Interpreting the Impasse in Radical Development Theory: A Postmodern Intervention

© Denis Wall

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"There is no single history, only images of the past projected from different points of view."
--Gianni Vattimo, 1992

"The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not."
--Richard Rorty, 1989

"If the Other has no form, the One ceases to exist?"
--Olu Oguibe, 1993

"The social and political sciences [are] the west's confession booths. Sociology [is] an elaborate excuse, the obvious clothed in the esoteric, the injustice sweetened by science."
--Ian Walker, 1987

"Development will not be forgotten. We now know that it is not easy. We know that it is not fast. We know that it first makes poverty more visible and harder to accept....We know that it means hard work rather than foreign aid. We know that there is no formula and no one policy that can be guaranteed to work. We know that its foundations are education and competence rather than capital investment. It's not a 'sure thing' but risky. It cannot be provided; it must be achieved. But the successes of the last forty years show that it can be achieved."
--Peter Drucker, 1989

"Development theory cannot go 'ahead' and it cannot go 'backwards'. It is stuck."
--Robert A. Packenham, 1992
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I also owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to my wife Eveline who continues to support and encourage me in my studies, especially during this past summer when this thesis was written. This study is for her.
The modernist dream of a grand or master narrative is a now dead project, the recognition of the futility and oppression of such a project is the postmodern condition. This thesis suggests that while postmodernism expresses a desire to do away with privileged forms of representation it also indicates the formation of a new global reality. A critical appraisal of the impasse in radical development theory is given as a means by which to substantiate this claim. Drawing on themes relevant to postmodernism, this thesis contends that contrary to the recent trends in development theory, radical development has not transcended its self-imposed limitations in so far as it has neglected to problematise the domains of the discourse in which it is situated. The system currently in place produces not only the need for development but the very conditions making a critique of development possible. Thus postmodernism does not call for a 'better' way of doing development, not even for 'another' development but rather questions the privileged position through which these critiques are able to take place.

August 18, 1994
Denis Wall
Chapter 1: Framing the Question

Introduction

The impasse debate in radical development theory has not yet been settled. Although there has been no shortage of recommendations and strategies regarding how the stalemate may successfully be resolved (Kiely, 1994; Zhao & Hall, 1994; Carew, 1993; Moorse 1991; Lubeck, 1992; Lehmann, 1990; Vandergeest and Buttel, 1988; Mouzilis, 1988), and despite evidence that the impasse is on the verge of being transcended (Schuurman, 1993), radical development studies continues to remain in a state of crisis (Escobar, 1992b; DuBois, 1991).

Yet, insofar as a perceived impasse continues to exist, it is important not to underrate the significance of David Booth's (1985) original conceptualisation of the impasse in radical development, nor to deny outright the more recent efforts and attempts to navigate around it (Corbridge, 1990). However, while Booth and Corbridge have offered valuable insights as to the nature of the problem in radical development studies and have created a space for the inclusion of new 'post-impasse' approaches, they have neglected to problematise the discourse from which their critiques emanate (Ferguson, 1990).

This study contends that interpretations and explanations about the nature of the impasse in radical development theory have, to date, not taken into account the privileged position they occupy within the dominant discursive imaginary. By remaining firmly embedded in the discourse which regards the necessity of the concept development as preeminent to theorising about it, means that the impasse will continue to remain a formidable barrier in radical development theory but also, and perhaps more importantly, that the quest for
alternatives to development will continue to be eclipsed by the search for new
directions in development.

The aim and purpose of this chapter is to elaborate more extensively on
the constitution of this problem as well as to introduce the conceptual apparatus
that will be used to further explore this issue in the chapters that follow. After an
abbreviated discussion of the problem and its relevance to succeeding
chapters, are several sections outlining the scope of this study as a whole.
These sections attempt to situate the problem in radical development theory
within more recent theoretical perspectives in the social sciences. Specifically,
this chapter seeks to establish a point of entry which makes possible a
postmodern intervention to the impasse question in radical development
studies. In doing so, it hopes to contribute to the vitality of debate within radical
development studies through the inclusion of alternative perspectives. This
study also emphasises the need to destabilise the privileged space that
development continues to occupy in mainstream development discourse.
Problematising development in terms of the discourse within which it functions
and is situated means, essentially, to question the central values and core
assumptions which govern how development can be thought about. Raising
these issues can at least help to make radical development studies aware of its
limited ability to transcend an impasse which it has itself helped to construct.

The initial problematic which Booth posed continues to generate a
great deal of attention and discussion in radical development theory today and
remains as a pivotal reference point by which to enter this debate. While
Booth's account of the impasse was clearly characterised by its sustained
critique of radical development theories and approaches by pointing out the
reasons for their failure and decline in popularity (Booth, 1985; Corbridge,
1990), it in no way suggested that these particular views of global (under)development should to be discarded entirely. Indeed, the programmatic point was to encourage students of radical development to take a second look at the critical concepts radical development theory offered and begin to place a greater awareness and emphasis on those aspects which spoke about bringing real and lasting socioeconomic change as opposed to merely trying to explain why certain types of change were essential and necessary.

The strategy of impasse thinking continues to be involved with trying to re-invigorate radical development theory through the implementation of a more meaningful criteria of praxis (unity of theory and practice) such that the critical elements of Marxism can still remain relevant both within the context of problems posed by the advent of a 'new' world order and the means through which this condition can more sensibly and accurately be understood.

The notion that radical development theory was in need of re-alignment and that this could be achieved by following a set of recommended procedural guidelines has only intensified. Instead of becoming solidified and rather than creating unanimous approval, this debate has opened radical development to the possibility of including additional sets of previously unasked questions about the meaning of development itself. Hence, where the literature was once narrowly focussed according to a specific theme, and the transcendence of the impasse thought to be immanent, radical development theory has instead continued to recede further into the impasse as new obstacles are presented that challenge even the very foundational basis upon which it was originally constructed.

The original impasse in development theory, or what in chapter three of this study is ironically referred to as the 'official story,' was specifically
concerned with questioning the appropriateness and continued explanatory potential of a number of new Marxist-influenced approaches in the sociology of development. Although certainly not without problems of its own, this initial theoretical formulation of the impasse came to be regarded as an important concession—if not an outright admittance—that neo-Marxist approaches in development studies needed to undergo some form of critical self-evaluation if the explanatory appeal and potential of these approaches was to have a continued relevancy in the future. Once the acceptance of this initial formulation of the impasse was acknowledged and began to circulate within a relatively broad stratum of development thinking, it did not take long for it to catch the attention of and be incorporated into a wide variety of viewpoints and positions.

Most interestingly, perhaps, is the turn which the impasse has recently taken, one which continues to problematise not only the limitations of neo-Marxist accounts in new ways but brings into this discussion issues and questions which were formally relegated/privileged to the realm of literary theory and various philosophical discourses now associated with postmodernism. The emergence of postmodernism as a consciously informed perspective, and the variety of analytical perspectives it offers to the social sciences in general and to theories of the impasse in particular—the focus of chapter two—are fundamentally altering the ways in which the impasse has until now been conceptualised and defined. In short, the questions which postmodernism poses and the position from which it attempts to do so, not only forces a renegotiation of the impasse itself, but also raises questions about the inherent meaning of the concept development and the category of the Third World to which it is inextricably tied. Postmodernist informed perspectives open up new vistas for theorising the content and nature of the impasse.
Furthermore, these perspectives can also add important insights to how the concept development, and by extension the concept Third World, can be reconsidered in new and interesting ways.

In addition to exploring and describing the potential attributes of postmodernism for further understanding the constitution and construction of the impasse, is the need to examine the wide-ranging impact postmodernism is having in the social sciences. The influence of postmodernism in the social sciences can, in turn, be extended towards alternative ways of thinking about traditional subject matters such as development. Specifically, in order for postmodern social theory to be applicable to development studies it must somehow demonstrate its capacity to be of relevance to Third World contexts. In other words, rather than simply be regarded as the idle pursuit of Western academics—which it no longer seems to be—we need to explore the critical and even political potential postmodernism can offer to citizens of the Third World.

1.1: Problem Statement

This study is guided by the understanding that postmodernism has not been systematically and explicitly applied to Third World contexts nor, on the other hand, has radical development theory examined the possibility of employing, or at least adding, postmodern perspectives to its programme. This

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1 This point is considered crucial for postmodernism. If it is to escape its own eurocentric bias it must not seek to represent itself as a totality of meaning with an original point of reference but must also show how its own meaning is inherently a decentered one, especially where it confronts and comes into contact with cultural systems which do not necessarily claim to have the same experience with modernity as does the West. Michael Rosenthal writes with a similar attitude where he states "if postmodern theory's major weakness was its inability to register experience outside a privileged and largely white milieu, its insights [must] be...usefully developed by thinkers in the developing world, who have their own take on the legacy of modernity..." (1992:105).

2 This statement concurs with David Slater when he writes "although there have been some recent hints of possible connections with the...post-modern literatures, in the main these readings of development and its conceptualisation have largely remained outside those other analytical domains. On the other hand, the most well-known exponents of post-modern interpretations...have tended to remain rather silent on Third World development" (1992:283).
lack of attention is somewhat surprising given the current and increasing popularity of postmodernism within the social sciences. At the same time, judgment should not be imposed too quickly since the concept postmodernism is a relatively recent phenomenon in North American academic discourse, particularly the social sciences, and in any case seems still to be regarded by many of its detractors as only a momentary distraction—as though longevity is proof of relevancy.3

Despite such unwarranted allegations, postmodernist thinking is causing major upheavals and shifts within what were once considered the stalwart foundations of Western knowledge. It is forcing the entire Enlightenment tradition to reconsider the structure and content of its privileged forms of scientific discourse.4 The intrusive entry of postmodernism into the social

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3 There are signs that postmodern discourses, as their variety increases, are becoming subsumed under the heading ‘Cultural Studies’ or ‘Multicultural Studies.’ For a good indication of the former see Fred Inglis (1993), while in the case of the latter see the recent statement by Chicago Cultural Studies Group (1992). Stefan Collins (1994) recently described cultural studies “as a function of disciplinary decomposition and reformation” (3). By this he means that “cultural studies looks at the alleged remoteness and narrowness of traditional university curricula and says ‘Get real.’ The ensemble of texts, objects and activities that had, at least since the first part of the nineteenth century, been picked out by the term ‘culture’ should rather...be seen as tastes of a dominant class at a historical moment” (4). The dominant class here is taken to mean while males who not only wrote and told what they believed were representative stories of all “mankind” but also devised the means by which such knowledge was acquired and distributed. Cultural studies, according to Norman K. Denzin, “examine three interrelated problems: the production of cultural meanings, the textual analysis of these meanings, and the study of lived cultures and lived experiences and their connections to these worlds of representation” (1990: 146). For selected readings see Simon During’s (1993) recent edited collection.

4 Statements such as these need clarification and will receive more attention in the following chapter. As a starting point, however the following must suffice: Postmodernism can generally be regarded “as a legitimate reaction to the monotony of universal modernism’s vision of the world. Generally perceived as positivistic, technocentric, and rationalistic, universal modernism has been identified with the belief in linear progress, absolute truths, the rational planning of ideal social orders, and the standardisation of knowledge and production. Postmodernism, by way of contrast, privileges heterogeneity and difference as liberative forces in the redefinition of cultural discourse. Fragmentation, indeterminacy, and intense distrust of all universal or totalising discourses are the hallmark of postmodernist thought” (Harvey, 1999: 8-9). The reference to “discourse” will also gain more specificity in later chapters. Nonetheless, the term is often
sciences, including sociology, has been met, understandably, with ambiguity and confusion. Here too, postmodernism antagonises "those discourses which set out to address a transcendental subject, to define an essential human nature, to prescribe a global human destiny or, to proscribe collective human goals" (Hebdige, 1988: 186). Specifically, it rejects the conceptualisations that have often been attributed to Hegelianism and Marxism (philosophies of historical development and linearity); ones such as 'disinterested reason,' 'scientific Marxism,' 'objective' statistics, 'neutral' description, 'sympathetic' ethnography or 'reflexive' ethnomethodology, and their accompanying abstractions like 'society,' 'class,' 'mass,' etc. Furthermore, it contests the viability of researcher reference points such as 'value-freedom'--the attempt to exclude value-words and value-judgements from the discussion of human and social affairs.\(^5\)

While the general currency of postmodernism in sociology cannot be denied (Smart, 1993; Doherty et al., 1992; Rosenau, 1992; Bauman, 1991), its applicability--in various creative endeavours--to many strata within its traditional boundaries is still being negotiated. This, however, can be circumvented if, as John W. Murphey correctly states, "sociologists may initially find the terms adopted by postmodernists to be risque and their ideas odd [but] with a little patience...social scientists can benefit immensely from the work conducted by postmodernists in other fields, particularly literary theory" (1988: characterised as a "means through which domination takes place. The dominated collaborate with the dominators when they take for granted their discourse and their definition of the situation" (Gitlin, 1989: 106).

\(^5\) Here the social scientist, through the procedure of carrying out research, attempts to separate moral and political value-judgements about the people in his/her field of study from his/her own. The aim is to minimise possibilities of disagreement by eliminating from scientific work controversial and disputable matter. This reflects a methodological attempt to stay within the realms of a well-established scientific method--a body of assertions that can be established objectively as true or reasonable.

9
In the same way, postmodern informed discourses on development, some of which are now being constructed within the bounds of the impasse debate, can be beneficial in helping to at least explain the nature of the impasse to the widening field of development discourse in general.

Development, as both a social phenomenon and relative new-comer to the discipline of sociology, is receiving sustained attention from a variety of associated interest areas that have been designated (but not exclusively) as development related themes. David Hulme and Mark M. Turner describe this field as having come about with the completion of the Second World War and the advent of what today is still—albeit increasingly problematic—considered as the Third World; that is, the regions identified as Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the South Pacific. These authors note that where development, read progress, first “focused on economic growth and the replication of the economic, social and political orders found in the Western industrial nations”, it quickly changed its emphasis as it became apparent “that the developing countries were not modernising as anticipated” (1990: 5). This quick shift in thinking was replaced by what was then believed to be a less problematic set of concerns. Redefinitions of development began to focus on progress as a form of welfare, including the provision of basic needs, employment, the reduction of inequality, personal security and civil rights inter alia. Today, even these meanings of development are held as highly suspect, especially by postmodernism which considers such concepts as engineered by (well-meaning?) Western social scientists operating under their own systems of domination and with their own interests at hand.

The impasse literature which has, in the main, associated itself with the
sociology of radical development has not considered its position in relation to some of the most beneficial aspects of postmodernism. And although the concept development and the ways in which it is represented in sociological accounts of the Third World is increasingly being questioned, recourse to postmodern perspectives on how such representations are conducted has, surprisingly, not been the centre of sustained attention or even criticism. However, this is not to say that postmodernism has had no effect on development. Indeed, development as a continuing process towards achieving some form of equality is very much part of the postmodern condition: Globalisation, the 'new' world order and 'late' capitalism are increasingly being employed as concepts to identify and situate development in a new global era. However, there is a difference between 'postmodernism as condition' and 'postmodernism as 'critical practice.' These differences are explored and elaborated upon in greater detail in the next chapter.

One of the few attempts--to make a brief aside--to utilise the problematics of discourse posed by postmodernism and its relationship to development, are feminist oriented discourses. Encouraging attempts by postmodern feminists (Mohanty et al, 1991; Minh-ha, 1989; Alcoff, 1991-92; Parpart, 1993; Radcliffe and Westwood, 1993, to mention only a few)6 to question the agenda of both liberal and radical feminists have recently begun to direct sustained attention

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6 This list certainly does not exhaust the list of feminist writing on postmodernism/feminism in the Third World. Interesting and invigorating conceptualisations of familiar categories such as those of WID, WAD, and GAD are popular starting points. Furthermore, the increasing number of feminist oriented participants attracted to postmodernism, both in the First World as well as the Third World, attests to the growing popularity of this form of analysis and criticism. Most postmodern feminists are united in their agreement regarding what they believe are misrepresented images of women in the Third World by those feminists who not only continue to employ a Western informed standard of knowledge but also those who seek to collapse the category 'woman' into a common denominator. As such, postmodern feminists, in their attempts to come to terms with the nature of exploitation toward women in general, are concerned at the same time with maintaining existing categories of difference and with accepting that "Third World women [are] persons with their own history, practice and achievements..." (Parpart, 1993: 456).
towards ways in which women on the ‘margins’ have been both (mis)represented—while remaining voiceless—and excluded from participating in the discourse which directly involves them. Those who associate themselves with this line of thinking are also attempting to discern how ‘woman’ as a group can still maintain a sense of cohesiveness and solidarity in relation to patriarchal oppression and reproductive subjugation (realising that these types of exploitation do not occur the same way universally).

For instance, Rosemary Hennessy (1993) is involved with the issue of how “over the past twenty years, the voices of women who have found themselves outside the boundaries of that mainstream—women of color, lesbians, working-class, and ‘third-world’ women—have pressured feminism to question the adequacy of a generic ‘woman’ and a gender-centred feminist inquiry” (xii). Her project involves showing that this category is a discursively constructed one and how it can escape the trap of considering its own assumptions as totality; where Western knowledge is inscribed as the basis of an emancipatory agenda for everywhere else. In short, she wants to bring into feminist discourse a materialist based politics—what she calls the “politics of discourse”—which can speak to woman everywhere without at the same time taking away their differences.

Using a ‘standpoint’ approach, Hennessy argues that the authority for a stance such as feminism, which is engaged in reconstructing the category of the subject, need not be purely epistemological (a criticism often made of poststructural informed analysis) but can also be political in its understanding of knowledge as ideology. That is, instead of organising around group identities, this new dis-identifying subject of feminism will be engaged in exposing the historical and ideological processes that have constructed the difference upon
which group identities depend. As Hennessy figures it, this will finally allow feminism to break out of its epistemological impasse and towards a critique of the effects of gender oppression, thereby giving it a political component.

This, in part, also informs the problem here. Where Hennessy, and others with analogous interests are concerned with "what gets to count as 'reality' through the assumptions [materialist feminism] valorizes and the subjects it produces" (Hennessy, 1993: xiii), the discourse of development, in similar fashion, addresses how a reformulation of the concept development might also lead to other, less privileged understandings of the reality it currently occupies. This can take place through an exposition of the powerful processes that have constructed the dominant imaginary of development. Such a discourse would be in agreement with the notion that dominant theories of development and the reality they define, have reached an epistemological impasse, but further asks to what extent it is possible to imagine a different domain which both leaves behind the imaginary of development as an attainable end (a static condition) and which eclipses radical development's dependence on Western modernity and historicity. Directly related to this question are others: Why has radical critique such as neo-Marxism but also alternative development not had more success with displacing the current imaginary of development? What kinds of critical thought and social practice might lead to thinking about Third World realities differently? Can the hegemonic, epistemological space of development--inscribed in multiple forms of knowledge, political technologies, and social relations--be significantly modified?*

*These questions require a certain 'critical' way of thinking, that is "to learn to what extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently" (Foucault 1985: 8). As such, these questions do not merely judge the adequacy of certain practices or forms of development but place more emphasis on the origin of certain ways
1.2: Purpose Statement

The intent and purpose of this study can be stated as such: It will attempt to find a common ground around which theories of the impasse in radical development studies are currently situated. This study will explore the possibility that current thinking about this particular impasse has not evolved far beyond its initial discursive formulation. Despite recent additions to the literature, the content generally tends to concentrate on familiar themes and issues; ones which elaborate on the initial formulation of the impasse or simply reconceptualise it in order to add other misgivings about the original agenda and scope of radical development theory. At the same time, and from a more encouraging standpoint, is the awareness that radical development theory is in a period of malaise. This is beneficial since it will force the field to critically confront the inconsistencies of its most cherished beliefs. In so doing, it becomes possible to revitalise radical development theory such that it can gain a renewed relevancy within existing global conditions and the alternative ways required to imagine it. However, as this study will show, this can take place only by spending less time on proving its credibility and (through a discredibility of long-standing orthodox approaches) and more time on showing how dominant approaches to development are maintaining existing power structures.\(^8\)

While there is some sense that the radical development paradigm--despite the near-collapse of its entire project owing, in part, to the hegemonic of thinking about such issues and how this has resulted in certain conceptualisations of development to be privileged over and above others. In a related but general sense they also deal with the discursive structures upon which Western modes of scientific reason are structured. As such, the ‘imaginary of development’ is taken to mean the “underlying grammar [of] North American hegemony over the imaginary of a great part of humanity” (Brunner, 1993: 41). That is, modernity has structured our capacity to think and reason according to a specific logic such that it becomes impossible to think otherwise.

\(^8\) Tariq Banuri, in looking at the ways in which main strands of development theory--development economics, political development, social modernisation, dependency and world systems, and non-dependency Marxists--have challenged the project of modernity (i.e. modernisation
power of capital—continues to hold a certain explanatory potential, it is not
certain to what extent it can be incorporated into a discourse which "refuses the
certainty of absolutes" (Foucault, 1986: 87), "opposes itself to the search for
origins", and rejects any notion of teleology (Ibid: 77). One reason for this
skepticism, which this study addresses, are efforts involving the continuance of
radical development (based on a similar epistemological grounding—as
informed by the paradigm in which it resides—more so than maintaining the
reasons for 'underdevelopment') as expressed by its desire to move beyond the
impasse. The allusion of course has to do with transcending the impasse;
through a process of either ignoring the problems it posed (because there
seems to be no foreseeable way of navigating around the impasse while
keeping intact the original framework of radical theory) and simply carrying on
as before—which many have continued to do anyway—or, on the other hand
(and more interestingly) creating an alternative, critical component to radical
theory without however problematising the traditional ontological assumptions
and forms of scientific reasoning on which it continues to be based.

This study accepts the idea that radical development theory—a unified
"system of concepts that helps explain the causal-consequential relations within
and among social phenomena and the laws/tendencies that govern their
quantitative and qualitative development and decline" (Amirahmadi, 1989:
167)—is at an impasse and even argues that moving beyond the impasse can
be beneficial. This study, however, differs from conventional post-impasse

specifically), states that the impasse in development "is significant because it is helping to bring
together a number of disparate criticisms of a process which had largely been accepted until
recently" (1990: 74). These critiques of modernisation, however, do not constitute any radical
dismissal of its main metatheoretical prospects, especially where development constitutes a set of
end states, towards which humanity either aspires on their own initiative or as the inevitable end
point of historical processes. In other words, these internal/external critiques of modernisation do
not challenge the notion that development must be attained (they all support the implications of
this concept) but rather disagree as to the best way of achieving a developed condition.
theorising in radical development through a questioning of the following assumptions: First, how this transition is to be made; second, the theoretical features which will consequently serve to identify and characterise post-impasse theorising; and third, its continued desire to objectively represent the nature of social change. On a different but related level, is the failure of impasse thinking, either in its formative state or in its present fragmented state, to acknowledge the theoretical turn that postmodernism has been responsible in initiating.

The claim being made here can then be stated as such: Radical development theory, as a mode of inquiry that came into being in the post-World War II global order, is at an impasse because it fails to problematise the discourse on which it is grounded. While many currently working with development related topics consider development to be at an impasse if not in a state of crisis, and that in many instances it has failed miserably, few viable alternative conceptualisations and designs for change are offered in its place. One particular reason for this, which is the central component of this study, is that radical development theory, with which the impasse debate is wholly concerned has, in a steadfast and singular fashion, sought to formulate 'new' and 'better' forms of development without also considering how this project may in itself lead to other forms of oppression and domination. Furthermore, while the impasse debate criticises radical development theory for taking this approach in addition to problematising other aspects of it, the impasse debate does not adequately address the issue of why such meanings of development have remained so predominant in our thinking and vocabulary. Just as importantly, it has not asked how these meanings came to be
constructed in the first place. The implicit acceptance of the concept development as it currently stands by those theorising the nature of the impasse is then a major reason as to why this impasse exists and why it will continue to do so despite current efforts to transcend it or navigate around it. The need to challenge certain forms of development, is here, of course, regarded as a worthy enterprise. However, doing so without also at the same time noting how this enterprise has constructed certain powerful meanings and images of the Third World is regarded as deeply problematic. The impasse literature, despite its critical edge, carries on with such a construction through its acceptance that change and progress, as defined by the Western liberal tradition in development discourses, are in some ways necessary components of development. Yet despite the recognition of this problem, radical development theory--like Western discourse--continues to regard the project of creating a world free of contradictions as its basic theoretical goal.

1.3: Approach

The concerns and issues introduced and presented above will be situated within the loose framework of postmodernism. The term postmodernism, as the next chapter will explore, encompasses a wide range of disparate assumptions and beliefs concerning both the general epochal condition of the contemporary global problematique and the prevailing modes

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9 David Williams (1993) even goes so far as to suggest that "[radical] development discourse reflects an underlying liberal discourse, with its language and concepts and with its attendant tensions and problems, particularly that between the right and the good, and the related problem of constructing a conception of the good towards which societies in the Third World should be moving, and a seeming unwillingness to sanction the imposition of this good, or at least an unwillingness to be seen to be sanctioning its imposition" (420-421).

10 The problems and statements posed here are also ones which presently concern Arturo Escobar (Associate Professor of Anthropology at Smith College, Northampton, Mass). Many of his insights, especially the concept 'imaginary', are of great importance to this study. They will be acknowledge whenever possible. For initial thinking on the problem posed here, see Escobar (1992a; 1992b, especially pp. 21-22; 1992c).
of expression that continue to serve to identify this condition—its privileged constructions and understandings of reality. These two presentations of postmodernism—as an identifying trademark of the present historical condition engendered, to a great extent, by the qualities of late capitalist culture, and as a poststructural critique of the claim that scientific knowledge is universal—will serve as the focal point of this study. While this view of postmodernism is obviously wide-ranging and somewhat nebulous, it nevertheless gives an indication of the diversity and range of subject material with and to which it can be identified and linked. This speaks not only for how it views certain phenomenon but also, importantly, in the ways they are presented.

How we are expected to write affects what we can write about. The referencing system in sociology (and most of the other social sciences) discourages the use of footnotes, a place for secondary arguments, novel conjectures, and related ideas. Knowledge is constituted as 'focused,' 'problem' (hypothesis) centred, 'linear,' and straightforward. Other 'thoughts' are 'extraneous.'...Each of these conventions favors—creates and sustains—a particular vision of what constitutes sociological knowledge. The conventions hold tremendous material and symbolic power over sociological writers [emphasis included] (Richardson, 1990: 120-21).

The approach here will focus on how postmodern perspectives on discourse can lead to a renegotiation of the impasse. The result will be a reading of the impasse as informed from a variety of different levels, positions, and standpoints, with the hope of showing how the content of the impasse—the concept development—can be decentred and loosened from its current

11 More specifically, the concern here is two-fold: One has do with ways of being in the world ('postmodernism as condition') and the other with how we think about the world ('postmodernism as critical practice'). Postmodernism is a contemporary sensibility, developing since World War II, that privileges no single authority, method, or paradigm. According to 'postmodernism as critical practice' (poststructuralism), language is an unstable system of referents, thereby making it impossible ever to capture completely the meaning of an action, text, or intention (Howard, 1994).
imaginary. Such an approach, operating under the guise of what is commonly referred to as discourse analysis, is required in order to inform ongoing critical thinking on development of its misguided quest for a unified social scientific paradigm.

A treatment of the impasse literature as discourse will show that the impasse is not simply a momentary distraction (a hurdle that can be overcome by following certain procedures and proscriptions) but rather that it is representative of a more pervasive and fundamental shift in Western ways of thinking. This type of a totalising, logocentric project undermines the possibility that local, personal, and community derived narratives exist which sometimes run counter to established and 'official' discourses. These mini-narratives are ignored by the much more powerful mainstream and enfranchised forms of 'thinking in totality'--progress, modernisation, development--and therefore, severely limits its capacity to accept and even imagine alternative conceptualisations to these processes. The ways in which such concepts are represented and the goals with which they are associated is regarded by postmodernism as illusory, as the products of a fallacious structural logic. Discourse analysis, then "focuses less on material reality than on representations of that reality" (Portes and Kincaid, 1989: 485).

The 'official' impasse will be characterised as pursuing the following sort of agenda: "the search for a fixed, final, and singular unity of meaning, an

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12 In a more illustrative sense, 'discourse' is recognised by its attempt to bring the margins into the centre while simultaneously recognising and holding separate notions of difference. Employing the concept discourse in this manner means to be involved with what Oguibe (1993) calls "counter-centrist discourse". His concern is that "while counter-centrist discourse has a responsibility to explore and expose these structures [of domination], there is an element of concessionism in tethering all discourses to the role and place of the outside. To counter perpetually a centre is to recognise it...discourse--our discourse--should begin to move in the direction of dismissing, at least in discursive terms, the concept of centre, not by moving it, but in superseding it" (4).
identity, transcending and unifying spatial and temporal differences--as if all history were authored by a single voice occupying a uniquely valid vantage point" (Ashley, 1987: 408). This goal—the construction of a social reality that emphasises only certain social processes and privileges specific groups and social agendas—which has informed development discourse to date, and which the impasse seeks to continue—is here considered as a misguided strategy by which individuals and groups promote their own interests, pursue a social agenda, or struggle for power at the expense of those it supposedly benefits.

Development, as a metatheory, has become a central point of reference and cannot be considered without also implying 'change,' 'progress,' 'evolution' and 'growth'. Metatheories are regarded as problematic in this study because, above all else, they try to articulate a general theory both about the nature of the impasse as well as attempting to conjecture what type of grand theory will finally allow this impasse to be transcended. A common problem which 'discourse' attempts to address is—to concur with one strand of poststructuralist thought (Michel Foucault)—how discourse is involved in power; where power is seen as a relation, where "[i]t inheres in difference and is a dynamic of control and lack of control between discourses and the subjects constituted by discourses, who are their agents. Power is exercised within discourses in the ways in which they constitute and govern individual subjects" (Weedon, 1987: 113). Indeed, discourses are produced within a real world of power struggle: "discourse is a violence we do to things. Claims to objectivity made on behalf of specific discourses are always spurious: there are no absolutely 'true' discourses, only more or less powerful ones" (Seldon and Widdowson, 1993: 161).

As such, discourse is more than a galaxy of texts (some theories of textuality ignore the fact that discourse is involved in power) in that political and
economic forces, but also ideological and social control, cannot be reduced only to aspects of representation.\textsuperscript{13} The assumption here is that real power is exercised through discourse, and that this power has real political effects. Power is reflected in the ways through which the concept development is represented and, hence, calls for engaging "more forcefully...the very idea of development, with the word itself, and especially with the illusory hopes it engenders. Discourse-analytic studies inspired by Michel Foucault "are beginning to show, without doubt, that 'development' is a term and a set of practices through which core experts and professionals reproduce and extend core power" (Goldfrank, 1990: 254). This type of discourse analysis stresses 'resistance,' 'criticism,' 'opposition' and brings to postmodernism a form of materialist intervention since it is not solely based on a textual theory of difference but one that is also social and historical. In this way 'postmodernism a critical practice' does not abandon the undecidability or contingency of the social altogether; rather, the undecidability of history is understood as related to class struggle, the institutionalisation of asymmetrical relations of power and privilege, and the way historical accounts are contested by different groups (Rosenau, 1993).

Summary

The impasse debate, if nothing else, has recognised and acknowledged the exhaustion of the once hegemonic narratives of development and their

\textsuperscript{13} The reference here is to what some consider as the conservative element of postmodernism or its lack of a politicising component. Such an approach to social theory is decidedly limited in its ability to transform oppressive social and political regimes of power. This type of postmodernism generally occupies itself with a reality that is constituted by the continual "playfulness" of the signifier (representor) and the heterogeneity of differences. As such, this type of postmodernism constitutes a moment of self-reflexivity, asserting that meaning itself is self-divided and undecidable. As a mode of critique, it rests its case on interrogating specific and local enunciations of oppression, but often fails to analyse such enunciations in relation to larger dominating structures of oppression. See Kincheloe and McLaren (1994).
promised forms of liberation from inequality and inequity. This has made room, in various regions throughout the Third World as well as in the First World for the emergence of a new counter-centrist discourse indebted to the postmodern celebration of detotalisation, radical pluralism, and the local; a discourse better able to represent the multiplicity of practices of resistance within these areas.

Furthermore, the impasse in development discourse has created space for alternative and unconventional forms of development discourse to take place. The crisis in social theory, of which the impasse is but one small (yet typical) example, has given opportunity and even necessitated alternative modes of theorising.

The most recent revelation of this crisis is what the "voices" of postmodernity are seeking to exploit. The crisis or its conditions, are the result of two arrogant assumptions that derive from the varieties of positivism...That sociology should necessarily be a science and the claim that sociology could prescribe the conditions for and the ultimate nature of a new society" (Jencks, 1993: 131).

The weakened condition of the holders of this once privileged arena of discourse can be beneficial for marginal--commonly perceived as such--forms of analyses which do not have as their outlook an all-encompassing and hegemonic frame of reference; especially where this means tolerance and acceptance of alternative and local modes of inquiry.

This newly created space provides, first of all, an appropriate place from which to begin an analysis of the sort of contributions postmodern critiques can make towards criticising both the substance as well as the objectives of the impasse discourse. Secondly, it has also permitted attention to be shifted away from this dilemma and towards an exploration of other and less exclusive representations of development.
Chapter 2: Postmodern Perspectives: Situating the Impasse

Introduction

This chapter identifies and outlines two distinguishing features of postmodernism: as 'condition' and as 'critical practice.' 'Postmodernism as condition' describes the present historical period and concerns itself mainly with examining the dramatic changes and shifts that have occurred around the globe since World War II. More precisely, 'postmodernism as condition' refers to an unprecedented level of (re)organisation and (dis)order in the economic and sociopolitical realms. The main lines of debate, from the perspective of global 'condition,' appear to be centred around questions concerned with either homogeneity/uniformity or, conversely, heterogeneity/diversity (Appadurai, 1990: 5): Should the apparent hegemony of capitalist development around the globe be regarded as bringing the world closer together (i.e. the 'global village') or pulling it further apart (i.e. the creation of a 'fourth world')? The paradoxical nature of this question suggests a neat division between what appear to be two opposing viewpoints. On the one hand there exists the belief that the 'new (postmodern) times' of the post-World War II era are global times in the sense that human activities are now organised crucially on a world-wide scale. On the other hand there exists the contention that the 'global' is not so global as it seems. A third or middle-range position suggests that “globalization would seem to be as much about exclusion as inclusion” (Taylor, 1994: 365).

1 The appearance of a Fourth World within the Third World gives the impression that capitalist expansion is ignoring or forgetting those areas and regions which provide little or no space for the development and spread of a market-based economy. Included in this group are most of Africa, the non-oil producers of the Middle East and most of Latin America. These areas lack the crucial aspects capital requires in order to flourish and reproduce: natural resources, a skilled and organised labour force, and high rates of consumption. In essence, these areas are excluded from the workings of the world-capitalist system because they do not meet the required criteria for inclusion. They are simply reduced to a level of irrelevancy. For further discussion on this perspective see Castells (1993).
Regardless of the viewpoint adopted, 'postmodernism as condition' reflects a continued desire to see to fruition the, as of yet, uncompleted project of modernity. As such, this view of postmodernism presents itself as merely the current 'cultural dominant' (Jameson, 1984) or 'regime of signification' (Lash, 1990) of the 'late capitalist' period but not as a significant break from modernity. It simply represents a late and extended phase of modernity which is still comprehensible under modernity's terms (Dirlik, 1994).

'Postmodernism as critical practice' involves a confrontation with traditional ways of theorising, especially their uncritical attachment to conventional (modern) discursive practices. Here, postmodernism is concerned with rethinking our relations with the material world by doing away with, as much as possible, those metatheoretical (universal) themes (reason, truth, progress) that have mainly served to cover up the lack of a legitimate connection between the claims of modernity and the evolution of Western civilisation. Where modernity entered history in the eighteenth century as a progressive and enlightened force promising to liberate mankind from ignorance and irrationality, it has instead subjugated and dominated mankind in new and unprecedented ways: pollution, wars of mass destruction, poverty, genocide, famine, etc. Of great importance here is how Western science has been implicated in this process. The way it has been practised and the assumptions on which it has been based, plays an important role in the way we think and act, and in the way modern societies function (Braidotti et al.: 1994).

2 In the opinion of Charles Jencks (1991) "the main political reason for the shift to a post-modern world is the extraordinary growth in supranational organisation since the second world war" (17). He adds that "this is not the result of some grand design, but the consequence of thousands of limited agreements between different nations" (17). "Intergovernmental organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO] have grown from 123 in 1951 to 365 in 1984, and international non-governmental organisations' have multiplied over the same period from 832 to 4,615" (17-18).
Consequently, the forces that serve to legitimate the presence and further
spread of Western science around the world are currently being problematised
via postmodern informed perspectives. ‘Postmodernism as critical practice,’
however, acknowledges the difficulty of working within the discursive spaces
provided by modernity and proposes, instead, to set itself up outside the
modern paradigm; not to judge modernity by its own criteria but rather to
contemplate and reveal its assumptions and contradictions (Rosenau, 1992: 6).
It recognises that “the system in place produces not only domination and
oppression but the very conditions making a critique of this domination and
oppression possible” (Racevskis, 1994: 6). Alternatively, ‘postmodernism as
critical practice’ celebrates the chaotic, ephemeral, contingent and
discontinuous character of society and history. “The heterogeneity and
fragmentation of social life are its main starting points and hence its approach is
characterised...by its distrust of totalising discourses, of reason and of universal
truth” (Larrain, 1994: 291). Similarly,

[the core of postmodernism is the doubt that any method of
theory, discourse, or genre, tradition or novelty, has a
universal and general claim as the ‘right’ or the privileged
form of authoritative knowledge. Postmodernism suspects
all truth claims of masking and serving particular interests in
local, cultural, and political struggles. But postmodernism
does not automatically reject conventional methods of
knowing and telling as false or archaic. Rather it opens
those standard methods to inquiry and introduces new
methods, which are also subject then to critique [emphasis
included]. (Richardson, 1994: 317-318)

As such, this interpretation of postmodernism resists association with any
particular world view because it is impossible to pass judgment on a discourse
from the perspective of another discourse. Indeed, following Foucault, we are
warned against constructing any new universal theories because they will inevitably lead to other forms of domination and oppression.

