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Conscious Choice of Convenience: The Relocation of the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet, Labrador

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in partial fulfilment of a Master of Arts degree in Atlantic Canada Studies at Saint Mary's University

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22 August 1997

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0-612-22808-8
ABSTRACT

Conscious Choice of Convenience: The Relocation of the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet, Labrador

Timothy A. Powers (c) 1997

"Conscious Choice of Convenience" examines the rationale for the decision to relocate the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet, Labrador to Sango Pond. Relocation is viewed as an ill-conceived response to a difficult situation. The thesis probes into the world of public policy decision making on the Native-Government paradigm in Canada utilizing the situation of the Davis Inlet Innu as the case study.

An interesting combination of research material and personal experiences are utilized to tell this fascinating story of how the Mushuau Innu achieved a displacement decision. Extensive primary sources such as government briefing documents, Innu reports and private correspondence are placed together for the first time to capture this important historical event.

The Davis Inlet Innu relocation choice of Sango Pond became a convenient way for themselves and the governments of Canada and Newfoundland to address the serious problems of this northern community. The tenacity and conviction of the Innu in their crusade to achieve a healthy homeland was unmatched. The legitimacy of the Innu choice of Sango Pond is vigorously challenged because of the lack of proper scrutiny that the option received.

The paramountcy of economic development as exemplified by the Voisey's Bay development and the importance of Canadian international economic relationships, were the factors that influenced the relocation decision. Capital enhancement rather than physical and social rejuvenation of the Innu superseded a sound relocation strategy. The future of the Mushuau Innu could be hanging in the balance.
DEDICATION

The thesis is dedicated to the memory of Gillian Crosbie Hamblin. A person who's life was unduly shortened, but who's affect on all who knew her was profound. She was an educator, who gave more than she ever could have imagined. "Giggy" epitomized the importance of the "Pearson" creed:

Education is above all and ever has been, the process of learning how to think honestly and straight; to distinguish between the true and the false; to appreciate quality and beauty wherever it may be found; and to be able to participate with intelligence and tolerance in that most important of all forms of free enterprise - the exchange of ideas on every subject under the sun...

...the educated person will place the desire to put muscle into missiles or men, below the desires to put dignity and decency into living, moral values into action, beauty into words or images. He will put the search for the good life in peace and freedom above every other search.

Lester B. Pearson - May 27, 1961
Acknowledgements

The thesis would have never been pursued without the support and encouragement of my parents. Both of them helped in different ways to see this effort through to completion. They gave me the gift of opportunity and for that I am eternally grateful.

Dr. Mark Davis a good friend and superb thesis advisor was an unwavering pillar of support through-out this projection. His sage advice, humour and faith in me were more valuable to me than he will ever know. I thank Mark for challenging me to always challenge myself.

Thank you to the Hon. John C. Crosbie, P.C., Q.C. who taught me the importance of voicing your convictions know matter how contentious they maybe. He was also the inspiration for my pursuit of the stars.

My classmates in the Atlantic Canada Studies program made my time at Saint Mary’s rewarding and thought provoking. Particular thanks goes to Caroline, Jean, Moira, Michelle and Rhian for making my Master’s experience a worthwhile one.

My friends at the Gorsebrook Research Institute always cultivated the perfect environment for learning and laughing; Kimberly, Daphne, Denise and James a bouquet of thanks to you all. Special mention goes to Jackie Logan who always went above and beyond the call of duty to help me in every way she could possibly envisage.

Dr. Therese Arseneau was a valuable advisor who helped me get "Conscious Choice of Convenience" done. Her efficiency is unmatched. Dr. John Reid deserves an acknowledgement for stepping in at the 11th hour to become my third advisor. He too proved to be an invaluable source of assistance.

Finally, thank you to all my friends throughout North America who kept me going during the life-span of this endeavour. Jen and Michelle in Sackville, Sue in Prince Edward Island, Simon in Ottawa, Suellen in Arizona, Krista in Antigonish and all the others who were there for me, your kindness will not soon be forgotten.
FOREWORD

On November 13, 1996 when it was announced that the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet were going to be moved to Sango Pond, Labrador it became clear to me that this was an historical event that needed to be chronicled. Since becoming involved with this issue in 1991, I felt I could bring an informed insider's perspective on the Davis Inlet relocation decision-making process.

In 1991, while in the employ of John C. Crosbie, then federal Minister of Fisheries in the Mulroney government, I was handed the responsibility for all Newfoundland non-fisheries matters. At that time few people knew anything about the Mushuau Innu of the remote Labrador community of Davis Inlet. Certainly improving the plight of 500 natives was not a priority of the federal or provincial governments.

A tragic house fire that killed six children in 1992, and a major youth suicide attempt in 1993 focused the international spotlight on the Innu. By the summer of 1993, after Mulroney and Crosbie had left office, I was hired by then Indian Affairs and Northern Development Minister, Pauline Browes, to serve as her Special Assistant for Aboriginal Affairs in Atlantic Canada.

Throughout the summer, and fall of 1993, particularly during the federal election campaign, the Davis Inlet situation was front and center on the federal government's agenda. In a two year period the Innu through tragedy and skilful public relations, had received more attention than in their entire history. Not since the Oka uprising in the summer of 1990, had an Aboriginal issue captured the national stage. Davis Inlet became a beacon for all that was wrong with the state of native-white relations in Canada.

In April 1994, the new federal Chretien government signed a Statement of Political Commitments (SPC) with the Mushuau Innu which granted conditional support for a relocation to Sango Pond. In July of that year I was hired by Indian Affairs to serve as a negotiator for Canada in discussions with the Innu for certain aspects of the SPC, specifically the Devolution of government programs and services to Innu control.
Meanwhile, however, while early planning was taking place on the Innu relocation, in November 1994, Diamond Fields Resources announced a major discovery of nickel, cobalt and copper at Voisey's Bay, Labrador on land claimed by the Innu Nation and the Labrador Inuit Association. The commercial value of this find has been calculated to range from $15-20 billion. The discovery represented an economic messiah to government officials, the general public and the private sector. To the Innu it was initially perceived as the most substantial threat to their survival as a people.

Not surprisingly, after the Voisey's announcement, the political dynamic of Davis Inlet changed. Davis Inlet relocation had moved from a process-driven exercise of pacification, to a significant bargaining chip in the high stakes game of mineral development. The trading off of a people's future became a commodity, that would be realized by November of 1996, with the signing of the Mushuau Innu Relocation Agreement by Canada, Newfoundland and Davis Inlet.

While the Relocation Agreement was being ironed out throughout September - November, 1996 I served as an advisor to the Chief Federal Negotiator. The position presented me with the opportunity to be a witness to history. This thesis represents my views and recollections of how the Davis Inlet relocation was achieved. I have spent the better part of six years living, breathing and researching this issue. As advisor, negotiator, student researcher, business person and Newfoundlander I have considered the Mushuau Innu story from many different perspectives. In each of these roles I dealt with all the participants in this drama specifically: government officials from Canada and Newfoundland, the Innu, International Nickel Company (INCO)/Diamond Fields Resources Ltd. (DFR), media and the general public. My hope in compiling this story, is that we learn from the mistakes of the past, and ensure that in 30 years hence the Mushuau Innu of Sango Pond are not living through another relocation trauma.
CHAPTER 1

DOWN THE GARDEN PATH:
AN INTRODUCTION
On November 13, 1996 the Mushuau Innu Relocation Agreement was signed. The agreement legally bound the government of Canada to relocate the Davis Inlet Innu to Sango Pond, Labrador. Initial estimates forecast an $82 million expenditure to move 500 people 15 kilometres into the Labrador wilderness. Was this decision the result of good public policy or was the sanctioning of relocation an ill-conceived response to a difficult problem? This thesis will address that question comprehensively. It was a complicated process, fraught with good intentions, near-sightedness, political manipulation and sorrow.

Davis Inlet, Labrador located in Canada's northern nether regions is one of the country's most infamous communities. It was an unknown locale to most Canadians and others until 1993 when terrible images of gas sniffing children were seen from Vancouver to Vladivostok. These pictures profoundly shook a nation that believed such happenings were common only to Third World settings. Canadians appeared shocked to discover that this horror existed in their home and native land.

The early 1990s were tumultuous times for the Mushuau Innu. It is difficult to question the foreshadowing of the
inevitable when in 1991, the governments of Canada and Newfoundland approved a $2.5 million water and sewer infrastructure project for Davis Inlet, but the Innu rejected this offer because they preferred to relocate. The seeds of change were already being sown when tragedy struck. On Valentine's Day, 1992 six young Innu children were killed in a tragic house fire in Davis Inlet. The incident was made even more conspicuous because the children, all under the age of 12, were left unattended while their parents, allegedly alcohol abusers, were at a drinking party. The symbols of Davis Inlet are both numerous and powerful. The fire focused concerned eyes on the community and served to illuminate the circumstance of calamity in which the Innu lived. The government response to the fire was not of sufficient proportion to foster change. The Canadian government's response was a less-than-prophetic statement by Indian Affairs Minister Tom Siddon that:

    ...if need proves to be urgent then I will do everything in my power to make a relocation possible 1

The dilemma surrounding Davis Inlet was rife with qualifiers, political double talk and uncertain solvability. Two weeks shy of the anniversary of the 1992 fire, the gas-sniffing incident rocked the community and the country. Siddon's hollow words of the
previous year seemed to have been offered the necessary challenge as the need to do something for the Mushuau Innu was now serious and urgent. During the span of 11.5 months, in 1992-1993, the problems of Davis Inlet alcoholism, substance abuse, poor housing and insufficient services created a very tragic image of hope lost that dramatically affected the Canadian psyche. Symbolic action to address a substantial matter was the framework through which the mending of the Mushuau Innu would be attempted.

Davis Inlet provides a fascinating snap-shot of Native-White relations in Canada. The picture of a confused and misunderstood relationship between parties emerges. This relationship, grounded in historical injustices, cultural confusion and popular revisionism serves as a template for interpreting other Native actions in Canada such as Oka or Gustufsen Lake. Each event had its own nuance but the general principles of conflict were common to all. The profile, and timing of the Davis Inlet situation make it an ideal and important case to study.

A discussion of the Innu's heritage is undertaken in this thesis. Understanding the Mushuau Innu and their belief system establishes a conceptual mind-set for fathoming why they sought a
third relocation. The writings of social scientists Frank Speck, Peter Armitage, Marie Wadden, Adrian Tanner, Georg Henriksen and Paul Wilkinson, among others, will be utilized. The relocation negotiations produced a number of Innu documents. These included the Innu Seven Point Plan, the Comprehensive Community Plan, the "Hearing the Voices" and "Gathering the Voices" reports. This will mark the first time that a complete combined review of these documents has been conducted.

Fiduciary obligation is the premise that guides Aboriginal-government relations in Canada. Fundamental to the comprehension of why relocation became an issue for the Mushuau Innu is a historical overview of Aboriginal-government relations in Newfoundland and Labrador. Aboriginals in the province found themselves in a very different position vis-a-vis the federal government from those of their brethren in other parts of Canada. Fiduciary obligation towards Natives did not exist when Newfoundland joined Canada in 1949. A "black-hole" of responsibility allowed the Innu to fall through the cracks and receive disjointed, ineffectual representation. Denoting the special status of the Innu was seen as a "citizen plus" privilege by the government of Newfoundland, which they did not want to bestow on the Innu, by having them designated
Indian Act Indians.

The valuable research work of Mark Davis, Edward Tompkins, James Hillier, Peter Neary, S.J.R. Noel and others will be employed to capture a 50-year time capsule of Innu/Canada/Newfoundland & Labrador relationship. Davis' and Tompkins' efforts provide tremendous insight into the prevailing, practical political rationales that governed decision-makers of the period.

Governmental misdirection, misunderstanding and mistakes are found throughout the Davis Inlet story. Neither the government of Canada nor the government of Newfoundland and Labrador avoids those characterizations. Each government made questionable decisions in judgement while attempting to grapple with who would have primary responsibility for Native administration in Newfoundland at the time of Confederation and thereafter. Misdirection came in the motivation implied by the governments in denying the Innu categorization as Indian Act Indians. The judgement of both levels of government will be challenged in examining the reasoning for this exclusion. Cultural misunderstandings of the Innu, by the governments, led to the formulation of haphazard stop-gap administration which forced the Innu to act to survive.
An evaluation of the Mushua Innu relocation decision will be conducted to determine if it was the wisest and only course of action to pursue. To assist in this evaluation it will be necessary to examine a brief historiography of relocation as policy in Canada, followed by a review of public policy theory and practice. Magnus Gunther, Sheila Grant and the Royal Commission of Aboriginal Peoples have all surveyed the history of Native relocations in Canada. Ralph Matthews and Della Stanley, among others, have studied the effects of *Fisheries Household Resettlement Program* in Newfoundland and Labrador. It was under the guise of that Act that the Mushua Innu of Labrador were moved in 1967, from Old Davis Inlet, to their current site. The review of the relocation historiography and public policy options, will help establish criteria to be utilized to ascertain the propriety of the decision to relocate the Innu to Sango Pond.

Upon completion of the review of the decision-making process, an analysis of the technical feasibility of Davis Inlet is conducted. The documentation prepared by representatives of the Innu regarding the viability of Sango Pond, and the federal government review of this material is challenged. Specific
attention will be afforded to the "Terpstra Report" and the Mushuau Innu Renewal Committee sanctioned "Natuashish Economic Development Report Comprehensive Community Plan". Internal federal correspondence, held by the author, provides an interesting postscript on the Sango studies.

Sustainable development must be the guiding principle governing the course of the Innu community at Sango Pond. While the concept of sustainable development has been endorsed by the federal government, it will be demonstrated that the principles of the premise were abandoned with the choice of Sango. Prime Minister Chretien's comments on Canada's commitment to sustainability could be seen as political rhetoric if juxtaposed with the Sango decision:

Now we must go from Rio to results. Through a pragmatic, step-by-step approach. We must aim for measurable results and report on our progress. For it is not just admirable goals that will ensure a better world for our children. It is concrete results.

For our children and grandchildren, for future generations, we have an obligation to create a healthier, cleaner world.

Carving out a prosperous future was the rationale behind the Innu advocacy of relocation. Improving the future lot of the Innu through displacement eventually became the rallying cry of Canada
and Newfoundland. Building the right bridge to the next millennium assumes all schematics have been perused. It was incumbent on the the Innu and the governments to ensure that the right decisions were made for the future generation. The examination of site alternatives and options other than relocation, contests the Sango Pond relocation decision. Postulations will be outlined which suggest other viable choices could have been made.

A contention made throughout the thesis is that the relocation of the Mushuau Innu symbolized different opportunities to the various participants. Only to the Mushuau Innu did relocation mean a move towards community rebirth at a new location. The Innu Nation, the principal political organization of the Innu peoples of Labrador, saw displacement as a way to forge a new relationship for themselves with Canada and Newfoundland. Relocation represented image maintenance, and the impetus that would lead to the development of Voisey's Bay, to the federal government. Newfoundland also saw relocation as a device to initiate the Voisey's Bay project and as an opportunity to off-load onto Canada complete responsibility for the Innu.

The silent partner, which held a substantial role in the economic
prosperity of the province, was the Voisey's Bay Nickel Company (VBNC). The company quietly sought to achieve appeasement of the Innu. Using the time worn argument, welcomed by political leaders, that Voisey's Bay meant a prosperous future for all Newfoundlanders and Labradorians, VBNC needed peace for development. Elected officials, governing on agendas of fiscal prudence, were able to digest an $82 million relocation appetizer in return for a gratuitous $15 billion entrée.

A dominant theme that unfolds in the thesis is the tenacity, strength and conviction of the Innu people of Labrador, particularly the Mushuau Innu. The Innu fought off conquest, assimilation and near-genocide to achieve a circumstantial position of power. Throughout each stage of their history they have refused to forsake their beliefs of a self-directed future. Unwavering in their commitment towards change they continue their crusade toward a fair and just society, where they are active participants in the decision-making process.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 1

1. Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, *Chronology of Key Events Related to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet* (Amherst, N.S.: INAC, 1996)

CHAPTER 2

THE PEOPLE OF THE BARRENS
The Mushuau Innu have wanted to escape Davis Inlet since shortly after they were put there in 1967. The Innu desire to leave Davis Inlet goes to the root of defining who the Innu people were and now are. A discussion on the current relocation can not take place without first examining "the People of the Barrens". Such an examination will uncover the Innu rationale for seeking refuge in Sango Pond.

The Innu of Labrador number about 1500 and live primarily in two communities: Davis Inlet and Sheshatshiu. The Mushuau Innu are part of the extensive group of Native people who inhabit the subarctic forests and adjacent taiga of North America from the coast of Nitassinan (Quebec-Labrador Peninsula) in the east to the Rocky Mountains in the west. The Mushuau Innu belong to the Cree/Montagnais/Naskapi linguistic-cultural continuum which stretches from Alberta to the Labrador coast. In the regional context, the Mushuau Innu are a sub-group of approximately 10 000 Innu people based in the Quebec portion of Nitassinan, in the communities of St. Augustine, La Romaine, Natashquan, Mingan, Sept-Isles/Maliotenam, Schefferville, Mamtimekosh, Betsiamites, Pointe-Bleue and Les Escoumins.¹
The Innu of both Davis Inlet and Sheshatshiu are also referred to as "Montagnais-Naskapi Indians". The term "Montagnais" was used first by the French explorer Champlain, and then by the Jesuit missionaries. After the early 1800s the term was restricted to the Innu living closer to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, including Mushuau (Davis Inlet) Innu, who had been integrated into the fur trade.

The term "Naskapi" has a more complicated etymology, and first appeared in Jesuit missionary records in 1643 as Ounachkapiouek. By 1733 it appeared as "Naskapi". At first, Europeans intended "Naskapi" to designate a subcategory of Montagnais Indians, but it later took on negative connotations, to refer to Innu whom they considered the most primitive, least Christian, unbaptized, and the least Europeanized. For the governments, "Naskapi" meant those Indians who remained nomadic, unsettled, and who could not be enumerated. For other aboriginal groups, the term "Naskapi" was used for Native groups who were less "civilized" than themselves through contact with western society.

Nevertheless, for Peter Armitage, the term "Montagnais-Naskapi" is somewhat misleading. It implies that the Innu can be divided into
two distinct cultures: the Montagnais (Sheshatshui) and the Naskapi (Davis Inlet). In fact, they are part of the same culture and speak closely related dialects of the same language, innu eimum, a derivative of Cree.²

The Mushuau Innu are the people of Davis Inlet. Mushuau, a word from the innu eimum dialect, refers to the Innu people who hunted and inhabited the barrens of Labrador. Davis Inlet itself is known as Utshimassits in innu eimum. Utshimassits translates as 'place of the boss'. The Sheshatshiu Innu, the larger of the two Innu communities in Labrador, use their group and place name interchangeably. Sheshatshiu translates as 'where the river opens into the lake'.

The Mushuau Innu settlement of Usthimassits (Davis Inlet) is located on Iluikoyak Island, off the Labrador coast approximately 295 kilometres north of Happy Valley-Goose Bay. The unincorporated settlement, as of 1995, has approximately 525 Innu residents and 25 resident non-Innu. The current Davis Inlet Innu population is young, with 115 of the 525 residents (22%) aged five or less. Eighty-seven children are preschoolers, of whom 24 are aged five. There are 162 children (31%) aged six to 15. Thus, 61 per cent are 20 years of age or younger while 53 per cent of the population are under the
The Innu argue that they have inhabited Labrador since time immemorial. Documentation prepared by Mark Davis indicates that in 1700 the Innu were closely involved in the fur trade with the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC). Colonial government documentation records that the Innu tended to congregate at trading posts, and communities began to emerge.

The Innu contend that in 1633 the Jesuit priest Le Jeune wintered with a band of Montagnais Indians in southwestern Labrador, but it took the Jesuits a long time before they reached Mushuau Innu territory. Innu materials indicate that before the middle of the eighteenth century, the Hudson's Bay Company extended its business northwards into the interior, stimulated by the desire to intercept the Indian trade with the North West Company, and the Inuit trade with the Moravians. In 1830, the Hudson's Bay Company established Fort Chimo on Ungava Bay in Quebec, and in 1831 a trading post in Davis Inlet. According to a Naskapi Development Corporation report, the stimuli for the HBC to setting up trading posts were the quality of the marten pelts and the reputed prosperity of the Native population in the interior on the grounds that the goods purchased at the trading posts were limited to
ammunition, tobacco, and alcohol, and only a small fraction of them ever visited the trading posts.  

The Mushuau Innu suggest they traditionally harvested in the interior. Although many of them regularly travelled to the coasts to trade their furs with the Hudson's Bay Company after the middle of the nineteenth century, they apparently did not undertake seasonal migrations to exploit the renewable resources of the sea.

Paul Wilkinson, an Innu Consultant, argues that the relationship between the managers of the Hudson's Bay Company and the Innu was based on the desire of the former to increase the quantity of pelts, especially marten, traded by the Mushuau Innu. The Innu traded furs in exchange for basic supplies. Wilkinson records that in 1833, when the Innu were persuaded to trap marten in early winter at the cost of not hunting caribou, they subsequently found themselves starving and demanded food at the trading post. Innu records go on to state that the Mushuau Innu resisted the pressure put on them by the managers of the trading posts to switch completely from hunting caribou to trapping fur-bearers. They retained much of their independence, since they lived in such a marginal environment with regard to fur-bearing animals. In comparison to most other Innu groups further south, the Mushuau
Innu continued their migratory and semi-nomadic existence as caribou hunters in the interior of the Quebec-Labrador Peninsula until approximately 1916. Then the caribou herds failed to materialize, causing hunger and near starvation.  

