Civil Society, Participation, and Regional Integration: Rhetoric and Reality in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)

by

Joel Straker

A Thesis Submitted to
Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts in
International Development Studies

September, 2012, Halifax, Nova Scotia
Copyright Joel Straker, 2012.

Approved: Dr. Anthony O’Malley
Supervisor

Approved: Dr. Henry Veltmeyer
External Examiner

Approved: Dr. Garvin Fridell
Reader

Date: September 24, 2012
Civil Society, Participation, and Regional Integration:
Rhetoric and Reality in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)

By: Joel Straker

Abstract

This thesis examines why the numerous declarations by CARICOM Heads of Government (HoGs) in support of civil society organization (CSO) participation in the regional integration process have not resulted in any tangible, real involvement of CSOs in the institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM. To answer this “why” question, this thesis posits that above and beyond the obvious challenges of providing the necessary framework and capacity building for CSO participation in the CARICOM integration process, the current lack of real and substantive inclusion is rooted in the structure of a representative democratic framework with limited consideration for the principles of a participatory model of democracy. The findings support the concluding position that while the stated commitment (rhetoric) of HoGs to CSO participation is clear, the tangible manifestations (reality) of those statements are lacking, including a framework for participation and capacity building mechanisms for CSOs. This is in keeping with the representative model of democracy, which is characterized by engagement limited to the protective function, and that, subjected to functional and instrumental usage, when amicable and none-threatening of economic and political status quo. This limited engagement precludes the region’s integration project from the educative, integrative, and developmental benefits accessible through civil society participation.

Date: September 24, 2012
Acknowledgment

It is a great pleasure to thank the many individuals who made completing this thesis possible.

I would like to gratefully and sincerely thank my supervisor, Dr. Anthony O’Malley. I am indebted for his stewardship, expertise, and sincere and invaluable guidance throughout every stage of this process. I remain ever grateful to him and would also like to say a heartfelt thank you for everything he has done for me while studying at Saint Mary’s. I extend my special appreciation to the other members of my committee, Dr. Henry Veltmeyer and Dr. Garvin Fridell, for their thorough examination and constructive suggestions. I am also thankful to the faculty in the International Development Studies program.

To my scholarship providers the Organization of American States, I thank you. I also place on record my gratitude to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research and the Office of International Activities for providing financial support for field research.

To my fellow IDS peers, I am indebted for the positive influence, collegial advise, support, friendship and useful forms of diversion. I hasten to extend my special appreciation for my Canadian classmates who imbued in me a sense of this country’s rich history and made my stay extremely enjoyable. This sentiment is also extended to the Neish family who provided me with a ‘home away from home’, my wholehearted thanks.

I greatly appreciate the contributions of the various civil society organizations and individuals in the Caribbean, who took the time out of busy schedules to speak with me, help me find documents and otherwise assist with this research. These organizations deserve special recognitions—the passion and dedication with which they pursue their work inspires me to believe in the power of people to lead change in the region and further afield.

A thank you does not begin to cover what I owe to my family. My sincere and heartfelt gratitude for the love, unceasing prayer, unconditional forbearance and support over the years. Thank you for believing in me and for endlessly inspiring me.

Finally, and most importantly, I am eternally grateful to the Almighty God for his sustaining grace.
Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Map of the Caribbean Regional................................................................. 67
Figure 2: The Organs and Bodies of the CARICOM............................................. 74
Figure 3: Areas of Functional Co-operation within CARICOM ............................... 79
Figure 4: Regional Level Structure – Option 1: Civil Society Council/Ministerial Focal Point Model .............................................................................................................. 204
Figure 5: Regional Level Structure – Option 2: The National/Regional Civil Society Council and Ministerial Focal Point Model .............................................................................................................. 205
Figure 6: Regional Level Structure – Option 3: Enhance Regional Civil Society Council and Ministerial Focal Point Model .............................................................................................................. 206

Table 1: Comparision of Representative and Direct Democracy Models................. 40
Table 2: Political Economy of Economic Integration Initiatives............................ 73
Table 3: Typology of Civil Society in Regional Governance..................................... 92
# Table of Contents

**Abstract** ................................................................................................................................. iii  
**Acknowledgment** ................................................................................................................... iv  
**Figures and Tables** ................................................................................................................... v  

**Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION** ................................................................................................. 1  
Overview ...................................................................................................................................... 1  
The Problematic .......................................................................................................................... 3  
Significance of the Study .............................................................................................................. 4  
Itinerary of Key Concepts ........................................................................................................... 4  
Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 6  
Limitations ................................................................................................................................... 13  
Theoretical Triad .......................................................................................................................... 14  
Data Analysis .............................................................................................................................. 15  
Scope of the Research ................................................................................................................. 17  
Argument ..................................................................................................................................... 19  
Summary of Findings ................................................................................................................... 19  
Outline of Chapters ..................................................................................................................... 21  
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 23  

**Chapter 2: THEORETICAL PATH: Exploring the Literature and Framing the Study** .... 24  
Participation and Participatory Development (PD) in Theory ..................................................... 24  

- A Brief History of Participatory Development ........................................................................... 26  
- Participatory Development: Theoretical Conceptualizations .................................................. 29  
- Participatory Development: Under Theoretical Scrutiny ....................................................... 31  
- Distilling Key Elements Of Participatory Development ......................................................... 34  

Democratic Theory ...................................................................................................................... 36  

- Democracy in Brief .................................................................................................................. 36  
- Models of Democracy Theory ................................................................................................. 38  
- Key Functions of Participation in Democracy and Development ............................................ 44  
- Civil Society ............................................................................................................................. 46  


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Brief History of Organization Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflections on Organisational Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions and Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Implications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter 3: SITUATING THE RESEARCH: CARICOM Regional Integration and the Rhetoric of Civil Society Participation**

**PART I: CARICOM Regional Integration**

- Regional Integration
- CARICOM: The Region
- Historical Overview of Caribbean Regional Integration
- Why Integrate?
- Political Economy of Caribbean Regional Integration
- CARICOM Organizational Mapping
- Mapping CARICOM’s Four Pillars
- On the Cusp of Collapse: Challenges, Issues and Opportunities

**PART II: Regionalizing The Debate—Participatory Rhetoric**

- Gaps in the Literature
- Ethos and Benefits of Civil Society Participation in Regional integration
- General History of Civil Society Participation in the Caribbean Region
- Participatory Rhetoric: Antecedents of Civil Society Engagement in CARICOM

**Conclusion: The Confluence: Civil Society, Participation, and CARICOM**

**Chapter 4: PRESENTATION OF FIELD RESEARCH DATA: The Reality of Civil Society Participation in CARICOM**

**Introduction**

1. Participation
2. Potential Contributions of CS to Regional Integration
3. Considerations for a Framework for Participation
4. Constraints on Civil Society Participation in Regional Integration
5. Institutional Approaches to the Integration Challenge of Participation

