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Participation as Tyranny!
Struggle for Social Control in Rural Uganda

Abstract

by Graeme Reniers

This thesis critically examines the role of peasant participation in development processes in Uganda, as embodied by the ‘good’ governance agenda. The historical nature of the struggle for social control and peasant resistance to control in Sub-Saharan Africa was explored along with literature concerning contemporary manifestations of this struggle as found in the participatory processes of the ‘good’ governance agenda. A qualitative case study using Marxist dialectical materialist methods was performed to determine the nature of the relationship between ‘good’ governance defined participatory processes and the struggle for social control in Uganda. The study found Ugandan peasants to have historically resisted elite control, and that elites have responded with limited democratic and economic concessions while struggling to expand social control. An analysis of Uganda’s version of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and the role of local government units and civil society organizations, as part of the framework for participation provided by the ‘good’ governance agenda, found the trend of granting limited democratic concessions while obscuring the struggle to expand elite social control continues. The thesis concludes that participatory ‘good’ governance models are best understood as a sophisticated tool of class struggle, wherein bourgeois classes (domestic and international) struggle to socially control and subvert popular classes, and is therefore a system of tyranny.

12 April 2011
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCU</td>
<td>Bugisu Cooperative Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Constitutional Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFM</td>
<td>Collaborative Forest Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDC</td>
<td>Forum for Democratic Change</td>
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<td>FSUP</td>
<td>Forest Sector Umbrella Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Highly Indebted Poor Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>KY</td>
<td>Kabaka Yekka (King Only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC</td>
<td>Local Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAIF</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFPEDE</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naads</td>
<td>National Agricultural Advisory Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFA</td>
<td>National Forestry Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NRA</td>
<td>National Resistance Army</td>
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<td>NRM</td>
<td>National Resistance Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Participatory Action Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEA</td>
<td>Poverty Eradication Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMA</td>
<td>Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture</td>
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<td>PPA</td>
<td>Participatory Poverty Assessment</td>
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<td>PRA</td>
<td>Participatory Rural Appraisal</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Resistance Council</td>
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<td>RKG</td>
<td>Rwenzururu Kingdom Government</td>
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<td>RRA</td>
<td>Rapid Rural Appraisal</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAM</td>
<td>Transnational Agrarian Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCA</td>
<td>Uganda Cooperative Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>Uganda National Congress</td>
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<td>UPC</td>
<td>Uganda Peoples Congress</td>
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<td>UPM</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Movement</td>
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<td>ULA</td>
<td>Uganda Land Alliance</td>
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<td>UNFFE</td>
<td>Uganda National Farmers Federation</td>
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<td>UNLA</td>
<td>Ugandan National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>UNLF</td>
<td>Uganda National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>UPPAP</td>
<td>Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Process</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
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Chapter One: The Question, Theory, Statement and Methods

With the collapse of the communist model of development and the conclusion of the Cold War in the early 1990s, capitalism appeared to be the only remaining path to development. However, the most recent capitalist model of development, exercised through the use of structural adjustment, also failed to reduce poverty and caused a social backlash in recipient countries. Attempts at top-down development had failed, and were delegitimized in favour of bottom-up approaches. With the sustainability of structural adjustment programmes waning, powerful capitalist forces – represented internationally by the World Bank Group\(^1\) – needed a new development agenda. Hence, bottom-up forms of democracy were anointed as the only legitimate form of ‘good’ governance. Though continuing neoliberal structural adjustment, this new agenda of ‘good’ governance promised to reduce poverty by bringing all social groups into the development process. Participation, once associated with social movements as an exercise to counter dominance and social control, was now being championed by dominant actors as an integral part of ‘good’ governance. Hence, this new agenda held peasants, once considered incapable of any political role, to have first-hand knowledge of rural development needs, and whose participation in policy formation was now a prerequisite for development.

As those in power ostensibly allowed bottom-up processes to shape policy, mainstream development discourse optimistically spoke of a paradigmatic shift in theory.

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\(^1\) This Group includes the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in addition to the World Bank itself.
New buzzwords emerged and by participating in policy formation, 'civil society' became the new driver of social change and 'poverty reduction', while powerful actors such as the World Bank were no longer necessarily considered obstacles to 'empowerment'. Older concepts such as class struggle and imperialism no longer appeared relevant. Indeed, power relations and imbalances ceased to be of much importance in mainstream participation discourse, as with the right technical procedures all social groups and 'communities' could be equally brought into the process – and thus, all interests could simultaneously be served in 'multi-stakeholder' approaches.

Uganda was championed by the World Bank and mainstream theorists as proof this new 'good' governance agenda could work. With stable economic growth and relative peace following decades of political, economic and social chaos and violence, Uganda appeared as a true success story. Its participatory processes embodied by local governance, civil society, and its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) were considered a model of 'good' governance from which other governments needed to learn. Indeed, Uganda’s President Museveni, once a revolutionary peasant guerrilla leader, was embraced by American and World Bank presidents as emblematic of a new era of world leaders. Yet, despite peasants being 'empowered' to 'participate' in a relatively 'democratic' system of 'good' governance, Uganda continued the same neoliberal capitalist path to development hitherto made conditional by the World Bank and IMF. Furthermore, despite relatively high rates of economic growth, disparities have widened (Muhumuza, 2002) and poverty has increased (United Nations, 2008).

As the initial optimism concerning international affairs waned following the Cold War, the prospect of a top-down embrace of bottom-up development stagnated. Among
more critical theorists, naivety towards power relations was – at most – short lived. Critics amongst several ideological camps and social science disciplines have raised alarms over the uniform policies that supposedly unprecedented participatory processes have produced. Doubts have been raised over the likelihood that poor people in less developed countries prefer the same neoliberal model of capitalism that bourgeois classes in rich countries prefer, leaving Cooke and Kothari (2001) to ask: Participation: the New Tyranny? Investigations into how empowering the practice of ‘empowerment’ really is, how democratic ‘democracy’ really is, and how participatory ‘participation’ really is, soon emerged.

Much of this research has found that oppressed peoples have not been empowered, that meaningful democracy has not grown, and that participation has become a technical exercise used to legitimize predetermined outcomes. Many studies have found the interests of the rich and poor still contradict each other (Mohan and Stokke, 2000; Kamruzzaman, 2009); that power relations and imbalances continue to shape the way social groups are brought into development processes (Cornwall and Brock 2005; Cheru, 2006); and Marxist theorists have shown that class analysis is still a relevant tool in our understanding of social change (Saul, 1997b, 2005, 2010; Brass 1997, 2007b;). Furthermore, many studies have found what is now considered ‘good’ governance does not serve to empower the poor to participate, but rather to strengthen the dominance of international bourgeois and domestic elites (Abrahamson, 2000; Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Fraser 2005). Such findings have recently led to “calls for participation to be re-articulated within broader processes of social and political struggle” (Leal, 2010).

It is the objective of this thesis to contribute to this re-articulation of participation
by investigating a model and so-called 'success' story of the 'good' governance agenda. By virtue of being a model for other countries to later implement, Uganda presents an excellent opportunity to critically examine the parameters of 'good' governance in its most established form in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the contextual history of social struggle and the nature of power embedded in Uganda's institutions of 'good' governance best exemplifies how the practice of participation has shifted from an exercise of emancipation towards a bourgeois attempt to achieve social control through the reconceptualization of participation provided by the 'good' governance agenda. It was poor peasants in Uganda that established a grassroots system of democratic local governance during a six-year civil war in the 1980s that challenged elite dominance and brought the current central government to power. Nonetheless, with the reconfiguration of local governance within the 'good' governance agenda, and the introduction of PRSPs and the rising importance of civil society, elite classes have (re)emerged to capture a dominant political-economic position in Uganda. We must look deeply into this example, we must critically examine the role of the Ugandan peasants and dominant classes in political processes, and we must determine the nature of the relationship between 'good' governance defined participation and the struggle for social control in Uganda.

Recent events in Northern Africa and parts of the Middle East make this research particularly timely and relevant. As the world’s gaze has turned to the inspiring image of oppressed peoples in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya challenging tyrannical political systems, many elsewhere are asking when their turn will come. While this thesis does not seek to predict when or where "Egyptian style protests" will occur, it does seek to contribute to the understanding of the struggle over social control embodied by the 'good' governance
agenda, which may also help explain the current absence of powerful peasant movements in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political leaders in countries observing principles of 'good' governance, will present participatory processes as evidence their rule is not tyrannical, and that such social uprising are therefore unnecessary. In direct contradiction to such foreseen claims, this thesis investigates the role participatory processes and 'good' governance play in the struggle by dominant actors for social control – using Uganda’s ‘successful’ model as a case-study.

Notwithstanding the emergence of critical studies on the ‘good’ governance agenda, much research on participatory processes continue to be plagued by technocracy – i.e., an overemphasis on technical aspects such as meeting schedules, locations and facilitation methods – with few studies considering deeper social implications of participatory processes themselves being reduced to a technical procedure (Booth, 2005; Driscoll and Evans, 2005; Jütting et al. 2005; Craig and Porter, 2006). Furthermore, most Marxist research on participation and ‘good’ governance has concentrated on its imperial implications and the World Bank and IMF’s not-so-secret agenda of expanding capitalist structures (Moore, 2005; Stewart and Wang, 2003; Gould, 2005; Sumner, 2006; Ruckert, 2007). This has left the examination of national and local political implications and processes unsatisfactorily analyzed. This thesis seeks to overcome both shortcomings – that is an overemphasis on technical aspects and an under-emphasis on the role of domestic elites – by examining participation and the structures of ‘good’ governance at a national level and local level, albeit with references to international actors such as the World Bank. By providing an in-depth analysis of the reality of participation in Uganda, this thesis seeks to provide a useful resource for comparative research on countries that

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2 As opposition leader Dr. Besigye called for following Uganda’s most recent elections.
followed Uganda in adopting processes of 'good' governance, and strives to be useful to critical scholars in deepening our understanding of the nature of social control, as the struggle for emancipation continues.

**History of Struggle: Control and Peasant Resistance in Africa**

To understand the role of 'good' governance participation within the broader context of the struggle for social control, it is necessary to consider the historical nature of – and the forms of governance embodied by – such a struggle. A literature review on the struggle for social control by dominant classes, and peasant resistance seeking to evade control, will inform us of the historical patterns and legacies of governance that shape current incarnations of this struggle. Hence, an examination of the historical relationship between peasants (who resist control) and dominant classes (who struggle for control) and the forms of governance this struggle has produced, will provide context from which the current 'good' governance agenda has been formed in Uganda and elsewhere.

Well established in Europe and Latin America, theory on peasant relations to dominant classes and states in Africa has been hindered by the notion of an autonomous peasantry (Kasfir, 1984a) and debates as to how capitalist penetration has reorganized production and social relations. Lenin (1970), Hobson (1971), and Luxemburg (1951) articulated the idea that capitalism's need for primitive accumulation required the opening of new markets on the fringe of imperialism. For Kautsky (1988) this spelled the inevitable demise of a peasantry unable to compete with capitalist forces; conversely Meillasoux (1973) argued that non-capitalist modes of production are needed for capitalism to survive, and thus peasant classes survive to effectively subsidize capitalist
production, and fittingly Bettelheim (1975) suggested capitalism partially dissolves but maintains pre-existing production modes. For proponents of the idea of an autonomous African peasantry, all these ideas “ignore the autonomous role of peasant societies in reproducing themselves” (Bunker, 1987:3). Bunker argues that such theories deny peasant agency and maintains that it is erroneous to look solely at capitalist expansion as the source – or driver – of change, in (post)colonial African society; rather, the dynamics of change can be found in resistance to imperialism and the internal conflicts, alliances, and new power dynamics imperialism created.

The idea that rural Africa was still pre-capitalist after colonization was first put forth by proponents of African Socialism (eg. Nyerere, 1968) and later echoed by Hyden (1980, 1983). Hyden’s main conclusion is that unlike Europe where the peasantry was captured by wage labour, and Latin America where it was captured by tenancy arrangements, African peasants have not been captured by other social classes. An ‘economy of affection’ entails that a free-holding peasantry can rely on kin relations rather than relations to the state for social security, thereby enabling peasants to use an ‘exit-strategy’ option – wherein they drop out of export production and withhold the ability of the state to capture surplus – as leverage and autonomy from dominant classes.

This idea has been strongly refuted, in particular by Mamdani (1997:13) who asserts that: “Hyden misses precisely the relations through which the ‘free’ peasantry is ‘captured’ and reproduced.” Hyden attempted to find a Latino-Asian prototype for African peasant capture, but coupled with land abundance and lack of an immediate overlord, concludes the peasantry is free. However, according to Mamdani, Hyden failed to account for the unequal socio-economic relations that African peasantries are
compelled to enter, which is twofold. First, differentiated village social structures indirectly compel poor peasants to ‘voluntarily’ enter unequal relations with rich peasants in a manner that effectively transfers surplus labour from peasants poor in land and labour implements to those rich in land and able to hire (Mamdani, 1997:80). These indirect pressures from below are compounded by direct coercion from above (i.e. directives from the state) in the form of forced labour, contributions, enclosures, cash crops, sales, and taxation (Mamdani, 1997:83). This second set of directives are extra-economic; that is, the resulting unequal relations are driven by an urban bourgeois in the political realm by way of guaranteed market functioning and the sanctity of private land (Mamdani, 1987a). In short, the idea of an autonomous African peasantry ignores rural capitalist penetration, peasant responsiveness to price incentives, the incorporation of peasants into wider class relations via patronage politics, and the power/ability of non-peasant classes to exploit the peasantry (Kasfir, 1984a). Thus, as Bernstein (1977) notes, “[t]he peasantry must be analysed in its relations to capital and the state.”

Local populations in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa were introduced to new goods, services, economic and labour demands under colonialism, “with the result that new needs were generated which could only be met by participation in the cash-based market economy. Two ways of participating were open to them [peasants]: sale of their labour or sale of their agricultural produce” (Saul and Woods, 1971:107). First introduced by coercion, taxation, and forced labour, commodity production became a necessity for African peasants. The ‘exit-strategy’ is further problematicized by the understanding that once any level of commodity relations are introduced it becomes of secondary importance to compare resources spent in commodity and subsistence production; it is
erroneous to assume that a household that is far more active in subsistence production rather than commodity production is able to withdraw from the latter (Bernstein, 1977).

Effectively captured by capitalist relations, class formation evolved among the African peasantry, though not in rigid ‘advanced’ capitalist forms (Gibbons and Neocosmos, 1985; Bernstein, 2004). Labour implements and land access can be used to determine relations to the means of production in a tripartite classification of poor, middle, and rich peasant classes in Sub-Saharan Africa; however, these strata are evolving and fluid (Kasfir, 1984b) leaving some to suggest other methods. Relative wealth, often put forward, is not a useful method due to the unpredictability (seasonal, weather, et cetera) of agricultural production (Bernstein, 1977). Sklar (1979) made the case that relations to power are a more important determinant of class than relation to production. That the African state routinely used customary practice in rural areas – not extending civil power beyond urban areas – to enforce what Mamdami conceptualized as decentralized despotism, supports the idea that relations to power determines class in peasant communities. This power difference is more political than economic, leaving peasants not completely within (nor out) of free market, but “on the interstices of the market and direct compulsions” (Mamdani, 1997:183). Thus, the colonial state was organized along pre-capitalist lines in rural areas wherein power over peasant property, tax assessment and collection was fused with the chief; a system maintained even as bourgeois citizenry rights were granted to urban African middle-classes before and after

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3 ‘Poor’ peasants depend on the regular exchange of their labour-power for social reproduction, as capitalist class formation does not require a landless proletariat, but merely workers with insufficient land to meet reproductive necessities; ‘middle’ peasants have enough family labour and land for reproduction, but only in specific relations with other peasant strata and modes of production; and ‘rich’ peasants, sometimes referred to as kulaks, accumulate sufficient capital to invest in technology/labour power, and potentially may become capitalist farmers (Bernstein, 1977). Researchers often use similar but often more stringent stratification methods but mostly rely on some form of labour-allocation for the designation of African
independence (Mamdani, 1991:241-2). This suggests that class identities in rural settings are more determined by the political realm of customary law as opposed to the economic realm of relations to production; that is, a chief and various peasants may appear to have similar relations to production but their class stratification is nuanced in the political realm. This argument, however, is inadequate in that it does not account for economic stratification among poor, middle, and rich peasants that do not have political positions or connections, and therefore erroneously assumes consistent social motivations for peasants of differing economic strata but commonly without political connections. Thus, Kasfir’s (1984b) idea that similar economic motivations and opportunities – not solely dependent on political connections or relations to the means of production – is a more useful determinant of class designation is more appropriate than designations based solely on political connections. To a certain degree, nonetheless, one could foresee rich and poor peasants having similar general economic interests (for example, higher market prices) but having dissimilar interests in class struggle; i.e., while rich and poor peasants may both be motivated by higher prices, their ability (or opportunity) to reap rewards on such prices is differentiated by their relations to the means of production – which may in turn determine their relations to each other, especially considered that rich peasants often employ poor peasants. Thus, relations to the means of production are still the most important determinant of social interest, and therefore the most appropriate means of designating social class.

The stratification of African rural classes are nonetheless complex and dynamic, and cannot be given full justice in this thesis; the concern here is rather to discuss and analyse how the peasantry is brought into the development process politically. This
requires not a complete examination of African rural classes, but an understanding that class differentiation does exist, and that social interests are largely determined by relationships to the means of production and other classes. As alluded to above, peasants have historically been marginalized in official political arenas and subjected to authoritarian rule legitimized by those in power as ‘customary’, but criticized by dissidents as ‘decentralized despotism’. That is why the issue of participation, which proponents of ‘good’ governance claim to reverse this long-standing trend, is peculiar in its stated objective of bringing the peasantry into the decision making process. However, the fact that peasants have historically been granted little political power (other than a select few rich peasants) does not mean they have had little or no political role in shaping the social structures that confine them. Thus, the attention of this literature review now turns to an examination of the nature of political power peasants have wielded without the benefit of state machinery.

As much as the peasantry has been labelled an ‘awkward class’ economically (Shanin, 1972), whose labour is necessary for capitalist production but ultimately is smothered and exploited by it (de Janvry, 1981), it has likewise been labelled awkward politically. Citing social isolation and a livelihood tied more to nature than society, Marx’s (1963) *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* set the precedent for a theoretical pigeonholing of peasants to be socially conservative, regressive, and as victims of the very movements for which they are mobilized. Doubly unable to form a unified movement or a political program, the peasantry was regarded as being readily manipulated into contradictory movements (see Lukacs, 1971:61; Hobsbawm, 1973). That said, it was seen by early Marxists to be imperative for the proletariat to not only...
mobilize and ally with the peasantry, but also to establish its political programme (Engels, 1965, 1894; Lenin, 1960, 1966; Trotsky, 1969). Mao's use of peasant forces is regarded by many as reversing the precedence – that is mobilizing peasants to be the leading force of social transformation. However, the debate continues as to whether the Chinese peasantry was relied on as a vanguard or follower, with Mao's own writings increasingly suggest the latter as the Chinese revolution progressed (see Mao, 1971; Schram, 1969; Knight, 2004).

The Chinese example, and a realization that peasant movements were threatening the balance of world order, caused a re-evaluation of peasant political power spearheaded by Moore's (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Adas, 1985; Skocpol, 1994). Whereas Kautsky (1988) held capitalism to be a conservatising influence on the peasantry, Moore (1966) contested that a transitional phase wherein the peasantry is simultaneously exploited by both capitalist and pre-capitalist relations radicalises the peasantry. In this context, the peasantry loses traditional security when exposed to agrarian capitalism and external markets, causing it to lose its stereotypical conservatism (Wolf, 1969a; Migdal, 1974). What is perhaps the most significant aspect of Moore’s work is that it moved the Marxian analysis of social change away from privileging urban agents of change (industrial bourgeois and proletariat) and towards rural agents (peasant-landlord class relations, rural-urban elite alliances). Moore also did not assume one route to modernisation and introduced a rural based schematic to understand political trajectories that, in direct contradiction to Marxian orthodoxy, considered a less commercialized agrarian economy to yield a more revolutionary peasantry.4 Moore

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4 In Moore's schematic, a strong bourgeoisie becomes politically aggressive and forms a bourgeois revolution which produces a bourgeois (liberal) democracy (e.g. England, France, and the United States); a
considered capitalist legal frameworks to weaken peasant solidarity (i.e. peasants become more individualized and internally competitive) and weak institutional links between upper classes and the peasantry to allow the peasantry more revolutionary autonomy. His theory, however, still rests peasant political action on that of bourgeois class action (or lack thereof). Not only do peasants still rely on a non-peasant leadership in Moore’s formulation, but peasantries only become revolutionary after the national bourgeoisie is tamed, and only if the landed upper classes have yet to commercialize agrarian relations. Weak agrarian commercialization allows peasant social institutions to survive but unable to cope with modern stresses, thereby invoking a peasant revolution. This peasant revolution is mediated by rural class contradictions; meaning, the peasantry’s political action and programme is divided along class lines and challenges agrarian social contradictions, such as peasant-landlord relations.

A clear departure from earlier Marxists can be seen in the relevance of bourgeois revolution. Whereas Lenin (1960, 1966) and Trotsky (1969) considered peasant participation in a bourgeois revolution to be a precursor to poor peasants overthrowing rich peasants and subsequently demanding agrarian socialism, Moore clearly considered a bourgeois revolution to pre-emptively diminish the likelihood of a peasant revolution. However, Trotsky’s theory of ‘permanent revolution’ suggested that a peasant-proletariat alliance can form a socialist revolution prior to the establishment of advanced capitalism.

While some orthodox Marxists maintained that capitalist expansion must proceed to the point of creating a large landless peasantry before it can become a major political
force (eg. Paige, 1975; Petras, 1981), the idea that peasant social institutions could become revolutionary led Marxian theories of peasant political power to be challenged by neo-populist frameworks of subaltern studies and ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’ (i.e. Scott, 1976, 1977, 1985, 1986; Kerkvliet, 1986). Much of the theoretical foundations of subaltern conceptualizations of peasant agency are prefigured in the works of Wolf (1969b) and Alavi (1973). Although Wolf dismissed smallholder agency he argued that only middle peasants have the capability to invoke and sustain class struggle, a thesis used by Alavi to suggest that peasant political agency “is mediated by primordial ties such as those of kinship.” This led subaltern studies to reconceptualise the basis of peasant consciousness as socio-culturally differentiated from their oppressors (as opposed to socio-economically differentiated), which Guha (1982, 1983) held to be the only means by which the peasantry can be recast as agents of history (instead of subjects).

