DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN THE 1990's: ORTHODOXIES AND ALTERNATIVES WITH REFERENCE TO ZIMBABWE

Copyright Christopher Johnston

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in International Development Studies at Saint Mary's University

July 19, 1993

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To my fellow students: A luta continua!
ABSTRACT

Development in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s: Orthodoxy and Alternatives with Reference to Zimbabwe

Amidst a lingering economic and social crisis in Africa, theories and approaches to development have been expounded. This thesis argues that as much as an observed crisis persists, a range of failures and deficits in theory and praxis also prevails. The main strand of development thinking for sub-Saharan Africa—the structural adjustment approach of the World Bank and IMF—is critically examined and determined to have been both inappropriate and unsuccessful. For their part, the major continent-wide African development frameworks have failed to offer a way out of the crisis. This exigent situation is illustrated in the case of Zimbabwe where the process of development is framed by both structural adjustment and its apparent local alternatives. The former constitutes the orthodox approach, yet prominent alternatives in theory and praxis share certain orthodoxies, namely the presumption of dynamic capitalist development. A critical challenge to this conception is presented.

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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

AN OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE IN THE 1990S

Introduction

The problem of development and underdevelopment in Africa has been the subject of much concern and analysis since the earliest years of African independence. Amidst the myriad of ongoing concerns—among them political instability, economic stagnation, poverty, hunger, disease, drought, overpopulation, interstate conflict, ethnic violence, corruption, failed leadership, ballooning public debt and rising income disparities—there remains lingering testimony to an African crisis. In the assessment of this crisis, one of the main controversies has been over the very role and nature of development in the contemporary context. Economists, political scientists, sociologists, historians, anthropologists and even archaeologists have entered this debate with a multitude of historical accounts, contemporary appraisals and henceforth prescriptions concerning the success or failure of various forces (internal or external) in bringing about development on the African continent.

This thesis will take up the challenge of examining the problem or 
problematique of development in sub-Saharan Africa, with specific reference to the
Zimbabwean context, and from an interdisciplinary approach. It will treat economics as central and take political economy as the pivotal mode of analysis, but will also bear constant reminder of the necessity to accommodate a wider range of strategies, methods and techniques in the study and practice of development. The primary catalyst for the analysis will be a rather pragmatic notion of an empirical quandary which both informs theoretical analyses and is itself compounded by various deficits in development theory. A "guiding light" for the thesis will be a hope that, in the context of crisis, it will become imperative that both theory and praxis aspire to break out of the orthodoxies and discover (or rediscover!) alternative approaches to development.

Zimbabwe is in many ways a representative case study for development in the 1990s. According to traditional statistical criteria, it remains a "Third World" country, yet a "developing" middle-income one. It has an agricultural and mineral resource base, as well as substantial industrial and service sectors. It faces dilemmas of urban versus rural, modern versus traditional, and indigenous versus foreign as well as more subtle currents of race, class and gender in Zimbabwean economy, polity and civil society. It bears a recent colonial history, but also an age-old cultural heritage.

\footnote{1}{Here "economics" is taken to refer mainly to the dynamics of economic systems, to the social relations of production and exchange, and to the process of economic development more so than to the intricacies of, say, quantitative economic modelling.}

It has a one party-dominant state but faces contemporary pressures to become more
democratic and representative of its many constituent groups. It is concerned with
regional security and stability in military, political, ecological and economic terms.
And it is inextricably linked to the global political economy.

National development in Zimbabwe is conceived of in a range of modes and
formulations depending upon whether one surveys Western academics, African
intellectuals, foreign aid and development planners, domestic economists or the
multitude of groups most affected by development attempts. This thesis will attempt
to isolate the basic substance of these contesting viewpoints and assess the value of
both the approaches currently taken and those proposed. Many difficult issues will
be encountered along the way such as the extent to which development attempts in
Zimbabwe have been a success or failure—or even appropriate to Zimbabwean con-
ditions and circumstances; the likelihood that a development strategy which is fun-
damentally capitalist, outward-oriented and market-driven in nature can produce
benefits for the majority of Zimbabwean people; the ability of development theory
and analysis both to describe the substantive framework within which the struggle of
development proceeds in Zimbabwe, and to prescribe new syntheses of praxis in the
contemporary context.
An Overview of the Scope of the Thesis

To guide the analysis of the various literatures and research, the following series of questions is posed at the outset. (1) How can contemporary development best be identified and portrayed, given the glut of definitions of economic, political, social and cultural "development"? (2) To what extent can universal principles and measures of development be employed, as against a recognition of historical specificity and cross-national differences in the African context? (3) What are the major alternative approaches to development in Africa--in theory and in practice? (4) To what extent can the process of development in sub-Saharan Africa be described as fundamentally capitalist in nature?

Using Zimbabwe to illustrate produces similar questions. (A) What are the relations of production, patterns of accumulation and forces of social reproduction that underpin the process of development in Zimbabwe? (B) Has indigenous capitalism emerged in the country? (C) If it has, then by what means and through what processes has this emergence taken place? (D) Has capitalism (internal and/or external) contributed to or hindered development in Zimbabwe? (E) Given the success or failure of development efforts, what are the major alternative approaches to development and whose interests do they represent? (F) In sum, what is the shape and condition of national development in Zimbabwe and what (alternative) options are available?
Objectives and Approach of the Study

The guiding theme of the thesis will be that the major "problem" of development, in the Zimbabwean context and elsewhere (in sub-Saharan Africa) may be the very way in which development is conceived for the country and the region. Utilizing this theme will help steer the thesis through a critical survey of the academic theories and models, the strategies embraced by planners in the bilateral and multilateral aid and development agencies, and the projects and programs by domestic and foreign agents of development within Zimbabwe. It will also keep the discussion on a course of continually connecting development theory with the experience of development in practice.

The primary objective of the thesis, then, will be to examine development thinking in sub-Saharan Africa and in Zimbabwe in light of the broader modes of theoretical analysis, and with specific reference to the supposition of capitalist development. A general review of the theory will develop with this goal in mind. In the first half of the thesis, theories, models, strategies, approaches and broader "ideas about development" will be evaluated in the context of crisis in Africa. Competing perspectives in theory and practice in sub-Saharan Africa will be critically analyzed from an interdisciplinary approach, with the hope of offering an expansive but composite overview of the role and nature of development.
As the orthodoxies of contemporary development are drawn out and positioned against their major "competitors," the particular and idiosyncratic experiences of Zimbabwe will be introduced. As theory meets practice, and policies, programs and projects are carried out, the praxis of development in the country will be critically appraised. Particular attention here will be paid to the treatment and conception of economy, capital, market and state within the explicit and implicit approaches to development taken by the state and other "agents" of development in Zimbabwe. As well, the assumptions (often implied) in these approaches that concern, variously, growth and equity, costs and benefits, participation, democracy, history and progress will be explored.

Data collection and analysis extends to quantitative assessments of the character and depth of crisis in sub-Saharan Africa as well as to the claims made as to the success or failure of capitalist development in Africa. One of the secondary goals of the study is to test the assertion [particularly that of Sender and Smith (1986)] that there is valid evidence of the emergence and continued growth of an indigenous capitalism in Africa that acts as a productive force, driving the continent along a path of economic and ultimately social development. This controversy will be examined first in the general case, and then the contention of capitalist development will be more fully explored with specific reference to Zimbabwe, so that any conclusions
drawn will likely be relevant to that case. However, the expected outcome of this endeavour is a rejection of, or at least a significant revision of, these arguments.

The question of capitalism will yield to the question of development as the thesis unfolds. The linkages between modes of production and exchange and development are rather cloudy. Nevertheless, as seen in the work noted above and many others, African capitalist development is said to have occurred. An evaluation of this claim will proceed on two planes: a theoretical or abstract assessment of the contending perspectives, and a more concrete collection and analysis of secondary data. Here, empirical evaluations will centre on the contribution of capitalist forces and patterns (be they indigenous or foreign) to economic, political and social development. They will also include both an overview of the Zimbabwean political economy and a critical appraisal of the policies and activities of the Zimbabwean state, as well as of the international financial and aid and development agencies. The claims that an outward looking, market driven, capitalist pattern of development can bring widespread benefits to the people of Zimbabwe, and of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, will be probed from both qualitative and quantitative positions, and the ongoing assessment of "development thinking" will remain attached to its actual experience.
A Preliminary Vocabulary

The central challenge of the thesis may be to move towards an unscrambling of the multitude of theoretical and practical concerns as regards the "problem(s)" or "question(s)" of development in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, one of the most basic quandaries remains the very treatment of development as a process as against an end state or ideal. The bias in favour of Eurocentric and modernizationist approaches, which has been roundly and justifiably criticized by many Africans, was a product of the idealization of the modern, industrial, consumer society. Thus, focussing on the process itself allows much more freedom to define development in a wide variety of manners of change and progress.

Similar concerns regarding the problem of development that will necessarily be encountered include: its basic character and nature--how to define development; its measurement--how to describe development (i.e. what indicators to use, etc.); the construction of its strategies, policies, programs and projects--how to prescribe development; and the determination of its agency--how to carry out development (i.e. vis-a-vis who is to bear its costs and who is to reap its benefits). Undoubtedly, sorting out these and other dilemmas of development will depend on a much more interdisciplinary approach to the study of development than is usually taken in Western scholarship.
The thesis, then, will utilize definitions and meanings that are decidedly broad and inclusive. The demarcations that encapsulate the academic disciplines, and the phenomenological yardsticks that differentiate the competing paradigms are ignored as much as possible. Nevertheless, the theoretical exploration here likely reflects a framework which can best be described as African political economy, and the language of the thesis will reflect this. Here, a summary and clarification of some of the terminology in the international development literature presents a preliminary illustration of the central issues and debates as well as a necessary streamlining to ease the flow of the discussion.

Development, as noted above, indicates both a means and an end. Depending on the model or approach employed, the end of the road (whether a land of milk and honey or a dire Armageddon!) or the road itself may be the focal point. Some theorists clearly highlight a state of development--most commonly a modern, industrial, liberal-democratic ideal--but offer less on the process of reaching such a condition. Others delineate a process of economic, political, technical, social or cultural change, but limit their predictions of where these processes might eventually lead. More and more, theorists have combined means and ends in more integrative works. In this thesis, the concept of development will be taken as primarily socio-economic: a process of transformation in the economy (i.e. a regional or national one) wherein the expansion of activity allows for a distribution of benefits to the widest
possible population with the ultimate aim of providing adequate and sustained access not only to basic needs but to personal and social reproduction. This conception also includes a necessary political dimension: that as wide a range of groups and individuals as possible obtain access to, participation in, and control over both the means of production and the mechanisms of decision-making in the political economy.

This definition of development will of course seem vague, imprecise, overly sweeping or simply inappropriate to many theorists. However, at its root is an appreciation of the interdisciplinary nature of the development problem. It attempts to cover a range of ideas about development, but with an apparent set of parameters within which to work. Loaded in the definition are notions of a fundamentally egalitarian socio-political process and an economic order which is at its heart equitable. Some would argue, in a behaviourist-positivist tradition, that such value-laden analyses constitute poor theorizing. However, as will be argued, the works in development theory which are often noted as "objective" and utterly "scientific" are often part and parcel of a set of mainstream orthodoxies which themselves are born out of a certain political position vis-a-vis the global political economy. No apologies are made in the thesis for its humanistic or holistic groundings.

As much as possible, the language of this thesis will accommodate competing perspectives. But its tendencies will soon become clear: international development
will be portrayed much less as modernization and more as a heterogeneous collection of social and economic transformations. Dimensions of conventional development theory--such as its neo-classical economic orientation, neo-liberal global doctrines, top-down planning and decision-making, and Eurocentric preferences--will be actively challenged. If it is even possible to divide development thinking into the two camps nowadays, this thesis will tend towards a radical approach with its emphasis on external constraints, the interaction among classes, the possibility of multiple development paths and of differing means of organizing production. However the lessons from the traditional modernization paradigm will not easily be dismissed: for example, the importance of values, democratic processes, middle sectors and the formation of new classes.

Also, the set of ideas which constitutes development thinking will include the formal body of research and published writings in the social sciences (techniques, models, approaches) but within a broader definition of development knowledge including the theories embraced by academics and practitioners to more indigenous notions and beliefs about development. Certainly, some of the most important ideas about development in recent years have come from the latter.

Within earshot will be recent calls for an abandonment of the very construct of "development." In a text called the Development Dictionary, Wolfgang Sachs (1992) writes an obituary for development:
The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusion and disappointment, failures and crimes have been the steady companions of development and they tell a common story: it did not work. Moreover, the historical conditions which catapulted the idea into prominence have vanished: development has become outdated. But above all, the hopes and desires which made the idea fly, are now exhausted: development has grown obsolete.\(^3\)

However, Sachs and the other authors in the collection acknowledge that their desertion is of a "cast of mind" or "mental structure" which has dominated development thinking since 1949. Here, a preferred approach is to help shape a rethinking of development rather than to support the execution and burial favoured by these theorists.

Clearly, the tendency to equate development with growth in per capita income will be circumvented, as will the proclivity to envision the basic mechanisms of development as industrialization, the migration of labour to industrial areas, a fundamental division of labour, a transformation of land tenureship and material production relations, and a steady expansion of investment. These criteria, the product of the theorizing of early development economists, constitute the orthodoxies in economics; but they disregard many important ideas and contributions from other disciplines and paradigms.

Assuming that development can be "rescued," a set of concepts and terms emerges from the definition of development denoted above--one which permits an

exploration of the problematique of development in the contemporary setting. In an investigation of the Zimbabwean context, some of these are general to the international political economy while others are specific and idiosyncratic to sub-Saharan Africa. Capitalism, in its Marxian usage denotes a set of social relations of production which includes among other things an appropriation of surplus labour value by agents of capital. However, the orientation of this thesis is not to contemplate strict features of a classical Marxian version of capitalism, but to consider the nature of a capitalist political economy which includes terminological space for capital as both financial and physical capital stocks, for capital as capitalist actors—the owners of the means of production—and most importantly for capital as macro and micro sets of relations of production and exchange. The coarse but predominant notion that capitalism is simply the way things are or the current and natural state of affairs will be left to the mainstream media and proponents of the status quo, though it is worthwhile to note that there may be room for these notions if one regards capitalism to be a transient stage of historical development: the way things are... for now.

In pursuing an exploration of the growth, development and contribution of capitalism in sub-Saharan Africa, attention will be given to the hallmarks of capitalism such as the emergence of free wage labour and the existence of classes.

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4This group might include merchant, industrial and financial capitalists, particularly if one approximates an historical-anthropological investigation.
As far as Zimbabwe and the potentiality of indigenous capitalism is concerned, an effort will be made to explore the notion of what some have termed "African capitalism". This includes a treatment of the challenging and often politically-charged distinctions between a black-and-white inclusive capitalism and the more strict (and preferable to many) "black capitalism in Africa". In addition to distinctions between local and foreign ownership of the means of production, subsequent chapters will grapple with the terms settler, peripheral, state, welfare, international and monopoly capitalism--each one having important contextual meanings.

As indicated above, capitalism has its primary significance here in denoting a set of relations of production and exchange—a mode of production. In development theory, production itself has come to acquire a variety of meanings. Some economists consider production in terms of more or less technical models of selecting and pricing inputs and formulating a production function to relate them to (desired levels of) outputs. A larger economic process, if it exists at all for them, consists of firms seeking to maximize profits on outputs by minimizing the costs of inputs to production. The interdisciplinary scope of this thesis will entail a much wider view of the factors of production in their full social and political relationship.

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In macroeconomics, an economy is typically viewed as an economic cycle which includes production, distribution, exchange and consumption. These four will be treated as fundamentally interdependent here, and to speak of modes of production generally implies, directly or indirectly, certain (and sometimes consequent) patterns of distribution, exchange and consumption. In the political-economic approach taken here for example, a capitalist mode of production includes a labour-capital/value-profit production dynamic, but might also imply, in most cases, a market distribution mechanism and the sale of goods and services (exchange) for money. The danger in using this as an analytical framework is, of course, that in the contemporary world complex mixtures of production, distribution, exchange and consumption abound. Nevertheless, it will be argued throughout that counterposing capitalist against alternative modes of production remains a worthwhile heuristic venture.

Alternatives to the capitalist political economy, in theoretical if not empirical terms, are numerous and varied. Where possible and relevant here, however, capitalism will be set against a socialist mode of production.\(^7\) This method is

\(^7\)However, it is precisely this point upon which the "modes of production debate" rests (see Chapter III). Some Marxist scholars argue that capitalist penetration may in fact take the form of a preservation and articulation of pre-capitalist formations under the service of essentially capitalist distribution and exchange relations.

\(^8\)Though left necessarily vague, this implies some alternative to the profit-driven appropriation of surplus labour value under capitalism, and may in turn involve varying degrees of state activity, etc. The purpose of positing a socialist mode is an heuristic one: to explore what capitalism and alternative systems imply to those who promote them.
employed for a number of reasons. The end of the cold war and the "victory of capitalism over socialism" is held widely and unquestionably at present. This declaration warrants a challenge. Secondly, the recent history of development and of development theory in sub-Saharan Africa, as elsewhere in the Third World, has been marked by debates and questions over capitalist versus socialist economy and polity—each offering a longstanding critique of the other. Lastly, Zimbabwe itself espouses a socialist orientation in its strategy of development, but it finds itself in the midst of essentially capitalist domestic and international political economies. The basic nature and significance of these contrasting modes of production will be explored more fully as the thesis charts the experience and backdrop of contemporary development in sub-Saharan African and, in particular, in Zimbabwe.
THE AFRICAN CRISIS

The economies of almost every African country are in a state of crisis, and in some cases actual disintegration. This is not a crisis of natural disasters, but of human making...[T]he crisis is not merely economic in nature, but involves a profound rupture of social structures and inherited political institutions.¹

--Bade Onimode

Though some may have grown weary of the "perennial doom and gloom" of statistical snapshots of the continued political, economic and social malaise in Africa, the fact remains that the continent is in the midst of a widening and deepening crisis. A brief perusal of the crisis here will accomplish three objectives: it will provide an empirical backdrop to the discussion of development theory and practice to follow; it will offer a preliminary exploration of the key ideas of development since these are often generated in the dialogues which surround the African crisis; and it will serve as a preface to an examination of the major competing approaches to development in sub-Saharan Africa--approaches which in all cases (save one) have been formulated in direct response to the plight of the continent and its people.

