THE NOTION OF TRUTH

IN THE

PHILOSOPHY OF BERTRAND RUSSELL:

1905-1918

James Ring

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to give an exposition of Bertrand Russell's Theory of Truth as proposed by him between the years 1905-1918. This period begins with the publication of his now classic paper "On Denoting"[1] in which he was able to overcome some of the problems in the theories of meaning of Frege and Meinong. It ends with a series of lectures that he gave under the title of "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism".[2] In this latter work Russell acknowledges the debt he owes to Wittgenstein for many of the ideas that he is setting forth.

The reason for choosing this particular topic for consideration is twofold: (1) the problem of truth itself is one that has often been considered throughout the history of philosophy and is still being discussed at the present time[3] and (2) Russell, bringing the techniques of logic to bear on the problem, is able to give forceful arguments against other theories and to give an interesting formulation of the Correspondence Theory of Truth.

Among other things in the lectures on "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", Russell is in the process of revising his theory of judgment--a theory that he had set forth

in detail in earlier works.[4] His long opposition to the Neutral Monism of William James, culminating in a series of articles published in the Monist in 1914,[5] gives way to a partial acceptance of this theory in "On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean"[6] (published in 1919). Two years later, in The Analysis of Mind,[7] Russell works out the implications of Neutral Monism for the Theory of Knowledge.

Russell, along with G.E. Moore, had provided English philosophy, at the beginning of the twentieth century, with some radical criticisms of the two schools of philosophy that dominated the academic scene at that time, viz., Idealism and Pragmatism. Russell himself, at the suggestion of H.H. Joachim, had begun reading Bradley and Bosanquet. Later, due mostly to the influence of M°Taggart, he "went over completely to a semi-Kantian, semi-Hegelian metaphysic".[8] Toward the end of the last century, however, Russell, as well as Moore, began in earnest to criticize what later came to be known as the "Old Philosophy". The first published expression of the "New Philosophy" was Moore's paper "The Nature of Judgment", which appeared in Mind in 1899. It set forth an approach to philosophy which differed from that of the Idealist in two ways: (1) it was a realistic rather than an idealistic philosophy and (2) its method was that of analysis. Russell points out that while Moore's main concern was the rejection of Idealism, his own main concern was the rejection of Monism.[9] These two theor-

ies were, nevertheless, closely connected by what Russell calls the "doctrine of internal relations". The importance of this doctrine for Monism in general, and for the Monistic Theory in particular, together with Russell's arguments for its rejection, will be shown in Chapter II.

The only school of philosophy that was at all challenging to the Idealist school for a place in the British universities, at the turn of the century, was that of Pragmatism, or as it was sometimes called, Humanism.[10] The principles of this philosophy, expounded in England by F.C.S. Schiller, and in America by William James and John Dewey, were the topics of considerable discussion by the first decade of this century. Along with the Monists, the Pragmatists found themselves subjected to attacks by Russell. He attacked with vigour and, for the most part, found Pragmatism unable to answer his arguments. Among the tenets of Pragmatism that he attacked was the Pragmatic Theory of Truth. The arguments that Russell puts forth against both the Monistic and the Pragmatic Theories of Truth, will also be discussed in Chapter II.

In his Theory of Truth Russell maintains that judgment, or belief, is that to which the terms "true" and "false" primarily apply. But according to Russell beliefs are directly and immediately about propositions. He points out that a proposition can also be said to be true or false according as it corresponds or fails to correspond to a

fact. Therefore, for a proper understanding of Russell's Theory of Truth, it will be necessary to see what, according to him, are facts, propositions, and beliefs, and further, to find out how facts, propositions, and beliefs are related one to another. As a necessary first step towards achieving this understanding, Chapter III will be devoted to an exposition of Russell's notions concerning facts and propositions. This exposition will consider Russell's various categories and classifications of facts and propositions, and an attempt will be made to determine, in so far as possible, exactly how, according to Russell, a proposition "means" a fact.

Russell looks on philosophical logic as "an inventory . . . containing all the different forms that facts may have."[11] Among the various forms of facts that Russell includes in his inventory is the type expressed by the proposition "A believes p". This type of fact appears to him as an anomaly. For, on the one hand, the proposition that expresses this fact is not an atomic proposition, (for it has a proposition as one of its constitutive elements) yet, on the other hand, it is not a molecular proposition for it is not a truth-function of p, i.e., it in no way depends on the truth of p for its truth. Chapter IV will be devoted to an exposition and explanation of this type of fact together with what Russell considers the correct analysis of the proposition that expresses it. Although the foundation for, and

certain important aspects of, Russell's theory of truth will be seen in Chapter III, (for here we will see how, in relation to facts, propositions can be said to be true or false), it is not until Chapter IV, where the discussion centers on belief, or judgment, that a full account of his theory can be given.

CHAPTER II

THE PRAGMATIC AND MONISTIC THEORIES OF TRUTH

PART I. THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH

In developing his own theory of truth, Russell explicitly rejects both the pragmatic theory of truth and the coherence theory of truth.[1] In order to get a complete picture of Russell's notions about truth it will be well to consider his objections to these and other theories. The primary purpose for examining Russell's objections to these theories will not be to make a decision as to the effectiveness of his arguments (for this would involve a detailed study of these other systems which would be another work in itself) but rather to see, by noticing the types of objections that Russell raises, exactly what his own position is.

Russell's main criticisms of the Pragmatic Theory of Truth are contained in two essays: "Pragmatism" and "William James's Conception of Truth".[2] The former is a criticism of both James's and F.C.S. Schiller's ideas concerning "Pragmatic method" as well as "Truth";[3] the latter, using essentially the same arguments as the former, concentrates on James's Theory of Truth. For our purposes, then, it will suffice to examine the arguments Russell gives in

"William James's Conception of Truth".

Before looking at Russell's criticism of James's theory of truth it will be well to set down, as briefly as possible, an outline of James's theory.

The pragmatic theory of truth, although considered by James to be about to take its place in the history of philosophy as one of the most important contributions of twentieth century thought, never really caught on.[4] The critics of the theory were many, and they attacked with passion.[5] James mentions often, especially when he is answering the charges of some critic, how strange it is that so many of his opponents accuse him of holding perfectly ridiculous positions.[6] It should be mentioned in behalf of the critics, especially the one who is of interest here, that James writes in a very loose way, with so many statements admitting of more than one interpretation, that it would be mostly a matter of luck if one were to come to the end of one of his essays understanding exactly what James was trying to say.

James's doctrine seems to be primarily a reaction against the rationalistic or idealistic notion of truth as an eternal, transcendent relation between an object and an idea.[7] James looks on the notion of truth as he does on that of wealth or health. As it makes no sense to say a man is healthy except with regard to the way his body is working and the things it can do, or to say of a man that he is wealthy apart from his power to buy, trade, etc., so,

according to James, an idea is true only in so far as it "works", or can be used as an instrument to get around in the world, to order new experience coherently with old experience.[8] James agrees with the common sense view that for a belief to be true it must correspond to reality. He says, "Our ideas must agree with realities . . . under penalty of endless inconsistency and frustration".[9] In fact here, James seems to be holding out for a type of "Correspondence Theory of Truth" which we will see Russell espousing in Chapter III. But if James agrees with his opponents (whom he calls "intellectualists") that an idea must agree with reality in order for it to be true, he points out that simply to say "agree" does not, in fact, solve any problem. The question--"How does an idea agree with reality?" is what James is concerned with. He says:

> To 'agree' in the widest sense with a reality can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed . . . . To copy a reality is, indeed, one very important way of agreeing with it, but it is far from being essential.[10]

The notion of correspondence is for James of little importance in his notion of ideas agreeing with reality. What is important is that the idea allow us to get about in the world with the minimum of discomfort. An idea is true to the extent that it allows us to handle the reality with which it is associated.

James makes much of the notion of the contingency

of the ideas that we hold as true, pointing out that what we hold as common-sense truths today were once held to be false.[11] He also emphasizes the similarity between a "working hypothesis of science" and a true belief. No self-respecting scientist would hold that an hypothesis is absolutely true and, extrapolating from the scientist's position, James refuses to believe any absolute truth whatsoever.[12]

For James, then, an idea or belief is true in so far as it helps us order our experience; it would not be true if it ceased to help us or if another idea helped better. The best sense that can be made of James's notion of an idea helping us to order our experience seems to be to consider it as a scientific hypothesis: it "explains" to the extent that we can predict future events. James argues that only those ideas which tell us which events to expect "count as true ideas".[13] And the possession of truth is but "a preliminary means towards other vital satisfactions".[14] Of course we have many ideas that we never make use of. Often we have pieces of "useless" information. But we do, in fact, store, either in our memories or in books, much knowledge that can be called upon should it be needed. James says

> Whenever . . . an extra truth becomes practically relevant to one of our emergencies, it passes from cold-storage to do work in the world . . . . You can say of it then either that 'it is useful

> because it is true', or that 'it is true because it is useful'.[15]

James says that from this idea we see the Pragmatic notion of truth as something "essentially bound up with the way in which one moment in our experience may lead us towards other moments which it will be worth while to have been led to".[16]

Russell offers several criticisms of James's theory of truth. Of these, the three that seem most damaging to James's position will be considered here: (1) If what is true is what it is useful to believe, as James seems to hold, then a serious difficulty arises in trying to establish whether or not a given idea is true. For it seems much easier to determine a plain question of fact, than to determine the relative good and evil, or usefulness and uselessness, that will follow from believing it. (2) It is obvious that there is a transition in one's mind from seeing that a belief is useful to holding that the belief is true. (3) James confuses the notion of "scientific hypothesis" with that of "true statement".[17]

The first objection has to do with the idea that the truth "pays". Russell cites various texts from James's, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking in support of this interpretation of James's theory, e.g.:

> Ideas . . . become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience.[18]
> The true is whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief . . . .[19]
> Our account of truth . . . is an account

> of processes of leading, realized in rebus, and having only this quality in common, that they pay.[20]

Russell sums up James's position in the statement "A truth is anything which it pays to believe."[21]

But what does it mean to say that a belief pays? Russell says: "We must suppose that this means that the consequences of entertaining the belief are better than those of rejecting it".[22] But knowing whether all the consequences of thinking a belief true will be good or bad is impossible, for no one knows what all the consequences of anything he does will be. Russell gives the example of Rousseau's Contrat Social. He points out that many of the leaders of the French Revolution were disciples of Rousseau and believed in the doctrines set out in his great work. Europe, indeed most of the world, is different than it might have been because of Rousseau's work. But how does the Pragmatic Theory of Truth account for the truth or falsity of the revolutionaries' doctrines? Russell says, "If, on the whole, the effects of their belief have been good, we shall have to say that their belief was true; if bad, that it was false."[23] But since it is impossible to determine what all the effects have been, and since the judgment as to whether they are good or bad depends to a large extent on one's political opinion, Russell thinks it far easier "...to discover by direct investigation that the Contrat Social is a myth than to decide whether belief in it has done harm or good on the whole".[24]

Russell's argument here is not strong enough to show that James's notion of "true belief" being "useful belief" is wrong but he does manage to show (1) that determining the utility of a given belief is difficult and (2) because of this, utility cannot serve as a useful criterion for true knowledge.

