


Multiple Personality Disorder:
Implications for Education

Shirley J. Burris
Master of Arts in Education
Saint Mary's University
Copyright by Shirley J. Burris, 1994

October, 1994


Dr. David Leltch, Saint Mary's University


Dr. Michael Larsen, Saint Mary's University



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Votre titre - Votre référence

Cher titre - Note de référence

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-315-95853-7

Canada

Name SHIRLEY JANET BURNS

Dissertation Abstracts International is arranged by broad, general subject categories. Please select the one subject which most nearly describes the content of your dissertation. Enter the corresponding four-digit code in the spaces provided.

EDUCATION / PSYCHOLOGY

SUBJECT TERM

0525

U·M·I

SUBJECT CODE

Subject Categories

THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COMMUNICATIONS AND THE ARTS

Architecture 0729
Art History 0377
Cinema 0900
Dance 0378
Fine Arts 0357
Information Science 0723
Journalism 0391
Library Science 0399
Mass Communications 0708
Music 0413
Speech Communication 0459
Theater 0465

EDUCATION

General 0515
Administration 0514
Adult and Continuing 0516
Agricultural 0517
Art 0273
Bilingual and Multicultural 0282
Business 0688
Community College 0275
Curriculum and Instruction 0277
Early Childhood 0518
Elementary 0524
Finance 0277
Guidance and Counseling 0519
Health 0680
Higher 0745
History of 0520
Home Economics 0278
Industrial 0521
Language and Literature 0279
Mathematics 0280
Music 0522
Philosophy of 0998
Physical 0523

Psychology 0525
Reading 0535
Religious 0527
Sciences 0714
Secondary 0533
Social Sciences 0534
Sociology of 0340
Special 0529
Teacher Training 0530
Technology 0710
Tests and Measurements 0288
Vocational 0747

LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND LINGUISTICS

Language 0679
General 0289
Ancient 0290
Linguistics 0291
Modern 0401
Literature 0294
General 0295
Classical 0297
Comparative 0298
Medieval 0316
Modern 0311
African 0305
American 0352
Asian 0355
Canadian (English) 0593
Canadian (French) 0311
English 0312
Germanic 0315
Latin American 0313
Middle Eastern 0314
Romance 0314
Slavic and East European 0314

PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION AND THEOLOGY

Philosophy 0422
Religion 0318
General 0321
Biblical Studies 0319
Clergy 0320
History of 0322
Philosophy of 0469
Theology 0323

SOCIAL SCIENCES

American Studies 0324
Anthropology 0326
Cultural 0327
Physical 0310
Business Administration 0272
Accounting 0770
Banking 0454
Management 0338
Marketing 0385
Canadian Studies 0501
Economics 0503
General 0505
Agricultural 0508
Commerce-Business 0509
Finance 0510
History 0511
Labor 0358
Theory 0366
Folklore 0351
Geography 0578
Gerontology 0578
History 0578
General 0578

Ancient 0579
Medieval 0581
Modern 0582
Black 0328
African 0331
Asia, Australia and Oceania 0332
Canadian 0334
European 0335
Latin American 0336
Middle Eastern 0337
United States 0585
History of Science 0398
Law 0615
Political Science 0616
General 0617
International Law and Relations 0617
Public Administration 0814
Recreation 0452
Social Work 0626
Sociology 0627
General 0938
Criminology and Penology 0631
Demography 0628
Ethnic and Racial Studies 0629
Individual and Family Studies 0630
Industrial and Labor Relations 0700
Public and Social Welfare 0344
Social Structure and Development 0709
Theory and Methods 0999
Transportation 0453
Urban and Regional Planning 0453
Women's Studies 0453

THE SCIENCES AND ENGINEERING

BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Agriculture 0473
General 0285
Agronomy 0475
Animal Culture and Nutrition 0476
Animal Pathology 0359
Food Science and Technology 0478
Forestry and Wildlife 0479
Plant Culture 0480
Plant Pathology 0517
Plant Physiology 0777
Range Management 0746
Wood Technology 0306
Biology 0287
General 0308
Anatomy 0309
Biostatistics 0379
Botany 0329
Cell 0353
Ecology 0369
Entomology 0793
Genetics 0410
Limnology 0307
Microbiology 0317
Molecular 0416
Neuroscience 0433
Oceanography 0821
Physiology 0778
Radiation 0472
Veterinary Science 0786
Zoology 0760
Biophysics 0425
General 0996
Medical 0996
Earth Sciences 0425
Biogeochemistry 0996
Geochemistry 0996

Geodesy 0370
Geology 0372
Geophysics 0373
Hydrology 0388
Mineralogy 0411
Paleobotany 0345
Paleocology 0426
Paleontology 0418
Paleozoology 0985
Palynology 0427
Physical Geography 0368
Physical Oceanography 0415

HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES

Environmental Sciences 0768
Health Sciences 0566
General 0300
Audiology 0992
Chemotherapy 0567
Dentistry 0350
Education 0769
Hospital Management 0758
Human Development 0982
Immunology 0564
Medicine and Surgery 0347
Mental Health 0569
Nursing 0570
Nutrition 0380
Obstetrics and Gynecology 0354
Occupational Health and Therapy 0381
Ophthalmology 0571
Pathology 0419
Pharmacology 0572
Pharmacy 0382
Physical Therapy 0573
Public Health 0574
Radiology 0575
Recreation 0575

Speech Pathology 0460
Toxicology 0383
Home Economics 0386

PHYSICAL SCIENCES

Pure Sciences 0485
Chemistry 0749
General 0486
Agricultural 0487
Analytical 0488
Biochemistry 0491
Inorganic 0490
Nuclear 0491
Organic 0494
Pharmaceutical 0495
Physical 0754
Polymer 0405
Radiation 0605
Mathematics 0986
Physics 0606
General 0608
Acoustics 0748
Astronomy and Astrophysics 0607
Atmospheric Science 0798
Atomic 0759
Electronics and Electricity 0609
Elementary Particles and High Energy 0610
Fluid and Plasma 0752
Molecular 0756
Nuclear 0611
Optics 0463
Radiation 0346
Solid State 0984
Statistics 0984
Applied Sciences 0346
Applied Mechanics 0984
Computer Science 0984

Engineering 0537
General 0538
Aerospace 0539
Agricultural 0540
Automotive 0541
Biomedical 0542
Chemical 0543
Civil 0544
Electronics and Electrical 0348
Heat and Thermodynamics 0545
Hydraulic 0546
Industrial 0547
Marine 0794
Materials Science 0548
Mechanical 0743
Metallurgy 0551
Mining 0552
Nuclear 0549
Packaging 0765
Petroleum 0554
Sanitary and Municipal 0790
System Science 0428
Geotechnology 0796
Operations Research 0795
Plastics Technology 0994
Textile Technology 0994

PSYCHOLOGY

General 0621
Behavioral 0384
Clinical 0622
Developmental 0620
Experimental 0623
Industrial 0624
Personality 0625
Physiological 0989
Psychobiology 0349
Psychometrics 0632
Social 0451



Abstract

Shirley J. Burris

Multiple Personality Disorder: Implications for Education

October, 1994

This thesis examines Multiple Personality Disorder, about which there appears to be little educational literature, introducing important reasons for professional concern, and ways in which it is involved in the learning process.

A survey of the literature reveals characteristics and range of the disturbance, a brief history of what is known, causal theory, skepticism and therapy.

A deeper appreciation of the disorder, more complex issues and larger questions arise in the context of a broader knowledge of ways of knowing; ways personality develops and becomes distorted, in theory, and in relation to groups of others. This appreciation begins with an examination of the work of William James, who discusses how we know ways of thinking, what an individual may know of himself and others, and the limitations of psychology. The paper explores ways in which personality develops, through the work of Salvatore R. Maddi. The work of R.D. Laing reveals ways in which the person and others form the Self, and determines the nature of splitting of personality. Multiple Personality Disorder involves sexuality, whose nature and involvement in personality development are investigated in a review of the work of Sigmund Freud, who, though not recent, shows sexuality to be a lifelong and encompassing element of development. The theories of Émile Durkheim submit ways in which thought and the person develop in the context of society.

Common themes of the authors related to development, need and coping strategies are categorized in the conclusion, in order that educators appreciate that development and disorder involve complexity, context and limitations which may determine educational response.

Acknowledgments

I wish to express my deep appreciation to the professors of the Faculty of Education at Saint Mary's University, who constantly worked to provide attention to the hearts and souls of their students.

This work was inspired in part by my advisor, Dr. David Leitch, whose personal approach, commitment to his profession and to the people whom he serves, is a gift to all who learn from him. I have been honored to have been his student, and am indebted to him for his patience, his enthusiasm and his disciplined standards. I am grateful to Dr. Mark Flynn, University of Saskatchewan, and to Dr. Robert Sargent, of Saint Mary's, for their advice and support.

I am indebted to Dr. David Barnes, who provided the first vision of this goal so many years ago through his awakening in me, a faith in myself.

I extend my deepest appreciation and respect to my sons Michael and Joseph, who have contributed their love, their time, and ceaseless inspiration through their relentless embrace of life.

To my beloved partner and friend, Phillip, who has provided endless listening, constant love and support, and tireless passion for knowing, I express profound gratitude.

This work is, in part, a tribute to the persistent love and encouragement of my dear friend Carol, who, in many ways, has walked the journey with me, in the way a sister would.

Acknowledgment is due to the respect for learning created by my parents.

Lastly, I wish to extend special recognition to Daniel, wherever he may be.

You have all walked my feet with your hearts, and I am forever grateful.

Multiple Personality Disorder:
Implications for Education

Table of Contents

Chapter 1	
The Importance and Course of Investigation.....	1
Chapter 2	
The Disorder: History, Causal Theories, Range, Characteristics, Skepticism and Therapy.....	7
Chapter 3	
Can Ways of Thinking Be Known?: The Work of William James.....	23
How Does Personality Develop?: The Work of Salvatore R. Maddi.....	56
How Do the Self and Others Form the Self?: The Nature of Splitting: The Work of R. D. Laing.....	90
Personality and Sexual Development: The Work of Sigmund Freud.....	117
The Person and Thought in the Context of Society: The Work of Émile Durkheim.....	129
Chapter 4	
Common Themes. and Questions for Educational Consideration.....	153
Bibliography	168

Chapter 1

Part I: The Importance of Investigation

Information about Multiple Personality Disorder (referred to hereafter as MPD) has been forthcoming in scarce measure only in the past three decades, and just in the past two decades has a significant body of information been more widely available (Kluft, 1987. pp. 363 - 373). There was marginal attention paid to MPD until 1974, when eleven investigators reported their experiences with it. Discussion accelerated after 1983 when journals devoted special issues to the subject, and International Conferences were held (1984-1986). Increased interest has been attributed to our increased knowledge of sexual abuse, which is believed to be associated with the disorder; notice drawn by the distinct physiological changes between personalities within the same person, and by the impact of feminism upon the fields of medicine, psychiatry and psychology (Kluft, April, 1987, pp. 363 - 364). We presently find a significant body of discussion on the subject in professional journals, and in the public media. It is worthwhile to seek and identify valid information and distinguish it from media hype.

Examination of this topic is not only a matter of interest, but important for many reasons. Since the disorder affects youth (Peterson, March, 1990; Rivera, 1988. p. 44; Rivera, 1991. pp. 7-8), then it is, by virtue of area of professional obligation, a concern of education. It does not seem, however, to have received recent broad professional discussion at Nova Scotia in-service sessions. In fact, an ERIC search revealed little research in the area of education, with only a few media articles related to MPD. The issues at hand are far more than medical in nature. The potential impact to our classrooms may be serious. For example, if we look at only one aspect of the study of MPD, this seriousness becomes evident. The ramifications of abuse is manifested in important ways related to MPD, and also in valid ways to the student population in our province; ways

which illustrate the wisdom of professional awareness. MPD involves dissociative behavior. If we consider that dissociative behavior related to abuse is parallel to that of post-war, combat and holocaust victims (Rivera, 1991, p. 1) then we may rightly suppose that academic performance will be affected. If 34% of girls, and 13% of boys (Badgely Report, 1984, in Rivera, 1991, p. 9) are victims of sexual assault alone [not including the other five types of abuse categorized by Wilbur (pp. 3 - 4)], then in a school of 1000 students, a possible 175 girls and 65 boys may be affected (or approximately 7 girls and 3 boys in a twenty - student classroom). If there are a projected one in one hundred persons who may exhibit MPD (Rivera, 1991, video), then a possible ten of 1000 students might exhibit MPD. These figures applied to provincial populations may have significant implications. Though caution must be taken in applying sets of projected figures to any given population, it is dangerous to ignore a potential problem for a crucial portion of it. As Wilbur states (in *Multiple Personalities and Child Abuse: An Overview*, p. 6), "The loss of health, opportunity and education to the individual is severe. Certainly as serious is the loss of bright, talented individuals to serious illness and crime."

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Medical Disorders (III-R) describes MPD as "the existence of two or more distinct personalities or states, each with its own relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to and thinking about the environment and the self. At least two recurrently take full control of the person's behavior" (Curtis, February, 1988). Often confused with schizophrenia (Banks, Spring, 1993), it develops as a psychological /behavioral disturbance (Kluft, 1987; Curtis & Fraser, Draft F3 - 31, #5), while schizophrenia is a biological/organic disorder (Wallis & Willwerth, July, 1993, p.39). Within a person, the presentation of alternate personalities is a recurrent

pattern stemming from a traumatic event. Alternate personalities may be amnesic to, or not aware of the other(s), may take the form of a helper or rescuer, or may be violent and express anger (Curtis & Fraser, Draft F3-31 #5). It is not always apparent and observed when present (Graves in Curtis & Fraser, Draft F3-31 #5) and, in fact, many high-functioning individuals can hide the disturbance seemingly indefinitely (Kluft, Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. 174. 12. 722-726).

The disorder is believed to be authentic (Bliss in Curtis and Fraser, Draft F3 - 31 #5), "not rare" (Ross, 1990. p. 355) and has received legitimacy in professional and public discussion, especially in the last five years (Dunn, 1992. p. 22). As well, it has received its share of sensational attention in the media. Consumers of this information have an interest in distinguishing valid findings from hype, and in discovering that which appears genuine, to determine its effects.

The effects of MPD are clearly suggested by some to be very intense. Rivera (1991, video) proposes the incidence at one in one hundred persons, a significant portion of our population. Wilbur, in *Multiple Personalities and Child Abuse: An Overview*, describes the individual's health, education and social damage as "severe". Personal debilitation is in direct conflict with maximized potential: that which we are bound to foster in our capacity as professional educators. In the same article, Wilbur offers that the loss to society in intellect and talent through related illness and crime is "serious". Rivera cites Bliss (1983) in her discussion of significant incidence of "multiple personality in ...criminal population" (1988. p. 44). Human health, education and legal costs always translate into short and long-term financial costs, and, legally, losses extend to that body of the population who become the victims of crime. Human

expense in loss of potential is inferred. Should MPD be a legitimate factor in such expense, investigation is warranted.

MPD has been found to correlate highly with incidence of childhood sexual, physical and/or psychological abuses (Curtis, 1988, p. 85; Rivera, 1991, p. 10; Ross et al, March, 1991, pp. 97-101; Coons & Milstein, 1986 in Sandberg & Lynn, 1992, p. 717). It is necessary to determine the significance of this correlation, its place in the complex entirety of personal development, and an appropriate reaction to it.

The literature presents inconsistencies and problems with wholesale acceptance of MPD medically and generally. Ross (July, 1990) discusses issues concerning the stylization of MPD personalities; their function in the disavowal of inappropriate behavior. He notes the observations of those who contend that the disorder is confused with others which are similar, or with regular variations in personality---that it is a myth; that it is created experimentally or deliberately either by therapists or maintained by patients eager to please therapists, and is reinforced with treatments. He challenges that those who submit high incidence of created childhood abuses have constructed same. Dunn (1992) calls for further active investigation of MPD citing questionable effectiveness of treatment, lack of empirical data, varying and inconclusive results. He indicates that prediction of numbers to the population in general is difficult because of the nature of test populations, and because of inconclusive results. He takes issue with the lack of follow-up data. Important is his interest in why some persons develop MPD while others in similar circumstances, do not.

Leavitt and Braun (1991, p. 509) state that there is "evidence of a distinct diagnostic disorder among a subgroup of patients", but conclude that "the

possibility that patients presenting dramatically inconsistent histories are also fabricating alter personalities cannot be discounted".

Dunn also presents questions about culture-relatedness of the disorder, as do Dale, Witztum, Mark and Rabinowitz (1992). Of interest here is the significance, negative or positive that the community places upon the behaviors, thereby making the perception of the situation subjective.

Rivera (1988) suggests that significant rates of presence of male personalities in female patients, and female in male patients reflects gender conflict in the larger social setting. She discusses our perception of male and female roles, and how the conflict within the MPD patient is a microcosm of a larger societal conflict.

The course of investigation will begin with a review of the contemporary literature, which will compose Chapter 2, and will unearth current opinions and findings in detail about MPD, revealing a complete picture of the disorder as we presently know it, its effects and issues for consideration. In spite of a number of conflicts, we know that there is a group of characteristics displayed which we call a "dissociative state", that it disturbs, and that it is associated with other problems, (Sandberg & Lynn, 1992) personal, societal and medical. We know it affects "normally integrated functions of identity, memory, or consciousness" (rev. 3rd ed.; *DSM - III - R*; American Psychiatric Association, 1987), and therefore may have some association with learning process.

Problems seem to be created by this state. Certain experiences seem to correlate with the state, but care must be taken not to confuse correlation with causation. There appear to be similarities with other disturbances in behavior of persons, and for this reason, it is necessary to examine MPD in a larger context. What constitutes wholeness in a person, and what forces enable the

development of wholeness? What alienates, splits and mutates the development?

Chapter 3 will undertake to address the larger issues, in five parts. A review of the work of William James will examine the nature of thought and reality; what constitutes thought; how it is driven, and how it becomes illusory. The nature of the "self" will be sought, with the view that limitations exist in our capacity to know of these things.

Inquiry will be made into the way in which personality develops, in exploring the theories of personality developed in the last century. Components of growth; motivation for and aims of development; that which seems to enhance and that which seems to pervert growth will be pursued primarily in review of Salvatore Maddi's *Personality Theories: A Comparative Analysis* (1968).

The individual exists in the context of other groups of persons, and is shaped and formed by the dynamics of these groups. The self with the self, the self with others and the self in the context of the family will be scrutinized through the work of R. D. Laing, particularly in *The Self and Others: Further Studies in Sanity and Madness* (1962) and in *The Politics of the Family and Other Essays* (1969). The nature of splitting will be sought in a review of *The Divided Self* (1960).

MPD states correlate with experience of abuse, including sexual abuse. Though it is wise to examine the disorder in a broader view than just sexuality, it is necessary to include an understanding of sexual development. Though not a contemporary theory, that of Sigmund Freud through both his own writings and the commentary of others will be discussed in a way that may provide an

understanding of the encompassing nature of sexuality in our lives; how it contributes to wholeness and to conflict.

Émile Durkheim's social theory and theory of pragmatism will be considered to obtain a view of the individual in society, to see how, in society the person develops securely or is alienated. How people and societies know, know truth and reality, and where distortion, fragmentation and unhappiness fits in this context.

It will be the role of Chapter 4 to provide an overview of main ideas, common themes in areas of positive development, areas of human need and conflict. A return to MPD will take place to examine questions for future examination in the area of education with respect to MPD.

The end of this paper will hopefully provide the reader with a deeper awareness of, knowledge of and appreciation for MPD, the complexity of the issues surrounding its manifestations, and significant reasons why it is imperative to examine the issue as it relates to the field of education and the people we serve.

Chapter 2

The Disorder: History, Causal Theories, Range, Characteristics,

Skepticism and Therapy

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Medical Disorders (III-R) describes MPD as "the existence of two or more distinct personalities or states, each with its own relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to and thinking about the environment and the self. At least two recurrently take full control of the person's behavior" (Curtis, February, 1988). Although it is most often confused with schizophrenia (Banks, Spring, 1993), it develops as a psychological /behavioral disturbance (Kluft, 1987; Curtis & Fraser, Draft F3 - 31 #5), while schizophrenia is a biological/organic disorder (Wallis & Willwerth, July, 1992, p.39). Within a person, the presentation of alternate personalities is a recurrent pattern stemming from a traumatic event. A personality may be amnesic to the others: that is to say that the primary personality is not aware of the other(s). The alternate personality may take the form of a helper or rescuer, or may be violent and express anger. (Curtis & Fraser, Draft F3-31 #5) It is not always apparent and observed when present (Greaves in Curtis & Fraser, Draft F3-31 #5) and, in fact, many high-functioning individuals can hide the disturbance seemingly indefinitely (Kluft, 1935, *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*. 174. 12. 722-726). There is skepticism regarding its existence as described (Curtis, February, 1988) but it has been shown to be authentic and not a rare phenomenon (Greaves in Curtis & Fraser, Draft F3 - 31 #5). Rivera proposes the incidence (1991, Video) at approximately one in one hundred persons.

There was marginal attention paid to MPD until 1974, when eleven investigators reported their experiences with it. Splits of personality have been

mentioned, however, as early as 1876, in the case of Felida X. (Azam, May 26, 1876 in James, 1891, in Hutchins, 1952, p. 245), and also by Ribot in James (1891, in Hutchins, 1952, p. 244). Discussion accelerated after 1983 when journals devoted special issues to the subject, and International Conferences were held (1984-1986). Increased interest has been attributed to our increased knowledge of sexual abuse, which is associated with the disorder; notice drawn by the distinct physiological changes between personalities within the same person, and by the impact of feminism upon the fields of medicine, psychiatry and psychology (Kluft, April, 1987, pp. 363 - 364).

Questions arise about the distinctive qualities of the disturbance. If persons display, at given times, dominant personalities embodying the characteristics of aggression or protection, etc., then how is this different from normal human individual diversity? Are we not all angry at some point, or do we not all display activities of care-taking periodically? What makes the attributes of the disorder different from the normal range of human expression? Curtis and Fraser (Draft, F3-31 #5) explain that the personalities in MPD do reflect the varying traits of the normal, well-rounded person. However, normally these traits are fused. Multiples reduce the personalities to basic elements (referred to as "subpersonalities" or "alternates", depending upon the literature) and these elements function as "dissociated parts of a whole person, as opposed to a whole person with varying expressions. They are seen by the individual as separated entities rather than integrated parts of a whole, and the person will consider different expressions as belonging to different "people", separate and dissociated from the self, as opposed to an activity of which the self is in charge.

On a continuum, (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986, 728; Kluft, 1987, p. 293) the intensity of the dissociation of the self from the states of expression is seen to begin at the "normal" integrated state, in which the individual displays varying

aspects of a diverse personality, and is responsible for them -- sees them as "his/her own self" doing or being. Most people experience a type of "trance" or dissociative state from time to time. We may not remember passing the last exit on a routine daily drive home, or we become "lost" in thought, or a novel. The intensity of the dissociation and separation of characteristics proceeds by degree from this "everyday" type of experience to the opposite end of the spectrum, where there is embodiment of characteristics into separate entities, acting as individuals within the person, and seen as same by the person. Bernstein and Putnam indicate that at this end of the spectrum lie major forms of psychopathological disorders.

As well as confusion resulting from subtleties in degree and range, there has been difficulty in identifying differences between MPD and other disturbances, because of parallel or similar behaviors, and because other disturbances can coexist with MPD (Horevitz & Braun, 1984, in Kluft, *High - Functioning Multiple Personality Patients: Three Cases*, p. 722). MPD has been mistaken to have been such disorders as depression, sexual dysfunction, personality disorder, substance abuse, bulimia, anorexia, or panic disorder (Fraser & LaPierre, 1986, in Kluft, 1987, p. 90). It is sometimes overlooked because of subtleties in the individual, especially in high-functioning persons who have worked out a coordinated system among their substates. "Clinicians expect to see dramatic phenomena, and don't" (Kluft, 1985, p. 205 in Kluft, *"High Functioning Multiple Personality Patients: Three Cases"*. *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*. Vol. 174. No. 12. p. 724). It goes undetected in many males because they less often present for treatment, and many males become involved with the criminal justice system before diagnosis can be made (Kluft, April, 1987, p. 370).

As well, MPD has been confused with acute neurological intoxication, mixed neurotic disorder, marital maladjustment, alcohol use and fatigue [the last two are said to be facilitators of dissociation and precipitate the emergence of a multiple (Curtis & Fraser, 5th Draft, F3-31 #5, p. 3)]. Most often, in the lay person's conversation, MPD appears confused with schizophrenia, and has been misdiagnosed professionally as well (Curtis & Fraser, 5th Draft, F3-31 #5, p. 3; Fraser & LaPierre, 1986 in Kluft, 1987, p. 90). However, schizophrenia is biological, with research indicating a hereditary factor, appearing to be somewhat manageable with drug therapy according to Wallis & Willwerth (July, 1992, p. 39). MPD, however, according to Rivera (1991, video) is a created psychological reaction to trauma, appearing to respond to "talk" therapy.

How does the disturbance originate ? According to Curtis and Fraser (Draft, F3-31 #5. p. 4), two conditions must be present for the development of MPD. There must be a pre-disposition to dissociation or auto-hypnosis. This is the ability of the individual to shift the consciousness to altered state -- to "trance out". There is suspicion that this is a genetic quality, and also discussion that the parents of persons with MPD may themselves have had MPD (especially the abuser), therefore modeling the behavior. There must also be the repeated, continued presence of a significant stressor, which presents itself often (Rivera, 1991, p. 10) in the forms or combined forms of child abuse, usually between the ages of four and nine.

The developing process appears to be one in which a coping strategy employed for survival evolves as a skill, employed to deal with other, less life-threatening events. Kluft (April, 1987, p. 366) discusses the "Four-Factor Theory" of the development of the disorder. In the Four-Factor Theory, the child is first exposed to stimuli which is overwhelming to her/him. Being unable to cope with less drastic measures, the child dissociates the contents of the

stressful event, and experiences them in this dissociated state. Survivors of abuse have stated in conversations that they experienced the episodes from different positions, both spacial and temporal: as if far away, or in a dream state, or from a position in the future, as the adult self. Some have dissociated to the point of amnesia. The dissociated experience becomes linked to a substate - a being not the original personal state. If there are not adequate stimulus barriers or restorative experiences for the child, if the overwhelming stimulus is allowed to continue, and/or if there are double bind messages created for the child which prevent her/him from learning how to interpret and process reality (for instance, abuse has happened to the child and then the child is told it hasn't happened, or that father really loves her/him after father has beaten her/him repeatedly), then MPD can result.

Curtis and Fraser (Draft. F3-31 #5. pp. 4-6) explain a similar origin, but add detail to the process, and identify state evolution. There exists, before trauma, the original person. When this person is introduced to traumatic stress which he/she cannot process straightforwardly, a temporary dissociative state is created in which the event is experienced. The state and its contents are then forgotten (though according to Prince, 1909, in Hale, 1975, in Bernstein and Putnam, 1986, p. 728, there need not be amnesia always; rather, a co-consciousness develops, in which the state is "remembered" in varying degrees). Following the trauma, the original person returns. Over time, if the trauma, or similar trauma is repeated, the dissociated state is invoked to cope, and develops a reason, an "existence" with a role, a time, and an environment. The non-dissociated state is amnesic, according to Curtis and Fraser, because the amnesia is an essential defense for the psyche of the person. In the event that the dissociated state is experienced as a co-conscious state, as mentioned before (Prince, 1909, in Hale, 1975, in Bernstein and Putnam, 1986, p. 728)

perhaps there is still a degree of "removal" or lack of full experience which, while not amnesia, nevertheless acts as a defense.

As repeated stress occurs, and resulting dissociation is practiced, the phenomenon becomes a skill, and may be then transferred as needed when other situations of stress arise. The nervous system keeps constantly alert to for the recurrence of the original danger, and hyper-aroused perceptual and motor response systems can reply to the most subtle of cues (facial features, voice tones, etc.,). When the cues are perceived, trance and dissociation recurs (Curtis, 1988, pp. 85-95). When this stage is reached, many or most stress events then trigger an automatic dissociative state, which has become adept with stress. The non-dissociative state is left to non-stress environments. The original person has now developed into two new states: the primary personality (amnesic or co-conscious state left to non-stress situations) and the dissociative personality (which is able to handle stress without amnesia). The skill of dissociation, having been developed and strengthened, may now be used more diversely. Subsequent divisions of other subpersonalities emerge from these two main personalities as unique situations arise to require them. In fact, the higher the dissociative ability, the further splitting is possible (Curtis & Fraser, 5th Draft, F3-31 #5, p. 12).

The Curtis and Fraser Draft (F3-31 #5, pp. 1-12) describe the roles and characteristics of the subpersonalities as quite identifiable. The primary subpersonality, or that altered primary individual left after the dissociative state is created from trauma, and after the original person has "split" seems moral and concerned in nature. It is the one who seems to present the person to society, and who most often presents for treatment, and who "tries to do the right thing". Either amnesic or having some degree of awareness (Curtis and Fraser describe it as possibly a "bemused" awareness), it organizes, maintains

behavior standards, is upset and muddled when things go wrong. It appears very concerned with consequences and is often "too good to be true" (p. 6), carrying honesty to extreme, seeming unable to be dishonest. Things and feelings are apparently blocked by this subpersonality, and passiveness is a characteristic. It has a sense of time passage and maturity.

The dissociated subpersonality appears to be the proverbial alter-ego, and appears to experience things at the visceral level. The one who has dealt with stress and trauma, and the one whose job it is to continue to do so, it is assertive and possibly aggressive. Neither concerned with morals nor social conformity, it does the "fun" things, and can split into further violent and anti-social subpersonalities. Identified by Curtis and Fraser as the "I want" part, it pursues pleasure at all costs with high levels of self-confidence and esteem, energy and courage. Sometimes this is carried to destructiveness.

In the event of some emergency, where the survival of the being is threatened, there sometimes emerges a third main subpersonality called the "Executive Subpersonality". The role of this sub is apparently to take charge and monitor events and other subs if there is conflict. Not amnesic, it knows and organizes the other subpersonalities, and is informed of their memories even if others are amnesic. It is not a "person" as such, and does not experience emotions. It merely observes, watches, monitors and applies logic, rescuing or protecting the person, and acting sometimes as co-therapist, directing and evaluating. It does not have the sense of being a person, but rather the sense of just being. Curtis and Fraser explore the possibility that this is a part that is in all of us - the "survivor" part. Other subpersonalities can spin from this subpersonality as well.

Characteristics of the person him or herself vary, and can depend upon how amnesic the subpersonalities are. The lives of persons with amnesic

subpersonalities can be, understandably, quite chaotic, as control, awareness and sobriety is handed over to varying other states ("Inner Faces of Multiplicity". *Investigation - A Research Bulletin*. Institute of Noetic Sciences. Vol. 1 # 3-4. pp. 3-6). Other individuals function quite highly in a smoothly run coordinated system state (Kluft, 1985, Vol. 174. No. 12. p. 724; Kluft, Apr., 1987, p. 367), observing, negotiating jobs, academics, domestic tasks, rest and other tasks ("Inner Faces of Multiplicity". *Investigation - A Research Bulletin*. Institute of Noetic Sciences. Vol. 1 # 3-4. p. 6).

Some characteristics displayed include amnesia (for periods of hours to days), trancing off, staring and daydreaming, sudden mood and behavior shifts, impulsive and self-harm patterns. Sometimes there is a change in writing style as subpersonalities assume control, and at times, writing content is uncharacteristic. Persons may at times destroy writings completed in another state. (Curtis, 1988, pp. 85-95). Indeed, sometimes there is physical dual-handedness evident as alters emerge and "exist". (Sager & Smith, September, 1971, pp. 717 - 719). Other physiological changes occur as alters exchange control. Varying ability levels are present, such as in the case of Garry, a spokesperson in the video *Multiple Personality Disorder: Putting Many Faces on Child Abuse* (Rivera, 1991), who could speak bilingually at times, only French at others and still only English in other states. In the same video, Rivera mentions that at times, patients' needs for prescription eyeglasses will change from state to state. They display the apparent ability to heal more rapidly ("Inner Faces of Multiplicity". *Investigation - A Research Bulletin*. Institute of Noetic Sciences. Vol. 1 # 3-4. p. 6), and may retain certain learned behaviors or talents (such as the ability to play piano) in only one or some states (Wilbur, *Multiple Personality and Child Abuse: An Overview*. p. 5).

Migraines are common, perhaps precipitated by the stress induced when personalities are in conflict for control or because of the "change" process (Kluft, 1987, p. 90). Often, persons are bright and talented (Wilbur, *Multiple Personalities and Child Abuse: An Overview*, p. 6) and may display a "perfect memory" ("Inner Faces of Multiplicity". *Investigation- A Research Bulletin*. Institute of Noetic Sciences. Vol. 1 # 3-4. p. 6), perhaps because they experience perceptual stimulation from and with a number of different states and perspectives. They display high hypnotizability, being the "highest group on the median scale score, scoring considerably higher than all other groups" including alcoholics, normal, phobic, agoraphobic, schizophrenic, and other persons with post-stress disorder (Bernstein & Putnam, March, 1986, p. 732).

They may be "unusually sensitive to interpersonal worlds", have a profound sense of inferiority and worthlessness, and experience difficulty orienting to internal and external cues (Speigel, 1984, p. 101).

It is important for professional to become aware of certain characteristics which may be cause for concern in patients or students, but, as with any check list, caution must be used. The list compiled (Petersen, March, 1990, F3-23 #80) and available at the Medical Science Library, Nova Scotia Hospital, includes contributions from Fagan and McMahon, Kluft, and Putnam. Although characteristics listed are characteristics of children and adolescents with MPD, they are also characteristics displayed by children without MPD, and must be used in context, with professional collaboration, and with great prudence. Fagan and McMahon list such criteria as "numerous injuries; hurt taking chances; markedly careless; lies; schoolwork goes from good to bad; age/person inappropriate sexual behavior; truant for as much as five days; loss of feeling". Kluft cites "currently active imaginary companionship; dissociators in family; hallucinated voices; fluctuations in abilities; passive influence experiences

[events happening to the individual without their awareness (such as automatic writing)]; inconsistent school behavior". Putnam cites "sustained repeated abuse; self-mutilator; marked variation in ability; hysterical symptoms; refers to self in third person". Out of context, many of these displays can be seen in other children (and adults) for various reasons. Though such lists are helpful in putting together clusters or patterns of characteristics, they cannot be used alone, nor in piecemeal, unrelated ways.