**Conclusion**

**Chapter 5: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION: Rhetoric and Realty of Civil Society Participation in CARICOM**
Chapter 1:

INTRODUCTION

Overview

Development is increasingly being undertaken through regional integration (RI) projects. One such project is the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a regional organization, comprising fifteen countries\(^1\), with the principal objectives of economic integration, functional cooperation, foreign policy coordination, and security (CARICOM, 2001). Almost without exception, stakeholders in the region view integration as an indispensable part of Caribbean development. Pursuant to achieving its objectives, the process of policy development embarked upon over the thirty-nine years history of CARICOM has been punctuated with numerous declarations, affirmations, and commitments\(^2\) by regional Heads of Government (HoGs)\(^3\) to implement civil society (CS) participation in the formal institutions and mechanisms of integration. Stated differently, these declarations can be regarded as attempts to democratize\(^4\) the development policy process that drives

---

\(^1\) CARICOM member countries: Antigua and Barbuda; the Bahamas (a member of the Community but not the Common Market); Barbados; Belize; Dominica; Grenada; Guyana; Haiti; Jamaica; Montserrat; St. Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; St. Vincent and the Grenadines; Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago.

\(^2\) ‘Declarations’, ‘affirmations’, and ‘commitments’ are referred to collectively as the ‘antecedents’ or the ‘rhetoric’ of participation in CARICOM.

\(^3\) Heads of Government (HoGs) is used interchangeably with and taken to mean, policy makers and decision makers who have official responsibility for governing the integration project.

CARICOM RI. Up until now, however, these attempts have encountered implementation deficits and, consequently, there is widespread dissatisfaction among stakeholders with the outcome of these attempts (Bishop & Payne, 2010; Girvan, 2011a; Girvan, 2011b).

Perhaps accordingly, CARICOM is felt to be “distant from the ‘man in the street’ and that there is little awareness, let alone buy-in, of ordinary citizens or organisations outside of a limited circle of officials” (Bishop & Payne, 2010, p. 18). At the same time the prognosis ascribed to CARICOM is grave, it is afflicted by “a multiple crisis—a crisis of implementation, of credibility and—dare I say—of legitimacy” (Girvan, 2011a, p. 1). In view of this CS engagement has attracted increased attention. This attention is conceivably predicated on the need to address the deficit of participation and to tap into the needed ‘value add’ that CS participation can bring to the integration project. As stated already, several antecedents to CS participation have marked CARICOM’s history. The ethos (though not to be construed with a formal mechanism of participation) for engaging CS is rooted in the ‘Treaty of Chaguaramas’ (1973, revised 2001). Subsequent iterations of engagement were elaborated in the following: ‘The Grande Anse Declaration’ (1989); ‘The CARICOM Charter of Civil Society’ (1997); the ‘Liliendaal Statement of Principles on Forward Together’ (2003), and the ‘CARICOM Civil Society Participation and Engagement in Regional Integration Project’. In sum, these antecedents have not resulted in formal and predictable participation by CS in the institutions and mechanisms CARICOM.
The Problematic

Evidently, actualizing CS participation in CARICOM RI is problematic. Even though HoGs have publically acceded to engage with CS and CSOs have expressed their concomitant desire at this juncture the level and depth of participation envisioned by all parties have not materialized. This is possibly because beyond the numerous declarations that advocate for participation CSOs require capacity building and resources to participate. Moreover, the repeated failure of these antecedents suggests additional factors maybe impacting the actualization of CS participation in CARICOM.

This thesis responds to the need to understand the context and complexities surrounding actualizing civil society participation in CARICOM RI. This thesis therefore seeks to examine the following question:

**Why is it the case that numerous declarations by CARICOM Heads of Government in support of CSO participation in the regional integration process have not resulted in any tangible, real involvement of CSOs in the institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM?**

In order to examine the research question this introductory chapter sets out the direction the research will take by providing the conceptual framework and methodological base. Henceforth, the chapter: elaborates the rationale of this study; details the methodological approach; provides a theoretical brief; establishes the delimitations and scope of the
study, proffers the argument and summary of findings, and outlines the structure of the thesis.

**Significance of the Study**

This study takes on significance because of the importance attached to the area of research: firstly, CARICOM occupies centrality as a key strategy for development and attenuating the impacts of globalization on region; and, secondly, increased value is being ascribed to CS as interlocutors and key development actors in the region.

Generally, this study seeks to contribute to the development and advancement of the literature on civil society participation. This topic has excited practitioners and the academic community alike. This excitement is underscored by the need to explore the concepts of civil society and participation as empirical rather than abstract phenomena and to understand the value and benefits of participation. Specifically, this thesis aims to identify and detail of key factors impacting, and requirements for, actualizing CS participation in CARICOM. The findings of this thesis may form the basis of further empirical inquiry on civil society participation in RI and the recommendations may help in the development of future participatory initiatives in CARICOM.

**Itinerary of Key Concepts**

This section plots outs, in brief, the key concepts employed in this thesis. This itinerary is
useful at this point since these concepts—regional integration, civil society, and participation—are referenced heavily and with fair exactitude throughout this thesis.

**Participation**

What is participation? The debate on participation is wide and far-reaching. This debate will be explored in Chapter 2. For this thesis, participation is defined as: “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources which affect them” (The World Bank, 1994, p. xi). Stakeholders are defined as “those affected by the outcome—negatively or positively—or those who can affect the outcome of a proposed intervention” (The World Bank, 1996, p. 125).

**Civil Society**

The concept of civil society animates development thinkers globally. Some scholars, according to Jude Howell, “have shunned the use of civil society, pointing to its conceptual fuzziness, ideological impregnation, and referential ambiguity” (Howell & Pearce, 2001, p. 111). In the Caribbean, the concept of civil society has sustained the similar nebulosity it carries in the international community. In this thesis, civil society is taken to mean: organization/entities operating outside of the tri-partite partnership of government, labour and the private sector (CPDC, 2011). The activities of these organizations fall within the realm of not-for-profit and are viewed as having a focus on development. A typology of these organizations would include: non-governmental organizations, non-profit organizations, foundations, community based organizations, voluntary organizations and other collectives of citizens organized around a particular goal or set of interests. This patchwork of entities attests to the breadth and scope of civil
society organizations in the Caribbean, and connectedly, their (potential) importance as development actors in both the national and regional space. The contestations surrounding the concept of civil society will be dwelled on in Chapter 2.

**Regional Integration**

Van Langenhove and Costea argue that the concept of regional integration acquired varying meanings as a result of several successive waves of regionalism during the last century (2007). Soomer posits, “regional integration can be described in two ways, as a *process* and as an *outcome*” (2003, p. 1). As a process, it entails a country’s willingness to share or unify into a larger whole and as an outcome, regional integration occurs when established criteria are met (ibid). The wider discourse surrounding the concept of regional integration will be examined in Chapter 3. However, in this thesis, regional integration is referred to as: the coming together of two or more countries that are geographically close to each other and/or that share common problems, normally through reciprocal preferential agreements, for purposes of safeguarding or promoting issues of common interest to the participating countries through harmonization of their respective policies.

