

KIERKEGAARD'S NOTION OF 'UNSCIENTIFIC'

IN THE CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT

by

WAYNE W. J. CORMIER, B.A., B.Ed.

© Copyright

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
Degree of Master of Arts at Saint Mary's University, Halifax, N.S.

1977

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	i
CHAPTER ONE	1
CHAPTER TWO	16
CHAPTER THREE	21
CHAPTER FOUR	
(1) The Sense (Meaning) of "To Exist"	31
(2) Consciousness of Being a Subject	34
(3) The Validity of Objective Thought	38
(4) Passion as a Necessary Element	41
(5) Passion and "Absolute Disjunction"	44
(6) "Ethical Responsibility"	46
(7) "Subjectivity is the Truth"	51
(8) "Indirect Communication"	54
(9) Conclusion	57
FOOTNOTES	61
BIBLIOGRAPHY	67

## INTRODUCTION

The father of the many modern existentialist schools of thought is Soren Aabye Kierkegaard, a thinker whose writings until fairly recent times (i.e. the early 1940's) were largely unknown outside of Denmark. When his works finally did become more widely read, particularly in North America, the emphasis was clearly put upon the theological aspects of his writings as opposed to the philosophical. The author of this thesis considered such an emphasis to be unfortunate and indeed rather unfair to Kierkegaard, because in fact there are at least two dimensions to his thought, the religious and the philosophical. Both are essential for a clear understanding of Kierkegaard; and further, both are so closely interrelated that neither can be properly understood or appreciated without the other. Kierkegaard simply could not have adequately developed his doctrines had he concentrated entirely upon the religious and neglected the secular aspect of man as developed through philosophy.

With this in mind, it was decided to examine Kierkegaard's philosophical thought and, more precisely, his philosophy as presented in his major "philosophical" work, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments.

Given the practical limitations of this dissertation, however, further specification was necessary. Accordingly, what is treated here is only one aspect of Kierkegaard's thought in the Postscript (albeit a very important aspect--indeed perhaps the most important aspect): his notion of "unscientific." Inasmuch as Kierkegaard's notion of "unscientific" was a reaction to Hegel's notion of "scientific," it is necessary also to include a brief chapter on the Hegelian background against which Kierkegaard was reacting.

At this point it should be noted that caution must be exercised in attributing the contents of the Postscript directly to Kierkegaard, inasmuch, as he did not sign the work with his own name. Instead, he attributed it to Johannes Climacus, while assuming the responsibility for publication under his own name. It is our opinion, however, that one may ultimately attribute the thoughts developed in the Postscript to Kierkegaard since he chose to make use of the pseudonym and he did in fact write the work.<sup>1</sup>

Before discussing Kierkegaard's doctrine, we will examine the very lonely, depressing, and agonizing major stages of his own life (Chapter One). For it is clear that no thinker's views were more influenced by his own life than Kierkegaard's. The major stages of his life were what led him to produce his works, to give his special emphasis to the individual, and to formulate his opposition to the community as embodied in Hegel's "speculative philosophy" or "science." Then, as already noted, we will consider

briefly the Hegelian notion of "scientific" against which Kierkegaard was rebelling (Chapter Two). Following this, we shall deal with what Kierkegaard perceived to be the major consequences of following Hegelian "science" (Chapter Three). Finally, we shall examine the various insights comprising Kierkegaard's notion of "unscientific" itself (Chapter Four).

It is hoped that this thesis will show in a direct manner that the "scientific" approach is simply not adequate as a method for describing the human being and his function in reality, and that it was truly brilliant and indeed courageous of Kierkegaard to adopt the position he held regarding the "unscientific." It is also hoped that this thesis will lead to the implicit conclusion that Kierkegaard's position is perhaps the only position which offers true hope to man in his increasingly confused "scientific" age.

In bringing this introduction to a close I wish to acknowledge the tremendous assistance, intellectual insight, and moral support given me by my thesis advisor, Doctor Arthur P. Monahan of the Department of Philosophy at Saint Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia. On the several occasions throughout the years when I wanted to abandon this project he gave me the hope needed to carry on. In this regard, I must also acknowledge the continuing support and encouragement given to me by my mother, Gladys Cormier. It is her happy outlook and cheerful disposition which also sustained me in my moments of darkest despair.

I would also like to thank the following for their help--  
Mr. Herman French, Assistant Superintendent of Education, (Prince  
Albert District), of The Department of Indian and Northern Affairs--  
Saskatchewan Region; Doctor Charles Taylor, Doctor Rowland C.  
Marshall, and finally Mr. Robin Reed, a fellow teacher in Southend,  
Saskatchewan.

## CHAPTER ONE

As already noted, the aim of this thesis is to present an examination of the meaning of "unscientific" in Soren Aabye Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments. To be more precise, this thesis shall examine Kierkegaard's notion of "unscientific" as a reaction to what he perceived as the notion of "scientific" (objective truth) which is embodied in "The System" presented by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.<sup>1</sup>

However, because of the intensely personal nature of Kierkegaard's writings and because the "individual" is the cornerstone of his works, it is first necessary to study the events in the major periods or stages of his life; namely, his formation at the hands of his father, his unhappy love affair with Regine Olsen, his collision with the press and mob of Copenhagen, and his open struggle with the Established Church of Denmark--and to see how these events influenced his outlook and his writings.

In discussing his formation at the hands of his father, Kierkegaard confesses to us that,

From a child I was under the sway of a prodigious melancholy, the depth of which finds its only adequate measure in the equally prodigious dexterity I possessed of hiding it under an apparent gaiety and "joie de vivre" . . . This proportion (the

equally great magnitude of melancholy and the art of dissimulation) signifies that I was relegated to myself and to a relationship with God. As a child I was sternly and seriously brought up in Christianity. Humanly speaking, it was a crazy upbringing. Already in my earliest childhood I broke down under the grave impression which the melancholy old man (his father, Michael Penderson Kierkegaard) who laid it upon me himself sank under<sup>2</sup> . . . What wonder then that there were times when Christianity appeared to me the most inhuman cruelty . . . But I have never definitely broken with Christianity nor renounced it. No, from the time when there could be any question of the employment of my powers, I was firmly determined to employ them all to defend Christianity, or in any case to present it in its true form . . . So I loved Christianity in a way: to me it was venerable--it had to be sure, humanly speaking, rendered me exceedingly unhappy. This corresponds to my relationship with my father, the person whom I loved most deeply. And what is the meaning of this? The point precisely is that he made me unhappy--but out of love. His error did not consist in lack of love, but in mistaking a child for an old man.<sup>3</sup>

In summarizing Kierkegaard's childhood and early upbringing we can note that its salient features appear to be the fact that it was such a cruel upbringing (even though it was cruel out of mistaken



love, not hate) and that it was so guilt ridden. Because of these features it was necessarily a depressing and very lonely childhood. When compared with an ordinary childhood it can be best labelled as warped. The thing primarily responsible for such a warped childhood is the adherence to a perverted Christianity. It is nothing short of tragedy that such a thing (Christianity), which is meant to give so much hope, gave instead so much grief to the young Kierkegaard.

As if this wretched childhood were not enough, Kierkegaard suffered from an almost equally wretched love affair with Regine Olsen (a girl to whom he was actually engaged). In reviewing his unhappy love affair with Regine Olsen, Kierkegaard<sup>4</sup> in a lengthy journal entry entitled "My Relation to Her" tells us that,

Even before my father died I had decided upon her . . . Her father . . . was willing enough as I could see. I asked for a meeting: it was granted to me for the afternoon of the tenth (of September, 1840). I did not say a single word to persuade her. She said yes . . . But inwardly, the next day I saw that I had made a false step. A penitent such as I was, my vita ante acta, my melancholy, that was enough. I suffered unspeakably at that time . . . then I set my whole strength to work . . . Her devotion once again put the whole "responsibility" upon me on a tremendous scale, whereas her pride had almost made me free from "responsibility." My

opinion is, and my thought was, that it was God's punishment upon me . . . How much I loved her is shown by the fact that I always tried to hide from myself how much she had moved me . . . If I had not been a penitent, had not had my vita ante acta, had not been melancholy, my union with her would have made me happier than I had ever dreamed of being . . . I wrote to her and sent her back the ring . . . It was a time of terrible suffering: to have to be so cruel and at the same time to love as I did . . . And so about two months later it broke . . . And so we parted. I spend the whole night crying on my bed . . . When the bonds were broken my thoughts were these: either you throw yourself into the wildest kind of life--or else become absolutely religious, but it will be different from the parsons' mixture.<sup>5</sup>

Once again the cruelty and unhappiness of the earlier period in Kierkegaard's life surfaces to haunt him.

Faced with the two above alternatives, Kierkegaard made the decision to "become absolutely religious." In discussing this decision, he tells us:

Before my real activity as an author began there was an occurrence, or rather a fact or "factum" (namely, the affair with Regine) . . . I shall describe the consequence of this "factum" in so far as it serves to illuminate the authorship. It was a duplex "factum." However much I had lived and experienced in another sense, I had, in a human sense leapt

over the stages of childhood and youth; and this lack, I suppose, must . . . be somehow made up for: instead of having been young, I became a poet, which is a second youth. I became a poet, but with my predisposition for religion, or rather, I may say, with my decided religiousness, this "factum" was for me at the same time a religious awakening, so that I came to understand myself in the most decisive sense in the experience of religion, or in religiousness, to which, however, I had already put myself into relation as a possibility. The "factum" made me a poet . . . But just because I was so religiously developed as I was, the "factum" took far deeper hold on me and, in a sense, nullified what I had become, namely the poet. It nullified it, or at least I was led simultaneously to begin in the same moment at two points, yet in such a way that this thing of being a poet was essentially irrelevant to me, something I had become by means of another person--on the other hand the religious awakening, though it was certainly not a thing I had experienced by means of myself, yet it was in accordance with myself, that is to say, in this thing of becoming a poet I did not recognize myself in a deeper sense, but rather in the religious awakening.<sup>6</sup>

One cannot fail to see from this that again religion and the religious viewpoint have come undeniably to the fore as the major determinant in Kierkegaard's entire existence.