Russell's second objection deals primarily with the meaning of the word, "truth". He says that there is obviously a "transition in my mind from seeing that . . . [a] belief is useful to actually holding that the belief is true".[25] Russell says that, according to the Pragmatists, to say "it is true that other people exist" means "it is useful to believe that other people exist". But if the one means the other, they are simply different ways of expressing the same thing. "Therefore", Russell says, "when I believe the one I believe the other".[26] But if this were the case there "could be no transition from the one to the other, as there plainly is".[27] From this argument Russell concludes that the Pragmatists are simply wrong in thinking that the meaning of "true" is the same as the meaning of "useful to believe". He thus says:

> This shows that the word "true" represents for us a different idea from that represented by the phrase "useful to believe", and that, therefore, the pragmatic definition of truth ignores, without destroying, the meaning commonly given to the word "true"; which meaning in my opinion, is of fundamental importance, and can only be ignored at the cost of hopeless inadequacy.[28]

Russell's second criticism is based, then, on the fact that the Pragmatists in holding that "true" means "useful to believe" are actually, under the guise of telling us what the word commonly means, proposing that we adopt a new meaning for the word.

Russell's third objection is that James confuses "working hypothesis" with "true statements". James says "Ideas . . . become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience."[29] Speaking of the satisfaction that characterizes any "true ideas", James says:

> The ideas around which the satisfactions cluster are primarily only hypotheses that challenge or summon a belief to come and take its stand upon them. The pragmatic idea of truth is just such a challenge.[30]

But, according to Russell, it is simply a mistake to look on ideas as hypotheses. He gives three reasons to support his contention: (1) working hypotheses are only a small part of our beliefs, not the whole; (2) prudent people give only a low degree of belief to a working hypothesis; and (3) the pragmatists confuse two distinct notions of "working" viz., in science a working hypothesis is one from which verifiable propositions can be deduced; for the pragmatists an hypothesis works if the effects of believing it are good.[31] Hence since true ideas are not the same as working hypotheses (Russell has tacitly appealed to ordinary usage to support this argument) and since hypotheses

elicit a lower degree of belief than do what we call "truths", Russell rejects the pragmatic theory of truth. Russell sums up his objections to the pragmatic theory of truth in the following words:

> . . . we cannot agree that when we say a belief is true we mean that it is a hypothesis which 'works' . . . If . . . we agree to accept the pragmatic definition of the word 'truth', we find that the belief that A exists may be 'true' even when A does not exist. . . . therefore, the pragmatist theory of truth is to be condemned on the ground that it does not "work".[32]

The main purpose in exposing Russell's arguments against the pragmatic theory of truth was to get a better understanding, when we come to study his own theory, of exactly how he thinks his theory is superior to any alternatives. The reasons in virtue of which he differs with James seem to be of two types: these might be termed (1) reasons of common sense and (2) reasons of common usage.[33] His argument from common sense attempts to show that if a theory of truth is to be adequate it must not allow statements such as "A exists" to be true when, in fact, A does not exist. His argument from ordinary usage seems to rest on the notion that an adequate theory of truth must not violate the popular notion of "truth" or "true". If any theory changes the meanings of these words, then it is no longer a theory of "truth". We shall expect, then, that Russell's own theory of truth will be neither contrary to common sense nor a violation of common usage.

An outline of James's theory of truth has been

presented along with Russell's criticism of it. In fairness to James, however, it should be noted that he answered Russell's criticism in his article "Two English Critics".[34] James says that Russell's article "entirely fails to hit the right point of view for apprehending our position",[35] and he goes on to answer Russell's specific charges. He denies that he puts forth the pragmatic principle as a criterion for truth. He says, "Good consequences are not proposed by us merely as a . . . criterion, by which truth's presence is habitually ascertained . . . [but] rather as the lurking motive inside every truth-claim."[36] James further denies that in defining "true" in an extraordinary way, i.e. as "useful" he holds that a "true belief" has no reference to objective facts. He points out "If any one believe that other men exist, it is both a content of his belief and an implication of its truth, that they should exist in fact."[37] He charges Russell with having a very narrow view as to what is included in a definition. He notes that "real terms . . . have accidents not expressed in their definitions" and that Russell's logic "would seem to exclude, 'by definition', all such accidents as contents, implications, and associates..."[38] James does not answer Russell's charge of having confused "scientific hypothesis" with "true statement".

In defense of Russell two factors might be mentioned: (1) James uses language in his philosophical arguments as if

he were writing for the popular press; it is especially disconcerting when he uses metaphors in his basic exposition of an argument. (2) James's charge that Russell excludes, by definition, accidents that accrue to true beliefs, is not particularly damaging. Russell would answer that what he at least is interested in, is what is essential to the notion of "truth". What James considers accidental, Russell considers essential, and Russell is able to base his position on the ordinary usage of the word "true". Besides these two points, it should be noted that James, in his reply to Russell's criticisms, gives an example of his notion of truth that completely vitiates his arguments. He accuses Russell of joining "the army of those who inform their readers that according to the pragmatic definition of the word 'truth' the belief that A exists may be 'true', even when A does not exist".[39] James calls this a "slander" and mentions that it is "repeated to satiety by our critics".[40] In the very same passage, he goes on to say

> . . . I may hold it true that Shakespere wrote the plays that bear his name, and may express my opinion to a critic. If the critic be both a pragmatist and a baconian, he will in his capacity of pragmatist see plainly that the workings of my opinion, I being what I am, make it perfectly true for me, while in his capacity of baconian he still believes that Shakespere never wrote the plays in question.[41]

To Russell, this position is unintelligible. The truth of the proposition "Shakespeare wrote <u>Hamlet</u>" depends

on who wrote the words to a particular play, not on the usefulness of the belief that someone might have as to who wrote the words.[42]

PART II. THE MONISTIC THEORY OF TRUTH

In any consideration of the problem of truth there are, according to Russell, two questions that occur immediately: (1) Is truth dependent on mind? and if it is, how? (2) Is there only one truth or are there many?[43] In his criticism of the monistic theory of truth Russell is primarily interested in the second question. He notes that the doctrine that the truth is one, viz., "logical monism", is closely connected with what he calls "ontological monism", or the doctrine that reality is one. Logical monism rests, to a great extent, on one of the basic principles of ontological monism, viz., the principle of internal relations. The relationship between the two and Russell's arguments against them will be exposed in this chapter.

According to Russell, the monistic theory of truth may be characterized as holding that "the mark of falsehood is the failure to cohere in the body of our beliefs, and that is is the essence of truth to form part of the completely rounded system which is the Truth".[44] Russell finds great difficulty in believing this doctrine. He singles out one work, H.H. Joachim's The Nature of Truth,[45] as giving as good an exposition of this theory as can be found, and proceeds to give arguments for the rejection of some of the

major points in Joachim's work.

Joachim states that the truth is "one, and whole, and complete, and that all thinking and all experience move within its recognition and subject to its manifest authority . . ."[46] Russell points out that one of the consequences of such a doctrine is that isolated or individual truths such as 2+2=4 "are really only true in the sense that they form part of the system that is the whole truth".[47] But the consequences go even farther than this; for not only does an individual truth derive its truth from the whole system but it is not even wholly true apart from that system.[48] Thus only when individual truths are taken together to form that totality which makes them a complete system can they be said to be true. Each part of truth is interconnected with each other part to form what Joachim calls an organic unity.[49] Thus the whole of truth is an organic unity or what is also called a "significant whole". This type of unity is characterized by its being "such that all its constituent elements reciprocally involve one another, or reciprocally determine one another's being as contributory features in a single concrete meaning".[50] Thus, as Russell points out, ". . . the truth about any part of the whole must be the same as the whole truth".[51] Therefore, we can see that the truth of any one part is the same as the truth of any other part, for each is the whole truth if, indeed, it is true. Truth then for those who espouse the "monistic"

theory, derives from the capability of a given belief to fit into the system of all other beliefs.

Russell points out some difficulties with this position. The first of these difficulties he expresses in this way: "If no partial truth is quite true, it cannot be quite true that no partial truth is quite true; unless indeed the whole of truth is contained in the proposition 'no partial truth is quite true'."[52]

A second difficulty which Russell points out is that since it is obvious that human minds cannot know all truths or the relation of one truth to every other truth, it follows that whatever we know is not quite true.[53] This, of course, includes the proposition that whatever we know is not quite true. The Monist cannot escape this "paradox" and be quite true to the principles upon which his theory is built.

Another difficulty that Russell points out concerns the Monist's treatment of error. Since every statement expresses only a partial truth because it is not able to encompass the whole of reality, so likewise, every statement is at least partially true for it must encompass some bit of reality, i.e., it must at least itself have being. Russell notes that under these circumstances "the distinctive characteristic of error cannot lie in the judgment affirmed, since every possible judgment is partially true and partially false".[54] Joachim's conclusion concerning the question

of error is that "the essential characteristic of error is the claim to express truth unqualified".[55] Russell is quick to point out that if error results simply from a state of mind that refuses to recognize that it does not have the unqualified truth, error consists "wholly and solely in the rejection of the monistic theory of truth".[56]

Russell claims that another, and very serious, defect of this theory is its inability to distinguish between right and wrong judgments as we understand them in ordinary life. To clarify this point we might use as an example the two propositions: (1) Napoleon Bonaparte was a French general, and (2) Napoleon Bonaparte was an English king. Now, according to the Monists, if (1) is uttered by someone who thinks he is telling the unqualified truth, then he is in error and if (2) is uttered by someone who knows that it is only partially true, then that person is not in error. Russell would maintain a less psychologically oriented theory of truth. He says:

> . . . there is a sense in which such a proposition as 'A murdered B' is true or false; and . . . in this sense the proposition in question does not depend, for its truth or falsehood, upon whether it is regarded as a partial truth or not. And this sense, it seems to me, is presupposed in constructing the whole of truth; for the whole of truth is composed of propositions which are true in this sense, since it is impossible to believe that the proposition . . . ["Napoleon Bonaparte was an English king"] . . . is part of the whole truth.[57]