**Methodology**

This section details the method and techniques used for data collection and analysis. This section includes: the sources of data, the sampling technique, theoretical lens of analysis, and method of analysis.
Stake, in Hammersley and Gomm, states, “research should be done not to increase the already existing multitude of research studies, but to further understanding” (2000, p. 20). This thesis research hopes to build upon the already existing knowledge by furthering the understanding of the intersection of civil society, participation, and regional integration. The particular aspect being introduced is an understanding of the nuanced context and complexities surrounding actualizing civil society participation in CARICOM. The research question outlined earlier provides the avenue through which to explore this understanding. This question is explored using qualitative methods and data acquisition techniques, which are outlined below.

**Qualitative Methods**

Traditionally, methodological approaches have been subsumed under two main paradigms, the qualitative and quantitative (Daly, 2003). Babbie and Mouton (2001) suggests that the selection of a methodological approach is dependent on: the aims and objectives of the study, the nature of the phenomenon, and the underlying theory. With due consideration of the espousals of Babbie and Mouton (2001), the substantive themes of this study are best explored through the qualitative method and data acquisition techniques, which places special importance on the narratives of participants. Accordingly, the “demonstrable effort to produce rich and relevant detailed descriptions and particularized interpretations” is seen as a defining feature of qualitative research (Given, 2008, p. 893). The aforementioned are both priorities of this research.
Data Collection

Primary and secondary methods of data collection were used to probe the research questions. The data collection itinerary was as follows: firstly, a significant review of literature and document analysis was undertaken; secondly, qualitative field research was embarked upon, this comprised key informant and elite interviews, observation, and document collection; and thirdly, (post field research) field documents and supplementary literature review, analysis, and theorizing were carried out.

Primary Data

Comprising semi-structured interviews, field research was undertaken from July to August 2011 in the CARICOM member countries of Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. In addition to conducting interviews while in the field, I engaged in observation, by attended academic lectures and public discussions—these forums offered venues to engage in informal talk on the substantive themes under focus and a chance to generate a finer understanding of the issues at play in the Caribbean. Additionally, being in the Caribbean provided the opportunity to garner relevant documents that would have been inaccessible outside of the region or without permission and assistance of the publishing organization.

Interviews

With the focus on CS participation in CARICOM, key informant interviews were conducted with CSO executives from a range of institutional identities, as well as, elite interviews with well-placed experts on the topic—individuals knowledgeable by virtue of
their engagement with the CSO sector and CARICOM. Each interviewee was asked a series of semi-structured questions was allowed to expand freely on what he/she considers to be of importance. Generally, interviews were used as an exploratory process; a means to probe the research focus and question in under examination, thoroughly.

Early in the field research process, interviews were recorded by hand. However, after the ‘initial’ interview guides were refined (see Appendix I) and the research questions fully developed, a digital recorder was used to record interviews once the participant consented. Brief notes were taken in all recorded interviews, revisited and augmented with details, where required, after the interviews. The interviews were transcribed within the two-month period following field research. Recording and transcribing interviews were important means to preserve the integrity of the research and to provide the chance to use the exact words of respondents in the presentation of field research data and analysis (Silverman, 2005, p. 184).

Interviews were conducted in two parts. Part one sort to garner an organizational profile and perspectives on CARICOM RI, including: support for regional integration, principle concerns in relation to regional integration, and attitudes toward engagement. Part two focused on the fundamental and technical issues involved in realizing participation: what should constitute participation, the benefits of CS participation, CSO capacity to participate, constraints on participation, policy changes needs to realize participation, and suitable mechanisms for participation. In summary, part one provides an understanding of
the attitude toward participation and part two allow for patterns, similarities and/or differences to be extracted in relation to the complexities surrounding actualizing participation.

**Sampling**

“Qualitative research is a form of empirical inquiry that typically entails some form of purposive sampling for information-rich cases” (Given, 2008, p. 893). This is to say, samples are chosen for how well they typify or illuminate the characteristics of a certain demographic or class of what is being studied. This approach is embedded in qualitative data collection techniques and supports data analysis and interpretation that goes beyond the surface of the data generated. To comment further on this feature of qualitative research, it must be established that since qualitative research is based on or its emphasis is on gaining a penetrated understanding of particular events, cases or phenomena, its samples are generally small, non-representative and non-probability based but geared to producing idiosyncratic knowledge. This idiosyncratic knowledge is expressed (generally) in narrative, which allow for the richness and complexity of the experience to be elucidated.

This thesis research utilizes purposive sampling. As stated earlier, semi-structured interviewed were conducted. Since the quantum of organizations that constitute ‘civil society’ in the Caribbean region is large and amorphous, the deliberate strategy was to privilege umbrella CSOs at both the nation and regional level, and the sector/issue level (for example, the association of women’s NGOs—taken to represent the pool of women’s
organizations in the country). By employing this approach, it was felt that these organizations would have both a firm grasp of their experience as ‘unitary’ organization and would also be able to iterate the realities facing the composite of organization affiliated with them. Moreover, these organizations can be viewed as being at the forefront of (past and/or current) interface with policy makers by dint of their ‘representative’ status and the tendency to engage these types of organizations for prior mentioned reasons. Accordingly, one can contend that these organizations are best suited to provide experiential accounts on the topic under focus.

One must hasten to add, umbrella organizations are only so few and therefore did not serve at the solitary constituency from which participants were drawn. ‘Non-umbrella’ or ‘unitary’ CSOs formed part of the interview sample. Additionally, to diversify and fortify the data collected exercise, a few well-placed experts (mainly academics) completed the total sample of participants interviewed for this study.

In sum, guided by the choice of qualitative methods, interviews served as an extremely useful data collection technique for developing a holistic understanding of the context and complexities surrounding civil society participation in the CARICOM, gauged from a diverse sample of participants. Moreover, interviews were also useful as a triangulation tool (in verifying statements made by other interviewees and in giving credence to espousals based in documentary reports).
Secondary Data

Secondary data for this thesis was obtained from a plethora of sources, which are identified below:

- Reports from studies undertaken by CARICOM as well as governmental and donor agencies on the region;
- Reports from studies undertaken by civil society groups and other interested parties; and
- Literature from books, academic and newspaper articles, consultancy reports, speeches, communiqués, credible websites, (namely, the CARICOM Secretariat) and other relevant publications and texts.

Documentary sources were indispensable sources of information for this thesis. These sources helped to develop and fashion the research focus, to map the problematic, theoretically locate the realities surrounding the substantive themes of focus, and to distill and analyze the research findings. Moreover, documentary sources were important triangulating aids in facilitating the verification of some of the statements or positions ventilated by interviewees.