Though Guha relied heavily on Marx he privileged the ideas of Gramsci, and while tribal and non-tribal peasant insurgencies were differentiated, intra-peasant class polarities and heterogeneous economic interests tended to be over-simplified. Indeed, in this redefinition of consciousness, counter-hegemonic peasant political participation is recast on the basis of cultural revitalisation and away from materiality; allegiances based on kin, clan, religion and ethnicity are considered more important than those based on class (Adas, 1979; 1985). Peasant agency was thought to be determined by the degree of cultural autonomy, meaning isolated peasantries with anti-state (bourgeois or not) pre-capitalist values have the greatest agency in peasant resistance to capitalist attacks on traditional social relations (Scott, 1976; 1977). Marxists were accused of systemically distorting peasant protest towards state-centric directions, and new state formations based

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5 Which would later be championed by subaltern studies.
on class-based revolutions were accused of being more coercive and hegemonic than those they replaced (Scott, 1986). Instead, ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’\(^6\) replaced what is characterised as a left-wing romanticism of national liberation wars as the primary means of peasant political agency (Scott, 1986; Adas, 1986), although such forms of resistance were conceded by subalternists to often precede openly confrontational peasant organizations (Kerkvliet, 2009; Scott, 1977).

While some saw subaltern studies as distinguishing itself only through the rhetorical devices of populist idioms and the term ‘subaltern’ (Bayly, 1989) the difference between subaltern and Marxian conceptualizations of peasant agency or class power and political direction are paramount. Though Moore had already recast peasantries as capable drivers of social change and used the survival of traditional peasant institutions to do so, the peasantry’s political programme was still considered materially inspired and state-driven. The focus of subaltern conceptualized peasant agency, meanwhile, is primarily cultural survival – i.e. the survival of peasant institutions which are the basis of Moore’s idea of peasant political power but not the political end. It is the move away from a materially inspired peasant political agenda that has received the harshest criticisms from Marxist perspectives.

A political agenda not directed towards state-capture but securing decentralized democracies leaves the state serving bourgeois interests, thereby allowing it to manipulate local government units through NGO-subcontracted market-based development projects, thereby failing to emancipate peasantries from capitalist structures

\(^6\) Also referred to as ‘Brechtian’ forms of struggle, which can include foot-dragging, dissimulation, false-compliance, pillering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on (Scott, 1986; see also Kerkvliet 1986, 2009). ‘Brechtian’ implies that change can be affected without the direct symbolism of action, and thus the arena in which politics is played out could be everywhere. Ergo, the privileging of
(Brass, 2002, 2005, 2007a, 2007b; Das, 2007; Amin 2001; White, 1986). Indeed, as will be further discussed in the proceeding sections of this literature review and illustrated in Chapter Three, the ‘good’ governance agenda has succeeded in manipulating what appears to decentralized democracies and local governments. Furthermore, some Marxists have gone so far as to accuse subalternists of rejecting “emancipation as the object and attainable end of historical transformation” altogether (Brass, 1991; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001; Veltmeyer 1997, 2007) by thematically linking it to post-modernism via its replacement of class with culture as the impetus of action, and replacing ‘revolution as change’ with ‘resistance to change’. Similarly, the use of ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’ has been criticized as recasting peasantries as dis-empowered actors unable to form an open political force (Walker, 2008), contrary to the subalternists claim of recasting peasants away from a passive victim persona. Finally, the utility of subaltern studies as an analytical tool is severely questioned by its false framework of homogenous peasant survival in the face of capitalist expansion (Putnaik, 1979), which imagines rural actors as uniformly oppressed by urban actors and obscures the prefigured political outcome of rural social movements (Brass, 1991, 1997).

There is not a complete and absolute schism between Marxist and subaltern methods however. In particular, the use of ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’ is enticing for studying peasant political power where the minimal political freedom to organize a movement or protest is lacking (Malseed, 2008). In other scenarios, some have argued ‘everyday’ resistance can predict a rise in organized peasant mobilization (Kerkvliet, 1993, 2009; Korovkin, 2000). Attempts at the latter have produced mixed recognizable organizations and movements in conventional studies is thought to miss much that is political (Kerkvliet, 2009).
results from a Marxist perspective. ‘Everyday’ resistance in Ecuador has been argued to have preceded an anti-socialist and non-class identified political organization (Korovkin, 2000). Conversely, the framework has been used to suggest peasants in China are challenging a post-socialist development path (Walker, 2008). An ‘everyday’ framework has likewise been used to challenge a neo-populist perception that Vietnamese peasants desire a return to traditional socio-economic structures within the context of a richer modern world. The study concluded, however, that the framework “does not advance us very far in the analysis of power relations between the peasants and local and national power structures” (White, 1986).

It is not easy to transplant this continuing debate onto the African context, but doing so provides a constructive basis for the theoretical understanding of peasant political power in Africa. Though the largest and perhaps most exploited (though highly differentiated) class in Africa, several historical obstacles to peasant political power must be acknowledged. Firstly, the impact of capitalism has been highly inconsistent due to unparalleled variableness of pre-capitalist structures. Secondly, the introduction of capitalist social relations has been a relatively recent phenomenon, leaving intact prior social networks which have the double impact of leaving the development of class consciousness murky and the peasants’ most likely ally to be ruling elites from peasant lineage. Thirdly, the lack of landlords, quasi-feudal relations, and the use of local functionaries obscure and depersonalize the power behind oppression, creating an exploitative system and central state character difficult to comprehend from the peasant

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7 Especially given that only Adas (of the aforementioned) derived a considerable amount of his theoretical formulations from African examples.
8 ex. the prevalence of feudal, pseudo-feudal, acephalous and communal societies in pre-colonial Uganda means the impact of capitalism is highly differentiated across geographic and tribal affiliations, diminishing
vantage point. This allows for political action to be easily confined to the local and for peasants to be incorporated into the political programme of others at higher levels. Finally, divide-and-conquer techniques have been used by both colonial and independence-era elites who present an imagery of the political-economic pie divided by ethnicity and not class (Saul, 1979: 299-309; Kasfir, 1984b; Mamdani, 1997: 213). Notwithstanding these obstacles, it would be a mistake to discount the political power contained within sub-Saharan African peasantry — regardless of for what and for whom it is mobilized.

While African petit-bourgeoisies are often credited with leading the independence struggles (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987) — with some considering it as the only class with the necessary education to understand the concept of sovereignty (Emerson, 1962: 227) — others argue they were forced into action by the pressures of peasant masses who were more revolutionary, more disdainful of the drawn-out bargaining process, and whose mobilization and participation at critical junctures forced the national leadership to act to retain power (Fanon, 1963: 92-102; Hodgkin, 1964: 61). Fanon argued that the bourgeois leaders preferred the long process of constitutional bargaining and were relatively docile when compared to the peasant appetite for radical liberation. Fanon also lambasted the rural proletariat for working for the colonialists whereas the peasantry — considered homogenous and classless with resilient pre-capitalist social relations — stubbornly defended tradition.9

Fanon's depiction of peasant agency (that is classless, uniform, and defending

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9 A case has also been made for labelling the urban proletariat as the vanguard in independence struggles; see Shivji (1975) and Panford (1994) for an analysis of this class' role in such struggles.
tradition), however, is highly contested and is argued to have been manipulated by nationalist leaders who tended to exaggerate mass participation, uniform consciousness and peasant homogeneity (Saul, 1973a). Van Walraven and Abbink (2003; see also Gewald, 2003) emphasize the importance of 1960s historiographic studies as allowing the bourgeois nationalist leadership to build a flawed imagery of African peasants solely resisting white colonialism while obscuring the degree to which African peasants were also challenging capitalist structures. Resistance of the everyday-form is thought to characterize common peasant resistance to colonialism, whereas overt struggles were a response to the more oppressive features of capitalism – such as land seizures and extreme threats to subsistence and peasant reproduction (Isaacman, 1993). However, the historiography of peasant resistance at the time was “marred by a teleology that constructed all African protest as leading inexorably to modern nationalism and decolonization” (van Walraven and Abbink, 2003:2) which diminished the extent to which capitalist structures were being challenged by peasants. The result has been a false decolonization – a mere ‘Africanization’ of colonial structures – and neo-colonial African states characterized to be dominated by a bourgeoisie with interests compatible with foreign capital, and a political demobilization and oppression of the peasantry (Saul, 1973b; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987:49; Shivji, 1991a:33). This view, however, does tend to exaggerate the commonality of class interest between domestic bourgeois and international capital, to ignore new concerns of domestically emerging ruling classes, and to dismiss the “albeit limited political consciousness created by the nationalist struggle for independence” (Kasfir, 1984b:3).

Regardless, one would be hard pressed to argue that peasants achieved political
emancipation in most nationalist struggles, and there thus was/is a needed second phase to liberation – the first being a nationalist struggle for independence with an impetus of ethnicity and populism; and the second being a social struggle against both international and domestic oppression based on an impetus of class (Cabral, 1972; Saul, 2005; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987; Vambe, 2005). At this particular conjuncture, an example of Zimbabwean peasant political power and its relation to the nationalist leadership pre- and post-independence provides a useful concretization of the argument that peasantries challenged the more oppressive features of capitalist structures during later-colonialism, but that a petty-bourgeois leadership emerged which offered only a very limited social transformation mandate, thus resulted in a second phase of peasant political protest.

ZANU, dominated by an educated and elitist middle class, would emerge out of ZAPU – which had firm roots among peasants and migrant workers – to become the main nationalist organization and gain power upon independence (ZANU would later absorb ZAPU to become ZANU-PF)\(^{10}\) (Saul, 1979; Lee, 2003). Though supportive of national liberation, peasant participation in the struggle was based on a broader goal than ethnic emancipation and also demanded a transformation of village social structures to remediate intra-African inequalities in resistance to colonial relations. Regardless, ZANU-PF offered only a racialized nationalist programme and thus had to rely heavily on coercion to receive peasant support (Kriger, 2002:2-12), and causing ZANU-PF to rely on early resistance literature in an attempt to construct links to the ethnic resistance

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\(^{10}\) ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) was previously named the ANC (African National Congress) and the NDP (National Democratic Party) but was forced to change its name repeatedly as each preceding entity was banned by the Rhodesian government, a pattern which was prevalent, as we shall see, in Uganda as well. Countervailing this organizations was the Rhodesian Front (RF), a party of white hegemonists who after independence would go on to become the Republican Front and then Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe before fizzling out when white-reserved seats in parliament were abolished with its members of parliament either joining ZANU or becoming independents.
against white occupation in the late 19th Century (van Walraven and Abbink:2003). Like the earlier struggles, the peasantry rejected white dominance, but now demanded democratic control over modern sources of wealth and not a return to traditional cultural values (Ranger, 1977).

Ranger (1985) argues there were two-phases to this developed peasant consciousness. The first was a twofold ‘peasant option’ introduced by the colonialists: become forced labour, or effectively subsidize colonial oppression by growing crops for sale to metropole markets and subject to taxation. Opting against forced labour, most adopted the second option which necessitated several survival options: residency relocation, adoption of commercial crops, innovative labour divisions, and the use of new technologies. A second phase to peasant consciousness formation occurred in the 1930s-40s when sharecropper and tenant peasants on white farms were forced onto already overcrowded African reserves. Faced with extinction as a class, the peasantry developed a radical consciousness but were disconnected from broader social movements and resorted to sporadic boycotts and general ‘everyday-form of peasant resistance’ tactics until the nationalist struggle emerged.

From the outset, the 1980 ZANU government formation was viewed as a coercive party and violence continued until it absorbed ZAPU in 1988, becoming ZANU-PF (Kriger, 1992:30). Some scholars saw peasant disdain of ZANU as extending towards a ‘state’ in general, depicting the state as a modernist intruder (Drinkwater, 1991; Munro, 1995), but this view fails to acknowledge the modernist-structural peasant consciousness that emerged on the one hand, and the role of traditional chieftains in state-formation on the other (Alexander, 2006). Elite ‘embourgeoisment’ of the government led to the
embrace of neoliberalism in the late 1980s/early 1990s which combined with a slow pace of land redistribution would lead to several ZANU-PF polling defeats and a political and economic crises later in the decade (Saul, 2005:137; Dashwood, 2000:189; Lee and Colvard, 2003).

Issues revolving around land use and allocation have been a central theme of peasant political protest. On the eve of independence, ZANU leaders compromised with white settlers and agreed to a market-based redistribution scheme but peasant protest forced further agrarian reform and a 1997 break from neoliberalism by listing of 1,471 farms for expropriation (Moyo and Yeros, 2007). Saul (2005) considers this ‘fast-track’ land reform a ZANU-PF attempt to maintain power while disorganizing the landless peasantry who played an important role in their electoral defeats. The result has been what Moyo and Yeros (2007) consider to be an ‘interrupted revolution’ yet to be completed.

Not all of the attempted ‘second phase’ to liberation movements have been successful however, including the one in Congo-Kinshasa which sprang out with disaffection of political leaders who adopted extravagant lifestyles upon independence and failed to improve living conditions for the masses. A rising sentiment that "independence was meaningless without a better standard of living, greater civil liberties, and the promise of a better life for their children" (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987:92) provided the impetus for action, but the absence of revolutionary intellectuals, preparation, and internal ethnic divisionism within ranks led to a defeat against US-Belgium backed neocolonial forces comprised of white mercenaries, metropolitan troops, and anti-Castro

11 Formerly Zaire and present day Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
12 Save for a few, including Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara for a period.
Cubans organized by the CIA (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987).

There are exceptions to the norm of political ‘embourgeoisment’ and ‘false decolonization’ that must also be considered, including Mozambique and Tanzania. Tanzania’s pursuit of more structural transformations is often attributed to President Nyerere’s leadership which formed a strong link with peasants and workers and encouraged active engagement and anti-racialist populism (Saul, 1973c; see numerous speeches by Nyerere, 1968). In Mozambique, racial politics plagued Frelimo at the beginning, but as an exiled force it had to acquire a deeper political programme to gain peasant support as it shifted operations across tribal territories. Mozambique’s ‘second phase’ was actually a neo-colonial counter-revolution led by Renamo backed by neighbouring white-minority governments and notoriously using violent recruitment tactics to oppose the socialist Frelimo government (Saul, 1973b, 1979; Siebert, 2003). As noted above however, these were exceptions and the general norm of state formation after independence can be characterised as a centralized neo-colonial state structure from which the peasantry were politically marginalized.

The rise of peasant movements in other continents has led to a renewed interest in the potential of peasant organizations to effect change. However, studies tend to neglect organizations not preoccupied with market-based development projects – effectively ignoring organizations with a class-informed identity (Moyo, 2002). The former, dominated by wealthy males, actively promote a bifurcated state system by exchanging

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13 Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, or in English the Liberation Front of Mozambique.
14 Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, or in English the Mozambican National Resistance.
15 The concept of a ‘bifurcated’ state is quite similar to indirect rule and Mamdani’s (1997) idea of ‘decentralized despotism’ wherein urban citizenry rights are not expanded to rural spaces, leaving peasants under the rule of undemocratic traditional or customary authorities. The circumstance Moyo is referring to does not necessarily require the rule of traditional or customary authorities, but rather may be disguised by decentralized democratic processes dominated by rural elites, who then effectively endorse a clandestine
rural political leverage for materials and services from the central state (Moyo, 2002). Moyo’s suggestion that peasant organizations infused with class consciousness are actively opposing neoliberalism but are simply not being studied is questioned by Bernstein however (2005), who instead argues that intergenerational and gender conflicts are more prevalent symptoms of failed agrarian development.

It is true that fully fledged mass-based revolutions such as those attempted in present day Congo – and which Moyo seems to suggest are being reformed – are also exceptional, but this does not mean peasant politics is limited to the ‘everyday forms’ of hidden resistance. Rather, Seddon and Zeilig (2005) argue that nationalist struggles of the early national development era of class struggle and protest has been restructured by globalization. They contend that in the late 1970s and 1980s popular forces protested neoliberal reforms more than the legitimacy of the institutions behind such reforms, but go on to argue that protests began to involve “greater political orchestration” in the late 1980s and 1990s and aimed themselves at governments as much as specific policies – demanding greater democracy. Their article compares protest occurrence figures from the 1980s to the early 1990s to suggest that thirty-five undemocratic regimes met their demise as a result of either massive protest or directly through the (re)introduction of elections in the early 1990s.\(^{16}\) Keep in mind; these protests are coincided with a rise in development discourse fixated on ‘good’ governance.

Such occurrences add weight to the view that innate peasant passivity is an outdated characterization. To placate the state and bourgeois classes as similarly passive

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16 In the 1980s they calculate an average of twenty annual major political protests on the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, this number increased to 86 major movements in 1991 alone (Seddon and Zeilig, 2005).
when faced with a peasantry exerting its class power is likewise flawed. Driven by rural resistance, the general trend of African states has been to grant limited democratic reforms at the local level through the creation of new institutions with the rhetoric of decentralization and participation as a means to empowerment, while in actuality further concentrating political power at the top in an attempt to muzzle dissenting voices (Mamdani, 1997:214); therein suggesting that participation may be considered as a tool in a larger struggle for social control. This argument provides the link between the two seemingly disparate bodies of literature of concern; that is, one concerning itself with the state-class nexus and theories of peasant struggle, and the other concerning itself with the neoliberal project of participation.

To summarize, the literature reviewed shows that the infusion of capitalist structures and social relations have further economically differentiated the peasantry, forcing poor peasants to enter unequal socio-economic relations with dominant rural classes within their locality – not merely forcing peasantry writ large to enter unequal socio-economic relations with outside actors. Political compulsion has further differentiated the peasantry, and has facilitated the disappearance of an autonomous peasantry. Peasants, however, have been able to shed their politically passive image and have struggled to induce social change by resisting dominant class attempts to exert social control. Though dominant classes and political elites have tried to divide the peasantry along ethnic lines, appeal to populist sentiments and present an imagery of a peasantry demanding traditional/customary social renewal, many peasantries have demonstrated a power to induce more structural social change through democratic and economic gains. These gains have been limited, and somewhat reversible, because
political elites have responded by granting local democratic concessions while struggling to maintain political centrality and social control, which has been suggested to have the intent of placating the peasantry while confining the political role of poor peasants.

The World Bank and the Politics of ‘Good’ Governance Discourse

‘Participation’ as a concept has long been associated with social movements, but it is an ambiguous term that has also been utilized "as a means of maintaining rule, for neutralizing political opposition and for taxing the poorest" (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). At the end of the last section it was suggested that the concession of democratic decentralization in response to peasant protest was a means for political elites to obscure a highly centralized power structure while placating dissent with a degraded version of empowerment through local level participation. The next sections of this literature review will closely examine how this participatory framework has developed in the ‘good’ governance framework. Beforehand, though, the relationship between power and development discourse, policy and practice must be considered to understand how popular challenges to hegemony can be manipulated to justify and obscure continued elite dominance and undermine socially transformative emancipation.

Dominant classes shape political discourse to legitimize and ‘naturalize’ their rule over subjects; dominant discourse, by way of ideological hegemony, co-opts as many oppositional discourses as it can (Moore, 1995). The discursive framing of democracy, and its subsidiary buzzwords such as participation and empowerment, has been (re)shaped to legitimize political dominance through the lens of ‘good’ governance. Thus, while democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa is conventionally explained solely as the result of domestic actors drawing inspiration from international examples, Abrahamson
(2000) argues this narrative is used to downstage globalized political interconnectedness (i.e., international pressure and political dependency) thereby dismissing the role of discourse in preserving Western/Northern hegemony. Mainstream discourse has long articulated an undeveloped South in need of Northern intervention so as to (re)model the South as mirrored to the North (Abrahamson, 2000); though framed as a reversal of this long established trend, the ‘good’ governance agenda and its discursive use of democratization, empowerment and participation continue the pattern.

The interrelation of international bourgeois interests and development knowledge necessitate that discourse be understood in relation to extra-discursive factors. For example, and pertinent here, early modernization theories held liberal democracy to be nearly inevitable once ‘traditional’ societies reached a certain degree of ‘modernity’. As the Cold War intensified and political freedom in developing countries was (re)imagined as a potential communist breeding ground, democratic desirability waned in modernization discourse and political order and stability were prioritized, consistent with international bourgeois interests (Abrahamsen, 2000:26-27)17

Hastened by the demise of the Keynesian consensus in the 1970s and the ascent of neoliberalism in the 1980s development discourse took another decidedly anti-democratic turn and gave way to monetarism. Political participation was regarded as insignificant or potentially detrimental to economic adjustment (Abrahamsen, 2000:29-30). As the communist model of development collapsed in 1989, the World Bank reversed the anti-democratic trend in discourse with its 1989 report, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, by (re)introducing governance as a primary concern

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17 See Almond and Coleman, 1960, as an example of the former; Huntington, 1968; and Coleman, 1965, are examples of the latter.
and suggesting the need for better, yet less, governance in Africa. However, as Moore’s (1995) critical analysis informs us, this report promotes a discourse consistent with international bourgeois interests. It assumes poverty to be a factor of unutilized productive forces capable of being released not by (re)distributing resources but by deregulating resource access. Therefore, popular participation in designing development programs became a requirement to strip domestic elites of regulatory and policy functions, thereby creating an environment considered to be conducive to unrestricted productivity. The state’s resources, now supposedly freed from domestic elites, were to be made available in the market, where all people are assumed to have equal access. Since states are considered incapable of creating such a market, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) would perform this role; but for Moore, this is a mere recalibration of colonialism hidden in the rhetorical devices of ‘democracy’. The World Bank urged bilateral donors and other agencies to follow suit and support governments undertaking such reforms, thereby allowing neoliberal democracy, considered to be ‘good’ governance, to become a pre-condition of aid (Abrahamson, 2000).

Given that the Cold War influenced discourse, it should not be surprising that its conclusion would likewise do so. While they were once somewhat politically important, African states became neither politically or economically important following the Cold War, and the ‘good’ governance agenda became what Abrahamsen (2000:36) describes as a “morally comfortable” way for Northern countries to justify Africa’s miniscule share in global resources and subsequent poverty. In academic circles, the end of the Cold War legitimized the emergence of post-Marxist and post-modernist approaches accused of breeding apoliticism and negating emancipation as an end, effectively allowing ‘critical’
It should not be lost that this triumphalism is particularly erroneous given that it came on the heels of several capitalist development failures, most notably structural adjustment. Given such failures, 'good' governance discourse served not only to alienate the African state from society and delegitimize state-led development, but also to de-link the agenda from previous development failures (Abrahamsen, 2000:49).

Shivji (1991b:255) warned twenty years ago that the distinction between 'popular' and 'liberal' democracy would become blurred in discourse with the disappearance of imperialism, class struggle, and class-state relations from the lexicon of academia. Without this distinction, Shivji cautions:

"we are likely to get a celebration of the liberal triumph; jump indiscriminately on compradorial (for that is what liberalism degenerates into in most of our imperialist-dominated countries) bandwagons and confuse the long human struggle for democracy (equality) with its particular historical form - western liberalism (individualism)" (see also Saul, 1997a, 1997b).

Indeed, mainstream discourse presents democracy as an unchallenged and unproblematic, universally agreed upon concept (Moore, 1995; Abrahamsen, 2000:67) that has estranged scholars to embrace the 'good' governance agenda (Mohan, 1994; Mohan and Stokke, 2000).