Russell further argues that the appeal to coherence will not

stand up to analysis for the notion of coherence is itself based on incompatibility or inconsistency. But these notions, in turn, are based on our notions of truth and falsehood.[58] For, according to Russell, two propositions are coherent when both may be true[59] and not coherent when "at least one must be false".[60] But this notion of coherence presupposes the laws of logic. Two contradictory propositions are not coherent, according to Russell, "because of the law of contradiction".[61] But he says: "if the law of contradiction were itself subjected to the test of coherence, we should find that, if we choose to suppose it false, nothing will any longer be incoherent with anything else".[62] Hence if the test of coherence is to apply, it must assume that the postulates of logic are true. If they are not assumed to be true, then every proposition would be compatible with every other one, i.e., they could all be true. If the postulates of logic are assumed to be true, then obviously this is not the truth of coherence but must be an altogether different notion of truth. Russell concludes from this type of argument that the notion of coherence as truth is not the fundamental notion of truth. He observes that the Monists have confused a criterion of truth with the meaning of truth. He says, "although coherence cannot be accepted as giving the meaning of truth, . . . it is often a most important test of truth after a certain amount of truth has become known".[63]

Basing their theory of truth on the notion of incompatibility has raised problems for the Monists that their theory cannot handle. If the notion that Napoleon was a king of England is to be rejected, it must be rejected on the ground that we hold some incompatible proposition as true. But in what sense would this proposition be true? If it is merely that it coheres with other propositions already held, our truth is of little value, for as Russell points out: "It may be perfectly possible to construct a coherent whole of false propositions in which . . . ['Napoleon was an English king'] would find a place."[64] Consequently, "there is no reason to suppose that only one coherent body of beliefs is possible".[65] This is especially obvious in scientific matters where there may quite possibly be many hypotheses "which account for all the known facts on some subject" and yet not one of these can be said to be true.[66]

The arguments that Russell has so far given against the Monistic theory of truth have been designed to show that the theory is not consistent, i.e., that some of the implications of the theory are not compatible with its basic principles. We shall now direct our attention to a very different type of argument. It is directed against a fundamental principle of the doctrine, and, Russell claims, the Monistic theory of truth itself rests upon this principle, viz., the axiom of internal relations.

Russell's adamant opposition to the Monists in re-

gard to the nature of internal and external relations, a basic doctrine of their metaphysics, made it virtually impossible for him to accept any of the solutions that they offered to such philosophical problems as "truth", "time", "motion" and "change". He considered their doctrine to be a totally inaccurate account of relations. The doctrine of internal relations is the belief that all relations are "grounded in the natures of the related terms".[67] According to this view "the fact that two objects have a certain relation implies complexity in each of the two objects, i.e., it implies something in the natures of the two objects, in virtue of which they have the relation in question".[68] F.H. Bradley, in his monumental work Appearance and Reality says: ". . . every relation . . . essentially penetrates the being of its terms, and, in this sense, is intrinsical".[69] He further says that he does not admit "that any relation whatever can be merely external and make no difference to its terms".[70]

This doctrine had a strong appeal for the Monists for some of the consequences of this doctrine lend much support to other doctrines proposed by them. Russell points out that it follows from this axiom that the whole of reality is an organic unity in the sense that we have seen those words used by the Monists.[71] Russell notes that according to this theory:

> . . . each part will have a nature which exhibits its relations to every other part

> and to the whole; hence, if the nature of any one part were completely known, the nature of the whole and of every other part would also be completely known . . .[72]

Another important consequence of this theory for the Monists is "that nothing can be considered quite truly except in relation to the whole".[73] Nothing said about a given individual can be wholly true unless it takes in the totality of its relation. Thus Russell says:

> Nothing quite true can be said about . . . [an individual] . . . short of taking account of the whole universe; and then what is said about . . .[it]. . . will be the same as what would be said about anything else, since the natures of different things must, like those of Leibniz's monads, all express the same system of relations.[74]

Hence the axiom of internal relations not only gives credence to the doctrine of truth maintained by the Monists, but it is the basis for their whole philosophy. For if nothing can be truly considered, apart from the whole of reality, then, whether the topic is Ethics, Theory of Knowledge or Metaphysics, the only truths will be those that take into account the whole of reality.

Russell points out that Bradley came to the doctrine of internal relations through a consideration of the relation of diversity. If two things A and B are different, they cannot be so, solely because of their different adjectives for these adjectives themselves must be different; but then how is the difference between these adjectives to be explained? If we explain them with reference to the differ-

ence of their (i.e., the adjectives') adjectives, we end up in an infinite regress, and yet we cannot explain their difference with reference to their own adjectives alone.[75] Russell paraphrases the Monists' argument as follows: "We cannot take 'different from B' as an adjective requiring no further reduction, since we must ask what is meant by 'different' in this phrase, which, as it stands, derives an adjective from a relation, not a relation from an adjective."[76] "Thus" says Russell, "if there is to be any diversity, there must be diversity not reducible to difference of adjectives, i.e., not grounded in the 'nature' of the diverse terms."[77] Therefore if the axiom of internal relations is true, there can be no diversity. According to the Monists, Reality is one. Bradley argues to this position in Appearance and Reality, by showing the inconsistencies in a world that has relations. He says:

> The relation is not the adjective of one term, for, if so, it does not relate. Nor for the same reason is it the adjective of each term taken apart, for then again there is no relation between them. Nor is the relation their common property, for then what keeps them apart? They are now not two terms at all, because not separate. And within this new whole, in any case, the problem of inherence would break out in an aggravated form.[78]

According to Bradley "our experience, where relational, is not true" and the great mass of phenomena that we apparantly experience, is to be condemned "almost without a hearing".[79] The consequence of the Monistic theory, then,

is that there is only one thing, i.e., there is no diversity at all. Wherever there appears to be a relation, it is really an adjective of the whole made up of the terms of the supposed relation.

Russell mentions two commonly given grounds for believing in "internal relations": (1) the law of sufficient reason, and (2) "the fact that, if two terms have a certain relation, they cannot but have it, and if they did not have if they would be different".[80] Russell takes the law of sufficient reason to mean that any proposition can be deduced from a simpler one, i.e., one more evident, but since this seems to him patently false he does not discuss it except in relation to the second reason cited above. Russell claims that the force of the second ground rests on what is a "fallacious form of statement". The statement is given in the following form.

> If A and B are related in a certain way . . . you must admit that if they were not so related they would be other than they are, and that consequently there must be something in them which is essential to their being related as they are.[81]

But Russell points out that since we are assuming that A and B are related in a certain way, to point out consequences of supposing that they are not is futile for this supposition would be false and from a false premise anything can be deduced. He goes on to reformulate the above statement in such a way that this criticism cannot be levelled at it, viz., "If A and B are related in a certain way, then any-

thing not so related must be other than A and B, hence, etc."[82] But, of course, with this formulation of the statement, difference of adjectives is not proved, but only that some things can, in fact, be different. This is not a good reason for believing that things related in a certain way are related so because of some quality inherent in their natures.

The clearest and most concise form of Russell's arguments against the doctrine of internal relations (i.e., for the doctrine of external relations) is found in Our Knowledge of the External World.[83] Before going into his arguments for the doctrine of external relations it would be well to state explicitly what that doctrine is. In his paper entitled "Logical Atomism" Russell says:

> What, then, can we mean by the doctrine of external relations? Primarily this, that a relational proposition is not, in general, logically equivalent formally to one or more subject-predicate propositions. Stated more precisely: Given a relational propositional function 'xRy', it is not in general the case that we can find predicates f, g, h, such that, for all values of x and y, xRy is equivalent to xf, yg, (x, y)h (where (x, y) stands for the whole consisting of x and y), or to any one or two of these. This, and this only, is what I mean to affirm when I assert the doctrine of external relations; and this clearly, is at least part of what Mr. Bradley denies when he asserts the doctrine of internal relations.[84]

The doctrine of external relations states then that no relation can be reduced to a predicate or series of predicates. It follows from this that no description, no matter

how complete, of a given object, i.e. no matter how many of its properties or qualities were taken into account, would serve to inform us of the various relations with other objects into which this one had, does, or could enter.

In his account of external relations Russell notes that certain relations, viz., symmetrical relations, can be constructed in a manner such that they are reducible to certain predicates.[85] A relation such as A is equal to B (a relation that holds between B and A if it holds between A and B) is a symmetrical relation, and thus it is capable of being reduced to a single property, or, as Russell puts it, "it can be regarded as expressing possession of some common property".[86] But this does not apply to asymmetrical relations. These are relations which hold between A and B, but do not hold between B and A, v.g., the relation of "father of" or "greater than". Now when two things are known to be unequal, we may reduce the relation of inequality to the property of "having different magnitudes". However, Russell points our that "to say that when one thing is greater than another, and not merely unequal to it, that means that they have different magnitudes, is formally incapable of explaining the facts".[87] Although the difference in magnitude accounts for inequality, it does not account for the fact that one thing is greater than the other. For if difference of magnitude were the only difference between the two objects, there would be no way of accounting for the one's being

greater and the other's being smaller and not vice versa. In fact, we would have to fall back on saying "that the one magnitude is greater than the other, and thus we shall have failed to get rid of greater."[88] In short Russell says that "both possession of the same property and possession of different properties are symmetrical relations, and therefore cannot account for the existence of asymmetrical relations"[89] With these arguments Russell seems to be able to show the Monists that their axiom of internal relations ends in nothing but contradiction. He concludes by saying that as far as he can see "the axiom is false, and that those parts of idealism which depend upon it are therefore groundless".[90]

We have seen that Russell rejects the Pragmatic Theory of Truth primarily because, according to him, there is a difference between the concept of "true" and the concept of "useful", i.e., knowing that a belief is true and knowing that it is useful. For, a person, knowing that a given belief is true, may still ask meaningfully whether or not that belief is useful. He rejects the Monistic Theory of Truth, primarily because it is based on the axiom of "internal relations" which, according to Russell, gives a faulty account of what relations are.

In the next two chapters Russell's positive contribution toward a theory of truth will be exhibited. It is to be expected, of course that Russell's theory will be able to escape the criticisms that he has levelled at these other two theories.

CHAPTER III

FACTS AND PROPOSITIONS

In Russell's theory of truth--essentially a correspondence theory of truth--an interesting and important role is played by his notion of propositions: what they are, and how they are able to reach out into the non-linguistic world and thereby be either true or false.[1] We might wonder: "How is it that a proposition is able to correspond to anything at all, or what exactly is it in the non-linguistic world to which a proposition does correspond?" These questions were asked by Russell, and, under the influence of Wittgenstein, he was able to give some answers to these questions in his series of lectures entitled The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.