To be brief, the rationale for the primary and secondary methods used for data collection in this thesis was very useful in elaborating a clear and plausible argument. Notably, interviews and documentary sources were crucial as they helped to shed light on the little researched area of actualizing formal and predictable CSO participation in CARICOM.
Limitations

All research necessarily involves some compromise. The main limitations that can be leveled against this thesis study are its small sample and the concentration of field data collection within only three of the fifteen countries that comprise CARICOM: Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. These limitations are primarily due to time and resource constraints.

To counteract these apparent weaknesses several considerations were implemented at key inflection points in the data collection process. For instance, although this research was limited in terms of geographical coverage the total sample was selected to comprise a diverse group of organizations and individuals who represented sectorial, national, and regional perspectives. These nomenclatures aided, through their inherent ‘focal point’ qualities, in accessing the specific concerns of the broader base of CSOs. As a result, the probability of skews in the data garnered was minimized. Additionally, the use of a plethora of secondary sources including regional reports and studies served to triangulate the finding generated from the primary research. Moreover, the process of observation while in the field provided important insight on the topic and served as a supplement to the aforementioned considerations.

Despite the limitations of a relatively small sample and geographic scope instituting measures at key junctures can serve to counteract the potential effects of such limitations. In sum, this research does provide key insight into CS participation in the context of RI,
their potential contributions to a RI project, as well as, the factors impacting actualizing formal and predictable participation in such schemes.

**Theoretical Triad**

To investigate the central research question of this thesis, I have chosen three theories (theoretical triad) or ‘lines of inquiry’ through which to examine the topic: 1) participatory development theory; 2) democratic theory; 3) organizational theory. I thought this triad most relevant, and propitious to probe the research question, support data interpretation, discussion and analysis, and, moreover, that it would provide a basis from which conclusions can be drawn and recommendations proffered. It is worth noting, at this juncture, that the triad of theories is taken to hold not order of hierarchy and are thus sequenced purely on preference.

Participation development theory attends to the necessity to situate this research project in the development vein, an interdisciplinary vein. More importantly, it offers the compass with which to locate the raison d'etre of the concerted efforts to actualize CS participation in the CARICOM.

Enmeshed in CARICOM RI are both the desire to develop and attenuate the impact of globalization and the desire of ‘the people’, the Caribbean citizenry, to fashion their advancement. “It is our Caribbean and our future” (CPDC, 2002, p. 3). At essence, those are the sentiments of the collective body of civil society organizations in the region. In
the regional context, the Caribbean citizenry is collectivized as civil society. For this reason, the relationship between democratic theory and civil society, and the approach of democratic theory towards civil society is significant in the analysis of the approach of CARICOM vis-à-vis the engagement of people in the RI process. Through this lens and stream of analysis overarching light would be shed on the central research question of this thesis.

Completing the triad is organizational theory. Since it is the much avowed and much recommended goal of regional policy makers to engage CS, and the concomitant desire of CS to be fully participative in the process of integration, organizational theory lends an angle of analysis of civil society different from that of democratic theory. Organizational theory permits an investigation of whether CSOs are capable of formal and predicable involvement in CARICOM. An assessment of their capacity to and the organizational imperatives required for meaningful involvement are buried within this theory. In précis, this theory will assist in answering how to enable CS participation the RI process.

Having establishes the suitability of the abovementioned theories (participatory development, democratic, and organizational) for this thesis the discussion to follow will focus on data analysis.

**Data Analysis**

This research is generally descriptive in design as guided by the central research question
and theoretical framework. One purpose of the theoretical framework is that it acts as the analytical lens through which the empirical findings are analyzed. Data analysis in this thesis is based primarily on the country studies undertaken in Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. These cases serve in an instrumental way on the macro level (the regional level, CARICOM), to “provide insights into, or refine theoretical explanation, making it more generalizable” (Berg, 2009, p. 326). In addition, the empirical data from key informant and elite interviewees in the three countries allow for micro level analysis; recognition of the intrinsic aspects a particular organization and country, and *ipso facto* separate intrinsic case studies.

With respect to the specificities of the data analysis process, utilizing the triad of theories to examine the data garnered, *ad-hoc meaning generation* was applied to the interview manuscripts (Kvale, 1996, p. 189). To elaborate, firstly, interviews were transcribed in entirety with only small irrelevant sections excluded from the transcriptions. The transcripts were then read as a whole to get the general feeling of what kind of information was generated. They were then read a second time (and third time where necessary), and important sections were isolated for further analysis (Gerson & Horowitz, 2003). Nodes (focal areas) were then formed, statements grouped and enumerated in order to determine how many times similar sentiments were expressed amongst the interviewees, noting patterns and similarities in the texts. Contrasting views were highlighted as being important in gauging how diverse parties felt about the specific issues. In the final analysis, patterns were clearly developed and a battery of finding emerged (see Chapter 4).
Analysis is divided into five sections based on focal areas distilled from the field data. The focal areas are as follows: 1) participation; 2) potential contribution of CSOs to RI; 3) considerations for a model framework for participation; 4) constraints to CS participation; and 5) institutional approaches to the integration challenge of participation. Each focal area is assessed through the lens of participatory development, democratic, and organizational theory. Out of necessity, there is a degree of historicized and politicized analysis of the data garnered.

Scope of the Research

It is important at this point to provide a note on the scope of this thesis. This thesis will gather from CS their views on participation and why CS participation in the formal institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM has not materialized. These primary findings will be combined with secondary sources on participation in CARICOM and accessed through the theoretical triad to arrive at an empirically supported conclusion.

This thesis does not examine if integration is desirable, though it establishes that CS support integration and want to participate. Also, while this study looks, as part of its objective, at the 'terms' that may inform a framework for actualizing participation, it does not venture into the actual formulation of a framework (for work on model frameworks see Appendix V and (CPDC, 2011)). What is study offers are perspectives that seek to clarify and explain 'current' participatory practices (rhetoric and reality), and seeks to posit views on 'future' participation using empirical data and analytical purchase derived
from relevant theories.

Also, this thesis does hold as an objective the macro issue of democracy, that is to say, if CARICOM countries practice representative or direct participatory democracy. However, what it does look at are the (democratic) principles that emanate from the declarations and history of CS participation. While it is obvious that the former feels the latter in some way, for rigor and the obligatory demands of focus and analysis, this study treats with the narrow target pinpointed.

Further, though reverberations of the debate on democracy chime repeatedly throughout this thesis the project steers away from academic debate on development and democracy. Again, the focus is not on if and weather CARICOM member states are democratic or what type of democracy they employ, what is sort is evidence of their approach to CS engagement. Such evidence will provide the basis to a well-reasoned conclusion.

It is worth noting that CARICOM countries have both a history of democracy and participatory engagement, various antecedents speak to this history. Also worth noting is that participatory engagement exists in both form of democracy (this thesis explores representative and direct democracy), however, the quality and rationale of participation differs. Importantly, the uptake of one approach should not be deemed as the total disregard or the other. Therefore, an examination of the participation can therefore unearth which form it being employed as the dominant framework.
Argument

I will argue that above and beyond the obvious challenges of providing the necessary framework and capacity building for CSO participation in the Caribbean integration process, the current lack of real and substantive inclusion is rooted in the structure of a representative democratic framework with limited consideration for the principles of a participatory model of democracy.

