and *WWII*. The unproblematic association of the words was also enabled by the contextual, political, and historical factors at play in the post-WWII U.S. context. The fact that the United States emerged from WWII on the side of the victors enabled the popular histories of PAA to be written in a way that associated the terms.

#### *8.4.4 Toward a Historiographical Approach That Legitimizes Plural Construction of History*

This chapter has sought to provide an alternative account of the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA to destabilize the authority of the popular histories of PAA, whose wide dispersion is evidenced through their recounting in *Time* (1941) and *Fortune* (1936) magazines.

The socio-past of PAA and SCADTA as told in the published accounts and in the (re)assembly differ in a number of ways. Whereas the popular histories of PAA (with the exception of Turner, 1976) specify that the PAA acquisition of SCADTA stock was conducted with the intent of *de-Germanizing* the airline, (re)assembling the traces of PAA and SCADTA's socio-past suggest that the intent was initially to *Americanize* SCADTA. *Americanizing SCADTA* refers to changing the majority ownership, management, and personnel to Americans. Talk of Americanizing the airline was prominent prior to the emergence of a focus on what was viewed as the *German threat* in the approach of WWII. The popular histories, written either during or after WWII, speak of *de-Germanizing SCADTA* because of their clear knowledge of Germany as a WWII enemy to the United States.

Also a point of contestation between the popular histories of PAA and the (re)assembly of the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA is how they describe the secrecy of the PAA acquisition of SCADTA. Whereas it is taken as given in most popular histories of PAA (except Turner, 1976) that no Colombians and very few Americans knew of the deal (Francis White of the U.S. State Department was one of the few who knew), (re)assembling the traces of the socio-past has offered an alternative account.

Specifically, it is suggested that news of the PAA acquisition of SCADTA was published in newspapers in both Colombia and the United States. This is relevant because in the advent of WWII the popular histories suggest that some in the State Department were *alarmed* by *Germans* flying in America's backyard. This invites a question: If U.S. officials knew of the deal and were motivated by commercial incentives, would they have allowed the PAA–SCADTA relationship to continue because of the commercial benefits it brought to the United States and PAA? Though it is not possible to answer that question definitively, it does point to the quote that began this thesis, that those who control our interpretation of the past have a large control over the present and future.

Another point of difference between the popular histories of PAA and the (re)assembly of the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA are the reasons each offers concerning Trippe's enduring interest in SCADTA. It is not stressed prominently in the popular histories of PAA, but it is rendered clear in the (re)assembly of the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA that Trippe was largely motivated by financial incentives to gain a foothold in Colombia and maintain an undisturbed relationship with SCADTA as long as possible, regardless of the circumstances brought through WWII. Alternative accounts of the socio-past of PAA have suggested that Trippe and PAA helped rid the northern hemisphere of a German threat (Newton, 1967), thus depicting Trippe in almost heroic terms. Through (re)assembling the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA, it is suggested that Trippe's desire was to maintain a foothold in Colombia as long as possible because of commercial incentives. Trippe only rid SCADTA of its German personnel *after* he was pressured to do so by the U.S. State Department. Even then, Trippe urged that he would

only do so if the U.S. government absorbed the cost of the large severance packages offered to the German SCADTA personnel.

Finally, pluralizing the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA by (re)assembling it has allowed us to problematize the notion of the *German threat* that is readily depicted in the popular histories of PAA. It is suggested that the *German threat* was manufactured by the popular histories as based on the normalized associations that the histories audiences had of the words *German*, *Nazi*, and *threat*. Through (re)assembling the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA, it was learned that (a) German SCADTA personnel were mostly naturalized Colombians with Colombian children and wives; (b) prior to the break of WWII not all Germans were Nazis, and (c) we have no archival evidence of Nazi infiltration in SCADTA. The stories told of SCADTA's Nazi infiltration that features in Josephson (1943a, 1943b) and Bender and Altschul's (1982) histories have not been retraced. As has been noted, Josephson's history of PAA has no footnotes and thus it is impossible to assess its accuracy.