By 1916, the Innu were living at Old Davis Inlet on mainland Labrador (six kilometres from current site of Davis Inlet). Colonial government documentation records that at the time the Innu depended on colonial relief and were starving. Between 1939 and 1945, the Mushuau Innu began to settle permanently in the Old Davis Inlet area. By 1942, the Commission of Government for Newfoundland established a permanent trading post at Old Davis Inlet.  

In 1945, the Oblate Catholic missionaries started a church at the community. Innu oral historical interpretations are quite detailed on the role of the missionary. According to the Innu, the missionary worked for the Catholic Church and was answerable only to his superiors in Montreal. He was stationed in Old Davis Inlet for an indefinite period of time, and his major concern was to make the Mushuau Innu into good Christians. In a bid to put an end to alcoholism, the missionary encouraged the government to stop relief payments to the Mushuau Innu during the cod season. This suggests
that alcohol abuse has been a long-standing in the Innu community.

The missionary imported small outboard engines, so that the Mushuau Innu could purchase them for their punts. Since the Mushuau Innu did not have the money to pay for the outboard engines, the missionary lent them the money on the condition that they stop drinking. For non-drinking males, the missionary financed purchases of even bigger motorboats. The other services provided by the missionary were dispensing medicines and giving out vitamins and powdered milk to mothers with young children, and he was the only mechanic able to repair and maintain the machinery in Old Davis Inlet. The source of lighting in the Mushuau Innu's tents was the missionary's generator. 9

The church played a prominent role in the lives of the Innu. Both Armitage and Wilkinson report that the missionary acted as the middleman between the Mushuau Innu and the outside world. It was he who operated the radio used to call in the hospital plane in cases of emergency and to send out orders for outboard engines. The missionary, with his knowledge of innu-eimum, became the link between the Mushuau Innu and the storekeeper, and government officials and other representatives of western society. The missionary came to control a vast amount of information about the
community through both his economic activities and the confessions of his parishioners. The Innu contend that the missionary replaced the shaman, thus assuming control of the Innu's souls. By rendering services and controlling information, the missionary made himself indispensable to the Mushua Innu. 10

In the late 1940s, on the eve of Newfoundland's confederation with Canada, the Innu were dependent on the welfare of others to survive. Their independence had been forsaken for participation in a "new white world" which was alien to them; they were foreigners in their own land. Appreciation of the Innu culture and lifestyle was not something that existed amongst non-native people at that time.

For non-Innu such as the missionary, the store keeper, and Commission of Government officials it was easier to convert than comprehend. The imperialist zeal still perpetuated itself among the British hierarchy of the Dominion of Newfoundland. The "aboriginal identity crisis" suffered by white officials enhanced an already volatile situation. A failure to respect cultural nuances, leading to conquest rather than conciliation, caused tension in Native-White relations in Labrador with the Innu. Unfortunately the Labrador model was commonplace not unique to
Canada, but rather common-place. The collective guilt from this
tension was an influential factor in facilitating the modern day
relocation of the Mushuau Innu.

In an effort to better the Innu lot in August of 1948,
Newfoundland's Commission of government moved 74 Innu to Nutak, an
Inuit settlement, 250 miles north of Old Davis Inlet in search of
new and better hunting grounds. They were provided with new tents,
clothes and necessary food supplies. After one year, in an amazing
'homeward bound' effort the people, walked back to Old Davis Inlet
away from Nutak and closer to their traditional hunting grounds.
The Innu have said they were not consulted about the move and were
humiliated.\textsuperscript{11}

There is limited historiography on the 1948 resettlement but it
appeared the government had limited knowledge of how to deal with
the perceived "Indian Problem". Co-locating the Innu with other
Aboriginals may have seemed meritorious, but is illustrative of the
lack of cultural awareness the government had about the Innu and
the Inuit. The Inuit, formally known as Eskimos, had a very
different lifestyle from that of the Innu: one was sea-oriented
(Inuit), the other land-oriented (Innu). Mixing the two groups
together was a recipe for failure.

If the forced 1948 relocation was not bad enough, unbeknown to the Innu, they were to be dealt two more staggering blows in the next 20 years. The Innu were abandoned at Confederation in 1949 and denied recognition, and again relocated in 1967 to perhaps a more isolated settlement. Both of these events greatly contributed to the Innu identity.

Meanwhile, Newfoundland joined Canada in 1949. The Innu, as will be discussed in detail later, were not recognized as Indians under the Indian Act. At that time the province explained that Aboriginal peoples of Labrador and Newfoundland had the right to vote in general elections, and enfranchisement should not be taken away from them by placing them under the Indian Act.

The Innu were again excluded from Indian Act status in 1951, when the Act was revised. While perhaps not a significant development for the Innu at that time, the full impact of the exclusion would be realized through the pan-Indianism movement that engulfed Canadian Natives in 1969. Prior to the "White Paper" controversy, the Innu were unaware of the federal funding benefits provided by Indian Act Indian designation. Unknowing victims until 1969, the
Innu could not help but feel cheated by their forced ostracism.

Exclusion did not help the plight of the Innu. In 1967, the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, with financial support from the Government of Canada, relocated approximately 100 Mushuau Innu to Davis Inlet. The community was to be located on an island about six kilometres away from the original community site of Old Davis Inlet. The intent of the relocation was to enhance the economic prospects of the Innu by involving them in a commercial salt-water fishery and providing them with access to a coastal boat service. More details on the government’s rationale for the move will be provided later.

The Innu-acknowledged failure of the 1967 relocation provided the initial impetus for the modern move. The Innu believed that the Newfoundland government had promised them sufficient housing and services. Government records are unclear on what was actually promised. The crucial point, however, is that the Innu believed they were entitled to receive the fruits of the promise. When these homes and services failed to materialize "en masse", any bond of trust that the Innu had towards the government was destroyed. To
the Innu the broken promises were reflective of their import to the state. An excerpt from the Comprehensive Community Plan provides the Innu perspective on the effects of the 1967 resettlement:

...the relocation of 1967 undoubtedly contributed to the, albeit declining, sense of powerlessness and dependency demonstrated and expressed by the Mushuau Innu today which has been and continues to be one impediment, although far from the greatest one, to their economic development. 12

A brief prepared by the community of Davis Inlet, in 1973, for a Citizens Rights Conference, reinforced the Innu frustration with the 1967 relocation. Clearly the Innu felt victimized and desperate after the move. Great indignation must have been felt amongst them when they were forced to beg for the basic amenities of life. The tone of the brief was despairing:

We the people of Davis Inlet feel that our houses should be built better because in winter our houses are very cold. In fact, we have to haul our wood a long way. Some of our people have skidoos. We hope that our houses could be built better and could be made much warmer for winter conditions.

We the people of Davis Inlet feel that there should be a water system in our community. We have a long way to go to get water and sometimes have to bring water from the Roman Catholic Mission. Sometimes in the winter the valve is frozen and then we have to use melted snow for drinking water. 13

The Innu have always contended that they were a fiercely independent people prior to contact with non-natives. Certainly,
prior to their entanglement with governments in 1916, they doubted neither their identity nor independence. By 1967, it was an Innu belief that their encounters with the non-natives brought disease, despair and subjugation. They assert their existence was fundamentally altered forever as a result of these interchanges. The divide-and-conquer practices of the non-natives transformed Innu culture into an expendable item. However, it is this culture that defined the Innu essence of being. Commentary from the Mushuau Innu in their report, "Gathering Voices: Finding Strength to Help Our Children", provides a sketch of their culture.

When people were in the country, we were always healthy and strong because we were eating country food. The man, his wife, the children would work very hard.

People used to dress in caribou skins. We were very poor. There were no game laws. We used to travel wherever they wished. Everyone was free. We were always on our own. We were our own bosses. Nobody would tell us where we could trap or hunt. A family could choose to go wherever it wanted to.

Mushuau Innu used to meet up with other Innu from other territories like Uashat (Seven Islands) and Sheshatshit. There was no boundary between Quebec and Labrador. The land belonged to the Innu. We were always very happy to meet. Those groups of Innu would have a lot of food, tea and tobacco. 14

The holistic satisfaction of the Mushuau Innu as characterized
in the "Gathering the Voices" report is seen to be achieved by the pursuit of the traditional lifestyle. The traditional Innu lifestyle, exemplified by their hunting and migratory practices illustrated the nomadic nature of their existence. Their daily lives were not encumbered with formalized rules and regulations. The collective acted in the best interest of the collective; individual achievement was secondary to group preservation. Innu elders point to the caribou hunt process as an example of the Innu communal operation:

People always travelled inland with anyone no matter who they were. Who ever started first became the leader and eventually more families would follow. It would not matter how many families there were. They were accepted by the leader. This person was not like a Chief, just a person who led his people. He would tell them when to move, when they should have mukushan. When a leader said it was time to move, everyone had to respect his choice. There was always a leader in the country. 15

The Mushuau Innu hunted caribou, fished inland water ways, hunted waterfowl and trapped fur-bearing animals such as fox, mink, otter and lynx. The mainstay of the economy was caribou. The Innu Comprehensive Community Plan recorded that there can have been little competition for resources, since the Mushuau Innu occupied a vast tract of land that was able to yield everything they needed.
When the need arose, they moved beyond their normal territorial limits just as other people from different parts of Nitassinan came to the area. The boundaries of the hunting territory were determined by the distance that the Innu wished and were able to travel at any given time.

The Innu regarded caribou as a respected foe, not a commodity to be needlessly butchered. The role of the hunter was to kill only enough game to feed the family or community. Resource accumulation was supposed to be a foreign concept to the hunter. All elements of the animal were to be used, not just the meat. The environment where the hunt occurred was to have been left well-preserved. Treating nature well ensured a reciprocal arrangement would take hold.

In Georg Henriken's 1966 *Hunters in the Barren Grounds*, a description of the Innu hunting grounds is provided. This excerpt captures the distinctive nature of the Innu environment:

> The hunting grounds of the Naskapi lie roughly within a semi-ellipse reckoning 150 miles west and 50 miles north and south of Davis Inlet. It is in the interior western part of this area where the Naskapi hunt for caribou which provides the setting for the most crucial aspects of Naskapi social life and culture. The environment consists mainly of barren mountains and rolling plains broken landscape, widely scattered patches of conifers
are found in protected riverbeds and on a few sheltered hillsides. Here the Naskapi erect their tents while, the daily hunting activities take place in the surrounding wind-swept Barren grounds. 16

The romanticization of the past often provides an escape from the circumstances of the present. Hope springs eternal when recanting a glorious past history. Certainly the Mushuau Innu did not fare well from their relocations of 1948 and 1967. A transition to a foreign environment, immersion into an unfamiliar economy, and a failure of governments to comprehend and respond to this Native dilemma all shaped the Innu's desire to effect change.

The Mushuau Innu have long argued that moving a First Nation from its traditional lands undermines its entire culture and imperils its continued survival. They suggest that hunters relocated to areas with which they are not familiar are disadvantaged, and decline in their hunting success is reflected in deteriorating health, and in individual and collective social and economic disintegration. They felt that this happened to them in August 1948, when they were moved to Nutak, and again in 1967, when they were relocated to Davis Inlet.
An integral element of the Innu lifestyle is the concept of spirituality. The Innu notion of spirituality is very complex in its associations, yet simple in its rationale. Essentially man and nature co-exist in harmony, and each possesses a mutual respect for the other. Within this realm of spirituality, the achievement of the collective is advanced over the benefit of the individual.

Henriksen, Speck, Wilkinson and Mackay, in their various works, all confirm the importance of spirituality to Innu health and well-being. Mackay and Wilkinson both feel that a revived spirituality could possibly be achieved at Sango Pond, but not at Davis Inlet. They argue that the historical experience of the Mushuau Innu at Davis Inlet since 1967 has left them in ruins, the only opportunity for healing and development could come in a new secure environment.

Henriksen and Dyck both agree that the loss of traditional subsistence activities has stranded Aboriginals at the bottom of socio-economic hierarchies. Henriksen believes that the Mushuau Innu were completely disempowered by the governments of Newfoundland and Canada and by the Catholic Church. The Innu were forced to become perpetual dependants of the state and the western economic system. He contends that the state transformed the Innu
from a ritual society to modernity. The transformation was a result of both the 1967 relocation and of the state's subsequent relationship with the Innu. Paul Wilkinson has argued that the experience of the Innu must have demonstrated to them that the western economy was flawed and unreliable and was incapable of offering them a comparable degree of security to that offered by their traditional economy. This litany of failure noted by Wilkinson included the failure of the fur trade. It culminated with such ventures as the Churchill Falls hydroelectric project, the proposed uranium mine of Brinex near Postville, the demise of the iron-mining industry at Wabush, and the collapse of the Newfoundland cod and seal fisheries. He contends, with some accuracy, that the "Mushuau Innu have witnessed an unparalleled record of failure". Part of this perceived failure can be attributed to the fact that the Mushuau Innu did not participate in many of those ventures, the exceptions being the fur trade and the fishery. A lack of participation fuels resentment, invites conflict and breeds scepticism. At the time of the Churchill Falls and the mineral developments, the developers and governments did not believe the Innu held any rights to the land. Labrador was considered crown
land and therefore consultation with Indians, who were not legally
considered Indians, about resource development was
deemed unnecessary. Exclusion and misunderstanding must have
made the Innu speculate that these non-natives were "a parcel of
fools come hither to deceive them". Concerning the Innu
involvement in the salt water fishery none of their own historical
records indicate a strong attachment to that industry. Any
industry that the Innu did engage in proved less than successful,
because they had neither the training nor the experience to
capitalize on those endeavours.

The consequences of modernity in Davis Inlet resulted in
exorbitantly high rates of accidents, violence, sexual abuse,
alcoholism and suicides. The gravity of the despair in Davis Inlet
is captured in a 1995 Health Canada report. The people of Davis
Inlet reported that from 1965 to 1992, there were 66 deaths, of
which 47 (71%) were alcohol-related. In 1992, 87% of Innu houses
were assessed to be in poor or fair condition. In 1991-92, there
were 123 people who were "chronic alcoholics" or "problem
drinkers". In 1991-92, the provincial court judge estimated that
90% of the criminal cases in Davis Inlet were alcohol abuse
related. From January to August 1992, it was reported that there
were 54 suicide attempts in Davis Inlet, of which two were fatal. Unemployment rates reported by the Department of Human Resources and Development were often in the area of 90%.  

These horrifying figures, combined with 60% of the population under the age of 20, were volcanic. Development, growth and revitalization are difficult to achieve when a young population is encountered with perpetual tragedy. Battles against alcoholism, substance abuse and mental illness (as reflected by the suicide attempts) leave precious little time to re-invent a community. The magnitude of the social problems of Davis Inlet cannot be understated; there was a critical situation in that community.

The Innu arguments concerning disempowerment, and touching on community genocide, are difficult for anybody to refute upon review of the Health Canada evidence. The Innu had not adapted well to life at Davis Inlet and immersion into a non-traditional economy. This Innu failure to adjust is directly linked to the Innu not being considered Indian Act Indians. Canada did not assume fiduciary obligation for the Mushuau Innu at the time of Newfoundland's union with Canada; subsequently, proper
Aboriginal policy never existed for the Innu or other Native people in the province.

The Innu view Sango Pond as a place where cleansing and healing can occur. Traditional activities and pursuits would be used to provide the impetus for Mushuau regeneration. Commentary from the Innu document "Gathering Voices: Finding the Strength to Help our Children" reinforces this notion:

> We should build a lodge or a long house at the new location. This lodge would be for the hunters. It would be a place to hold mukushan and to clean the caribou bones. We would learn about the animal spirits in this lodge. We could hold drum dances. This would be a place for the elders to teach us their ways. This would help us get back our culture. We can do it. Also we could practise our own medicines. We could teach our children our own games. The women could learn to make traditional clothing like coats with fur. This would help people to stop drinking.\(^{21}\)

There is very little Innu documentation that provides a detailed explanation as to why Sango Pond is considered their best choice. Three reports the Innu prepared on relocation - "Comprehensive Community Plan", "Hearing the Voices" and "Gathering the Voices" - speak to the regeneration of the peoples hope at that location, but do not explain why there and why this regeneration will happen at Sango Pond. For example, all the "Comprehensive Community Plan" says about the significance of this location is:
A referendum, organized by the Mushua Innu Band Council, was held on 8 June, 1993, to determine the preferred site for relocation. 165 Mushua Innu, aged 18 years and over, voted in favour of Natuashish (Sango), three voted for Goose Bay, two voted for Labrador City, and one favoured Sheshatshiu. Seven Mushua Innu voted to stay in Utshimassits. 22

What can be pieced together about Sango Pond from those documents and Federal government materials is that Sango was a traditional gathering place of the Mushua Innu, that the location affords closer access to the George River Caribou herd, a primary food source and that Sango Pond may have been a traditional Innu burial ground. This final point has yet to be confirmed pending the completion of a heritage study of the area.

Sango Pond is the locality for the Mushua Innu at least, where tradition leads to the future. This location provides sanctity to a people in need of hope. Sango is seen as a place where a cultural cleansing can occur and the reemergence of a strong Innu heritage will transpire; a locale where the victimization of the Innu can be vanquished. Sango Pond, for the Innu, symbolizes the new relationship between themselves and Euro-Canadian society. Sango Pond is not just about a physical move for the Innu, it is about turning a page in history, moving on and directing their own future. The words of the Innu themselves are most appropriate:
We must govern and run our own affairs. We need to solve our own problems and not the white agencies. We need self-government. We have to take over all the government institutions: the school, social services, the clinic, policing, the store and so on. We should have Innu teachers, social workers, nurses, police and so on. At the moment, we don't have many educated Innu to take over these institutions. We must encourage our students to attend colleges, universities and other training institutions.

Davis Inlet was never just about Davis Inlet; the Mushuau Innu cause to move to Sango Pond would be championed by many suitors for a plethora of reasons. Relocation to Sango Pond, a Mushuau Innu creation, would take on a life of its own and become a postscript on modern Native-White relations in Labrador and Canada.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 2


   Mushuau Innu Renewal Committee, *op. cit.*, p. 17


4. C.M. Davis, "The Davis Inlet Story", unpublished paper prepared for the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, pp. 1-15

5. Mushuau Innu Renewal Committee, *op. cit.*, p. 21

6. ibid., p. 21

7. ibid., pp. 20-22

8. Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, *Chronology of Key Events Related to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet* (Amherst, N.S.: INAC, 1996)


10. Armitage, *op. cit.*

   Mushuau Innu Renewal Committee, *op. cit.*, p. 25

11. Canada, *Chronology of Key Events Related to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet, op. cit.*


15. *ibid.*, p. 13


18. Mushuau Innu Renewal Committee, *op. cit.*, p. 31

19. *ibid.*, p. 31


23. Innu Nation, *op. cit.*, p. 33
CHAPTER 3

RECOGNITION ABSENT
People are ultimately responsible for their own destiny. The direction of the destiny often comes with access to and participation in the democratic process. If participation in the process is inhibited, the results for the affected party can be devastating. The inability to have a voice ensures, even with other existing predilections, that the concerns of the group will remain mute.

In Canada, the federal government has a fiduciary obligation to recognized Native peoples. This recognition affords these Aboriginals certain opportunities, to guide their lives. While the extent and benefits of this federal obligation continue to be debated, there is little doubt that today recognition is better than lack of recognition. Recognition provides access to fiscal resources and the influence of jurisprudence. The Mushuau Innu of Labrador have never had fiduciary responsibility exercised on their behalf.

Fiduciary responsibility provides the context for interpreting Aboriginal-government relations in Canada. The early concepts of fiduciary responsibility come from the Royal Proclamation of 1763, Section 91 (24) of the British North America Act, 1867, the
Indian Act, 1876 and Indian Act, 1951.¹

There is little, if any, historical evidence or jurisprudence to determine if the Innu fell under the Proclamation Act of 1763, despite having resided in Labrador on British colonial lands.² In 1867, Newfoundland and Labrador did not join Confederation. Therefore, Section 91(24) of the British North America Act, 1867 "Indians and Lands reserved for Indians" did not apply to the Innu. Subsequently, the 1876 Indian Act was not applicable to these people. These pieces of legislation were defining elements for fiduciary responsibility and more importantly, services. It was from these documents that a "special" status for Native people emerged. Canada developed a direct trust responsibility for Aboriginals as a result of these Acts, specifically the Indian Act of 1876.

Fiduciary obligation is premised on the concept that the partners in a relationship act with the "utmost good faith" towards each other.³ The interpretation of Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples report assumes a cooperative arrangement predicated on fairness, and the existence of open discourse between the participants. Predetermined outcomes, or prescriptive policy directives, should be foreign in the contemporary epoch. The
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (INAC) attempted to define its responsibilities towards the Innu prior to the negotiations on the Mushuau Innu Relocation Agreement. INAC negotiators were reminded by a federal Department of Justice attorney that:

One must also keep in mind that the honour of the Crown is at stake in all Crown dealings with Aboriginal people. This requires that our dealings with the Innu in respect of a relocation be carried out fairly, "completely above board", and with respect for the interests of the Innu. 4

Present day practices are guided by a historical revisionist mentality. The history of the Native-White relationship in Canada has been influenced by conquest and attempts at Aboriginal assimilation. Prior to the Calder decision in 1973, fiduciary obligation was epitomized by a wardship relationship between the federal government and Indian Act Indians. Fiduciary obligation is interpreted differently by the Native community and the government of Canada. Many First Nations believe that fiduciary obligation should be broadly elucidated, whereas the federal government takes a narrowly specific view of its obligations.