Confronted with the possibility of either throwing himself into the wildest kind of life or of becoming absolutely religious, Kierkegaard chose the latter. However, it was not a simple one-step procedure. Indeed before he could encounter religion in a truly personal way, he had first to become a poet (and, I think, thus enable himself to take a less stern, pessimistic and unhappy view of his life). That is to say, Kierkegaard had to become a poet so that he could experience the joys and virtues of a missed childhood. Only when he had "normalized" himself in this way could he profitably and genuinely become religious.

Perhaps the most important period of Kierkegaard's life, as far as this thesis is concerned, is that in which he was in conflict with the "Corsair" (a comic newspaper of the time) and the mob of Copenhagen.<sup>7</sup> For it was during this period that Kierkegaard came to recognize the worth of the individual as opposed to the masses. The culmination of Kierkegaard's expression of the primacy of the individual over the collective "system" is his sustained attack, in The Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments, upon Hegelianism and its contempt for the individual.

This period was indeed a period of agonizing suffering for Kierkegaard. He must have truly suffered tremendously under a heavy cloud of self doubt and because of a very real bitterness and overwhelming sense of betrayal.

In summarizing the period of conflict with the "Corsair" and the mob, Kierkegaard notes that,

Vulgarity had won the day in Copenhagen and to some extent in Denmark. All those who should have been a last resort, the journalists, even the police, despaired and said, there is nothing to be done, and naturally the vulgarity only increased, it triumphed . . . The question then was whether there was not a young man in the country who was looked up to . . . a young and respected man who dared to do something. There was such a man, and only one, "the great pseudonym"<sup>8</sup> (that is, Kierkegaard himself), undoubtedly the most respected firm; until now spotless--and what is more venerated by vulgarity which shrewdly preferred to be friendly . . . The thing he had to do, the task before him, was if possible to give the situation so completely new a turn, in a few words, as to impress the editors (of the "Corsair") themselves. In that he was successful. That is an historic fact . . . The "Corsair" was lost, in a sense "it never was the same again."<sup>9</sup> The question now was: at how high a price was the unselfish man (Kierkegaard) to pay for this step; for it was only natural that it should cost something. That was the problem before his contemporaries, who solved it by agreeing with the judgment of the educated classes (the better type of journalist). Their duty was to second the step and to show that it was unselfish, was the only thing to do, and was almost heroic.

They all remained silent. That was the betrayal--in that very second I saw that my position among the middle classes would become little by little untenable . . .

Everything that has been outstanding in the world has nearly always been betrayed by its own times. But my contemporaries' betrayal is of a meaner kind, because it was a double betrayal. The important people were really the ones who betrayed me . . . Miserable age! The possibility which I had always reserved for myself, if I ceased being an author, of living in the country, ranked by my literary position not a little above a country parson's humble position--is lost.<sup>10</sup>

As we can well witness, again tragedy, suffering, and a very religious self-sacrificing, characterizes Kierkegaard's already unhappy and indeed depressing existential experience. It cannot but amaze one to realize that, in spite of (perhaps even because of) this immense unhappiness, Kierkegaard clung to existence with an existential hope that is an example to us all.

It seems inevitable, given Kierkegaard's overriding and all consuming concern with religion and its very real effects upon him, that he would eventually have to enter into open conflict with what he considered to be perverted Christianity. Indeed the fourth and final period of Kierkegaard's life is the period in which he openly attacked the established Church of Denmark.<sup>11</sup> He began this attack by simply and calmly requesting<sup>12</sup> that the officials of the Church be honest enough to admit that there was a discrepancy be-

tween their version of Christianity and true Christianity.

To be more precise, Kierkegaard requested that the established church realize that the value of Christianity lies not in the quantity of believers but in the quality of belief. Indeed, not the masses but the individual and his belief are what is of prime importance. (Note that his emphasis upon the individual is a natural and logical culmination of the three earlier periods of Kierkegaard's life). In elaborating upon this request, Kierkegaard explains that,

The tactics in use for a long time past have been to employ every means to get as many as possible, and if possible all, to enter into Christianity--but without being at all scrupulous to ascertain whether what one got them into was really Christianity. My tactics were by God's aid, to employ every means to make it clear what the requirement of Christianity truly is--even though not one single person should be induced to enter into it, and though I myself might have to give up being a Christian (in which case I should have felt obliged to make open admission of the fact). On the other hand, my tactics were these: instead of giving the impression, in however small a degree, that there are such difficulties about Christianity that an apology for it is needed if men are to be persuaded to enter into it, rather to represent it as a thing so infinitely lofty, as in truth it is, that the apology belongs in another

place, is required, that is to say, of us for the fact that we venture to call ourselves Christians, or it transforms itself into a contrite confession that we have God to thank if we merely assume to regard ourselves as Christians.

But neither must this ever be forgotten: Christianity is just as lenient as it is austere, just as lenient, that is to say, infinitely lenient. When the infinite requirement is heard and upheld, heard and upheld in all its infinitude, then grace is offered, or rather grace offers itself, and to it the individual, each for himself, as I also do, can flee for refuge. And then it is possible. But surely it is not an exaggeration when (in the interest of grace itself) the requirement of infinity, the "infinite" requirement, is presented infinitely. Exaggeration occurs only when, in an entirely different way, the requirement is presented and grace is not even alluded to. On the other hand, it is taking Christianity in vain when (perhaps in consideration of the claim-- which presumably will overawe both God in heaven and Christianity and the Apostles and martyrs and witnesses to the truth and the fathers, with all their praxis--that "this won't do at all in practical life")--Christianity is taken in vain, when in view of this consideration the infinite requirement is reduced to finite terms, or maybe entirely ignored, and "grace" is introduced as a matter of course, which simply means that it is taken in vain. <sup>13</sup>



Two things about being a Christian can be noted. First, it is not a matter of course (as the church claims). In truth, one must work at being a Christian with the utmost of his strength, and endurance. For being a Christian is the most difficult enterprise possible for man. Second, with God's help it is possible to become a Christian. However, the individual must continually be actively seeking God's help. He must never assume that it is something automatically given to him merely because he exists. In other words, being a Christian is not a state but a process of existential exertion on the part of each and every individual.

The officials of the Danish Church declined to respond positively to Kierkegaard's private requests to change their posture. Accordingly, after the death of Bishop Jacob Peter Mynster, whom Kierkegaard would not have wished to criticize in public because of his high regard for the bishop, Kierkegaard made his attack against the Established Church public. He carried out this attack by writing articles for the newspaper, Foedrelandet and publishing (to the extent of personal financial ruin) a series of ten pamphlets called, The Instant.

He also attacked the Established Church privately, in his Journals. Possibly one of the best examples of this attack upon the Church is to be found in Journal entry fourteen hundred and five, where he warns:

How afraid men would be of me if they were to know, how strange it would be to them: this much is certain, what has concerned

me lately is whether God wishes me to stake everything upon producing a catastrophe, getting arrested, condemned, and if possible executed . . . If a catastrophic effect is to be produced, I thought of giving "the alarm" quite unexpectedly and after the most complete silence: that official divine worship is a mockery of God, and to take part in it is a crime . . . (Bishop) Martensen's silence is a horrible prostitution, it is really blasphemy, and the community ought really to say to Martensen, like Countess Orsini to Marinelli: have mercy, and tell a little lie, even that is better than your kind of silence . . . One would therefore have to call upon the established order, call upon it in the name of Christianity, to use the means at its disposal to defend itself . . . The charge brought against the established order would have to be that the whole thing was a lie, divine worship a mockery of God, and to take part in it a crime; but at the same time the charge would have to be intensified by proving that the established order itself knew that it was a lie, and that they therefore avoid taking action . . . But oh, it is terrible to think of the depths to which the established order (that is, the Established Church) has sunk, to what a depth of misery and bourgeois mediocrity and untruth.<sup>14</sup>

In reading this passage, we can appreciate just how bitter Kierkegaard was with the Established Church, and how sincerely (if not fanatically) he believed in the necessity of informing people

about the requirements and conditions of being a true Christian.

At the same time, it is noteworthy that Kierkegaard believed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that the Church was indeed hypocritical. If this was truly the case, one can readily envisage the immense difficulty Kierkegaard would have in defeating this deliberate plot called established Christianity. What is more, it is the opinion of the author of this thesis that such a task would ultimately prove impossible. So once again, Kierkegaard would and did confront grief, disappointment and frustration. Unfortunately, Kierkegaard died before he was to complete his attack upon the Established Church of Denmark.

Hopefully, this brief summary of the stages in Kierkegaard's life succeeds in showing how important and influential each period or stage of his life was in contributing to the overall pattern of his actions and thoughts. To be more precise, we notice, as he progresses from existence as a son, to existence as a lover, then to existence as a polemical author, and finally to existence as a witness to the truth that, as one of his biographers puts it,

Kierkegaard's life was outwardly uneventful, but then to the ethical personality it is not the quantity of events which matters, but that in experiencing them he allows his personality to be moulded by them and by this personality makes an indelible impression on others with whom he comes into contact. The people with whom Kierkegaard came into a special

and fateful relationship during his life were: his father, who instilled his religious faith; the young girl, Regine Olsen, to whom he became engaged and who made him a writer; and the author and critic, Meir Aaron Goldschmidt, who (via the Corsair) was the origin of his contempt for contemporary society; and Bishops Mynster and Martensen, the two prelates who alike became in his eyes personifications of what he called "perverted Christendom."<sup>15</sup>

The common denominator of all the stages in Kierkegaard's life seems to be religion and a religious awareness. The first and most evident results of this religious outlook are loneliness, frustration, guilt, unhappiness, and very real depressions.

If one were to attain to only this level of religious existence, it seems that suicide is perhaps the only alternative. However, if one is able to transcend this level, (as Kierkegaard eventually did with God's help or "grace"), then one is able to experience such true all embracing happiness that he can never be "laid low" or defeated again. This is a genuine happiness that arises from our realization that, even though unacceptable, we are indeed genuinely accepted by God. We will share in eternal happiness. That is why we were created.