#### ***8.4.5 The A Priori—Do Not Begin By Assuming What You Wish to Explain/Imposing the Plot***

ANTI-History places much emphasis on problematizing the a priori. This suggests that ANTi-History caution against beginning a historical analysis by assuming what that historical analysis should show.

Popular histories of PAA are written in a manner that assumed SCADTA posed a *German threat* to the Panama Canal and to the U.S. way of life by virtue of the historian's situated knowledge (time: 1943, 1980, 1982; place: U.S.) of Germany as an

enemy to the United States in WWII. These histories appear to be written in a certainist tone because they unproblematically assume the existence of the *German threat* in 1931, a time when Hitler was not yet in power. Through (re)assembling the socio-past of PAA–SCADTA, it has been stressed that the fear of aerial operators over the Panama Canal and into the United States was not specific to Germans but extended to all foreigners. Thus, the popular histories of PAA are written in a way that assumes as given (that there is a German threat in 1931) what it is that they wish for their analysis to show (that the German SCADTA personnel eventually was perceived as a threat). In conducting historical analyses, I stress the importance of problematizing our a priori knowledge of the past prior to (re)assembling knowledge of the socio-past.

#### ***8.4.6 (Re)assembling/Tracing the Associations of the Social Past/Emphasis On Performativity***

ANTI-History means following the actors around to (re)assemble their associations, map out their efforts at network building, and understand how they have constructed meaning of their past. The (re)assembly of the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA has largely been dedicated to (re)assembling the socio-past by following the actors around and tracing their associations to understand how that socio-past holds together.

#### ***8.4.7 History as an Effect of the Interest-Driven Socio-Politics of Actor-Networks***

ANTI-History assumes that actors are engaged in interest work, in which they seek out the interests of other actors; negotiate with alternative actors; and, if successful,

alter their interests to match that of their own (it is stressed that the assumption that actors are involved in interest work does not itself reveal the nature of those assumptions). Tracing the correspondence of Wesley Newton and John Leslie, it is possible to map out the negotiations of the two actors concerning the socio-past of SCADTA and PAA. Newton (1978), for example, enrolled Leslie (1971g) into his network in 1971 with the intent of ensuring the accomplishment of his history dedicated to Latin American aviation. Leslie (1971g) also enrolled Newton, in 1971, to strengthen his cause of writing a history of PAA that was eventually published by Daley (1980).

It is suggested that to *do* history, actors engage in interest work, seek to enroll actors, and translate their interests to that of their own to enable their cause of telling a specific story of the past. ANTi-History is different from *conventional history* in that the latter does not make a point of (a) surfacing the socio-politics and (b) stressing that these socio-politics and negotiations *are* the history as opposed to mere judgments made in uncovering the history.

#### ***8.4.8 Acknowledge and Expose the Potential Instrumentality of Historical Accounts***

A case can be made for viewing the popular histories of PAA as instrumental creations that acted in situating and maintaining a favorable image of PAA in the public eye. By constructing alternative accounts of the socio-past and pluralizing history, ANTi-History is dedicated to exposing the potential instrumentality of alternative historical accounts. By tracing the socio-politics of the actor-networks involved in the construction of history, we can ask questions such as on whose terms the history was created, who benefited, and who is marginalized from a particular interpretation of

history. By (re)assembling the socio-past of PAA-SCADTA in a contextualized way, it can be assumed that the *German threat* was manufactured by the popular histories of PAA. These drew on the public's normalized association of the words *German*, *Nazi*, and *threat* to suggest that prior to WWII SCADTA was infiltrated by Germans who were a threat to the Panama Canal and, by extension of this, posed a threat to the U.S. way of life. What is most noteworthy in that in alternative published accounts of the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA, PAA was portrayed as aiding the U.S. government in ridding the northern hemisphere of the *German threat*. Through (re)assembling the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA, it has been suggested that Trippe was commercially motivated to not only gain but also maintain a strong foothold in Colombia. In fact, when approached by the U.S. government in 1938 to rid SCADTA of its German personnel, Trippe argued that paying the severance packages owed to the German personnel was not financially viable and strongly urged for the U.S. government to absorb the cost. Though it is certain that PAA did *Americanize* and, shortly after, *nationalize*, SCADTA in 1941, but the motivators for the decision that are presented in the popular accounts of PAA are dissimilar to that found in (re)assembling the PAA-SCADTA past.

