THE BASIS AND NATURE OF MARITAIN'S TRUE HUMANISM

A thesis offered in partial fulfillment for the degree of Master of Arts

Douglas Henry Rodwell © Copyright

Saint Mary's University

April 1, 1964

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The material presented in this paper stems from a mild interest in, and possibly some opposition to, the present trend in the political environment towards socialization, which in some respects reduces the person to a subservient position in the community. Quite naturally, the comment of Jacques Maritain, on the cover of his major political treatise Man and the State, "The state is for man, not man for the state..," evoked some reaction and curiosity. The subject of this paper is limited to those factors which form the basis of justification for the above quotation, and the nature and characteristics of the political society in which man obtains the position ascribed to him by Maritain. This paper does not deal with other important aspects of Maritain's philosophy such as his theory of knowledge; the relation of church and state; his metaphysics; the equality of man; which in themselves are quite interesting. These, whenever mentioned, are kept to the barest minimum for they are major topics of enquiry.

There is no attempt in the body of the paper to pronounce upon the faults or virtues of Maritain's humanism.

Critical comments, or, possibly more appropriately, areas of doubt in the mind of the writer, will be made in that portion of the introduction which deals with the topic in question.

It is proper here to indicate some of the factors in Maritain's life which profoundly influenced his philosophy. Initially Maritain was a Protestant interested in science. Dissatisfaction with the positivistic movement of the early twentieth century diverted his interest from the field of science to that of philosophy. His quest for certainty led, through a very circuitous route, to theology. This quest, which was somewhat resolved with his conversion to Catholicism, was more fully attained through his subsequent study and wholehearted acceptance of Thomistic philosophy. This became the basis of all his philosophical work, both during his early productive years, when he devoted himself to the justification of Thomistic metaphysics and theology, and later in his social and political writings. We should note here, that, though political and social developments during the late 1920's and early 1930's re-awakened his interest in more practical matters, he continued his studies in metaphysics and theology, and applied them to the solution of problems arising out of his new interests. In his

moral and political philosophy he "tried to work out the character of authentically Christian politics and to establish, in the light of a philosophy of history and of culture, the true significance of democratic inspiration and the nature of the new humanism for which we are waiting." [1]

The second chapter endeavours to outline Maritain's metaphysics as it pertains to his social and political philosophy. The two concepts, individuality and personality, are so important to his philosophy that they must be borne in mind throughout all his work. In this particular section the problem of subsistence is considered, primarily from Maritain's point of view. Whether his doctrine on this point is acceptable in all circles is debatable; certainly he felt compelled under pressure of criticism, to elucidate his position further. [2]

Natural Law is fundamental to his political philosophy, primarily, because it is the source of man's rights, the criteria for the common good, and the basis of human authority. Natural law is known through connaturality, according to Maritain. This doctrine is somewhat obscure; at the same time it appears to contradict his general postulate on the rationality of man.

This manner of knowing suggests a form of intuition which may be suspect to other eminent philosophers of the same school.

The last part of this chapter deals with the problem of freedom, a perennial problem of political organizations and societies. Two types of freedom are discussed, with emphasis upon the freedom which man seeks as his ultimate goal, and which the common good should enable him to achieve. This freedom is a terminal freedom, and is to be equated with beatitude.

The third chapter defines the organizations which are either the product of man's free creation, that is, societies, or which are connatural, namely communities. Political terminology customarily accepted in our culture is more precisely defined than is our wont. Maritain, while adhering to his definitions in Man and The State is not always consistent. When he discusses civic rights in his book, The Rights Of Man And Natural Law, he imputes to the community the attributes which he reserves for the political society. We note that political rights come from the "constitution of the political community" [3], but, according to a comment in Man and the State, when reason is sufficiently operative and retains priority in

the operation of the group, it is a society. Hence, when political rights stem from a constitution reason prevails, and man does not "appear as a product of the social group" [4] as is the case in a community. Clearly, Maritain intends, in this context, a political society. That this is contradictory also becomes apparent when we note that a nation, classified as a community rather than a society in Man and the State, has "no rational form or juridical organization." [5] A constitution is the product of man's rationality, hence we may conclude that rather than "community" Maritain really means "society".

The terms given careful attention in his work include "nation", "body politic", and "state". The term "nation" is given a slightly unusual definition. It is not synonymous with country, but is a "group of people speaking the same language and having the same cultural and historical background." [6] The people need not be either geographically or politically united. As an example, one might consider the Germans, who, living in such countries as Austria and Czechoslovakia (as happened prior to 1936,) were politically separated from their national group. Accepting this definition, one wonders how Canada, with the many linguistic groups, from diverse historical backgrounds, may be considered as a nation.

The distinction between the "body politic" and the "state" is of paramount importance. They are not synonymous. The state is a part of the body politic, and that part which looks after the interests of the whole. The state possesses the authority to regulate the whole, but as is shown in the section under this heading, authority is not sovereignty nor is it absolute, but resides in the people or body politic.

The common good, viewed as the ultimate end of the state, provides in conjunction with natural law, the basis of man's rights. When discussing the rights of man, Maritain distinguishes between the exercising of the rights and the possession of them. Some are absolutely inalienable in terms of possession, but not in exercise. The distinction between them seems to be very fine, and one which does not seem particularly well founded. It appears illogical to say that a right is absolutely inalienable, yet may not be exercised. Included in the fourth chapter, is a treatment of the two movements which Maritain visualizes as being typical of man. His movement towards his own ultimate end, vertically as it were, and horizontally towards the temporal end of his earthly existence, namely, the common good.

The final chapter recapitulates the fundamental characteristics of a true humanism envisaged by Maritain, and briefly indicates the manner in which he believes it should be implemented.

CHAPTER II

BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS

Individuality and Personality

The true image of man, the pivotal point around which the social and political philosophy of Jacques Maritain is built, has its source in the metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas. The metaphysics is derived from Aristotle's concept of material being wherein is found the co-principles of matter and form. Matter is to be considered, in this case, as prime matter, a philosophical concept rather than scientific. Prime matter is that metaphysical principle whereby a being is capable of being determined to its essential mode of existence. It is matter which lacks any positive characteristics. It is neither able to be, nor to be thought directly, but in itself is pure potentiality. This matter is a kind of non-being, or a power of receptivity which enables a material being to undergo substantial change. It may be said to have an avidity for being. In man, when considered as prime matter, this avidity for being may be considered as the narrowness of the ego which tends to grasp for itself.

Prime matter is also the principle of individuation or diversity, but in itself has nothing to account for the distinctness of one substance from another. In this instance, prime matter must be considered as the root of extension, in which case, the being of which it is a principle has parts external to each other. The substantial form, the other co-principle of being is then able to inform one portion rather than another and hence distinguishes that portion from all other embodiments of the same form. Thus, matter marked by quantity (materia quantitate signata) is the principle of individuation in corporeal substances and implies position in space. Maritain asserts that "we are obliged to take our stand upon that which reveals this nature to our senses, namely the operations, phenomena, or accidents, of the substance. In this sense we know the substance by the accidents." [1]

Matter also has a tendency to division, and man's individuality, being rooted in matter, also has this tendency. Maritain illustrates this analogously by citing that each individual, as individual, is part of a species, and a part of the universe. It is to be noted that as individual, the loss of one, or even a number of men, does not, to any appreciable extent jeopardize the species or the whole

universe, nor does it prevent the fulfilment of God's design for the universe as a whole. As individual, man is but "a single dot in the immense network of forces and influences, cosmic, ethnic, historic, whose laws we obey. We are subject to the determination of the physical world." [2]

Individuality, according to Maritain, has its roots in matter, and is that which makes a being uniquely itself; it is that which relates man to the world of matter; and for which man seeks material gratification. This, however, is not the whole man, but is only the shadow of the true person. The second co-principle of being - spirit, form, or act - insofar as it is rational, constitutes the personality, and as such is of far greater importance. Personality deals with those universal things of the mind which are beyond the reach of the tangible world, but are the concern of the real person. It may best be considered through love, for in the beloved, all the qualities are merged; love does not aim at any particular essence or quality but at the center in which is to be found the "source of existence, of goodness, and of action." [3]

Personality belongs to the ontological order, and has its first metaphysical root in subsistence. Subsist-

ence is a property of essence and is a neeessary condition for the exercising of existence by an individual nature. [4] It presupposes an individual nature to which it gives final completion. The individual nature to which completion is given becomes a center of existential and operative activity. When the subject completed by subsistence is an intellectual subject, it brings with it a perfection of a higher order. The completion of the person by subsistence is a metaphysical completion which causes the substantial nature receiving it to be a closed whole. The personality given to man by subsistence is metaphysically inalienable and obscure to him. The subsistence makes the person a center of liberty and enables him to confront things, "the universe, God; talk with another person, and communicate with him by understanding and affection." [5] Through the intellect the person is able to possess his existence, to hold himself in hand; to perfect himself and to give himself freely to another, and to receive unto himself another self freely given.