I feel that it is to Kierkegaard's everlasting credit that he was able to persevere through such difficult if not existentially impossible times and situations. Given the events and relationships

which characterize Kierkegaard's life, it is not at all surprising that he should become a rebel, not only against the socio-political establishments of his day but also against the intellectual climate which prevailed. Need one note, however, the extreme circumspection with which Kierkegaard pursued his "rebellion," such as almost to guarantee its failure.

Now we are in a position to begin the examination, first, of Georg Wilhelm Friderich Hegel's notion of "scientific," and then of what Kierkegaard considered to be the consequences of his notion, and finally Kierkegaard's own notion of "unscientific" which he formulated as a reaction to the Hegelian notion of "scientific."

## CHAPTER TWO

Since Kierkegaard's notion of "unscientific" is a reaction to Hegel's notion of "scientific," we must briefly consider the latter notion.

In the Preface to his Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel asserts that, "The true form in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of it. To contribute to this end, that philosophy might come closer to the form of science--the goal being that it might be able to relinquish the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge--that is what I have resolved to try."<sup>1</sup>

What Hegel means by scientific or, more precisely, by truth attaining its true form only by becoming scientific, is simply that truth can find the element of its existence only in conceptual analysis (the constant analysis of the concepts found in reality): that is to say, since his system is dialectical, the concepts it employs must be dialectical and hence fluid. Therefore, only by a continuing analysis can a concept be grasped. Indeed, truth can reside only in the continuing analysis.

Further on in the Preface, he insists on the need for conceptual analysis primarily because he believes that only in this way (that is, via analysis of concepts) can philosophy or science become universal, and he feels that it is absolutely essential that philosophy become the property of all. Indeed, as he states:

Only what is completely determinate is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and of thus becoming the property of all. The intelligible form of science is the way to science which is offered to all and made equal for all; and to reach rational knowledge by means of understanding is just the demand of consciousness as it approaches science (philosophy). For the understanding is thinking, the pure ego; and the sensible is the already familiar and that which science and the unscientific consciousness have in common-- that whereby the latter can immediately enter science.<sup>2</sup>

For an adequate understanding of Hegel's notion of conceptual analysis we must realize that, for Hegel, what is true is not a complete and final substance but a constantly progressing subject. (That is to say, the true resides in both matter and form-- not in a definite matter alone.) In explaining what he means by the term "subject," Hegel tells us:

The living substance (that is, the true) is, further, that being which is in truth subject or--to say the same thing in other words--which is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of positing itself, or the mediation between a self and its development into something different. As subject, it is pure, simple negativity and thus the bifurcation of the simple, that which produces its own double and opposition, a process that again negates this indifferent diversity and

its opposite: only this sameness which reconstitutes itself, or the reflection into itself in being different--not an original unity as such, or an immediate unity as such--is the true.<sup>3</sup>

To sum up this rather abstruse quotation we can simply say that, according to Hegel's philosophy, the "true" is that which makes itself what it becomes. In other words, knowledge is based upon a constantly evolving situation--it is not found in a static, finished world of dead concepts.

He arrives at this conclusion because of his doctrine that,

All that is necessary to achieve scientific progress . . . is the recognition of the logical principle that the negative is just as much positive, or that what is self-contradictory does not resolve itself into a nullity, into abstract nothingness, but essentially only into the negation of its particular content, in other words, that such a negation is not all and every negation but the negation of a specific subject matter which resolves itself, and consequently is a specific negation, and therefore the result essentially contains that from which it results . . . Because the result, the negation, is a specific negation it has content. It is a fresh Notion (Concept) but higher and richer than its predecessor, for it is richer by the negation or opposite of the latter, therefore contains it,



but also something more, and is the unity of itself and its opposite. It is in this way that the system of notions (Concepts) as such has to be formed--and has to complete itself in a purely continuous course in which nothing extraneous is introduced.<sup>4</sup>

Allow me, at this point, to attempt to clarify the meaning of the above quotation by making use of an example. At one time it was considered to be true that all swans were white. However, only a fool (the intuitionists and the formal schematizers whom Hegel attacks) would have accepted this as being the everlasting truth. For, indeed, black swans were found to actually exist. Hegel's analysis of the situation would be as follows: we now know that there exist black and white swans; thus, the former statement that "all swans are white" has been negated and replaced by a richer Concept. However, we must not stop here in our quest for knowledge of swans, but must take part in the progressing development of the concept of "swan."

The fact that the true is only what it becomes makes it necessary that the subject matter of philosophy (science) has a coldly progressing necessity and that no attempt should be made to make it (that is, philosophy) edifying. To be more precise, scientific philosophy is the philosophy that employs the impartial canons of logic and abides in logical, as opposed to emotional and biased, determinations.

This brings to mind the final characteristic of a scientific philosophy offered by Hegel--namely, that what is of paramount importance is the content of philosophy rather than the individual philosopher. Indeed, according to Hegel, the efforts of individual philosophers prove, upon closer analysis, to be parts of the one system of philosophy.

In concluding this chapter we note that Hegel propounds a philosophy (science) which is constantly progressing inasmuch as it is constantly seeking the truth. But it is the ever elusive truth which is of primary importance. The individual philosopher (scientist) and his relationship to what is "temporarily" true are of very little value. What is of the utmost importance is the movement towards the absolute (truly true) truth. This movement takes place quite independent of individual philosophers.

This denial of the importance of the individual is the basis for Kierkegaard's rejection of Hegel's "science," and in the next chapter we shall deal with what Kierkegaard considered to be some of the necessary results of that "science."

## CHAPTER THREE

In this chapter we will consider at least some of the consequences<sup>1</sup> involved in following Hegel's philosophy or, if you like, "science." More particularly, we shall examine what Kierkegaard perceived such consequences to be.

One of the gravest consequences of Hegel's "science" will be the temptation to forsake the "existing" individual in favor of the study of science itself.

As Kierkegaard quite rightly observes:

. . . it seems strange to me that people are always talking of philosophy or speculation (science) as if it were a man, or as if a man were speculative philosophy. It is speculative philosophy that does everything, that doubts everything, and so forth. The philosopher, on the other hand, has become too objective to talk about himself; he does not say that he doubts everything, but that speculative philosophy does, and that he makes this affirmation about speculative philosophy. Further than this he refuses to commit himself--in case of private inquiry. But is it not then possible to agree to be human beings? . . . if we posit speculative philosophy we must assume the existence of a philosopher or of several philosophers.<sup>2</sup> Clearly, it seems that when a man becomes truly "scientific," he must forsake himself and his interests (including his existential interest) for the sake of the community of "science." He, in fact, comes to forget what it means to exist as an individual human being.

Consequently he neglects (inadvertently or otherwise) his existential obligation to become what he truly "is."

Another consequence which follows from the unqualified acceptance of Hegel's "science" is the use of a language and means of communication (the language of the world--historical and of abstract thought) which tends to emphasize what Kierkegaard calls the "differential ideal," and this implies that some men are superior to others. In mentioning this situation, Kierkegaard says: "But perhaps philosophy will say: "These are popular and simple reflections which theologues and popularizing philosophers are fit to expound; but speculative philosophy has nothing to do with such things." How terrible to be excluded from the superior wisdom of speculative philosophy."<sup>3</sup> Obviously, in a scientific society, scientists are, de facto, superior to garbagemen because of their (the scientists') knowledge. Kierkegaard claims that in existential life, however, there are no superior beings. Thus this claim of the scientists (to superiority) is a great disservice to existential man.

A third result of adhering to Hegel's "science" is the overriding emphasis upon the timelessness or eternity of the scientific enterprise, and the accompanying denigration of the individual and his finiteness. Indeed, individuals may come and individuals may go but science goes on forever. Individuals are of very little import. It is "science" and only "science" that counts. This is the complete and absolute reverse of the way that things existentially are and should be, according to Kierkegaard.

So true in the eyes of Kierkegaard is this criticism that his formulation of it contains very trenchant remarks:

In spite of all his exertion the subjective thinker enjoys only a meager reward. The more the collective idea comes to dominate even ordinary consciousness, the more forbidding seems the transition to becoming a particular existing human being . . . In the midst of all our exultation over the achievements of the age and the nineteenth century, there sounds a note of poorly conceived contempt for the individual man; in the midst of the self-importance of the contemporary generation there is revealed a sense of despair over being human. Everything must attach itself so as to be a part of some movement; men are determined to lose themselves in the totality of things, in world-history, (science), fascinated and deceived by a magic witchery; no one wants to be an individual human being.<sup>4</sup>

In other words, by following science and stressing its timelessness or eternity, man forgets that he himself has only a limited time to fulfill his existential obligations.

A fourth consequence of Hegel's "system" or "science," as Kierkegaard views them is the fact that the scientist becomes interested in and concentrates only upon cognitive matters. He is entirely disinterested in the other aspects of man--namely, his feelings, imagination, et cetera. Indeed, "The scientific movement of thought is from lower to higher, and thought is designated as

the highest stage. In the interpretation of the historical process there is similarly a movement from lower to higher; the stages of imagination and feeling have been left behind, and thought, as the highest stage is also the last. Everywhere it is decisively concluded that thought is the highest stage of human development; philosophy (science) moves farther and farther away from contact with primitive existential impressions, and there is nothing left to explore, nothing to experience."<sup>5</sup>

The tragedy here is that, by moving farther and farther away from contact with existential impressions and emotions, man cannot possibly perform his existential duty to develop himself. For example, without "passion" no existential thinking (let alone existential action) can take place. Surely there is nothing so wasted as a life which has been spent entirely or mostly on thought. For, in terms of ultimate destiny, an all-pervasive thought accomplishes very little.

Again, in speaking of speculative philosophy (science), Kierkegaard advises:

Let the inquiring scholar labor with incessant zeal, even to the extent of shortening his life in the enthusiastic service of science; let the speculative philosopher be sparing neither of time nor of diligence; they are none the less not interested infinitely, personally and passionately, nor could they wish to be. On the contrary, they will seek to cultivate an attitude

of objectivity and disinterestedness. And as for the relationship of the subject to the truth when he comes to know it, the assumption is that if only the truth is brought to light, its appropriation is a relatively unimportant matter, something which follows as a matter of course. And in any case, what happens to the individual is in the last analysis a matter of indifference.<sup>6</sup>

Here again the emphasis is mistakenly upon the discipline of science, while the individual and his existential duties and concerns are completely ignored.