Summary of Findings

The primarily aim of this research was to undertake a study of CS participation in CARICOM regional integration, with the research question being:

Why is it the case that numerous declarations by CARICOM Heads of Government in support of CSO participation in the regional integration process have not resulted in any tangible, real involvement of CSOs in the institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM?

The statements below adumbrate the major findings.

1. On the basis of CSOs own analysis and recommended actions the sector face significant constraints to meaningful participation.
2. CS places a high premium on what they can contribute to the RI project; this includes technical expertise, alternative viewpoints, policy coherence, improved governance and legitimacy.

3. Repeated experiences have led to the opinion that political leaders have no genuine commitment to engage civil society. Consequently, the participatory process is heavily burdened by suspicion.

4. Field data indicates that civil society engagement must be predicated on the following key requirements:
   - A new paradigm of engagement where CS contributions are valued
   - An institutional framework to support CSO capacity building
   - A participatory framework/mechanism which is open and accountable

5. Participatory engagement between CS and government in the region is limited to ad hoc and amicable engagement (the protective function) and does not extend to the integrative, education and developmental functions.

6. Considered from the perspectives of the primary and secondary data, the failure to implement a framework for participation, capacity building mechanisms, suspicions of a lack of genuine intent, and the history of ad hoc and limited engagement, it can be concluded that the participatory processes are informed by the protective principles of a representative democracy framework as opposed to the deeper integrative, educative and developmental processes of direct democracy.
Outline of Chapters

Chapter 1 is an introduction of the research topic, research question, rationale, objective, methodology and argument of the thesis. This introductory chapter provided a guided discussion that framed the research direction of the thesis. The organization of the remainder of this thesis is presented below.

Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical point through which the substantive focal areas of this thesis will be analysed, and explores the landscape of debates on those areas. The chapter discusses the theories of participatory development, democracy, and organizations, which were introduced in this first chapter. The background, major contributors to, and facets of each theory that are germane to the study are delineated. Specifically, this chapter plots the debates regarding participation and civil society. The chapter is brought to a close with a focused discussion, which sums-up the theories, and teases out the implications for the research project.

Chapter 3 has two parts. Part I provides the context of the study—the CARICOM Caribbean. In so doing, the chapter presents an outline of the concept of RI, historically sketches Caribbean RI, reflects on the region’s political and socio-economic landscape, and the current state of RI. Part II dovetails off Chapter 2 and Part I by moving the discussion of CS participation from the general to the specific; that is to say, the chapter ‘regionalizes’ the debate. The ethos and benefits of CS participation in RI is presented together with the history of CSO participation in the Caribbean. To conclude, the
discussion is docked by cataloguing the participatory rhetoric of CARICOM; the antecedents of CSO participation. From this vantage point, one would be will primed to process the empirical unearthing of the study.

Chapter 4 outlines the key findings of the research based on primary data collected in the Caribbean. The empirical data is drawn from the fieldwork in Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. The focus of this chapter is to provide a distilled account of the findings.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion and analytical examination of the empirical data in line with the questions fielded in the primary data gathering process. This discussion and analysis dwells on the five focal areas that emerged from the finding in the context of the historical/political economy context presented in Chapter 3 (Part I) and the theoretical debates outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 (Part II). This examination is augmented by secondary data and seeks to uncover the dynamics at play in the attempts at civil society participation in CARICOM.

Chapter 6 concludes the thesis, it pulls together the findings, links these to the grounding chapters, clarifies the findings, offers recommendations, and, finally, emphasises the significance of the argument of the thesis.
Conclusion

This chapter has set out a clear elaboration of the research direction of this thesis. The chapter has placed the research within a coherent framework by detailing the broad parameters of the study. It has provided the rationale of the study, methodological approach, method of data analysis, theoretical framework, limitations, and proffer the argument, summary of findings and overall structure of the thesis.

The next chapter focuses on these theories used in this thesis, referred to as ‘the triad’ or ‘theoretical triad’ in this study. The three theories chosen provide a strong explanatory framework for the unfolding processes of civil society participation in regional integration.
Chapter 2:

THEORETICAL PATH:
Exploring the Literature and Framing the Study

People today have an urge—an impatient urges—to participate in the events and processes that shape their lives.... if properly nurtured in a responsive national[,] regional[,] and global framework, it can also become a source of tremendous vitality and innovation for the creation of new and more just societies. (UNDP, 1993, p. 1).

This chapter explicates the theoretical lines of inquiry used to explore the research question of this thesis. In so doing, this chapter acts as a primer for understanding the context and complexities surrounding actualizing civil society participation CARICOM. The theoretical triad of participatory development, democracy and organizational development, introduced in the first chapter, are detailed. Ultimately, the findings of this thesis will be discussed in terms of how they relate to this triad.

Participation and Participatory Development (PD) in Theory

What is participation? The concept of participation is rooted in (participatory) democracy, which is guided by the idea that people should be involved in the affairs of their well-being. Notionally, participation (in development) emerged in the 1970s in the ideas of Freire (1972) and Rahman (1995), whose espousals advanced the need for what Martinussen called “development-by-people” (1997, p. 41). Martinussen states, “the development-by-people approach regards popular participation as a goal in itself, and as
the process through which other development goals must be defined” (ibid). Freire contends, “development can only be achieved when humans are ‘beings for themselves’, when they possess their own decision-making powers, free of oppressive and dehumanizing circumstances; it is the ‘struggle to be more fully human’” (1972, p. 29). Chambers (1983, 1994, 1997), a contemporary of the aforementioned, brought participation into mainstream development by emphasizing Participatory Rural Appraisal. For Chambers, participation is where “the positivist, reductionist, mechanistic, standardized-package, top-down models and development blueprints are rejected, and in which multiple, local, and individual realities are recognized, accepted, enhanced and celebrated” (1997, p. 188). In today’s terms, those ideas form the summary basis of participatory development; simply put, development undertakings characterized by broad based stakeholder involvement.

The participatory approach to development and development policy formulation is considered to have numerous benefits or attractions (Chambers, 1993). Before reflecting on these benefits or attractions, a definition of participation is worth exploring. 'Participation' is a contested term with multiple interpretations that range from manipulative participation, consultative participation, and interactive participation to self-mobilisation (Pretty J. N., 1995; Sarkissian, Walsh, & Cook, 1997). The volition to engage and enable people’s participation is viewed as democratizing development and the decision-making processes (White, 1996). As a method of change, participation is viewed as a means to develop the voice and organisational capacities of those previously excluded, e.g. women, indigenous peoples or minorities (ibid). For this thesis,
participation is referred to as: “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources which affect them” (The World Bank, 1994, p. ix). Stakeholders are “those affected by the outcome—negatively or positively—or those who can affect the outcome of a proposed intervention” (The World Bank, 1996, p. 125). Proponents (Chambers 1993; The World Bank 1994, 1996; et al.) posit that participation contributes to the practices of ‘good governance’® and a slew of other benefits. “Good governance” is generally understood to mean an array of practices that maximize the common/public good” (Veltmeyer, 2008, p. 228). According to Veltmeyer, participatory relationships between government and social organization “conforms to the following ‘democratic’ principles: transparency, effectiveness, openness, responsiveness, and accountability; the rule of law, acceptance of diversity and pluralism, and social inclusiveness” (ibid). Moreover, civil society participation is seen as promoting partnership, building ownership, and as a complementary role in the development process premised on the notions of ‘sustainability’ and ‘empowerment’ (Blackburn, Chambers, & Gaventa, 2000). The origins and further debates on participatory development are explored in the sections to follow.