Personality signifies interiority to self, and "of its essence asks for a dialogue in which souls really communicate." [6] The communication demanded by personality is a creative one, for it is only by such creative com-

munication that personality can perfect itself and enjoy its full sufficiency in the absolute to which it is directly related. Personality rarely finds such communication in man because of the affliction to which he is subjected. The fullest expression of this communication must be found in man's relationship to God. The person, because of the spirit which subsists in him, - and the higher order of spirit to which he aspires - is capable of more complete participation with God. Man's dignity lies in the property of resembling God; "For God is spirit and the human person proceeds from Him in having as principle of life a spiritual soul capable of knowing, loving and of being uplifted by grace to participation in the very life of God so that, in the end, it might know and love Him as He knows and loves Himself." [7]

Recognition of the metaphysical distinction between individuality and personality must not be mistaken for a separation. Man is a whole being, a composite of individuality and personality.

> There is not in me one reality, called my individuality and another reality, called my person. One and the same reality is, in a certain sense an individual, and, in another sense, a person. Our whole being is an individual by reason of that in us which derives from matter, and a person by reason of that in us which derives from spirit. [8]

The separation of the individual from the person, and the undue stress that may be given the former results in a perversion of man as a whole. There is a conflict between these two aspects, a conflict, which in the view of Maritain is weighed in favour of individuality. Personality must be won by man, it is something he must fight for, and he pays for it as dearly as he pays for liberty.

> Personality, while metaphysically inalienable suffers many a check in the psychological and moral register. There it runs the risk of contamination by the miseries of material individuality, by its meannesses, its vanities, its bad habits, its narrownesses, its hereditary predispositions, by its natural regime of rivalry and opposition. 9

In spite of the emphasis given to personality, Maritain insists that individuality is not to be construed as something evil, nor to be ignored. We must keep in mind that material individuality is the very condition of our existence, and that it is something good. Recognition and gratification must be given to the material demands of man's individuality, however, when preponderance is given to the individual aspect of our being, evil results.

The image of man expounded in Maritain's metaphysics is that of a person whose dignity lies in the property of resembling God, who is

> ... a being made of matter and spirit,

> whose body may have emerged from the historical evolution of animal forms, but whose immortal soul directly proceeds from divine creation. He is made for truth, capable of knowing God as the Cause of Being, by his reason, and of knowing Him in His intimate life, by the gift of faith. 10

Such a man "does not look for a merely industrial civilization, but for a civilization integrally human (industrial as it may be to its material conditions) and of evangelical inspiration." [11]

Natural Law

The basic postulates emphasized by Maritain in his expositions on the true image of man are, that man was created by God, and that his dignity is due to his being created in the image of God. Maritain considers it self-evident that man has, not only a nature, but that he has a rational nature. Because man has a nature, he is subject to Natural Law. Maritain employs the term Natural Law rather reluctantly because jurists and philosophers of the enlightenment have so misused the term that it is generally ill-received, and its true nature badly obscured. [12] Historically considered, Maritain accepts Natural Law as being recognized by the ancients - who called it an unwritten law which they considered unchangeable - handed down to and by the great Greek philosophers and thinkers, such as Aris-

totle, and as being modified by Christian thought through the early Church Fathers. It became a well-developed doctrine through the work of St. Thomas Aquinas. Maritain adheres to the latter's doctrine of Natural Law, enlarging upon it in those areas where he believes insufficient clarity exists.

Natural Law, according to St. Thomas, is that which constrains or binds a creation to act or function in a particular fashion.[13] This inclination is given by its creator. Since He is the creator of the universe, the stamp of His Intelligence is imparted to all of His Creation. The law as it exists in the Divine Intellect is Eternal Law, and inclines things to their proper acts and ends for the good of all creatures. It is the plan of Divine Providence and is consequently perfect - the source of both the physical and the moral order.

Maritain extends the concept of inclinations indicated by St. Thomas to the idea of the normality of functioning. By this Maritain means that any created thing is designed to serve the purpose of its creator. Maritain illustrates this by reference to a piano. It is designed to play musical notes whenever and wherever it may be. If it does not, it is not in tune with its

Natural Law. If it is not able to be tuned so that it does, it ceases to function as a piano, and hence ceases to possess any value. The point is that the piano should produce music, if it doesn't, it really isn't functioning normally.

Where man is concerned, he partakes of Eternal Reason as well as being a creation of God. Man must carry out a normality of functioning, and this includes functioning rationally. Since man is rational, he is free to act as he determines. This implies that he should act according to Natural Law, not only because it is Natural Law, but because he knows that he should act that way. Because man is given a choice, Natural Law is not simply Natural Law for him, but also moral law. "Since man is endowed with intelligence and determines his own ends, it is up to him to put himself in tune with the ends necessarily determined by his nature." [14]

Another aspect of Natural Law recognized by the writers of antiquity is the idea that it is unwritten law. Biblical support for this idea is conveyed by St. Paul who points out that people, unaware of Jewish law, (assuming that Jewish law was divinely given, hence more nearly divine or eternal law), who acted in accordance with their

nature, were also following Natural Law. Since Natural Law is unwritten law we may well wonder how it is known, particularly since man is to attune himself to it. Maritain's explanation of this is based in part on the fourth article of Question 90 of St. Thomas's Summa Theologica, which is concerned with the promulgation of law. St. Thomas says "the natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally." Knowledge known naturally is knowledge through connaturality or inclination according to Maritain. Natural Law cannot be known by man "through conceptual knowledge or by way of reasoning." [15] It is, therefore, obscurely known, undemonstrable, and incapable of rational justification. This does not deny its validity, according to Maritain, who maintains that there are some things validly, yet inexplicably known by man which are more valid than those which may be more readily explained. Natural Law does, however, become known to practical reason, but this only occurs after it has been grasped by the intellect as being consonant or in agreement with the principles known through inclination. [16]

Two points which Maritain emphasizes as being pertinent to Natural Law as related to man arise from man's rationality. We must remember that man is in-

dividual in some respects, and, in common with other forms of animal life, some aspects of Natural Law are common to both. However, because man is rational, those aspects of nature which he possesses in common with other forms of being are influenced by his rationality, and consequently become completely different, or essentially human. All of man's inclinations become reason-permeated because they are "inclinations refracted through the crystal of reason in its unconscious or pre-conscious life." [17] Man's rationality also influences the nature of Natural Law as known. Man's rationality gives him a historicity not found in any other form of being. The inclination which human nature has received has been felt through the course of time, consequently man has become progressively more aware of the precepts of, or the subsequent principles derived from, the first principle of Natural Law. This may be illustrated as follows: the first principle of Natural Law, and seemingly the only one recognized by people generally, is that "we must do good and avoid evil." [18] From this precepts follow in a necessary fashion. A precept which Maritain states as following from the first principle is "thou shalt do no murder". An enlargement of this, or an addition to Natural Law, is the concept of 'genocide', or

the extermination of a race. Recognition of genocide as being contrary to Natural Law is readily apparent; it is an addition to the Natural Law through the rationality of man and the development of history. Such additions to Natural Law are consonant with St. Thomas's statements in Question 94, Article 5 of Summa Theologica. The criminal nature of genocide was recognized when it was written into the annals of history in 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Here we see this addition to Natural Law had its influence upon the law of nations. [19]

Freedom

A fundamental problem in social and political philosophy, and one with which Maritain shows great concern, is freedom. Preliminary remarks on freedom by Maritain indicate two basic aspects of it, both of which have been considerably altered from the concepts understood by the philosophers of the scholastic school. The two basic aspects are freedom of choice and freedom of spontaneity. Insofar as freedom of choice provided the basis of society, each person appeared as a little world or being "with no other restriction on (his) freedom save that they are not to hinder a similar freedom on the part

of their neighbour." [20] This in effect sets up a multiplicity of standards, and basically established each person as a law unto himself. Freedom of spontaneity or autonomy, when considered as the basis for social life in the temporal order became merely a transitive sort of freedom, pertaining solely to the production and control of material accomplishment and the achievement of power. This is particularly evident in the totalitarian states where the person occupies a secondary position to a "Leviathan dominating the whole earth, to the Freedom of which a multitude of happy slaves will sacrifice their souls." [21] Neither of these are a satisfactory concept of freedom, nor place them in the proper perspective in the social order.