Kierkegaard sees as a fifth implication from holding to the "science" of the Hegelians: the conviction that "science" is or will be, eventually, all-knowing. It can explain absolutely anything, given enough time. As Kierkegaard asserts: "Speculative philosophy (science) has understood everything, everything, everything."<sup>7</sup> And, "The idea of a universal history (the scientific idea) tends to a greater and greater systematic concentration of everything. A Sophist has said that he could carry the whole world in a nutshell, and this is what modern surveys of world history (science) seems to realize: the survey becomes more and more compendious."<sup>8</sup> The truly unfortunate thing here, of course, is that science has failed to deal with its very own foundation, namely, the scientist himself. To be more specific, science fails to deal with the scientist as an existential being.

Still another consequence of upholding the principles of Hegelian "science" is the denial of the existence and import of the

"Ethical." According to Kierkegaard,

The objective tendency (science) is the way and the truth; the ethical is, becoming an observer! . . . or else one is compelled to assume that there is no ethical question at all, and in so far no ethical answer . . . What conclusion would inevitably force itself upon Ethics, if the becoming a subject were not the highest task confronting a human being? And to what conclusion would Ethics be forced? Aye, it would, of course, be driven to despair. But what does the System (science) care about that? It is consistent enough not to include an Ethic in its systematic scheme . . . For in our age it is not merely an individual scholar or thinker here and there who concerns himself with universal history (science); the whole age loudly demands it. Nevertheless, Ethics and the ethical, as constituting the essential anchorage for all individual existence, have an indefeasible claim upon every existing individual; so indefeasible a claim, that whatever a man may accomplish in the world, even to the most astonishing of achievements, it is none the less quite dubious in its significance, unless the individual has been ethically clear when he made his choice, has ethically clarified his choice to himself.<sup>9</sup>

This point about science lacking an Ethic is very crucial; for it is because of this lack that many of the other consequences of science (as Kierkegaard perceives them) exist.



A seventh consequence of the acceptance of Hegel's "science" is the belief that all events flow with an ordered regularity and are indeed merely parts of a necessary whole. There can be no room for contingency or truly free actions in such a schema. In fact, as Kierkegaard quite correctly points out: "Everything has been finished, and speculative thought (science) has now to rubricate, classify, and methodically arrange the various concepts. One does not live any more, one does not act, one does not believe; but one knows that love and faith are, and it only remains to determine their place in the System (of science)."<sup>10</sup> One can note here that, when contingency and the possibility of truly free action are denied, no Ethic can logically exist. For indeed, how can an individual be held responsible for an action over which he had no control?

An eighth implication from adopting the Hegelian scientific posture, as Kierkegaard sees it, is the necessity of using a limited form of communication--the form of communication labelled "direct communication." Direct communication is necessary because "science" is primarily concerned with results and the knowledge of results. As the Dane put it, it is a fact that . . . "objective thought (science) translates everything into results, and helps all mankind to cheat, by copying these off and reciting them by rote."<sup>11</sup>

And what is more, in its concern for results, science completely ignores the individual, and does not even bother itself with any attempt to communicate with him in a meaningful (existential) manner. For if science were interested in the individual, it would

have to adopt an indirect form of communication. But:

Objective thinking (science) is wholly indifferent to subjectivity, and hence also to inwardness and appropriation; its mode of communication is therefore direct. It goes without saying that it need not on that account be at all easy. But it is direct, and lacks the elusiveness and the art of a double reflection, the godly and humane solicitude in communicating itself, which belongs to subjective thinking. It can be understood directly and be recited by rote. Objective thinking (science) is hence conscious only of itself, and is not in the strict sense of the word a form of communication at all, at least not an artistic form, in so far as artistry would always demand a reflection within the recipient, and an awareness of the form of communication in relation to the recipient's possible misunderstanding. Objective thinking is, like most human beings, so touchingly kind and communicative. It imparts itself without further ado, and, at the most, takes refuge in assurances respecting its own truth, in recommendations as to its trustworthiness, and in promises that all men will some time accept it--it is so certain.<sup>12</sup>

These, then, for Kierkegaard are the consequences of being a disciple of Hegelian "science." It is precisely because of these consequences that he reacted by formulating his own notion of

"unscientific," with which we shall deal in the next chapter.

But let us first summarize this chapter by noting that the overriding consequence of following science, as Kierkegaard perceived it, is the overemphasis upon and the omnipotent status granted to the community of followers while the individual, per se, is ignored. We have seen in the first chapter that the individual had come to be the all-important cornerstone in Kierkegaard's thought. But whereas as maintained in the first chapter, he applied this doctrine of the primacy of the individual only to the religious sphere, he now applies it against the entire secular climate and activity of his day. That is to say, he has decided that he must now do battle with science itself, with its completely erroneous and existentially destroying emphasis upon the group as opposed to the individual. In order to wage this battle against science, Kierkegaard has attempted to show the ways in which science has erred and the consequence of these errors.

In summary, Kierkegaard maintained that Hegelian "science" has made the mistake of completely neglecting the individual in favor of the study. This leads the man with a scientific disposition utterly to forget himself and his responsibilities while attributing everything to science. Ultimately, this forgetting leads to such things as the conducting of the grizzly medical experiments in the Nazi concentration camps and more immediate developments in biological warfare, among many other "accomplishments" of science. The scientist is able to live with the horrors he creates by claiming that they are

done in the name of and for the sake of science. The tragic thing here is, of course, that the scientist has forgotten that he is and must be, first and foremost, a human being with existential responsibilities which are negated by science. Given that the ultimate destiny of man is his personal eternal happiness, one can see how truly unfortunate his preoccupation with science is.

## CHAPTER FOUR

(1)

## THE SENSE (MEANING) OF "TO EXIST"

As we have seen, Soren Kierkegaard's notion of "unscientific" is primarily a reaction to his perception of what Hegel meant by the "scientific" (that is, speculative philosophy). Kierkegaard believes that the "scientific" ignores the individual human being and his existential concerns. Not only this but, what is perhaps an even more serious accusation, the "scientific" lacks a recognition of the fact that each man is responsible for his actions and situation. In expressing this in a different manner we can say that the "scientific" lacks an ethic, and is even destructive of the ethical. This is the case because the "scientific" requires that the individual abstract from his own existence. But it is precisely his own existence which Ethics would emphasize and demand that he hold on to.

In this chapter we shall examine, in turn, what Kierkegaard understands to be the constitutive elements or factors in the "unscientific."<sup>1</sup> To be more precise we shall restrict ourselves to the examination of Kierkegaard's understanding as it is presented in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments.<sup>2</sup>

We shall begin by distinguishing between two senses of the term "to exist," while concentrating upon the sense with which Kierkegaard was primarily concerned. Then we shall examine, quite closely, his

concept of the "subjective thinker" as a particular human being, and the difficulty involved in becoming a "subjective" (truly existing) thinker. Next, we shall deal with "subjective thought" and its "objective dimension." Following this, our concern will be with Kierkegaard's notion of "passion" and the role it plays in human existence. Then we shall discuss the concept of the "absolute disjunction" (either--or) as it is involved in "passion." After this discussion, we shall concentrate on the notion of "ethical responsibility" and the "ethical." This will be followed by a brief examination of Kierkegaard's claim that--"subjectivity is the truth." Finally, we shall look at the concept of "indirect communication."

It is the contention of the author of this paper that Kierkegaard's notion of "unscientific" as he uses it in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments can only be formulated and understood in terms of the above-mentioned aspects or constituents of Kierkegaard's thought. One might note also that the discussion of the above mentioned points will include, either explicitly or implicitly, Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegelianism and the "scientific."

A first point to be made concerning Kierkegaard's notion of "unscientific" is that he distinguishes two meanings or senses of the verb "to exist":

All logical thinking (science) employs the language of abstraction and is sub specie aeterni. To think existence logically is thus to ignore the difficulty, the difficulty, that is, of thinking the eternal as in process of becoming. But this

difficulty is unavoidable, since the thinker himself is in process of becoming. It is easier to indulge in abstract thought than it is to exist unless we understand by this latter term what is loosely called existing, in analogy with what is loosely called being a subject. Here we have again an example of the fact that the simplest tasks are the most difficult. Existing is ordinarily regarded as no very complex matter, much less an art, since we all exist; but abstract thinking takes rank as an accomplishment. But really to exist, so as to interpenetrate one's existence with consciousness, at one and the same time eternal and as if far removed from existence, and yet also present in existence and in the process of becoming: that is truly difficult.<sup>3</sup>

There are, then, two senses of the term, "to exist"--a loose sense and a strict or difficult sense. The latter sense, as we shall see, is the sense which holds interest for Kierkegaard and which relates directly to what he means by the "unscientific."

In the loose sense, "to exist" means, "Merely that the individual having come into the world is present and is in the process of becoming . . . one does not become anything in particular by coming into being."<sup>4</sup> "To exist" in this loose sense can hold for anything which "is"--anything from a rock to a sputnik. In other words, "to exist" in the loose sense is merely to "be"; to have the status of "being."

To have the status of being is no great thing since,

"existence has the remarkable trait of compelling an existing individual (and indeed, any existing thing) to exist whether he (or it) wills it or not."<sup>5</sup> Indeed: "To have been young, and then to grow older, and finally to die is a very mediocre form of human existence; this merit belongs to every animal."<sup>6</sup> Obviously, then, Kierkegaard is not primarily concerned with the loose sense of "to exist," that is, with the sense in which "to exist" is merely a status.

In the strict sense, the term "to exist" refers to the task of becoming what you truly "are": . . . "really to exist, so as to interpenetrate one's existence with consciousness, at one and the same time eternal and as if far removed from existence, and yet also present in existence and in the process of becoming: that is truly difficult."<sup>7</sup> This sense of "to exist" refers solely to a truly human existence, and the individual who really or genuinely exists is the "subjective thinker."