In its report, *Global Economic Prospects* (1993), the World Bank predicts that economic growth among developing countries will improve markedly, but in a highly uneven pattern. Latin America and in particular Asian countries will grow rapidly, it says, while conditions in sub-Saharan Africa could worsen dramatically. It predicts a rise in growth rates from 2 percent to 3.7 percent; but with rapid population increases, per capita income will be under severe strain. It forecasts an average annual growth rate in population of 3 percent through the 1990s: sub-Saharan Africa's population of 495 million is expected to nearly triple to over 1.23 billion by 2025, and urbanization should continue as urban populations are expected to rise by 4.6 percent per year.²

The Bank estimates that sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the world where poverty will worsen in the 1990s. The numbers of poor in Africa will rise from 216 million in 1990 to over 304 million by the year 2000, leaving half of all Africans below the poverty line. From this, it expects a number of problems to intensify—from environmental degradation to an aggravation of the plight of women in Africa. In short, it reports sub-Saharan Africa's rank as generally unchanging. It remains lowest in the economic measures: per capita GDP, gross domestic investment, gross domestic savings; lowest in social indicators: life expectancy, daily calorie supply, primary and secondary school enrolments; and lowest in many other earmarks of

"development" such as fertilizer and energy consumption. It continues to have the highest rank in population growth, crude birth rate, crude death rate, fertility rate, infant mortality, population per physician, foreign aid as a percentage of GNP and external debt as a percentage of GNP.³

UNICEF's picture is not much better. Some progress has been made: immunization rates have risen from 20 percent to over 50 percent in the last seven years; the average life expectancy in Africa has risen from 41 to 54 years since 1960. However, one third of the 14 million children world-wide who die each year are African, though Africans comprise only 10 percent of the world's population. Thirty percent of women in Africa suffer from chronic anaemia--part of the "vicious cycle in which their children are born with low birth-weight and face almost certain malnutrition by the age of two."⁴ Africa remains, UNICEF says, the only region in the world where nutrition has not improved in the past 25 years. World Bank figures confirm that sub-Saharan Africa is the only region where the average per capita food production has actually fallen since the base period 1979-81.⁵

The image of The African Crisis is becoming well known to all. The Globe and Mail recently ran a full-page piece written by its Development Issues Reporter, John Stackhouse, entitled "Africa: The Cruel Continent" with a pull-quote that read,

The world's poorest land appeared to be on the verge of a breakthrough. The Cold War ended, lacklustre leaders departed, economic successes appeared. But the engine of change has stalled. Everyone is losing hope.6

In the article, the cause of the stalled engine seems to be a disastrous combination of regional conflict, economic stagnation, vanishing foreign investment and aid and failed economic and political reforms. It notes that African debt has risen by $30 billion (US) since 1990, an amount just over the $27.2 billion spent to service the debt, and about 60 percent of the foreign aid it received. International commodity prices have collapsed, and Africa's terms of trade were 45 percent lower in 1992 than in 1980. An estimated 8 million Africans are infected with the HIV virus, and about 100 million are malnourished with farmers producing about 20 percent less food per capita than in 1970.7

The African Development Bank may be alone in its optimism. At the 29th annual meeting of the ADB, its Senegalese President Babacar Ndiaye asserted that Africa has strong medium-term prospects for growth despite the continent's weak overall economic performance. The widespread view that Africa is beyond hope is,


7Ibid.
he said, a "misleading portrayal of both prevailing reality and future possibilities. .
even during the 1980s, the period all too readily decried as the lost decade for develop-
ment, some 20 countries in all sub-regions, had records of positive increases in per
per-capita income." In his view, the growth rate of two percent, while low, gave "hopeful
indications of turnarounds in economic performance."8

If anything, Ndiaye's optimism belies some of the difficulties with the very
term "crisis." Some argue that the crisis exists only in relative terms: Africa (with a
very recent colonial past) has been arbitrarily and unfairly submitted to the same
measures and indicators that are applied to the modern, industrialized countries.
Many other Africans are simply tired of hearing and seeing their lives depicted as
ones of complete and utter despair. They suggest that a necessary climate of
optimism will be generated if more effort were expended on celebrating Africa's rich
culture and heritage. In all likelihood, the economists of the African Development
Bank are given to a very pragmatic approach: in order to ensure that a cheerful and
confident environment for foreign investment and assistance is maintained, the
magnitude of the economic crisis is downplayed.

The roles of foreign investment and foreign aid, as well as of the foreign
policies of Western governments have been noted dimensions of the African crisis.
While it is not the task of this thesis to fully separate and explore the internal versus

8"African Development Bank Sees Growth Despite Africa's Weak Economic
external roots of the crisis, there are undoubtedly aspects of the contemporary development milieu which rest on such distinctions. As will be shown, the theory and practice of development (certainly in Zimbabwe) frequently encounters dilemmas such as the role and impact of transnational corporations; the effects of foreign direct investment vis-a-vis stimulating growth and/or supplanting indigenous ownership and enterprise; the likelihood or ability of national political economies to pull back from international markets in processes such as delinking or intra-regional integration; the presence and involvement of foreign military forces and their effect on local security and stability; and the role of foreign technologies (both physical and human) in domestic economic, political and social change. In simplest terms, questions of dependence pervade the development discourse, and Africans must continually ponder the extent to which they will be affected by decisions or actions taken far removed from their own lands:

With no permanent policy toward Africa, the developed North seems to treat the continent like a crying child, coaxing it one minute, ignoring it the next, scolding it thereafter. It prefers to shun the carnage that has become Liberia. It quarantines Sudan. And after dithering in tiny Somalia, it commits more resources than almost any African aid program has ever seen.9

The role of foreign assistance in the African crisis (and its possible solution) has been a sharply contested issue. Aid and assistance during the Cold War were of course driven by geopolitical objectives. By the 1980s, however, donor countries

increasingly turned to economic motives, and to a lesser extent moral ones, and began to question the effective "pay-off" of their commitments either in terms of the establishment of healthy bilateral and multilateral trade relations or in direct benefits to the populations of the recipient countries. On both counts, many contributing states and agencies have witnessed apparent failures and have begun to rethink their commitments after the "lost decade for development" in Africa:

Beset by Afro-pessimism, many donor representatives no longer believe they are to blame for Africa's economic malaise. They wonder how an oil-rich, authoritarian regime brought economic stagnation to Nigeria, while an oil-rich, authoritarian regime brought rapid economic growth to Indonesia. Or how South Korea, which in 1957 had a smaller economy than Ghana, now operates one 38 times larger. Or how Tanzania, with comparative peace and stability, received about $8 billion (US) in foreign aid in the eighties—equal to about half its total economic output—and still finished the decade as the world's second-poorest country.¹⁰

Another familiar theme in the discourse of the African crisis, one that is raised in the quotation above, is the ongoing comparison of the situation in sub-Saharan Africa with that of the countries of the Far East. The World Bank predicts that by the year 2030, per capita income in East Asia will reach $3,300 (US) while in Africa it will remain at a low $400.¹¹ Table 2.1 shows the trend and forecast of regional growth in per capita incomes, comparing the apparent weak performance of sub-Saharan Africa to East Asia and the developing countries as a whole. For planners

¹⁰Ibid.

at the Bank and Fund, for analysts in Europe and North America, and for increasing numbers of development theorists and practitioners, the crisis in Africa is that it has failed where others have succeeded\(^2\) and it is quickly losing ground.

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\(^2\)The Asian NICs, but also the near-NICS and now China.
RESPONSES TO CRISIS: DEVELOPMENT POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

[T]he current situation is so desperate and unlikely to improve without a major concerted effort by African countries and their development partners. --Commonwealth Secretariat

We have come to appreciate that fundamental structural change is needed to transform African economies and make them competitive in an increasingly competitive world. --The World Bank

[S]ince the global objectives of Fund and Bank are for the creation of a world system where international capital's trade and investment flows are unrestricted, the Third World's concerted action has to address itself to the control of international trade and investment. --Laurence Harris

Ultimately, the solution to African economic problems will have to come from Africans themselves, and this can hardly be done without concerted mobilization of human and material resources of the continent for inward-looking and self-reliant development. --Bright Okugo

With crisis standing as an ad hoc theme for this chapter, this section will make the argument that a crisis is at hand among the major policy frameworks that have been posed for sub-Saharan Africa. In the last section, it was shown that development


in African is currently framed by an empirical crisis. Though even the basic character of the crisis, much less the nature of its causes, is subject to incessant debates, we can reasonably consider that there is a long-term and entrenched economic, political and social malaise confronting the continent and its people.

This section will review some of the major macro-policy structures that have been advanced in recent years, with the intention of highlighting the key ideas of development in Africa in praxis: the realm where theory meets practice. Later, of course, development theory and ultimately national policy approaches (in the case of Zimbabwe) will be explored. By ascertaining the ideas, concepts and strategies of development along the dynamic and interrelated continuum of theory-praxis-policy-practice, it is hoped that a more rich and full problématique of development in sub-Saharan Africa can be revealed.

The four quotations above, all printed in the same year (1989), are illustrative of the difficulties facing African development praxis, and the sheer magnitude of divergence between the major approaches to development for the region. Though there seems to be concurrence over the need for broad structural change, there are rather visible disagreements vis-a-vis an inward versus outward focus for development, reliance on capital and international markets, the dynamic character of the global political economy, and notions of who is to participate in the necessary "concerted" efforts.
The IFIs and Structural Adjustment

Most policy documents, particularly of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), have focused on such dimensions of the African crisis as the rapid decline in growth rates, deteriorating terms of trade, low rates of gross domestic investment, low levels of savings, stagnating agricultural output especially in the food sector, the decline of many industries, and ballooning foreign debt. The social dimensions of the crisis—the rise in poverty, pauperization, refugeeism, disease, crime and now environmental degradation—are widely reported by the World Bank and IMF as being products of these economic troubles. Less visible but sometimes recognized are the political dimensions: the crisis is framed as the delegitimation of the state, the withdrawal of large populations from participation, government corruption, and rampant militarization.

The underlying current of debates in the reports of the World Bank and IMF had generally amounted to dilemmas of a chicken and egg variety: whether economic growth is a necessary prerequisite to political democracy and social welfare or whether the reverse is true. In recent years, in the era of Structural Adjustment Programs, the former has become the predominant causal relationship in African development thinking within the IFIs. Processes of economic stabilization and growth are now seen to be clear and natural precursors to social and political change.
The technical features of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)—their terms and conditionalities for recipient members of the IFIs—have become well known. African participants in SAPs typically face complete sets of economic and political conditions to receiving continued balance of payments support and development assistance through the IFIs. Chapter IV will include an examination of the evolution of Zimbabwe's participation in its SAP as well as some of the social and political effects of structural adjustment; and the fifth chapter will turn to alternatives to structural adjustment in the country. These discussions are introduced here in a broader context: in terms of the development policy framework implied in the SAPs in force through the 1980s and into the 1990s in sub-Saharan Africa.

In Africa, the World Bank/IMF response to the crisis, and the consequent implementation of SAPs, has followed an evolutionary course with its beginnings in the "Berg Report" of 1981, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa - An Agenda for Action*. This was the first document produced by the Bank to outline a strategy to combat what it saw as the African crisis. It contained the basic analytical framework for an agenda of economic development in the short and medium term. This framework has come to serve as the foundation for present SAPs: exchange-rate

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adjustments, requirements for stabilization (vis-a-vis fiscal policies: cutting government spending and raising taxes) as well as adjustments such as trade liberalization, institutional restructuring, sectoral changes (e.g. the expansion of cash crops for export) in order to boost foreign exchange earnings and thus repay foreign debt obligations.\textsuperscript{18}

The most pertinent and succinct way to describe the fundamental approach to development taken in Bank/Fund SAPs is to say that neo-classical economic growth analysis and modelling dominates the basic formulation of causes of development; that a neo-liberal international political economy orientation is assumed (a "free trade bias" along with presumed undercurrents of an active pursuit of comparative advantage and participation in world markets); and that a preferred national-political strategy is to allow markets to allocate resources, in the name of economic efficiency, with minimal interference from state intervention.

However, the framework for development formed by the Bank/Fund has undergone a visible evolution. This change is primarily one of expanding its conception of structural adjustment to include dimensions beyond the purely economic realm. The perceived political, social and cultural underpinnings of macro-economic reforms became evident by the 1984 report, \textit{Towards Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action}:

Distorted incentives and inefficient institutions are central to Africa's poor return on investment and therefore to its economic performance. These failings have deep roots in African societies, and to improve the economic performance requires governments to have the political will to overcome these interests.19

Through the 1980s, the Bank continued a basic stance of promoting economic reforms and, increasingly, political reforms. This included support for currency devaluations, floating interest rates, wage controls, increases in foreign investment, expansions of private sector activity, rollbacks of government programs, privatization, and cuts in civil service employment. By the time of its 1986 Africa report, Financing Adjustment with Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1986-90, it was standing firm in its tough "pull yourselves up by your bootstraps" approach to development in Africa.

However, as a result of some fairly heavy criticism and rather poor results of the SAPs in the region and elsewhere, it began to soften its approach, at least at the level of rhetoric, by the late 1980s. In the 1989 report, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth - A Long-Term Perspective Study, it maintained that "the countries that have persisted with reforms since the mid-1980s are showing the first signs of improvement. . . these give grounds for believing that recovery has started."20 However, the discourse of neo-classical economic theory so prevalent in the previous reports seemed to slightly wane:

19World Bank, Toward Sustained Development, 44.
20World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis, 1.
It is not sufficient for African governments merely to consolidate the progress made in their adjustment programs. They need to go beyond the issues of public finance, monetary policy, prices, and markets to address fundamental questions relating to human capacities, institutions, governance, the environment, population growth and distribution, and technology. Changes in perceptions and priorities, as well as incentives, will be required to bring about improvements. Above all, to channel the energies of the population at large ordinary people should participate more in designing and implementing development programs.\textsuperscript{21}

The Bank/Fund approach has certainly remained grounded in a basically modernizationist, market economy-centred process of adjustment and reform, but it seems now to at least consider other non-economic dimensions of development. It has recently stated that worsening conditions can only be avoided if three problems are addressed: environmental degradation which makes the many parts of Eastern and Southern Africa susceptible to drought; the AIDS epidemic which could dramatically affect the labour force and therefore economic growth; and the shortfalls in international aid which is now being drawn in large measure to Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid.

Alternatives: Collective Continental Responses

The simplest way to frame the major approaches to development praxis in sub-Saharan Africa is to consider the Structural Adjustment Programs of the IFIs as set against a broad set of continent-wide "alternatives." This is merely to consider the currently existing set of strategies and policies, and the theoretical orthodoxies behind them, as compared to all other proposed options. This, of course, is an unfair oversimplification, but this subsection will attempt to explore this range of alternatives in the hope of bringing out key ideas and concepts of development without being overly concerned with a meticulous differentiation of the various alternative approaches.

Alternatives to the SAPs, and to the mainstream orthodoxies, have arisen at least partially in direct response to the policies formulated and implemented by the World Bank and IMF. Many of the reports of the IFIs have been criticized for failing to adequately explore the causes of the current African crisis. This exploratory task has been undertaken by mainstream theorists who have produced a range of explanations and generated a profusion of debates. Some look at the crisis purely in terms of misfortunes brought about by the vagaries of international markets: tumbling commodity prices, a squeezing-out of Western markets for African manufactured and processed exports by Asian goods, and a "migration" of multinationals to regions outside Africa. Others focus on the failure of planning: the ad hoc nature of responses
to various aspects of the crisis as well as the disjointedness of aid, development assistance, foreign policies, trade policies and technology policies of Western countries. Still others probe internally at economic mismanagement, militarization, tribal-based patronage, corruption, suppression of democratic participation and so on.

On a global scale, criticisms of structural adjustment (and sometimes alternatives) have been advanced from a number of state agencies, intergovernmental bodies and NGOs, each of these having its own interests and each putting forth its own idea of how development can be brought about in Africa and elsewhere. Chief among these perhaps is UNICEF. In its 1987 report, Adjustments with a Human Face, it criticized the World Bank and IMF for ignoring infant and child welfare in their policy frameworks, and for the detrimental effects of SAPs on the most vulnerable groups in developing societies in the 1980s. UNICEF did not, however, reject the notion that macroeconomic adjustment is necessary, or that economic growth ought to remain the central goal of development. It proposed a lighter, more "human" version of structural adjustment where the political and economic reforms of the SAPs are combined with poverty alleviation and nutritional protection as well as initiatives to target children and women from poor families (e.g. health and

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23 This is part of the argument for structural adjustment: that a coordinated continent-wide macroeconomic program is what's needed.

education). Also, it has recognized important dimensions of development that have remained beyond the scope of analysis in the Bank/Fund approach, such as the role of informal sectors in generating growth in incomes of the poor during periods of structural adjustment.25

Perspectives on development within institutions in Africa vary widely. Some, such as the African Development Bank (ADB), do not diverge much from the orthodoxies found in the Bank/Fund. The ADB recently blamed the poor economic performance of the continent during 1992 on devastating drought in the East and South, the harsh international economic climate, and on the conflicts in Somalia, Angola and Liberia. The ADB answers include: "more comprehensive measures" in dealing with the massive external debt; negotiating better terms for future borrowing; an emphasis on concessional lending on a case-by-case basis at lenient maturity, grace period and interest rates; a renewed importance for development-oriented action26 but only to the extent that this action is in line with the sound financial and operational policy measures of the IFIs; and socially-conscious structural adjustment that complements rather than conflicts with economic integration.27 On the last point, the

25Ibid.: 90.

26In this, the ADB sees its position as set apart from the IFIs.

ADB seemed to acknowledge a need for collective responses to economic crisis in Africa, but only within a framework of SAP conditionalities.

For the most part, major alternative frameworks for development in sub-Saharan Africa are the realm of a number of collective and regional initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s. Though the search for indigenous development options certainly began as early as in 1963 with the inception of the Organization for African Unity, it is in the 1980s that the major African collective alternatives arose. Some of the most active regional initiatives have been in the form of sub-regional enterprises such as ECOWAS or SADCC. These have come to emphasize regional cooperation and gradual regional integration in the face of economic and political pressures in the world system. Most of these sub-regional initiatives remain fairly inactive for a number of reasons, among them that the SAPs have focused efforts externally to world markets at the expense of the development of both trade and policy regimes within sub-Saharan Africa and that cooperation among African states has been slow in coming as a result of ongoing mistrust and conflict. Sub-regional groupings have

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28 ADB, in its self-proclaimed role as the economic arm of the OAU, has recently established the African Export and Import Bank (Afreximbank) in part to help facilitate intra-regional trade.

29 There are also numerous initiatives at a more functional level in the arrangements in the areas of trade, currency, agriculture, ecology, etc., such as the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) of Eastern and Southern Africa or the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in the Horn of Africa. The focus here is instead on major initiatives that have articulated a macro political-economic or development program for the continent itself.
largely been preoccupied with military and security concerns (e.g. the ECOWAS/ECOMOG action in Liberia). Also, with their member states concerned with SAPs at the national level they have had little energy left to construct development policy at the regional level.

The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) put forth by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the early 1980s was intended to be a blueprint for the political and economic emancipation of Africa, promoting national and collective self-reliance. Operating under a longer time horizon than its competing framework in the Bank/Fund, the "Berg Report," it laid specific development goals to be reached by the year 2,000. It also differed in its allowance for a strong role for state intervention in Africa, its antipathy for the general path of primary-product export-led growth, and its view that goals of personal income and consumption and access to public services were critical (not ancillary) to development. The LPA also took a different approach to the Bank/Fund in that the status of women was not considered separate or marginal from the overall question of development.

The Lagos Plan stressed food and energy self-sufficiency and an approach of continental economic integration to be brought about gradually via sub-regional

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31Reginald H. Green, "Africa in the 1980s: What are the Key Issues?" Ch.4 in P. Ndegwa et. al., eds., Development Options for Africa: In the 1980s and Beyond, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1985: 30.
groupings. The key emphasis of the LPA was primarily the indigenization of African economies. For a number of reasons, the Lagos Plan of Action has failed to plant itself on the development agenda in sub-Saharan Africa. This failure has been explained variously by its silence on internal dimensions of the African crisis, by its inadequate consideration of contradictions, inequalities, modes of exploitation, corruption and human rights abuses, and by the continued unbalanced nature of Africa's relationship in the world economy.

Most recently, the main direct collective response to the development agenda of the World Bank/IMF has been the UN Economic Commission for Africa's Alternative Economic Framework of 1989. The impetus for the report was a criticism of the orthodox view of development behind the SAPs, but it also put forward a program of its own: a political economy approach stressing underdevelopment and dependence as obstacles to growth. It offered a survey of the various structural

32 For an elaboration of this discussion, see Adebayo Adedeji, ed., Indigenization of African Economies. London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1981. Adedeji, a Nigerian economist, was the principal architect of the Lagos Plan.