When Maritain considers freedom of choice he defines it as the absence of necessity, and may be equated with free will. This is known by each person inherently. Maritain suggests, however, that St. Thomas's clarification of free will proves its existence in every intelligent nature. At the outset we must note that the will is a power of spiritual appetition which is rooted in the intellect, and thereby is necessarily grounded in nature. Because it is grounded in nature it has a necessary determination. This follows from his concept of natural law,

which points out that a created nature has a normality of functioning determined by the wisdom of the creator. The object towards which the will is necessarily determined is the "good which satisfies every desire, a good which suits in every respect all human aspirations: in short, beatitude." [22] Anything which is not this absolute good therefore cannot determine the will necessarily. It is on the basis of this that Maritain contends that with respect to everything other than the absolute or limitless good, the will is completely free. This important and interesting concept of free will must be passed over so that consideration of the second aspect of freedom, which is more pertinent to social and political philosophy, may be studied.

The freedom which receives considerable attention is that which consists merely in the absence of restraint, or as Maritain terms it, freedom of spontaneity. Such freedom is considered in five degrees, depending upon the nature of the 'being' considered. The lowest degree pertains to those inanimate objects which obey the laws of its nature, an example might be water which always seeks its own level. The second degree belongs to vegetative life, and the third "by organisms possessing sensitive life" [23], but which do not give themselves the ends

of their own activity. In this category one would place animals and birds, the ends of which are determined by nature. The fourth degree of freedom of spontaneity becomes apparent only in the world of spiritual things, wherein it becomes freedom of independence. It becomes freedom of independence because it is concerned with persons who are endowed with free will, and consequently do not merely follow the inclination of nature, but endeavour to make themselves the sufficient principle of their own operation. Freedom becomes the form and interior principle of the activities which the soul freely carries out. When this occurs, "the person - insofar as it is concerned in the pure line of its aspirations as a person, - wishes to pass to an ever higher degree of spontaneity and independence." [24] The person is thereby aspiring to the fifth degree of freedom of spontaneity, or as it is generally termed by Maritain, Freedom of Autonomy. Full freedom of autonomy is a state of spiritual perfection or sanctity which is almost godlike, for "then it is the very life of God that lives in man's heart". [25] The person, however, is hindered from achieving this for two reasons, first, because of his being subject to realities other than himself and to laws which he has not made. Second, he is involved in the "miseries and fatalities

of material nature, - the servitudes and the needs of the body, heredity, ignorance, selfishness, and the savagery of instincts." [26] Even though the condition of man is a deterrent to the attainment of freedom of autonomy he nonetheless continues to work towards it. This movement Maritain calls the dynamism of freedom, and involves both a spiritual and social form.

> We maintain then that freedom of choice, freedom in the sense of free will, is not its own proper end. It is directed to the achievement of freedom in the sense of autonomy; and in this quest of autonomy which answers to an essential demand of the human personality the dynamism of freedom is to be found. 27

CHAPTER III

MAN WITHIN THE COMMUNITY

Community and Society

Maritain emphasizes the political nature of man, considering it necessary because of his existential poverty which stems from his nature and individuality, and also because his personality, which possessing an expansiveness of knowledge and love, demands communication in order to progress to its ultimate goal. The previous sections have outlined the concepts of man which must be considered by the political society if it is to perform its function in enabling man to achieve his goal. The society which Maritain believes best suited to this end is variously termed by him as 'organic democracy', or 'integral humanism'. In the exposition of this society recourse is made to terms usually associated with political philosophy, but used quite frequently in a rather loose sense. Many are considered synonymous, and are used as such, even by Maritain. It is necessary to clarify these terms so that Maritain's exact intent may be understood.

The various associations in which civilized man is involved have been given a twofold classification, community and society. Community is more nearly a biological reality than is society because it is determined more by biological factors than by intelligence and will. In the concept of community there are a number of levels, commencing at the lowest level there is the family. From this spring all the other levels, namely clan, tribe, and at the highest level, the nation. Within all levels of community there develops common unconscious psyche, common feelings and customs. These occupy a dominating position in the community, taking precedence over the rational activities, and imposing patterns of conduct upon the community. The development of these feelings, customs, and unconscious psyche arise from the historical situations and the environment peculiar to the community. If one seeks examples of community in the sense of which Maritain speaks, one might find them in those areas distant from western culture, or where environment has tended toward the isolation of groups over a considerable period. Specifically one might think of the Eskimo, the tribes in central Africa, or the so-called 'hill-billy folk' in various isolated portions of the United States.

The most important, most complete and most complex

community engendered by civilized life is the nation. Besides possessing the characteristics common to all communities, the nation possesses a dynamism which appears to be more operative than on the other levels, and which causes the nation to perpetuate itself to a greater degree. This dynamism results from the awareness which the nation has of its own unconscious psyche, mores and patterns of feeling. The lower levels of community, such as the clan, the tribe, or the ethnic group may become a nation, but only when the people who constitute it become "aware of themselves as history has made them, who treasure their own past, and who love themselves as they know or imagine themselves to be." [1]

Neither the nation, nor any other level of community, can become a society, though it may provide the natural conditions from which a society may arise. The nation is not a society because it does not have a ruling authority, nor such other aspects of society as a rational or juridical organization, a common good, civic friendship nor formal norms and order. The nation "does not appeal to the freedom and responsibility of personal conscience, it instils in human persons a second nature. It is a general pattern in private life, it does not know any principle of public order." [2]

Society as distinguished from community is the result of man's rational activity. It is an organization consciously created by his intellect and will, and remains under the control of his rational activity. It is designed to fulfil specific needs, or to achieve a specific goal. Examples of society developed by man include business organizations, professional associations, and labour unions in the economic and cultural spheres. In the realm of political activity the body politic and the state are societal organizations.

The body politic and the state are not synonymous in the philosophy of Jacques Maritain, but are to be considered as the whole and the part respectively of one political society. [3] This interpretation is confirmed by Evans who says "The body politic is the people organized under just laws and together pursuing a common good. The state is simply the particular agency which has the especial care of the common good, and the direction of the people to this common good." [4] Consideration of the body politic must be given priority because it provides the foundation of the state, and is the whole of which the state is a part. The body politic is the most perfect society devised by civilization, and is the entire group of human persons who have united through friendship

and under just laws in order that their common interests and the good of their human existence may be enhanced. The people are the "living and free substance of the body politic" [5] who bring it into existence by exercising their rights and drawing up its constitution. While the body politic is the work of reason, it is, nonetheless, made up of people who impart to it flesh and blood instincts, passions and reflexes. These must be controlled, and when moral justice fails to control them, legal force is necessary.

The body politic is not simply the people, but a complex whole which incorporates various levels of community and other societal forms devised by man to fulfil particular needs. These societal forms and communal forms possess rights which must be respected by the body politic for they deal with matters vital to its well-being. This is especially true of religious, educational, economic and cultural societies because they were created by the free initiative of the people and must be as autonomous as possible so that their contribution may be as complete as possible. Any restriction upon their activity would limit the contribution they could make. The same is true of the family unit which has rights and freedoms anterior to the superior unity of the body politic.