It is perhaps interesting, at this point, to note that both Kierkegaard and Hegel are in agreement concerning the necessary existence of a dynamic as opposed to a static situation. ("X" is only what it becomes). However for Hegel "X" is the truth, while for Kierkegaard "X" is the individual and his existence.

(2)

#### CONSCIOUSNESS OF BEING A SUBJECT

Of the "subjective thinker" Kierkegaard says:

If an excursion into the realm of pure thought (science) is



to determine whether a man is a thinker or not, the subjective thinker is ipso facto excluded from consideration. But in and with his exclusion every existential problem also goes by the board . . . there is required for a subjective thinker imagination and feeling, dialectics in existential inwardness, together with passion . . . The subjective thinker is a dialection dealing with the existential, and he has the passion of thought requisite for holding fast to the "qualitative disjunction" (either--or) . . . The subjective thinker is not a man of science, but an artist. Existing is an art. The subjective thinker is aesthetic enough to give his life aesthetic content, ethical enough to regulate it, and dialectical enough to interpenetrate it with thought. The subject thinker has the task of understanding himself in his existence.<sup>8</sup>

What Kierkegaard is saying here is that the individual is not merely a thinking being. Thinking and the dialectical are just one aspect of man. Equally important to him are his imagination and feelings and his conscience. Thus the individual is not a one-dimensional scientist (philosopher) but a multi-dimensional artist. As an artist, he is concerned not with objective truth (knowledge), but with self knowledge and self development.

What the task of self-understanding entails for Kierkegaard can be more fully appreciated when we realize that, "while abstract thought seeks to understand the concrete abstractly, the subjective

thinker has conversely to understand the abstract concretely. Abstract thought (science) turns from concrete men to consider man in general; the subjective thinker seeks to understand the abstract determination of being human in terms of this particular human being."<sup>9</sup> To be more precise: "While objective thought (science) is indifferent to the thinking subject and his existence, the subjective (unscientific) thinker is an existing individual essentially interested in his own thinking, existing as he does in his thought."<sup>10</sup> Thus the individual must also be conscious of what it means to be a particular human being: "In all his thinking he (the subjective thinker) therefore has to think the fact that he is an existing individual."<sup>11</sup>

Developing this consciousness (in effect, "becoming subjective") is not, in any way, however, an easily accomplished task. Indeed:

It is commonly assumed that no art or skill is required in order to be subjective. To be sure, every human being is a bit of a subject, in a sense. But now to strive to become what one already is: who would take the pains to waste his time on such a task, involving the greatest imaginable degree of resignation? Quite so. But for this very reason alone it is a very difficult task, the most difficult of all tasks in fact, precisely because every human being has a strong natural bent and passion to become something more and different. And so it is with all such apparently insignificant tasks, precisely their seeming insignificance makes them infinitely difficult. In such cases

the task itself is not directly alluring, so as to support the aspiring individual; instead, it works against him, and it needs an infinite effort on his part merely to discover that his task lies here, that this is his task--an effort from which he is otherwise relieved.<sup>12</sup>

In other words, to consciously become what he truly "is" is very difficult for man because of the fact that he already "is." He does not appreciate that just being a subject in a superficial sense is not enough. He finds it extremely difficult to develop himself because he would rather expend the energy on developing other things. Nevertheless, he does have a very real existential obligation to become "self" conscious.

Furthermore, once an individual human being has begun the task of interpenetrating his existence with this "consciousness of being a subject," he must undertake the task of shaping his existence in accordance with this consciousness: "The task of the subjective thinker is to transform himself into an instrument that clearly and definitely expresses in existence whatever is essentially human."<sup>13</sup>

Let us be quite clear about this. "To exist" in the strict sense of the term involves two things: first, the individual must know himself (that is, he must become a subjective thinker) and, second, the individual must act in accordance with this knowledge (that is, he must shape his existence in terms of his subjectivity). Only when an individual has undertaken both of these requirements, Kierkegaard would say, has he begun to exist essentially as a human being.

Thus the only fundamentally (essentially) valid enterprise for an existing human being is subjective thought which enables the individual to become a true subject (that is, to become what he "is"-- to actualize his potential).

(3)

#### THE VALIDITY OF OBJECTIVE THOUGHT

Please note, however, that while Kierkegaard for his own purposes stresses the subjective (the "unscientific"), he is not so mindless as to deny all validity to the order of the objective ("scientific"). In speaking of "objective thought," he says: "But wherever objective thinking (science) is within its rights, its direct form of communication is also in order, precisely because it is not supposed to have anything to do with subjectivity."<sup>14</sup> Elsewhere, regarding "objective thought," Kierkegaard claims:

Only a very limited intelligence, or someone who cunningly wishes to guard himself against feeling impressed, could here assume that I am in this objection playing the role of a vandal, seeking to violate the sacred security of the precincts of science, and to have the cattle let loose; or that I am a lazzarone, placing myself at the head of a herd of newspaper readers and balloting idlers, in order to rob the modest scholar of his lawful possessions, earned by the employment of his happy

gifts in resigned toil.<sup>15</sup>

Again, Kierkegaard asserts that, "Existence is always something particular, the abstract does not exist. From this to draw the conclusion that the abstract is without validity is a misunderstanding."<sup>16</sup>

Clearly, then, Kierkegaard is willing to accept the worth of "objective thought" as long as it remains within its proper boundaries, that is, as long as it does not presume to interfere with man's most vital field of operation--"subjective thought." If at any time "objective thought" gets in the way of (that is, interferes with or completely terminates) "subjective thought," however, it must be abandoned.

Further, at this point we must recognize that even "subjective thought" has an "objective" dimension or aspect: "The reflection of inwardness gives to the subjective thinker a double reflection. In thinking, he thinks the universal; but as existing in this thought and as assimilating it in his inwardness, he becomes more and more subjectively isolated."<sup>17</sup>

In other words, the individual, because he is a human being, must arrive at some conception of what it is that makes a "human" existence a "truly human" existence: what it is that makes man "man"; what the basic attributes involved in the human mode of existence are. In thinking about these basic attributes, he is thinking, in reality, about the "universal" because these attributes belong to all mankind.

But he must never stop once he has arrived at an understanding of these "basic" or "universal" attributes. Indeed, he must then assimilate or internalize these "universals"; that is to say, he must understand how these "universals" apply to his own particular existence. Only in accomplishing this "reflection of inwardness" does a man truly exist as a man.

Both of these reflections (the subjective and the objective) are absolutely essential to a human existence. Indeed:

. . . the objective way deems itself to have a security which the subjective way does not have (and of course, existence and existing cannot be thought in combination with objective security); it (the objective way) thinks to escape a danger which threatens the subjective way, and this danger is at its maximum: madness. In a merely subjective determination of the truth, madness and truth become in the last analysis indistinguishable, since they may both have inwardness. Nevertheless, perhaps I may here venture to offer a little remark, one which would seem to be not wholly superfluous in an objective age. The absence of inwardness is also madness. The objective truth as such, is by no means adequate to determine that whoever utters it is sane; on the contrary, it may even betray the fact that he is mad, although what he says may be entirely true, and especially objectively true . . . In the type of madness which manifests itself as an aberrant inwardness, the tragic and the comic is that the something which is of such infinite

concern to the unfortunate individual is a particular fixation which does not really concern anybody. In the type of madness which consists in the absence of inwardness, the comic is that though the something which the happy individual knows really is the truth, the truth which concerns all men, it does not in the slightest degree concern the much respected prater. This type of madness is more inhuman than the other.<sup>18</sup>

It is important, then, to realize that the adopting of either extreme, (subjectivity or objectivity), to the exclusion of the other will lead to madness. By becoming too subjective, the individual loses contact with objective reality and withdraws completely into himself. By becoming too objective, the individual loses contact with himself and concentrates entirely upon the objective reality of the world around him. The point here is that the madness which the objective philosopher (scientist) fears will result from excess subjectivity can just as easily result from excess objectivity.

(4)

#### PASSION AS A NECESSARY ELEMENT

Kierkegaard also insists, adamantly, that if a man is to truly "exist," (that is, if he is to be a genuine individual subject), "passion" must be an essential element in his life. This might be

designated then as another feature or characteristic of what he understands by the "unscientific." In explaining what he means by "passion"

Kierkegaard says:

It is impossible to exist without passion, unless we understand the word "exist" in the loose sense of a so-called existence. Every Greek thinker was therefore essentially a passionate thinker. I have often reflected how one might bring a man into a state of passion. I have thought in this connection that if I could get him seated on a horse and the horse made to take fright and gallop wildly, or better still, for the sake of bringing the passion out, if I could take a man who wanted to arrive at a certain place as quickly as possible, and hence already had some passion, and could set him astride a horse that can scarcely walk--and yet this is what existence is like if one is to become consciously aware of it. Or if a driver were otherwise not especially inclined toward passion, if someone hitched a team of horses to a wagon for him, one of them a Pegasus and the other a worn-out jade, and told him to drive-- I think one might succeed. And it is just this that it means to exist, if one is to become conscious of it. Eternity is the winged horse, infinitely fast, and time is a worn-out jade; the existing individual is the driver. That is to say, he is such a driver when his mode of existence is not an existence loosely so called; for then he is no driver, but a drunken



peasant who lies asleep in the wagon and lets the horses take care of themselves. To be sure, he also drives and is a driver; and so there are perhaps many who--also exist.<sup>19</sup>

"Passion," then, is a prolonged state of fear, a state of anxiety, a state of active concern for one's own existence because of the uncertainty of that existence and the fact that it is constantly threatened.

In speaking further of passion, Kierkegaard informs us that, "All existential problems are passionate problems, for when existence is interpenetrated with reflection it generates passion. To think about existential problems in such a way as to leave out the passion, is tantamount to not thinking about them at all, since it is to forget the point, which is that the thinker is himself an existing individual."<sup>20</sup>

It is necessary to be passionate when thinking about and trying to solve existential problems simply because individual existence involves not only thought but also individually directed action. It seems to be part of man's general psyche or mental and emotional makeup, that he is only capable of truly effective and meaningful action when he has intense feelings and emotions towards something. This is especially true when the "something" under consideration is a man's very existence.