I propose through ANTi-History that the popular accounts of PAA are instrumental in that they are constructed in a way that portrays PAA in a favorable public eye. Though the actions taken by PAA that are discussed in the popular accounts of PAA's past may be similar to that understood through the (re)assembly featured in this chapter, the motivations for such decisions are dissimilar. Also, through (re)assembling the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA, the interest-driven motivations that governed

certain actions, such as ridding SCADTA of its German personnel, can be brought to light to illustrate history as a potentially instrumental creation.

#### ***8.4.9 Archives as a Useful Site For Tracing Associations of the Past***

It must be stressed that the (re)assembly of the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA would have largely been paralyzed without the use of the PAA archive, which acted as a powerful actor, a site of repository, a point of assembly of many traces of the past. All traces from the PAA archive that made mention of the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA were used to construct the (re)assembly. Traces that did not necessarily support the *story I wanted to tell* in the (re)assembly were not purposefully left out.

### **8.5 Summary**

Chapter 8 has featured an empirical application of ANTi-History to pluralize the history of PAA and SCADTA. An important conclusion to be drawn from this empirical application of ANTi-History is the potential benefits to be derived from pluralizing history through constructing alternative interpretations and knowledge of the past. The (re)assembly of the socio-past of PAA and SCADTA served to destabilize the authority of the dominant histories, by illustrating a competing contextualized account. Furthermore, the possibility of the existence of alternative accounts of the past illustrates the dire need of theories of history whose inherent purpose is the construction of plural knowledge of the past.

## Chapter 9: Concluding Thoughts

*“... not only is historical perspective not required of organizational theorists, it is not expected...” (Jacques, 2006: 44)*

### 9.1 Introduction

In this dissertation, I have laid out the development of ANTi-History, as an alternate way of understanding the relationship between history and organizational analysis by theorizing historiography. I have also sought to illustrate an empirical application of ANTi-History through drawing on PAA archival materials. My hope is that I have shown ANTi-History as not only an alternative approach to historiography but one that is novel, and thus contributes to the field of organization studies. In this chapter, I offer concluding thoughts on ANTi-History, including an overview of its contributions and limitations.

### 9.2 Contributions

#### *9.2.1 Theoretical Contribution to Organizational Studies/Management*

ANTi-History, I have attempted to argue, contributes to the literature in organization studies and management because it offers a methodology that researchers can use to historicize theory and historicize the organization. Historicizing theory and organizations is one way to provide contextualized research. It is also a way of ensuring a nonessentialist view of management theory and organizations. By viewing theories of organization and the organization as socially constructed, their *naturalness* and *false necessity* are exposed, thus opening the possibility for viewing them as ever changing. As

chapter 6 sought to illustrate, by writing-in the socio-politics of an organization's history and/or the conditions of its construction, the grounds upon which a type of knowledge is constructed can be illustrated. Furthermore, historicizing theory and organizations opens the possibility of the development of alternative interpretations of theories of organization and organizations.

Presenting alternatives to a popularized version of the past can enable the destabilizing of authority that is far too often unproblematically associated with single popular and uncontested accounts of the past. One way of destabilizing the authority of popular histories is by pluralizing history. Chapters 6 and 7 were constructed with the hope of illustrating this. The possibility for plural interpretations of theory and organizations is a precondition for the creation of research with emancipatory potential. ANTi-History assumes that actors can be liberated from disenfranchising interpretations of the past through the construction of alternative accounts of the past that are rooted in an actor's way of knowing or mode of conceiving.