Separating 'postmodernism as condition' from 'postmodernism as critical practice' serves a two-fold purpose in this study: It permits discussion of the impasse debate in radical development theory to occur on its own discursive level while simultaneously dealing with the more crucial aspects of postmodernism that the impasse debate has not yet considered. This chapter introduces the notion that the impasse debate is both an outcome and part of the postmodern condition and that it represents the current changes and shifts in the global order which require new and better theories of explanation. On the other hand, this chapter suggests that the impasse debate has not yet considered the implications of 'postmodernism as critical practice,' a standpoint which would serve to undermine its efforts toward the construction of new and better theories.

This follows along with what was referred to in chapter 1 as the discursive imaginary where the question of transcending the current discursive domains of development was first introduced. The goal of this chapter is to further elaborate upon the different views of postmodernism that have thus far been presented in order to substantiate the claim that impasse theorising may lead to new and better theories of development, as necessitated by a world gone postmodern, but not necessarily a way out of the discursive imaginary produced by modernity.

3 This problem becomes the basis for new thinking in the field of development studies: "At one level it is forcing a long overdue acceptance of issues of culture and cultural identity in developmental theory. At a second level the recognition of culture poses new problems concerning whether cultural heterogeneity at the local level resulting from the fusion of global and local influences, constitutes a threat or an opportunity for development. At a final level, it opens up a space for recognising the power of culture in resisting and thereby shaping globalisation" (Editorial, 1994: 11).
The following sections address this theme from a variety of positions. The first section deals with 'postmodernism as condition.' A brief description of its major features is followed by a critical appraisal of the continued spread of Western ideas of modernisation. A postmodern global condition, it is argued, means nothing less than the spread of Western capitalism and, henceforth, the loss of cultural diversity and indigenous knowledge systems. The second section deals with 'postmodernism as critical practice.' This version of postmodernism is the missing component in the impasse debate in radical development theory. ‘Postmodernism as critical practice’ differs from ‘postmodernism as condition’ in that it considers development theory to be a part of the discursive imaginary of modernity. In other words, ‘postmodernism as critical practice’ recognises that development theory today cannot be separated from what Foucault (1973) identified as plays of power which mobilise rules, codes, and procedures that assert particular meanings through the construction of knowledges within these rules, codes, and procedures themselves.

These governing practices not only articulate specific institutional meanings, values, and commitments, they often define, describe, and delimit what is possible to say and not to say; they circumscribe what can and cannot be done. (Ruiz, 1994: 260).

2.1: Postmodernism as Condition

The postmodern epoch can be regarded as a condition or current state of affairs, arising out of a multitude of factors having to do with the changing nature of the modern material world after World War II. This transformation is represented by hyperactive shifts in the organisation, production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of labour and capital which is occurring
continuously and with increasing propensity. The borders between time, space, and speed are no longer clear cut and distinguishable as information and technology are broken down into invisible signs, symbols, and cultural artifacts. Its repercussions are immense and far-reaching, bringing about new modes of perception and understanding. This 'maelstrom of modern life,' as Marshall Berman (1988) once suggested, has many sources, all of which are incorporated in the term 'late capitalism':

Great discoveries in the physical sciences, changing our images of the universe and our place in it; the industrialization of production, which transforms scientific knowledge into technology, creates new human environments and destroys old ones, speeds up the whole tempo of life, generates new forms of corporate power and class struggle; immense demographic upheavals, severing millions of people from their ancestral habitats, hurting them half-way across the world into new lives; rapid and often cataclysmic urban growth; systems of mass communication, dynamic in their development, enveloping and binding together the most diverse people and societies, increasingly powerful national states, bureaucratically structured and operated, constantly striving to expand their powers; mass social movements of people, and peoples, challenging their political and economic rulers, striving to gain some control over their lives; finally, bearing and driving all these people and institutions along, an ever-expanding, drastically fluctuating capitalist world market.

This encyclopaedic list of everyday life in the postmodern world vividly describes the essence of change, indeterminacy, fluidity, and fragmented condition of 'late capitalism.' Berman's description also reveals the intensity

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4 'Late capital' is here understood to mean one of many successive stages that occur within the domain of the capitalist mode of production. For example, in terms of flexibility, 'late capitalist' economic activity breaks away from the Fordist regime of standardised mass production to a flexible regime of production, distribution and exchange (see chapter 3 of this study). The movement towards flexibility is accompanied by the rise of informal economies, the reorganisation of the 'new international division of labour' (NIDL), 'post-Fordism,' 'new times,' etc. In spatial terms,
and logic of capital to capture the imagination of the entire world, where the
progressive force of capitalism is credited for transforming and unifying the
globe like never before:

The development of 'postmodernism' or 'postmodernist' forms as the cultural correlate of a combination of complex
socio-economic and technological changes...[c]onstitute evidence of the emergence of...a 'post-industrial' society or
a further 'late' or disorganised stage in the re-articulation of
the capitalist mode of production. (Smart, 1990: 404)

Alongside the spread of capitalism there also occurs, according to Berman,
modes of resistance, expressed in terms of collective social movements,
political uprisings, and ethnic based clashes. In the end, however, these
modes of resistance prove to be futile against the power of capital and, instead,
become a part of the 'maelstrom of modern life' where it is not possible to
differentiate struggle from conformity.

Berman is not the only one to have linked postmodernism with recent
trends in the diffusion of capitalism around the world; where postmodernism is
simply another (new) cultural dominant and logical extension of modernity.
Fredric Jameson, for instance, is also a strong proponent of the notion that
postmodernism should not be considered in terms of a clean break with the
previous era or, conversely, with the dawn of a new era, but rather as the
infrastructural reality of late capitalism.5 What this means for Jameson, insofar

late capitalism' and its spread to the Third World already represents an expansion beyond the newly
Industrialising countries (NICs) of the 'Pacific Rim' region to even more recent frontiers such as the
Philippines, Thailand, Mauritius, and China (Predd and Watts, 1992: 5-6). Furthermore, and for
the first time, the footloose nature of 'late capitalist' enterprises has tapped into previously isolated
'backward', agrarian/peasant societies where it has become possible to "capture the labor power
of first-generation female workers" (Ibid: 6). In some cases "this signals the final cataclysmic victory
of a triumphant world capitalism and, as such, the eclipse of history. For others, it represents the
waning of an ancien regime, of an old social order; the demise of the golden age of postwar
capitalism" (Ibid: 8).

5 Jameson (1994) believes postmodernism to be a way of "thinking and acting in the new world
as a new hyperreal, post-industrial, post-historical, post-ideological information society is upon us, is that such a condition only appears to exist (as something different and apart from modernity) and should, therefore, be considered more accurately as another stage within the capitalist mode of production. For Jameson, the postmodern condition is posited alongside Ernest Mandel's (Late Capitalism, 1972) third stage in the evolution of capitalism, where this stage—called "late or, multinational or, consumer capitalism" (Jameson, 1984: 78)—is preceded by the stages market capitalism and monopoly or imperialist capitalism. As Jameson was again later to write,

[This Mandel's Late Capitalism] is what made my own thoughts on 'postmodernism' possible, which are therefore to be understood as an attempt to theorize the specific logic of the cultural production of that third stage, and not as yet another disembodied culture critique or diagnosis of the spirit of the age. (1989: 33).

The postmodern condition then, to be more specific, is regarded by Jameson as the 'culturally dominant' mode of expression within the present period. Its key features include

a 'new depthlessness,' evident in contemporary theory and cultural life in general in the preoccupation with interpretation, surfaces, images and simulacra; 'a consequent weakening in historicity'; a decentring of the subject and associated changes in emotional tone and intensity; and broad changes in the experience of space and time, associated with a whole new technology, which is itself a figure for a whole new economic world system. (Jameson, 1984: 58, quoted in Smart, 1992: 186-187)

system of late capitalism" (14). The 'post-modern' is referred to as "the break with the modern, with heavy industry (and the reality as well as the concept of production), along with all the varied modern visions of the utopian transformation of society--this break is the condition for the setting in place of the structures and institutions of late capitalism, or in other words, the third cybernetic and multinational stage of this mode of production" (13).
The third stage, as Mandel argues and Jameson appropriates and extends, is where Western capital has gone global and transnational; where it has, in short, become decentred. This decentred, yet ubiquitous economic reality, is deceptively difficult to understand because, as Jameson argues, it exceeds representation and labelling. Like hyperspace, or a postmodern novel, it is virtually impossible to situate oneself for any length of time within the realm of 'late capital' since its anchor points are always shifting and always in a continual state of motion.

Despite the difficulties associated in coming to terms with a world gone postmodern, Jameson nevertheless continues to hold to the belief that this condition simply represents another shift in the transformation and restructuring of capital. This is not a departure from the classical Marxist stance on historical materialism so much as it marks an attempt to understand the complexities of the capitalist mode of production in one of its many stages.\(^6\) In fact, Jameson agrees with the fundamentals of Marxian social theory, particularly its emphasis on understanding the capitalist mode of production as a progressive and totalising historically determined movement.\(^7\)

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\(^6\) Historical materialism, as outlined most succinctly in Marx's preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* is understood by him to mean the following: "The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life....The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real basis, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production determines the social, political, and intellectual life processes in general" (Tucker, 1978: 4). Engels also shared this belief with Marx (continuing to expound on Marx's theory after his death) but shifted the emphasis somewhat when he stated (shortly before his own death), as outlined in a letter to J. Bloch, 21-22 September 1890, that neither he nor Marx ever subscribed to an unqualified economic determinism which would reduce all historical development to economic causes alone. He wrote that they assert themselves historically only in the last resort: "The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of...structure...also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggle and in many cases predominate in determining their form. There is an interaction of all these elements...." (Tucker, 1978: 760).

\(^7\) Marx believed that he had clearly shown how pre-capitalist modes of production had all been absorbed by the capitalist mode of production. This point has created a lot of controversy inside circles sympathetic to the main tenets of Marxism. Some believe Marx was wrong in attributing the...
Although the third stage of capitalism that Mandel and Jameson are concerned with is not evident in Marx's description of capitalism, it is nevertheless consistent with its overall project of historical closure. Jameson states "The marxist framework is still indispensable for understanding the new historical content, which demands, not a modification of the marxist framework, but an expansion of it" (Stephanson, 1988: 13). Expansion is interpreted to mean postmodernism as the 'cultural logic of late capitalism' thereby constituting a 'cultural dominant' and a new socioeconomic stage of capitalist development. In including a wide range of cultural, social, economic and political phenomena within the realm of postmodernism, Jameson has managed to take the debate out of the realms of cultural theory specifically and reinstate it into the arena of social theory. This becomes an important aspect to consider when dealing with the synthesising effects which an all-encompassing spread of productive techniques and a reorganised labour force are having in both the economic and political realms.

adapted from capitalism with the Industrial Revolution of the previous century. For example, the 'world systems' analysts are continually stretching the beginning of capitalism further and further back into history; Indeed, A. G. Frank (arguing that capitalism means relations of exchange, not relations of production) postulates that the first instance of 'capitalism' occurred some 5000 years ago. Still others believe (mostly anthropologists) that previous modes of production (e.g. the feudal mode of production in predominantly agrarian societies) are still in operation today in many parts of the Third World and exist alongside the capitalist mode of production. Jameson's view is probably closest to the Marxist understanding of the capitalist mode of production even though his appraisal is not the sort of definition Marx would have envisioned. However, the invention of 'monopoly capitalism' by the Second International and 'late capitalism' by the Fourth Internationalist theorist Ernest Mandel, certainly breathes new life into Marxism. This implies that postmodernism represents a clean break with previous historical epochs, particularly modernity, and has ushered in a brand new logic of capitalism. This would seem to be antithetical to postmodernism. As Jerome Christensen has recently pointed out: "It is because Fredric Jameson, the best Marxist theorist of postmodernism, shares many of the evolutionary assumptions of the neoliberals (the word revolution does not appear in the index to his Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism) and adheres to the epochal model of tidy synchrony ('the postmodern must be characterized as a situation in which the survival, the residue, the holdover, the archaic, has finally been swept away without a trace' [Jameson, 1984: 309]) that his utopian agenda looks less like a challenge to postmodernism than another elegant variation" (455).
Capitalism's late era can then be described as one marked by a level of intrusion into the domains of life unparalleled in capitalism's history. Commodification and capitalist exchange relations have penetrated the spheres of information, computerisation, knowledge, consciousness, and experience to such an extent that the seemingly fragmented and chaotic postmodern world presents new challenges to social theory and radical politics. For Jameson, however, the form these challenges adopt does not give them the capacity to exit outside or without the Marxist master narrative but are, rather, merely subsumed under its critique. Hence, 'postmodernism as condition' is interpreted by Jameson to mean the cultural logic of capitalism and its advanced market economics.

Another well-known proponent of 'postmodernism as condition' is David Harvey (1989). His critique deals mainly with postmodernism as constitutive of various aesthetic and cultural practices under the dominating influences of capitalism. For this reason, postmodernism cannot be equated with a progressive politics that seeks to bring about a different form of radical social change. From this perspective, Harvey's portrait of postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism is similar to that proposed by Jameson in that he places the production of culture in its political, economic, and social contexts. By remaining within a Marxist metanarrative in their critiques of 'late capitalism,' Harvey and Jameson avoid any form of cultural determinism where postmodernism is a relatively autonomous aesthetic current. This means that postmodernism, as the latest artistic style, does not exist outside the bounds of Marx's materialist conception of history but should more accurately be understood as a by-product of socioeconomic forces.

'Postmodernism as condition' does not threaten to deconstruct the vital
political component of Marxism. Instead, Harvey concentrates on showing how
the capitalist mode of production has evolved to another stage, where
postmodernism is a useful term by which
to represent all the shifting and churning that has gone on
since the first major post-war recession of 1973, which does
not lose sight of the fact that the basic rules of a capitalist
mode of production continue to operate as invariant
shaping forces in historical-geographical development.
(Harvey, 1989: 121)

Adopting this position permits him to answer the postmodern challenge of
metanarrative without relinquishing postmodernism’s periodising elements.

A third important contribution to a description of the postmodern condition
comes from Scott Lash (1990).9 In this particular work he analyses
postmodernism as a cultural concept. Drawing on some of the tenets of the
Regulation School and their notion of ‘regime of accumulation’,10 Lash regards
postmodernism as a ‘regime of signification’. This regime comprises two main
components: a cultural economy and a mode of signification. For Lash, very
briefly, and as outlined in his first chapter, a specific cultural economy includes:
(1) specific relations of production of cultural objects; (2) specific conditions of
reception; (3) a particular institutional framework that mediates between

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9 Lash does not call postmodernism a ‘condition.’ Early in his book he states a number of things
which postmodernism is not. "Postmodernism is...not a condition, nor [is it] a part of a fabric with
post-industrialism, a type of society, in the sense that people speak of industrial society, or
capitalist society, or modern society". (1990: 3-4). Lash typifies what Jameson and Harvey have
also attempted, namely to arrive at an absolute meaning of postmodernism. As discussed later on
in this chapter, it is not possible to identify or accurately name the contours of postmodernism
without reverting to the construction of singular truth claim about what postmodernism is or is not.
Simply put, such a practice results in closure. In any case, for Lash, postmodernism is strictly a
dominant cultural ‘truth’.

10 He is particularly attracted to this concept because, unlike the notion mode of production, it
clearly connotes a temporal dimension: like flexible accumulation, it takes shape, persists for a
duration, then disintegrates. And unlike the concept mode of production, regimes of
accumulation are as importantly determined by how people consume as by how they produce.
Hence, regimes of accumulation attribute as much importance to the market as they do to the
point of production.
production and reception; and, (4) a particular way in which cultural objects circulate. Within the ‘mode of signification’, cultural objects depend on a particular configuration between signifier, signified, and referent signifier. Hence the signifier (sound, image, word, statement) and the signified (the concept of meaning) and referent, whereby the object in the real world to which signifier and signified connect, are all interrelated.

Lash also argues that modernism has differentiated and atomised the roles of signifier, signified, and referent; that is, each functions autonomously of the other which therefore implies that objective accounts of a situation (text) can be known independently of the subject (author) position. On the other hand, postmodernism problematises these distinctions between representation and reality. He argues that "modernism conceives as representations as being problematic whereas postmodernism problematises reality". (1990: 13) For instance a modernist text aspires toward making value-free judgments--where the biases of the researcher are acknowledged--in order to claim validity. This realisation, however, is provided only in order to state that the text has been tainted by the author's own background and that once removed, or if read with this consideration in mind, an objective centre will still predominate. Regardless of the personal baggage a researcher brings with him/her, objective reality is still claimed to exist. In the case of 'postmodernism as critical practice,' this objectivity is, of course, always discursively constructed. It is just one interpretation beside many others. Its dominance rests on the fact that certain ideologies have the power to continue with one particular discourse whereby other discourses are suppressed.

For Lash, empirical reality is predominately characterised by images, or representation, whereby the cultural context assumes dominance over the
economic and sociopolitical sphere. Lash attempts to penetrate the dimensions of modern society by addressing the key cultural tendencies in contemporary capitalist society. This, in turn, has repercussions in the way capitalism is currently (dis)organised. What Lash is trying to do, through his belief that postmodernism is an increasingly important feature of contemporary culture, is "show how it articulates with some features of disorganised capitalism" (Lash and Urry, 1987: 286). Noting that a period of disorganised capitalism presently exists, he wants to know what social conditions specific to this era are most important in creating "an audience which is predisposed towards the reception of postmodernist culture" (Ibid, 286).

All three writers, as presented here, hold to the belief that 'postmodernism as condition' represents the cultural dominant, or truth, within capitalism. At the same time, postmodernism is not regarded as something that describes a formal and authentic period beyond the current stage of capitalism nor is it considered to be dominant over economic determinism. It is simply a reflection of a particularly complex socio-historical and economic condition. Thus, postmodernism does not represent a clean break with the classic Marxist metanarrative as much as it represents a partial break from earlier stages within the capitalist mode of production.

This representation of postmodernism is fairly conservative in that it does not regard postmodernism as offering a viable revolutionary (or even reformist) agenda for bringing about social and political change. Rather, postmodernism as condition is simply used as a descriptive conceit by which to understand the fragmented state of capitalism in one of its late stages. Similarly, the concept of 'late capital' is considered in terms of an epochal shift in the nature of capitalist social relations in which flexible production plays an important role. For Harvey
(1992), but also for Jameson and Lash, changes in the urban arena, particularly in planning and development, are examples of cultural and intellectual transformation in a regime of flexible accumulation. This new regime is characterised by flexible labour processes, labour markets, products, and patterns of consumption which in turn requires new interpretations within the body of Marxist theorising.

It is within this perspective—the birth of global culture, with a world view that is truly all encompassing—that the impasse debate in radical development is currently situated. The fragmented and dispersed nature of the international political economy, especially the rapid advances of capitalism and its accompanying structural changes in the post-World War II era, is a major contributing factor linking the onset of new and better theories in the field of development to the changing complexity of the present global condition.

The notion that 'postmodernism as condition' necessitates the construction of alternative theories and concepts is a standpoint which Jameson, Harvey and Lash implicitly reject. For them, the Marxist conception of historical materialism, in one form or another, still remains a vital component to understanding the current disarray that 'postmodernism as condition' so eloquently describes. In short, they still hold to the belief that Marxist concepts

11 Marx's theory of historical materialism has undergone a number of changes during this century. These are dealt with by Albert Bergesen (1993). He identifies four distinct historical stages in the transformation of Marxian theoretical logic; from determination by the base to determination by the superstructure. The Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci occupies the first stage. Here "the base/superstructure model is inverted, as consensually shared world views are now the determinant of the hegemony of the state, which in turn insures the production of economic relations in the base" (2). In a second and further elaboration, the French structuralist, Louis Althusser, fuses the ideological and political into one instance or sphere (the "Ideological State Apparatus") where "the logic of the ideological sphere expands downward, absorbing the logic of the state" (2). Nicos Poulantzas, in the third stage, served to unify the ideological state and the economy into a common discourse. Here, the base is absorbed into the superstructure and makes up a singular theoretical entity. "At this point Marxian theory has actually moved beyond the inversion of the base/superstructure model, for the ideological no longer determines the political, or the economic, for now it is one with them" (3). In the fourth stage, as represented by
adequately represent conditions in the material world. What is missing in their analysis, however, are the historical shifts that have made it necessary to rethink Marx’s logic. In order to accommodate a broader perspective on this matter it is important to seek a clarification to the question that asks how ‘postmodernism as condition’ has upset commonly held understandings regarding the current make-up of the world order and, more importantly, how it has sought to destabilise conventional practices of research.

Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (1994) address both the advent and currency of ‘postmodernism as condition’ in relation to a series of successive stages or “moments” that preceded the existence of this category. However, rather than only dealing with postmodernism as the ‘cultural logic of late capitalism,’ Denzin and Lincoln also provide an analysis of how ‘postmodernism as condition’ translates into ‘postmodernism as critical practice.’ The historical position each ‘moment’ occupies reflects the commitment of a particular period to different styles of research, epistemologies, and forms of representation. Yet these differences do not mark a radical shift away from any previous mode of acquiring and making sense of reality but indicate, rather, the growing reliability on scientifically based criteria as the legitimate source of knowledge. In short, the last century shows a steady progression in the way in which science has enfranchised itself and come to be

the post-Marxists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, the causal relations between spheres are eliminated and “the logic of ideology no longer determines the logic of the base, but now is the logic of the base” (3). Hence, “[w]ith the ideological, political, and economic now merged, and sphere-to-sphere causal analysis gone, the way is paved to theorize a causal-free social formation, where there is little, or no, determination, and where what patterns do emerge are thought to be the by-product of surface behaviour, struggle, conflict, coalition, bloc, and hegemonic formation” (13). Here, the Marxian social formation—where economy, politics, and ideology inform each other equally and collectively—is transformed or renamed the Marxian discursive formation where collective existence is discourse, not historical social relations. This is not just where “culture or ideology determines social relations, but [where] ideology/culture, in the form of ‘discourse,’ are social relations [emphasis included” (14).
depended upon to solve and implement the problems plaguing society. Development studies is very much involved in this effort, as its propensity towards modernisation shows. The extent to which theorising about development today—as momentarily problematised by the impasse—is any different from that of its predecessors is not yet clearly understood, particularly in terms of moving away from totalising explanations. And while post-impasse research has certainly acknowledged the beneficial aspects of new theories, it has not yet sought to problematise the privileged epistemological framework from within which they continue to function.\textsuperscript{12}

The first moment or "the traditional period," encapsulates the period from the early 1900s to World War II and coincides with the establishment of many social science disciplines. Research was distinguished by

objective, colonizing accounts of field experiences that were reflective of the positivist scientist paradigm....[and was] concerned with offering valid, reliable, and objective interpretations....The 'other' who was studied was alien, foreign and strange. (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 7)\textsuperscript{13}

This type of research stresses a positivist world view of which the aim of inquiry is toward complete explanations which will lead to making accurate predictions

\textsuperscript{12} The reference to post-impasse research refers to a specific body of literature directly associated with critiques of radical development. This literature is dealt with in chapter three.

\textsuperscript{13} The concept 'Other' is a necessary component of master narratives since it serves as a benchmark by which Western social science is able to legitimate itself as it confronts practices and ideas which are alien to it. The only way in which Western science can make sense of difference is by comparing and contrasting it to available knowledge already established as fact. Western social science believes itself to be capable of knowing and giving voice to the 'Other' through the belief that the 'Other's' knowledge is inferior and irrelevant when situated alongside positivist informed thought. Writing from this perspective Henry Giroux states: "within the discourse of modernity, the Other not only sometimes ceases to be a historical agent, but is often defined within totalizing and universalistic theories that create a transcendental rational White, male Eurocentric subject that both occupies the centers of power while simultaneously appearing to exist outside of time and space. Read against this Eurocentric transcendental subject, the Other is shown to lack any redeeming community traditions collective voice of historical weight--and is reduced to the imagery of the colonizer. (1991: 7). Postmodernism problematises the conceptions of traditional social
and ultimately the control of phenomena, whether human or physical. In addition, knowledge is thought to accumulate in a progressive manner as the result of contributing research and further enlightenment. Positivist research also discourages value judgments by assuming the possibility of the researcher to remain a neutral or unbiased observer and collector of data. Finally positivism relies mainly on information received from quantitatively derived measurements, designs and methods. This has to do with its reductionist position which holds that a common rational structure exists to which all questions of difference can be referred to for resolution.

The "modernist phase", or the second moment, extends from the latter period to the early 1970s. New interpretive theories like ethnomethodology, phenomenology, critical theory, and feminism emphasised qualitative research practices that would allow researchers to give a voice to society’s underclass (villains and social outcasts were valorised as heroes to mainstream society). Inquiry was still “[f]irmly entrenched on mid-century methodological discourse...[and] attempted to make qualitative research as rigorous as its quantitative counterpart” (Ibid: 8). Through the use of open-ended and quasi-structured interviewing techniques together with participant observation and their subsequent analyses in a standardised statistical form “the modernist period cloth[ed] itself in the language and rhetoric of positivist and postpositivist discourse” (Ibid: 8).

Mohanty recognises the difficult implications that such question raise, particularly the ways that these issues are defined and specified in the first place: “what we need today is greater clarity about what is presupposed, implied, or entailed by our formulation of questions of the ‘other,’ which would in effect be an interrogation of proposed agendas through the process of seeking precise definitions” (Ibid: 119).

14 Postpositivism assumes ‘reality’ exists independently of the knower but that it can, at best, be apprehended only imperfectly due to the ‘flawed’ human intellectual mechanisms and the
The third stage (1970-1986) is referred to as a period of "blurred genres" since a wide variety of paradigms, methods and strategies (symbolic interactionism, constructivism, naturalistic inquiry, positivism and postpositivism, phenomenology, ethnomethodology, semiotics, structuralism, feminism, and various ethnic paradigms) were available for researchers to employ and utilise in their work. Traditional modes of representation and analyses (functional, positivist, behavioural, totalising approaches) in the social sciences gave way to a more pluralistic, interpretive, open-ended perspectives. That took cultural representations and their meanings as its point of departure" (Ibid: 9). The collusion between the investigator and the investigated 'object' began to be taken for granted as it was realised that the word of the researcher was merely interpretative and could not expect to reach a level of objectivity and neutrality. "At issue now is the author's presence in the interpretive text, or how the researcher can speak with authority in an age when there are no longer any firm rules concerning the text, its standards of evaluation, and its subject matter" (Ibid: 9).

A double crisis—a "crisis of representation" and a "crisis of legitimation"—sets the fourth moment apart from the previous ones. Reflexivity (self-reflection) in research and writing is the consequence of the "blurred genres" (poststructuralism, micro-macro descriptivism, deconstructionism, and ethnomethodology) of the previous stage. Reflexivity also calls into question privileged categories of gender, class, and race. "Issues such as validity, reliability, and objectivity, which had been settled in earlier phases, are once

fundamentally intractable nature of phenomena" (Guba and Lincoln, 1994: 110). While postpositivism rejects dualist thinking—where the investigator (subject) and the investigated (object) are assumed to be independent entities—it nevertheless holds to the notion of objectivity as a worthy ideal. Building upon and continuing along a tradition of preexisting knowledge is also important: "replicated findings are probably true (but always subject to falsification)" (emphasis included)" (Ibid: 110).
again problematised. Interpretive theories, as opposed to grounded theories, are now more common as writers continue to challenge older models of truth and meaning" (Ibid: 10).

Above all, 'crisis' has to do with the unresolved issue where the problems of writing are still viewed as different from the problems of method and fieldwork, when in fact there is no difference between writing and fieldwork. Regardless, this attitude of difference, which demarcates writing from methodology, is one component of the crisis. The other has to do with the notion that this dilemma can be solved by simply becoming more self-conscious about writing.¹⁵ This is the second component of the crisis; that is, that a solution can in fact be found. This double crisis is explained accordingly: During the process of writing, a field-worker is implicitly making claims about moral and scientific authority. These claims, in turn, allow the text to function as a source of validation for an empirical science in that it shows that the world of real lived experience can still be captured, even though the writing its termed experimental, reflexive and self-conscious. Research that stresses or implies the importance of such distinctions commits the error of, for example, "directing attention away from the ways in which the text constructs sexually situated individuals in a field of social difference" (Ibid: 10). In other words, self-conscious research, where a subject position is privileged and taken into account within the research text, colludes with empirical science's hegemony by

¹⁵ These are, respectively, a 'crisis of representation' and a 'crisis of legitimation.' The former problematises the notion that qualitative researchers can directly capture lived experience. This crisis argues that reality is created in the social text by the researcher. The latter makes the traditional criteria for evaluating and interpreting qualitative research problematic and asks "how are qualitative studies to be evaluated in the poststructural moment?" (Denzin and Lincoln 1994: 11). The crisis of representation (writing) and legitimation (fieldwork) blur together in the next (fifth) moment since "representation must now legitimize itself in terms of some set of criteria that allows the author (and the reader) to make connections between the text and the written world" (Ibid: 11).
reproducing new domains of knowledge and positions of power. Where studies attempt to make distinctions between empirical science and social criticism, they do so from the assumption that differences between the two do indeed exist (hence the perpetuation of empirical science’s hegemony). The point, rather, "is to engage fully a new politics of textuality that would refuse the identity of empirical science....[and] intervene in the relationship of information economics, nation-state politics, and technologies of mass communication, especially in terms of the empirical sciences" (Ibid: 10).

The fifth, or present, moment is in large part shaped and defined by the dual crises of representation and legitimation. This moment includes the means of written expression and interpretation as well as the types of research practices that defined the previous moments; which researchers either follow or resist. In a concluding essay in the same volume Lincoln and Denzin (1994) state that the present period is marked by a "tension" resulting from the conjuncture of all previous ‘moments’: A "continuing critique of positivism and post-positivism" along with an ongoing "self-critique" and "self-appraisal" of the researcher; the dual crises (the representation of the ‘Other,’ and the authority of the text); the emergence and attempted inclusion of a cacophony of voices speaking from specific "gender, race, class, ethnic, and Third World perspectives"; and, the blurring and collusion of previously separated domains or borders of "scientific, moral, sacred, and religious discourses" (576).

The fifth moment, then, considers the contemporary world in terms of the immense social and cultural upheavals, and the ways in which these changes and shifts can be comprehended and interpreted. This moment also alludes to the possibility of imagining alternatives to development, where the descriptive term ‘postmodernism as condition’ is used as a basis by which to problematise
how research about development is carried out.

2.2: Postmodernism as Critical Practice

'Postmodernism as condition' does not fill the void in development theory that has come to be referred as the impasse, nor can it be considered to sympathise with the claims of the 'counter-revolution' in development. If anything it problematises these concepts and the space they occupy as new theories attempting to maintain their explanatory potential in the face of vexing global realities. These approaches—the new theories that are supposedly creating the agenda for post-impasse radical development theory and, on the other hand, the apparent dominance of a neoliberal 'new' world order—continue to reflect a predisposition to the metatheory of universal progress in terms of scientific reason and modernisation. Postmodernism challenges the Enlightenment belief in rational-actor models of social action, whether they be individuals cognizant of universal reason or collective actors conscious of material self-interests. Both liberal and Marxist theories of agency are rejected

16 The resurgence of neoclassical/neoliberal orthodoxies in the field of development studies has been referred to as a 'counter-revolution.' John Toye (1987) writes, "[t]he counter-revolution in development theory and policy which has characterized the 1980s can be understood, in part, by examining what it is reacting against. The present counter-revolution is dedicated to countering a previous revolution. That previous revolution was the work of John Maynard Keynes and its impact on economic thought and policy making of the 1930s and 1940s" (22). The counter-revolution is credited with making aid conditional on the recipient's agreement to follow certain policy guidelines. Toye calls for an urgent appraisal of this practice, in particular, the World Bank's structural adjustment loans. From a similar perspective, Cristobal Kay, in the context of defending the dependency approach, suggests that '[t]oday, neoliberalism is triumphant, especially in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Neoliberals are rushing to proclaim the 'end of history,' the emergence of a new neoliberal order, and as a minor footnote, the irrelevance of development studies" (993: 691). Structural adjustment policies or programmes (SAPs)—sometimes referred to as the 'Washington Consensus'—are ways by which heavily indebted nations can continue to borrow from Western banks. Elements of this 'consensus' include "extensive reforms of the state (privatization of public-sector enterprises, fiscal reforms, severe retrenchment in compensatory social spending and elimination of subsidies to consumption and 'inefficient' producer interests, etc.); 'getting the prices right' with a priority given to maintenance of macroeconomic equilibrium; sweeping market-oriented reforms (deregulation and monopolization of the private sector, flexibilization of labor markets, etc.); and competitive reinsertion in the world economy (trade liberalization, promotion of foreign investment, etc.)' (Smith, 1993: 16).
as essentialist because both offer a reductionist view of the relationship between consciousness, the subject, and social change.

Rather than support claims which emphasise the pursuit of absolute truth, as inspired by the existence of a metatheory, or that theories should attempt to encompass all of totality into their frameworks, postmodernism tends, instead to focus on how such discourses gain their superiority and status at the expense of smaller, resisting discourses. ‘Postmodernism as critical practice’ perceives this situation in terms of

the decline of modernity of authoritative discourses and accepts, even promotes, the multivocality of identifications and self-identifications that have begun to crowd a formerly hegemonic and homogeneous field of representation. No solutions are available here, only the contemplative distancing of the observer of observers of actors observing one another and acting accordingly. (Friedman: 1992: 848)

Besides the privileged space such theories seek to occupy and represent they also contain an implicit desire to control, dominate, and regulate how meaning is constructed and how knowledge is acquired. Frederique Apffel

17 Multivocal Identities, or the notion of a decentred subject(ivity), is important to understanding ‘postmodernism as critical practice.’ In this form of analysis, for instance, the subject is decentred precisely because there are no clear-cut or predestined roles waiting for subjects to occupy in pursuit of their historically guided mission. Rather, there are a multitude of roles that individuals come to play in history. These produce a ‘self,’ experienced not as a single and complete identity, but as multiple, incomplete and partial identities formed in historically specific relations to the different social spaces people inhabit over time. Postmodern subjectivity is thus throughout an integral component of sociality. Subjectivity, as socially produced, is embedded in symbolic processes of signification that give meaning to ‘subject positions’ as they are formed at the intersection of such structural categories as class, gender, race, and ethnicity, but always emergent within specific ‘language games,’ and their discursive practices. In this way, subjectivity is neither natural nor universal but fragile, decentred, and emergent--continuously in process of being formed, uniformed, and reformed through communication and shifting meanings of identity itself (Phillips, 1994). As Chantal Mouffe states quite clearly, “we are in fact always multiple and contradictory subjects, inhabitants of a diversity of communities (as many, really, as the social relations in which we participate and the subject-positions they define), constructed by a variety of discourses and precariously and temporarily sutured at the intersection of those subject-positions” (1988: 44).
Marglin (1990), in his excellent historical case study of smallpox in India, provides an interesting example of the social construction of disease. He contends that Western science, synonymous with modernity and more recently with modernisation theories, perceives itself as a superior form of knowledge through its practice of "render[ing] obsolete more traditional systems of knowledge" (102). It succeeds in this endeavour by dismissing "naturalistic" and "religious" forms of explanations, and often cures, for disease on the basis that they are "irrational" and not founded on 'scientific' principals. Such principals "underlie the dominant strands in Western systems of knowledge" (Ibid: 102), including medical discourse. The common way by which Western discourse makes sense of reality and acquires knowledge about the world is by drawing comparisons and making distinctions based on logical and binary oppositions: rational/irrational, subject/object, health/illness, mind/body, life/death, nature/culture, good/evil and so forth. This logocentric habit is, of course, based on a first principle or metatheory, which lies "outside the system of differences which constitutes meaning in language" (Ibid, 102). The notion that a space might exist between these clear-cut dichotomising differences is inherently refuted; that is either/or distinctions leave no room for both either and or.

According to Apffel Marglin, Western scientific discourse creates a boundary between "smallpox...as a disease" and health as the "absence of disease" (Ibid: 103). In India, smallpox--both its presence(disease) and absence (health)--has traditionally been regarded as a unitary manifestation, represented by the goddess Sitala. She "is both the disease and its cure or its absence, health" (Ibid: 103). Such a presentation of smallpox is considered to be an example of a non-logocentric mode of thought.

46
The eradication of this indigenous understanding of smallpox—from non-
logocentric to logocentric—is problematised for the political implications it raises,
mainly as a means of gaining access and control of ‘less superior’ cultures
through the "universalizing of medical knowledge" and the "transfer of [Western]
technology (Ibid: 103). Apffel Marglin traces the manner of coping and dealing
with smallpox, as once controlled by indigenous methods—variolation, or the
use of human smallpox matter to inoculate susceptible persons previously
unexposed to smallpox—to the situation where it became a matter entirely
mandated by the colonial state—vaccination utilising the alien substance of
cowpox matter. Variolation, as a form of inoculation, was traditionally
accompanied by worship of the goddess Sitala of smallpox who represented
both its presence and absence and, therefore, served to "dissolve all binary
oppositions" (bid: 116). Vaccination, on the other hand, when it was forcefully
introduced to India early in the nineteenth century after its ‘discovery’ in
England, broke the bond between disease as normality, as a component of life,
and its representation with religious/cultural practices. Until then, health had
not been regarded as the absence of illness, nor life the absence of death. “For
health and life to reassert themselves, illness and death have to be
experienced. The presence of health and of life depend on the presence of
illness and of death, not on their absence” (ibid: 105).