Capitalist triumphalism reigned supreme in academia as alternatives were labeled as non-credible. Capitalism and bourgeois democracies were widely accepted as the only viable options (Abrahamsen, 2000:34). It should not be lost that this triumphalism is particularly erroneous given that it came on the heels of several capitalist development failures, most notably structural adjustment. Given such failures, 'good' governance discourse served not only to alienate the African state from society and delegitimize state-led development, but also to de-link the agenda from previous development failures (Abrahamsen, 2000:49).

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18 It must be noted, however, that some were criticizing a movement in social theory away from class analytics and towards an assumption of an 'end in ideology' as far back as the mid-1960s (see Westergaard, 1972).
19 Fukuyama's (1989, 1992) 'end of history' thesis provides a good example of this assumption.
20 Mohan (1994) also examined the relationship between power and knowledge and found that the Bank creates a consensus to justify neoliberalism by establishing research agendas and then basing their 'policy discourse on this self-funded and 'objective' research.'
21 Mafeje's (2002) premonition has come true, as liberal democratic openings in Africa have degenerated into one-party dictatorships shrouded in the veneer of Western bureaucratic procedures.
itself from socio-economic equality objectives. Abrahamsen (2000) argues that
democracy is framed in ‘good’ governance discourse in a way that presents it as
distinctive from the state’s socio-economic roles – thereby obscuring the distinction
between democracy and neoliberalism itself. The detachment of democratic functions
from any economic role\textsuperscript{22} indirectly reaffirms \textit{a-priori} social structures; i.e. current
discourse promotes a conceptualization of democracy that indirectly promotes elite
privilege even though popular demands for democratization in Africa are rooted in
economic grievances.\textsuperscript{23} By not considering the role of imperialism and class struggle, the
current debate on African democracy no longer has to concern itself with debates on
political-economic alternatives, meaning it no longer has to conceptualize democracy as
“the route to any kind of genuine empowerment” (Saul, 2005:61). Ergo, it becomes
possible to allow participation in democratic procedures without concern that political-
economic dominance will be threatened. Indeed, as Schmitz (1995) noticed, “[w]hat is
remarkable about much of the fashionable discourses on ‘participatory development’ are
the extent to which they evade the actual relations of power which keep people poor and
disempowered.”

Originally restricted by bourgeois social thought to those possessing ‘reason’ and
‘rationality’ – thereby excluding peasants, women, the proletariat, and other socially
marginalized groups – democracy has since been extended as a universal right as such
groups struggled for participatory inclusion. Yet, the wider democratic rights have spread
the shallower these rights have become (Amin, 2001). As democratic procedures at the
national level have been reduced to the selection from a pool of elites to manage a

\textsuperscript{22} Or as Amin (2001) would argue, the separation of political and economic domains.
\textsuperscript{23} As discussed in the first section of the previous section of this chapter.
predetermined economic system, ‘good’ governance discourse has opted to emphasize local level participation (Mohan, 1994). The narrative produces an imagery wherein local communities are now ‘empowered’ to participate in local poverty reduction strategies, but empowerment to participate in broader strategy formation – i.e. addressing the international political economy of poverty – is absent from consideration of what it means to be ‘empowered’.

Participation, as a component of democracy, likewise has a long history of debate and contestation. There is no definitive origin to the debate on participation in the public realm as current discourse offers a reinterpretation and co-optation of an old concept. One could likely find remnants of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in contemporary discourse on participation. In the realm of political science one could just as easily begin with Rousseau’s 1762 treatise *The Social Contract* which argues that participation is not merely an adjunct to institutional arrangements but the basis of popular sovereignty which requires political equality; or one could start from Schumpeter’s (1943:258-61, 270) more recent rejection of participation in any meaningful role, instead arguing that it is necessary only in the minimal sense necessary to sustain electoral mechanisms and suggesting that the masses are not rational enough play a greater political role. In development discourse, however, one tends to begin discussions on participation as if Friere’s 1970 *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* was the first to make mention of it, even though Friere’s conceptualization of participation has been extensively co-opted.

Friere stressed repeatedly that true emancipation cannot come by chance or from bourgeois benevolence, but that it can only come from the praxis of the poor. This praxis, the combination of theory and practice, requires the oppressed to critically understand the
nature of their oppression, for “[t]he conviction of the oppressed that they must fight for their liberation is not a gift bestowed by the revolutionary leadership, but the result of their own conscientization [the building of social consciousness]” (Friere, 1993:49, emphasis in original). Only after this process, Friere (1993:51) asserted, will “the presence of the oppressed in the struggle for their liberation be what it should be: not pseudo-participation, but committed involvement.” While supporting participatory governance, Friere considered its arrival to depend on the mobilization of peasant and proletariat classes in conflict against authoritative political and economic structures (Thomas, 1999). However, similar to concepts of democracy, participation has been subject to a discursive re framing that permits its manipulation by powerful actors to strip its meaning and practice of any threat to hegemony.

The World Bank’s usage of the term demonstrates the extent to which ‘participation’ has been d estranged from its Frierian conceptualization. In the forward to the Bank’s (1996) Participation Sourcebook, then new World Bank President James Wolfensen calls participation the Bank’s new “way of doing business;” a model wherein ‘sponsors’ (domestic governments) and ‘designers’ (the Bank’s task manager) collaborate with ‘stakeholders’ (the participants) to develop project strategies and tactics. The term ‘stakeholder’ is preferred to the more exclusive ‘participant’, because the Bank is including not just the poor and disadvantaged under this rubric but also NGOs, the private sector, and even the Bank’s own staff and shareholders. Furthermore, participation in development projects is habitually relegated to phases that continue to allow non-participants to identify what development ‘needs’ are to be targeted; meaning non-participants effectively decide what objectives people are to be ‘empowered’ to
participate in.

**Participation by Project Phase:****

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<th>Project Phase</th>
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(Extracted from World Bank, 2001)

With mounting self-collected evidence suggesting that weaker social groups were often excluded from project-based participation, the Bank became more focused not on correcting this but rather concentrating on what it refers to as ‘citizen participation’ to promote broader inclusion, which entails political decentralization and participatory local governance (Pozzoni and Kumar, 2005). Although World Bank analysts Pozzoni and Kumar (2005) acknowledge “that weaker groups are likely to exert only minimal influence, if at all, on the decision-making process” in both project and citizen based participation, the latter is still considered better at including groups hitherto excluded on grounds of gender, caste, and race. That class does not appear on this list is not a mistake or an assumption that weaker classes are not marginalized, but rather that participatory local governance is thought only to occur in classless societies. As Shah (1998), another Bank analyst, wrote: “[t]he success of decentralization as a tool for citizen participation, however, critically depends upon a class-less society.” Where what the Bank terms as ‘wealth heterogeneity’ does exist, nonetheless, elites are said to be better educated and are accordingly regarded as legitimate representatives of their communities, ergo “the issue should not be how to avoid elite domination, but how to ensure that the power and energy of the elites serves the interest of the poor” (Pozzoni and Kumar, 2005). Though the Bank acknowledges that elites may exist, and that these elites attain higher degrees of
wealth and education, there is no consideration as to whether such discrepancies are a result of class-based social divisions.

Bringing community level participatory process to the national level is considered to be of secondary importance (Blackburn et al, 2000) as states are regarded as too large to address ‘small things’ and too small to address ‘big things’ (Shah, 1998). Thus, it is seen as imperative that states decentralize responsibilities over non-descript ‘small things’ while allowing the World Bank Group to handle ‘big things’; because, in the Banks view, “the public sector is dysfunctional and does not deliver much in developing countries” (Shaw, 1998). Indeed, state governments are considered to be the biggest obstacle to participation and are accused of scepticism towards, and of rarely providing, long-term support to participatory processes (World Bank, 2001). State ‘ownership’ of participation is regarded to come only from sharing the significant costs of participatory processes, such as labour, materials, time and money, with local communities. The Bank’s conceptualization of participation, therefore, explicitly involves stripping the state of its political-economic roles and reassigning these roles to local elites and IFIs.

Far from challenging oppressive social structures, participation now – as conducted through the neoliberal ‘good’ governance project – serves to reinforce elite dominance. The co-optation of Frierian participation as a concept has been made possible through participatory methodological mainstreaming – which have risen to replace more conventional political processes – that have shifted the intent of participation away from challenging oppressive social structures.

Generally regarded as the first methodology to be inspired directly by Friere, Participatory Action Research (PAR) used the ideas of critical reflection, dialogue and
participatory research to build social awareness and confidence among oppressed peoples with the aim of empowering action and social change (McIntyre, 2008). According to Chambers (1992, 1994, 1997), however, this emphasis on empowering the poor to take political action against established interests limited the spread of PAR. Therefore, Chambers engineered a shift in participatory approaches away from challenging broader social structures by reducing participation to a project-level focus. Abandoning social change through political action as the impetus of participation allowed Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) to become the most widely used method of participation in the international development industry (Blackburn et al, 2000) – a framework self-acknowledged to be influenced more by the discursive language of PAR rather than its methods (Chambers, 1992, 1994, 2008). Indeed, in its approach to project-oriented development, PRA is more influenced by the non-participatory Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA).

Chambers claims that to reduce poverty the basis of knowledge itself needs to be tackled, and not the basis of political-economic structures. As will be demonstrated, however, by assuming that the rise of participatory approaches represents a paradigmatic shift in development theory and practice, proponents of the participatory methods Chambers popularized fail to account for the political use of the very alternative knowledge system they endorse.

Chambers (1983) accuses modern scientific knowledge of ignoring the organic and oft superior knowledge of rural peoples, and therefore “[w]hatever is important to the

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24 The core principles of RRA include triangulation, exploratory and highly interactive research, rapid and progressive learning, substantial use of indigenous knowledge, interdisciplinary and team approaches, as well as a flexibility and use of ‘conscious’ knowledge (Grandstaff et al, 1987; Gibbs, 1987). RRA’s approaches to agroecosystem analysis, applied anthropology, and field research on farming systems have
poor tends to be neglected by the non-poor” (Chambers, 1988:2). As a result of spatial, project and personal, seasonal, diplomatic, and professional biases, Chambers (1983, 1987, 1992, 1994, 1997, 2008) argues that rural poverty remains effectively unobserved by conventional research methods. Given that “professionalism creates and sustains its own reality” (Chambers, 1997:33), it is the development professional (ranging from foreign radical activists in remote villages to the President of the World Bank) that need to change their knowledge system. Power is considered a disability in terms of knowledge in the development industry, as it leads to self-deception. Chambers (1997) reasons that powerful actors impose their oft erroneous knowledge systems, and in so doing, learning is impeded by denial of – and distance from – realities, a pattern of victim blaming, and personal dominance. Hence, PRA is introduced as a means to correct the broken knowledge system by allowing the poor to share and analyze their own reality.

Instead of transforming or challenging broader socio-economic structures, then, participation needs to open space to bring the poor into policy formation processes. This space is thought to be opened by conducting Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPA) alongside conventional World Bank poverty assessments – space ostensibly opened because previous poverty measures were considered faulty without the participation of the poor in the research process (Holland and Blackburn, 1998). In 1992 the World Bank indicated they would begin using PPAs, which rely on either PRA or non-participatory RRA methods. Analytically, PPAs are focused on household consumption and income data – not structural causes of poverty – and are performed by social scientists hired by the World Bank. That the “[o]bjectives, methodology, and research agenda are established by the task manager [Bank staffer] with the social scientist, and institutions strongly influences the methods of PRA (Chambers, 1992, 1997, 2008).
and researchers within the country are identified [by the Bank] for potential collaboration” (Holland and Blackburn, 1998:3) is not seen as problematic, because again, the problem of poverty has shifted from structural causal factors to lack of adequate knowledge. The only power imbalance recognized is that the aggregation of results and relevancy of findings on policy is determined “outside the control of local participants” (Norton, 1998:180). That the World Bank establishes the research objectives – which noticeably concentrate on purchasing power – is not problematized. As for the actual influence of participatory processes on policy, the Bank claims it is difficult to ascertain and suggests that instances of low policy impact can be explained by ‘host’ governments not placing a high priority on poverty reduction, or on “a lack of trust between the government and the World Bank” (Robb, 1998:135).

The fact that it is up to dominant classes to ‘empower’ the rural poor – as only the upper classes have the necessary power and resources to do so (Chambers, 1983) – is not considered a logical contradiction, as “[a]ltruism is a fact of human behavior, and can be chosen” (Chambers, 1997:13). Thus, for Chambers (2008:180), the only factor that limits the potential of participatory methodologies includes institutional and socialized biases towards didactic teaching methods in universities and powerful institutions; a lack of suitable facilitators; and a vulnerability to project funding withdrawals. A more plausible limitation of Chambers’ reconceptualization of participation is that it reinterprets the concept away from a means of challenging powerful actors and structures so as to change them and alter the balance of power, towards ‘participation’ as an improved research process by which those powerful actors are better able to implement their development agenda.
PRSPs and Participation

In December of 1999 the World Bank Group announced that it had approved the implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as a new framework for the delivery of aid and reduction of poverty. The move was touted as a significant departure from previously dictated policies for its 'participatory' components (Cheru, 2006). PRSPs have since become the central vehicle for delivering aid from the Bank and IMF and it is expected that other donor agencies (bilateral and multilateral) will follow suit (Lazarus, 2008). Initially, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) were required to sign a PRSP as a condition for debt reduction, but the program has since expanded to non-HIPCs with over seventy signatories, many now producing second generation papers. Participation, conveyed by the Bank to be an integral feature of PRSPs, is considered to be a means of national dialogue wherein “stakeholders influence and share control over priority setting, policy making, resource allocation, and/or project implementation (World Bank, 2007). While some applaud the engagement of civil society in policy debates, the renewed focus on poverty, and the “harmonisation of donor alignments” (Driscoll and Evans, 2005), others are not appeased. The common concerns of PRSP opponents are threefold: one, macroeconomic policies remain non-negotiable in that they must continue to be neoliberal in character; two, the depth of participation is shallow and breadth narrowly focused, with an over-emphasis on the ‘process’ rather than the ‘principle’ of participation; and three, national ownership and authorship is dubious as “negotiations over key concessional loans remain the private domain” (Lazarus, 2008).

The mainstream response has been technocratic and dismissive of the limitations
of the newly conceptualized participation, while presenting shallow prescriptions to improve only the process and not utility of participation. The weakness of the participatory process is attributed to the inexperience of stakeholders and a lack of resources and skill to actively engage in (Driscoll and Evans, 2005). Driscoll and Evans (2005) blame sector ministers in host-governments for limiting participatory processes for fear of losing control, and then contradict themselves by claiming participatory processes in host-countries fail due to institutional weakness. In the African context, Hanley (2002) contends one should not be surprised at the weakness of participatory processes in that governments need longer time-frames to acclimatize to the paradigmatic shift due to the poor state of social sciences on the continent. Perhaps taking note of this type of argument, the World Bank (2002b) has only conceded that compromised participatory processes result from overly-ambitious timelines for completion. To improve participatory processes, the Bank (2000, 2002a) argues it is necessary to institutionalize participation via participatory local governance; even going so far as to suggest that participatory local governance can serve as a substitute for dysfunctional parliaments.

Such responses to the failures of PRSPs have been criticized for several reasons: first, the democratic deficiencies of participatory processes, such as persistent social exclusion and non-representative use of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), are overlooked; secondly, it is overly simplistic to assume an externally imposed alternative can successfully replace internal, ‘dysfunctional’ institutions; and thirdly, the mainstream responses ignore empirical evidence that suggests the formal institutionalization of participatory processes embodied in the PRSP formula is insignificant “where the rule of
law is often subordinate to the logic of informal institutions” (Lazarus, 2008). In short, mainstream responses to the emerging criticisms of PRSPs are technocratic, shallow, and dismissive.

Despite these shortcomings, many have attempted to salvage the project by offering reforms. Ideas offered by reformists often centre around the apparent neglect of domestic political considerations. It is argued that a divide has been created between the conventional representative process and the consultative process of PRSPs. At the national level, parliaments and other elected politicians have been excluded (Cheru, 2006). At the local level, government units are not utilized in the process – despite Bank championing of local governments. Rather, separate forums are created, producing “a quagmire in not using formal institutions because they do not function properly, but then subsequently undermining their development by sidestepping them” (Whitfield, 2005).

Piron and Evans (2004) assert that political processes are ignored in host countries; most observably the electoral cycles in many recipient countries impede either the formulation or implementation of PRSP processes. Reformers tend to assume that the political implications of PRSPs are not discussed in the technocratic circles of the World Bank (Piron and Evans, 2004; see also Morrison and Singer, 2007). A more critical perspective, such as that taken in this thesis, would not assume the sidestepping of existing political processes to be accidental. It is possible to assert that the supposed consultation processes required by PRSPs brings in selective elements of ‘civil society’ rather than the elected political power brokers who already have mechanisms in place to perform such processes, represents an attempt by the Bank to create another political process/structure that does not reflect any real kind of democratic political power base
that can then be more easily manipulated. Rather, for those seeking to salvage PRSPs, the disappointed and repetitive policies brought forth are reduced to a problem of participatory processes. It is argued that the different purposes meant to be fulfilled by participation compromise its influence, and that those who wield elected power merely refuse to ‘buy-in’ (Booth, 2005; Booth et al, 2006).

Various critical, Marxist, and neo-Marxist perspectives, in contrast, argue that the World Bank’s previous efforts to enforce neoliberalism have been thwarted by social factors below the state – i.e. peasant resistance – and driven by such an understanding, accuses the Bank of trying to circumvent the state. The participatory process thus becomes a tool to manufacture consent by transforming the domestic objectives of a variety of actors to allow the Bank and IMF to maintain traditional lending patterns while publicly positioning themselves away from the immensely unpopular era of structural adjustment (Fraser, 2005; Whitfield, 2005; Dijkstra, 2005). Participation in the PRSP process is recognized as a technology of social control to suppress protest and absorb counter-hegemonic ideas and energies through lengthy processes and false democratic promises, thereby diminishing the potential of radical transformation (Ruckert, 2007; Lazarus, 2008; Craig and Porter, 2006; Fraser, 2005; Dijkstra, 2005). The assertion that counter-hegemonic groups are being absorbed and neutralized by PRSP processes can be questioned, however, because groups missing from the PRSP process include not only elected officials, but also trade unions, small rural and local NGOs with close connections to poor peasants, feminist organizations, and other marginalized civil society groups (Stewart and Wang, 2003). As such, it is the professionalized middle class in client countries that dominate the ‘civil society’ elements invited to participation in the
PRSP process; the middle class is reported to have established themselves in national-level CSOs to partake in such processes not to represent the poor per se, but to access funding (Gould, 2005; Dijsktra, 2005). This is not to suggest that ‘good’ governance participation lacks an element of social control, but rather that counter-hegemonic energy has not absorbed and neutralized by the PRSP process itself. As will be demonstrated in the conclusion of this thesis, theoretically developed in the literature review, brought forth in the thesis statement and demonstrated in chapter three, attempts to achieve social control is part of the ‘good’ government framework of participation as a whole.

The technocratic façade of participation abets global capital by undermining domestic accountability and weakening formal elected legislatures and national governments (Dijkstra, 2005; Whitfield, 2005; Morrison and Singer, 2007). As Dijkstra explains:

“[a]s long as one talks about ‘participation’ by ‘civil society’, it is not necessary to define or formalise the actual influence of this participation process, which means that donors can insert their priorities into the strategy. As soon as parliaments are involved, donor influence may be curtailed” (Dijkstra, 2005).

Thus, ‘ownership’ of the PRSP process cannot possibly rest with host-countries, which is further compounded by the fact that the boards of the World Bank and IMF ultimately have power to reject or endorse any PRSP (Kamruzzaman, 2009). We thus witness democratically elected representatives being largely shutout of perhaps the most important ‘domestic’ development strategy of their respective countries. Therefore, while supposedly strengthening democracy, what we see in ‘good’ governance defined participation is what appears to be the replacement of domestic bourgeois (liberal) democracy with an international bourgeois dictatorship.
Participation as Tyranny

The use of buzzwords such as ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’, and ‘poverty reduction’ frame development objectives as an apparent ideological confluence of no-nonsense pragmatism and unimpeachable moral authority. In truth, “the terms we use are never neutral” (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). Participation has been divorced from its Frierian meaning of a tool for the oppressed to transform social relation and “has been translated into a managerial exercise based on ‘toolboxes’ and procedures” (Cleaver, 2001). The term is popular among governments and IFIs because it remains attractive as a populist slogan but is no longer a threat to established interests (Rahnema, 1995).

Local government units are not only highly susceptible to elite capture, as indicated above, but can also be used to exert social control at a more local level (Jütting et al, 2005; Robinson, 2003; Veltmeyer, 2007). While there is no systematic evidence that decentralization leads to poverty reduction, there is evidence that it acts as a conduit for dispersing the burden of social programming costs from central governments onto localities, thereby allowing capital to reap the benefits of participation while minimizing its costs (Robinson, 2003; Mosse, 2001). Unable to afford such programming, local governments depend on NGOs, who – disconnected from their radical origins and insensitive to power relations – have become a ‘Trojan horse’ for global neoliberalism through their use as ‘apolitical’ participatory project facilitators (Wallace, 2004). Project oriented participation has itself been reduced to a technicality. The degree of participation in the most significant component in planning processes – that of establishing objectives – is open to interpretation, allowing it to become a tool in the political arena of powerful actors (Christoplos, 1995; White, 1996; Ye Jingzhong, 2008; Rahnema, 1995).
Participation has been relegated to the design or implementation of pre-established objectives,\textsuperscript{25} meaning it would be more accurately regarded as the pseudo-participation Friere warned of.

The idea that participation celebrates the rise of local knowledge is a dubious juxtaposition. While Chambers claims that participation corrects the knowledge imbalance in development practice by replacing institutional with local knowledge, local power dynamics which privilege the use of elite knowledge are ignored (Kothari, 2001; Mosse, 2001). Communities\textsuperscript{26} are presented as homogenous entities, which corresponds to an imagery of identical needs and interests (Bhattacharyya, 2007), allowing wealthy elites to theoretically represent the interests of the poor. Communities, however, are not homogenous entities and structural impediments prevent certain groups from ‘participating’ relative to others. Thus “power is involved in the construction of interests themselves” (White, 1996; see also Kwok-Fu Wong, 2003). Variables such as age, gender, religion and ethnicity, as well as socio-economic structures such as class, can limit one’s ability to participate in the project related meetings or local governance units that generate ‘community’ knowledge.