(5)

## PASSION AND "ABSOLUTE DISJUNCTION"

A very necessary ingredient in "passion" is the existence of what Kierkegaard calls the "absolute disjunction" (that is--"either-or situations"), a point referred to earlier and now to be clarified (cf. supra, text quoted on p. 35). In fact, it is necessary to insist that,

One must therefore be very careful in dealing with a philosopher of the Hegelian school, and, above all, to make certain of the identity of the being with whom one has the honor to discourse. Is he a human being, an existing human being? Is he himself sub specie aeterni, even when he sleeps, eats, blows his nose, or whatever else a human being does? Is he himself the pure "I am I"? This is an idea that has surely never occurred to any philosopher; but if not how does he stand existentially related to this entity, and through what intermediate determinations is the ethical responsibility resting upon him as an existing individual suitably respected? Does he in fact exist? And if he does, is he then not in process of becoming? And if he is in process of becoming, does he not face the future? And does he ever face the future by way of action? And if he never does, will he not forgive an ethical individuality for saying in passion and with dramatic truth, that he is an ass?

But if he ever acts sensu eminenti, does he not in that case face the future with infinite passion? Is there not then for him an either-or? Is it not the case that eternity is for an existing individual not eternity, but the future, and that eternity is eternity for the Eternal, who is not in process of becoming? Let him state whether he can answer the following question, i.e. if such a question can be addressed to him:

"Is ceasing to exist so far as possible, in order to be sub specie aeterni, something that happens to him, or is it subject to a decision of the will, perhaps even something one ought to do?" For if I ought to do it, an aut-aut is established even with respect to being sub specie aeterni. Was he born sub specie aeterni, and has he lived sub specie aeterni ever since, so that he cannot even understand what I am asking about, never having had anything to do with the future, and never having experienced any decision? In that case I readily understand that it is not a human being I have the honor to address . . . But where everything is in process of becoming, and only so much of eternity is present as to be a restraining influence in the passionate decision, where "eternity" is related as "futura" to the individual in process of becoming, there the absolute disjunction belongs.<sup>21</sup>

As we can well see from this rather long quotation, in order for passion to exist an "either-or situation" must also exist. We said

earlier in this chapter that all existential problems are, of necessity passionate problems. Thus it follows that all existential problems involve "either-or situations." So true is this that even the Hegelian philosopher (scientist) is forced to admit that his very claims and doctrines depend upon an "either-or situation." Of course, once this all-important admission is made, the scientist cannot fail to recognize the fact that he is indeed an existing individual with existential responsibilities.

(6)

#### ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY

A concomitant feature of the "absolute disjunction" is what Kierkegaard refers to as "ethical responsibility."

About the "ethical" he asserts, "The only reality that exists for an existing individual is his own ethical reality. To every other reality he stands in a cognitive relation; but true knowledge consists in translating the real into the possible."<sup>22</sup>

And what is more: "For the study of the ethical, every man is assigned to himself. His own self is as material for this study more than sufficient; aye, this is the only place where he can study it with any assurance of 'certainty.'"<sup>23</sup>

Indeed:

It is on this point about existence, and the demand which the

ethical makes upon each existing individual, that one must insist when an abstract philosophy (science) and a pure thought assume to explain everything by explaining away what is decisive. It is necessary only to have the courage to be human, and to refuse to be terrified or tricked into becoming a phantom merely to save embarrassment. It would be an altogether different thing if pure thought would accept the responsibility of explaining its own relation to the ethical, and to the ethically existing individual. But this it never does, nor does it even pretend; for in that case it would have to make terms with an entirely different dialectic, namely the Greek or existential dialectic. The stamp of the ethical is what every existing individual has the right to expect of all that calls itself wisdom . . . I shall be . . . proud, insistent, fearless, and even defiant in standing by my thesis: that the Hegelian philosophy, by failing to define its relation to the existing individual, and by ignoring the ethical, confounds existence.<sup>24</sup>

What Kierkegaard is saying here is that what is of the utmost importance to an existential being is his own "ethical" reality. More specifically, every man must realize that he has existential obligations that only he can fulfill, and to dwell upon the ethical reality of someone else (as far as this is possible) is indeed a very serious error. However, the most serious error possible is the error committed by Hegelian philosophy (science) when it completely ignores the reality of the ethical.

In discussing the intellectual orientation of the "ethical," Kierkegaard informs us that,

The aesthetic and intellectual principle is that no reality is thought or understood until its esse has been resolved into its posse. The ethical principle is that no possibility is understood until each posse has really become an esse. An aesthetic and intellectual scrutiny protests every esse which is not a posse; the ethical scrutiny results in the condemnation of every posse which is not an esse, but this refers only to a posse in the individual himself, since the ethical has nothing to do with the possibilities of other individuals . . . What then is the real? It is the ideality. But aesthetically and intellectually the ideality is the possible (the translation from esse ad posse). Ethically the ideality is the real within the individual himself. The real is an inwardness that is infinitely interested in existing; this is exemplified in the ethical individual.<sup>25</sup>

Kierkegaard believes most strongly that the very being of the "ethical" lies, contrary to the scientific, in the principle that no possibility is understood until each posse has really become an esse. That is to say, the existing ethical individual must never rest content with the achievements (realities) of other individuals, but he has the obligation to also realize that these are possibilities which he himself must actualize in himself. Naturally, this realization, of necessity, leads to a constant striving on the part of the individual human being.

According to the Dane,

When reality is apprehended by an outsider it can be understood only as a possibility. Everyone who makes a communication, in so far as he becomes conscious of this fact, will therefore be careful to give his existential communication the form of a possibility, precisely in order that it may have a relationship to existence. A communication in the form of a possibility compels the recipient to face the problem of existing in it, so far as this is possible between man and man. Let me illustrate this point once more. By relating how this or that man really had done so and so, something very great and distinguished, it might be imagined that a reader would be brought nearer to the forming of a resolution to do the same, than if the account is offered merely as a possibility. Abstracting from the fact that the reader can understand such a communication only by resolving the esse of its reality into a posse, since otherwise he merely imagines that he understands it, the knowledge that this or that person has actually done so and so, may just as well constitute a hindrance to action as a stimulus. By means of the consideration that he is an actual person the reader transforms the doer of the deed into a rare exception. He admires him and says: "But I am too humble to do anything like that." Admiration has its very proper place in connection with differential achievements, but it is a misunderstanding when brought

into relation with what is universally human . . . Whatever is great in the sphere of the universally human must therefore not be communicated as a subject for admiration, but, as an ethical requirement. In the form of a possibility it becomes a requirement. Instead of presenting an account of the good in the form of actuality, as is usually done, instead of insisting that such and such a person has actually lived, and has really done this or that, by which the reader is transformed into an admiring spectator, a critical connoisseur, the good should be presented in the form of a possibility. This will bring home to the reader, as closely as is possible, whether he will resolve to exist in it. A communication in the form of the possible, operates in terms of the ideal man (not the differential ideal, but the universal ideal) whose relationship to every individual man is that of a requirement . . . Ethically speaking there is nothing so conducive to sound sleep as admiration of another person's ethical reality. And again ethically speaking, if there is anything that can stir and rouse a man, it is a possibility ideally requiring itself of a human being.<sup>26</sup>

In summarizing this section we can note that because of the existence of "either-or situations" every man must make responsible decisions concerning his existence and act upon these decisions. He has an undeniable existential obligation to become what he truly "is." So urgent is this obligation that he must be constantly careful not to distort it by admiring the ethical reality of any other being. For



when admiration enters the picture, no room is left for the necessary personal choices and actions. The existential individual must be equally as careful when facing the temptation to shirk his obligation by embracing the Hegelian philosophy (science). Indeed this very science neglects the ethical and confounds existence.

(7)

#### SUBJECTIVITY IS THE TRUTH

Another very important constituent of Kierkegaard's notion of "unscientific," is the proposition that "subjectivity is the truth." In the light of his concept of "to exist" in the strict sense and in relation to what has been presented above, the validity of this claim should be obvious. Indeed:

The subjective reflection turns its attention inwardly to the subject, and desires in this intensification of inwardness to realize the truth. And it proceeds in such a fashion that, just as in the preceding objective reflection, when the objectivity had come into being, the subjectivity had vanished, so here the subjectivity of the subject becomes the final stage and objectivity a vanishing factor. Not for a single moment is it forgotten that the subject is an existing individual, and that existence is a process of becoming, and that therefore the notion of the truth as identity of thought and being is a chimera of abstraction, in its truth only an expectation of the creature; not because the

truth is not such an identity, but because the knower is an existing individual for whom the truth cannot be such an identity as long as he lives in time.<sup>27</sup>

In other words:

When the question of the truth is raised in an objective (scientific) manner, reflection is directed objectively to the truth, as an object to which the knower is related.

Reflection is not focussed upon the relationship, however, but upon the question of whether it is the truth to which the knower is related. If only the object to which he is related is the truth, the subject is accounted to be in the truth.

When the question of the truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed subjectively to the nature of the individual's relationship; if only the mode of this relationship is in the truth, the individual is in the truth even if he should happen to be thus related to what is not true.<sup>28</sup>

To view this in a slightly different manner, we can note in another of Kierkegaard's statements of the point that,

The objective accent falls on WHAT is said, the subjective accent on HOW it is said . . . In the ethico-religious sphere, accent is again on the how. But this is not to be understood as referring to demeanor, expression, or the like; rather it refers to the relationship sustained by the existing individual, in his own existence, to the content of his utterance. Objectively the interest is focussed merely on the thought-content,

subjectively on the inwardness. At its maximum this inward how is the passion of the infinite, and the passion of the infinite is the truth. But the passion of the infinite is precisely subjectivity, and thus subjectivity becomes the truth . . . Only in subjectivity is there decisiveness, to seek objectivity is to be in error. It is the passion of the infinite that is the decisive factor and not its content, for its content is precisely itself. In this manner subjectivity and the subjective how constitute the truth.<sup>29</sup>

What Kierkegaard is claiming is that the objective attempt to define truth, as "a correspondence between thought and being," will simply not be valid for a subjective reflection. Indeed, the existing individual as "existing" never is or has that state called "being," but is always in a process of becoming. Thus what is vital, as far as truth is concerned, is not the "what" but the "how" of existence.