The state, the second of the two political societies devised by man, is viewed as an instrumental agency by Maritain. The state may be regarded as the governing body of the body politic, and is accountable to it through duly elected representatives. This is in contrast to the absolutist or substantialist theory which regards the state as superimposed on the body politic, superior to it, and beyond its power. The state is the instrumental agent devised by the body politic to carry out a specific function. It is the part of the body politic which specializes in the interests of the whole. It is the topmost part of the body politic because it is the only part which deals with problems affecting the entire body politic, but this does not place it above the people. Maritain is most emphatic about this. "The state is inferior to the body politic as a whole, and is at the service of the body politic as a whole." [6]

The difference between the state and the body politic, aside from its function, lies in the fact that it does not possess to any great extent the instincts and passions which are evident in the body politic. As an institution it requires human energy and intellect, but it is a superior embodiment of such energy and in-

tellect. It could not exist without man,

> ... but it constitutes a superior embodiment of reason, an impersonal, lasting superstructure, the functioning of which may be said to be rational in the second degree, insofar as the reason's activity in it, bound by law and by a system of universal regulations, is more abstract, more sifted out from the contingencies of experience and individuality, more pitiless also, than in our individual lives. 7

The service which the state should provide for the body politic, may be stated very briefly, but carries with it tremendous implications. The state is the organization created by the body politic and charged with the administration of public affairs, the maintenance of law, and the promotion of the common welfare and public order.

The State's Authority is not Sovereignty

The state is able to perform those services required of it by exercising the power which it receives in conjunction with the authority entrusted to it. In order to understand the authority which the state has, and the manner by which it receives and exercises it, we must note the definition of authority as it pertains to the democratic society visualized by Maritain. Authority is not sovereignty. The latter, as defined by Maritain, involves two elements, "first, a supreme independence and

a supreme power which is a natural and inalienable right", and "second, a right to an independence and a power which in their proper sphere are supreme absolutely or transcendently, not comparatively or as a topmost part in the whole." [8] Acceptance of this definition clearly leads to the conclusion that no human being, nor organization established by him, can possess sovereignty. The state, whether it is a person considered as an absolute ruler, or an elected body, may bear the attributes of sovereignty, but in actual fact "God alone is sovereign" [9] because He alone is absolutely and transcendently above the whole body politic and creation.

Authority is to be considered as comparative sovereignty, for it is neither absolute nor transcendental. It may be defined as "a right to direct and command, to be listened to or obeyed by others." [10] This right is demanded by natural law because man's development and progress is possible only under some form of order. Keeping in mind that ultimately all authority rests in God, we note that He invests it, not in some designated person or group of persons, but, in the people generally. Thus, people possess through participation in God an inherent right to autonomy, self-government or authority. Temporal authority therefore resides in the people. Maritain re-

cognizes the impracticality of order without leaders, yet poses the problem of how this leadership may be justified in a Christian Humanism in which the people are equal. The resolution of this problem lies in considering man in the cosmos rather than as an individual member of a society. Natural law and the common good both demand that there exist in society some who command and some who obey.[11]

The authority possessed by those who command is a genuine, living authority according to Maritain. The rulers, in as much as they are people in their own right, possess the same inherent authority possessed by the people in general through participation in divine authority. The rulers also possess authority entrusted to them by the body politic as a whole. The state however does not possess the authority entrusted to them by the body politic as a right, much less an inalienable right. The state is but the vicar of the authority of the body politic, its authority may, therefore, be termed vicarious. The vicarious authority which the state possesses is subject to the control of the body politic, for we must remember that the authority possessed by the body politic is a natural right and an inalienable one. The body politic may, therefore, in agreement with the constitution by

which they organized their society, control the authority which they entrusted to the state.

This rightly suggests that the body politic controls the state. The manner in which this control may be exercised necessitates a brief glance at the hierarchic structure of the True Humanist Society under consideration. We recall that the basis of the society is the people, or the body politic. The topmost part of this society is the state. Intermediary between these are to be found the representative bodies at the various levels. [12] The state, that is the governing body, is responsible to the representatives of the body politic. Since this is the case, the first, and obvious manner in which the body politic exercises control over the state is through the use of their franchise which circumscribes their mandate whereby the body politic may replace representatives with others more amenable to their wishes. The other means available for the control of the state are those rights belonging to the people through natural law. Paramount among these natural rights is freedom of speech, which may be enlarged to include the press, radio, and other means of communication, and pressure groups which may act upon governmental agencies. Of these means the first

is generally sufficiently well known, the second, freedoms of press, speech, and radio, while well known, are not used as fully as they might be, nor does the body politic currently regard them with as much sanctity as Maritain feels should be the situation in the organic democracy he proposes should exist. The third means of controlling the state though normally practiced is rather questionable in the eyes of Maritain, because, rather than being rational has a tendency to use flesh and blood means of control. Through the use of emotional propaganda it subverts rational politics to mass agitation and pressure groups.

Maritain introduces a fourth means of control, which he calls spiritual, and which has its origin in oriental civilization. Basically it is the power of truth or Satyagraha which Gandhi used in the procuring of Indian independence from Britain. It is coupled with the idea conveyed by St. Thomas that the main "act of virtue of fortitude is not the act of attacking, but that of enduring, bearing, suffering with constancy." [13] People imbued with the spiritual means "can confront the whole machine (state) with the naked human strength of their patience in sustaining suffering on behalf of unyielding, just claims." [14]

The manner in which the governing body exercises its authority is pertinent at this point. Basically the function of the state is to enable the people to reach that level of freedom of expansion necessary for the attainment of their ultimate end. While recognizing the equality in nature inherent in the human species, the state must also recognize the social and economic inequalities which differentiate one man from another. Adequate freedom from control should be given to each person to enable him to progress as completely as possible. Such limitations on the authority of the state should be extended to the societies within the body politic that are designed to improve the lot of man and the society. These should have as much autonomy as is consonant with the good of the body politic as a whole. It is with this view in mind that Maritain espouses M. Yves Simon's idea "that every function which can be assumed by the inferior must be exercised by the latter, under pain of damage to the entire whole. For there is more perfection in a whole, all of whose parts are full of life and initiative, than is a whole whose parts are but instruments conveying the initiative of the superior organs of the community." [15] The autonomy given by this also contributes to the control of state authority because it creates

in the body politic a consciousness of power which the state cannot ignore. This does not mean, however, that the state should merely carry out the wishes of the body politic. The state has genuine authority, and it must use it. It must make decisions, and when it does, they must conform to the dictates of conscience, and be in keeping with the laws of ethics governing politics. The legislators must do what they believe to be required by the common good, even though they may incur the displeasure of the people.[16] The law which should be regarded as paramount by the state is natural law, and "The legislator in a Christianly inspired body politic ... could never, and should never endorse or approve any way of conduct contrary to natural law, but he could and should tolerate certain ways of conduct that depart in some measure from the natural law."[17]

The fact that the state is accountable to the people, and at the same time exercises the people's authority over them, seems to be contradictory. Maritain does not believe this to be the situation. He visualizes the state as being in communion with the people, a communion concerned with the will to live together, the awareness of a common destiny and vocation and the movement towards the good. This communion

is at a deeper level than those superficial levels so frequently prominent in the dealings of man. It is because man obscures the deeper level with his everyday comings and goings, and the momentary trends of opinion and passions, that the state must direct and counsel him toward the good, frequently in spite of his immediate desires.

The authority which the state exercises is not only concerned with the society of which it is a part, but also with those external communities with which it is in contact. Maritain, in keeping with his concept of community and society, contends that as long as no supre-societal organization is established each society in the international community enjoys comparative supreme independence. If and when the society, by its own choice, enters an international society its autonomy becomes subject to the authority it has assisted in establishing.

CHAPTER IV

THE COMMON GOOD RESTRICTS MAN AND STATE

The Nature of the Common Good

The common good, frequently mentioned and more frequently implied in Maritain's political philosophy is the criteria for the activities of both man and the state. It, like many other terms used by Maritain, has its source in the writings of St. Thomas where there is established a hierarchy within the common good related to the metaphysical concepts of man, namely, individuality and personality. Both individuality and personality seek an end. The former, according to St. Thomas, seeks a practical end, while the latter seeks a speculative end. In each instance it is termed a 'good'. The good sought by the speculative intellect, that is, personality, is the truth as found in God. The good sought by the practical intellect, that is, individuality, is a temporal end or good. The good sought by the speculative intellect is superior to the good sought by the practical intellect for it transcends the temporal order to which the practical intellect is restricted. The common good sought by the speculative intellect is construed by Maritain as being the separated common good, and is the

ultimate end of man as person.[1] This is superior to the common good which man as individuality seeks.