Roughly one decade ago Cooke and Kothari (2001) posed the question: “Participation: the new Tyranny?” Through discursive manipulation ‘participation’, in a rather Orwellian sense, has come to mean the opposite of its traditional connotation. The traditional usage of participation as a means of transforming social structures is symbolized more by the popular demands peasants have made for the democratic right to change socio-economic structures, than the tyrannical model of ‘democracy’ the ‘good’

\textsuperscript{25}See table extracted from World Bank (2001) on page 32.
\textsuperscript{26}Even the term ‘community’ has some limitations and problems associated with a failure to comprehend
governance agenda now enforces. The 'good' governance agenda reinforces a priori structures by detaching democracy from the socio-economic realm and truncating its capacity to debate alternative models of development. Through participation, an attempt has been made to create alternative political processes that exclude democratically elected representatives and replace them with a restrictive use of elite-saturated civil society agents and local governments. Far from being empowered, the participatory governance framework shuts the rural poor out of national, and local, development policy dialogues – leaving them no democratic body whose power has not been stripped away by 'good' governance. With this in mind, it must be seriously considered whether participation is a tool of international and domestic bourgeois struggle to socially control the poor peasantry; in other words, the question of whether participation is the new tyranny must be answered.

**Thesis Statement**

As a reminder, the central question guiding this thesis asks: what is the nature of the relationship between 'good' governance defined participation and the struggle for social control in Uganda? The hypothesis strongly argues that the neoliberal inspired 'good' governance model of participation in Uganda reinforces the dominant position of elite classes, domestic and international, over poor peasants. It is argued that participation as conducted under the rubric provided by the 'good' governance agenda in Uganda, under the current regime and World Bank influenced period, is a form of tyranny rather than a means of socially transformative empowerment.

The participatory model of governance deployed in Uganda has created an alternative political process outside conventional political modalities that possesses the social differentiation.
discursive lure of democracy but shuts the poor peasantry out of development policy dialogue. Locally, poor peasants are ill-represented in government units, which are instead dominated by local elites. The local government units, nonetheless, are themselves shutout of development policy circles and are used as a means of localizing social control to re-enforce externally designed agendas while forcefully extracting taxes and abetting exploitative economic relations. Unable to finance the social programs which have been decentralized, local government units depend on Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) which are selectively chosen to participate in policy formation in a manner which excludes the poor and those with non-conforming perspectives, thereby circumventing conventional political processes and excluding elected politicians. The circumvention of conventional political processes has permitted the establishment of an obscured international bourgeois dictatorship shrouded with the veneer of democratic populism, which reinforces the domestic dominance of elite classes over poor peasants in Uganda.

As a class, poor peasants in Uganda have historically not been granted the same citizenry rights of more elite classes, and have been subject to political and economic dominance. However, the poor peasantry is not devoid of political power. It has the ability, and has demonstrated this ability, to shape the very social structures that confine them by struggling for land and democratic rights during colonialism and by restructuring village social relations during the ‘Bush War’ which brought the current regime to power, thereby challenging elite class dominance and resisting control. Political elites in Uganda, supported by the neoliberal ‘good’ governance agenda, have responded by making limited local democratic concessions, such as elected local councils, while maintaining
political centrality and policy processes dominated by an international bourgeoisie by way of World Bank influence.

The introduction of participatory governance structures in Uganda denies the social basis of class and assumes uniform economic interests, and can therefore only be deemed successful by likewise denying the social basis of class. Effectively depoliticized by discourse manipulation, participation today represents a false, ostensibly apolitical, regime of empowerment. This can be observed in Uganda’s new governance model. In many ways, it has been designed to mute and neutralize the power of poor peasants, not to empower them. Participation in Uganda has been a top-down response to bottom-up insurrection, and has been used to entrench elite dominance while obscuring it with the creation of institutions that appear participatory and empowering in rhetoric only.

**Methodology**

Several data sets are needed to support this thesis statement. These data sets can be divided into historical information and information concerning the usage of participation in the current ‘good’ governance model deployed in Uganda, from the mid-to-late 1990s to the present. Historical information is needed on the nature of social relations in colonial and post-colonial Uganda with specific reference to modalities of social control over poor peasants; this includes the nature of political compulsion, socio-economic differentiation, and peasant subjugation to local class dominance. We are also looking for occurrences of peasant resistance to social control, and how peasants have been able to challenge social contradictions and shape the very structures that confine them. Furthermore, we need to know how political elites have historically responded to the challenge posed by peasants to social control. Concerning the current era, we need to
know the nature of participation in national electoral mechanisms and we need to know what space, if any, is available for poor peasants to participate in national and local policy dialogue; the modalities of alternative political processes created by the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) and ‘good’ governance restructuring; the role of local government within the ‘good’ governance model of participation; and lastly, we need to know the role of civil society plays within the ‘good’ governance framework of participation. In regards to the PEAP, local governments, and civil society, we need to know the nature of participation within their roles and how this impacts the struggle for social control, and we know the effects of this participation on the poor peasantry.

A qualitative methodology will be used to perform this research and analyze the materials. According to Newman (2006:149), in its emphasis on developing insights qualitative research concerns itself with the incalculable texture and richness of raw data; or as Berg (2004) alludes to, the “essence and ambiance” of concepts, definitions, characterizations, et cetera. As part of a qualitative methodology, this project has employed the use of a case study, which may be defined as an “in-depth multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon” (Orun et al, 1991:2), which in this case is ‘participation’. Sjoberg et al (1991:50) assert that only in-depth case studies can examine both the truly powerful and truly disadvantaged, as required by this study; non-case study approaches, in particular social scientists who attempt to deploy natural science methods such as social surveys (claiming then to make accurate broad generalizations that would supersede case studies) miss the very powerful and very marginalized. Wright’s Classes (1985), for example, though a self-proclaimed Marxian study, missed the most economically and politically powerful as well as the
homeless and many of those living in ghettos (Sjoberg et al, 1991).

Uganda presents us with a particularly useful case study of participation as part of the 'good' governance agenda. Uganda’s political-economic history closely resembles patterns consistent with the general Sub-Sahara African experience. It was the first PRSP signatory in 2000, and its PEAP (1997) and implementation of participation are considered to be a model for other countries. By virtue of such status, there are many reports and studies on the patterns of 'good' governance participation, the impact its had on the poor peasantry, and relationship between poor peasants and domestic elites in Uganda, which can be used in this study. These studies, however, tend to look at one particular feature of participation, such as local government units, civil society organizations, or Uganda’s PEAP. Many studies, therefore, miss the complex relations between the different facets of institutionalized participation and the patterns that become evident when examining the interconnections between these features, thereby leaving a knowledge gap which this study seeks to fill.

The collection of materials was drawn primarily from reputable academic journals (such as The Journal of Peasant Studies, Review of African Political Economy, World Development, et cetera), University Press publications, and highly regarded publishers (such as MacMillan Press, Zed Books, and Fountain Publishers in Kampala), Ugandan government documents, civil society reports, or online publications (World Bank documents, and in some instances, newspapers). One brief trip to Kampala (for the month of June, 2010) was undertaken for the purpose of collecting written reports, government and CSO documents, academic conference proceedings, and occasional papers from the Centre for Basic Research. This trip also allowed for meetings with Ugandan academics
to present ideas and arguments, and informal conversations with students and Kampalans with peasant families about rural political life, to get a feeling for the political climate ahead of the 2011 general elections, and to seek autonomous peasant organizations or movements engaging in politics (a quest which, for the most part, failed).

To interpret data, this project uses a Marxian interpretative paradigm, which like feminist, ethnic and cultural studies, privileges a materialist-realist ontology which considers material differences between groups to be affected by social relations, and therefore “[e]mpirical materials and theoretical arguments are evaluated in terms of their emancipatory implications” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998:27-8). Marx’s central scientific goals were to provide an empirical understanding of market-based economic institutions, the social implications of these institutions, and to shed light on the historical processes that have given rise to these institutions in capitalist settings (Little, 1986). Though Marx’s methodological approach included issues of class, struggle, and labour power as agents of history shaping base and superstructure, there is no monolithic Marxist methodological technique. Nonetheless, Marxist studies always use an approach which is materialist (i.e., not subjective), refers to class struggle, and is dialectical. For this study, such an approach implies that peasants, and bourgeois classes, are acting on the basis of material interests and not cultural biases. It also implies a dialectical relationship between classes, wherein contradictions are continually challenged and new social orders are continually being shaped through class struggle. With that said, this study will pay particular attention to how social contradictions and class struggle have shaped ‘participation’, and in turn, will examine how ‘participation’ itself breeds social contradictions.
Since Marx, Marxist methodologies have been divided by “an epistemology that embraces its own historicity and one that claims to portray a reality outside itself” (MacKinnon, 1982). In the former stream, all thought is considered ideological (i.e., based on class interests) and is well represented by Lukacs (1971:47) who considered the project of research to be the creation of “a theory of theory and a consciousness of consciousness.” In the second realm, reality is distinct from theory and ideology (see Poulantzas, 1978:14); as Althusser (1979:170) warned, “‘pure’ science only exists on condition that it continually frees itself from ideology which occupies it.” However, by the 1960s Colleti (1972) had noticed Marxism as a social study method was becoming increasingly divorced from its revolutionary value. By 1978, Marxists (or those claiming to be Marxists) were further divided by the rise of Analytical Marxism, which rejected what had been hitherto agreed upon across Marxist lines; that is, a difference between Marxist methods and ‘bourgeois’ social science (Bertram, 2008). Analytical Marxism “has recommended that Marxian theory should conform to ‘normal’ scientific methods,” (Philp and Young, 2002), which principally amounts to according importance to individuals within both explanatory and normative theories (Wright, 1994:181). It considers Marxism to be burdened by methodological approaches that undermine its contributory and explanatory potential in mainstream social science. It remains Marxist, according to Wright (1994:192), in that it continues to work on the theoretical tradition established by Marx, its theoretical and empirical questions are rooted in Marxist discourse and themes, it uses Marxist language and terminology, and maintains a

27 When appropriate, Marxist studies would also refer to the ‘labour theory of value’.
28 The publication of Cohen’s Karl Marx’s Theory: A Defence to be exact.
29 Indeed, Vaillancourt’s (1986) analysis of Marxist methods concluded that only those who accept general empiricism (systemic inquiry as knowledge creation) and reject crude empiricism (the rejection of solely
normative commitment to human dignity, freedom, and equality.

Nonetheless, Analytical Marxism has been accused of being ‘anti-Marxist’ (see Lebowitz, 2009; Bertram, 2008). Most concerning is its methodological commitment to atomistic individualism, which opposes structuralist explanations and views social institutions and practices as explicable on their own outside broader social relations, thereby ignoring that individual interests and behaviours are defined by social relations (Bertam, 2008:113; Lebowitz, 2009:42). In regards to this thesis, the institution(s) of participation itself is benign; it is only when we examine participatory institutions (for example, local governments) in relation to how they are used in broader social relations of class struggle, that we begin to develop a deeper understanding of the ‘essence’ of participation. And, on an individual basis, the levers of participation are technically open to all – it is only when the experience of participation is differentiated on the basis of social groupings do we begin to reveal patterns of social contradictions, as an individual’s experience of participation is largely prefigured by their social grouping(s). Whereas a feminist approach would analyse the social relations of participation on the basis of gender, the Marxist inspired approach employed here analyzes the social patterns of participation on the basis of class. This means we need to examine how participatory structures have been shaped by class struggle, and how particular classes are then able to use participatory institutions in struggle against other classes.

Lebowitz (2009:70-2) argues that from reading Capital one understands “the necessity of science begins from the understanding that there is an enormous gap between personally experienced knowledge) produce defensible research as it represents the adoption of other social science methods.
appearances and essence.”\textsuperscript{30} This suggests “that scientific truth ... is not attainable through induction and empiricism” (Lebowitz, 2009:72). That does not mean empirical evidence has no role, but that it performs only a partial role in creating scientific knowledge. As Lenin (1963) argued, provided the initial observations are true, moving from the concrete to the abstract bring scientific inquiry closer to the truth, not further from it. Thus, from the concrete (observed) abstract concepts must be developed, and then used to return to the concrete (understood) (Lebowitz, 2009:77). Marx’s analytical project as a whole then, is to first observe the concrete; second, to develop abstract thoughts regarding the ‘essence’ of observations; third, to test and reshape the conceptualized essence in relation to appearance until unity is reached; and lastly, to reconcile the derived at concept of reality with objective reality, i.e., the concrete (Marx, 1973:100-1, 1877:102; Lebowitz, 2009:75).

Lastly, there are some incompatibilities between Marxism, as a critical social science, and conventional social science; principally, the understanding that science is never value-neutral, that it must be grounded in the pursuit of emancipation, and “that social scientists are participants in the socio-historical development of human action and understanding” (Comstack, 1982:377; see also Saul 2006). This thesis has no pretensions of being socially neutral; the decision to uncover a particular truth is not a neutral decision for Marxist researchers (Saul, 2006).

\textsuperscript{30} For example, it appears that the sun and other planets orbit the Earth, but in essence, Earth orbits the Sun. A scientific explanation not preoccupied solely with appearances is required to establish the essence. A social example would be that in capitalist economies, one particular firm may lower its prices and increase its market share relative to other firms selling the same product. This gives the appearance that lowered prices necessarily increase market share. However, if all firms similarly lowered their prices, market share would not increase and profit margins would fall; ergo, the ‘tendency of the rate of profit to fall’.
Chapter Two: The History of Social Control and Resistance in Uganda

This thesis argues that the 'good' governance model of participation in Uganda has reinforced the dominant position of elite classes over poor peasants. In so doing, it thesis takes a dialectical materialist perspective of class struggle between poor peasants and more dominant classes. It argues that peasants have been historically subjugated to the social control of more dominant classes, and that peasants have challenged this social contradiction by resisting elements of social control. Dominant classes, however, are also not without political power, and have attempted to ameliorate resistance. As poor peasants struggle with dominant classes, new social structures are created. In an attempt to stymie bottom-up challenges, dominant classes use their power to shape emerging social structures in a manner that allows them to retain elements of social control over lower classes. To examine the 'good' governance framework of participation, then, without first examining the social struggles that have shaped it, would miss important facets of our understanding. Dominant classes, represented principally by the World Bank, attempt to present 'good' governance and 'participation' a-historically, as if it were their unsolicited gift to the poor. Rather, taking a dialectical materialist approach to history, we can understand that 'participation' is not a gift and that as the poor have struggled for participation dominant classes have only ceded a strictly controlled form of it.

As such, this Chapter serves as more than just an introduction to the case study; rather, important components of the overall argument will be established. The Chapter will examine how peasants were compelled in unequal social relations with exogenous and local dominant classes, and how the nature of social control has reinforced social
contradiction. That peasants, nonetheless, have demonstrated the ability to resist control, and have attempted to challenge social contradictions by shaping the very structures that confine them, in this case, by struggling for land and democratic rights, will also be illustrated. A trend will then begin to take shape wherein Uganda elites respond to peasant resistance by imposing renewed methods of social control by stropping democratic and economic rights that were gained. Lastly, peasants’ continued power to transform rural social relations will then be examined, which will bring us to the present era of ‘good’ governance. From studying Uganda’s political history of social struggle for control and resistance to control, we will build a deeper understanding of how ‘participation’ as defined by the ‘good’ governance framework is not a regime of empowerment, but conversely, an attempt to re-enforce elite social control.

Colonial Social Control and Resistance

While the slave trade first introduced the destructive elements of capitalist penetration in Uganda – stealing the most productive labourers with disastrous consequences to production and trade (Mamdani, 1976:19) – the year 1888 and the next quarter-century signify “its unification and its incorporation into the capitalist world system” (Jørgensen, 1981:33). Uganda’s geo-strategic importance on the source of the river Nile, Britain’s desire to expand trade between India and East Africa, and the need of British import-export companies already operating in the area for state cooperation in compelling peasants to abandon their consumptive needs, made Uganda a highly coveted territory for the British (Robinson et al, 1972:86; Barber, 2006; Jørgensen, 1981:40; Mamdani, 1976:40).

When the British arrived there were over forty distinct socio-political systems in
present-day Uganda. These systems varied between highly centralized kingdoms (most prominent were those of the Baganda, Banyoro, Batoro and Akole peoples) and decentralized structures, most prominent amongst which were the Basoga, Chiga, Iteso, and Karamojong (Jørgenson, 1981; Kizza, 1999). The metropole secured the protectorate in a series of Agreements with pre-colonial ruling classes in exchange for establishing and protecting pseudo-feudal aristocracies (Mugaju, 2000:13), and utilized the Buganda political systems and its military power to conquer its neighbours (Kizza, 1999:68).

With its centralized and authoritarian pre-colonial government, military levies, and centralized tax collection and currency, the agreement with the Buganda government proved the most important and allowed Uganda to expand to its current border by absorbing Buganda’s neighbours, and for the British to open the protectorate for market expansion and labour (Richards, 1973). Nonetheless, several changes were made to the Bagandan social system, under the assumption it was feudal, seeking to formalize elements of property, feudal ranks and privilege. The Lukiiko (Buganda’s parliament) was formalized, the tenure of senior chiefs stabilized, and freehold land was established via the ‘mailo’ tenure system. The latter arrangements would become a prime source of conflict as the previously divided economic and political powers of chiefs were

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31 The 1900 Buganda Agreement, the 1900 Toro Agreement, and the 1901 Ankole Agreement represent a formal alliance between domestic elites and the imperialists. Religious factionalism proved the catalyst for conquest of Uganda for the British, indirectly through Buganda. French and British Christian missionaries arrived in 1877 and provoked a series of religious wars which bitterly divided Baganda elites across Catholic and Protestant lines. The Kabaka (King) Mwanga – who was aggressively anti-sectarian – was expelled in 1888 only to regain the throne in 1890 as power ebbed and flowed between the Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims. He led an unsuccessful anti-British campaign and was again expelled in 1899, forcing his successor to forge an alliance with the British to ascend to power (Kizza, 1999; Fortt, 1973:66; Mugaju, 2000:13).

32 The repercussions of the ‘mailo’ land tenure system are no infamous in Uganda. The intent was to divide just over 9,000 square miles among 1,000 individuals to ensure the development of large and viable plantations, however, within two decades more than 4,000 had a share of the land; nullifying the plantation economy and simultaneously inducing widespread contempt among peasants who did not get a share (Fortt, 1973:70).
harmonized, creating a contentious feudal class (Apter, 1967).

According to Mafeje (1973b) there were two classes below the Kabaka (or King) prior to the British: the chiefs, charged with accumulating capital through taxation and raising armies, and the mass of peasants who paid tribute and supplied forced labour. The system was not feudal however, in that chiefhood was appointed and peasants had free mobility. The 1900 Buganda Agreement represented the chiefs' consolidation as a class; through negotiation they gained a degree of independence from the Kabaka with the protection of their estates and hereditary rank stability. This allowed the newly created feudal and once productive chief class to become parasitically engaged in rentiership with peasants (Mafeje, 1973b:8). While a feudal class was indeed created, Mafeje's analysis misses one important caveat: the role of Bataka (clan heads and elders). Chiefs were actually separated into two categories in pre-colonial Buganda; those who were politically appointed representatives of the Kabaka, and the Bataka who mediated land disputes. Prior to the Agreement, the chiefs, now given control over the means of production, had only a form of political role which was entirely dependent on the Kabaka, but by absorbing the economic role of the Bataka, these chiefs became a powerful and independent class. The Bataka, meanwhile, ceased to have official authority in the protectorate government (Apter, 1967:113), but as will be shown, went on to lead peasant resistance to new forms of social control. From a peasant perspective, where they once had separate political and economic bodies they could play off against each other or bring disputes to, they now had one body that controlled them both politically and economically with no official means of challenging those in power.

With these new power imbalances in mind, the main priority of the British
controlled protectorate administration was to introduce cash crops as part of a strategy to make the protectorate self-sustaining and eventually profitable (Bunker, 1981). Plantations of coffee and cotton were immediately introduced in Buganda which heavily depended on the state and the Director of Agriculture to create a labour pool through forced labour, the creation of migrant labour teams, and by divorcing peasants from land, as production became subordinated "to the accumulation needs of British capital" (Mamdani, 1976:4). The British did not introduce trade, but manipulated it. For example, the Langi tribe already grew sesame as a market crop to sell to neighbours, but this activity was disrupted in favour of British controlled plantations – a disruption linked to 10,000 deaths caused by famine in Busoga in 1908 (Tosh, 1978). Indeed, overall trade actually declined as production was subordinated to the needs of the metropole economy, meaning crops Uganda did not have a comparative advantage in (such as coffee and cotton) replaced indigenous industries (Mamdani, 1976:48).

Buganda remained relatively autonomous through this initial period beginning in 1990, but faced with a failed plantation economy in 1919 the British exerted more control and announced a policy of 'benign' paternalism to developed Uganda as a peasant cash crop economy – meaning the expansion of plantations ceased and peasants outside of Buganda were allowed to retain customary land access but compelled to produce cash crops (Apter, 1967:161; Mugaju, 2000:13). Blamed for waning production due to property neglect, the feudal chiefs fell out of favour with the administration (Mafeje, 1973b). A dual economy was created in Buganda wherein indigenous peasants would engage in mixed subsistence and market production on land owned by chiefs, while migrant labourers worked on coffee or cotton plantations (Apter, 1967:55). To enforce
cash crop production elsewhere, the protectorate government built up communication infrastructure and roads to strengthen its grip on power to compel peasants into market production and exchanges (usually through taxation), and enticed non-Baganda chiefs to cooperate by offering land (and protection of land) and lower-level administrative positions (Mugaju, 2000:13). Peasant protests, which will be discussed in more detail shortly, fuelled further economic reforms through the Busulu and Envuju Law of 1929, which introduced rent controls and stripped chiefs of eviction powers. However, peasants were still not permitted to sell their plots and a fixed tax was concurrently introduced in lieu of forced labour (Apter, 1967:190; Fortt, 1973:70-2; Mamdani, 1987b:80).

An entirely European Uganda Legislative Council was introduced in 1920 to bring the government into closer consultation with business interests; one representative of the business community and one from the planters and ginners were included among the seven appointees (Apter, 1967:162). With a series of peasant protests between 1945 and 1949 limited democratic reforms were introduced with elected seats added to the Legislative Council in 1948, and an entirely elected council in 1952, as part of an attempt to produce a western style bourgeois democracy (Mugaju, 2000:15; Mamdani, 1997:201). With independence looming, multipartyism appeared inevitable and the British began to "nurture moderate political parties as a belated fallback position to contain and neutralize African radicalism" (Mugaju, 2000:15). The Uganda National Congress (UNC) was the first to be formed (1952), and soon gave way to the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), the Democratic Party (DP), and the Kabaka Yekka (King Only, KY). The UNC pressed for immediate independence irrespective of democratic institutions; the UPC espoused an anti-Buganda platform; the DP strove to oppose Protestant hegemony and repel
socialism; and the KY were neo-traditionalists opposed to multipartyism (Jørgensen, 1981:198; Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:99; and Mugaju, 2000:17). None of these parties struggled for popular democracy but rather political control, and the 1961 elections which paved the way towards independence were widely considered fraudulent (Mugaju, 2000:18).