Russell often begins an essay or talk with what he thinks an obvious truism, something that would not be doubted by anyone, and then he analyzes it so that finally he ends up with something rather different from the original, yet consistent with it. Now he takes it to be true and completely evident that there are such things as facts in the world[2], and that there are such things as beliefs in the world[3] and that these beliefs "have reference to facts, and by reference to facts are either true or false".[4] By "fact"

Russell means "the kind of thing that makes a proposition true or false".[5] Thus, for example, when one says: "It is raining", it is the condition of the weather, which makes this proposition true or false, that Russell calls a "fact".[6] It is necessary to note that when Russell is speaking of facts he is not speaking of particular things.[7] He points out that a given particular does not render any statement true or false. Thus he says:

> We express a fact, for example, when we say that a certain thing has a certain property, or that it has a certain relation to another thing; but the thing which has the property or the relation is not what I call a 'fact'.[8]

Furthermore, according to Russell, facts are part of the totality of "things" that go to make up the world. He does not look on facts as simple subjective orderings of our experience of the particulars in the world. He is very forceful in putting forth this view, and there seems little room for doubt about what ontological status he gives to facts. At one point he declares: "It is important to observe that facts belong to the objective world."[9] Later, elaborating on this statement, he remarks:

> . . . I want to emphasize . . . that the outer world--the world, so to speak, which knowledge is aiming at knowing--is not completely described by a lot of 'particulars', but that you must also take account of these things that I call facts, which are the sort of things that you express by a sentence, and that these, just as much as particular chairs and tables, are part of the real world.[10]

For a more detailed understanding of what role facts play in our knowledge of the external world and what role they play in Russell's theory of truth, let us proceed to his classification and analysis of some different types of facts.[11]

An important division of facts is into <u>particular facts</u> and <u>general facts</u>. Russell gives as an example of the former the fact expressed by the proposition "this is white", and of the latter, the fact expressed by the proposition "All men are mortal".[12] According to Russell, it would be impossible to describe the world completely by means of particular facts alone. Thus he remarks:

> Suppose that you had succeeded in chronicling every single particular fact throughout the universe, and that there did not exist a single particular fact of any sort anywhere that you had not chronicled, you still would not have got a complete description of the universe unless you also added: 'These that I have chronicled are all the particular facts there are'.[13]

General facts, therefore are as necessary as particular facts for a complete description of the world. Russell notes, moreover, that a general fact cannot be inferred from particular facts.[14] Thus he observes:

> You never can arrive at a general proposition by inference from particular propositions alone. You will always have to have at least one general proposition in your premisses.[15]

But since general facts are irreducible to a compilation of particular facts and yet are necessary for a complete description of the world, Russell concludes that general facts

are as much a part of the world as particular facts. Russell is not sure of the correct analysis of a general fact,[16] but thinks that it probably involves the notion of a "propositional function", which he introduces in his analysis of "existence" facts.[17]

Facts are also classified as "positive" and "negative". Russell is not dogmatic to the point of insisting that there are such things as negative facts, but he does not see any way of avoiding positing them when trying to explain what relation propositions, as either true or false, have to facts. The distinction between a positive and negative fact is that a proposition such as "Socrates was alive" expresses a positive fact; a proposition such as "Socrates is not alive" expresses a negative fact.[18] Russell is not altogether clear as to how one is to determine whether a given fact is positive or negative (he says there is no formal test) but says simply that it can be seen from the meaning of the words.[19]

Russell gives two main reasons for admitting the existence of negative facts: (1) if negative facts are admitted, the correspondence between facts and propositions is economically accounted for, and (2) he has seen no good argument against admitting them. According to him a proposition can be true or false only with reference to a certain state of affairs in the world, i.e., to a fact. Now, according to his theory, what makes the proposition (1) "Canada is to the north of Mexico" true, is the <u>fact</u> that

Canada is to the north of Mexico; what makes the proposition (2) "Canada is not south of Mexico" true is the fact that Canada is not south of Mexico. Now what makes (1) true is a positive fact; what makes (2) true is a negative fact. If negative facts are not admitted, one would run into great difficulty showing why (2) is true because of some fact in the world. Russell, claims that if the truth and falsity of propositions is to depend on facts, the best way of accounting for the truth of a proposition such as (2) is to admit the existence of negative facts.

He supports his second reason by taking what he calls "as good a case as can be made for the view that there are no negative facts" and giving arguments against it.

He discusses an article written by Raphael Demos, who in 1914, attended the lectures Russell gave at Harvard.

The crux of Mr. Demos' article is his analysis of the formula for negating a proposition, viz., "Not-p". He says that "not-p" means "there is a proposition q which is true and is incompatible with p". With an analysis of this type, the proposition "the pen is not blue" would mean there is a proposition, e.g., "the pen is red" which is true and with which the proposition "the pen is blue" is incompatible.

Russell has strong objections to this analysis. He says that this analysis makes incompatibility "fundamental and an objective fact, which is not so very much simpler than allowing negative facts".[20] Moreover, incompatibility

occurs between propositions, not between facts. The problem then arises as to what kind of fact, incompatibility between propositions, reflects. Since Russell holds that propositions are not the type of thing that would be listed in an inventory of the world--as would facts, beliefs, wishes, etc.--he concludes that "this incompatibility of propositions taken as an ultimate fact of the real world will want a great deal of treatment, a lot of dressing up before it will do".[21] As a simplification, then, to avoid positing negative facts, Demos' analysis simply will not do.[22] Russell, therefore, found it necessary to posit "negative" facts as real entities in order to make his theory of truth internally consistent.

Finally Russell is careful to note that "there is not a dualism of true and false facts".[23] He says that it is impossible to say of facts that they are all true for the simple reason that "true" always implies a possible application of its correlative "false", yet there can be no such thing as a false fact, and hence no such thing as a true one.

Having seen generally what it is that Russell means by the word "fact", we can go on to see what his notion of "proposition" is, and how propositions are related to facts. Russell defines "proposition" as "a sentence in the indicative, a sentence asserting something, not questioning or commanding or wishing".[24] This definition is intended to

include the type of sentence preceded by the word "that", v.g., "that it is raining" would indicate that "it is raining" is a proposition.[25] Moreover, a proposition is a complex symbol, i.e. a symbol which has symbols as its parts.[26] A symbol is defined by Russell as something that "'means' something else".[27] What Russell means by the word "mean" is not altogether clear. He does say that the word "meaning" itself has different meanings at different times, i.e. it can be put to different uses. He gives as an example what he calls the different meanings of "Socrates", "mortal" and "Socrates is mortal". The first he says means a certain man; the second means a certain quality; and the third means a certain fact.[28] And he adds:

> . . . these three sorts of meaning are entirely distinct, and you will get into the most hopeless contradictions if you think the word 'meaning' has the same meaning in each of these three cases. It is very important not to suppose that there is just one thing which is meant by 'meaning', and that therefore there is just one sort of relation of symbol to what is symbolized. A name would be a proper symbol to use for a person; a sentence (or a proposition) is the proper symbol for a fact.[29]

It seems that he bases his notion of the difference of these applications of the word "meaning" on the fact that in these examples the several things "meant" have what might be called a different ontological status. But the particular notion of meaning that is of interest here is that of a proposition as a symbol for a fact.

As has already been noted, Russell claims that a

fact is not the type of thing that can be called "true" or "false".[30] What can be called "true" or "false" is a "belief" or a "statement". Russell says that "a belief or statement always involves a proposition", v.g., one says that "a man believes that so and so is the case".[31] "What he believes", says Russell, "is a proposition on the face of it, and for formal purposes it is convenient to take the proposition as the essential thing having the duality of truth and falsehood".[32] Russell is not implying that "true" and "false" as applied to beliefs, refer to a relation between a believer on the one hand and a true or false proposition on the other. In fact he regards "propositions" as logical fiction. Since the word "proposition" does not refer to any thing, there can be no relation between a believer and a proposition.

If, then, propositions have the duality of truth and falsehood, and facts do not, there is not a one-to-one correspondence between a given set of facts and the set of propositions that correspond to them. Russell makes this point by saying that propositions are not names of facts. He says that it was Wittgenstein who pointed this out to him and that he himself had never before realized it. He further remarks that it is "perfectly evident as soon as you think of it".[33] Wittgenstein has pointed out to him that "there are two propositions corresponding to each fact".[34] Thus, for example, the two propositions "Socrates is dead" and

"Socrates is not dead" both correspond to the same fact, viz., that Socrates is dead. The first proposition is true; the second is false. Thus a proposition cannot be thought of as a name for a fact because a name cannot be true or false. Russell says:

> For each fact there are two propositions, one true and one false, and there is nothing in the nature of the symbol to show us which is the true one and which is the false one. If there were, you could ascertain the truth about the world by examining propositions without looking around you.[35]

Hence there are two possible relations that a proposition may have to a fact; "the one . . . being true to the fact, and the other being false to the fact".[36] This type of relation cannot obtain between a name and what it names, for, as Russell points out, "A name can just name a particular, or, if it does not, it is not a name at all, it is just a noise."[37] Hence, Russell concludes that "You cannot properly name a fact. The only thing you can do is to assert it, or deny it, or desire it, or will it, or wish it, or question it, but all those are things involving the whole proposition."[38]

Before going on to seeing the component parts of facts and propositions and trying to establish what type of "correspondence" can obtain between them, it is necessary to see another distinction which Russell makes with regard to propositions, viz., the distinction between atomic and molecular propositions.

An atomic proposition is one which, as Russell puts

it, "points to only one fact".[39] He holds that propositions can correspond to facts in one of two ways: they can be true or they can be false. Now when there is only one fact that renders a given proposition true or false, that proposition is said to be an atomic proposition.

Propositions that point to more than one fact, or, in other words, are rendered true or false by more than one fact, are called molecular propositions. This type of proposition takes atomic propositions as its atoms, i.e., as its irreducible, constituent parts. Molecular propositions are made up of atomic propositions and such connectives as "and", "or", "if . . . then", etc. Hence in a proposition such as "p or q" there are two facts involved: the one that makes "p" either true or false and the other that makes "q" either true or false. But, although there are molecular propositions, there are no molecular facts. Russell thinks this is obvious.[40] In this case, then, a proposition exists, but no <u>one</u> fact corresponds to it. For there is no object in the world corresponding to the word "or", i.e., it has no objective referent; and therefore, an attempt to analyse disjunctive propositions, by trying to determine a referent for each word in the proposition, would be futile. Disjunctive propositions can be entirely explained by the following schema: let TT stand for "<u>p</u> and <u>q</u> both true", TF for "<u>p</u> true and <u>q</u> false", etc. We can then read the bottom line of the schema[41]

TT TF FT FF

T T T F

to see the truth or falsehood of "p or q" and see the conditions for their truth or falsehood in the top line.[42]

The truth or falsity of the propositions which constitute a molecular proposition determine the truth or falsity of that molecular proposition. Russell calls a molecular proposition a "truth-function" since its truth or falsity depends on the truth or falsity of the propositions that go to make it up. It is important to note, however, that in the proposition "A believes p" in which one proposition is part of another, the truth of the whole proposition is in no way dependent on the truth of the contained proposition, i.e., p.

We have set forth Russell's notion as to the various types and classifications of propositions and facts, and have shown to a limited extent the relationships between propositions and facts. In order to arrive at a clear understanding of the foundations of their relationships we must see: (1) what he considers their constituent parts to be, and (2) how the constituent parts of a proposition correspond to the constituent parts of a fact. To help understand these two points, we will use, as examples, only what Russell calls atomic propositions and the facts to which they correspond, viz., atomic facts.