The federal government chooses to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction for Indians through the Indian Act and applies it to
recognized (status) Aboriginal peoples. This Act acknowledges that Aboriginal people have a "special status" in Canada. The Act gives the government significant powers over "Indians and Lands held and reserved for Indians". Indian bands subject to the Act receive regular funding and policy direction from the federal government for services such as education, governance, housing and community infrastructure. This funding is generally understood to be guaranteed in perpetuity, or until such a time that a new governance arrangement, such as self-government, is achieved. The federal government can repeal the Indian Act as it is just an Act of parliament, not a Treaty-like document. However, such action is not likely as it is the most well-established mechanism for service delivery to Indian people.

The concept and magnitude of fiduciary responsibility has been expanded by Canadian jurisprudence. In the 1973 Calder case, the Supreme Court of Canada suggested that there may be unextinguished Aboriginal title. In the 1984 Guerin case, the Supreme Court ruled that the Aboriginal interest in land is a pre-existing legal right, and the federal government has a fiduciary obligation to protect Indian interests. In the Nova Scotia Sylliboy case of 1985, the courts introduced the formula that is Aboriginal people
have a right, and have not relinquished that right, then they still have that right. The 1990 Sparrow Decision expanded upon and reinforced earlier jurisprudence. In Sparrow v. The Queen, a landmark case on aboriginal rights, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that:

the government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to Aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the government and Aboriginal is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must be defined in the light of this historic relationship.

Fiduciary responsibility had become a federal obligation, as noted in the Guerin, Sylliboy and Sparrow rulings. One of the benefits of these legal precedents for status Native peoples was the opportunity for an enhanced existence and power-base to influence policy with an ever-growing cash flow. These court decisions gave Aboriginals occasion to further define their status with the Crown over and above the Indian Act. The advent of Aboriginal rights jurisprudence has meant that the federal government's relationship with Indians has been guided by more than just the Indian Act.

Conditions prior to the Calder decision in 1973, could have been much worse for Indians if the Indian Act did not exist. At
that time, the Indian Act was the only federal Aboriginal statute enacted by the government of Canada. Regressive and paternalistic as it was, it did provide Natives subjected to it some fiscal resources to survive. In 1985, for example, the federal government provided $100 million to 57 native organizations. This funding was to be allocated on an annual basis. Initially, the Mushuau Innu were not subject to the benefits of fiduciary responsibility, and became destitute as a result of this deliberate oversight. Fiduciary responsibility signifies federal recognition. This recognition can be vital for community maintenance and future development based on the existing funding system.

Prior to Confederation with Canada, the Dominion Government of Newfoundland had assumed the responsibility for Aboriginal peoples. Evidence of this is found in Chapter 80 of the 1916 Consolidated Statutes of Newfoundland entitled "Of the Protection of Esquimaux and Indians". The intention of the act was to prevent the taking of Native peoples from Labrador, mainly for exhibition purposes and leaving them destitute. This was in response to an incident in 1914 when four Labrador Inuit were taken to, and stranded at, the World's Fair in Chicago.
The Innu claim that the Labrador Boundary Dispute, and especially the 1927 Privy Council decision ceding Labrador to Newfoundland, weakened them further. Adrian Tanner, an anthropologist and Innu expert, has argued that the 1927 boundary dispute had a pronounced effect on the Innu. They were forced to sever their contact with the Quebec Innu and participate in a regulated hunt. The traditional economy was obliterated by the imposition of foreign laws and practices. The Innu's lack of recognized status prevented them from participating in the boundary negotiations, but even had they been recognized Indians there is little, if anything, they could have done then to affect the outcome; 1927 was not 1997. Concerns of the Innu would not likely have been paramount to Newfoundland officials involved in the dispute.

History of Newfoundland involvement suggests that they were the principal government active in trying to improve the lot of the Innu. An example was the 1948 move of 74 Innu to Nutak. It is difficult to speculate what this move suggests, but it may have fallen in line with the general intentions of the 1916 legislation, which appeared to have some concern for the welfare of natives. If this Nutak action of the Commission of Government was sincere, then the concept of the move may have had merit.
The period from 1946 to 1949 the Newfoundland confederation debates, was a time when the Innu people stood on the edge of receiving, but then ultimately lost, Indian Act designation. The Innu's lack of official status created the fiduciary "follies" for, and by, the governments of Newfoundland and Canada. In 1946, the British government established the National Convention in Newfoundland. The purpose of the convention was to, "examine the position of the country and to make recommendations to Britain as to possible forms of future governments to be put before the people at a national referendum." The establishment of the Convention marked the first time that Labradorians had direct representation in a Newfoundland governance system. Labrador sent three members to the National Convention, none of whom was Aboriginal.

In October of 1947, the Sub-Committee of the Canada-Newfoundland negotiating team dealing with Indians and Eskimos tabled its report entitled *A Preliminary Statement Regarding the Position of Newfoundland's Indians and Eskimos in the Event of Union*. The report recommended that the Canadian government have "sole responsibility" for Indians and Eskimos. This recommendation was based on Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and a 1939 Supreme Court of Canada decision that declared Inuit are Indians
for the purposes of sub-section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1967. Material obtained from the Sub-Committee report explained, "that they (Innu, and MicMac) should become a direct federal responsibility as in the rest of Canada." Records of the debates of the National Convention reflect the sub-committee's conclusion:

...There happen to be 300 Indians in Labrador, and many more Eskimos, and I (Smallwood) will remind him that in Canada, for the purpose of administration, Indians and Eskimos are all treated as Indians for purely legal reasons. We have many hundreds of them. Mr. Bay Boy may not feel like laughing when I say that the Government of Newfoundland has no such division or department for the welfare of the Indians or Eskimos, of whom there are hundreds in Labrador.

Why Indians were not recognized in Newfoundland remains an historical challenge. Mark Davis and Edward Tompkins, historians who have done much work on Innu - Government relations, point to October 1948 as crucial period for determining which level of government would have responsibility for the Innu. Newfoundland archival records indicate that during that month informal discussions took place between Newfoundland Secretary for Natural Resources, K.J. Carter, and Major MacKay of Indian Affairs. Carter believed application of the Indian Act constituted "wardship" and "...would be a retrograde step...", particularly since no reserves
existed in Newfoundland and Labrador. His rationale was that Newfoundland Aboriginals could vote and there were no reserves; therefore, the Indian Act should not be applied. Premier Smallwood objected to these discussions, but was persuaded to accept Carter's view by Mackay. Informal discussions ended with Newfoundland's assumption of administrative responsibility subject to appropriate federal grants and subsidies.

K.J. Carter's statement spoke to the new province's position on Natives:

It would be a retrograde step to bring the Indians and Eskimos under the restrictive provisions of the Indian Act ... it would be desirable for the new province to continue to administer the affairs of all aborigines including the Indians, subject to a provision of appropriate grants or subsidies by the Dominion, rather than transfer them to Dominion administration under the Indian Act.

When Newfoundland joined Canada, the Innu were not recognized as Indians under the Indian Act. The 1949 Terms of Union Agreement made no mention of Aboriginals and the position of Indians and Inuit was not clarified in terms of any special status. The Newfoundland Premier, J.R. Smallwood, considered all occupants of Newfoundland and Labrador to be citizens of the Province with equal rights. The Premier did not want to create a legislated class of citizens. Smallwood recognized that Indian Act application
to Newfoundland Aboriginals would have been political suicide. Smallwood equated special status to an enhanced standard of living for Aboriginal people. The perception of an enhanced standard was all the reality the Premier needed to prevent the Act's implementation. In a report prepared for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, - Adrian Tanner, John Kennedy, Susan McCorquodale and Gordon Inglis - four well-respected Newfoundland academics assert that "the Newfoundland government probably feared they would have provided them (Innu) with a standard of living above that shared by some of their non-Aboriginal neighbours, something which would have been politically difficult...". 23 The Innu were not privy to the debates and lacked the power to influence any decision. Their future was shaped for them by individuals who had had minimal contact with these Indians. Innu representation came primarily from the Catholic missionaries who worked with them. At the time it would be reasonable to assume that both the church and state felt they had the Innu's best interest at heart. It is unlikely that Smallwood contested the Catholic Church's administration of the Innu. He needed the Catholic vote to ensure his eventual election as Premier. Historical rumour has it that the Catholic Church
supported Smallwood's Confederation with Canada movement. Since the Innu were Catholic, Smallwood did not want them disenfranchised before the vote. The battle over Newfoundland's Constitutional status in 1948 was so close that Smallwood, knew every vote counted be they Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal.

Both Davis and Tompkins correctly argue that Clause 3 of the 1949 Union Agreement stipulated that the British North America Act, 1867, as well as all acts of Confederation from 1867 to 1949, applied to the new province of Newfoundland, including the Indian Act. Subsequently, they suggest that the latter legislation effectively carved out a special place for status or registered Indians in Canada. The Indian Act should have been applied to the Province of Newfoundland to give its Aboriginal peoples a special status, contrary to Premier Smallwood's position. 24

At that time, the political expediency of "no special status" was not contested by any party. Smallwood had what he wanted, union and leadership, Canada was not soliciting additional expenditures, and the Innu lacked the awareness and organization to challenge the interpretation of the Terms of Union Agreement.

The blatant exclusion of the Innu from inclusion in the
Indian Act was perhaps a genuine Newfoundland Confederation conspiracy. The failure of the federal government to exercise proper responsibility for Newfoundland's Aboriginal people should never have happened. It did, and the silence of the Terms of Union on fiduciary responsibility spoke volumes about the significance of Aboriginal people to the leadership of Newfoundland and Labrador, and Canada.

Canada was not content to have a complete reversion to the old Colonial government approach to the administration of Native peoples. Federal Department of Justice records suggest that Canada was fully aware of its responsibilities towards the Innu even after Confederation. A 1950 legal opinion prepared for the Department of Justice stated:

> It is the sole responsibility of the federal government to formulate and carry out all policies that are directed at dealing with Indian(s) or Indian problems. Such policy is to be formulated by Parliament and the executive. This responsibility carries with it the responsibility of providing money to be devoted to the carrying out of policies related to the Indians.²⁵

Legal opinions are only opinions, and they often receive ambiguous interpretation. This was true of the 1950 document. No significant challenge to the primacy of Canada's responsibility
would be mounted until some 35 years later. The intervening years were characterized by reactive management by both levels of government.

Freedom from the Indian Act put the Mushuau Innu in a downward spiral. Without structured funding, and proper mechanisms for community governing, the Innu were at the whim of unresponsive governments. There were no other avenues for the Innu to define their relationship with the crown. Nor were there treaty obligations. Unlike the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia or the Mohawks of Quebec, the Innu had never signed a treaty with the British, Canadian or Newfoundland governments. The only other vehicle was the yet to-be-tested Proclamation of 1763. The inability to launch a legal challenge against a pre-existing contract would exacerbate the Innu struggle.

As reported by Tanner & et.al, in Aboriginal Peoples and Governance in Newfoundland and Labrador - A Report for the Governance Project Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, "the province lacked both the constitutional competence to legislate for Aboriginal peoples and the financial ability to establish special programs for them". Even if there was provincial authority, it is doubtful
if there was the political will at either the federal or provincial level to make the required changes.

While the government of Newfoundland may have lacked power to assume responsibility for Native peoples, this did not prevent them from prohibiting certain practices. Newfoundland's Alcoholic Liquors Act stated that liquor could not be sold or given to "an Indian or Eskimo whether or not such a person is an Indian under any provision of any statute of the Parliament of Canada". In this case the province was clearly acting as if it had legislative authority for Indians and Eskimos and as if they were Indians.

Between 1950-1954, the Government of Canada became more involved in Native affairs in Newfoundland. The federal government reimbursed the provincial government for relief and health programs as well as medical expenditures for Indians and Inuit of Northern Labrador. Recurring incidents of tuberculosis, rather than a sense of obligation, forced Canada to act; the demise of the Innu would not have been politically acceptable. The Canadian response exemplified the federal government's view on the management strategy for the Innu; the extension of this philosophy was do not let them become an eyesore.
In 1954, the federal Cabinet approved a program committing Canada to broaden federal responsibilities for Aboriginal people in Labrador. The ten-year agreement was accepted through an exchange of letters between the Canadian Secretary of State, J.W. Pickersgill, a member of parliament from Newfoundland, and Newfoundland Minister of Public Welfare, H.L. Pottle. The agreement saw cost share rations between Canada (90%) and Newfoundland (10%). Also the Innu were now eligible for health, medical expenses and education coverage from the federal and provincial governments. 29

In 1965, the province appeared to have economic difficulty providing services to Native people, and was eager to lessen its administrative costs. After Premier Smallwood pressed Prime Minister Pearson the first official federal-provincial Native Peoples of Newfoundland and Labrador Agreement was signed. 30 The terms of the agreement were essentially the same as the one struck between Pickersgill and Pottle. This agreement still exists, but has been fiscally enhanced, and renamed the "Contribution Agreement between Canada and the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador for the Benefit of the Innu Communities of Labrador, 1991 -1996". 31
The evolving duality of the Federal position concerning Newfoundland Native affairs is illustrated in an appendix of a February 9, 1965 federal Memorandum to Cabinet on the Canada-Newfoundland Agreement, which read:

When the terms of Union between Canada and Newfoundland were being discussed, the future status of the Indians and Eskimos of Labrador was considered. While the federal government accepted responsibility for the welfare of native people in all parts of Canada outside Newfoundland unusual conditions existed within the proposed Province of Newfoundland that appeared to make it more logical to leave this responsible with the new provincial government. Among these conditions were the unusual degree to which the native population had inter-married with the white population and the long experience of the old Newfoundland government in the handling of its own native population....It was generally accepted that the federal government had some responsibility in this field, but the exact definition of this responsibility was left for later study.32

In 1967, the government of Newfoundland and Labrador relocated approximately 100 Mushuau Innu to Davis Inlet from Old Davis Inlet on the mainland. The 1967 relocation was undertaken to consolidate the community in a more sheltered location with shipping access, coastal boat service and to provide adequate housing. The move took place under the terms of the Fisheries Household Resettlement Program a program partially funded by the federal government. Subscribing to the growth-centred theory of
development, provincial leaders believed that if you merged certain isolated fishing communities into larger "growth centres" a new industrial and non-traditional type of development would be achieved in the province. Under the Newfoundland resettlement program, approximately 300 communities and 30,000 people were moved.\textsuperscript{33} This was also a when the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development was trying to entice isolated Aboriginal communities to more accessible and easily administered locations.

In the second Davis Inlet relocation of 1967, the logic employed by the governments was questionable. At the recommendation of the Catholic missionary in Old Davis Inlet, the Innu were moved to an island to pursue commercial fishing opportunities and be more accessible to the provincial coastal boat. The Mushuaau Innu were not properly consulted about the move and lacked the political power to question the decision. The consultation involved provincial officials and the priest telling the Innu how and when the move would occur. Expression of the views of the Mushuaau Innu was neither discouraged, nor encouraged.\textsuperscript{34} This relocation clearly demonstrated how disjointed and ineffectual the dual management of Aboriginal affairs was in Labrador. No historical evidence has been found to date to suggest that a viable fishery
could have been established at Davis Inlet. Certainly the Innu did not have any real experience in a commercial fishery. An irrational, piece-meal, reactive dual management exercise guided the Innu.

In 1969, due to a strange turn of events, the Innu prospects for a new relationship with Canada and Newfoundland took hold. That year the federal government introduced "The White Paper on Indian Policy". This policy called for a repeal of the Indian Act, thus limiting federal responsibility for Indians and terminating their special status. The policy also recommended that an equitable way be found for bringing the treaties to an end. The federal government had gravely underestimated the value Native people placed on special status, and their interpretation of the "White Paper" as a blueprint for assimilation. This document ignited Canadian Indian nationalism. Indian leaders from across the country united in a reaffirmation of their separateness. They issued a "Red Paper" in response. As part of a face saving exercise the federal government withdrew the "White Paper" and immediately began to fund Indian political organizations. Federal retrenchment went so far as to commence funding to Indian groups
and political associations specifically for research into treaties and Indian rights. This new federal funding was available to all Native groups not just Indian Act Indians. The "White Paper" debacle created an opportunity for the Innu people to begin to exercise some long-overdue direction over their affairs.

In 1972, the Native Association of Newfoundland and Labrador was established. The association was comprised of the Innu, Inuit, and MicMac peoples. Shortly there after, upon separating from the Native Association of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Innu created an organization called the Naskapi-Montagnais Innu Association (NMIA). It did not take the Innu long to commence exercising their influence. The NMIA, along with other native groups were able to provide direct input into the Native Peoples of Newfoundland/Labrador agreement. Two representatives each from the NMIA, the Labrador Inuit Association and the Federation of Newfoundland Indians were added to the federal-provincial management committee of the agreement.

The requirement for Native representation on the agreement committee marked the emergence of community-based governing structures. Under the auspices of the NMIA, Davis Inlet and
Sheshatshiu both sent representatives to the committee.\textsuperscript{41} For the first time the Mushuau Innu had a voice, however limited, at the decision-making table.

The Innu, however, continued to work for change. Results of the NMIA voice included their presentation, and subsequent acceptance of the Innu Comprehensive Land Claim by the Government of Canada in 1979.\textsuperscript{42} As evidenced by their actions with the recognition of this claim, the Government of Canada added some legitimacy to the argument that the Innu should have been classified as \textit{Indian Act} Indians. The NMIA also began to emerge as a political entity, cognizant of the way the Canadian government system operated.

The Innu were to take advantage of other government initiatives. In 1985, the Federal Cabinet affirmed its commitment to Aboriginal constitutional and non-constitutional self-government initiatives, including community-based negotiations with Indian and Inuit people.\textsuperscript{43} In 1986, Canada revised its Comprehensive Claims policy. The revisions allowed for the enhancement of self-government for the achievement certainty of land title.\textsuperscript{44} As a result of the policy a draft framework with the NMIA was prepared.
This draft indicated that self-government negotiations would be an acceptable element of the agreement. However, if the claims negotiations were not moving ahead, then self-government negotiations would not be possible.  

A comprehensive land claim settlement would allow the Innu to define their own land base and establish through self-government, their own system of government. Any uncertainties concerning responsibility would be eradicated with a successful claim. The claims policy initiative provided the Innu with a turning point in their history. A federal program now existed which allowed them to plead their case to the nation. They had the opportunity to strike a modern treaty that would characterize their relationship with Canada. It should be noted that, although the Innu Nation Newfoundland and Canada signed a Framework Agreement for the Innu Claim in 1996, they were still many years away from finalizing an arrangement.  

In 1990, the Naskapi-Montagnais Innu association changed its name to the Innu Nation under the leadership of Peter Penashue. Penashue converted the Innu Nation into a dynamic political force that came to have profound influence on national and international
affairs. Two year later the election of Katie Rich as Chief of Davis Inlet, brought another strong Innu representative to the forefront.

The Innu continued to make gains and generate momentum for a self-government arrangement. They were greatly aided in 1992 when Donald McCrae, of the University of Ottawa Law School, produced a report for the Canadian Human Rights Commission on Innu - Government Relations. The McCrae report found that Canada clearly had a "fiduciary obligation" to the Innu as Aboriginal people in Canada. McCrae called upon the federal government to "acknowledge its constitutional responsibility towards the Innu and recognition that Newfoundland has a role in respect to the Innu that is no different from that of any provincial government in respect of aboriginal peoples." 48

Between 1990 and 1992, Newfoundland fought a series of constitutional battles with the federal government. Throughout the Charlottetown Accord constitutional renewal discussions, Newfoundland had accepted the concept of Aboriginal self-government. Former Newfoundland Premier Clyde Wells was adamant that Canada bore direct responsibility for Aboriginal peoples. The government of Newfoundland and Labrador embraced the
McCrae Report. Provincial political positioning came in line with the firm Innu view that Canada was responsible for them. These sentiments were confirmed in intergovernmental correspondence between Newfoundland and Canada:

...we shall have to insist that any Innu community constructed at Sango Bay, or elsewhere, be acknowledged by the Government of Canada as being "lands reserved for Indians", as that phrase is used in s.91(24) of The Constitution Act, whether or not the Innu accept registration under the Indian Act or the community becomes a "reserve under that statute. This position, as you will acknowledge, is consistent with the recommendations of the McCrae Report...\(^49\)

Several tragedies in the early 1990s focused national and international attention on the health and social problems in Davis Inlet. In February 1992, six children died in a house fire in the community. In January 1993, six teens were discovered sniffing solvents in an abandoned shack and threatening suicide. \(^50\)

These tragedies, coupled with an active public consciousness about past native injustices provided the Innu with an avenue for empowerment. The vehicle for change would be Davis Inlet, and the route relocation.

First Nations issues attained paramount importance to the general public, and in turn governments, between 1985 and 1994. The failure of the Meech Lake Accord, the Oka Crisis, the Donald Marshall
Inquiry, the failed Charlottetown Accord and the Sparrow decision heightened Canadians awareness of past injustices committed against Native peoples. The Oka Crisis and the Marshall Inquiry in particular, had caused great embarrassment to governments. In each of these cases mismanagement of the issue in initial stages of conflict had caused irreconcilable damage to the prospects of positive resolutions. The Oka action and the Marshall Inquiry were the best known examples of Native-government relations in Canada; they exemplified images that needed alteration. The rectification of the situation in Davis Inlet presented the Innu, and governments, with an opportunity for historical redress and change.