31 Most of them beyond the scope of the discussion here, but many having to do with the overwhelming dominance of the Structural Adjustment Programs of the Bank/Fund on the policy scene in Africa, through support from the donor community, during the 1980s.


35 The close connection between the Lagos Plan of Action and the Alternative Economic Framework should be noted. The LPA, though written by the ECA, was published by the OAU. See Robert S. Browne, "Alternative Policy Frameworks for African Development in the 1990s" in Nyang'o and Shaw, eds., op.cit.; 71.
factors limiting development in sub-Saharan Africa, and centred on a set of obstacles to accumulation and productivity in the region: (i) a predominance of commerce over industry; (ii) an absence of linkages within the productive sectors; (iii) the small size of African economies and consequent low buying power; (iv) a dependence on a few similar export crops; (v) a policy bias in favour of urban areas; (vi) the instability of political and social institutions; and (vii) poor political leadership.\textsuperscript{36}

The ECA proposed an alternative framework, with an objective of human-centredness, human development as the ultimate measure, a basic philosophy of food self-sufficiency (on a regional basis), a primary aim of the reduction of poverty (with "poverty" stated in economic, intellectual and cultural terms), and a goal of sustainable development. For the latter, Structural Adjustment Programs were recognized as merely one-off improvements in stability which have not generally worked even in that regard. Instead, a key to sustainability was recognized as the effective participation in decision-making at all levels to ensure the accountability of leadership, the efficiency of institutions, and the effectiveness of programs and projects. This political dimension is beginning to be recognized even by the World Bank, though in the Bank/Fund discourse the emphasis seems to be on the political will of African governments to carry out reforms rather than on the approach to political participation taken by the ECA.

An important dimension of the ECA alternative framework for the analysis in this thesis—i.e. in terms of the nature of production and exchange vis-a-vis development in Africa—is that it recognizes historical origins of the weak linkages found to be present in African political economies. The ECA framework portrays a lingering disarticulation of African societies that is in essence an historical legacy of colonization. In the colonial years, organic linkages between sectors and classes of society were removed. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 2.1.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>FIGURE 2.1 - COLONIAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural Production</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resource Extraction</td>
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With this historical legacy, the constituent parts of the African economy are disassociated from one another—sectors are deprived of forward and backward linkages that have been present in economies that have developed. A true "cycle" of production and consumption is often missing. The effect of these severed linkages today is that connections between industry and agriculture, between transportation and communication and so on, are weak or remain entirely absent. Therefore, discussions

of power and progress in the African context may have much less to do with ideology and leadership and more to do with a disarticulation between industry and agriculture in a system of production and consumption as well as their associated social relations. This historical legacy cannot be taken as a universal phenomenon however, since settler economies such as Rhodesia or South Africa were much more likely to have industrialized and to have established deep linkages across economic sectors.

As noted at the close of the first section of this chapter ("THE AFRICAN CRISIS") the question continually posed is "why has the international crisis had such a devastating effect in Africa as compared to the Asian NICs?" The proposed answers to this vary widely from suggestions that the Asian "corporatist" model of development centres on an adherence to tough efficiency and competitiveness-driven market principles, with a consolidated mobilization of support from all groups behind industrial expansion and growth, to claims that frugality, productiveness and entrepreneurship are culturally bound in the Asian political economies. It will be argued here that any answer has to begin with the most fundamental and structural dimensions of internal and external relations throughout African history. The historical record of colonization has, of course, been written and rewritten, but seldom in the analyses of mainstream planners or academics today does one find mention of this historical experience and its continued legacies in the current times. This history will not be recounted in this thesis, but discussions about the nature and impact of the
contacts between what existed prior to and what was brought by external forces—and the resulting contradictions present in contemporary African societies—do inform the nature of development. If anything, these issues are what separate the alternative approaches to development in sub-Saharan Africa today from the mainstream orthodoxies.

The search for alternative frameworks for development in Africa has not abated. The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation in 1990 stated that development, self-reliance and stability can only come through the empowerment of people, democratization of society, provision of basic human needs, expansion of democratic space, respect for human rights, governmental accountability, decentralization and deconcentration of power, increased roles for popular and non-governmental organizations, and effective participation of the people in the development process. However, the very fact that the search goes on highlights the disappointing record of these alternatives in being brought to bear in the form of concrete, implemented policy. The crisis in development praxis in sub-Saharan Africa includes both the evident deficiency of the

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Bank/Fund SAPs—in terms of the neglect to incorporate African development perspectives as well as the apparent failure empirically to bring about the changes they had intended—and the inability of alternatives (which, it is argued here, are necessary ones) to present a coherent policy challenge to the structural adjustment orthodoxies much less a workable alternative framework for development in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s.

This crisis in praxis is not without its fruitful outcomes. The purpose of reviewing it here is not to fully sort out its origins and impacts but to illuminate some of the key issues and ideas in development, from a macro or continental perspective, that have arisen from the dialogues and debates surveyed. In the next section, a further crisis will be posited: one at the level of theory. It is hoped that in so doing a more penetrating problématique of development—one that includes lessons from empirical, practical, ideological and theoretical fronts—can be brought forward to the subsequent examination of contemporary development in Zimbabwe.
The body of literature on development in Africa is immense. Development studies spans numerous disciplines in the arts, social sciences and sciences. Many theories and models with origins external to the continent have been extended to the African context. Consequently, theory and intellectual inquiry has been continually adapted and has grown into branches within the established disciplines, or have crossed over into new interdisciplinary areas of study. At the same time, indigenous ideas and knowledge about the nature of development were articulated more and more, and were often integrated into the emerging cross-disciplinary fields of development. In a relatively short historical period, Africa, with its newly independent states, became something of a testing ground for the strategies and approaches to development. The "recency" of the evolution of development principles and models in sub-Saharan Africa, the hybrid nature (external with internal) of development theory of the region, and the ongoing confluence of development theory with development practice are all kept in mind as the theoretical and empirical examinations in the thesis are carried out.

Development theory has its origins in development economics. Core courses in development studies generally trace the emergence and growth of development thinking to the early "pioneers" of development economics. Forty years later,

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[40] See Gerald Meier and Dudley Seers, eds., The Pioneers of Development, London: (continued...)
development theory has of course broadened to other disciplines in the social sciences, sciences and humanities. And theorists have subsequently turned much further back than the pioneering development economists to look for insights into the contemporary "problem" of development. Development theory, as a body of research and published writings (formalized models, studies, strategies and so on) now covers a fairly wide range of concepts and ideas. But as a result of charges of ethnocentricity in Western scholarship, development thinking, if not yet formal theory, has increasingly reflected a broader definition of development knowledge (preferred here) which includes a range of ideas about development from the concepts put forth by academics, researchers and practitioners to indigenous notions and beliefs about development that are held by the intended beneficiaries of what the expatriate experts call "development."

The multifarious nature of key concepts and ideas in African development is emphasized here. Clearly, theories differ dramatically in what are considered the key units of analysis and agents of change: state, autocracy, market, firm, group (tribe, class, gender), community or individual. They also vary in what are regarded as the fields of play for development—the world system, the region or continent, the national

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40(...continued)

polity, the international or domestic political economy, the village or the household—as well as the rules of the game, i.e. the parameters and constraints in the dynamic process of change.

The vastness of development theory may be a strength in terms of the wide variety of approaches and the broad array of ideas it embraces. However, there is a number of areas where useful connections might be made (or in some cases must be made). One of these is the gulf that exists between the highest and lowest levels of analysis and practice. At the one level are theories of the global condition for development—international political economy, world systems theory, models and systems of trade, finance, technology, communication and knowledge—and at the other end are the apparently micro-level grassroots initiatives undertaken by thousands of researchers and practitioners in the field. The former are accused of being too far out of touch to make a difference while the latter are told that what they are doing is merely tinkering around at the margins while the real events of the globe unfold. These levels must be connected in order to address the contemporary problem of development, particularly for sub-Saharan Africa.

This relates to the difficulty of casting the dimensions of the particular as against the universal in development theory. There coexists a need for clear macro if not global conceptions of how development might proceed, alongside a need to recognize a dense heterogeneity of peoples, forces, structures, ideas and approaches
internal and external to the developing countries.\textsuperscript{42} The risks of either are visible in the current setting. Structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa illustrates the problem of conceiving of development in a generalized formulation of economic change and downplaying the idiosyncratic features of each continent, country, and sub-region. By the same token, the work of development practitioners at the project level often attempts to make development theory more responsive to particular conditions and circumstances. In the face of a coinciding pressure for political palatability and saleability in development consulting, they become micro-theorists and form development approaches that often consist of, for example, simple input-output or systems models, or sets of facile steps. While these may adequately serve the purpose of treating the problem and process of development in the local context, they may offer little in terms of lessons for other settings and may unduly ignore the complex macro-level forces constraining development.

Finding a common ground for approaches to development on an international scale, if not on a local scale, may also be aggravated by the persistent fragmentation of development theory into the disciplines which encompass development studies. Paul Streeten (1981) delineated three areas of interdisciplinary work in development: specialists working together on a practical problem; assumptions, concepts or methods being borrowed from one discipline and applied to another; and a more

sweeping recasting of concepts, models and paradigms which transcends the various disciplines.\textsuperscript{43} The latter of these might be where development theory is ultimately headed, but there are lasting barriers to interdisciplinarity in development theory.

As Michael Lipton (1970) noted, disciplinary divisions correspond to a separation of variables into sets that can be safely treated as 'nearly independent' in the affluent countries and cultures for which they were designed.\textsuperscript{44} But despite the interdisciplinary case having been made over 20 years ago, the European and North American social science disciplines continue to dominate both theory and studies. Academics are pressured to publish in the journals of their respective disciplines and are taken less seriously if they emphasize newer interdisciplinary ones. Collaboration is biased in favour of work with those in their own field. Theoreticians become entrenched, with development economists mistrusting colleagues in other disciplines while being resented in return.\textsuperscript{45} Worse, disciplines are often roughly divided into sections where members need only interact with people who will not question their own fundamental assumptions. Perhaps worst of all, the very language that is commonly used in the discourses of different disciplines may be so widely dissimilar as


to preclude any meaningful dialogue. As Streeten noted, a consolidated body of development theory may need a new terminology. To be sure, it may be worthwhile to consider a new descriptor for development theory itself—to use trans-disciplinary or supra-disciplinary rather than cross-, inter-, or multi-disciplinary to imply and encourage a movement towards a new synthesis or convergence in theory for those aspects which most reflect the establishment of a new discipline for international development.46

If development theory falls short in reaching its analytical potential as a result of lingering disciplinarity, it also falls short in its prescriptive power as a result of a continued framing of development within competing paradigms. By the 1980s, the divisions between modernization theory and dependencia were clear, and they were presented as extremes in the polemic works which dominated the dialogue. In the development literature in the mid-1980s, quite a number of writers and editors challenged us to move beyond these divisions to find at least patches of common ground, and to work towards a synthesis if not convergence of development theory.47 They described the turf staked out by each of the established paradigms, but then looked at new theories like bureaucratic authoritarianism in Latin America or

46Streeten, loc.cit.

corporatism in Africa as eclectic, gap-bridging works which could lead us away from the entrenched divisions between the approaches.48

They encouraged theorists to make use of the most significant dimensions of each, and they called for the construction of new theories—or in some instances: a single new development theory based on the apparent commonalities and impending convergences between behaviourist, positivist, quantitative methods on the one hand, and humanist, holistic, qualitative approaches on the other;49 or as some saw it: between Marxist and non-Marxist social scientists.50 Any of these attempts to avoid throwing the baby out with each particular bathwater, it was said, would depend on fostering cooperation, not competition, in the academic discourse.

Not only are the divisions between orthodox and radical as sharp as ever in the social sciences, as evidenced in the morass between neoclassical and Marxist economic theory, but the factionalization within these broad approaches has escalated. For example, much of the literature in political economy over the years has consisted of battles over old issues: internal infighting over whether or not a given supposition


49Ibid.: passim.

is consistent with what Marx himself had originally proposed. Even in development studies, much effort is spent on staking out and defending territories at the expense of problem-oriented or policy-oriented research.

The dimensions of development focused on in subsequent chapters here will generally be those within political economy, though to adequately portray the problematique of development in Zimbabwe other relevant dimensions will be incorporated. For example, since ethnicity is a central dimension of historical and contemporary society in the country, the theories of development which cover race will be included. Certainly, as will be noted, one of the central dilemmas in development theory and practice in Africa is the problem of bridging the gaps between approaches in race, class and gender. This can only be approached by breaking out of the confines of the competing paradigms of conventional development theory, especially given the current climate of revisionism and reform in sub-Saharan Africa.


Minogue, op.cit: 232-239.

The above exhortations for analyses beyond the rigid paradigms of development from the 1960s and 1970s may rightly point towards a more integrative approach. However, it should be noted that the main rallying cry for a rescue of development theory in this study is one underlined by a tone of harsh criticism and reproach for the current orthodoxies in development theory and praxis. One ideological, political position has effectively steered the course of development thinking through the 1980s: one that is variously characterized as neo-classical, neo-liberal, top-down, expert-based in the allocation of knowledge, Euro- or Amero-centric, anti-participatory, neo-modernizationist, and so on. As some have lamented, the mainstream in development theory has moved further and further to the right. A more subtle concern might be the way in which many works in development theory are presented as neutral, with no recognition of the value-laden positions behind them. Development, in theory and in practice, must necessarily proceed from some basic ideological or political position (or world view) which should be recognized, articulated and expressed, as well as from some fundamental schema—a set of ideas, concepts and principles about the role and nature of development, whether as an end or ideal, or as a social, political, economic or technical process. These are too often implied or assumed by practitioners and theorists without really flushing them out. This would seem to be the case in the current neo-classical and neo-liberal orthodoxy.

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54Hettne, op.cit.: 235.
Subsequent chapters of this study will strive to reconcile the legacies of African history (pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence) with the contemporary development problematique. A central goal of this thesis is to help illuminate "a way out" of the current empirical and theoretical crises, so care will be taken to avoid a diatribe through the miseries of slavery and imperial oppression. Nonetheless, it will be asserted that one of the very failures of the current orthodoxies in development analysis and praxis (particularly, as will be argued, the Structural Adjustment Programs of the World Bank/IMF) has been the neglect of historical forces and phenomena that have guided the course of African societies for millennia. One of the historical issues that will be addressed concerns the nature of capitalist development in sub-Saharan Africa. Though the contention of capitalist versus socialist development may be dismissed by many as having lost its usefulness, the question of capitalism will be revisited in the next chapter as a necessary background to an exploration of conventional and alternative approaches to development in the contemporary context.
CHAPTER III

CAPITALISM AND DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
CRISES IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ECONOMY

THE QUESTION OF AFRICAN CAPITALISM REVISITED

In comparison with large multinational firms in Kenya, indigenous capital is small and insignificant. Nevertheless, at the present stage of accumulation in Kenya it is still the case that value formation is nationally based and the state is able to support the interests of the internal bourgeoisie. During the independence period, within the limits set by Kenya's position in the global economy, the indigenous bourgeoisie have extended their control over the means of production.  

--Nicola Swainson

I believe that the evidence shows that, although an indigenous capitalist class has managed to carve out a slice of the benefits arising from accumulating in large scale industry, this has arisen from the alliance between this class and foreign capital. Not only does little prospect emerge for indigenous capital to squeeze out foreign capital, but the inbuilt contradictions of economies of this type make it difficult to foresee that such a pattern of accumulation - with or without foreign capital - can proceed in a viable form.

--Raphael Kaplinsky

In the last chapter, an African crisis--both observed and in policy or praxis--was presented. Alongside this, a note of caution was raised that in general terms development theory itself may be in a state of crisis thus compounding the difficulty

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of finding a way out of the dire situation. Undoubtedly, development thinking on all fronts in and about sub-Saharan Africa is at a critical juncture. The answers are elusive; worse, the questions of development are not entirely clear. Those who are in positions to formulate and take decisions affecting the social, the political and especially the economic lives of people in the midst of this crisis in Africa tend to take as given that change, if any, will be, and should be, made within the context of a capitalist system of production, exchange and accumulation. This claim presumes that certain questions have been definitively answered: whether capitalism has caused or led to development in broad economic and social terms in sub-Saharan Africa; whether the pattern of capitalist development can bring benefits to the majority of African people; whether an indigenous capitalism has emerged in Africa (African capitalism) and whether this capitalism has positively contributed to development.

The quotations above surrounded the "Kenyan Capitalism Debate" of the early 1980s. In large part, the questions of capitalism and capitalist development in Africa have been left behind since then as either irrelevant given Africa's irreversible integration in the world (capitalist) economy and in the current framework of World Bank/IMF structural adjustment; or as outdated given the apparent manifest failure of capitalism's only alternative on a world scale. However, this chapter will revisit these questions with a view towards exploring how capitalist development in sub-Saharan Africa ought to be treated: for instance, as fact--an historical and empirical
reality; as an *ephemerality*—something which, if it has occurred, is transitory or short-lived; or as *fiction*—a false reality which diverts attention and effort from more important contemporary concerns.

Certainly, in order to initiate a cogent exploration of the issues at hand, and to set the stage for an examination of the case of capitalism and development in Zimbabwe, one must first acknowledge that the theoretical landscape upon which the questions of capitalism and capitalist development in this study are posed is one of many undulations. The question of capitalism in Africa touches on many historical era, crosses over a wide range of academic disciplines, and includes a multitude of bodies of research—each grounded in a different frame of reference. This chapter will offer a brief pass at some of the key ideas in the theory surrounding African capitalism, as well as a look at some of the major empirical studies of capitalism and capitalist development in Africa. The hope with this appraisal is that it will serve to both raise questions pertinent to the contemporary problematique of development—including ones often assumed *a priori* in orthodox development thinking—as well as to point towards at least the possibility of answers.
THE EMERGENCE OF AFRICAN CAPITALISM

Despite its general wretchedness, its comparatively tiny establishments and extremely low productivity, its primitive technique and small number of wage workers, peasant industry is capitalism... Capital is a certain relation between people, a relation which remains the same whether the categories under comparison are at a higher or lower level of development.  

--V.I. Lenin

Looking for the historical growth of a distinctly indigenous capitalism in Africa would seem to be a rather futile undertaking for those who equate capitalism with modernity and modernization with development. It would also seem a pointless exercise for others who are smitten with fond notions of the globalization of economics and the interdependence of contemporary social relations. However, any investigation of the crisis in Africa today, which addresses the question of capitalist development and the importance of capitalist forces and relations to Africa, must include an examination of the social relations of production and consider the state of affairs existing prior to, during, and after the arrival of Western capitalism. It is useful, for example, to inquire whether capitalist forces were present before the European conquest, and to contemplate the extent to which such domestic forces may have thrived on their own.

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4...of any form, no matter internal or external in its origins.
Thus, this initial exploration will involve an attempt, of sorts, to recount whether capitalism is *natural* to the African experience. As Lenin observed above, capitalism is neither an ideology nor a singularly modern, highly developed, large scale, technology-intensive production technique. Rather it is a complex set of social and economic relations which might exist at various stages of development and at several phases in African history.

Much of the writing on the emergence of capitalism in Africa has been done by historians and anthropologists. African scholars, as well as their Western counterparts, have documented a number of cases of the social relations of production and exchange that existed in various areas of precolonial Africa.\(^5\) As one would initially expect, precapitalist modes of production were predominant in this era.\(^6\) Analyses and discussions have produced countless blends of primitive communalism,


slavery, and feudalism, as well as lineage,\(^7\) tributary,\(^8\) and even a distinct "African" mode of production.\(^9\) The importance of these modes in informing the contemporary development problem, the critical differences in the perspectives taken by theorists in pre- post- and colonial African history, and the relevance of the interaction of precapitalist modes of production with capitalism are all important issues which are taken up elsewhere in this thesis. Here, the claims made as to the emergence and dynamism of indigenous capitalist formations in the precolonial context are explored.