In analysing facts and propositions into their com-

ponent parts, Russell lays down the following definitions:

> . . . the components of a proposition are the symbols we must understand in order to understand the proposition . . . the components of the fact which makes a proposition true or false, as the case may be, are the meanings of the symbols which we must understand in order to understand the proposition.[43]

This is a general description of the constituent parts of propositions and facts.

In order to get a more precise notion of the individual parts of a fact we must examine the different types of atomic facts. According to Russell there is a gradation of complexity with regard to atomic facts. The most simple type of fact is that consisting in "the possession of a quality by some particular thing",[44] e.g., the fact expressed by the proposition "this is white".[45] The type of fact that is next on the scale of complexity, i.e., more complex than the possession of a quality by a particular, is one in which there is a relation between two particulars, v.g., the fact expressed by "This is to the left of that". Next on scale would be a fact involving three particulars and a relation, e.g., "He gives the book to her". Russell speaks of a relation R_2 being "higher" than another relation R_1, if and only if, R_2 relates more particulars than does R_1.

In every fact there is one component which can be expressed in a proposition by either a verb or a predicate. This component is either a quality or a relation. And, for the sake of simplicity, Russell refers to qualities as mon-

adic relations.[46] If there are relations in a fact, there must be things related. These things, in turn, are constituents of facts. Russell calls them "particulars". He gives the following definition: "Particulars = terms of relations in atomic facts Df."[47] It is important to note, as Russell points out, that particulars, as so defined, do not depend on there being any way of deciding which things in the world can be called particular. As he puts it:

> The whole question of what particulars you actually find in the real world is a purely empirical one which does not interest the logician as such. The logician as such never gives instances, because it is one of the tests of a logical proposition that you need not know anything whatever about the real world in order to understand it.[48]

Russell points out that one of the peculiar characteristics of particulars is that they are entirely "self-subsistent".[49]

> . . . each particular that there is in the world does not in any way depend upon any other particular. Each one might happen to be the whole universe; it is a merely empirical fact that this is not the case. There is no reason why you should not have a universe consisting of one particular and nothing else.[50]

Russell has said that the identification of particulars, or saying what sort of thing in the world can be called a particular, is not of interest to the logician. However, as we will see, Russell's primary candidate for the type of thing that is a particular is a "sense-datum".

Now if a fact is composed of relations (and quali-

ties) and particulars, what is it that propositions are composed of? According to Russell's theory, the symbol in a proposition that corresponds to a quality or monadic relation is what we call a "predicate" and the symbol corresponding to any higher relation is sometimes a verb, sometimes a phrase.[51] If predicates stand for qualities, and verbs and phrases for relations what parts of a proposition stand for the terms of the relations, i.e., the particulars? Russell says that proper names are the words in a proposition which stand for particulars. He gives the following difinition "Proper names = words for particulars Df."[52]

According to Russell, one can name a particular only if one has acquaintance with it.[53] When we use the word "Socrates" today in a proposition, it cannot be as a proper name but only as a shorthand description for, v.g., 'the philosopher who drank the hemlock', or 'the teacher of Plato'. This does not mean, of course, that we cannot utter true propositions containing such words as "Socrates".[54] Indeed we can, and we do. Russell holds, however, that Socrates does not enter into any proposition which can be made today, i.e., Socrates cannot be mentioned because there is no one alive today that was acquainted with him. Russell adds that although as far as common language goes, his notion of proper names is false, he still must hold that a proper name is the only type of word capable of standing for a particular.[55]

Russell states that the notion of "understanding" as applied to predicates is far different from that applied to proper names. As has been stated, acquaintance with a particular is a necessary condition for the understanding of a name. Predicates are understood in a different way. To understand a predicate is to understand a proposition in which the predicate is a symbol. Russell gives as an example the understanding of "red":

> To understand "red", for instance, is to understand what is meant by saying that a thing is red. You have to bring in the form of a proposition. You do not have to know, concerning any particular "this", that "This is red" but you have to know what is the meaning of saying that anything is red.[56]

Hence the understanding of a predicate is more complex than the understanding of a name. Russell says that the same applies to relations. To understand a relation like "before", is to understand what the proposition "x is before y" means--though not necessarily to know whether it is true.

Russell's notions of facts and propositions, what they are composed of, and what categories they fall into have been shown. It is now necessary to see how, in his theory, propositions can correspond to facts. That Russell is not explicit on this point is unfortunate. Although he relies heavily on Wittgenstein's views for many of his basic ideas about facts and propositions, he does not introduce anything like Wittgenstein's "picture theory" of meaning as a possible explanation for the relationship between proposi-

tions and facts. Therefore, we must simply try to determine, from what we have seen, how precisely, a given part of a proposition means a certain part of a fact, and how a proposition as a whole means a fact.

According to Russell, facts are made up of particulars and relations, while propositions are composed of names and predicates.[57] It has been pointed out that when a name means a certain particular it is said to mention that particular in a proposition, and only a particular that the speaker has been acquainted with can be mentioned or named in this way. There is a one-to-one correlation between a particular and the name that stands for it, i.e., in a given time and place there is only one object referred to by a word like "this". The notion of object, however, raises further problems. Precisely what it is in the physical world that is a particular, or how we would go about finding out such a thing Russell does not know; consequently it is difficult to see how he can talk about them. For example, Russell cites as an expression of an atomic fact the proposition, "this is white" (supposedly while holding up a piece of chalk to his audience). He is careful to point out that by the word "this" he is not referring to a physical object, viz., the chalk, but "what he sees", i.e., the patch of white, or the sense-datum. Now it is only very rarely that one does not refer to some physical object by the word "this" in a proposition such as "this is white". If it is

questionable whether the theory of sense-data is tenable as an epistemological hypothesis, it is even more questionable in a theory of meaning. There is little doubt that "meaning" can be accounted for without resorting to sense-data explanation.[58] As for predicates, they, in turn, represent or correspond to, in a one-to-one correlation, the relation to which they refer. Exactly how it is that a predicate can correspond to a quality, Russell does not tell us.

But, as has been mentioned, Russell, at this stage of his philosophical development, makes no attempt to explain how a certain combination of proper names and predicates can, in fact, express a proposition. It was only after he had adopted James' "neutral monism", and he distinguished between "word-propositions" and "image-propositions" that he was able to give a coherent explanation of how propositions could "mean" facts.[59]

CHAPTER IV

JUDGMENT AND TRUTH

In this final chapter a detailed account of Russell's positive contribution toward a "theory of truth" will be given. His theory of truth is intimately bound up with his theory of judgment. Since "truth" and "falsity" are applied primarily to beliefs[1] and beliefs divide naturally into true and false, Russell maintained that both judgment and truth must be treated together.[2] Thus the purpose of this chapter will be to present Russell's theory of truth through an explication and analysis of his theory of judgment.

There are three factors, according to Russell, that must be taken into account if a theory of truth is to be satisfactory:[3] (1) it must be able to admit falsehood, (2) it must admit beliefs, and (3) it must be based on a relation between beliefs and non-beliefs, i.e., simply things which are not beliefs. He points out that, although falsehood is an undeniable fact, "A good many philosophers . . . have constructed theories according to which all our thinking ought to have been true . . ."[4] But, since for Russell it makes sense to talk about truth or true beliefs only if such things as falsity and false beliefs are admitted, he will take falsity into account in his theory of

truth.

With regard to the second point, Russell says: "It seems fairly evident that if there were no beliefs there could be no falsehood, and no truth either . . ."[5] Since Russell qualifies this "evident" truth with such words as "seems" and "fairly", he might have given some argument to support his view. He does offer a semblance of an argument in proposing that we imagine "a world of mere matter".[6]

In such a world, devoid of any mind, there would be no possibility of truth or falsehood, for one material thing is not said to be "true" of another. The relation of "being true to" demands a mind as one of its terms.

Russell's third point is pointed directly at the coherence theory of truth. Truth cannot be simply a relationship between beliefs: it must account somehow for what we generally think of as other than beliefs. Russell gives as an example of what he is talking about, the belief that Charles I died on the scaffold.[7] What renders this belief true (or false if it were false) is something that happened a few centuries ago, i.e., something which was not a belief. "Hence", says Russell, "although truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs, they are properties dependent upon the relations of the beliefs to other things, not upon any internal quality of the beliefs."[8]

That this third characteristic is a necessary attribute for a satisfactory theory of truth is not supported by

argument. We have indeed seen Russell's arguments against the coherence and pragmatic theories of truth, but his arguments were against these theories. He did not establish that a satisfactory theory of truth would have to be based on a relation between beliefs and non-beliefs. In fact, by the way in which he handles the problem in The Problems of Philosophy, Russell seems to accept this notion as perfectly evident. It can hardly be taken as perfectly evident when men such as Joachim, Bradley and James opposed it so. The example of Charles I's dying on the scaffold is effective only to the degree that one already believes that a form of correspondence is necessary for the notion of truth. When Russell goes on to say:

> The third of the above requisites leads us to adopt the view--which on the whole has been commonest among philosophers--that truth consists in some form of correspondence between belief and fact,[9]

it seems that he is assuming the principle that he should have established. That the adoption of the necessity of the third requisite leads to a type of correspondence theory is obvious. In fact, it seems that the only theory of truth this third characteristic can be said to be essential to is a correspondence theory of truth. But to base the necessity for adopting the third principle on the ground that only in this way can be explained the correspondence between the belief that Charles I died on the scaffold and the fact that he did, and then to say that the adoption of the third re-

quisite leads to a correspondence theory of truth, is either to argue in a rather small circle or to beg the question.

This failure on Russell's part to answer the question: "Why does truth have to be considered a relation between belief and non-belief?" is serious, I think, but not fatal. There is a good sense in which he might say he has done this by refuting the arguments of both those who hold the coherence theory of truth and those who hold the pragmatic theory of truth. In fact, as we saw in one of his arguments against the pragmatic theory of truth,[10] he appeals to the ordinary use of the word "true". This appeal may be considered Russell's attempt to build a foundation for this theory. If this is granted, then, the next step is to examine, in detail, Russell's theory of truth. This will be done, as was mentioned, through a study of his theory of Judgment.