The trauma experienced by the people of Davis Inlet in 1992, and 1993, accentuated their desire to leave the community they had been forced to inhabit in 1967. Since 1991, the Innu had been actively soliciting the federal and provincial governments to move them from Davis Inlet to Sango Pond. Finally, in April of 1994, the Government of Canada made a number of commitments to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet and the Innu Nation of Labrador in a document entitled, the Statement of Political Commitments (SPC). The government conditionally agreed to support the desire of the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet to move to Sango Pond.
The SPC was significant because it marked the first time the federal government and the Innu signed a political accord dedicated to relocation. Tom Siddon, during his tenure as Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development had made many pronouncements about relocation but was never a signatory to a displacement agreement. The SPC did not "officially" commit the government to moving the Innu but it did increase the possibility that it could happen.

Three sections of the SPC acknowledged the federal desire to modernize its relationship with the Innu:

(9) To conclude a comprehensive land claims agreement as soon as possible

(10) To conclude an agreement on self-government with the Innu Nation and their communities, including matters relating to policing and administration of justice

(11) To devolve existing federal programs and funding delivered to the Innu and work with the province of Newfoundland and Labrador to devolve such programs and funds under existing federal-provincial agreements for the provision of services to the Innu in a manner consistent with Canada's current devolution policy... 51

Land, resources and government are essential ingredients for empowerment. The SPC illustrated that Canada was finally ready to deal with the Innu, as if they were a federal responsibility.
Newfoundland was supportive of the SPC because it relieved them of charge for the Innu.

The discovery of the $15 billion Voisey's Bay Nickel property, in 1994, did not hinder the Innu's efforts to achieve recognition. This property rests on land claimed by both the Innu and Inuit. Government and native parties knew full well that some sort of "quid pro quo" would be exacted if the mine was to be developed.

In early 1996, Canadian officials were acknowledging the connection between the mine and relocation. Ministerial briefing documents described this emerging logic:

1) Development at Voisey's Bay and in the rest of Labrador is critical to the economic recovery of the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador;

2) Relocation of the community of Davis Inlet to Little Sango Pond is in our view essential to any agreement with the Innu;

3) Innu have the means and the motivation to disrupt development and contribute to an unhealthy investment climate if their concerns are not addressed. 52

Federal and provincial government officials realized that it would be easier to work with the Innu than against them, given their history of demonstration based on low-level flying at Canadian Forces Goose Bay. 53 Recognition of the Innu, along with clarification of their land claim, allowed for the definition of
rights and land title. Having these elements defined could minimize legal challenges to mineral development and accelerate negotiations by reducing land title and benefit uncertainties. The prevailing rationale of the governments was that a less cumbersome process enhanced the likelihood of the expeditious development of Voisey's Bay.

Failure to consider the Innu as Indian Act Indians at the time of Confederation, coupled with consistently disjointed provincial and federal policy practices, created conditions for the recent relocation decision. Strict interpretation of the Terms of Union between Newfoundland and Canada afforded Newfoundland responsibility for all of its citizens. Neither the Innu nor any other Aboriginal groups were singled out as recipients of special status.

The exercise of fiduciary responsibility was not available for the Innu. The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador lacked direction and understanding with regard to Native policy. Initially, Canada was not eager to undo a constitutional arrangement and assume the additional administrative costs of affecting such a change. Canada, appeared to be content with Innu assimilation as
defined by the Terms of Union Agreement. John Gray, a *Globe & Mail* columnist, in a recent article on the Innu, captured the essence of this fiduciary folly:

The government of Newfoundland wanted no special responsibilities for aboriginal people; the federal government has never extended the same commitment to Labrador's Innu and Inuit as it has to all other native people in the country. For almost 50 years, each government has been trying to get the other to be responsible for native affairs. 54

What emerged was a symbiotic arrangement between the governments of Newfoundland and Labrador and Canada. The result has been haphazard administration, insufficient financial resources and near stagnation of the Innu people. The rise of Indian Nationalism in 1969, allowed the Innu to become more active participants in their own affairs. The NMIA, and its predecessor the Innu Nation, publicly exposed the governments for failing to protect their interests. The Mushuau Innu became active agents of change in the 1970s, and by the 1990s were influencing their own future. Taking the imposed images of tragedy and redirecting them westward, brought an admission of failure and an acceptance of responsibility by the Government of Canada.

The SPC and the Mushuau Innu Relocation agreement were watershed
events for the Innu. These once-impoverished and neglected people, skilfully forced the government of Canada to exercise fiduciary responsibility for them. Utilizing tragedy, public opinion, a reputation for protesting, a sense of collective guilt, and a well-documented history of neglect, the Innu exposed their wounds to the world. Lack of proper recognition, as afforded by the Indian Act made the Innu react to survive. The utility of this new found recognition for the Innu was that it gave them the opportunity to achieve relocation. They now had a voice, and through circumstance were care-takers of one of the most valuable pieces of real-estate in the world.

Eventually, for an Innu relocation to happen it would have to wind its way through the vortex of the public policy process to become legitimate. Relocation did not occur because Canada realized its malignant neglect of the Innu. Displacement occurred because it provided a convenient way to appease the Innu, while simultaneously allowing the conditions for the development of Voisey's Bay. Capital gain, more than admission of past injustices or compassion would motivate decision-makers to favour a move to Sango Pond.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 3


7. ibid.

8. ibid.


12. ibid., p.6.


15. Canada, *Chronology of Key Events Related to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet*, op.cit.

   Davis, *op.cit.*

   Tompkins, *op.cit.*


17. ibid., p.31.


20. ibid.

21. ibid.


24. Davis, *op.cit.*

   Tompkins, *op.cit.*

25. Canada, *Chronology of Key Events Related to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet*, op.cit.

26. Inglis, et.al., *op.cit.*

27. ibid.

28. Canada, *Chronology of Key Events Related to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet*, op.cit.

29. ibid.

30. ibid.

32. Canada, National Archives of Canada, Federal Justice File 204,595.


34. Davis, *op.cit.*


37. *ibid.*, p.87.

38. Canada, *Chronology of Key Events Related to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet, op.cit.*

39. *ibid.*

40. *ibid.*

41. Timothy A. Powers, personal papers, Advisor to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, June-November, 1993.

42. Canada, *Chronology of Key Events Related to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet, op.cit.*

43. *ibid.*

44. *ibid.*

45. *ibid.*


50. Canada, *Chronology of Key Events Related to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet*, op.cit.

51. Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, *Statement of Political Commitments with the Mushuau Innu* (Hull: INAC, April, 1994)


53. Since the late 1980s, the Innu had conducted numerous protests at Canadian Forces Base Goose Bay. These protests took on an international dimension and involved collaboration with Plough-Shares International and other groups opposed to military development and ecological destruction. The effects of these actions are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4

TRADE-OFF:
RELOCATION FOR RICHES
Public policy has been defined as; "whatever governments choose to do or not to do."\(^1\) Ideally good public policy involves conscious choice that leads to deliberate action; the passage of a law, the spending of money, an official speech or gesture, or some other observable action, or inaction.\(^2\) The Mushuau Innu Relocation Agreement, and the process through which the decision was forged, illustrated the true nature of policy development in Canada. Comprehension of how and why the agreement happened is instructive to demonstrate the paradox of Sango Pond relocation as policy choice.

There are two intricate and interdependent elements involved in the public policy making process: the political agenda, and policy discourse. The political agenda involves the definition of policy priorities and direction taken by the sitting government. The agenda is shaped by the philosophy of the governing party, public opinion, international political climate and financial market forces. Bruce Doern, a Canadian public policy expert, has identified four developments that have profoundly affected policy development in Canada. These events are:

1. The rapid globalization of the economy;
2. The launching of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement;
(3) The failure of the Meech Lake Accord;

(4) Continuing experience with policy consequences of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 

Policy discourse is "an unfolding tapestry of words and symbols that structures thinking and action." The effectiveness of discourse is measured by the multiple definitions of the problem that are presented and discussed. If the discourse is one-sided, an agenda item will likely be perpetuated rather than resolved. Genuine discourse requires that all sides are heard and their opinions are given consideration. Decisions must be based on having all pertinent information available and factoring that material into the policy agenda that is being pursued.

The discourse on Davis Inlet driven by various participants to the process, captured the different agendas that were brought forward. Multiple agendas rather than a single cohesive goal complicated Innu relocation. Central to this analysis is an examination of relocation as a historical policy practice by the governments of Canada and Newfoundland. An evaluation and analysis of the Mushuau Innu decision to move can only be achieved by reviewing some underlying tenents of public policy theory in Canada.

Relocation as a policy option for Davis Inlet, stems from the
historical practices of the Canadian government, particularly the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, and the Newfoundland and Labrador Fisheries Household Resettlement Program. The principal motivation for pursuing relocation was the belief that a change of location would provide enhanced economic opportunity for those relocated.

Relocation developed as federal government practice during the 1950s; the Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay moves were the most infamous displacements. In a submission to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Magnus Gunther, a political scientist, analyzed the move of the Inukjuak Inuit to those high Arctic communities.

Gunther asserted that the moves were experimental, and occurred in response to a 1953 collapse in the Inuit economy, in Inukjuak and Pond Inlet. He maintained that although federal officials consulted with the communities, all parties had a limited knowledge of what to expect after a move was made. This appears to have been a reactive attempt to deal with the decline of a traditional northern economy. Gunther surmised:

The situation at Inukjuak was harsh and marginal, the "Eskimo economy" had collapsed and the RCMP promised that they (Inuit) would be able to get more game,
more furs, housing and in one instance, use of a power boat...the people who were moved were among the poorest in the district. They were also promised that they could return home after a few years if they did not like the project.

Further evidence confirms the pragmatic and ad hoc nature of federal relocation practice. The Makivik Corporation, in a letter of March 23, 1989 to Hon. Pierre Cadieux, Indian Affairs Minister wrote that "Northern Quebec Inuit went along with the federal relocation "experiment" since they had been told that the hunting and quality of life would be better in the Far North." The Hickling Corporation Report, Assessment on the Factual Basis of Certain Allegations made before the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs Concerning the Relocation of Inukjuak Families in the 1950s, quotes one of the original participants as saying, "We did not really know where we were going till we got there," and noted that this probably an accurate account of the level of understanding at that time.

The historian Sheila Grant, has suggested that the Inuit relocations were about the extension of Canadian sovereignty to the High Arctic. In Sovereignty or Security Grant argues that: The possibility of Soviet aggression, combined with the uranium fields on the shores of Great Bear Lake and the advances in aviation technology firmly entrenched the wartime significance of the region. With
Canada now lying inconveniently between the two opposing superpowers, Ottawa again faced the dilemma of being dependent upon a traditional adversary to defend against a potential one. 

Grant contended that in the case of Grise Fiord relocation and the abortive plans for the Alexandra Fiord, concern for sovereignty was, unquestionably, the primary motive behind the idea and site selection. In 1990, while appearing before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, Grant stated that Resolute Bay was added in direct relation to the "Canadianization" discussions taking place within the Canadian government at the time. She concluded that concern for sovereignty determined the time and place of the moves and without this concern there would have been no reason to relocate southern Inuit to such a distant and alien environment. In her view, sovereignty was the primary motive in determining when and where.

Gunther challenged the validity of Grant's sovereignty argument. Citing V.C. MacDonald's Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic report and the Hickling Report, he says the issue of sovereignty was an insignificant point, as Canada was already recognized as custodian of the Arctic by the U.S. and Greenland. MacDonald emphasized that:
...the conclusion appears inevitable that Canada has made so many displays of sovereignty, in so many respects, in so many places, for so long a period, with so little challenge, as to establish its title to the whole of the Canadian Arctic Region by effective occupation in conformity with international law. ³

The importance of these early relocations lies in how they were effected. In the cases noted above and subsequent native community relocations, reactionary responses superseded proper planning and implementation. Government officials and disenchanted Inuit sought alternatives for a northern economy and people in transition. The sustainability of hope was simplified by the continuum of the pursuit of a known "traditional" lifestyle.

Recent research findings suggest that most Native community relocations were utter failures. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples report (RCAP), which examined 13 displaced peoples, found that the relocation of Aboriginal people often took the form of deliberate initiatives by governments to move particular communities for administrative or development purposes.

According to RCAP, an "Administrative" relocation was carried out either for the convenience of government and to make administration of services easier through centralization and/or amalgamation, or to address the perceived needs of Aboriginal
people by moving them away from negative influences of non-Aboriginal settlements. The Mushuau Innu relocations of 1948 and 1967, as well as the Inukjuak Inuit moves are considered "Administrative" by the Commission.

"Development" relocations have been classified as displacements that occurred to access native land needed for agriculture, urban growth, or hydro dam construction. These types of moves occurred in Western Canada in areas where the non-Aboriginal population was in a mode of rapid expansion. Specific examples include the move of the Songhees (urban growth) in British Columbia and the Chemawain Cree (hydro dam) in Manitoba.

The Royal Commission felt that the three traditional goals of Canada's policy toward Aboriginal people - "protection, civilization and assimilation" - were all expressed through relocation at one time or another. Echoing Gunther's view, reactionary responses, and an ignorance of options directed relocations not some alleged state policy of conquest.

The province of Newfoundland and Labrador, pursued a provincial relocation policy. Joseph Roberts Smallwood's cry to "Pull up your boats, burn your flakes, and forget the fishery - there will be two
jobs for every man in Newfoundland" represented the provincial government's development manifesto. Newfoundland social scientists, Parzival Copes, Noel Iverson, Ralph Matthews and Cato Wadel confirm that this rhetoric drove the province's economic agenda towards a centralized, non-traditional economy less reliant on natural resources, and more focused on manufacturing. Essential to the success of this strategy was the necessity to consolidate and relocate hundreds of Newfoundland's coastal communities.

Since 1953, the Newfoundland government had assisted, in a formal way, the depopulation of isolated, non-viable, outport fishing communities. Initiated by the requests of a few communities, the program became a matter of government policy in 1965 with the Fisheries Household Resettlement Program. Through a joint federal-provincial scheme under the "growth centre" strategy of the Atlantic Regional Development Agreement (ARDA), residents were paid to relocate in one of seventy designated areas where services and employment opportunities were supposedly better than in the outports.

The decline in the inshore fishery forced the Newfoundland government to pursue other fisheries development plans such as an
expanded offshore fishery. The genesis of this fishery was fewer fishers and boats, with more fish processing plants and plant workers. Centralized plants near transportation routes assumedly were expected to make the "new" fishery more cost efficient. Centralized communities also provided the government with a convenient way of offering and establishing service centres. However, in a majority of cases these centres did not have the services or employment opportunities necessary to cope with the influx. Historian Della Stanley records:

"Compensation for loss of business and house value was inadequate or non-existent. Only 14 percent of those who moved actually settled in major, fisheries-oriented growth centres, and the offshore industry, itself in trouble, by 1970, could not absorb the inshore surplus." 14

The Newfoundland resettlement exercise was reflective of the provincial government's desire to fall in line with emerging federal regional development strategies epitomized by ARDA. Newfoundland was highly dependant on federal largesse to fuel its economy. The "growth centre" theory enveloped most of Atlantic Canada. The growth centre strategy of development posits that regional development is most likely to occur around "growth centres" containing "master industries" that have extreme "propulsive potential" for development. These are
generally large industries that can take advantage of their large size so as to produce a cheaper product that can be manufactured elsewhere. Furthermore, they are industries that have extensive "frontward and backward linkages" with regional suppliers and extra-regional distributors. These linkages (theoretically) lead them to spawn a network of related industries within the region, thereby accelerating the process of development. As evidenced by research material produced by RCAP, and illustrated in Newfoundland, there was an effort to "diversify" Canada's economy. The post-war period featured a new search for "prosperity" dedicated to infrastructure projects and entrepreneurial enhancement. Aboriginals and Newfoundlanders often served as the theoretical test cases.

The Fisheries Household Resettlement Program was about creating new economic opportunity in hope of avoiding the failures of the past. Smallwood came to power, and maintained power, by continuing to fan the flames of hope. The hope came by the pursuit of numerous economic development ventures. Newfoundland resettlement was about restoring hope, but the evidence suggests it was unsuccessful. A great deal of resettlement's failure seems to lay in the fact, that like most Smallwood initiatives of the time it was ill conceived
and poorly planned. Statistics gathered in 1971 by sociologist Ralph Matthews, an expert on the Newfoundland program, illustrated the failure of diversification. Matthew's article "The Smallwood legacy: The Development of Underdevelopment in Newfoundland, 1949 - 1972" recorded that failure:

From confederation to 1970 the number of fishermen stabilized around 18,000 or about 20% of the labour force.

Only 12,600 of the approximately 160,000 persons employed in 1970 were engaged in manufacturing, and most of those were engaged in producing food products for the local market. Less than 2000 were engaged in the production of durable goods.

In 1970, 50% of the labour force were engaged in tertiary activities.

Newfoundland can only maintain this level of service because it receives a substantial level of financial support from the other Canadian provinces through transfer payments. 16

This relocation exercise appeared to occur in a vacuum with little or no study done to confirm the economic viability of new fishery. There is no information to indicate that any type of review was conducted to ascertain the psychological effects of displacement for the people involved. Community social dysfunction would not likely have been an overriding concern of provincial government officials. Such variability was interpreted to be the result of
insufficient economic opportunities, and thus if such opportunities were being procured then psychological dislocation would not have been viewed as a factor. It would be fair to suggest that hindsight allows for the examination of knowledge bases which were limited at the time of these moves. However, this does not discount the reality that relocations do cause such dislocations, which in turn hamper prospects for success.

The history of relocation policy provides half prespective needed to analyze the propriety of the 1996 Davis Inlet Relocation decision. To get to the heart of public policy decisions requires fathoming of the framework in which they were made. In Canada, this necessitates reviewing a crowded landscape of policy influences. Interpretation of what is good public policy, are often strikingly different between Natives and non-Natives and this is exemplified in the actions of the governments in their relationship with the Labrador Innu.

The paradox between Native policy and non-Native policy must be understood to comprehend why governments and Aboriginal groups are often at cross purposes. It is a valid argument to suggest that Canadian policy towards Aboriginals is often misdirected and not
appropriately conceived. The fundamental cultural differences between the Aboriginal approach to collective rights, and non-Aboriginal doctrine of individual status causes conflict in regard to direction. Menno Boldt, sociologist at the University of Lethbridge, describes this policy conundrum in his book, *Surviving as Indians*:

... Canada's injustice to Indians flows primarily from the "sidestream" effect on Canadian mainstream policies that are designed to serve the "national interest" at the expense of Indian interests. 17

Cultural differences are responsible for different policy perspectives between Aboriginals and the state. James Frideres, a sociology professor, postulates that culture is manmade and is transmitted not through biological heredity but through learning. Culture has traditionally been divided by anthropologists into material culture (consisting of material objects, such as artifacts, and the ways in which these are used) and non-material culture (beliefs, customs, languages, social institutions, mentifacts). 18

Most Aboriginal cultures are profoundly different from non-aboriginal cultures. It is the failure to recognize and comprehend these differences that often results in flawed policy towards
Canadian natives. Canadian public policy has generally avoided adaptation of Aboriginal nuances. Innu culture interpretations are quite varied from Newfoundland non-Aboriginal positions. Daniel Ashini, an Innu Nation Vice-President, captures the nature of these interpretations in an article he prepared for the *Voisey's Bay News*:

...many Innu are starting to challenge the assumptions Europeans have made about us for centuries. For example, today many people still believe that the Innu will inevitably embrace 'modern values' and become just Canadians on the march of 'progress'. Many people seem to think that this is natural, that it is all part of the process of 'development'. Projects like Voisey's Bay are seen as steps down the path that will eventually bring the 'backward' Innu into the modern world.19

Colin Scott, an anthropologist, has argued that cultural distinctiveness is a key value and indispensable political resource for Aboriginal peoples in Canada. Implicit in cultural politics are issues about the rights of the suppressed cultural collectivities, issues impassioned by hopes of equity in economic and jurisdictional terms.20 Aboriginal culture has gained prominence as a positive policy value only in the last twenty years. The aim of Aboriginal policy, is preservation and conservation, followed by enhancement; state policy is directive and prescriptive.
Comprehension of these disconnected platforms is necessary to understand the framework of Native-White relations in Labrador and Canada. Aboriginal leaders, for their part, tie cultural rights to the historical priority of Aboriginal peoples, and to an institutionally comprehensive definition of cultural survival. The nature of "Sovereign Crown" however, is diametrically opposed to indigenous cultural premises in which authority is delegated by grassroots constituents to leaders.

The advocacy of the preservation of the traditional lifestyle is the cornerstone of Aboriginal peoples' cultural covenant. This argument was front and center in the Davis Inlet relocation debate. Innu culture was originally structured around the hunt and was based on communal participation and rights; that is a culture where no one individual is paramount over another. The concepts of capital accumulation and selective distribution of resources were foreign to this environment. Some scholars have pointed out that when tradition is taken to be absolutely static, invulnerable to change, and devoid of historic relativity, when any change in tradition is disallowed as a form of behaviour qualifying as a right, then tradition is reduced to traditionalism. This is a widely held concept among numerous scholars including Boldt and
Scott. Marginalization and misinterpretation based on semantics of tradition, have caused the term to be interpreted as static rather than evolutionary. Thus the pronounced misinterpretation of what preserving a traditional lifestyle means; it does not constitute returning to a 19th century migratory existence, rather it refers to an Aboriginal directed adaptation to changing circumstances. Scott appropriately defines the concept:

> Profoundly embedded in the collective life; that policies on aboriginal government must accommodate the reality of aboriginal culture as changing, adapting, and developing; that policy makers reject the notion that these dynamic qualities signify cultural assimilation. 21

Public policy relating to Native people has found an ally in Section 35 of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. In contemporary jurisprudence, pre-and post-Confederation treaties are increasingly interpreted as either implicit or explicit acknowledgement that indigenous institutions, customs, and traditions remain in effect. Contemporary land claim agreements and treaties continue in this vein; like earlier treaties, they can enjoy protection under Section 35 of the Constitution. The policy implications of the inherent right as defined by Section 35 of the *Constitution Act* are profound. Section 35 has allowed for a contested terrain where Natives have occasion to guide and
challenge policy. Section 35 has acknowledged the "distinctiveness" or "difference" between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples.