Because the disorder is highly individualistic, is subtle or may overlap other disorders in many ways; because the disturbance resembles others, there is skepticism regarding the actual existence of the dysfunction (Curtis, 1988, pp. 85-95). It is proposed that if patients with MPD are very highly suggestible [high scores were obtained on the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale Form (p. 86)], then perhaps the states or alters are therapist-induced. Ross (July, 1990) proposes that the disorder is a myth, perhaps created experimentally by therapists, and / or patients in collusion with therapists maintain the myth. Dunn (1992) questions inconclusive results in proof of the existence of MPD. Leavitt and Braun (1991, p. 509) acknowledge the existence of a distinct disorder, but caution there is probability of fabrication due to inconsistencies. Kelly and Kodman ask what difference lies between normal changes of ego-states and MPD, and ask for further, careful, scientific study.

However, it is argued that therapists do adhere to sets of professional ethics which do not include this type of behavior, at least not in the large numbers in which the disorder seems to be appearing. Studies have been undertaken to determine if states could be deliberately created. These attempts were unsuccessful. "It is abundantly clear that it is quite easy to induce a subject to manifest many of the phenomena of MPD, but it is equally

demonstrable that the transient enactment of such phenomena does not constitute clinical MPD" (Kluft, September 1991, 607).

Whether the perception of the disorder might be subjective and cultural is proposed by Dunn (1992) and by Daie, Witztum, Mark & Rabinowitz (1992) who discussed the case of a Druze patient with symptomatology of MPD. Meaning of cultural healing practices to the patient and cultural interpretations (in this instance, the belief in transmigration of souls) of the phenomenon are important to consider.

It has been more forthrightly proposed that the disorder just "doesn't exist". Curtis states that the history of the patient conforms to criteria for diagnosis, and is collaborated by friends and family. There has been unsuccessful treatment of other misdiagnosed disorders, until successful treatment has occurred for MPD, thereby ruling out the proposal that MPD is merely "something else". Professional observations of the patient, and collaboration with other professionals have supported the existence of MPD, as has the eliciting of the subpersonalities or alters to confirm observations and diagnosis. According to Rivera (1991, video) the numbers of sufferers may be as high as one person in one hundred.

Therapy is regarded with optimism. Usually taking the form of "talk" therapy (Rivera, 1991, video) the goal is the reintegration of "parts" into a whole individual who operates as a unit with varied expressions, as opposed to several independent "entities". This could take the form of more compatibility and cooperation, progressing in degrees through reintegration (Kluft, "Multiple Personality Disorder". Review of Psychiatry. Vol. 10. pp. 176-177). Curtis and Fraser (5th Draft, F3-31 #5, pp. 10-11) describe a developmental process of treatment, wherein observation by the therapist determines the maturation level and status of all of the person's alters. Face, voice and behavior of the person is

noted; social, family , personal etc. histories are studied, and the age and state of the emotional and skill development of each subpersonality is determined. In a process designed to assist maturation of all, the "selves" are provided with guidance to grow, and to practice skills. Through hypnosis, the "selves" are interviewed to assist in the exercise.

Becky Frye (Nov., 1990, pp. 1013 - 1022) describes a process by which Art is used as the framework of expression in therapy. It is especially helpful because those with MPD have in most cases been abused in some way, and may be afraid or unable to verbalize the experience or their feelings about it. Those people who were threatened when ordered not to tell about the abuse find that drawing their feelings and experiences is a "safe" way to express without "telling" verbally. Through visual images, patients may see the process unfolding through a visual chronicle, and eventually be able to create a whole picture. Patients can see their terror transforming to strength and beauty. Being symbolic, it is a safe tool for those with MPD to vent anger and aggression.

Frye identifies four stages in the process of therapy, for which the acronym D.A.R.E. was created. The first is the stage of denial in which the person disbelieves the knowledge of his/her condition, but yet very much needs to know. There is resistance to change and a clinging to the familiar system (using altered states) to cope. In the second stage, there is an intellectual state of awareness, which persons have not yet internalized, but accept as a conscious knowing of the truth of their situation. In the resolution stage, roles change, and conflicting emotions exist. In the final stage of emergence, there is an internalization of their state, a reconnecting of internal psychic processes, control and insight.

Thus far, we can see that the disorder is debilitating, and requires serious and long-term efforts to regain control and order, or even an approximation of cooperation within the person, in order to command some structure. In many cases the proper diagnosis takes years to obtain. Kluft ("Multiple Personality Disorder". *Review of Psychiatry*, Vol. 10, p. 170) cites studies by Coons (1984); Kluft (1987b, 1988a); Solomon and Solomon (1982); Putnam et al. (1986); Ross et al. (1989c) and Coons et al (1988) which showed that "a series of MPD patients averaged 6.8, 7.1, and 7.0 years, respectively, between their entry into the mental health system and their receiving MPD diagnosis. They usually have had more than three prior psychiatric diagnosis". It may be assumed that many are never diagnosed at all, especially the males who may have found themselves involved with the legal and criminal systems before the opportunity to present for treatment would have arisen (Kluft, 1987, p. 370; Rivera, 1991, video). Children, especially if their parents are the abusers whose actions precipitate the disorder, will probably not be brought for treatment. This is unfortunate in that much less treatment time is necessary if the disorder is discovered in childhood (Kluft, 1987, p. 370). Hornstein and Putnam, *Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*, 31:6, Nov., 1992, pp. 1082 - 1083) found trends for adolescents to be more symptomatic, and higher incidence of diagnosis in adolescents was significant ($p = .001$). It was suggested that perhaps the disorder may evolve with time, which suggests in turn that early diagnosis is probably beneficial.

Given that this time spent in debilitation may be the greater part of an individual's life spent in diminished capacity, and, given that educators are in the business of maximizing potential, awareness is necessary.

The literature is rife with links to abuse as a major causal factor of MPD. Wilbur (*Multiple Personality and Child Abuse: An Overview*, pp. 3-4) describes

six categories of abuse. Emotional neglect and physical neglect include behaviors which deny the child necessary survival and safety materials and processes. Sexual abuses include *chronic* exposure, rape, and fondling. Trauma is maximized by conflicts created when the child is punished for displaying sexual behavior which had been encouraged during the abuse, in other situations. Physiologic abuses include such activities as sleep deprivation, or medicating unnecessarily (laxatives). Demeaning, denigration, ridicule and humiliation are all actions of psychological abuse. Physical abuse encompasses injury with bruises, bone breaks, tissue tears and damage. In consultation with Faythe Banks, ritual abuse was cited as that involving harmful or frightening activities

surrounding "occultish" practices. Curtis and Fraser (5th Draft, F3-31 #5) cite the presence of "a significant stressor" as the primary stage in their description of the evolution of the disorder. Bernstein and Putnam (1986, p. 727) note a "strong linkage between the development of dissociative symptoms and traumatic experience". Studies have shown that abuse (in MPD patients) takes place before the age of eight, and that 97 of 100 show 3.2 types of abuse, the other three experiencing other forms of trauma such as war veterans may (Curtis, 1988, p. 85). Of the 185 individuals mentioned by Rivera (1991, p. 10), 98% experienced sexual abuse; 97% experienced emotional abuse and 89% experienced physical abuse. Many were victims of a combination of abuses. Kluft (1987, p. 367) states that Multiple Personality Disorder is "a post-traumatic pathology". "Most multiples, as children, have been physically brutalized, psychologically assaulted, sexually violated, and affectively overwhelmed. A small number may have experienced one of these forms of desecration" (Wilbur, *Multiple Personality and Child Abuse: An Overview*. p. 3).

In a study completed by Ross & Miller et al (March, 1991, pp. 97-101) 102 individuals were involved in four centers (Winnipeg, Utah, California and Ottawa). The Dissociative Disorders Interview was used and persons were diagnosed as having MPD. It was found that 90.2% had been sexually abused, 82.4% physically abused and 95.1% experienced one or both forms of abuse. Over 50% of these people encountered abuse before the age of 5, and endured the abuse for an average period of 10 years. In many cases numerous perpetrators were identified, and there was the likelihood of abuse by mother and father. Though abusers were more often male, there was a substantial number of female abusers. It was concluded that MPD is a response to a vulnerable childhood time.

The collective responses characterized as MPD are labeled through observation, investigation and comparative analysis. The associated environments and activities are seen to correlate. Declarations cannot be made absolutely; causation cannot be pronounced. How can we know what these characteristics mean? What kinds of knowing about students with MPD can be possible with respect to identification and helping in the education setting? How can we evaluate the thoughts of another? Why does this phenomena seem to present itself, and how is it that a person may find himself or herself involved in its presentation? The work of William James will be reviewed in the following chapter in order to examine ways of knowing one's own thoughts and those of another. Also, some discussion will take place regarding the limitations of the field of psychology regarding this knowing.

Chapter 3

How Can Ways of Thinking Be Known? - The Work of William James

Understanding the way in which a person knows himself or herself, his or her own life, truths and others is important in any context. Whether we are trying to come to know about a person experiencing MPD, or any other person, what are the things we need to appreciate about the complexities involved in this process. What awareness do we need about how people know of their own lives, and just how much can others know about that? An investigation of William James will provide an appreciation of the complexity involved in knowing: knowing truth, knowing self and knowing others. Through James, it will become apparent that no declaration about that knowledge by anyone can possibly approach an absolute understanding. For purposes of this paper, and especially concerning persons with MPD, an understanding of such knowledge is limited indeed, and cannot be more so. This is crucial to remember when we think that life decisions are made by, for and about these people, based on such supposed knowledge. James' writing is "weighty" at best, and the reader may find this is so. It is hoped, however, that within, the reader will find some explanation for such limitation of understanding involved in knowing.

Human thought is discussed in William James' *The Principles of Psychology* (1891) found in the collected works of James in Hutchins (1952). At the work's end, he expresses that the ways of human thought can be given no absolute account, rather can be postulated only; that ways in which we understand the world seem to be ways that are useful and necessary to our lives. Throughout the work, he reminds his audience that ways of knowing are

* The spelling of "phantasy" or "fantasy" shall alter throughout this paper, and is a reflection of the source authors' spelling.

* The use of "he" or "she" throughout the paper reflects the source author's use, and is not intended to negate either gender.

subjective. These things, he explains, are those which make Psychology a field of non-absolutes (Chapter VIII), and that any attempt to discover phenomena of the mind are limited. We are obliged, however, to know something of it, so we must ask what the nature and extent of that knowing may be.

This section will discuss thirteen questions. What is psychology, and how is it limited? Connections between physical and mental states will be examined, as well as what James refers to as causal efficacy. The unity of the thought process and how sensation is related is discussed by James. He also examines the idea of the whole brain as opposed to distributed parts. The Stream of Thought, or how thought comes to be is important, and following from this, an attempt to determine how thought thinks of the self. The status and role of the soul, and an accounting of psychosis are postulated by James. There is a proposal concerning how it is that we perceive reality, and the related idea of category. Finally, the chapter will deal with James' account of instinct and origins of our mental categories (judgment, imagination, etc.).

Psychology is defined as "the science of mental life, both of its phenomena and of their conditions" (p. 1). Psychology (mental acts) must take into account the experiences of the body both as antecedents to the mental acts and as resultants of mental acts. It must also account for those automatic and instinctual, yet purposeful acts (such as buttoning one's coat), and examine the mental acts in these contexts.

He sets about to explain how the activities of the brain functioning are related to the mental activities or mind activities, declaring the postulates of spiritualists and associationists. The spiritualists, he says, declare that there is a "soul" which is present before the experience and enables the experience to be thought, whereas associationists begin with the experience, and through processes of ever-increasing complexity, the experience impresses itself as a

thought, impressing itself upon our mind. The Ego arises out of these experiences. James argues that the memory works not absolutely, but conditionally, and so the task is to look for the conditions. He argues that the memory can be stimulated by an idea, but that it can be interrupted, (by fever, or drug, etc.) and so that one cannot apply absolutisms to thought. Conditions of the body affect memory and how we undergo memory.

He says, citing Ladd, that a "certain amount of brain physiology must be pre-supposed or included in psychology" (Ladd, 1887). Mental activities can stimulate physical activities, such as when memories of fear can stimulate heart rate increases. People differ from things, in that if one alters the conditions of things, one also alters the ends, but if one alters the paths of people, the ends may still be kept in view and remain fixed. Intelligent performance is distinct from mechanical performance in that in humans there can be "pursuance of future ends and choice of means for their attainment" (James, 1891 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 7).

Antecedent and resultant intellectual behavior is discussed in accounts of experiments on frogs (by today's standards, ethically questionable). Acid, poured upon the leg of a headless frog, was followed by the leg being wiped by the other leg of the frog (James, 1891 in Hutchins, 1951, p. 12). The frog, says James, responded to the antecedent (acid). Certain muscles (leg movements) were just as stimulated by the neurological activities of the lower spine as in the higher cortex. A brainless frog set in a container of water seeks air, a resultant behavior, says James, used as a means to find an end. The acts of all centers of the brain involve the same muscles, the lower level of the spine obeying the present stimuli (acid, airlessness). Only the higher center obey absent stimuli, such as education or memory, etc. (pp. 12 - 13). Cerebral hemispheres are the seats of memory, and the higher the animal, the more cerebrum necessary. "In

all ages, the man whose determinations are swayed by the most distant ends has been held to possess the highest intelligence" (p. 15). He uses a tramp / saint analogy to illustrate this point, and to lead into a discussion of the "scope of vision" held to be more far-reaching in the more cerebrally developed.

Machines, he says, perform from "laws from behind" (Leibmann, p. 489 in James 1891 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 6) working correctly or incorrectly, with no consciousness of error. People, on the other hand are conscious of error, operating from "laws from the front" (the ends, the "purpose or ideal from which the brain should act whether it does so or not) (p. 6). Acts therefore that are done for an end and illustrate a choice of means can be called "indubitable expressions of the mind" (p. 7).

He cautions against separating the lower nervous system too sharply from the higher, in separating the functions as being distinctively mechanical in the lower, and distinctly higher order in the higher cerebral areas. Meynert (1874, in Sachs, 1885, in James, 1891, in Hutchins, 1952, p. 47) explains that lower sensorial excitement spreads to arouse a higher idea center, and James argues that the organs of intellect have "native tendencies" (p. 50) at birth (instinct and emotions, modifiable by experience, this experience and resultant thought having the power to modify other ideas; to "educate themselves" (p. 48). He uses examples of experiments with birds and animals to show that those deprived of hemispheres do perform acts which are driven by purpose (p. 48), and shows that damage to higher systems may result in inability to perform lower level actions.

Sometimes, he says, the hemispheres are treated as the "Seat of memory and ideas" (in the psychic sense) and sometimes as a "complicated addition to his reflex machinery" (p. 84). He takes on the question of how the physical thought process is to be reconciled with the psychic thought process; of what

the conscious thought process is in the "Automaton Theory" discussion (pp. 84 - 95).

James argues the points of others to determine that the mind and the brain are more intimately connected and less absolute than is thought. Huxley (cited only as having been cited in 1869 by James in James, 1891 in Hutchins 1952 p. 86) says that emotion is like a train whistle in that it is the result of machinery, and not a causal phenomenon; that mental conditions are symbolic only of organic activity. Clifford (cited as was Huxley, James 1891 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 86) says that the brain is physical and mechanical, and that mental facts only parallel the physical. Hodgson (in James, 1891 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 87) states that feelings are "correlates of nerve movements" and are not the result of causal phenomenon.

James says that there are good reasons why theories like this exist; that the spinal cord argument can be "leveled" up or down (P. 88), that physical and mental events are separate and independent, in a way that is easy to explain. The consciousness, he says, is not scientific enough to explain, and that we can't form an image of it, and that if we become too metaphysical in our attempts to define mental process and its relation to the brain, it becomes difficult to explain the proofs. If we allow physical causality, however, he says that metaphysical causality must be allowed.

The "particulars of the distribution of consciousness point to its being efficacious" (p. 90). Consciousness, he says, comes because of its efficacy in man's struggle, and it does influence body history. Man chooses what to notice and name, and selects; each individual being unique and different, chooses what to select, and this is unlike "just" reflex. The instability of man allows adaptation of conduct, and man is capable of responding to an infinite number of stimuli as opposed to being able to respond to just a few determined responses.

The brain is physical, and it is consciousness that "loads its dice" (p. 92) or makes efficaciousness, allowing for more than survival, being a "fighter for ends" (p. 92). Our brains have parts which take up the duties of parts lost without being persuaded by those parts to do so. The conscious self corrects. It is therefore more than a system of symbols, more than a result of machinery or a parallel. It is a process of "causal efficacy" (p. 93)

So, we may entertain the idea that physiology is involved in mental processes, and that there are characteristics separating higher order thought from lower. We may be justified in looking within the metaphysical to find causality, and not be obliged to look absolutely outside of the realm.

How is the mental state constructed? In the attempt to discern what the mental state is (James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, chapter VI), James discusses the "Mind - Stuff Theory" or the theory that states of consciousness are composites of smaller states.

There is seen to be a chasm between inner and outer worlds, and that there is some type of passage from the physical activities of the brain to the "corresponding facts of consciousness"...that the "nervous system...parallel phenomena of sensation and thought" (Tyndall, p. 420 in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 96). Spencer (*Psychology*, p. 195 in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 97) speaks of a "nascent conscious" wherein ganglion coordinating the stimuli form the raw material. Fick (1862, p. 29 in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, pp. 98 - 99) asserts that there are psychic units which correspond to the physical, and that, for example, pain units would be different than heat units. Spencer (§ 60, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, pp. 99 - 100) uses the analogy of the changing of beats to tone to pitch saying that feelings integrate from the minute and individual to the compound. - an elementary

consciousness ["primordial element" (p. 100)] which combines and recombines itself in many ways. Physical processes, he says, fuse in the mental world.

James argues that there is consciousness needed to begin with, that it is not some product that comes up out of nothing --- that there is "consciousness in the nebula" (p. 101). The brain is there first to receive, so that arguments about where reception takes place are just that --- arguments. Increasing cause he says (in response to Spencer) will not necessarily mean that the effect is increased, and uses the example of the note increasing too much in loudness ceasing to become a note at all to illustrate his point. He argues that the physical things do not "fuse" in the mental world, rather that they integrate outside or below the threshold of the consciousness and then are perceived "as a whole" (p. 103) "simply and totally". Integration, he argues, must take place before the consciousness because otherwise the integrity of the consciousness would be broken. One cannot, he states, mix feelings to get new feelings, as one might mix materials (such as shades of red) and get new materials (new reds).

If there were units of consciousness corresponding to the physical, they would not compound without a medium or a vehicle, says James. They cannot "sum themselves together" (Montgomery, pp. 18 - 19 & 24 - 25, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 104). Unity must "exist for something besides itself" (Royce, p.376, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 104). Private minds, says James (p. 105) do not "agglomerate into a higher compound mind". We know many different things together, and we know them as they are separate and as they are compound; we identify and name them. A higher state, therefore, is "not a lot of lower states; it is itself" (p. 106).

If we agree with James, we may assume that there is a wholeness of thought.

How can thought experience in different ways? In addition to examining the connections between the physical and mental states of mind, and how sensations become thoughts, James discusses the various states of mind (pluralism of consciousness), asking whether states of unconscious are possible and if so, how can they exist. Leibnitz (cited here by name only, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 108) postulated that whole sensations were made of many "minimum" sensations of which we were only conscious of the whole and not conscious of the smaller. James argues that the whole is what it is, and that all is necessary to have all. There is no need, he says, to divide the consciousness, and says that it is a fallacy of division to assume that that which is true of a collection is necessarily true of parts distributively. He argues various proposals:

Stewart (*Elements*, Chapter II, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 109) says that all consciousness is automatically unconscious and are results of unconscious deliberation, to which James refutes that they are conscious, but we have no memory of them. It is argued that links between associations are unconscious, but James says that they are either instantly forgotten or the brain track is adequate enough to handle the link without arousing it to awareness. To the postulates that unconscious thought presides over somnambulist thought or thought during epileptic seizure, he says that as in a hypnotic trance, it is forgotten, though conscious, or is victim of rapid and complete "oblivescence" (p. 109). As for the mind unconsciously counting the vibrations when we hear music, James says, simply, that we don't. That we know more than we can say, that there is potential knowledge or "unrealized principles" in an unconscious state (p. 110), James dismisses, saying that we look at past things in a different way, having learned more as learning changes the way in which we look at things. Therefore, when we look at something past and suddenly see something

new in it, it is due to the fact that we have learned something else which causes the review and new knowledge of the past thing. To the idea that instincts are unconscious, James says that they are actions of the nervous system "mechanically charged" by stimuli to the senses. Results of sense perception is said to be unconscious inference from data given to senses. James responds that it is a rapid reasoning, not like familiar reasoning, but not unconscious. It is argued that we may have a more intense sensation about something which we had at some unconscious level before, but James responds that this is not one thought becoming more intense, this is two thoughts or ideas about the same thing, or something not attended to before or named, has been attended to now and named. It was still in the realm of the conscious, and not unconscious.

He says that there is a felt need to reduce thought to some empirical explanation of the connection between the brain event and the mental counterpart, but that the thought is the thing, and it cannot be reduced. This is difficult to accept because there is a tendency to say that the thought process is composed of parts (aural, visual, etc.) and so composed is the world of objects of thoughts (that heard, that seen etc.). James says the "whole brain" (p. 116) must act together if thoughts occur, and that consciousness responds to the entire act of the brain.

To the theory that there is a cell or group of cells which is the keystone to the whole process (Multiple Monadism or Theory of Polyzolism) (pp. 116 - 119), James says that no such cell or group of cells is to be found. The whole brain is as much of a unit as a cell or group of cells, so there is no need to find one, moreover. To the theory that there is a soul cell ("pontifical cell" or "arch monad") where the "manifold brain process" combine efforts, James says if there were a soul it would be separate and we would not need to explain it physiologically. The brain is unitary so we don't need to say how it combines.

We cannot explain it, he says, so it is safe to say that the mind and the brain are parallel, and leave it at this until more is known (p. 119).

We can allow then, that the mind experiences things according to how it notices presently, and what it knows of the thing heretofore. It can therefore display various ways of knowing and various reactions to things, creating different states. How we know now, what we notice and focus upon, and how we process the object are involved.

How can psychologists determine things of the mind, and to what extent? We do not know exactly how the mind considers what the brain experiences, cannot reduce it to empirically observable facts, cannot formulate absolute laws about the conscious. James cautions that to the psychologist, the minds he deals with are not his own, but those belonging to others, and so are merely able to be seen as objects (much like Laing here). He must judge from what he finds in his own mind objectively, being not only outside of the other mind with which he is dealing, but outside of the objects observed by that other mind as well. He must study knowledge of "men about other things" (p. 120) as opposed to knowledge proper, and must analyze knowledge of "particular men" of particular places and things at particular times, and must trace reasons why this knowledge because one thing or another. He must report them without being able to say how he can in an objective way dealing with subjective facts (Robertson, p. 1 in Ward, p. 153, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 120).

James examines three methods of investigation used in Psychology and discusses the fallibility of each. The use of introspective observation distinguishes mental states from objects where persons must look into their own minds to discover what is there. Though fundamental to psychology, there are many obstacles with this method, not the least of which is nomenclature regarding certain states of consciousness. Some of the language is clumsy,

subjective, vague, and there are a lack of terms for certain states. Moreover, the introspective observation is subjective and as such cannot be open for public check. Being inaccessible to direct knowledge, it is incompetent. Some claim (Uberweg, *Logic*, § 40 in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 122) that it needs no explanation or defense because it "exists only in" the person, and others (Bretano, *Psychologie*, §§ 1,2, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 123) say that it cannot, by its nature be denied or doubted, and so it is superior to physical science. Comte argues (*Cours de philosophie positive*, pp. 34 -38 in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 123) that we cannot have knowledge of our mental states because they are in conflict with a state of observation from the outside or from ourselves in that we cannot divide ourselves in two, with one part doing the observing and one part doing the experiencing. Mill counters (1882, p. 64 in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 124) that we can however remember experiences, and then directly observe them for information as to their nature. James agrees that this is practical but cautions that memory is fallible, that we observe then in a state that is removed from the experience itself, and therefore alter the experience, and finally, that naming the experience detracts from its "force" (p. 124), but this is the only way open to us. Even if all of this is so, we are not in serious doubt about our states (Mohr, 1882, p. 47. in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p 124). We know we are angry and we don't doubt it, for example. James warns that there is error and doubt about "order...quantity... degree ...motive ... ingredients ...longevity ... complexity or simplicity of " our feelings and therefore "introspection is difficult and fallible" (p. 125), but that is simply true of all observation of any kind. He says that the best we can do is be aware of this, and keep testing later views and knowledge against the original observation, test, revise and compare.

The experimental method, he says, studies "elements of life" (p. 126) and attempts to reduce them to quantitative states by connecting conscious states to the physiological process; by analyzing space perception to its "sensational elements" (p. 126); measuring duration of processes; creating from accurate memory, how states influence each other; determining the numbers of facts discerned simultaneously; and trying to compose elementary laws of obliency and retention. James passes argument against these goals, stating that not enough has been done in the field with them as yet to comment, but that "each year" would produce new information.

The comparative method, he says, supplements the other two, and involves comparing one mental state to another (animals with children, for instance) (p. 127). Sources of error in this method include the misleading influence of speech. It is a subjective process, to begin with; in addition, a lack of words to describe such states may lead to overlooking a phenomena simply because words do not exist to amply define same. In assuming ideas are separate and subjective entities, the mental stream flow, (further discussed later) relatedness, may be overlooked. The "psychologist's fallacy" may be in effect (p. 128) in the "confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report" James says he must see the thought of an object as another object seen through his understanding of it. He also warns that others and their experience must not be treated as if they know themselves as psychologists do (p. 129).

The psychologist can test whether something is thought and known or just thought only by his testing it against what he thinks and knows (p. 141). This is all we can do with the finite brain.

In further discussion of the nature of thought, James talks about the "Stream of Thought" (pp. 146 - 187) calling it the study of the mind from within,

and saying that the only postulate that can be made of it is that some sort of "thought goes on" (p. 146). There tend to be characteristics of thought.

Every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness. There is a personal self, and thoughts are associated with it; this personal self is organized with habits, memory and a sense of identity.

In each personal consciousness, thought is always changing, even the second and third thoughts about the same thing, though they are of the same thing, are different thoughts. The second and third and following experience of the same thing are changed experiences. Hodgson (*The Philosophy of Reflection*, pp. 248, 290, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 149) calls this change the "sequence of differentials".

In each individual conscious personal thought is "sensibly continuous" (p. 146). Thoughts in the conscious are joined by memory, and even gaps such as sleep do not break the continuity as the consciousness has been part of the whole self and continues. Changes in consciousness are more transitional than abrupt, says James, (he uses the analogy of the joints in a bamboo stick to illustrate continuity versus breakage).. He says that the important thing about the train of thought is its conclusion and that "transitive" parts (p. 158) lead from one conclusion to another; that "consciousnesses melt into each other" (p. 161).

He says that thought always appears to deal with objects that are independent of itself (p. 179) and that however complex the object, the thought is an undivided state of consciousness.

Thought has the capacity to select and choose, to reject or repress from endless possibilities. It has the capacity of will in this selection and of naming the items it selects.

The stream of Thought has the characteristics of having halting places, of coming to final or provisional substantive conclusions, and of relatedness.

Can Thought know Self, in what manner, and to what extent? Thought is conscious of a self, and James discusses what the nature of the self is (pp. 188 - 259), from a broad view to small subtleties the "sum total of all that he can call his" (p. 188). He talks about the constituents of self, the feelings and emotions they arouse and the actions prompted. The Empirical Self, referred to as "Me", he says, is composed of the material self, the social Self, the spiritual Self and the pure Ego. The material Self is composed of the innermost body plus possessions (which can include preferences and interests). The social Self consists of the recognition one perceives one gets from one's mates, and, depending upon the nature of the mates, there can be several "Selves" in this category (i.e. the sailor, the professional, the neighbor, etc.). This "club opinion" (Locke, *Essay c. Human Understanding*, Chapter XXVIII, § 12, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 190) is, James says, an important force in that lack of any notice at all would constitute annihilation. The spiritual Self may be thought of as abstract in that it is divided into faculties (will, sensibility, conscience, etc.) or concrete (stream of personal consciousness); both of these being reflective and inward. It is more than empirical, more than sensible and transcendent, and thinks of its own existence along with the rest of "stuff", judging, willing and thinking. James calls this "sciousness" the "Thinker" (p. 196), but is unable to define just what the nature of the Self is any further than this. He discusses the pure Ego after talking about the feelings and actions aroused and prompted by the Selves.

He says that feelings aroused by the Selves are those of self-complacency (for example, pride) and self-dissatisfaction (shame, for example), and that these feelings are physiologically expressed (with a smile, for instance). These feelings prompt actions of self-seeking and self-preservation. Self-seeking is futuristic in a sense, in that there is an end involved, and

includes those actions for each Self: for the physical Self they may involve hunting or making of tools; for the social Self, they include actions that please others, or attract notice from others; in the spiritual Self, they involve psychic progress that may be of a moral, spiritual or intellectual nature. The seeking actions are aligned with growth, invention, creativity, while the preservation activities are aligned with defense and protection.

The different Selves may be in conflict with one another, says James. Everything that is added to the self is a burden as well as a pride. Nothing can affect the selves unless it touches a potential or actual self; that is if something is not part of self, it can have no power over self. The Selves form a hierarchy subordinating the lower selves to the higher, depending upon the priority or situation. All of the Selves can be immediate (active) or potential (remote), and all progress from the lower to the higher (ideal). All progress is a substitute of the higher for the lower, and all is for some Self. He discusses the impossibility of absolute social unselfishness in that even actions of saintliness involve a notion of a reward for the higher spiritual self.

In his discussion of self-love, he addresses the question of who the Self is that is the loved. When self-seeking is developed, he says, selfishness is a characteristic, the kind of which varies with the Self that is sought, and the nature of which is the "direct feeling of regard for his own pure principle of individual existence" (p. 265).

With regard to bodily Self-love, Me and Self, says James, are all things objective that "excite feeling", that have the power to produce a stream of consciousness, an excitement (p. 206); is a collection of "objective facts" (p. 207) about which the Self is excited. The Self may be the condition of the love as well as the object of it, as the present Thought in the Stream of Consciousness apprehends all other Thoughts and makes them a memory of

itself, then gives up itself to the next present Thought, so may the love be actually the nature of the Thought as is presently felt, and therefore, the Self as the Thinker is the condition of his love as well as the object of it (pp. 206 - 207).

Social Self-love is the interest in the opinion and images "other men have framed of me" (p. 207), but is only the subjective interpretation of other men's thought. Shame, says James, for instance, is just my perception of your image of me that has changed. The body is the vehicle of this thought. The love of the Spiritual Self involves love, hates, sensibilities, and these too, says James are not the real self, but the changing sets of consciousnesses (p. 208).

In coming to a decision about who the Self is that is loved in Self-love, then, James says that perhaps Self-love is not a love of conscious "identity" (p. 208), but a love for those things associated and are really objects of the mind. Lotze (*Med. Psych.*, pp. 498 - 501, in *Microcosmos*, Chapter V, §§ 3,4, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 208) calls these things "objects to the subject" (Thinker). Altruistic passions, he says, are as primary as other love. Egoistic (utilitarian) and sympathetic interests can both arouse passions which occur at the same psychologic level. Our egoistic interests form a "larger mass", so that love of self objects (utilitarian) are more, but are no more primary than sympathetic interests.

Horwicz (*Psychologische Analysen auf Physiologischer Grundlage*, Pt. II, 2d half, § II, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, pp. 209 - 210) proposes that the feeling and the thinking self may be the same thing. Those things that are of us (our warmth in a chair, for instance, or our own fluids, for example) may not be disgusting to us, not because they are ours but because we "know them better" and realize them more intrinsically. We live "closer to them".

In judging ourselves and others, James says that our knowledge of self is applied to a standard by which the Self judges other men, and then measures

himself. Bain ("Emotions on Self", in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 212) in explaining how we judge, discusses how we categorize our thoughts of others according to values, etc., and says that our thought of self accompanies our thought of another. He says this cannot happen to an isolated person. We "decide between the self and other men ... under the bias of our own desires" .

James then returns to a lengthy discussion of the nature of the pure Ego. What is the Self that is "Self", that which some call the soul....what part of us is the "seat"? We have, James says, a sense of personal identity in that the thoughts we have belong to one thinker and not another, and we have a sense of personal sameness which we treat as a subjective feeling, or an objective truth. He speaks of thought with respect to this identity; essential to thought is the "bringing things together into the object of a single judgment" (p.213) or the thinking things together. This thinking part of the thinking things together is called "subjective synthesis" and is as opposed to "objective synthesis" which is the union of things as the object of consciousness (p. 214). Things, in other words, united in thought are related to objective synthesis and the unity of thoughts involved are related to subjective synthesis. He says that in the same way we have perceptions of sameness about any other phenomena, we have perceptions of sameness about our personal identity. "It is a conclusion grounded either on the resemblance in a fundamental respect, or on the continuity before the mind, of the phenomena compared" (p. 215). With respect to the Self, James says that there are united thoughts of Self in that all of our Selves have continuity and continuously grow. They're not the same selves, but a continuous line of related selves with intimacy ["a feeling of warmth" (p. 214)] assimilated to the thoughts of the present self. Where this sense of unity is no longer felt, then the sense of continuity leaves us, as in the time gap interruption of our childhood selves separated from our adult selves these selves, he

says sometimes feel like another person. The continuity is interrupted. Another way in which interruption in self occurs is through dimly recollected experiences, or where feelings have "evaporated" (p. 216), and are therefore different from those now, and therefore can have no judgment cast upon them. Their resemblance is therefore missing, or interrupted.

The personal identity which we feel is then the resemblance among continuous feelings and all things associated with them over time. The vehicle of the judgment of that identity is the section of consciousness which is the "pulse of thought", the "owner" (p. 217); the part that makes the "self's constituents stick together" (p. 217). Because of the existence of these thoughts about ourselves, says James, there is knowledge about ourselves, but because of the knowledge of these thoughts about ourselves there is our existence; each is dependent in a way upon the other. There must be a something else beyond the thoughts and the unity of the thoughts something responsible for the coming together of these thoughts. The unity is only an ideal until the owner provides a center to hold the constituents together. Things do not fuse without a medium, and the "something else", the self, is what does the "gumming". The medium, the Unity of Consciousness, says James is the "judging thought" or the "identifying section" of the stream of consciousness (p. 218).

Like the Thoughts (present apprehending all past) in the Stream of Consciousness, something owns the thought. It may be the soul or the Ego. There cannot be one owner changing from time to time, but there are a succession of owners, (like the succession of thoughts in the Stream), passing ownership on from one to the next as there are changes, and so the Self becomes a "collective self" (p. 218). Each new "owner collects and knows all the previous owners, standing representative of them, adopting all others. The Thought appropriates all other thoughts and objects of those thoughts. The

Thought is the agent and is the vehicle of choice and the vehicle of cognition; cannot appropriate itself, but it can appropriate all others to itself and the present self can only really be known after past and appropriated.