Russell begins his inquiry into: "What is Truth?", with his characteristic method of analysing what the question could possibly mean. He notes that we may ask such questions as "Is science true?" or "Is revealed religion true?".[11] But questions such as these are settled not by "general considerations as to what 'truth' means"[12] but rather by considering this or that specific subject.[13] Even if we were to take as our problem the explication of the meaning of the word "truth", we must still distinguish those uses of the word which are not philosophically relevent from

those that are. Thus Russell says that the question: "How is the word 'truth' properly used?", is ". . . a question for the dictionary, not for philosophy".[14] He notes other uses of the word, v.g., "a 'true' poet" which are irrelevant to his particular philosophical inquiry.[15] The question "What do people usually have in mind when they use the word 'truth'?" is closer to what Russell thinks is the valid starting point for his inquiry[16] but even this must be abandoned for it would resolve itself into a question of psychology.[17]

If the foregoing ways of construing the starting point for arriving at the concept of truth would not be fruitful, then what would be? Russell points out that we all feel that "some fundamental concept, of great philosophical importance" is involved in the notion of "Truth", and it is only by analysis that this concept will be made clear. Russell then states explicitly that what he wishes to do is to:

> . . . detach this concept from the mass of irrelevancies in which, when we use it, it is normally imbedded, and to bring clearly before the mind the abstract opposition upon which our distinction of true and false depends.[18]

The method that Russell intends to employ in his "detaching" is, of course, analysis.[19] He will, as is his custom, start with what is well known but vague and confused, and try, having analyzed this vague knowledge, to end with some clear and distinct ideas, which, though different from the origin-

al ideas will not contradict them.[20] The test for the validity of the assertions he makes after analysis is twofold: (1) the test of internal consistency, and (2) the test of giving a comprehensive account of the "confused beliefs with which we start",[21] i.e., taking account of all the original data.

Before proceeding to the analysis of the fundamental concept of truth, which is his aim, it is important to see exactly what type of "things" Russell will refer to as "true" and "false". The "things" that can be called true or false he says are statements and beliefs or judgments.[22] Thus things such as the sun or the square root of two are not "true",[23] but the judgment "the sun is shining" or "the square root of two is 1.414" is the type of "thing" that might be true or false.[24] Russell goes on to say that the "truth or falsehood of statements can be defined in terms of the truth or falsehood of beliefs or judgments.[25] This can be done by saying that a statement is "true when a person who believes it believes truly, and false when a person who believes it believes falsely".[26] Thus Russell will confine his analysis of truth to the truth of beliefs "since the truth of statements is a notion derived from that of beliefs".[27]

Having told us what it is that he does not consider worth pursuing with regard to the question of truth, shown us, at least in a general way how he proposes to attack the

problem, and set down what things he considers the predicate "true" can be ascribed to in the most fundamental way, Russell is now prepared to set down explicitly the formulation of the problem of truth that he thinks will be, on the one hand clear, and, on the other hand, fuitful for his analysis. He puts it in the form of a question: "What is the difference which actually constitutes the truth or falsehood of a belief?"[28] It is not an epistemological criterion by which one might determine whether or not a belief is true,[29] that Russell is seeking. Rather he wishes to discuss exactly what it is that makes a given belief true or else false.

Russell begins his process of analysis by pointing out that if he was right in "saying that the things that are true or false are always judgments, then it is plain that there can be no truth or falsehood unless there are minds to judge".[30] But, although this is true, it is also true that "the truth or falsehood of a given judgment depends in no way upon the person judging, but solely upon the facts which he is judging".[31] Hence although a given judgment depends upon a mind for its existence, whether or not the judgment is true does not depend on the mind, but on facts external to it. Russell gives again the example of the judgment that Charles I died on the scaffold to support his contention that while the judgment depends on his mind, whether the judgment is true or whether it is false, depends on some

event independent of his mind. It is this independent event which grounds Russell's notion of truth in reality. By referring to a particular kind of event, it is able to have some objective content.[32] But is it possible to construe all judgments as a relation of a subject to an objective? Although the view that there are truths which are objects, is, according to Russell "highly plausible",[33] the view that there are falsehoods that are objects, "is the very reverse of plausible".[34] The great problem is, as Russell points out, if one maintains that the content of a belief is a simple object, with regard to truths, one is forced to maintain it also with regard to falsehoods.[35]

Russell here has two alternatives to offer in explaining the difference between true beliefs and false beliefs. The first is that when a mind judges it enters into a two term relationship with some object, i.e., the subject is related to some simple object; or, second it enters into a multiple term relation with the constituents of the judgment which it makes. He rejects the former[36] and accepts the latter.[37]

The main difficulty for Russell with the thesis that the mind in judging always enters into a relation with a simple object is in trying to determine what exactly that object might be. Using the example of judging that Charles I died on the scaffold, and, assuming that there is some such simple object (following Meinong, he calls it an "object-

ive"[38]) he points out that truth and falsity will then depend on some quality or characteristic of the objectives.[39] That is to say, if <u>each and every</u> judgment corresponds to some particular thing, then their truth or falsity cannot depend simply on the relation of correspondence, v.g., whether it holds or does not hold in a particular case, but on something about the objective itself--presumably whether it, i.e., the objective, is true or false. But how are objectives to be divided into true and false? Russell says:

> So long as we only consider true judgments, the view that they have objectives is plausible: the actual event which we describe as 'Charles I's death on the scaffold' may be regarded as the objective of the judgment 'Charles I died on the scaffold'.[40]

So if the objective of a judgment is considered to be an actual event, there is no difficulty. But what then is the objective of a false judgment, v.g., 'Charles I died in his bed'? Russell points out:

> There was no event such as 'Charles I's death in his bed'. . . thus, if there is an objective, it must be something other than 'Charles I's death in his bed'. . .[41]

The only plausible alternative would be to say that the objective is "that Charles I died in his bed" but if this is held then, as Russell points out "we shall . . . have to say the same of true judgments: the objective of 'Charles I died on the scaffold' will be 'that Charles I died on the scaffold'".[42] But to this view Russell poses two objections: the one, according to him, "not decisive"

but weighty, and the other "fatal". The first objection to this type of objective is simply that is is difficult to believe that there are such objects as 'that Charles I died in his bed', or even 'that Charles I died on the scaffold'.[43] It is plain to see that a word such as 'Socrates' denotes an object, but a phrase of the form "that so and so" cannot. A phrase of this type "is essentially incomplete",[44] according to Russell, and acquires significance, only when it occurs in a judgment. It seems then that to speak of "that Charles I died in his bed" as an object is to be avoided if at all possible.

The second objection rests on the absurdity of allowing entities in the world to be false independently of whether or not there is any mind to make a mistake.[45] This, according to Russell, is an implication of allowing false objectives, and it is untenable. If entities were false, independently of a mind, what possibly could be the difference between truth and falsehood? Russell, therefore, concludes:

> . . . it is difficult to abandon the view that, in some way, the truth or falsehood of a judgment depends upon the presence or absence of a 'corresponding' entity of some sort. And if we do abandon this view, and adhere to the opinion that there are both true and false objectives, we shall be compelled to regard it as an ultimate and not further explicable fact that objectives are of two sorts, the true and the false.[46]

To reply that the truth or falsity of an objective has no relation to a judgment is not to explain true and

false at all, for it is evident that there can be no truth if there is no mind, and in fact it is true and false beliefs that are to be explained. To base the truth and falsity of objectives on a relation between the objectives and those judgments which are true and those which are false would simply be to argue in a circle, for the purpose of positing the objectives was to explain the difference between true and false judgments.

A possible way out of this difficulty would be to say that true judgments are related to an objective whereas false judgments simply lack any objective. Russell points out that this account is unacceptable as long as judgment is seen as a relation of the mind to an objective.[47] There would, in fact, be no relation if there were no objective, for a thing cannot be related to nothing. Therefore as long as judgment is seen as a relation of a mind to a simple object, false objectives must be admitted. Since, according to Russell, the view that judgments consist in a relation to a single object is an impossible one, he chooses to abandon it,[48]

Russell's main reason, then, for rejecting the theory that in judging, the mind enters into a relationship with some single object, is that this theory would not admit of false judgments.[49] But if the only alternative analysis of judgment is in terms of a multiple relation between the mind and several other things, in what does that relation consist?

Russell now faces two problems. First, he must show exactly what type of relation it is that the mind enters into with several terms rather than with a simple term or object. Secondly, he must analyse "corresponding" so that it is clear in what way it is to be said that the relation between terms of a judgment "correspond" to the relations that the terms (exclusive of the mind) have among themselves.

Russell deals with the first of these two problems by going into some detail in explaining just what relations are and how "dual" relations differ from "multiple" relations. He points out that the relation that the mind enters into with certain things in an act of judging is not a relation between the mind and each of the individual things taken separately, e.g., the relation of "being conscious of" each thing.[50] (Although he does not deny that the mind indeed may enter into this type of relation with the several things.) He says rather that in order to obtain the judgment, "Charles I died on the scaffold", there must be:

> . . . one single unity of the mind and Charles I and dying and the scaffold, i.e., we must have, not several instances of a relation between two terms, but one instance of a relation between more than two terms.[51]

He gives some examples of what he means by "a relation between more than two terms". He says among the most familiar of this type of relation are those expressed in propositions about "what happened at some particular time".[52] He gives as an example the proposition "A loved B in May and hated

him in June". Supposing this proposition to be true, Russell points out "we cannot say that, apart from dates, A has to B either the relation of loving or that of hating".[53] The date must be mentioned, i.e., the time itself enters into the relationship. Thus in our example the relation is "not between A and B simply, but between A and B and May".[54] It is not to be thought that this single relation that obtains between these three terms can be further analysed into two-term relations obtaining between the individual terms.[55]

He gives a further example, which, because it does not include the notion of time, may be more clear than the previous one. He says: "The simplest possible proposition asserting jealousy is such as 'A is jealous of B's love for C', or 'A is jealous of B on account of C'."[56]

Now in either of these two formulations it might be thought that there is a relation between "A", on the one hand, and "B's love for C", on the other. The problem with this analysis is that in a case of mistaken jealousy it simply will not apply, i.e., there will be nothing to which "A" is related, for there would be no such thing as "B's love for C".[57] Thus, the best way to interpret the relation is as one holding between three persons. This is the type of relation that Russell calls a "multiple" relation in contradistinction to a two term relation which he calls simply a "dual" relation.[58] Russell sums up his position in the following statement:

> Thus if I judge that A loves B, that is not a relation of me to 'A's love for B', but a relation between me and A and love and B. If it were a relation of me to 'A's love for B', it would be impossible unless there were such a thing as 'A's love for B', i.e., unless A loved B, i.e. unless the judgment were true; but in fact false judgments are possible.[59]

Having given an account of what he means by "multiple relation",[60] Russell must still give an account of "correspondence", i.e. of what it means for the relation of the terms of the judgment to correspond to the relations that the terms have among themselves. Russell argues that the judgment, "A loves B", consists "of a relation of the person judging to A and love and B".[61] "But" says Russell,

> . . . the judgment is not the same as the judgment 'B loves A'; thus the relation must not be abstractly before the mind, but must be before it as proceeding from A to B rather than from B to A.[62]

He goes on to say that the

> 'corresponding' complex object which is required to make our judgment true consists of A related to B by the relation which was before us in our judgment.[63]

He distinguishes two 'senses' of a relation such as loving, viz., "as it goes from A to B or from B to A".[64] This idea of a relation having different "senses" may be seen from the following example. The fact that "a dog bites a man" is different from the fact that "a man bites a dog", although both facts are made up of the same three elements, viz., a man, a dog, and the relation of "biting". Now if the constituent parts of the two facts are the same, what makes

the two facts different? According to Russell the difference lies in the two "senses" of the relation of biting, viz., the one as it goes from the dog to the man and the other as it goes from the man to the dog. Now for the judgment to be true, i.e. for the relation between the constituents of the judgment to correspond to the relation between the constituents of the judgment irrespective of the mind judging, ". . . the relation as it enters into the judgment must have a 'sense', and in the corresponding complex, it must have the same 'sense'".[65]

One of the properties that Russell said would characterize an adequate theory of truth would be its ability to account for falsehood. It can be seen that Russell's theory does in fact meet this requirement; his theory of judgment does allow for the possibility of false judgments. If "judgment" is understood as a multiple relation between a mind and various objects, these other objects may enter into some relation with each other independently of the mind. In the case under discussion, if the objects do enter into a relation, viz., if A does love B, then the judgment is true; if they do not enter into the relation, viz., if A does not love B, then the judgment is false.