In 1865, the British government outlawed variolation and made
vaccination compulsory throughout India. Resistance, however, followed and
many protested “against an alien rule and the imposition of an alien practice
(Ibid: 104). Vaccination by British officials, as Apffel Marglin argues, was
resisted “because of its entailments, political and cultural” (Ibid 118). For
instance, those who died of smallpox—and sometimes their houses—would be
cremated by British officials against the wishes of the indigenous population who considered this to be sacrilegious to their belief. Many also considered vaccination to be a tacit acceptance of British authority and rule. Other rumours circulated which saw the mark left by inoculation as identification for official government purposes: induction into the army, tax collection, census taking, and selling girls to harems. Yet rather than seeing this resistance as a genuine invasion of a cultural knowledge system, administrators and governmental experts dismissed the protests on grounds that variolation, synonymous with the goddess Sitala, represented superstition and obscurantist beliefs that could not be incorporated into modernity. All this despite evidence that “variolation, when practised fairly extensively in the population, was an impressively effective method of controlling the disease” (Ibid: 110).

The implications for development has mainly to with the introduction of outside knowledge by experts. Specifically, official smallpox eradication programmes doubted and opposed people’s local and long practised forms of knowledge because it was incompatible with Western sciences’ view that ‘nature’ and ‘superstition’ needed to be dominated and eradicated if progress was to be made. The management of smallpox by official medical discourse, reflected in its practice as a vastly superior form of knowledge, was conducted

18 ‘Expert’ knowledge is a contentious issue in development studies. Experts in the Western academy exist which see themselves as holders of vast amounts of information: Some regard themselves as experts on Brazil, South Africa, even China, not to mention entire regions/continents like the Pacific Rim and Latin America. Conversely, as these experts would no doubt agree, it would be foolhardy to admit being an expert on truly ‘complex’ countries like Canada, the U.S.A. or Germany. On another level, experts also create meaning: “It’s only when knowledge is, or is to appear, so specialised and insulated that ‘experts’ can exist. In the extreme version, ‘peripheral states and their cultures are dissected and explained by mostly Western scholars for the benefit of American audiences (undergraduate classrooms, congressional commissions, CNN viewers, etc.). This ‘knowledge’ is also projected back to the ‘area of study in the form...of U.S. foreign policy and military intervention, or contained in development programs and business practices. The area studies specialist—the expert—mediates this process” (Bencomo & Colla, 1993: unpaginated).
in a style which completely disregarded traditional belief systems and, rather
than being founded on cooperation, became a matter of animosity and
suspicion: The introduction of a system of smallpox eradication scheme--
vaccination--having its basis in Western medical discourse and highly superior
to variolation (iatrogenic rate after variolation 1/100 and after vaccination
1/1000), was not regarded as an acceptable reason by the majority of the Indian
population to forgo variolation.

Development here, is also implicated as serving the interests of
authoritarian political institutions and the logocentric language they employ to
exercise control and fear. Where smallpox is regarded as an absolute evil that
should be totally destroyed, it was regarded as an insult to a religious/cultural
deity--something which represented a concrete symbol or the existence of a
non-logocentric mode of thought and action. When Western science dismisses
this as superstition it also constructs the basis of its own understanding; that is,
Western science, based on a system of binary logic, cannot exit without making
either/or distinctions. Its very logic depends on the existence of invented
oppositions. In the case of India, as Apffel Marglin contends all along,
vaccination was directly coupled with political and cultural mandates and had
therefore little to do with a development that espoused saving people from
disease and starvation:

If development means fewer deaths from diseases and
starvation, superior technologies such as vaccination must
be used to alleviate the suffering of the masses. However,
to be successfully diffused and transplanted they must be
decoupled from their negative political and cultural
entailments. This is seldom if ever done, probably because
of the widespread perception that more efficacious
techniques reflect superior forms of knowledge. (Ibid: 140)
Refusal by Western 'experts' to at least incorporate indigenous knowledge systems in the eradication of smallpox (ideally its control so that the religious component could be kept) makes evident that the indigenous knowledge was unimportant while Western knowledge is superior.

As the synopsis of Apffel Marglin's article suggests, postmodernism rejects totalising discourses which attempt to set relational standards on how knowledge is acquired and used. More specifically, it antagonises discourses which are associated with the Enlightenment and the Western philosophical tradition; "those discourses which set out to address a transcendental subject, to define an essential human nature, to prescribe global human destiny or to proscribe collective human goals" (Hebdige, 1988: 86).

Post-impasse research in development studies, despite its efforts at distancing itself from the claims of radical development theory remains, in many ways, committed to the Enlightenment inspired project of modernisation. As discussed later in this study, 'development' (as 'process' as well as the achievement of 'historical closure') remains as a central concept in most studies of the Third World. As such it participates in the destruction of indigenous knowledge systems, of creating a pool of development 'experts' well-versed in Western scientific discourse, and a reluctance to resist against the power of metatheories.

As the case study of smallpox reveals, 'postmodernism as critical practice' challenges the underlying metanarrative of modernisation theories without seeking to replace them with other all-encompassing frameworks. Instead, 'postmodernism as critical practice' looks to smaller, local narratives which do not rely on formal distinctions like subject/object to arrive at meaning. Neither
subject (human agent) nor object ('society,' or social institutions) should be regarded as having primacy. Each is constituted in and through recurrent practices. The notion of human 'action' presupposes that of 'institutions,' and vice versa [emphasis included]. (Tulea and Krausz, 1993: 15-16)

Furthermore, 'postmodernism as critical practice' "recognises such concepts as particularism, pluralism, heterogeneity, difference, localism, and micro phenomena" (Banai, 1993: 389) without, however advocating that "everything goes and do whatever you like...[but] that there are no hard and fast ways of separating the right and the wrong way, the right and the wrong culture, and so on" (Cantell and Pedersen, 1992: 138). In this way, postmodernism itself, even though it may constitute and describe a type of social and cultural condition, cannot be reduced to any one particular meaning or definition. In other words, while postmodernism may adequately be used as a label by which to perceive and make sense of this period in history, it itself resists categorisation.

Any attempt to define and talk about postmodernism produces a master narrative. According to Brian McHale,

[n]o doubt there there 'is' no such thing as postmodernism. Or at least there is no such thing if what one has in mind is some kind of identifiable object 'out there' in the world, localizable, bounded by a definite outline, open to inspection, possessing attributes about which we can all agree. (1992: 1)

Postmodernism exists as a plurality of meanings, one without a fixed, unified essence; it "exists discursively, in the discourses we produce about it and using it" (Ibid: 1). There can be no privileged status accorded to postmodernism, nor does it aspire to synthesis or totality. Rather, it regards all (empirical) data as
being socially constructed, according to the logic of a particular theory. In this way, 'facts' are perceived as being tainted by the approach used to acquire them. Hence "faithfulness to an objective truth cannot be a criterion for evaluating versions of reality (since the truth will have been produced by the version that is being evaluated by its faithfulness to the truth, and so on circularly" (Ibid: 2). Postmodernism problematises the privileged status of theories and their dependence on the supposition that knowledge exists independently of the theorist; that universals endure despite the current inability to recognise them.19

McHale's perspective on postmodernism is important since it marks a radical departure from traditional modes of theorising. His contention is that the practice of theorising about reality--where reality is the object of theory--is being replaced by narratives (stories) about theory: "instead of narrative being the object of narratological theory, it is theory that has become the object of narrative: where once we had theories about narrative, we begin now to have stories about theory" (Ibid: 4).20 This "narrative turn" of telling stories rather than

19 'Postmodernism as critical practice' is often criticised for its relativity, and nihilist assumptions. These notions can, however, easily be problematised as well for containing certain ideological viewpoints of their own; that is, relativism and nihilism contain implicit value judgments which privilege one set of assumptions above others. Lawson and Appignanesi, for instance, write that "[i]f relativism initiated an unsettling of truth and objectivity, postmodernism is an attempt to engage in the complete dismantling of the edifice. To this extent, postmodernism is a radical version of relativism. While relativism can be described as the view that truth is paradigm-dependent, postmodernism might be described as the view that meaning is undecidable and, therefore, truth unattainable (1989: xli). In any case, as W. B. Stanley argues, "nihilist assumptions are deeply entrenched in our culture to begin with. For example, our historical focus on individualism, political choice, the market economy, instrumentalism, and scientism all promote a view that reduces truth to procedural outcomes or market forces" (1992: 174).

20 See Richardson (1990) for an account of the value of narrative in sociology. Richardson problematises conventional modes of theorising as embedded within a predetermined structure: "All social scientific writing depends upon narrative structure and narrative devices, although that structure and those devices are frequently masked by a 'scientific' frame, which is, itself, a metanarrative (117). Richardson, like Brian McHale, wonders whether it is possible to construct a sociology "in which narrated lives replace the narrative of unseen, atemporal, abstract 'social forces'" (Ibid: 117).
doing theory, has developed out of a response to

the loss of "metaphysical 'grounding' or 'foundations' for our theorizing. We are no longer confident that we can build intellectual structures upward from firm epistemological and ontological foundations....[W]hile there may well be somewhere a 'world' underlying all our disparate versions of it, that world is finally inaccessible, and all we have are the versions; but that hardly matters, since it is only the versions that are of any use to us anyway. (Ibid: 5-6)21

From this perspective metanarratives like those about human emancipation and progress, deriving out of the Enlightenment centred thought of Marxist and Hegelian doctrine, which once served as the basis for a grounded and legitimate knowledge, are no longer credible. The metatheoretical commitment of seeking "a foundation in the image of history as the working out of a purpose (enlightenment or emancipation" (Crook, 1990: 53) remains, however, a central component of development theory, even in its so-called post-impasse period. The "positivist assumption--that 'truth' must surely emerge if 'the facts' are just set down in their proper, self-evident order--" (Norris, 1985: 19) is adhered to in current development theorising despite the self-acknowledgement that this is the central reason for its malaise.22 Post-

21 For 'versioning' as methodological technique see Andrew Herman (1990). Similarly, Dick Hebdige (1967) devotes the first chapter of his book toward an intriguing discussion of the spirit of versioning for writing. Versioning has long been one of the key characteristics of reggae, ska, and other African, Afro-American, and Caribbean music and occurs when a particular piece of music is re-mixed and modified by different musicians or producers who give the 'original' soundscape a slightly different construction. Versioning is not so much an act of musical plagiarism as a gesture of respect and inspiration; when the 'original' source is used as a springboard for telling one's own story. Hence, there are no truths (plagiarisms) only versions, layered one on top of the other, where the original becomes a simulacrum or vague unrecognisable image of something which may once have existed in a 'pure' form but has since been lost or covered up.

22 It should be stated that many theorists sympathetic to the postmodern sensibility argue that positivist methods are but one way of telling a story about society or the social world. They may be no better or no worse than any other method; they just tell a different kind of story. This, however, is a problematic stance to take since positivism is inherently a discourse of exclusion.
Impasse theorising repeatedly commits the same errors it has found in radical development theory (if not conceptually then at least in setting up "competing ideologies work[ing] to reorganize the discursive field in pursuit of their own particular ends" (Ibid: 19).

Among the issues and debates covered so far is the important one of how postmodernism has come to be a way by which to problematise previously held notions about the acquirement of knowledge and the representation of reality. Precisely, 'postmodernism as critical practice' challenges all grand theories and all claims for a singular, correct style for organising and representing knowledge without, however, offering anything in its place. In dwelling on the inadequacies of past modes theorising and their delimiting means of representation and legitimation, postmodernism "is defined not by what it is but what comes after. It is variously called postparadigmatic--postmodernism, post-Marxism, poststructuralism, postpositivism--some even say post-feminism [emphasis included] (Richardson, 1988: 199).

The demise of authority and the lack of a general paradigmatic style of organising research has led to the free-flow of ideas and methods across the social science disciplines, leading to a blurring of genres. Hence when recourse to a dominant paradigm is no longer possible and when even the very concept of paradigm is subject to contextualisation and indeterminacy, "scholars face...a crisis in representation: uncertainty about what constitutes adequate depiction of social reality" (Ibid: 200). Such a situation arises, for instance, when empirical research excludes interpretations of the forces that shape both the researcher and the researched. Alternatively, "attention is focused on epistemology, interpretive understanding, and the discursive forms

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For this reason many other postmodernists reject positivist assumptions since they reproduce only a certain kind of science that silences too many voices.
of representation themselves. Our common sense understanding of method is extended to include epistemological assumptions on the one hand, and the writing process on the other" (Ibid: 200). As a way of carrying out critical social research, postmodernism "is not simply the empirical re-presentation of the world but the transgressive task of posing the research itself as a set of ideological practices" (Kincheloe and McLaren, 1994: 145).

In this way and from a contemporary standpoint, as Steven Seidman (1992) suggests, the postmodern intervention is not merely another rehashing of debates between positivists and their critics or between scientific and humanistic sociologists. Indeed, these seemingly endless discussions may be taken as symptomatic of the current impasse of sociological theory and of its stultifying insularity. (49)

More precisely, the crisis, or its conditions, that Seidman addresses are "the result of two arrogant assumptions that derive from the varieties of positivism. These assumptions are that sociology should necessarily be a science and the claim that sociology could prescribe the conditions for and the ultimate nature of a new society" (Jencks, 1993: 129). That sociology has not met this criteria has been made evident by its unconvincing accounts of modernisation, whether it be from the point of view as advocate or as critic. 'Postmodernism as critical practice,' without taking sides, is situated in this debate to the extent that it seeks to utilise the space this crisis has opened up for the purpose of including previously excluded voices.

The impasse in radical development as well as the means that have been suggested as to how it may be transcended represent a continuation of this crisis rather than its problematisation. That is, the impasse alludes and refers to both the continual confrontation between the dominant and alternative
paradigms (described in the next chapter) and the ongoing project of displacing outmoded explanations of reality with ones which are apparently more encompassing and true to life. Postmodernism raises questions about how the impasse debate has come to be developed and constructed in the first place. In place of progressive theory building, Seidman urges

a shift in the role of theorists from building general theory or providing epistemic warrants for sociology to serving as moral and political analysts, narrators of stories of social development, producers of genealogies, and social critics. I advocate a change from a discipline-centred social inquiry whose reference point is debates in speciality areas to contextualized local narratives that address public conflicts (Seidman, 1992: 49).

From a broader and global perspective, the dual crisis of representation and legitimation (viewed from positions as those offered by Jameson, Harvey, and Lash) has arisen alongside a crisis of politics—if not enveloped by it—particularly where it involves those conceptions of socialism which rest upon the ontological centrality of the working class, upon the role of the Revolution, with a capital “r,” as the founding moment in the transition from one type of society to another, and upon the illusory prospect of a perfectly unitary and homogeneous collective will that will render pointless the moment of politics. The plural and multifarious character of contemporary social struggles has finally dissolved the last foundation for that political imaginary. Peopled with “universal” subjects and conceptually built around “History” in the singular, it has postulated “society” as an intelligible structure that could be intellectually mastered on the basis of certain class positions and reconstituted, as a rational, transparent order, through a founding act of a political character. Today the left is witnessing the final act of the dissolution of that Jacobian imaginary. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 2)

23 The post-Marxist position that Laclau and Mouffe refer to here has come to be a key aspect in current debates in radical development theory. According to its adherents, notably Stuart Corbridge (see chapter 3 of this study), post-Marxism is a suitable alternative to orthodox and neo-Marxist approaches in development. In terms of analysis post-Marxism regards class as suspect. “Class analysis, particularly in its more classical Marxist forms... is held in disrepute. Class, defined
The recent global upheavals and the advent of the ‘new world order’ may have brought about a postmodern condition but has done little in terms of the ways in which this condition has destabilised how meaning is constructed. Indeed, as Jameson, Harvey, and Lash would see it, ‘postmodernism as condition’ signals the furtherance of capitalist expansion on a global level and which only strengthens the notion of evolving and progressive forms of capitalism. In this way it is is difficult to perceive how ‘postmodernism as condition’ is any different from modernity, except in terms of spatial integration where the capitalist mode of production gains a world wide hegemony. Jameson, in particular, dogmatically believes that commodification—the selling of human labour power to profit-maximising capitalists—is the primary source of domination in capitalist societies and that reification—the appearance of this relation between persons and classes as relation between things and prices—is the major historical process against which to understand norms, values, sensibilities, texts, and movements in the modern world. (West, 1986: 123)

A similar criticism can be made of Harvey as suggested by Peter Marden (1990)...

In the first instance by relations to the means of production—by surplus-extraction relationship—is regularly dismissed as a figment of mechanistic structuralism. In the 1960s and 1970s, to understand how societies were transformed, scholars were drawn to examining the cataclysmic outbursts of rebellions and revolutions. Now such studies are out of favour, replaced by examination of everyday forms of resistance” (Dore, 1992: 94). The theme of resistance has become the focus of new social movement discourse. While modernist politics was aimed at creating an ‘imagined uniformity’ based on an analysis of class that took the consciously informed industrial proletariat as the single/privilged agent of collective change, more recent work has focused on “the diversity of the agents and the varied forms of individual (identity) as well as collective identity” [emphasis added]. The study of new social movements have drawn attention to “the relegation off class struggle as (possibly) the only constituitive element of identity and replaced it with an emphasis on non-class basis of social identity.” New social movements have called “upon a range of different voices and discourses and articulated them in new political spaces and through multiple claims to representation”; they emphasise plurality and “a multiplicity of identities which cross-cut gender, ‘race’, culture and class”; and, they have forced a reconceptualisation of political terms such as ‘democracy’ and ‘civil society’ (Jones, 1994: 4-5). See also Bill Martin’s (1992) account of new social movements from a Derridean perspective. Martin makes distinctions between ‘political movements’ and ‘communities of resistance.’ The former “work generally in a more secular framework, and there is in these movements some concern with theory ‘as such’. Communities of resistance are more characterized by the attempt to forge a new form of life, primarily by living in a new way” (30).
"Essentially it can be argued that Harvey's...study is a thorough modernist critique of postmodernism. Indeed...his project is still very much about defending Marxist metanarrative from the deconstructive challenges of poststructuralism" (Marden, 1992: 47). Marden's statement also echoes ongoing trends in radical development thinking where postmodernism as condition might well be accepted since it leaves intact traditional conceptions of development and the means by which it is represented in research. This means, in essence, continuing with the metanarrative of Marx's economic determinism that regards the postmodern(ism) as simply a current cultural dominant within capitalism, not as a perspective which confronts the current (and past) socioeconomic period as a discursive construct.

Since the term 'postmodernism as condition' describes the current historical situation and is considered a reflection of capitalism's latest manifestation rather than a way of questioning the basis upon which this condition has been constructed, it offers little potential for problematising the impasse in radical development. From this perspective, the impasse in development theory serves as another indicator of the necessity of new and more elaborate theories by which to make sense of the shifts and reconstruction of the new geopolitical order. Aside from being part of this project, the impasse has not, however, acknowledged the notion of postmodernism as a configuration of new sentiments and ideas regarding the nature of theorising and conducting research. Precisely, those who have taken up the cause of the impasse in radical development expect new innovations to come in the form of systematic analysis from which emerge distinctive models of research practice as products to be tested and distributed. By contrast postmodern informed analysis offer "neither models to follow nor the much-awaited products of a new
paradigm nor empty conformity with radicalizing fashion" (Marcus, 1994: 573).

Paradigms in research function as overlying frameworks which pervade the entire way of thinking about a particular issue or theme as well as the way in which the topic or object of study is approached. Paradigms are based on general assumptions about the nature of reality and attempt to provide a basis by which understand and comprehend the complexity of this reality. In this way paradigms operate as metatheories in that they are committed to a set of basic beliefs (or metaphysics) that deal with ultimates or first principles. It [a paradigm] represents a worldview that defines, for its holder, the nature of the "world", the individual's place in it, and the range of possible relationships to that world and its parts....The beliefs are basic in the sense that they must be accepted simply on faith (however well argued); there is no way to establish their ultimate truthfulness [emphasis included]". (Guba and Lincoln, 1994: 107)

Furthermore, researchers do not usually explicitly acknowledge the viewpoint from which they operate since, generally speaking, the mode of inquiry adopted already reflects that particular position. This is explained in terms of how researchers respond to three defining and fundamental questions (ontological, epistemological, and methodological), all of which, according to Guba and Lincoln, are interconnected in such a way that the answer given to any one question, taken in any order, determines how the others may be answered.

The ontological question is concerned with the form and nature of reality and in so doing starts from the assumption that a material world exists. However, depending upon the paradigm from within which a researcher operates, the related questions of 'how things really are' and 'how things really work' begin to be the basis by which paradigms are distinguishable. For instance, a positivist or dominant world view assumes that the 'real' world 'out
there' is comprehensible in human terms and can be represented realistically and in universal terms. From a more critical perspective, reality is shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender values. On a more extreme level, reality is held to be related to the specific and localised context where it is produced.

The epistemological question addresses the relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known. The answer that can be given is, to a certain degree, dependent on the position taken regarding the ontological question. For example, if a 'real' reality is assumed, then the position of the knower can be one of objective detachment or value freedom in order to be able to discern 'how things really are' and 'how things really work'. In the case of a positivist oriented paradigm, the knower and the would-be known are assumed to be independent entities where the former can realistically and truly represent the object under investigation without bias so long as a scientific framework is rigorously adhered to. Alternative paradigms are more concerned with how the values of the researcher infringe on the object of study and henceforth the results that are obtained. Continuing along these lines, an extreme viewpoint would consider the "investigator and the object of investigation to be interactively linked so that the findings are literally created as the investigation proceeds. The conventional distinction between ontology and epistemology disappears (Ibid: 111).

The methodological question is interested in determining how the would-be knower can go about finding out whatever is believed can be known. A positivist methodology is informed by questions or hypothesis that are proposed and then subject to empirical tests for verification. On the other hand, alternative paradigms regard inquiry as as transactional, requiring a dialogue
between the investigator and the subjects of the inquiry. This dialogue is dialectical in nature, meaning that in order to transform ignorance and misapprehension about what is thought to be a determined and immutable history there must first be an acceptance that historical conditions can be changed through human efforts and action. A more critical position, one holding to the position that 'facts' about the 'real' world are only socially constructed, suggests that "individual constructions can be elicited and refined only through interaction between and among investigator and respondents" (Ibid: 111). This refers to the above remarks on the duel crisis of representation and legitimation where a great deal of skepticism currently exists regarding the ability of the researcher to capture and evaluate lived experience in any accurate sense.

The role of language in shaping common sense perceptions of the 'real' world continue to be a central aspect of postmodernism. Specifically, postmodernism informed research is directed against the idea of theory-neutral language, in other words, the notion that the physical world is fixed and the belief that the right language is the key to unlocking the mystery of material reality is problematic. The logic employed in this understanding of material reality is that through rigorous research we will continuously improve language through a more accurate correspondence with nature and thereby be able to discover the genuine order of things (see Game, 1991: pp. 5-6). Conversely, in examining the effects of reality rather than the causes, 'postmodernism as critical practice' claims that our knowledge of the world is constructed as a problem of representation rather than one of factual accuracy. From a similar perspective, John Hassard (1993) understands the major theme of postmodernism to be the replacement of the factual by the representational: "Under a postmodern approach...the empirical process is redefined. The language which is produced by the empirical process does not equate with an increasingly accurate correspondence with reality. Instead, it represents a
Poststructuralist derived interpretations have had a great impact within the various streams of social science discourse. Following their structuralist predecessors, poststructuralists have introduced the concept of the 'speaking subject' or the subject in process. However, instead of viewing language as an impersonal system as structuralists tend to do, language is regarded as always articulated or joined with other systems, especially subjective processes. The conception of language in use is summed up in the term 'discourse.'

Poststructuralist thought often takes the form of a critique against positivism and empiricism—the dominant mode of thought in Western societies.
since the Enlightenment. Empiricism regards the subject/investigator/researcher as the source of all knowledge. The human mind is able to receive impressions from the external world which it then categorises and organises into a knowledge of the world. This occurs through the 'apparently' transparent medium of language where the subject grasps the object and puts it into words. However, empiricism is problematised by a theory of discursive formations which refuses to separate subject (self) and object (other) into separate domains. That is, knowledges are formed from discourses which preexist the subjects experiences. Even the subject itself is not an autonomous or unified identity but is always in a process of transition. “Subjectivity...is linguistically and discursively constructed and displaced across the range of discourses in which the concrete individual participates” (Belsey, 1980: 61).

The work of Michel Foucault is often acknowledged in poststructuralism.27 Poststructuralism is a particular kind of postmodernist thinking commonly associated with French thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze, and Jean-Francois Lyotard. Common to all is a similar intellectual tradition beginning in the early 1960s when they “reacted against the formalism of structuralist linguistics and against the figure of the epistemological subject implied or explicitly defended by its theorists” (Poster, 1989: 4). They also leaned towards some form of Marxist theory at one time or another but began to doubt its agenda, especially the Stalinist type defended by the French Communist Party. Most importantly perhaps is that none of these thinkers would consider themselves as 'poststructuralist' since this implies, in the least sense, a unified theoretical project of sorts (like structuralism) and, in the greatest sense, a paradigmatic sensibility; both of which are to be resisted.

28 Thomas Kuhn (1970), in his well known work, challenges the belief that regards science as a steady progression of knowledge. He showed that science 'progresses' in a series of jumps and breaks, in a discontinuous movement from one discursive formation, or paradigm, to another. In this way researchers are not subjects perceiving and creating meanings of the world through untainted or objective minds, but rather they conduct and write their research within the conceptual limits of particular scientific discourses, which are historically situated in relation to their society and culture. Kuhn offers this example: “Looking at a bubble-chamber photograph, the student sees confused and broken lines, the physicist a record of familiar subnuclear events. Only after a number of such transformations of vision does the student become an inhabitant of the scientist's world, seeing what the scientist sees and responding as the scientist does. The world that the student then enters is not, however, fixed once and for all by the nature of the environment, on the one hand, and of science on the other. Rather it is determined jointly by the environment and the particular normal-scientific tradition that the student has been trained to pursue” (111-112).
informed analysis. His research has involved mapping the discursive formations which, often in the name of science, have enabled institutions to wield power and domination by defining and excluding the mad, the sick, the criminal, the poor and the deviant. For Foucault, discourse is always inseparable from power because discourse is the governing and ordering medium of every institution. Discourse, according to Foucault, determines what it is possible to say in any era, what are the criteria of ‘truth’, who is allowed to speak with authority, and where such speech can be spoken.29 This idea of discourse and its direct relationship to power is a central component of poststructuralism.

Poststructuralism links language, subjectivity, social organisation, and power. The centrepiece is language. Language does not "reflect" social reality, but produces meaning, creates social reality. Different languages and different discourses within a given language divide up the world and give it meaning in ways that are not reducible to one another. Language is how social organization and power are defined and contested and the place where our sense of selves, our subjectivity is constructed. Understanding language as competing discourses, competing ways of giving meaning and of organizing the world, makes language a site of exploration, struggle.

(Richardson, 194: 518)

And since the individual is subject to multiple and competing discourses in the many instances of lived experience in everyday life, the individual's subjectivity is in a continual state of flux, not stable, fixed or rigid. At the same time "poststructuralism points to the continual cocreation of the Self and social

29 Foucault's cryptic remarks about the possibility of resistance to the discursive power of ideologies make it somewhat difficult to pursue his line of reasoning in terms of any emancipatory agenda. Indeed, in a well-known interview Foucault once remarked, "I think to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system" (1977: 230). Richard Rorty (1989) interprets this to mean that "we are too far gone for reform to work--that a convulsion is needed, that our imagination and will are so limited by the socialization we have received that we are unable to even propose an alternative to the society we have now" (64).
science; they are known through each other....Poststructuralism incites us to reflect upon our method and explore new ways of knowing [emphasis included]" (Ibid: 518).

Poststructuralism raises many questions about the business of carrying out research on development, ones which have not been attended to in radical development discourse either in its pre-impasse period or that which has followed it. Concepts such as 'representation' and 'difference' are themselves made problematic through poststructuralist analysis in the sense that their usage may well serve to implicate a furthering and continuing process of repression and closure. The challenge of critical research--in creating the possibility for 'their' self-representation--is to radicalise the idea of 'representation' and 'difference' itself, from which follows the suggestion that "the other is not us, [it] insists, and is quite possibly not even like us" (Mohanty, 1992: 119). For Mohanty the challenge of "how do we conceive the other, indeed the Other, outside of our inherited concepts and beliefs so as not to replicate the patterns of repression and subjugation we notice in the traditional conceptual frameworks" (Ibid: 119). In this way

much of our understanding of what is crucial to a poststructuralist political and critical climate depends on how we define and specify these issues. More than any synoptic or comprehensive view of poststructuralism, what we need today is greater clarity about what is presupposed, implied, or entailed by our formulation of questions of the "other," which would in effect be an interrogation of proposed agendas through the process of seeking precise definitions. (Ibid: 119)

Foucault has asked similar questions, ones which Mohanty sympathises with, and which also share her desire to orient thinking in a radically different direction: "How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How
are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions?” (Foucault, 1984: 49). Hence, the belief that our actions can be guided by truths and knowledge we have acquired before we enter into relations of power is no longer defensible from a Foucaultian perspective: “Knowledge and truth are no longer for Foucault, as they were for the humanists, the enemies of power, but are absolutely essential to its functioning” (Shumway, 1989: 113). Put another way “knowledge [for Foucault] is discursive practice, and...all practices are productive of and produced in networks of power and knowledge” (Game, 1991: 9). And for Foucault there is no detachment, “no refuge from worldly involvement, no possibility of withdrawing to some fixed point, a pure subjectivity above the flux of human practices” (Falzon, 1993: 3).

This section has shown that the case for a direct causal link between thought and action, intention and results, reason and progress, political struggle and emancipation—as represented by mainstream modern social science discourse—seems to have lost much of its credibility. Furthermore, the claim that change can be controlled and brought about through wilful, purposeful human agency has become suspect mainly because this line of reasoning assumes the possibility that opposition can actually be situated outside the workings of power in that it somehow contains a more pure and genuine form. Likewise, what has become increasingly evident is that such an opposition, “beginning as a challenge to the all-embracing or totalising ‘identity of the system of capital, turns out to be itself fully implicated in the production and maintenance of the very principle of identity which it proposes to question” (Docherty, 1990: 211). In other words, the system in place produces not only domination and oppression but the very conditions making a critique of this domination and
oppression possible; the subject is inseparable from power: “Power relations change, shape and produce the very reality we experience (and the 'who' of the 'we' of any particular experience), hence central to modern power is its productivity, not its repressive effects” (Jacques, 1991: 332).

Summary

The impasse in radical development is very much a product of the condition of postmodernism, one which, at any rate, it implicitly recognises. Yet while the impasse acknowledges postmodernism as a periodising concept, it has not concerned itself with the problematique 'postmodernism as critical practice' poses regarding its doubt toward metanarrative and its suspicion of truth claims as serving ideological interests. This is particularly evident where radical development is criticised by impasse theorising for having lost its explanatory function and appeal. However, as the following chapters demonstrate, post-impasse research has not transcended the limits of its own critique since it continues to be situated in the same discursive space that it criticises.
Chapter 3: Paradigms in Development

Introduction

Radical development theory adopts a neo-Marxist position which situates it firmly in the alternative paradigm of the social sciences. As such, radical development theory constitutes a sustained critique of conventional approaches to development; the neoclassical/conservative tradition on the one hand and the orthodox Marxist tradition on the other (Levitt, undated: 84). Like all positions within the alternative paradigm, radical theories of development are best considered in terms of the critical function they serve. Radical development theory does not work within the accepted domain of mainstream development theorising but seeks to bring about fundamental change to prevailing and accepted definitions of development. Specifically, radical development emphasises the causes that lead to the continued underdevelopment of the Third World rather than on presenting resolutions as to how the Third World can be brought out of its undeveloped state. Yet in its criticism of the neoclassical and orthodox Marxist theories, radical development is advocating its own position on development through its dissatisfaction with

1 The dependency approach, for example, represents one particular stream within neo-Marxist theories of development because it represents a radical departure from conventional Marxist accounts of development. Neo-Marxism, however, also encompasses other approaches than just dependency. Its origin can be found at the beginning of this century, particularly in the writings of the Hungarian intellectual Georg Lukacs (History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics) and in the works of Antonio Gramsci (Letters from Prison). Lukacs emphasised the Hegelian aspects of Marx's thought and developed a striking critique of the bourgeois world-view as 'reified;' that is, as unacceptably static and objective. Gramsci re-evaluated the role of the superstructure in Marxist theory in his discussion of both the role of intellectuals in reformatory politics as well as the concept of hegemony (the process by which workers gain leadership over all the forces opposed to capitalism and weld them into a new political bloc capable of resisting and eventually overthrowing the dominance of the bourgeoisie). Neo-Marxism, as it developed after World War II lost most of its political vitality and became instead an intellectually based movement. Besides the works of Frankfurt School members who stressed the subjective and psychoanalytic side of Marxism (especially bourgeois culture: Dialectic of Enlightenment), and of Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialist Marxism (Search for a Method), was the important work of structuralists--how certain structures (institutions) in society underlie and generate certain phenomena--such as Louis Althusser (For Marx).
conventional forms of development. As such, this chapter contends that radical development is not so much an alternative to development as it is a continuation of the desire for development to occur in alternative forms.

This chapter provides a general statement of what is meant when references are made to radical development theory. Since development is often considered from opposing points of view about the condition of society (progressive/regressive, contemporary/traditional, developed/underdeveloped), paradigms become a helpful means for organising and situating different theoretical positions according to their central values and propositions. The notion that theories about the meaning of society fall somewhere within one of two major paradigms is acceptable to this study to the extent that it facilitates a preliminary discussion of the struggle for theoretical dominance of competing claims about social reality.

Despite the problems associated with paradigms (mainly their dualistic and conflictive nature), initial thinking about the impasse in radical development theory cannot be conducted otherwise. Rather than attempt to define the many approaches that constitute the radical development paradigm, section one of this chapter simply seeks to clarify, in broad terms, the point of view from which radical theories of development operate. The second section situates the dominant development paradigm within the theory of modernisation. This serves as an elaboration to the argument that neoclassical and orthodox Marxism share a similar outlook with regard to the notion of capitalist progress. The last section presents a critical appraisal of radical development theory and assesses whether its claim as an alternative form of development is justified. This explanation is required since radical development is the main focus of critique for impasse and post-impasse development theorising.
3.1: Radical Development: Towards a Definition

Radical development, first and foremost, provides a critical analyses of the processes believed to be responsible for underdevelopment. In this way it shares a number of assumptions regarding how social reality is viewed; ones which oppose the dominant (traditional, mainstream) paradigm. Those who adhere to the dominant paradigm of development can be identified by their faith in the principles of the free market and of liberal democratic governance or, conversely, of the necessity of this condition in the evolutionary path toward a more egalitarian social system. In both instances fundamental beliefs predominate that adhere to several of the following principles: maintenance of the status quo and the existing social order; expanded efficiency of the market; harmony and cohesion of social groups; faith in reason, science, progress; and, adoption of correct values and social structures.

Opponents of the dominant paradigm provide a different perspective on development. The alternative paradigm, in contrast to the dominant mode of perceiving reality, emphasises, above all, interventive and even revolutionary action against the existing social structure. This belief, as supported by analyses of structural conflicts and contradictions within the dominant order, is

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2 Neoclassicism and orthodox Marxism have traditionally occupied the two contrasting streams of theoretical work within the dominant paradigm in development theory. The end of World War II and subsequent decolonisation made it necessary, however, for both paradigms to rethink their positions in terms of the 'new' global order. For profiles of initial work in this area see Meir (1987). Meir deals mainly with the works of P. T. Bauer, C. Clark, A. O. Hirschman, A. Lewis, G. Myrdal, R. Prebisch, P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, W. W. Rostow, and J. Tinbergen. Although this list represents an eclectic mixture and range of insights and positions it nevertheless gives an indication of the formative moments in Third World development theory. Common to these individuals is the belief that the expansion of capital is necessary if progress is to occur. However, reasons and the means for advocating development along similar paths to that of Western nations differ considerably. Some for instance (speaking from the neoclassical tradition) express a firm conviction in the importance of foreign trade (reduction in barriers, free international movement of capital, diffusion of knowledge and skills) and comparative advantages (large pools of labour, natural resources) in the development process. Others (Marxist inclined) favour a more national or state-centred approach in which the process of development would be strictly regulated and monitored.
that an overall and active transformation of the current social system is required before any just and equitable form of development can be created. This includes the firm conviction that capitalism is not a progressive force, either as the best possible organising principle that can possibly be attained, or conversely, as a mode of production in a series of historical stages culminating in absolute equality. Rather, capitalism is regarded as a negative force in the Third World; one which impedes its development in the sense that it is the direct cause of underdevelopment.

While both paradigms hold completely opposite views on the nature and composition of Third World societies and how they should be involved in the development process, they all "take for granted that the goal of Third World development can and should be to rise to the 'living standards' the developed countries currently enjoy" (Trainer, 1989: 481). In this way, the concept development remains firmly entrenched within the social imaginary that finds it unable to conceptualise any other form of development and to refer to any standard other than its own. Both paradigms collude, in different ways, by continuously reproducing and reinforcing the myth of the necessity of development.