As the changing institutional structures of social control indicate, the imposition of far-reaching political and economic changes during the protectorate period was met with fierce resistance from peasants; meaning Ugandan peasants must be understood to possess political power capable of challenging and shaping social structures. Peasant movements during Uganda’s colonial history will be discussed chronologically, beginning with the Nyabingi movement, the cooperative movement, and movements in colonial Buganda.

While England, Germany and Belgium were engaged in a struggle over control of the 2,045 square miles that to make up Kigezi, local peasants formed and sustained a resistance for roughly the first quarter of the twentieth century. Nyabinga itself is a religion, but its revolutionary and ideological tracts concentrating on anti-imperialism, land, and emancipation suggest that the religious component was a fading medium for peasant resistance against an imperialist enemy whose first agents were missionaries (see Rutandwa, 1993). The movement was materially motivated, and the absence of an organized political structure of elite dominance denied the British their usual means of social control. The immediacy of response and its ability to sustain itself as a cross-border and cross-tribal insurgency against three colonial powers for roughly twenty-five years distinguishes the Nyabingi movement not only in Uganda but in all of colonial
Africa (Hopkins, 1970:258). The insurgency intensified in 1914 when World War One led colonial states to intensify extraction, spurring the amalgamation of guerrilla forces across the three colonies (Rutandwa, 1993:247). Led by bagirwa33, over 1000 peasants participated either in the guerrilla force or through material contributions. There was a distinctive class element to the conflict; it was not only a resistance against an alien intruder but aimed to remove ruling classes in areas with functioning political entities and targeted privileged society members in areas without (Rutandwa, 1993:269). Though gaining some successes in terms of language rights, tax and forced labour relief, and the replacement of Baganda agents of the protectorate with locals, the movement was eventually defeated militarily in 1928 (Rutandwa, 1993:169).

The spirit of resistance was not as fierce elsewhere in Uganda, where the British could exert indirect control through the allegiance of local chiefs and beneficiaries of British imperialism. This is not to say social control was universally successful in ameliorating peasant political power. Indeed, the longest running peasant-based movement in Ugandan history – the marketing cooperative movement – saw its heyday throughout much of the South and East. Led by militant nationalists and failed Baganda landowners, peasants and workers were organized into cooperatives and trades unions in a struggle against the monopolistic control over cotton marketing and ginning by Indian merchants (Richards, 1973:87; Ebong-Opyene, 1993:44). The cooperatives and unions demanded the right to organize along with higher wages and prices for cotton and coffee, and used strikes, boycotts, and mass demonstrations to achieve these goals. Their

33 An oracular priestess and the personification of the Nyambingi spirit; in singular known as mugirwa. Generally, they were healers, but become community leaders in times of armed conflict. As the armed conflict intensified some Abagirwa (male priests) would take up Nyambingi’s personification (Rutandwa, 1993; Hopkins, 1970).
growing power and a series of riots pushed the protectorate government to pass the Cooperatives Societies Ordinance in 1946, ostensibly to allow cooperatives to be registered, to aid in their organization, and to allow Africans to enter cotton ginning. In actuality, the Ordinance was used to divide, tame, and steer the cooperatives away from a mass-based peasant organization and towards a more capitalist, non-political, and profit-making approach (Ebong-Opyene, 1993:44; Mamdani, 1983; Brett, 1970:110; Richards, 1973:87). The cooperatives soon transitioned from a popular vehicle of dissent to an undemocratic, exploitative, and oppressive institution used as part of the ruling class’ arsenal to “legitimize its rule, solidify its economic base, and ultimately consolidate its hold on state power” (Ddungo, 1994). This marked “the beginning of the hijacking of the autonomous peasant organization (Ebong-Opyene, 1993:44), a trend which is repeated or mimicked during the current era of participatory governance via the cooptation of resistance councils and the establishing of state-directed Farmers Associations.

Nonetheless, the time frame of Bunker’s (1987) analysis of the Bugisu Cooperative Union (BCU) takes place after this co-optation. Led by wealthy sons of lower level chiefs, the BCU’s goal was to achieve some degree of autonomy (political and economic) from the state while resisting exploitation and retaining some control over labour. Bunker (1987:60-77) was well aware that cooperative leaders had been co-opted previously, but suggested ‘ethnic pride’ superseded their materialist interests and argued that through the cooperative “peasants achieved and maintained considerable political power” (Bunker, 1987:3) as evident by the BCU emerging as the richest, strongest and most politically active cooperative after successfully struggling to control coffee marketing in 1954. Bunker’s analysis, however, is too assumptive in terms of the actual
nature of political power peasants achieved within the cooperative relative to cooperative leaders as its economic performance improved. Furthermore, the analysis can be criticized for its use of the flawed ‘exit-strategy’ theory as the basis of political power, its failure to consider the nature of BCU political activity relative to groups outside the co-opted cooperative movement, and failure to acknowledge that BCUs fixation on market share, economic prowess and wealth is consistent with the aims of capitalist cooptation; i.e., such tendencies do not equate to resistance, but rather compliance with capitalistic economic restructuring.

Returning the focus to Baganda once more, two types of nationalism emerged during colonialism which deeply affected the political climate, with consequences for the direction peasant political power took. The first type was internally directed, popular, and challenged local hierarchies established by the British (Apter, 1967:114). The main protagonists were the chiefs backed by British power and the Bataka, now stripped of its economic role and backed by the peasantry. The Bataka formed an association and allied with the peasantry in a common campaign against the now feudal chiefs, organizing a series of protests. The protectorate administration’s attempt to dampen the protests motivated the enactment of the aforementioned Busulu and Envuju Law of 1929 (Apter, 1967; Mamdani, 1987b:80; Mafeje, 1973b). After the cooperative movement was co-opted and effectively nullified, the peasant-Bataka alliance was reinvigorated and organized with the Taxi Drivers’ Association and the Uganda Farmers Association (consisting of both the Baganda poor peasantry and peasant immigrants from Ruanda-Urundi) a series of uprisings between 1945 and 1949 to demand democratic reforms. Those uprisings were somewhat successful in that they pressured the protectorate to

34 Especially considering that cooperatives had become anti-democratic and highly internally exploitative.
allow a limited number of elected seats in the Lukiiko (Apter, 1967:231-51; Mamdani, 1997:207-8; Mugaju, 2000:18). The alliance among Baganda and migrant poor peasants did not survive the top-down class alliance remobilization on the behest of the second type of nationalism prevalent in Buganda - parochial - in the face of colonial reforms during the 1950s and the process towards independence.

The 1950s may be referred to as the era of the ‘Closer Union’ crisis, in which all of Uganda’s tribes were brought into a legislative council not directly controlled by Buganda. While peasants still sought their material interests of land and political power, and still saw the Buganda government as contradicting their interests to serve the prerogatives of dominant indigenous classes, they lost the allegiance of the Bataka. The Bataka, who had now formed the Bataka Party, was lost to the elite-centric nationalism preoccupied with Baganda separatism and attempts to protect its sovereignty from other Ugandan tribes (Apter, 1967:181-257). The boycott of non-African traders and supplies in 1959 is most emblematic of parochial tactics, whose impacts were felt immediately and declared illegal but managed to last eight months. The boycott was organized by Buganda’s elite, who had created the Uganda Freedom Movement\textsuperscript{35} with the objective of achieving immediate Ugandan independence, to protect hereditary rulers, oppose minority rights of non-Africans, and to abolish the Wild Committee.\textsuperscript{36} Though it had considerable short-term impact, the boycott did little to change economic racialization and may have stalled the movement towards independence by drawing attention away from the established process publicly committed to by the protectorate government (Ghai, \textsuperscript{35} Itself decreed illegal by the protectorate and forced to recreate itself as the Uganda Freedom Convention, and then the Uganda League.\textsuperscript{36} Otherwise known as The Constitutional Committee and appointed in 1958. The Committee was tasked with mapping Uganda’s constitutional evolution towards independence. Supported by the UNC (later the
1970). The action also meant peasant interests gave way to intra-elite struggles across tribal factions as the prime central government concern.

**Post-Colonial Social Control and Resistance**

The DP may have initially won the 1961 election to determine who would take office once Uganda was granted independence in 1962, but it never assumed power. The conservative and separatist KY and the centralist and African socialist UPC cited common Protestantism as a reason to form a coalition and assume power (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:99). The KY-UPC coalition was based on compromises during the 1961-2 constitutional negotiations in London, which saw UPC leader Milton Obote become Prime Minister in return for a federalist state with strongly entrenched powers for Buganda and the Kabaka’s designation as head-of-state (Jørgensen, 1981:201). The alliance soon disintegrated. Disgruntled over a constitutional conflict about taxation rights, Kabaka Mutesa unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow Obote with the aid of army head Shabin Opolot in 1966 (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:99). Obote responded by replacing Opolot with Idi Amin, arresting five KY ministers, exiling the Mutesa and declaring a state of emergency which lasted until the Amin coup of 1971. The country deteriorated into a de-facto one-party state and military backing became more important than social support, which was waning - especially in the South (Jørgensen, 1981:255-303; Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:100; Brett, 1995; Mugaju, 2000:21).

Economically, the country was almost entirely agricultural at independence, and the three tiered ethnic hierarchy (Europeans at the top, following by Asians and Africans respectively) meant the very small bourgeois and proletarian classes were almost entirely...
non-African (Ramchandani, 1973; Wrigley, 1988). Class differentiation in rural areas was compounded by geographic disparities, with a firmly established landlord system in Buganda yielding large quantities of coffee on more fertile land, while northern peasants cultivated less profitable cotton on less productive land (O’Conner, 1988). Attempts at capitalist agrarian development decidedly failed by 1966 as world market prices disintegrated and exposed the country’s lack of technology. The Economic Planning Commission proposed a land reform that would see tenants given legal title, but this was rejected by the landlord dominated Lukiiko who saw it as an undesirable concession “to the [urban] bourgeois elite inside and outside Buganda” (Mafeje, 1973b:21).

Obote’s government devised a series of rapid industrialization plans, but economic conditions gradually worsened (Southhall, 1988). Agriculture was incorporated into the plans in 1967 by concentrated production and exports in marketing boards and the National Trading Corporation. Aiming to accrue rapid growth by meeting external needs, the plans “ignored the need for an integrated economy with independent sectors [and] … perpetuated Uganda’s subordinate role in the vertical international division of labour” (Jørgensen, 1981:214). With no “virile national bourgeoisie” with which to work, the government soon embarked on state capitalism (Mafeje, 1973b).

Obote’s Common Man’s Charter of 1969 was a definitive move towards total state control over economic activity; followed by the Nakivubo Pronouncements which nationalized all major enterprises, the Cooperatives Statute Act of 1970 which gave government discretionary powers over peasant cooperatives, and the Trade Unions Act which did the same for the proletariat (Bunker, 1981; Bigsten et al, 1999:11). Obote subsequently forcefully set about abolishing the land system in Buganda, claiming
landlords to be selfish and perpetuating feudalism. Nevertheless, land distribution remained grossly uneven, and the Common Man’s Charter made no mention of remedies for agrarian exploitation (Mafeje, 1973b:22). This Africa Socialist project was ostensibly meant to address dependency on foreign capital and markets through import substitution industrialization, and to address the basic needs of Ugandans, but failed to engender the support of peasants who were antagonized by the redistribution of surplus from rural areas to support urban industrialization to the point that urbanites were making five times the income of peasants by the time Obote was ousted in 1971 (Gershenberg, 1972; Scoville and Due, 1977). Mafeje (1973b:24) suggests Obote could not deal with agrarian reform more forcibly because “he represented a weak class economically, the politico-bureaucratic elite” (emphasis in original) which owned little land – the most productive economic asset.

With Obote out of the country Amin organized a military coup in January 1971 not only to seize power but also to forestall upcoming elections and an imminent arrest concerning his pattern of overspending and a murder accusation (Jørgensen, 1981:268). Backed externally by Britain and others seeking to reclaim alienated economic interests, Amin was also initially championed by domestic elites for the same reasons, and peasants from a broad range of ethnic groups who regarded Obote as a despot (Brett, 1995; Mamdani, 1983, 2002). Economically, Amin reversed all the African Socialist tenets: all previously nationalized firms were re-privatized, and along with businesses expropriated from expelled Asians, were divided amongst his bourgeois allies and military officers (Mamdani, 1983:39). The 1974 Land Reform Decree reinforced landlordism in Buganda by repealing the rent control law of 1929, and also repealed usufruct land rights
elsewhere, thereby opening the door for unfettered capitalist entry into the countryside (Mamdani, 1987a, 1987b). His popularity dissipated as a result of such counter-reforms, the brutality of his military dictatorship, and the chaos of public life (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:100).

With constant challenges to his power, Amin “took refuge in provoking external conflicts” (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:100); which eventually proved to be his undoing. A 1978 attack on Tanzania motivated its government to actively support Amin’s opponents by hosting the Moshi Conference, which served to unite more than twenty opposition groups and form the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF). Given the Amin regime’s clampdown on any internal opposition, and military spending in excess of forty per cent of Uganda’s total budget, it was assumed the degree of social control was so entrenched that any successful resistance effort must come externally (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:101, Nyeko, 1997). The resistance was successful, but its external origin embedded a disconnection between liberators and “the poor state in which the vast majority of Ugandan citizens then lived” (Nyeko, 1997).

The interim administration led by Yusuf Lule and Godfrey Binaisa tried to delay elections to allow time for internal movements to materialize, but were sacked by the Obote-supporter dominated UNLF, who then replaced the interim Presidents with their own appointee and immediately announced multi-party elections to take place at the end of 1980 (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:101). The party spectrum resembled that of the 1960s, involving the UPC and the DP along with a new Conservative Party (mainly Bagandans) and the Uganda People’s Movement (UPM) supported by well educated Banyoro. Again, Obote’s regime came to power after what many feel to be another
fraudulent election result, and the political atmosphere soon deteriorated into an armed resistance against Obote’s regime (Mamdani, 1988; Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:101; Mugaju, 2000:22). Three insurgent groups materialized, including the National Resistance Army (NRA), and Obote’s Presidency fell to a military coup for the second time, in July 1985. The new president, Tito Okello, offered to integrate the insurgent groups within his government, but Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) elected to keep fighting, and its military wing, the NRA, successfully seized Kampala in January 1986 (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:102).

While the Obote II regime abandoned its earlier African Socialist sympathies and instead embraced neoliberal conditionalities handed down by the IMF in exchange for structural adjustment loans, the NRM regime came to power with a wave of optimism concerning political and economic recovery and an unwillingness to abide by IMF and World Bank conditions (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:105; Bibangambah, 2001). Unable to raise the funds to repay previous loans, the regime soon gave into IMF pressure and accepted a ‘Economic Recovery Program’ emphasizing agrarian privatization and trade liberalization (World Bank, 1993:vii; United Nations, 2000:1; World Trade Organization, 1995:10; Bigsten et al, 1999; Bibangambah, 2001).

The arrival of the NRM to power brings us to the current era of struggle for social control, as influenced by the ‘good’ governance agenda, and the main temporal focus of this thesis, which will be critiqued in the next chapter. First, however, we must take account of peasant resistance during the post-independence and pre-NRM and ‘good’ governance period – one marked by highly oppressive and authoritarian governments which ultimately helped bring to power the current NRM government. Only two large-
scale peasant movements occurred in this period of intense control, but the movements themselves reached a new plateau of scope and intent, and therefore posed a greater challenge to hegemonic control.

Known for its brazen initiative of creating an alternative state structure autonomous from the central Ugandan government, the Rwenzururu Movement was Uganda’s first peasant movement to materialize in the post-independence era. The organized political action was a response to state organized oppression of the Baamba and Bakonzo tribes in the Toro Kingdom of western Uganda, a kingdom dominated by the Batoro after they agreed to mediate colonial interests in the 1900 Toro Agreement (Syahuka-Muhindo, 1994; Mamdani, 1997:197). Lead by local clan heads, Bakonzo peasants first unsuccessfully rebelled over tax, land alienation, labour, and tribute from 1919-1921 (Syahuka-Muhindo, 1994), but of particular concern here is the much longer and combined Baamba and Bakonzo movement from 1962 to 1982. Though led mostly by petty bourgeois forces, it was peasant grievances, solidarity, and shared identity developed during the constitutional process that forged a shared Baamba and Bakonzo movement in the Rwenzururu Mountains (Syahuka-Muhindo, 1994; Mamdani, 1997:197).

In the nascent stages of the movement the petty bourgeois leaders pursued legal tactics in the Ugandan legislature, but the imprisonment of their members radicalized the peasantry; while much of the petty bourgeois faction wanted to continue legislative manoeuvres and petitioning, the radicalized peasantry rallied behind a more militant

37 As it is commonly known.
38 Generally labeled as such for their ownership of small agricultural product marketing and retail enterprises, a higher degree of education, ‘professionalism’ and commercial connections outside the immediate locality.
leadership and armed struggle\(^{39}\) as the route towards emancipation. It was, however, the establishment of the Rwenzururu Kingdom Government (RKG) that made this movement particularly noteworthy. Initially, the RKG’s system of governent embraced grassroots popular democracy, complete with councils and committees linking villages and counties to the central RKG. Village chiefs were independently elected by the village, and higher chiefs and ministers were confirmed by an elected assembly (Mamdani, 1997:199; Syahuka-Muhindo, 1994:268-298). This structure proved an effective means of peasant mobilization and social reorganization, and for Mamdani (1997:198), represented a form of intra-tribal civil-war wherein peasant-ruling class relations were forcefully reorganized from the bottom-up to deconstruct patterns of social control.

Not everyone offers a glowing assessment, however. Syahuka-Muhindo (1994:273) argues that while early RKG leaders may have been drawn mostly from the poor peasantry, this is not because of institutional arrangements but due to petty bourgeois elements, seeking to identify with other Ugandan petty bourgeois elements, abandoning the movement.\(^{40}\) Also, forming the RKG so early proved costly as it eventually demobilized the peasantry, making the movement not only susceptible to defeat but also to internal power enclaves (Syahuka-Muhindo, 1994:273; see also Kasfir, 2008). With the peasantry largely demobilized, petty bourgeois factions slowly retook control and without a popularly organized leadership mechanism were able to seek more self-interested economic rather than broader political gains in a 1982 settlement with the Obote government (Syahuka-Muhindo, 1994:313).

\(^{39}\) Interestingly, the leadership adopted a no-gun policy with the logic that the use of guns would invite the central government to use excessive fire power to quash the movement at a time when it could not acquire adequate modern weaponry. For most of the armed conflict the peasant guerrilla force used traditional weaponry (Syahuka-Muhindo, 1994).
By the time the Rwenzururu movement came to its official conclusion another movement was already well underway, one that Mamdani (1997:187) considers "[t]he most serious attempt yet to dismantle the regime of indirect rule in the local state." This movement, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and its military wing the National Resistance Army (NRA), would go on to seize state power in 1986 and has continued to rule up to the time of this writing. While the two movements overlap, the link between them remains contested. Syahuka-Muhindo (1994) suggests the NRA contacted remnants of the Rwenzururu leadership in 1985, and that the remnants of the latter movement organized the transport of arms, and provided food and shelter. Feelings of 'tokenism' and betrayal among peasants over the 1982 settlement convinced some to attempt to revive the Rwenzururu movement with the aid of the NRM, but the relationship turned sour after the NRA/M took state power and sent troops to the Rwenzururu Mountains to root out any remnants of the movement, and refused to grant federal status (Syahuka-Muhindo, 1994). Others suggest the NRA/M’s leadership learned more from Frelimo during visits to its training camps, in particular concepts such as ‘popular justice’ (Baker, 2004). Museveni (1997:29) recalls his admiration for Frelimo’s Resistance Councils (RCs) and that insistence that emancipation was not simply a matter of Africanization. Thus, while there is no evidence of a direct linkage between the two Ugandan movements, Mamdani (1997:200) suggests the real linkage is in strategy and circumstance: both movements were compelled to create a state structure in guerrilla controlled areas that gave ‘checks and balances’ to the peasantry in order to marshal their

40 A precedent that would be followed in the Luwero Triangle during the ‘Bush War’ of the 1980s.
41 Frelimo is also known as the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique. Racial politics plagued Frelimo in the early stages, but as an exiled force it required a deeper political programme to gain mass peasant support as it shifted operations between tribal territories. Frelimo’s leadership is credited with developing
mobilization; an issue that will be returned to shortly with the discussion of Resistance Councils.

The NRA/M formed when Museveni’s Popular Resistance Army allied with Yusuf Lule’s Uganda Freedom Fighters in 1981, in response to what many regard as fraudulent post-Amin elections perpetrated by Obote’s UPC (Piron and Norton, 2004:4). Eventually, the NRA/M would complete the rare feat of seizing state power in Africa as an insurgent movement without external support (Ngoga, 1998; Kanyogonya, 2000). It would do so primarily via what is referred to as the ‘Bush War’ in the Luwero Triangle of Buganda, from where the movement also drew most of its participants.

The motivation behind participation for the Baganda peasantry remains debated. For Mamdani (1997:200) the NRA/M was tasked with recreating the social alliance between Baganda poor peasants and peasant immigrants that pre-existed Buganda’s parochial politics. To do so, the NRA/M had to redefine the basis of rights on the grounds of residence and away from the basis of descent; ergo, for Mamdani, it was necessary for the NRA/M to breed a class-identity among its potential participants. Given that the major internal contradiction was ethnic, with the majority of the participants being Baganda while the leaders were Banyankole-Bakiga (Museveni’s tribe), one can deduce that the NRA did indeed have to ameliorate any parochial political tendencies (Ngoga, 1998:100). Museveni’s (1997:48-141) writings seem to confirm this, as he recounts suppressing tribal sentiments among new recruits and insists they were successful in changing mentalities away from tribal leanings.

Kasfir (2005) disagrees, and stipulates that the NRA began their guerrilla war in peasant class-consciousness through protracted struggle (also repeated by the NRA/M) which necessitated continued peasant participation after their tribal territory had been liberated (Saul, 1973b, 1979).
Buganda precisely because peasants there considered the current government as their ethnic rival. Kasfir backs up this claim with interviews from several peasant participants who remember being persuaded to join the movement by ethno-centric promises, such as the restoration of the Kabaka position. Additionally, Kasfir argues that some of the early peasant support may merely have been out of self-interest, as NRA officers would pay for supplies and the peasants, due to the conditions of war and general economic chaos, had no other means of selling their crops. Lastly, Kasfir asserts that at least some of the peasant participation must have been coercive. Given the violence and imprisonment of NRA enemies that peasants bore witness to, it is likely that at least some of the peasants would have been intimidated (intentionally or not) into active participation if not passive compliance (see also Tideman, 1994). Nevertheless, Kasfir concedes, although peasants in the Luwero triangle never directly demanded the arrival of the NRA/M, their general reaction was positive, mostly due to the ability to participate in the democratic practices of the RCs.