Roger Gibbins, a political scientist, reinforces this concept. In an article entitled, "Canadian Indians and the Canadian Constitution: A Difficult Passage Toward an Uncertain Destination", Gibbins examined the gains accrued by Native people as a result of the Constitution Act of 1982. He records that Section 35 marks the first time that the Canadian state has explicitly recognized Aboriginal people and Aboriginal rights. The significance of this denotation is that Section 35 ends debate on the existence of Aboriginal rights in Canada and shifts the terms of debate to meaning and implementation of such rights. He ends his review defining that the extent of terms of the "1982 Constitution Act even without further change, provides Indians with substantial leverage of the political process, leverage that, with both luck and skill, can be used to offset a continuing shortage of conventional political resources." Although the Innu are not registered or subject to a treaty they have been due benefactors of the principle of Aboriginal rights. In the past they have made successful arguments in the court of public opinion that they do have privileges which were ignored. The McCrae report used the
national Section 35 achievements as a springboard to present the Innu case. This provision also provided the Innu with the avenue to pursue their land claim.

The effectiveness of the Charter inclusion is often restrained by the fiscal strategy of government. Federal Indian policy is also hampered by the relative insignificance of the department of Indian and Northern Affairs. Indian Affairs is best categorized as a municipal affairs administration rather than "agent provocateur" of and for Aboriginal policy. Federal policy is too often directed by a few departments who pull the levers of government. These departments are guided by the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO), who serve as the foremen of federal policy. The practical policy structure needs to be acknowledged because it was by this route that Davis Inlet received an affirmative relocation decision. David Nicholson, a former Assistant Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs, wrote "Federal Policy: An Insider's View." He details his interpretation of how Indian Affairs and Indian policy operates in Canada. He asserts that the fiscal policy of the federal government hamstrings Indian Affairs and Indian policy. He observes that INAC's policy-making latitude is bounded on one side by legal barriers imposed by the Department
of Justice and on the other by fiscal-restraint policies of Treasury Board; this leaves little capacity for constructive or innovative policy-making. 23

The fiscal-restraint agenda of the Chretien government channelled by the PMO, PCO and the Department of Finance is the operational dogma. Ovide Mercredi, commenting on the lack of focus on Aboriginal issues in the 1997 Federal election reinforced this contention. The AFN chief suggested that various governments have captured the national political agenda with talk of budget deficits and the need to down-size governments and reduce spending. He felt the result of this was a sense of fear in the public mind - fear about the future, fear about personal security. Mercredi concluded that on that agenda there is no room for Aboriginal people. 24 David Cameron, a political scientist, has reiterated Mercredi's supposition. Cameron points to the plans of the $58 million Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples for a "whole new order of government with its bureaucracies and civil servants, its councils and operating agencies, its legislatures and political leadership and staff."25 He says:

... for better or for worse, the Mike Harris Tories are more representative of the current mood and thinking of a majority of Canadians than are the aboriginal royal
Cameron's commentary highlights the current problem with the Aboriginal agenda: Indian policy is not a priority of the federal government. Indian policy only becomes relevant when it becomes a component part of a larger issue.

Sally Weaver, a noted anthropologist, takes Nicholson's view further and discusses the varied philosophical and operational priorities that fragment the federal government. In Weaver's review of *The Hawthorn Report*, the two-volume, government commissioned national survey of Canadian Indians, a "Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada" (Hawthorn 1967), an extensive description is given on the policy process. Weaver's analysis is comprehensive and intuitive:

> the policy-making process took two different but increasingly divergent paths. Publicly, DIAND's consultation meetings with First Nations began in the summer of 1968, becoming the major instrument for raising Indian expectations that their views on special rights would be considered by the government in revising the Indian Act. Privately, within the government at the cabinet level, a dramatically different exercise began with which questioned both the philosophical and practical basis of a separate Indian administration and special rights for First Nations. This second exercise took place in the central advising agencies around the cabinet: the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), which provided Trudeau with political partisan advice on policy, and the Privy Council Office (PCO), which provided Trudeau and the cabinet with bureaucratic advice from an overall governmental perspective rather than from a specific department's perspective.
The dichotomy discussed by Weaver in relation to the Trudeau government, was even more pronounced in the Mulroney era.

Concerning the Mushuau Innu, federal direction came from a number of sectors; INAC did not have exclusive domain. Through 1991 until the early summer of 1993, Mulroney's senior federal Cabinet Minister for Newfoundland and Atlantic Canada, John Crosbie helped direct INAC Minister Tom Siddon in dealings with the Innu. Siddon appointed his parliamentary secretary Ross Reid, M.P. for St. John's East, to serve as the federal envoy to Davis Inlet. When Kim Campbell assumed office in June 1993, she appointed Reid, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, with special responsibility for Davis Inlet. At that time, Reid effectively displaced INAC Minister Browes from the most prominent Aboriginal file in Canada. Reid and the PMO coordinated the Davis Inlet strategy for the federal government during the summer of 1993, and throughout the fall election campaign. A special sub-committee was established by the PMO to direct the political response to Innu actions. Ray Castelli, Campbell's Deputy Chief of Staff, oversaw this group, which included senior political staff from Public Security, Indian Affairs and Fisheries and Oceans. Bureaucratic direction was provided by Shirley Serrafini, the Assistant Secretary to Cabinet
in PCO and by Jack Stagg, an Assistant Deputy Minister of INAC.

The Reid appointment exemplified the role of pragmatic politics in overriding scripted policy. Reid had symbolic and practical importance that put him front and center on the Davis Inlet relocation issue. Reid, a Newfoundlander, had a sound professional rapport with the government of Newfoundland, the Mushuau Innu and the Innu Nation. He played a significant role in Kim Campbell's leadership campaign and was recognized as one of her most powerful ministers. Ross Reid was afforded the power to achieve a solution for the Innu, and his involvement represented the importance of Davis Inlet to Tory political fortunes. Tory strategists believed that the dilemma of the Mushuau Innu, if left unattended, would explode and reveal a malaise in Canadian social policy. They believed that the new Prime Minister could not afford this embarrassment.

The role of Crosbie and Reid throughout the stages of the Davis Inlet drama highlighted another policy issue. National policy is often shaped by regional caveats; regional political sensitivities cannot be ignored if policies are to succeed. The prominence of Crosbie and Reid in their respective cabinets meant they were
central figures in shaping Davis Inlet's future. Prominent personalities often influence policy development and reflection and that was certainly true of those two cabinet ministers.

Reid was successful in keeping the Davis Inlet situation under control. He was able to convince his cabinet colleagues that the issue of Davis Inlet could only be contained if the federal government acquiesced to the Innu and their demands to be moved to Sango Pond. A government still recovering from the wounds of Oka, and of the debates over the Charlottetown Accord found the conditional acceptance of relocation palatable. A reference in a September 16, 1993 Aide Mémoire to Cabinet captured the symbolic significance of relocation. Relevance came to this matter because failure to act would have hurt Canada's solid international reputation. The Innu were acutely aware of this and thus were determined to ensure their story had an international audience. According to the Aide-Memoire's communication plan:

A powerful August 22, 1993, Montreal Gazette editorial reprinted in at least two other papers said, "For 44 years, the Federal government has dithered, stalled, looked the other way and swallowed its concerns about the condition of the Innu ....Ottawa should come off its high horse, preaching to the whole world about respect for human rights. Labrador is in our back
It is imperative that sound public policy practices exist to provide effective administration. Translation of the public policy literature presented suggests that the following criteria must exist in order to formulate sound decisions:

1) Proper Discourse - multiple definitions of the problem are presented.

2) Policy Agenda - it is well-planned, fiscally responsible and adheres to defined national priorities.

Proper discourse and adherence to a recognized policy agenda were not evident in the Davis Inlet relocation deliberations. Policy that transpired came to fruition through a merge of multi-faceted priorities. Relocation was not just a policy option in and of itself. The real policy agenda item that relocation represented was economic development and opportunity. Further confusing the situation were the different agendas of the participants in the decision-making process. To dissect properly the grounds for the decision it is necessary to conduct an overview of the actions of the participants.

The Mushuau Innu were responsible for making Davis Inlet a national
policy agenda priority. The Innu invocation of an "ethnodrama" catapulted this isolated Labrador community onto national stage. The concept of the ethnodrama is the use of media coverage of a particular event to promote political objectives vis-a-vis the Canadian state. This is a political stratagem much favoured by Aboriginal leaders both in Canada and other settings.\textsuperscript{31} The Oka Crisis and the Assembly of First Nations protest of the Cabot Celebrations in Newfoundland are examples of this strategy. According to Robert Paine, political scientist, the success of an ethnodrama centers on the issue of moral opposition, and dramatic presentation:

...moral opposition use alternative (often innovative) channels in the knowledge of powerlessness to register one's will directly through the ballot box. The alternative means chosen are moral in the sense that they there is an appeal to values which are widely recognized as intrinsic and thus supra-transactional; a common occasion for the use of moral opposition is when a group believes that it is being mistreated with respect to a supra-transactional value; but in such a case, the action taken must not itself do violence to the normative moral code.\textsuperscript{32}

Ethnodrama becomes a viable approach when cultural misunderstandings exist. One of the principal problems with Innu-Government relations has been the resistance of the Innu towards Western assimilation. Therefore, a clash of cultures emerged. The
determination of the Innu to protect their heritage gave them the incentive to use western canons to their advantage.

The trauma of the community of Davis Inlet provided the Mushuau Innu with many "white" supra-transactional values. The death of the six children in the 1992 house fire, and the 1993 gas snifing incident captured on film, reflected images of innocence lost, coupled with hope abandoned. The other pictures of Davis Inlet brought forward by the community were of mistrust, deceit, racism and abandonment. The Innu version of their history was subjectively reported by the media. The Mushuau Innu had the currency of tragedy to utilize to affect change. The currency had authenticity, as afforded to it by the media, and a receptive audience that did not appreciate having their "white" societal values compromised before their eyes.

The ultimate agency of the Mushuau Innu was seen in their astute analysis of the political landscape. In 1992-93, the Innu realized they had a body of public opinion that could be used to force the governments of Canada and Newfoundland to act. Polls conducted by INAC in 1994, illustrated that 69% of Canadians thought the situation for Aboriginal people was worse and only 30%
of Canadians believed that the standard of living for Aboriginal people was the same as or better, than that of the average Canadian. The Innu knew that if they were to act, opportunity's door would only be open for a short time. After the failure of the Charlottetown Accord, the policy agenda of governments was focused on fiscal austerity.

The Mushuau Innu acted with immediate vigour after the sniffing incident had been beamed, via television into homes worldwide. Knowing the gravity of the situation, the Mushuau Innu, in conjunction with the Innu Nation, released the Innu Seven Point Plan on February 5, 1993. The plan served as the Innu's blueprint for action. In the process the Innu Nation managed to add issues such as constitutional recognition and self-government to that document. This indicated that the Innu Nation understood the Davis Inlet drama had its potential benefits.

The most significant point of the "Seven Point Plan" was the demand by the Innu that a former Prime Minister, Joe Clark, be appointed as Canada's representative to the Innu. The importance of the call for Clark by the Innu can not be understated. For them Clark was the ultimate dramatic symbol of recognition. He was then
Constitutional Affairs Minister and had just finished a seven year period with External Affairs. He had once advocated the notion of Canada as a "community of communities." Clark had the profile necessary to keep the Innu ethnodrama going, as well as the political capital to resolve the Davis Inlet mess.

Clark was not appointed as Canadian negotiator to the Innu but this did not hinder the Innu's efforts. They had a more potent medium to deliver their message. The Canadian and international media were allies of Davis Inlet.

The Canadian and international media alliance with the Innu prevented any discourse on the dilemma of Davis Inlet. The news coverage of this story was more about controversy than collaboration. Allan Levine, in *Scrum Wars: The Prime Ministers and the Media* captures the pervasive influence of the media on the public policy process:

TV simplifies politics both by making it more personal and by turning the reporters who deliver the news into major Canadian stars with expert opinions on everything. The political analysis offered on television, media critic David Hayes has observed, tends to emphasize "presentation and superficial appearances, and favours conflict rather than extended exposition of ideas or complicated arguments ... In recent years this search for the truth has led to controversial media-created news items, such as stories about former Liberal prime minister
John Turner's alleged drinking problem and Brian Mulroney's Gucci loafers....Such adversarial journalism is said to benefit the public. 36

The "Language of languish" is a tool used by the media to encourage adversarial journalism. This type of stylistic prose was well utilized to describe the situation in Davis Inlet in January, 1993. Newspaper headlines from the period are instructive:

"Living with a time bomb -- tragedy, hopelessness stalk tranquil; Snow-Covered Innu Village"

"Hope is Dead in Innu Village"

"Suicide Routine in No-Hope Village" 37

The prevalence of the word hope, and the constant reference to its loss in Davis Inlet, were embedded in the Canadian psyche. The portrait of the Mushuau Innu was a masterpiece, without having been properly painted.

The lack of objective coverage of the Davis Inlet events by the mainstream media in Canada prevented a discussion on, and understanding of, the problems of the remote Labrador community. The biased nature of the reporting forced an image-obsessed federal government into a reactive response mode, in which the only viable solution to the problem was the one advocated by the Innu. The Innu-driven idea of that relocation to Sango Pond provided an
answer to the problem.

The February 9, 1993 announcement by then Indian Affairs and Northern Development Minister, Tom Siddon, that the "Federal Government supported the relocation of Davis Inlet", came with little surprise. The Canadian government was very much aware its problems with the press. A February 3, 1993 media analysis report prepared for Indian Affairs regarding the "Davis Inlet Suicide Attempts", spoke to the situation:

- Almost without exception, news coverage was highly sympathetic to the Innu population of Northern Labrador and critical of both the Newfoundland and Canadian governments;

- The situation presented a perfect platform for the Innu leadership to lay a damning indictment against the federal and provincial governments. The emotionally-charged story left the two governments in an almost indefensible position in the court of public opinion;

- the community is Canada's "Third World"...;

- the national and international communities are outraged that the governments tolerate such a situation and are not moving faster to resolve the problems. 39

In 1993, Davis Inlet as a symbol of human tragedy was the image the federal government most wanted to obliterate. The Canadian government knew that its international political currency would be diminished if something was not seen to be done for the Mushuau
Innu. Siddon's February announcement was one step in that direction. The announcement, of course, only signified the government's intention to pursue the concept of relocation. It was not a commitment to move the Innu.

The media's interpretation of the Davis Inlet situation, guided national acceptance of the Innu-driven Sango relocation plan as the only acceptable alternative as no other options were brought forward. The Sango Pond alternative may have been the appropriate option but a proper policy debate should have taken place in the press to contemplate solutions to the problems. The federal government should have been more assertive at that time in publicly challenging relocation. Neither the media, nor the federal government, contested the concept of Sango Pond relocation as a policy option.

Davis Inlet created a window for the other native groups to use to present their cases. Davis Inlet represented all that was wrong with Aboriginal-government relations in Canada. The community's notoriety was capitalized upon by the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), and by its Grand Chief Ovide Mercredi.

Soon after the gas-sniffing incident, Ovide Mercredi
visited Davis Inlet. It is likely that Mercredi's trip had more to do with the fact that to the AFN and other Native organizations, Davis Inlet represented a chance to put aboriginal issues back in the national spotlight. Native matters had seemingly fallen off the Federal policy agenda. Mercredi and Ron George, leader of the Native Council of Canada (NCC), wanted to kick start a national reawakening. In a January 30, 1993 interview, Ron George synthesized the importance of the plight of the Mushuau Innu to the national Native organizations:

...George...pointed out that he predicted such problems when the Charlottetown Accord was defeated. He told the interviewer that the Indian Act was at the root of all the problems; constitutional change was the only real hope for change. He cited the apparent hypocrisy of Canada celebrating its status as the "number one human rights defenders in the world, but their own Human Rights Act exempts the Indian Act...That's a tragedy, shame on Canada."^

The utilization of Davis Inlet for political benefit by the national Native organizations was seen by the staging of an October 6, 1993 AFN rally on Parliament Hill. According to the media advisory announcing the rally:

The action is intended to call attention to the continued deplorable conditions at Davis Inlet and to highlight the lack of progress in negotiations with the federal government.^

Nowhere on the media advisory are the Mushuau Innu mentioned. At
the actual demonstration on Parliament Hill that day, the majority of the Innu who were present were Innu Nation members from Sheshatshiu. The underlying purpose of the demonstration was to attract national media attention to Native issues. The Native organizations realized that the only way to garner coverage of their concerns was to have a highly visible event in Ottawa, on a controversial subject. The AFN and NCC needed to articulate their positions during an election campaign that had minimal focus on Aboriginal matters. The majority of the national media were travelling across the country with the various party leaders, although there were always "taxi squads" of reporters stationed in Ottawa to cover ongoing governmental activities. Parliament Hill, itself, claimed territory of the Algonquin Indians, provided the perfect backdrop for the action. The rally resulted in two days of national "media hits" on Aboriginal affairs.

The Innu Nation, like the AFN and NCC, used the Davis Inlet relocation as a bargaining chip to achieve other political objectives. Peter Penashue, former president of the Innu Nation, was front and center with Katie Rich, by this time former Davis Inlet chief, at all the pertinent political discussions on relocation. Penashue's positioning went beyond the optics of
displaying a unified Innu force. He saw the benefit of the Davis Inlet tragedies as an opportunity to accelerate and resolve longstanding Innu issues such as: land claims, self-government and Aboriginal justice issues. The 1994, Statement of Political Commitments illustrated the success of the Innu Nation's overtures. The Statement of Political Commitments directed Canada to provide Aboriginal justice and policing, transfer of programs and services to Innu control, and deal with comprehensive land claims and self-government negotiations.45

Another incident, the so-called "Justice Impasse" in Davis Inlet between 1993 and 1995, demonstrated again that the profile of the community made it a very advantageous venue for resolving grievances. In December, 1993 the Mushuau Innu Band Council banished a provincial court judge and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) from the community. 46 It is believed that this incident was orchestrated by the Mushuau Innu, on behalf of the Innu Nation. 47 The public reasoning for the expulsion concerned Innu dissatisfaction with the practice and application of the Canadian Criminal Code to its people. The Innu Nation argued that, Innu should not be subject to Canadian law because: they were not citizens of Canada and the legal system was not
culturally sensitive. The actual rationale for the "Justice Impasse" also had a great deal to do with an attempt to have the Statute of Limitations expire on charges that had been levied against Gregory and Agathe Riche for their role in the 1992 house fire that killed their children. The role of the Innu Nation in the staging and direction of this event, is exemplified in correspondence outlining conditions for the resolution of the "Impasse":

The government (Newfoundland) and Innu Nation will proceed to complete as early as possible the proposed policing agreement;

... as the policing agreement is complete the courts will resume operation in Davis Inlet...without formal announcement...the Judges will be disposed to use sentencing circles...

Both the government (Newfoundland) and the Innu Nation will move as quickly as possible to establish the Task Force on justice issues...The Task Force should be made up of representatives from the Department of Justice, Social Services and the Innu Nation....

Clearly, Davis Inlet was not always about Davis Inlet, the community was a symbol for graver injustices. It appeared that the Mushuau Innu were not averse to having other native organizations use their circumstances for the perceived betterment of the whole.
As Bruce Doern pointed out, public policy in Canada has been profoundly affected by the globalization of the economy and by Section 35 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As illustrated Section 35 afforded the Innu and numerous other Native groups the political capital necessary to influence policy decisions.

The financial success of Canada is seen to be tied to globalization. Globalization means the importance of harmonious trade relations with partner states; it is also imperative to appear to have a clean slate on human rights. Canadian officials felt that problems of Davis Inlet, if left unaddressed, would overturn the tired Canadian motto, "the number 1 country in the world in which to live." Doern could have been thinking about the federal reaction to Davis Inlet when he wrote:

... the rapid worldwide shifting and specialization of production and the movement of capital - has made Canadians more conscious of their interdependence with the rest of the world and with the inevitability of rapid change. Canadians have also developed a greater sense of vulnerability and of being a smaller player on the world stage. 51

A resolution to the Davis Inlet problem was needed to preserve commercial bonds with partners such as the European Union and the United States. Canada did not want to suffer the fate of trade sanctions imposed on them for their negligence with the Innu.
The lack of constitutional renewal resulting from the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, served to exacerbate Native tension in Canada. The federal government actively sought ways to address Aboriginal concerns in a less grandiose manner. However, the effects of the Native lobby had not worn off with the media, or the Native community.

Shortly after the Siddon announcement in February 1993, the federal government began to initiate Emergency Services funding to the Mushuau Innu. The stated purpose of this money was to rehabilitate community infrastructure at Davis Inlet. The underlying federal view of Emergency Service provision was that it would convey the image of an immediate and attentive response to a grave problem. Federal image maintenance meant new resources and facilities for Davis Inlet. Between 1993 and 1997, approximately $5 million in Emergency Services funding has gone into that community. The work done there has included emergency repairs to 65 existing homes, construction of at least 11 new homes, establishment of a wilderness camp at Sango Pond, the building of a youth drop-in center and a women's center.