He discusses three types of theories related to The Pure Self or The Inner Principle of Personal Unity (pp. 220 - 240): the Theories of the Soul; the Associationist Theories and the Transcendentalist Theories.

What is the role of the soul, and is it necessary to explain thought? The postulation of a theory of soul, he says, was necessary because, objectively, something was needed to explain the characteristics of the self in terms of simplicity, substantiality and metaphysics; subjectively, because we have an idea of ourselves as more than a brain, so we must be. The principle of individuality is substantial. Psychic phenomena are activities, and so they must have a concrete agent; therefore, this concrete agent must be the soul. The soul is not, however, just of brain and matter, because it must be of thought as well as of brain and matter; unlike brain and matter it is spontaneous and simple, and can turn "against [the] corporeal" (p. 221). It is thus required to be immaterial and simple as well as substantial, and therefore must be the soul. We grasp ourselves, or have an idea of ourselves, which is something that no material agency could do. James says, if we were a brain, we would grasp ourselves as a brain; if the brain could grasp itself, it would grasp itself as a brain. We grasp ourselves as more than a brain; however, and therefore, we need the idea of a soul as our "self" (p. 221), with the characteristics of being immortal, incorruptible, individual and responsible.

James disputes the need for discussion of a soul, however, and says that we do not need it to explain Thought as we have explained it; as a "changing" thing, appropriating other past thoughts. It can, he allows, be something "behind" (p. 222) the Thought, but there is no reason why we cannot have just

the phenomena and nothing more. We and psychologists need only to look at the Thought - at the phenomena - and nothing more. The idea of the soul does not add to the purposes of psychology, and is not necessary to it. When the brain acts, a thought occurs, and we need not be metaphysical about this. He allows that even if the concept of soul is demanded, then it must borrow the form of the stream of consciousness and duplicate it, as this is the way we act, and if the soul is us, then this is the way the soul must act. Therefore, it would be a copy of the stream. Furthermore, we do not need to know the essence of the mind for purposes of psychology. He quotes *Elements of Intellectual Philosophy* to explain that by the actions of the mind we know the mind exists. By the mind we are cognizant of the actions of the mind. We do not have knowledge of the "essence of which they are predicated" (Wayland, *Elements of Intellectual Philosophy*, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 224). He argues the soul upon the merits of its characteristics saying that if the soul were immortal, it would not be a desirable state without the stream of consciousness, as we could not recognize its immortality; neither could the soul be held responsible without the stream, as it would not recall for what it was responsible. He also argues the idea that the soul is a closed unity, saying that even if there is unity in consciousness, separate selves are created (such as the child separate from the adult self), and that we can have a sort of unity in a way that is individual and connected without doing it metaphysically. Therefore, he says, successive thoughts are the only verifiable thing about the soul, and the only thing with which psychology needs to be concerned or can be concerned. Psychology cannot do any more than empirically "ascertain" (p. 225) the correlation of successive thoughts with the brain process. Psychology, he says, does not need the metaphysical process.

He explains and argues the Associationist Theories. The Associationist theory is a psychological theory (Flew, 1979, p. 29) indicating that association is the fundamental principle of mental life.

Hume responded to the notion that the Self is Unity abstract and absolute, by saying that there is first of all no impression of the self that is constant and invariable, and furthermore, we are not even always conscious of the Self (as in sleep). We do not have a simple and constant view of ourselves, but just a collection of perceptions, and because of this, the Self is Diversity, and not Unity. James says to this that Diversity is also connected in the Stream of Thought. Herbart (not cited by work or year, merely by name) says that a conflict of ideas can fuse into a manner of representing itself "which can be called an 'I' (James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 228). New feelings, says James, can differ from the old but are "cognizant and appropriative" of the old (James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 228), which is to say that diversity, in the appropriation also becomes a part of the unity of the self.

Thompson (1884, p. 114, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 228) proposes that the Ego is an unknown substance whose attributes are states of consciousness. It eludes cognition but is postulated by cognition, but James argues that this is the same as Thought.

Taine (1878, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 229) proposed that what we call our "I" is a web of conscious internal events "abstracted and isolated by mental fiction", but James argues that character does not abstract itself.

James Mill (*Analysis*, p. 331 in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 229) submitted that the self is a "train of ideas continuously connected first to last" and declared by memory, saying that memory and self are different modes of the same thing, and that psychologists can refer one to the other. I can remember

something that I did, sense it was my own and know it was Myself who had the series of sensations, but I cannot know anything of myself. The bond among the series of sensations is my Ego (later called "something in common") (*Analysis*, Vol. II, p. 175, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 130). James argues that the tie or the link is not a real tie, but just the remembering Thought appropriating the old thought, and that resemblance, continuity and appropriation is the tie between them; he reminds us that the Thought can also disown as well as appropriate the old thought.

He exposes, in his exploration of Self, the Transcendentalist theories to discussion (pp. 232 - 240). They postulate, he says, that material is given by the lower faculties to the Understanding (Kant, 1787, § 13 in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 232) and then connected. There is a known that "I" think it, or at least, this is capable of being realized, and this awareness is implied in all experience. Therefore, one cannot have a consciousness of anything without a consciousness of Self. James points out here that Kant only says **that we are**, not what we are or what we are about. He says also that the Pure Ego of (Kant's) Apperception is only the subject corresponding to the object, and that without the object we cannot know the subject. The subject can only be known in the sense that it knows the object, and psychology cannot deduct from this. He agrees with Kant that Reality is outside the mind, but he finds difficulty in the way Kant brings the multiplicity inside the mind, and would rather the multiplicity be left outside, and the mind remain simple. Bringing the multiplicity inside, he says, leaves the objects empty, and does not explain the mind. The outside multiplicity can be known by the present passing "Thought". The "Thought" is the principle by which the Many is simultaneously known (p. 233). He says that if we are absolute or solipsistic, then we destroy psychology as a distinct science. Our thoughts, he says, are finite.

We do not need a metaphysical explanation of great complexity about the "Me" or the Self. The "Thought" is the only thinker that objects require, and one can use "Me" or "I" for both the empirical person and the judging "Thought", whose identity is loosely constructed of memories with facts and thoughts appropriated.

How do these ideas account for psychosis? Some comments are made regarding what James calls the "Mutations of Self" (pp. 240 - 258), and attempts are made to explain them. He says that alterations of the memory are manifested in several ways. There are, in the changing "Me", losses or false recollections; as well, memory losses can be normal occurrences. Abnormal alterations, he says, are "alterations in the present self" (p. 241), and present themselves in the form of insane delusions, alternating selves, and mediumships or possessions. Insane delusions occur, James says, when there are new sensations and a loss of the old personage. He uses the metaphor of a caterpillar, having metamorphosed, being not the same as it was, and having now the sensations of a butterfly, and none left of a caterpillar at all, though it is in some sense the same being it was, no longer, in another sense, is, and is without the sense of what it was before (Taine, 1878, p. 462, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 242). He says that alternating selves are a result of inconsistencies of a person with himself and are a result of changes in the memories of a person. Mediumships and possession, he says, are special types of alternating personalities, and are taking place within the person, as opposed to true possession from another source, as the utterances by the person in the trance are only as complete as the person's abilities will allow. He says the trances behave as would hypnotic trance, and the behavior appears as is expected by situations.

He concludes from this that, as Janet says (*Revue Scientifique*, 1888, p. 84, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 249) there "exist precise, constant and necessary relations between the bodily and the mental state, such that it is impossible to modify the one without modifying the other in parallel fashion". We must, James says, when these mutant states occur, be capable of abandoning association paths for new ones, and thereby "successively changing all modes of action" (p. 258). It could, as well, be that organized systems of paths are thrown out of gear with others, producing simultaneously existing consciousnesses.

Psychosis may be accounted for by the Stream of Thought proposal if we allow that metamorphic conditions of the stream, changing or parallel paths of consciousness may take place.

How do we perceive reality, and what is reality? There are two ways in which we investigate psychic states: by analyzing the constituents, the composition of the state and its nature, and by understanding its history, the conditions under which it exists, its genesis and how it links to facts. Three categories relate to reality: that of belief and disbelief, of the same category; the opposite category of doubt and inquiry, and the category of unreality. James says that the state of belief is characteristic of itself and that is how we know we have it. If one disbelieves, one must hold up something for belief and then reject it, therefore bringing disbelief into the same category as belief. Doubting and inquiring, however, he says are opposite to belief, and concern conflicts in reality (pp. 659 - 660). Unreality is unlike either the first or the second category.

He cites John Mill's discussion about belief (James Mill, *Analysis I*, pp. 412 - 413, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 637). Mills identifies belief as that which is the difference between memory and imagination. He tells us that Bretano (Marty, 1884, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 266) sees belief as

more than thought in that belief is thought plus acceptance or denial. James calls Bretano's judgment about thought, "belief", and states the four elements of belief as a subject, a predicate and their relationship plus a psychic attitude. Belief occurs under certain conditions wherein it is not contradicted, in that its perceptions are related to the world, its propositions are similar to other propositions and don't clash with other beliefs. All of this depends upon the capacity for diversity of ways to think about things and our human ability to choose or reject objects.

We have, James says, two primary worlds: the world of Reality and the world of Illusion. Related to these worlds are a number of "sub-universes" (p. 641) which are categories into which are placed illusions, errors individual and collective and absolute; reality which is absolute, abstract, relative, ideal; the supernatural, and so on. These categories for us are (p. 642) a sense of things and forces; science; ideal relations; idols of the tribe; supernatural; opinion and madness. "Every object we think of gets at last referred to one world or another of this or of some similar list" (p. 642). We compare objects until the object compared finds those with which it is not in conflict, and we categorize the compared object here. Our propositions concerning the different worlds (into which we categorize) "are made from differing points of view" (p. 642) and each of these worlds has reality while attention is paid to it.

Concerning these categories, James says that each thinker has habits of thought and often selects and attends to the same world rather than the others to be the ultimate reality. How do we determine reality? Things of sense usually have a stronger reality than those of concept, but they are no less than equal to those other things (for example, the Christian reality of faith is a less real reality than things of sense, even though it may be strong). To have practical reality or "reality for ourselves" (p. 643) an object must appear, must appear interesting

and must appear important. To have relative reality the object must be real in relation to our emotional and active life. If it is in conflict then it will be disbelieved and will be unreal. Hume calls this (*Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, sec. V, pt. 2, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 644) having the idea in a "lively and active manner"

Adding reality to an object, says James, does not add to the object itself. We are always outside of the object giving it the attribute of existence (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* translated by Max Müller, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 644). The original source of reality is us who give reality and give a higher degree of reality at will. Realities are threaded together making a continuity of realities forming the corpus of our living reality. We feel our own reality and attach reality to those things of our needs, and thread those other things related to that until all realities are anchored in the Ego (p. 645).

For some however, James says, there is nothing awakened, and no reality can be felt. This relates to the "dead and empty" world (Griesenger, *Mental Diseases*, §§ 50, 98, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 646) of insanity and depression.

Things are connected to the Ego and felt as real. What are the stirrings, the connections we give to other things to make them real? Any relations to our mind itself makes an object real, James says (p. 646). Children and those with undeveloped minds have chaotic and sense minds, but as items become more permanently fixed and categorized, discrepancies and contradictions are felt between their realities, and they have characteristics which make them "stirrings" They have the power to possess consciousness, vividness and the ability to excite. They have the capacity to arouse active impulses and emotional interest a(such as love and desire), and they have congruency with our favorite forms of contemplation (p. 647).

With these characteristics in mind, we see that sensations are usually more lively, and are usually judged more real. However, there are exceptions. If a concept is connected with a sensation that is more real than the first sensation, then it will be judged more real than the first sensation, though it is conceptual and not sensory in nature. The more interest and excitement something has, the more real it is deemed to be. Conception then, though it may remain conceptual, must, to be accepted as real, terminate in the sensible world. Objects must pass the sense test, or be disbelieved. Connections must be sensible, vivid and important to be judged real. Associations with reality, he says, make fancies more real (he gives the example of children and dolls). He addresses the importance of language as it relates to those discussion in that words serve a sensible purpose, and is essential to thought in that it stands for an idea and makes it therefore sensibly real (pp. 649 - 650). He says that selected sensations of appeal or woe, pleasure and pain are very belief compelling.

With respect to the influence of emotion and active impulse on belief, James says that we are able to suspend belief in the presence of an emotionally exciting idea. We are also able to believe because a thing is conceived with passion and that we believe an action will occur. This is often related to delusion and insanity (he gives the example of burning witches). Objects that are arousing and exciting, are tested by the senses, and reach the self, and are believed to be real.

We take beliefs and realities and structure them into systems of belief. Systems which are conceptual in nature (belief in objects of theory) are able to exist but must include objects of reality and the attempt to explain them. Those conceptual systems which most appeal to our aesthetic, emotional and active needs are those which are most real. We select the realities in the same way as

we prioritize the sensations into hierarchical systems of paramount reality. Those conceptual systems most accepted are those most rich in content and most organized and simple (Royce, 1885, pp. 317 - 357, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 658).

He briefly discussed belief and will, saying that they are two names for the same phenomenon. We can believe, or we can believe by will, and the latter takes more time than the former, often involving acting as if a thing were real; because it then becomes connected with our life, it then becomes real.

Reality involves belief, which involves our capacity to choose and reject and test. It is structured according to relatedness and similarity into categories.

Where do our mental categories originate? What are instincts? James focuses upon psychogenesis in a discussion of how and how much the outside world can effect the way we react without prior experience; he questions how much of our thinking is inherited human or race event, the nature of our instinctive reactions, and whether there are features of our organic mental structure which occurred accidentally. To proceed, he distinguishes between the mind and the objects outside of it, saying that that which we experience is not the same as the objects outside the mind; that which we experience is a duplication of the objects (p. 852), and therefore there is some sort of harmony between the nature of the mind and the nature of the things outside it. He indicates that the empiricists postulate that the awakenings" in the mind occur from the outside; the a priorists determine that some of the "awakening" is internal, and that no amount of experience can alter this.

A characteristic of experience, says James, is that it is supposed to impress us. We experience things in a certain order and sequence, and this occurs as an habitual thing, thus enabling us to predict or divine the future from the present. He turns to the work of Spencer (*Principles of Psychology*, § 207,

in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, pp. 853 - 854) to explain that the empiricists say that experience should be the "sole fashioner of the mind" (p. 853), and that following from this, the experience of ancestors fashion the minds of those present as well. Experiences which have occurred for "numberless generations" (p. 853) register and cause "automatic physical reactions" (p. 853). As these experiences are multiplied, they gain strength, and as a succession of generations can have an infinite number of experiences, tendencies are induced, and this is the genesis of instinct. This accounts for hereditary development of the instinct. Those things "constantly and "infinitely repeated" (p. 854) become automatic elements of thought or forms of intuition.

He says that all knowledge is not from without. Experience teaches us something of order in which we perceive experience, which is not the same as the objects nor the same as the order in which these objects occur in reality. He says that some knowledge can come from hereditary processes, that is the ways people react being conditioned from numberless similar experiences throughout generations. However, some knowledge and ways of thought are those which he names "back door". There may be incidence of experience causing accidental changes in molecular structure, or unintended effects on brain tissue. Higher intellect perhaps was such an incident. Therefore, the two modes of origin of brain structure can be direct or indirect and accidental (Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, § 207, in James, 1892 in Hutchins, 1952, pp. 857 - 858). James calls these modes "front door" and "back door knowledge".

He explores the genesis of elementary mental categories, asking what are the natural origins of ways of knowing things (sensation, emotion, time, space, difference, causality, judgment, etc.) ?

If, says James, we are long enough exposed to experiences, familiar ways of cognition and consciousnesses may evolve into new ways of becoming

familiar, but exposure is not enough by itself to bring about a knowledge of them. Perhaps, he says, we came upon them by luck. Our ways of consciousness do not resemble objects, but the reacting brain determines the nature of objects, because that is the only way we have to experience and know them. Judgment comes about when the experience of one thing leads to an expectation of another thing. It is a secondary form of knowing after the original impression, in which the idea of one term engenders another more detailed idea once more attention is given it.

Regarding imagination, James says that it is a subjective response to sensation, and is as much a single fact as a "sharp picture" (p. 483).

From where came our ability to "know" natural sciences and pure sciences? What ways of knowing enabled us to know things in these ways? James says that we cannot view things in total....cannot think the *plenum* (p. 862) but must take parts of things and generalize, thereby forming hypothetical laws and data. Thinking in this way is not an immediate result of experience but it can be applied to reality, and can "correspond to" (p. 864) outer relations. Moreover, experience used to show scientific truths are more aggressively sought than those simpler truths derived in a more passive way, and scientific truths are derived in a more artificial way. The order of such truth is incongruent with the order of passively received experience. The ideal and inward relations among our thoughts and outer objects are in no way reproductions of the order of outer experience. They are received and ordered in a different way by us in our way of knowing them in the scientific way, but the order into which we place them does not conflict with the order in which objects occur outside or in reality. Therefore, experience lends itself to a translation into scientific forms that are not necessarily like the ways they are experienced. We have the capacity to re-order and categorize.

Pure sciences reflect even less than do natural sciences upon the real order. The "relations of resemblance and difference ... have nothing to do with the time and space order in which we may experience the latter" (p. 867). He uses the metaphor of the colors black and white to illustrate his point in saying that the outer frequency of shades between black and white experienced is explained by an inward structure, and that the things we do to reorder these structures occur for subjective reasons. The "back stairs" way of knowing is the only thing which would account for the way we structure our experiences of black and white and shades thereof, as in no way can shades between black and white ever have consistently been experienced in the order in which we place them. The mind notices itself experiencing differences and similarities between things, and calls this comparison. These differences and similarities exist for the person and what he means by them.

How does the capacity for comparison occur? He comments further upon how differences, similarities and comparison take place. The operations of knowing and comparing over time give results of categorization. The Axiom of Constant Results stated by James: "the same operated in the same way gives the same" (p. 869) Comparisons can be compared, giving up comparisons of a higher order, and in this way the mind is able to create series and sets of comparison placed in a structure. In this way we are allowed to classify, and James says if nature lets us do it, it must be natural; we need to see the world this way.

Regarding logic, James says that we apprehend and predict from it. We may take things that are, ["relationships of 'is'" (p. 872)] to relations of substituted possibilities. This process of systematic classification and substituting is an incidental result of our capacity to discern differences and likenesses and compare. It is a mental arena not directly related to experience,

and is subjective. It is useful and necessary to our life, and we are allowed to say that we cannot give an account of it; we can only postulate.

Mathematical relations and our ways of knowing them are also independent, he says, of our experiences of the world, involve choice, and subjective meaning (p. 875). We can know a sand heap as a number of different things mathematically; as many pebbles of sand, or as one pile, as one thing or as twenty thousand things. We can interrupt our counting, and it doesn't matter, as we can carry right on with it. Experience does not present itself in this same way. We are, he says, "the masters of our meanings..." (p. 876) making more meaning than we find, and making relations between things.

The same is true of our ways of knowing aesthetic and moral principles. We judge according to the ways things are for us or for someone else, and after a while see, by comparison, etc., that what is right for me in certain ways may also be right for someone else, and vice versa.

With regard to instinct then, we may accept that similar, hereditary things consistently and infinitely repeated become instinctive forms of knowing, over the centuries. Accidental alteration of molecular structure may be involved. Because we have the capacity to know, compare and order over time, our ability to categorize follows.

To summarize: James has proposed that the physiological is involved in the mental, and that something separates the higher order of thought (human) from the lower (seen in our capacity to delay, choose, select, etc.). He maintains that the metaphysical can explain itself without the need for duality, reduction, or external rules of causality. There is a wholeness and unity to thought, and that within this unity can be experienced different states. We categorize related and continuous experiences and knowledge of things, including knowledge of our selves, in various contexts. Access to knowledge of this process is limited. The

Stream of Consciousness proposal can effectively explain knowing, including distorted and psychotic ways of knowing and changing, and needs no outside agent, such as the soul, to do so. Reality is related to belief, selection and categorization, which involve instinctive ways of knowing.

With respect to MPD, several ideas of James are especially important. Knowledge of self is not absolute. It is the best we can make of it in our situation, according to our environment; that which we categorize as real, and that which we believe. A convoluted environment, then, may influence a convoluted reality, and support a distorted knowledge of self. Further, since it is difficult for the person himself or herself to know the truth and knowledge of self, then it is difficult (and impossible in an absolute way) for psychiatrists, psychologists, counselors, and others, to know. It may be wise, therefore, to search in a diverse way for information concerning persons with MPD, or any other persons. It may also be well to avoid absolutes when trying to know others.

James best expresses the essence of this section (1891, p. 93), saying, "The brain is an instrument of possibilities, but of no certainties."

How do ways of knowing evolve to create the person? How are patterns of belief and reality for people different and how are they similar? Following will be discussion of personality theories in the work of Salvatore R. Maddi.

Chapter 3

How Does Personality Develop? - The Work of Salvatore R. Maddi

MPD is thought to be a coping strategy. It is helpful to our understanding of the disorder to appreciate how it is that personality develops, and through this, come to see how coping strategies, and MPD itself may evolve. The work of Salvatore R. Maddi will provide an overview of various personality theories. This information is crucial to educators, as it will remind us of the complexity of personality, and therefore of personality disturbances. It will also provide an awareness that any person must be considered in light of his or her development over time, and within a specific environment.

Persons meet, observe and interpret their world, then act accordingly. Persons interpret depending upon certain circumstances, each person therefore, developing uniquely. In spite of the individuality involved in development, certain aspects of development can be categorized, and knowledge can be accessed about human personality development in general. How are theories developed? What is known and how?

Salvatore Maddi discusses personality theory from twenty-five main perspectives, with emphasis on the work of seventeen theorists, through a structure definitive of adequate theorizing, categorized through three main philosophies of human behavior. Not only does this offer a comparative, evaluative, wide view of explanations of human personality, but it provides a knowledge of theorizing and evaluation of theory as well.

He discusses the works of the theorists in light of three theory types: the conflict theories, which regard development as a process of avoiding conflict; fulfillment, which basically regards development as a process resulting from the move toward maintenance and fulfillment; and consistency, which involves balance. Each theory is investigated in light of a core, or more inherent aspects

of personality, which are common to many, and which influence behavior; and is investigated in light of a periphery, which includes aspects that are more individual, and involve a learning from those experiences of the behaviors influenced by the core aspects.

The personologist, an "expert in the study and understanding of personality" (p. 5), is restricted in that human personality is difficult to pinpoint, and is not open to reductivism as animal life cannot be observed subjectively. Personologists can, however, search for commonalties among people through diagnosis, research and psychotherapy in order to make generalities representative of all. He can categorize aspects of personality which are separate and distinct to individuals, and which are separate and distinct from social or biological influences, flushing out that which is of psychological importance; identifying also that which the person brings to the environment. Aspects which display continuity, which are distinct to human beings can be identified. In that the study of personality is has restrictions, the findings may not be absolute, but can approach a comprehensive understanding of how we become.

The personologist studies a "stable set of characteristics and tendencies that determine those commonalties and differences in the psychological behavior (thoughts, feelings, and actions) of people that have a continuity n time, and that may or may not be easily understood in terms of social and biological pressures of the immediate situation alone" (p. 10) Characteristics seem to be more instinctive in nature, and account for repetitiveness and habit, whereas tendencies appear more aggressive, directional, and account for the drive to serve a goal.

The personologist understands and formulates theory with three kinds of knowledge: the empirical, the intuitive and the rational. The theory is first

created from an idea (intuitive), then rationalized and finally, attempts are made to prove. It follows that analysis must take the same forms: a search for an intuitive reaction, logical assumptions and consistency, and any empirical proof (though Maddi indicates that due to the nature of personality, we are limited empirically).

Theory must account for a *core* of personality, which is distinct from the periphery of personality. The core consists of those aspects that are common across persons, which are inherent and influence behavior. Core tendencies determine in which direction and toward which goals people will travel; core characteristics explain the content of the goals, or the "inherent potentialities" (p. 16). They are assumed to be present in all persons. The *periphery* of personality consists of those aspects that are learned, as opposed to being inherent, and which influence behavior. Concrete peripheral characteristics are used to determine individual differences as opposed to commonalties; are relevant to a style of life and are relevant to some portion of behavior (obstinacy, for example). It can mean a trait, or it can mean more than a trait. The expression of the core characteristics and tendencies in one's living, brings about reward or punishment, and from the experience of core plus reward and punishment experienced by the person, the periphery develops.

Individual characteristics of the periphery are categorized to determine personality *type*.

Theories are categorized into three types: *conflict*, which accounts for a striving for balance, both between man and society (psychosocial), and within man (intrapsychic); *fulfillment*, which accounts for the human desire for growth, both in being the best he can be (actualization) and in a reach for the ideal (perfection); and *consistency* which accounts for man's attempts to use

feedback from his world for maintenance both by avoiding discrepancy (cognitive dissonance) and by balancing comfortable levels of stimulation (activation).

Maddi discusses the works of a number of theorists to explain the core of personality, and again to explain the periphery of personality. He compares the perspectives, and analyses for intuitive, rational and empirical validity before postulating the contents of an effective theory. He concludes with a number of substantive characteristics of personality which adhere commonly, and which have been seen to have validity.

He first treats the core of personality, first offering discussion of the conflict model which postulates that conflict is inherent in man both between man and society, as developed in the *psychosocial* version of the model, and within the psyche, as developed in the *intrapsychic* model. The concepts of the core are general in nature and concern basic and long-term attributes. The work of Sigmund Freud and Henry Murray are presented to illustrate the versions of the conflict model.

Freud postulated (1925) that conflict between the individual and his society is at the center of a person's life, and the tendency of the person is to maximize the instinct (individual) while minimizing punishment and guilt (societal). All behavior is motivated by instinct and is all defensive. Sexuality, according to Freud, pervaded all behavior and marked the stages of development of a person. The instincts are the core characteristics of the person, are biologically rooted and all have a source, an energy, an aim and an object. These somatic processes are mentally represented. The source of energy is from within and expresses a need (for example, a dry mouth expresses thirst); deprivation is expressed as tension and is indicative of how much is the need; this phenomenon is constant. The aim of the instinct, though never reached in its ideal, is to reduce tension through the object, or vehicle of

satisfaction. The source and object are expressed by a wish; tension and aim are expressed by an uncomfortable emotion. Three kinds of instincts (self preservation, sexual and death instinct) are collectively called the *id*, and the structure through which the *id* may be satisfied most effectively within societal demands is known as the *ego*.

Conflict is created when the person attempts to satisfy his instincts and finds himself confronted by societal expectations, and punishments. When these punishments are internalized, there arises guilt. The *superego* is the internalized set of rules idea imposed through guilt and punishment.

Defense mechanisms (in the sense that defense is the debarring of mental content from awareness) are employed to maximize gratification and minimize punishment and guilt. Conflict raises alarm which raises anxiety, and the person employs compromise to reduce the anxiety in the form of defense mechanisms (by necessity of their function, unconscious). At their most effective, these defense mechanisms are a minimal distortion of instinctual reality; at their most psychopathic, they become gross distortions of reality, in order that the perceived reality will come close to the acceptable, and therefore, reduce guilt and/or punishment.

Conflict is eternal, and there is no alternative to it.

Murray's position (1938) like Freud's, postulates conflict, but includes motivation such as love and achievement which may be more social and not so restrictively biological in nature. This, according to Maddy, changes the original meaning of the *id* which Freud intended. Murray's *superego* is not just a set of taboos but a more sophisticated, less absolute set of ideals. Behaviors such as rational thought and accurate perception, according to Murray, can exist in the absence of conflict, and the *ego* can exist and have its basis in part, in a nature more informative and separate from the *id*. Unlike Freud, he indicates that

tension can be increased to heighten pleasure. Murray's complexes exist as a result of fixation at a stage, which means that if one experiences tension and anxiety, one regresses to a stage in life more pleasurable or filled with less tension than the existing stage.

Also dealing with psychoanalytical conflict, Maddi mentions the ego psychologists (Hartman, Kris & Loewenstein, 1947 in Maddi, 1968, p. 42), who, like Murray, endorse the existence of a conflict-free ego sphere coming up out of energy not derived from the id. Functions like rational thought and accurate perception have their basis in a predisposition and an independent course of development from the id. As well, they endorse intellectual and psychosocial goals that are not psychosexual in nature [such as Hendrick's (1943, in Maddi, 1968, p. 43) need to master], and some instincts that are not opposed to society (love, for instance). Unlike Freud, the ego psychologists sanction change throughout life, into adulthood. Defense and non-ideal states for these theorists involve distortion of reality when messages conflict with reality.

The modifications made away from the pure Freudian view, in Maddi's opinion, give rise to the fulfillment model of personality theory.

The final psychosocial theory considered by Maddi is that of Harry Sullivan (1947), whose account of core tendencies involves the pursuit of satisfaction and the minimizing of insecurity, and whose theory is a variant of the conflict model. His treatment of sexuality is less broad than Freud, and is related to intercourse and orgasm. According to Sullivan, the nature of the core personality involves a biological element, the deprivation of which increases the tendencies, inducing a need for tension reduction. The psychological element of the core involves the need for security, which is more complex than the need for satisfaction, and is interpersonal in the need for approval. The ideal state Sullivan calls *euphoria*, which is a state of blissful absence of tension.

Between the needs for satisfaction and security there is a dynamic interaction, which is the basis of the core characteristics, among which, there is interrelatedness, in that the physical needs determine a "significant force" (p. 49) in interpersonal relations. The manner in which the energy of the needs manifest themselves in "characterizable processes" (p. 49) in interrelatedness is referred to as a *dynamism*. In addition to the core characteristics of biological nature (needs for food, etc.), there exist both a power motive, which is biological and psychological in nature, as well a need for biological and psychological touch (loneliness).

Conflict arises in that the pursuit of satisfaction and security, selfish by nature, faces disapproval inherent in society (Maddi questions why such disapproval should be assumed to be automatically and consistently present). Social interaction leads to *self-dynamism*, which is a state learned rather than inherent, and is a kind of combination of ego - superego combination. This combination is, in nature, defensive plus something more (p. 51), and is a structure by which we live, both satisfying the tendencies and avoiding tension. Classes of defensive behaviors used to manipulate the tension levels and accomplishment of the goals are three: dissociation (avoidance common to people), parataxic distortion (an avoidance and renaming of reality), and a sublimation (an exchange for approved goals, and a rendering of personal aims unconscious).

The intrapsychic version of the conflict model is distinct in that the conflict is seen to result from opposing forces within the person. The theory of Otto Rank is the first discussed. He accounts for the human tendency to minimize the fear of death (in the sense that death is total conformity and subsumation by others), at the same time to minimize the fear of life (the separation, individuality and distinctiveness of the person). There is a desire to surrender and a desire

to separate, yet a fear of doing either too much. The conflict created can be minimized, according to Rank, in any of three ways: achievement, regression or compromise.

Rank (1929, 1945) uses the term fear as opposed to the term anxiety, to name the force or tendency leading to the object and actions taken as a result of that fear. He sees anxiety as being a more diffuse state. The two fears he names are tension states. He says that the desire to separate is inherent in all of us, even in the nature of the cell; but this nature causes trauma, beginning with the first separation of birth. Avoidance of such separation, however, leads to an avoidance of life, in which separation is inherent. The extreme avoidance of life, being death, involves fear of the avoidance itself.

The Rankian equivalent of the ego and self-dynamism is the *will*, which organizes and integrates the experience of the person into a sense of being for that person, and is distinct from the ego in that it is conscious. His equivalent to guilt is the *counterwill*. By way of adding to the discussion of Rank, Maddi adds the opinions of May (1958) whose approximation of Rank's compromise is rather a push to go on with courage in the separation process (p. 57) in order to avoid guilt. Whereas Rank associates separation with guilt, May tenders that avoidance of separation is the only tendency to produce guilt. Rather than focusing upon defense, Rank indicates that the will helps to ease the fears, and determines that love helps with the balance involved.

The positions of Andras Angyal (1941, 1951) and David Bakan (1966) are included as intrapsychic conflict theories, though they are more growth oriented and less defensive. Angyal posits a tendency to maximize both autonomy and surrender, while Bakan affirms a tendency to maximize both agency (individualism) and communion (interrelatedness). Both theories adhere to the view that we must separate both from others and separate the parts of

ourselves in order to achieve a state of differentiatedness and independence, while at the same time being obliged to join and integrate both with others and the parts of ourselves to become a person "organized" (as a whole and with others). There is conflict resolved by a compromise of representing both tendencies as much as possible through the expression of love. The ideal state is the simultaneous expression of each tendency, but it must be recognized that there will never be a transcendence of the conflict. The failure to compromise results in the disproportion of one of the forces. The defense is a creation of a symbolic self as opposed to a true self.

The *fulfillment* model distinguishes itself from the conflict model in that there is only one unfolding force at work, versus the two opposing in the conflict model. The two versions treated by Maddi are the *actualization* version, in which there is a force to express ever greater humanistic potential, and the *perfection* version, in which there is a force to strive for the ideal or complete life. The actualization version expresses the greater reality, and the perfection, the greater idealism.

The work of Carl Rogers (1959) and Abraham Maslow (1962) is used to investigate the actualization version. Carl Rogers asserts the purpose, or core tendency of man to be one force fulfilling a genetic blueprint [the qualities of which are not expressed exactly, but can be seen in the skills and preferences of the person (p. 70)] ; and the maximized expression of the true nature of the person. This force is not in conflict with anything, because when one is expressing and maximizing the unlimited potential of one's true nature, then one is in harmony with self and with society. Hurting others is a distortion of nature, and a destruction of the self.

There are two core tendencies, to actualize all capacity to serve and maintain and enhance life, and to actualize the self-concept. In the latter

tendency is the need for positive self-regard and the need for positive regard, which is more interpersonal in nature. The ways in which the tendencies will be expressed are defined by two characteristics: the genetically determined inherent potentialities, and the socially determined self-concept. The inherent potentialities, according to Maddi, must be explained further, but are explained by Rank in their ability to be seen in behavior (skills and preferences) expressed. The potentialities together with the tendencies will interact. This interaction will produce either a state of congruence or incongruence (less positive). Congruence can be achieved only through unconditional positive regard, since through this, the person learns positive self-regard, and achieves a positive self-concept which embraces all potentialities. If there is only conditional positive regard, the person grows with conditions of worth approved and monitored by society (external to the person). Guilt, denial, distortion, and "crippling" (pp. 76) defenses result, and the true nature of the person is denied. The person achieving congruence will be, in Roger's view, a "fully functioning person", and will display a respect for all manifestations about himself; will be conscious of all that there is to know about himself, and will be flexible and open to new experience (p. 77).