The RCs were the first democratic institution to be created in Ugandan villages (Kasfir, 2005). The original committees, that would later form RCs, were at first dominated by relatively wealthy villagers who were becoming dictatorial over the peasantry. This negatively affected mobilization and the NRA officers stepped in to correct the contradiction (Tideman, 1994:85; Kasfir, 2005). In essence, the peasants exchanged their participation in the movement for political rights and democracy. RCs were used clandestinely in government controlled areas as well, and although these were largely undemocratic they were used for mobilization and intelligence gathering (Baker, 2004). Though at times the commitment to popular participatory democracy was
withdrawn under severe military pressure, for reasons of ideological conviction and
civilian dependence the NRA/M stands out for remaining committed to the practice of
participatory democracy though the course of its guerrilla war (Kasfir, 2005), during
which roughly 100,000 people lost their lives (Piron and Norton, 2004:4).

At his swearing-in address, Museveni described the NRA/M’s program as one of
democracy, security, ethnic unity, and antithetical to “a mere change of guard: it is a
fundamental change in the politics of our country” (Museveni, 2000:3-7). During the
‘Bush War’ the NRM secretariat released its Ten Point Program of issues they would
concentrate on after seizing power. In addition to the three just mentioned, this plan
focused on Ugandan independence, social services, pan-Africanism, anti-corruption,
internally displaced persons, and a mixed economy (Museveni, 1997:217; “The Ten-
Point Programme”). However, described as a Marxist-Leninist entering the guerrilla war,
Museveni, according to Mazrui (2000:131), contradicts the general trend and was
effectively de-radicalized by revolution, becoming “almost totally uncritical of Western
powers.” The political program implemented following the 1986 NRA/M victory will be
carefully scrutinized in the following chapter.

Conclusion

Uganda’s colonial history more or less fits the classic British model of indirect
rule through complicit local elites, who cooperated in subjugating Uganda’s economy to
metropole needs in exchange for expansion and protection of their exploitative
relationship with peasants. Peasants were strongly controlled in a bifurcated state system
where they had no democratic rights. Political and economic elites were consolidated into
one class; in Buganda, this class was positioned as landlords and controlled the Lukiiko.
Taxes, forced labour, the imposition of rent, and threats of land alienation compelled peasants to engage in unequal social relations with parasitic elites.

Nonetheless, peasants demonstrated a degree a political power and resistance that reflected their material interests to challenge not only colonial structures but local social contradictions. The Nyabinga movement resisted imperial intruders and local elites and were able to gain tax relief and relief from forced labour before suffering military defeat. Later, and elsewhere, the cooperative movement challenged economic dominance through strikes, boycotts and mass demonstrations, achieving the right to exist before colonial elites co-opted it. In Buganda, peasants were able to achieve limited economic gains in the Busulu and Envuju Law of 1929, and later were able to achieve limited political gains in a partially elected Lukiiko, through mass protests and uprisings. Peasants were able to successfully struggle for limited gains, such as rent controls, but failed to overturn or fundamentally transform broader structural mechanisms of social control and class dominance.

The political arena was largely turned into a power struggle for control between petit-bourgeois factions divided along ethnic and religious lines, leading up to and after independence. It was not until his control as president began to wane did Obote begin to challenge exploitative class relations in rural areas, but from the peasant perspective, his first term in office largely saw their surplus product appropriated and accumulated in urban areas in favour of urban industrialization, from which they never had the chance to benefit. From a control aspect, peasants, along with urban workers, saw the basic right to vote erode. Amin continued the dictatorial tactics, and led one of the most controlling and tyrannical regimes the world has seen in recent history. He also overturned the limited
economic gains peasants struggled for during the colonial era. The reign of terror did not end with his presidency.

Through the intense period of struggle over post-colonial social control, the ability to form any peasant movement was severely constrained. Nonetheless, peasants in the Rwenzururu movement were able to establish an alternative state. By doing so, they challenged and overturned basic structures of rural social control, and formed a grassroots popular democracy – albeit one that eventually collapsed. Peasants in the Luwero triangle also challenged rural political and economic contradictions by forming Resistance Councils. Their struggle eventually succeeded, took state power, and expanded throughout the country. It was peasants who resisted social control, established a popular and grassroots form of democracy, and challenged rural class oppression and economic structures. As we will see in the next chapter, the ‘good’ governance framework of participation attempts to reverse this trend, not expand on it.
Chapter Three: Uganda’s Model of ‘Good’ Governance Participation

The previous chapter illustrated the struggle over social control in colonial and the early post-colonial (1962-1986) Uganda. Political restructuring in favour of democratic reforms and greater participation has been established not as a gift bestowed by dominant actors, but a response to peasant resistance to social control. This Chapter, then, will discuss the latest articulation of the struggle over social control in rural Uganda, as shaped by the language of ‘good’ governance and participation, within a World Bank driven model of development.

Before examining the model of ‘good’ governance participation deployed in Uganda, the NRM regime’s relationship with poor peasants must be explored. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, peasant participation in the ‘Bush War’ helped bring the NRM to power, and the NRM in turn provided a means – through resistance councils – by which the poor peasantry could challenge social contradictions in the countryside, particularly through addressing land issues and popular control of local governance. Therefore, it must first be demonstrated that the NRM no longer represents the peasantry in challenging social control, but rather, now embodies such control. As such, the first section of this Chapter will consider the NRM’s struggle for social control, and its attempt to legitimize itself and Museveni’s now twenty-five year presidency as democratic and popularly representative.

After this discussion, the institutional structure, functions, and social composition of Uganda’s ‘good’ governance model of participation will be analyzed. Three main institutions or actors have been identified as central to this model: the PRSP and its host government department, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development.
(MFPED); Local Councils; and Civil Society. The analysis of each is divided into three parts: first, a brief introduction to its position or role within the broader ‘good’ governance model of participation in Uganda; second, the nature of participation and its elements of social control found within each unit; and third, a description of the tyrannical use of power that shapes each unit and its impact on the poor peasantry.

The NRM and the Struggle for Social Control

Upon taking power the NRM insisted it was to be an interim government, and that it would allow the formation of a democratically elected government after drafting a new Constitution. Four years later, however, Museveni (2000:44-8) used war in the north, external threats to security, and declining prices on exports as justification to extend the interim period – giving no definitive end date. When the constitution was enacted in 1995, nine years after taking power, it was made clear that the NRM was no longer intending to be an interim government – symbolically represented by changing its name to simply the ‘Movement’ and reintroducing itself as Uganda’s system of government.

The Constitution was derived from the Odoki Commission that solicited views from around the country on governance issues and the role of different bodies (the judiciary, legislature, and executive). The Constitutional Assembly (CA) followed to draft the new Constitution reflecting its conclusion that the populace retains the right to democratically select a new political system, but that the Movement system would remain in control until such a time; however, most CA members were NRM supporters, according to Barya (2000). It was determined that such a referendum would be held in 2000 to approve the Constitution, and select Uganda’s system of governance. While Bazaara (2003b:11) claims that both NRM critics and supporters agree the drafting
process “was the most participatory in the history of Uganda,” Furley (2000) provides a contradictory analysis. According to Furley, while the constitutional commission held consultations throughout the country, the general complaint was that the agenda and discussions were controlled by the commissioners; rumours of fraudulence and a pre-drafted Constitution spread rapidly. In the end, the commission produced no answers to important questions on multipartyism, federalism, and traditional monarchies, instead referring these matters back to the NRM. It must also be noted that while the CA was technically popularly elected, Furley (2000) contends unlimited campaign spending and sizeable bribery meant wealth, or the support of the wealthy, was a prerequisite for inclusion.

A no-party movement system was thus extended indefinitely, with Museveni entrenched as President. The system must be differentiated from multipartyism, one-party states, and military dictatorships: it is justified as a fully inclusive system wherein all citizens are considered members of the Movement with merit-based elections and no organized political opposition (Piron and Norton, 2004:7). Olaka-Onyango (2000a:44) traces the history of Movement-democracy in Uganda and has aptly divided it in the following phases: 1986-9, a transitional phase as the Movement attempted to embrace a broad-based government and coalitional parties; 1989-1992/3, when the Movement entered a phase of permanence and exclusionism while moving towards banning oppositional parties; 1993-5, when the Movement consolidated undemocratic gains through the constitutional process; post-1995, when the Movement trekked its way to the creation of a de facto one-party state which culminated in a 1998 Movement National Conference where it established the Politburo and National Political Commissar Office
staffed by Movement directorate; and finally the 2000 referendum to anoint the Movement as the lone-Ugandan party by suppressing organized opposition.

Over the years there have been several justifications for this system, which include: a conflictual history blamed on political parties; a need for an extended period of reconciliation and consensus-building after a prolonged period of violence; that consensus-building reflects true ‘African values’; that political parties are based on class divisions, whereas Uganda is peasant based and therefore devoid of class divisions; that without classes, political parties breed sectarianism; that a no-party Movement system guarantees national unity; that the system is most likely to bring about equitable distribution of resources and development; that this development will eventually give rise to social classes which at some point could support multipartyism; and finally, that Ugandans have demonstrated overwhelming democratic support for the system in the 2000 referendum (Piron and Norton, 2004:7-8; Kasfir, 2004; Museveni, 1997:195-7).

Two issues among these justifications must be dealt with, one being that of class, the other being popular support. In regards to class, Museveni is overtly contradictory. In his 1997 book Museveni (1997:27) criticizes Nyerere’s *ujamma* plan as a primitive communalism which did not recognize the existence of pre-colonial classes and exploitation in rural Africa. Later in the same book, Museveni (1997:195) dismisses multipartyism in Uganda on the basis of one peasant class. However, as Kasfir emphatically states, and as discussed in the previous chapter:

“[i]t is necessary to put on blinders to ignore the class divisions in Ugandan society. To an important degree, sectarian conflicts in Ugandan society rest on class differences. If the presence of class cleavages provides the basic justification for parties, Uganda is ready for a multiparty political system” (2007:70).
According to the latest census, 87.6 per cent of Ugandans reside in rural areas, with 77 per cent of the working population active in agricultural labour (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2002). These findings are often used to dismiss the presence of class divisions in Uganda, and posit that the country’s populace is comprised of one class, an undifferentiated peasantry. However, using the data in the Appendix and further analyzing the means of production among the peasantry, and peasant relationships to the means of production, class stratification among the peasantry emerges. One can see that a minority of rich peasants have access to 43 times more (and better) land than poor peasants, own ten times more value in labour implements (such as hoes and other tools) and can afford to apply substantially more agricultural inputs such as fertilizer. Rich peasants are able to perform more labour on their own land, and hire ten times more labour than poor peasants. Furthermore, rich peasants are more likely to live farther away from farms and participate in non-agricultural labour. Though poor peasants produce substantially more foodstuffs per acre, by virtue of land size, rich peasants are nonetheless able to produce roughly five times more agricultural output. In between these two classes sit middle peasants. Roughly equal to poor peasants in terms of population, middle peasants have access to more means of production, hire more labour and perform more non-agricultural labour, and produce more agricultural outputs than poor peasants.

What this information tells us is that Uganda is far from having one peasant class. References to an undifferentiated peasantry and an absence of class cleavages, therefore, has been falsely used by those with central state power to shape an imagery of a Ugandan polity with uniform socio-economic interests, and to legitimize the closure of official political competition and class representation as democratically representative. That the
Movement system is popularly supported is also questionable.

While the referendum results were decidedly in favour of the Movement system, it was far from a fair campaign. As Barya (2005:35) explains, “[b]y participating in the referendum, the multipartyists would be committing political suicide” as the referendum would likely make organized opposition illegal; ‘outing’ oneself as oppositional risked becoming lawfully criminal. Piron and Norton’s (2004:9) research indicates “a high degree of dissatisfaction with the current political system, in particular, the lack of political space to organize,” a point that will be revisited in the section addressing civil society. Also, when considering polling from 2000 to 2002 by Afrobarometer, support for the Movement system rapidly declined following the referendum. Whereas in 2000, 72 per cent of respondents were ‘satisfied’ with the level of democracy in Uganda and only 17 per cent were ‘unsatisfied’; two years later 60 per cent were ‘satisfied’ while 32 per cent were ‘unsatisfied’ (Logan et al, 2003). By 2008, an Afrobarometer poll announced that only 37 per cent of polled Ugandan’s responded that the country “is a democracy and are satisfied with democracy” (Mattes et al, 2010). Growing cynicism correlates with a growing sentiment that the Movement is no longer all-inclusive and is dominated by Museveni’s family, kin, and the ‘old guard’ from the ‘Bush War’ (Makara et al, 2009).

Kasfir (2004:60-70) provides a critical examination of the NRM’s systematic use of ‘Movement-democracy’ to legitimize itself while tightening its grip on political power. Kasfir argues that although there is some substance to claims of unprecedented democracy in Uganda since the NRM seized power – fuelled by an extraordinary number

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42 According to the same report, this finding positions Uganda between Liberia (37%) and Burkina Faso (36%), ahead of neighbouring Kenya (27%) but well behind neighbouring Tanzania (65%) and Botswana (80%).

43 This sentiment is substantiated by figures such as 71 per cent of the Cabinet being Bahima, Museveni’s
of elections considered free and fair – this democracy has been increasingly constrained by the limits of the Movement system. Kasfir’s argument that the Movement system has been falsely used as a basis of legitimacy has five parts: one, complex colonial legacies made achieving national legitimacy particularly problematic when the NRM seized power; two, the NRM’s support base was small when it formed national government and was based on a geographically condensed guerrilla war without much national exposure; three, initial legitimacy was gained by expanding the Movement system along with Resistance Councils; four, contradictory, shifting, and self-serving rationales for the system suggest it is more of a tool to gain power than build democracy; and five, the Movement system has been used to entrench the NRM and Museveni’s power rather than to expose it to the electorate. Most fundamental to consolidating its grip on power, however, was the NRM’s use of RCs/LCs. Their non-interference during RC/LC elections gave the NRM unprecedented popularity at first as peasants were granted democratic rights, but ultimately, it mean that every village and every peasant who voted was necessarily supporting the NRM with the RC system brought under central control under RC Statute No. 9, 1987, and having no position to influence national policy (Kasfir, 2004). We can thus see how the Movement system has been used a means of social control from above, not control of the State from the bottom.

Before drawing this section to a close, new developments must be taken into account. The NRM ‘u-turned’ on the 2000 referendum and announced a return to multipartyism in 2003, but as Makara et al (2003) argues, this was only after constitutional amendments allowed “the executive and the central political leadership to remain in power.” These amendments include scrapping presidential term limits, and

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tribal group; the Cabinet also controls three-quarters of the national budget (Mwenda, 2008).
expanding executive powers while reducing the authority of parliament and watchdog organizations, including the Electoral Commission (Makara et al, 2003; Mwenda, 2007). While all members of parliament had been officially considered part of the Movement, some still identified with officially defunct parties, and the reintroduction of multipartyism saw these parties spring back to life – though considerably weakened (Piron and Norton, 2004). Still, Museveni’s vote share fell from 76 per cent in 1996 and 69 percent in 2001 (before oppositional parties were officially allowed to field candidates) to 59 per cent in 2006, “even through the main opposition candidate was jailed throughout much of the campaign period” (Mattes et al, 2010).

This main opposition candidate is former NRA colonel and medical doctor for Museveni, Dr. Kizza Besigye, leader of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) and official candidate of the Inter-Party Cooperation (IPC).\(^4^4\) He ran for Presidency from within the Movement in 2001 before the reintroduction of multipartyism, but was self-exiled after claiming persecution based on a NRM allegation he is linked to rebel groups (Piron and Norton, 2004:10; Makara et al, 2009). The electoral process in Uganda is marred by confusion, and the distinction between the NRM and the state are blurred, with Museveni campaigning using state resources such as army helicopters and receiving endorsements from state officials (Piron and Norton, 2004:9). In 2003 Brock et al (2003:15) concluded, “the exchange of votes for material benefits is embedded in the day-to-day political economy of the country.”

This situation does not appear to have changed: on 20 January 2011 alone, the Daily Monitor (Uganda) reported a clash between IPC and NRM members after NRM

\(^4^4\) A coalition of opposition parties (FDC, Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), the Conservative Party (CP) and JEEMA, but excluding the Democratic Party (DP)), agreed to field one Presidential candidate. Dr.
officials were allegedly caught distributing money to residents, “asking them not to attend Dr Besigye’s rallies;” and also reported the opposition MPs had received (but rejected) a sizable bribe from the NRM ahead of the elections, supposedly reminiscent of bribes allegedly used to convince MPs to scrap presidential term limits. These two reports add to a series of new events involving violence and alleged corruption ahead of the February 2011 elections. The Electoral Commission announced a Museveni victory with 68 per cent of the vote, but the results were rejected by opposition leaders amidst various Daily Monitor reports of bribery; election rigging by way of ‘pre-ticked’ ballots and ‘ghost’ voters; intimidation and arrests of those expressing dissatisfaction with Museveni; and heaving policy, military, and paramilitary presence in streets to thwart potential demonstrations. These reports are consistent with preliminary findings by the European Union’s Election Observation Mission (EOM) in Uganda that widely observed “[t]he distribution of money and gifts by candidates” and “found that the power of incumbency was exercised to such an extent as to compromise severely the level playing field.”

Institutional Functions and Roles of Participatory ‘Good’ Governance

PRSP and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development

I) Position or role in the broader ‘good’ governance model:

The most important body of policies of the ‘good’ governance development

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Besigye won the nomination through IPC elections.

45 Violence was personally witnessed while conducting research for this thesis in Uganda in June 2010. An IPC rally was held in Kampala to protest against the Electoral Commission, accused of being NRM-biased. The rally came to a violent end as the ‘Kiboko Squad’ (known for using canes [kiboko] to ‘whip’ their targets, usually at opposition rallies) intermingled with riot police and charged the crowd, with Dr. Besigye himself being ‘whipped’ and beaten.

46 These statements can be found at http://eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/english/press_release_preliminarystatement_uganda_20_february_en.pdf; the final report is scheduled to be released in May, 2011.
agenda, consistent with other recipient countries, is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), for which Uganda is often presented as a showcase model. The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) was released in 1997 and later became the first officially recognized PRSP in 2000. The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) wields the primary position in Uganda’s structure of participation. Though not generally regarded as a ‘participatory’ institution, because it is not, the MFPED hosts the PEAP and oversees its implementation, including the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Process (UPPAP) – the participatory component in formulating the PEAP. By virtue of not being a ‘participatory’ institution, the MFPED tends to be overlooked in studies on participation in Uganda even though it is internally autonomous from the presidency, parliament, and other departments, and nevertheless is seen to ‘drive’ the policy process of the PEAP and all its subsidiaries (Foster and Mijumbi, 2002:3).

Consistent with other PRSPs, the document contains four pillars which act as the apex of development policy in Uganda: economic growth, ‘good’ governance, income generation, and quality of life (MFPED, 2004). Central to rural development, the PEAP’s policies act as a guide for Uganda’s Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA), which in turn has the following four major objectives: 1) reduce subsistence peasant poverty via improved efficiency and a greater shift towards market reliance, 2) enhance food security through reliance on market as opposed to self-sufficiency, 3) increase off-farm income generation opportunities in rural areas, and 4) sustainable research management for purposes of technological modernization (MAAIF and MFPED, 2000). Under the rubric of the PMA sit a series of development programs at the more local level,
the most important two being the National Agricultural Advisory Services (Naads) and Collaborative Forest Management (CFM). Key outputs of the Naads program include projects designed to generate technological advances, develop enterprises, and build market linkages (MAAIF, 2000; Nahdy, 2004; Friis-Hanson, 2008). CFM schemes are established, in utilization of Naads, to ‘empower’ peasants to diversity their forestry livelihood opportunities through tree production and nursery enterprises, agro-forestry, non-timber forest products, improved marketing and trading, and ecotourism (Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2005).

From the information given above, a basic schematic of rural development policies may be illustrated by the following figure:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schematic of Rural Development Policy</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Body</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP)</td>
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<td>National Agricultural Advisory Services (Naads)</td>
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<td><strong>Objectives</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
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<td>Good Governance</td>
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<td>Income Generation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality of Life</td>
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<td>Reducer subistence through efficiency and market reliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhance food security through market reliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase off-farm income generating opportunities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technological modernization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Build market linkages</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enterprise development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diversify forestry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Livelihoods</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase market access and trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attract ecotourism</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Paramount to the analysis formed in this Chapter is the failure to consider class and economic inequalities in any of the objectives shown above. All four of these main units of policy assume the presence of rural uniformity and the absence of class contradictions. By eliminating class from the lexicon of social understanding, the ‘good’ governance agenda fails to anticipate a differentiated ability among peasants to respond to ‘pro-poor’ policies that rely on commercialization, enterprise development, and the adoption of modern technologies.
II) Participation and the struggle for social control:

The UPPAP embodies the participatory process in formulating the PEAP. The UPPAP was designed by civil society\(^\text{47}\) with the mandate to achieve middle ground between empowering the poor and extracting useful data for policy making (Bird and Kakende, 2001:53); but the inclusion, or lack thereof, of the poor has been heavily criticized. Methodologically, the UPPAP has been criticized for employing the Rapid Rural Appraisal approach instead of Participatory Rural Appraisal (Holland and Blackburn, 1998). Furthermore, the lack of a well-defined consultation process allowed the World Bank to use “the opportunity to convince the government of the supremacy of market-led economies in poverty reduction” (Namara, 2010:9). Though 644 people were considered to have participated in the consultation process, Namara (2010:10) argues “the basis for consultation was the already conceived draft and it was more of a sensitisation exercise … [i]ndeed the participation of the people was aimed at reducing resistance against the unpopular macro-economic market-based policies.” Hence, debates on macro-economic policies from participating CSOs were not permitted (Nanna et al, 2002).

The second UPPAP in 2002 is claimed to be more participatory (Piron and Norton, 2004:13), but Wordofa (2004) claims that the process still marginalized the poor, “caused by the lack of recognition of the differences among and within communities.” Though the second UPPAP did expand the number of participants to 2,449 it nonetheless continued the precedent set earlier of attempting to sensitise participants to pre-drafted policies (Namara, 2010).

The information concerning how influential the UPPAP has actually been on the

\(^{47}\) Civil society’s role in formulating the PEAP and implementing the UPPAP will be examined more closely in the section concerning civil society specifically.
PEAP is inconclusive at best. Foster and Mijumbi (2002:35) claim the UPPAP has influenced the revised 2000 PEAP considerably by emphasizing the need to support rural markets, financial and credit services, micro and small businesses, disaster management, and land security. Other analyses rely on unsubstantiated assumptions. Piron and Norton (2004:26) assume the process has been very influential, as indicated by more districts demanding to be included in the second UPPAP. This assumption is dubious – more districts demanding to be included may be just as indicative of exclusion as it is indicative of influence. Blackburn, Chambers and Gaventa (2000) assume the UPPAP has been influential simply because it is located in the MFPED – but fail to support this claim with any evidence. Conversely, the Panos Institute (2002) claims that the World Bank owned the consultation process and directed the debate. Most ominously, the first UPPAP was conducted after the original PEAP was released (Piron and Norton, 2004:13; Bird and Kakende, 2001:46), leaving one to infer it had no influence.