An African historian, John Iliffe (1983), provided the first general survey of the growth of African capitalism to include precolonial formations. In his study, *The Emergence of Capitalism in Africa*, he brings together both written and oral evidence from a host of case studies and empirical works conducted by African scholars and also European and American anthropologists and sociologists. He reviews precolonial and colonial evidence and concludes that capitalism could indeed be found in Africa prior to European conquest, and in some cases before any real contact


with the so called capitalist states in the Northern world. For criteria, his investigation rests on an essentially Marxian definition of capitalism:

...the production of goods for exchange by capitalists who combine capital and land which they own with labour power which they buy from free and propertyless workers. Capitalism, in my usage, centres on the exploitation of the labour power of free wage labourers, for, as Marx wrote of capitalism late in his life, 'The relation between capital and wage-labour determines the entire character of the mode of production.'

This usage, Iliffe notes, guided the earlier major works on the growth of capitalism such as those of V.I. Lenin on Russia and Maurice Dobb on Britain.

Iliffe finds evidence of this capitalism existing in precolonial times. He first notes the merchant capitalism among traders first of North Africa and later of West Africa, and finds that those areas of sub-Saharan Africa that had the strongest ties with the outside world through trade and economic ties (e.g. the coastal regions) were precisely those that were more likely to have adopted or utilized capitalist modes of exchange. However, he stresses that capitalism in the Marxian definition above exists not in exchange relations evident among these peasant producers and craftspeople but rather in production. Marx himself made the distinction between a capitalist mode

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of exchange which can easily co-exist with other modes of production and a capitalist mode of production which will tend to replace pre-existing modes.\textsuperscript{12}

Iliffe then continues his analysis by looking for evidence of the emergence of wage labour (Marx's first criterion for the mode of production). This he finds in a number of instances, firstly among agricultural labourers who were paid in kind for their efforts in Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, and particularly South Africa. Among porters hired by the Jahaanke traders of Bundu in Senegal (similarly in Hausaland and in the caravan trading of Angola), Iliffe notes that the demand for labour was too irregular to be met economically by slaves and too large to be met by kinsmen, so these porters were employed as wage labourers. Thirdly, he notes that in the craft industries of the western savannah region (Jenne), as well as in northern Nigeria, there were waged textile workers, leatherworkers, house and boat builders and weavers.\textsuperscript{13}

To this exploration of the emergence of wage labour, Iliffe then adds a brief consideration of the criterion of the ownership of land and capital equipment and the expansion of production into larger scale operations in order to obtain lower costs of production and economies of scale. This trend, he finds, was evident in precolonial times. His central example here is the cloth production and dye pits in Kano which


\textsuperscript{13}Iliffe, \textit{op.cit.}, 7-22
he draws from a case study by Philip Shea (1974). Iliffe notes, however, that indigenous capitalist ownership of land and equipment remained sharply constrained by precapitalist political forces and social formations such as slavery.

In his final reckoning of the precolonial situation in Africa, Iliffe submits that there is enough evidence to conclude that indigenous capitalism had emerged, but that it remained in small pockets here and there—in the spheres of trade, crafts and urban life—and it was largely restricted (mostly in terms of its political and social underpinnings) by both precapitalist modes of production and their associated social relations, as well as by the penetration of foreign capitalism in some cases, for example by white settler capitalism in southern Africa. Many or most of the precolonial regions remained, as others had held, precapitalist. It is interesting to note here that in passing Iliffe indirectly probed the fundamental character of what he envisioned as indigenous African capitalism—i.e. to be compared to the accounts of Russian, European, British and Muslim capitalism. For example, he points to something he calls "hedonistic pragmatism": a social attitude which encouraged acquisition

14Philip J. Shea, "Economies of Scale and the Indigo Dyeing Industry of Precolonial Kano", *Kano Studies*, NS, 1:2, 55-61; and in Iliffe, op.cit.: 10-12.


16Iliffe, op.cit., 18-21.

but discouraged accumulation— and asks whether this and similar social or cultural concerns stand as impediments to African capitalism.\(^{18}\)

Despite these selected reservations, Iliffe nonetheless put forth the central empirical work in support of the claim of precolonial indigenous capitalism in Africa. The general implication embraced by many inside and outside of Africa is that Africans need not be wary of the capitalist mode of production, nor fear the spread of capitalist relations as the penetration of a foreign instrument of transformation. However, Iliffe makes no explicit claims as to the relationship between capitalism and development; he merely offers empirical evidence for the existence of an indigenous African capitalism (i.e. vis-a-vis modes of production). One must look elsewhere for support for the claim of an indigenous capitalist development path.

\(^{18}\)Ibid., 21-22. Here Iliffe draws the comparison with the rise of European capitalism and notes Weber's emphasis on a "worldly asceticism."
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

[A]ny cleavage between foreign and national capital is secondary. At a more fundamental level they share common interest and common cause in confronting other classes. In particular, whatever conflicts may set local and foreign capital apart, both are similarly driven to exploit the working class (and peasants).  

--Lionel Cliffe and Peter Lawrence

Many writers treat capitalism in sub-Saharan Africa as an external force and as one part-and-parcel to colonization. A great many academics, if they contemplate its origins at all, find the rise and spread of capitalism in Africa a distinctly colonial phenomenon. Among these, there are those who see the spread of colonial capitalist relations as a progressive, modernizing phenomenon, and others with a much more disapproving view: capitalism, it is said, was brought to Africa from Europe with guns and bibles. This sentiment, espoused by early African nationalist leaders such as Nyerere, extends to many current African political figures and scholars who continue to view capitalist forces in sub-Saharan Africa as profoundly foreign.

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The unsympathetic *theoretical* position was first staked by the dependency theorists, in the tradition of Paul Baran and André Gunder Frank, who maintained that capitalism in the *African periphery*, from colonial times to present, was inextricably linked to agents of capital in the European, North American and Japanese *core*. Led by Samir Amin (1972) in applying the dependency approach to the African setting, the central thesis among the dependencistas has been that the underdevelopment of sub-Saharan Africa has occurred within the context of capitalist expansion in Africa and a dependent role for Africa in the world capitalist system. Through a series of historical phases, African political economies have been systematically integrated into this world system, and the possibilities for development in sub-Saharan Africa are constrained by this historical fact. Development, which is blocked by the forces of international capital, might only proceed (variously) via African socialism, through some form of self-reliant/participatory development, or some process of delinking.

These early "dissenting" viewpoints are not the central focus in this thesis since they do not represent the orthodoxies of development being challenged here.

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To be sure, the early form of the dependency approach has been largely left behind as having nothing to offer the current African realities in terms of prescription. However, insofar as dependencia might inform the nature of the current crisis and help outline alternative approaches, its analysis will pertain. If nothing else, some of the proponents of emerging alternative approaches to development in Africa have themselves emerged from the dependency tradition.

The dependency approach is probably too often directly equated, in the African context as elsewhere, with what is termed "the radical paradigm."\(^{26}\) There are in fact many useful contributions to development theory (particularly the study of capitalist development) from Marxists who work outside what is strictly considered the dependency school. There are, for instance, a number of scholars who have pursued a dialectical materialist approach to African history. In this tradition, Walter Rodney (1972) is recognized as the earliest to present a view of African history which blended a Marxist approach with dependency theory.\(^{27}\) Samir Amin (1972, 1973) is credited with both "developing dependency theory and in theorizing its application not simply to Africa's role in a world capitalist economy but also to internal African

\(^{26}\)This reflects the narrow association of Latin American dependencia with "radicalism", that is, it established itself as the major historical challenge to the modernization paradigm. In recent years, efforts have been made to more carefully disaggregate radical/dependency work into structuralism, dependency, neo-Marxism, world-systems theory, etc. See for example Cristobal Kay, *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment*, London: Routledge, 1989.

developments." The French anthropologists and historians—Meillassoux (1973), Terray (1972, 1975), Coquery-Vidrovitch (1976, 1985) and others—have been the leading group of scholars in the application of the concepts of historical materialism to African history. In doing so, they entered new fields of inquiry and posed many new sets of questions which have served to establish many of the approaches currently taken by political economists.

In exploring the role and impact of capitalism in Africa today, some theorists feel that one must examine not only the proposition that capitalist relations of production have replaced earlier ones, but also the extent to which capitalist forces have coexisted and interacted with those of precapitalist modes of production. Some neo-Marxist scholars have contended that the external capitalist forces of the colonial and postcolonial eras in Africa have articulated rather than replaced precapitalist forms in a way that has both expanded the scope for surplus appropriation by external actors and suppressed the growth of indigenous capitalist forces. Effects of this are said to be pervasive, with links being shown between the multifarious nature of productive modes and economic underdevelopment/socio-political instability.

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28Crummey and Stewart, op.cit.: 19.


John Iliffe (1983) uses a three-outcome framework from Marx to illustrate the product of the interaction of capitalism with precapitalist modes,

. . .Marx envisioned three rather than two alternatives. 'In all conquests,' he wrote, 'there are three possibilities. The conquering nation subjects the conquered nation to its own mode of production . . .; or it allows the old mode to remain and is content with tribute . . .; or interaction takes place which gives rise to a new system, a synthesis.'

Iliffe considers it extremely important to note that this synthesis between capitalism and precapitalist modes of production can be found in dramatically varying degrees in various parts of colonial and post-colonial Africa. As noted in the last section, he devoted a large part of his work to exploring the nature of these differences.

Others feel that, while there are likely a number of African cases to illustrate some form of articulation of precapitalist modes of production (taking place through an unequal exchange rather than through the capitalist exploitation of surplus labour value), these may be the exception and ultimately have little relevance to the contemporary concerns of Africa. Many have ultimately rejected the modes of

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31 Iliffe, op.cit., 34; Marx citation found originally in Oekonomische Manuskripte 1857/58.

32 In his chapter "Capitalists and Peasants," Iliffe describes the synthesis of modes. For example, in Kenya rural capitalists failed to supplant petty commodity production among the peasantry. In "Capitalists and Preachers" (Ch.3) he notes that Euro-Christian values are essentially capitalist values (i.e. the "work ethic", etc.), but he poses religion as changing from capitalism's ally initially to an eventual role as an enemy of capitalist formations.
production approach itself—with its abstraction, heuristic devices and ideal types—as having nothing to offer the realities of modern-day African existence.\textsuperscript{33}

Although the form of analysis has been left behind by most political economists as "the modes of production debate of the 1970s," the interaction of capitalist forces with those common to other forms and patterns of accumulation and social reproduction in Africa remains worthy of exploration, especially in light of the apparent failure of capitalist development in Africa during the 1980s. Many political economists have held that the nature of modes and relationships of production and exchange effectively determines the structures of accumulation, patterns of systemic reproduction and fully the nature of politics in a society.\textsuperscript{34} The analysis in this project proceeds from, but does not take for granted, this logic which Marx depicted this way:

Each special mode of production and the social relations corresponding to it, in short, . . . the economic structure of society, is the real basis on which juridical and political superstructure is raised, and to which definite social forms of thought correspond.\textsuperscript{35}


\textsuperscript{34}This was a recurrent theme in the Sage series on \textit{African Modernization and Development} in the early 1980s and in the fifth volume Crummey and Stewart stressed the "necessity for the application of the concepts of historical materialism to the precolonial history of Africa." See Crummey and Stewart, eds., \textit{op. cit.}: 11. For contemporary perspectives, see for example Julius Edo Nyang'oro, "On the Concept of 'Corporatism' and the African State," \textit{Studies in Comparative International Development}, 21:4, Winter 1986-87: 31-54.

\textsuperscript{35}Karl Marx, \textit{Capital (Vol.1)}, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908-09, Note 1: 93-94.
While this materialist conception of history will not be applied here as an unquestioned guideline to any-and-every historical investigation, the impacts of economic relations—themselves bound in distinct modes of production as well as in interactions between modes—on other realms of society including politics will nonetheless be treated as a central mode of analysis. The notion of the centrality of the social relations of production expressed by Marx can surely be useful in informing the analysis of how development is conceived and carried out in Zimbabwe.

As the discussion here reveals, one of the most complex and difficult issues encountered in the analysis of capitalist development throughout African history is that of foreign versus indigenous capitalist formations and actors. In the more conventional theories, some have posited an importance in distinguishing between foreign and indigenous capitalism. A few of these find that only an external capitalism has spread throughout the continent, and later conclude that it, and not indigenous capitalism, is the only source of economic development—this having already occurred or to come about in the near future.\textsuperscript{36} Others have determined that foreign capitalism predominates, but only a domestic capitalist pattern of accumulation and reproduction will lead to genuine development.\textsuperscript{37} This latter

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position, though not often carefully studied, has become implied in many perspectives across disciplines and political spectra.

Many scholars focus on classes rather than the mode of production itself. As one would expect, those in the mainstream typically see no utility in distinguishing between foreign and local capitalist classes. Others purposefully and wholeheartedly embrace the presence and spread of foreign industrial and finance capitalists in African economies. The quotes at the beginning of this chapter point to longstanding discussions (and debates!) over the existence and role of local bourgeoisies. Tracing the spread of capitalism during and after the colonial period, a process of interaction between agents of external capital and indigenous classes which are decidedly capitalist (particularly in contemporary societies) has been delineated. In increasingly large measure though, observers maintain that indigenous African capitalist classes have emerged and significantly contributed to development in Africa. Controversies remain over who may comprise these indigenous classes (and thus earmark "African capitalism"): blacks, Indians, and whites in settler states have all been counted among African bourgeoisies.

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These important issues related to "indigenousness" will be returned to in later discussions of Zimbabwe. The crux of the analysis at this point is a critical appraisal of the thesis that capitalism has been a dynamic and progressive force for development in sub-Saharan Africa (with specific reference in Chapters IV and V to Zimbabwe). Therefore, the principal focus here is on current crises and the claims of capitalist development in the years of independence. In the remainder of this chapter, the assertion that development has been a corollary to capitalism or that capitalism has led to development is presented and critically challenged.

Post-Colonial Capitalist Development

Capitalism, then, has or has not led to development in Africa. For many in the liberal tradition, it has—evidenced by the growth of markets and the profitability of business firms which in and of itself illustrates a positive transformation. As noted in the last chapter, this conception of capitalist development predominates development thinking in the World Bank and IMF and so pervades the large volume of academic research in support of the work of the IFIs.

Contrary to what one would expect, some Marxist scholars also share this view of positive capitalist development. In this section, the empirical work of John Sender and Sheila Smith (1986), *The Development of Capitalism in Africa*, will be examined with a view toward exploring and challenging their argument that there is valid
evidence of the emergence and continued growth of capitalism in Africa (an increasingly indigenous one), that acts as a productive force, driving the continent along a path of economic development. Since they pursue their examination within a Marxist political-economic framework, a brief review of their work—in combination with a general critique of their approach, an update of some of their data, and a preliminary focus on Zimbabwe—offers a useful framework within which to connect some of the theoretical work on capitalist development in sub-Saharan Africa (in political economy) with historical and recent empirical data.

It should be noted that Sender and Smith take up the classical-orthodox Marxist position that capitalism is a necessary historical stage *en route* to socialism (a view which has not been widely held among contemporary Marxists, particularly African ones). Hence, their defence of capitalism is said to serve this end. Their intellectual ancestry is clear: the late British Marxist Bill Warren (1980) had earlier published a seminal work, *Imperialism. Pioneer of Capitalism* arguing that capitalism assumed a central and positive role in transforming Third World countries, and that colonization accelerated the process by which capitalism brought about a successful social transformation.41

Sender and Smith adopt an approach which combines a set of macro-level claims of capitalist development for Africa as a whole with a comparison of the

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successes and failures of eleven individual countries (among the successful is Zimbabwe). First, they survey the evidence of the emergence of capitalism in Africa. Similar to Iliffe (see above), they adopt a Marxian framework of tracing the emergence and growth of free wage labour. Their focus, in contrast to Iliffe, is on the growth of the African labour force in the years since Independence. They look at the transformation of social relations and institutions in terms of the increasing acceptance of hired labour as a vocation, evidenced in the decline of slavery and tributary modes, as well as in the end of colonial coercion which meant a new freedom to sell one's labour. Sender and Smith demonstrate the emergence and expansion of free wage labour via a growth in the absolute size of the African labour force in the twentieth century. Figures are cited for nine countries, including Zimbabwe where total enumerated wage employment rose from 530,200 in 1951, to 610,000 in 1963, to 997,500 in 1973, and eventually to 1,042,600 in 1982. In the general case, the organization of labour into unions and the efforts to increase labour productivity across the continent confirm for Sender and Smith that free African wage labour has arisen and grown.

42 Enumerated wage employment refers to employment data collected by government agencies. Thus the coverage varies from period to period, and from country to country, but is usually confined to government employment, employment in enterprises employing twenty or more workers and to enterprises prepared to report the details of their employment levels to government officials.

43 Sender and Smith, op.cit.: 54.
However, Sender and Smith cite nine *selected countries* to demonstrate their point—a *selection* that varies from section to section throughout the book. Their choice *is* of likely consequence since the countries used in this instance are the most industrialized and may not be representative of all of Africa. As well, all of the data shown in their tables had been collected through official national and international agencies for the formal economy and for firms employing twenty or more workers, so it generally excludes wage labour in small-scale industries and micro-enterprise, and neglects the size and composition of labour in African informal sectors. Also of concern is that their data, compiled in 1986, excludes all of the 1980s. In so doing, the impacts of various important structural factors on wage employment are not accounted for: for example, the decline in world commodity prices and cuts in public sector employment dictated by the austerity programs adopted under structural adjustment.

In addition to marking the development of capitalism by the growth of wage labour in Africa, Sender and Smith look at the labour force itself as an area of significant social development. They note that not only has the size of the free wage labour force grown, so too have the skills of workers and the quality of life of

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44 Many reviews of Sender and Smith have criticized their selectivity. For example, Simon Commander chides that their "arbitrary conjunction of nations makes even the low-income, middle-income divide seem a sophisticated approach."—See Book Review in The Journal of Development Studies, 24:3, Apr. 1988: 417.

45 See footnote in Sender and Smith, op. cit., 55.
working people improved. Here, they illustrate increases in primary and secondary school enrolments (static levels and as a percentage of age group), declines in infant mortality rates, and increases in life expectancy rates for nine selected countries. While trends in these indicators do show progression through the 1980s, there are other areas where "progress" has proceeded rather slowly. For example, child mortality rates (one to five years) were only 50 percent higher in sub-Saharan Africa than the LDC average in 1950, but are now double; rural health care remains poor in most of Africa; only one in four Africans now has access to safe piped drinking water; and sub-Saharan Africa remains the only region in the world where caloric intake would be below minimum standards even if food were equally distributed. From these and other problems, the social progress claimed by Sender and Smith as resulting from capitalist development and from the spread of wage labour in sub-Saharan Africa must be questioned. Indeed, one might equally adopt an approach (in deliberate opposition to theirs) of exploring the extent which the current crisis can be attributed directly to the effects of capitalist "development" on African people (now "wage labourers") in many cases.

Next, Sender and Smith describe apparent increases in the capacity of the African state to borrow and finance local industry, to consolidate the position of

African capitalists, and to bolster the accumulation, diversification and growth in manufacturing. In simple terms, African states were able to access resources they otherwise would not have had through low interest loans in the 1970s. Curiously missing from this simple claim is a recognition of the current debt crisis and the ongoing cycles of debt rescheduling, borrowing rate increases, foreign exchange shortfalls, and cash crop production for export. Sender and Smith cite "reasonable" debt service ratios, but these have skyrocketed in the years from 1982 (their latest year) to 1987: from 9.5 percent to 39.9 percent in Ethiopia, from 17.4 percent to 58.7 percent in Zambia, from 5.1 percent to 65.7 percent in Tanzania, and from 9.2 percent to 25.4 percent in Zimbabwe.