Having shown us how judgment may be understood to be a multiple relation between a mind and various objects, Russell is ready to "state the difference between truth and falsehood".[66] He says:

> Every judgment is a relation of a mind to several objects, one of which is a relation; the judgment is true when the relation which is one of the objects relates the other objects, otherwise it is false.[67]

Thus in our example of someone's judging that A loves B, this judgment would be true if, in fact, love related A and B, and false if it did not.

Russell gives a precise formulation of what a true judgment is in the following:

> . . . the judgment that two terms have a certain relation R is a relation of the mind to the two terms and the relation R with the appropriate sense: the 'corresponding' complex consists of the two terms related by the relation R with the same sense. The judgment is true when there is such a complex, and false when there is not. The same account, mutatis mutandis, will apply to any other judgment.[68]

"This", says Russell, "gives the definition of truth and falsehood."[69]

Russell set out to define truth and falsehood, or rather to distinguish between what it means to say that something is true and something is false. He showed that it is belief or judgment that can be considered as fundamentally true or false, pointing out that any theory that sought to give an account of truth must take into account the fact that if there were no minds there would be no such thing as truth yet that a thing was not dependent upon a mind for its truth. A further requirement for a theory of truth was that it allow the possibility of false judgments and this in fact Russell was able to do without having to

spawn new metaphysical entities to take the place of the objects of false judgments, i.e. without having to stipulate the existence of objects which were being denied in the judgment under discussion.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to give an exposition of Bertrand Russell's Theory of Truth. We examined his arguments against both the Pragmatic Theory of Truth and the Monistic Theory of Truth. We also examined his notions of "fact" and "proposition" and showed what he considered to be the correct analysis of propositions of the type "A believes p".

To get an adequate idea of his theory it was necessary to see the positions he was opposing and to see what type of arguments he thought would be sufficient to destroy those positions. He criticised the Pragmatic Theory of Truth for two reasons: first, because it failed to accord with common-sense (it allowed propositions such as "A exists" to be true, even though A did not in fact exist), and, second, because its use of the word "true" failed to correspond to "ordinary usage" (the Pragmatists held that "true" meant "useful").

Russell criticized the Monistic Theory of Truth, first, because it was based on a mistaken notion of the nature of relations, and secondly, because of its notion that every proposition is partially true and partially false. Russell argued that this position made it impossible for the Monists to account for false judgments.

In Chapter III we examined Russell's notions of "proposition" and "fact" in order to see how, according to him, the one could possibly correspond to the other. His positing the existence of "negative facts" made it possible to account for the truth or falsity of all propositions by their correspondence to facts. His analysis of propositions into names and predicates (or verbs), and facts into particulars and relations, enabled him to show, in a specific way, how propositions can correspond to facts.

In Chapter IV we saw, in detail, Russell's analysis of propositions of the type "A believes p". It was only after we had seen this analysis that we were able to see fully his notion of truth. His analysis of this type of proposition into a multiple relation whose terms were the subject, and the particulars and the relation that were the constituent parts of the proposition p was original and interesting. Russell was able, with this analysis, to give what he considered an adequate account of false judgments.

Although, as has been noted, Russell had serious doubts about the correctness of this analysis by the time he gave the lectures on "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" (1918), he did not reject it at this time. It was only after he had given up the idea that knowledge consisted in a relation between a subject (the knower) and an object (the known), that he finally rejected the notion of a judgment as a multiple relation between a subject and other

simples. It was due, in part to Wittgenstein, but largely to William James that he did accept the notion that knowledge is "non-relational". He expressed his rejection of the old idea and his acceptance of the new one in "On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean" (1919) and in The Analysis of Mind (1921).

NOTES - CHAPTER ONE

1 Bertrand Russell, "On Denoting", Mind, New Series, XIV (1905), pp. 479-493. Reprinted in Logic and Knowledge, ed. Robert Charles Marsh (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956), pp. 41-56.

2 Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", Monist, XXVIII (Oct., 1918), pp. 495-527 and XXIX (Jan.-July, 1919), pp. 32-63; 190-222; 345-380. Reprinted in Marsh, pp. 177-281. All references made to this article will be made to the Marsh volume.

3 New Impetus was given to the discussion of truth by the debate between J.L. Austin and P.F. Strawson. See George Pitcher, ed., Truth (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964).

4 See Russell's "The Nature of Truth", Mind, New Series, XV (1906). The first two sections of this paper were reprinted as Chapter VI, "The Monistic Theory of Truth", and Chapter VII, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", in Russell's Philosophical Essays, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), pp. 131-159. All references to this paper will be made to this reprinted version. See also Russell's The Problems of Philosophy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), Chapter XII, "Truth and Falsehood", pp. 119-130.

5 Bertrand Russell, "On The Nature of Acquaintance", Monist, XXIV (Jan.-July, 1914), pp. 1-16; 161-187; 435-453. Reprinted in Marsh, pp. 127-174.

6 Bertrand Russell, "On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume II (1919) pp. 1-43. Reprinted in Marsh, pp. 285-320.

7 Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1921).

8 Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1959) p. 38.

9 Ibid., p. 54.

NOTES - CHAPTER ONE (Cont'd)

10 Both William James and F.C.S. Schiller referred to their Philosophy as Humanism. See William James, The Meaning of Truth, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911) esp. Chapter III, "Humanism and Truth", pp. 51-101, and Chapter V, "The Essence of Humanism", pp. 121-135. Also see F.C.S. Schiller, Studies in Humanism, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1907).

11 Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", p. 216.

NOTES - CHAPTER TWO

1 The Monistic theory of truth is in fact a coherence theory. As Russell says "Monism defines 'truth' by means of coherence", (See Russell, My Philosophical Development, p. 175.) For the sake of convenience we shall use these two terms interchangeably.

2 Bertrand Russell "Pragmatism", Edinburgh Review, CCIX, (Apr., 1909), pp. 363-388. Reprinted in Philosophical Essays, pp. 79-111 and "Transatlantic Truth", Albany Review, II (Jan., 1908), pp. 393-410. Reprinted in Philosophical Essays as "William James's Conception of Truth", pp. 112-130. All references to these articles will be made to the reprints in Philosophical Essays.

3 Russell criticizes the ideas put forth by James in Pragmatism: A New Name For Some Old Ways Of Thinking, (Longmans, Green and Co., 1907) and by Schiller in Studies in Humanism. James's book will hereafter be referred to as Pragmatism.

4 See James's The Meaning of Truth. In Chapter V (a reprint of an article written in 1905) he talks about the effects that Humanism will have on the Philosophical world. In Chapter VI (written in 1907), he says, "My failure in making converts to my conception of truth seems, . . . almost complete." p. 136.

5 James himself gives a list of rather impressive and formidable critics (including Taylor, Lovejoy, Carus, McTaggart and G.E. Moore) in the preface of The Meaning of Truth, p. xix.

6 In fact The Meaning of Truth was published to clear up the misunderstandings into which the critics of Pragmatism had fallen. See especially Chapter VIII, "The Pragmatist Account of Truth and Its Misunderstandings", pp. 180-216.

7 James is constantly referring to the intellectualists and the rationalists, and when he cites two examples of anti-Pragmatic views, they are, neither of them, theories that a man like Russell would espouse. See Pragmatism, pp. 227-228.

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8 Ibid., pp. 202-204.

9 Ibid., p. 211.

10 Ibid., pp. 212-213.

11 Ibid., pp. 223-225. See also Chapter V, "Pragmatism and Common Sense", pp. 165-194.

12 Cf. James, The Meaning of Truth, p. 199.

13 James, Pragmatism, p. 203.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., p. 204.

16 Ibid., pp. 204-205.

17 Cf. Russell, "William James's Conception of Truth", pp. 118-119.

18 Russell quotes this passage from James, Pragmatism, (p. 58) in "William James's Conception of Truth", p. 116.

19 Russell quotes this passage from James, Pragmatism, (p. 75) in "William James's Conception of Truth", pp. 116-117.

20 Russell quotes this passage from James, Pragmatism, (p. 218) in "William James's Conception of Truth", p. 118.

21 Russell, "William James's Conception of Truth", p. 118.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., p. 119.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., here Russell is opposing James's notion that a belief is truthful only because it is useful and useful only because it is true, i.e., it is true or useful in so far as it helps us order our experience and get around in the world. See James, Pragmatism, p. 204.

26 Russell, "William James's Conception of Truth", p.119.

NOTES - CHAPTER TWO (Cont'd)

27 Ibid., pp. 119-120.

28 Ibid., p. 120. It seems strange to see Russell argue from an "Ordinary Language" viewpoint. For a totally different attitude toward "Ordinary Language Philosophy", see his rather sharp attack on what he calls "Oxford Philosophy" in the last chapter of My Philosophical Development, where he answers criticisms levelled at him by J.O. Urmson, G.F. Warnock, and P.F. Strawson.

29 James, Pragmatism, p. 58.

30 James, The Meaning of Truth, p. 199.

31 Russell, "William James's Conception of Truth", pp. 128-129.

32 Ibid., pp. 129-130.

33 Again this might seem a strange position for Russell to put himself in, for he, himself, has never been beyond sacrificing common sense or common usage when the philosophical need arose. (Cf. note 28 above.)

34 See William James, "Two English Critics", Albany Review, (Jan., 1908). Reprinted in The Meaning of Truth, pp. 272-286. All references to this article will be made to the reprinted version.

35 Ibid., p. 272.

36 Ibid., p. 273.

37 Ibid., p. 278-279.

38 Ibid., p. 278-279.

39 Ibid., pp. 273-274.

40 Ibid., p. 274.

41 Ibid.

42 See Russell, My Philosophical Development, pp. 180-181.

43 Russell, "The Monistic Theory of Truth", p. 131.

44 Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 127.