The federal government believed that as long as there was activity
in Davis Inlet, relocation could be held in abeyance. The Emergency Services funding was rebuilding the community and this might eventually provide a way off the hook. Neither Siddon's 1993 declaration, nor Irwin's 1994 Statement of Political Commitments, legally bound Canada to relocation. 55

The Government of Canada also had regional economic development aims, in desiring to achieve sound relations with the Innu. For example, the future of NATO flight training at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Goose Bay needed to be secured. The Innu Nation had long objected to low-level flying in Labrador. The primary concern of the Innu was that these training flights impacted on the migratory pattern of the George River Caribou Herd, their principal food source. The Innu Nation had always been very active in launching runway occupations at CFB Goose Bay. Innu protest activities certainly played a role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) 1991 decision not to establish a permanent tactical fighter aircraft training center in Goose Bay. 56

In February 1996, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands signed a 10-year Memorandum of Understanding with Canada concerning low-level military flight training in Labrador and Quebec. The
Department of National Defence (DND) estimated that the training at CFB Goose Bay provided the main source of employment and socio-economic development in central Labrador, representing approximately 1000 civilian jobs in the surrounding area. The Department of National Defence forecasts saw expenditures by NATO allies over the life of the 10-year agreement between $1.2 to $1.4 billion. It concluded that CFB Goose Bay contributed $123.8 million annually to the (Gross Domestic Product) GDP of Newfoundland and Labrador and $300 million annually to the GDP of Canada. Having a 10-year agreement did not guarantee peace from the Innu, so the federal government sought other means to keep them appeased. Canada wanted to make certain their military allies were not dissuaded from training at CFB Goose Bay.

The discovery of nickel in Voisey's Bay in November 1994 fundamentally changed Canada's view on relocation. The Canadian government's position concerning Voisey's Bay and relocation was clear. The Government of Canada viewed the relocation of the Mushua Innu as crucial to ensuring Innu cooperation on the Voisey's Bay development. A memorandum prepared for Minister Ron Irwin, in June, 1996 spoke definitively to the linkage between relocation and Voisey's Bay:
The key to continued progress with the Innu is the relocation of the community....;

The (Innu) strategy will address how we can continue to move ahead on each of these issues while respecting the linkages which exist between this file and a series of others, particularly Voisey's Bay;

The Innu are unlikely to focus on or participate in Voisey's Bay or Comprehensive Land Claim negotiations if relocation does not proceed;

... there are other issues confronting us, including Voisey's Bay, that could be disrupted by Innu reaction to this delay in a final decision on relocation. 59

The federal government knew the economic prosperity of Newfoundland and Labrador could not be forsaken for the Innu. Newfoundland's federal political representatives and the provincial government would not let that happen. It was blatantly obvious to federal bureaucrats that an increase in provincial revenues lessened their government's fiscal responsibility to the province. It was anticipated that these revenues would be forthcoming from the Voisey's Bay development. A myriad of priorities were influencing federal plans, but relocation became the policy choice because of the comprehensive propitiation it offered.

Newfoundland was not much different from Canada in the tack it chose to pursue with the Innu Relocation. The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador did not possess any special concerns for
the Mushuau Innu. Its position was evident in the Terms of Union Agreement with Canada, and was maintained until the Voisey's Bay discovery. Prior to Voisey's Bay, Newfoundland asserted that it did not have the financial ability or inclination to assume fiduciary responsibility for its "Native" citizens.

During the Davis Inlet drama of January, 1993 Newfoundland Premier Clyde Wells, attempted to foist all responsibility for the Innu onto the federal government. Wells believed that Canada bore fiduciary responsibility for these people. He found some vindication with the issue of the McCrae Report, which confirmed his position. By the Fall of 1994 the burden of responsibility had become a perfunctory point. Cynicism colours the interpretation of Brian Tobin's remarks on the occasion of the signing of the Mushuau Innu Relocation Agreement:

In concluding arrangements concerning the land for the new community, the Province is fulfilling a longstanding commitment to the people of Davis Inlet and it is our hope that the relocation will help the Mushuau Innu build upon the great progress they have made to date in addressing the serious difficulties facing their community.

In November of 1994, the relocation dynamic was also changed for Newfoundland with the discovery at Voisey's Bay. If there was to be any doubt that the relocation of the Mushuau Innu and the Voisey's
Bay development were linked it was eradicated early in 1995. On February 3, 1995 the Mushuau Innu served written eviction notice on Diamond Field Resources (DFR), the project developer. On February 4, 1995 the Voisey's Bay standoff began and nearly 50 Mushuau Innu arrived at the Voisey's Bay DFR mining camp. By February 6, 1995 there were nearly 80 Innu at the site, they caused approximately $10,000 damage to DFR equipment. The RCMP had dispatched 30 officers to the site in an effort to maintain order. Order was eventually restored after DFR agreed to have the Innu fully engaged in the development planning process. The Innu knew Newfoundland's tendency to pursue economic miracles by the route of the mega-project. Their own experience with Churchill Falls made it abundantly clear that Voisey's Bay was the cash cow the province now sought to milk. Newfoundland wanted to get Voisey's Bay developed.

Premier Tobin borrowed from the Smallwood development scheme collection to unearth an instantaneous solution to Newfoundland's economic woes. He sought again to fan the flames of hope of a province trying to find its place in the world. The January 1996, Ready for a Better Tomorrow: Platform of the Liberal Party of Newfoundland and Labrador, did not misrepresent Tobin's priorities:
The new Liberal government will take every step necessary by government to develop and gain full benefits from the Voisey's Bay mine, including the construction of a smelter and other ore processing facilities in our province. 63

Tobin, the former federal minister, had been party to cabinet deliberations on Davis Inlet before returning to Newfoundland. He understood the political imperative of not opposing Innu relocation to Sango Pond as his predecessor Clyde Wells had done. 64 Relocation was now seen to benefit Newfoundland, as concerns about "Aboriginal special status" were eclipsed by the possibility of "have" province categorization.

The motivations of the Voisey's Bay Nickel Company (VBNC) paralleled those of the provincial government. VBNC, an INCO subsidiary, paid $4.3 billion to DFR for the rights to the Voisey's Bay property. 65 The company wanted to ensure that its $15 billion mine went into operation. Records of an August 2, 1996 meeting, between federal government officials and VBNC indicate VBNC's view on relocation:

R. Gill, Executive Vice-President VBNC, said the Innu are linking the relocation of Davis Inlet Innu to VB (Voisey's Bay) project in discussions with the company. Key message from Gill was the hope some "quid pro quo" was extracted by the feds for the commitment to relocate (presumably in exchange for a smooth project development). 66
The VBNC sales pitch to government officials regarding Innu pacification was predicated on three issues: long-term Native employment; achievement of a fiscally lucrative Impact and Benefits Agreement with the Innu; and tax revenue from the project. In the late summer of 1996, VBNC estimated that they had 300 people working at the mine site of which 30% were either Innu or Inuit. Total tax revenue from the project had been estimated to be $300 million per annum. VBNC representatives did not need to do any arm-twisting to make their point. The tax revenue projections alone were sufficient to sway the governments on the merits of the project.

The principles of political economy were alive and well in Labrador. The provincial government, in cooperation with VBNC, urged the federal government officially to commit to relocation so Innu accommodation on mineral development could be obtained. Again, relocation was a means to another end, not the one intended by the Mushuau Innu.

Relocation only became viable because of its value as a trade-off item with the Innu, in return for the development of Voisey's Bay. The Mushuau Innu Relocation to Sango Pond became a
federal policy priority because of a paranoid federal government, a subjective media and the enterprising community of Davis Inlet. A government fixated on its international reputation was embarrassed by "Third World" conditions in its newest province. The lack of open discourse allowed the Mushuau Innu to put forward an unchallenged plan.

The tragedies of Davis Inlet attracted many supporters, who saw opportunity in the misery of another. As Mushuau Innu allies the AFN, NCC and the Innu Nation knew that only fools suffered gladly, and jumped on the Davis Inlet bandwagon of despair. Their respective consoling achieved its intended results. In many respects this was a skilful way to move policy items forward that were stagnating. Public policy, as has been illustrated, often consists of reactionary responses to the opening of the window of opportunity. Ideal public policy may be based on long-term or theoretical considerations; actual policies often fall into place because they provide pragmatic solutions. Certainly that appears to be the case with the Innu relocation.

The discourse on the relocation of the Mushuau Innu was not focused on what was best for the Innu to rectify and prevent
recurrence of past problems. The evidence presented demonstrated that the participants in this process opted for the known Innu alternative made acceptable because it was championed by the "victims." Discourse requires probing examinations of options, not pro forma acceptance of politically expedient solutions. Relocation to Sango Pond achieved consensus amongst the parties because it was the means to numerous other ends. For discourse to be genuine it must focus on the issue, not the output presupposed by it advocates and endorsed by opportunistic political leaders and miners.

Does the relocation of the Mushuau Innu adhere to the priorities of the national government and their agenda? There are two responses to that question, but only one genuine answer. It could be argued that the relocation of the Innu was a national priority, because it created economic opportunity and responded to the Innu demands. Economic opportunity comes from construction of the new site, but more importantly with the possible development of Voisey's Bay. The tax revenue projections cited earlier would make any government salivate. Debt, deficit management and employment generation are known priorities of the Canadian and Newfoundland governments. The anticipated revenues generation of Voisey's Bay and the employment
expectations for the initiative made it difficult for
governments not to sanction relocation as a vehicle to
Voisey's Bay.

Fiscal austerity and the enhancement of the social well-being
of individuals are other notable items on the national agenda.
How can relocation possibly be justified as a sound measure, given
that the federal government will be spending $82 million, to
move 500 people, 15 kilometres into the middle of the wilderness?
The dubious nature of this alternative is made even more precarious
because of the rationale for the decision. The social well-being
of the Innu is hanging in the balance, a decision made with little
forethought to the future and afterthought on the past has been
rendered. The choice to move to Sango Pond does not conform to the
national policy agenda, it seems to be neither fiscally sound nor
conscious of Canada's social priorities.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 4


2. ibid., p.13.


6. ibid.,p.139.

7. ibid., p. 153.


11. ibid., pp.410-415.


18. James Frideres, Ethnicity in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993)


21. ibid., p.321.


34. Mushuau Innu Renewal Committee, op. cit., p.8

35. ibid., p.8


40. Canada, *Chronology of Key Events Related to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet*, op.cit.

42. Assembly of First Nations, "Media Advisory" (Ottawa: October 6, 1993)

43. Timothy A. Powers, personal papers, Advisor to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, June-November, 1993.

The author was also on Parliament Hill for the duration of the Innu protest. Through personal observations, third party observations and informal conversations with the Innu participants it was ascertained that the majority of protestors were from Sheshatshiu. Utilizing the people of Sheshatshiu for such activities was not an uncommon practice of the Innu Nation. The people of Sheshatshiu were very skilled in the art of protest given their previous experience with low-level flight demonstrations at CFB Goose Bay.

44. Powers, Advisor to the Minister, *op.cit.*

45. Canada, *Statement of Political Commitments with the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet, op.cit.*

46. Canada, *Chronology of Key Events Related to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet, op.cit.*

47. Timothy A. Powers, personal papers, negotiator for the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, July 1994 - August 1996.

48. Canada, *Chronology of Key Events Related to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet, op.cit.*

49. Powers, Negotiator, *op.cit.*

The Innu Nation and the Mushuaau Innu had always been adamant that Gregory and Agathe Riche should not be subject to punishment for the death of their children in the house fire. The Innu believed that the Riches had undergone enough suffering and that the fire was a direct result of the governments failure to respond to and respect Innu cultural nuances. Publicly and privately Innu leaders were insistent that anything that possibly could be done would be done to ensure the Riches did not go to trial.

51. Doern, op.cit., p.19

52. Canada, Chronology of Key Events Related to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet, op.cit.

53. ibid.

54. ibid.

55. Powers, Negotiator, op.cit.

56. Canada, Chronology of Key Events Related to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet, op.cit.

57. Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Information Sheet Number 62 (Hull, P.Q.: INAC, 1996)

58. ibid.


61. Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Hope Restored as Governments Sign Davis Inlet Relocation Agreement (Hull, P.Q.: INAC, November 13, 1996)

62. ibid.


64. Powers, Negotiator, op.cit.

65. Canada, Chronology of Key Events Related to the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet, op.cit.
66. Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Memorandum to ADM John Sinclair re: Aug 2/96 ADM Voisey's Bay Committee Meeting with INCO/VBN/DFR. (Hull: INAC, August 6, 1996)

67. ibid.

68. Powers, Negotiator, op.cit.
CHAPTER 5

DILEMMA OF DAVIS INLET
The Mushuau Innu, in their crusade for an escape from Davis Inlet to the safety of Sango were the greatest proponents of sustainable development; or more appropriately, of survivability. They firmly believed that Davis Inlet was unfit for habitation. However, were their beliefs in the magic of a relocation to Sango valid? They certainly weren't tested or well planned. It will be argued that Davis Inlet was technically, but not politically, viable for ongoing permanent settlement. Crucial to understanding of the "Dilemma of Davis Inlet" is the concept of sustainable development. One definition of sustainable development, offered by the Bruntland Commission, is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.可持续发展应该是一种综合方法，它包括了社会、环境、文化和精神福祉与经济进步的联合发展。1

Essential to the effectiveness of sustainable development is interdependence; the system of interacting cause-and-effect relationships.3 Such development can best be achieved when all participating groups are working towards the same general objectives and are cognizant of their mutual arrangement.
Remaining at Davis Inlet was not initially written off by the federal government. The Innu body of evidence and the images of this supposed "Satan's Lot" made it appear unsustainable. Images do not always conform to reality. The images of Davis Inlet, as portrayed by the Innu, were difficult but not impossible to refute.

Such Innu-generated documents as "Hearing the Voices", "Gathering the Voices", and "Natuashish Economic Development Report: Comprehensive Community Plan", cite numerous reasons that would prevent the Innu from achieving a healthy existence at Davis Inlet. These premises will be addressed in this section and in the concluding chapter. The argument of these reports can be summarized as follows:

1) there is an insufficient water supply and water disposal system;

2) the limited water is being contaminated because of the inadequate sewage system;

3) contaminated water is the leading factor to community ill health;

4) the houses built were just shacks;

5) there is very poor housing, extreme overcrowding and a housing shortage;

6) there is extreme underemployment and unemployment;
7) there are unusually high child mortality rates;
8) living conditions have led to severe social problems including substance abuse;
9) there is severe domestic violence;
10) there is inadequate hospital, fire protection, school and mail, air, road and social services;
11) there is insufficient land for expansion, the population has an annual growth rate of approximately 4.5%.
12) they are isolated at Davis Inlet during freeze-up and break-up.4

Remaining at the current community of Davis Inlet was never viewed as an option by the Innu. Apart from a lack of technical suitability, they felt Davis Inlet was socially destructive. While the Innu considered Davis Inlet unfit for habitation, they nevertheless were not averse to receiving "emergency services" funding from the federal government for a short-term community upgrade. As noted earlier, the Mushuau Innu had received well over $5 million in special funding to assist in the temporary rehabilitation of Davis Inlet.5 The 1994 Statement of Political Commitments specifically allocated $3.8 million to refurbishing that community, this was in addition to the nearly $1 million set aside for Sango Pond feasibility studies.6

This short-term special funding had a significant effect on
community infrastructure enhancement. According to a 1995 INAC document, improvements included 5 new homes constructed, 35 home renovations, completion of a women's centre and installation of water and sewer to 3 band facilities. It was reported that 56 people received trade training. The same federal document alludes to a correlation between the physical rebuilding of Davis Inlet and the health of its inhabitants:

Indications from Health Canada are that health and safety of the inhabitants has improved. Alcohol and substance abuse has declined, community leadership is more prominent, and elders have regained a greater position in the community.

Based on this material there is the indication that a community refurbishment could be undertaken and effect change. The magnitude of the change would only be gauged over time, but time was never afforded to the consideration of a rebuilt Davis Inlet.

Only one of the 33 studies completed as part of relocation review, the "Terpstra Report", dealt with the possibility of the Innu remaining at Davis Inlet. Canada and Newfoundland fully funded this report, on behalf of the Innu, who worked with Terpstra to define the terms and conditions of the document. Terpstra's analysis
could hardly be classified as detailed, particularly given the limited number of essential service system alternatives he contemplated for Davis Inlet. He considered only two types of water and sewer systems, and two methods of energy generation. The report did not appear to be interested in searching out more advanced northern technologies that existed in places such as Greenland, Iceland and Norway. It is fascinating to note that Terpstra's 20-year cost comparisons between a refurbished Davis Inlet and a new community of Sango Pond, demonstrated that it was more cost-efficient to rebuild Davis Inlet. Terpstra's 20 year capital cost forecast for Davis Inlet was $57.8 million compared to $69.1 million for Sango Pond.

Certainly, a healthy vibrant community requires a good water supply system and proper housing. The effectiveness of such a locale is measured by the planning for and implementation of, that infrastructure. Evidence from the Report of the Royal Commission on Labrador (circa 1975) suggested that Davis Inlet was a technically viable site. According to the Royal Commission on Labrador:

While Davis Inlet is probably the easiest community on the north coast to supply with piped water and sewer services, with sandy ground offering easy excavation, only five
dwellings have piped water and none of them is occupied by an Indian family.

Davis Inlet has a community well, which is adequate in quantity for the entire settlement but contaminated by a high bacteria count. The soil is easily penetrated by surface water fouling the well, and some residents are apparently using slop buckets and water buckets interchangeably. A separate well supplying the school is satisfactory. 12

The Innu had always protested that there was both an insufficient water and sewer system, and drinking water supply in Davis Inlet. However, the Royal Commission on Labrador suggested that there was nothing to inhibit the establishment of community wide water and sewer services. The Royal Commission also noted that although the Innu well was contaminated they had an adequate quantity of water for the residents. If the school water well was satisfactory there is no reason to believe that a purification process could not have been created for the general community well.

One of the other issues addressed by this Royal Commission was the state of housing in Davis Inlet. Proper shelter, like sufficient water, is essential a healthy community. The Royal Commission provided some mixed messages on shelter. While reporting that there were "shocking home conditions in Davis Inlet", there is the implication that this situation could have been rectified:
Prior to 1967, Davis Inlet consisted almost entirely of tents, occupied by Nauscaupi, who wandered over the inland barrens and into coastal valleys in pursuit of caribou and furs. The only permanent facilities were the buildings of the Roman Catholic Mission and the Government trading operation, which has since become the Labrador Services Division.

Unlike the Labrador Eskimo, who moved into Government housing from a background of relatively permanent homes and nearly two centuries of contact with Europeans, the Indian people of Davis Inlet came straight from a nomadic tradition into the shells of modern homes with no preparation whatever.

In 1967, this agency (Newfoundland Housing Corporation) moved the settlement to a new site nearby and began a house building program which provided new homes for all families. The existing site is one of the most attractive on the coast. 13

The problem with housing did not appear to stem primarily from the lack of housing, but from the transition into a more permanent rather than a migratory lifestyle. The roving tent-dweller lived very differently from the homesteader. The Innu had no experience with household living, and were offered no practical instruction on household management. It is little wonder that many of the houses were eventually reported to be in deplorable condition because, in all likelihood, the Innu were oblivious to the fact that their individual dwelling required ongoing maintenance. Previously, the migratory Innu moved from place to place to pursue their existence. This meant packing the tent and putting it up
at the new location. When the tent became worn it was likely discarded in favour of a new one. The problem with changing from a communal hunting and gathering society to an individual-oriented 'Western' system, was best exemplified by the housing issue. Adaptation to the concept of individual property rights, not insufficient dwelling spaces, created much difficulty for the Mushuau Innu.14

The evidence provided reinforces a concept that the Davis Inlet site had the potential to be a community with a sound physical infrastructure. However, poor planning advanced by cultural misunderstandings hindered the development of Utshimassits. Neither the government of Newfoundland nor the government of Canada bothered to create or implement a suitable community habitation strategy. The Innu had been unwilling conscripts to the 1967 relocation decision, and this was reflected in their attitude towards their new community. It appeared no party was prepared to make a commitment to community enhancement and community education. Therefore it was not surprising that Davis Inlet fell into such destitute conditions. There is little reason to believe that if all parties had embraced the 1967 move, that Davis Inlet would not be a vibrant town. Certainly, northern technologies are such that the
site of Davis Inlet could remain inhabitable. If the Canadian government can operate a large military installation at CFB Alert in the remote Arctic, what prevents Davis Inlet from being remodelled?\textsuperscript{15}

The Davis Inlet tragedies of 1992 and 1993 paved the way for the Terpstra report to be left unchallenged such as the findings of the Royal Commission on Labrador. The federal government had lost the public relations campaign with the Innu and the government of Newfoundland and Labrador wanted to off-load responsibility for Natives onto Canada. The powerful visual images of the gas-sniffing incident, seen throughout the world in January 1993, would not be vanquished by sensible technical, and logistical planning. Davis Inlet had gone from a physical planning problem to an emotional issue of cultural genocide.