Maddi adds variation to the theory by way of discussion of the work of Kurt Goldstein (1963), whose theory is parallel to Rogers', but is one of the organism, versus one of personality (pp. 77 - 80). Goldstein refers to the tendency as the self-actualizing tendency (p. 77) and includes no theory of self-concept. Society's function, he says, is to provide a context for the fulfillment of the person, or to interfere with the actualization. Danger or damage results in catastrophic anxiety in which there exists only maintenance instead of actualization, and only survival instead of growth.

A two-force variant of the fulfillment model is that of Abraham Maslow (1962), who submits that fulfillment is important, but is accompanied by the goal to satisfy survival needs, which must happen first before the push to fulfill may take place. There is a tendency to actualize one's potential (physiological) and a tendency to choose what satisfies (psychological concomitant).

Maslow speaks of two types of tension; that coming from deprivation, for which the goal is satiation (maintenance), and that coming from growth motivation, for which the goal is to increase the tension and expand (enhance). Maslow's personality core characteristics consist of the needs of physiologic nature, safety, belonging, love, esteem, self-actualizing and cognitive understanding. Fulfillment and self-actualization will happen if the survival needs are satisfied. Maslow is distinct from Rogers in that Rogers includes maintenance in his notion of fulfillment, whereas Maslow's fulfillment exclusively involves enhancement.

In the perfection version of the fulfillment model, the motivation is to overcome inferiority and strive for a rather external ideal of perfection (as opposed to internal growth). Maddi examines the theories of Adler, White, Allport and Fromm to illustrate this concept.

In the proposal of Alfred Adler (1930, social and individual sides are both inherent and without conflict in the tendency to transcend limitations to a state of superiority. The goal of the person is the will to fully realize the ideal life, to achieve completion. The will to achieve this goal is never satisfied, since the goal is an ideal, and so the core tendency is said to be towards *fictional finalism* (p. 90), or the fictional (ideal) completion of the goal. The core characteristic is striving (innate) and perfection. Feelings of inferiority are important in that they stimulate the tendency and increase the tension, making the growth and striving more powerful.

When the tendencies are expressed, a style of life is developed, as well as are habits and traits resulting from inferiority and compensation. These results of expression are different among individuals, and therefore are considered to be peripheral characteristics, to be discussed later. Destructive habits and traits (such as jealousy and competitiveness) and constructive habits and traits (such as cooperation and striving) are said to be results of family atmosphere.

Robert White (1959, 1960), by comparison, considers tendencies of effectance motivation (to produce effects) and of competency motivation (to become competent). If the effectance is biologically motivated, stimulation for the nervous system is involved, and tension will increase. White does not distinguish, but rather assumes survival needs and their requirement for preliminary satisfaction.

Gordon Allport states (1955) that the first of two tendencies is to "function in a manner expressive of the self" (p. 97), whereby the self is called the *proprium* and where full satisfaction of the tendency is called *proprie functioning*, the higher order of the two. The lower order of the two is called *opportunistic functioning*, and involves the tendency to satisfy biological and survival needs.

Proprieate related functions are individual, but are common to all persons. Specific proprieate and opportunistic functions involve any reduction in tension. Proprieate functioning involves self-meaning where the self is a collection of executive functions which are phenomenological (in that they follow what the person believes is significant). The proprieate functions are not necessarily a complement to the opportunistic functions, but they can be.

The core characteristics of proprieate functioning intermingle, are future oriented, proactive and psychological. They include self-esteem, self-identity,

sense of body, self-extension, rational coping, self-image and propiate striving (pp. 98 - 103).

Propriate functioning develops through a simultaneous increase in differentiation and integration, manifested in a maturity which is seen in the self, the relationships, emotional security, problem centeredness, realistic perception, self-objectification and expression of philosophy and values. Lack of affection and succoring will result in the opposite of maturity and in mental illness (pp. 103 - 105).

Erich Fromm's position (1941, 1947, 1955) entails the antagonism between the animal and human natures inherent in man, and the attempt to fulfill the human. Man's nature is unique to man, and achieves expression according to his environment. Core characteristics express the need for relatedness, transcendence, rootedness, frame of reference, and identity.

The consistency model is distinct in that it allows more compatibility between the aspects of the content of personality, which is largely learned. It involves information needed in dealing with the outside world of the kind which is best for the person. The personality is determined by the feedback from the experiences and the outside world. Two versions of this model are considered by Maddi: the *cognitive dissonance* version (in which discrepancies between cognitions determine the energy for direction to avoid anxiety), and the *activation* version (which entails matches and mismatches between actual and customary levels of activation and tension). The work of George Kelly (1955), Leon Festinger (1958) and of David McClelland (1951) is considered as a structure through which to discuss the cognitive dissonance version of the model.

The elements of the cognitive dissonance model concern what the person and his world are like, and what is going on with each, and both together. The theory of George Kelly contends that people operate to avoid disruptive

surprises, the core tendency being to attempt to predict and control the events he experiences. From experiences, persons develop core characteristics called *constructs*, which are the mental representations of the experience, formed inductively. Constructs are subjective (depending upon the experience of the person), bipolar (i.e., good-bad), and are categories of thought. Constructs are formed into hierarchical systems with some being superordinate to others, some being subsumed by others, and forming different groupings.

Constructs and construct systems are used to deduce future events, and direct expectations and action. The significance of events for the person will determine whether or not it will be subsumed into the construct system, and where on the hierarchical system it will be placed. This will determine future expectations and action. Also, there are favored poles of constructs (for example, in the construct "dependent-independent", the person may favor "independent") which will determine certain lines of expectation and action. Bruner (1956, in Maddi, 1968, p. 123) says that persons also make choices and act according to avoidance and emotion. Persons may make two types of future choices: elaborative (made for the purpose of expanding his system, and adding experience), and conservative (made for the purpose of maintaining the system).

Action is taken by the person in a manner consistent with choices, and, the person, behaving as scientist, then tests his experience against his constructs and expectations. If anticipation turns out to be inaccurate, then constructs are changed, and new predictions tested. If there is a lack of consistency between the construct of an individual and his world (cognitive dissonance), then there will be anxiety. Hostility is created when a person continues to choose from predictions already recognized as a failure, and guilt arises when there is an awareness of the removal of the self from the structure.

Maddi adds observations made by Leon Festinger (1958, in Maddi, 1968, pp. 126 - 127) to compliment the work of Kelly. Festinger submits that people will try to reduce cognitive dissonance when they encounter it, because of anxiety. Festinger speaks of elements called *cognitions* (which are like Kelly's expectations), which are relevant to consistency. The change, according to Festinger, will be either with cognitions (expectations) or with the relations between them (there may be distortion, he says); therefore, the change is interactive within the person between cognitions, and not interactive with the world, as there seems, with Festinger, to be no concern with congruence with the real world.

The suggestion of David McClelland (1953) is that of cognitive dissonance, however, McClelland maintains that only large discrepancies between actual and expected events lead to anxiety, and therefore, the tendency is to minimize only large discrepancies. Minimum discrepancies, he says, are necessary for novelty, and the tendency therefore, is to maximize those. Core characteristics are both innate (underlying tendency to avoid large discrepancies, and to seek small discrepancies), and learned (the techniques for avoiding and seeking).

Several elements are unique to the individual: the avoidance-of-boredom effect of moderate congruence; the emphasis on action, the constructs and the motive.

By contrast, the *activation* version of the consistency model focuses upon the relationship between the person's customary and actual levels of activation and tension, as opposed to the relationship between constructs and experience. Maddi examines the theory of Donald Fiske and Salvatore Maddi (1961) to illustrate this concept. There is, according to Fiske and Maddi, a discrepancy which arises between a person's accustomed level of activation, and the actual

level of activation which he experiences, which determines behavior. Activation refers to the level of excitement, awareness, alertness or energy. The tendency of the person is to maintain the level of activation to which he has become accustomed, or which is characteristic of him. Activation is neuropsychologically characterized: psychologically by the tension, awareness, subjectivity, etc., and neurologically by the state of excitement in a postulated brain center (similar to, yet differentiated from, tension) (p. 135).

The determinants of activation are three sources of stimulation and three dimensions of stimulation, subsumed "under the term *impact*" (p. 135). Three sources of stimulation are exteroceptive (external), interoceptive (internal) and cortical [the cortex itself is considered a source of stimulation (p. 136)]. Stimulation has the dimensions of intensity, meaningfulness and variation (of which change, novelty and expectedness are aspects). Impact is an attribute of stimulation, and is determined by the significance of the stimulation. In turn the impact determines the activation level.

Customary levels of activation are decided (Kleitman, 1939 in Maddi, 1968, pp. 137 - 138) by averaging numbers of curves of activation of the individual over a period of time. The average activation curve (a core characteristic) averaged with other averaged activation curves taken at other times from the same individual determine the "cycles of existence" (p. 137). Individual characteristic curves of activation are formed from experience, though the person may be predisposed to high or low levels. The impact of early stimulus has the formative influence on the person, as opposed to the content of the early stimulus, according to Maddi and Fiske. As the person grows, the curve of activation solidifies, enabling the person to use it as a tool to correct and anticipate his actual experiential levels; ways of influencing become habitual. Although the content of the curves of activity are individual, the

concept of discrepancy between actual and customary is common to all, and general. If a person experiences unusual long term impact [as in period of battle experience (p. 140)] then the characteristic curve may be shifted, otherwise, the curve tends to become more entrenched as a person grows.

If discrepancy occurs between the customary level of activation and the actual level of activation, the aim is to return to homeostasis. Consistency is maintained in two ways: anticipation and correction. Anticipatory attempts may include the adaptation of behavior to maintain the curve, a continual shift of anticipatory levels. Balance must be maintained so as to not allow repetitive experience to become boring. Nor can new experience be permitted to overwhelm. One must take these experiences and apply them across the spectrum of one's experience to step back and see how the new is parallel to the old, and in so doing, lessen the impact. As growth takes place, so too does progressively greater differentiation and integration (Maddi and Propst, 1963 in Maddi, 1968, pp. 142 -143) New things will be learned and modified into the whole.

Corrective attempts tend to be the less ideal manner in which a person will respond to impact and discrepancy. When anticipation fails, the adult appears to take an emergency mentality, and apply impact-increasing and decreasing behaviors when the levels are already too low or too high. These behaviors involve distortion, not in the sense of Freudian defense where reality is debarred from conscious awareness, but in the sense of exaggeration or of underestimating.

Concluding the core personality discussion, Maddi emphasizes issues raised by the models, and investigations undertaken to empirically show how aspects of the theories can be said to be valid.

The concept of "gating" is of particular interest in this section. Introduced by Bruner (1957 in Maddi, 1968, pp. 175 - 176) and involves the "central nervous system control of stimulation coming into the organism" (p. 176), thus translating the defense concept to sensible terms. Hernandez-Peon *et al* (1956, in Maddi, 1968, pp. 177 - 178) showed "gating" in work with cats, and Galambos *et al* (1956, in Maddi, pp. 177 - 178) found that there was central nervous control of outside stimulation. The finding of inside systems of defense as well as outside indicates more "widespread effects of defense" (p. 177). Maddi speculates that gating involves something like a template. If the outside stimulation matches the template, then all is well, and if not, conflict arises and defense is summoned. He says that this solves the problem of how the mental content of defense is not available to awareness, and solves the problem of "parts" of us knowing and "parts" of us not knowing.

The *periphery* of personality is next considered. This is the learned, individual part of the personality which is specific as opposed to general in effect. It is composed of *concrete peripheral characteristics* (or traits), which determine direction of activity, are the smallest units of personality, and reveal differences in intensity and content. It is also composed of the categorization of characteristics into *types*, which identify styles of life, patterns, and characterize how people are. The three models (*conflict, fulfillment and consistency*) are presented by Maddi for discussion of the periphery of personality.

In treatment of the conflict model, Maddi again pursues the psychosocial (Freud, Murray, Erikson and Sullivan) and intrapsychic versions (Rank, Angyal and Bakan) (pp. 229 - 271)

Freud's peripheral characteristics are according to stage of development, or type of which there are four: oral, anal, phallic and genital stages. At the oral stage, incorporative characteristics are those of receiving, while the aggressive

characteristics are those of taking, expressed bipolarly (pessimism / optimism, for example). Attributes of the anal stage are expulsive and retentive in nature (stinginess/generosity), at the phallic stage are sexual (chastity / promiscuity), and at the genital (considered the mature stage) they consist of being capable, socialized and adjusted; this is the ego-ideal.

Maddi submits that because Freud's environment was rigid to the extreme regarding sexuality (pp. 240-242), the wholly sexual nature of his theory was perhaps an attempt to deal with this. The character type (oral, anal, phallic and genital) expresses the pattern of defenses, conflict, and response to conflict, or any combination of these. The successful progression through each stage depends upon the success of the preceding stages, and Freud maintains that frustration or indulgence at any stage results in fixation with that stage, and the person will therefore display thoughts, emotions and actions which reflect the character of the conflict, parental reaction or emotions shown at that stage. Damage at any of the four stages leads to an effect on the fourth; any breakdown leads to immaturity, and if severe enough will lead to psychopathology. At the oral stage, defenses include projection, denial and introjection (incorporating or becoming another person to avoid the threat from that person). At the anal stage, intellectualization (loss of consciousness of the instinctual), isolation, reaction formation (substituting opposite wishes and impulses) and undoing (actions are performed to cancel out anxiety-producing wishes) are acknowledged defenses. The major defense at the phallic stage is repression, and at the genital stage, it is sublimation, which is a changing of wishes and desires to those more socially acceptable, and involves the least "damming up" (p. 240).

Murray's types are parallel with Freud's stages, are called complexes and include two additional: the claustral and eurethral. Defenses at each complex

are similar to those of Freud. Defense of the clitoral complex is denial (passivity / withdrawal), and of the urethral complex resemble the anal character type, expressed in competitiveness or acquiescence.

Needs (learned conditions which are motivated and involve goals) are aroused by real or perceived deprivation. Murray's *id* serves the role of housing the needs, which are either those of activity (process / action or mode / excellence) or those of the need for desired effect. These are classified to mental or mind needs, viscerogenic needs and sociorelational needs (Murray and Kuckhohn, 1956, pp. 13 - 21, in Maddi, 1968, p. 247). Later, two more needs were added to the categorization: creative needs and negative needs (need to avoid unpleasantness) (Murray, 1954, pp. 445 - 452, in Maddi, 1968, p. 247). A further categorization involves qualities of the needs: proactive / reactive; diffuse / focal; latent / overt; conscious / unconscious (Murray, 1938, pp. 111 - 115 and Murray, 1954, pp. 447 - 450 in Maddi, 1968, p. 248). Needs, according to Murray are related to the ego and superego, in that Murray's ego and superego are sets of functions which are abilities in various domains (p. 244), and have a causal role in the development of needs.

The *need integrate* refers to habits which solidify over time, and accounts for behavior in dealing with the needs. The combination of the need and the arousal trigger, or press, results in an interactional unit called the *thema*. The *press* can be subjective (beta), or objective (alpha). When the need / press interaction is established early and is pervasive, it is referred to as the unity thema.

The stages proposed by Erikson are eight in number, the first four being more social in nature than biological. At each stage, the amount of conflict determines whether the positive characteristics or the negative are learned. The first stage is like the oral, and involves development of general trust and basic

mistrust; the second, a like-anal stage, either autonomy or shame and doubt are learned. The third stage is like Freud's phallic stage and involves either initiative and responsibility or guilty functioning. Traits of inferiority or industry are learned at the fourth, or latent stage, and at the fifth stage, characteristics of identity or role diffusion are learned in adolescence. Stage six involves attributes of intimacy or isolation; stage seven, generativity or stagnation and stage eight, ego integrity or despair (in later life).

Like Freud, disturbances in the previous stages, affect the latter, and like Freud, fixations involve the expression of negative traits at each stage.

Sullivan, whose theory suggests that man tends to maximize satisfaction and security, determines ten stages of development: Infancy, characterized by prototaxis and parataxis and notions of good / bad; Childhood, accompanied by traits of cultural awareness and manipulation; Juvenile Era, associated with syntaxis, logical interrelatedness and reputation; pre-adolescence, in which the person moves from egocentrism to love; and Late Adolescence.

Disruption and damage at various stages may result in what Sullivan calls a syndrome, of which there are ten, related to defensive characteristics which are stage - associated. Five are pre-juvenile and five are post-juvenile. The first syndrome is associated with self-absorption and fantasy; the second, incorrigibility; the third, negativism and cynicism. Non-integrative and psychopathic behaviors comprise the fourth, and the fifth syndrome is simply referred to as "stammerer" (p. 264). The first four post-juvenile syndromes display characteristics of ambition - riddenness, asocial nature, inadequacy and homosexuality, respectively, according to Sullivan, and persons presenting the last syndrome appear chronically adolescent, and tend to pursue ideals without ever finding them.

For the intra-psychic theorist (pp. 265 - 271), conflict exists within the individual, rather than between the individual and his society. Rank's position (pp. 265 - 269) is that there is conflict between the desire for unity and the desire for individuality, resulting in one of three situations: individuality without unity; unity without individuality and a balance. Life foists upon us continuous separation, beginning with birth, which leads to an increase in differentiation. The counterwill is the child's first expression of will, and if the child is permitted reasonable support in his expression at this stage, he should go on to develop a will which is mature, which leads to selfhood and the type of person who typifies Rank's ideal "artist" (p. 267). If the counterwill in the child is not respected, the functioning becomes characterized by ethical guilt, will *versus* union, moral guilt and need for societal approval.

Rank establishes three types, which are exclusive of one another: the ideal or artist; the neurotic man, who experiences moral guilt, separation, and who is fixated at the counterwill stage. The third type is called the average man, and typifies the individual who experiences union without individuality, and is considered most inferior of the three (p. 268).

Angyal (pp. 269 -270) promotes three dimensions of personal structure: the vertical dimension, through which acts can be both concrete and inner; the progressive dimension referring to surface actions organized to achieve goals, and the transverse dimension, concerning the coordination of discrete acts to a larger effective unit (p. 269). Acts can be described through all three dimensions, and relate both to core and peripheral areas. For example, Maddi suggests that the writing of an exam (overt) fulfills the need to prove intellectual ability (inner); it reflects the progressive in the way that an exam moves one toward a further life goal, and is transverse in that it expresses an organization of many discrete facts in the learned content of the exam (p. 270). Angyal

proposes that the symbolic self (sum total of self-concepts) operates through systems or structures of behavior (setting) to achieve goals. The changing of these systems is referred to as shifting.

Maddi states that Bakan's position (pp. 270 - 271) is referent to the core of personality only (approaching agency or communion), and merely provides three resultant kinds of persons: those who maximize agency; those who maximize communion and those who balance.

In discussion of the *fulfillment model* of personality, Maddi discusses the *perfection* (Adler, White, Allport and Fromm) and *actualization* (Rogers and Maslow) versions of the model, and that which they contribute to our understanding of personality. The fulfillment model provides understanding for the way in which man responds to one force, whose direction is growth; the perfection process directed toward the achievement of an ideal, and the actualization process directed toward continuous expansion and growth of the individual.

Adler's (pp. 279 - 282) position is that the tendency of man is to transcend inferiority, doing so actively (competitively) or passively (cooperatively) by means determined primarily through the family atmosphere, developmentally. The styles of life (or types) resulting from individual approaches are four in number, each with its own characteristics and goals. The active constructive style, whose goal is the attainment of attention and service, is characterized by ambition; the passive constructive, whose goal is the abrogation of power, by charm. The less ideal types, which are psychopathological, are active destructive, whose goal is revenge; and passive destructive, whose goal is to be left alone. They embrace attributes of rebellion and viciousness, or laziness and passive aggression, respectively. The goals are described as those of

fictional finalism, as their attainment, being ideal, is never attainable, and so achievement of them (finality) is fiction.

White (pp. 282- 286), according to Maddi, gives only sketchy "lines" (p. 282) along which we might understand his view of periphery, rather than a comprehensive assessment of what he means by it. We are, according to White, motivated by tendencies to be effective and competent, experiencing shame or guilt if we are not. Effectance incorporates the need for information, and competence involves the need for both actual competency and the sense of competency. Trust and mistrust are characteristics evolving out of interactions for achievement of the goals.

Allport (pp. 287 - 292) advocates the tendency for man to satisfy propiariate needs, to express the self, in a proactive manner, and to satisfy opportunistic needs, which are those of survival. He describes stages of development as four in number, involving sense of self and body at the first (age 1) ; a sense of self-esteem and extension at the second (age 2-3) ; at the third, a sense of rational coping and self-image (age 6 - 12) , and finally, the capacity for propiariate striving (full self-expression). Though the need for opportunistic functioning is essential to the satisfaction of the needs of propiariation, it is necessary to shift from the former to the latter, the shift being known as functional autonomy. Two types of personal disposition are posited by Allport: the dynamic, which is motivational in nature and is more expressive of the needs, and the expressive, which is more stylistic, and intent-oriented.

Fromm's (pp. 292 - 293) account of tendency is desire of man to express his human nature (as distinct from his animal nature, and appearing to be transcendent of it). Core characteristics express the needs for relatedness, transcendence, rootedness, identity and frame of reference. Development is a function of the type of relationship experienced with the parent, as opposed to

the stages expressed in other theories. The type of relationship might be one of three: symbiotic (related without individuality); withdrawal - destructiveness (negative relatedness or distance) and love (mutual respect, support and admiration).

Personality types or styles of life are called orientations by Fromm, and are five in number. The ideal type is learned from a love relationship with his parents, and is called the Productive Orientation. It involves a values of self, peace, confidence and loyalty. The remaining four comprise the less ideal types, and come out of less ideal relationships with parents. The Receptive Orientation is related to masochistic patterns of symbiotic passivity. This person must receive all good, which exists outside of him. He appears passive and cowardly. The Exploitive Oriented person evolves from symbiotic dominance, and feels the necessity to take the good, all of which exists outside of him. He displays aggressiveness. The individual expressing the Hoarding Orientation learns destructiveness evolving from parental withdrawal, has no faith in the outside world, is stingy and possessive. The Marketing Oriented person experiences withdrawal learned from parental destructiveness and displays behavior opportunistic and wasteful in nature, with a self-value that is of a supply and demand nature.

The theories of Rogers (pp. 272 - 277) and Maslow (pp. 277 - 279) are used to discuss the actualization version of the fulfillment model. Rogers purports the tendency to fully actualize one's potentialities (which are inherent). He indicates no idea of stages, but indicates that characteristics are functions of development and come out of conditions of worth. The types resulting are the fully functioning person and the maladjusted person. The characteristics of the former include an openness to experience, existential living (which implies flexibility and adaptability), organismic trusting, experiential freedom and

creativity. The characteristics of the latter include defensiveness, restrictiveness, a disregard for organism, commonness and conforming attitude - those of maintenance.

Maslow (pp. 277 - 279) establishes a needs hierarchy, which is reflective of the tendency to actualize inherent potentialities and satisfy biological and psychological survival requirements. He, like Rogers, does not adhere to stages of development, but proposes that if the survival requirements are satisfied, the person will go on to express actualization. The ideal type expressed by Maslow is the self-actualized person, who displays characteristics of realistic orientation, spontaneity, acceptance of himself and the world, task orientation, a sense of privacy, independence, appreciativeness, spirituality, identity with mankind, intimacy, democratic values, distinction between means and end, humor, creativity and non-conformist behavior.

The peripheral characteristics of the *consistency* model (expressing the tendency to get from the world the particular kind of information that is best suited for him to interact with the world) is lastly considered by Maddi (pp. 302 - 324), the two versions of which are *cognitive dissonance* (Kelly and McClelland) and *activation* (Maddi).

Kelly (pp. 302 - 304) describes sets of personal constructs (small units of behavior unique to the individual, determining the direction of behavior) which is organized to hierarchical systems (which describe the personality type, and determine the style of life adapted by the individual). They are used to satisfy the tendency to minimize discrepancy between that which one expects and that which one experiences. These constructs are bipolar abstractions of experience (such as one would abstract an experience to be sad / happy). The periphery of personality includes the types of constructs best suited to the individual for logic and function, and can be diagnosed by observation and discussion with the

person. Constructs are, in nature, loose or tight, constellatory, propositional, preemptive, superordinate and subordinate to one another, incidental (subsuming narrow events) or comprehensive.

McClelland (pp. 304 - 316) cites the tendency for man to minimize only large discrepancies, and the need to maximize the small, in order to avoid boredom, and enhance growth. The core is comprised of the tendency, and characteristics known as expectations, which entail what the person believes will be the future event. Concrete peripheral characteristics include motive, traits and schemata. Man is motivated by anything that arouses him to anticipate change causing pleasure or pain, affecting approach (need to achieve) or avoidance (fear of failure). He displays the trait of repeating continual successful reactions and repeating successful styles of functioning. The effects of motive, according to McClelland can be positive or negative, and include increased task output, increased need for interrelatedness and sensitization. Patterns learned with small discrepancies lead to success and approach; patterns learned with too little discrepancy teach boredom and indifference; and patterns learned with discrepancies that are too large teach avoidance. The traits are a collection of habits, differing from motive in that they are learned and repetitive as opposed to directional. Collections of traits or habits form styles of functioning. The schemata is a unit of cognition concerning culture, communicated socially, are not intentional in nature, but include prescriptions for action. They include ideas about ideas, about values and about social roles.

In the activation version (Maddi, in Maddi pp. 316 - 324) the focus is upon what Maddi refers to as the curve of activation (level of stimulus) individual to each person, and the tendency of man to maintain the level to which he has become accustomed or which is characteristic of him. The curve differs between and within people with respect to level and type of activation, and in ways in

which people react to it (approach or avoid). Compositions of individual differences account for type and traits. Traits at the peripheral level are varied, and include four ideal types and four counterparts (less ideal types) of personality, the difference between the ideal and less ideal resting in whether the person is active or passive in his approach. Each type has a favored attribute (level of intensity), a favored source of influence (internal / external) and a favored activation position (active / passive). The active person will pursue needs satisfaction, while the passive person will act from fear. The person who is high activation, active and external or internal; the person who is low activation, active internal or external are the more ideal. The personality displaying high activation, passive internal or external; the personality displaying low activation, passive internal or external are the less ideal. High activation requirements will be reflected in needs for stimulus intensity, meaningfulness and variety while low activation levels will be reflected in fears of intensity, meaningfulness and variety. The active personality will tend to anticipate behavior and either impact-increase or impact-decrease, whereas the passive personality will tend to use correctiveness measures once these experiences are already too high or too low.

Maddi leaves the comprehensive investigation of models of personality and proceeds to analysis. Maddi's analysis of peripheral considerations include a rational analysis (pp. 325 - 352) and an empirical analysis (pp. 353 - 444). In the rational analysis, Maddi addresses characteristics, motives, traits, schemata and types, and the problems of the unconscious and individuality, concluding with discussion of the theories as expressions of the three models of personality. The empirical analysis commences with a concept of the ideal strategy for theorizing personality, followed by the actual strategies in various theories. The

work concludes with discussion of the formal and substantive characteristics of a good theory of personality (pp. 445 - 461).

Examination of the kinds of characteristics required of the portion of theory dealing with periphery, he says, must include the nature and the function of those characteristics. The theory must provide a sense of what is needed to explain the phenomena of behavior. One kind of characteristic concerns goals and strategies of and for behavior (such as Murray's "need"; McClelland's and Maddi's "motive"); another concerns unselfconscious habits of performance (Allport's stylistic disposition), and a third include characteristics of values, ideas and principles of thought (McClelland's "schema"; Kelly's "personal construct").

Motives and traits, he says, tie characteristics and behavior, distinguish the motive and the trait as distinct or mutually exclusive in order to distinguish directed behavior from repetitive behavior. Repetitive behavior must be seen as experienced before, and directive behavior as self-conscious and decisive. Behavior can be thought of as wholistic, he says, but must be categorized in order to understand it in the way that psychologists are obligated to understand it (p. 329). Thought cannot be observed, but the behavior that went before or seems designed for a new goal can be observed.

What constitutes motivation? Motivation best describes personal goals and strategies yet to be achieved. Motivation, unlike traits, are not causal, however, therefore, the theory must provide an understanding of core tendencies but there is no need to include motivation at the core level. That which is not considered proactive or intellectual enough to be a motivation is more like a drive (like McClelland's approach - avoidance). Rogers' actualization, he says, is more like a genetic blueprint than a motivation, yet can develop into a motivation, much like Adler's drive for perfection gets translated into a motivation (fictional finalism). Psychoanalytical motivation is dual in

nature and locus-determined. At the one level, it can be instinctual (avoid - approach source), and at the other level the objects and wish to obtain them relate to goal states, and are therefore motivational.

Problems exist regarding how to explain goals about which we are unaware, or unconscious. They can start by being conscious, he says, and then if there is a defense, they retreat to the unawareness. Organismic needs, he says, are too universal to be unconscious goals, and not all behavior has to be unconscious, nor does all behavior have a component of unconscious motivation.

Schemata are needed, according to Maddi, because there is the need for theory to describe all kinds of behavior, in order to be complete.

He submits that conceptualizations of personality types serve the function of higher level explanation of behavior, subsuming characteristics into patterns, and determining flavor. Some theorists don't type (McClelland) because they wish to respect the individuality of the person, and not restrict him to one or another type. Some consider type to be superfluous (in Rogerian theory one is either actualized, or he is not, and therefore, typing is unnecessary).

There arises from this discussion the problem of whether to accept the concept of individuality or of type. Maddi says one can use a morphogenic (use of data across aggregates of people to predict individual behavior) approaches and still be loyal to the individual, because specific concepts can turn out to apply to other people. The nomothetic approach involves the use of specific kinds of concepts and their content at the peripheral level so as to classify behavior. In this way, differences can be recognized, but in a standardized way. Differences, says Maddi, are "relative, not absolute" (p. 346), and so it is helpful for a theorist to postulate as many kinds of peripheral characteristics and types as possible and as are practical, thereby having the optimum number of possible

combinations, and therefore, more differences, finally, more respect to individuality. For example, in Maddi's theory, there are twenty-four types, which may be more useful than two or three.

How do the theories express the three models? The content of the peripheral personality should help to explain what constitutes the life of the person. Types express the concrete ways adults lead their lives. The kinds of content emphasized in a theory is resultant of the kinds of concepts employed, and helps to distinguish the ideal from the non-ideal personalities.

The conflict model (pp. 347 - 349) he says views all behavior as defensive, and society as powerful over the person, while the intrapsychic views the individual balanced with commitment to society, as opposed to the defensive and negative. The fulfillment model (pp. 349 - 351) emphasizes spontaneity, acceptance and openness in the actualization version, as opposed to conformity and duty. The perfection version emphasizes a concern for more than survival, as opposed to biological concerns. In the consistency model (p. 352), the cognitive dissonance theorists do not state much that is conclusive on this point, whereas he says the theory of Maddi offers statements about procedures for correcting activation and discrepancy levels, and describing the passive character as the non-ideal.

In viewing the empirical studies completed regarding the theories of personality, Maddi says that ideal studies have not, as yet, been completed, because of the nature of personality itself, and difficulties therein. However, he says, "modest" and "tentative" (p. 353) conclusions can be drawn. Difficult as it is to satisfy empirical demands in this field, empirical study is required as satisfaction and support for the existence of peripheral characteristics. Satisfaction by reason alone is not sufficient. Empirical evidence is needed to show which characteristics are peripheral, how they are organized into larger

groups or types, and the amount of behavior explained by them. He concludes that pure psychosocial theories of conflict; and pure cognitive dissonance theories of consistency lack any "empirical promise" at the peripheral level (p. 443). There is less empirical support for the perfection version of fulfillment.

The ideal empirical strategy, he says is in three parts. First, the concrete peripheral characteristics must be measured to show the empirical existence of the characteristics, and, though the ideal can't be achieved, the evidence will support the need moderately. This is achieved by creating operational definitions for the characteristic, observing and asking. The theory is better if it begins with empirically genuine concepts.

The second step involves showing interrelationship among the measures to provide evidence concerning placing characteristics into types. This is achieved by taking all reliable characteristics, determining the relationships among them, and correlating to show how strong the relationship is among them. Like characteristics are then clustered. Within the theory, the clusters should occur as the theory predicts, and concerning other theories, it can be shown how overlap exists between theories [for example, one can compare Fromm's hoarding with Freudian anal type (p. 359)].

The third stage demands that the construct validity of peripheral theory be tested. The relationship between the needs and variables must be tested (for instance, the greater the frequency of variables, the higher the need). The construct has validity if the number of relevant variables correspond to the level of construct. As each peripheral characteristic influences the variety of life, there must be moderate intercorrelation with sets of relevant variables. Sets of constructs must correlate for information about range and intensity. Practical problems exist in terms of time and complexity, and interpretational difficulty.

Actual studies that have been completed have been factor analytic studies wherein factors are combined to show how clusters cluster to larger groups, and then to show how larger groups interpret personologically. There is weakness with inductiveness and with crude interpretations. There must be distinction between traits as habits, as cognitive (values, etc.,) and as motivation. Cattell (1950, in Maddi, 1968, p. 372) is able even to distinguish between two kinds of traits: urges ("ergs") and traits. Similarities between the factors of Cattell (1946; 1957, in Maddi, 1968 pp. 365 - 377) and Guilford (Guilford and Zimmerman, 1956; Guilford, 1959 in Maddi, pp. 365 - 377) shows empirical evidence that "an adequate peripheral theory of personality must realize its concrete peripheral characteristics content concerning a number of areas of human functioning" (p. 373).

Maddi concludes with discussion of the ideal composition of a "good" theory of personality (pp. 445 - 461). It must, he says, consist of an explanation of the core of personality, or what is common to people as individuals and part of the nature of the person, and provide for explanation of the tendencies of the core, and characteristics implied in the tendency. It must provide understanding of the peripheral personality, or that which is distinctive, learned, and cannot be subdivided. Differences in intensity and content must be clarified, and should be able to be quantitative. There should be consideration of the interaction of the core and periphery of personality, or how the core tendencies "come to be expressed" (p. 450) in the peripheral characteristics of personalities. Also, there should be "data language" (p. 450) specifying what the theory needs to explain, and how to observe and measure same.

Important issues arising from Maddi's work with respect to MPD concern needs and the satisfaction of those needs. Throughout the theories there appear to be human needs which require satisfaction in some way and to some

degree. This appears best done in some positive, encouraging, balanced, and forward-moving manner. If these needs are consistently thwarted and denied, the individual seems to develop coping mechanisms, which may be practical to survival and development of the individual in some ways, but could damage the development. MPD is thought to be a coping strategy. It may be wise to look upon it with respect for the intricacy of the developmental process.