In other words, the claim that "subjectivity is the truth" must be viewed as an indicator of "how" the individual human being (existing subject) must proceed if he wishes to reach the truth concerning his existence. He, of course, must proceed by way of "subjective reflection." A measure of the assertion here that Kierkegaard is addressing himself only to the "how" of how the individual knowing subject must proceed in reaching the truth is that Kierkegaard does not in any way deny that the content of truth is in some sense necessarily "objective," in the sense precisely of not being arbitrary. Kierkegaard

is here simply not addressing the issue of truth content; he is emphasizing the issue of subjective appropriation: if something is to be true for me, it must be mine (subjectively) inasmuch, as I have appropriated it to myself.

To be more precise we can note that for Kierkegaard, "For an objective reflection the truth becomes an object, something objective, and thought must be pointed away from the subject. For a subjective reflection the truth becomes a matter of appropriation, of inwardness, of subjectivity, and thought must probe more and more deeply into the subject and his subjectivity."<sup>30</sup>

We should bear in mind, here, the point stressed earlier in this thesis (cf. supra, text on pp.40,41) that an excess of either "subjectivity" or "objectivity" can lead to madness. That is to say: if an individual strives ceaselessly to achieve one to the total exclusion of the other madness results.

(8)

#### INDIRECT COMMUNICATION

As a consequence of his claim that "subjectivity is the truth," the notion of "indirect communication" plays an important part in Kierkegaard's concept of "unscientific." In speaking of "indirect communication," Kierkegaard asserts that, "If the concept of existence is really to be stressed, this cannot be given a direct expression as a paragraph in a system; all direct swearing and oath-supported assurances serve only to make the topsy-turvy profession of the paragraph more and

more ridiculous. An actual emphasis on existence must be expressed in an essential form; in view of the elusiveness of existence, such a form will have to be an indirect form, namely, the absence of a system."<sup>31</sup>

The fact that each existing individual has the ethical task of knowing himself as himself and of becoming what he (and only he) actually "is," means that all existential communication between one individual and another must, of necessity, be an "indirect communication." Indeed:

Wherever the subjective is of importance in knowledge, and where appropriation thus constitutes the crux of the matter, the process of communication is a work of art, and doubly reflected. Its very first form is precisely the subtle principle that the personalities must be held devoutly apart from one another, and not permitted to fuse or coagulate into objectivity. It is at this point that objectivity and subjectivity part from one another.

Ordinary communication, like objective (scientific) thinking in general, has no secrets; only a doubly reflected subjective thinking has them. That is to say, the entire essential content of subjective thought is essentially secret, because it cannot be directly communicated. This is the meaning of the secrecy. The fact that the knowledge in question does not lend itself to direct utterance, because its essential feature consists of the appropriation, makes it a secret for everyone who is not in the

same way doubly reflected within himself. And the fact that this is the essential form of such truth, makes it impossible to express it in any other manner. Hence when anyone proposes to communicate such truth directly, he proves his stupidity; and if anyone else demands this of him, he too shows that he is stupid.<sup>32</sup>

Hence, "The very maximum of what one human being can do for another in relation to that wherein each man has to do solely with himself, is to inspire him with concern and unrest."<sup>33</sup> In other words: "Inwardness cannot be directly communicated, for its direct expression is precisely externality, its direction being outward, not inward. The direct expression of inwardness is no proof of its presence . . . The highest degree of resignation that a human being can reach is to acknowledge the given independence in every man, and after the measure of his ability do all that can in truth be done to help someone preserve it."<sup>34</sup> Thus all "existential communication" must assume the form of "indirect communication" in which inspirations, not results are the primary focus or target. In other words, if any communication regarding existence is to take place it must be an indirect communication. The reason for this is quite simply that every man has the vital obligation to become what he truly "is" (i.e. to actualize his existential potential) and direct communication hinders him since it is concerned only with the results. While the individual is occupied with results, he forsakes his duty to undertake responsible action. It is only through responsible action that the individual can honor his existential duty.

(9)

## CONCLUSION

In concluding this thesis, it can be noted that the total of the various insights discussed in the final section of the paper comprise Kierkegaard's notion of "unscientific" as he developed it in the Postscript. We must always remember that it was because of Kierkegaard's revulsion from Hegel's "science" that he determined to present his own thought by employing a completely different set of principles or ground-rules.

This is Kierkegaard's point when he asserts that, "What I here write must be viewed as elementary reading for the primer class, not in the speculative sense, but in the simple sense. Every child knows it, if not precisely with the same background of experience; everyone understands it, if not precisely with the same sharpness of definition; everyone is able to understand it."<sup>35</sup>

Kierkegaard saw himself as forced to re-examine the "scientific" conceptions of existence, thought, knowledge, truth and communication, and to formulate these conceptions anew in terms which are compatible with the "unscientific" (the "existential") and the ethical demand, made upon every man, that he truly "exist."

In this thesis, we have dealt specifically and almost exclusively with Kierkegaard's re-examination in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments and with the results he achieved. To be more precise, we dealt, in the first chapter, with

the major stages or events in Kierkegaard's life namely, his relationship with his father, his love affair with Regine Olsen, his conflict with the Corsair, and his attack upon the Established Church of Denmark. The common feature of all the stages was shown to be Kierkegaard's unhappiness, loneliness, and his sense of a religious mission that could only be carried out by him as a dedicated individual. It was also noted that it takes a genuine human being of superior courage and personal conviction to persevere as well as Kierkegaard did.

In the second chapter we dealt briefly with Hegel's notion of "scientific." We also arrived at the conclusion that, for Hegel, the study of science, as opposed to the individual and his existential obligation, was of the utmost importance. In the third chapter we examined what Kierkegaard perceived to be some of the more important consequences of Hegel's science. His criticism of Hegel deals with the points at which Hegel seems to forsake the individual and his existential duty. The most glaring error, according to Kierkegaard, is that the study of science has totally usurped the place of the individual and his concern for his own self-development. Because the importance of the individual has been denied, certain things follow. First and of primary importance is the fact that the individual himself is tricked into believing that he is of only minor importance. Thus the system of science lacks an Ethics. Other consequences of the denigration of the individual are the emphasis upon the timelessness of the scientific endeavour; the advocating of the use of direct communication because science is preoccupied with the



communicating of results; the denial of true contingency and free action because of the scientific belief that all events flow with an ordered, necessary regularity; the mistaken emphasis upon thought to the exclusion of feelings, emotions, and imagination; the erroneous pride in thinking that science is or can be all knowing; and finally the adulation of the scientist while ignoring man in general.

The fourth chapter dealt with Kierkegaard's notion of unscientific as it was developed in relation to the following topics-- the two meanings of senses of "to exist," namely, the loose and the strict sense; the consciousness of being a subject with genuine existential obligations and the difficulty of recognizing the fact that these obligations do exist and must be acted upon; the fact that the enterprise of objective thought is valid within its own field and that there is indeed an objective dimension to subjective thought; the need for man to have "passion" if he is to truly engage in existential thought and action; the necessity of the existence of the "absolute disjunction" (either-or situations) and its relationship to passion and existential action; the very real existence of ethical responsibility and the realization that every existing individual has the responsibility to become what he truly "is"; the fact that "subjectivity" is the truth and that a thing, statement or condition only becomes true for an existing individual when he has made a conscious decision

to accept it as so. What is important for Kierkegaard is the subject's relationship to the thing or statement he holds to be true--not the thing or statement itself. Finally we dealt with the realization that all existential communication must be indirect, because the best that one individual can do for another is to inspire him. Each man must be true to himself, and the use of direct communication would hinder this requirement.

It is hoped that this thesis has demonstrated in a rather straightforward manner that the "scientific" approach is, in fact, inadequate and that it was astute and truly brave of Kierkegaard to adopt the position he held, regarding the "unscientific," in his Postscript.

As a final note, I must beg the reader's indulgence for what seems, upon first glance, to be an inordinate amount of space devoted to the biographical details of Kierkegaard's life, in the first chapter of this paper. However, in view of the fact that Kierkegaard's thought is nothing other than a personal and individualized expression of everybody's all-important "existential" concern, I feel justified in dealing in some detail with the major events of his life.

## FOOTNOTES

## INTRODUCTION

1. For a considered examination of the complicated question of Kierkegaard's authorship and use of pseudonyms see George E. Arbaugh and George B. Arbaugh, Kierkegaard's Authorship, a Guide to the Writings of Kierkegaard. (London:Allen and Unwin, 1968).

CHAPTER ONE

1. Soren Aabye Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1941), subsequently referred as Postscript. It must be remembered that one should exercise some caution in attributing the contents of the Postscript directly to Kierkegaard, inasmuch as he did not sign the work with his own name. The main reason he did not use his own name was because of his belief that in existential communication only an indirect approach is possible. The use of pseudonyms facilitates this approach. It should be noted, of course, that this work was by no means the only one for which Kierkegaard employed a pseudonym.
2. Soren's father suffered greatly under the stress of fits of depression and guilt because he believed himself doomed as a result of having cursed God in his youth. The father never forgot, as long as he lived, the fact that while herding the flocks on the heaths of Jutland, he had cursed God because he

was suffering from hunger and cold.--See the Introduction to The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, trans. and ed. Alexander Dru (London:Oxford University Press, 1959), p. xvii,,subsequently referred to as Journals.

3. Soren Kierkegaard, The Point of View for My Work as an Author: A Report to History, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York:Harper & Row Publishers, 1962), pp. 76, 77, subsequently referred to as Point of View.
4. Kierkegaard met Regine Olsen in May of 1837, and became formally engaged to her in September of 1840, when he was 27 years old and she was 17. He terminated the engagement one year later and Miss Olsen subsequently married.
5. Journals, 367, pp. 91-5.
6. Point of View, pp. 83, 84.
7. Kierkegaard's love affair and engagement ended in 1841; this next stage of his "career" can be said to begin roughly in 1845 when he published his first material in (or about) the Corsair. The period extended from this time until 1854.
8. Kierkegaard used a number of pseudonyms throughout his literary works. He was forced to resort to the use of pseudonyms because of his absolute insistence upon the necessity of utilizing indirect communication--See "A First and Last Declaration," at the conclusion of the Postscript, pages not numbered--Unpaged at Kierkegaard's request.