Other than the Terpstra report, one additional study briefly examined a heating system for the community. The document prepared by Natural Resources Canada, was entitled a "Preliminary Feasibility Study For A District Heating System for the Community of Davis Inlet." The study did not attempt to look at the feasibility of remaining in Davis Inlet but rather
contemplated one small component of community infrastructure requirements. The whole issue of a modified heating system was not a key agenda item governing the Innu's desire to move. The Innu assertions are difficult to contest when little work was done to examine the plausibility of staying put. However, an analysis of the information that exists as in the Terpstra Report, in the achievements of emergency services funding, in the 1991 governmental offer to install a new water and sewer system, and in the pertinent sections of the Royal Commission On Labrador - indicates that it may have been technically viable to remain at Davis Inlet. It appeared nobody wanted to question the Innu-media depiction of the situation. In 1993, Canada was still in the process of recovering from the Marshall Inquiry, the Oka Crisis and the Charlottetown Accord; Native-White relations were still fragile.

Shortly after the gas-sniffing incident occurred, former Indian Affairs Minister Tom Siddon gave "notional approval" to the Mushuau Innu desire to relocate. The intention of the federal government in granting this notional approval was to address the Innu and the general public's immediate cry for action. The federal government also wanted to engage the Innu in a
relocation review exercise that would keep them occupied. If the Innu were busy with the pursuit of relocation, they would have little time to showcase their problems to the country during the 1993 federal election campaign.17

The change of government in October of 1993 did not alter strategy for the Davis Inlet problem. The new Minister of Indian Affairs, Ron Irwin, appeared to make a conscious effort to elongate the "process" with the Statement of Political Commitments. As noted earlier, the Canadian government agreed to support the desire of Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet to move to Sango Pond, subject to certain conditions:

a) adoption of a long-term comprehensive community plan which addressed social and high unemployment problems, and if the federal government agreed to the plan;

b) evidence that Sango Pond is technically and environmentally viable site;

c) provision that the site development would be based on appropriate government standards;

d) reaffirmation of the new site through a ratification process;

e) reasonable costs acceptable to Canada. 18

A political commitment is not a legally binding covenant. Such commitments are made as good-will gestures, that can easily be
overridden by other governmental priorities such as fiscal restraint or war. Clause "e" of the SPC always provided the government with option of breaking its political promise to the Mushuau Innu on the grounds that the cost of the move was too exorbitant. Few people would have difficulty reinforcing this intention with a price tag of $140,000 a person. Prior to, and at the issuance of the SPC, neither the government of Canada, nor the Innu had defined or quantified what constituted "reasonable costs". It is difficult to comprehend why a policy decision of such magnitude did not have a specific price tag affixed to it as the optimal output. In 1993, the federal cabinet was presented with a general estimate of $82 million plus or minus 15%. When Reid received federal cabinet approval in September 1993 to have Canada absorb the total cost of relocation if necessary, he was vigorously challenged by his cabinet colleagues on the high cost of the initiative. He was counselled to inform his peers that he was only seeking leverage to resolve the immediate problem. It was suggested that he advise cabinet that every effort would be made to search out a less costly alternative. Cabinet did not endorse a $82 million relocation; the aide-memoire was drafted in a short period and its entire purpose was to give Reid bargaining room.
When the new Liberal government assumed power in November 1993, it is suspected they saw a "reasonable cost" clause as the directional seeker guiding federal policy on the Innu.

The Innu and the government of Canada understood the significance of the clause. The challenge for the Innu was to convince the general public and the federal government that whatever they deemed the cost of Sango relocation to be, that it was reasonable. The Mushuau Innu would have to use the nearly $1 million in exploratory funding that they received as the result of the SPC to develop a comprehensive, air-tight case vindicating relocation. 21

The federal government needed to find a way to achieve a cost-effective solution to the Davis Inlet problem. The government of Newfoundland and Labrador had never supported the notion of relocation and had publicly stated so. 22 Newfoundland's logic was that by relocating the community you were relocating the problem, not truly addressing the malaise of Davis Inlet. 23 There were sceptics in the federal government who harboured the same opinion, but were constrained by the SPC to take some action. Publicly that action was seen to be relocation. 24

Prior to the November 1994 discovery of the Voisey's Bay mine, the
federal government quietly engaged in an options review exercise. The Atlantic Regional Office of INAC was asked to prepare possible alternatives to the Sango Pond relocation. The Atlantic regional office, taking its direction from Minister Irwin's office, suggested five possibilities:

(1) Complete relocation to Sango Bay (deluxe model);
(2) Complete relocation to Sango Bay (scaled/phased model);
(3) Partial relocation to Sango Bay -- utilizing Davis Inlet facilities, ie Airport, etc;
(4) Refurbishment of Davis Inlet with no relocation;
(5) Relocation to Sheshatshui.25

The fact that the Minister's office sought alternatives to the Sango move is confirmation that Canada had not at that point, committed to relocation. Why would the exploration of other options have been pursued, given that the Mushuau Innu position on Sango was firm? Some initial discussions took place concerning the feasibility of these alternatives but the Voisey's Bay find changed everything. Once the financial magnitude of the mine's discovery was assessed a new Davis Inlet relocation mind-set emerged for reasons of political expediency, the Innu were not consulted about these alternatives.
The Voisey's Bay property was located in an area claimed by both the Innu and Inuit peoples in their land claim proposals. No development would be able to take place until these Aboriginal groups agreed to the project proceeding. The Inuit were considered by government officials to be a more pragmatic group to deal with. Federal and provincial officials believed that the Inuit would not hinder the development of the mine as long as they received a substantial compensation and employment package from the mine's proponent.26

The federal government sought an angle of appeasement with the Innu. The carrot that would eventually be dangled to the Innu would be complete relocation to Sango Pond. An $82 million relocation seemed "reasonable" and convenient to help ensure the development of $15 billion mine. The primacy of economic recovery and capitalist development directed relocation policy. The trade-off happened without real scrutiny, or forethought on the effectiveness of relocation. The move to Sango Pond was acceptable, the consideration of other relocation options vanished as quickly as it had developed.

Therefore it was no surprise when Sango Pond was found to be a
technically viable site. In total 33 studies were conducted to allow for the confirmation of Sango. Process documents had become $82 million sales receipts. The Comprehensive Community Plan was the cornerstone document of the Mushuau Innu relocation plan. A March, 1995 federal government review of the plan cited some glaring problems that challenged the fundamental Innu premise that relocation would lead to economic and social stability. Erik Hulsman, INAC's community planning expert, in his review of this document addressed the problem:

It is unclear whether this report was prepared on behalf of the Mushuau Innu Renewal Committee for submission to the committee or to the Minister. You refer to this dilemma by stating, on page 14, "This report remains principally a non-Innu formulation of a solution to an Innu problem ..."

There is a real danger that the pie-in-the-sky approach of this study creates expectations which simply cannot be met. 27

Hulsman's commentary on the studies is enlightening. His perspective served to illuminate three principal problems with the Sango Pond papers: the authors, the social recovery plan and the economic development strategy.

Although the Innu were completely involved in the relocation planning, all the reports were authored by non-Innu.
While the Innu lacked the technical expertise and detailed knowledge of the English language, it is disconcerting to see their future again scripted by the "White Man". Two previous relocations had been directed by non-Innu, and as the Innu themselves argued, that was why they were in their current predicament.

The Sango Pond review process proved to be a very lucrative for consultants. It was in the best interest of the authors to draft favourable reports for the client, to cultivate lucrative future arrangements. Why would the Innu's primary advisors/consultants want to end an arrangement that was paying him significant resources? Capitalism, or Mushuau Innu cultural enhancement, what guided the writers? While it may be unfair to pass judgement on their motivations it is an area that deserves scrutiny. Mel Smith, former Deputy Minister of Native Affairs in British Columbia, in his book Our Home and Native Land confirms the existence of the "Indian Industry" of which Wilkinson could be considered a member. Smith's logic necessitates a sounding given its relevance to the Davis Inlet relocation process:

...the White Paper's funding initiative to Indian organizations nonetheless went forward. The $50 million, which was intended to be used to assist the native leadership
in implementing the White Paper's proposals," helped these native groups take their battle for rights to other forums." It financed lawyers, consultants, advisers, academics, and others. Thus the "Indian Industry" was born. 29

Clearly, not all consultants are motivated by selfish purposes and the desire for riches. There are many paid professional advisors who do have the interests of their clients at heart, and work to make life better for those who have engaged their services. However, Smith's insights, given his experience, can not be ignored. For the sake of Innu and non-Innu alike it was and is imperative that proper advice is provided by these outside advisors, otherwise history could repeat itself at Sango Pond.

The twin planks of relocation as recorded in the Statement of Political Commitments, were the adoption of a strategy that "addressed social, and high unemployment problems" in the community. Out of the 33 studies conducted, only two reports - "Healing Efforts of the Mushuau Innu since 1992, and the Davis Inlet Community Relocation Project Social Reconstruction Plan - dealt with the social problem in any detail. The former document was essentially a historical chronology, and the latter was a weak predictive product that could
draw no firm conclusions on the health benefits of the Sango Pond move. Most health professionals acknowledge that alcohol and substance abuse problems are permanent illnesses that can be treated, but not cured. Health Canada prepared its own report on the healing potential of relocation. Health Canada would not and could not say that relocation would rid the Innu of illness. The Health Canada report surmised:

... it is important that relocation be only a part of the healing strategy ...

...The extent of improvement in health is unpredictable. It is also unlikely that any improvement will be sustainable unless there are accompanying strategies to address other underlying factors associated with the situation in Davis Inlet.

It is expected that it will take many years and significant support for the community to achieve a period of stability for the Mushuau Innu in their process of community healing. It is also expected that there will be many setbacks along this process as healing tends to be an uneven rather than a linear process.

The act of relocation was always cast by the Innu as move that would foster, rather than diminish good health; this notion can be very misleading. Both Health Canada, and Art Hansen and Anthony Oliver-Smith, social scientists who have studied relocations throughout the world, caution that the opposite may also true; relocations can cause significant disruption of
community functioning and can be associated with adverse health impacts. This assertion appears to have been entirely ignored by proponents of the Sango move. Referring back to the Health Canada report, and its contention that stability was essential to recovery the question can be phrased as to how stable is the new Mushuau Innu environment would be? Should events proceed as scheduled, during a ten-year span the Innu will be moving locales and have a major mine operating in near proximity to them. These would be major occurrences that would inevitably impact on the Innu.

The economic development strategy to be pursued by the Innu, as outlined in the Comprehensive Community Plan for Sango Pond, is flawed. There are two glaring errors with the plan: the majority of employment generation is focused on community construction and operation, and the long-term view is geared to western-type entrepreneurial development. In chapter 13 of the "Plan", the Innu are very clear about employment and job-creation:

In the short and medium terms, there are three obvious sources of employment and job-creation for the Mushuau Innu: the construction of their new village at Natuashish; the physical operation and maintenance and administration of the village; and economic development initiatives.
... it shows that the construction would create a minimum of approximately 123,000 person-days of work over an estimated six years of construction.\textsuperscript{34}

Short-term employment generation of that type is finite, outdated and creates artificial future wage expectations. While the Innu should have access to the community construction work, this should not be the primary component of their economic regeneration. The Innu plans appear to subscribe to the Newfoundland recipe for job creation: short-term transient work followed by tertiary-type employment with the local government administration. How much permanent work can be created for a community government administering services to 500 people? As was clearly illustrated in the previous chapter through the example of the Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program, the prospects for success with such short-term employment undertakings are dubious at best.

Long-term work in Songo Pond is expected to come from the establishment of service-based industry such as adventure tourism, and from product-based developments. Some of the proposed service-based projects are big-game outfitting, photo-safaris, and bird-watching. The suggested product-based developments
include caribou husbandry, fur farming and aquaculture. While all of these ideas have merit, they are all projects that require the cultivation of entrepreneurial skills.

The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples Report was endorsed by the Innu Nation and in turn the Mushuau Innu. One segment of this lengthy report deals with Aboriginal economic development strategies. Specifically, RCAP endorses the Native economic development template developed by Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt, academics who were associated with the "Project on American Indian Economic Development" at Harvard University. It is useful to invoke the template to further speculate on the probability of Innu economic renewal at Sango Pond. Cornell and Kalt concluded that one of the most important factors in economic development success is external opportunity, which refers to the political, economic and geographic environment of reservations. They have outlined four circumstances which are crucial for economic development:

1) political sovereignty: the degree to which a tribe has genuine control over reservation decision making, the use of reservation resources, and relations with the outside world;

2) market opportunity: unique economic niches or opportunities
in local, regional or national markets that result from particular assets or attributes (minerals, tourist attractions, distinctive artistic or craft traditions) or from supportive government policies;

3) access to financial capital: the ability of the tribe to obtain investment dollars from private, government or other sources; and

4) distance from markets: the distance tribes are from markets for their products. 36

The Innu Comprehensive Community Plan does not truly speak to these four points. Ultimately, the Innu are moving to political sovereignty but they are not yet there. Until such time as a self-government arrangement is achieved and perhaps sometime later, they are largely financially dependent on Canada. Also they are still negotiating their land base, they do not have control over development. Since most land in Labrador is provincial crown land, Newfoundland still has a role to play in shaping the Innu’s future. This double-edged sword of interdependence is brilliantly illustrated by the Voisey’s Bay project. Without clear title to the land and its resources all parties are subject to the whims or aspirations of the other interested participants.

The Innu long-term economic strategy is poorly crafted. The Innu propose to, without prior practical experience, market such ventures as adventure tourism, and bird watching. Part of the plan
suggests that Davis Inlet could be converted into an exclusive fishing resort. Fathoming the marketability of a venture of that type is not easily done, given the international stigmatization surrounding Davis Inlet. The Comprehensive Community Plan seems to search for any conceivable type of pursuit. The Plan's justification of the Davis Inlet resort is void of specifics:

It is self-evident that the site of Utshimassits is unsuitable for a permanent village for a rapidly growing population that today numbers over 500 individuals. It cannot be denied, however, that the site is magnificent from a scenic potential for consumptive or non-consumptive adventure tourism, and that it already possess much of the infrastructure, including a wharf and landing strip, that is essential for adventure tourism and that cannot normally be provided in a remote location because of the high cost. Moreover, there many buildings in Utshimassits that are in good condition, but that could not easily be moved to Natuashish. 37

Marketing Davis Inlet as a resort means obliterating entrenched images of tragedy. Stereotypes are difficult to crack even for highly seasoned business marketing professionals. This is not to suggest that the Innu cannot acquire these skills, but developing that expertise takes time. There is little sense in pursuing adventure tourism unless a specific consumer base exists. While a market may exist, no business plan or market survey, was conducted to determine the potential for this type of project.
Are the 'Innu too far removed from markets to be successful? What would they market and to whom would it be marketed? These questions are not addressed in their cornerstone plan that advocated the move to Sango Pond.

Newfoundland has always been ripe with a swashbuckling development mentality. There have been no shortage of business ideas like the Sprung Greenhouse, or the Come-by-Chance oil refinery. Abstract concepts, supplanted concrete analysis and visioning, often the hallmarks of commercial success. Failure is commonplace as was the case with the above-noted projects, when unchallenged ideas are enacted. The Mushuau Innu economic development plan closely mirrors Newfoundland's case history.

The Mushuau Innu will have access to financial capital from at least two sources: an Impact and Benefits Agreement with VBNC, and an eventual land claims settlement. However, neither of these sources was accurately factored into the Comprehensive Community plan. It would not have been politically intelligent for the Mushuau Innu to tie their fortunes to Voisey's Bay, when they were trying to sell relocation as a stand-alone viable item, and on Voisey's the Innu Nation had
initially taken an anti-mineral development stance. The irony of relocation now is that the Mushuaau Innu's best economic development hopes will come from the Voisey's Bay project.

Another important factor cited by Cornell and Kalt is internal assets, which are the characteristics of the tribes and the resources they control that can be committed to development. Again the authors have identified four important variables:

1) natural resources: minerals, water, timber, fish, wildlife, scenery, fertile land, oil, gas, and so on;

2) human capital: the skills, knowledge, and expertise of the labour force acquired through education, training and work experience;

3) institutions of governance: the laws and organization of tribal government, from constitutions to legal or business codes to the tribal bureaucracy. As these institutions become more effective at maintaining a stable and productive environment, the chances of success improve; and

4) culture: conceptions of normal and proper ways of doing things and relating to other people and the behaviour that embodies those conceptions. As the fit between the culture of the community and the structure and powers of the governing institutions becomes better, the more legitimate the institutions become and the more able they are to regulate and organize the development process. 38

The Mushuaau Innu do not yet have any clear title to land in Labrador, with the exception of the new Sango Pond site. When the Innu Nation's Land Claim is finally resolved the Mushuaau may
have access to certain tracts of land. However, it should be noted that the Mushuau Innu, and the Sheshatshiu Innu, will then have to negotiate between themselves to determine the recipient of the components of the land claim agreement. Will communal rivalries benefit or hinder the fiscal prospects of the Mushuau Innu?

The Comprehensive Community Plan recognizes that the human capital skills are lacking. The Innu must overcome substantial obstacles before they can take advantage of any opportunities. Massive training initiatives are going to be necessary. In some cases markets may evaporate during the time it takes the Innu to receive the commensurate skill set. The high numbers of Innu who will be involved in the construction of the site will be inhibited from participating in other training initiatives while Sango Pond construction is occurring. If as it appears, according to the Innu plan, that the majority of the community will be working on the construction project, then who will be available to work at the Voisey's Bay mine? Many of the professional mining positions may have vanished when the time comes for the Innu to pursue them or a majority of these jobs may have gone to the Sheshatshiu Innu. Could such an occurrence fragment the Innu Nation and diminish their significant political clout?
The Mushuau Innu institutions of governance are not always stable. Katie Rich's resignation as Chief of Davis Inlet in January 1997 was a testament to the volatility of governance in the community. Rich resigned after it was alleged that she received kickbacks from a Quebec contractor to secure work for that builder on the relocation. Rich was later exonerated of any wrong doing and went on to become President of the Innu Nation. The Rich case provides a superb example of the transformation affecting the Mushuau Innu. The leadership of Davis Inlet are playing a panoply of roles, from governors to administrators, while attempting to redefine their society with an avalanche of foreign equity in the offing. With no proper separation of governance and administration, an insecure environment for development exists amongst the people of Davis Inlet. The conditions for the Innu are made even more precarious because the Innu have no practical experience managing mass resources. The speed and breadth of change will create instability. Neither the Innu in their Comprehensive Plan, nor the government of Canada have properly addressed governance and administrative training regimes for the Mushuau. Stability is not achieved with the snap of a finger, it is the product of experience, conditioning and education.
One of the overarching themes of the Innu's relocation arguments was that the move would serve as a vehicle to preserve and enhance the "traditional way of life". The examination of their community plan suggests the sell-out of that position. Native traditional lifestyle is predicated on adaptation to change, but when the change appears to be tantamount to the pursuit of western economic philosophies what validity can such options hold? The non-Innu architects of the report have staked the Innu's survival on culturally foreign development schemes; the irony is overwhelming. The Mushuau Innu may well prosper in these pursuits but if the lessons of 1967 illustrate anything it is that imposed development schemes reap little reward. The proposed reconstitution of the Innu economy needs further examination.

There is no conclusive evidence to suggest that life will be better for the Innu at Sango Pond. There is no certainty that hope will even be restored at the new Innu home; hope is impossible to quantify. Indian Affairs Minister Ron Irwin seemed to sense this when speaking at the signing of the relocation agreement:

We are under no illusion that relocation has
some magical power to solve all our problems
or end all the pain. But we believe that
the relocation to Natushish (Sango) will
contribute to the healing process already
underway. 40

Indeed, by not insisting upon stricter criteria for relocation,
the federal government may be failing the Innu once
again. Sufficient information exists to suggest that relocation to
Sango Pond was not the only viable option but the only alternative
pursued. Internal federal government cost estimates,
made prior to the Voisey's Bay discovery, determined that
a rebuilt Davis Inlet would cost $38 million, and a move to the
Innu community of Sheshatshui $25 million.41 Both of these
choices were substantially less costly than the $82 million
forecast for the Sango Pond project. Statistical predictions
are fallible but such a large discrepancy is difficult to
ignore.

This "Dilemma of Davis Inlet" was prefaced with a discussion on
sustainable development. The crucial elements of this type of
development are an integrated approach and interdependence.
The Mushau Innu would argue that relocation to Sango adheres
to the concept of sustainable development, the examination
of the relocation reasoning suggests otherwise. Considering the concept of sustainable development, the ability of future generations of Innu to meet their needs may be compromised at Sango. While the memories of Davis Inlet may be obliterated, the legacy of despair could be extended and "relocated". The economic and social development plans are wrought with strategies for limited success. Only the Innu themselves will be able to gauge the extent of spiritual and cultural renewal they will achieve at Sango, and only over time. It is important to ask how valid a continuum of renewal will exist in 2002 after Sango Pond is erected and the short-term construction jobs have vanished?

Another issue is that none of the $82 million earmarked for the Sango Pond relocation is for health protection measures. It is entirely for infrastructure development. A healthier and more sustainable community would benefit more from direct health expenditures on their behalf. Juxtapose the move to Sango Pond with the capital cost projections for a resettlement to Sheshatshui or a refurbishment of Davis Inlet. The resources saved in pursuing either of those alternatives could be allocated to the Innu for ongoing medical treatments and counselling. New financial resources over and above the $82 million will probably be required
to provide medical aid to the Innu. If you build Sango Pond the Innu will come but perhaps so will the social malaise.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 5


2. ibid., p.8.

3. ibid., p.3.


8. ibid., p.4.

9. Timothy A. Powers, personal papers, advisor to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and the Minister Responsible for the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, June 1991 - July 1993.