We may accept that accounts of generalities and category can be given to explain ways we develop. Regarding the individual, what may be said of the context of his particular process. How does this person's relationship with himself and others shape who he is and who he becomes? How does this go awry? The next chapter will deal with the work of R. D. Laing, to explore these questions.

Chapter 3

How Do the Self and Others Form the Self? - The Work of R. D. Laing

Laing is examined in order to provide an appreciation of the person as a result of his or her interactions with others. With respect to MPD, it appears not enough to attempt to know the person in isolation. His or her context is essential to an understanding of him or her as a person. This idea is of educational importance, as well. Also, through an investigation of Laing, we may come to know how disorders may evolve as a result of this context.

Freud refers, in his account of Dr. Breuer's encounter with a young disturbed female in which the doctor used hypnosis and association, as the "talking cure" and "chimney sweeping" (Hutchins, 1952, pp. 2 - 3), and alludes to symptoms vanishing "permanently", thus "cured". A simplicity is implied here with which Laing takes position. He explains the complexity involved in the development of one's idea and relationship of the self with others, and in so doing, shows that disturbances in these ideas and relationships result over time and in many subtle and compound ways (Laing, 1960, 1962 & 1969).

Disturbances in the process cannot be therefore addressed in isolation from others and life circumstance, nor in the fashion of a "chimney sweeping".

Main ideas covered in this chapter concern three of the works of R.D. Laing: *The Self and Others*, *The Politics of the Family and Other Essays*, and *The Divided Self*. In the first, Laing examines the role of interpersonal relationships in development and the knowing of self. He highlights the complexity of the nature of the process, cautions that investigation must involve context, and involve a human aspect. As a second major idea, he warns that there is limitation in the knowing of ourselves, and the knowing of others, an idea especially important, he thinks, to incorporate in the perspective of the psychologist. Thirdly, he examines the manifestations of certain interactive

phenomena: phantasy, the "social phantasy system", false positions, illusion, collusion, positions, place, attributes and injunctions. Three key issues in *The Politics of the Family and Other Essays* are present in discussion of the role of family in development and knowing of self. He discusses the family as distinct from the "family"; the roles, operations and rules of the family; and medical versus social models of treatment. Again, there arises the sense of investigating within a context, and with a respect for the human and the multidimensional aspect necessary in any approach. *The Divided Self* examines the process through which splitting occurs. Three key ideas of this work also involve a multidimensional approach. The first advises that persons are beings in context, and that a multidimensional perspective is necessary in any approach to understanding. The role of security in the development of personality, and finally, the elements of a split, receive comment.

In *The Self and Others* (1962) he uses two sections to explain the experience of the person with himself and other people, and how the actions of the person consequently relate. He shows the realm of situations which affect the well-being and the reality of the person, and that disruptions in this reality or well-being are the complex results of many intricate, interrelated things. His discussion involves self, other selves, society, families, roles or positions in families and society and with others. It can be seen that an individual's disturbances then do not belong totally to the individual in a certain sense, nor can they be treated without consideration of a complex temporal, behavioral and interpersonal web.

He begins the discussion of ways we experience the world ("modes") with the premise that the best we may do as human beings is infer the experience that the self has of another person by observation and assignment of attributes to that behavior. The self assigns structures, laws, etc. to account for and

understand the meaning of the behavior for him. All he has is the same process to apply to others in his attempt to understand how it is that others see and experience him. This limitation prevents persons from being "outside" (p. 16) enough to objectively and scientifically analyze this experience from any other perspective except their own, and therefore, prevents persons from applying any scientific systematic criteria or structure to which he may draw all others, compare and identify. It prevents us from fully analyzing that which is happening to us, as we cannot be removed from ourselves, and so, even if we have a personal private relationship with self, we cannot allow that our interpretation of it is the total reality.

Laing cautions that analysts would do well to acknowledge that this is a limitation in the relationship they carry on with their clients, and therefore, be careful not to view statements and attributes made by themselves and other analysts as laws, or objective structures any more than they can be in human reality. Therefore, the observations and interpretations of us all, including analysts are restricted to our own experience.

The way in which we experience others and ourselves may be real, imaginary or "phantasy" (Chapter 1). He says that phantasy is a very basic way in which we experience ourselves in relation to ourselves and others, and is related by mental construct or mechanism to primary instinct. It is mostly unconscious, though, if subjected to reflection may not necessarily be, nor may it necessarily be all that is unconscious, and can be observed by another through inference of the meaning of observations (pp. 24 -26). There are structures of phantasy which Laing calls a "social phantasy system" (Chapter 2). When immersed in systems of groups' understanding of self, others, individuals and the group, individuals understanding and experience of themselves may be altered. The private world of the individual (as opposed to that which he shares

with others) consists of his individual perceptions and evaluation of those perceptions. A loss of these perceptions through the process of immersion in the social phantasy or the social mode of experience may come about, thus affording the person the loss of his identity, or his understanding of himself, others, and himself for others. He is (Laing, 1962 & Bion, 1955 in Laing 1962) through this loss, alienated or placed in a "false position". In other words, the way in which a group experiences itself and its members is social phantasy. If members' private phantasy of the experience is immersed in this, the private experience of the person is altered. He is alienated from himself because of the loss of his private experience and interpretation of that experience. If the member agrees to this process then he is rewarded with membership, though his experience may still be not his own, and therefore, not his reality; nevertheless, he contributes to the survival of the group. If a person begins to understand he has been placed in a position alienated from himself, and begins to perceive and express this state (a "derealization of the prior false sense of reality, and a re-realization of a new sense of reality") (p. 22), then he is in conflict with the group perception, and is on the "outside" . He is seen as different by the group, and is said to be "out of contact with reality" (p. 24).

Families can be nexus groups operating from social phantasy. Its members may never remove themselves from the system; may never rerealize a new reality, and therefore live in alienation from themselves. Its members can be placed in positions of conflict, and therefore live in untenable (no-win) states, or its members may only partly successfully perceive the reality of the situation for them, and therefore experience internal crisis in the internal conflict and distress.

When faced with a position of untenability, a person may attempt to act upon his position to make it more bearable for himself with the dismissal or

denial of reality and the creation of elusion. He may, for purposes of security (Sullivan in Laing, 1962, p. 36) or sincerity create a replacement reality with false, dramatized or histrionic actions. Dysfunction may arise from the person's relationship with his elusion, or imagined perception of reality. He speaks of Tillich's (1952, in Laing, 1962, p. 35) identification of three states of possible "non-being": the person faces ultimate meaninglessness as a spiritual being; faces ultimate condemnation as a moral being or ultimate annihilation or death as a biological being. Laing adds the fourth possibility and says that a person faces non-being when he experiences partial loss of "synthetic unity with self and concurrent loss of relatedness with the other", and is then placed in a state of chaotic non-entity and a loss of relatedness with other. This non-unity involves elusion of experience, and pretense of reality. If a person imagines himself away from reality and then back into it, he effectively is not experiencing the pure reality, and is creating something synthetic --- perhaps a "going through the motions" feeling that persons report. It is a simulation only of reality because of the double pretense involved in the removal from and the reentry into the original reality. He lives "behind an invisible veil which separates him from the naked apperception of the reality and the truth of the position he is in relation to himself and the other" (p. 29). A person may have greater sense of experience in imagined realities than in real ones. Using other real persons with whom to interact, he creates an imagined reality in which to interact with them, perhaps because the real reality "dissolves" his phantasy (p. 32).

To adapt to insecurity he may pretend to be what he is instead of being it. It may be that this is like the initial feeling that interns get when they first practice the practice of teaching or medicine or soldiering, before the feeling of being a "real" doctor, teacher, etc. grows. Perhaps there will be a lack of a sense of himself as the "agent of" his own actions and perceptions (p. 35).

He illustrates complexity in use of pretense and elusion as applied to the subject of masturbation, making the distinction between "good" or "honest" use of masturbation which occurs when there is no sexual alternative, and a "bad" or "dishonest" use of masturbation as a preference to reality (Sartre, 1952a in Laing, 1962, p. 42). Laing adds that masturbation can be very honest in another manner: If the person intends it as a private investigation of his real desires. He goes on to illustrate elusion and substitute experiences, saying that the masturbator can substitute experiences with the real person with masturbation, therefore making masturbation a counterfeit intercourse; or, in being with a real person can substitute a masturbatory "shadow" reality of that person, thus making intercourse a counterfeit masturbation.

He uses the dream of Rasklonikov (Dosto[y]evsky, 1951 in Laing, 1962, Chapter 5) to illustrate how phantasy can shut off or preclude realness, imprisoning the individual in phantasy, making it impossible to perceive reality.

Turning to discussion of interpersonal action, he begins with a caution against any structure which seeks to analyze through fragmentation of the person. He says that person's experiences often are fragmented, but that the parts of self cannot be separated out; that the person cannot be taken apart for inspection by "piece" because of the wholeness of the person, nor can the person, by reductivism, be associated with other processes such as comparison with animal behavior, for instance, because of the uniqueness of the person. If this is done, he warns, the human reality is lost in the process, that being that the person is a person with others and interactions. He addresses the concepts of complementarity, confirmation, collusion, existential position as a function of self and others, untenability, ambiguity and incompatibility.

That said, he goes on to show that persons' identities often depend upon others; that the identity can be actualized (good) or imposed (he gives the

example of the cuckolded husband). He says that between us there is the feature of complementarity by which the other fulfills or completes the self, biologically (as parent) or by choice, at many levels. Complementarity involves interaction of giving and receiving, and when this interaction is interrupted, hatred and envy occurs. Attempts to hurt or destroy the object of the hatred leaves the person with more emptiness. He uses the example of sexual gratification in this case, by explaining that part of the gratification involved is the knowledge that one has given the other pleasure, or has caused a change in the other. Should the other refuse to be gratified, then the ability to give has been taken from the other; the interaction of giving and receiving has been interrupted. Complimentarity has been made negative.

He proceeds with the notion that the identity one has for self is composed of the identity others have for him and the identity he ascribes to others. When one is young, one is what others say he is, but becomes more autonomous in the choosing of what he is as he becomes older. Sometimes, there is conflict in this choosing, and his sense of identity is disrupted. Dysfunction results. Shame occurs, he says, when there is a combination of frustration (when one must accept an identity one would rather not) and confusion (when collusion must occur to not talk about the incompatibility of the imposed identity). If the created identity is destroyed then all sense of reality is destroyed. The person must redefine reality, identity and self. He may "derealize" and "restructure" (pp. 82 - 83) his own experiences. Sometimes, collusion allows for smoothly running situations, causing them to appear normal, and attempts to express the conflict felt with imposed identities causes the appearance of disruption. What we perceive to be abnormal may well be the person's struggle for sanity and control of identity, and the opposite may be true. Laing illustrates this concept with use of case study, and says that there is psychosis in certain states of sanity, and an

"attempt at sanity" in certain madness (p. 87). We must be cautious in identifying what we perceive to be happening then, and be cognizant of the subtleties and layers of interpersonal action.

It is an aspect of humanity and human desire to be confirmed and to confirm others (Buber, 1957a in Laing, 1962, p. 88). Dysfunction and confusion are created when there is conflict in confirmation, such as when a child is confirmed for an action at one time, and disconfirmed for it at another (this characteristic is often found in the families of schizophrenics) (Speigel & Bell, 1959 in Laing 1962, p. 90), or when there is pseudo-confirmation. Pseudo-confirmation may be either pretend confirmation; confirmation of a false child which does not really exist; it may be the consistent subtle mutilation of the authenticity of the person or a failure to recognize the person as the agent of his own actions. It may be tangential, failing to endorse what the person actually says or does, where the reply is an inadequate fit for the statement. As it is not geared to the intention of the original statement, or as it emphasizes incidental, inconsequential statements not intended for confirmation, it has a frustrating effect (Reusch, 1958 in Laing, 1962, pp. 37 - 48). Conflict and confusion results, causing interruption in the individual's relationship with others and with himself as others see him. Reality is affected.

Involved with complementarity and confirmation is collusion, which is "mutual self-deception" (p. 98). If a person is involved in a relationship which is positive, collusion may feed the complementarity of one to the other. If counterfeit acts of confirmation or pretense occur, if there is mistrust and despair, then there is dysfunction in that the person's self-identity and his identity for the other person can be reactions of despair, anger, etc. Such collusion can fuel or bind the relationship, and "trap" the persons within. This happens when there is discrepancy between the persons' perception of the

compliment that is between them. The needs of the one may not fit the needs of the other, and the one may find the need to induce in the other the cooperation required to compliment as the one perceives the particular identity. This distorts the reality. A collusive dyad is created when the other will confirm the reality which the one is trying to make real, and will cement the phantasy. Persons' behavior must be considered then, in light of their relationship with others, and their perception of relationships with others. They are not isolated from others, and do not take shape in isolation.

Another caution issued by Laing to analysts is that to analyze in light of observable behavior alone is not complete, and that observations must be complimented by some attempt to understand the person's relationship to his own actions and the actions of others (which may enable him to place himself or cause him to be placed by the actions of others in an untenable position). He points out that if one is to make the effort to consider the relationship of the person to actions, than there is no structure of valid criteria with which to determine the meaning of same. He goes on then to explain the importance of person's understanding of experience, and dysfunction caused by disruptions in the truth of those understandings.

He distinguishes between two truths. There is the truth of natural science which is the structure by which we symbolize the reality of the world, and which involves the difference between the reality and the intellectual representation of that world, and the "Greek" truth (Heidegger, 1949, in Laing 1962, p. 120) which means "without veil or secrecy". This has importance to his topic because he states that the latter truth is the truth involved in "true to oneself", and involves concept of self and actions forthcoming consequently. He says that if a person's actions and words disclose his real self, then he may be

said to be genuine, but a person who has "never been disclosed to and/or confirmed by others" may turn to a false modeling of self-disclosure (p. 122).

A person for instance in a false position may despair, having lost the starting point from which to project himself into his future, of having a future, and therefore may purposefully intend not to be himself, and project that to everyone else. He may also choose to take the role of "outside observer" (p. 124), therefore not having to take responsibility for any actions. A person who has not been revealed to nor "seen" by others may adopt false modes of disclosure or substitutes for self-disclosure. Disruptions in the truth of who he sees himself to be, or in the truth of his reality may cause disruption or distortion in action. It would be necessary to acknowledge this in any investigation of behavioral disturbance.

In order for a person to fully understand truly and fully the experience of his position, he must understand the actions of others, his own actions and understand his understanding or phantasy of others; this, because the self can be placed into false or untenable positions by the actions of others. The space of the self is affected and molded by the influence of others all the time, by the necessity to have "place" or significance in the world of others for the dual purpose of giving and receiving gratification. Most people seek a "first" place (p. 128) in the world of another (for example, a spouse).

When understanding of that role is distorted, by either the self or another, dysfunction may result. Fears of never occupying a space for anyone, or of being expected to occupy the central space for everyone may result in paranoia. Persons then either seek a place or develop a delusional one. Laing (1960 in Laing 1962, p. 129) illustrates the case of a young man who responded to the negligence displayed by his parents by fearing that he would have to be so outrageous in order to attract attention and a place, that no one would want him

anyway, and therefore, became a "nobody" by choice, shameful that he made no difference to anyone.

The place for the other may be distorted, and Laing speaks of several ways this can occur: processes creating schizogenesis; double binds; and a biological theory. The person's position may be rendered untenable by others.

Searles (1959 in Laing 1962, Chapter 12) explains how the position of the other may be rendered untenable and refers to the process as "driving the other crazy", a process, he points out, that may be intentional but is mostly an unconscious process for both the person and the other who is placed in the position of untenability. Schizogenesis occurs, says Searles, when conflict is created: if attention is drawn to areas of the other is only dimly aware, which are in direct conflict with the view the other holds of himself; when stimulation (sexual for example) is initiated under circumstances which make it impossible for gratification to take place; when simultaneous exposure to stimulation and frustration, or to rapidly alternating stimulation and frustration is initiated; when the person relates to the other at unrelated levels, or switches the emotional wave length while on the same topic, or conversely switches the topic to an inappropriate one while on the same wavelength. In other words, dissension is created when areas in direct opposition to one another are stimulated. Laing extends the discussion of conflict to include "conflict which fosters confusion" about who the person or the other is or about the situation, and makes distinction between integrative, "authentic" conflict and disintegrative "inauthentic" conflict. When there is conflict and confusion, doubt about the person or the situation's definition, then there is "interpersonal disjunction" (p. 133).

The ultimate confusion occurs when no matter what meaning he gives the situation, his feelings are invalidated, when his own acts are "stripped of

motives, intentions or consequences" (p. 135), and/or when the situation is robbed of meaning for him. This having occurred, the person is in an untenable position, and is obliged to comply with the other person's view of him.

Double bind situations are noted as common patterns in the lives of schizophrenics, and are thought to be capable of developing schizophrenia if they are very specific and intense. A double bind process develops when there exists a victim person and one or more others in a situation where there is a repeated habitual expected experience (not necessarily traumatic). Learned punishment avoidance occurs when a primary negative injunction is implied or stated [do / do not do or punishment (withdrawal of love, abandonment, etc.) will result]. Conflict follows when a secondary injunction is implied or stated which is in opposition to the first injunction (damned if you do and damned if you don't situation), but related to it. Frustration follows this when a tertiary injunction then is involved, prohibiting escape (a promise of love or threatened annihilation, for example). The victim perceives the universe in terms of double bind patterns precipitating responses such as panic or rage (Bateson *et al* 1956 in Laing, 1962, pp. 137 - 138).

In the biological theory (Bowlby, 1958 in Laing 1962, pp. 142 - 143) it is proposed that a human child will take flight from danger to the mother, but when the parent (mother) is in some way tense, she transmits this to the child physically or psychologically, causing stress, and therefore becomes an unpleasant danger herself. The child, more frightened, clings harder, but finds more danger the harder he clings, creating a vicious circle of instinctual response systems in the human which does not meet an appropriate terminating response, thereby creating anxiety.

Laing concludes the work with discussion of further types of ambiguous and incompatible attributions and injunctions which serve to place persons in

situations that are false, untenable, in conflict or confusing, thereby extending understanding of the complexity of human distress and dysfunction. He discusses attributes and injunctions.

The purpose of attributes is for the definition of a person by an other, to place him or put him in a position. Though some attributes can be tested, many cannot, and the motives and intentions of the first person may become trapped in the definitions and attributes of an other, thus creating conflict or a false sense of the person's reality or understanding of himself. If the attributes of another are taken as imperatives, the person may experience guilt at non-compliance with these attributes. Laing distinguishes between this guilt (calling it a "false guilt") and a true guilt which involves the obligation one has to oneself to actualize.

Distress may occur when two mutually exclusive roles are attributed simultaneously to be executed simultaneously, having the same effect as an injunction. An example used by Laing is the directive to "be spontaneous".

Firth (1957 in Laing 1962, pp. 153 - 157) discussed ways in which language can subtly imply attribute or injunction, and render the implication unable to be validated or invalidated through its subtlety, thus creating conflict and confusion. Ostensive statements may be used as injunctions, facts as implied threats or attributes, accusations may be concealed in sympathy, orders may be implied in statements of fact, and so on. These types of statements are easy to deny, difficult to label as an attack and may be used as a collusive alliance by a social nexus against anyone who implies threat to the existence of the group. Contradictory attributions have a double bind effect, and if there is attempt to break the double bind, then badness or madness is implied. The statement "Paranoid people are right" has been used in various social situations as a joke, but in light of Laing's attention to these types of linguistic subtleties,

may be more fact than funny. Finally, he says that the withholding of attributions is not seen as an attack, but can strip the person's behavior of intent, purpose or any agency at all.

In *The Politics of Family and Other Essays* (1969), Laing again sets out to show that the development of the person is interrelated in a highly complex manner with other individual, with networks of individuals and with each other individual's understand and interpretation of the interrelatedness occurring, in addition to the relationship with the self and the self understanding. This also takes place over time, and in ever-changing, ever-evolving situations.

Therefore, dysfunctions which develop in development are subject to extremely intricate paths of investigation, are not ostensibly validated, and are not with a structure of infallible and immovable solid criteria by which to evaluate them. In understanding Laing's point of view, any idea of "quick fix" notions involving personal development and dysfunction are cast aside as ludicrous.

In the first section of his work, Laing defines "family" as distinct from family to be involved in a set of operations which are reciprocal, and which are its life. He speaks of intervention in family dysfunction and distinguishes the social process of ongoing understanding of the "story of" the family and intervention from the medical model of more structured, isolated identification and intervention. He examines the family in the social context, discussing the behavior of the family in the context of the family, in the context of the larger society and points out that sometimes families and individual within those families have to go through a process which appears to be psychotic in order to transform itself from mystification. In forcing a return to "normalcy", he says, sometimes psychiatry hinders the family, and prevents the transformation.

In the second part of the work, he examines the roles, operations and rules which maintain the family, and which are the functions by which it lives. He

talks about how invalidation occurs, the operations used to insure membership in the family (social nexification mentioned in *The Self and Others*), the rules and metarules by which the family and its members exist, and how these rules are mapped (projected) interpersonally, interfamilially and between family and society.

"The Family" to which he refers (as distinct from the family) is the internalized family of the members involving a set of reciprocal relations and operations between the people in the family that make it a "family". He explains the constructs of the "family" in terms of fantasy (having defined previously fantasy as the intellectual set of symbols by which we understand the real world), in terms of transformation and externalization, and as a defensive function. As fantasy or the way in which it intellectualizes the real experience, the family is a system, internalized by its members. The system is composed of sets of elements which have certain relations and operations between them, which are different for inside the family than outside of it. The system is internalized when the members map the outer elements into an inner set of constructs and begin to define the selves by these constructs, and begin to allow actions to be functions of the constructs and position within family. The internal group may condition a person's relation to self. The group itself is internalized and the operations of the group repeat in the selves of the group. The group presence exists as a family as long as each member has it inside himself, and so as a defensive function it preserves itself against disintegration or the infiltration of other family constructs by new members (in-laws, for instance). Not only does each member internalize the "family", but there is reciprocal internalization of each other's internalization of the concept of family, so as to preserve through change over time. This reciprocal mapping of the family of each member onto the common family allows for the nexification of the group. It can be seen then,

that to attempt to identify problems and dysfunction of one member of a family is an impotent gesture unless one undertakes to understand the story of the family, which may never be able to be done because the group is closed against such infiltration. Acknowledgment of the complexity of the familial situation is imperative in understanding personal problems of the members. Given the operations in place discussed in Laing's aforementioned work, the struggle of the individual who may clash with the "phantasy" of the family which is in conflict or in confusion, thus making positions of the member untenable or false or negated, is an almost overwhelming one in terms of intricacy and elaborateness. When conflict and dysfunction occur, intervention is undertaken in many instances. Laing discusses the medical model upon which much intervention is based, saying that it is the medical model of a social situation, construing the situation through a structured definition of what it may be. Instead, he says, the complicated network must be examined for the story of its history, environment, interactions, linguistics, and other intricacies, in order to understand the individual therein. The difference, he says, between the social and the medical diagnosis is that the training is in a sequential process of treatment after investigation and diagnosis, whereas in the social intervention the professional meets the situation in a reciprocal relationship which overlaps, tolerates change and redefinition, and in which intervention is phasic. The social situation (the "family") cannot be approached with a medical process.

Laing discusses the family in social contexts with respect to treatment of schizophrenia, indicating primarily that no one can really agree upon what schizophrenia is, venturing that sometimes when attributes of schizophrenia are ascribed, then schizophrenic behavior is induced, thereby affirming the diagnosis. He ponders that if some behavior is said to "cause" schizophrenia, then to what extent does schizophrenia "cause" subsequent behavior; how

much does the symptomology of a disease increase as the person is treated as if diseased (pp. 46 - 47). He ventures that the behavior of the schizophrenic, in light of his discussion of groups and families and their influence upon individual perception of reality and development of the individual, is much more intelligible if placed in the context of the environment in which it exists. Rationality begins to surface as the family context of the schizophrenic is investigated. Irrationality is often the child of an irrational network (Speck, 1966 in Laing, 1969, p. 50).

Cooper (1967, in Laing, 1969, p. 50) indicates that perhaps the environment of treatment enhances schizophrenic behavior, that because the person may be in hospital he is therefore treated as a "patient", i.e. one who is sick, and therefore, perhaps behaves more like "one who is sick".

Consequently, if one is treated in a home-like environment in an everyday manner, behavior rises to meet the inherent expectations of such an environment. Bateson (1961 in Laing, 1969, pp. 50 - 52) suggests that perhaps transformations are a natural growth, or evolution up out of conflict, and that they would be best left to go on unhindered if psychiatrists were not consulted.; that there is a sequence of events through which a person must transform, regress and then grow again. If a process is introduced (psychiatric, for example) which may "stick or stop the person from proceeding through the transformation. When this occurs the schizophrenic may not know how to move ahead. He submits that the term "schizophrenia" itself may be restrictive.

Laing begins the second part of his work with consideration of the family and invalidation. He says that families are structures which are products of behaviors and experience, perhaps unknown to those who generate and perpetuate it. Certain adherence must be made for the survival of the family. Events which happen with persons are composed of the experience of the person of the event (which Laing refers to as "A") (pp. 68 - 74), and the public

view of the event ("B"). He uses the example of Jack and Jill marrying to illustrate his point, saying that the marriage involves the feeling of married and the public marriage ceremony or ritual. "A", he says is "mapped" onto "B" (which he says is the function of ritual in the family). If A fits B, and both the getting married and the feeling married are reality, then all is well. If, however, one's experience of married does not match the event which took place, then it becomes necessary to disavow the experience, or invalidate it to preserve the marriage. If the self disavows "A" and takes refuge in "B" (i.e., there was a ceremony so it must be real, therefore the being married is the reality and the not feeling married is not reality) then there is disavowal and excommunication of the reality of the felt experience. If the individual cannot tailor A to fit B, then he is seen as in need of help, and perhaps a psychiatrist or therapist is called. The message is that if the public explanation of the event cannot be accepted, then labeling takes place. Invalidation of the experience of self occurs. The personal dysfunction is a retreat to a more intricate external situation.

In order for families to survive, its members must internalize its fantasies and its structures; must become and maintain certain "ways". Families employ certain techniques in order to mold its members to suit the understood definition of that particular "family"; they often employ them unconsciously. Sets of elements or relations may be projected or mapped onto an individual which may temporarily or eventually permanently maintain or alter him. Laing gives the example of members internalizing that "Johnny is the image of his grandfather" (p. 77). These projections are of little use unless the individual complies in their "truth", and so, members are induced to embody these projections or maps, to "become" this entity. The person is induced by use of attributes which are told to the person (he is told what he is; i.e. Johnny is the

smart one, etc.); by instruction, or by injunction (order to behave in ways that are like what is desired).

One generation "projects to the next, elements derived from a product of at least three factors: what was 1) projected into it by prior generations 2) induced in it by prior generations 3) its response to this projection and induction" (p. 77). If an individual begins to find himself in conflict with these projections, mappings and induction [Laing refers to the process as awakening "from an induced trance" (p. 82)], he may find himself to be in a situation of transition, and may either be identified as crazy by the family or fear he is crazy. Because of the complexity of the projection and induction process, because the process is very smoothly, and often unconsciously run, and because it exists temporally through generations, families are difficult to study, and individual problems are difficult to "see" in terms of the context of the family. It may be tempting, for these reasons, to treat them in isolation.

James quotes Hagel (p. 89) as saying that the world "is a unity of the given and the constructed"; that is to say, a unity of what is experience and what is made from it. A person meets what is given, and construes it in terms of distinctions or categories, according to rules. He performs operations on his experience in order to comply with the rules. Experience is categorized according to good / bad, real / unreal, inside / outside experience, myself / not myself, etc. Normally, this helps him to understand the world and helps his experience to make sense.

If difficulties arise with the categories of good / bad, for example, the person will perform certain operations upon the categories to conform, to normalize his experience: through introjection, he places what is outside of him, inside; through projection, places what is inside of him, outside. In psychoanalysis, these operations are called defense mechanisms, and also

include denial, splitting (the division of a set of categories into two subsets with no traffic between), which appears to be the opposite of identification (the merging of two separate sets of categories as one); displacement or "taking out on"; scotomization (not seeing); replacement; rationalization; repression; regression; mystification or misidentification; and reversal ("I hate him because he hates me) (pp. 95 - 96).

The operations are necessarily performed to normalize experience. If an experience ought to be pleasant, then it is operated upon to make it so; if the experience, says Laing, is forbidden, then it is sacrificed for a higher value, all of these in ways that are for the most part, unconscious. The rules of families may require this process of operation, and this requirement demands another requirement that all members co-operate. A "transpersonal system of collusion" (p. 97) is then developed, in which the person is complying with others who comply with him, etc.

Systems of rules and metarules (rules about rules) are also present in the family structure and offer opportunity for conflict between and within persons. Values are the starting point, and are labeled positive or negative, optional or neutral, and are involved in appropriate times for all expressions of these values. When positive values are mapped onto a positive range, then there is support. If negative values are mapped onto a negative range then there is support. If cross-mapping occurs (positive values to negative range / negative values to positive range) then there is conflict. There are rules about rules, rules involving experience, rules about attributes, about knowing about rules, about situations, what can be spoken about and what rules can be spoken about. Metarules involve times, where, when, to whom, in what context what is verbal and non-verbal and what can be thought about. A vast field of possible conflict and disruption exists.

The system of "mapping" is involved in family dynamics, and takes place when elements and relations between elements from one set of categories (domain) are mapped onto the elements and relations between elements of another set of categories (range). Elements can be mapped set to set or set to itself. Families project (send elements) and map elements outside of themselves from themselves; from outside to themselves, and within from themselves to themselves. Processes of induction are present when sets of elements are received having been sent by another; processes of introjection take place when sets of elements are received, having been sent by self. Processes of projection, re-projection and re-re-projection, etc. take place. It is important, when looking at individual to be aware of and to understand how the content of these processes exist, how the structure of the processes are designed, and the techniques employed.

With every explanation of process offered, the complexity of human conflict becomes more evident. It becomes impossible to look at individual conflict and dysfunction out of these contexts; impossible to imagine approaching them in an isolated, quick fashion. Any process which attempts to deal with dysfunction in this way should be suspect.

This focus is maintained throughout *The Divided Self* (1960). An existential - phenomenological attempt to explain the nature of the experience of a person with the world and the self should be found within the context of the person. Consequently, an explanation of the nature of a split in the personality ought to be sought in the context of the person. He says that the language of psychology further isolates an individual already isolated; though necessary to understanding the predicament of the individual, should not be used exclusively. The manner in which a person is perceived determines the type of information forthcoming, and therefore, a human perspective is necessary. A purely

psychopathological account of "depersonalization and disintegration" (p. 23) only serves to perpetuate dualism, and a way must be sought to discover the patient's way of "being himself in this world" (p. 25). In order to achieve this, the patient's way of being must be appreciated and it must be understood that both separateness and relatedness are essential to being.

Understanding psychosis from an existential - phenomenological perspective avails a different perspective: instead of seeing schizophrenia in negative terms (i.e. maladjustment), one may interpret that the schizophrenic perhaps sees things that others do not. Instead of seeing "signs of a disease" (p. 31), one may see sense in the actions of the schizophrenic as related to his feelings. If the person's actions are purely seen as functions of a disease or as functions of his past, the understanding of him may be restricted. He must be understood with an attitude of human caring.

Laing says that we should discover who the person is for him, who he is for the other and who the other thinks he is: the degree of "conjunction or disjunction" regarding these, between two people when one is "sane by common consent", tests "sanity or psychosis" (p. 36). In all of us is the desire to reveal ourselves to others, and the desire to conceal, the latter desire exacerbated by vulnerability.

Laing outlines the process of the splitting of the person, beginning with the concept of security, defenses against a threatened security, and the creation of new "selves". In the presence of *Primary Ontological Security*, a person feels their presence as alive, whole and continuous through time; in addition, he sees others and the world as so (p. 39). When this security is absent, ordinary life experiences are a threat to the person, and because others are not perceived to be this way, he cannot share his experience of life with others. Anxiety results, of which, there are three types. Engulfment anxiety occurs when there is no

state except either complete aloneness or complete engulfment. Every relationship (being seen, loved, understood, etc.) threatens loss of identity. Though isolation is painful, engulfment is perceived as deadly. Implosion anxiety occurs when the person feels empty, but because this is the identity of the person, contact would be implosive and destructive. Depersonalization or petrification anxiety exists when there is dread of being turned to stone. Constant confirmation of the self as a person is necessary. Paradoxically, the characteristics of these three anxieties can be employed to prevent the anxieties. The person, in turning himself to stone, in engulfing himself, consuming himself with love or depersonalizing others may prevent him from being so changed by others. However, this consequently increases the insecurity, and the vicious circle continues. If the person cannot feel autonomous, he cannot feel related either. Conversely, he may also use complete merging as a defense as well.

How is security related to a split? Security breeds a feeling of unity; conversely, insecurity exacerbates the anxieties and the defenses, breeding disunity between the mind and the body, with the person usually more associated with the mind. An embodied person feels in the body; feels a sense of unity, aliveness, vitality and substance. His body is the base of reference for his experiences and relationships between himself and others. A person experiencing disunity, experiences feelings of detachment, wherein his body is just another object in a world of objects and is outside himself as opposed to being his own being. His inner "true" (mind) self looks on and observes his body or "false self"; a relationship is set up between the two as two entities, and he therefore does not experience the world in reality. The body does the experiencing, the impersonating, while the true self observes in a hyper-conscious manner, and is experienced as a mental entity. Any attempt to be

autonomous is therefore, futile, as it is only a mental construct. It objectifies itself and others or is indifferent for safety's sake, and therefore cannot be enriched by the outer world or by others and becomes impoverished. The more the self is defended this way, the more, paradoxically, it is destroyed (p. 77).

The split, then, consists of two elements: the mental, or unembodied self which is the executor of functions of the second element - the false self system. The false self system is that housed in the body, and is involved with body experiences and actions. The mental or unembodied self is dissociated, a condition normal in life for most. In situations of danger, for instance, it is natural to depersonalize until the danger has passed. The distinction involved in schizoid dissociation is in its function as a basic "orientation to life" (p. 79) in response to the perception of life as a threat, as opposed to a temporary coping device. All actions are delegated to this false self, and the world cannot therefore be experienced in a real way, and therefore, is unreal. This situation exacerbates the emptiness felt by the person, making matters worse. Laing (p. 82) illustrates the normal personal relationship involving the self and body together interacting with the "other" or other things and people in the world. The relationship of the individual having undergone the split is such that the self stands apart, interacting with the body and the world and considering them both outside as such: (self / body) \leftrightarrow other; self \leftrightarrow (body + other).