At the same time we must remember that man as an individual is but a part of a biological species which likewise has a good, to which each individual is required to contribute as a part of the divine plan of the universe. Man is also part of the social whole which he creates, and in keeping with the Aristotlean maxim that the good of the whole is more divine than the good of the parts, man is, in some respects inferior to the good, that is the common good of the whole social body.

The concept of the common good is derived from natural law. The postulate upon which this is based is that man does in general that which is for his own good. We should note, however, that some of man's actions are not basically directed to his own good, yet, at the time he carries them out he does not realize it. Man as a social being has designed a society to aid him in his quest for the good. The good which he seeks in concert with his fellowman is that good which alone he would be unable to achieve. We may see here more readily the idea of the common good, for it is a good common to the multitude of persons who constitute the body politic. Maritain

implies this when he says "the common good is common because it is received in persons, each one of whom is as a mirror of the whole." [2]

Before enlarging upon the exact nature of the common good we must take cognizance of the nature of the ends it serves. First we note that the end of the state is to procure the common good, therefore the common good is the ultimate goal of the state. But we must note that the common good of the state is that which enables the people who constitute it to achieve their own separated common good. Thus, in so far as the people are concerned, the common good as the ultimate end of the state is but an intermediate end that enables them to attain a superior good. This hinges upon the fact that the common good of the state is a temporal good while that of the person is a spiritual and hence transcendental good. [3]

The common good, though it aims at the good of all members of the body politic, is not simply the sum of the material goods of its members. Were this the case, it would lead to an anarchistic society wherein the good of the members would deteriorate to become the good of a few, and those few who would be able through power to override the wishes of the multitude. Nor is the common

good to be considered as the good of the whole as such, for this would soon place the whole above the members and sacrifice the members to it. The common good is "the good human life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their communion in good living." [4] This, however, does not mean that the wishes, or the good of the majority must be satisfied. Each person in the body politic, whether a member of a minority or a majority, must be the recipient of the common good.

Quite naturally the common good, since it is to provide a 'good living', must encompass those material necessities essential for the continuance of life. Included in this would be the material needs of food, shelter, and clothing. Added to this would also be those material goods which are within the possibilities of the state as a result of its technological development. The common good includes also those public services and commodities which are deemed desirable in any community. The common life which is presupposed in the common good includes many of those less tangible aspects of life which constitute society. The traditions, customs, and heritages of past generations that have contributed to the cultural life of the society are a vital part of the common good. The fiscal condition and the

laws of the state, coupled with the judicious enforcement of that law, and the guarantee of the integrity of the state through its military strength are all vital parts of the common good.

> It includes the sum or sociological integration of all the civic conscience, political virtues and sense of right and liberty, of all the activity, material prosperity and spiritual riches, of unconsciously operative hereditary wisdom, of moral rectitude, justice, friendship, happiness, virtue and heroism in the individual lives of its members. 5

Maritain constantly points out the necessity of the common good being morally and ethically good. He condemns any reversion to the idea that the end justifies the means. In the procurement of the common good for the society, the state must use justice and virtue. These are the internal, spiritual attributes which give vitality and life to the society and tend to the preservation of the state. The corruption of these forces by the state itself, even in the procurement of the common good, tend to destroy the spiritual vitality of the state, and eventually tend to its own destruction. 6

A second major condition of the common good is its communicability. Within the social body the common good must flow among the people as individuals, and as a group. We may most readily perceive the 'flow' of

goods which result from the work of individuals, for certainly our economy is based largely upon communication, but the well-being of society is dependent upon more than just the exchange of material goods. Friendship, the unity of the world, the brotherhood of man and similar terms frequently mentioned over the media of mass communication to-day are indicative of the flow deemed part of the common good. Also, the cultural changes currently taking place among nations bear ample testimony of the deep sense of 'communion' suggested by Maritain as being an integral part of the common good. We see that the communicability of the common good is not restricted to the community of its origin, still less is it to be restricted to a temporal era. It is a movement which, besides flowing from the individual person to the body politic and back upon the people, accumulates from generation to generation. In a vital society each ganeration builds upon it, enriching the lives of each succeeding generation. Thus, each generation in seeking to provide its members with those conditions necessary for their own common good contributes to succeeding societies.

The state, in striving for the common good, must use the authority delegated to it by the people. Such authority must be directed to the preservation and advance-

ment of the common good, and must be exercised in a manner consonant with the integrity, justice, and moral goodness implicit in the common good. There are limitations upon the authority of the state. Two instances where they occur are in the field of education as well as in times of emergency. The state may insist upon an educator instructing in a particular field; it may limit the content of the course of instruction, but it may not impose upon the instructor the beliefs he should hold about his field of study.[7] The limitations upon the state's authority are related also to the lives of the persons who constitute it. There are occasions when the state, due to some emergency, as in times of war, requires the services of its people; such services must obviously be designed to serve the common good. The state may demand of the people services designed to bring about the successful conclusion of the war, but it may not demand that any of its members face certain death. Should the sacrifice of human life be necessary for the common good, the life sacrificed must be given voluntarily by the person concerned. Lest this be construed as evidence of the superiority of the state, Maritain hastens to show that the person who willingly sacrifices his life does not lose it, but gains. By the sacrificing of his life

for the preservation of the common good he moves forward by the dynamism of freedom bringing about his own freedom of autonomy.

The Balance Between Man and State

These limitations upon the authority of the state suggest a balance between man and the state. The nature of this balance becomes more apparent when we recall that the societies are the creation of man, and that man himself "is by no means for the State. (but that)... the state is for man." [8] The balance between man and the state which possesses authority over the whole poses a paradoxical situation which is resolved only by reference to the basic metaphysical concept of man. Insofar as man's individuality demands goods and services from the state, man is inferior to it. On the other hand, the person, having a supra-temporal vocation which is completely foreign to the state and the body politic, - since neither possess a spiritual nature - is superior to the whole body politic of which he is a part. Since this is true, some things possessed by the person are beyond the control of the state and therefore its authority is limited. The limitations thus placed upon the authority of the state stem from the same natural law from which its authority is derived. Maritain indicates

three instances where restrictions upon the state's authority are of particular importance; the rights of the human person, the rights of the civic person, and the rights of the working person.

The rights of the human person which take precedence over the authority of the state are found in those areas where man transcends the temporal order. Of paramount importance would be his vocation to beatitude; his ultimate goal which is to see and possess God. It is fitting that the transcendent nature of man's vocation should take place in the spiritual sphere, for religion first noted and aided man towards his spiritual end. The concept, natural law, later extended this aspect of man's life, so that it regards all activities of the mind as being part of that spiritual network or universe of truth which is part of man's transcendental vocation. Considered in this light all activities carried on by scholars, poets, artists, philosophers, and humanists would be included in the spiritual area, and hence, beyond the authority of the state. Maritain points out that the only limiting factor in this category is the truth sought by the person engaged in the activity. The state may compel a person to carry out certain functions in a particular field, a person may be required to

teach philosophy, but the state may not instruct the philosopher what he should believe, or discover. A similar situation exists in those matters of conscience which deal with religion and education. The person has the inviolable right to make his own decision with regard to the path he chooses to follow towards his own personal destiny, or religious vocation. He also possesses the right to marry whom he pleases, and as head of a family to "produce and bring up human persons and prepare them to fulfill their total destiny." [9] The state must not only recognize the limits which the transcendental aspect of man places upon its authority, but, if education is within its province, it must complement the work of the parent in his task of preparing the people to fulfill their destiny. Here we see that the rights of a human person, not only place a limit on the state, but impose a responsibility upon it so that the fullest development of the human person may take place.