In addition to this financial market borrowing, Sender and Smith review the record of official bilateral and multilateral development assistance to African countries. In sum, this acquired financial capital has been invested effectively in the expansion of infrastructure. For this, they cite increases in energy output, in the kilometres of paved roads, in the hectares of irrigated land in selected countries, and

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49 Sender and Smith, op.cit.: 89.

in the number of new industrial parks built. Here they ignore the record of countless
development "megaprojects" and the widespread failure of large-scale
technologically-intensive infrastructure expansions. Worse, the positive role of aid
in capitalist development must be questioned given the recent record: on net, there has
been an outflow of resources from sub-Saharan Africa through the 1980s and with
development assistance from donor countries recently being shifted to Eastern Europe
this trend seems unlikely to change.

Sender and Smith eventually move on to a general appraisal of the emergence
and growth of capitalism and capitalist development in Africa in terms of the
development of productive forces. Again, they utilize a Marxian conception of this:

In order to increase production, it is necessary to develop the
productive forces... To produce more goods is never the aim of
bourgeois production. Its aim, rather, is to produce more exchange
value. It brings about the real expansion of the productive forces and
of goods in spite of itself. Here they review evidence such as the introduction of new production techniques, a
shift of labour into more productive sectors, and a growth of labour productivity--
evidenced by improvements in workers' health, literacy and scientific knowledge.

51Sender and Smith, op.cit.: 90-91.

52Karl Marx, 1953, Grundrisse, translated by and cited in G. Cohen, Karl Marx's
Smith, op.cit.: 93.
Though the trend in wage labour shifting out of agricultural and into manufacturing holds true for the 1980s, a range of related issues is not covered. Though manufacturing employment had grown, agriculture still accounted for three quarters of the labour force in 1980. The magnitude of labour mobility between sectors as well as the sharp rural-urban migration that has taken place are neglected.\(^5^3\)

Manufacturing growth, they continue, has been substantial in Africa, and the share of output (GDP) from industry and manufacturing has increased (though this has slowed considerably in the 1980s).\(^5^4\) There has been an increasing depth of processing, and so a greater share of value-added being captured.\(^5^5\) Also noted are increases in imports of capital goods—machinery in manufacturing; and fertilizers, pesticides, tractors, and commercial vehicles in agriculture. However, the utility of these factors may be limited: they are small in absolute terms, the link between these increases and overall productive increases is weak, and there have been many other negative factors noted in the literature critical of associated agricultural development schemes.\(^5^6\)

The increase in imported inputs has led, Sender and Smith note, to significant increases in crop yields, in agricultural production and agricultural commodity

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\(^5^3\) Commander, *loc.cit.*

\(^5^4\) Sender and Smith, *op.cit.*: 96. Note that manufacturing has declined in Zimbabwe in the 1970s.

\(^5^5\) Ibid.: 97-98.

\(^5^6\) Bill Freund, review in *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 15:3, April 1988: 422.
exports. In development terms, these expansions in agriculture have led to an improved access to food. The proof of this for Sender and Smith is in the increases in population throughout Africa. However, in the area of agriculture as in others, they do not offer growth figures on a per capita basis where far less favourable pictures emerge. In Tables 3.1 and 3.2, both agricultural production and food production show continued growth, on a continent wide basis in the 1980s. But on a per capita basis, agriculture and, more importantly, food production have declined through the 1980s.

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<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Total SSA-</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Senders and Smith, op.cit.: 102-106. In the 1980s, however, agricultural production has declined in many areas.

In the final part of their survey of the data, Sender and Smith bring together their analysis of capitalist development in the following paragraph:

The improvements discussed above, in the physical and social infrastructure, the shift of the labour force to higher productivity sectors, the development of skills, the growth of manufacturing output, changes in the structure of manufacturing production, the dramatically increased availability of producer goods for the industrial and agricultural sectors, and the growth of agricultural output, are conveniently summarized in Table 4.33 [The table shows average annual growth rates in GDP for selected African countries]. In most countries listed, the annual rate of growth of gross domestic product has been rapid.59

The rates of GDP growth listed are fawned upon with considerable admiration: they are held up against inferior rates (around two percent) in the first century of the

59Sender and Smith, op. cit.: 108.
capitalist epoch in Europe and America. Again, if their figures are updated to include the 1980s, the picture changes. From 1980 to 1985, average annual GDP for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole declined by 0.3 percent.6

One of the main criticisms of the work of Sender and Smith, in reviews of the book and here, is its failure to contextualize the experience of capitalism in Africa.6¹ Little effort seems to be made to recognize and contrast the varying historical and contemporary social, and economic conditions between and among African countries and to compare them with the benchmark "economic miracles" of the NICs in Southeast Asia vis-a-vis the differing role and nature of external relations, of authoritarian government, and so on. In particular, their approach avoids any treatment of some of the important issues in the African crisis. As Crawford Young (1987) noted:

[T]heir defense of state-guided capitalist development fails to give adequate weight to some of the pathologies of the African economic impasse. We find no reference to the Hyden theses on the peasant mode of production and economy of affection, nor the Berry inquest into "unproductive accumulation" as degenerative malady in the Nigerian political economy, nor the Schatz identification of "pirate capitalism" as key to grasping the inertness of the Nigerian economy in the face of massive capital windfall provided by the oil boom.6²

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6¹ Freund, loc.cit.

6² Crawford Young, review in Perspective, Sept. 1987: 144.
In their efforts to dispel what they see as the many myths of the dependency approach, the concept of dependency is entirely rejected. As one reviewer noted, "Concern about the type of development, that is the extent to which it is 'dependent' as indicated by the use of foreign technology and finance and the reliance of the economy on foreign firms and external markets, is entirely absent."^{63}

In the end, Sender and Smith's *The Development of Capitalism in Africa* stands as implicating evidence of what can be generally termed in this thesis as a crisis in development thinking. The presumption of the dynamism and promise of capitalist development in Africa as elsewhere is, of course, well entrenched in the orthodoxies of neo-classical economics and modernizationist neo-liberal global political economy. But in a work starting out in the Marxist tradition, Sender and Smith have curiously gone the way of the mainstream despite what seems to be unconvincing evidence for the position. At root is the notion that the progressive and dynamic nature of capitalism is derived from the existence of a labour force alienated from its means of production and who must sell their labour to survive, and from competition between productive units. But nowhere in the work is a delineation of the means by which capitalist social relations stimulate the development of the productive forces in the African context,\textsuperscript{64} or by which capitalism will eventually

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(continued...)

(continued...)
productive forces in the African context, or by which capitalism will eventually bring benefits to African peoples far and wide. Surely Marxist political economy can offer much more to development theory if not practice. As regards the Bank/Fund and their approach, Sender and Smith ultimately seem to differ only in their regard for the potential of the African state in promoting capitalist "development."

The works explored in detail here, by Iliffe (1983) and by Sender and Smith (1986), have been used for a number of reasons. First, contained in them are many ideas and concepts that are representative of the approaches in the orthodox mainstream or alternatively of the major critical stream in development theory. Also, they are fairly interdisciplinary in their coverage of the social, political and economic realms in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. Thirdly, they include many of the important analytical and conceptual dimensions of the political-economic approach taken here. Fourthly, they are integrative works: they include useful summaries of a wide range of case studies. And finally, they have combined their theoretical approaches with significant quantitative empirical data. The difficulties of blending

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64 See Daniel Weiner, op. cit.: 351. In his review he states that, "Nobody would dispute the emergence of wage labour in Africa during the last one hundred years. But whether this constitutes a population divorced from its means of production which exerts pressures to revolution the production process is another question altogether."

65 Bill Freund notes, "it is disturbing and in the end unconvincing for Marxists to be so uninterested in class analysis and class struggles by comparison with their faith in FAO and World Bank statistics," loc. cit.

66 Commander, loc. cit.
theoretical motifs with empirical frameworks and research agendas must of course be recognized.

However, these studies are also illustrative of the tendency, which now stands nearly unhindered in development theory and praxis, to presume that outward-looking, market-driven capitalist political economy is the current historical fact in sub-Saharan Africa. While an indigenous African form of capitalism may exist (even in multiple forms), and though the capitalist new international division of labour (NIDL) in the global political economy may have irreversibly penetrated the region,® the case for an active capitalist development as the only mode of economic and social transformation has not been convincingly made for the continent. In the next chapter, a case study of Zimbabwe is pursued so that these issues may be brought to bear in a richer context of social and political life for national-level approaches to development in Africa in the 1990s.

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CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ZIMBABWEAN DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

Chapter II began with what has become a practiced tradition in the literature on African development: a revised and amended lamentation over the protracted "African Crisis." The statistics and indicators, as well as the qualitative analyses in support of them, all revealed a widening and deeping economic and social crisis across the continent. To this review of the observed crisis was added the assertion that both development theory and praxis for sub-Saharan Africa are themselves in a state of crisis, that is, their abilities to respond to the empirical crisis are limited. While this notion of an all-emcompassing crisis may serve as a valuable theme or challenge for development into the 1990s, there is also a danger that any portrayal of a situation as being utterly hopeless in the general case may preclude an exploration of the idiosyncrasies, particularities and possibilities found in the national, regional or local case. Thus, it is the purpose of this chapter to explore the contemporary *problematique* of development in Zimbabwe so that "the crisis" can be framed in a multifaceted and complex national context, keeping in mind the difficult "question of capitalist development" of the last chapter.
Certainly, the Zimbabwean case is bound up in many idiosyncracies which become almost immediately evident. Chief among these are the recency of its independence and the predominance of the issue of race. Established and managed among the British territories in Southern Africa, the country (as Southern Rhodesia) was distinct in being one of the few areas in Africa permanently settled by white Europeans. In 1965, the white minority regime of Ian Smith advanced the United Declaration of Independence (UDI). This "independence" for Rhodesia was never widely recognized, certainly not by Britain, nor the black majority under ninety years of white rule. The fifteen year period following UDI was one of United Nations economic sanctions against Rhodesia and a prolonged struggle for majority rule.

Zimbabwe is thus noted for its relatively "fresh" independence (in 1980) and its history of racial strife (though much less acute than in, say, South Africa!). But it is also noted for its apparent success in industrial and agricultural development amidst much more severe economic and political crises experienced by its neighbours. In fact, Zimbabwe is now seen by some of the most widely-heard observers to be one of the few successful cases of development in sub-Saharan Africa.¹ It seems to have escaped the all-too-common cycles of violence and oppression to peacefully transform its political structures and develop its national economy.

¹One of its neighbours, Botswana, is also given much attention, though its success is much more likely to be attributed to its mineral wealth than to any coherent attempt at broad-based development.
The World Bank ranks Zimbabwe 45th poorest of 125 countries in the world, placing it (just barely) in the category of the middle-income economies. Among the sub-Saharan Africa countries, however, it ranks seventh richest. The World Bank thus considers Zimbabwe one of the more successful African countries in terms of its performance and its potential. With positive industrial and agricultural growth, a fairly diversified economy, low external debt and a stable political system, it expects Zimbabwe to develop further, parlaying economic growth into continued social development. Zimbabwe places higher than the average for sub-Saharan Africa in annual growth rates since 1965 (GNP and GDP), as well as in life expectancy, male and female adult literacy rates, and primary and secondary school enrollments.

What follows is an examination of the current environment in Zimbabwe in terms of the historical circumstances and current conditions for development as discovered and articulated by theorists, planners and practitioners with a view toward uncovering both accepted and proposed approaches to development. In part, this discussion parallels the debates in theory and praxis raised in Chapters II and III. The World Bank/IMF orthodoxies are virtually unwavering within the Structural Adjustment Programs across Africa, so they warrant only a brief repetition for the case of Zimbabwe. On the "alternatives" side, approaches are informed by the

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3 Ibid.: statistical appendices.
discourse concomitant to, and arising from, the collective responses noted in Chapter II. But the major theoretical responses to the orthodoxies of development (structural adjustment) in Zimbabwe are very much distinct to the country itself. As well, the case of Zimbabwe highlights the issues raised in Chapter III; the questions of capitalism, indigenous capitalism and capitalist development run through the conceptions of development in and about Zimbabwe.

HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND CONTEMPORARY DILEMMAS

The economic history of southern Africa is a complex one. A multitude of competing forces and modes of production and exchange, in a variety of ethnic formations, have marked the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial eras. The predominance of capitalism in the region during and following the period of colonization is the central focus of many historical works, though some Marxist scholars have stressed the interaction of precapitalist modes with white settler capitalism, as well as the general and prolonged resistance of precapitalist formations to precolonial merchant capitalism and later colonial capitalism in pockets throughout the region.\(^4\) The treatment of the establishment of capitalist relations of production as the primary colonial function cannot be eluded. However, both the predominance of capitalism and the resistance of alternative formations are acknowledged here.

\(^4\)Crummey and Stewart, op.cit.: 14.
The effects of integration and incorporation of Africa and its various sub-regions into the world capitalist system have been well documented. For Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), this long process of integration proceeded in increasing degrees of peripheralization. As well, there was a gradual transition from *nominal* incorporation, with settler capitalism being the dominant configuration, to *effective* incorporation, where foreign capitalist relations came to dominate. Evaluating colonization in the mercantile age and later, researchers trace the primitive capital accumulation of colonists (e.g. white settler producers in southern Africa), the expansion of commercial exchange they effected, and their tendency to wrest the land and means of subsistence from indigenous populations in a process of proletarianization. This has been shown to be the general case in southern Africa as indigenous peasant producers were robbed of productive resources, removed from control over the exchange process, forced into competition for the production of petty commodities, and often thrust *en masse* into forced labour services.

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9W.G. Clarence-Smith, "Capitalist Penetration Among the Nyaneka of Southern (continued...)"
Case studies of the impact of integration of African peasant villages into the world economy abound, with accounts focussing on various aspects of the breakdown of indigenous social systems. Survival, many noted, had been previously based on a traditional system of economic solidarity which was then endangered by shifts in the relations of production, leading to deep macroeconomic alterations toward greater production and wage labour. For example, traditional social mechanisms ensuring reciprocal assistance were weakened in West Africa, thus threatening the survival of the weakest subsistence producers. On the other hand, some writers have illustrated and emphasized the resistance of some groups to capitalist penetration and class formation (i.e. in the manner of the well-known case of the Maasai in East Africa). In these cases, egalitarian, non-stratified configurations have remained intact (or had survived much longer than one would expect) because of the complexity of contradictions encountered by capitalist production relations, their agents, and their associated ideology.

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9(...continued)


A close study of Zimbabwe underlines this diversity in the experiences of traditional inhabitants in the face of contact with the world capitalist system, as well as the complex differentiation among rural peasant groups. In southern Africa, it is argued, peasants were drawn into the world economy within a process (which continues today in spite of more permanent urban employment) of the reproduction of labour much more than the production of commodities. However, to the extent that the rural peasantry can be analytically disaggregated, one can isolate pockets of precolonial relations that have survived colonial and postcolonial violence, as well as the processes of integration and incorporation in the external political economy. Among these are groups that have reinforced pre-existing modes of accumulation through the productive reinvestment of income earned in wage labour.

Agricultural production systems have been shown to be particularly vulnerable to the impacts of market development and capitalism. In many analyses, the development of commodity production in agriculture across sub-Saharan Africa has led to the displacement of peasant producers by capitalist forms of production. However, in at least one case, Nigeria, the conclusion has been reached that although

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niches of capitalist farming can be found, a general capitalist transformation of agrarian production relations cannot be established since capital (in alliance with the state) has encountered difficulty in subordinating peasant producers to their direction. In southern Africa, with its large European settler communities, traditional labour and agricultural systems were altered dramatically and in varying degrees depending largely on the shifts in state policies towards peasant production and the settler sector.

The introduction, growth, and protection of private landed property in sub-Saharan Africa has been explored as part of the wider processes of colonization in the late nineteenth century and the introduction and preservation of capitalism as the dominant mode of production. Customary land relations across Africa were changed into forms that were amenable to capitalistic relations in many ways. As well, the colonial and postcolonial state has played a prominent role in the protection of private landed property.

Some theorists have placed migration in southern Africa in a context which is something more than the territorial displacement of individuals seeking higher


incomes (i.e. as it is in neo-classical and functionalist models). Rather, migration should be considered a reflection of the transformation of traditional production methods because of the encroachment of capitalism in Africa. As such, migration highlights the problem of underdevelopment and peripheral capitalism in Africa, and the immiserization of populations unable to meet their subsistence needs via wages in the capitalist sector nor by traditional production methods.18

Beyond Political Economy

Some critical dimensions of development are seemingly more technical, more general or even (arguably) more fundamental than is usually encompassed in analyses grounded in political economy. For example, one important but difficult factor in social history, and a well travelled "dilemma" of contemporary development, remains population growth. Overpopulation has been held to blame for countless problems in post-colonial Africa: poverty, disease, crime, urban decay, environmental degradation, food and water shortages, and rural landlessness. From the dominant neo-Malthusian view of the 1960s, most theorists, academic researchers and planners have moved on to more complex explanations for social phenomena in sub-Saharan

Africa. Analysts of all stripes now generally favour approaches that combine population and migration problems with other social, political and economic circumstances that consider the local or regional context, and that seek to recognize both internal and external forces in African history. However, a few Malthusians remain—notably a handful of semi-autonomous research and policy institutes calling for sweeping birth control programs across the Third World (including, presumably, in Zimbabwe).

One of the greatest challenges in examining development in the Zimbabwean context is to constructively fuse approaches in political economy with those based on race, culture and gender. Rather than leave them stand apart as competing perspectives, it is hoped that elements of various modes of analysis can be effectively incorporated into a synthesis of the problematique of development. As well, since an interdisciplinary strategy is posed at the outset, the contemporary political economy perspective in sub-Saharan Africa will be treated as a profoundly multifaceted and evolutionary one.

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21See for example publications of World Population Conferences, East West Population Institute, or Population Council (NY).
The significance of non-political-economic factors in the development question in southern Africa cannot easily be dismissed. In the study of imperialism and colonization, power politics and economic transformation tend to be central. However, as some point out, European colonialism in Africa was also a cultural project. In southern Africa, non-conformist missions conjured up new maps, new systems of relations, and new notions of time, production, and personhood. From the very first contact with indigenous peoples it would seem, missionaries sowed the seeds of the colonial state and of a deep and enduring dependency. However, others stress the differences in the experiences of traditional societies, the differential impact of Christianity across Africa, and the tendency of religions and ideologies to be ultimately driven by historical social formations—in short, by the expansion of European capitalism in sub-Saharan Africa.

Southern Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particularly the apartheid Republic of South Africa, has been a manifest case study of the racial underpinnings of social, political and economic life. It is the latter of these three "lives" that is of interest here, as political economy will remain the central method.

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However, questions of race and class are too often posed independently of one another; the struggles of black versus white and of labour versus capital are not simple to merge. In this light, the analysis of development in Zimbabwe here will strive to connect these modes by including, where possible, gap-bridging works. Many of these have started with the phenomenon of the lower absorption of the non-white population in the capitalist sector (as free wage labour), particularly, of course, in South Africa. This occurrence, some point out, contradicts the generally held assumption that capitalism naturally tends to absorb precapitalist modes of production. It also raises the debate over whether, in historical terms, state-imposed racial cleavages predominated over class interests (the liberal-pluralist perspective) or whether non-white populations in southern Africa were actively sought by the capitalist class as a cheap source of labour—i.e. seeing racial discrimination as an integral part of the growth of capitalism in the region (the neo-Marxist interpretation).