The isolation of the self has been set up as a means for control and protection against both the fear of love destroying them, and their love destroying others. Since the reality of the self in the world comes from the relationship between the self and the world, the isolated self experiences emptiness, and therefore may create another split in the inner unembodied self, setting up a relationship with the self, to mitigate the emptiness. The freedom and control of the isolated self has been only a phantasy. The person, at the

same time he creates the isolation, may "long for and envy" (p. 91) what he imagines that others have, but he cannot participate without the overwhelming loss to himself (engulfment, implosion, petrification) and therefore, out of this conflict arises devastating fear, anxiety and guilt.

The second element of the schizoid condition is the false self system of which the body is the center, and operates in response to the direction of the inner or unembodied "true" self. All persons have, to some degree, "masks", and operate to some degree in mechanical state or role; the person who has split, however, requires the process to survive, even if the state makes the person miserable. It is seen by the person as a separate entity. The false self may respond to the will of others, complying (being whatever the other wants of it, i. e. perfectly "good" or perfectly "bad") out of fear of the consequences of being his true self. He, in concealing the possibilities of his true self, also restricts and denies them. There is, according to Laing, hatred involved for this necessity, but the hatred cannot be directly revealed lest it upset the compliance, and so subtle expressions of the hatred may occur in such actions as deliberate or compulsive, total or partial, temporary or permanent impersonation of the hated person, or exaggerated compliance (p. 100). He may develop a whole system of impersonations, and may use them to evoke from others the hatred he himself cannot express. The inner self may hate the caricature (s) if it (they) take over, and if there is too much threat from the caricature, the inner self may strip the self of all behavior (catatonic withdrawal) (p. 105). He may, as well, suddenly unveil the false self entirely, revealing the true self, which has during the process of the splitting, been accommodating the split condition with increasingly insane methods, and so, when revealed, reflects this.

Self - consciousness consists, according to Laing, of the awareness of oneself by oneself, and the awareness "of oneself as an object of someone else's observation" (p. 106). Both are related, and in the person experiencing the split, there is an enhanced awareness of both the self for the self and the self as the object of the attention of others. This awareness is compulsive, and needed to sustain the security of his existence. It serves as a way of making sure he and others exist, but at the same time, this visibility is an exposure to danger, and so he tries to make himself more detached and invisible, which is in conflict with the need to be seen to secure the truth of his existence. Both states are then dreaded, making a precarious dilemma. He may split once more in order to allow part of himself to see himself, but this again sets up the dilemma in that the part seeing is feared to persecute.

Laing sees the sane schizoid individual as distinct from the psychotic one in the progress of the process of increasingly elaborate means required to maintain the false self system, which increasingly damage the person. The need for autonomy and reality are in conflict; the more the identity is preserved, the more it is lost. The person is therefore anything he wishes in "phantasy ... nobody in reality" (p. 142). Compliance may increase to a state of belief in actual possession by or of others, and "magical" (p. 145) ways of acquiring reality may be adopted (such as touching, copying, imitating or 'stealing'). The person may subject himself to pain or terror in order to feel, or may reveal the real self (which has not been in touch with reality through the process of the split) suddenly. He may try to "kill" his real self, as a defense or through guilt, by denying it. The logic here is if the self is "killed" it cannot be destroyed. The inner self, in this "killing" may become itself split, losing its identity and integrity. The person may approach "a state - of - death " in life (p. 176).

As the basic split fails to do the trick, the process increases in complexity reaching the status which Laing refers to as "chaotic nonentity" (p. 162), in which the person displays unusual order of speech and actions, perhaps to confuse others to preserve its own secrecy; in trying to be outside of everything, has become someone who doesn't know "who or what he is" or who "has become something or someone other than himself" (p. 172).

To simplify the analysis of the situation then, to remove it from the individual human context, is to miss the understanding of the complexity of fears and insecurities precipitating the phenomena.

We may accept that the investigation of a person's thoughts, and the processes necessarily involve a respect for diversity, context, and a range of factors. Behavior resulting from the thinking processes are complex, and deserve a recognition of this fact in any attempt at understanding. Laing has provided insight regarding the role of others, both in society in general, and those others deemed significant to the person.

If we consider Laing's ideas when examining MPD, we may find several important issues. It seems fragmented to investigate the person in isolation. The person is a part of a whole story, a whole family and a whole society. To examine the phenomenon of MPD, one must include related others, their relationships with the person, the rules of that relationship, etc. These are all important to a broader and closer understanding of the person. Absolute understanding appears impossible. This is a critical view with respect to education as well, whether dealing with persons exhibiting MPD characteristics, or any other student.

Sexuality is also involved in MPD literature. To understand some of the nature of sexuality and its role in the development of personality, the work of Sigmund Freud will be discussed.

Chapter 3

Personality and Sexual Development - The Work of Sigmund Freud

Research on Multiple Personality Disorder has suggested a correlation with abuses (Ross & Miller *et al*, 1991; Wilbur, *Multiple Personality and Child Abuse: An Overview*, Kluft, 1987; Curtis & Fraser, Fifth Draft, F3 - 31 #5; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Rivera, 1991; Curtis, 1988; Frye, Nov., 1990), sexual abuse being one type (remembering that correlation cannot be confused with causation). Freud provides us with the idea that sexuality in a broader sense, concerning pleasure needs, is incorporated thoroughly and throughout our lives, from infancy. Our sexuality is involved in our general needs, in ways in which those needs are satisfied or not satisfied. Damage done to the developing personality involves satisfaction or deprivation related to needs, and it is therefore that damage done relates to sexuality. Therefore, it would be appropriate to address the process of sexual development as related to personality development in the discussion of the disorder. A mature, balanced personality necessarily involves a mature, balanced sexuality. It is wise to understand the nature of sexuality as it relates to one's entire life span, and the importance of healthy needs satisfaction, if we are to understand the student as a whole, at any given age. It is especially important to understand sexuality as it relates to MPD for a more complete appreciation of the phenomenon.

This chapter will commence with discussion of general ideas surrounding Freud's work, most importantly to this topic, the impact of sexuality as related to the development of the personality. His theory of personality will be reviewed, involving discussion of the id, the ego and the superego, and how psychic energy is concerned with them. Regarding the role of conflict, next addressed in this chapter, issues of balance, growth and problems will be examined. Finally, the role and development of sexuality will be considered.

Convinced that the sexual process originated early in life, was life-long, and had impact upon human behavior and experience, Sigmund Freud (1856 - 1939) suggested that "...neurotic anxiety arose from sexual sources...[and] ...had a physical basis in dammed-up sexuality" becoming converted to anxiety through repression (Roazen, 1973, p. 5) According to Freud in "Sexuality and the Aetiology of the Neuroses" (Freud in Strachey, 1953, 22 : 263, in Roazen, 1973, p. 5) "...the most significant causes of every case of neurotic illness are to be found in factors arising from sexual life". His personality theory was unique in that it allowed for an unprecedented notion of infantile sexuality, already formed in the child by the age of four or five, the ensuing years just bringing "to light what is already within him" (Freud in Strachey, 1953, 16: 356, in Roazen, 1973, p.6).

In his *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1901 - 1905, in Stafford-Clark, 1966, p. 105) Freud gives an account of neuroses, repression and the libido associated with sexuality.

Influenced by Darwin, Fechner and von Helmholtz (Hall, 1954, pp. 11 - 21), Freud accepted that man was a being of nature whose mind could be studied scientifically, and whose energy could be quantified. He created a "dynamic" psychology involving the study of the "transformation and exchanges of energy within the personality" (p. 13), developing a theory of personality and sexual development.

What is the structure of the personality? According to Freud, the personality is organized into three systems: the id, the ego and the superego, which, when balanced in their efforts, result in adjustment; when in conflict, result in maladjustment.

The id is a reflex apparatus which operates on the pleasure principle, results in impulse and deals in the realm of phantasy. It is unconscious,

instinctual, and has no values, nothing corresponding to time or space or category. It has no idea, no organization and is the mental expression of somatic processes (Freud, 1932 in Hutchins, 1952, p. 837) Its energy is from the instincts of the body; it exists to alleviate tension produced by need. It releases energy through impulsive motor activity (such as sneezing), and through creating image of that which is required to fulfill the need when the immediate motor release is not sufficient (as with hunger). This creation of image is subjective, and is known as the primary process or wish fulfillment (Hall, 1954, pp. 22 - 31).

When the id fails to satisfy needs with motor response, it creates image and wish fulfillment. Since it cannot tell the difference between real objects and images, and since the image of a necessary object (food for hunger) does not satisfy the need, something further is required. The ego is developed up out of the id for this purpose, using energy from the id (Hall, 1954, pp. 22 - 31). It is a perceptual conscious system which mediates the external and internal (Freud in Hutchins, 1952, p. 838) The ego operates on the reality principle, and solves problems in the real world to acquire for the id that which it demands. This process is called the secondary process. The ego uses reason, logic and a knowledge of the real world to set a plan of action to solve the problem. The ego uses its energy to serve the needs of the id, to master the impulses of the id, and to improve its own skills of memory, logic and knowledge of reality (Hall, 1954, pp. 22 - 31). In many respects the ego of one person forms like that of another (usually the parent) through identification with that person (Freud in Hutchins, 1952, p. 832).

The world reacts to the operations of the ego in the world, with either punishment or reward, and a part of the ego splits to deal with this reaction. It is called the super-ego, and is formed from experiences with parents and other

models (Freud in Hutchins, 1952, pp. 830-833). Controlling the domain of morality, it has two subsystems: the ego - ideal, resulting from praise, leading to pride and self-love (secondary narcissism); and conscience, resulting from punishment, leading to guilt, inferiority and self-hate. It enforces physical and psychological punishment and reward on the system as a parent would. Where the id operates upon wishes and phantasy, and the ego in reality, the super-ego operates upon the ideal (Hall, 1954, pp. 22 - 31).

How does the structure operate? The driving force operating the subsystems is the psychic energy, or energy from the instincts [in the broader sense, the libido (Hall, 1954, p. 59)]. Psychic energy is transformed bodily energy for the psychologic purpose of reducing tension either directly, to fuse instincts, to compromise or to defend. Two instincts exist for the person: those of life (body needs and sexual instincts) and death (aggression and destruction). The energy used in the life instincts, or the libido (used in the more general sense), is taken by the ego to serve the body needs and to transform the death instincts to those more appropriate for life (for example, changing aggression to competition). The seat of the instinct is the id which provides the whole system with the energy to move the being from a state of tension to a state of relaxation, or non-tension. The instinct has a source (needs); an aim (removal of need); and object (means by which need is removed); and an impetus (force). It is characterized by conservatism (move to relaxation), regression (return to pre-need state) and repetitiveness.

The psychic energy is distributed throughout the system. When completed in a smooth and balanced manner, there is an efficient use of the limited energy creating a synthesized system and a mature ego. Each part of the system uses the energy in a different manner. When the id needs, it invests the energy in a reflex action or in the creation of an object choice or object

cathexis to fulfill that need. If that object does not fulfill the need, the energy is used to travel from one object to another to locate the fulfillment, a process known as displacement. Not able to differentiate, it equates one object with another (predicate thinking). Its energy is also used to break through restrictions created by the ego (impulsive and wanting the ego to see what the id wishes) to discharge itself in phantasy or action. When this occurs, reality has been lost (Hall, 1954, 39 - 48).

The ego uses energy to satisfy the id safely, to restrain the id by postponing or blocking the discharge of the id (anti-cathexis) and to synthesize the three systems. It checks reality (Freud in Hutchins, 1952, p. 838), changes wish fulfillment to logical thought, and chooses objects to fulfill needs (ego-cathexis). It uses energy also to develop memory, discrimination, judgment, etc. It sees what is realistic.

The superego creates the ego-ideal or the conscience, which denies the id as opposed to postponing its discharge, concerning itself with goodness and badness as opposed to truth and falseness. Very young children are amoral, with no superego developed (Freud in Hutchins, 1952, p. 833). It seems to operate against the id, but the id can satisfy itself by turning the superego against itself through self-aggression, or through masking true motives (ultra-moralism masking cruelty). The superego wishes the ego to see what should be - the moral ideal. (Hall, 1954, pp. 46 - 49).

Conflict created in the operation of the three systems result in frustration, anxiety and coping mechanisms (defenses), some of which are positive to the person and some of which distort and are negative for the individual. What precipitates frustration? The superego and the ego may block the discharge of tension, causing internal frustration (*versus* external frustration as the result of privation or deprivation). The process is known as anti-cathexis, concerns either

the id - ego or the ego - superego, and operates in the execution of repression. If anti-cathexis opposes a thought, then the memory is repressed, and no conscious memory of the thing exists. This is opposed to forgetting, which takes place when the force to remember is weak, causing memory to not occur in the first place. Repression occurs with experiences of pain, and those associated with pain forcing them to the realm of the unconscious, which Freud defines as "what is unknown" (Hall, 1954, p. 56). We are not directly aware of that which is unconscious, but we know of it in that we are "obliged to assume...[it, because we]...infer it in some way from its effects" (Freud in Hutchins, 1952, p. 835).

Painful emotions resulting from the excitation of internal organs is known as anxiety, and alerts the person to danger. Either the ego handles the anxiety or is overwhelmed by it, creating a nervous breakdown. Three kinds of anxiety exist: reality anxiety (fear of real things); neurotic anxiety (fear of the object - choice of the id) and moral anxiety (fear of the superego and punitive effects). When experiences are overwhelming, a trauma occurs, which reduces the person to helplessness, which are the origins of all fears (Hall, 1954, pp. 61 - 69).

The earliest experiences of life, according to Freud, can be traced to the adult personality (Stafford - Clark, 1966, p. 116). Coping mechanisms designed to alleviate anxiety and conflict in the person become stabilized over the course of the person's life, resulting in a personality type. How does the personality develop?

Maturity, external frustration, internal conflict, perceived personal inadequacies and anxiety all initiate change in the personality. Methods used to resolve conflict are employed. The person may identify with or incorporate the qualities of an object or person in a narcissistic way (wanting to be the object); in a goal-oriented way (identifying with someone achieving the goals desired by the

person); in a way that substitutes for a loss (becoming like that which is lost or that which rejects); or out of fear (identification with the aggressor). The individual may displace, or substitute another object for that desired, or he may deflect or sublimate the desire to another object (Hall, 1954, pp. 72 - 85).

Problems of the individual are either solved or reality is distorted and falsified by means of defense mechanisms (Hall, 1954, pp. 85 - 96; Stafford - Clark, 1966, pp. 44 - 45; Bruner in Roazen, 1973, p. 28). Generally, these mechanisms, especially if used in excess to respond to overwhelming circumstances, waste energy and are dangerous if allowed to dominate the individual's behavior.

Conflict may be dealt with by repression, seated within the ego, but possibly instigated by the superego. Primal repression is that of the race of mankind, as seen in taboos against incest. Repression proper is the individual barring or disguised discharge of a dangerous memory or idea, especially those traumatic or associated with trauma. It is a necessary mechanism, but is damaging when used exclusively to problem solve.

In the course of projection, the causes of anxiety are foisted upon the external world, and justified in the transformation of a neurotic or moral fear to one of supposed reality. Masking of reactions (as opposed to substitution) is called reaction formation, and conceals the true reaction of the person. It distorts reality, and wastes energy.

When fears of failure, insecurity and punishment overwhelm, immobilization may occur in the form of fixation at a certain stage in one's life (infancy, childhood, adolescence or adulthood); in the form of fixation upon certain objects; or in the form of fixation at certain developmental stages in the personality (i.e. wishful thinking). Regression is in the same arena, but rather than involving a failure to move on, is performed by a running back after certain

stages have been passed, to a previous stage. Any departure from the rational is considered regression.

What is the role of sexuality?

Freud attributed young children with a sexual nature, naming it infantile sexuality (Freud in Hutchins, 1952, pp. 119 - 152; Stafford - Clark, 1966, p. 107), proposing that the causes of many conflicts in later life were originated in the sexual nature. Inferiority, for instance, he submitted, had a "strong erotic basis, in that the child feels unloved, transferring the parental rejection or loss to the superego, which expressed the "unloved" in guilt, which is parallel to moral inferiority (Freud in Hutchins, 1952, p. 833).

How does the sexuality develop? The genital and other body zones (erogenous zones) are involved in the expenditure of energy for pleasurable purposes. These zones are the oral, the anal and the sexual zones; they are the first sources of excitation and pleasure for the child, and also involve the greatest sources of conflict with parents and society, therefore, become very important. Experiences are created around each, and habitual behavior or prototypes develop out of these experiences in varying degrees. Prototypes arise from the original methods of dealing with pain incorporated into a trait, and each action can be involved in reaction, projection, fixation and repression. (Hall, 1954, pp. 102 - 111).

Erotic tactual (sucking and stroking) and aggression through biting are associated with the mouth area or oral zone. Personality types paralleling actions are the acquisitive, or taking-in; the tenacious or holding on; the destructive or biting; and rejection and refusal arising out of spitting and closing the mouth. The anal zone involves expulsion and elimination. Conflict is created in early life with toilet training. Prototypes involve primitive discharge (of rage, for instance), compulsive neatness, creative production, or retention.

The sexual zone involves a preoccupation with the genitals and the phallic stages of both the female and the male, slightly different in each (Hall, 1954, pp. 109 - 112). In the male phallic stage, the male loves mother and identifies with the father, eventually wanting mother exclusively, becoming jealous of the father. This complex Freud called the Oedipus Complex (Freud in Hutchins, 1952, p. 834). In time, the son begins to fear punishment for this desire, mainly in the form of fear of castration. Fear of castration arises from the observation that females, having no penis, may have lost theirs in such activity; and that father's penis, being larger, denotes more power. The desire for mother weakens with this fear, with the realization of the impossibility of this with maturity, and with disappointments one naturally finds in mother as time passes. Desire for the mother is renounced, replaced with either an identification with the father (perhaps out of fear of the father), or identification with the mother (out of the loss of possessing the mother totally). Since Freud believed we are all constitutionally bisexual, he believed that the stronger of the characteristics (male or female) would emerge as the main component here, and that heterosexual or homosexual development would be related. In the female phallic stage, the love of mother is the primary state, with no early identification with the father. Discovering she has no penis, she blames mother for this, begins to prefer and identify with father. The wanting of the penis she is without, Freud called penis envy. Eventually, the daughter loves the father, wanting him exclusively for herself, and feeling jealous of the mother; the state Freud called the Electra Complex (Stafford-Clark, 1966, p. 126). This state passes with the realization of the impossibility of the possession of father, with maturity. With the female as well, the identification process following may be related to the development of heterosexual or homosexual traits, depending upon which parent

is the model for identification (Freud in Hutchins, 1952, pp. 859 - 860; Hall, 1954, pp. 11 - 112) .

A latency period follows the phallic stages of both the male and female, lasting from approximately five years of age until adolescent sexual development. Heretofore the stages of the developing sexuality have all been pregenital. In the pregenital period, the focus is that of body pleasure and primary narcissism or that of self-love (distinguished from secondary narcissism which is involved with pride of the superego when the person identifies with the ideals). The object is the body of the self and the parents who are involved also in giving body pleasure. Narcissism, Freud proposes, leads to a normal interest in others of the same sex, socially acceptable, and acting as a transition stage from the person's love of himself to the person's love of an unknown sex (the opposite sex). At adolescence the person cathects or desires the opposite sex, and the focus is upon these object choices, versus narcissism, the aim being reproduction. Sexual or love objects are those to which the libido is directed. All pregenital cathexis become fused with the genital, but still can be traced in experiences of stroking, sucking, foreplay, etc.

Displacements, sublimation and transformations of these desires become part of the character of the person. Sexual partners in adult life, for instance, may be parent figure similar (Stafford - Clark, 1966, p. 128). Perversions occur when there is "incomplete maturity of sexual object and aim which prevent full union of any kind with another individual (p. 119). Freud offered examples of voyeurism and exhibitionism as parallel states of fixation at a child-like state; sadism and masochism as another parallel set of states involving aggression. Fetishism concerns the abnormal object selection, chosen because it is a symbol of the possibility of completion (p. 123).

At the period of adulthood (after approximately two decades), their personality becomes stabilized (Hall, 1954, pp. 116 - 122). Not necessarily the same as well-adjusted, the concept simply means that routine consistency has developed in the way a person interacts with the world. It could, and hopefully does involve balance and adjustment. Well-adjusted persons use problem solving techniques, logic; they use anti-cathexis against the object cathexis of the id and the idealized cathexis of the ego - in other words, establish realistic procedures as opposed to ideal or wishful ones. They insure prevention of distortion and falseness. Stabilization may focus around defenses, coping patterns, fixations or withdrawals, or a combination of these. Sublimations, displacements, fusion and transformation of instincts have been established at adulthood, and though change occurs until the person dies, most change after adulthood involves a variation of the established patterns. The stabilized personality is one in which the "psychic energy has found more or less permanent and constant ways of expending itself in performing psychologic work" (p. 122).

When development is denied or repressed, abnormalities arise. Acceptance and encouragement, love and inclusiveness seem here, as in other theories of development, to induce a balanced maturity, involving and including a balanced sexual maturity.. There is but a limited amount of psychic energy, needed for smooth operation. The greater the cathexis to one thing, the less is left to the individual (Stafford - Clark, 1966, p. 129).

We may understand from this chapter that sexuality, broadly and erotically considered, in a life-long process, incorporates the need for pleasure and the drive to satisfy this need. Experiences discovered in the process of satisfying these needs teach and shape the person. Love, self-love, pride and

love of others are involved, as are self-esteem, pride, identification, and full, mature union with another; all related aspects are vital elements of the person.

Several important ideas in Freud's work may relate to MPD. Sexuality appears inclusive of more than intercourse. It seems important to a great deal of our broader pleasures and needs throughout our lives, and follows a course of development based upon an adequate and encouraging satisfaction of those needs. If those needs are denied, or satisfaction depends upon damaging coping mechanisms, then harm is done to the person. MPD appears to be a coping mechanism, and so, may involve harm to both sexuality in the broader sense, and in the more matured, focused sense.

From aspects of an internal nature, the next segment will move to external forces upon human development, with examination of the social theory of Émile Durkheim.

Chapter 3

The Person and Thought in the Context of Society - The Work of Émile Durkheim

A full consideration of MPD entails a deeper appreciation for society's role in the development of the individual. How does that which the individual is, depend upon society? How does the individual's knowledge, and truth for the person depend upon society? It is important educationally, to understand in what way each student is a product of his or her society, and how alienation from that society affects that student. How the relationship with society has influenced the development of the student exhibiting MPD characteristics, is therefore critical to any educational interpretation as well. The question of how the school system itself is shaped by society is an interesting inquiry. A study of Durkheim will provide insight.

In the context of his or her environment, the person develops; positive development seeming to take place in surroundings of acceptance; less desirable developmental patterns occur in surroundings of alienation. Durkheim's view of society aids in understanding the place of the individual in the structure of society; the social becomes a point of view from which to understand human behavior (Nisbet, 1965).

The context of the perspectives of Durkheim was one of great social and industrial flux. The first part of this chapter will deal with three aspects: the duality of society and man; the function of society, and the function of authority as a mediate between man and society. The second part of the chapter will deal with Durkheim's response to popular pragmatist theories of the time, and will point out that the duality of society and man is reflected in the structure of truth.

At the turn of, and during the first part of this century, Durkheim responded popular perspectives, to the environment created out of the French and Industrial Revolutions, and to the intellectual structures of the day.

Three perspectives were popular: analytic individualism, biologism and moral progress. The first presumed that reality lay in man and society was deduced from the individual. Man was driven to liberate himself from the "tyranny" of institutions in an attempt to avoid alienation from his true nature (p. 12). Durkheim proposed that society did not begin with the individual, but was the source itself, irreducible and inseparable from man. Biologism sought to understand human nature through physiological and psychological origins, citing them as direct causes of human behavior. Instincts, drives, racial diversity and biogenic forces created personalities, which operated within a culture to make that culture. Durkheim proposed that it was the society that formed the individual. The popular idea of moral progress stated that from the nature of man follows progress; a forced forward movement of man resulted in an escape from tradition. In Durkheim's not-so-linear view, society's change resulted from the weakening of past authorities and order.

These notions were created in the environment of a society resulting from the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. Sudden and encompassing economic and democratic changes created new language and new ideas, and fostered the attempt to put new elements into some kind of structure.

Four themes are carried in Durkheim's work. He traced the movement of the focus of society from family, community and religion to the individual, money and contract in *Gemeinschaft und Gelleschaft* (1887); and discussed the process of social atomization, or the creation of isolated individuals in society. He followed the replacement of monarchy, status, class, marriage and property with "utility, rationality and efficiency"; the move from the scared and traditional

to the secular and rationalist (Nisbet, 1965, p. 22). He examined the displacement of church by state in an environment of mass democracy.

The application of science to nature and society to foster understanding (positivism), and conservatism (involving intellectual attitudes in opposition to change) influenced his study and methods. Principally, he viewed the nature of society as primal; that man depends morally and psychologically upon society, and separation from it caused anguish and isolation. He proposed the necessity of authority, and observed that the morality of society was related to sacred values as opposed to a utilitarian morality. He asserted that society was organically developed, and not created and re-created.

Perspectives that formed the substance of his ideas included discussion of society, personality, authority, the religio-sacred and development (pp. 29 - 112).

He saw the nature of society as primal, as everything above the physical and biological. More than intraindividual, it "expresses itself and becomes known" (p. 33) through the collective knowledge, concepts and representations of peoples. From the common action of society comes a collective conscience expressing the values of the community.

In *The Division of Labour* (1893), he proposed that the function of society was to integrate and cooperate, rendering social constraint unnecessary. Primitive society was homogeneous, consisting of collective, repressive laws, with little room for the individual. Religion, cult, ritual and the whole drives and determines the will of the individual. This society represented a type of solidarity he called *mechanic solidarity*. The second society, a natural continuance of the first represented a transition to a type of solidarity he called *organic solidarity*, wherein the individual was free to pursue functions and to unite in

"complementary roles", and wherein justice was more restitutive (Nisbet, 1965, p. 35). This was a more heterogeneous society.

In *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1895), he proposed that all study of human behavior must begin with the context of social facts; that behavior was a function of social facts, and must be sought in "relation of that fact to some social end " (Nisbet 1965, p. 31). Social facts of exteriority, constraint, and tradition (prime elements of mechanical solidarity) are irreducible to individual, psychological or biological elements. He continued, according to Nisbet, these themes in *Suicide* (1897) and in *The Elemental Forms of Religious Life* (1912); the crux of his work being that human behavior emanated from or was conditioned by society, society being the sum total of "groups, norms and institutions" (Nisbet, 1965, p. 38) forming the environment of the human being. It was these things, according to Durkheim, and not the instincts of man which were influential to human behavior.

He addressed three social problems: the question of the nature and substance of morality; analysis of contract and an analysis of suicide in order to illustrate the truth of his proposal.

Moral life cannot exist without social life. Morals come out of society, reflect society and operate within the context of society, as opposed to individually. In *Moral Education* (1925) he proclaimed three elements of morality, these being the spirit of discipline; the ends (goals) of morality and autonomy. He saw discipline (duty) as necessary for moral conduct, its source being society's sense of what ought to be. An elemental force, it is incapable of reduction. Morality is useless unless it is for something (ends). These ends have their context in the goals of groups. A person's "rational awareness of reasons for what he does" (Nisbet, 1965, p. 42) provides self-responsibility.

Contract, he said, is not a simple "atomic act" (p. 42) between two people, and is not individual. It is the model of societal relationships made possible by the mores of society. It reflects the sacred, and is a ritual of same, symbolizing man's contract with God, his society and his neighbour; the breaking of same equalling a sacrilege.. All of these must be prior to the notion of contract, making it a idea of societal influence.

Durkheim analyzed suicide, considered most individual and personal, and showed it to be of the larger society. In the same category as crime, economic conflict, etc., it reflects a pathological societal state. Three kinds of suicide emerged in his work: egoistic, anomic and altruistic. With egoistic suicide, the group cohesion declines, failing to provide support for the ego, and is preventable, according to Durkheim, by strong integration of society. Anomic suicide occurs in an environment of breakdown of system and values. Altruistic suicide results when social involvement is very great, and the individual feels some act of his has damaged the group. He accepted suicide as an individual act, but insisted that it reflects the moral state of a society , moreover, certain societies have an "aptitude" (p. 47) for it.

Behavior reflects society, and society is "indistinguishable from the observable data of human conduct" (p. 48). Personality, authority, religio-sacred and development are all manifestations of society.

In his discussion of personality, he says that society and man are inseparable, that man has a dual nature: social and individual. Society and man are fused, and society is in man, not outside of him. Man's actions are founded in the organism but are reflections of society, and are performed in the context of society. Society is interpreted by individual acts, but the individual is formed by the society, which is prior to the individual. Two types of personality are mentioned by Durkheim: that sensitive to traditions, rules, authority and

duty, and that which is less bound to duty, and is more "expansive and ardent" (p. 52). These reflect eras which are comparable: disciplined societies and those in flux. Man is formed through society and society through man, the one not able to exist without the other (Durkheim, 1915, p. 347 in Nisbet, 1965, p. 53).

By authority, Durkheim meant the discipline over the mind, which, he said enabled the existence of true society and true morality. Through the practice of moral rules, one becomes self-governing and emerges to a true freedom. Authority, then is necessary to freedom. Authority, Durkheim saw as the first of the three elements of morality, rooted in moral values, and put into action through discipline. The absence of authority produced the absence of a sense of duty and robbed real freedom. Since individual interests may not be those of society, or may be in conflict with those of society, a system is necessary to bring the interests of society to mind; a system of moral discipline or a code of rules (Durkheim, 1957, p. 61 in Nisbet, 1965, p. 60). This code of rules has the function of forming the personality and character, leading to true freedom and liberty. Authority is not the collective repression of the individual, but has the opposite function of liberating the individual; yet it reflects the solidarity of the society. It is the mediate between man and society, and gives society its pluralism, and is manifest in church, kin, guild, etc., and receives its legitimacy because it originates from moral values of the society. Suicide is a reflection of problems with social authority and a decline in same.

The groups of society originally powerful enough to wield authority can no longer fix these problems. The family no longer commands authority, the education system, being only a reflection of society and not an influence upon it, cannot wield authority. political forces are too far removed from the individual to command authority. Durkheim's solution to the problems with authority were to

set up collective forces outside the state, give them legal authority recognized by the state (Durkheim, 1951, p. 380, in Nisbet, 1965, p. 60). He viewed the state, the individual and secondary authorities (family, etc.) as members having a triangular relationship. The role of the state was to protect secondary authorities from the individual and vice versa, creating social stability. In primitive societies, he saw the secondary authorities as sovereign, with the state and the individual less well-established.. As the individual became stronger, a break occurred, the state assisting the individual in the break. War and commerce helped to strengthen the state, developing an "affinity" (Nisbet, 1965, p. 71) between the individual and the state. The state, able to free the individual, also has the power to repress him, and the role of the secondary authorities balanced the power with the development of civil liberties (Durkheim, 1957, p. 63 in Nisbet, 1965, p. 73).

We may see that according to Durkheim, society is in man and man is in society. Man is formed from society and it is necessary to him; that distress is created out of man's isolation from it. The function of society in Durkheim's *mechanic solidarity* is restraint, and collective good, whereas the function of society in his *organic solidarity* is a fostering of interaction of individual freedoms. His theme of duality carries to his notion of authority, which he says is necessary to freedom, and lives in it. Authority, he says, functions as a mediate between man and society. He proposes that there is a triangularity to society in the individual, the state and the secondary authorities, and that, through the interactions of these three, society evolves.

The duality of man is a key idea with respect to MPD. Isolation from society causes anguish for the individual. Any attempt to know the person necessarily involves a knowing of the person in the context of his or her society.

This notion extends to a duality involved in truth and knowledge for the individual, and that for society. People come to know and believe things in the larger structure of the knowledge and truth for society. Durkheim's work with theories of pragmatism offer another insight as to how people know themselves, others, and truth in general. How and what the person with MPD, and how and what persons in the school system in general (teachers and students alike) know, necessarily entails knowing what that has to do with society.

Part II - Pragmatism:

Durkheim discusses truth and ways of knowing truth. He responds to the pragmatist theories of his time, appearing to agree with them in part, but appearing to want more structure for truth and knowing than that truth is whatever man wishes. Truth, for the pragmatists, is human, varied and variable; a growing, living thing. Durkheim proposes that truth has elements of moral obligation, necessity and impersonality, and sets about to show how this is so in his responses to other theorists. In applying concepts of truth and knowledge to society, he says that individual thought is needed for societal thought, and that societal thought is a collective conscious, continuing the notion of duality discussed in his societal theory. He says that societal truth is close to objective or impersonal, and uses mythology to show truth as a higher reality which imposes itself on and is a representation of society. It is distinct and continuous, he says, and obligatory.

Durkheim's lectures on pragmatism and sociology (Allcock, 1983) will first be discussed as a means of determining his philosophy of ways of thinking and knowing, which enhances the approach to his social theory. Particular Durkheim lectures argue William James, as well as John Dewey and Ferdinand Schiller), accepting portions, and rejecting others. From this point of departure, the social

theories of Durkheim will be reviewed (Nisbet, 1965 and Gehlke, 1968), with an eye to exacting the nature of the person's growth or alienation within his society. Discussion of Durkheim, then, will provide some insight about the questions of how we know' how we know ourselves and the role society plays in the knowing process.

Three basic pragmatist theses are that truth is human; truth is varied and variable; and it is impossible to copy a given reality (Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 37). The basis of the pragmatist philosophy is that "thought creates truth" (Allcock, 1983, p. xiv), not a fixed truth, but a growing and living truth more severe than "logical utilitarianism". Introduced in 1878 by C.S. Pierce, it became the basis for theories of truth developed by John Dewey, Ferdinand Schiller and William James. Ideas, according to James (1907, in Flew, 1979, p. 284) "become true just so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience". Durkheim's major criticism of truth of this nature, the "created" truth, what passes for truth, a "what-one-wishes" kind of truth, is that it is not regulated, and is the "fulcrum" (Allcock, 1983, p. xxxvii) of his discussion on pragmatism. The truth of pragmatists is tested in the value of it in action [("what is true is what is useful") (Allcock, 1983, p. 2)], but Durkheim calls for criteria to be placed upon such testing. Truth, he says, contains three necessary elements: that of moral obligation, that of necessity and that of impersonality (Allcock, 1983, p. xxxviii). He sets out to show how these can be in the face of pragmatist arguments that they are not. Out of his treatment of pragmatism comes a way of knowing.