The reflexivity called for in ANTi-History offers to researchers in organizational studies and management who are sympathetic to ensuring reflexive research another possible methodology with which to conduct their research. Drawing insights from the sociology of knowledge has helped foster an understanding of how knowledge is constructed and the dire need for all research to adopt a reflexive agenda.

The three interdependent empirical applications of ANTi-History to the socio-past of PAA offers a theoretical contribution to organizational studies and management in that it gives researchers wishing to use ANTi-History an exemplar of its performativity and its potential rigor.

### ***9.2.2 Theoretical Contribution to the 'Historic Turn' In Organizational Studies***

ANTI-History and its empirical application offer potential insights to the organization studies literature that called for the *historic turn* (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006; Jacques, 1996, 2006; Kieser, 1994; Üsdiken & Kieser, 2004). In their 2006 article, Booth and Rowlinson put forth an agenda for both their newly launched journal and for scholars of organizational studies. Among other agenda items, Booth and Rowlinson suggested that organizational studies could benefit from the development of alternative styles of writing as well as newly developed methods for crafting the history of organizations. They suggested that the implications of historians and philosophers of history such as Hayden White and Michel Foucault be rendered explicit for organization studies. Also suggested was the need for more critical and ethical reflection in the craft of organization studies research, and more contextualized and historicized research. In a similar vein to the call for an historic turn, Lamond (2008) suggested the need for research that renders transparent its ontological and epistemological assumptions.

ANTI-History answers these multiple calls. First, ANTI-History is an alternative method for the historicisation of theory and the writing of organizational history that demands of the management historian a dramatically different way of writing and doing research. Its emphasis on following actor-networks to (re)assemble their constitution and the socio-past demands that researchers let themselves be guided by traces as opposed to their preconceived understanding of the constitution of the socio-past. Furthermore, it is stressed that researchers using ANTI-History perform the past by cutting across conventional academic categories, thus assuming history as an effect of heterogeneous

actor-networks. Second, ANTi-History has been developed by drawing on insights from Foucault (1982, 2007) and White (1973, 1985), and by virtue of this it renders explicit the implication of these scholars for organization studies research.

In terms of critical and ethical reflection, ANTi-History is dedicated to the craft of research that transparently writes-in the power dynamics of actors who have enabled the emergence of a specific way of knowing. Thus, the actors' power dynamics are included into an account of organizational knowledge, to illustrate not only how a form of knowing emerged, but to show whose way of knowing assumes dominance and to what degree other actors are influenced by the dominant interpretation. This is related to the call for research that is informed by ethical thought, in that what comes to constitute as *good* and *bad* ways of being as well as knowing are exposed as socially constructed. By writing-in the power dynamics of the actor-networks involved in the emergence of a way of knowing, the categories and constitution of *good* and *bad* are not assumed to be neutral, but instead are illustrated as socially constructed and situated. Thus, they are illustrated as an effect of actor-networks.

The latter point is broadly related to what I perceive as the fourth contribution of ANTi-History to the organization studies literature calling for an *historic turn*. This pertains to the need for more contextualized and historicized research. The task of ANTi-History is one of historicizing theory and the organization and this is achieved by (re)assembling the constitution of knowledge of an academic field and/or knowledge of the organization.

Finally, ANTi-History sets out to (re)assemble the constitution of knowledge of the socio-past in a way that is sympathetic to Lamond's (2008) appeal for scholarship that

renders transparent its epistemological and ontological assumptions. By virtue of its emphasis on transparency, ANTi-History renders explicit its ontological and epistemological assumptions.