Skepticism toward dependent development, where the Third World is victim to the exploitive tendencies of the world capitalist system, is rooted in the notion that dominant views of development control and limit the extent to which

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3 Much empirical evidence currently exists to support such claims: 1) Persistent and lingering social problems (basic needs remain unfulfilled, rising rates in infant mortality, illiteracy etc.) 2) continual increase in income disparities as reflected in GDP/capita. Robert McNamara, ex-president of the World Bank, once stated that if present rates of economic growth continue in the Third World (1.3-1.6%/annum), it will take them 150 years to reach half the GNP/capita the rich countries had in 1980 (Thompson, 1983:39). 3) Increasing debt burdens. In addition to these points, mention needs to be made regarding technological advances in communications, transportation, and changes in agricultural practices. Despite such advancements, "more than 1 billion people, one fifth of the world's population, live on less than one dollar a day--a standard that Western Europe and the United States attained two hundred years ago" (World Bank, 1991:1).
the Third World is allowed to develop. Showing that this is indeed what is happening is the primary aim of radical development theory. In this way radical development constitutes a theory in that it attempts to explain and give reasons as to why development is not occurring, despite claims to the contrary by neoclassical and orthodox Marxists theorists.

There are of course different approaches to this understanding, of which one of the first gave the following reasons: 1) that a system of world capitalism already exists (one in which most of the instruments of production as well as objects of consumption are privately controlled) and is exploiting the colonial and post-colonial countries; and 2) that as the industrialised 'core' of world capitalism develops ever greater wealth and power so too the exploited 'periphery' becomes relatively more underdeveloped. J. Larrain (1989: 115-119) explains that in taking this position, dependency oriented explanations of underdevelopment essentially argue that foreign economic penetration and heavy external dependence cause major distortions in the economies of Third World countries which leads to the stagnation and the outward flow of surplus capital and expertise from the Third World to the 'core.' This continual process of underdevelopment widens the gulf between the powerful and technologically innovative rich world and the poor Third World which, as a result of this process, becomes even more vulnerable to exploitation. The resulting conditions allow for more severe forms of state repression to occur as their regimes attempt to protect the interests of the wealthy elites, who as clients of the capitalist 'core,' do well out of the system. Any chance of real progress towards democracy is thus denied.

4 The work of Andre Gunder Frank is perhaps the most noted and popular brand of dependency and, without a doubt, encapsulates the early radical development paradigm most succinctly. See Frank (1966).

5 As the Impasse discourse makes clear (especially, Booth, 1985), dependency approaches have
While the dependency approach marks the first radical dismissal in development theory of some of the key concepts in orthodox Marxism it should not necessarily be considered as the only approach within the radical development paradigm. Scott Werker (1985) wonders whether dependency can even be considered as belonging to any particular paradigm at all:

Paradigmatically, dependency has been regarded by some as an inadequate alternative to the...[dominant paradigm] because it has simply inver.ed--via the process of polemics as opposed to theory building--the latter's theoretical principles and assumptions without also transcending its methodological problematique (84).

This reflects a narrow interpretation of what constitutes a paradigm; that is, as directly confrontational, arising out of a sound theoretical base and capable of offering itself as a viable replacement. This limited view of the concept paradigm leaves no room for world views which strictly serve a critical or oppositional function. Legitimating alternative world views through actual implementation or demonstration is, in any case, something which the dominant paradigm prevents from taking place.

The same skepticism towards the dominant world view that characterises dependency is also shared by many other approaches situated in the alternative paradigm; namely their critique and subsequent dismissal of existing types and received views of development which privilege one particular form of inquiry, a singular perception of the world, and a dogmatic vision of reality been subjected to relentless criticism and derision. The usual sorts of arguments launched against dependency remark that it simply overemphasises the level of domination of the more economically advanced societies. These critics (Laite, 1988, among them) like to point out that countries like Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, the Arab oil countries, and especially the new industrialising countries (NICs) of East Asia and the 'Pacific Rim' regions are good examples of how the relationship with the 'core' can be renegotiated by 'peripheral' countries and how some can even establish successful development programmes. Laite also believes that where dependency focuses on 'core' and 'periphery,' it leaves out explanations of the process of class formation in Third World societies, "either of bourgeois groups implementing dependency relations with the periphery, or of proletarian and peasant groups resisting such exploitation" (190).
above all others. However, the degree to which approaches within the alternative paradigm emphasise their dismissal of the dominant paradigm differ greatly. For instance, paradigms are not marked by absolute and definitive stances but contain within themselves a certain operative range. In the case of dependency, all that will be said here is that it is located somewhere along the continuum within the alternative paradigm; possibly closer to the pole which holds that change for the better, through human action, is possible if not necessary. While certainly not anarchistic (it is structured by a set of principles regarding the necessity of the achievement of development in some form or another) dependency nevertheless struggles against established and current forms of development.  

3.2: Modernisation theory as Dominant Paradigm

From a more general perspective, radical development theory can be described in terms of what it is against. As already indicated, its main opponents are those who hold opposing viewpoints while situated within the dominant paradigm of modernisation (neoclassicists and orthodox Marxists). Radical development, specifically dependency, is “based on a critique of the modernization approach extant in mainstream economic and sociological studies of development and on a critique of the traditional Marxist approaches.”

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6 Recognising that the concept dependency has been greatly oversimplified, the point nevertheless remains that it constitutes a valid point of departure by which to navigate through the discussion involving paradigms. On a different note, dependency, especially its connection to World-Systems theory, is certainly far from anachronistic. G. M. Rocha, in looking at the resurgence of neoliberal orthodoxies in Latin America during the 1980s, suggests that “because the liberalization, deregulation, privatization, and other ‘modernizing’ policies associated with the structural reforms are directly linked to the promotion of large flows of capital and constitute the latest effort of the adherents of the neoclassical paradigm to promote the diffusion of capitalism from the centre to the periphery, dependency cannot be seen as anachronistic” (1994: 74). Furthermore, instead of focussing entirely on the categories of ‘core’ and ‘periphery,’ new research is being done on the international divisions of labour that characterise global industries (Gereffi & Korzaniewicz, 1990), as well as environmental destruction (Fergusson et al., 1993), and examination of resource conflicts (Margario et al, 1994). For a general overall defense of dependency see Castells and Laserna (1989).
Since the impasse recognises the existence of problems in both views it is necessary to provide a condensed overview of each of them. One way in which this can achieved is to consider the dominant paradigm in terms of its principal interest in modernisation.

Theories of modernisation are usually equated with the neoclassical approach, especially where economic growth is concerned. In this way it is not entirely wrong to include orthodox Marxism as involved in similar motives, albeit for different purposes:

The Marxist variety of modernization stresses qualitative leaps which a society is forced to make because of the dialectics of internal contradictions, expressed through class struggle. All transitions to new stages of development are by definition 'progress', since every 'mode of production' will exhaust its potential before being replaced by a 'higher' mode. This is what makes the Marxist theory of change another theory of modernization" (Hettne, 1990: 60).

Where the former claims to be setting forth programmes for the benefit of material advancement--expressed in the virtues of capitalism--and as the means for reducing poverty and other social ills, the latter--while noting the inherent evils of such a system--is far more concerned with the resulting and inevitable outcome. This resulting paradox is qualified by opposing views on the historical situation of capitalism. Again, the former believe in its perfectibility as the best that can be achieved whereas the latter are more interested in the outcome it will produce.

This conception of modernisation is obviously vulnerable to criticism for its attempt to conflate opposing theories such that they essentially erode the differences that set them apart. However, if modernisation is viewed as progress, evolution, economic growth and so forth, then it is not entirely wrong
to combine theories which typify this view, especially in the case of development where modernisation refers to emulating the achievements of Western societies by effectively mimicking their efforts by choice or out of necessity.7

Radical development, as represented by neo-Marxism, holds that modernisation theory, as a prime example of the dominant paradigm, and its quest for unity, cohesiveness, maintenance, and evolutionary change of the status quo, maintains oppressive structures which need to be either completely overthrown (through revolutionary processes) or at the very least reformed (with the aid of state regulation). Dependency and related approaches in the radical development paradigm refute many of the common assumptions of theories of modernisation including the following: 1) a series of evolutionary stages from undeveloped to developed occur during economic development; 2) internal differences among societies are responsible for variations in the rate of development; 3) these internal differences are both structural and social psychological; 4) modernisation is quickened when less developed societies make frequent contact with developed ones; and, 5) economic and technological aid to less developed nations hastens modernisation (Margavio et al., 1994). However this criticism alone does not define the radical component of dependency approaches. Its claim to 'radicalness' comes from its desire to maintain ties with Marxism while at the same time allowing for a certain skepticism to exist regarding the extent or degree of capitalist penetration and its long-term effects in the Third World.

7 Whether individuals, singly or in identifiable groups, can significantly alter historical processes has always been a point of contention in Marxist theory. One text that problematises the role of the individual in Marxist theory is by Marx himself: “Men make their own history, but not as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living” (Marx in Tucker, 1978: 595).
The dependency perspective on the causes of underdevelopment constitutes only one of several views that together compose the radical development paradigm, however it is mentioned here because it illustrates the differences between the two paradigms. Other neo-Marxist approaches, or what is referred to as the 'new' Marxist influenced development sociology in the impasse literature, includes 'the mode of production theory,' 'world systems theory,' and 'associated dependent capitalist development.' Common to all is that they are, in one way or another, linked to the critique employed by dependency. Furthermore, as neo-Marxist approaches, they all "adopt an almost antithetical stance to the dogmatic Eurocentric views of Marx" (Hulme & Turner, 1990: 45). Such approaches focus on the external relations of Third World countries with industrial capitalism leading to the conclusion that exploitation and underdevelopment are the net result. Specifically, Frank's claim was that international economic relations of exchange (as opposed to production) between the capitalist states and the underdeveloped states either cause or perpetuate underdevelopment. This leads to his argument that underdeveloped states cannot leave this situation without severing economic relations with the world capitalist system through revolutionary means (Binder, 1986: 20). Each Third World country must go through its own individual socialist revolution and cut all economic relations with the world capitalist system, regardless of the state of development, class structure or, political institutions prevailing in the particular country.


9 Frank's notion of underdevelopment, as a created and lasting stagnant condition, is the central premise of radical development theory. The orthodox counter-attack against it have been handled especially well by Bill Warren (1973). He argues that the Third World is achieving normal and considerable capitalist development; citing as evidence growth in GNP.
3.3: A Critique of Radical Development Theory

Although the popularity of dependency, in its initial formulation, is evidently on the down-turn—at least in terms of its relevancy in the present global context (its call to nations to mobilise and socialise) and the resurgence of neoliberal values—it no doubt has served, and will likely continue to do so, as a valuable interlude to the dominant paradigm. As Aidan Foster-Carter (1973) has remarked, neo-Marxism, as initially informed in radical development theory by the dependency approach, has posed new problems to dominant “bourgeois theory” and “traditional Marxism” in a number of ways. Bourgeois theory (neoclassical modernisation theory), is seen “not as a value-free science but as ideological, serving Western foreign policy or reflecting prejudices of the Western world-view” [emphasis added] (ibid: 22).

In making the case for dependency as a critique of bourgeois theory, Foster-Carter recognises the importance of Frank in first formulating a neo-Marxist critique of the difficulties associated with using underdevelopment to describe a internal condition rather than a external process. For instance, Foster-Carter describes Frank as rejecting the idea of underdevelopment as a process which citizens of the Third World are themselves somehow responsible for (another bourgeois sentiment), and argues instead that “the non-developed countries were never underdeveloped, though they may have been undeveloped,” and that underdevelopment is in fact not an original state but one continuously generated at many levels by the workings of capitalism” (ibid: 22). Even the concept Third World is a bourgeois construct “since what it...designated is really ‘capitalism’s backyard’ and that the real conflict is between capitalist and socialist systems” (ibid: 22). On a related level, Frank in his critique is seen to object to the discursively constructed meanings that have
colonised development discourse; vacuous terms such as 'tradition' and 'modernity,' thus creating a dichotomised 'Other,' and implying that "development and underdevelopment are separate, watertight compartments" (ibid: 22). Frank, as suggested by Foster-carter, would rather believe these to be one and the same issue; "two creatures of the same process" (ibid: 22); the 'development of underdevelopment.'

Separating the two terms leads, in Frank's estimation, to simplistic dualisms which allows the blame for not developing to be placed squarely on the Third World. The dualism criticised by Frank not only eludes consideration of the role which industrialised nations played in the process of causing underdevelopment but also, at the same time, results in the creation of false perceptions and distorted images of the Third World:

available theory...fails to reflect the past of the underdeveloped part of the world entirely, and reflects the past of the world as a whole only in part. More important, our ignorance of the underdeveloped countries' history leads us to assume that their past and indeed their present resembles earlier stages of the history of the now developed countries. This ignorance and this assumption lead us into serious misconceptions about contemporary underdevelopment and development (Frank, 1966: 37)

Consequently, underdevelopment takes on mythic proportions and serves to legitimate the need for development. The emphasis is on failure--the lack of development--and the internal reasons behind it (the proper institutional structure, a work ethic), rather than the complex external interchanges through which underdevelopment occurs.

Conservative ideology, masked as liberal discourse, represents underdevelopment as a static condition; "it assumes that development and underdevelopment are outcomes of internal processes occurring in relative
isolation from international influences" (Rocha, 1994: 75). The continual one-sided representation of the Third World as underdeveloped has also proved to be consequential in proscribing strategies and programmes by which to overcome this perceived internal condition to the point where it has become difficult to even imagine the Third World as anything but underdeveloped. The dominant discourse of underdevelopment as a fixed representation of the Third World is not unlike what Edward Said (1979) calls 'Orientalism'.

Orientalism, he argues can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institutions for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it; in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient (3). [It] views the Orient as something whose existence is not only displayed but has remained fixed in time and place for the West. (Ibid: 108)

Foster-Carter also goes on to describe other components of neo-Marxism (besides ideology), all of which are designed to refute various elements of bourgeois theory. The concept 'totality' is, for instance, understood by neo-Marxists as referring to a world that is "basically a single, integrated unit" (Ibid: 22) and not as one determined by an underdeveloped economic base alone, as the dialectical interconnection of development and underdevelopment shows. Bourgeois theory on the other hand makes quantitative distinctions between traditional and contemporary societies, dependent, above all, on the extent and level of industrialisation. Even traditionalism (another orientalising concept), though it lacks any theoretical substance, maintains itself as a distinct and

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10 This statement owes its existence to President Harry Truman, who on January 20, 1949 in his inauguration speech before Congress, declared the largest part of the world as 'underdeveloped areas.' Using the prefix under as opposed to undeveloped has the added implication of enforcing a negative value-judgement, as though a sufficient standard or norm has not been attained. Undeveloped lacks the same force: it evades the possibility of involvement.
residual category of difference which allows it to conjure up and present images of the 'other' as slothful and undesirable.

In addition to reading neo-Marxism against bourgeois theory, Foster-Carter also compares neo-Marxism with "traditional Marxism". Among several interesting features that he mentions include the following; all of which are hinged in some respect to the relative distance that neo-Marxists maintain between themselves and the classical Marxist canon of the orthodox Marxists: "the former open-minded, viewing the world inductively and bringing in Marxian elements by way of explanation, the latter clinging dogmatically to a Marxist weltanschauung [world view] and deducing scholastically from this what the world 'must be' like (ibid: 25).

The first difference involves the meaning of imperialism. The concept of imperialism, for traditional Marxists, is used to characterise modern capitalism as a whole in the age of monopoly and also serves to explain the nature of imperialist rivalry (imperialist wars are fought for economic reasons). That is, capitalist expansion and interstate territorial rivalries are synonymous with imperialism; hence, imperialism is generally regarded as the result of capitalist development and an expression of its maturity. However, after World War II, with massive decolonisation, the tendency towards interstate territorial rivalries declined--which had at first prompted the introduction of the concept--as nations began to cooperate amongst each other through the establishment of common markets. This meant capitalism could survive and expand further (where it did not become isolationist) without being associated with the kind of territorial rivalries among core capitalist states that Marxists had assumed to be the necessary outcome of full capitalist development. The point here is that traditional Marxists tried to explain the inevitability of imperialism, as the last
stage of capitalism, since competing imperialisms lead to war, war brings revolution, and revolution will overthrow capitalism and imperialism together. Neo-Marxists on the other hand, are "particularly interested in the specific nature of imperialism as it presents itself to its victims: how it alters them, and how it can be defeated" (ibid: 25). This shift of emphasis, according to Foster-Carter, parallels the emergence of the Third World as an actor in its own right.

A second distinction involves that of political identity, or what Foster-Carter ambiguously refers to as "nationalism". By this he means to problematise the eurocentric notion of the preceding term "imperialism". Foster-Carter maintains that capitalist expansion as carried out by Western countries, and as something "natural" to them was usually met with hostility, resistance, and aggression in many of the countries where it has sought to gain a foothold:

"[I]n societies where capitalism was not the natural growth from preceding conditions as in Europe, it was inevitably viewed primarily as an alien intrusion rather than an immanent socio-economic trend, which irrevocably disrupted endogenous social processes without offering any immediate or evident recompense" (Ibid: 26).

The questions this raised in the early 1970s, when Foster-Carter wrote this article, as well as today are remarkably similar. Foster-Carter wonders how national uprisings against colonial aggressors effect the traditional Marxist notion of imperialism, especially on a cultural level where it threatens to undermine all other histories. This becomes an important consideration when dealing with the aspect of who exactly is the proletariat and to what extent is a

11 In the context of present global conditions (new international political economy) the concept imperialism seems to hold little validity. Outside of having said virtually nothing about non-economic motives—nationalism, racism, the pursuit of national power (Fascism and Nazism)—the explanatory potential of imperialism seems to have lost its edge as it is superseded by the concepts of hegemony and world power. The shift in meaning that neo-Marxists have attributed to imperialism after World War II (where it designates the development of underdevelopment) as well as the attempt by traditional Marxists to maintain its relevancy is one of the factors leading to the impasse in development theory.
class struggle in a remote Andean village synonymous with a class struggle in any Western metropolis. That is, do these elements have to be created in regions where they do not naturally exist before they can be overthrown? Is this then what imperialism constitutes—a destruction of indigent ‘life worlds’ for the purpose of building new ones which can then in turn overthrow the capitalist master? Does a national identity (consciousness), involved in resistance, always constitute class? In other words, where do other identities fit in—diverse phenomena as the civil rights movement, women’s movement, gay movement, and peasant revolutionary nationalism in colonial countries?

Traditional Marxism privileges the proletariat (distinguished on one end of the spectrum from the national bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and on the other end by lumpen proletariat and the peasantry in descending order) as the “incarnation of all oppression, and by virtue of its specific role within mature capitalism makes a revolution which is sufficient but also a necessary condition for general emancipation” (Ibid: 27). What Foster-Carter advocates continues to be an important problem today, especially where issues of identity, subjectivity and difference are concerned. Foster-Carter recognises the importance of identity formation and its constitution as problematic and as something which Marxism needs to deal with:

We need a term for this dimension of Marxism: perhaps ‘selfhood; or ‘owness.’ We also need a theoretical perspective which would redefine the concept of ‘class’ so as to provide a general account of the processes whereby individuals and groups come to define their larger selves in terms of certain characteristics and not others in different situations (for instance: class, race, nation)....[W]ithout such a revision we shall remain powerless to deal with the major phenomena of our era (Ibid: 28).
3.4: Summary

Having outlined key aspects of radical development by situating it within the alternative paradigm makes it possible to gain a foothold by which to begin to navigate the impasse. As the next chapter will show, neo-Marxism, as an important component of the alternative paradigm, figures heavily in the impasse debate. However, rather than treating it with the same confidence that Foster-Carter showed, the impasse (with the benefit of hindsight) tends to converge on neo-Marxist inspired approaches toward development with much more caution. This is not simply the result of dependency's lack of a sufficient theoretical framework or of its overall waning popularity (arguable matters at any rate) but has to do with more general problems that involve the entire agenda of the neo-Marxist problématique for radical development. Its devotion has not been to development per se but rather with the continual process of legitimating its own position against opposing approaches and theories that threaten to undermine it. In other words, neo-Marxist development theories have been so busy qualifying and dogmatically asserting their claims against orthodox Marxism and neoclassical economic theory that they have neglected to deal with the 'real' issues concerning development. The impasse makes this clear in a number of ways while holding to the notion that neither dependency nor any of its relations turned out to be the panacea for which many were searching. In fact, this can be considered as both its central pronouncement as well as, ironically, its reason for being.

The impasse, nevertheless, continues to remain a familiar feature within the radical paradigm. Whether it regards itself an extension of radical development in the sense that the alternative paradigm provides the best means by which to negotiate through the impasse is a topic that will be of
concern in the following chapter. The claim there is that the impasse is, indeed, well situated in the alternative paradigm and will continue to occupy this position (and even commit the same errors) unless it begins to question both the nature of its discourse and what intellectual ends it intends to serve.\textsuperscript{12} This has to do both with new theoretical approaches to the impasse that have recently arisen as well as the claims of some of them to have successfully breached the impasse.

To end this section on a different note, yet one that is related to the impasse in development, it is important to state that recent historical shifts have been unsympathetic to both of the major approaches within the dominant development paradigm.\textsuperscript{13} In the late sixties and most of the seventies far-reaching global events occurred which provided a dearth of empirical evidence supporting the contention that the sacred truths inherent in the neoclassical version of modernisation were deeply flawed: The application of Western

\textsuperscript{12} The continuance of the impasse is assured if provocative statements such as the one by D. G. Becker keep being made: "Dependency theory" has lost most of its adherents, thanks to its ideological excesses and its inability either to account for observations or to guide a meaningful political praxis. Those who want a progressive theory of development have been left with two contenders: what Peter Evans has called "Cardoso’s historical-structural method" and postimperialism" (204). "Postimperialism" is Becker’s version of a classical Marxist approach applied to the contemporary Third World. See chapter 4 of this study for further clarification.

\textsuperscript{13} The way in which the conventional understanding of paradigm has been presented here does not permit the suggestion to be made that the two paradigms are merely in direct conflict with each other for superiority of world view, even though this is quite true, but rather that the struggle for representation is more inter-paradigmatic than anything else. Both neoclassical modernisation theory and traditional Marxism are manifestations of the dominant paradigm in that they share a similar understanding of the necessity of their respective versions of history. Ultimately, however, the distinction between paradigms is a superficial one in that they are driven by the common belief that there is some relatively fixed human nature; that true scientific understanding is possible for example. This is where dependency finally fails as an alternative paradigm and starts to resemble the dominant paradigm, simply in reverse: "underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions and the existence of capital shortage in regions that have remained isolated from the stream of world history. On the contrary, underdevelopment was and still is generated by the very same historical process which also generated economic development: the development of capitalism itself" [emphasis added] (Frank, 1968: 43).
economic modernisation packages, synonymous with the end of World War II and the decolonisation of most of the area that came to be referred to as the Third World, were visibly discredited as political instability and insurrections reached previously unknown levels. On the one hand were the rise of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes coupled with plummeting living standards and abject poverty in Latin America; and, on the other were the seemingly successful socialist mobilisation regimes in China and Cuba; the installation and success of radical regimes in several African countries (Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola), Vietnam, Grenada, Nicaragua, Argentina; and, the phenomenal industrialisation and subsequent world power status of the USSR even without benefit of the Marshall Plan.

At the same time, the founding centres of modernisation theory—Europe and North America—were also deeply effected: Seemingly disparate events such as the Vietnam War, student revolts (Ohio, Frankfurt/Munich, Paris), revolutions in community, family, and personal values (feminism, dual-economy households, sexual mores), widespread doubt about its core values and the continued relevance of some of its institutional structures, the rise of ‘development without growth,’ the Green movement, all played important roles in what appeared to be a pervasive challenge to the Western hegemon.

This movement was, however, short-lived. It did not take long for historical events to shift in favour of modernisation theory again—this time in the

14 The reference is to the two financial pillars set up in 1944 in New Hampshire, U.S.A.—the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D. or World Bank)—that originally comprised the Bretton Woods system. Their original purpose (as outlined by the U.S.A., Great Britain, and Canada) was to provide a basis of monetary and currency stability for post-War prosperity and expanding national economies. The idea was for its members to fix declared exchange rates (parity) in order to avoid the sort of problems that brought about the world-wide recession during the 1930s. Third World countries were immediately forced into this standardised form of exchange if they wished to participate within the international global economy.
guise of liberal democracy. Once again, a variety of cataclysmic changes occurred, all of which would serve to support Western Conservative ideology: Socialist regimes--led by the USSR--were toppled overnight; China began major reforms to incorporate elements of liberal capitalism into its economic framework; the horrors of Cambodia's 'killing fields;' and, escalating political problems in Fidel Castro's Cuba. Furthermore, socialism had virtually no significant success to its credit in the development field, even after repeated attempts (e.g. India and Algeria). At the same time liberalism and capitalism did quite well. Democratically elected regimes returned to most of Latin America and the--the "lost" decade of development in the 1980s being blamed on its experiments with import substitution industrialisation (ISI) and state led growth. The rise of Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) in East Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong--dubbed the "four tigers") achieved spectacular rates of success and more often than not provided the blueprint for would be NICs.15 In the background, Western Europe and North America also experienced dynamic growth resulting in a new found faith for modernisation.16 As a result, dependency and neo-Marxist perspectives are presently experiencing an apparent stagnation in theoretical activity.

What this chapter has attempted to do is give a working definition of

15 Between 1965 and 1990 the World Bank reports that the average growth of GNP/capita of Japan, the "four tigers" and the "cubs" (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) was more than 5.5 %. By contrast, the average growth rates for the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) countries was less than 2.5%. Even during the "depressed" years of 1989 to 1993 when the per capita growth rate of European countries was only 1.4% the Asian developing countries reached 4.5%. Later, when China is factored in, the statistics will be even more favourable to Asia. See Yahuda (1993: 17).

16 Meanwhile, this turn of events brought to the fore a series of problems concerning the legitimacy and credentials of the 'Left' in Western academia and in official policy circles. Its unpopularity within the university curriculum as well as its subsequent retreat from political life further diminished any hopes of regaining the stature it had previously worked so hard to acquire. For academia see Exchange (March 7, 1994). For a political view derived from a Latin American perspective see the new book by Mexican scholar Jorge G. Castaneda (1993).
radical development theory within the context of a discussion on paradigms and their relation to neo-Marxism, specifically the dependency school. The problems which paradigmatic structures inevitably produce have thus far only been alluded to. For instance, both paradigms and the approaches and models which they respectively encompass are built on opposing world views, whether they be teleological or existential. The shared assumption, however, is that reality is 'out there' and ultimately knowable. The difference is how sense and sensibility, in the final analysis, is determined. The dichotomisation within the dominant paradigm results only in its theories playing off each other and producing dominance according to whichever series of historical events are currently in session. In the meantime, the radical paradigm expends its total energy on disproving the project of dominance, thus negating its own principals in the process. The agreement here is with James Manor where he speaks of the dependency school as a stalled quest to develop a "monopoly" on truth: "With their ideological basis, they tended to begin their studies with the script already half-written. The [radical] paradigm [was] ideological as much as it was a mode of analysis. It tended towards monopolistic claims of truth for its own world-view" (1991: 2).

And finally, as a way of introducing the problématique of the impasse, a statement by Ian Roxborough adequately sums up this discussion as well as beginning a new one—one that is not without its own set of problematic assumptions. He states that not only is the present impasse--what he calls "frustration"--in development studies a result of an "over simplified view of the actual historical development of the West" but also a result of the differing viewpoints of the "antagonising" characteristics of paradigms themselves. On the latter he writes that "we need to stop worrying about supposed paradigm
conflicts between modernization, dependency, world-systems...and other schools and get on with taking a fresh look at historical patterns of development. This should not be taken as a plea to ignore theory; on the contrary, we need to break out of a rather narrow focus on "development theory" as though this were totally separate from the broader concerns of social science and make an effort to assimilate recent work from other areas of social science (1988: 761).
Chapter 4: Negotiating the Impasse in Radical Development Theory

Introduction

The impasse in radical development theory continues to widen proportionately with the growing realisation that existent practices and modes of thinking about development are unable to bring about desired forms of change. Efforts to understand and resolve this issue began nearly a decade ago when David Booth (1985) 'officially' declared radical development theory at an impasse. Since that pronouncement, the field of radical development studies continues to be involved in a vigorous and ongoing debate about the content and substance of radical development theory.

This chapter explores and describes, in three interrelated sections, the literature that has come to be associated with the impasse in radical development theory. It suggests that the impasse cannot adequately be resolved until the imaginary of development itself is purged of the privileged position it occupies as a discourse that seeks to understand and represent, in totality, the perceived nature, causes, and processes of progressive global change and transformation. Precisely, where inroads to the impasse are being made through a questioning of its explanatory limitations, the problem of continuing to work within the discursive imaginary of development is virtually ignored. The effort expended by impasse thinking in formulating new and better ways by which to more accurately understand and conceptualise development has, to date, summarily neglected to consider the powerful role of the discourse from within which it functions; one that determines the extent to which new and better thinking on development can actually occur. This exploration is informed by the following questions: 1) The factors responsible for bringing about the impasse 2); the common set of issues and problems that characterise impasse
thinking 3); the problems the impasse debate poses to radical development theory in general, and; 4) the proposals it gives for moving development out and beyond the impasse. In so doing, this chapter treats the impasse in radical development as a discourse; that is, as a group of statements which constitutes and delimits a specific area of concern, governed by its own rules of formation with its own mode of distinguishing truth from falsity (Foucault, 1984).

4.1: Conceptualising the Impasse in Radical Development Theory

The impasse in radical development theory is a distinct reality for those who adhere to certain tenets of Marxism. For this group the impasse represents both practical and theoretical issues. On the one hand are the problems that many Third World countries are experiencing in the face of global economic disparities and on the other hand are questions which seek to understand why this condition continues to persist. While these themes have traditionally dominated the agenda of radical development studies, they have not always been the subject of sustained criticism. The impasse debate marks the first attempt in the brief history of radical development studies to restore to it some form of legitimacy and renewed relevance.

David Booth, in a key article written and published in 1985, provided the first definitive account of the main problem areas in the new Marxist-influenced development sociology. He states at the outset that while there is good reason

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1 Orthodox Marxists and neoclassicists do not acknowledge the existence of an impasse in development theory. The former see the expansion of capitalist development as a necessary step towards self-fulfillment and as a means by which complete equality will be the outcome. The latter view the emulation of Western styles of development as a worthy and attainable undertaking.

2 Marx was mainly concerned with the problem of trying to analyse large-scale, long-term processes of systematic social change and historical development, not with trying to formulate an economic growth model by which “underdeveloped” regions could catch up with the more “developed” areas. In this sense, “Marx did not really know the concept of underdevelopment. It is a concept alien to his work as he usually expounded it” (Wallerstein, 1991: 151).

3 “Development sociology,” or what throughout the article is referred to as “the ‘new’ Marxist-
to believe that Marxist-influenced development sociology is at a standstill, this
condition should not be attributed entirely to any one specific perspective nor
should it be regarded as simply the outcome of the theoretical controversies that
occurred between the dominant orthodox Marxist and alternative radical
development paradigms. Dismissing both these assumptions as the direct
causes for the impasse allows Booth to distance himself from any inter-
paradigm conflicts. Instead, Booth wisely remains a judicial observer to the
controversy and produces the following charge: He maintains that all
perspectives in either paradigm have "underlying commonalities of approach,"
specifically their uncritical reliance on "Marxism's metatheoretical commitment
to demonstrating the necessity of economic and social patterns, as distinct from

influenced development sociology", is defined by Booth to mean those theories of development
that arrived on the sociological stage during the mid-nineteen sixties (radical development) and
which continued to dominate radical development discourse well into the 1970s. This particular
branch of sociology came about as a result of a growing disillusionment with some of its key
concepts and assumptions. For instance, sociological theories of modernisation began with the
general acceptance that a dichotomy exists between two ideal types of society: the 'traditional'
society ('rural,' 'backward,' 'underdeveloped') and the 'modern' society ('urban,' 'developed,'
'industrial'). While this describes two types of social structures along with the belief that they are
somehow historically connected by means of age-old evolutionary processes that follow certain
laws, the assumption is that sooner or later these differences will erode as the two polar types
move towards each other. That is, 'traditional' societies are supposed to follow the same pattern
of change experienced earlier by developed nations. In sociology this would mean mimicking the
social or "pattern" variables defined by Talcott Parsons, as well as the institutional factors of the
developed countries (see Larrain, 1989, esp. pp. 87-94). This represents a completely lopsided
view of historical process in that it does not even consider the crucial role played by colonisation in
the modernisation process. This process can certainly not be mimicked. Andrew Webster also
alludes to this point when he refers to the works of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim:
"Their models of society were built...on a number of assumptions about the very origins, passage
and future of society...of social development [which]...bore little resemblance to the processes
that were at that very period of history beginning to lay the foundations for the underdevelopment
we now see in the Third World" (1990: 3). Webster is right in implying that these theorists could
possibly not have known that the end of World War II would bring about decolonisation and a
whole new range of problems but at the same time he is to be criticised for assuming that the
period in which they wrote prevented them from knowing about the problems which colonisation
was causing. The obvious fact is that colonisation never really worked in the sense that European
settlement was invited or even accepted. The mere fact that some form of resistance followed
every act of colonisation should have meant something to these theorists (Said, 1993). Hence,
they were not operating out of ignorance but rather from a set of ideological assumptions that
regarded "their" society as the model to be achieved by everyone else.
explaining them and exploring how they may be changed" (761). This accusation, besides being quite radical in its own right, is supported by evidence that questions the 'essentialism' of Marxist development sociology; its "tendency to reduce social, cultural and political actions to their supposed economic determinants, and [its]...epistemological dogmatism [emphasis added] (Corbridge, 1993: 452). For Booth, it is no longer a mystery as to why development sociology is at an impasse. Besides being "arid," "repetitive," "under-researched," "untheorised," and "lack[ing] cumulative quality" (761), radical development theory has also succumbed to nothing more than "sterile controversy." All this at the expense of forsaking "cumulative empirical research" (762).

As this initial reading of Booth suggests, his article was not only vital in establishing the parameters of the impasse debate but also defined the field with which it would subsequently be associated. Other literature on the impasse has agreed with Booth's introductory formulation. This agreement, however, rests not so much with Booth's claims nor with the evidence he produces to substantiate them but more so with Booth's successful attempt to create an official space where the problematique of radical development can be coherently organised and unified into a specific discourse. In other words, besides an awareness of the short-comings of development sociology at the time which Booth wrote his article, few if any had ventured to openly criticise the strategies of radical development theory specifically, especially since it appeared to be the only means by which to foment a critique against the neoliberal ideology that was enjoying so much success at the time.

Booth's argument regarding the existence of an impasse is followed up by a critique outlining the various deficiencies of the new Marxist-Influenced
development sociology. He shows how the various approaches relate not just to each other but also to the classical core of Marxist theory. This is accomplished by reviewing the problematic features of some of the most familiar approaches and debates in the radical development paradigm: 'dependency' and 'transitive underdevelopment;' Bill Warren's defence of the classical Marxist view of capitalist development; and, the 'modes of production theory.' A brief summary of Booth's critique of these approaches is necessary in order to fully appreciate and understand the scope of Booth's argument.

Booth begins his assessment with the dependency approach. He notes that subtle differences exist within this approach including questions about which controlling forces are most prominent in maintaining the process of underdevelopment: trade, finance, ownership of productive assets, technology or, ideology and culture? Nevertheless, dependency rests on "a shared conviction that in the analysis of underdevelopment and patterns of change in Third World social formation, external relations determine the role of 'domestic structural properties, not vice versa" (762). In this group he includes the likes of Frank, Wallerstein, Sunkel, Cardoso and Quijano. Their approach to dependency is criticised from three related points of view: 1) "circular reasoning;" 2) "fallacious inferences from empirical observation;" and 3) "a weak base in deductive theory" (762).

According to Booth, circular or tautological reasoning about autonomous and nonautonomous economic growth is central to dependency theory. Booth cites A. G. Frank's well known theoretical proposition that contemporary underdevelopment is caused by the unequal relationship between underdeveloped and developed countries. This is a two-way process, as much historical as it is contemporary, which assumes that the metropolis intentionally
keeps the satellites underdeveloped. This leads to Frank's hypothesis that satellites experience their greatest economic development and especially their *most classically capitalist industrial development* if and when their ties to their metropolis are weakest" [emphasis included] (762). Booth contends that this hypothesis represents nothing more than "an exercise in tautology," (763) one which cannot be proven or disproven through the use of empirical evidence such as historical data. Since tautological reasoning excludes no logical possibilities it essentially becomes a meaningless theoretical assumption.

What Booth would rather see is a formulation of dependency that would not be as susceptible to circular arguments. For instance he believes that a more reasonable demonstration of dependency could involve, for example, "focusing on the one hand on patterns of deteriorating income distribution, social marginalization, and authoritarian politics, and on the other on the role of multinationals, inappropriate technology and/or cultural alienation" (763). In Booth's opinion this would complicate the charge of tautology against dependency because it could then formulate "a set of substantive hypothesis linking proposed causal factors to independently identified ones" (763).