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45 Harold H. Joachim, The Nature of Truth, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1906).

46 Joachim, The Nature of Truth, p. 178. Quoted by Russell in "The Monistic Theory of Truth", pp. 132-133.

47 Russell, "The Monistic Theory of Truth", p. 132.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Joachim, The Nature of Truth, p. 66. Quoted by Russell in "The Monistic Theory of Truth", p. 132.

51 Russell, "The Monistic Theory of Truth", p. 132.

52 Ibid., p. 133.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., pp. 134-35.

55 Ibid., p. 135.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, pp. 122-23.

59 Ibid., p. 123.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Russell, "The Monistic Theory of Truth", p. 136.

65 Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 122.

66 Ibid.

67 Russell, "The Monistic Theory of Truth", p. 139.

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68 Ibid.

69 F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, (9th impression, authorized and corrected, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 347.

70 Ibid., p. 513.

71 Cf. p. 18. above.

72 Russell, "The Monistic Theory of Truth", p.140.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 For a more complete view of Bradley's position, cf. Appearance and Reality, Bk. I, Ch. III, "Relations and Qualities", pp. 21-29, and Appendix, Note B, on the same topics, pp. 512-25.

76 Russell, "The Monistic Theory of Truth", p. 141.

77 Ibid., pp. 141-42.

78 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 27, n. 1.

79 Ibid., p. 29.

80 Russell, "The Monistic Theory of Truth", p. 143.

81 Ibid.

82 Russell's argument, although valid, would have been more forceful had he cited a text of Bradley in which this logically fallacious formulation of the monist's position was given.

83 Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of The External World, (rev. ed., London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1926), pp. 56-59. Cf. also Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, (2nd ed. with a new Introduction, New York: W.W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1938), pars. 212-16.

84 Bertrand Russell, "Logical Atomism" in Contemporary British Philosophy, First Series, (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1924). Reprinted in Logic and Knowledge, ed. Robert Charles Marsh, pp. 323-43. Reference made to this paper will be made to the re-

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print in *Logic and Knowledge*, p. 335.

85 Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 58.

86 *Ibid.*

87 *Ibid.*

88 *Ibid.*, p. 59. Russell gives a similar account in "The Monistic Theory of Truth", p. 144.

89 Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 59.

90 Russell, "The Monistic Theory of Truth", p. 146.

NOTES - CHAPTER THREE

1 Russell, in fact, takes the proposition as the basic vehicle of truth and falsehood. See "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", pp. 184-185 and p. 187.

2 Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", p. 182.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 60

8 Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", p. 183.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid. Although it seems certain that Russell holds that facts are entities in the world, he does say in the last lecture of the series in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, something that seems to contradict this interpretation, viz., ". . . facts are the sort of things that are asserted or denied by propositions, and are not properly entities at all in the same sense in which their constituents are.", p. 270.

11 P.F. Strawson, in his article "Truth" in Truth, p.39, takes exception to the assimilation of facts to things. He says: "If you prize the statements off the world, you prize the facts off it too; but the world would be none the poorer. (You don't also prize off the world what the statements are about -- for this you would need a different kind of lever.)"

12 Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", p. 183.

13 Ibid., p. 183-184.

14 Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 65.

15 Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", p. 235. Russell notes the Epistemological consequences of

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his doctrine. A strict empiricist position, i.e., that all knowledge is of particulars, is simply untenable. See also Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 66.

16 Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", pp. 236-237.

17 Russell, ibid., p. 237. For a discussion of the relation of the nature of propositional function to the notion of existence see Russell's "On Denoting" and Lecure V of "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", pp. 228-254.

18 Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", p. 211.

19 See the discussion following Lecture III of "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", p. 215.

20 Ibid., p. 213.

21 Ibid., p. 214.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., p. 184.

24 Ibid., p. 185.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., p. 186.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., pp. 186-87. The contradictions that Russell is talking about here are of the kind that occasioned his "theory of types". For an account of his theory see "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", Lecture VII, especially pp. 259-65, and My Philosophical Development, pp. 75-83.

30 Cf. p. 35 above.

31 Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", p. 187.

32 Ibid.

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33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., p. 188.

39 Ibid., p. 208.

40 Ibid., p. 209.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., p. 196. This definition, it should be noted, does not imply that there is a component of a fact corresponding to each symbol in the corresponding proposition. See Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", pp. 209-210.

44 Ibid., p. 198.

45 Russell is not referring here to the colored object but to what, and what alone, he believes, is actually seen, i.e. a white patch--a sense-datum.

46 Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", p. 199.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., p. 201.

50 Ibid., p. 202. Here Russell gives very clear expression to his opposition to the Monist's notion of Reality.

51 Ibid., pp. 199-200.

52 Ibid., p. 200.

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53 Ibid., pp. 201, 202. According to Russell what we are primarily acquainted with is sense-data. "When we ask what are the kinds of objects with which we are acquainted, the first and most obvious example is sense-data." See "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, XI, 1910-11, pp. 108-128. Reprinted in Mysticism and Logic, (London: Penguin Books, 1953). References to this article will be made to the reprint in Mysticism and Logic. See page 198.

54 In his essay "Russell's Philosophy of Language" in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963) I, pp. 229-255, Max Black says that Russell's theory implies that someone uttering a proposition containing the name of a person with whom he was not acquainted, cannot have uttered a true proposition. (See especially pp. 248-249.) Russell points out that Black overlooked his notion of names such as "Socrates" being shorthand descriptions. Russell certainly never denied that descriptive phrases could be used in propositions without making the propositions false.

55 Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", p. 200.

56 Ibid., p. 205.

57 Here of course "relation" is taken to include "quality" and "predicate" to include adjectives, verbs, and phrases.

58 Cf. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and Strawson's "On Referring" for the theory of "meaning as use".

59 See Russell's "On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean".

NOTES - CHAPTER FOUR

1 Russell, "On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 149.

2 In fact, Russell presents what he calls the "fundamental problem of truth" in the form of a question about judgment: "What is the difference between a true belief and a false belief?", "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 149.

3 Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, pp. 120-21.

4 Ibid., p. 120. Russell probably has in mind such men as Joachim and Bradley. He might equally have said that their theories hold that everything we know is false.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid. It is not to be thought that Russell is holding out for some kind of spiritual substance. His distinction is merely between "mental" stuff and "material" stuff. For a full account of his ideas on this topic, see his article, "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter", pub. in the Monist, July, 1915 and reprinted in Mysticism and Logic, pp. 120-38. He was later to reject this theory in The Analysis of Mind (1921).

7 Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 121.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Cf. p. 14 above.

11 Russell, "On The Nature of Truth and Falsity", p. 147.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 This of course reflects Russell's own particular tastes in doing Philosophy. For philosophers such as J.L. Austin and P.F. Strawson, how the word "truth" is used

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is of great philosophic importance. See the contributions of these two philosophers to Truth, ed. by George Pitcher.

15 Russell passes quickly and easily over the notion of "ontological" truth which has played an important role in traditional discussions of truth.

16 Russell, "On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 147.

17 Ibid., p. 148.

18 Ibid.

19 In fact, Russell says that the whole of the series of lectures on "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" is but a justification of analysis. See "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", p. 270.

20 For Russell's particular views on what method is to be used in philosophizing, see his notion of analysis in "Philosophy of Logical Atomism", pp. 179 ff. For a full account of the role of analysis in Russell's philosophy, see Morris Weitz, "Analysis and the Unity of Russell's Philosophy" in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, pp. 57-121. See also D.F. Pears, Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy, (London: Fontana Library, 1967).

21 Russell, "On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 148.

22 It should be noted here that Russell uses "belief" and "judgment" synonymously. See fn. 1 on p. 148 of "On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood".

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., pp. 148-149.

27 Ibid., p. 149. Russell was later to give up this position. In his article "On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean", he chooses to define the "truth" and "falsehood" of beliefs in terms of

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the truth and falsehood of propositions, i.e. true beliefs are defined as beliefs in true propositions and false beliefs as beliefs in false propositions.

28 Russell, "On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 149.

29 For Russell's account of "how we can know what is true and what is false", see The Problems of Philosophy, Chapter VIII, on "Knowledge and Probable Opinion", pp. 131-148.

30 Russell, "On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 149.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., p. 150.

33 Ibid.

34 Of course, this problem had long given Russell much trouble. It was only through his theory of descriptions that he was able to analyze, to at least his own satisfaction, propositions in which there occured a phrase that seemed to refer to something non-existent. See his "On Denoting".

35 Russell, "On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 150.

36 Ibid., pp. 150-153.

37 Ibid., pp. 150 ff.

38 Ibid., p. 150.

39 It is difficult to imagine what sort of properties truth and falsity might be, as applied to objects. But, as Russell points out, these types of properties would be the logical outcome of a theory that posits objectives for both true and false judgments.

40 Russell, "On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 151.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

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43 Russell would of course base his argument on a common-sense feeling for the "real", (or what he calls his "vivid sense of the real"). It is strange that he would not use this same type of argument against the positing of negative facts.

44 Russell, "On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 151.

45 Ibid., p. 152.

46 Ibid.

47 See Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, pp. 67-68.

48 Russell, "On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 152.

49 See Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 124.

50 Russell, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 153.

51 Ibid., p. 154.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Russell says, "This relation between A and B and May cannot be analysed into relations between A and B, A and May, and B and May: it is a single unity." ("On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 154). Here, again, Russell is showing Bradley and his followers the fruitfulness, in Philosophy, of admitting external relations. For there is nothing in the natures of these various terms or in their individual relations among themselves into which the relation that obtains among all three terms can be analyzed, and yet this relation is an undeniable fact.

56 Russell, "On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood", pp. 154-155.

57 Here again would arise the problems surrounding false objectives.

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58 For an account of the type of knowledge we have of the constituents of a judgment, i.e. of the terms of the multiple relation, see Russell's "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description", pp. 206 ff.

59 Russell, "On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 155.

60 Cf. p. 11 above in which the twofold problem was set up, i.e. the problem of (1) accounting for "relation" and (2) accounting for correspondence.

61 Russell, "On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 158.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 The idea of the sense of a relation seems to be introduced to smooth over what Russell later came to see as a flaw in his theory, i.e. in the relation that obtained between the subject doing the judging and the particular relation (i.e., the one expressed by the subordinate verb) to which it is related. See Russell's remarks on the difficulty of putting this relation into a spacial representation, as he is discussing the logical form of belief, in "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", pp. 224-227.

65 Russell, "On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 158.

66 As was mentioned previously, the notion of "difference", here, is not to be taken as referring to a criterion by which true and false beliefs can be distinguished, but rather the actual characteristic or quality that constitutes the difference between the two types of judgment.

67 Russell, "On The Nature of Truth and Falsehood", p. 156.

68 Ibid., p. 158.

69 A deceptively simple looking answer to a question which has occasioned many very complex answers in its history.

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