### ***9.2.3 Theoretical Contributions for the Conceptualization and Use of Archival Research***

Kieser (1994) and Rowlinson (2004a) have each noted that the use of the archive by organizational scholars is rare. Potential reasons for the rare use of the archive are numerous and may include the tedious nature of archival research, the lack of training available to organizational scholars for archival research, and the lack of funding available to travel to an archive, as well as the fact that using archival research to study the organization is not a norm and thus neither expected nor sought out by editors of journals and publishers.

This research offers a contribution in that it illustrates one way in which the archive can be used to conduct organizational studies research. ANTi-History has been developed as a methodology on which researchers using the archive can draw to historicize management theory and/or the organization. Also, ANTi-History offers explicit insight as to how the archive can be used, which is to follow actors around and (re)assemble the constitution of the socio-past to do history. ANTi-History also offers insight as to how a researcher can ensure a reflexive use of the archive, by exposing how the researchers' presence has an active effect on the traces followed, and thus the history (re)assembled. Finally, the empirical applications of ANTi-History offer examples on how to reference archival research.

#### ***9.2.4 Practical Contributions and Implications for the Manager or Managers***

ANTI-History offers contributions to the manager and practitioner. At the broadest level, ANTi-History and its empirical application illustrate the importance that an understanding of the past can have on how we inform and make sense of our present condition.

In a more specific sense, ANTi-History contributes to the day-to-day life of the manager in that it stresses the need for a manager to adopt an anti-realist view of history. One implication of adopting a realist view of history is the assumption that there is one past and history mirrors the past. Thus, a realist view of history is unitarist. A manager who acknowledges that history is socially constructed knowledge of the past will, by virtue of this, acknowledge that knowledge of the past can potentially be plural. Following this, a manager who adopts a pluralist view of history will acknowledge that her employees' knowledge of the past may differ from that of her own and, by virtue of this, her employees' view of the present (as informed by the past) can differ from that of her own as well. More generally, ANTi-History offers the potential for organizational members to question managerial and organizational histories.

Related to the above point, a manager who acknowledges the existence of plural interpretations of the past may be more sympathetic to tendencies to impose her meaning of the past (and present) on others who do not share her interpretation. It is stressed that ANTi-History can help managers and employees acknowledge that they are active in the meaning making of their past every day, and thus are active in constructing their history.

ANTI-History assumes that history is socially constructed knowledge of the past, and through adopting this view it seeks to destabilize a realist, unitarist, and objective view of history. Another consequence of adopting a realist view of history may be to assume that the character of a given history is *essential, natural, or necessary*. This view has the potential to transcend and fuel an attitude of powerlessness among managers and employees. Managers and employees who view the organization and its deeply historically rooted practices as disenfranchising may assume that they are unchanging. Such managers may adopt a helpless attitude toward these disenfranchising processes: *Well, that's just the way it's done, the way it's always been done, nothing we can do about it* (hypothetical manager). Understanding history as socially constructed and thus understanding that past changes were caused by actors, may empower workers and managers by enabling them to realize that as free-willed agents, change is within their grasp. Acknowledging history as socially constructed may also sensitize organizational members to the issues of power involved in a unitarist view of history.

### **9.3 Limitations**

#### ***9.3.1 Limitations of ANTi-History***

Limitations of ANTi-History have surfaced through its inception. The first issue that has been raised is that ANTi-History is restricted in its ability (as is ANT) to provide explanations of the socio-politics of past actor-networks that can acknowledge the full complexity of the social context in which these actor-networks are active (Brown & Capdevila, 2005). Because the would-be researcher who uses ANTi-History is reliant on traces of the past to (re)assemble history, she is limited in the degree of intimate