A Brief History of Participatory Development

Since its launch after the Second World War, over the decades international development has changed (Nelson & Wright, 1995; Gardner & Lewis, 1997; Willis, 2005). The

® ‘Good Governance’ implies a democratic regime in which the responsibility for human security and political order is not restricted to the government and other institutions of the state but is widely shared by different civil society organizations (UNDP 1996; World Bank 1994).
dominant discourse of development was born when institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations (UN) agencies shifted their focus from the reconstruction of post-war Europe to “a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (President Truman cited in Gardner and Lewis 1997:6). In the thirty years to follow, it became apparent that “conventional, technocratic, top-down forms of development” had not yielded the benefits envisioned (Nelson & Wright, 1995, p. 5). The problem was traced to the alienation of beneficiaries; the prescribed remedy was their participation in development. Some also believed that, due to the failed agenda of the post-colonial state, beneficiary involvement ought to enable self-sufficiency and people’s independence from the state. This viewpoint aligned with the World Bank’s neo-liberalist structural adjustment policies, which “moved functions from the state to the private and non-governmental sectors” (ibid). Expediently, CS (more particularly NGOs) were seen as especially apt for promoting participation—“operating at the grassroots level, close to the poorest of the poor” (Lane, 1995, p. 182).

However, towards the end of the 1980s, structural adjustment policies were attacked due to their adverse effects on vulnerable groups (Mayo, 2001; Nelson & Wright, 1995). In addition, “the premise for strategic aid” that existed during the Cold War collapsed along with communism, resulting in “aid-fatigue among the western countries” (Khun, 1998, p. 19). Calls were made from the North, as well as from the South, for a reconceptualization of development which would combine people’s participation in economic growth and in government decision-making, and equality in access to basic services (Nelson & Wright,
Several bilateral agencies experimented with new participatory approaches and soon the World Bank established the ‘Learning Group on Participatory Development’. The Group produced a report in 1994, where beneficiaries were named as stakeholders and participation was seen as “a process through which stakeholders’ influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources which affect them” (The World Bank, 1996, p. 125).

In contrast to the 1980s, during the decade of the 1900s and onward, donors have begun to return ownership over development from the private sector to governments; a trend that Mosse labels the “post-Washington consensus” (2005, p. 193). In this context, people’s participation implies partnership with the state as a sustainable long-term development strategy. Mohanty (2007) explains, this latest form of participation in terms of citizenship and democracy, arguing that the emphasis today is on making governance institutions responsive, transparent and accountable to citizens. Similarly, Cornwall and Coelho write that:

“Enabling citizens to engage directly in local problem-solving activities and to make their demands directly to state bodies is believed to improve understanding, and contribute to improving the quality of definition and implementation of public programs and policies. These policies and programs are seen, in turn, as contributing to guaranteeing the access of the poorest to social services, thus enhancing prospects for economic and political inclusion, and for development” (2007, p. 5).
Who are the people who have been identified as participants? Chambers writes that although “practice has lagged behind the rhetoric”, more and more constituencies have been invited to participate, including women, poor people, ethnic and religious minorities, refugees, the disabled, and the very old (1998, p. xvi). Its rich and clamorous history has meant that participation and participatory development have been examined with much fervor. The discussions to follow dwell on the key facets of the theory.

**Participatory Development: Theoretical Conceptualizations**

A number of theorists have cautioned against using and interpreting the term participation uncritically as it can mean many different things and carry different implications (Pretty & Scoones, 1995). The corollary to this is that there are no universal definitions of participatory development (the same has already been said for participation, as discussed earlier). What is seen are diverse ideologies, all reflective of the broader goals that participation might achieve. What then are the gains of having people participate?

One view is the *instrumental* (referred to as the ‘institutional perspective’ in some literature) in which participation increases the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of 'formal' development programs (Craig & Mayo, 1995). This view is built on the premise that the broad goals of development are valid, however, the institutional practices are not working, but can be improved through direct involvement of the beneficiaries who then aid in achieving pre-established goals.
Another view is that participation is part of a *transformative* agenda (referenced in some literature as the ‘social movement perspective’), which might be anti-developmental (Esteva & Prakash, 1998). This stance adopts the posture that 'development' itself is flawed and only by valorising other, non-hegemonic voices can meaningful social change occur. In this vein, people can be empowered to take their own initiative, which some theorist view as the only true form of participation (ibid). In today’s development discourse, this empowering form is the ultimate and most fashionable form of participation.

These conceptualisations, while useful, are still rather general. Rahnema suggests that participatory development involves the following core elements:

- **Cognitive** in order to generate a "different mode of understanding the realities to be addressed" (1997, p. 121)
- **Political** in "empowering the voiceless" (ibid)
- **Instrumental** in order to "propose new alternatives" (ibid)

In spite of these differences in conceptualization, there has been a growing acceptance regarding the importance of popular involvement. At the root of this 'consensus' is the belief in not relying on the state—the prime institution of modernity—for development. According to Toye (1987) it might not have been coincidental that participatory development gained popularity around the same time as the neo-liberal counter-revolution of the early 1980s with its discourse of self-help and individualism.
Participatory Development: Under Theoretical Scrutiny

The conceptual differences cited above, coupled with the popularity of PD has occasioned much attention its way, a lot of which has been critical. A number of authors have noted the theme of the limited potential of participatory development to alter wider social structures. For example, Pretty and Scoones draw attention to the difficulties for local level institutions to influence state policies, or to tackle “problems arising out of the wider political context” (1995, p. 162). Willis writes, “the scope of ‘people-centered development’ will remain limited by the broader structural factors, particularly at a global scale” (2005, p. 208). Willis in this context cites the “continued faith in the market as the key actor in development” and the theoretical context of neo-liberalism which “shapes so much of international development policy today” (ibid). As a result of these espousals a charge has been leveled that PD depoliticizes or “undermines resistance” (Nelson & Wright, 1995, p. 11).