10. Terpstra & Associates Ltd., Davis Inlet (Uthshimassit) Service Infrastructure, Socio-Economic Study (1992)

11. ibid.


14. Armitage, Scott, Henriksen, Tanner and Davis have all addressed the issue of Innu cultural conceptions. Implicit in all of their works has been the notion of Mushuau Innu cultural distinctiveness.

15. While this may be considered supposition the argument made has validity. The original move to Davis Inlet in 1967 was not well-planned. None of the parties involved worked towards ensuring that it would succeed. Provincial officials were slow in delivering services and the basic amenities to the Innu. The Innu were entirely unfamiliar with living in a permanent community. Human errors not a lack of technical capabilities impeded the development of Davis Inlet in 1967.

16. Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Siddon Announces Federal Support for Relocation of Davis Inlet (Hull: INAC, February 9, 1993)

17. Powers, advisor, op.cit.

The author was party to ministerial discussions and strategy development with PMO, PCO and INAC bureaucrats when this issue was addressed. Senior federal government officials did not want the trials and tribulations of the Mushuau Innu occupying the national spotlight during the Spring and Summer of 1993, prior to federal election. Federal strategy had been to create a process which kept the Innu occupied with the pursuit of relocation. Part of this strategy involved engaging them in negotiations with Ross Reid and other federal officials. It was believed as long as they were negotiating the terms for what would constitute a sound relocation, they would be content that progress was being made to address their plight. Therefore, if their issues were being scrutinized little time would have been left to invoke the images of tragedy that they had used so successfully in January 1993.


19. Calculation is based on dividing the estimated $82 million mentioned in the Mushuau Innu Relocation Agreement and dividing it by 500. The 500 represents the number of people of Innu origin known to reside in Davis Inlet in 1996.
20. Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Aide-Memoire Relocation of the Davis Inlet Innu (Hull, P.Q.: INAC, September 16, 1993.)


22. Media Tapes and Transcripts Ltd., Clyde Wells Statement (Ottawa: M.T.T., February 8, 1993) p.2

23. ibid., p.2


25. Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Memorandum to George Fotheringham ARDG re: Davis Inlet (Amherst: INAC, October, 1994)


The author has in his possession materials which question the billing practices of certain consultants with the MIRC. The author was also privy to numerous internal federal discussions in which this issue was discussed. INAC officials can corroborate these contentions.

29. Melvin H. Smith, Our Home or Native Land (Victoria: Crown Western Ltd, 1995)


Mushuau Innu Band Council and Mushuau Innu Renewal Committee, Davis Inlet Community Relocation Project Social Reconstruction Plan (December, 1995)


33. *ibid.*


40. Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, *Hope Restored as Governments Sign Davis Inlet Relocation Agreement* (Hull: INAC, November 13, 1996)

41. Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, *Davis Inlet Options Total Funding* (Amherst, N.S.: INAC, January 27, 1995)
CHAPTER 6

UNCERTAIN FUTURE:
WHAT PRICE FOR HOPE?
The plan for relocation of the Mushuau Innu to Sango Pond was an ill-conceived response to a difficult problem. The development of the Voisey's Bay mine, preservation of international reputation, and Innu cooperation coaxed the federal government into sanctioning relocation. The Mushuau Innu, although recipients of their wish, may have been done a disservice by the federal government's failure to scrutinize the Sango Bay relocation. Policy choices should be made on their merits, not out of convenience.

A lack of cooperation between governments and an abdication of responsibility caused substantial difficulties for the Innu. Proper cooperation (all levels of government), planning and understanding amongst all parties should have been pursued. A relocation taking place in Newfoundland, should involve the government of Newfoundland. Newfoundland has been providing services in Northern Labrador since the time of Confederation and thus had the knowledge base on Labrador infrastructure and operational requirements. The much-publicized future of the Newfoundland and Labrador economy predicated on the Voisey's Bay development dictated that Newfoundland play an increased, not a diminished, role with the province's Aboriginal peoples. Such cooperation would afford a more sensitive understanding of the policy positions and differences of
the participants. Conciliation and compromise could surpass conflict as the vehicle for establishing sound inclusive public policy; policy that does not overlook Aboriginal nuances but ensures incorporation.

Relocation was supposed to be about the restoration of hope, achieved through economic and social renewal. Economic and social renewal are deemed crucial to physical and psychological well-being of the Mushuau Innu. None of the studies that deal with the move to Sango can or do properly quantify the correlation between the move and the improved health and overall circumstances of the Innu. In fact, as is noted in the Health Canada report, the move could cause significant immediate-term stress. It is this type of stress which left unchecked can produce further physical and mental ailments. Most health practitioners acknowledge that displacement, whether forced or otherwise, causes psychological irritation. If this irritation is not addressed, individuals increase their risk of incurring mental illness such as depression. Depression, left untreated, can lead people to seek solace for themselves through alcohol and substance abuse. This, as the Innu indicated, happened to them as a result of the 1967 relocation and could easily happen again in 1997.
Other options could have been considered. For example, if cost was the only consideration then perhaps the most reasonable choice would have been to rebuild Davis Inlet. Estimates complied illustrated that this work could have been done for $38 million. The SPC defined the purpose of this action for the Innu was to achieve economic and social recovery. While leaving Davis Inlet may have alleviated many painful memories, in what other respects would psychological betterment be achieved? Psychological improvement usually does not simply occur by changing environments.¹ Health Canada and the Innu themselves agree that the move to Sango Pond will not cure the substance or alcohol abuse, problems that in the past have had a stranglehold on the Innu. Extensive interactive treatment is necessary to initiate recovery. There is no magical force that will alleviate the Mushuau Innu of these problems once they move to Sango Pond. Economic stability can afford emotional balance but it seems more likely that an imbalance will exist in the Innu community after the relocation is complete. The only guaranteed job opportunities presented to the Innu are those created by the move. They do have access to the Voisey's Bay project, but this would exist whether they were at Davis Inlet or Sango Pond.
The Innu have suggested they have an annual population growth rate of 4.5%. The Mushuau argued that Davis Inlet could not cope with that expansion. The truth will never be known because no formal review of the possibility of expanding the existing community was enacted. Informal opinions offered to the author by engineers and INAC officials suggested that Davis Inlet could have managed the population growth. The population projections may be inaccurate as they are based on the Innu remaining at one locale. Who dares to suggest that this shall happen, given the tragedies of the past, and a substantial youth population who has had extensive exposure to Western society? The Innu youth may not be as eager as their leadership to follow the traditional path.

Sites other than Sango Pond were not given due consideration as alternative locations. Although the Innu produced a report on alternate sites this document was a weak dismissive offering that failed to provide any detailed technical analysis. What made Sango Pond a better site than Sheshatshiu or a point along the trans-Labrador highway? Nothing, other than the fact that the Mushuau Innu had chosen Sango and were determined that they would not be dissuaded from moving there. Sheshatshiu was an
existing Innu community, fully serviced with additional land for community growth. It is located near Goose Bay which has all the necessary amenities such as hospitals and police that the Mushuau Innu had sought. The people of Sheshatshiu are members of the Innu Nation, and they also vigorously engage in traditional cultural practices. Their proximity to non-Native centers has not dislocated their culture; rather it has provided them with a vantage point from which to be heard. The financial cost of a $25 million move to Sheshatshiu would have been much less expensive than the move to Sango. There has always been speculation in Labrador that the Mushuau Innu and the Sheshatshui Innu do not interact well with each other but there appears to be no evidence to corroborate that contention. Practical experience suggests otherwise: in all the major protest efforts that have been undertaken by the Innu Nation both communities have been supportive and sent representatives. Cooperation for communal purpose, rather than segregation of communities seems to be the standing practice. If the Mushuau Innu had sought refuge in Sheshatshui it is hard to imagine they would not have been accommodated. No just comparison can be made to the Nutak resettlement of 1948. Under the Sheshatshiu scenario Innu would be co-located with other Innu and a minimal cultural gap
would likely have existed.

Another location for the Mushuau Innu could have been along the Trans-Labrador Highway (TLH). The TLH runs from Goose Bay to Labrador City following the same route as the Churchill River. The territory is sparsely populated and is considered by the Innu to be part of the traditional hunting lands. Residing in this area could be just as beneficial as Sango Pond. Site development costs would be higher than Sheshatshiu but lower than Sango. Being located on the Churchill Falls power grid and between the two population centers of Wabush and Goose Bay, would have lowered costs. Wabush and Goose Bay have all the necessary infrastructure such as hospitals, and an airport, to negate the Mushuau Innu requiring such facilities at a TLH site. Access to the power grid allows the possibility of hook-up for a new community to an existing power source, saving millions of dollars in the establishment of a community generating station. At a location such as this one the Innu would not be encumbered by other communities and would be immersed near the center of their hunting territory.³

Another possible scenario could have been the establishment of trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) amongst the Mushuau
Innu, Canada and Newfoundland to develop a comprehensive plan and design for the new community at Sango Pond. The purpose of such a planning document would have been to formulate strategies that avoided the problems of Davis Inlet. Canada acknowledged the importance of Newfoundland involvement in a 1993 Aide-Memoire to cabinet on relocation. Prior to the discovery of Voisey's Bay the federal government may have been on the right track:

The participation of the province is extremely important to a successful relocation, regardless of the site chosen. The province owns the land and has expertise and program delivery responsibilities in several areas critical to the development of a new and healthy community.  

Newfoundland's role in the Sango relocation implementation has been and is expected to remain minimal. The government of Newfoundland has provided the Sango site, and components of the project are subject to provincial environmental regulations. To date, this is the extent of provincial involvement on the Sango Pond project.

While Newfoundland has turned over funding responsibility the Canadian government and agreed to proceed with discussions of devolution of programs to the Innu, there is still a sense that the province is washing its hands of the Innu. A partnership based on sustainable mutual co-existence would seem more appropriate
than a cleansing. Even though it is to the Innu's benefit to have a direct relationship with the federal Crown, it is to Newfoundland's benefit to work with the Innu. Five years hence the Aboriginals of Labrador stand to be the custodian of "Cain's" land, and potential volumes of mineral generated wealth. The government of Newfoundland, like the federal government must forge a new modern relationship with the Innu. They should not be deaf to the words of Peter Penashue:

It is important for all of you to realize that the Innu and Inuit peoples of Labrador will be increasingly important "players" in Labrador Economic Development for two key reasons. The first is that the Innu and Inuit will, after land claims and self-government agreements are concluded likely with the next five years, have clear and specific rights with respect to development within our traditional territories many of you will be dealing with us in our role as government.

Second, land claim settlements and the impact benefit agreements will bring equity to our people and our government, we will be in a position to establish our own business and to enter partnerships on a joint-venture basis with some of you and we intend to so. 5

Penashue's comments re-enforce the importance of collaboration and cooperative planning for all groups living and investing in Labrador. The Sango Pond relocation decision-making process did not employ this concept. Proper relocation requires a planned approach
according to scholars Art Hansen and Anthony Oliver-Smith, who have studied both forced and voluntary relocations. They identified a four stage planning process which could have been applied to the Mushuaau Innu relocation, such a planning process was absent when the most recent decision was made. The stages are:

a) Recruitment Stage - those responsible for the move need to think about sociocultural characteristics of the population to be moved and how this will affect their response to relocation and to a new environment. This would be done before the move.

b) Transition Stage - transition period is a time of stress to which the response is a conservative stance to reduce the possibility that further stress will occur. The transition stage commences prior to moving from the old community to the new location. It continues until such time as the entire move is complete.

c) Stage of Potential Development - this stage is characterized initiative and risk taking and the emergence of a dynamic and increasingly open-ended society. Development is measured by rising standards of living for a significant proportion of relocates. Social and economic development plans are scripted and scrutinized in advance of the move. Implementation begins with settlement in the new community. The tenure of development varies according to the individual undertaking.

d) Handing Over/Incorporation Stage - A resettlement community is a long-term success as an entity when management of local production systems and the running of the local community are handed over to a second generation that identifies with community. The time-line for this period is variable depending upon the success of the community's development. The incorporation stage may never come to fruition. 6
Relocation is both a physical and psychological exercise. The major fault of the Sango decision is that too much emphasis has been placed on the physical infrastructure, which could serve to jeopardize a community still recovering from major psychological traumas.

What appears to be happening with the Sango relocation is that physical site plans are superseding a long term community healing strategy. To date, the federal government has appointed only technical experts to facilitate the relocation. At the time of the author's departure from INAC no coordinated strategy had been developed with the Innu and/or Health Canada to address ongoing health initiatives for the Mushua Innu. The main focus of the federal government and the Innu was on reaching agreement and commencing plans for construction prior to the 1997 federal election. Rhetoric without substance is a dangerous phenomenon; politically-driven relocations seem destined for dangerous sailing.

Too much of the Innu's future economic development is predicated on short-term construction employment generated by the construction of the Sango Bay site; 123,000 person days of work are expected to be created through the life of the project. If an established site
other than Sango were chosen those numbers could be significantly diminished. The Innu have been vigilant in arguing that proper economic renewal could only happen at Sango Pond, and it is easy to comprehend why they have made this case.

If Davis Inlet had been properly equipped in 1967, would Innu society be at the point of stagnation? This question is not easily answered but deserves some contemplation. Change appeared to be inevitable for the Innu at the time of Confederation with Canada. The Innu's lack of recognition meant they were at the whim of a provincial government caught in the pursuit of gold at the end of a mythical rainbow. The Innu were forced riders of the Newfoundland economic development road to nowhere. They ended up in Davis Inlet in 1967 but they could have as easily landed in Sango. Having no special rights or status they suffered a fate similar to other Newfoundlander, misguided policy prescription resulting in community impairment. The perpetuation of dysfunction had a more tangible effect on the Mushuau Innu as they were participants in a foreign system that neither knew nor cared to discover their uniqueness.

The Sango relocation decision did provide some positive outcomes.
Canada lived up to its SPC commitment to assume full responsibility for the administration of the Innu. For practical purposes this denoted that the Innu and Canada establish a direct funding arrangement which provided the Innu with First Nation equivalency funding. They are now funded as if they were an Indian Act band without having to register as Indian Act Indians. In essence they have achieved their own quasi-judicial status prior to the existence of a self-government treaty.

The government of Canada and the government of Newfoundland and Labrador have agreed to devolve the control and administration of all services such as education and housing allotment to the Innu. This provides the Innu with occasion to conceive, direct and implement their "own" policy. The Innu are moving to empower themselves and remove the governments of Canada and Newfoundland from their lives. These great leaps forward would probably be in a slow motion process if it were not for the relocation decision.

Once again the odds are stacked against the Innu as they try to direct their future. The Innu have demonstrated that they are a strong people able to survive the most stressful of situations.
Hopefully the profound Innu belief in the sanctity of Sango will prove well-founded. It is easy to dismiss the Sango decision based on the roots of its conception, but difficult to endorse it because of its frightening resemblance to earlier relocation schemes. The Innu achieved a huge moral victory in facilitating "their" relocation, and this is of historical significance given their past dictated insignificance. The Mushuau Innu Relocation Agreement does signify the beginning of new a Innu-Canada relationship. Although the Innu must resist the temptation to make the mistakes of their previous caretakers, they may have started on the wrong foot. The words of Sir Francis Bacon seem appropriate to capture the relocation decision ambience:

If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties.
ENDNOTES FOR FINAL CHAPTER


2. In 1995, Canadian government officials and some local contractors in Labrador were asked about the feasibility of site expansion at Davis Inlet. This informal survey was conducted by the author in his capacity as a federal government negotiator. These federal and private technical experts were in agreement that the Davis Inlet site could be expanded by the area around the airport. People consulted included Joe McKinnon, Director Technical Services INAC Atlantic, Ernie MacLean, former Director of Works Services and Transportation, Government of Newfoundland and Labrador and James B. Powers President, Labrador Construction Limited.


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APPENDIX # 1

SANGO POND STUDIES

1) Mushuau Innu Band, Davis Inlet, Labrador Preliminary Layout and Various Details

2) Sieve Analysis Results, Soil Testing at Sango, Davis Inlet Study

3) Final Field Report C.S.S. Matthew 1993


5) Natuashish Economic Development Report, Comprehensive Community Plan

6) Environmental Issues Scoping Study, Davis Inlet Relocation Project

7) Natuashish: Little Sango Pond Community Concept

8) Survey and Mapping of Sango Bay Area

9) Preliminary Vegetation Survey Sango Bay, Labrador

10) Phase 1 Report on Heritage Study for Utshimassits Community Relocation Project, Sango Bay, Labrador

11) The Identification and Investigation of Borrow and Aggregate Sources in the Sango Bay Area, Labrador Phase I Report

12) The Identification of Borrow and Aggregate Sources in the Sango Bay Area, Labrador, Phase II Report

13) Sango Bay Labrador Wharf Facility Feasibility Study

14) Feasibility Study for the Establishment of an Airstrip at Little Sango Pond

15) Design Brief Highway Alignment and Design, Sango Bay Labrador

16) Servicing Feasibility Study for the Sango Bay Area, Mushuau Innu

19) Natuashish Cost Estimates (Class "C")
20) Comparative Relocation Costs
21) Utshimassits Relocation, Initial Environmental Evaluation
22) Alternative Regions for the New Village for the Mushuau Innu: An Evaluation
23) Hearing the Voices: Government's Role in Innu Renewal
24) Gathering Voices: Finding Strength to Help our Children
26) Study of Borrow Sources and of Freezing/Permafrost Sango Area, near Davis Inlet, Labrador
27) Data on Soil Temperature-Monitoring
28) Sewage Treatment and Disposal Options and Their Environmental Impacts on Coastal Communities of Labrador, prepared by Sheppard Hedges & Green Ltd.
29) Preliminary Feasibility Study for a District Heating System for the Community of Davis Inlet (Existing Site) - prepared for P. Wilkinson & Assoc. and Mushuau Innu Band; prepared by Natural Resources Canada
30) A hydrographic survey of the approaches to the proposed Sango Village
31) Decommissioning Cost Study for Davis Inlet
32) Healing Efforts of the Mushuau Innu Since 1992
33) Davis Inlet Community Relocation Project Social Reconstruction Plan
GLOSSARY

Aboriginal refers to an Indian, Inuit, Metis, Non-status and those persons able to be registered under the Indian Act.

ADM acronym for Assistant Deputy Minister

ARDG acronym for Associate Regional Director General

Band means a body of Indians as defined by the Indian Act

Commission of Government body of non-elected officials appointed by the British government to oversee and administer the affairs of the Dominion of Newfoundland between 1933 -1949

Contribution Agreement a type of financial arrangement

Designated Lands means a tract of land or any interest therein the legal title to which remains invested in the Federal Crown and in which the band for whose use and benefit it was set apart as a reserve has, otherwise than absolutely, released or surrendered its rights or interests, whether before or after the coming into force of this definition

DFR acronym for Diamond Fields Resources Limited

DIAND acronym for the Federal Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development

DM acronym for Deputy Minister

Emish the name used by the Mushuau Innu for Voisey’s Bay after Amos Voisey moved into the area, located 90 kilometres north of Utshimassists

Fiduciary Obligation a custodial trust relationship between the Federal government and recognized Aboriginal groups

IBA acronym for Impact Benefit Agreement

INAC acronym for the Federal department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
INCO  acronym for International Nickel Company Ltd.

Indian  means a person who pursuant to the Indian Act is registered as an Indian or is entitled to be registered as an Indian

Indian Act  Canadian federal statute that defines the legal responsibilities of the Federal government for recognized Status Indians

Innu  meaning "the people" in Innu-eimun, the name which the people formally known as the Naskapi and Montagnais use to identify themselves

Innu Nation  principal political organization of the Innu peoples of Labrador, representing the communities of Davis Inlet and Sheshatshiu

Inuit  meaning "the people" in Inukitut, the name which the people formally known as Eskimos use to identify themselves

LIA  acronym for the Labrador Inuit Association the principal political organization of the Inuit peoples of Labrador

Mushuau Innu  Innu of the barrens, referring primarily to the Naskapi or Davis Inlet Innu

National Convention  elected body established by the British government to prepare constitutional options for the Dominion of Newfoundland

Native  same as aboriginal

Natuashish  Sango Pond, relocation site for the Davis Inlet Innu

Nitassinan  Innu traditional homeland encompassing much of the Quebec-Labrador peninsula in Eastern Canada

Non-status  a non-registered Indian

Nutshimish  the bush or the country, life on the land

Off-Reserve  native person or any person not living on or within federally designated "Reserve" lands

On-Reserve  native person or any person living on or within federally designated "Reserve" lands
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RDG</td>
<td>acronym for Regional Director General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered</td>
<td>means registered as an Indian in the Indian Registry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>means a tract of land, the legal title to which is vested in the Federal government, that has been set apart by the Federal government for the use and benefit of an Indian band</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheshatshiu</td>
<td>(Shay-shah-joo), translates as 'where the river opens into the lake', located in central Ntesinan at the western end of Atatshuinipek (Lake Melville)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>a registered Indian subject to the provisions of the Indian Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms of Union</td>
<td>Refers to the confederation document between the governments of Canada and Newfoundland and Labrador detailing the terms and conditions of Newfoundland's relationship with Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utshimassits</td>
<td>(Oot-shee-mah-seets), Innu name for Davis Inlet, translates as 'place of the boss', located on the north coast of Ntesinan, 280 kilometres from Goose Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utshimassiu</td>
<td>of Davis Inlet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utshimau</td>
<td>boss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VBNC</td>
<td>acronym for Voisey Bay Nickel Company, a division of INCO Ltd.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3

Geographical Location Maps
GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION MAP
EASTERN CANADA