knowledge that she can gather of the reflective actors that she is engaged in tracing. Such a researcher can follow the traces and the action of the socio-politics of actor-networks but is limited in her understanding of the motivation for the actors' actions as well as their meaning making of those actions. Thus, the researcher may be accused, as has been the Strong Programme of the sociology of knowledge and the Science & Technology Studies, of providing simple, context-based explanations of society or, in this instance, the socio-past. The relevance of this criticism is supported and explained by Collingwood (1956: 214), who noted that the purpose of history "is not the mere event, but the thought expressed by it." He (1956: 214) stressed that whereas non-reflective phenomena can be described as a series of events, "history cannot," because it is "not processes of mere events but processes of actions, which have an inner side, consisting of processes of thought." Thus, Collingwood described that events have an outer (action) and inner (thought) component, and it is the task of historian to understand both. Through Collingwood's scholarship we can find a partial solution of the limitation of ANTi-History as providing simple context- or action-based explanations. Collingwood (1956: 215) noted that the historian can discern the inner thoughts of actors by "re-thinking them in his own mind." Though Collingwood's advice does have an unwanted cognitive element, it is noted that by a historian drawing on his own insights as to the motivations fueling the actors' actions, the historian can fill in what those motivations may be. Therefore, the onus is placed on the historian to draw inferences that will explain the motivations of the actors who are involved in socio-politics.

To the degree that ANTi-History draws on ANT in the analysis and (re)assembly of the constitution of the socio-past it is subject to the criticisms that have been associated

with ANT. Some voiced criticisms of ANT have included (a) its lack of methodological stability; (b) confusion as to which actors to follow, lack of insight or suggestions to inform which actors should be followed; (c) the question of assuming that nonhuman actors have a voice or are active agents (Collins & Yearly, 1992); and (4) the ambiguous role of actors' interests in governing their efforts at network building (Singleton & Mulkay, 1993).

Though it is plausible to assume that these criticisms of ANT translate into criticisms of ANTi-History, some are easily redressed. For example, to answer the second criticism, which suggests that ANT offers little insight to guide the researcher in decisions concerning which actor to follow, it is suggested that the researcher follow the *action*. Using ANTi-History, I followed the action of various actors at the PAA archive (I followed them where they led me, out of the PAA archive and into, for example, biographies of actors situated at various libraries and then back into the PAA archive) that were involved in constructing what came to be Daley's (1980) history. Perhaps the criticism of not knowing which actors to follow may be more pressing and serious for a researcher who uses ANT to engage in ethnography. Using ANTi-History at the archive did not pose problems of which actors to follow; I was able to follow a variety of actors until their traces became nonexistent, such as the Newton–Leslie correspondence, which ended in 1973.

### ***9.3.2 Limitations of the Thesis and its Application***

Some of the limitations of the thesis include its heavy, though not sole, reliance on archives. First, it must be stressed that because archives are socially constructed sites,

which are manicured according to the conventions of archivists and house-limited documents, archives can be understood as concealing as much as they reveal.

A second limitation of the application is its reliance on the use of only one archive to gather relevant materials to inform the three empirical applications of ANTi-History. For example, my more recent research indicates that Matthew Josephson's collected papers are located at the Yale Collection of American Literature at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut and may shed more detailed light on the production of his PAA history. In chapter 7, ANTi-History was used to contextualize the founding of PAA and I feel sure that Josephson's collected paper may well contain a number of traces relevant to the study of PAA. Perhaps these will be useful for further research. In the meantime, because Josephson's (1943b) history of PAA is not referenced, it is impossible to decipher what traces upon which Josephson relied to tell his history of PAA. Perhaps Josephson's collected papers at Yale University could shed some light on the socio-politics of the actor-networks involved in crafting his history of PAA.<sup>6</sup> Thus, using multiple archives to gather materials for the dissertation would have made for a more rigorous piece.

#### **9.4 Conclusion**

In closing, I would like to stress, as has Jacques (2006: 44) that "not only is an historical perspective not required of organizational theorists, it is not expected." My hope is that I have illustrated the many benefits that historicizing theory and

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<sup>6</sup> Though in fairness I did consult Josephson's various autobiographies and none of these cast any new light on the situation; PAA was hardly mentioned (see Josephson, 1962, 1967, 1981).

organizations can offer to the organizational scholar. ANTi-History has been developed as a methodology to aid researchers to historicize theory and organizations.

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