The rights of the civic person require a second glance at natural law and the nature of the person. Natural law only indirectly affects the rights of the civic person for it leaves undetermined the manner in which social relations are to be conducted. It is up to human positive law to complete those aspects left undetermined

by natural law. (The human law which completes natural law is statute law, or positive law.) It is that body of law drawn up by the reason and will of man which, in giving birth to a particular community, deals with those rights and duties of man which follow in a contingent manner from the first principle of natural law. It develops as a result of the dynamism which is inscribed in man's nature, and tends to express the deeper requirements of natural law. The more positive law agrees with the fundamental principles of natural law the more it passes on to higher degrees of justice and perfection. Since positive law deals with the concrete, temporal situation, and promulgates the rights and duties of man, his rights are directly related to positive law, and only indirectly related to natural law.

A second point pertinent to the civic rights of man stem from Aristotle's postulate that man is a political animal. The interpretation given to this by Maritain is that man naturally wishes to participate actively in the political life of the community. In an organic democracy the basic manner in which this participation obtains is universal adult suffrage. Implied in the idea of universal suffrage lies the right of each person to express himself as he wishes, and to associate with others of similar

views in an effort to promote the welfare of the community. The right to associate with one's political colleagues necessarily results in the establishment of political parties. Conceivably the latter could be harmful to the community, and would be harmful unless regulatory steps were available. The organization of the organic democracy would be such that it would "regulate the make-up of the State, of the legislative assemblies and the organs of government in such a manner that the latter, while subject to the control of the assemblies in matters of major interest, would be freed from party domination." [10]

Included within organic democracy we note three basic rights of the citizen. The first, implied rather than categorically stated, is the right to establish in concert with one's fellowmen the constitution under which the political society as a whole governs itself. Secondly, the right of free men in a free society to control their own temporal destiny through the exercise of suffrage. Thirdly, the right of each person to express himself on political matters and to associate with others who hold similar political views. Subordinate rights stem from these and concern the status of man as a part of the society. Briefly such rights include the equality of man before the law, equality of all men with regard to public

employment, - that is, direct employment by the state in the activities through which it provides services for the body politic and political equality. These rights are obviously fundamental conditions for man in an organic democracy.

The rights of the working person advocated in organic democracy reflect the essential dignity of man and his right to property as guaranteed by natural law. The dignity of the human person, of work, and of the working person is a phenomenon which though recognized in early times, assumed new importance in the nineteenth century, and has been variously interpreted by social reformers during the ensuing years. Not all reformers recognized the spiritual foundation of man's dignity, consequently many, notably Karl Marx, placed man at the service of the state and sacrificed him to it. Maritain, while propounding social concepts similar to socialistic states, distinguishes organic democracy from them by recognizing and repeatedly emphasizing, the primacy of the spiritual upon which man's dignity is based. In organic democracy the working man possesses a dignity in his own right, no less than the leader of the community. The work of each contributes to the common good thereby enabling all members of the community to progress to their own ultimate end.

Foremost amongst the rights of the working person is his right to a living wage, one that enables him to live with his family at a sufficiently human standard of living. His wage must be such that he may provide his family with those necessities of life, and those other good things which permit him and his family to develop in accordance with that expansiveness of being inherent in them. Other rights which the worker possesses are linked to the rights of the groups to which he belongs. Professional organizations, and trade unions must be groups of free workers, voluntarily created and joined by the workers. They must not be regimented by the state, nor should they be under the control of the state. All other organizations within the state must recognize that same dignity of the worker which is accorded the latter by the state, and which he may rightfully expect from both.

Through natural law man possesses the right to possess property and the right to work. In spite of this, Maritain contends that the overwhelming ascendance of technical developments in our civilization have resulted in two conditions detrimental to the welfare of the person. Man has become the servant of the machine, a condition which does not permit the full growth and progressive expansion necessary for man's fulfillment. Second,

the industrial economy to-day in the capitalist world has largely become a "regime whose first consideration is the profit of investment." [11] The solution to these problems offered in an organic democracy are found in a form of collective ownership or co-partnership. Basically this is a partnership where the 'salary list' is replaced by the merging of the interests of worker and owner. The operation of the company by worker and owner compensates them for the servitude imposed upon them by the machine. This compensation stems from the active interest they have in the operation of the concern. This is not to be considered as state ownership, for the state does not control, nor does it interfere with the operation of the company. This type of operation would overcome the faults of state ownership because the incentive in the industrial concern "would proceed from interest, a sense of operative responsibility; which the workman would have in the well-being of the concern." [12] An industrial economy conducted in this manner would mean that the worker would have a title to work, that is, a person would possess "a trust or worker's title, which assures a man that his employment is rightly his, is juridically linked with his person, and that his operative activity will there have room to progress; it should

serve to give a title and a social guarantee to the bringing into action of what is functionally and inalienably the property of the worker; his personal powers, his intelligence, the skill of his hands." [13] Such a corporative organization must take into consideration the material requirements of the people concerned and grant sufficient concrete allowances to them. These allowances would have more significance for both the worker and his family because of his direct involvement in the company.

There are some concerns which could not be placed under a corporative system as indicated above. These concerns are the responsibility of the state, which in its turn must recognize the needs of the people, and provide for them. Included in the rights of the worker are many social welfare concepts currently in vogue. The state in an organic democracy must be prepared to provide the worker, when occasion arises, with relief, unemployment insurance, sick benefits, and social security. These must be provided to that extent commensurate with the resources of the body politic.

Lest the rights of man as an individual or as a member of a group appear to dominate the state we must reconsider them in the light of the temporal superiority

of the state. The rights which man possesses through natural law are inalienable because they are grounded in his nature. This does not mean that they are infinite, or without limit. The rights man possesses are limited because they are intrinsically related to the common good. This does not mean all rights are limited, for example, the right to existence and the right to the pursuit of happiness cannot be restricted in any way as it would jeopardize the common good. [14] These two rights are absolutely inalienable, hence man should brook no interference with them. On the other hand, rights to free speech, or association with others, might through misuse, jeopardize the welfare of the state and the common good. When this is the case, the state must for the sake of the body politic limit their use. The possession of rights may be inalienable, but the exercise of the rights may pose a problem. The right to an education is an absolutely inalienable right, yet the exercise of it may licitly be limited as an unlimited exercising of it would over-tax the resources of the state and bring about a reduction in the common good. Such a limitation need not be permanent, but should serve to stimulate the society to improve its operation so that the exercise of such rights may be extended as fully as possible.

Turning briefly to the rights which man as a member of a group possesses we note similar limitations. The sphere of influence of a group should be restricted to those items which concern it, each dealing with those problems and matters which are proper to it, and leaving to other bodies or organs those activities for which they have been devised. This applies particularly to those political organizations or parties which having vested interests tend to exert undue pressure upon the state. All political parties, and any other organizations within the society, must be sufficiently under the control of the body politic that they do not in fact establish control over the state.

The Two Movements of Man

The rights possessed by man as suggested above stem from his supratemporal vocation which gives him superiority over the completely temporal end of the state. At the same time, Maritain, by recognizing each man's responsibility to the temporal common good reveals two movements in man's life. One, a vertical movement in which his personality is involved and which gives the ultimate meaning and direction to life without which he would be left with an imperfect earthly existence. The

second movement is the horizontal movement which, though restricted to the temporal order, contributes to the vertical movement of man's soul. This brief section in The Range of Reason merits quoting for it shows the necessity of considering man as a whole constituted of individuality and personality, and of man's necessary function in the state. Also pointed out is the fundamental requirement for the attainment of a truly organic democracy.

> The horizontal movement of civilization, when directed toward its authentic temporal aims, helps the vertical movement of souls. And without the movement of souls toward their eternal aim, the movement of civilization would lose the charge of spiritual energy, human pressure, and creative radiance which animates it towards its temporal accomplishment. For the man of Christian humanism history has a meaning and a direction. The progressive integration of humanity is also a progressive emancipation from human servitude and misery as well as from the constraints of material nature. The supreme ideal which the political and social work in mankind has to aim at is thus the inauguration of a brotherly city, which does not imply the hope that all men will someday be perfect on earth and love each other fraternally, but the hope that the existential state of human life and the structures of civilization will draw nearer to their perfection, the standard of which is justice and friendship..... This supreme ideal is the very one of a genuine democracy, of the new democracy we are expecting. It requires not only the development of powerful technical equipment and of a firm and rational politico-social organization in human communities, but also a heroic philosophy of life, and the quickening inner ferment of evangelical inspiration. 15

CHAPTER V

CHARACTERISTICS OF TRUE HUMANISM

The term used by Maritain to designate organic democracy is True Humanism. It is a humanism which stands "as a rich development of graciousness and liberality produced by antique disciplines and by love of beauty - it is simply the flower of a properly human life - above all, of reason and the virtues of reason." [1] It is the achievement of both divine and human cooperation. The characteristics of a truly humanist society reflect the three central themes of Maritain's philosophy, namely, the primacy of the spiritual, the essential dignity of the human person, and the importance of natural law in the temporal order.