That the UPPAP, and the PEAP in general, finds its home in the MFPED warrants a closer examination, as there is a “perception that the Ministry of Finance has been excessively authoritarian, ungenerous to deserving parts of the Government in its management of the budget process, and rather closely associated with donors” (Booth and Nsabagasani, 2005:vii). What is problematic is the MFPED is internally autonomous from the presidency and other departments in Uganda but externally dependent on the donor agencies to the extent that donor World Bank Group staff is considered part of the Ministry’s human resources; that the Ministry actively encourages donor agency staff to participate in its working groups; and, due to uncompetitive wages and a lack of capacity, that the MFPED is dependent on external advisors for direction (Piron and Norton,
Thus, the Panos Institute (2002) claims that the World Bank owned the UPPAP consultation process and directed the debate. Indeed, as Piron and Norton, 2004:27) observed, though the MFPED and World Bank have dominated the drafting process, elected Members of Parliament and Local Council leaders were altogether excluded to ostensibly make the drafting process ‘truly’ from the perspective of civil society. Nonetheless, as Foster and Mijumbi (2002:34) conclude, the PRSP approach in Uganda “has been built on a fairly hierarchical and centralised planning and budget process, which leaves only limited space for participation by those affected by decisions taken by the centre.” Taken from the information presented above, one can argue that participation in the PRSP process plays, at best, a complimentary role designed to legitimise preconfigured outcomes and agendas.

III) Tyranny and the effects of social control:

The origin of the PEAP dates back to a 1995 “GoU/World Bank seminar, at which concerns were expressed about the lack of systemic consideration of poverty impacts in the Bank’s vision of growth in Uganda”\(^{48}\) (Piron and Norton, 2004:13). This would suggest that the intention of the PEAP was to move development policy away from an overemphasis on economic growth and towards poverty reduction. However, while the PEAP has been celebrated as an economic success, and has credited with allowing Uganda to maintain high levels of growth (between five and ten per cent annually) in terms of gross domestic product (World Bank, 2008), according to Muhumuza (2002), this “growth has not translated into improved standards of living for the majority of the poor. The reforms have also been characterised by increasing income

\(^{48}\) GoU = Government of Uganda.
disparities.” Economic disparities have not been remedied since Muhumuza’s 2002 analysis with, as the United Nations (2008) latest data indicated, 41.7 per cent of the rural population is living below Uganda’s poverty line, compared to 37.4 per cent when the PRSP became official recognised in 2000.

The most evident explanation for the failure to address poverty and economic disparities through the ‘participatory’ PEAP process would be the influence of dominant actors over policy formation process. In the regard, the following quote from Piron and Norton is revealing:

“[d]uring our fieldwork, we were given the following interpretation of the 1995 meeting which eventually led to the drafting of the PEAP. President Museveni felt that policies of the Ministry of Finance, such as macroeconomic stability and growth, were not sufficiently focused on poverty reduction. The World Bank was invited to help persuade the President that the policies were adequate, but the outcome of the discussion was a decision to start a process to ensure that poverty became more central to policymaking. The President’s vision of poverty reduction, based on state-led rural development, was also modified as a result of these consultations, which identified the need to give priority to the social structures” (2004:15)

This leaves little doubt as to why “Uganda is seen by the IFIs to be receptive to their policy advice” (Piron and Norton, 2004:21). Furthermore, considering that half of Uganda’s budget is comprised of foreign aid (Mwenda, 2006), and that Museveni’s more ‘African Socialist’ sentiments continue “to be moderated by IFIs and MFPED economic advisors” (Piron and Norton, 2004:17) it is not surprising that although Museveni initially rejected market-based development he began to reluctantly accept it in 1987, and then fully embraced it in the mid-1990s (Foster and Mijumbi, 2002). In response to accusations of ‘selling out’ by ‘radical theorists’, as he puts it, Museveni writes:

“I think where the IMF helped us was in making us realise the importance of macro-economic tools, such as letting prices find their
own level ... that if you have the stimulus of free pricing, then it will be easy to produce ... it was actually more patriotic to privatise the economy than to leave large chunks of it in the public sector ... [because] keeping the economy in public hands will cause its decline.” (1997:180)

Finally, Museveni (1997:183) concludes that to eliminate rural poverty, after permitting private actors to be the primary development agent, “all the bureaucrats need to do is to ensure that people can communicate physically” to get their produce to the free market. This neoliberal approach to development, embraced by the broader PRSP agenda and supposedly the result of participatory processes, is actually mandated by the MFPED in close association with the World Bank, with little, if any, input from ‘participants’. The PEAPs role in the struggle for social control is thus paramount, as it allows the World Bank and dominant classes in Uganda to maintain and extend control over the economy, while obscuring anti-democratic neoliberal reforms and privatization through ‘participatory’ processes.

Though rhetorically legitimised as targeting poverty reduction, the market-oriented development agenda of the PEAP and denial of class allow its affiliated development projects to reinforce a priori class structures. The reinforcement of established class stratification can be seen by critically examining Uganda’s Naads and Collaborative Forest Management (CFM) projects and programs, wherein participation has been reduced to a procedural exercise. According to Nahdy (2004), the Naads executive director, the program aims to ‘empower’ subsistence farmers through technology and market information while deepening decentralization and reducing costs by shifting extension services from public to private providers. ‘Farmer groups’, formed by Local Councils, are considered empowered through their participation in decision-
making, however, their decision only qualifies for the program if selected activities are deemed marketable and profitable (MAAIF, 2000). If the activity is accepted by the Naads program, private providers are then subcontracted to provide training, materials, or demonstrations, but according the Uganda Monitor, only the relatively wealthy peasants have the capacity to host a demonstration site, and poor peasants can ill-afford to procure the equipment required to implement the training provided at demonstration sites. Information found in the Uganda National Household Survey 2005/2006, available in the Appendix, substantiates such claims. We can see from the statistics that the average rich peasant is visited by an extension service provider 0.92 times annually, and that 14 per cent of rich peasants receive services from the Naads annually. Conversely, the average poor peasant only received 0.11 visits by an extension service provider, and that only five per cent of poor peasants receive services from the Naads annually.

In regards to forestry, the sector has been subject to the Forest Sector Umbrella Programme (FSUP) – an ostensibly pro-poor livelihoods approach to induce bottom-up participatory planning (Harrison and Goldman, 2002). The Forestry Department was divested and the National Forestry Authority (NFA) was born as a self-financing profit oriented authority. Management was decentralised to the private sector and LCs through Collaborative Forest Management (CFM) initiatives, “to encourage more active participation of local communities and farmers” (Banana et al, 2002). Through the use of Naads and NGOs, peasants are considered empowered to diversify their livelihood, but community initiatives are given only ten year permits, whereas private initiatives are rewarded with fifty year permits, creating “a disincentive for communities to undertake long term and lucrative investments” (EMPAFORM, 2006). Again, it is only “the

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49 Article by Kavuma, R.M., on 7 January 2010 titled “NAADS: Modernising Uganda’s Farmers?”
relatively richer farmers that have been able to invest land, labour and cash who have been able to benefit from these initiatives, which it seems have not reached the poorest of the poor” (EMPAFORM, 2006). Also, now self-financing, the ‘pro-poor’ NFA seeks profit through charcoal production permits, charging prices that exclude poor peasants in favour of rich peasants. This leaves poor peasants performing sub-contracted work for rich peasants at rates below the market price of charcoal, effectively creating a permit rent for richer peasants through this ‘pro-poor’ and ‘participatory’ program (Bazaara, 2003c).

Local Councils

1) Position or role in the broader ‘good’ governance model:

Historically, the system of local governments in Uganda was at best ambiguous and inconsistent; it was patchwork system designed to meet the needs of colonial power. Local governments were not designed to be democratic or to invoke participation, but rather as a mechanism of social control and to facilitate economic extraction while minimizing the threat of dissent. This system was constitutionally maintained after independence until Amin dissolved all district councils and divided the country into ten provinces ruled by his appointees. The second Obote regime returned the local government system to its prior arrangements (Tukahebwa, 1998:12-14). Resistance Councils, introduced in the revolutionary environment of guerrilla war, promised to be the most radical form of popular democracy introduced in post-colonial Africa, and Uganda was to be its privileged host. Reflecting the NRA’s dependence on the peasantry, the councils were to replace elitist, representative, and parliamentary types of democracy

50 Buganda and Busuga were granted a federal and semi-federal status at independence, respectively, but were stripped of this status when Obote scrapped the first constitution in 1966 and introduced a centralized
with a grassroots, popular, and participatory system (Ddungo, 1994:365). As will be shown here, this promise was at best short-lived.

When the NRM came to power it quickly moved to establish what was then the Resistance Council (RC) system throughout Uganda not only for sake of legitimacy, but to also address NRM financial weakness by ‘downloading’ social programs to the local level (Tukahebwa, 1998:14; Muhereza, 2003). A major presidential policy statement in 1992 launched the current wave of decentralization, which was further crystallised in the 1995 Constitution. This Constitution renamed Resistance Councils as Local Councils and spelled out the devolution of powers to local governments (Nsibambi, 1998a). The 1995 Constitution necessitated the implementation of the 1993 Local Government (Resistance Councils) Statute which endorsed the “decentralisation of functions and powers and services to Local Government (Resistance Councils) to increase local democratic control and participation in decision-making, and to mobilise support for development which is relevant to local needs” (Republic of Uganda, 1993). When the PEAP was released in 1997 another the 1997 Local Government Act was released in succession to:

"[a]mend, consolidate and streamline the existing law on local governments in line with the constitution to give effect to the decentralisation and devolution of functions, powers and services; and provide for decentralisation at all levels of local government to ensure good governance and democratic participation in, and control of decision making by the people; and to provide for revenue and the political and administrative set-up of Local Governments; to provide for election of Local Councils and any other matters connected to the above” (Republic of Uganda, 1997).

The system’s hierarchy is designed to link the village (LCI) to the district council (LCV) through the parish, sub-county, and municipality levels (LCII, III, and IV, respectively). Each council consists of a cluster of councils immediately below them in the hierarchy.
Every LC includes a nine member executive committee with specific responsibilities (Youth Secretariat, Finance Secretariat, Vice-Chair, etc.). Everyone in the village is considered a member of LCI, and the executive of all LCs are included in the LC directly above them (Republic of Uganda, 1997).

The institutional design of Local Councils may be impressive, but their role in policy creation has considerably eroded from its origins in peasant mobilization during the ‘Bush War’ to challenge rural social control. Local Councils played no role in designing the PEAP or implementing its participatory component, The Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Process (UPPAP), and thus had no role in designing the PMA which set the guidelines for local development programs, such as the Naads or CFM. Where the Local Councils do play a role is in administering such programs. The Naads program is administered by all LC levels, who aide in the formation of ‘farmer groups’ of between fifteen and thirty to become ‘clients’ of the program (MAAIF, 2000). Local Councils also administer Collaborative Forest Management projects. The decentralization of forest management was initially included in the 1993 Local Government (Resistance Councils) Statute, but the initiative was ill-supported and re-centralised two years later. When the PEAP was released in 1997, the Local Government Act re-decentralised forest management in a CFM scheme confined by the PMA as designed by the MFPED in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) (Banana et al, 2002; Owino and Ndinga, 2004; Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2005; MAAIF & MFPED 2000).

While almost all local issues were handled at the discretion of RCs during the ‘Bush War’, RC/LC functions have been reduced substantially through the centralization
of power and implementation of PEAP mandates. The inherent paradox of Uganda’s
decentralization for ‘empowerment’ program is that on the one hand its breadth of formal
powers (political, economic, financial) given to local governments far exceeds those
previously devolved in the country and throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, yet, on the other
hand, the depth of devolution is significantly limited in terms of discretion over use of
these powers (Kiyaga-Nsubuga and Olum, 2009). When Brock et al (2003:13) conducted
their research into LCs, they took note of a general sentiment expressed by discussion
groups that while the RCs “gave people power to control their own destiny’, the LC
system in its current incarnation is only used to levy taxes, since LC leaders know what
each resident owns.” This suggestion is echoed by Francis and James’ (2003) study that
found villagers identified LCIII as a tax-collection agency, with little evidence suggesting
local retention of such taxes, despite the increased burden of social programming costs.

This leaves LCs largely dependent on grant funding from the central government
– two thirds of it conditional – to implement policies likewise designed at the centre
(Piron and Norton, 2004:29), leaving some to doubt the ability of LCs to act
independently from the centre (Bazaara, 2003c). While legally, laws that do not
contradict the centre are permitted, in practice this independence is obfuscated by
executive interference and technocrat usurpation of planning (Bazaara, 2003c:17). Brock
et al (2003:20) argue, conversely, that their respondents indicated that “where the
Movement does directly influence policy, it is at the central rather than the decentralized
levels of government.” Nonetheless, a more critical analysis suggests this to be as much
indicative of lower level LCs not having significant policy making discretion as it is
indicative of lower level LC being autonomous organs of policy formation. With policy
formation being highly centralised and local units primarily responsible for administering and collecting the taxes to pay for such policies, there would be little utility in influencing local level policy. As such, Nsabagasani (2003) has noticed that “instead of identifying local people’s problems and pressing for them to be addressed by higher authorities, LCs have been used as channels through which directives are passed on to communities.”

II) Participation and the struggle for social control:

Ddungo’s (1994) study into the decline of RC’s as a force of peasant power provides us with a compelling glimpse into the foundation of Uganda’s participatory governance model, and its descent into a means of social control instead of a means of challenging control. Limited to forty homes, during the ‘Bush War’ the RCs acted as a form of self-government among the poor peasantry who worked cooperatively with leaders it had the power to recall. The RCs presided over almost all grassroots issues, and almost all affairs became politicised. Support and opposition to the formation of RCs can be seen along class lines. On one hand, rich peasants, rural capitalists, chiefs and absentee landlords opposed their formation because RCs constituted a threat to their economic and political dominance. On the other hand, poor peasants, and some middle peasants, saw RCs as an opportunity to advance their claims to dispossessed lands.

Once a proactive organ of popular power, the survival of RCs became questionable as they were depoliticised once the NRM came to power; attendance waned and elections became a mockery. The elite classes that fled during the war returned to assume power in the RCs; thereby representing a failure to transform socioeconomic stratification (Ddungo, 1994:365-85). Analyses from other researchers share Ddungo’s, demonstrating the devolution of RCs from a mechanism to express popular peasant
power during the guerrilla war to an instrument to prevent mobilization thereafter, and finally to a device to ensure the election of NRM candidates (Olaka-Onyango, 1989, 2000; Mamdani, 1991; Sabiti-Makara et al, 1996).

Local Councils have moved far away from their Resistance Council predecessor’s legacy as an instrument for poor peasants to challenge rural political-economic contradictions and landlord class dominance. This can be confirmed by examining which class now controls LCs. Though electoral mechanisms have gone through considerable changes, class dominance has not changed since rich peasants and rural capitalists returned to take-over RCs in the Luwero Triangle after the ‘Bush War’ – and research findings have been remarkably consistent. Francis and James (2003) found that LC membership is exclusively drawn from “households in the highest income strata. Poorer individuals cannot afford the ‘goodwill gestures’, such as beer, soap, or salt, handed out as an inducement to potential voters in elections to all levels of local government.” Piron and Norton’s (2004:30) respondents describe councillors as “local elites with little genuine interest in the opinions of their poorer constituents.” This is most recently echoed in a recent study that found:

“as much as it would appear that every citizen above the age of eighteen is free to contest local elections, the reality is that because of the ‘monetised’ nature of politics in the country, many peasants can ill afford to buy their way into political office. This monetised electoral process has now taken root to the extent that even the annulment of results by the courts has not deterred those with money from buying their way into power. This elite capture of the government process has become endemic” (Kiyaga-Nsubuga and Olum, 2009).

Ergo, LC elections in Uganda have been characterised as a competition for favours and

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51 Originally, voting was performed using a highly visible lining-up system which exposed vulnerable groups – particularly youth and women – to patriarchal wrath. A secret ballot system soon replaced this. Also, direct elections – initially reserved for RC/LC1 and RC/LCII – have been extended to all levels on the
lobbying, with the winner being the highest bidder; the ability of peasants to determine who represents them locally tends to be exaggerated (Namara and Nsabagasani, 2003).

Lastly, peasant participation in the LC system has eroded sharply. After the election is held in LCI, Tukahebwa (1998:26) found that the executive committee rarely convenes public meetings and assumes all council responsibilities in regards to decision making. The study found this to be consistent with the LCII level, where 63 per cent of the respondents indicating they do not participate in any decision making. Higher level LCs are more remote to most citizens, and although meetings are considered open they are sparsely attended. The study found citizens to be disinterested and apathetic, with participation being “largely seen as a government obligation than a people-driven process.” Francis and James (2003) found that patronage and technocratic forms of local governance leaves little room for participation, characterizing the LC system as bringing “control closer to the people.”

III) Tyranny and the effects of social control:

Tyranny – the exercise of arbitrary and excessive power to exploit and oppress – is best demonstrated not through particular programs, however, but through the activities of Local Councils. As mentioned above, taking advantage of LC knowledge of local ownership and production, the central government primarily uses LCs for tax collection purposes (Brock et al, 2003). This is not to say tax collection is necessarily tyrannical, but it becomes so when little of that tax money is retained in the locality (as little as five per cent), as uncovered by Francis and James (2003). Locally collected tax revenues include market dues, licensing fees, and most controversially, the graduated personal tax levied on all adult males and salaried women. The annual collected of graduated personal tax is

most unpopular and is accompanied by armed police, the use of force, and imprisonment of evaders (Francis and James, 2003).

Local Councils have also become highly susceptible to elite capture, and as Kiyaga-Nsubuga and Olum (2009) contend, local elites are not using their captured political power benevolently. They cite a lack of political awareness among the poor peasantry as leaving the LCs susceptible to policies and decisions that serve the narrow interests of elites while freezing out the interests of the poor. While Tukahebwa (1998:26) describes LCI and LCII as mere administrative units “preoccupied with settling disputes among the citizens,” this research took place before the 1998 Land Act, which in following PEAP directives, allowed for the conversion of customary land rights into freehold titles (Republic of Uganda, 1998). Property disputes and land transactions are adjudicated at the LCI level, with land committees and boards and the parish and district levels approving/disapproving applications for free-hold conversion of customary land (Republic of Uganda, 1997).

Generally, ten per cent of the total land sale price is levied as compensation for LCIs, land boards, and committees. With little retention of tax revenues, facilities such sales are one of the few recourses for LCs to pay for social programming costs (Lumonya, 2009). As Akin, et al. (2005) indicate, due to the problem of securing funds, decentralization has harmed the quality of social programming, and many LCs attempt to ‘free-ride’ off neighbour regions by diverting medical patients, or by administering user fees. As Lumonya (2009) suggests, poor peasants are being compelled to sell their land

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52 I wish to express gratitude to Daniel Lumonya, a doctoral candidate at Cornell University, for permitting the citation of his presentation made at a *The Journal of Peasant Studies* workshop in the fall of 2009. I encourage the reader to follow Lumonya’s progress as he continues his work on issues of land use, land reform, and land dispossession in Uganda – which must be acknowledged to be outside the scope of this
out of economic distress caused by such user fees, and indeed, the total size of privatised land doubled shortly after the PEAP was implemented (Place and Otsuku, 2000). Caswell (2002) argues that land privatization and transactions have increased peasant landlessness. While no concrete figures have been found to verify such an observation, a Food and Agriculture Organization (2006) study suggests that land privatization has had recursive implications for poor peasants, writing on land reforms in Uganda that:

“[a]n elite minority has tended to benefit from reforms while the majority of the poor and vulnerable end up worse off as institutions and systems that supported their livelihoods and gave them a sense of security are marginalized and replaced by modern institutions” (Odhiambo, 2006).

Bazaara (2003a) contends that no ordinary peasant can afford to convert their land to freehold tenure, let alone purchase land made available for sale, and therefore suggests the Land Act was designed to attract foreign buyers.\(^{53}\) However, as Lumonya (2009) has observed, poor peasants are turning to banks to secure loans to pay titling costs, and dispossessed land is being accumulated by local elites who control the LC. Effectively, with ten per cent of the land sales fees being returned to the control of LCs, and with elites having authoritarian control, this would amount to subsidised capital accumulation for rural bourgeois elements.

**Civil Society**

1) Position or role in the broader ‘good’ governance model:

\(^{53}\) A series of reports in the Daily Monitor seem to validate concerns over foreign land grabs. Aug 2, 2009: 16,000 peasants were evicted from thirty-six square miles in Kiboga because, according to villagers, the land was sold to French investors by the government. Nov 26, 2009: an amendment to the 1998 Land Act was being debated by Parliament that would see landlords sent to jail for seven years if they evict tenants; but opposition MP Dan Okello claims this same amendment includes a clause that would introduce a land tax meant to induce peasants to sell land to “NRM agents or foreigners” (Article can be seen here: http://www.parties.ug/news.php?article=174&return=articles.php; as of 15 September 2010; originally obtained at same url on 16 December 2009). Mar 25, 2009: Museveni’s declares intention to limit foreign
Once all but smothered out of existence by prior regimes, a plethora of international and local civil society organizations (CSOs) have surfaced since the NRM came to power in Uganda. However, studies show that this emergence is as indicative of external agendas and international patterns as it is indicative of more lenient government policies (Dicklitch, 1998:8; Brock et al, 2003:21). CSOs have played an important but largely administrative and implementation role within Uganda’s ‘good’ governance structure, beginning with the UPPAP process. Although Blackburn, Chambers, and Gaventa (2000) call the UPPAP a “model for the future” owned by the Ugandan government, the government’s leadership role in design quickly gave-way to a multi-stakeholder approach involving donors, research institutions, and NGOs: with the latter, and Oxfam specifically, given implementation responsibility (MFPED, 2004).

CSOs are also hired by Local Councils as part of the Naads program to facilitate discussions with ‘farmers groups’ to identify the needs of peasants. The needs get relayed back to Naads officials who then subcontract to individuals, advisors, professional companies or CSOs to provide training, supply materials, or set-up a demonstration site (MAAIF, 2000). In regards to Collaborative Forest Management (CFM) projects, CSOs are heavily relied upon to identify potential forestry livelihood diversification strategies (Bazaara, 2003c). Personal connections between CSOs and state organs are considered the most important trait for in terms of procuring such contracts (Goetz and Lister, 2001).