The second problem with dependency has to do with what Booth calls its fallacious reasoning. Even if dependency was to concentrate on more substantive issues as opposed to making grandiose claims about the nature of structural underdevelopment or just simply refrain from formulating underdevelopment in broad and problematic terms, it would still not be a convincing explanation of what is 'really' taking place. This is evident where Booth shows his admiration for scientific research that attempts to uncover false claims about reality for the purpose of arriving at empirically significant truths. He wonders whether even the substantive hypotheses that he regards above as
heading dependency in the right direction can be validated empirically; “that is, whether marginalization and related processes can be shown to be the result of factors of ‘dependence’ such as the colonization of the most dynamic sectors of the economy by transnational capital, as opposed to other factors suggested by other kinds of development thinking” (763). Booth thinks that dependency should be more involved with performing “[s]ystematic and theoretically informed comparative analysis” (763). That it does not “draw valid causal inferences from statistical analysis” (763) makes it logically unsound.

The third critical appraisal of dependency is one which continues from the first two: Its refusal to use historical evidence for purposes other than illustration (doing so would allow it to be more substantive rather than tautological) and its ineptitude at conducting comparative analysis (resulting in a flawed logic) is associated with its “tradition [of hav[ing] typically worked from an extraordinarily weak economic base in deductive economic theory” (763). The failure of dependency has then to do, in large part, with its misguided understanding of economics. In Booth’s estimation, proponents of dependency rely too much on “defunct economists.” In addition, adherents of the dependency perspective are rebuked for their “amateurish” attempts to understand economics, as well as for their “uncritical consumption of economic literature” (764).

Booth regards dependency as an anachronism, "a child of its time" (764). In other words, there is nothing inherently wrong with dependency that Booth can see, except that global events have simply passed it by therefore holding its relevancy as an explanatory framework in question. Here Booth uses the example of how an international global economy is creating an interdependent world: “Advanced import substitution is associated with an invasion of
manufacturing multinationals, growing external vulnerability and regressive trends in employment and income distribution" (764).

The second approach to development theory Booth reviews is Bill Warren's challenge to radical development. Booth states outright that he is just as dissatisfied with the "anti-dependency" literature of Warren and others who share his sympathies as he is with the dependency perspectives. He begins by summarising Warren's views on notions of colonialism and post-colonialism and what these important events mean to the development of productive forces in the Third World. Booth's presentation of Warren's argument can be summarised along the following lines: 1) Warren argues that capitalist development will "necessarily" be successful in the Third World; 2) since World War II, empirical evidence suggests that there has been a great deal of contact between industrialised centres and the Third World, specifically with regard to capitalist social relations and the increase in productive forces; 3) colonialism did not distort development, but to the contrary it brought about progressive social change; 4) if the Third World is not progressing it is not the fault of their dependent relationship to the metropolis but rather because of contradictions in the Third World; 5) an economic relationship with industrialised countries is beneficial to the industrialisation of the Third World; and 6) indigenous forms of capitalism are on the rise in the Third World thereby loosening any sort of dependence on the metropolis that may have existed.

In associating these statements with Warren, Booth admits forthright that it is certainly not easy pointing out the "fallacies." Nevertheless, not being one to be deterred from a daunting task such as this, Booth writes "that while it is difficult to dismiss the feeling that while what he has said is true, it is in a certain sense not the whole truth" (766). Where dependency's explanatory field
attempted to take into account too many converging issues and themes, Booth admonishes Warren for taking into account far too little. Specifically, "Warren's approach is limiting in a series of interconnected ways...[having to do with] the framework he offers in [the] place" of the approaches he criticises. First of all it is not clear what Booth means when he speaks of Warren's replacement framework. Warren does not need to provide an alternative framework (he is already operating from within one that is very similar to the orthodox Marxist approach), he only needs to defend the one he is working from within. And even this is not a requirement if Warren truly believes in the Marxist version of progress. Hence it would be far more interesting to ask what Warren is doing in this debate to begin with besides attempting to convert those he believes are misappropriating Marx's logic.

Nevertheless, what Booth may be trying to say is that the approach Warren associates himself with is highly problematic if not unethical, particularly in the parts where he claims that the Third World experiences its misery for reasons that have purely to do with historical destiny. Booth states the obvious when he notes that if this is indeed true then it "makes virtually unusable as a framework for social science research, let alone politics or policy formation" (767).

For Booth, this last point amounts to what is most limiting about Warren's challenge. Yet Booth feels that there is still something about this approach worthy of consideration:

one feels the sources of Warren's 'extremism' have not been properly grasped or the implications thought through...the response to Warren has been in the first place overpersonalized and stronger on perceiving theoretical weaknesses than on grasping the nettle of metatheory--the reasons why a given intellectual tradition articulates problems for theory 'in the way that it does' [emphasis
Booth is saying something important in the last part of this statement. What he infers seems to point towards paying less attention to Warren's historicist assumptions and more on its historiographical significance. If this reading is correct then Booth could be taken to mean that notwithstanding the problems associated with accepting Warren's essentialist stance, it is still an interesting one in that provides at least an example of a certain intellectual movement or phenomenon for which there are good reasons as to why it exists at this particular moment in history. It is revelatory of the current state of theorising since it mirrors this current intellectual tradition.\footnote{This represents a problem for Booth, but one which he does not, unfortunately, develop much further. One wonders why Booth did not spend more time on constructing a historiographic narrative of radical development, that is, the belief that a certain mode of thinking has contextual origins, as opposed to simply stressing the explanatory limitations of radical development.}

The third tradition in radical development theory Booth concerns himself with is the mode of production debate (MOP). If Frank's formulation of dependency and Warren's evolutionary MOP theory can be considered as occupying polar positions in Marxist development sociology, then where can the mode of production debate be situated? According to Booth this is precisely the question which the debate about modes of production has established, namely that it is impossible of steering a "middle course between dependency and the so-called 'classical' (Warren) position" (768). This ends up being its only redeeming quality, at least when considering its contributions in terms of generating empirical evidence.

Theoretically it has much more to offer, and Booth focuses on three outstanding contributions (Ernesto Laclau, Hamza Alavi, and Jairus Banaji) to the mode of production debate, all of which go some way in qualifying different aspects of Marxist concepts to the purposes of radical development. Booth
states that the problem with their separate issues however, is that they cannot be organised into a coherent resolution of the outstanding problems. The result is that it loses its ability to be used on a consistent level, “the task of illuminating world development since the sixteenth century” (768).

The first strand—and the only one that will be dealt with here—is represented by the Argentinean Ernesto Laclau in his famous 1971 rebuttal of Frank’s position. His main argument with Frank was that he had mistaken the sphere of production for the sphere of commodity exchange as indicated by Frank’s emphasis on the importance of the latter at the expense of the former. This is why Frank holds to the position that Latin America has always had a market economy from the beginning of its relationship with its colonisers; that it has, therefore, always been capitalist (in the sense that capitalism is a mode of production); and the dependent nature of its insertion into the capitalist world market is the cause of its underdevelopment.

The accusations Laclau levelled at Frank came as a result of Frank’s assertion that all the developing countries’ social structures have been capitalist from at least the sixteenth century. Laclau points out that Frank mistakenly identified the existence of markets, or trade relations, with capitalist relations of production. Alternatively, Laclau emphasises the primacy of the conditions of production over those of exchange. Laclau goes on to define the concept of MOP as a combination of four elements: the pattern of ownership of the means of production, the form of appropriation of what he called an economic surplus, the degree of the division of labour, and the level of development of the forces of production. Laclau’s argument was that the world system—both past and present—should not be considered as a uniform system, with the capitalist MOP being the only one in existence. Rather the world system should be considered
as an economic system in which different modes of production—both capitalist and non-capitalist—coexist with each other while under the dominating and prevailing influence of the capitalist mode of production. According to Laclau, Marxist theorists should try to understand the underdeveloped countries in terms of a system that combines, or articulates, the capitalist and other noncapitalist modes of production rather than in terms of Frank’s conception of homogeneous capitalist relations.5

This section, perhaps more than the others, shows Booth caught up entirely in an exercise designed to reveal intricate variations within the various configurations of the MOP school. This does not add new substance to his argument made at the beginning regarding “Marxism’s metatheoretical commitment to demonstrating the necessity of economic and social patterns...,” but points more to Booth’s own position within this debate. That is, at this point in the article there is the sense that Booth’s argumentative style cannot be separated and distinguished from those with which he is debating. While Booth points out time and again the “mistakes,” “wrong assumptions,” and “errors” he ignores the way his own views try to construct and represent, in scientific jargon, an understanding that is “valid,” “significant” and “correct.” In other words, Booth ‘speaks’ the same language as those he criticises. Any attempt to transcend the impasse without also taking this matter into consideration is at best regarded here as a suspicious undertaking.

In addition to the three theoretical approaches outlined above, Booth also gives mention to more recent research in the new Marxist-influenced

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5 For a good review of the modes of production school, from which this section borrows, see David F. Ruccio and Lawrence H. Simon (1986). Booth’s analysis of this particular approach is quite convoluted and unnecessarily complex. It is difficult to see where he is headed with his own summary of this approach except for the purpose of finally stating that “all roads lead to one or other of the basic variants of Marxist development theory, and mode of production concept as such is no guarantee against either” (770).
development sociology and reveals several of its short-comings. He looks first at the empirical research that developed synonymously with the debate on theory in the modes of production school.

Although the empirical research he looks at is influenced by ideas emanating from the modes of production theories, they are nevertheless useful in that "they dispense with the rather cumbersome apparatus of export-of-capital-theory and employ the seemingly simpler and more attractive language of production and reproduction" (771). This is because that research deals mainly with internal and micro-level studies that do not readily lend themselves to global type comparisons. Two major empirical fields are discussed; the study of peasants and trends in rural structure (the ways in which peasant communities survive in the global capitalist system) and, research on the 'informal sector' and its relations with large-scale enterprise in urban centres (which explains the persistence of non-traditional, small-scale economic activities). Booth dismisses the findings this research comes up with in short order because "they contain nothing fresh and vigorous in theoretical terms" (772). Booth also chastises this research for having occurred at the "expense of other, logically unproblematic and empirically challenging, research strategies" (772).

This neglect, according to Booth, leaves unsaid important issues such as how people come to work in the informal sector as well as the relationship of the informal sector with other formal small-scale sectors. Yet research continues to remain oblivious to these sorts of questions if for no other reason than because its interest is not necessarily in these people and their daily struggle for subsistence but in trying to rescue the problematique of Marxist development. The unity of this discourse depends on contributing to the saving, building and
even strengthening of its framework. Rules of language, procedure, and statement govern what can and cannot be included. Hence, other studies are not simply neglected because researchers are consumed with following one particular research format, as Booth implies, but because any other format, especially that which is confrontational or in any way threatening to established procedures, will simply not be regarded as relevant and therefore not published. Again, as Booth states, “so far only a few specialists have been prepared to admit this, and a widespread tendency in the literature consists in reproducing the same essential combination of vulgar theory and functionalism in superficially novel and conceptual languages” (772). However, Booth does not give reasons that address this dilemma beyond the fact that this problem occurs.

The second field in the new sociology of development is that of radical political economy. Here Booth continues with the previous statements of fact “that there are many other special areas that have progressed little if at all under the influence of the dominant theoretical perspectives of the past decade and a half “ (772). In this regard he finds that the concept ‘class,’ in the Third World context, has been notably under-represented and poorly developed as has the issue of ‘urban bias’ in policy plans. Other issues left on the margins included the controversy that erupted with the World Bank’s proposal of ‘redistribution with growth’ and later that of the basic needs strategy. Booth wonders why sociologists and political economists were “conspicuously absent” from these discussions. Booth’s reasons include the Bank’s influence over what got to count as important (as though that ever deterred any radical political economist from entering into a debate) and simple lack of interest. And finally, continuing under the heading of radical political economy, Booth asks why sociological
development research has not had more influence in making and implementing development policies, either directly or through non-government organisations and national aid programmes.

The rest of the article—a relatively short section compared to the space devoted to refuting established doctrine—is used by Booth for interpreting the impasse. His focus is on attempting to locate the problematic features that are common to all the approaches he has dealt with. He states that this requires “standing back” a little and objectively surveying the theoretical landscape occupied by radical development. To do this he advocates moving from “purely theoretical to metatheoretical” considerations” [emphasis included] (773). Specifically, Booth is not interested in asking in what ways approaches in radical development theory have been wrong, although he did spend most of the article stating these reasons, but rather in why they were wrong—“what it was that led them to advance and persist in false or theoretically limiting positions” (773). This is an interesting question according to Booth because if answered sufficiently well, it can “prevent the reproduction of the old errors in new guises” (773). As stated at the start and again here, Booth reaches the conclusion that aside from radical development relying on Marxist concepts to varying degrees, they all share a “metatheoretical commitment to demonstrating that what happens in societies in the era of capitalism is not only explicable, but also in some stronger sense necessary” [emphasis added] (773).

In other words Booth is concerned with the privileged status that the new Marxist influenced development sociology accords to the orthodox Marxist framework. In his estimation, simply using Marxist informed concepts implicates radical development in forwarding and even accepting the claims of orthodox Marxism, regardless of how far they venture from its ‘original spirit’ or
to what degree they misappropriate these concepts for their own ends. In one way or another they are all motivated by the desire to maintain not just the critical (useful) components of Marxism but its entire apparatus. For Booth, then, there seems to be no middle ground, such as that of using Marx’s conceptual apparatus as tools by which to reach certain understandings and interpretations of the world. In the end “this is what explains the inability of the radical literature genuinely to go beyond itself even years after the need for some decisive advance has been recognised” (773).

Booth, borrowing from the views of Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst which had already gained some notoriety by the late 1970s, writes that his conclusion regarding radical development’s predisposition towards metatheory is expressed in two main forms in the development literature. The first comes out of Marx’s well known conception of ‘historical materialism’ and the other “involves a form of system teleology or functionalism” (773). Booth feels that since development studies have not shown to be at all critical of these categories, as shown by their implicit but uncritical acceptance of metatheory, it must be logically assumed that they find nothing intrinsically wrong with them. At any rate, becoming more critical of these foundational elements of Marxian theory represents for Booth something unheard of in development studies proper.

Booth begins by basing his critique of radical development on the work of Hindess and Hirst. He takes the work of this group as representative of a stance against Marx’s methodology in Capital, precisely “that the significant characteristics of national economies and social formations may be ‘read off’ from the characteristics, especially the ‘laws of motion,’ of the capitalist mode of production” (773). The objection is this: modes of production should not
necessarily be considered as totalities from which all meaning is derived and shaped, nor should a mode of production privilege a certain type of existence as the cause of contingent universal orders. On the one hand a skeptical position is adopted with regard to the extent to which a mode of production limits the types of choices that are available to be made while on the other hand questions are raised regarding the mechanical unfolding of historical events.

This appraisal of the orthodox Marxist framework—the extent to which prevailing ideologies (the superstructure) are determined by economic forces (the base)—is believed by Booth to be an important issue for dissecting the "main problems affecting Marxist-influenced development sociology today" (773). Situating Warren's position in relation to this critique is a fairly simple undertaking since as Booth correctly states, "Warren's work would seem to represent the purest...the most classical, instance in the development field of what Hindess and his collaborators are concerned about" (774). What Booth finds most unconvincing about Warren is his "blindness" to the different development experiences that countries have gone and are going through; Warren's "evolutionist prejudices" (that the path of modernisation is the correct one—insofar as it is the necessary one); and his penchant for reducing all analysis to an economic level (where the origin and cause of events is believed to reside).

Criticising the dependency approach for its "metatheoretical commitment" proves to be a more difficult undertaking for Booth. Here Booth focuses on the work of Samir Amin because

Amin of all dependency theorists is the one who does most to cast his argument in the language of classical Marxism, tracing the historical steps taken by Lenin and his successors by conceiving 'dependence' strictly as imperialism viewed from the periphery, and imperialism as
capitalist accumulation on a world scale (774).

Booth does not hold to this position and reiterates the argument he made in the preceding pages. He states that the problems which the Third World are experiencing does not have to do with the structure of the international capitalist system. Likewise it should not be believed that the extent to which these countries can develop is completely regulated by national governments and power groups. Even though there are marked differences from Warren's and especially Marx's original analysis "the method and its shortcomings are identical" (775).

Other dependency oriented analysis are handled with more caution by Booth since "there is some danger of taking it [his argument] too far" (774). Nevertheless, they all fall into the same general category of 'reading off,' 'picking off,' or 'lumping together' the "salient features of modern capitalism as it effects some LDCs [less developed countries]" (774). In other words, dependency theorists choose only those features of different parts and stages of capitalist growth that serve to support their specific claim. Booth feels that this practice is not much different from what orthodox Marxists such as Warren are involved with; that is, "lumping together various characteristics of different national economies and conceiving them as aspects of some 'law' or other of the unfolding of capitalism" (774).

The modes of production debate fails in similar ways to that of Warren's position and the dependency arguments. Regardless of their attempt to theorise the economies and social formations of particular nations according to distinct histories, they still rely on some conceptual reading of abstract and universal laws of the capitalist mode of production. Booth writes that "reality has shown itself too rich to be captured by the simple terms of a concept of relations
of production with corresponding 'laws of motion,' and relations of production with wholly non-corresponding laws of motion" (774).

Booth completes his critique of the metatheoretical commitment of radical development by also including those approaches which do not take the existence of 'laws of motion' or the 'necessity of capitalist development' as the theoretical starting point of their analysis. Despite their seemingly humble attitude, Booth is not taken by this approach. While they may leave out the theoretical component, the nature of their research is still based on the assertion that what they find is applicable toward the building of Marxist grand theory. In other words, they accept that because capitalist forces seem to be working consciously and in tandem to set the agenda of Third World nations through the leverage of powerful institutional practices, it must be because this is what capitalism requires. This gives to capitalism law like credentials of enormous proportions; as though there exist individuals who are capable of directing and orchestrating world events as they see fit. Booth's contention in all this is that although the capitalist world economy may indeed be structured it should not also be considered as determinist.

For Booth then radical development asserts the existence of either one of two fundamental truths: 1) the development problems (directly connected to their social structures and political systems) experienced by Third World countries are explained through their relationship (essentially static or essentially changing) with the international capitalist system; or 2) the current economic and social processes that keep the Third World in an underdeveloped condition "take the particular form they do because of the way they contribute to the process of capital accumulation in the wider system" (774). In rejecting both these conclusions (for that is what is reached before
Booth asks why does it, despite widespread doubt and numerous inconsistencies in radical development sociology, continue to remain such a powerful and compelling research paradigm? He rejects the notion that this has anything to do with a particular intellectual tradition and claims instead that the "main factor is the seductive attraction exercised by the social sciences by certain forms of system teleology" (774), including the functionalist belief that change in all societies is generally uniform and similar.

Even though the orthodox approach of Warren and the radical approach of dependency work from what would appear to be different world views, as discussed in the previous section, Booth claims that when all things are considered both have the same ultimate interests at hand, specifically, getting to the root of Third World reality.

The interest in discovering a 'deeper'--effectively more teleological--set of reasons for the way the world is, is what lies behind the persistence in analyzing development problems in certain kinds of ways even when they can be explained well or better in other terms (775).

This leads Booth to ask a fairly basic and standard question, one which has to do with why a given form of knowledge, or a particular structure of meaning, is privileged over others. For Marx the answer was straight-forward: His theory was that under certain historical conditions economic realities ultimately determine the ideological 'superstructure' by way of certain socioeconomic processes. This simply means that the production of knowledge

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6 Booth refers to teleology as a form of explanation with reference to 'ends'. The processes responsible for underdevelopment are explained as having to do with a grand purpose for which an 'end' has already been designated.

7 When Booth refers to a sort of 'generic functionalism' he is not invoking a particular sociological brand name as that espoused by Emile Durkheim or Robert Merton for instance, but more as a general and pervasive form of analysis. Functionalism refers mainly to a methodological and theoretical orientation in which the consequences of a given set of empirical phenomena, rather than its causes, are the focus of analytical attention.
as well as that which gets to count as reality and truth is determined by the socioeconomic processes underlying such explanations of the world. What is important here is not the fact that the knowledge—or what is referred to as ideology—produced in a capitalist mode of production mystifies representations of social reality and is used to disguise the interests of powerful groups in society but rather that it exists to serve a particular function. Analysing the functions that institutions play, for instance, will reveal this fact quite plainly. Booth realises this and cites this type of analysis as part of the reason for the impasse:

if the world is such that functional statements are explanatory, then an approach to the analysis of the institutions of less developed countries which uncovers or explains the changing nature of their 'contribution' to some wider system represents an irresistible challenge [emphasis included]" (775).

The predisposition towards functionalist analysis, however, in no way represents the issue which Booth is trying to get at. Functionalism, relying on teleological principles, merely represents the inordinate value attached to questions which assume the existence of certain institutional structures as validity of their presence. These are among the substantive issues which make it appear as though the Marxist-influenced approaches are unique from one another and therefore not open to the general criticism Booth attributes to them. However, as he once again states, this only conceals the homogeneity that exists within radical development, "a homogeneity which has tended to limit the questions asked and to weaken the impact of damaging criticisms of particular theories" (775). The heavy impact of theorising along these particular lines serves not only to limit the amount of space given to other approaches but also helps to explain the "failure of sociological work to respond adequately to the
Booth concludes by mentioning that while there is a growing acceptance that radical development's metatheoretical commitment is the source of its problems, "what lies behind the respective theoretical limitations" (emphasis included) of these theories of development has not yet been explored. In other words, notwithstanding that the theoretical limitations are due to reasons already outlined, why do radical theories of development continue to attract so much widespread attention. Related to this problem is whether the focus and attention given to radical development has been the reason why other kinds of theories about development have been notably absent from development studies. Have they been prevented from being constructed due to the domination of the field by other more privileged theories? If Booth is correct in thinking that scholars such as Frank and Warren knew they were wrong, then his other question of why they continued to advance and persist in making false or theoretically unacceptable statements still remains unanswered. Was the reason for Warren simply that he was defending the Marxist problematique from intruders like Frank? And for dependency thinkers, did they uphold their position--while consciously aware of their errors--because they believed that sooner or later evidence would be found that would lend support to their claims? Did advocates of dependency adopt this perspective only because there was no better alternative?

These are all interesting questions, but they miss the point. This may have something to do with the fact that Booth's prognosis is itself a part of the (modern) tradition he criticises. By adopting the discourse which he criticises Booth is unable to, as he states, "conduct the sort of survey that can result in a new research agenda" (777). This is not to say that he cannot formulate
another theory of development or continue to be involved with using the "lower-order concepts derived from Marx" (777), especially for empirical purposes that he so much advocates, but rather that it is quite impossible for him to imagine development in any other way than as something which is required.

This becomes apparent when he states that "curiosity about why the world is the way it is, and how it may be changed, must be freed not from Marxism but from Marxism's ulterior interest in proving that within given limits the world has to be the way it is [emphasis added]" (777). While Booth is willing to go so far as a "temporary shift of emphasis in the sociological development debate from theory to metatheory" together with "a revitalised interest in the real-world problems of development policy and practice" (777), there is still the matter of an overwhelming interest to keep development as "policy" and "practice" as though these concepts are somehow more neutral and immune to the problématique identified with the metatheoretical commitment of Marxist development. That is, there is still a marked desire to get back to the real development that Booth knows is out there; to do development to someone; to continue to hold to a cherished notion that modernisation, as represented by its conceptual constructs, is a process to be emulated. This of course, after a brief epistemological purging in order to get development back in focus and on the right track.

A good summary of Booth's position, as well as one sympathetic to its original claims, can be found in an article by Stuart Corbridge titled "Post-Marxism and Development Studies: Beyond the Impasse" (1990). These matters aside for the time being, the position Corbridge adopts is one that is not much different from that of Booth. Corbridge accepts, first and foremost, that radical theories of development do indeed suffer from the problems of
"necessity" and "commitment" outlined by Booth. Corbridge also understands this to be revealed in their acceptance of the capitalist mode of production as determinant of certain social formations which, consequently, results in their disregard for other development experiences (shifting systems of culture for instance) not always explainable in Marxist terms. In sharing these convictions, Corbridge is not departing from Booth's analysis so much as extending them to include a broader range of theoretical activity. Precisely, where Booth criticised neo-Marxism for its "economism," "essentialism," and its privileged "epistemological" standing, Corbridge goes on to make the claim that these perceived shortcomings apply just as well to non-Marxist development studies.

Booth contends that the impasse in radical development theory encompasses not only neo-Marxist influenced perspectives but also a number of other and even more radical, perspectives. These include an increasing variety of post-Marxist approaches (the ultra-radical) as well as a number of neoliberal ideologies operating under the banner of their neoclassical forbearers (radical in their own right in that their concern is with implementing change, mainly in Eastern Europe where the project involves undoing much of what has been constructed in the last sixty years or so).

8 The impasse debate is already considered to be in its 'second round.' Corbridge (1993) makes the following distinctions: The first round criticised orthodox Marxism for its inability to provide a framework for immediate revolutionary sociopolitical change in Latin America and Africa. The second round includes the end of 'actually existing socialism' in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as China. This demarcation is beneficial in that it permits distinctions to be made around the use of the term "radical." This term, more often than not, designates a narrowly defined field in neo-Marxist theories of development. However, in the present global context--owing perhaps to new and additional concerns being directed at both orthodox Marxism and neo-Marxism--its meaning has come to be associated with just about any approach that challenges the dominant order. Whether 'alternative development' (micro-level, community-based, sustainable, participatory, etc.) can be considered as "radical" is questionable, especially since it has, in many cases, been co-opted into the dominant paradigm.

9 The reference here is to the New Right. Individuals sympathetic with its ideology regard the free operation of markets as the best means to achieving economic growth. The Right does not consider Third World development in the same sense that Keynesian economics does--that development economics in the Third World works according to different laws and logics than does.
It is here where Corbridge begins where Booth left off, not only in situating Booth's analysis to include a much wider discursive context, but also adding to it the contributions of the French Regulation School and the postimperialists as representative examples of how post-Marxist analyses can be used to interpret the impasse in radical development studies.

Corbridge picks up on Booth's question of why Marxist development sociology continues to flourish despite the recognition that it can no longer adequately account for the present state of affairs in the global system. For one, Corbridge claims that such analyses have seen the error of their ways and have increasingly adopted a critical stance toward the epistemological foundations of orthodox Marxism. He cites recent work from a growing post-Marxist literature as evidence of this. Secondly, Corbridge feels that radical development, as a phenomenon of its time, represents a more general and encompassing crisis in theorising in the social sciences. This explains its desire to formulate scientifically accurate explanations of the causes of underdevelopment and the historical course of capitalism. Without defining it as such, Corbridge seems to imply that the 'crisis of representation' in the social sciences has much to do with its experiences with modernity. Hence the reason why it can now be discerned that radical theories of development are in a state of crisis, as represented by the impasse at which they currently exist, is that the discourse of modernity has come to be challenged for its inability to meet the demands of economic life in the West. Stuart Corbridge (1992) maintains that the Right is indifferent to development studies because it does not consider the notion of "duoecomics" to be valid nor does it place much hope in any form of social democracy. Conversely, the current dominance of the New Right, or 'counter-revolution', is centred around the advancement of "three main propositions: (1) that the norms and laws of economic life hold true as much in the developing world as in the developed world (this is the tradition of monoeconomics); (2) that market imperfections in the Third World (as elsewhere) cannot be used to legitimise state interventions (this is to misread the theorem of the second-best which is central to welfare economics); and (3) that the pursuit of equality in the Third World (as elsewhere) is uncalled for, morally unsound and bound to promote economic inefficiency" (287).
explanation it originally set out for itself. Corbridge, however, does not take it quite to this extreme; that is that the crisis of representation is synonymous with the crisis of modernity. What he does argue is that "the object of development studies—the world system—has been transformed so radically since the late 1960s that it has begun to resist the conventional narratives of the discipline [emphasis added]" (623). The 'late capitalist' period, designated by the rise of the NICs, relative decline of US hegemony, break up of the socialist bloc, and the splintering of the Bretton Woods system are cited as requiring new explanations, ones which the conventional narratives of modernity can presumably no longer explain. For purely descriptive purposes, Corbridge invokes the concept postmodernism, in calling attention to the complexity of the world system as it developed since the 1960s.

Corbridge, then, accepts Booth's distaste of the formalistic tautologies and teleologies that characterised Marxist development discourse. However, he differs with Booth's assertion that this discourse continues to remain dominant and states rather that "the [post-]Marxian tradition has begun to respond to many of the criticisms made by Booth", and in any case Booth only

10 Since conventional narratives were constructed to explain various global phenomenon, it is generally accepted that their utility diminishes in accordance with the waning of these phenomena. For example dependency has been regarded as 'a child of its time'. This simply means that it arose when it did because it filled a particular void in theorising. As soon as the conditions which brought dependency into being began to change so too did dependency. Dependency either had to adapt to these changes and make alterations and concessions to its theoretical framework as required or it could dismiss itself as irrelevant as its explanatory ability was no longer held to be relevant. In this way it can be said that the strength of a theory rests on its ability to adapt to changing social and political conditions. This is the problem Booth tried to confront above. He believed that the time for dependency, similar to other radical approaches, had long since passed, yet they were still in use. What he did not entertain, contra Corbridge, was that a theory or sets of theories, did not exist to replace the radical school. Corbridge states there are now theories—post-Marxist inspired ones—which fill this void adequately. What Booth and Corbridge do not realise, or just neglect to suggest, is that post-Marxism may still operate within the radical or alternative paradigm. The 'crisis of representation' addressed by Corbridge is then one which is inimical to the alternative paradigm and not to an epistemological crisis of greater proportions.
looked at the impasse in fairly narrow terms as opposed to its "context of a wider crisis of representation" (625). Post-Marxism, at least the type espoused by Corbridge, and which he takes up later in the article, sensitises development to the following aspects:

(1) to the constant but shifting production of space under the rule of capital; (2) to the changing sites and temporalities of capital accumulation and crisis formation in the world economy; (3) to the fragile economic and noneconomic conditions of existence of national and international regimes of accumulation. (628)

In terms of the 'crisis of representation,' Corbridge feels Booth adheres to a standard that is too abstract or removed from actual historical circumstances. Whereas Booth does not take into consideration the context out of which radical development was formed, Corbridge attempts to locate development within a particular historical period.11 He begins with a chronological description of the world as it took shape after World War II. He notes that the rise of the Third World as an entity into its own was constructed in terms of what it was not: not fed, not educated, not housed, not industrial, and not clothed. "[T]he Third World was measured against the First World and as a bloc found wanting" (626).

Measuring the Third World against the First World was at first made possible by referring to their differences. Distinguishing the First World from the Third World was carried out through the use of comparative analysis at the levels of economy, society, and polity. This mode of analysis was particularly popular until approximately the mid 1960s. Immediately following this period

11 For this reason Corbridge thinks Booth’s analysis is one-sided or “unbalanced”. Booth is only concerned with the deep theoretical underpinnings of Marxism and with noting the relationship between development sociology and Marxist sociology in general. Obviously he does not think it important to consider radical development as also reflective of and shaped by particular historical forces.
and extending into the 1980s came the gradual realisation that regional differences do not take shape autonomously but are developed as a result of linkages to the global economy as a whole. Precise indicators were formulated by which to accurately understand the disparities demarcating the three zones. Measured against the growth of the West, categories such as economic status were developed: low-income, low middle-income, upper-middle income, high-income oil exporters, industrial market and non-market.

These distinctions served to classify and identify the new regional differences. From the 1950s when a clear international division of labour (a Fordist regime of accumulation), nationally regulated markets, and a fixed exchange rate were the order of the day, to the 1980s where a ‘new’ international division of labour (a post-Fordist flexible regime of accumulation), multinational and transnationalisation and, a floating exchange rate became the disorder of the day. This crude but unfrayed presentation of climactic change is what Corbridge calls the “rapid...uneven, drift toward becoming postmodern” (626). In this way, Corbridge’s description of the new international political economy is interesting in that it “is quite at odds with the stagnationist thesis of underdevelopment theory” (626) described by Booth.

Corbridge’s implicit reference to ‘postmodernism as condition’ serves the purpose of showing how conventional representations have not accurately reflected the way the world has taken shape since at least 1945. To his thinking, this results in nothing short of a complete paradigm breakdown, whether it be the dominant or alternative one. Both, although through different processes, are considered to be ends directed, the one through simulation and the other through change. In both cases, a vision of a particular sort of ending ultimately elides their differences. However, Corbridge is by no means
advocating for a nihilist or relative position to take the place of the crisis of paradigms in the social sciences. That post-Marxist positions sometimes tend to lean towards "a cause-less eclecticism" (628) is a criticism often made by orthodox and neo-Marxists.

The remainder of Corbridge's article argues for the viability of a post-Marxist development studies. His examination toward this possibility is informed by invoking the recent insights of Regulation theory and proponents of postimperialism. His assessment of post-Marxism is carried out by comparing it with the Marxist position. Corbridge begins his analysis of post-Marxism by elaborating upon the problems identified in Booth's article. Corbridge shares Booth's conviction that the main problems encountered by radical development theory has to do with its continued attachment to orthodox Marxism, however, he goes a step further and hypothesizes that post-Marxism meets the criteria for moving radical development theory out of the impasse.

Three key debates are addressed and contrasted. The first involves issues having to do with 'causality,' 'determination,' and 'conditions of existence of social and economic formations' (628-629). Determining and causal factors are often at the heart of radical development theory mainly because they provide a structured and ordered way of producing and analysing results. Utilising the principles of the scientific method, positivist oriented development studies proclaim that the procedures of natural science are directly applicable to the social world. The goal is to establish that laws or law-like generalisations can be made about social phenomena. Furthermore, the neutral position of the researcher is required if there is to be a rigid separation between facts and

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12 To reiterate, empirical based research posits the subject as the source of all knowledge. The human mind, via the apparently transparent medium of language, receives impressions which it sifts and organises in order to make sense of the material world. The 'subject' grasps the 'object' and puts it into words. The impasse does not explicitly challenge the continuance of this project.
values. Normative statements by themselves cannot count as facts unless they are supported by empirical evidence.

This is what Booth’s critique was directed against when he asserted that the entire realm of the new Marxist-influenced development sociology was concerned with imposing a particular moral standard of its own as opposed to finding a genuine replacement to the dominant paradigm of development. At the same time, Corbridge criticises Booth for missing other valuable insights of Marxism, ones which do not necessarily have to be attached to its ontological and epistemological framework. Concepts derived from Marx such as the labour theory of value, class analysis, and the theory of alienation can function just as well by themselves; without also incorporating Marx’s metatheoretical baggage.

Post-Marxists agree with the last statement and accept empirical propositions such as that of the economy tending to be a determining factor under the rule of capital. Conversely, they are critical of concepts such as ‘primacy,’ which take ultimate precedence when they are part of a discourse that is closed to any other possible explanations of the determining aspects of the economy. It is when Marxists refuse to consider any other options, as they do when they operate within their “closed and mechanistic discourse” (628), that they become open for criticism by post-Marxists. As Corbridge states, “their [post-Marxist] target is a world with one, privileged, vantage point” (629). However, some post-Marxist positions hold to a genuine Marxist discourse in the sense that they are committed to the development “of a social scientific

as much as it criticises radical development theory for not having more success with it. Impasse, and post-impasse research continues to make distinctions between subject and object, knower and known. The notion of ‘discursive formations’ where knowledge is formed out of discourse that preexists the subject’s experience, has not yet been adequately addressed in post-impasse theorising.
vision which is wedded to concepts of causality and determination while opposing teleology and determinism" (629).

Nonetheless, Corbridge criticises post-Marxism for its close proximity to postmodernism; that is not so much for being a postmodern discourse, but for attempting to reconstruct an outmoded Marxism such that it is better able to represent the logic of 'late capital' under postmodern conditions. The approach post-Marxism takes has inevitably resulted in a variety of criticisms being launched against it. Like postmodernism, from which post-Marxism emanates, it has "followed...a path of intellectual relativism and political nihilism....[and] embraced the absolutization of language....[which leaves it] floundering in a world of absolute contingency and theoretical sophistry" (628). Lacking a vantage point--a crucial component of any truth claim--post-Marxism becomes a "social science without rhyme or reason, a history without a cause or narrative" (628).

Corbridge also deals with post-Marxism's problematisation of the economy. Noting the numerous and confusing array of debates within Marxism regarding the degree and extent to which the economy is responsible for shaping and controlling the social forces that lie beyond it, leads Corbridge to concentrate on the work of the French Regulation School as an example of how a "prospective" post-Marxism deals with the concept of economy. Corbridge

13 The contradiction is apparent to Corbridge; what he means to say is that post-Marxism replaces a mode of production as totality with an emphasis on the relations of production (the social relations under which production is organised: how resources and labour are allocated, how the labour process is organised and how products are distributed) and the diverse contexts in which they may exist. While many post-Marxists believe that capitalist relations of production presuppose the existence of a definite set of conditions (private property rights and free wage labour which are dependent on particular forms of labour discipline, accounting mechanisms, legal practice and so forth) they deny that these conditions exist because it is required of capitalism or even that these conditions are produced in forms which are determined by the relations of production. Post-Marxists leave room for the possibility "that capitalist relations of production may be reproduced or undermined by a set of opposing and unhelpful actions associated with (say) religion or demography" (629).
regards the work of the Regulation School as “offer[ing] the clearest example of an economics informed by Marxism which yet avoids an unhappy essentialism and teleology” (629).

Very briefly, he mentions three aspects it contains that are of value to radical development studies. One is its challenge to various ideologies of globalism, particularly those who like to view the globe as a unified and coherent system sharing more or less the same rules of capital formation and dispersion. Regulation theory holds that the national dimension is primary (despite the erosion of nation-states and the growth of transnational business). Here, the world economy is theorised as a system of intersecting social formations. The concept ‘system’ is problematised in that it lacks an account of stability and structure; ‘system’ implies that the globe is a unified and cohesive whole which is somehow kept intact by intentional forces. Regulation theory holds that the ways in which economies of nations are structured and regulated is of primary importance and supersedes uniform global processes.