Critics have scrutinized certain structures at both the macro and micro level to demonstrate the shortcomings of PD. Regarding macro structures, many theorist have explored the “bureaucratic exigencies” (Mosse, 2002, p. 24) or, in other terms, the “organizational demands” of development (Kapoor, 2005, p. 1211). These theorist, among others, assert that organizational demands eclipse the needs of beneficiaries because the implementing agencies (most frequently NGOs) are accountable to donors (upward accountability) rather than to the beneficiaries (Wallace, 2004). Gardner and Lewis (1997) posit, PD cannot be fully participatory as long as the bureaucratic structures
remain intact—the guise of participation is preserved. As a result, some writers argue that PD is the latest trend in development a “politically desirable development idea” where participation “can be made into a commodity and marketed” (Mosse, 2003, p. 66).

Connectedly, another macro level constraint of PD has captured attention. Cornwall and Coelho assert that the committed involvement of state actors is decisive for the success of participatory projects, as they are the ones who plan and deliver services (2007). The authors rightly ask, “what is it that motivates state officials to participate and to follow through on decision arrived at in these spaces…rather than resorting to quicker and more authoritarian decision-making processes? And what do they get out of participating in the participatory sphere?” (2007, p. 19). The authors suggest governments might engage in participation “as a strategy that seeks to cultivate allies, strengthen networks and gain votes” (ibid).

At the micro level, there are several challenges to effective participation. Firstly, people may have their own reasons for non-participation and those are not restricted to work demands, or inappropriate timing and place of participatory activities (Gardner & Lewis, 1997). For instance, people might lack confidence or the knowledge necessary for “participation in public processes” (Mahmud, 2007, p. 58). People may also be unwilling to spend time and effort on actions “that do not have direct and immediate relevance for their livelihoods” (ibid, p. 58). In addition, people may be suspicious of ‘outsiders’/‘developers’ intentions, especially, in instance of previous negative experience (Mosse, 2005). Sibley (1998) suggests that there might be aspects of culture
which may place a group apart from the dominant society and, in which the group is not willing to relinquish it in the event of incorporation into the larger society (also see Sibley (1995)). Another reason could be political, such as when more powerful groups in a community monopolize the participatory process leaving the less powerful groups frustrated (Eyben & Ladbury, 1995).

Many authors have criticized participatory development for its underlying assumptions regarding communities or, as Cleaver calls it, the “myths of ‘community’” (1999, p. 609). In fact, the concept of community is “often used by state and other organizations, rather than the people themselves, and it carries connotations of consensus” (Nelson and Wright cited in Mohan (2002, p. 160)), homogeneity (Eyben & Ladbury, 1995; Williams, 2004) and solidarity (Cleaver, 1999). Eyben and Ladbury warn that this idealized notion of community is “a real barrier to understanding the dynamics of participation and explaining the circumstances in which participation does, and does not occur” (1995, p. 194). Precisely because participatory policies tend to be naïve with respect to political issues, “dominant power structures in the local communities are reproduced” (Henkel & Stirrat, 2002, p. 171). In other words, participation amongst the poorer and more marginalized sections of society is likely to be obstructed (Cornwall & Coelho, 2007), even when they appear to be participating.

Finally, Mosse (Mosse, 1994) points out that the domination by the most powerful sections in a community is not always evident because it does not exclusively take place through competitions or confrontation, but more significantly through consensus. The
process of consensus-building points to another limitation of PD. Mosse is particularly concerned with the way in which consensus not only excludes the less powerful voices, but also expresses a unity of option, termed “the official view” (1994, p. 508). The ‘official view’ conceals the diverging or even conflicting views of local reality. Williams suggests, “to take the ‘incorporation’ of participatory events at face value is to ignore people’s ability for feigned compliance and tactical (and self-interested) engagement” (2004, p. 565). Williams calls our attention to the “space for unintended consequences, both positive and negative”, which is always present within participatory development (ibid, p. 565). White concludes, “people have never been a blank sheet for development agencies to write on what they will” (1996, p. 14).

**Distilling Key Elements Of Participatory Development**

From the debate that preceded on participation and PD, certain key elements have been distilled as highlights for discussion. These key elements are: power processes, new knowledge, and civil society.

*Power Processes*

It needs emphasising that whichever definition is use the process of PD is fundamentally about power (see Craig and Mayo, 1995; and Nelson and Wright, 1995). Participation involves political struggle whereby the powerful fight to retain their privileges or to exert their dominance, therefore the process can often be marked by reluctance to release control or domination.
New Knowledge

As discussed, PD aims to reverse the biases that have marginalised and alienated the poor. As Rahnema (1992) pointed out one important step in doing so concerns cognition and knowledge generation. In contrast to the ‘expert’ knowledge of ‘normal’ development, PD stresses the necessity of local knowledge. The expert systems relied upon scientific approaches where planners worked from normative social models so that the recipients of development were treated as passive or, more often, conservative and obstructive. PD reverses this. The research methods for doing this were inspired by Freire and have grown into a veritable industry, but all centre upon trying to see the world from the point of view of those directly affected by the developmental intervention (see Chambers, 1997).

Civil Society

In rejecting the statism and top-down method of 'normal' development, the focus for PD has become overtly local and grassroots in orientation (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). This therefore permits a plurality of developmental goals to be realised as well as offering citizens the opportunity for self-determination. Given that the State was seen as the main impediment to participation, much of PD is organised through civil society (Hyden, 1997). If state structures are inflexible, bureaucratic, urban-biased and unaccountable, then civil society organisations are believed to be smaller, more accountable, locally aware and more hands-on. Although civil society has multiple meanings (ibid), in a developmental context it has largely been interpreted as the realm of non-governmental
organisations (Craig & Mayo, 1995). The debate on civil society will be examined in a separate section to follow as it pertains to considerations of both PD and democracy theory.

**Democratic Theory**

The choice of democratic theory for this thesis is guided by the recognition that regional integration projects are political processes, as much as they are economic. Principally, political actors drive the process of integration in the political arena with political and economic capital at stake. Democratic theory, therefore, serves as a tool for analysing the model(s) of democracy being employed, and, by extension, its implications for civil society and participation. Moreover, this theory may serve as a basis from which to draw conclusions and make recommendations.

**Democracy in Brief**

The term 'democracy' has its formal origins in ancient Greek political and philosophical thought. It comes from the Greek word *demokratia* ‘rule of the people’, which conjoins *dēmos* a term for ‘the people’ and *kratos* the term for power (Luckham, Gotez, Kaldor, & al., 2000). Beyond the broad commitment to rule by the majority, democracy involves a set of contentious debates⁶ some of which can be traced to the permanent tension between

---

⁶ The definition and/or conceptualization of the term ‘democracy’ are heavily contested. These contestations are not the focus of this thesis research. This thesis employs the conventional definition of
democracy as an ideal, on the one hand, and as a set of actual public institutions on the other (Drèze & Sen, 2002). Competing conceptualizations of the key components of the democratic ideal and their proper relationship to each other continue to fuel debates as evidenced in the anthology of work of the classical, modern and contemporary commentators.