II) Participation and the struggle for social control:

Participation of CSOs in policy formation processes are by invitation only, and invitation is predominately on the basis of how much policy makers will benefit from each particular CSO’s inclusion, and not on “any conception of the right to contribute to land purchases to between three and fifty acres (this has not been re-addressed since).
policy formation” (Lister and Nyamugasira, 2003). Indeed, Brock et al (2003:14) found that government officials dominate policy formation processes, and that organizations were reluctant to participate in policy formation, even at the local level. Organizations are legally permitted to lobby governments concerning policy formation and implementation, but “[g]iven the concentration of policy formation at the national level, this role is usually played by CSOs at the national or international level. Moreover, it tends to be carried out by INGOs” (Lister and Nyamugasira, 2003). This means, the limited and selective use of civil society in policy formation tends to be drawn from those organizations furthest removed from the poor peasantry. The Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations’ (DENIVA)\(^{54}\) own statistics indicate that 41 per cent of respondents characterised ‘poor people’ as being either excluded or severely under-represented by CSOs, which is much higher compared to other marginalised groups;\(^{55}\) the ‘upper class’, on the other hand, is the only group thought to be equitably represented by the majority of respondents.

With government dominance over civil society in policy formation circles, it is not surprising that those who disagree with or are disadvantaged by proposed policies are systematically excluded from the processes (Lister and Nyamugasira, 2003). According to Dicklitch (1998:25-6), “the NRM regime’s attempts to co-opt NGOs into its national development strategy, so that NGOs are vehicles of NRM-inspired and led development,” adding that “those that are considered too political are labeled sectarian and even called criminal by the President and either co-opted or muzzled.” Hearn explains that

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\(^{54}\) DENIVA “is a Ugandan Network of Non-Governmental and Community Based Organizations” (http://www.deniva.or.ug/deniva/).

\(^{55}\) No other group was considered to be excluded, but 26% considered religious minorities, 24% for ethnic minorities, 22% for the rural population in general, and 15% for women, were thought to be ‘severely
"donors have been successful in influencing the current vision of civil society ... so that a vocal, well-funded section of it, which intervenes on key issues of national development strategy, acts not as a force for challenging the status quo, but for building societal consensus for maintaining it" (Hearn, 2001; emphasis in original).

When Hearn asked USAID if they could recount instances of CSOs challenging the development agenda established by international actors, the reply was "No". Conversely, USAID offered instances where Parliament had challenged the externally established agenda; however, Parliament has no role in designing donor-funded programs. This leads Hearn to suggest that the democratically elected Parliament would be a better outlet for political leverage than CSOs that are dependent on donor financing.

Dependent as they are on donor financing, many CSOs have been compelled to adopt ‘gap-filling’ roles to satisfy the “economy of survival” (Dicklitch, 1998:102), created by state withdrawal from basic service delivery in areas such as health, education, and sanitation. Many, however, have not chosen the service delivery business by default but by design, focusing on capturing funding and work rather than working towards democratization and empowerment (Brock et al, 2003). Dicklitch (1998:8) considers some CSOs to be of questionable origin, attributing the ever-growing roster of CSOs to the chase for foreign grants, characterizing them as “entrepreneurs tapping into a growing industry.” What’s more, DENIVA’s report on Civil Society in Uganda found that:

“61% of respondents to the community survey did not mention any organization helping poor people in their community to improve their lives in the past 12 months, reflecting a common allegation by the public that a majority of CSO activities target the productive poor, rather than the very poor” (2006:76).

under-represented’ by civil society organizations (DENIVA, 2006:29).

56 Of the 434 indigenous NGOs in Dicklitch’s study, 40.8 per cent were found primarily to be ‘gap-fillers’. This figure balloons to 81.2 per cent when religious NGOs are included; religious NGOs primarily are preoccupied with ‘gap-filling’. Whole voluntary organizations make up 14.1 per cent of NGOs, people’s organizations only amount to a miniscule 1.2 per cent. The remaining 2.4 per cent are classified as ‘other’, and are mostly comprised of NGO networks (Dicklitch, 1998:126).
Given that CSOs, dependent on foreign funding, fail to challenge the neoliberal agenda which they are used to legitimise, is that building capacity among – and educating – the poor to allow for direct advocacy is considered merely “a long term CSO strategy” (Lister and Nyamugasira, 2003).

Regardless, DENIVA (2006:26) argues that recently “people and people’s organizations have been more forthright claiming spaces for protest.” However, their argument rests on membership figures, including 80 per cent of respondents identifying themselves as members of a CSO – though, 52 per cent of these claimed membership to a religious group compared to only 25 per cent claiming membership to ‘self-help’ groups, 80 per cent claiming to have attended a community meeting within the past year, and 63 per cent claiming to have coalesced with others to raise an issue (compared to the African average of 44 per cent). DENIVA credits this participation to the reach of LCs to every village; however, they fail to critically consider the type of organizations that exist, the work these organizations perform, the content of such meetings, or why individuals coalesce outside organizations to press issues.

The largest civil society organization that claims to represent peasants is the Uganda National Farmers Federation (UNFFE), with a claimed membership of over six million. The UNFFE was formed in 1992 as an umbrella association of district level farming groups, but changed to a Federation in 2002 to accommodate its various ‘commodity associations’ and ‘service provider’ members. Its formation is tied to the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAIIF) and it has had a close

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57 One would assume that DENIVA credits LCs with increasing participation in CSOs because, as LCs have seen their revenue retention dwindle concurrent with an increased responsibility for social programming, they have become dependent on recruiting NGO to fulfill these responsibilities. What one
relationship with the MAIIF over the years, with several overlapping senior officials as well as Members of Parliament. Indeed, UNFFE's main priority is to "[s]trengthen the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry of Fisheries" (UNFFE, 2009). Their central argument is that while PEAP subsidiary policies and institutions controlled by the MFPED were unveiled, such as the Naads, institutional mandates overlapped and responsibilities became superfluous; and thus such institutions should give way to MAIFF authority. The UNFFE thus, instead of advocating on behalf of poor peasants, appears to be engaged in a power struggle between the MAIFF and the MFPED.

Indeed, most 'peasant organizations' are inextricably tied to government bodies. More local than the UNFFE are various District Farmer's Associations, which are formed by Naads, with the objective to organise producers of similar crops for purposes of reaching external markets (Brock et al, 2003:28). The Farmer's Associations are a needed and consistent component of the PMA, and thus exist on the basis of a particular government program that, as shown above, systematically benefits rich peasants over poor peasants. Such associations ought not to be considered as any sort of peasant advocacy group, let along autonomous organization.

The only visible organization that advocates for poor peasants is the Uganda Land Alliance, which demands land rights for the poor and marginalised, particularly women. It is, however, a consortium of 48 local and international NGOs which operate at the national level, and can therefore not be confused as autonomous poor peasant organization, but rather an organization that advocates for peasant – and women's in particular – land rights.\textsuperscript{58} The efforts of the ULA are welcome, but should not be a

\textsuperscript{58} View their website at http://www.ulaug.org

\textsuperscript{58} View their website at http://www.ulaug.org
considered as a substitute for grassroots organizations directly controlled by, and representative of, poor peasants.

Tukahebwa (1998:28) found that organizations attempting to influence policy simply “do not exist at the grassroots level where they are most needed.” Several years later, Brock et al confirm this finding, writing that:

“civil society or autonomous spaces existing in village or sub-county policy processes is minimal. Several references [by interviewees] to the collapse of agricultural cooperatives in the mid 1980s provide testimony of the decline of other local institutions alongside the rise and consolidation of the LC system” (2003:14).

An inverse relationship between local governance and autonomous peasants organizations therefore seems to exist; in other words, as institutions of ‘good’ governance increase, organizations that represent poor peasants decrease.

There is, however, appears to be a re-emergence of the cooperative movement, despite – or more cynically because of – its legacy of cooptation. Kabwegyere (2000:97), a senior NRM official, recognises the historical cooptation of peasant cooperatives but claims “since the NRM came to power the people have been encouraged to take the bull by the forms and make cooperatives their own.” Acknowledging this paternalistic history, the newly formed Uganda Cooperative Alliance (UCA) avows a new generation – based on entrepreneurship, committed and visionary leaders, member participation, sustainable, bottom-up growth, women and youth inclusion, and diversified activities – will be able to avoid such a downfall (Msemakwela, UCA General Secretary, 2009). Its report on advocacy in the most recent annual report, however, is limited to less than half a page (out of forty) that focused on a “lobbying campaign to win as many MPs on the side of cooperatives as possible” (UCA, 2009:1). It offers no specifics other than mentioning
meetings with the Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry as well as the Minister of State for Microfinance. The Bagisu Cooperative Alliance (BCU) mentioned in the second chapter of this thesis, has also been revived despite political pressure against it, and is described by Wiegratz (2010) as an expression of peasant desire to struggle for a better life and regain a sense of power while confronting “a sense of powerlessness.” Its re-emergence is a very recent occurrence, however, and has yet to stake a major role in Ugandan politics.\(^{59}\) Cooperative, nonetheless, are not autonomous peasant organizations and reportedly remain subject to strong government interference.

**III Tyranny and the effects of social control:**

The lack of advocacy groups based in poor peasant organizations, or the coalescence of poor peasants into groups that can advance their interests, not only allows poor peasants to be more easily excluded from policy circles but also engenders economic exploitation by dominant classes within rural communities – in particular, the “trade practices between smallholder farmers and traders in rural markets” (Wiegratz, 2010). Wiegratz considers neoliberal reforms to be an attempt to transform Ugandan peasants into ‘*homo economicus*’, that is, rational utility maximisers engaged in cost-benefit analysis, self-interested economic individualism, egoism, and capitalist rationalism. It is argued that economic, health, and education liberalization, and a weakened public sector, has diminished poor peasant bargaining power vis-à-vis traders. Individualised without group representation, farmers are without leverage and due to an ‘economy of survival’ are forced into accepted traders’ malpractices and low sales prices.

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\(^{59}\) On 21 January 2011 the *Uganda Monitor* reported that Uganda’s High Court overturned the Registrar of Cooperative Societies suspension of the BCU board, which was deemed unlawful without consulting the Uganda Cooperative Alliance. This court decision was celebrated "as the first step towards liberating the union from government interference."
Traders – considered to be backed by local political elites in exchange for cheap inputs – routinely negotiate transactions with children, arriving at homesteads where they are informed that parents are absent. Wiegratz (2010) describes how brokers have recently emerged to negotiate transactions between peasants and traders for a cut of roughly 10 per cent; the latter two both claim an inability/unwillingness to circumvent brokers (considered to be unnecessary) over concerns of broker political/economic connections and intimidation tactics. Yet, according to Wiegratz, when peasants approach local councils they are confronted by a dismissive response that suggests Uganda’s new, liberalised economy entails a non-interventionist policy. Wiegratz’s respondents “reasoned that the malpractices were applied by the various actors in order to keep them poor and subsequently govern and exploit them with more ease.” Many reportedly long for the cooperative era, when there was at least a semblance of fairness due to the ability of peasants to negotiate in group settings.

Conclusion

The objective of this Chapter was to demonstrate how the conceptual manipulation of participation in mainstream development discourse has allowed the institutionalization of participation to retain strong elements of social control and to countervail the democratic struggles of lower classes. Data was collected on the formation of central government, the ‘good’ governance development agenda, the control of local government units, and the use of civil society.

Research found that the NRM, who originally came to power based on peasant support of Resistance Councils, has operated in a de facto one-party atmosphere for much of its time in national government. The longstanding refusal to accept multiparty politics
was based on, among other things, a flawed notion of Ugandan classlessness, but in actuality it facilitated elite electoral dominance. Though a return to official multipartyism has now been permitted, constitutional amendments, intimidation tactics, and ‘vote buying’ have sustained a NRM regime and Museveni government that has lost touch with the resistance to control that brought them to power.

It has been found that the Ugandan parliament and other elected officials have been circumvented in designing the PEAP – the driver of development policy. The fact that the PEAP is under the official direction of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) does not boost confidence of actual domestic ‘authorship’, as the highly authoritative and internally autonomous department is externally dependent on – and staffed by – donors, and specifically the World Bank. Though drafted before any ‘participatory’ processes were put in place, the PEAP has entrenched a neoliberal development agenda under the auspices of ‘good’ governance. Participatory processes that have since been adopted have been used to sensitise the populace to – and diminish resistance against – unpopular policies that facilitate economic dominance over poor peasants.

Resistance Councils (RCs) were introduced during the NRA/M’s ‘Bush War’ as a radical form of grassroots popular democracy; they initially promised to empower poor peasants to displace elite dominance. RC popularity disintegrated as they were depoliticised once the NRM formed national government, participation waned and elites reclamationed power in rural areas. While there is great breadth (range of issues) around decentralization, there is little depth in terms of power to formulate policy, and the Local Councils (LC) that have replaced RCs are used as channels to pass down directives, as
evident by funding conditionalities. Rather than being used to identify local needs and influence policy from the bottom, LCs are used primarily for the forceful collection of taxes, little of which is retained locally. Furthermore, coupled with poor financing is the inducement – provided by financial compensation for processing sales, and permitted through privatization – for LCs to facilitate the accumulation of land among elites, and the dispossession of land among poor peasants unable to pay for fee-based social programming.

The number of CSOs operating in Uganda has exploded since the mid-1990s and they have ostensibly been given a key role in development policy formation. Though eager to procure recently privatised service delivery and social programming contracts, CSOs are reluctant to participate in policy formation. Those who do participate do so by invitation only; these CSOs have largely replaced parliament in donor-driven policy formation, and their dependency on donor funding engenders systemic support rather than advocating on behalf of the interests of poor peasants. Left to compete in a neoliberal economy without any representation as a class – such as autonomous peasant organizations, strong cooperatives, or the ability to collectively negotiate economic relations – poor peasants have been disempowered economically, as well as politically. Market-based development programs benefit the CSO development industry and rich peasants through service contracts and extension services, but these benefits fail to reach the poor peasantry. This can be seen through institutional ‘participatory’ reforms to forestry that abet rent-seeking behaviour, extension services through the NAADS program which primarily benefit rich farmers, and service and social programming contracts that benefit CSOs but leave poor peasants unable to afford user-fees.
Chapter Four: Conclusion

As stated in the Introduction, the primary question that has guided this thesis is: What is the nature of the relationship between ‘good’ governance defined participation and the struggle for social control in Uganda? To answer this question, a theoretical framework was developed to understand the nature of participation in Uganda. The framework was informed by literature on the history of the struggle for social control and peasant resistance to control in Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by a critical analysis of mainstream participation as part of the World Bank’s ‘good’ governance agenda, PRSPs, and the (re)re-conceptualization – the first reconceptualization being that of the World Bank’s ‘good’ governance agenda – of participation as tyranny.

From these bodies of literature, it was found that as elite classes struggle for social control, poor peasants have historically been given subordinate citizenry rights; however, poor peasants have resisted social control and elite dominance. Political elites have responded to challenges posed by poor peasants by granting limited democratic concessions while maintaining political centrality, which has been suggested to intentionally placate peasant protest while covertly confining the political role of poor peasants. The analysis of the ‘good’ governance agenda found that it continues the struggle for social control by embracing the concept of participation, but reversing its practice from a radical exercise that challenges social control, to a technical procedure that legitimises neoliberal policies as democratic and part of bottom-up processes. Hence, participation, considered to be part of ‘good’ governance, has reinforced a priori social structures by detaching itself from broad concerns over social, economic, and political structural transformation. Through the use of ‘participation’, alternative political
processes have been created to circumvent elected representatives, displacing them with an exclusionary use of bourgeois-staffed civil society agents, private actors and donors. Far from empowering, the participatory framework defined by ‘good’ governance has confined the political role of poor peasants – shutting them out of development policy dialogues and leaving them with no democratic body whose power has not likewise been reduced through ‘good’ governance. Participation has thus become a central tool among elite classes in their struggle for social control, and has therefore a new form of tyranny.

Informed by the theoretical foundation established above, the thesis then sought to prove that ‘good’ governance ‘participation’ in Uganda has reinforced the dominant position of elite classes, using a Marxist dialectical materialist methodology. Given its use as a model of ‘good’ governance, Uganda has been used as a case study because of its considerable potential to uncover patterns that were abstractly articulated in the literature review, by illustrating the role participation plays in the struggle for social control in concrete terms. Data presented pertained to the historical nature of the struggle for social control and peasant resistance to control in Uganda, processes of political centralization and government formation, the alternative political processes created by ‘good’ governance, and the role of local government units and civil society within the ‘good’ governance framework, and the implications for poor peasants.

The second chapter examined the historical nature of the struggle for social control in Uganda, and peasant resistance to control. The chapter found poor peasants to have historically been denied the same citizenry rights of more elite classes, and that through taxation, forced labour, land rents, and threats of land alienation poor peasants were compelled to engage in unequal socio-economic relations with dominant classes.
Poor peasants resisted social control through armed rebellion, riots and protests and were able to make limited economic and political gains, such as rent control and a partially elected Lukiiko (Buganda’s legislature). Much of these gains were reversed after independence by the Obote and Amin regimes, which used military intimidation to further social control and suspended voting rights. Peasants continued to resist social control, particularly through the Rwenzururu movement that temporarily established an alternative government, and the National Resistance Movement that would eventually form national government.

The third chapter then sought to prove elite classes, domestic and international, have emplaced a system of ‘good’ governance which reinforces elite dominance and social control, but obscures it in the language of ‘participation’. The analysis validated the thesis’ hypothesis that ‘good’ governance participation has reinforced elite dominance in Uganda. It was found that poor peasants had little to no influence in the formation of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) in 1997 and its subsequent revisions; rather, consultations were used to ameliorate resistance to unpopular neoliberal macro-economic policies. Furthermore, Members of Parliament and other elected officials along with dissenting civil society organizations (CSOs) were also excluded from the formation process, which was dominated by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) and the World Bank. Resistance Councils (RCs) have been transformed into elite-dominated Local Councils (LCs), which are used to localise control through taxation, funding conditionalities, and the facilitation of land dispossession. CSOs have flourished under ‘good’ governance, but their participation in policy formation is selective, and their dependency on donor funding limit the ability to criticize.
policy. With their existence as a class denied, poor peasants are forced to compete in a neoliberal market economy on an individual basis where they are routinely exploited, and are denied the benefits rich peasants and CSOs receive from ‘pro-poor’ development programs. This data demonstrates that the ‘good’ governance model of participation deployed in Uganda has been a tyrannical system which abets elite political and economic dominance over poor peasants. Therefore, it is the contention of this thesis that participatory governance models are best understood as a new and sophisticated tool of class struggle, wherein elite classes (domestic and international) attempt to politically and economically control and subvert popular classes: a system of elite tyranny over poor peasants.

The language of participation has been rhetorically attractive for those in power; its ubiquitous discourse can be manipulated to legitimise and tyrannically secure the established interests of capital and elite classes, while clandestinely shutting the poor out of national and local policy dialogues. Leaving poor peasants with no discernable political body that reflects their interests as a class – as ‘class’ does not exist in the lexicon of mainstream participation discourse – ‘good’ governance participation effectively amounts to a bourgeois dictatorship masquerading as a benevolent regime of empowerment. Mainstream participation literature – particularly that of the World Bank – imagines rural societies as homogenous communities, thereby permitting the erroneous assumption of identical material needs, interests, and capabilities. Conceived homogeneity implies that development policies are designed on the basis of classless communities, which do not exist in Uganda. Detached from any means of challenging political-economic structures, ‘empowering’ and ‘pro-poor’ programs influenced by
'participation' can therefore be used to reinforce a priori social structures in a class differentiated reality.

There are some limits to this study, however, that must be acknowledged. There is more than one kind of oppression, and social control can extend beyond class to encompass gender, cultural, and ethnic dimensions among others. By concentrating on class, there are likely some powerful criticisms and perhaps justifications of 'good' governance participation not considered in this study. That said, other dimensions of social control are not mutually exclusive to that of class, and by limiting its scope, this thesis is able to provide greater depth to its critique on participation than would have otherwise been possible. Furthermore, while 'good' governance certainly has implications for patriarchy, for example, it is the contention of this thesis that it is class struggle for social control and resistance to control which have primarily shaped the 'good' governance agenda, and therefore its framework of participation.

Concerning the likely conclusions from non-Marxist theoretical perspectives, this study has not provided enough evidence to draw upon. Nonetheless, from the information presented, the likely conclusion from a subalternist perspective is more apparent that of feminism, or others. Subalternists would similarly reject the model of participation deployed in Uganda. Even with a downgraded importance placed on class, the centralization of policy formation leaves little, if any, space for meaningful community-led policy formation. Again, though, such an approach may be blind to the intra-community struggle for social control and disparities presented in this thesis.

Further studies are needed, particularly studies concerning the ability of poor peasants to resist dominance given the brevity of social control embodied by the 'good'
governance agenda. These studies could focus on poor peasant resistance outside institutionalized political avenues, such as social movements. Such studies may also focus on the ability of poor peasants to resist social control in conventional political avenues – that is, political processes circumvented by ‘good’ governance processes, such as parliament and oppositional political parties.

It has been a primary contention of this thesis that poor peasants possess the power to invoke social change. It would be a stretch to assume that the ‘good’ governance agenda has succeeded in entrenching elite social control to such an extent that poor peasants no longer have the capacity to resist control. The elements of social control produced by the agenda, however, which extends what falsely appear to be democratic and participatory processes to every village, may help us understand the lack of powerful peasant movements in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, this explanation must only be considered partial, as the ‘good’ governance agenda is pursued in other locations, such as Latin America, where vibrant peasant movements continue to resist control and advance the interests of poor peasants. Thus, the question must now turn towards how poor peasants in Sub-Saharan Africa may respond to new developments given this new tool used by elites in their struggle for social control – a question becoming increasingly important as the international revaluation of land and occurrences of land grabs and dispossession continue. The recent discovery of oil repositories and the movement towards exploiting this resource in Uganda make this question of prime importance concerning Ugandan poor peasants. The process of social change is ongoing, and we need to know more about how poor peasants will shape future social structures.
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### Appendix:

**Peasant Households in Uganda (Class Averages)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>'Poor' Peasants</th>
<th>'Middle' Peasants</th>
<th>'Rich' Peasants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations (totals)</strong></td>
<td>5200</td>
<td>2373</td>
<td>2575</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household Size (members)</strong></td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Means of Production</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acres of land cultivated by farmstead</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of land with ‘good’ soil</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of labour implements (US$)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of fertilizer applied (US$)</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of pesticides, herbicides and fungicides applied (US$)</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relationship to Means of Production</strong></td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>117.1</td>
<td>151.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour days performed by household</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour days hired</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from homestead to farm (km)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in non-agricultural employment (%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly income from non-agricultural employment (US$)</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Production</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of agricultural output (US$)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of agricultural output per acre (US$)</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of land devoted to traditional subsistence crops (cassava, beans, maize)</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of land devoted to traditional export crops (coffee, banana)</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent who received Naads services</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: applicable figures are given in yearly amounts. Peasant households without direct ownership or user rights to land are not included in this survey, and no reliable figures for landless peasants are available.