He presents the origins of pragmatism. Nietzsche, (Nietzsche, 1909 - 1915, in Allcock, 1983, pp. 2-3) maintained that truth is determined by utility. Propositions and ideas are not truths or false, but are tools for inquiry, are tested by experience, and can only be judged to be effective or ineffective (Flew, 1979,

p. 173). Nietzsche allows a rarer type of truth called liberated truth, held by artists, for example, which is found beneath experiences, but features the idea of utilitarian truth. Durkheim explains the way in which Pierce (5.308, 5.401, 5.402 and 5.407, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, pp. 5-6) says the process occurs. Thought, says Pierce, occurs as a result of doubt. Doubt produces tension, and belief satisfies. Doubt gives rise to the idea, which gives rise to the action which makes it possible to have belief. Having belief then lessens the need for doubt and thought, becoming habit. A return to equilibrium is established. If one wishes to get a sense of the idea, one examines the habit, and the idea of it will be found therein. In the event that two effects of ideas are the same, then the ideas are the same. In opposition to pragmatism, however, Pierce allows for the moral obligation of truth, or that which obliges us to believe it.

William James (1911, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, pp. 6-7) submits that we set out two types of questions: those of science and those of life. We cannot wait for the type of process involving the exacting of scientific truth with life, as our life needs are pressing. We therefore must choose a hypothesis for our life and then act (as in religion). Therefore, he says, truth has a "personal character" (p. 7) and is inseparable from life, a characteristic upheld by Schiller, who calls his pragmatism, *humanism* (Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 7).

Given the general nature of the concept of pragmatism, Durkheim moves to focus the three main points of the theories of James, Schiller and Dewey. Pragmatism is not a "fixed system", but a movement in a direction, and can be used as a method or "attitude of the mind"; as a theory of truth or as a theory of the universe (James, 1907, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 10).

Discussion of the criticisms by pragmatists of rationalist thought, provides a way of knowing the nature of pragmatism.

in the dogmatic sense, the true idea is the one which conforms to things, in which the mental representation of the object adequately fits the object - a direct interpretation of sense objects. Absolute Reason is copied by us, is external and ready-made, "Imposing itself", or in us imposed by God (Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, p. 12). Pragmatists see the copying of reality a valueless exercise, and submit that the importance in our relationship to reality is in the way the person sees and adds to it (James, 1907, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, pp. 13 - 14)

What is the function of truth in knowledge?

According to James, if we only think the copy of a thing, we cannot prove its reality because the thought is all we have. Therefore, thought and reality are separate, but Schiller and Dewey (Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 16) solve this difficulty by proposing that thought and reality are one, and that they participate in one another, "linking thought and existence to life" (p. 16), a fundamental pragmatic notion.

If we see truth as external to us, the fact that we are obligated in some way to seek it is unimportant. It would still be external to us and therefore unable to be understood by us. Therefore it is necessary to see truth in the context of actions, as situational (Schiller, 1907 in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 17). If truth is accepted as being pure and objective and impersonal, then we have to accept that there is something in us, a "pure intellect" (p. 17) which enables us to grasp it, but pragmatists deny this. We seek, they say; we choose and select for a desired end, the knower purposefully actualizing potential in the context of his interests and for the realization of his goals (Schiller, 1907, p. 186, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 17). Truth is human, and made for man, not to be isolated from him in itself or in the way it is grasped.

In the same way that truth cannot be an external purely intellectual thing, it cannot be an absolute thing. Truth is changeable, and not fixed; it cannot be absolute, because then it is not attainable. Why do we seek absolute truths? Perhaps because real truths are less sensational, and cannot hold our attention because of their changeability; that the diversity of minds grasping real truths prevent a universal understanding of those truths. It is argued, however, that diversity in persons may correspond to a diversity in truth, a "necessity" (p. 20), and we ought not deny that diversity by seeking absolutes.

How is reality changeable and personal ?

The idea of a static reality, sanctioned by Spencer and supported by concepts of the conservation of energy, indestructibility of matter, etc. is contested by Schiller. (Schiller, 1903, chap. ix, pp. 225 - 227, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, pp. 21 -22). Even if laws are immutable, if we discover them, they are our creation. The future and the universe are still potential; our belief generates acts that affect future reality, and therefore, reality is changeable. That thought is linked to action and in a sense "creates reality itself" (p. 23) is an essential idea of pragmatism, and involves the "structure of the universe itself" (Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 25).

The notion of reality as pluralist is also defended as being able to be as real as unity (James, 1909, p. 34, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, pp. 25 - 27) There is no reason to necessarily believe that there is one reality, as there can as easily be more which are interrelated but distinct and autonomous and therefore allowing room for change, as opposed to one reality where the roles of all parts are determined by the whole, and therefore static. Plural realities may be continuous and therefore able to be thought of as one for purposes of discussion and cognition; able to look like one in the way that they interrelate with one another, but can have separate parts, "uniting things and beings with

one another" (p. 26) , and being both united and autonomous, and therefore, changeable.

How is thought as a duplicate of reality useless, and how are thought and reality heterogeneous?

If thought gives rise to judgment, which then gives rise to concept, then thought can generate truth and must have a "natural affinity for" it , but James (1911, chapters iv, v, & vi, pp. 47 -112 in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 28). and Bergson insist that this is not so. Concepts are distinct and experience-born, and are separate from other concepts, with, therefore, "no contact or confusion among them" (p. 28). There are simple things, which, when compounded can be of the thing, but as themselves are only of an aspect of the thing. A concept is what it is. Conceptual thought requires that reality be the same; James argues that reality is changing, and shows it to be so. Reality needs an infinite number of concepts to translate it, and in this infinity is therefore unfinished, therefore demanding it be divided into units [which he calls "discrete pulses" (p. 29)] to accomplish change. Each time there is a pulse, there is something more or something less given to reality in the translation. Durkheim challenges James on this point, pointing out that the focus is not with the number but whether the concepts are distinct. If the parts are distinct, then there is a stopping and starting, and therefore a static, with no change. If parts are distinct, then they are divided, by the nature of distinction, into "discontinuous elements" (p. 30) and therefore, there is no change. If the parts are distinct, then they cannot act upon one another, contrary to any explanation about networks of influence. Durkheim concludes that the isolation of concepts is an artificial construction of reality.

Radical empiricism and pluralism are secondary aspects of pragmatism, and discussion takes place regarding how this is so.

If nothing takes place outside of experience, as is the empiricist view, and things have a distinct relationship among them imposed from outside, then this is not reality, but logic. Therefore, this goes beyond experience, and the pragmatic view has no business associating itself with an empiricist view. On the other hand, the world is a continuous, all-linked, interpenetration of all things by all others, including relationships between them, so we can experience things by moving from one to the other. Therefore, because pragmatism allows for links between things, it is distinct from simple empiricism, which separates mind from things, but can be radical empiricism, which does not demand the separation. (James, 1909, pp. 238 and 280 in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, pp. 33-34)

In discussion of pragmatism as pluralism, James (1909, pp. 325 and 328 in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 35) interprets pluralism not as an absence of unity, but as a unity which is "untidy". Reality is flexible and interrelated, being able to separate and unite changing its context and its nature. Multiplicity and flexibility are elements of reality; its parts can come together as a specific kind of unity which is at once "variable and lasting" (p. 36).

What has thought to do with reality?

The value of an idea, the truth of an idea, lies before the reality, giving us choice, and orienting it to the future. The role of thought is not to copy but to change reality (p. 38). Rationalists argue that whatever we do to reality merely is an addition, not a change, but pragmatists say that as soon as one reflects, one modifies reality, and in this, thought is causal. Thought and reality are one in the same process, and are on a continuum.

James (1890, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, pp. 41 - 42) says that if the object and the subject are separate then knowledge is impossible. For three reasons, James proposes that thought is not separate from the objects of thought. . If our consciousness exists by itself, then its role is just one of faculty.

There are attributes which exist both in the object and in the subject, sometimes as part of thought and sometimes as part of things. Thirdly, thought takes up what he calls "subjective space" (p. 41), in that the mental image has the extension of the object, which itself has physical space. If space were not already a part of our subjective interpretation then we couldn't make a notion of it. There is, rather than a separateness, a duality, in which things can be part of my experience, or of functional importance, at the same time that it is part of the physical existence unto itself, or of practical importance), and these realities overlap as two lines may intersect (pp. 42 -43).

Durkheim points out that if the subject and the object are the same, then the theory is monism, and not what it claims to be. Where, he asks (Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 43) is the knowledge which comes out of the need for the subject to project itself into the object in order to know it, if it is the same as the object? It could be in the way in which thought precedes reality, and therefore the sameness is in the continuity. Truth is established when consequences of action present themselves. False ideas bring different consequences, and truth is a "way in which our experiences most profitably combine" (James, 1909, p. 73 in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 44). Truth is attributed to ideas out of experience, therefore, and not an absolute. Hence, experience gives our truth its value, and thereof, there is unity in truth and value. Since the moral is, like truth, to serve us, it can no longer be distinguished from truth. Similarly can we compare what is true with what is real; what is true with what is good, etc. Differences among them are of degree and not kind, making all judgments value judgments, and making utility the only value, as these all serve utility.

If action is the only way through which knowledge can be considered ((Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 44), then how is knowledge an instrument of action?

The extension of an object is brought to us by sensation, and can therefore be in us. Images cannot be part of us in the same way. There is a distance between the subject and the object with respect to images. There may be a series of images between the subject and the object, and thus, the two do not have to be one, but the distance between them does not have to be void, but the continuity of the images. How can the images be verified? If the series is a true one, and we follow the series, we arrive at the object. (James, 1912, p. 29, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 46). Concepts of the object let us be general, and move through these image series more quickly. Abstract ideas are as real as sensations because they represent experience, and the return to reality is a return to the representation of an act rather than the representation to the object, because the verification of the object is found in the success of the act. The true ideas then, puts us "into a relationship with the object" (p. 48) and arrives through the act. The criterion for the true idea is that it must be specific to a reality and no other; it must yield a satisfaction that fits the situation.

The pragmatist criteria for truth involve satisfaction, verification and verifiability, necessity and freedom. The mind as a living thing has the practical need of "being in agreement with ourselves" (p. 51). Therefore new ideas must agree with our internal things, plus ideas already suited to us (satisfaction). Verification takes place when we see the acts the idea leads to, and whether these acts are harmonious, but in addition, even then, the idea is not true without use. Therefore, says James (1909, p. 192, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 52), truth "happens to an idea", and is a collective name "for the verification process". The idea must be verified, or potentially verifiable, or

verified by someone you trust. Truth then involves necessity and freedom, at once. Necessity with respect to the "internal and external order of sensations and perceptions" (p. 53), plus the truths we already have; freedom in the way we may choose, arrange and categorize from the chaos of things.

If truth happens to things, and if we create our own reality, how do we do this?

If we make reality in cooperation with the world, our reality could be illusory. Constructing reality is not the same as constructing truth, and the two, says Durkheim, (p. 54) must be separated. Dewey (1903 and 1916 in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 55) says that there are two types of truths: truth developed from doubt, which is of reflective consciousness; and truth accepted, which is of instinctive consciousness. One arranges and organizes reality and one reorganizes reality. Doubt however, is not the distinguishing factor, as it can be in both; rather, satisfaction is the factor. In humanism (Schiller, 1907, essay iii, para. 9, p. 90, cf. essay xvi, para 9, 361 in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 56) judgments must be affirmed and must be from a mind, "motive (and) purpose". Therefore, the personal factor is in all thought, and one cannot isolate the logical / empirical from the real / personal thought. Though there are different aspects involved, they are not separate.

The problem of agreement and value for many, among infinite personal truths and realities can be explained by knowing that though ideas are individual in origin, they do not remain that way. They become the objects of mental agreement, and finally, reach the "stage of common sense" (James, 1907, p. 170 in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 57). Truth does not impose itself. Because we have needs of logical necessity, we recognize and construct it.

Durkheim points out that if logical thought is not separate, then, it is a lower form of thought, and we need to replace it with something. The intention

of his lecture, "Pragmatism as a Method", was to discuss the replacement, but the lecture has been lost. Therefore, the editor summarizes Durkheim's intent. Pragmatism as a method, he says (p. 59) was to renew empiricism (in radical form), to express attitudes against rationalism; abstract thought and intellectualism; express attitudes against dogmatism and absolutes; and to focus upon consequences as opposed to first principles. The method would show that the value of ideas is seen in how realities are changed by them.

How does the pragmatist notion of thought and reality account for religious thought?

Pragmatism, rather than being a doctrine of morality asks value of religion. According to James (1902, Lectures III - VII, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, pp. 60 - 61) there are five kinds of individual consciousness: the reality of the unseen; religious optimism (faith); religious pessimism ('sick souls'); states between doubt and faith; and conversion. Truth here does not depend on any states or anything "organic" but on results and products. Our own realities are evolving all the time. If we look to the saint as an example of the product of religion, we see that the saint does not quite fit the definition of the man of action necessary to pragmatic thought. James says that however, he does have a role, which is to arouse the goodness in us that we "carry around" (James, 1902, p. 358, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 62), and so has a functional role in the evolution of our prejudices, etc., mentioned above. Mysticism is a continuance of another side of our consciousness which has effects in us. Polytheism is in that it satisfies (pragmatic criterion of truth) , and does not have to be a oneness to satisfy. Things are therefore important for their worth, and applied to this concept, religious thought is possible and real.

Pragmatism comes under criticism for its gaps, however, and its too-liberal license of interpretation. Its abstract nature, says Durkheim (p. 65)

clashes with its empirical orientation. There are conflicts in the theory, in the way that pragmatists say that consciousness does not exist, yet say that thought creates reality. The purpose of pragmatism, he says, is to free the will to construct reality. Whereas rationalism places thought above the human, and makes it unto itself and absolute, pragmatism wants thought to be " 'naturally' (Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, p. 444, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 67) part of reality and life", able to be understood and analyzed humanly.

Durkheim says that pragmatism does not take the opportunity to broaden the view to society; does not recognize the duality between mentality arising from the individual and mentality arising from collective experience (p. 68). Just as man creates his reality, mankind creates his destiny, and collectively may be in a better position to explain truth, reality and morality.

As another criticism of pragmatism, Durkheim says that it has not shown how truth either changes or is diverse. We do not necessarily have to say that a changed truth implies there was a wrong before, and diversity does not necessarily imply that all is different from the other. Truths may be relative, he says. The social world is formed in cooperation with the organic world, and is a combination of different elements which are fused. The various syntheses are different from one another depending upon the institution in which they are present, and depending upon when in history they are found, but they fulfill the same roles (for example, family, government, etc.) Each history and each people in each history has its own aesthetic, and therefore truth is variable. A truly homogeneous world, he says, would not grow.

Tolerance is an outcome of the respect for this diversity, and therefore, pragmatism is justified from a social perspective.

How do pragmatists account for the utility of truth?

The characteristics of truth as traditionally seen, are those of moral obligation; necessity and objectivity or impersonal nature. Pragmatists dispute this opinion, saying that since the truth is at our human level, we have no need to rise to it, so it does not oblige us to rise to it. However, we do have need of its usefulness, so the truth does not impose itself on us, but we impose ourselves on truth. Impersonal truths, say pragmatists, may be the final stage at which all personal truths converge, but is not inherent in individual truths.

Durkheim says that since society is greater in extent than individuals, then the truth of society is a greater truth than that of the individual, since it involves the collective. It is therefore more close to an objective truth. Perhaps the fact that historically, persons had more agreement among themselves meant that they adhered to impractical truths.

Durkheim confronts the pragmatic view that thought has no speculative value because knowledge exists for the sake of action. Dewey (1907, vol. xvi (2), pp. 37 - 38 and 55, in Durkheim, 1955, in Allcock, 1983, p. 79) says that reflection comes when equilibrium is disturbed; consciousness awakes when habit is disrupted as social consciousness awakes when it is disrupted. Therefore, action is the only motivator of thought. Durkheim says (pp. 77 - 79) that thought involved in mythology evolved to become philosophy, morality, sciences, history, etc. In part, these things are practical, but sometimes become speculative in that they engage in problems for the sake of the search. Further, consciousness is not always for the sake of action, as sometimes it can hinder action (as in the piano player who does not perform well because he concentrates too intently upon the playing), and sometimes action can paralyze thought. He rather thinks that consciousness requires inaction, and the release requires action. These two states of inaction and action travel as places each between the other, the one being when the other ceases and vice versa. Therefore, says Durkheim,

thought and action are not alike, thought is not only for the sake of action and there is room for speculative thought.

He goes on to say that especially as knowledge become of a higher order the "antithesis notes as between truth and action....[becomes]...all the more marked" (p. 82). He accounts for this. The role of consciousness, he says, is not to run the action of the body, but so the body can know itself, to "produce beings" (p. 83), and stops are needed in action to produce knowledge. Pragmatist view denies all of this, and Durkheim allows that a practical role of thought does exist, but is not the only role. Habit no longer needs conscience, but conscience is necessary at other levels.

To explain how this relates to truth, he uses mythology as an example, asking why it was accepted as true. An idea is accepted as truth not because it "conforms to reality, but by virtue of its creative power" (p. 84). Mythology was a collective representation of truth, and therefore fulfilled the role of creating, as well as possessing a greater energy and psychological force than the individual. It was therefore accepted as truth, not because it suited anyone's experience or action test, but because it presented itself as a creative power, as a representation of truths that existed in society, and with the strength that collectivism gave it. Things of this nature impose themselves upon our conscience. This, he says, is pragmatism at a different level in that it is a collection of individuals, and in its collectiveness has a unity not present with individuals, though it originates from the model / copy unity, and the co-author belief of pragmatists. Collective representations exist to make a higher reality which is society and "does not exist simply to direct practical affairs" (p. 85).

There are different types of truth. Mythology expresses "ideas which society has about itself" (p. 88), and people accept it without verification collectively. They are truths that are more than necessary, objective and

satisfying, though these are part, the sum of these truths is more than these. These truths correspond to a reality which is that of society itself, which can't know itself unless it can express itself in relation with things. Therefore, mythology is a truth, and is so as a way of expressing experiences.

Scientific truths express the "world as it is" (p. 88), and are a collective representation. If they are impersonal, so too are collective truths (as explained before), because they are "outside and above" the individual (p. 88). They fulfill a need (dialectical, for example, in search to find agreement) for agreement, and "turn the mind" to higher truths, eliminating contradiction.

Durkheim says that for purposes of achieving and reconstituting the common consciousness, science is too fragmented and philosophy too personal for the task. To do so, and therefore reach understanding, perhaps sociology could master the job, because it is a more common philosophy. He says that it is difficult to express ideas of society in an objective way, and society can only know itself from within through representations like mythology (i.e. in ways that express a unanimous conception" and impose selves without doubt (p. 91) (for example, in ideas such as "democracy "). This kind of thought seems needed by society as much as scientific thought. There is room in this former type of thought for "undivided diversity" (p. 91) which is encouraged by the "diversity of objects found in the world" (p. 91); further, each object itself presents an infinite diversity in points of view from which it may be examined. Therefore, no one mind can embrace all things in all ways, and therefore, individuals are needed. Truths are partial until they are collective, and therefore, collective thought is needed. Therefore, Durkheim says, individuals are not as arbitrary as James thinks, but rather, perform different tasks. The role of tolerance in this collective concept is one of respect for the complexity, and the role of

speculation is to provide "nourishment to the collective consciousness" (p. 92); truth adding something to truth.

Pragmatists view thought and reality as being heterogeneous. Truth implies a distinction and continuity in reality that reality itself does not imply, and therefore, distorts reality when representing it. Durkheim says that when expressing change you must break down the continuity. He says that though reality was fused in the beginning, there are breaks and discontinuities over time (early family, law, religion, etc. became more distinct over time). It does not distinguish its parts against its wishes, but as a natural part of a degree of evolution (as opposed to absolute evolution). Therefore, he says, thought and reality are not really heterogeneous. Motion and change are not fixed either, stops and rests are required for knowledge and achieving. Therefore, becoming is a series of consecutive fixed states, the new being relative to what was. The idea of change subsumes three elements: what was, what is yet to be and the link between the two. The link can be represented by a concept, and therefore is never isolated. Therefore, both distinction and continuity exist in both things and in the mind.

He concludes that truth is social and human; living both in cooperation with reality and modeled on it. It is therefore obligatory in that it is a norm.

Certainty, he says is said to be the state of believing we have truth, but, it is neither objective, nor can we know when we do have it. Certainty carries with it the entailed or conditiona^l disposition to act, and conformation to representations of sensation, image and concepts. Certainty can attach itself to concepts of that which has already been achieved (practical) and that which is yet to be achieved (theoretical). It imposes itself by the authority that comes from the collective representation of a right way to act, and a right way to think;

this authority given strength by the collectiveness. We therefore can have two types of certainty: practical certainty and theoretical certainty.

Thinking generally is just a certain way of thinking particularly, and involves continuity between the individual and the genus; allows for the existence of individual concepts (God, for instance); has the quality of immutability through language, and has potential for universality. It got to be this way because collective thought is the same as collective experience, and in its collectivity it is fixed, impersonal and imposed upon us. Durkheim thus accounts for his statements about the elements of truth in the beginning of his discussion. It is proven in the fact that if it were not adequate with respect to truth then it wouldn't be general, fixed and verified by the masses.

As Durkheim moves through his discussion of thought and truth, via his critique of pragmatism, he has established a connection between the individual, and society. His establishment of these foundations of his ideas about thought, individuals and society lead to a greater appreciation of his social theory.

Society and the individual appear, according to Durkheim, to create one another, in a manner of speaking. They appear to need one another. Isolation from society, its authority, its rituals, its institutions may cause anguish and unhappiness. Educationally, and in general, we may ask how MPD and other psychoses may be manifestations of isolation from society, and how this happens to people. Care must be taken to look at the person in context, and to look at the truth for that person in the context of his or her society.

Chapter 4

Common Themes and Questions for Educational Consideration

Far from simplifying matters, the investigation has suggested more difficult questions of larger proportion, and has revealed complexity in the issues. This chapter will deal with four questions. What is the importance of MPD to educators? What is apparent, in summary, about MPD? What key ideas have the authors surveyed, contributed? Based upon questions of importance to education, known nature of MPD, and the framework for perspective suggested by the authors, what are the conclusions we may draw --- the larger issue?

What is the importance of MPD to education? If a student has learned that he or she cannot rely on perceptions as reality or truth, or is significantly preoccupied with internal problems, then learning will be interrupted. MPD is a new issue for education, involving truth, reality and conflict. That concerns education directly.

What is apparent about MPD, in summary?

Certain behaviors seem to present themselves in certain persons. These behaviors seem to be related and are accepted as a syndrome (Dunn, 1992, p. 22) in that they are collectively labeled MPD. These behaviors appear to be splitting (Curtis & Fraser, Draft F3 - 31, #5), with amnesic qualities, and the state appears to affect other daily behavior (Kluft, 1987). It appears to involve intensification of everyday dissociation, normally experienced (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986, p. 728; Kluft, 1987, p. 293), and appears to coexist with other characteristics of other disorders (Horevitz & Braun, 1984, in Kluft, "High Functioning Multiple Personality Patients: Three Cases, p. 722; Fraser & La Pierre, 1986, in Kluft, 1987, p. 90). It seems associated with psychological reaction to trauma (Rivera, 1991, video; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986, p. 727), and

may be a coping mechanism in response to stress (Rivera, 1991, p. 10). It may be a means of survival (Curtis & Fraser, Draft F3 - 31, #5, pp. 1 - 12). (These coping and survival mechanisms are spoken about in Freud's work in response to overwhelming stimuli and helplessness.) Some skills and / or levels of skills appear to be involved that are unconscious or amnesic to the majority of the dimensions of the person (Sager & Smith, Sept., 1971, pp. 717 - 719). Frye indicates that safety seems to assist the persons with the experience of MPD (Frye, Nov., 1990, p. 1013 - 1022), and the fact that vulnerability seems to be involved is espoused by Ross and Miller *et al* (March, 1991, pp. 97 - 101). That culture is involved is proposed by Daie, Witztum, Mark and Rabinowitz (1992). Spiegel suggests that the disorder is related to a sense of inferiority and difficulty orienting (1984, p. 101). Sandberg and Lynn (1992) mention an association with other problems, and Wilbur (*MPD and Child Abuse: An Overview*, pp. 3 - 4) suggests that forms of abuse are linked.

What key ideas have the authors presented?

Key ideas from the literature regarding persons, human development, and issues involved with the damaging of that development will be considered. This development is far from simplistic. Therefore, understanding and responding to its damage is also far from simplistic. This complexity is a dominant feature of the framework through which we may understand MPD. This affects how education may need to respond.

Though it is necessary, for the sake of practicality, to try to fit summary to the literature, it is unwise to attribute to such, any notion of oversimplification, or to infer some "quick fix" solution. Grasping "in part" solutions leads only to further confusion because the issues involved are much deeper and more serious in nature, so demand attention to their detail and respect for their complexity. With this in mind, however, it is useful to attempt to locate some

"road marks" for the sake of practicality, remaining aware that these "road marks" do not constitute the sum of the issue; nor do they infer a unilateral solution. To this end, some common themes arising from the work of the authors will be suggested. Several phenomena appear to be related throughout the areas of psychology, sociology, epistemology and sexuality. Common themes appear and reappear in the works of all of the authors. For the sake of structure, these have been assigned three categories: general themes, those reflected in areas of human need and themes related to coping strategies. General themes may be considered against the question, "What characteristics seem to be involved in the nature and development of persons?" Themes related to need may respond to the question, "How do the needs of people seem to reflect these characteristics?" Maddi (1968, p. 76) uses the term "crippling", which gives an encompassing sense to the idea of the various kinds of damage done to persons in each realm. The third category of themes may relate to the question, "What characteristics seem to be involved in the 'crippling' of the 'self'?"

People employ a variety of mechanisms to cope with situations which do not foster their growth and development in a positive way. Freud, Laing and Maddi all mention some form of fixation, projection, repression, regression, substitution, illusion, collusion, distortion, dissociation, splitting, avoidance or asocial behavior. These may be expressed in degree and in varying combinations. They may travel on a spectrum from a healthy, efficacious and minimal use to a more energy-depleting and damaging manner. Durkheim, concerned more with the focus upon the dynamics of society and the individual, and upon the essence of thought as it relates to those dynamics, does not expound upon an inventory of characteristics, but mentions unhappiness, individualism which seems to be so in a negative sense, isolation and suicide. Similarly, the focus of James is more directed to discussion of the essence and

dynamics of thought, and mentions hysteria, delusion, insanity and alternating "selves".

The fact that these processes in some way resolve a given conflict or conflicts is their strength and their life-giving force. The fact that they may be associated with degrees of misery, determines their status as problematic.

Involved in the nature of persons, whether sociologically, psychologically, sexually, or epistemologically are what appear to be seven informal categories: the concept of a "something greater"; dualism; wholeness; autonomy; a quality of genesis (both developmental and creative); a temporal / contextual attribute; and a feature of efficacy. How might these categories be seen in each author's work?

The "something greater" for Durkheim, is involved with the idea of society, and how it brings to the individual a sense of identity and direction. Through authority, duty, limits and a quality of the sacred, persons find true freedom. Something greater than themselves, though invested with the features they individually, collectively and over time have brought to it, determines back to them, their sense of morality, justice and ways of being. Collective truths and collective ways of knowing, according to Durkheim are stronger. In them, individuals find and contribute their own truths. This present, persons are more free to choose the manner in which they will interact in this arena: freedom.

In the theories examined by Maddi, the essence of the "something greater" appears less metaphysical, and involves the relationship that the individual has with society, how that shapes and forms the individual. For Laing, that beyond the person forms the identity of the person, in that it is composed of the identity others have for him, and that which he has for others. Members of a group define themselves through internalizing the definition and rules the group has for itself.

For Freud, the Ego itself is created to deal with that beyond the needs of the person, albeit, in order to serve the instinctual needs of the person (Id), but formed and modified by determinants of that which is beyond the needs of the person to insure safety and acceptance.

James contends that the uniquely distinct feature of humanity is the ability to postpone, to wait, to choose and to operate from the "forward", to a goal. Man is a "fighter for ends" (James, 1892, in Hutchins, 1952, p. 92), able to move to that outside of himself in future direction.

The theme of dualism appears in the sense that persons have an seemingly ongoing struggle to find balance between their individuality and this greater, mostly expressed as society. Durkheim declares that man's nature is a dualistic one; that society is in man and man in society with an accompanying conflict. The behavior of individuals, according to him, reflects society, and society is composed of the collective truths of individuals.

The theorists selected by Maddi acknowledge the existence of a relationship between society and the individual; a relatedness - as does Laing. For Freud, the Ego mediates that relationship. For both James and Laing, the knowing of those others is only possible in a subjective manner, and a relationship builds between the self and the known to form the truth for that person.

Unity / wholeness is a key concept. For Durkheim, the unity of the person is inherent in the unity of the society in which the person finds membership. In Maddi is found the notion of unity with self, and Freud expresses this unity as the way in which the Ego strengthens the systems of logic and reason to establish a smoothly run system of interaction. For James, thought or consciousness is whole, primal and irreducible. Laing cautions those attempting to know another that they should look for that knowledge in the context of their

whole story and interrelatedness with others. Any other process, according to him, leads to fragmented pictures.

Autonomy figures greatly in the works of all. James indicates that the very essence of who we are as human beings involves choice, power to select and name. He notes the autonomy of conscious in his concept of the Stream of Thought or Stream of Consciousness, and says that Thought can educate itself. Our very reality is made by us in the way in which we know objects in a subjective manner; Durkheim acknowledges that this making of our reality leads to action and determines future, and says that autonomy results from authority, in that we can choose how to contribute individually to the societal. Freud's Ego has, invested in it, the power to choose, select and form plans of action, albeit, in the context of restrictions placed upon it by the world, the Id and the Superego; nonetheless, it remains the executive, more or less, depending upon the quality of the distribution of energy throughout the systems. Laing indicates that the very direction of insanity may be to find a way through phantasy and untenable positions to a sanity that is real and true. Though a wounded autonomy, it nonetheless implies the person assuming power.

In Maddi's work, the concept of autonomy is involved in ways in which the person deals with conflict, seeks fulfillment and maintains consistency. Angyal names it as a state which persons are driven to maximize; Kelly cites the control of events as a goal, and Bakan refers to it as agency. In other theories, autonomy is named as a feature of positive development.

Genesis may be a feature of development, in what appears to be two distinct senses: in the sense of development and in the sense of creativity. The person becomes in a developmental fashion. Most of the theories of personality involve stages, all involve growth over time, whether the term "stages" is specifically used or not. Durkheim's view of society arises from a premise of the

evolution of society, organic, he says, in nature. Laing speaks of growth, complexity and change over time, and James' Stream of Consciousness involves a knowing always developing, changing and different. Freud insists that the early affects the later, and that sexuality is life long, developmental and far reaching.

Regarding genesis in the creative sense, it appears not enough that persons develop and grow; there appears to be a feature of persons creating or generating. For Durkheim, in the sense that individuals contribute to society their notions of that which is sacred, and collective agreement is reached. This creates for the individuals in that society a sense of what is truth for them, and also creates the type of society for those persons. Adler in Maddy speaks of growth to perfect power, and White of producing effects. Allport proposes propiarte behavior, one feature of which is to express. "Express" is also a term used by Fromm. The Ego of Freud appears to need to create in problem solving ways, and creativity is cited by James as a need. We create our reality and our truth.

A temporal / contextual feature seems prevalent, not only in the sense of development, as discussed previously, but as something more. Characteristics of changeability, metamorphosis, non-absolutism and contextuality are involved. The individual exists in the context of the society, says Durkheim, organic and changing over time. Collective truths are different for different societies depending upon their time and their context. The features of the theories analyzed by Maddy tend to indicate that certain contexts enhance development and others deny or delay it. Laing insists that understanding of the person can only be so in context and in the knowing of complexity over time and changeably. The Ego of Freud exists in the context of the outside world, of the biologic or instinctual needs, and in the context of the environment in which

reward or punishment is delivered. James posits that we can only know others in the context of ourselves, and that this is non-absolute and changing. Truth and reality evolve in the context of new information, and new Thoughts. This happens in the midst of the way we resee ourselves and things of ourselves; in the ways in which others see us, and we come to know those ways; and in the ways we come to know how we feel about this. The temporal nature then, involves the non-absolutism and changeability - different in a way than developmental, though inclusive of it. The changeability seems to involve the context and both the changing ways we see the context, and the changing of the state of the context itself.

Lastly, the element of efficacy appears of importance throughout. James says that what we come to know and understand, seems to be that which is necessary and useful to us, and in ways which are necessary and useful. Consciousness is efficacious, according to him, and causal. We can only know and use what we have, making choices for reasons that make sense and have validity for us. Durkheim, when speaking about pragmatism and truth, submits that the value of an idea is in how reality is changed by it, and that truth involves satisfaction, action and is affected by consequence. Personality theories imply that ways we become fulfill needs we have, positively or negatively. The striving for balance between opposing desires or forces mentioned in many is efficacious in itself, creating equilibrium.

The needs themselves reflect these themes. We seem to express a requirement for them. Needs included in the concept of "something greater" are those such as Durkheim's needs for authority, duty limits, ritual, rite and cult. In not quite the same way, but still involving a "something greater", Rogers' and Maslow's (in Maddi) need for actualization, and the "man as artist" concept of Rank (in Maddi), in a sense illustrate this feature.

Dualism is reflected in the needs of membership and individualism, expressed by Durkheim, and in the theories in Maddi which propose simultaneous needs of agency and communion, autonomy and surrender, and the sense of self and of society. In Laing's implied needs for identity and membership, unity with self and relatedness with others, agency and acceptance, a dualism is present. Freud's alleged life and death needs involving demands upon the physis energy supply imply a dualism; need for balance entails opposing forces, and therefore involves dualism.

Wholeness is reflected in Durkheim's need for identity both for the individual through society and for the society, and in the collective truth of a society. Wholeness is expressed in the need for both parts of the struggle in the conflict theories analyzed by Maddi; in the need for survival plus something more, in the actualization theories, and in the need for adequate stimulation for the person in the consistency theories (involving meaningfulness, intensity and variety). Laing advocates that knowing a person in context involves wholeness, and is seen in the needs of the person to belong, and be accepted, form a unity with self and relatedness with others. Agency and a "place" imply wholeness, as does the knowing of the person through the context of the whole. The safe balance of all the needs undertaken by the Ego advocates wholeness. If, as James says, we need to choose, label and create truth for useful and necessary ways for us, then we are, in a sense, part of that truth, and the truth part of us. Dualism itself is implied in wholeness.

Autonomy needs appear to be those like Durkheim's need for freedom and identity, our need for agency, actualization, power, competence and control (Maddi), and Laing's reference to being, agency and identity. The Ego represented a form of logical autonomy, in response to the need for same by the

organism. James' reference to our choice and will, our conscious selection and naming may represent a need to do so, because we do so.

We have needs that indicate genesis: Durkheim's creation from the scared; needs to create, express, actualize in Maddi; Ego need to develop its own skills; needs of people to create truth and meaning, and the need of Thought to educate itself.