A second important aspect of Regulation theory that Corbridge mentions has to do with its conceptual apparatus. The concepts ‘regime of accumulation’ and ‘mode of social and political regulation,’ are the identifying characteristics of Regulation theory. A well known advocate of Regulation theory is the French radical economist Alain Lipietz. Lipietz’s project to date is 

14 Instead of relying on Corbridge’s somewhat obtuse account of these concepts, the primary works of Alain Lipietz will be consulted instead. One component missing in Corbridge’s version is a critique of Regulation’s eurocentric bias. When Lipietz, for instance, speaks of agency, his discourse is littered with traditional verbiage of labour movements and union organisation. That this group, by itself, can no longer be depended upon to bring about social change has become a more or less accepted fact in post-Marxist theorising, especially when the industrial proletariat can no longer be privileged as the only ones being exploited. Another criticism has to do with Lipietz’s contention that the analysis of the world’s problems hinges on the notion of Fordism. That is, the derivative concepts ‘global Fordism’ and ‘peripheral Fordism’ provide the means Lipietz needs to assess the current global malaise. For Lipietz, global Fordism implies the global spread of an ‘intensive regime centred on mass consumption.’ Peripheral Fordism suggests the
concerned with showing how orthodox and determinist oriented economics have failed to interpret satisfactorily the actual patterns of development in past and present contexts. This sentiment, which defines his point of view, finds itself expressed in a number of his works. In one instance he writes:

...by arguing that the world is as it is because it was designed to serve 'the interests of the powerful' or 'the interests of the system....[s]uggests that there is some Great Engineer or Supreme Entrepreneur who organizes labour in terms of a preconceived world plan. Depending on one's tastes and styles, this watchmaker's activity is the outcome of the efforts of readily identifiable subjects such as Multinational Companies or the Trilateral Commission....Such tendencies can only lead...to either a banal pessimism of the intellect ('We can't do anything about it; the system is against us') or a new opium of the people ('It will soon collapse under the weight of its own contradictions') (Lipietz, 1987: 4).

Instead of a "banal pessimism" (related to the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's concept 'pessimistic functionalism') Lipietz advocates that researchers, militants, and intellectuals rely on a post-Marxist form of analysis which leans more toward the concrete analysis of concrete situations; one which does not allow events and phenomena to remain seemingly out of the jurisdiction of human control and action. Clearly, Lipietz believes in the human subject's ability to take action for the purpose of bringing about change to existing extension of that regime to the periphery. The impression here is that Lipietz does not merely describe what is happening but that these events are unfolding without any type of resistance (which could alter their formation and spread). What Lipietz ultimately ends up doing is constructing the 'periphery' in opposites; according to what the West is not. This point also brings to mind Lipietz's inordinate desire to locate Fordism wherever it might be lurking. In his quest, he admonishes dependency writers for keeping a blind eye to noncapitalist forms of production in peripheral regions, however, his own imposition of Fordism onto peripheral reality repeats the eurocentrism Lipietz criticises in other writers. This is based on his belief that Fordism may represent some form of a social-democratic compromise (like Taylorism once was); if recommends Fordism to the exploited citizens of the South rather than socialism. This can be taken to mean an acceptance of the positive aspects of capitalism, with only the present quarks (crisis) in Fordism to be mended in order for it to be a successful form of development in the South. His aim is obviously geared towards modernising the South.
conditions, ones which can result in altering the course of history towards a more desirable future.

The concepts 'regime of accumulation' and 'mode of regulation,' especially in their contemporary usage, are usually associated with the concept 'Fordism.' An accumulation regime is a particular combination of production and consumption which can be reproduced over time despite the presence of conflictual tendencies; while a 'mode of regulation'--social and political--refers to an entire institutional whole and a combination of norms which can secure and maintain capitalist reproduction temporarily despite the conflictual and antagonistic character of capitalist social relations. According to Lipietz,

*a regime of accumulation* describes the fairly long-term stabilisation of the allocation of social production between consumption and accumulation. This implies a certain correspondence between the transformation of conditions of production and the transformation of the conditions of reproduction of wage-labor, between certain of the modalities in which capitalism is articulated with other modes of production within a national economic and social formation, and between the social and economic formation under consideration and its outside world'....

The regime of accumulation must be materialised in the shape of norms, habits laws and regulating networks....

The set of internalised rules and social procedures which incorporate social elements into individual behaviour...is referred to as a *mode of regulation*. Thus, the dominant regime of accumulation in the OECD countries during the postwar period - an intensive regime centred on mass consumption - has a very different mode of regulation to that operating in nineteenth-century capitalism. In a gesture of homage to Gramsci, we know refer to it as Fordism (Lipietz, 15 Fordism is/was associated with a system of centralised management of large industrial enterprises. The extreme division of labour and the application of the automatic assembly line, setting the pace for workers' operations, were its basic distinguishing features. Unfortunately, Lipietz does not concern himself with the logical outcome of Fordism, that being post-Fordism, in any of the articles being addressed here. It could, however, be argued that "global fordism," to some degree, fits the criteria of post-Fordism--if not by definition than at least by description.
An important consideration is also made regarding the extent to which a regime of accumulation is totalising--in the sense that it explains all relations of production in a given historical phase. Lipietz acknowledges that that "there are at least two ways every regime is part of a larger context 'external' to it" (1988: 31). He notes here that capitalist production does not necessarily organise all forms of production in any particular social formation. For instance, the reproductive labour which occurs within households is largely external to capitalist organisation. However, within time, capitalist commodity production may extend into household production thereby bringing about an extension of wage labour and capitalist accumulation such that there will be a new articulation of household production. The second 'external' context is that of the "different economic relations among different socio-economic relations" (Lipietz, 1988: 32). Different political and economic regimes, particularly those of the post-1989 events in Eastern Europe, means that a variety of regimes of accumulation exist.

Clearly evident here is that Regulation theory, as conceptualised by Lipietz, is not confined to analysis of economic matters alone. Equal emphasis is placed on noting the outcome of social and political struggles. In time, the outcome of such struggles stabilise to form a hegemonic system (class alliances based on structured choices which shape the interests both of the ruling and dominated classes into conformity with the accumulation regime), which in turn

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16 Elsewhere he states "A mode of transformation conjoined to and compatible with norms of production and consumption is called regime of accumulation. This regime can be described as the given repetition of the production of sections or productive branches and of the corresponding demand: what is called a schema of reproduction or macroeconomic structure...the 'Fordist' regime could be described as a parallelism of the increase of productivity, the norm of consumption of wage workers, and of the composition of capital" (Lipietz, 1993a: 132).
means that the discovery of a particular mode of regulation has been made. This discovery, however, cannot be made without first having the preexisting conditions already in place; which allow its discovery to be made in the first place. This is an important point to stress, since, as noted earlier, it provides a means by which to describe an existing regime of accumulation (an *intensive* one such as Fordism for example\(^{17}\)) in terms of certain actions and decisions committed by human agents (conscious or not, but nevertheless material ones).

[A] regime of accumulation cannot be supported solely by its own coherence—institutional forms and norms of actor aspirations...are needed to ensure the convergence of expectations and of behaviour towards the regime of accumulation. These *forms of regulation* concern the organisation of wage relations, of competition, the management of the money supply, and state intervention (Lipietz, 1989: 73).

Among the sentiments expressed by Lipietz, as described above, is the belief that Marxism goes far beyond its deterministic and teleological constraints. Holding to the notion that capitalism brings with it certain governing principals and conditions of material existence does not mean, according to Lipietz, that it cannot however be altered by concrete forms of human intervention. In the case of 'core' and 'periphery' relationships, it means recognising that this relationship is one of concrete effects, one which can be observed at the level of material forces, not as a grand scheme executed by transcendent historical forces.

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\(^{17}\) If Fordism is an *intensive* regime of accumulation, then the period before it (from at least the time of the Industrial Revolution to the beginning of the 20th century: marked by the global spread of capitalism) can be referred to as an *extensive* regime of accumulation as capitalist industry began to spread across various regions of the globe in order to monopolise and subsume all other exiting regimes of accumulation. The latest regime of accumulation can be characterised as a *flexible* one. Post-Fordism is a flexible regime of accumulation. This describes the way in which capitalism is once again reasserting itself by developing and evolving into new forms, especially in the way labour and work are organised.
What Corbridge neglects to take into account when he states that “the Regulation School directs our attention to the diverse political (and other) conditions of existence of national and international regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation” (631) is the degree to which ‘regimes of accumulation’ can effectively alter the social and political ‘modes’ that govern its formation. Notwithstanding that concrete forces, as opposed to teleological ones, give shape to the regime of accumulation, the problematic issue of what and who these concrete forces are that allow for the (Fordist) regime of accumulation to take the typical form it does still remains an issue to be resolved. In other words, accepting that concrete intervention is the primary shaper and mover of regimes of accumulation, is displaying faith in human will to intervene where it wants.

Conversely, capitalist development, of which the Fordist regime is one stage, should not be considered as moving along a predestined path because it has been planned to do so or because that is what is wanted and required of it. This not only places too much faith in the ability of capitalist entrepreneurs to do with the economy as they see fit but also shifts the notion of teleology from

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18 After the transitionary process of capitalism was complete, it developed, according to Lipietz, into the following stages: 1) 1848—end of the 19th century. Extensive growth centred on the means of production and based on the acquirement of skills by workers. Prices and wages set according to levels of production. 2) Depression ca. late 19th century. The first of many recurring crises of capitalism. Too place due to tensions in the labour markets after periods of success as well as high competition as products began to saturate the consumer market. The crisis of this regime of accumulation is a result of the previous regime’s inability to extract enough surplus value. A deficiency in regulation of the supply/demand is another factor. 3) Phase of recovery. Monopolies and cartels (linked to imperialism) along with a stable purchasing power of the labour class, signalled an improvement in the regulation and management of growth. This meant an improvement in the mode of regulation which signalled a transformation of the regime of accumulation as realised by the introduction of Taylor’s ‘scientific management’ scheme at the level of production. The regime of accumulation still remained ‘extensive’ and was centred on the means of production rather than consumption. 4) World War I. Geopolitical redistribution of power. The expansion of Taylorist and Fordist means of production initiated an ‘intensive’ regime of accumulation which flourished until the stock market crash of 1929. 5) 1930-1945. A period of major crisis which was characterised by an almost pure global mode of regulation. 6) World War
its metatheoretical 'truth' position to a concrete one. In both cases, albeit in different guises, there is no attempt to question the irrationality of capitalism, that it may exist, not independent of the capitalist will, but not according to it either. The Regulation School seems to imply that regimes of accumulation are what they are because of a concrete, strategic plan directed and carried out by those (World Bank, multinational companies, business elites) who, for reasons of their own, have a vested interest in maintaining or changing a regime whenever they choose.

If this is an accurate assessment, than capitalist development still remains a mysterious force, one shaped by the progressive will of material or immaterial forces. Ironically, capitalism's existence may have as much to do with elements that oppose and resist it as much as with those which support and promote it.

While this description is in itself interesting, it leaves unanswered the question of why the concept development remains so prominent in Western thinking. Corbridge does not deal with the philosophical ramifications that this question begs but rather concerns himself with the shape radical development needs to take in order for it to transcend the theoretical limitations of the impasse, thus meeting Booth's challenge that new thinking on development must take place outside the confines of neo-Marxist development sociology.

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1) The victory of the Allies. Permitted a concentration on mass production towards durable mass-consumption. Monopoly regulation is strengthened through such innovative means as wage contracts, indirect wages, credit, state intervention (based on the ideas J.M. Keynes). This regime of accumulation was called 'Fordism'. 7) 1970s–present. Present crisis is a result of both a crisis of the regime of accumulation and a crisis of the mode of regulation. In the case of the former, the exhaustion of the gains of Taylorist productivity and the increase in the composition of capital through Fordist processes led to a fall in profitability. In the case of the latter, its essential national character is faced with the increasing prospect of internationalisation of production and circulation. Hence, a competition among states results in 'competitive stagnation.' Furthermore, the fact that the export of mass production to regions of the South was not matched by an equal rise in mass consumption helped undermine the critical balance between production and consumption, the key to the Fordist system. See Lipietz (1989).
The third aspect of post-Marxism Corbridge deals with is indubitably its greatest strength. This has to do with its position on agency, power and politics. However, instead of dealing with these issues from a micro-level perspective (community based politics, new social movements, civil society), Corbridge chooses instead to incorporate them under the heading postimperialism. Postimperialism initially developed as a reaction to the work of dependency theorists, but also out of its own interests having to do with the relationship between modern—hence international—business corporations and their effects on the national polity of Third World countries. Using the concept of class to analyse political institutions as well as political theories about modern business corporations, postimperialists attempt to show that such corporations act in similar ways to political institutions and are therefore capable of adopting an increasingly powerful role in determining how national and international politics is conducted. Postimperialists also consider the national setting to take priority over the international one insofar as politics is concerned. Even where there is economic integration of some form on a national level, does not delimit in any way the political power of individual nations.  

The consequences of this position in relation to Marxism is, according to Corbridge, two-fold: First, postimperialists, contrary to Lenin, do not consider

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19 It has been stated that “we are in the epoch of postimperialism” (Parrini, 1993: 14) where imperialism is no longer in operation and for which the theory of imperialism is inappropriate for providing insight into the relation between developed and developing regions. Postimperialism is perhaps best understood as a reaction to the failures of the dependency approaches, especially its inability to account for the high economic growth experienced by NICs. On a more general level, postimperialism can also be regarded as a pessimistic reaction to the slow progress of radical forces in the Third World (Becker, et al. 1987). In attacking the dependency viewpoint, advocates of postimperialism go so far as to deny the relevance of imperialist domination for understanding the Third World. In this way there is an underlying assumption that regards all regimes around the world as qualitatively equal and, therefore, obscure the relation of exploitation between developed and developing areas. By and large, opinion, which see imperialism as unimportant come mostly from the Right. In contrast, postimperialism is part of the radical tradition in the sense that it often criticises inequalities and repression and speaks of the desirability of socialism. This
imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. They reject the idea that business has to expand into foreign markets in order to save them from immanent collapse. The also refutes the notion that capitalism is by its nature imperialist and that the inter-relationship between states is a coercive one. Postimperialists conclude that corporations, operating on an international setting, consolidate rather than diversify national interests on a new global level. In the instance of transnational corporations, they have the benefit of bringing to the Third World capital resources, technology, markets, and other advanced services. In the view of postimperialists, this is advantageous to Third World countries, whatever their economic status.

Corbridge is quick to acknowledge the radical position of this viewpoint since as he notes "it subverts the Third Worldism of much Leftist thinking" (632). Instead of breaking ties with the industrialised world, as much of the reactionary left tend to advocate, postimperialism encourages a level of economic participation. Corbridge, in drawing mainly from the recent work of David Becker et al. (1987), summarises one of their main thesis.

Becker and Sklar contend that as industrialisation continues to spread globally it creates what they have called a 'corporate national bourgeoisie.' This group is comprised of an eclectic mix of various political, consultative and business types ranging from high ranking members of state and politicians to well-educated professionals to entrepreneurial elites and managers of corporations. Yet their positions, all of which include rank, privilege and prestige viewpoint can also be considered as conservative in that postimperialism tends to present inequalities and exploitation as accidental facts and not as directly related to the world capitalist system; the relationship between developed and developing is basically a harmonious one as the position regarding transnational corporations shows. A good starting point for critiques and reviews include Addo (1984), who offers a good comparison of world-systems analysis and Marxist imperialism; Sivanandan (1989) discusses 'hierarchies of production' in the international division of labour. See also Sklair (1991: 28, 227-239); Parrini (1993); and Haynes (1993).
all bear the trademark of a social group with its own identifiable place in society. For Becker and Sklar this group meets the conditions and criteria that are commonly associated with class.

The designation of class is provided for two reasons. The first is an obvious one and has to do with sharing similar socioeconomic privileges as well as having identical interests so far as political power and social control are believed to be intrinsic to the capitalist mode of production. This class organises and maintains both public and private large scale industrial units in the global economy where it also confronts, as a class, the workers who perform the labour. The second reason for designating the 'corporate national bourgeoisie' as a class is that they are involved in a conflict with the oligarchic national bourgeoisie who occupied privileged positions before the onset of multinational and transnational corporations. However, even as the 'corporate national bourgeoisie' is still being defined, its position is in the process of changing to that of 'corporate international bourgeoisie.' This does not change the structure of its control at all, since this class simply adapts to the changes they themselves orchestrate. What Corbridge, echoing Becker and Sklar, sees happening as a result, is a process whereby the international class of elites "is breaking forever the cast of imperialism" (632). Indeed, as Becker and Sklar state: "To the extent that the drive succeeds, imperialism--the domination of one people by another--will be (is being) superseded by transnational class domination of the world as a whole" (1987: 14).

It is difficult to understand why Corbridge places so much emphasis on drawing a relationship between postimperialism and the impasse in
development studies. On the one hand it is clear: postimperialism adds another element to the growing list of critiques directed at Marxism's metatheoretical commitment. However, beyond this critique there needs to be a great deal of uncertainty and skepticism towards Corbridge's positive assessment that postimperialism offers new directions for development studies.

Regardless, Corbridge outlines what he considers are positive aspects of postimperial informed analysis. First, it reveals how citizens of Third World nations (Latin American countries are usually used as examples) can consider the emergence of the 'international corporate elite' as a beneficial component to their societies. The argument is that since this class of elites works best under constitutional governance they will have a vested interest in maintaining its structure and cohesion. The understanding is that liberal democracy is beneficial to everyone and that the rise of a class of elites is proportionate to the strength of any liberal democratic order. The added benefit is that authoritarian rule cannot function under conditions where the 'corporate international bourgeoisie' are dominant. Second, and with respect to radical development theory, postimperialism shows that decisions concerning political choices to not have to be reduced to capitalism or socialism. While postimperialists accept that capitalism is driven by a basic contradiction "between the social character of production and the private, anarchic character of the regulation of production" (Becker & Sklar, 1987: 11-12)--hence the emphasis on class--they do not believe, contrary to many socialists, that this will inevitably result in capitalism's collapse. Instead capitalism is able to manage these conflicts and adapt them into its functioning system. In this sense, the contradiction becomes the norm.

20 Highly problematic, again, is the extent to which the corporate international elite have the ability to control and regulate the flow and spread of international capital. Even though this is what seems to be happening because this class of elites requires it, there must also be some attention given to the matter of forces and actors that resist against this domination of elites. And once
and not the exception of the capitalist system. What Corbridge and the postimperialists regard as important here, under late or mature capital, is that the "mechanism of adaptation...is working to promote transnational institutions and an international working class movement which may yet balance the power of the corporate bourgeoisie" (632). Third, postimperialists also realise that a distinction exists by virtue of the differences between those owning the means of production and those who do not. However, they do not believe that the form of exploitation such a situation creates can be reduced by acting against foreign capital. And finally, postimperialism also relegates the importance of the nation-state as secondary to that of a theory on the international ruling class. Nationalisms will recede into the background as the field of politics stretches to meet the formation of transnational economic classes.

Corbridge concludes by briefly evaluating the contributions that Regulation theory and postimperialism make to post-Marxism. He believes that the former is much more developed in terms of its theoretical approaches than is postimperialism. He states that postimperialism needs to consider the basis of its arguments in at least one instance; the belief that the managerial bourgeoisie are necessarily evolving into a powerful force within the global economy. This brings to the fore the delicate issue of economic determinism and its extension to all forms of development as explainable or reducible to this factor alone. For example, the demise of authoritarian rule in Latin America as a result of its lack of support from international capital could be implied to mean that teleological elements are at work. Thinking about development in these

text again, even though it would be interesting to develop a line of analysis that would verify the extent to which resisting forces are actually accommodated in the framework of capitalism, even ones which are required in order for capitalism to develop along its present trajectory, the point to stress is that Corbridge seems to uncritically accept capitalism's metatheoretical commitment to demonstrating its necessity.
terms means not only the accepting the metatheory of progressive development but also, on a more concrete level, reduces politics to apathy.

Corbridge, however, deals with postimperialism because it "forms one moment of an emerging autocritique of Marxist development studies" (633). For Corbridge this aspect alone makes it worthy of consideration; that is, simply because postimperialism as a form of analysis exists is evidence enough that the strict orthodox Marxist interpretation of development can be amended. Postimperialism is also important because, in Corbridge's estimation, "it contributes to a new theorization of the politics of the world economy, and of the role of actors and institutions within that broader structure" (633). This raises the level of its possibility to one which can take an active role in helping form a post-Marxist development studies that can transcend the impasse.

Corbridge notes four aspects of post-Marxism that he finds useful in the fulfilment of this endeavour. The first has to do with Booth's initial assessment of radical development theory as too committed to disavowing Marx's notion of historical materialism, particularly the mode of production/mode of exchange controversy but also the Marxist metatheory of the necessity of capitalism. Corbridge agrees with the problem as stated and, like Booth, regards the existence of the impasse as verification of the malaise in development theorising. However, where Booth remains skeptical in outlining approaches required to transcend it, Corbridge takes this issue to be more or less settled. He is convinced that many Marxists are no longer operating under the epistemological weight of their predecessors. Regulation theory, for instance, has been instrumental in encouraging theoreticians to look at the dynamic forces of capitalism which, in turn, gives it an immense variety of forms and processes that may either be consistent or inconsistent with the logic of capital
accumulation. The point they emphasise is that 'regimes of accumulation' should not be approached in terms of their interconnectedness or relatedness on a grand (world systemic) scale but rather in terms of questions that begin with what each country produces, how it functions, and why specific wage relations and regimes of accumulation develop over other ones.

Likewise, postimperialists also reject the teleology of radical development as well as the continual rehashing of age-old questions that attempt to prove or disprove the Marxist problématique. This debate has been forsaken, not because it has been disproven but because its importance is no longer held to be relevant to explaining existing global conditions. Yet, on the other hand postimperialists work within the bounds of Marxist theory in so far as they hold to the notion that concepts such as class, exploitation, and political agency are vital to explaining the contemporary global condition. At any rate, a powerful critique is being developed in post-Marxist circles "toward theories of capitalist development which emphasise contingency, disorganization, and structuration. In place of a top-heavy structuralism, there is new emphasis upon human agency...questions of gender, ethnicity and ideology" (633)

If post-Marxism rejects the neo-Marxist indulgence with the telos of historical materialism, it also at the same time acknowledges the possibility of other truth claims. This represents another possibility whereby the impasse can be transcended. Corbridge feels that when post-Marxists begin to converse on a multidisciplinary level within the social sciences, they are acknowledging that they alone are not the privileged executors of scientific knowledge and that their interpretation of the world 'out there' is one among many. This frees post-Marxism from a defence of the indefensible [since it]....no longer need[s] to argue that peripheral capitalism must promote authoritarianism, or de-industrialization, or relative overpopulation because to
argue otherwise is somehow 'bourgeois'. (634)

Borrowing from related fields such as Regulation theory and its recent work in post-Keynesian economics and institutionalism, opens up the possibility of creating a multi-disciplinary informed discourse.

A third possibility created by post-Marxist discourse is that it separates issues having to do with the completion of an explicit political agenda (e.g. revolutionary socialism and Third Worldism) with those that seek to analyse the form that power takes. However, post-Marxism is not apolitical in the sense that it forsakes class and its relation to the economy nor does it deal with these concepts as contingent of a greater metatheoretical apparatus.

Finally, post-Marxism "offers a more nuanced political agenda" (634). Capitalism is regarded as neither holistic or unified nor as a necessary evil without any appeal whatsoever. It accepts the prospect of capitalism's continued existence but not one that takes the same form everywhere. This requires post-Marxists to change their position from time to time according to the context being studied and to historical changes that inevitably occur. Becoming adaptable requires working from within the capitalist system rather than outside it or even against it. Effort is directed at changing what exists as opposed to bringing to fruition that which is hoped and longed for; that is, "a feasible politics which takes seriously the case for markets within socialism, and of socialist systems within capitalism...[instead of] a politics of despair and hopelessness" (634).

4.2: Transcending the Impasse in Radical Development Theory

It would certainly be wrong to presume that Booth and Corbridge have been the only ones to note the direct impact which the legacy of Marxist-
influenced theorising has had, and continues to have, in radical development theory. Indeed, important inroads are being constructed from a variety outerlying points by which to divert development away from the impasse. In some cases this involves taking a 'middle-range position (Booth); one which deals with situating development theory somewhere between Warren's classical Marxist approach and the dependency perspective. Booth, for instance is not interested in involving himself in a debate which consists entirely of proving or disproving the content of Marx's original insights on the telos of history. He advocates returning to more fundamental and basic issues of development, the collecting of quantitative empirical evidence to validate theories about the relations, for instance, between the 'informal sector' and large-scale enterprises in urban centres. This ignores the debate on metatheory but still regards the utility of Marx's concepts as of utmost importance in understanding many of the issues confronting the Third World. Others, like Corbridge, are concerned with showing that it is possible to borrow from and link with recent approaches that have arisen in response to questions about the Marxist problematique. In this instance, the work of post-Marxists, operating under a variety of guises, including that of the Regulation School and postimperialism, is increasingly being scrutinised in hopes of finding suitable material with which to complement development studies.

With much work being carried out trying to show how alternative approaches and perspectives can add to the vitality of radical development theorising and consequently to legitimate its presence within various disciplines, there has been a virtual neglect regarding what Booth referred to as "metatheoretical considerations of a certain sort" (Booth, 1985: 773). Even Booth himself, for good reasons it is suspected, did not see fit to provide the
details of what such a project should consider or why it is even necessary, although he does go so far as to state that what is needed is an understanding of why radical development, even though it has been shown to be theoretically mistaken from a number of empirical stances, continues to cling desperately to some sense of hope that cannot be empirically attained or proven to exist. Nonetheless, Booth feels, and rightly so, that there still exists some "deep" reason "behind" the desire to (meta)theorise on a grand scale.

Yet Booth suggests that development return momentarily to a phase of grand theorising. This implies setting new goals, re-orienting, and taking inventory of the idea of development that has existed until now. For Booth there exists the possibility that the mission of radical development was never appropriate to start off with and that in its initial phases the 'new' Marxist-influenced development sociology already contained within itself the problems that would later realise themselves at the impasse. The metatheory from which it evolved or, Marx's philosophical musings on historical materialism and its required "commitment to demonstrating that the structures and processes that we find in the less developed world are not only explicable but necessary under capitalism" (Booth, 1985: 776), has served as the guiding principle for a generation of development theorists.

In the end, Booth and others have successfully upset this logocentric version of development and de-linked themselves from its totalising narrative. At the same time however Booth has called for its replacement, a new debate about what it is that development is trying to accomplish. This debate, like the one before it, is in danger of running into the same problem, the commitment to demonstrating that its truth claim is ultimately realisable. The second round in the development debate, its so-called 'post-impasse' phase, is supposedly well
under way. Here theories are constructed which locate themselves according to a 'new' or 'better' development.

Extending Booth's question regarding why radical development continues to work under the strictures of the Marxist problématique while apparently aware of its short-comings, could be another much larger question: Why, given the futility of the concept development, does theorising about it continue unabated? Being reminded of the problem with which this study is concerned, it is improbable whether the impasse can successfully be breached while holding to the requirement of the necessity of the concept development. Development as concept remains firmly embedded in the discourse of modernity and as such, thinking and acting apart from it and without reference to it, becomes proportionately more difficult as new theories continue to be added to its repertoire.21 What has unified the literature on the impasse is its unequivocal stance on the requirement of development as a central focal point for any departing analysis of the Third World.22 Whatever else the impasse has

21 The German critic Walter Benjamin, writing in 1940, once commented on a painting by Paul Klee titled Angelus Novus. The picture gives the impression of an angel struggling to maintain a distance between itself and an object not far away. The angel appears shocked, even terrified. For Benjamin, the angel represents history. “His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurlts it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress” (1969: 258). Benjamin’s evocative metaphor can also be applicable here. The remains of radical development, and the ‘development’ which subsequently replaces and follows it are, for Benjamin, not conclusively different from each other. Rather than a “chain of events” leading towards something ‘better’—making progress in development theorising—Benjamin regards the process as a singular historical event, where the debris piles steadily higher. This refuse separates that what may be possible to imagine from that of the impossible.

22 Some have implied, through the use of agricultural metaphors, that theorising about the Third World be left dormant and fallow for the time being, after which the activity of research can be carried on again: “The most promising new approach may not be any specific methodological or theoretical strategy...[what may most be required at this moment is for the study of development in the Third World to take a sabbatical leave from theory...][the best strategy [echoing Booth]
questioned, the dominance of the discourse of development has remained firmly intact.

As such it is necessary to provide a general survey of additional literature on the impasse; to substantiate the claim that thinking about the impasse revolves around a similar set of features and assertions. The problems which gave rise to the impasse and the manner by which it proceeds to describe and analyse these problems distinguishes it from other discourses of development. However, this is not to say that impasse discourse operates on an autonomous level of reason apart from competing discourses (orthodox Marxism and neoliberalism) or even that it undermines them in any special way but rather, in unique ways, it is a continuation and extension of these discourse as they operate within the greater discourse of modernity.

Critiques of radical development, but especially dependency, are unified by the common set of problems they pose. In the case of dependency, criticisms often begin with a statement of its origin and context and move from that to a description of its content and finally to reasons suggesting why it is flawed and how it can be improved or conversely, why it should be abandoned as a framework of analysis altogether. Its origins, as first formulated within the Latin American context, are generally held as having evolved from a specific set of historical circumstances. The most commonly held view is that the dependency perspective “emerged in the 1950s from the writings of Latin American Scholars who were largely disillusioned with development policies based on modernization theory” (Suda, 1992: 34). Its critical stance in turn, allowed it to present alternative reasons for underdevelopment to those offered may now be to engage in data-driven rather than theory-driven research...[a]n atheoretical approach which identifies, describes, and perhaps classifies that diverse reality would be truly a step forward” (Hoffman Rhyne, 1990: 382).
by the dominant developmentalist positions.23

Others also agree as to the origins of radical development; as mainly a response to modernisation theories. Writing from an African perspective, Colin Leys (1982) for instance, is concerned with why modernisation theories were wrong and declares that the answer is inscribed in the theoretical agenda of radical development. In fact, the very purpose of radical development is built on an assumption that something is wrong with modernisation. Leys comments that dependency inherently considered modernisation as Eurocentric, "wrongly assuming that European...experience was valid for Africa--for instance, they tended to be obsessed with scale and with industry, neglecting the possibilities of small economic units and the centrality of agriculture" (1982: 102). Secondly, modernisation was "excessively economistic--preoccupied with capital output ratios but incapable of analysing the noneconomic determinants of such ratios, such as education and training, state administrative competence, or ethnic rigidities in labour markets" (102). Third, and most importantly, radical

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23 Dependency emerged from the convergence of two major intellectual trends: one with its background in the Marxist tradition (classical Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, neo-Marxism) and the other rooted in the Latin America structuralist discussion on development which ultimately informed the tradition of the Economic Commission for Latin America--ECLA in English and CEPAL in Spanish (Hettne, 1990: 82). The former, as this study has already shown, is generally subsumed under the category of radical development (encompassing critiques from both poles of Marxism) while the latter is more commonly known as the structuralist school. The main tenets of ECLA were initially articulated and forcefully expressed under the official auspices of the United Nations (hence UNECLA) under the leadership of the Argentine economist and former finance minister Raul Prebisch. For a lengthy overview see Palma (1978). Structuralism as well as its contemporary equivalent neo-structuralism, emerged as a vigorous force in the interpretation of the economic problems of Latin America. It is heavily influenced by Keynesian and post-Keynesian thought. To this day it concerns itself mainly with the following factors: "The existence of structural heterogeneity in national and world economies; the simultaneity of several deep imbalances; the fundamental role played by institutional variables; the instability and deterioration of the terms of trade; and the uneven distribution of the benefits of technological change" (Ffrench-Davis; 38). There is a notable absence of the Latin American structuralist tradition from the literature on the impasse, yet no doubt it continues to shape development thinking greatly. One reason for its absence, as alluded to by Ffrench-Davis, may have to do with its efforts relating to economic and technological factors as opposed to the construction and adherence to any one specific theoretical framework.
development criticised modernisation theory for turning its ideals and visions of what 'could be,' into something which 'had to be,' thus forcing modernisation from its theoretical stance into a doctrinaire position. Modernisation theory "assumed that the 'backwardness' of the Third World was an 'original' backwardness, a primeval backwardness that had once been universal and could be overcome by the transmission of capital and know-how from the industrial West" (102). This was a mistaken assumption, according to radical development, since the backwardness that existed was one that was new to Africa, the outcome of colonialism. For example agriculture, one of the instances where it was considered backward, had been shaped and developed by colonialism.

Radical development, likewise, can be subjected to the same logic. As an inheritor of the ideal of Eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought, radical development places a great deal of hope in improving the conditions of material circumstances in the Third World through rational means. These ideals are built into radical development's conception of the modern world; indeed they were ones which preempted its existence in the first place. In assuming development as the norm, radical development exhibits an intriguing irony: as it denounces the Western World for its global exploitation, radical development theory shows itself to be, in its unexamined commitment to the idea of progress as the norm, completely attached to that mode of analysis. The only difference is in the means by which the ends are acquired. This difference does not justify one path over another, especially when both can be traced back to the same point of origin. Where theories of radical development cannot be formulated without also assuming the discourse of modernity (modernisation theory in particular), so too the theories that follow the (post-) impasse cannot be any different than
the theories they criticise. The discourse of modernity is all encompassing in that even while various theories of development (radical or otherwise) may presume themselves to be unrelated they, nonetheless, occupy a similar discursive space which greatly limits what can be said and thought.

This sort of critique is not generally considered in the debate about radical development nor even in the theories that are supposedly replacing it. Instead, reasons for the impasse continue to be centred around issues of theoretical content as the basis for their shortcomings, which is reflected, in turn by the current spate of development theorising in their attempt to account for these deficiencies. Underlying this project of critique and renewal has been a complete neglect of the rules which govern both what can be thought as well as how this thinking limits the degree to which change can actually be implemented. What is not taken into account is that all discourses of whatever political persuasion function within and share a similar regime of truth. For this reason it is difficult to imagine alternative possibilities.

This is evident in the many critiques that continue to try and substantiate the reality of the impasse. Dependency, for instance, remains as a major obstacle to transcending the impasse and is often the centre of criticism in articles which deal with the issue of the impasse. The impasse is maintained on the one level by the realisation of this fact and on another level by the understanding that all approaches and perspectives under the radical label can no longer be relied upon as a source of influence if radical development is to have a future. Whether post-Marxist positions comprise a new radical development remains to be seen but what has already been shown is that dependency and other Marxist-influenced approaches in their original format are no longer applicable to existing global conditions. Instead of being at an
impasse—implying that as soon as their inconsistencies are dealt with they can resume normal duty—some have suggested they can never be sustained and should therefore be considered as "passe" and "R.I.P." (Davidson, 1989: Hoffman Rhyne, 1990).

Hoffman Rhyne for instance, states two of reasons why he believes dependency is anachronistic and out of step with major social and economic developments: the great economic strides found in the Pacific Rim countries and the many instances of Third World polities moving toward democracy. These are arguable matters, however, as he correctly states, they are discordant to the theory...difficulties which stem from its core belief. That belief is that any part of the Third World is defined and constrained by its relation to the First World's capitalist core. Dependency theorists may disagree on particular processes or outcomes, but there is no disagreement that what happens in most of the world is constrained by the power of the North Atlantic economic Metrople" (1990: 371).

This belief by dependency, according to Hoffman Rhyne, contravenes against the examples of industrialisation and democracy occurring in the Third World. According to dependency, these events should not be happening so long as the "North Atlantic Metrople" remains dominant, which it still is. However, like most critics of radical development, Hoffman Rhyne's reason for dismissing/replacing it is very much part of that discourse.

It is this diversity [of the Third world] and its fundamental importance that must constitute the starting point for the new research strategies and theoretical conceptions needed to guide future studies. In striking contrast to dependency/world systems approaches, and to modernization ones as well, new approaches must be developed which can accept the many-sided diversity, building on it and not on a single, world-wide process. Rather than treating most differences, other than a nation's
place in the world-system, as analytically inconsequential, a future sociology of development *must* make the variety its central concern [emphasis added]. (1990: 380-381)

These are admirable goals to which the Third World "must" submit, and that the sociology of development "must", in turn, consider. And while the discourse of diversity is certainly to be celebrated, leaving it in the hands of a sociology of development will almost certainly reduce any diversity that might exist to a quantifiable and analytic whole. Furthermore, as a result of operating under the pretext of modernity, development continues to be relied upon as the agent of diversity, as best able to ensure its presence. That it has not, and that this may be the problem with development, is once again left unquestioned. Diversity then becomes something which the sociology of development constructs for the Third World.

The search for a unifying discourse, one which can clearly articulate and represent radical development in the post-impasse period, remains a central concern and vital aspect in the development debate. This approach does not represent a drastic departure from pre-impasse theorising but rather serves as an indicator of its continuation. While a questioning of the Marxist metatheory has indubitably occurred in the field of radical development, similar attempts to show the metatheoretical commitment behind subsequent approaches in radical development remain neglected. This is because radical development is not concerned with the issue of metanarrative in itself as it is with destabilising the orthodox Marxist position. In this way, radical development resists the claims of orthodox Marxism without, however, relinquishing all hope in the possibility of constructing another all-encompassing discourse; one that remains firmly fixed in Western foundations of thought.
The impasse may have served the important function of stressing the futility of the ongoing internal debate within the new Marxist-influenced development sociology—between the orthodox and radical positions—however, besides this recognition there does not appear to be a radical departure in how inquiry is conducted in the first place. Furthermore, new directions in development theory are certainly in existence, yet again they have not problematised the broader confines of the discourse from within which they operate. Important reasons for this dilemma, should however, not be dismissed. As David Harvey (1992) explains,

"If we accept that fragmented discourses are the only authentic discourses and that no unified discourse is possible, then there is no way to challenge the overall qualities of a social system. To mount that more general challenge we need some kind of unified or unifying set of arguments. (594)."