In the rural setting, societies and economies had been transformed by the monopolization of agricultural production and "primitive accumulation" of early white settler capitalists. With mechanization of farming eventually displacing most of the remaining black sharecroppers, rural agriculture in significant parts of southern

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Africa is largely racially exclusive. This has been of particular interest to the Zimbabwean case as the land resettlement policies are put into place to reestablish black farmers.

The race-class analysis gap has been bridged by those who have posited a split or segmented labour market in South Africa, where white labour seeks to prevent capital from replacing it with inexpensive black labour via racial policies, deepening from segregation to apartheid. Unlike South Africa, the phenomenon had been more subtle for Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, a number of (Marxist) theorists have connected race and class by stressing the active role of peripheral capitalism in the creation of tribalism and support of ethnic violence to where African tribal groups no longer have a genuine function in a primitive subsistence economy, but instead are incorporated into patron-client relationships in the peripheral capitalist economy.

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Certainly, even those predisposed to Marxist analyses have cautioned that one must remain sensitive to cultural, ideological and psychological factors that are not always reducible to, or subsumable within, questions of political economy.\textsuperscript{31} For example, the importance of ethnicity as a response to imperialism, and the significance of ethnicity in ideological struggles should be considered.\textsuperscript{32} However, it will be stressed here that the notion of class will proceed not from politics and ideology, but rather, as others have proposed,\textsuperscript{33} from the concept of the mode of production. The primary challenge will be to place development in a framework that accommodates both race and class...and gender.

Although recent in their formation, analyses and approaches based on gender have added a great deal to the understanding of both the nature and process of development in southern Africa. Many have offered revisionist perspectives on history in the region, and challenging reinterpretations of factors and forces in African development.\textsuperscript{34} Some of these have pursued gender dimensions of development in the


\textsuperscript{32}Saul, 1979, \textit{loc.cit.}

\textsuperscript{33}Wolpe, \textit{loc.cit.}

Zimbabwean context. As with race and culture, syntheses of political economy and gender approaches are sought here to inform the current context of development. For example, in rural peasantries that had been drawn into the world economy, many men were pulled to urban wage employment and thus absent from the rural setting. This resulted in changes in property rights related to kinship and in the gender division of labour. As a result, the position of women within the pattern of class formation must be closely examined. Peasant differentiation and the unique circumstances of women have been taken into account in assessing the political potential in societies whose complexity gives special meaning to the "worker-peasant alliance." In more general terms, where the position of women is seen to be poor and in decline, as it is in Zimbabwe, gender approaches have become more critical.

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DEVELOPMENT IN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE

Historical studies of the social, political and economic transformations in southern Africa and in Zimbabwe have given way to a rich body of work in development studies. However, this academic production has largely remained rooted in the various disciplines. To illustrate, the analysis of development in Zimbabwe has been well covered in the political science literature. There, theorists have emphasized post-independence nation-building, democratization, regional conflict and cooperation, South African foreign policy and regional imperialism, and now the post-apartheid transition in southern Africa. However, theories of development often proceed from an assumed set of regional and geopolitical constraints to analyze economic development and planning in isolation. Conversely, economic superstructures and substructures, class divisions and the social relations of production and exchange are conspicuously absent from many political theories. However, the gaps between government or politics and political economy and development have been traversed in a number of instances, and there are important contributions to development theory.

One of these, introduced in the last chapter, is the notion of a new international division of labour (NIDL). Concepts useful in informing the nature of the global political economy have long emerged from competing schools in International Relations: the realist "balance of power" between states or regional power blocs, "interdependence" among national economies in liberal international political
economy (IPE), and many patterns of "international inequality" from various Marxist approaches in IPE. The more recent concept of the NIDL was drawn out in the empirical work of Frobel et. al. (1980), and has since been used to describe the globalization of political-economic relations, the movement of production to various lower-cost peripheral locations, and a range of associated processes and trends such as the flexibilization of production, regionalization of trade and investment, subnational social differentiation, and the informalization of markets. Its popularity derives in large part from its having drawn from ideas across a range of intellectual traditions and competing approaches—e.g. Smithian social division of labour, Ricardian comparative advantage, and Marxian capitalist class relations.

The conceptual apparatus of the NIDL offers an imagery that international systems of production, distribution, and finance have undergone a profound reorganization resulting in an emergent global configuration of resource allocation and income distribution that affects all states, regional and national economies, and peoples in all corners of the globe. That is, it is presented as a pervasive (and often impenetrable) global objective reality, though the content of what is implied by the NIDL varies greatly with both the perspective and the empirical context.

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38 Frobel, Heinrich and Kreye, loc. cit.

Current economic, political and social crises in sub-Saharan Africa, and the ongoing problem of national development for African countries, have been studied in this light. Africa is described as having lost out or having been marginalized in the NIDL. Though it had exported capital during the 1980s (on net), it remains locked into a subordinate position in the global economy: saddled with debt and balance of payments crises, susceptible to commodity price fluctuations, dependent on food aid, and reliant on a magnitude of forces in the international system. In general, Africa is said to be "waiting" for a host of tendencies in the NIDL to eventually bring production, technology, investments, and thus prosperity to the continent. In particular, African countries such as Zimbabwe are advised to design their development strategies, programs and policies with a view toward working within the NIDL rather than as any sort of countervail to the pressures placed on them by global forces and patterns.

To the backdrop of the NIDL, many other political observers have added an examination of the transition of southern Africa from an era of apartheid and South African destabilization and regional hegemony, with boundaries intimately linked to the geopolitics of the Cold War, to a new era of politics and political analysis. Certainly, persistent conflicts and democratic struggles will continue to frame the agendas of state and non-state actors. However, studies of the region have increasingly sought to include new dimensions within and beyond diplomacy and the
politics of peace and security. Some of these have sought new definitions of security for evolving southern African states.\textsuperscript{40} Others have re-emphasized political economy (including the NIDL), and the social relations of production and exchange, and related these to racial politics as well as to foreign policy and institutions in the region.\textsuperscript{41} As the politics of southern Africa are transforming, so too are its economies, and the state, as seen here, is now considered in light of its part in economic development. Most recently, the state is examined in terms of its role vis-a-vis the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank/IMF.\textsuperscript{42}

Political dimensions of development are particularly significant in the case of Zimbabwe. At Independence in 1980 there was considerable attention given to the route that the country would take vis-a-vis development. In its early pronouncements, socialist and egalitarian goals were professed and the shedding of its imperialist burdens was on the "political agenda." However, Zimbabwe has deepened its integration into the world economy and it is clear that the country has embraced its "inherited" capitalist economy and many of the structures that some expected would


be dismantled. On this there have been a few interesting characterizations of a "post-white settler colonial state" which outline the idiosyncratic circumstances within which state activity and development proceeds. In *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986*, Ibbo Mandaza (1986) describes a range of dimensions critical to an understanding of the process of transition vis-a-vis development in the country. The first of these is that neo-colonialism (and consequently dependency) must be treated as "neither a bogey nor a convenient peg on which to hang Africa's ills." Rather, these factors may be simply recognized as fundamental constraints (as the NIDL) to the process of development. Secondly, Mandaza says, it may be necessary to acknowledge that the bourgeoisie, though predominantly foreign, may be the only group available to lead the process of economic development. And thirdly:

The apparent 'sell-out' is therefore a reflection of the overall dominance of imperialist hegemony at a particular stage in the development of the society; a reflection of the weakness of nationalist movements in this imperialist epoch, the inability to dismantle the state and change the socioeconomic structures after independence.  

The question of the role of the ruling classes in African development is one of great complexity. Persuasive arguments have been made that the power and dominance of elites is much more critical to the possibilities for "development" than are ideologies or articulated government mandates. Some writers, particularly

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African political economists, feel that colonial legacies, the contemporary global economic system, and ruling elites' policies--co-opting labour, favouring urban areas, distributing benefits communally, and spending on education to maintain intergenerational class divisions--exacerbates discrepancies between regions, urban and rural areas, and bourgeoisie and workers regardless of whether the stated program is "capitalism" or "socialism." In both systems, the managerial bourgeoisie is said to use the economic levers of the state to enlarge their size and prosperity. Indeed, even state intervention in the market often tends to increase poverty and inequality. This has been a source of disagreement in Zimbabwe: some maintain that there has been a genuine separation of political leadership from the nascent bourgeoisie, others feel that there is a substantial comprador element in the ruling class (in the form of an alliance between European and indigenous capitalists), while some feel that in light of the recency of the transition to independence and black African leadership it is simply too early to tell.

Since the Lancaster House Agreement taking force in 1980, and following UDI period, the government of Zimbabwe has formulated its own development plans. In them are a procession of claims of revolutionary, progressive transitions towards an equitable and just distribution of incomes and land, indigenous ownership and control of resources, popular participation, full employment, reduction of racial and regional

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disparities, domestic self-reliance and an end to imperialist exploitation. However, these goals are to be pursued within a stated context of rapid economic growth, dynamic efficiency, and macroeconomic stability.\textsuperscript{45} A variety of explanations has emerged to explain these differences, referring to them variously as \textit{creative tensions} in the development planning process\textsuperscript{46} or \textit{internal contradictions} which effectively demobilize the Zimbabwean state.\textsuperscript{47}

Most analyses of development in Zimbabwe though have focussed less on the formalized declarations of government documents and more on the actual approach found in the evolution of policy and practice. Despite its articulation of a socialist model, the government's actions since independence reveal a development path which has the country preserving, even stimulating its capitalist economy, remaining inextricably linked to the global economy (the NIDL), and bound by the austerity measures of the IFIs. Much has been written and much might be said here about power and politics, about the character, motivations and agendas of elites in Zimbabwe, and about alliances with transnational interests. But the focus here is more on the ideas


and strategies of development as they have been put forth in the contemporary context. This is to say, the content of competing approaches to development in Zimbabwe are the focus of study rather than the nature of the interactions between competing interests in the current setting. However, the latter is undoubtedly useful in informing the direction of development.

The Question of Zimbabwean Capitalist Development

[T]he most interesting place to watch will be Zimbabwe. . . .Zimbabwe has many of the same circumstances that have made Kenyan capitalism so vigorous. Zimbabwe has strong capitalist institutions created by a local white bourgeoisie, many of whom are now anxious to find black allies—the white and black Chambers of Commerce confederated in 1978. Zimbabwe has an aspiring black bourgeoisie eager to take over existing institutions, for capitalist farming has been encouraged since the 1930s in the Native Purchase Areas and in 1975 there were about a thousand African farmers owning an average of over a thousand acres each. . . .Unlike Kenya, Zimbabwe has an African government which, at an ideological level, is seriously dedicated to socialist policies. . . .The future of Zimbabwe will be a fascinating test of the relative strength in modern Africa of state policy as against inherited objective reality. And the future of Zimbabwe is absolutely vital to the future of capitalism in Africa.48

--John Iliffe

National independence did not in any way challenge the capitalist mode of production and the participation of imperialists in the making of the constitution was a clear indication that capitalism was being preserved. . . .The local bourgeois class is small and consists mainly of commercial farmers and small industrialists. Many of the local bourgeois are white. The African bourgeois class for historical reasons is poorly developed and unimportant. Many of the Africans have been employed as directors and managers of MNCs forming an

48Iliffe, op.cit.: 43.
important pro-imperialist petty-bourgeois class. The other sector of the African petty-bourgeois class is employed in the state apparatus many having had an imperialist anti-communist ideological upbringing. The majority of the population are working class and peasantry. The peasantry in Zimbabwe is highly politicized. the working class is openly for socialism and anti-capitalist but suffers from a poor tradition in the field of organisation. Kempton Makamure

A fundamental concern in this thesis has been in uncovering a problematique for development in sub-Saharan Africa and now for Zimbabwe. At issue are the key ideas, central concepts and principal debates informing this. The quotations above illustrate the question of indigenous capitalism and capitalist development in the case of Zimbabwe. Raised in Chapter III, the debate over whether an indigenous capitalist class has emerged to effectively drive a process of accumulation is pertinent to Zimbabwe. As noted, many treat development (equated with economic growth) irrespective of the issue of foreign versus indigenous ownership and control. However, this orthodoxy is difficult to uphold in the case of Zimbabwe: the phenomenon of an indigenous petty bourgeoisie—a stratum of people just beginning to emerge from the service of imperialism—being singularly in a position to use state power to effect development is compounded by the spectre of imperialist domination, a continued white-settler presence and participation, as well as regional struggles and violence.

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In the approach of the IFIs, and in the apparent path being taken in Zimbabwe, capitalism as a mode of production is presumed. The first quote above, from John Iliffe, portrays the predominant view that an indigenous capitalism has taken root, that it is currently moving into position to drive the direction of the Zimbabwean economy, and that it will eventually establish itself in formal terms on the development agenda of the state in the domestic political economy. The very notion of indigenous capitalism is not without its critics however. John Saul (1990), for example, offers a critical commentary on the view that an indigenous African capitalism is pervasive in southern Africa, noting that Afro-capitalism is itself a hollow concept. The notions of the centrality of the market, of capital, and of an open economy may have currency in the dialogue at the level of the state in sub-Saharan Africa, but in terms of widespread ideology and consciousness, there is a distinct silence: as Saul notes, "the absence of any very developed discourse around the theme of liberal democracy." The most contrary position, evident in the second quote above, from Kempton Makamure, is skeptical of the prospects for an indigenous capitalism in particular and for capitalist development in general. This viewpoint has the paradoxical role of being nearly shunned in the theoretical debates of development in Zimbabwe while simultaneously giving full support to the notion that a socialist transition for Zimbabwe is likely.

To analytically frame the experience of capitalist development in Zimbabwe is a difficult task. One might apply the methodology of Sender and Smith (1986) as described in Chapter III. In their terminology, capitalism has clearly grown in Zimbabwe. The emergence of wage labour, the spread of private ownership of land and industrial assets by capitalists, the appropriation of surplus value of labour, and all other criteria in their approach are satisfied. However, as noted above, the question of indigenous capitalism has not been definitively answered for Zimbabwe. More importantly than the colour of capitalism in the country though, the occurrence of dynamic capitalist development has not been persuasively demonstrated.

To illustrate, few question the frequent mention of Zimbabwe as a model for African agricultural development, and the supposed spread of benefits from the capitalist formation to others. However, Yash Tandon (1990) examined the bumper crop of peasant-produced corn in 1984-85 and estimated that peasant producers secured only 18 percent of the final returns, with 10 percent going to transport costs and the government levy, and the remaining 72 percent going to agro-chemical companies supplying hybrid seeds, fertilizers, insecticides and herbicides. The positive link between capitalist, commercial (white) farming and peasant production is thus questionable and warrants at least a closer examination. Nevertheless, a fact of capitalist development is presumed in many quarters and can be treated as a fundamental orthodoxy for development in Zimbabwe.

Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe

Although the government of Zimbabwe did not formally adopt its Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) until 1990, it had maintained a similar policy framework on its own. Through the UDI period (1964/65 to 1978/79) and the years of sanctions against the country, the government of Rhodesia had operated under a fairly enclosed set of economic conditions and relations. Following independence, the Mugabe government increasingly turned outward in its focus, largely to ensure that continuous aid and assistance would be forthcoming from donor countries. Also, it faced pressure to seek funds with which to promote its exports. Zimbabwe joined the IFIs and received assistance through the World Bank and IMF through the early 1980s and had informally agreed to put in place economic reform measures on its own which bore an "uncanny resemblance to the standard IMF programmes." 52

In 1990, the Zimbabwean government formally entered the era of structural adjustment by adopting a five year adjustment plan (ESAP). As reviewed in Chapter II, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have advanced the central policy agenda for international development in the last two decades. These policies, and the complete array of assumptions and suppositions behind them, are adopted by


53Thandika Mkandawire, "Home-Grown(?) Austerity Measures: The Case of Zimbabwe," Africa Development, 10:1-2, 1985. The structural adjustment alliance is typically the IMF and IBRD with donor states (e.g. the U.S. and U.K.) and with local governments and elites in recipient countries.
"developing" countries in the form of economic and political conditions to receiving multilateral balance of payments support and development assistance. ESAP, as other SAPs in sub-Saharan Africa, emphasizes stabilization, via cuts in government expenditures and taxation, and adjustments such as trade liberalization, institutional restructuring and sectoral changes in favour of expanded foreign exchange earnings.

Within less than two years after being introduced in Zimbabwe, structural adjustment does not appear to have been successful. Current account deficits have grown and the expected macroeconomic stabilization has been slow in coming.\footnote{Tor Skalnes, "The State, Interest Groups and Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe," Journal of Development Studies, 29:3, April 1993: 401-428.} Thousands of jobs have been lost, including in the public sector where early in 1993 20,000 to 30,000 more jobs were expected to be eliminated. Workplace relations have deteriorated rapidly with sharpened polarization taking place.\footnote{Lloyd Sachikonye, "Bearing the Brunt: Labour and Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe," Southern Africa Report, May 1993: 16-17.} Prices for many goods from staples to transportation have doubled in spite of wages being effectively frozen. High inflation (45 percent in late 1992) has pushed the cost of living to over double the minimum wage. Services from health care to electricity can no longer be afforded government support, and there is pressure to increase user charges on all services including education. Subsidies on bread, maize meal, sugar, beef, and vegetable oils have been removed. The harshness of structural adjustment measures has been compounded by the incidence of drought in southern Africa. Food production
has dropped off and an energy crisis has occurred since the country is supplied in part by hydroelectric power. In all of this, it is clear that it is the poorest who have suffered the most severe repercussions.\(^6\)

One of the criticisms of both the Zimbabwean governments' own reform program and the later ESAP introduced through the IFIs is that they were implemented with almost no public consultation:

Following the collapse of a social contract that had to a degree sustained social redistribution measures (education, health and land resettlement), the state is now viewed as pursuing a full-blown project of capitalist accumulation in concert with domestic and international capital. From the labour movement's perspective, this helps to explain why it was not consulted in the design of ESAP.\(^7\)

As has been well noted, the complex realities of social, economic and political life in a changing southern Africa are bound up in a multitude of difficult and interconnected development questions. In parallel, the diverse analytical and theoretical approaches to the problem both inform and compound the contemporary parameters of development theory and practice in sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, there are a host of prescriptions and recipes for Zimbabwe on micro and macro levels, in the social, political and economic realms, and from indigenous and foreign perspectives. Alternatives to structural adjustment are diverse. In the next chapter, an exploration of the major alternatives to the approach to development taken by the World Bank and IMF in Zimbabwe will be carried out.


\(^{7}\)Sachikonye, 1993, \textit{op.cit.}: 17.
CHAPTER V

ALTERNATIVES IN ZIMBABWE: THE 1990S AND BEYOND

MAJOR ALTERNATIVES TO STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN ZIMBABWE

In light of the apparent failures, noted in the last chapter, of the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) that the Zimbabwean government has carried into the 1990s, there has been widespread opposition to the World Bank/IMF platform of macroeconomic structural adjustment for the country. This chapter will examine some of the major lines of this opposition--theoretical and practical--in terms of what these opponents see as the main deficiencies and faults of structural adjustment, and what they propose as an alternative strategy. The emphasis here will continue to be on the basic conception of development that each of these alternatives has advanced to challenge the orthodoxies of the Bank/Fund structural adjustment.