Efficacious needs are reflected in the ways in which what we do and think and know are useful to us: need for collective truths; our need for balance and control; instinctive needs keep us alive; we have need to know in ways that are available to us, ways in which nature allowed us.

Freud's life needs encompass all of these needs.

The development of people, then, appears to have features, and people seem to have needs related to a sense of "something greater", dualism, wholeness, autonomy, genesis, a sense temporal and contextual, and efficacy.

How do "crippling" and damage take place? Related to these categories, eleven kinds of actions or absences seem to affect negative growth. These types are not clearly distinctive of one another, and may overlap, but informal categorization aids in some clarity and elimination of repetitive detail.

Alienation takes place in the context of society and groups; for Durkheim, this is the focus from which everything else develops. Because society forms the individual, it can alienate. Separation from the society causes anguish. Speck (1966, in Laing, 1969, p. 50) points out that "irrationality is often the child of an irrational network", and Laing provides that social phantasy results from the individual not fitting in with his group or family. Freud proposes that defenses arise when rejection takes place, as do other theorists in Maddi. James points to inconsistencies as foundations for disbelief, and altered truths.

Separation and rejection need not take place from society as a whole, and provide for another category of means of damage. Theorists in Maddi's work cite rejection as cause for interrupted and thwarted development. Laing cites it as cause for harm to the identity, and for perverted ways of seeing reality he cites negative complementarity as a form of this, and also relates it to the losing of "place", a need of the person.. Freud connects it to development of an unbalanced conscience, involving shame and a poor self-image.

When *identity* is removed, denied, altered or destroyed, Laing proposes that distortions are created to cope with a finding of another truth. Personality theorists suggest it is related to less than ideal behavior and development.

Deprivation can be seen as manipulative, and removing of autonomy; it can also threaten safety needs, preventing actualization (Maddi), and leaving us without the power to meet our environment with power, causing inability to maintain consistency, or to balance conflict. From a Freudian perspective, it may affect the Id, causing regression or fixation, and the inability of the Ego to develop in an efficient manner.

Loss of love is a form of deprivation, and can be a form of manipulation, but is categorized distinctly for purposes of this paper, as love appears to be a powerful feature in our lives. Lack of growth (Maddi), untenability (Laing) and other abnormalities may correlate (Freud). Passion (perhaps not the same as love, but related to it) has a function in belief or in the suspension of belief (delusion and insanity) for James.

Actions and situations producing *conflict, doubt, confusion* and great *discrepancy* seem present to damage. Though not the same concepts, they are related, and therefore categorized together. Overwhelming conflict appears to thwart the autonomy and security of the person, and is involved in states of helplessness; as are states of major discrepancy and confusion (Maddi).

Confusion and doubt for Laing, involve untenability and double bind, for example, and lead to distortion and false truths. Inconsistencies for James are involved in disbelief, but in the presence of excitement and motivation can lead to delusion.

Actions *shaming*, producing guilt, ridicule and condemnation are mentioned in Durkheim's analysis of suicide; and in the analysis of Maddi are involved with the inability to balance conflict, actualize and maintain consistency. For Laing, these actions may involve illusion, a counterfeit identity, and false roles, to name a few; and for Freud, a hypercritical Superego, robbing psychic energy otherwise needed to smoothly and safely operate the system, and to develop the skills of the system to ensure the smooth operation.

We appear to require a *balance* of stimulation, and limitation. Over or under-stimulation or overindulgence seem to arrest our growth, as pointed out by Freud (as an imbalance of the power of the Id, or the Superego). Theorists of Maddi (especially the consistency theorists) point to requirements for variety, intensity and meaningfulness, as well as the stress required for and stemming from learning. For Durkheim, the dynamics of a society stimulate its evolution.

The final three categories (*overwhelming situations or helplessness, fear and loss of safety, and meaninglessness / loss of validation*) appear to have the same effects. That is to say, they seem to be related to the person's inability to balance conflict, actualize or maintain consistency (Maddi); they seem to be related to the formation of delusion, illusion, phantasy, counterfeit roles and false truths for Laing; and to an overdeveloped Superego or Id which robs psychic energy for Freud. For Durkheim, the price may be higher: suicide. For James, an altered memory or delusion is involved in insanity, alternating identities and blocks to truth.

It can be concluded then, that the nature of people seems to involve things "greater than" themselves, duality, wholeness, autonomy, genesis, temporal and contextual characteristics, and efficacy. Persons have needs in these directions. When certain actions related to loss, distortion or deprivation occur with these needs, resulting behavior and development may be less than ideal for the true empowerment and potential of the person. This may occur in a psychological context, a social context, a biological or organic context, an epistemological context, an interpersonal or intrapsychic context, and may be in combination with one another. It may occur for pragmatic reasons (as ways for the person to cope with his or her world), and occurs over time.

There is need to remain aware of complexity and context of situations. Because the person is not reducible or simple, the process of the development of the person is complex. Therefore, the understanding of the development of persons must be undertaken with a respect for individual context, complexity and human limitations. The same is true in an understanding of the damage to that development. This is key.

As well as the need to examine in multi-contexts, there is need to examine from a multidimensional perspective: social, psychological, biological, philosophical, interpersonal and intrapsychic perspectives lend necessary information of varying nature. For example, the field of psychology may lend certain types of information, but as Laing and James both point out, can also have a detrimental effect, and is not without limitation.

It is necessary to investigate personal development and damage to same temporally. Tempting as it may be to cite, for instance, "the times" as causal, it is prudent to examine that as only one dimension of the phenomenon. Though possibly possessing effect, it is necessary to examine historically, the truths of woundedness for those persons at that time. For example, it is possible that

Freud responded to a drastically punitive sexual environment in his time. His theories lend knowledge to present understanding, but had different meaning then, as did sexual woundedness at that time. There are similarities and differences that help us to comprehend a larger view.

Caution is advisable in assigning causation to a phenomenon because of correlation, or determining reasons in isolation. Laing warns against "quick fixes", saying the "situation has to be discovered" (1969, p. 33), and cites examples of how expediency and the medical model may have actually perpetuated damage (pp. 33 - 42). A structural remediation model may deny the full expression and understanding that flexible interaction may permit. It is likely that we may find educational parallels. For example, have we "treated" behavioral problems, for instance, rather than attempting to understand their underlying and precipitating events, and how has this affected the growth of the person?

We have looked at themes which appear related to development, needs and "crippling" of development. The sources examined in Chapter 3 are authored by males. Brilliance and compassion are reflected in their work. Nonetheless, a feminine perspective would add to the understanding of the issues.

What conclusions can be legitimately drawn about MPD? What questions can we legitimately ask as educators about MPD, keeping in mind the complexity surrounding its nature, and the dangers of the "quick fix"? What is the larger issue?

MPD is a new issue for education, apparently not vastly addressed in the profession. It affects youth, and so it is necessary for educators to be aware of what is known about the disorder. It is crucial to see the complexity in the awareness, and not to approach it quickly, or in isolation.

We must, as a profession, resist the temptation to label and remedy, because this may be the pathway of absolutes and generalities, through which the reality and truth for the person may not fit. We must, rather, take the time to try to understand the person with MPD, and to try to see how both the person and the phenomena were created. As James suggests, we must accept the limitations involved in this understanding.

Maddi has told us that behavior is learned in an attempt to balance; to resolve conflict. It is a response of coping, or survival or growth; a response to surroundings - adjustment. We cannot afford to attempt to understand a student in isolation, according to a preconceived structure. We have seen that we must try to see the individual in the context of his surroundings, with the complexity, rules, limitations and interactions involved in those surroundings. Most importantly, we must attempt to see the unique meaning the person attributes to them, and how this may contribute to the way the person is being.

We have learned from James that a convoluted environment may give rise to a convoluted reality. Laing has told us that disruptions in truth may lead to disruptions in action. Durkheim has indicated that isolation from society leads to distress. We cannot view the person apart from the situation which bore these developments.

Laing, in *The Divided Self*, speaks of the need for trust between therapist and patient, and the need for the patient to sense that the therapist cares (pp. 164 - 165). Perhaps we may begin with this ... an acceptance that the person is the product of many and complex intricacies. In this acceptance, we may trust the student to reveal his or her truth and meaning to us. A building of trust may begin. Growth may occur. Perhaps a limited understanding of the person's own truth and meaning of the world may be of more human value than a cure that isn't.

Bibliography

- Adler, A. (1930). Individual psychology. In C. Murchinson (Ed.), *Psychologies of 1930*. Worcester, Mass.: Clark University Press. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Allcock, John B. (Ed.). (1983). *Pragmatism and Sociology: Émile Durkheim* (J.C. Whitehouse, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1955)
- Allport, G.W. (1955). *Becoming: basic considerations for a psychology of personality*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- American Psychiatric Association. (1987). *Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (3rd ed., revised)*. Washington: Author. In J.C. Curtis, Diagnosis. Halifax and Dartmouth: Dalhousie University and Nova Scotia Hospital. 85.
- Angyal, A. (1941). *Foundations for a science of personality*. New York: Commonwealth Fund. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Azam. (May 26, 1876). *Revue Scientifique*. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 245). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Badgely, R. (1984). *Sexual offences against children*. The Badgely Report. Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Government Publishing Centre. In Margo Rivera, *Multiple personality: An outcome of child abuse*. Toronto, Ontario: Education / Dissociation. 9.
- Bain. Emotions on self. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 212). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Bakan, D. (1966). *The duality of human existence*. Chicago: Rand McNally. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.

- Banks, F. (1993). Conversations / consultation. Counselor, Second Story Women's Centre, Bridgewater, Lunenburg County, Nova Scotia.
- Bateson, G. (1961). *Percival's narrative: A patient's account of his psychosis*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. In R.D. Laing (Ed.), *The politics of the family and other essays* (p. 50). New York: Random House, Pantheon Books.
- Bateson, G., Jackson, D.D., Haley, J., & Weakland, J. (1956). Toward a theory of schizophrenia. *Behavioral Science*, 1, 251. In R.D. Laing (Ed.), *The self and others: Further studies in sanity and madness* (p. 137-138). Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Bernstein, E.M. & Putnam, F.W. (1986). Development, reliability and validity of a dissociation scale. *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, 174 (12), 727 - 735.
- Bion, W.R. (1955). Group dynamics: A re - view. In M. Klein, P. Heimann, & R.E. Moeny - Kyrle, (Eds.), *New directions in psycho-analysis*. Also in W.R. Bion, *Experiences in groups and other papers*. London: Tavistock Publications; New York: Basic Books. In R.D. Laing, *The self and others: Further studies in sanity and madness* (p. 21). Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Bliss, E. (1983). Multiple personalities, related disorders and hypnosis. *American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis*, 26 (2). 114 - 123.
- Bliss, E. (1986). *Multiple personality, allied disorders and hypnosis*. New York: Oxford University Press. In Margo Rivera, Am I a boy or a girl? Multiple personality as a widow on gender differences. *Resources for Feminist Research / Documentation Sur La Recherche Feministe*, 17 (2). 41 - 45.
- Bowlby, J. (1960). Separation anxiety. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 41, 89. In R.D. Laing, *The self and others: Further studies in sanity and madness* (p. 142). Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Bretano. *Psychologie*. §§ 1,2. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 123). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.

- Bruner, J.S. (1957). Mechanism riding high. *Contemp. Psychology*, 2. 155 - 157. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Buber, Martin. (1957a) Distance and relation. *Psychiatry*, 20. In R.D. Laing, *The self and others: Further studies in sanity and madness* (p. 88). Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Cattell, R.B. (1950). *Personality: A systematic, theoretical, and factual study*. New York: McGraw - Hill. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Chapman, Loren J., Chapman, Jean P., & Daut, Randall L. (1976). Schizophrenic inability to disattend from strong aspects of meaning. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 85(1) 35 - 40.
- Comte, Auguste. *Cours de philosophie positive*, I. 34 - 38. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology*. (p. 123). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Coons, P.M., & Milstein, V. (1986). Psychosexual disturbances in multiple personality: Characteristics, etiology, and treatment. *Journal of Clinical Psychiatry*, 47, 106 - 110. In David A. Sandburg & Steven J. Lynn, *Dissociative experiences, psychopathology and adjustment, and child and adolescent maltreatment in female college students*. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 101 (4) 717 - 723.
- Cooper, D. (1967). *Psychiatry and anti-psychiatry*. London: Tavistock Publications. In R.D. Laing (Ed.), *The politics of the family and other essays* (p. 50). New York: Random House, Pantheon Books.
- Curtis, J.C. (February, 1988). *Diagnosis*. Halifax and Dartmouth: Dalhousie University and Nova Scotia Hospital. 85 - 95.
- Curtis, J.C. & Fraser, G.A. *Are we all multiple personalities?* Draft F3 - 31, #5. Medical Science Library, Nova Scotia Hospital, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia.
- Dale, N., Witzum, E., Mark, M., & Rabinowitz, S. (1992). The belief in the transmigration of souls: Psychotherapy of a druze patient with severe anxiety reaction. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 65, 119-130.
- Dewey, John *et al.* (1903). *Studies in logical theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. In J.B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.),

Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim (p. 88). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dewey, John. (1916). *Essays in experimental logic*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. In J.B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim* (p. 88). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dewey, John. (1907). Pure experience and reality. *Philosophical Review*, XVI (2). 419ff. In Émile Durkheim, *Pragmatisme et sociologie*. In Armand Cuvillier (Ed.), (p.p. 37 - 38 and 55). Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. In J.B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim* (p. 79). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dunn, Gary E. (1992). Multiple personality disorder: A new challenge for psychology. *Professional Psychology: Research and Practice*, 23 (1). 18-23

Durkheim, Émile. (1915). *The elementary forms of the religious life* (J.W. Swain, Trans.). London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. In J.B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim* (p. 67). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Durkheim, Émile. (1938). *The rules of sociological method* (S.A. Solovay and J. H. Mueller, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. In J.B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Durkheim, Émile. (1953). *Sociology and Philosophy* (D.F. Pocock, Trans.). London: Cohen & West Ltd. In J.B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Durkheim, Émile. (1955). *Pragmatisme et sociologie*, Armand Cuvillier (Ed.). Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. In J.B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Durkheim, Émile. (1957). *Professional ethics and civic morals*. (C. Brookfield and H.N. Kubali, Ed. and Trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. In J.B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Durkheim, Émile. (1961). *Moral education: A study in the theory and application of the sociology of education* (E.K. Wilson and H. Schnurer, Trans.). New York: The Free Press. In J.B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Durkheim, Émile. (1964). *The division of labour in society* (George Simpson, Trans.). New York: The Free Press. In J.B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Durkheim, Émile. (1969). *Journal sociologique*. Paris: Universitaires de France. In J. B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Durkheim, Émile. (1977). *The revolution of educational thought: Lectures on the formation and development of secondary education in France*. (P. Collins, Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. In J. B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim*.
- Durkheim, Émile. (1983). *Pragmatism and Sociology*. (John B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse, Ed. & Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1955)
- Durkheim, Émile and Mauss, Marcel. (1963). *Primitive classification* (Rodney Needham, Trans.). London: Cohen & West Ltd. In J.B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fagan, J. & McMahon, P. (1984). In Petersen, Gary. (March, 1990). Child and adolescent multiple personality. *Dissociations III* (1). File F3 - 23, #80. Medical Science Library, Nova Scotia Hospital, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia.
- Festinger, Leon. (1958). The motivating effect of cognitive dissonance. In G. Lindzey (Ed.), *Assessment of human motives*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Fick, A. (1862). *Lehrb. d. anat. u. physiol. d. sinnesorganne*. 29. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of*

- psychology* (pp. 98 - 99). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britanica.
- Firth, J.R. (1957). A synopsis of linguistic theory (1930 - 1955). In *Studies in linguistic analysis*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. In R.D. Laing, *The self and others: Further studies in sanity and madness* (p. 153). Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Fiske, D.W. & Maddi, S.R. (Eds.). (1961). *Functions of varied experience*. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Fraser, G.A. & LaPlerre, P.D. (1986). Lactate-induced panic attacks in dissociated states. Presented at the Third International Conference on Multiple Personality Disorders and Dissociated States, Chicago. In J.C. Curtis, *Diagnosis*. Halifax and Dartmouth: Dalhousie University and Nova Scotia Hospital. 85 - 95.
- Flew, Antony. (1979) *A dictionary of philosophy*. (pp. 29, 173 and 284). London: MacMillan Press.
- Freud, Sigmund. (1898). Sexuality in the aetiology of the neurosis. In James Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud* (p. 263). London: Hogarth Press. In Paul Roazen (Ed.), *Sigmund Freud* (p. 5). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Freud, Sigmund. (1910) The future prospects of psycho-analytic therapy. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: The major works of Sigmund Freud* (pp.123 - 127). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britanica.
- Freud, S. (1925). Character and anal eroticism. In S. Freud, *Collected Papers [Vol. 2 (a)]*. London: Institute for Psychoanalysis and Hogarth Press. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Freud, S. (1925) Instincts and their vicissitudes. In S. Freud, *Collected Papers [Vol. 4 (b)]*. London: Institute for Psychoanalysis and Hogarth Press. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Freud, S. (1925). On the transformation of instincts with special reference to anal eroticism. In S. Freud, *Collected Papers [Vol. 2 (c)]*. London:

- Institute for Psychoanalysis and Hogarth Press. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Freud, S. (1925). Some character types met with in psychoanalytic work. In S. Freud, *Collected Papers [Vol. 4 (d)]*. London: Institute for Psychoanalysis and Hogarth Press. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Freud, S. (1925). The infantile and genital organization of the libido. In S. Freud, *Collected Papers [Vol. 2 (e)]*. London: Institute for Psychoanalysis and Hogarth Press. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Fromm, E. (1941). *Escape from freedom*. New York: Rinehart. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Fromm, E. (1947) *Man for himself*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Fromm, E. (1955) *The sane society*. New York: Rinehart. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Frye, B. (November, 1990). Art and multiple personality disorder: An expressive framework for occupational therapy. *American Journal of Psychotherapy*, 44 (11), 1013 - 1022.
- Galambos, R., Sheatz, G. & Vernier, V.G. (1956) Electro-physiological correlates of a conditioned response in cats. *Science*, 123, 376 - 377. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Gehlke, Charles Elmer. (1968). *Émile Durkheim's Contributions to Sociological Theory*. New York: AMS Press.
- Goldstein, K. (1963). *The organism*. Boston: Beacon Press. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Greaves, G.B. (1980). Multiple personality: 165 years after Mary Reynolds. *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, 168. 577 - 596. In J.C. Curtis,

and G.A. Fraser, *Are we all multiple personalities?* Draft F3 - 31, #5.
Medical Science Library, Nova Scotia Hospital, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia.

- Griesenger. *Mental diseases*. §§ 50, 98. In W. James, *The Principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The Principles of Psychology* (p. 646). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Guilford, J.P. (1956). *Personality*. New York: McGraw - Hill. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.
- Guilford, J.P. & Zimmerman, W.S. (1956). Fourteen dimensions of temperament. *Psychol. Monogr.* (70) 10. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.
- Hale, H.G. (Ed.). (1975). *Psychotherapy and multiple personality: Selected essays* (pp.114 - 136). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. .
- Hall, Calvin S. (1954). *A primer of freudian psychology*. New York: The World Publishing Company.
- Hartman, Kris & Loewenstein, R.M. (1947). Comments on the formation of psychic structure. In Anna Freud et al (Eds.), *The psychoanalytic study of the child (Vol. 2)*. New York: Inter'l Universities Press. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.
- Hendrick, I. (1943). The discussion of the "instinct to master." *Psychoanal. Quart.*, (12). 561 - 565. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.
- Heidegger, M. (1949). On the essence of truth. In *Existence and Being*. London: Vision Press. In R.D. Laing, *The self and others: Further studies in sanity and madness* (p. 120). Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Hergenhahn, B.R. (1980). *An introduction to theories of personality*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.
- Hernandez - Peon, R., Sherrer, H. & Jouvet, M. (1956) Modification of electric activity in the cochlear nucleus during "attention" in unanesthetized cats. *Science*. 123, 331 - 332. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.

- Hodgson, Shadworth. *The philosophy of reflection I.* 248, 290. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 149). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Horevitz & Braun. (1984). In R.P.Kluft, High-functioning multiple personality patients: Three cases. *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, 174 (12), 722 - 726.
- Hornstein, Nancy & Putnam, Frank. (November, 1992). Clinical phenomenology of child and adolescent dissociative disorders. *Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*, 31 (6). 1077 - 1084.
- Horwicz. *Psychologischew analysen auf physiologischer grundlage*. Pt. II, 2nd half, § II. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (pp. 209 - 210). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Hume, David. (1748). *Enquiry c. human understanding*, Sect. V, Pt. 2. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The Principles of Psychology* (p. 644). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Hutchins, Robert M. (Ed.). (1952). *Great books of the western world: The major works of Sigmund Freud*. London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Hutchins, Robert M. (Ed.). (1952). *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology*. London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Inner faces of multiplicity. Investigation - A Research Bulletin. Institute of Noetic Sciences. Vcl. 1. # 3, 4. 3 - 6.
- James, William. (1890) *The principles of psychology*. London: Macmillan & Co. In Émile Durkheim, *Pragmatisme et sociologie* .(Armand Cuvillier, Ed.) Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. In John B. Allcock and J. C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

James, William. (1891) *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins, (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology*. London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.

James, William. (1902). *The varieties of religious experience* (III - VI) London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co. In Émile Durkheim, *Pragmatisme et sociologie* .(Armand Cuvillier, Ed.) Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. In John B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

James, William. (1907). *Pragmatism*. London and New York: Longman's, Green & Co. In Émile Durkheim, *Pragmatisme et sociologie* .(Armand Cuvillier, Ed.) Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. In John B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

James, William. (1909). *A pluralistic universe*. London and New York: Longman's, Green & Co. In Émile Durkheim, *Pragmatisme et sociologie* .(Armand Cuvillier, Ed.) Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. In John B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

James, William. (1911). *Some problems of philosophy*. (Chaps. IV, V, VI). London and New York: Longman's, Green & Co. In Émile Durkheim, *Pragmatisme et sociologie* .(Armand Cuvillier, Ed.) Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. In John B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

James, William. (1912). *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co. In Émile Durkheim, *Pragmatisme et sociologie* .(Armand Cuvillier, Ed.) Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. In John B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Janet, M. P. (May, 1888). *Revue Scientifique*. (p. 84). In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 249). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.

Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of pure reason* (2nd ed.). (§ 13) In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books*

- of the western world: William James: Principles of psychology* (pp. 232, 240 and 644). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Kelly, George. (1955). *The psychology of personal constructs* (Vol. 1). New York: Norton. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.
- Kleitman, N. (1939). *Sleep and wakefulness*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.
- Kelly, Ronald L. & Kodman, Frank. (1987). A more unified view of the multiple personality disorder. *Social Behavior and Personality*, 15 (2), 165 - 167.
- Kluft, R.P. Multiple personality disorder. *Review of Psychiatry*, 10, 160 - 184.
- Kluft, R.P. (1985b). The natural history of multiple personality disorders. In R.P. Kluft (Ed.), *Childhood antecedents of multiple personality*. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press. In R.P. Kluft, High-functioning multiple personality patients: Three cases. *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, 174 (12), 722 - 726.
- Kluft, R.P. (April, 1987). An update on multiple personality disorder. *Hospital and Community Psychiatry*, 38 (4), 363 - 373.
- Kluft, R.P. (1987) First-rank symptoms as a diagnostic clue to multiple personality disorder. *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 144, 293.
- Kluft, R.P. (September, 1991). Clinical presentations of multiple personality disorder. *Psychiatric Clinics of North America*, 14 (3), 605 - 625.
- Ladd, George T. (1887). *Elements of physiological psychology*. Pt. III, Chap. III. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 3). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Laing, R.D. (1960). *The divided self*. London: Tavistock Publications.
- Laing, R.D. (1960). *The divided self*. London: Tavistock Publications. In R.D. Laing, *The self and others: Further studies in sanity and madness* (p. 129). Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

- Laing, R.D. (1962). *The self and others: Further studies in sanity and madness*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Laing, R.D. (Ed.). (1969). *The politics of the family and other essays*. New York: Random House, Pantheon Books.
- Leavitt, Frank, & Braun, Bennett. (1991). Historical reliability: A key to differentiating populations among patients presenting signs of multiple personality disorder. *Psychological Reports*, 69. 499 - 510.
- Leibman, G. W. *Zur analysis der wirklichkeit*. (p. 489). In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 6) London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Lindzey, G., Hall, C.S. & Manosevitz, M. (Eds.). (1973). *Theories of personality: Primary sources and research (2nd edition)*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Locke, J. (1690). *Essay concerning human understanding*. Bk. II. Chap. XXVIII, § 12. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 190). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Lotze. *Med. psych.* (pp. 498 - 501). In *Microcosmos*. Chap. V, §§ 3, 4. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 208). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Maddi, Salvatore R. (1968). *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin-Dorsey Limited.
- Maddi, Salvatore R. & Propst, Barbara. (1963). Activation and personality. Unpublished manuscript read at APA convention, Philadelphia. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.
- Maslow, A.H. (1962). Some basic positions of growth and self-actualization psychology. In *Perceiving, behaving, becoming: A new focus for education*. Washington, D.C. : Yearbook of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.

McClelland, D. (1951). *Personality*. New York: Dryden.

McClelland, D.C., Atkinson, J.W., Clark, R.A. & Lowell, E.L. (1953). *The achievement motive*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.

Meynert, Theodor. (1874). *Zur mechanik des gehirnbauers*. Vienna. In B. Sachs (Ed.). (1885). In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins, *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 47). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.

Mill, J. (1882). *Auguste Comte and positivism* (3rd ed.). (p. 64). In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology*. (p. 124). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.

Mill, James. *Analysis* (1). (J.S. Mill's Edition). (pp. 331 and 412 - 413) In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The Principles of psychology* (pp. 229 and 637). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.

Mill, James. *Analysis* (2). (J. S. Mill's edition). (p. 175). In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 130). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.

Mohr, J. (1882). *Grunlange der empirischen psychologie*. Leipzig. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 47). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.

Montgomery, E. *Mind*, V. (pp. 18 - 19 and 24 -25). In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 124). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.

Murray, H.A. (1938). *Explorations in personality: a clinical and experimental study of fifty men of college age*. New York: Oxford. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis* (p. 362). Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.

- Murray, H.A. (1954). *Toward a general theory of action*. Cambridge, Mas.: Harvard University Press. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.
- Murray, H.A. & Kluckhohn, C. (1956). *Outline of a conception of personality*. In C. Kluckhohn, H.A. Murray & D.M. Schneider (Eds.), *Personality in nature, society, and culture* (2nd ed.). New York: Knopf. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.
- Napoli, M. (Spring, 1992). Memory loss: A survival response. *Mothering*. 122 - 125.
- Nisbet, Robert A. (1965). *Émile Durkheim*. New Jersey: Prentice - Hall Inc.
- Peterson, G. (March, 1990). Child and adolescent multiple personality. *Dissociations*, III (1). File F3-23 #80. Medical Science Library, Nova Scotia Hospital, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia.
- Peirce, Charles Sanders. (1931 - 1958). *The collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*. (C. Hartshorn and P. Weiss, Eds., Vols. I - VI; Arthur W. Burks, Ed., Vols. VII and VIII). (5.308, 5.401, 5.402, and 5.407). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. In John B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim* (pp. 5-6). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pittenger, R.E., Hockett, C. F. & Danehy, J.J. (1960). *The first five minutes*. New York: Paul Martineau. In R.D. Laing, *The self and others: Further studies in sanity and madness*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Prince, M. (1909). The psychological principles and field of psychotherapy. In H.G. Hale (Ed.), *Psychotherapy and multiple personality: Selected essays*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 114 - 136. In E.M. Bernstein and F.W. Putnam, Development, reliability and validity of a dissociation scale. *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, 174 (12). 727 - 735.
- Rank, O. (1929). *The trauma of birth*. New York: Harcourt, Brace. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.

- Rank, O. (1945). *Will therapy and truth and reality*. New York: Knopf. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.
- Rabinowitz, Fredric E. (1989). Creating the multiple personality: An experimental demonstration for an undergraduate abnormal psychology class. *Teaching of Psychology*, 16 (2). 69 - 71.
- Ribot, M. *Maladies de la memoire*. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 244). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Rivera, Margo. (June, 1988). Am I a boy or a girl? Multiple personality as a window on gender differences. *Resources for Feminist Research / Documentation Sur La Recherche Feministe*, 17 (2). 41 - 45.
- Rivera, M. (1991). *Multiple personality: An outcome of child abuse*. Toronto, Ontario: Education / Dissociation.
- Rivera, M. (1991). Multiple personality disorder: Putting many faces on child abuse. (video)
- Roazen, Paul (Ed.). (1973). *Sigmund Freud*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.
- Robertson, C. G. *Mind*, VIII. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 120). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Rogers, C.R. (1959). A theory of therapy, personality, and interpersonal relationships, as developed in the client-centered framework. In S. Koch (Ed.), *Psychology : A study of science* (Vol. 3). New York: McGraw-Hill. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.
- Ross, Colin A. (1990). Twelve cognitive errors about multiple personality disorder. *American Journal of Psychotherapy*, XLIV (3). 348 - 356.
- Ross, C. & Miller, S.D. et al. (March, 1991). Abuse histories in 102 cases of multiple personality disorder. *Canadian Journal of Psychiatry*, 36, 97 - 101.

- Royce, J. *Mind*, VI. (pp. 376 and 317-357). In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (pp. 104 and 658). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Ruesch, J. (1958). The tangential response. In Hoch and Zubin (Eds.), *Psychopathology of communication*. New York: Grune and Straton. In R.D. Laing, *The self and others: Further studies in sanity and madness* (pp. 37 - 48). Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Sager, E.B. & Smith, J.J. (September, 1971). Multiple personality. *The Journal of the Medical Society of New Jersey*, 68 (9), 717 - 719.
- Sandburg, David A., & Lynn, Steven J. (1992). Dissociative experiences, psychopathology and adjustment, and child and adolescent maltreatment in female college students. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 101 (4) 717 - 723.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. (1952a). *Saint Genet. Comédien et martyr*. Paris: Gallimard. In R. D. Laing, *The self and others: Further studies in sanity and madness* (p. 42). Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Schiller, Ferdinand C.S. (1903). *Humanism: Philosophical essays*. (Chap. IX, pp. 225 - 227). London: Macmillan & Co. In J.B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim* (pp. 21-22). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schillier, Ferdinand C.S. (1907). *Studies in humanism*. London: Macmillan & Co. In J.B. Allcock and J.C. Whitehouse (Ed. and Trans.), *Pragmatism and sociology: Émile Durkheim* (p. 17). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Searles, H.F. (1959). The effort to drive the other person crazy - an element in the etiology and psychotherapy of schizophrenia. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 32(1). In R.D. Laing, *The self and others: Further studies in sanity and madness* (pp. 131 - 143). Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Shamsie, J. (Ed.). (1990). *Youth with conduct disorder: What is to be done?* Etobicoke, Ontario: Institute for the Study of Anti-Social and Violent Behavior in Youth. Ministry of Community and Social Services, Ontario.
- Shultz, R., Braun, B.G. and Kluft, R.P. (1985). Creativity and the imaginary companion phenomenon: Prevalence and phenomenology in multiple

- personality disorder. Paper presented at the Second International Conference on Multiple Personality and Dissociative States, Chicago. In B. Frye, Art and multiple personality disorder: An expressive framework for occupational therapy. *American Journal of Psychotherapy*, 44 (11), 1013 - 1022.
- Speck, R.V. (1966). Psychotherapy of the social network of a schizophrenic family. *Family Process*, 6 (2). In R.D. Laing (Ed.), *The politics of the family and other essays* (p. 48). New York: Random House, Pantheon Books.
- Spiegel, D. (1981). Vietnam grief work using hypnosis. *American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis*, 24, 33 - 40. In D. Spiegel, Multiple personality as a post-traumatic stress disorder. *Psychiatric Clinics of North America*, 1 (1), 101 - 110.
- Spiegel, D. (March, 1984). Multiple personality as a post-traumatic stress disorder. *Psychiatric Clinics of North America*, 1 (1), 101 - 110.
- Speigel, J. P. & Bell, N. W. (1959). The family of the psychiatric patient. In S. Areitit (Ed.), *American handbook of psychiatry*. New York: Basic Books. In R.D. Laing, *The self and others: Further studies in sanity and madness* (p. 90). Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Spencer, H. *Psychology*. (pp. 195 and 197). In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins, *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 97). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britanica.
- Stafford-Clark, David. (1966). *What Freud really said*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Stark, Elizabeth. (1988). Inside the mind of a multiple. *Psychology Today*, 22, 80.
- Steele, Kathy. (1987). Sitting with the shattered soul. *Pilgrimage: Journal of Personal Exploration and Psychotherapy*, 15 (6), 19 - 25.
- Stewart, Dugald. *Elements*. Ch. II. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 109). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britanica.

Sullivan, Harry. (1947). *Conceptions of modern psychiatry*. Washington, D.C.: William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation.

Survivors of Abuse. Conversations. (1986 - 1993).

Taine, H. (1878). *Théorie d l'intelligence* (3rd ed.). (p. 462). In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (pp. 229 and 242). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britanica.

Thompson. (1884). *System of psychology* (1). (p. 114). In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 228). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britanica.

Tillich, P. (1952). *The courage to be*. London: Nisbet. In R.D. Laing, *The self and others: Further studies in sanity and madness* (p. 35). Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

Toews, C. (1991). *Issues in sexual assault sentencing in Nova Scotia*. Halifax: Nova Scotia Advisory Council on the Status of Women.

Tyndall. *Fragments of science*. (5th ed.). (p. 420). In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology*. (p. 96). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britanica.

Überweg. *Logic*. § 40. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology*. (p. 122). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britanica.

Wallis, C. & Willwerth, J. (July 6, 1992). Schizophrenia: A new drug brings patients back to life. *Time*. 36 - 43.

Watt, Norman F. & Lubensky, Amy W. (June, 1976). Childhood roots of schizophrenia. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 44(3), 363 - 375.

Wayland. *Elements of intellectual philosophy*. In William James, *The principles of psychology*. In Robert M. Hutchins (Ed.), *Great books of the western world: William James: The principles of psychology* (p. 224). London: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britanica.

- White, R.W. (1959). Motivation reconsidered. *Psychol. Rev*, 66, 297-333. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.
- White, R.W. (1960). Competence and the psychosexual stages of development. In M.R. Jones (Ed.), *Nebraska symposium on motivation*. Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press. In Salvatore R. Maddi, *Personality theories: A comparative analysis*. Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin - Dorsey Ltd.
- Wilbur, C.B. *Multiple personality and child abuse*. (pp. 3-7). 2040 Regency Rd., Lexington, Kentucky. 40503. 3 - 7.