The possibility of relinquishing explanatory and totalising approaches in favour of smaller, less-powerful narratives is inimical, according to Harvey, to remaining politically passive. Harvey's criticism of poststructural claims echoes that of Booth and Corbridge, particularly in the assumption that social change can take place most effectively when orchestrated through a unified discourse. For these writers there is no other possibility than that of remaining firmly grounded in familiar territory since their conception of political action and the means that are necessary to bring about change rest on these assumptions. To think otherwise would threaten to destabilise a world view that has already been constructed. Sympathy toward unification predominate thinking about development today:

Indeed, rather than lambasting developmentalism for models that were too rigid and writers who were overly concerned with methodology, we might complain that it did
not generate stronger general categories to integrate research and that it did not concern itself adequately with producing a set of robust "middle range" theories of development, or general analytical propositions established empirically, that could serve to organize the field. (Smith, 1985: 539)

The organising features which paradigms offer and the possibility they provide of orienting discourse, not to speak of fulfilling and legitimating ideological purposes around a common set of themes and issues, has and continues to be the main development thinking. Although the developmentalist paradigm may have lost its explanatory power there are always alternatives to take its place (Hettne, 1990: 4).

Even well-meaning and ambitious proposals to reconceptualise development outside the strictures of paradigm (as though this is possible) have been postulated. For instance, Rajni Kothari (1984), in looking at the 'signposts' of our time including the international division of labour and its attending effects on the status of women and children, on employment, growth of the informal sector, and demise of trade union activity; the increasing oppressive character of the state; the growth of national security states, and so

24 Developmentalist paradigms (orthodox Marxist and neoclassical) rely on macro-comparative methods of inquiry. They presume a priori analytical units as well as reduce the object of comparison to a preset standard and criteria of judgment. For example, Western notions of capitalist democracy are the basis of comparison when stressing the need for Western democratic principals everywhere. Questions about the inappropriateness of macro-comparative inquiry along with, as stated above, the appropriate dimensions of social change and the evolutionism of the dominant development paradigm, continue to be challenged by radical development theorists. In this respect Philip McMichal (1992) states that comparative inquiry has undergone scrutiny from several quarters. "First, the national society's assumed autonomy was questioned...in dependency theory; second, world system theory posited the idea that all states are sub-units of a broader, historical system; third, and more recently, the collapse of Cold war verities and the disintegration of (unified conceptions) the Third World have focussed attention on the quite diverse and non-replicable politico-economic trajectories of contemporary states; and, finally the nation-state is understood to be losing salience as the site of issues related to sovereignty, and as the key institutional form of economic regulation (361)."
forth, argues that these "are not the signposts for a new paradigm, just part of the reality in which we live" (17). What these signposts are suggestive of however, is the need for alternative development thinking. As such Kothari writes,

there is a need to go beyond the original conception of 'another development' and 'alternative development' strategies, beyond the Brandt Commission and North-South dialogues, beyond Cancun and mini-summits convened by Third World leaders and appeals by heads of state. There is a need to rethink the basis of development cooperation and technology transfers, to recapture the real basis of self-reliance and the basic needs perspective--and to do this in the context of the rise of new social movements and new actors on the scene [emphasis added]. (Ibid: 17)

Progressing beyond these dilemmas holds to the possibility that the concept development can remain as the focal guiding point and frame of reference. Improving development by placing emphasis, for instance, on the basic needs approach, whatever its context, while appearing to break ties with paradigmatic influences, is still tied to a discourse of power which delineates basic needs as a requirement to achieving the standard of the West. In short, what Kothari fails

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25 Proponents of the 'basic needs' perspective argue that "the direct provision of essential goods and services is more efficient and more rapid way of eliminating poverty than an approach based on hopes that the benefits of increased national growth will eventually reach the poor" (Hicks, 1980: 17). Meeting 'basic needs' has to do with direct improvements in health, nutrition, and elementary education in the form of improved and redirected public services such as rural water supplies, sanitation facilities, and primary schools. For an overview see Burki and Haq (1981). The fulfillment of basic needs, in whatever form ('trickle down' or bottom up), is another central aspect of development discourse, synonymous with modernity. From the nineteenth century onwards, progressive thinking has maintained a belief in never-ending development; a limitless expansion of wealth. "Nature, human nature, or the forms of human coexistence, seemed to be inexhaustible. It was taken-for-granted that needs are always in the state of increase and differentiation. Production creates new needs every day. Marxists wanted to upset the capitalist mode of production and substitute an entirely new one so that all needs should and could be satisfied: liberals insisted that the modern market-dynamic alone warrants continuous progression in both creation and allocation of needs. But both believed that every day new needs should be developed, new satisfiers invented in order to create new needs again, and so on ad infinitum" (Heller, 1993: 25).
to notice, and what is most important to the theme of this study here is that the modifications to development he suggests (going beyond what he regards to be its limitations) do not constitute a radical positioning in relation to alternative development discourse as much as it is reflection of how difficult it is to imagine a truly different domain, an alternative to development.

The impasse discourse in development, through its critique of the dominant paradigm of modernisation, as well as its misgivings over the alternative paradigm, continues to be focused around discussions of transcendence, of moving beyond the limitations of radical development. Yet this desire has little to do with moving beyond the discourse of development and more to do with the construction of theories which can reinvigorate radical development. Generally, radical development has moved from a neo-Marxist position to adopting a post-Marxist stance. As such, post-impasse discourse, identified above all by its post-Marxist approaches, can be considered as a continuation of the radical development paradigm since in both instances there has occurred a sustained critique of the modernisation paradigm while at the same time holding to the possibility of potential revolutionary action as the source for sociopolitical change. The current imaginary of development remains intact; all that has changed in the transition from neo-Marxism to post-Marxism are alternative readings of Marxism, and not a problematisation of the epistemological foundations on which this discourse is based.

The dissatisfaction which post-Marxists show towards orthodox Marxism has largely to do with a disillusionment that the working class constitutes the basis of revolutionary social change. As a result, the Left in the West has turned increasingly to the politics of culture as a substitute for the politics of class interests. In Robert Meister's (1990) estimation this has to do with a
reconceptualisation of the ways in which the superstructure influences the base or the inversion of the classical Marxist position which held that the economy determines ideology. Rather than the economy being the sole determinant of social practices and where a distinction subsequently arises between material relations and cultural meanings, post-Marxists regard the base/superstructure division as a unified whole. "When everything can be included in the interpretation (or 'thick description') of the whole, there is little justification for isolating any part and calling it 'the explanation.' For fundamental social change, the unit of analysis becomes the whole of the social formation, a situation in which base/superstructure distinctions are no longer distinct from each other. (Meister, 1990: 19). Additionally, holding to this perspective results in questioning many of the Marxist assumptions about the meaning of social change emanating from critiques of logical positivism. The totalising effect brought about through the base/superstructure cohesion makes it impossible to define a casual relationship between ideas and social practices. Since ideas are "constitutive of social practices, and inseparable from them, then the 'brute facts' about a form of life can only be described by reference to the theories and values that make it meaningful to participants" (Ibid: 19).

The impasse discourse has recognised the futility of Marx's notion of historical inevitability as well as its attempts to explain and predict revolutions as the necessary outcome of class struggle. Class, insofar as it is still recognised as an analytical device, is now a 'relation,' and capital--synonymous with development--a 'process' within the totality of a social formation. To post-Marxists, "the living Marxism...becomes an interpretation of capitalism as a total system that would enable us to see how everything that happens within the framework of capitalism invariably strengthens the system, foreclosing the
possibilities for fundamental change" (Ibid: 20). This totality or social formation becomes a situation in which everything is constituted in and by discourse, making it impossible to imagine, let alone identify, those forms of consciousness that lie outside the dominant cultural system of 'late capitalism' in its global formation.²⁶ The notion that capitalism is an all-encompassing cultural system not only forfeits comparative analyses between the industrialised First World and the underdeveloped Third World, as neo-Marxist approaches in radical development have shown, but also makes it possible for post-Marxism to continue with this line of analyses by stressing the "possibility of revolution by suggesting that anything not supportive of the total system would be intrinsically revolutionary--a part of the alternative [emphasis added]" (Ibid: 20).

For post-Marxists the loss of faith in the industrial proletariat as the vanguard of revolutionary change has to do with the cooption of this 'agent' into the capitalist totality. The search for agency leads post-Marxists to look for subjects who have not identified themselves with and whose values have not been incorporated into the capitalist system. The emphasis is on groups who have an alternative vision of the totality, and to which capitalism has perhaps

²⁶ Notions of discourse have to do with the loss of the social. The notion of social structure has lost its explanatory appeal as a result of a century-long movement away from the base/superstructure dichotomy. This results in a conception of social formation that is not very social, at least on any material basis, especially since such a base has disappeared. All social formations can now be seen as cultural or ideological formations, free from social relations in either base or superstructure. Social formations are a construct of language and thus become discursive formations. In this way "[s]ociety is a 'field of discourse' without an 'extra-discursive reality.' It cannot be conceive[d] as an integrated whole within which every part is fixed in its position and functioning in relation to every other part by virtue of its relations to a central principle (or a contradiction) which underlies the structure of social relationships" (Zhao, 1993: 73). Society, in essence, does not exist outside of the discourse that is used to construct it. In this way, the possibility of locating a unifying principle, such as a mode of production, is lost since a concept of society is no longer made recognisable. Rather, the field of the social can better be understood as a network of dispersed differences in a continual state of flux and change, always contingent and always provisional.
not yet responded. The ability of mainstream discourse to co-opt concepts such as 'empowerment' and 'sustainability,' once regarded as 'radical' discourses, is a case in point. The pervasive form of cultural domination would appear to be making it increasingly difficult to find authentic discourses of resistance. Nevertheless, what post-Marxism is left with is to make connections between the various discourses of resistance without reducing them to a single dominant language that would only mimic what capitalism itself is already doing. Possible agents of change are not only already in existence but can take shape from the oppressive structures of capitalism. Laclau and Mouffe (1987), in their Insistence of the demise of the working class as privileged agent of consciousness and change, are interested in both:

Structural transformations of capitalism that have led to the decline of the classical working class in the post-industrial countries; the increasingly profound penetration of capitalist

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27 Whether the 'Fourth World' can be considered a site of resistance remains to be answered. That is, where the 'Fourth World' (large parts of Africa) is regarded as unimportant to capitalist world expansion and when the current regimes of accumulation do not even require these countries to belong to the world-system makes it problematic to regard these regions as available zones of exploitation. The nature of resistance to capitalism in the Fourth World, where exchange relations do not take place, makes for an interesting question. From a related perspective, groups who have not been co-opted into the dominant discourse or who remain outside it are referred by Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker (1990) as 'marginal sites'. They note several features that are common to 'marginal sites': (1) These sites are intrinsically ambiguous. Time and place are not sharply bounded, nor is there a homogeneous territory where categories are fixed, values are stable, and common sense meanings are sure. Neither is there "a unique and ultimate sovereign identity—be it the identity of the individual or the institutional structures of a social whole or community—to which one can appeal in fixed meanings and interpreting conduct" (Ibid: 261). (2) Marginal times and places are sites of struggle, where power is conspicuously at work. Power, however, is not negative and repressive but positive and productive. It does not deny the autonomy of subjects already in existence nor does it seek to impose and fix ways of knowing and doing that are deemed 'natural' or 'universal'. (3) Marginal sites 'resist knowing in the sense celebrated in modern culture, where to 'know' is to construct a coherent representation that excludes contesting interpretations and controls meaning from the standpoint of a sovereign subject whose word is the origin of truth beyond doubt" (Ibid: 261). (4) Marginal sites should not be considered in terms of empty spaces or "voids" awaiting control of "man's reason". The metaphors of 'exile', 'stranger,' 'nomad,' can be used to describe "our present age as one in exile", where it makes sense to listen to the exiles who live and move in these contested marginal zones, respecting the dissident practices they undertake" (Ibid: 262).
relations of production in areas of social life, whose dislocatory effects—concurrent with those deriving from the forms of bureaucratisation which have characterized the Welfare state—have generated new forms of social protests; the emergence of mass mobilizations in Third World countries which do not follow the classical pattern of class struggle; the crisis and discrediting of the model of society put into effect in the countries of so-called 'actually-existing socialism,' including the exposure of new forms of domination established in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat. (80)

In this instance, Laclau and Mouffe are concerned with noting the pervasiveness of the cultural dominance of capitalism and in the ways in which the market society succeeds in imposing its systems of meanings on 'marginal sites' that exist alongside it. In post-Marxist thought, capitalist discourse is regarded as hegemonic and thus precedes/envelopes the articulation of material interests. Discourse, in other words, constructs the capitalist mode of production. It is a situation in which the inversion of base/superstructure is most complete, where "language does not reflect the world [rather] it conditions and creates all the meanings that we find in the world, and [where] we have no access to any interpretation of the world that is separate from language" (Macdonald, 1990: 234). This rearrangement of Marx's theory of historical materialism has resulted in transition from former analysis which attempted to show the way the capitalist class controlled the workers struggle through manipulative ideas to a more general and inclusive interest in the way all hegemonic interests use culture to dominate others. Furthermore, post-Marxists

28 The reference is one that is usually attributed to Jacques Derrida (1974) who once remarked that "[t]here is nothing outside the text" (158). For Derrida this means all meanings and interpretations of reality are texts, not just written works but also ideas, beliefs, practices, and institutions. The division between 'text' and 'reality' is shattered in the sense that we have no access to reality other than through our sets of interpretations, values and beliefs. In this way, for instance, the capitalist mode of production is an idea—a 'text'—that has come to occupy a privileged interpretative space in reality.
are also concerned with showing how the dominant capitalist ideology perpetuates current belief systems through control of thought processes or consciousness (limitations on what can be thought and said) by the encoding of hegemonic ideas through language, visual images and texts. In these ways we are prone to be victims of ideology not because our minds are controlled but because we use common but biased images and figures of speech that are provided by society or its major texts. Our manipulation by particular, powerful interests involves the domination of desires, consumer choices, political preferences, belief systems, academic knowledge and other symbolic representations, rather than some specific effect directed at ideas about the putative performance of the economy. (Gottdiener: 655-656)

Capitalism, as a total social formation where forms of domination are everywhere the same, does not produce socialism but rather pluralism; that is, the loci of resistance are many. By positing a Marxist revolutionary consciousness as an alternative to liberal capitalism, post-Marxism “claims to be a transcendent form of unity that respects group differences by recognising their common psychological root in the struggle against oppression” (Meister, 1990: 22). The problem of pluralism, however, is still a contentious issue. Where capitalism is seen to divide and conquer, post-Marxists call for popular unity, yet in the instances where capitalism threatens to crush group differences, post-Marxists insist on the maintenance and struggle for group autonomy. Unity and autonomy, cohesiveness and difference, are still ambiguous concepts that need to be resolved in post-Marxist thinking.

Post-Marxism, then, exemplifies the latest influx into the impasse debate. As an alternative set of approaches, post-Marxism is quickly displacing its predecessor neo-Marxism and, consequently, presents itself as the latest trend in radical development theory, especially where it can be successful in
transcending the impasse which Booth initially problematised. The extent to which any particular approach in radical development can be referred to as post-Marxist—as opposed to neo-Marxist—depends of course upon how the base/superstructure distinction is made as well as the extent to which discourse is believed to shape the totality of the capitalist social formation.

To quickly reiterate, Marx's approach to politics consisted of attempting to find an underlying distinction between the conflicts that support a political order, and those that can threaten or transform it. He began by trying to understand to what extent the dominant political order was capable of co-opting the political consciousness and forms of opposition of its citizens into its institutional framework. In short, he wondered how much conflict liberal capitalism could absorb without losing its hegemony. The point of conducting this sort of analysis was to ascertain how certain political movements could undermine the state by looking at how the state attempts to undermine them. What is most important here is that for Marx the focus of political analysis was on how the institutional ideologies of modern states simultaneously organise our understanding of the world as well as of ourselves. Following out of this is the belief that institutions operate largely through their ability to structure from within the kinds of claims that can be made about them. While this in itself may not be problematic, the essentialist and determinist qualifications that are derived out of the behaviour of institutions in the capitalist mode of production is questionable, especially the role of the individual and autonomous subject or agent as conditioned by economic forces.

Post-Marxism holds that subjectivity is culturally determined; it is a function of the ideological practices by which certain subject positions become historically available. Furthermore, the social formation [is] reconceptualised as a structure of relatively autonomous levels of social practices,
giving ideology a central and determining influence that [cannot] merely be explained as the displaced trace of other forms of social practice. The overdetermination of any social practice by all the levels of the social formation [means] that culture [cannot] be reduced to the effects of economic relations, even if mediated through ideology. (Grossberg and Nelson, 1988: 7).

This has led post-Marxism to deny Marxism the status of a science and has begun to locate Marxism within the stream of current epistemological debates. These debates, informed by poststructuralism, confront the problematic nature and role of theorising itself as well as the status of theoretical concepts. Here, "social structure does not figure even as constraint; conflict becomes entirely intra-discursive" (Steinmetz, 1994: 182). Marxism has also been blamed for not challenging the status of science (Aronowitz, 1988), the dominant culture of late capitalism, as a pure uncontaminated form of knowledge. Unless Marxism is interrogated as an ideological and socially constituted discourse, it can have no independent basis for its explanatory position. This inevitably leads to the Foucaultian proposition of whether anyone can in fact attempt to write about the politics of culture in capitalism without being caught up in its discourse.

The impasse in radical development has not yet problematised Marxism from the level of discourse, although it has proposed the importance of post-Marxism in explaining the position of the Third World in the contemporary sociopolitical climate as represented by the postimperialists and the Regulation School. New social movement discourse as well as reconceptualisations of terms such as democracy and civil society have also been implicated as strands sympathetic to post-Marxist interpretations. These approaches, that of postimperialism and Regulation approaches on the one hand and new social movement discourses on the other, appear to occupy extreme positions within
the post-Marxist framework. The former can be regarded as a continuation of some aspects of the neo-Marxist tradition (the globalisation of capital) while the latter is more concerned with the analysis of discourse and the role of subjectivity and identity; the ways in which "[h]egemonic discourse provides a weapon with which domination can be challenged [without limiting] the ways in which actors understand themselves and imagine their opponents" (Steinmetz, 1994: 181).

Neo-Marxist approaches in radical development continue with the phenomenon of uneven development and the systems of political control and domination which make uneven development possible. From this perspective, as already noted, the work of world-systems theorists has made evident what has by now become popularised, namely the realisation that the centre-periphery demarcation is not one that can be attached to the last phase of capitalism (i.e. imperialism) but has been an intrinsic feature of capitalism all along.29 Beginning from this assumption, Kenneth Surin (1993) delineates some of the propositions regarding uneven development and how it can assist "directly or indirectly on the question of a recasting of marxism" (47).

His first proposition, echoing to some extent the dependency viewpoint, states that the capitalisms of the centre have autocentred logics of accumulation, in contrast to the countries of the peripheries which have an inherently unbalanced and dependent structure of development" (Ibid: 48). Citing the work of Samir Amin, Surin accepts the claim that "central capitalism" is mainly concerned with producing goods and promoting and encouraging.

29 As Weisskopf (1991) states "[c]apitalism has proved itself historically to be a resilient economic system, capable of generating its economic dynamism after each economic crisis in the past....Modern capitalism still has a great deal of life left in it. Anyone waiting for a terminal collapse in the capacity of capitalist economies to generate profits, capital accumulation, and economic growth is likely to have to wait a great deal longer" (77).
mass consumption whereas the periphery (including the NICs) are more concerned with production of export; importing only luxury goods from the centre for the satisfaction of the national bourgeoisie. Furthermore, productive forces in the peripheries undergo continuous development that do not, however, alter their position in relation to that of the centre. This is because "the economies of developed countries have to subserve exocentered imperatives like the 'need' to produce for export" (Ibid: 48). In this way the capitalist world system is dominant but remains polarised; where integration can be assumed "only at the level of the exchange of products and the flow of capital" (Ibid: 48). As such, capitalism has not existed and cannot exist in any other way, nor will it ever change except in the sense that the disparities between centre and periphery will become even more severe.

The second proposition holds that as the semiperiphery and the periphery continue to industrialise there will occur at the same time a greater polarity between these regions and the industrialised core "less in terms of (relative) rates and/or kinds of industrialisation, and more in relation to what happens within the structure(s) of productive social cooperation" (Ibid: 48). According to Surin, command of capitalist relations and expansion is still in the hands of the industrialised centres and will likely continue so long as control of the media, electronic technologies, national and international financial institutions and the forces which produce social subjects are in the hands of Western politics.

The third proposition for a recasting, or rethinking, of Marxism has to with profound changes in class formations. Precisely, "it is futile to believe that the proletariat can be the sole agent of resistance and social change" (Ibid: 49). A number of reasons are outlined by Surin: First the new international division of
labour has diminished the capacities of classes in the peripheral nations to organise themselves in opposition to capitalist expansion. Secondly, the relatively small working class in the periphery live beyond the confines of extreme poverty and are relatively satisfied, making it unreasonable to assume they have socialist aspirations. Third, in the case of peasant classes, they remain fragmented with regard to any unifying component and are usually not tied directly to any dealings with the state of capitalist formations anyway. And fourth, the 'comprador' class of bourgeoisie in the periphery have no interest in 'delinking' from the capitalist-world system since in many ways they are its direct beneficiaries.

4.3: Radical Development Theory after the Impasse

These attempts to reconstruct radical development thinking in post-Marxist terms represent a departure from the debates that occurred earlier on between the dominant and alternative development paradigms. In development studies today there is a renewed emphasis on the "celebration of difference and of polyvocality [that] is beginning to shape a 'new' development theory and practice which is fundamentally opposed to many of the tenets of a once-hegemonic Marxist development studies" (Corbridge, 1993: 453). This does not mean, however, that efforts of theorising from a particular paradigmatic viewpoint are over, or even that a paradigm shift has occurred. Rather, the impasse today continues along the lines of radical development as marked out by the early Marxist-influenced development sociology without, however, being committed to seeing the necessary fulfilment of any one particular grand theory. In addition, radical development theory today is more concerned with establishing a new grounding for Marxism as opposed to criticising the weaknesses of the classical core of orthodox Marxism. This includes analyses,
for example, along the lines of Surin who argues for the continuing relevance of neo-Marxist approaches to describing late capitalism without at the same time resorting to an immanent critique of Marxism.

Post-Marxism also presents itself as a means toward rejuvenating radical development. Appealing to Corbridge (1993) again, he suggests the following:

Let us not abandon some aspects of Marxism—let alone post-Marxism—because of the fragility of reason. Rather, let us reclaim from Marx a powerful set of arguments about the dynamics of modernisation; a set of arguments which is not always supportive of state socialism, and which is by no means resistant to other accounts of radicalized modernity. (457)

Here he outlines the way in which this agenda can possibly take shape; in terms of three related areas: modernity and modernisation, globalisation, and politics. Modernity, as understood by Marx, remains a powerful concept for Corbridge. Its capacity to describe the shifts and changes occurring within capitalism—the commodification of all areas of life, its ceaseless construction and destruction, its contradictory character—are still useful for making sense of the modern era. This version of post-Marxism is closely aligned with the work of Jameson, Harvey and Lash dealt with in chapter two. Here, "post-Marxism, as opposed to postmodernism, the Janus-faced nature of modernity (postmodernity) is more clearly revealed" (Ibid: 457). The hope for Corbridge is that modernity can be transformed from something meaningless and irrational to meaningful and rational.

Likewise for Globalisation. Here post-Marxism, closely aligned with

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30 David Slater (1993a) cites three main consequences of globalisation, ones which share a close proximity to Corbridge's version: (1) the way processes of economic, political, legal and military interconnectedness are changing the nature of the sovereign state from above; (2) the manner in which 'local' and regional nationalisms are eroding the nation-state from below, and (3) the way global interconnectedness creates chains of interlocking political decisions and outcomes among states and their citizens which in turn impact on national political systems (431).
postimperialism, is willing to accept that the declining influence of the West is not because its institutions have lost their impact on the rest of the world but rather as result of their global spread. Post-Marxism then becomes a way in which "to build into the basic Marxist 'metanarrative'...a greater sensitivity to the conditions of existence through which capitalist relations of production are secured at particular times and in particular places" (Ibid: 459). The contingent nature of capitalist relations under globalisation can also inform a unified politics of resistance and contestation where post-Marxism is most reflective and also preferred to some aspects of postmodernism. Where postmodernism tends to "substitute a poetics of fragmentation for the sins of the metanarrative" (Ibid: 460) post-Marxism is more concerned with understanding the fragmentary nature of modernity in terms of reason itself. In other words, post-Marxism, as Corbridge understands it, attempts to comprehend the influences of capitalist expansion (globalisation) within the rational discourse of modernity rather than problematising the ways in which modernity limits how, for instance, social meanings (including the concept of globalisation) come to be constructed.

Politics is the third component in Corbridge's reinvigoration of Marxism. Politics is synonymous with transformation and progress. With this Corbridge is not suggesting for a dialectical process towards socialism but rather of showing how the uneven development of the modern world is based "in the exploitative and anarchic logics of expanded commodity production" (Ibid: 460) where particular groups are always left disenfranchised as a result of the power of capital. Within this context of politics, the importance of post-Marxism is seen to be important for two main reasons: 1) It examines exploitation by replacing the labour theory of value with a more representative notion of exploitation as
unequal distribution of property rights. 2) It looks at exploitation in terms of multiple sites of oppression as related to questions of gender, ethnicity, and race. Post-Marxism adopts Marxism's commitment to transformative politics and "accepts a need to attend to the needs and rights of others, even as it accepts that such others must speak for themselves" (ibid: 460).

The close proximity of conventional accounts of Marxism to Corbridge's version of post-Marxism makes it difficult to problematise the concept development in any other way than within the discourse of modernity. More importantly, post-Marxism reverts back to grounding social action in a subjectivity that is taken to be formed prior to discursive struggles: the agency of oppressed peoples being determined—if not by material conditions than by ideological dictates. In devoting half his appeal to the importance of documenting structural oppression and the other half to the need for uncovering resistance and agency, results in Corbridge relying on structuralist accounts of subjectivity. That is, Corbridge understands social subjectivity by portraying it side by side with an impulse to resist. What is left unproblematised is the linkage between these two elements, where resistance is a requirement to the functioning of dominance and oppression.

What concerns Corbridge most, and what may at the same time be a good indication of the status of postmodernism in this debate on development, is "the nihilistic relativism which underpins some aspects of the new 'antidevelopmentalism" (Ibid: 449). This is not to disavow "the power of the postmodernist critique with regard to questions of difference and representation: to the presumptions which so often mark development studies" (Ibid: 451), including its pretensions to value-freedom, but rather to remain skeptical of the nihilistic excesses of some forms of postmodernism. In so doing, Corbridge
moves beyond "the conventions of the 'impasse (Booth) debate' to consider some of the arguments advanced by the populists and the postmodernists....[whose] voices have not always been central to a consideration of the impasse in development studies" (Ibid: 451). The postmodern intervention is most useful where it attempts to "recentre" the field of development studies "around an insistent critique of what development may be and is taken to mean" (ibid: 455). It forces development studies to ask "what is development, who says this is what it is, who is it for, who aims to direct it, and for whom?" (Ibid: 454). In addition to a humbleness in the face of accepting and making truth claims, and profound skepticism of the validity of any foundational logic, postmodernism represents a willingness to let others speak for themselves and encourages a local poetics of resistance. And finally, in place of universalizing assumptions of conventional development theories--free market, Marxist, or modernising--the postmodern turn...threatens development studies with a sense of its own arrogance and futility" (Ibid: 455).

Be this as it may, Corbridge is still unsure of how, precisely, to engage in an active politics of intervention. Post-Marxism proves to be a viable entry point into solving this 'dilemma' in its implicit suggestion that an "unwillingness to speak for others is every bit as foundational a claim as is the suggestion that we can speak for others in an unproblematic manner" (Ibid: 461). That is, postmodernism, in Corbridge's view "uses reason to subvert not only other reason but also reason itself" (Ibid: 461). In the end, the 'big' question that Corbridge is left with is how to argue "for a minimally universalist politics--for a normative development studies" (ibid: 461), one that acknowledges that depletion of socialist praxis while at the same time appreciating the vitality of some of the essential insights of postmodernism, especially that universal truth
claims are synonymous with Western truth claims and only serve to exclude a local politics of resistance.

The impact of Post-Marxism on contemporary radical development studies is also addressed in an important article by David Slater (1992). He shares with Booth the belief that development theorising is at an impasse and proposes, along lines similar to those of Corbridge, the adoption of a form of post-Marxist analysis that distances itself not only from the privileged category of class but also from modes of inquiry based on idealistic assumptions of socialism. Slater differs, however, from Booth and Corbridge, as well as from Leys, Hoffman Rhyne, and Kothari in that his position incorporates a postmodernist perspective. His contribution to the debate involves making connections between development theory and postmodernism in order to show how these two apparently dissimilar streams of thought intersect each other. He identifies three important areas where this intersection can be take place: “the troubled conceptualisations of centres and peripheries”, including globalisation; “questions of agency and power”; and “meanings of democracy and socialism” (284).

In the first instance, Slater considers the discursive accounts of Third World ‘reality’ from Western points of view. The representations of the ‘other’ that he sees in some postmodernist accounts (e.g. Jean Baudrillard, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Fredric Jameson) contain Eurocentric traits which do not collapse the centre/periphery dichotomy but rather exacerbate it (Ibid: 288-289). This Eurocentric bias is most evident where postmodernism assumes that Western ‘irrationality,’ in the form of modernity, is a dominant characteristic the world over. The problem with this is that while the

post-modern critique of the universalizing project of capitalist modernity has been politically enabling in one
sense, on the other hand, there has been a tendency to dissolve centre-periphery distinctions, whereby the realities of imperialist domination have been reabsorbed and neutralized within an apparently equivalent set of 'other' images and meanings. (Ibid: 289)

The danger this poses, and one which Slater is right to suggest, is that in postmodernism’s eagerness to insist on difference—whether regional, sexual, political—it subsumes difference into sameness, "into the meta-category of the undifferentiated" (ibid: 290) by defining it from Western postmodern perspectives. This critical remark could also be attached to Corbridge where he desires the construction of a politics of resistance while leaving intact, a least seemingly, a Western notion of resistance. Beyond this criticism, however, Slater notes the importance of the destabilising influence of postmodernism on the Marxist metanarrative—of universal modes of emancipation—which places him squarely in the impasse debate.

In Slater’s estimation, postmodernism is, first of all, better suited to address the centre/periphery dichotomy not by exoticising difference, heterogeneity, the marginal—which only perpetuates the dichotomy—but by reading and learning from it. This, he believes, is something which is absent from conventional Marxist accounts of Third World development: "within the central arena of critical or marxist development theory cognizance and recognition of those other debates and investigations are frequently absent" (Ibid: 290).

Secondly, where postmodernism is not one ‘Story’ but many different stories, it recognises Third World voices as authentic displays for popular self-determination, as indigenous forms of a revolutionary imaginary, not always as Western ones, where the relevance of national popular resistances are given
serious attention by Western intellectuals.

And third, postmodernism can offer potentially useful insights into the analysis of the globalisation of the capitalist economy. Departing from Jameson who believes that capitalism follows its own nature and inclinations, where it is set above and separated from discourse and social subjectivity, Slater stresses the importance of capitalism as a "constructed frontier...through which...political identities are constructed" (Ibid: 292). Citing an example, Slater stresses that the Nicaraguan Revolution, as both political symbol and event, "cannot be effectively understood under the rubric of 'global capital, just as the Revolution's destabilization cannot be explained by that of capital's presumed inclinations or imperatives" (Ibid: 292). That is, this revolution did not occur either because of 'inherent' contradictions within the capitalist world-system nor because capitalism 'required' the revolution to take place. Instead the 'success' of the revolution can be seen as the result of social agents working inside and outside the institutional matrix of capitalism while "adhering to a discursive strategy of destabilization" (Ibid: 293). That is, these agents of change worked from the perspective of specific and local interests rather than ones which were tied to some mysterious workings of geopolitical capitalism.

The second intersection of power, subjectivity and agency involves a confrontation with the centrality of class and the mode of production, particularly where class struggle represents the crucial process of the capitalist world economy. Here, Slater separates himself from much of the standard literature on the impasse question which lacks, on the one hand, a theorisation of subjectivity and, on the other hand, accepts uncritically the priorisation of the social relations of production and class struggle. In his estimation, this literature, a great deal of which has already been reviewed in this study, makes
class the central essence of radical analyses (Ibid: 295). Conversely, Slater mentions four problems associated with class analysis in radical development analyses: 1) The concept 'class' is too abstract and not "capable of social action or agency" (Ibid: 295). 'Class,' like 'gender,' does not act, only men and women do; 2) classes cannot be assumed to have objective interests resulting from the structure of class relations and cannot be assumed to work out of a predetermined position; 3) the fixed foundation--the point of production--from which consciousness is said to emanate predetermines any interpretation of consciousness; and 4) when the working class (industrial proletariat) is constituted as the privileged agent of revolution, other forms of political subjectivity are left out or positioned on the margins.

Criticising the concept of class in this way steers Slater in the direction of post-Marxism. This becomes obvious where he accepts the post-Marxist logic that there is a dualism in Marx. In some texts Marx stresses the importance of the agent and in others of the overriding impact of structure. However, what is missing is a theoretical integration of the two. What is needed, in other words, "is a unified theoretical framework and language which allow both the agency and the institutions to be conceived within them" (Ibid: 296). This means supporting a view that there are only "relative degrees of institutionalization of the social, which penetrate and define the subjectivity of the agents themselves" [emphasis added] (Ibid: 296). In addition, institutions are not fixed structural frameworks but loosely integrated complexes that are susceptible to change. This becomes important in terms of politics when the mingling of agency and structure means that the political comes to be regarded as a 'dimension' rather than a 'level.' If politics occupies a distinct level within the classical Marxist base/superstructure dichotomy, then within post-Marxism it comes to occupy a
much broader range. This variation of politics, according to Slater, differs from that of "classical Marxism and in much of today's alternative development theory [where] the political is either a superstructure or a subordinated sector of the socio-economic, being explained according to the supposedly objective tendencies of the latter" (Ibid: 296).

A common and important theme in all Marxist and post-Marxist studies of class and agency is the ways in which structure and subject are conceptualised. This point has already been dealt with above, however the importance of subjectivity to resistance still needs to be addressed. Continuing with the review of Slater provides some indication of how postmodernism conceptualises subjectivity and politics and also where this interpretation differs from radical development. Slater defines subjectivity "as a process...in terms of the individual's thoughts and emotions, within which ideas of identity and of ways of understanding and expressing the sense of relation to the social outside are particularly significant" (Ibid: 301). This definition is expanded to include a notion of subjectivity as free-floating and open to a myriad of corresponding positions: there is no longer any essentiality of subjectivity or a central privileged core which radiates meaning to the outer spheres of the individual's consciousness" (Ibid: 301). Furthermore, individuals are seen to be occupiers of many different subject positions at any one given time including gender, race, nationality and production. And finally, each particular subject position is discursively constructed which shifts according to the context which the individual inhabits at any given time. In the end, the subject position of an individual is never static nor can it be fixed.

Such a definition of subjectivity becomes useful for understanding new social movements (where resistance is a political component of every moment
in everyday life), as well as in helping to rethink parallel concepts like democracy and civil society. It also helps mark the boundary between theories of radical development (neo-Marxist) that regard subjectivity as concomitant with class, where it is “essentialised and centred” (Ibid: 301), and opposed to those approaches (post-Marxist) which regard class as only one particular and non-privileged identity among many.

The final and third intersection of postmodernism and development theory occurs at the crossing of democracy and socialism. Following up on his remarks about subjectivity, Slater notes that “[t]he multiplication of sites of political struggle and the construction and articulation of new identities open up the possibility for a more emancipatory vision of democracy” (Ibid: 304). This means, first of all, displacing representative versions of democracy that speak on behalf of people in the form of designated individuals, assemblies, parties, and workplace organisations. And in place of the abstract universalisms of the Enlightenment—the pursuit for an essentialised conception of social totality as well as the quest for a unitary subject—a more direct form of democracy is advocated. R. B. J. Walker (1988) describes this as a “deepening of democracy” (116) which makes possible a more meaningful, authentic self-government in which broad democratic participation is possible. In short, Walker calls for a direct democracy synonymous with ‘empowerment,’ where the development of subgroup identity is fostered (Ibid: 140). This interpretation of democracy as intrinsically local allows all citizens to participate in the political process on a more equal level without depriving individuals of their autonomy.

The pursuit towards a radical imaginary of democracy also includes a reinterpretation of socialist ideals of democracy. Citing Cuba as an obvious example of how radical development theory continues to defend the
achievements of post-revolutionary societies, Slater states that "the heralding of the social and economic improvements of over three decades of revolution overshadows any critical consideration of the absence of plurality, difference and discursive openness" (1992: 304). Slater realises that this viewpoint is open to criticism; not only because it is based on a liberal notion of heterogeneity but also because it lacks an account of other external factors which perpetuate this condition in Cuba. Specifically, in neoliberal accounts of development in Cuba, "the emphasis on the authoritarian nature of the one-party state is not infrequently used to blot out any of the relevance of the welfare achievements of the Cuban Revolution (Ibid: 304), not to mention the impact of over thirty years of hostility from the United States.