Considering the extent of organic connections among development theory, praxis, policy and practice (outlined in Chapter II), Zimbabwe may be set apart from many other African countries. It has a well established network of economists, researchers, academics, theorists, policy analysts, planners and others--from agencies and institutions both inside and outside the national bureaucracy--who have consistently over the years offered an abundant supply of economic (and to a lesser extent social) policy advice. While many other countries rely more heavily on their
own government planners and entertain the advice of external (often expatriate) advisors on an ad hoc basis, Zimbabwe seems to have had a fairly regular cast of characters who have been continuously and directly involved in policy formulation in recent decades. It is largely from these professional ranks that the major challenge to the development thinking manifest in Bank/Fund structural adjustment has come. Thus, in the case of Zimbabwe, there exists an intimate link between the theory and praxis of development—both orthodoxies and alternatives—at present.

In the literature of development theory, one of the most significant and critical challenges to structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa is contained in the work edited by Bonnie Campbell and John Loxley (1989) entitled *Structural Adjustment in Africa*. Less polemic than the "discourse" of the various World Bank publications, the collection offers a balanced and well-documented critique and challenge to SAPs in sub-Saharan Africa but clearly within a political-economic framework. In their opposition to structural adjustment, Campbell and Loxley (et. al.) focus on the external orientation and market biases dictated by the SAP conditionalities:

Never before have the IFIs wielded such pervasive influence on policy formulation in Africa: not since the days of colonialism have external

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forces been so powerfully focused to shape Africa's economic structure and the nature of its participation in the world system.  

This "neo-imperialism" is the case with Zimbabwe, they say, since even though the country's economy may be one of the few in Africa sufficiently healthy to avoid prolonged dependence on foreign aid, the government of Zimbabwe has nonetheless yielded to pressures to adopt an SAP and the policy conditionalities it entails. They predict, among other things, that the manufacturing sector of the economy faces destruction if tariff protection is prematurely removed.  

The case of Zimbabwe is a unique one since the government had formally adopted its ESAP only recently (in 1990). However, as indicated in Chapter IV, the reforms of structural adjustment had found their way into the economic policies of the country a decade earlier. So the criticisms and challenges to structural adjustment in Campbell and Loxley in 1989 were formed around the more informal (but imminently formal) policy motif of structural adjustment. In the Zimbabwean case study, written by Colin Stoneman, "IMF-inspired" policies are found to frustrate the stated intention of promoting greater equality between rich and poor and urban and rural dwellers, to

\[\text{\footnotesize \cite{2}\cite{3}}\]
effectively stall the program of land resettlement, and to slow down the progress that had been attained in health and nutrition.⁴

Stoneman⁵ rebukes the form of the World Bank approach in a review of its Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) methodology. Use of the DRC approach, he says, is ridden with biases and has not even gained consensus within the orthodox neoclassical school of economics. However, the crux of the criticism of Bank/Fund structural adjustment for Stoneman in the Zimbabwean case, and for Campbell and Loxley in the general case of sub-Saharan Africa, is one of content. They denounce the "essentially ideological nature of what the Bank presents as scientific tools of economic analysis"⁶ and they advance a rejection of the blind faith in free markets. The SAPs, they say, promote short-run efficiency guided by a market-based allocation of resources and based on the pursuit of a comparative advantage within international markets. As Stoneman notes:

. . .present policies are judged inefficient because a market would dictate a different pattern of relative prices and resource allocation. Considerations of equity, of a desire to construct a socialist society, even of the need for structural change for development, are implicitly relegated to a subsidiary category whose main characteristic is that of


⁵Affiliated with the Centre of Southern African Studies at the University of York, Stoneman also writes quarterly country reports on Zimbabwe for the Economist Intelligence Unit and has published for the Commonwealth Secretariat, SADCC and the Government of Zimbabwe.

⁶"...A critique of neoclassical economic orthodoxies, Ibid.: 7."
imposing costs above the level of market outcome. This implies an underlying assumption that the basic structure of the economy is sound: all that is needed is to allow market forces to favour those activities for which a comparative advantage already exists.\(^7\)

While not articulating a specific alternative development path for Zimbabwe or other African countries, Campbell and Loxley nevertheless offer a "blueprint for what form alternative adjustment programmes might take" which includes guaranteed minimum consumption levels for basic needs goods (food, water, housing, health care, education); a "laying down of foundations for self-sustaining growth based on dynamic specialization as far as available resources would permit"; the continued forging of intra-regional economic links; a gradual transformation of the structure of foreign trade; an emphasis on local resource use that is ecologically sound and embraces appropriate training, education and science policies; and greater public participation in program design and implementation.\(^8\)

In short, they promote an approach that is more inward-looking, less bent on finding niches in world markets based on current capabilities and less hostile to state intervention. But in terms of specific remedies to the current crises in so many African countries, or recommendations for concrete alternatives to directly challenge the course of development thinking and praxis promoted by the World Bank and IMF,\(^9\) they offer little more than a call for a stronger role for African states in the

\(^7\)Stoneman, \textit{op.cit.}: 56.

\(^8\)Campbell and Loxley, \textit{op.cit.}: 9-10.

(continued...)
process of adjustment. Campbell and Loxley and the authors of case studies in their collection make the case for "African states retaining discretion in matters of industrial policy in order to promote development based on dynamic rather than static comparative advantage," but fall short in promoting an alternative approach to development. For Zimbabwe, Colin Stoneman suggests a return to the pre-ESAP state-guided policies of foreign exchange earnings expansion, commercial market borrowing, and diversification away from primary commodities. Although he stresses that neither the World Bank/IMF framework nor the pre-ESAP status quo resemble what the Mugabe government had promoted as a self-reliant socialist strategy in its first two Development Plans, he avoids any prescription or even forecast of what an alternative strategy moving in such a direction might resemble.

To understand Stoneman's position, and consequently one of the major counter-orthodoxies in development thinking for Zimbabwe, it is useful to return to an earlier work: a 1982 collection edited by Martin Fransman entitled Industry and Accumulation in Africa. The predominant mode of analysis in the study, drawn

(...continued)

9Particularly vis-a-vis the continental alternatives being advanced in recent years from the OAU (Lagos Plan) and UNECA (African Alternative Framework), see Chapter II.


11Campbell and Loxley, op.cit.: 7; Stoneman refers to this notion of an emphasis on dynamic comparative advantage as an "alternative paradigm," op.cit.: 62.

12Stoneman, op.cit.: 61-62.
largely from the work of Ajit Singh, was a structuralist approach which held that "industrialization is a necessary condition for rising productivity and standards of living and this is true regardless of the 'political hue' of the state." In this view, development is conceived of as a process of growth in the manufacturing sector and a natural and consequent spread of a "technological dynamism" from manufacturing to other sectors of the economy. Singh fully argues that the "expansion of industry is an essential condition for the meeting of basic needs of the poor in the developing countries on a sustainable basis."  

In Colin Stoneman's own article in the collection, "Industrialization and Self-Reliance in Zimbabwe," he presents a strategy for this form of industrialization which he says must take place within a reduction of the domination of foreign capital in the national economy:

If it can be agreed that a strategy of dependence on foreign capital may well produce growth, but not necessarily development (since structural weaknesses either persist or are strengthened, so that poverty deepens amidst growing wealth and a balanced economy rarely results), then self-reliance is required as a central ingredient of a development policy. This may be quite consistent with using (and paying for) private foreign investment in certain sectors. It cannot be consistent with tolerating

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foreign ownership of some two-thirds of productive investment as in present-day Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{15}

In support of the Singh view, Stoneman argues that protection and purposeful economic planning with attention to both agriculture and the capital goods industries "are the necessary components of a viable industrialization strategy."

It is clear then that it is \textit{international} capitalism, and not capitalism itself that is the focus of Stoneman and others in their objections to Zimbabwe's ESAP and in their general critiques of the contemporary orthodoxies in development thinking. The hope for development in Zimbabwe in this view remains in an expansion of the manufacturing sector and in capitalist production and accumulation. This claim is further magnified in another recent empirical work on African development edited by Roger Riddell (1990) and entitled \textit{Manufacturing Africa: Performance and Prospects of Seven Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa}. Riddell, a former Chief Economist of the Zimbabwean Federation of Industries, outlines the general framework of the study and provides the case study on Zimbabwe. The goal of the research, as Riddell explains it, is to offer a response and challenge to the current revolution in development in Africa, namely the orthodoxies of structural adjustment and new tenets of development such as stabilization, privatization, deregulation, desubsidization, and deindigenization.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15}Colin Stoneman, "Industrialization and Self-Reliance in Zimbabwe," in Fransman, ed., \textit{op.cit.}; 286.

Riddell's major criticism of structural adjustment seems to be that it is unduly focused in the short term; in response, a long-term strategy of manufacturing expansion through state-interventionist import substitution and a stimulation of domestic demand is proposed and supported primarily by an examination of the Zimbabwean experience:

Zimbabwe's manufacturing sector has expanded over a time span of more than 60 years to become one of the most advanced and diversified in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, the sophistication of the economy and the pivotal place occupied by its manufacturing industry have led to the suggestion [his] that, with favourable domestic policies and a supportive external environment, Zimbabwe could be the first country in SSA to join the ranks of the Newly Industrializing Countries.17

Riddell acknowledges though that changes in the manufacturing sector are likely needed if it is to play a greater role in "generating jobs and foreign exchange for the economy as a whole" as well as increasing real incomes and expanding access to basic services.18

The bulk of Riddell's analysis consists of tracing the growth of manufacturing in Zimbabwe, surveying current trends and sources of industrial growth, connecting firm-level data to the sectoral picture, and projecting a macroeconomic context for future industrialization. He concludes that manufacturing growth in the country can

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16(...continued)
1990: 1.

17 Riddell, "Zimbabwe," op.cit.: 337.

18 Ibid.
be maintained, but only with carefully targeted interventions. However, he is vague on what form these changes should take:

To argue that changes are necessary... is by no means to concede that any one particular type of change should be advocated. A conclusion of the preceding discussion is that neither the type of policies outlined in the National Development Plan nor those being propounded by the World Bank are likely to achieve the targets set or to provide the basis for sustained expansion of the manufacturing sector over the next decade. Part of reason for that is that these plans are based on a high level of ignorance...

Like Stoneman, Riddell falls short in exploring the connections between manufacturing growth (as "development") and other broader notions of social, political and even economic development. Industrialization is seen as the basic engine of change, and attention is focused on the extent to which either the policy frameworks of the chief global-scale promoters of development such as the IFIs or the strategies of African states themselves are directed towards its pursuit. Beyond whole-hearted industrial expansionism, little theoretical space is open to some of the many alternative conceptions of development raised here and elsewhere; the main dilemma appears to be one of state versus market.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{19}}\text{Ibid.}: 395.\]
"A Plague On All Your Houses"

At the outset of this study, a definition of development was proposed in purposefully wide terms, including necessary economic, social and political dimensions of progressive change. If any attempt were made to apply its implicit criteria—such as equitability or participation—the approaches of the orthodox school as well as the above alternatives would fail. Overlooking this, the central features of the structural adjustment approach, as well as its "domestic industrial policy" alternative for Zimbabwe (Stoneman/Riddell), are inadequate in a number of more specific respects. For instance, the possibilities for positive activity of the Zimbabwean government are dismissed in the Bank/Fund orthodox approach and overstated in the major alternative. The Zimbabwean economy remains inextricably linked to the international political economy (NIDL), and actions of the Mugabe government are tempered by the interests of foreign (finance) capital. Yash Tandon (1990), in Adjustment or Delinking? The African Experience, criticized the position of Roger Riddell on the power of the state over the private sector, pointing out that the Zimbabwean government could not even think of completely resettling the land of white commercial farmers (for example) since it would elicit a hostile reaction in Britain and the United States (including from the World Bank and IMF).^20

^20Yash Tandon, op.cit.: 89.
Chapter III reviewed two empirical studies of capitalism in Africa. One (Iliffe) worked to establish the indigenous nature of capitalism in Africa; the other (Sender and Smith) sought to demonstrate the expansion and dynamic contribution of capitalism across the continent. While there may be no sufficient (or pertinent!) reason to doubt the claim that indigenous bourgeoisies can arise or even have arisen, the issue would seem to be moot for Zimbabwe. The capitalist class in Zimbabwe is questionably indigenous, and it is hardly the case that a dynamic local bourgeoisie has sprung up on its own accord: capitalism in Zimbabwe is a product of colonization. The orthodox SAP approach does not seem to mind this. For the central alternative, the issue is more important but does not prevent it from presuming the capitalist mode of production to be the natural state of affairs in the country.

With respect to the claim of the dynamic or progressive nature of capitalism in Zimbabwe, these competing schools both equate development with capitalist accumulation and presuppose some dynamic link between the capitalist sector and the rest of the Zimbabwean political economy. Adequate treatments of class and class struggle are missing in both cases. Ben Turok of the Institute for African Alternatives lamented this paucity in contemporary development theory:

There is clearly an absence of interest in, and a lack of sympathy for, the working class in practically all the literature except perhaps in that of the liberal researchers of the United Nations, ILO and other international agencies who are anxious to peddle their solutions of
Basic Needs Strategy, or "trickle down", which recognize workers as objects of policy and not as agents of change.\textsuperscript{21}

As in the approach of Sender and Smith (1986) assessed in Chapter III, the dynamism of capitalism in both perspectives for Zimbabwe is derived from the fact of a growing wage labour force—workers divorced from their means of production—and from the competition among productive units. As Turok notes, the question of agency is seldom raised, it is assumed that development is driven by the process of the capitalist mode of production itself.

In large part, both the orthodox structural adjustment position and the alternative perspective of Stoneman, Riddell and others are framed by the traditions of development economics. Though politics are sometimes treated in passing, economic development remains central. And several other forms of analysis in the social sciences are neglected. In a more interdisciplinary approach, development in Zimbabwe might begin to include many more social dimensions, and processes such as liberation and decolonization may become much more essential. As Zimbabwean leaders have defined these processes as pivotal to the future of the country, the case is even stronger for a much broader approach. And as seen in Chapter II, calls for a new development have been voiced on a collective, continent-wide basis.\textsuperscript{22}


\textsuperscript{22}See new definitions of development arising the from the initiatives of the Lagos Plan and the African Alternative Framework in Duri Mohammed, ed., \textit{Social Development} (continued...).
TOWARDS A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE

As seen in Chapter II, the major alternative frameworks for development in sub-Saharan Africa (in *praxis*) have been advanced by a number of collective initiatives such as the OAU's Lagos Plan of Action and African Alternative Framework of the UN-ECA. From the discussion above, it is apparent that the principal dialogue around "alternatives" to structural adjustment for Zimbabwe has been dominated by notions of positive *state* activity—namely, interventions to stimulate capitalist industrialization. Nevertheless, development thinking in the Zimbabwean context is clearly prone to controversies over levels of analysis. Certainly, the traditional view places the state at the fore: this has historically included African nationalists but is now predominated by those of the main alternative ("domestic industrial policy") perspective noted above. At present, the neo-liberal orthodoxies (including the World Bank/IMF ideology) contain an almost hostile view of state intervention. For development, they portray instead a landscape of dynamic, private business firm activity. This view has received support, albeit indirectly and probably not intentionally, from development agencies that have carried out ground-level studies of indigenous private enterprise and entrepreneurship.\(^ {23} \)

\(^{22}(...continued)\)

\(^{23}\)See A. Sverrisson (ZIDS), *Entrepreneurship and Industrialization: A Case Study of* (continued...)

(continued...)
Some observers in Zimbabwe, among them Pan-Africanists and others, are inclined to seek continental or regional solutions to political, economic and social crises. In the case of Zimbabwe, the reorientation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) away from its preoccupation with the threat of South African imperialism has created a new interest in the prospects for the initiative as a vehicle of development in the region.\(^{24}\) Still others focus on subnational dimensions of rural and agricultural development;\(^{25}\) project and program-level initiatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs);\(^{26}\) group-centred analyses of labour, environmental and women's movements;\(^{27}\) as well as participatory

\(^{23}\)(...continued)


development\textsuperscript{28} and informal sectors.\textsuperscript{29} However, the dilemmas of agency and of levels of analysis will remain secondary here to a treatment and synthesis of alternative (competing) modes of analysis in the current setting of development in Zimbabwe. Indeed, it is the process of development that has been the subject of scrutiny in the thesis.

One of the areas that might offer some insight as to where alternative formations might be consolidated is cooperatives. The interest in cooperatives and cooperative development is not new, nor has it been abandoned during the recent years of "free market competition." In 1988 the ILO published a study on the subject, noting rather flatly that "in Africa, there is a long tradition of co-operation in various economic activities and co-operatives are an example of this."\textsuperscript{30} The study did not explore the relationships between cooperatives and their social relations at the micro level and economic and social structures in the national or global context; nor did it

\textsuperscript{28}(...continued)


attempt to relate dimensions such as ideology or political consciousness to the cooperative form. However, it did offer an excellent portrayal of the heterogeneity among African cooperatives in terms of their function and relative success. From agriculture to manufacturing and from production to exchange activities, cooperatives had been established for food production and marketing, purchasing farm inputs, credit and banking, housing, small-scale manufacturing, artisan or craft production, labour-contracting, and worker cooperatives.

In Zimbabwe, there were 330 agricultural cooperatives in 1980, including a small number of communal farms which were introduced as part of the post-civil war resettlement program. These farms adopted various configurations from ones with communal grazing only, to a few with a full communal living and cooperative farming. In other sectors, cooperatives existed in marketing and supply, and also in the form of both rural and urban consumer cooperatives. Though not articulated in the earliest post-independence development plans ("Growth with Equity" and the "Three Year National Transitional Development Plan 1982/83-1984/85"), the Mugabe government has more recently shown evidence of a policy on cooperatives. As in other areas, Zimbabwe has proceeded slowly to transform the agricultural sector from its dualistic colonial condition in a strategy of Socialist Agrarian Transformation which includes (i) the development of peasant farming on a communal tenure basis; (ii) the preservation of large scale commercial farming to ensure short-run stability.

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31 ILO, op.cit.: 30-31.
in food supplies; and (iii) the gradual establishment of a socialized sector made up of producer cooperatives and state farms.\textsuperscript{32} The producer cooperatives, as basically socialist organizations, are characterized by (i) common ownership of all productive resources; (ii) voluntariness which excludes coercion by the state or other pressure groups; (iii) democratic control by members through their elected organs; and (iv) absolute neutrality in racial, sexual, religious and political issues.\textsuperscript{33}

By 1988, there were 1,908 cooperatives registered in Zimbabwe with an estimated 160,000 members.\textsuperscript{34} The record of producer cooperative development has been examined by a number of researchers: all of them find successes and failures in the approach, but most of them suggest that it may be too early to ascertain whether this may constitute a viable alternative development strategy.\textsuperscript{35} In some, internal sources of failure have been shown to be "mere manifestations of a more general


problem located at the level of the national political economy and factors external to
the cooperatives as economic enterprises. The apparent early successes of post-
independence cooperative schemes includes the positive role they play in improving
the status of women in rural areas. Though changes are slow in coming, the role of
women has evolved from the situation prior to 1980 when:

> . . . they were engaged [only] in tilling the land and subsistence farming.
The agricultural produce would be marketed to grain marketing boards
under the husband’s name which ultimately meant that she had little or
no control over the income earned.  