9. The Corsair was indeed lost. Its owner Goldschmidt grew uncertain, and went abroad. Its editor, P. L. Moller, came forward very ashamedly under his own name, bowed, and later he too went away: see Journal, 956, pp. 327-8.
10. Ibid. (Parenthetical material mine). The issue can be raised of how accurate or realistic was Kierkegaard's perception of his role in Denmark at this time. Was he the only person to undertake this crusade? Was his personal position really made untenable? Did everybody (anybody but Kierkegaard) really care all that much about what Kierkegaard was doing?

It is the judgment of the author of this paper that Kierkegaard's perception of his role in Denmark at this time was indeed an accurate and realistic perception. The author feels that Kierkegaard's personal position really was made untenable, and would cite, as an example, the despicable treatment of Kierkegaard by the Copenhagen mob. See the Introduction to Dru's edition of The Journals, p. xlvi.

11. This period is roughly from 1854 to 1855.
12. In an article in the newspaper, The Fatherland, 18 December, 1854.
13. Point of View, pp. 153-4.
14. Journal, 1405, pp. 545-7 (parenthetical material mine).
15. Peter Rohde, Soren Kierkegaard--An Introduction to his Life and Philosophy, trans. Alan Moray Williams (New York: Humanities Press, 1963) p. 16.

## CHAPTER TWO

1. Georg W. F. Hegel, "Preface To The Phenomenology Of Mind," trans. Walter Kaufmann, in Hegel--Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary (London:Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965), p. 375.
2. Ibid, p. 382
3. Ibid, p. 388
4. G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (London:George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1969), p. 54.

## CHAPTER THREE

1. This consideration of the consequences involved in following Hegel's philosophy of "science" is based, in part, upon Ralph Henry Johnson's treatment of the consequences of modern science in his book, The Concept Of Existence in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), pp. 34-71.
2. Soren Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 50 (parenthetical material mine).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid, p. 317 (parenthetical material mine).
5. Ibid, p. 307 (parenthetical material mine).
6. Ibid, pp. 23-24.
7. Ibid, p. 32 (parenthetical material mine).

8. Ibid, p. 119 (parenthetical material mine).
9. Ibid, pp. 119-120 (parenthetical material mine).
10. Ibid, p. 307 (parenthetical material mine).
11. Ibid, p. 68 (parenthetical material mine).
12. Ibid, p. 70 (parenthetical material mine).

#### CHAPTER FOUR

1. For the sequence of approach utilized in what follows the author of this paper has relied upon material presented in Ralph Henry Johnson's, The Concept of Existence in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff, 1972).
2. Soren Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1941).
3. Ibid, p. 273 (parenthetical material mine).
4. Ibid, pp. 516-7.
5. Ibid, p. 109 (parenthetical material mine).
6. Ibid, p. 311.
7. Ibid, p. 273.
8. Ibid, pp. 312-314 (parenthetical material mine).
9. Ibid, p. 315 (parenthetical material mine).
10. Ibid, p. 67 (parenthetical material mine).
11. Ibid, p. 314 (parenthetical material mine).
12. Ibid, p. 116

13. Ibid, p. 318.
14. Ibid, p. 70, footnote (parenthetical material mine).
15. Ibid, p. 135.
16. Ibid, p. 249.
17. Ibid, p. 68.
18. Ibid, pp. 173-175.
19. Ibid, p. 276.
20. Ibid, p. 313.
21. Ibid, pp. 271-272.
22. Ibid, p. 280.
23. Ibid, p. 127.
24. Ibid, pp. 274-275 (parenthetical material mine).
25. Ibid, pp. 288-289.
26. Ibid, pp. 320-322.
27. Ibid, pp. 175-176.
28. Ibid, p. 178 (parenthetical material mine).
29. Ibid, p. 181.
30. Ibid, p. 171.
31. Ibid, p. 111.
32. Ibid, p. 73 (parenthetical material mine).
33. Ibid, p. 346
34. Ibid, pp. 232-233
35. Ibid, p. 350.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH

- Early Theological Writings. Trans. T. M. Knox. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948.
- Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Trans. Gustav Emil Mueller. New York:Philosophical Library, 1959.
- Hegel's Logic:Being Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Trans. William Wallace. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1975.
- Hegel's Philosophy of Mind:Being Part Three of the Philosophical Sciences. Trans. William Wallace. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1971.
- Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. Trans. and ed. M. J. Petry. London:Allen & Unwin, 1970
- Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1942.
- Hegel's Science of Logic. Trans. W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers. London:Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1929.
- Hegel's Science of Logic. Trans. A. V. Miller. London:Allen and Unwin, 1969.
- Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson. New York:Humanities Press, 1955.
- Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Trans. J. Sibree. London:Bell and Sons, 1890.

## HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FREDERICH

On Art, Religion, Philosophy: Introductory Lectures to the Realm of Absolute Spirit. Trans. and ed. Glen Gray. New York: Harper and Row, 1970.

The Phenomenology of Mind. Trans. J. B. Baillie. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931.

Reason in History, General Introduction to the Philosophy of History. Trans. Robert S. Hartman. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953.

Hegel: Texts and Commentary. Trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966.

## SECONDARY WORKS ON HEGEL

Caird, Edward. Hegel. Edinburgh: W. Blackwood, 1886.

Gray, Jesse Glenn. Hegel and Greek Thought. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

MacIntyre, Alasdair C. Ed. Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor Books, 1972.

Mueller, Gustav Emil. Hegel: The Man, His Vision, and Work. New York: Pageant Press, 1968.

Plant, Raymond. Hegel. London: Allen and Unwin, 1973.

Travis, Don Carlos. A Hegel Symposium. Austin: University of Texas, 1962.

## KIERKEGAARD, SOREN AABYE

Armed Neutrality and an Open Letter. Trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Bloomington:Indiana University Press, 1939.

Christian Discourses. Trans. Walter Lowrie. London:Oxford University Press, 1939.

The Concept of Irony:with Constant Reference to Socrates. Trans. Lee M. Capel. London:Collins, 1966.

Diary of a Seducer. Trans. Gerd Gillhoff. London:Elek, 1966.

The Difficulty of Being Christian. Trans. Ralph M. McInerny and Leo Turcotta. Notre Dame:University of Notre Dame Press, 1968.

Edifying Discourses. Trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson. Minneapolis:Augsburg Publishing House, 1962.

Either/Or. Trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1971.

Fear and Trembling and the Sickness unto Death. Trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1954.

Johannes Climacus; or, De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, and A Sermon. Trans. T. H. Croxall. London:Black, 1958.

The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard. Trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1944.

Kierkegaard's Attack upon Christendom. Trans. Walter Lowrie, Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1944.

KIERKEGAARD, SOREN AABYE

Kierkegaard's The Concept Of Dread. Trans. Walter Lowrie,  
Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1957.

Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Phil-  
osophical Fragments. Trans. David F. Swenson. Princeton:Princeton  
University Press, 1941.

The Last Years:Journals 1853-1855. Trans. and ed. Ronald Gregor  
Smith. London:Collins, 1965.

On Authority and Revelation:The Book on Alder, or a Cycle of  
Ethico-Religious Essays. Trans. by Walter Lowrie. New York:Harper  
and Row, 1955.

Philosophical Fragments, or a Fragment of Philosophy. Trans.  
Howard V. Hong. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1962.

The Point of View for my Work as an Author. Trans. Walter Lowrie.  
London:Oxford University Press, 1939.

The Present Age and Two Minor Ethico-Religious Treatises. Trans.  
Alexander Dru and Walter Lowrie. London:Oxford University Press, 1940.

Repetition:an Essay in Experimental Psychology. Trans. Walter  
Lowrie. New York:Harper and Row, 1941.

Soren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers. Trans. and ed. Howard  
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Bloomington:Indiana University Press, 1967.

Stages on Life's Way. Trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton:Princeton  
University Press, 1940.

Thoughts on Crucial Situations in Human Life:Three Discourses on  
Imagined Occasions. Trans. and ed. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin  
Swenson. Minneapolis:Augsburg Publishing House, 1941.

KIERKEGAARD, SOREN AABYE

Training in Christianity and the Edifying Discourse Which Accompanied it. Trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1944.

Works of Love. Trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1946.

SECONDARY WORKS ON KIERKEGAARD

Arbaugh, George E. and George B. Arbaugh, Kierkegaard's Authorship: a Guide to the Writings of Kierkegaard. London: Allen and Unwin, 1968.

Eller, Vernard. Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship, a New Perspective. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1968.

Johnson, Ralph Henry. The Concept of Existence in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 1972.

Mackey, Louis. Kierkegaard: a Kind of Poet. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971.

Malantschuk, Gregor. Kierkegaard's Thought. Ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1971.

Shmueli, Adi. Kierkegaard and Consciousness. Trans. Naomi Handelman. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1971.

Thompson, Josiah. Kierkegaard: a Collection of Critical Essays. New York:Anchor Books, 1972

## SECONDARY WORKS ON KIERKEGAARD

Thomte, Reidar. Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion. New York:Greenwood Press, 1948.

## GENERAL WORKS ON EXISTENTIALISM

Boelen, Bernard Jacques Marie. Existential Thinking:a Philosophical Orientation. Pittsburgh:Duquesne University Press, 1968.

Kern, Edith G. Existential Thought and Fictional Technique: Kierkegaard, Sartre, Beckett. New Haven:Yale University Press, 1970.

Macquarrie, John. Existentialism. London:Hutchinson, 1972.

Schrader, George Alfred. Ed. Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Merlau-Ponty. New York:McGraw Hill, 1967.

Warnock, Mary. Existentialism. London:Oxford University Press, 1970.