Although there can be no doubt about the catastrophic effects which global capitalism is having on Cuba, particularly because Cuba resists these pressures, the socialist model in Cuba is nevertheless held to be responsible for the mistreatment of its citizenry. This is mainly because socialist thought in Cuba has become a totalising narrative where any distinctions between government and community are abolished: "This notion of a complete identification does away with the need to maintain a distinction between civil society and the state, and further still, the forces of the mechanism of identification implies that nothing will escape state power..." (Ibid: 305). This view does not contradict Slater's earlier remarks regarding the involvement of the citizenry in every aspect of democratic decision-making. Conversely, the totality or social formation of socialism, much like that of liberal democracy, makes it impossible to stress the multiplicity of identities. "It is within the realm of this discourse [of the socialist system] that the prosecution of economic and social development comes to be equated with socialism" (Ibid: 305).
instance, 'reality' continues to be revealed and defined at the level of the economy rather than at the level of discourse.

Slater problematises Cuban socialism on three inter-related levels: First, its attempts to transcend the state/civil society differential is criticised because this process invariably results in a condensation of power into the singular unity of the 'Party.' Second, the Cuban model is reproached for its attempt to arrive at a classless society which, if it were to occur, means the depletion or erosion of autonomous subjectivity. And third, Slater regards Cuba's socialist regime as closed to all other available options of "political culture, of alternative socialist as well as democratic thought" (Ibid: 306).

From this perspective, Slater's presentation of the impasse comes closest to the central focus of this study. Here, Slater deals with the power of the dominant discourse of Cuban socialism in order to show how it drastically limits the expression of marginal voices from actively partaking in political decision making. Not only does Cuban politics reflect the traditional hierarchisation and separation of politics from the more 'mundane' aspects of every day life (a reality of liberal democracies as well) but its pervasiveness also prevents the consideration of other options from taking place. The problem here is that Cuban socialism is maintained by its identification with Western forms of democracy.\(^\text{31}\)

\(^{31}\) Over 30 years of continuous revolution has no doubt created 'new' subjects in Cuba. The new or current generation of Cuban subjects can no longer be said to possess the same revolutionary ideals that their parents once held. And most certainly, Cubans cannot be characterised as embodying the ideal qualities of human(ess) that Guevara used to refer to as the 'New Man'--a person free of material greed and individual ambition as well as one ready to share equally with his or her fellow citizens in a just community. The antithesis of the 'New Man' was of course the corrupt and materialistic 'American Man'. Ironically, the 'new' subjects of Cuba--its literate, educated, healthy, and socially engaged people (the sort that typified the revolution in its early days) either in Cuba or living in exile--are the ones presenting the gravest threat to Cuba's political (in)stability. Today's Cuban subjects are distinct in many respects from those at the outset of the revolution in 1959: they have grown and developed in ways that would not have been possible without the revolution. Furthermore, the very elements that have defined the revolution--
especially the United States—to rebel against, the essence of Cuban political identity is lost. The point here is not that Western forms of democracy are in immanent danger of collapse but rather that Cuba’s existence is connected both formerly (the revolution, in the 1950s) as well as currently to the post-World War II capitalist system. The Cuban subject cannot, contrary to Castro, be recognised outside the dominant imaginary of Western liberal democratic discourse. In this way Cuba is not so different from the capitalism it struggles against. In fact the discourse which marks its “political landscape is so riven by the official contours of ‘scientific socialism’ that a move to its perceived opposite, capitalism, is starkly reinforced” (Ibid: 306).

Slater’s contribution to the impasse debate in radical development theory has left open the possibility of whether a postmodern intervention can actually “bypass” or “displace” the apparent impasse in radical development. Nonetheless, the introduction of postmodern perspectives to the impasse debate marks Slater’s article as an important turning point for radical development. Particularly important to this project is implementing what Slater calls a “constructive, enabling approach to the term ‘post-modern’” (Ibid: 309). This approach is not concerned with identifying the shortcomings of any one particular perspective within the radical development paradigm nor does it present itself as a new or better framework for development. Instead, by concentrating on the archeology and “excavation of hidden meanings, the externally, the continual struggle against foreign control, both economically and politically, and internally, a reliance on some form of socialism—threaten to undermine Cuba today. Being brought up as a revolutionary can bring with it the added effect of revolting against one’s own revolution. This is further exacerbated by Cuba’s desire to become integrated into a world economy without relinquishing its own identity. This in itself would seem to mean forsaking and abandoning the very conditions that have defined the revolution. For a ‘really existing’ socialist country like Cuba to enter a ‘really existing capitalist’ system and remain ‘existing’ seems problematic indeed, especially where capitalism is required to become a dominant mode of production prior to socialism. For further discussion on these points see Williamson (1992), Skidmore and Smith (1992).
analysis of organizing concepts of the economic, the consideration of the
prioritization of themes for research, a focusing on the imagery of transformation”,
postmodern perspectives can reveal how radical development, especially in
many of its ‘post-impasse’ guises, continues to adhere in significant ways to the
metanarratives of classical Marxism (Ibid: 310). Here a post-Marxist approach
can move away from the predicable language of class and capital
accumulation—terms which favour homogeneity over diversity—and displace or
at least re-problematise the impact of the Marxist tradition in the field of radical
development. This does not mean rejecting the entire Marxist framework
outright since, as Slater states, it would only result in maintaining “the myth of its
coherence and unity” (Ibid: 311). The critiques launched against orthodox
Marxists by early radical development thinkers is a typical example of how the
orthodox Marxist tradition came to be strengthened rather than weakened.
Having created a new forum for debate (the Third World), radical development
made it possible for orthodox Marxism to entrench itself within the discourse of
(under)development as well.

For Slater, as well as for other post-Marxists working from a
postmodernist perspective, the importance of Marxism is not its ability to
withstand the test of time that some of its more orthodox defenders like Bill
Warren advocate, but rather its ability to remain flexible and adaptable in the
face of a rapidly changing global order. Here, Slater emphatically notes that
“post-Marxism is not ex-Marxism” (Ibid: 311) since many of the concepts derived
from the Marxist tradition continue to have a profound impact on how reality is
understood and interpreted. Concepts like ‘hegemony,’ ‘historical bloc,’
‘collective wills,’ and ‘organic crisis,’ all retain their relevance (Ibid: 311). Yet
these concepts, as utilised by post-Marxists, never remain static in the sense
that they mark a particular historical juncture or in their commitment to some metatheoretical design, but are continuously reinterpreted and scrutinised to meet existing conditions.

Post-Marxist work in radical development differs from previous theories of radical development as outlined by Booth (notably dependency and modes of production) but also from much of the work occurring in the present under the guise of post-impasse theorising (especially postimperialism, globalisation, and Regulation theories). While much of the 'post-impasse' literature is generally considered as post-Marxist (Corbridge, 1993), it has yet to draw a favourable connection with postmodernism as 'critical practice.' Slater, perhaps, represents a notable exception to this rule in that rather than being caught up in the pursuit towards a reinvigorated radical development theory complete with new concepts he goes further and stresses the importance of avoiding "the formation of new fixities and normalising protocols of interpretation" (Ibid: 312). Above all else, this requires maintaining a reflexive posture towards the construction of theories; a point repeatedly emphasised by postmodernism. Indeed, as Brian McHale (chapter two, above) sees it, postmodernism displaces the conventional scientific approach to theorising--where reality is the object of theory--in favour of constructing stories about theories. To emphasise again, the majority of post-impasse research in development continues with the logic of radical development, not only by its dismissal of postmodernist assumptions but also, and more importantly, by its continued adherence to conventional modes of theorising as embedded within a predetermined structure of (scientific) discourse. Post-impasse research may problematise a variety of orthodox as well radical Marxist accounts of development but leaves in place the metatheory in which they are based; that is, the necessity of development is
left intact and not itself open to critical scrutiny.

In concluding this section it is worthwhile noting that recent approaches to the impasse debate have not problematised the metanarrative of development but have instead pursued other means, in the form of new theories, by which to continue with the necessity of development as it stands. The result is a reconceptualisation of radical development theory but not what it (mis)represents or how development can be thought about and imagined differently. The best indication of the present state of the impasse in radical development is the edited collection of articles by Frans J. Schuurman (1993). Not only does this book serve as a telling example of recent work in development studies (its most positive aspect) but it also indicates, interestingly, a notable absence of questions regarding the discursive imaginary of development. This is certainly not due to ignorance of an existing postmodern critique of development but rather its outright dismissal. Like the forms of radical development which marked the pre-impasse period, post-impasse research has not considered its stance in relation to how the dominant discourse of development continues to shape the agenda in radical development studies. Rather than constructing stories about radical development theory, there is still an unmitigated tendency to construct theories in radical development theory.

In the first article of this collection, Schuurman states that the book aims to give a general overview of the impasse debate while at the same time examining “the scientific tools that could be used to construct a post-impasse development theory” (1993: 1). Schuurman gives a broad account of how the impasse in radical development was formed while emphasising the importance of Booth's original contribution in getting this debate officially off the ground.
Since then, the debate has been conducted and orchestrated mainly by neo-Marxists who have attempted to come to a consensus regarding why radical development theory has lost its explanatory potential. Additionally, they have also attempted to formulate an alternative framework that would make possible the establishment of a new post-Marxist informed radical development theory. Postmodernism, however, especially where it is beneficial in questioning the discursive 'origins' and constructions of theories, continues to remain as a marginal curiosity; used only when it does not threaten to destabilise the current imaginary.

This is not say that postmodernism is completely absent from this debate but rather that its most crucial elements (particularly the notion of discourse) are avoided. Yet Schuurman stresses the importance, for instance, of deconstruction; a central notion of postmodernism. He mentions three of its most common and endearing qualities: its propensity at destabilising Enlightenment derived discourses of progress and modernisation, its stress on subjectivity over structure, and its ability to reveal the hidden and underlying metaphors (patriarchy, progress, democracy, rationality) that legitimate the continuance of the Enlightenment project for certainty and Truth (Ibid: 26). Dismissing the first description of deconstruction as "politically nihilist", Schuurman, nevertheless advocates the acceptance of its other two features for the purpose of "shaping post-impasse development theory" (Ibid: 27).

While 'informing' as opposed to 'shaping' might be a better way of expressing this idea there is, nonetheless, a major problem with following only half the recipe. Here there is a marked similarity in the way that many post-Marxists attempt to re-energise the Marxist problematique. Removing the most vital component from deconstruction renders it meaningless in the same way
that taking away from or adding to—whatever the case may be—the essentiality of Marxism dilutes it of its originality. In any case, if deconstruction, to whatever extent it is utilised, were indeed to ‘shape’ development theory it would do so by first ‘un-shaping’ and undermining it to the extent that the term would be devoid of any meaning whatsoever. Needless to say, any deconstructive reading of development would be completely antithetical to current post-impasse work.

Yet, if Derrida’s notion of ‘text’ were to be adhered to, then the aim of deconstruction would be to locate the point(s) of contradiction within the (Enlightenment derived) text of development, the point at which the ‘text’ of development exceeds the limits within which it is constructed, and where it breaks free of the constraints imposed by its own realist form.32 Shown to be composed of contradictions, the concept development could then be ‘deconstructed’ to the point where it is no longer restricted to a single, harmonious and authoritative reading. Instead, any objective/singular meaning of development becomes plural, open to re-reading, no longer an object for passive consumption but an object of work by the reader, theorist, the World Bank, and non-government organisation to produce meaning.33

While Schuurman does not address the implications of deconstruction for current radical development theory, there are indications that he accepts post-Marxism as a less threatening and intimidating atmosphere for situating current theorising in development. In essence, Schuurman feels that postmodernism

32: The realist or objective text (the scientific method) is a determinate representation, an intelligible structure which claims to convey intelligible relationships between its elements. A realist text is thought to exist apart from the person seeking knowledge, as though meaning is ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered.

33 This paragraph borrows from Catherine Belsey’s (1980, chapter 5) excellent discussion on deconstruction. From this follows the belief that the concept development is intelligible only through discourse, there is no unmediated experience, no access to its raw and central reality or meaning. From this perspective, the concept development “becomes a mere ideological simulacrum constructed via the complex power play of multiple discourses” (Bishop, 1994, 52).
and development theory can be linked via post-Marxism (Ibid: 28). Here he
aligns himself with those who tend to give priority to the notion of
postmodernism as condition (Jameson, Harvey, and Lash): the epochal shift
from modernity to post-modernity where the hegemonic institutions of capitalism
(industrialism, administrative and military powers) have become global. In this
context, the “analytical centrality of class and the capitalist mode of production”
(Ibid: 28) are refuted in terms of the dominant and privileged space they occupy
in research.

What is still left unquestioned when upholding this view of
postmodernism is the way in which it has come to be represented in the first
place. How did ‘postmodernism as condition,’ as a continuation of and not
departure/break from modernity, come to represent the current global
imaginary? Certainly not, as for instance Foucault would argue, from a
reasonable/rational unfolding of history. Rather ‘postmodernism as condition’ is
a concept embedded in language, one that gives a new (privileged) meaning to
the present global era and consequently limits the way in which this era may be
understood and made sensible.

The power of Enlightenment informed discourses to shape and construct
social reality remains a non-issue for Schuurman. What Schuurman proposes
for further development research is making direct connections between micro
(local levels like the household), meso (social categories like race, ethnicity and
class), and macro levels (globalisation or multinational/transnational capitalism)
such that these levels are collapsed into a combined and meaningful analytical
unit for research: “The central question for post-impasse development theory is
to design a theoretical framework that links these analytical levels” (Ibid: 31).
Within this framework, priority is given to the role of actors (the ‘housewife’,

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worker, state bureaucracy, national and international bourgeoisie, political parties international financial institutions) as they struggle for participation, equality, and representation within and across these different levels. Interrelating this diverse range of experiences is necessary, according to Schuurman if “the relationship between power, actors and structure” (Ibid: 31) is to become a more central issue in radical development theory. In this way, power (to own, control and dominate others), multi-levelled structure, inequity, and diversity become the key concepts in the construction of post-impasse development theories. The point, however, is “not to strive for one grand and glorious development metatheory per se” (Ibid: 32) but to gauge what type of research has already been carried out (postimperialism, Regulation theory, subject-centred approaches) in order that connections might begin to be made between these still separated lines of analysis. Whether these approaches contain an adequate description of development (much less problematise it) or if they implicitly contain a metatheoretical allegiance to the necessity of development is not dealt with by Schuurman. He accepts by ‘faith’ that the new theories in radical development are representative of the current global condition and that the resolution of its problems rest on articulating the diverse elements of these and other similar theories.

David Booth (1993), in another article in Schuurman’s book, is interested in pursuing a research agenda similar to that of Schuurman. He states whereas former influential theories ignored—more or less deliberately—the complex diversity of the real world of development, the styles of research that have come into prominence since the early 1980s take as their central task explaining significant variations in patterns of development in different local, national and regional settings. (49)

While the turn away from the stultifying debates between the orthodox
Marxist/neoclassical paradigm and the radical/alternative paradigm towards focusing on social aspects of development (policy and administration) is encouraging, there still remains the problem of how to unify the new trends in development research into a collective effort. For Booth, however, it is enough, at least for the time being, that radical development theory has left behind the problems he acknowledged in his 1985 article: the absence of a middle ground between the polarised positions of orthodox Marxism and neo-Marxism, and the metatheoretical commitment of Marxism to demonstrating the logical necessity of capitalist development in peripheral areas.

New research, according to Booth (and echoing Schuurman), has unfolded in the following three areas: from macro-diversity to responsible politics, meso-diversity: gender and class, and from meso-diversity to micro-diversity. In the first instance the idea that the Third World was a homogeneous entity has been disproven, especially after the tremendous growth experienced by the NICs. Hence, new research efforts are directed towards national variations based on comparative studies between nations. Factors which influence national development such as "state structures or 'modes of domination', as distinct from societal structures and modes of production, are now established as worthwhile objects of inquiry" (Ibid: 53). And more increasingly, political movements and cultural dynamics within nations are also regarded as explanatory factors in shaping development policy.

In the second instance, changes have taken place in how gender and class are currently represented in development research. In the case of gender there has been a transformation "from the universalist and functionalist pretensions [of the Marxist-feminist approach] with which it was initially encumbered" (Ibid: 54) to a greater emphasis on how patriarchy and capitalism
(as dominant discursive imaginaries) are continuously modified. That is, the starting point of an analysis of male domination over women should not simply rely on an uncritical acceptance of what appears to be a natural and biological division between men and women but should rather begin with the material conditions which generate these divisions in ever changing ways. The notion of class is also undergoing change, particularly in response to post-Marxist interventions. Additionally, instead of arguing the (non-)existence of class relations in Third World countries there is now a greater tendency, according to Booth, to study how classes are formed; not for the purpose of reducing this analysis to the level of determination but to draw "systematic comparisons between different locations and countries" (Ibid: 54) so that public policies can be more effective in implementing changes to reduce class differences.

In the last case, development studies have been transformed by a new understanding of how the global impinges upon the local. In terms of rural studies of agrarian conditions, there has been a shift from the "'Leninist' agrarian transition analysis" as well as "functionalist accounts of the persistence of peasant commodity or simple commodity production" (Ibid: 54) to "the

34 Marxist-feminists stress the biologically-based distinction between men and women over that of the social construction of male/female identity. Class remains the prime historical determinant. In presenting the 'class struggle' as itself a product of the organisation of the biological family unit, Marxist-feminists rely on a notion of patriarchy as a 'natural' universal domination without considering its materialist historical origins, variations, or constructions.

35 Distinctions continue to be made with regard to how country and area studies are carried out. Contrasts, as described in chapter two, are often drawn between the local and the global. This contrast is not only between objects of study (regional or international) but is also a contrast of methods. Alain Lipietz (1993b) draws the distinctions along the following lines: Where the local is privileged, studies are concerned with the "personality" of an area, that is, its natural and human endowments, its institutions, its own atmosphere. The "personality" provides the basis by which links with other regions can be comparatively made. The approach focuses on the internal structure of an area in order to explain its relationships with other areas. However, it is not 'globally' structuralist. The global approach defines the regions by their place in a more total or encompassing structure. In this way, the region and its characteristics are the products of interregionalism. Here, the approach could, for instance, study connections from the 'centre' to the 'periphery.'
investigation of differential responses to, and different outcomes from the central tendencies of agrarian change" (ibid: 55). Alluding directly to dependency approaches, Booth suggests that recent work in rural development avoids the "one-way determinism between the global and the local" (ibid: 55) and replaces this notion with studies which look at "specificities of particular places...[as well as] the broader forces which shape and are shaped by particular local circumstances and histories" (Ibid: 55). The key for Booth is that the actual workings of local rural agrarian development processes do not fit the criteria outlined by either the neo-Marxists (peripheral capitalism, agrarian transition) or the official ideologies of the neoliberals (rural 'planning,' agricultural modernisation). New research in this field is making this evident, especially where creativity in agricultural practices and resistance to some forms of technology as well as towards state centred approaches are apparent.

Returning to the domain of theory, Booth asks once again whether the three research contexts he has outlined justify a unified research approach and a coherent theoretical or methodological framework. He concludes by noting that while post-impasse development research has certainly reconstructed and formulated a variety of novel approaches, some of them contradict each other. This is no more apparent than at the level of theory. Booth briefly acknowledges the presence of three types of theorising. The first is the post-Marxist varieties. These continue along the lines of classical social theory in that "their approach is conceptually innovative but structural...; it is critical of the epistemological basis of particular sorts of classical claims, while accepting others" (Ibid: 560). Another intrusion to post-impasse research are the constructivist views. Lumping together phenomenologists (A. Schutz), interactionist anthropologists (F. Barth), poststructuralists (M. Foucault) and
deconstructionists, (J. Derrida) as representative of the anti-structuralist position, Booth dismisses this tradition as amounting to "nothing more than a relatively widespread mood, broadly analogous, but no more, with the...movements in the arts" (Ibid: 570). The third theoretical position influencing development theory today are positions that occupy a more middle ground in relation to the former two. In the one instance this approach takes the form of an actor-oriented work "that aspires not so much to explore the limits of structural constraint as to uncover through interactionist investigations the very processes that reproduce particular structural forms" (Ibid: 570). The other is the recent introduction of the new political economy and rational-choice school to post-impasse development theory as well as their collusion with anthropological interactionists.

From a generally optimistic level, Booth believes that these interventions are positive signs that the impasse in radical development is becoming a distant memory. New insights in radical development theory have not only shown the ineffectiveness of earlier approaches in the radical development paradigm but have also begun to redirect their efforts away from mere criticisms of those approaches towards the construction of an entirely new agenda for radical development theory. Presently, however, the field is still in great disarray but a rethinking is occurring on three main levels: theory and method; the relationships between agency, structure and explanations; and ultimately, the ethical relevance of studying development--who decides what shape it should take (Ibid: 580).

What remains ambiguous about Booth's article is the exact structure that he envisions for social development research. On the one hand he stresses the need for the construction of new approaches which are diverse in their outlook:
and in their representation of the traditional field of development theory—the Third World. Yet on the other hand he appears as an explicit advocate for the development of a homogeneous and unified theoretical model. In both instances there is still the overarching question regarding a division between empirical work and grand theoretical abstractions. In the instance of the latter, there has been a general reluctance on behalf of a new generation of radical development practitioners—having learned the lessons of their forbearers—to tread into the domain of theory (Smith, 1991).

Nonetheless, the problem of choosing between diversity and cooperation still stands. Booth’s answer to this dilemma is that it is entirely possible to uphold and maintain diversity within a common general framework. This viewpoint, as he realises, is at odds with many postmodernist positions. This frustration is presented in the following statement:

On the one hand...[there exists] an increased sensitivity to systematic variation, that is to say diversity about which it is possible to generalise at a certain level. At the other extreme lies the position of those for whom the rediscovery of diversity refers more to variety rather than variability, more to the celebration of difference than to the recognition of pattern of diversity [emphasis included]. (Ibid: 58)

The distinction here is between post-Marxism and postmodernism. If Booth were to choose an allegiance it would certainly be with the former camp. This is based on his interpretation of the differences between the two:

[Post-modernism goes some way beyond post-Marxism in the sweep of its condemnation of the concepts and methods of modern social science. Its careless espousal of relativistic and nihilistic positions, and its illogical extension of the critique of a prioristic notions of progress to cover all general inquiries about process, render it singularly unsuited to the task of reconstituting the basis of social development research. (Ibid: 59)
This condemnation of postmodernism is only partially accurate—if not antithetical to its 'position'—especially where it has never espoused any interest in the 'reconstitution' of anything. Furthermore, it is wrong to assume that postmodernism 'upholds' (as though to take up a position) relativism and nihilism as ends in themselves. Once again, these can be regarded as containing explicit value judgments about what it means to be a 'relativist' or 'nihilist.'

Booth seems to believe that a distinct postmodern position is actually available, one that is struggling to be included into the new domain of post-impasse development theorising. However postmodernism does not present itself as simply another theory. Rather, and in so far as this study is concerned, its contribution to current theorising has to do with the way it problematises the discourses we use to make sense of the reality in which theorising about development takes place. The important point here is that the language of post-impasse research does not necessarily have the potential to discover the mysteries of development because this language is itself a production of the dominant discursive imaginary by which this reality is interpreted. In this way, all descriptions and interpretations of development that situate themselves (uncritically) within the dominant discourse only serve to perpetuate its legitimacy and power.

Summary

If the continued anxieties over the future of radical development theory are any indication, then one must concede that the impasse is far from being resolved. This has not only to do with the changing global context in which development occurs but also with imagining alternative futures for development. The recognition that existent modes of theorising no longer contain the
necessary features deemed essential for understanding current global conditions is an encouraging sign, especially where it results in questioning the legitimacy of the basic underlying motives that have sustained traditional development theory to date.

The predicament in radical development theory has come about as the result of at least two opposing forces: On the one hand is the seeming inability of development theory to construct a totalising, holistic, and generally acceptable approach to the current geopolitical disparities which currently separate regions and countries according to physical and imaginative boundaries and zones of all types. Despite this apparent recognition, the search for an all-encompassing approach continues unabated. The precondition here has always required accepting that a valid metatheory of development exists in which to posit and address explanations of such questions as why global disparities exist. On the other hand, post-impasse theories of development have failed to realise that continuing with a theoretical project whose explicit aim is to formulate a strategy whereby all forms of inequality and inequity can be brought to a conclusion only results in the continued silencing and destruction of other choices.

Questions that still need to be addressed include whether it is even possible to explain the nature of global inequality and inequity without also claiming to offer a totalising, and thereby paralysing critique of such a condition. More specifically, how can such theories leave space for less exclusive interpretations and explanations? And, perhaps most importantly, how can traditional methods of inquiry be replaced by ones which do not necessarily and explicitly work towards or offer complete (dominating) explanations of existing conditions?
Finally, the important point that has to be stressed again is that development studies, from within whichever paradigm it happens to be working, has not undergone any significant theoretical transformation since the discovery that real differences among various populations, living in different regions of the world, actually exist. Development studies, despite the increased attention paid to it through an acknowledgment of its decrepit status, continues to be primarily concerned with constructing methods for alleviating perceived disparities.

Postmodern critiques of established practices and theories are playing an important role with regard to how commonly held assumptions of development are presently considered and understood. In addition, the displacement of dominant paradigms through an analysis and evaluation of their privileged subject status means that marginal discourses are beginning to be accepted as viable and authentic alternatives. In these ways, the very basis of current understandings of development are beginning to be questioned and finally disproven.

Some recent trends in what is called postmodern development discourse have highlighted a number of important and compelling issues concerning the changing nature of the geopolitical context in which development occurs: the inability of traditional theoretical models to account for the new socioeconomic mutations and convergencies currently taking shape around the globe; an awareness of a growing variety and number of heterogeneous subject positions; and, the increasing impact of suppressed and subjugated voices on Western knowledge systems. In more specific terms, these transformations can be characterised as a series of challenges directed against standard conceptions of the global problematique. Especially meaningful here are the various ways in which the transformative aspects of capitalism are explained.
and described: as postindustrial (information), late capitalist (images), global interdependence, new mercantilist, multi-national and transnational (corporations), post-Fordist (flexibility), social movement motivated, the rise of new fundamentalisms and so forth. What these concepts all have in common is their attempt to explain the conditions brought about by the recent cataclysmic shifts in the world order. In so doing, they compete with each other in offering the best 'story' or interpretation of these events as they are currently taking shape. Appropriately, although not unproblematically, this shift is being described in terms such as globalism, interdependencies, and the especially colourful one "new world order". This state of affairs signals both the advent of a new real politik as well as the requirement for new ways of imagining and articulating this situation.

It is within the context of this very unsettled and fragmented phase of political manoeuvring and social crisis in which the impasse in development discourse needs to be addressed. And as development discourse, in its present form, seeks to negotiate itself through these obstacles, its practitioners need to be reminded that following established rules, and functioning from within set parameters, will only limit the degree to which substantive change in theorising can take place. Conversely, what needs to take place, especially within the realm of impasse discourse, is imagining an alternative frame of reference for radical development critique such that it begins to resemble something much more unfamiliar than what is currently being offered. Such an outlook can, in the very least, inform the problematique of development discourse of its discursively constructed meanings. Hence, to think about alternatives to development requires, first of all, a theoretical-practical questioning of the accepted notions of development, modernity and the
economy. Such an approach can be achieved by utilising perspectives from various postmodern generated discourses.
Conclusion: New Trends in Development?

This study has problematised the impasse in radical development theory as both a product and continuation of current discursive practices. Likewise, in continuing to operate as a discourse that seeks totality and closure, the post-impasse debate in radical development colludes with the discourse of modernisation. While there has obviously been a 'progression' in terms of new theoretical explanations about the nature of inequality and oppression, these attempts in themselves do not represent any significant departure from the types of theorising that characterised previous discussions on development, whether of the dominant or alternative paradigm. What such discourses of development all have in common is a Western derived metatheoretical commitment that stresses the viability and furtherance of the concept development. In other words, a dominant feature of discourses of development, regardless of ideological standpoint, is a continued allegiance to the dominant discursive imaginary of development. The seemingly disparate viewpoints that make up neoclassical, orthodox Marxist, and radical theories of development make it possible, in this sense, to speak of them as a common and unified discourse; all collaborating with the Enlightenment derived project of progress and modernity.

The concept development, as it has been used in this study, is a discursive construct which arises out of a particular way of representing material reality. This leads to the suggestion "that much of current discourse on development is constructed out of and reflects 'deep' liberal discourse. It reflects its language and concepts such as rights, freedom, equality, and it reflects its tensions, most clearly that between the right and the good (Williams, 1993: 427)." Embedded in this discourse, theories of development can be

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1 Wallerstein (1994) characterises and defines the qualities that make liberal discourse a dominant feature of the current theoretical imaginary: "[L]iberalism offered itself as the solution to the..."
seen as colluding in the discourse of modernity, either by complying with it or resisting against it which, regardless, sets limits on how it can describe and know the object of its study.

In this way development discourse is not really a discourse about the 'reality' of the Third World but rather about a discourse that has constructed a certain image or story of the Third World. This study has tried to show that the discourse of radical development has constructed just one particular version of the Third World, a discourse so powerful that it precludes the existence and formation of other imaginaries. The impasse has been projected against this notion and shown to be part of a continued effort at constructing a total narrative. This means obviously to challenge the authenticity and existence of the impasse. In other words, the impasse and post-impasse research is situated within the same discursive formation as the theories of radical development it critiques. As such, radical development cannot be considered in terms of moving beyond radical development theory but rather as its logical extension. Yet despite the failure of the impasse to imagine a truly different domain of thinking about development, it clearly recognised the problems that radical development had come up against.²

² Part of the reason for the existence of the impasse is that past theories of development have failed to understand the epistemological context in which development was first conceptualised. Hence, the impasse can be considered in terms of at least having recognised its own theoretical limitations thus creating possibilities by which to 'break out of confining orthodoxies' (Schmitz, 1992: 2).
The four chapters of this study have deliberated upon these viewpoints with the aid of a growing body of literature that is currently seeking to destabilise and rethink the concept development in terms of the discourse in which it is embedded. The purpose for doing so was to sketch out a possible means of confronting post-impasse work in radical development, namely its position with regard to constructing another unified discourse of radical development. What makes the current project not so very different from pre-impasse discourse is the notable absence of a critique of the discursive origins of development and the ways in which it has subsequently shaped and constructed how it can be imagined.

Even though early radical development theory, especially the dependency oriented perspectives, problematised commonly held beliefs about the role of modernisation they nevertheless neglected to question the discourse from within which they operated; one which made their own critique possible. For example, early dependency based perspectives created distinctions between the Third World and the First World thus extending rather than erasing the discursive dominance of the latter over the former. David Slater (1993b), elaborates further on this notion. He maintains that the dependency perspective is useful in so far as it has helped to problematise two main tenets of modernisation theory: It called into question the dominant belief that the Third World had no meaningful history before its ‘discovery’ and inscription into the Western project of modernisation3 and, second, it inverted the commonly held assumption that the First World was beneficial for the Third World by employing the concept of underdevelopment. The problem Slater identifies

3 That is, radical scholars served the important function of criticising mainstream (modernisation) development discourse for attributing a pr.mordial quality to ‘traditional’ societies, and for implying that these societies were inherently static and incapable of change without the introduction of outside aid.
here has to do with the dependency thesis that "development could only be effected through radical, revolutionary breaks with international capitalism" (99). Here, Western capitalism (development) remains as the standard from which to depart. The discourse of the West is essentially the same discourse used to foment revolutionary action. Instead, what Slater calls for "is the deconstruction of that imaginary edifice called the Western World" (Ibid: 99). Such a project would effectively show how revolutionary discourse is inextricably tied to and colludes with the Western liberal discourse of modernisation.

Problematising development from the perspective of discourse means--following Slater--interrogating development from a conceptual level more so than attempting to construct a 'new' or 'better' version of development. Ferguson (1990), also provides an account of how the concept development can be approached at a fundamental level, where the point of departure for analyses and critique is not to take development as a given but rather to question why it has become "so firmly entrenched in Western discourse that it is almost impossible to question it, or to refer it to any standard beyond its own" (xiv). For Ferguson, unlike Booth and Corbridge, the point is "not to show that the 'development' problematic is wrong" but to describe, for instance, the discursive dynamics of development practices.

This represents an important digression in how development is usually considered. Rather than emphasising the importance of 'new' and 'better' theories of development, as a result of the short-comings of previous theories, Ferguson directs his attention to the ways in which thinking and talking about development dictates the form it subsequently takes. For him, the process of thinking and what may be thought and said at any particular period in time is no longer determined by a base/superstructure dichotomy nor in the more recent
variations where these spheres are merged. Rather discourses of development are the result of a causal-free social formation where the economy, politics, and ideology inform each other equally and collectively. Here collective existence, as opposed to historical social formations, is discourse. Ideology no longer determines social relations but in the form of discourse becomes a social relation. This version of discourse regards "thinking...as 'real' an activity as any other and [maintains] that ideas and discourses have important and very real consequences" (Ibid: xv). Operating from this perspective permits Ferguson to diagnose discourses of development in terms of the real or material consequences they bring about. No longer content with critiques caught up with trying to proximate how close or far a particular idea is from the 'Truth,' leads Ferguson to ask instead "what effects do these ideas (which may or may not happen to be true) bring about? How are they connected with and implicated in larger social process" (Ibid: xv).

The role of discourse in constructing imaginaries of development is emphasised by Ferguson in terms of what these discourses do. This negates the notion that discourse is an abstract entity and places it firmly in the realm of the concrete, where clear distinctions between the realm of economics and ideology are no longer made. It also provides a different way of approaching the question of development; that is, emphasis is placed on what any particular approach to development (a plan of action or policy initiative as guided by a specific ideological standpoint) is doing, not on criticising them as to whether they meet their objectives and intended outcomes. Using the two development

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4 Laclau (1988), for instance, has suggested that society, and with it class relations, have now become discursive entities, where relations between classes are recast as relations between identities which are never completely defined or fixed. "Such a situation, in which there is a constant movement from the elements to the system but no ultimate systems of elements, a structure in which meaning is constantly negotiated and constructed, is what I call 'discourse'. The concept of discourse describes the ultimate nonfixity of anything existing in society" (254).
paradigms outlined in chapter three of this study can help to clarify the differences of these two dissimilar approaches.

The neoclassical and orthodox Marxist approaches view development as a means by which to solve universal problems. An ideal or utopian world view is first imagined followed by specific proposals that seek to bring about a desired situation. Development agencies as well as grassroots organisations pursue a desired vision as reflected by whichever world view they happen to support. In either case (neoclassical or orthodox Marxist) "development projects are thus to be interpreted as lamentably inexpert attempts by society to remake itself; while for social science, utopian theorising is apparently the order of the day" (Ibid: 10-11).

On the other hand, the radical development, or alternative paradigm, associated with neo-Marxism denounces the dominant vision of a global liberal democracy or of a future utopian socialist order and posits instead that capitalism in the Third World is not a progressive force but a reactionary one, and where a capitalist organised development scheme is essentially a contradictory affair. Rather than bringing about development, First World capitalism brings about underdevelopment. As Ferguson states, radical oriented theorists see the purpose of capitalist development projects as aiding capitalist exploitation in a given country "either by incorporating new territories into the world system, or working against radical social change, or bribing national elites, or mystifying the real international relationships...[emphasis added]" (Ibid: 11).

In the end, both approaches to development are unsatisfactory. Ferguson reproaches the modern-day neoclassicists for being concerned only with "directing or reforming an institution whose fundamental benefence they
take as a given" (Ibid: 13) and the neo-Marxists for assuming "that the institutions of 'development' are part of a fundamentally imperialistic relation between centre and periphery and take the matter to be thus settled" (Ibid: 13). While theories based within the alternative paradigm are best suited to criticise idealist and utopian versions of development, they nevertheless collude with the dominant paradigm in so far as they accept its postulations as a precondition for critique. For instance, when neo-Marxists argue that a famine relief project is not so much a humanitarian attempt to overcome food scarcity as it is a powerful instrument of imperial and class-based control, they not only emphasise the importance of the dominant discourse to the existence of their own discourse but they also neglect to consider how this control is brought about and subsequently maintained. This leads Ferguson to adopt a skeptical position in relation to the neo-Marxists who attribute so much 'success' to Capital. He writes that "[o]ne cannot...expect things to simply snap into place through mysterious 'Black Box' mechanisms simply because Capital 'needs' for them to do so" (Ibid: 13). Conversely, Capital and the forces which are believed to resist it (class-based movements like unions, peasant uprisings, terrorist groups like the Shining Path in Peru) are working from within the same discourse in that they require the presence of each other in order to legitimate their own presence and by extension each other's presence. In this way, ideologically opposed distinctions between notions of development as either charitable and benevolent or, on the other hand, as exploitative and manipulative, can be problematised in terms of the discourse through which seemingly divergent concepts of development are made possible.

What remains for radical development theory in its self-proclaimed post-impasse phase is to problematise the dominant discourse from which it
operates. Dominant discourses of development in most societies are based on variations of Eurocentric modernisation theory where it is assumed that fundamentally beneficial social and technological changes have spread out of the 'modern' First World into the 'traditional' societies of the Third World. This essentially dichotomous perspective, in which it was posited that there are unilinear stages of growth through which all societies must eventually progress on the way from tradition to modernity, needs to be challenged by other discourses, both internal and external to the West.
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