It is probably important to distinguish between bureaucratic, state-run
cooperative systems and a more localized, bottom-up, self-directed process. Michael
Bratton (1986) studied the potential of rural farmer organizations in Zimbabwe to
undertake what he called "organized collective action" in the face of the food crisis
in southern Africa. He saw the cooperative organization of rural producers (in many
instances a product of precapitalist formations) as an important arrangement for
development:

> Since the state and market fall short, the alternative is to search within
the social fabric for local organizations that have development poten-
tial. I am referring to voluntary associations of farmers that coalesce of

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36 Clever Mumbengegwi, "The Political Economy of Agricultural Producer
Cooperative Development in Post-Independence Zimbabwe," H. Hedlund, Cooperatives

37 Chitsiga, loc.cit.
their own accord on the basis of shared economic interests and cultural values.\textsuperscript{38}

The ILO study noted that "co-operatives [are] sometimes being viewed as instruments of development, an attitude which has not always coincided with grass-root needs or aspirations."\textsuperscript{39} In too many instances, so-called "cooperative" projects have been carried out by governments for reasons more beneficial to political elites or others than to the participants in the projects themselves. This relates to an important distinction between a primary versus secondary role for cooperatives. In many if not most cases, they tend to exist on the edges of a basically capitalist economy and serve predominately to provide benefits to many people who would otherwise be marginalized from this primary economy, or to supplement the incomes of those who could not subsist solely on their incomes in the wage labour economy. This, Bratton notes, is the present case with communal-cooperative farming in Zimbabwe which "does not depart from the familiar tale of concentration of wealth among middle-men and big farmers during periods of capitalist transformation in peasant agriculture."\textsuperscript{40}

Clever Mumbengegwi (1988) further connects the apparent failure of producer cooperatives to their disassociation from other important areas of development policy:

\ldots producer cooperatives remain a very marginal aspect of an already marginal land redistribution exercise, meaning that they could not possibly fulfil a specific economic mission to other sectors of the

\textsuperscript{38}Bratton, 1986, \textit{op.cit.}: 368.

\textsuperscript{39}ILO, \textit{op.cit.}: 1.

\textsuperscript{40}Bratton, 1986, \textit{op.cit.}: 382.
economy. They remain curious experiments not integrated into a general process of structural and socio-economic transformation.\(^1\)

The possibilities for cooperatives in Zimbabwe in offering (or even informing) a significant alternative approach to development might then lie in the ability of a national development strategy to be constructed, articulated and clearly connected to both some conception of a "cooperative" mode of production and exchange and a distinct and concrete though flexible organizational formulation for cooperatives at the local functional level.\(^2\) It is also clear that a cooperative development program or strategy would have to face a range of related and difficult problems such as how to effect a transformation of the predominantly white-owned commercial agricultural sector. About 4,000 white commercial farmers still occupy more than half of the most productive land in the country while 4.4 million black farmers are in the most drought-prone areas known as communal lands.\(^3\) At present, major cooperative formations such as the Savings Development Movement (SDM) and the National Farmers' Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ) have had their greatest success in an advocacy role moreso than in offering a coherent alternative development model.\(^4\)

\(^1\)Mumbengegwi, 1988, \emph{op.cit.}: 162.


\(^4\)Michael Bratton, 1990, \emph{op.cit.}: passim.
An important theoretical foundation for the study of the problem of development in Zimbabwe may be the work on the extent and nature of political participation of poor populations. Many case studies in sub-Saharan Africa in this regard have focused on an assessment of political circumstances and the potential for improved material conditions of rural and urban poor. Others have considered the processes by which peasant populations disengage themselves from state politics and the national and global economies, and the effect of these processes on state stability, and then appraised the efforts of states to reintegrate rural peasant producers in the national political economy. Beyond marginalization in contemporary Africa, some have sought explanations for the conditions under which peasant populations will voluntarily enter into unequal, exploitive exchange and production relations via cooptation, patron-client relationships, and the coercion of the state through local administrators.

In the case of Zimbabwe, cooperative action among rural smallholding producers has been examined in terms of its role in the face of various political, economic and social crises. In particular, the presence of drought and the menacing

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threat of food and water shortages have been studied with reference to the ability of such inhabitants to organize and collectively improve their fate. Groups of rural peasant producers have been shown to expand access to household resources and agricultural services for their members. Further, periods of striking records of maize output in Zimbabwe have been attributed in part to the initiatives of small farmers to organize themselves.48

Indeed, it is imperative to consider what large groups in the population at large, particularly among the poor, have done for themselves. In a book entitled The Silent Revolution in Africa, Fantu Cheru (1989) advances a scathing review of the experience of African development to date and charges the proponents of the current orthodoxies and their major foreign and indigenous alternatives with planning for the recolonization of Africa. He submits instead that development might occur only as a real groundswell of democracy emerges. This, he says, is occurring only in the informal sectors of Africa: a silent revolution of ordinary Africans, opting out of the formal market economy and developing a parallel one which is immune to the manoeuvring of their rulers and the IMF. Ironically, he says, the very efforts of those from outside and above have led Africans in the informal sector to construct this new alternative paradigm for development:

The post-1980 economic crisis in Africa, despite its negative social impact, has opened up new opportunities for ordinary people which could pave the way for a third African solution for sustainable development. Bypassed by the formal development process, they have experimented with alternative strategies of their own without the heavy handed intervention of the state, which they regard as their number one enemy. Peasants and the urban poor in Africa have begun to defend themselves, not by picking up arms, but by simply dropping out of the formal economy, thereby allowing themselves greater freedom for creative adaptation to meet their basic needs.^

Whither the Socialist Transition?

In the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe, and in the attempts to formulate development plans in the early 1980s, a fundamental choice was recognized between a capitalist and socialist path not merely in terms of polity but in terms of mode of production. The preference for socialism has been put in perspective by restating the link between capitalism and imperialism:

Zimbabwe was occupied by British imperialism in 1890 and was immediately earmarked as a settler colony. The settler factor in the colonial system in Zimbabwe led to a rapid and brutal capitalist revolution in the country that was firmly established by 1923. By the 1960s a strong colonial capitalist system was fully established in the country built on the cheap labour of the African people which was secured by the system of racial economic discrimination and racial social segregation.^

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49 Fantu Cheru, op.cit.: 19.

50 Kempton Makumure, op.cit.: 71.
As noted in the last chapter, however, a clear decision was made at independence to adopt a socialist ideology simultaneous to a stated gradual transition from a capitalist to socialist economy. The debate, raised earlier here, over whether the ruling elites in Zimbabwe are willing and prepared to actively promote the transition to a production pattern which is less likely to rely on market forces to meet the basic needs of its population, or whether they are effectively entrenched as a comprador bourgeoisie in an increasingly capitalist political economy, is not settled. ZANU itself maintains that it is actively working to both transform the economy and to stimulate a widespread socialist consciousness.

In this thesis, the critical contention is between competing approaches to development which has been stated variously here in terms of competing modes of production and exchange and competing economic systems. Clearly though, a struggle is being waged in Zimbabwe between competing ideologies. In the discussion of cooperatives above, the possibilities for an alternative development strategy were examined. It was noted that a national strategy for socialist transformation cannot presume a natural, like tendency at the local level. Michael Bratton had noted that in the first place, within the organization of rural farming, the cooperative system existed (at this stage) more at the level of exchange than production and it will likely serve in a supplementary role to the main market-based system in the foreseeable future. Secondly, collectivity seems to have a greater positive impact on efficiency as against equity. Thirdly (and most importantly here) he noted,
It appears that in the African countryside, the conditions are not ripe for a socialist transformation. Traditions of asset sharing do not imply a peasant preference for social ownership of the means of production. In Zimbabwe at least, small farmers want to retain control over family assets in land, labor and cattle.\(^1\)

Though research in this area is decidedly sparse, there have been some recent explorations of the connection between the introduction of alternative (socialist in the case of Zimbabwe) structures, systems, and modes of production and the ideologies and consciousness of those who are collectively expected to be the dynamic social force behind a supporting alternative movement. John Saul (1990) examines the prospect for a socialist transition driven by the Zimbabwean working class:

The bases for extreme working class discontent are patent: in one recent year the average white monthly wage was $423, the average black wage $39. Indeed, between 1965 and 1975 the wage gap between black and white had actually doubled, and one estimate from several years ago suggested that fewer than 15 percent of the blacks in non-agricultural employment had earned above the Poverty Datum Line. Small wonder that with the electoral demise of white power the top blew off the Zimbabwean industrial relations system, and the new government was met with successive waves of strikes, involving thousands of workers in the private sector.\(^2\)

The barriers to a revolution of this proletariat, to use the Marxian terminology, include the relatively poor level of organization of Zimbabwean workers, and "contradictions exemplified in the possibility that any dramatic wage increases might have to be purchased at the expense of the peasantry or at the expense of those who

\(^1\)Bratton, 1986, \textit{op.cit.}: 383.

\(^2\)Saul, 1990, \textit{op.cit.}: 133-134.
are without work." It should be expected, Saul notes, that any widespread movement towards an alternative (namely socialist) formation would involve institutions and mechanisms to balance the interests of workers, peasants and others in a non-antagonistic way:

[W]orkers and peasants have deep-seated grievances in an inherited situation of gross exploitation, deprivation, and alien control. However, it is precisely because these grievances do not automatically find full expression as a full-fledged socialist project that questions of broader forms of organization and ideology are so important.54

This discussion raises an important dilemma: whether the issue of race or class is (or should become) the central nexus of bottom up pressures for social, political and economic change.55 Ben Turok (1987), addressed this issue by posing a choice between democracy and socialism in the short term. Largely a question of timing, it may be considered necessary for Zimbabweans to mount a democratic revolution for liberation to tackle the issues of anti-imperialism, neocolonialism and settler power before a meaningful socialist transformation can be taken on.56 Turok also stresses that it may take a number of years for a clear alternative program to be constructed against the opposition of bourgeoisies and the general criticisms of reactionaries.

53Ibid.
54Ibid.: 138.
55The blending of analyses of class and race, noted in Chapter IV, should be stressed.
56Turok, op.cit.: 138-139.
In the meantime, the Zimbabwean state has placed itself in a position to be the primary arbiter of the socialist transition,\textsuperscript{57} though in the eyes of some it has accomplished the elimination of "a mere intermediary between international capital and the exploited and oppressed Zimbabwean people."\textsuperscript{58} André Astrow (1983) charged that the potential for a socialist revolution was effectively foiled at independence. Signing the Lancaster House Agreement, he says, the PF leaders conceded to virtually every demand of the British negotiators. He suggests that if the struggle had continued on the basis of an anti-capitalist program rather than limited to a fight against the racism of the Rhodesian regime, a socialist revolution might have unfolded.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{58}Yash Tandon, \textit{op.cit.}: 87.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS:
ORTHODOXIES AND ALTERNATIVES IN PERSPECTIVE

Hopes are pedalled along the rioting tarmac
Sustained sparks of horizontal existence
The factory hands grapple with the throbbing pistons
For a few hand-sweated cents
The bespectacled spectre sits in air conditioned languor
And proclaims, "production must be increased"
The grief-wrung minds are shuttled
Between the agony of the factory
And the misery of home1 --Polycarp Chimedya

In large part, this study has consisted of an investigation of economic development, not from a technical or statistical standpoint but from a sociological perspective. As such, notions of what constitutes development (even economic development) have been taken as much broader than is conventional (or orthodox) in most of development theory. Development here thus includes important socio-economic dimensions that are not found in many models and theories--such as racial, gender and regional equality or political dimensions such as democratic participation

in development strategy formulation--and it would even allow space for subtle dimensions such as cultural diversity.

With this notion of development in mind, the condition of development in sub-Saharan Africa--empirical, theoretical and practical--was reviewed. Though the suggestion made here of an intense and urgent crisis may seem both conveniently strong and overly general in nature, a crisis was established nonetheless. Sub-Saharan Africa is steeped in a prolonged economic, political and social crisis for which little has changed in recent years despite the efforts of theorists, planners, practitioners and Africa's own political and intellectual leaders.

The theme of crisis was then extended in Chapter II to the realm of development thinking, that is, to the major approaches in theory, policy and praxis. There appear to be countless gaps in the IFI structural adjustment approach to development in Africa—a dearth of non-economic dimensions: human welfare, basic needs, self-determination, participation, and others. Though there are many useful ideas in the collective alternative frameworks for African development, including several in direct discord with the SAPs, these initiatives have failed to plant themselves on Africa's development agenda, and they have certainly not (yet?) raised a challenge to the consensus behind an outward-looking, open-market capitalism.²

²Perhaps this has as much to do with the ideological climate of the 1980s and into the post-Cold War 1990s. Articulating a new policy approach in Marxist terminology would certainly appear retrogressive in the aftermath of "the collapse of socialism worldwide!"
The numerous gaps and deficiencies in development studies (posed as crises here) have further compounded those in policy and praxis. Broad-based approaches at the macro level have failed to incorporate volumes of information from the micro level; what we consider to be universal often flies in the face of what seems to be the particular. A fragmentation along the lines of the disciplines persists, thus impeding the process of broadening development theory to acknowledge either an observed heterogeneity, or a heterodoxy of approaches across the various fields of study. As well, the attempts to overcome the traditional split of development paradigms into modernization and dependencia have failed to produce a genuine synthesis. Rather than converging, the divisions are still there, but new forms of concordance have emerged which appear to reveal conquer more than compromise in the discourse across subsequent intellectual streams. This form of "convergence" was evident in the apparent consensus around the notion of capitalist development reviewed in Chapter III and elsewhere.

The use of Zimbabwe as an illustrative case study has been fruitful in this and other respects. As regards the perceived crisis, the question of whether development in Zimbabwe has been successful meets with a mixed response here. It would be a grave mistake to suggest that the development efforts of the Zimbabwean government have been a patent failure. Leaving the question of capitalist development aside, it is clear that the state has made advances in the social realm. Even the harshest of
critics acknowledge the successes. Primary school intake increased by 268 percent between 1979 and 1984 such that for this age group the enrolment level rose from 40 percent at independence to over 93 percent by the mid 1980s. Similarly, enrolments at the Form One secondary level increased from 18 percent to over 83 percent in the same period. Health care has improved markedly, particularly in the rural areas with the establishment of Rural Health Centres and the Village Health Worker Programme. As well, significant efforts have been made in the areas of water supply.⁴

In terms of capitalist development in Zimbabwe, and from a technical and economistic perspective, development has been successful: little question remains over whether the capitalist mode of production exists (has developed, to use Sender and Smith's terminology) in the country. Also, one cannot dismiss the importance of the relative peacefulness with which the transition to independence has occurred in Zimbabwe. However, this smooth transition was surely bought at the expense of a neo-imperialist presence in the country. As well, debates have ensued over whether political independence can even exist given the fact of continued economic dependence in the country.

The Mugabe government has chosen and articulated a gradual path to socialism, but well into this "program" it acknowledged that little has changed in this regard:

⁴Yash Tandon, op.cit.: 90-91.
We are more capitalist than socialist at the moment. . . . No one can ever say that today Zimbabwe is a socialist state.¹

Given the criteria for development established here, it would seem that the leadership has also chosen a gradual path of development. The capitalist path has been embraced for stated pragmatic reasons. However, this pragmatism has also been interpreted as the undue compromise of a regime not responsive to its population. Worse, it may seem like a genuflection to the forces of a new imperialism.

The success or failure of development efforts in Zimbabwe, though certainly useful in guiding an exploration of the current problematique of development, is not set out as the central problem in the thesis. The ready acceptance of a capitalist process in Zimbabwe is only a signpost of the general state of development thinking at present. Running throughout the dialogues of the works surveyed in Chapter III on capitalism and capitalist development in Africa, as well as those of the major orthodoxies and alternatives in the Zimbabwean context² is the notion of capitalist development as an objective reality.

An unquestioned treatment of capitalist development as the current and natural state of affairs is unjustified since, as Chapter III showed, the occurrence of dynamic capitalist development in sub-Saharan Africa has not been convincingly

¹President Mugabe to Parliament in 1987, in Bartlett, op.cit.: 342.

²This includes the World Bank and IMF, albeit implicitly, the Zimbabwean government, and the major alternative stream covered in at the beginning of Chapter V.
demonstrated. Furthermore, the fundamentalism of this so-called objective reality obscures many other important issues such as the interaction of capitalism with other modes, and the possibilities for dynamic change being brought about by non-capitalist formations. As well, the major alternative stream of analysis for Zimbabwe (Stoneman, Riddell et.al.) treats self-reliant capitalism as the major challenge to structural adjustment; perhaps if self-determination were considered instead there might be room for the alternatives laying beyond this objective reality.

In Chapter III it was remarked that a curious paradox exists in contemporary development theory. Both the orthodox modernizationist approach (neo-classical economics in support of structural adjustment) and a major group on the traditionally alternative "radical" side--the Warrenites: orthodox Marxists including Sender and Smith--see a positive and dynamic role for capitalist development. To place the work of these Marxists in its context, the following comment by Nicola Swainson (1980) is appropriate:

Warren's bold attack on the 'dependency' orthodoxy can only be commended insofar as it drew attention to a serious flaw in current left debates, which fail to distinguish between development within the framework of capitalism and socialist revolution. They deny any progress of the former because of the absence of the latter, which only results in a utopian conception of socialism.⁶

⁶Nicola Swainson, op.cit.: 286.
The review of approaches to development in theory and praxis for Africa here suggests that the movement might have been taken to an opposite extreme: the result being support for "a utopian conception of capitalism."

It is apparent that development studies has fallen into a trap in the social sciences of fetishizing "great moments" in history. Traditions across all forms of scholarship privilege the notions that the Industrial Revolution demonstrated the availability of a unilinear path of industrial capitalist development to all societies across the globe, and that the French Revolution similarly confirmed that progressive bourgeoisies would spring forth to lead this process. Development theories in the heyday of the modernization paradigm were roundly criticized for their oblique readiness to prescribe linear, stage-driven recipes. Having congratulated itself for overcoming this, development studies moved on. However, it seems to have done so without seriously challenging the conceptual apparatus of necessary and universal stages in history from feudalism to capitalism to socialism, and from agrarian backwardness to industrial modernity.\(^7\) To overuse a word, it remains ethnocentric.

It has also become apparent that these tendencies do not stop at the level of theoretical discourse—they are intimately linked with analysis of praxis and major policy frameworks, if not the level of development practice:

\(^7\)Witness Sender and Smith's (1986) concluding comparison of the African "capitalist development" experience to that of early modern Europe.
In retrospect, it is apparent that the debate over the Berg Report and subsequent Bank statements on structural adjustment, although couched in terms of policy alternatives, is a continuation of the debate over appropriate development theory. On the one hand, the Bank believes that market-oriented, private sector led strategies are capable of generating sustained economic progress in Africa, free from the kind of chronic imbalances which have characterised recent experience. Marxist theorists of the classical, or Warrenite school, share this optimism and interpret post-Independence economic policies in Africa as being detrimental to the development of the forces of production and to the emergence, ultimately, of a revolutionary proletariat.⁸

The central argument of this thesis has been that the theory and praxis of development in sub-Saharan Africa has failed to provide an adequate basis for both a study of the problematique of development and for finding a concrete way out of the current empirical crisis. Development thinking is ridden with orthodoxies that needlessly hinder analysis of the problem, and alternatives that fail to present a reasonable challenge. To turn around this situation, development research must work towards rediscovering and reinventing old approaches and modes that may have been hastily discarded as well as to push forward in newly emerging directions.

New syntheses of development theory should therefore include a renewed sense of heterodoxy in their approaches; an interdisciplinarity in their modes of analysis to include more sophisticated blends of race, class, gender and ecology beyond development economics, including valuable contributions from

⁸Campbell and Loxley, op.cit.: 2-3.
anthropologists and historians overlooked in development studies; a continuous search for new formations (such as cooperatives or informal sectors); an attempt to connect the macro level of structure and system with the micro level of social relations; and a bridging of the gap between modes of production and ideology or consciousness.

Western conceptions of development must blend idiosyncratic indigenous notions and beliefs. Questions of development must consider dilemmas of structure versus agency, and of levels of analysis. The barriers between paradigms must be traversed, but not at the expense of reaching a spurious consensus. And the value-laden nature of social science theorizing must be acknowledged if the questions of development are to be answered in a way that will overcome both positivism and empiricism in development theory and praxis.

\*In the greatest reach: a transcendence of the disciplines.
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