The first characteristic of the humanist society is its personalistic nature. It considers society to be a whole composed of persons, who, because they contain a root of independence and consequently constitute a whole in themselves, aspire to a supra-temporal vocation which society cannot provide. The political society, being conscious of this common aspiration, will, by concrete

and positive liberties embodied in itself and subordinate institutions, endeavour to bring about in social action the inner freedom sought by the human person. The democracy in which this occurs will exclude domination by one segment of society over another or over the masses. The truly humanist society will be a classless, moral democracy, brought about through a concept of the dignity of work, - work in all its ramifications, - whereby there will arise "on the plane of social life itself respect for human personality in each of the individuals of whom the crowd is made up." [2]

The second characteristic is the communal aspect, or the autonomy of the temporal order. This recognizes the natural inclinations the person has to communion with his fellowman and to participation in the political life of the society. It acknowledges the common good as an infravalent end for man, but, rather than denying the primacy of the spiritual, acknowledges the subordination of the temporal order to the spiritual (not simply as a means) but as a real and effective subordination in that it must be attained in man's movement toward the separated common good. The true humanist society is communal because it works for "a better life for their brothers and to the concrete good of the community of human persons." [3]

It recognizes that in the political sphere, "and to the extent that man is a part of political society," [4] the common good is superior to the individual.

A more complex characteristic of True Humanism is its pluralist structure. This concept involves the temporal situations in which man is involved, political, economic, and juridical. The political aspect must not be confused with the political activities of the person as the natural inclination discussed under the communal characteristic of society. The pluralism desired on the political level refers to the associations set up by men for the furtherance of community life. These associations would possess autonomy consonant with the demands of society at the level upon which they operate. Pluralism "assumes that the development of the human person normally requires a plurality of autonomous communities which have their own rights, liberties and authority." [5] Among these autonomous communities would be the city, the municipality and the family. Economic pluralism proposes a system "whose spirit and economic structure would be in conformity with the communal and personalistic conception of society," [6] thereby granting the person those economic conditions necessary for his complete development. Two levels are suggested in regard to the economic pluralism,

the first, a family type of rural economy for agriculture, and a form of collectivisation of ownership for the regulation of the industrial economy. This involves the concept of the 'title to work' suggested earlier.[7]

Juridical pluralism considers the relationship between the temporal and spiritual orders from a religious point of view. Maritain, acknowledging the continuation of current religious diversity in the true humanist society, contends that legislators "should tolerate, (to tolerate is not to approve) ways of worship more or less distant from the truth."[8] Such toleration is necessary if the legislators are to direct the society towards a "virtuous life, and the prescriptions of the moral law"[9] which are a fundamental part of the common good. The thought entertained by Maritain is readily perceived in the following statements;

> It is towards the perfection of the natural law and of christian rectitude that the pluriform juridical structure of the city would be orientated,

resulting in a vitally christian commonwealth in which

> the various non-christian groups included in it would enjoy a just liberty.[10]

Maritain contends that the christian or theist characteristic of true humanism is quite important. On

close examination it becomes apparent that it provides the basis of the society, and virtually permeates all other aspects. This characteristic differs from juridical pluralism in that it does not concern itself with the relationship between religion and the state. The theist conception of society does not suggest or require all its members to adhere to a belief in God, or to be Christians. What it does suggest is that the society must recognize God as the principle and end of the human person, as the source of natural law, political authority and society. Society must also recognize that liberty, fraternity, justice and friendship, respect for the human person and his responsibility before God provide the internal power needed by the civilization in the attainment of its ends. These are the attributes which make a society vitally christian. For the non-christian, who in the main adheres to these attributes of justice, liberty, fraternity and the dignity of man, co-operation in a christian humanism is assuredly possible. The only area in which Maritain thinks he would suffer would be in the basis of his convictions for these characteristics. The non-christian in attempting to substantiate his adherence to the concepts of fraternity, justice and friendship, would be arguing from a considerably weaker position than the christian.

Lest the pluralistic characteristics suggest disunity in the society two quotations from True Humanism help to resolve this.

> The unity of such a civilization would .... (be a) unity of orientation, which proceeds from a common aspiration.... for a form of common life in better accord with the supra-temporal interests of the person; and the part of the agent of unity and formation which was played by the christian king in regard to the city of yesterday belongs...to the most politically evolved and the most devoted section of the christian laity and the popular elite in the new temporal order.[11]

The society possesses unity because it,

> allows of a heterogeneity of internal elements and is only based on a general sense of direction, a common orientation. The pluralist city multiplies liberties, whose measure is not uniform, which vary according to a principle of proportionality. Again, this solution gathers the whole unification of the temporal community into one essential and natural point: a simple unity of friendship.[12]

The attainment of a true humanist society as suggested above should come about, not by the imposition of this philosophy or a theological ideal. This would immediately negate the principles of it. Such a society would have to depend upon the fostering of an attitude conducive to it through education of all people, and particularly of the young. Five fundamental dispositions are necessary in education if such a society is to be the

result. "First, the love of truth, which is the primary tendency of any intellectual nature." ... Second, the love of good and justice, and even the love of heroic feats, ... Third, that disposition which might be called simplicity and openness with regard to existence.... The fourth fundamental disposition concerns the sense of a job well done, ... The fifth fundamental disposition is the sense of co-operation, which is natural in us." [13]

Education, Maritain believes, would implant in the people generally that 'christian leaven' which, working through them would bring about a truly humanist society.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

[1]Joseph W. Evans and Leo R. Ward, The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, Selected Readings, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955) p.ix.

[2]Cf.Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, 4th French ed., trans. Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959) p.434.

"The first draft of the Note on the Notion of Subsistence contained in Appendix IV of The Degrees of Knowledge appears in all previous editions. It has been reprinted in the present edition since it represents a certain typical approach to the problem which has seemed true to us now for a long time, and also because it has furnished one of the themes discussed in the recent controversies on the problem. At present, however, we consider that it requires revision, not in its fundamental insights, but in regard to certain corollaries against which the criticisms addressed by Father H. Diepen seem to be justified."

[3]Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1958) p. 46.

[4]Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) p. 4.

[5]Ibid., p. 6.

[6]Charles A. Fecher, The Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1953) p. 213.

Chapter II

[1]Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, trans. E. I. Watkin (London: Sheed and Ward, 1930), p. 226.

[2]Jacques Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, trans. ed. Mortimer J. Adler (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1940) p. 50

[3]Ibid.

[4]Cf. Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 438.
The notion of subsistence has been given considerable criticism by many of Maritain's contemporaries, and appears to be a particularly difficult subject. In Appendix IV of The Degrees of Knowledge, Maritain endeavours to clarify it, and points out, on page 436, "to exercise the existence the essence must be completed by the subsistence and thus become a supposit." He complements this by saying that "it renders an individual nature (become supposit) capable of exercising existence."

[5]Ibid., p. 231.

[6]Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, trans. John J. Fitzgerald (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941) p. 32.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid., p. 33.

[9]Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 232.

[10]Jacques Maritain, The Range of Reason, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952) p. 195.

[11]Ibid., p. 197.

[12]Maritain, Man and The State, p. 81.
"The philosophical foundation of the Rights of man is Natural Law. Sorry that we cannot find another word! During the rationalist era jurists and philosophers have misused the notion of natural law so.... that it is difficult to use it now without awakening distrust and suspicion in many of our contemporaries."

[13]St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theologica. I - II q. 90 a. 1. c.
"Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting; for lex (Law) is derived from ligate (to bind), because it binds one to act."

[14]Maritain, Man And The State, p. 86.

[15]Maritain, Range of Reason, p. 26.

[16]Ibid., p. 27.

Maritain further states that "the judgements in which Natural Law is made manifest to practical reason do not proceed from any conceptual, discursive, rational exercise of reason; they proceed from that connaturality or congeniality through which what is consonant with the essential inclinations of human nature is grasped by the intellect as good; what is dissonant, as bad." This manner in which Natural Law is known seems to be a form of intuition, which does not seem to be entirely in keeping with Maritain's general stand on the validity of reason.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Maritain, Man And The State, p. 90.

[19]It is interesting to note that the Ecumenical Council in its recent deliberations in Rome discussed some alterations in respect to the application of natural law to church doctrine. If these are to be effected it will denote two factors of natural law as pointed out in the work of Maritain, and St. Thomas. First, Natural Law contains all the law that exists, and as positive law develops from it, it brings into promulgation those concepts implicit in natural law. Secondly, new applications of those items which extend natural law are also enlargements of matter implicit in it.

[20]Jacques Maritain, Freedom in the Modern World, trans Richard O'Sullivan, K. C. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1935) p. 40.

[21]Ibid., p. 42.

[22]Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, p. 96.

[23]Ibid., p. 105.

[24]Ibid., p. 106.

[25]Maritain, True Humanism, p. 128.

[26]Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, p. 107.

[27]Maritain, Freedom in the Modern World, p. 30.

Chapter III

[1]Maritain, Man And The State, p. 5.

[2]Ibid., p. 6.

[3]Ibid., p. 10.
The body politic is not to be distinguished from the political society as it has been discussed above. This is plainly evident in Maritain's statement, "The Body Politic or the Political Society is the whole."

[4]Joseph W. Evans, "Maritain Analysis: Discussion of Man and the State", Thought, XXVI (December, 1951), 586.

[5]Maritain, Man and the State, p. 26.

[6]Ibid., p. 13.

[7]Ibid., p. 13.

[8]Ibid., p. 38.

[9]Ibid., p. 24.

[10]Ibid., p. 126.

[11]Cf. Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, p. 78.
"The political community having, in so far as it is a whole, its own reality, its own unity, and its own life, is by this very fact superior to its parts as such, and demands a hierarchic distribution of its organs; hence, furthermore, it demands that certain of its parts should have as their proper work those functions which concern the unity of the whole and the direction of the common work and common life, and that they should consequently possess an authority over the others."

[12]The nature of these levels appears to be somewhat similar to the Canadian Federal system, where we have federal, provincial, and municipal levels. We should note, though, that in the society visualized by Maritain, authority in the higher levels comes from below, that is, the lower levels delegate it to the higher whereas our system, by the B.N.A. Act, certain responsibilities are delegated by the Federal government to lesser societies such as the provinces and municipalities.

[13]Maritain, Man and the State, p. 69.

[14]Ibid., p. 71.

[15]Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, p. 88, citing Yves Simon, "Notes sur le federalisme proudhonien," Esprit (April, 1937).

[16]Cf. Maritain, Man and the State, p. 136.
"So the authority they exercise, which is the very same authority of the people participated in to some given extent and within certain given limits, is a vicarious but a genuine authority, held, like the people's authority, in virtue of the primary Source of all authority; they really hold a right to command and to be obeyed."

[17]Evans, "Maritain Analysis: Discussion of Man and the State," Thought, XXVI, p. 587.

Chapter IV

[1]Maritain periodically refers to the separated common good in his discussion of the common good. By this term he means the good of the individual as attained in beatitude. It is God to be seen and possessed.

[2]Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, p. 39.

[3]The two movements of man, vertically and horizontally, are clarified later. Cf. infra p. 55.

[4]Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, p. 41.

[5]Ibid., p. 42.

[6]Maritain clarifies this by stating in The Person and the Common Good that "perfidity, the scorn of treaties and the sworn oath, political assassination and unjust war, even though they be useful to a government and procure some fleeting advantage for the peoples who make use of them, tend by their nature as political acts ... to the destruction of the common good." p. 43. Cf. also Range of Reason, p. 134 ff.

[7]The limitations upon man in his investigations in any particular field of study are mentioned later in

the section on the rights of the human person. It is interesting to note in this connection that Maritain does not show intolerance for differing points of view, and in fact, in his later works suggested that those scholars to whom he was most opposed in his early years, have contributed to the good of man, even though it may have been as a negative example. Some he believes to be in this category would be Rousseau, Descartes, Luther, and Machiavelli.

[8]Maritain, Man and the State, p. 13.

[9]Maritain, Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 44.

[10]Ibid., p. 48.

[11]Maritain, True Humanism, p. 184.

[12]Ibid., p. 180.

[13]Ibid., p. 182.

[14]While Maritain recognizes the inalienable right to existence he does suggest a limitation upon it. "if a criminal can be justly condemned to die, it is because by his crime he has deprived himself, let us not say of the right to live, but of the possibility of justly asserting this right: he has morally cut himself off from the human community, precisely as regards the use of this fundamental and "inalienable" right which the punishment inflicted upon him prevents him from exercising."
Maritain, Man and the State, p. 102.

[15]Maritain, Range of Reason, p. 198.

Chapter V

[1]Jacques Maritain, Theonas: Conversations of a Sage, trans., F. J. Sheed, (London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1933) p. 46. Italics mine.

[2]Maritain, True Humanism, p. 195.

[3]Evans and Ward, The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, p. 231.

[4]Maritain, Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 14.

[5]Ibid., p. 15.

[6]Maritain, True Humanism, p. 158.

[7]Cf. supra, p. 50.

[8]Maritain, True Humanism, p. 160.
Maritain includes the parenthesis in this quotation, quite likely because the word 'tolerate' is so frequently misconstrued as meaning the acceptance of the beliefs of others rather than its actual meaning of permitting persons to have other beliefs and judgments not consonant with one's own.

[9]Ibid., p. 161.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid., p. 162.

[12]Ibid., p. 167.

[13]Joe. Park, ed. Selected Readings in The Philosophy of Education. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958) p. 347 ff. "Education at the Crossroads".
It should be noted here that the term existence in this context includes the individuality and personality which is involved in the true image of man.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brown, Brendan F. (ed.). The Natural Law Reader, Docket Series Vol. 13. New York City: Oceans Publications, 1960.

Clark, Mary T. Augustine, Philosopher of Freedom. New York: Desclee Company, 1955.

Davitt, Thomas E. The Nature of Law. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Co., 1953.

Evans, Joseph W., and Ward, Leo R. The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain. (Selected Readings). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955.

Fecher, Charles A. The Philosophy of Jacques Maritain. Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1953.

Maritain, Jacques. The Range of Reason. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952.

_____. Theonas: Conversations of a Sage. trans., F. J. Sheed. London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1933.

_____. An Essay on Christian Philosophy. trans., Edward H. Flannery. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955.

_____. Existence and the Existent. trans. Lewis Galantiere & Gerald B. Phelan. New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1948.

_____. A Preface to Metaphysics: Seven Lectures on Being. London: Sheed and Ward, 1939.

_____. Man and the State. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951.

_____. Scholasticism and Politics. trans. ed., Mortimer J. Adler. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1954.

_____. True Humanism. trans., M. R. Adamson. 4th ed. London: Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary Press, 1946.

_____. Ransoming the Time. trans., Harry Lorin Binsse. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941.

_____. An Introduction to Philosophy. trans., E. J. Watkin. London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1930.

_____. Freedom in the Modern World. trans., Richard O'Sullivan. London: Sheed and Ward, 1936.

_____. The Rights of Man and Natural Law. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1958.

_____. The Person and the Common Good. trans., John J. Fitzgerald. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947.

_____. The Degrees of Knowledge. 4th French ed. trans., Gerald B. Phelan, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959.

Mitchner, Norah H. Maritain on the Nature of Man. Hull, Quebec: Editions L'Eclair, 1955.

Park, Joe. The Philosophy of Education; Selected Readings. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958.

Phelan, Gerald B. Jacques Maritain. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937.

St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica.

Monographs and Periodicals

Jung, Hwa Yol. The Foundation of Jacques Maritain's Political Philosophy. Gainsville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1960. University of Florida Monograph; Social Sciences. No. 7, Summer 1960.

Evans, Joseph W. "Maritain Analysis: Discussion of Man and the State." Thought, XXVI (December, 1951), 585 - 89.

The Thomist. V (1943) Maritain Commemorative volume.