However, despite the multiple and competing conceptions of democracy alluded to above, its etymological roots imply that people hold power and that all democracies are characterised by the common thread of ‘participation’. It is from this angle that the debate on democracy (and more specifically, participation in development policy creation in democracy) will be traversed. The goal is by no means to explore the gamut of the democratic theory, but to adumbrate the key postulates that resonate with the substantive issues to which this thesis research is concerned. Accordingly, comparative exploration of the representative and participatory (direct) democracy model will be the primary focus.

democracy given by Larry Diamond et al. (1990) in their book Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. According to Diamond et al., “democracy denotes a system of government that meet three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular interval and excluding the use of force; a ‘highly inclusive’ level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies...and a level of civil and political liberties...” Diamond, L; J. J. Linz and S. M. Lipset (1990) Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

7 Throughout this thesis ‘participatory democracy’ and ‘direct democracy’ are used interchangeably. The ‘Athenian model’ of direct or participatory democracy should also be noted since it is synonymously used in the literature on democracy.
Models of Democracy Theory

It is customary to distinguish between three overall theoretical clusters in democracy: *elite, pluralist,* and *direct* democracy theories (with internal differences untold) (Held, 2006). Each of these theories suggests different roles for citizen participation in the democratic process. Stated differently, different forms/levels of democratization accompany the respective theory of democracy.

In the elite tradition democracy is conceived a struggle for power between narrow elites minority. For Schumpeter, in his classic book, ‘*Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*’, the incapacity of the common man to make intelligent decisions in areas of politics makes it necessary to limit the role of the general populace to the voting process—leaving actual rule to an elite minority (Schumpeter (1947) in Pateman (1970)). Thus, the role of ordinary citizens is limited to participation in regular elections. Apart from this, the citizenry is considered spectators of the political game. The elite tradition, therefore, foresees the inevitability of a strong role for expertise and technocrats in complex societies (Weber, 2002).

The pluralist tradition claims that policy-making in liberal democracies should be determined by a plurality of groups, which effectively mirrors the interests of society through the interplay of the different interest groups and organisations (Dahl, 1989). In addition to participating in elections, ordinary citizens are expected to participate and engage in collective action by involving themselves in organisations that represent their
interests in the political arena. Thus, politics is essentially a bargaining process where expertise are mobilised between representatives of different interests.

The elite and pluralist theories, in combination, are referred to as the theories of representative democracy. Theories of representative democracy\(^8\) have attracted criticism from proponents of direct (participatory) democracy. This tradition claims that all aspects of social life are in some sense political and should be the object of democratic autonomy. Hence, the political domain cannot be left to technocratic elites even if it is assumed that they can be held accountable as elected representatives of the public. In the direct democracy model institutional arrangements are designed to maximise active citizenship and laid stress on the notion of civic virtues (Luckham, Gotez, Kaldor, & al., 2000). Conceptions of direct democracy experienced a revival with the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, which were critical of existing representative democracies. These criticisms entailed ‘participatory’ and ‘deliberative’\(^9\) currents, which have significantly influenced the debates about expanded public engagement in development (Norris, 2011).

Proponents of participatory democracy theory criticise representative democracies for offering only very limited possibilities of participation to ordinary citizens, which leads to a depoliticised public with little influence over their own lives (Sclove, 1995). Consequently, the view is held that democratic procedures should not be restricted to

---

\(^8\) In some literature ‘representative democracy’ is refered to as the ‘liberal representative model’. These terms are used interchangeably throughout this thesis.

\(^9\) ‘Deliberative’ denotes citizen consultation.
politics in its narrow and legal sense, but should also be extended to other key institutions of society.

At a granular level, these two strands of democracy—representative and participatory—reveal key distinctions. However, recent work in democratic theory has begun to question the distinction between representation and participation, claiming that representation is participation (Plotke, 1997; Urbinati & Warren, 2008). Notwithstanding this stance, distinctions between representative and direct democratic models offer valuable insight into the often polarised assessments of the democratic merits of participation. Some key aspects of the differences between the two competing models are shown in Table 1 below.

### Table 1: Comparison of Representative and Direct Democracy Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Representative Democracy</th>
<th>Direct Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role of Citizens</strong></td>
<td>Elect politicians</td>
<td>Articulate and develop own interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support organisations to represent their interest</td>
<td>Participate in all stages of political process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role of Civil Service</strong></td>
<td>Effective and efficient professionals</td>
<td>Facilitator of collective decision making, co-learners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role of Experts</strong></td>
<td>Producers of value-free knowledge, offer cognitive support to particular causes</td>
<td>Support (self-) enlightenment of citizens by acting as co-learners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role of Politicians</strong></td>
<td>Steers providing authority</td>
<td>Overseers meeting demands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role of legitimation</strong></td>
<td>Indirect: politicians are elected by citizens</td>
<td>Direct: through citizen participation at different stages of political process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It would be an oversimplification to purport that it is an either or scenario vis-à-vis the choice to employ representative or participatory democracy model. In actuality, things
are often much more nuanced. The espousals of Luckham, Gotez, Kaldor, et al. offers currency here:

“twentieth century democracy, however, has brought about a sometimes contradictory fusion of the institutions of liberal with the politics of participatory democracy, and in some sense it is the product of overlapping historical revolution which establishes ‘modern’ politics….There are of course synergies between the liberal ideals of limited government under the rule of law and the democratic ideals of government accountable to their citizens via free and fair elections. Yet the two are conceptually and practically distinct” (2000, pp. 7-8).

These ideas offer interesting context for the assessment of citizen participation and participatory processes.

**Explicating Key Democratic Ideals in the Evaluation of Participatory Development**

At the institutional/operational level most contemporary democracies are modelled on representative principles, but since the 1960s many democracies have begun to experiment with ways to increase participation (and deliberation) (Abels & Bora, 2004). In the discussion to following, three central distinctions between the two models of democracy (representative and direct/participatory) are explicated vis-a-via how participatory policy development processes ought to be organised to be ‘democratic’, as
well as the type of criticisms these standards may induce. The differences relate to the following headings: *principles of inclusion, issue framing* and *quality of decision-making*. These categories are borrowed from the work of Biegelbauer and Hansen (2011).

*Principles of Inclusion*

In the representative tradition, an important aspect of democratic sovereignty relates to the equality of citizens: the interests of all citizens should be given equal weight in decision-making processes. It is therefore essential that those articulating views on behalf of the citizenry are representative expounders. This requisite usually leads to the demand for participants in such procedures to be statistically representative of the general population. From this perspective, criticisms are levelled when minority interests hold processes captive, which is a foreseeable consequence of unrepresentative processes (Horlick-Jones *et al.* (2007) in Biegelbauer and Hansen 2011).

In the direct democratic tradition, the ideal of sovereignty places more emphasis on the idea of self-governance: the possibility that those affected by decision-making will be able to take part in and influence decisions. The central criterion for public involvement is therefore whether all legitimate interests have been given the opportunity to articulate their concerns. In this perspective, criticism is due when particular voices are excluded, especially those of vulnerable affected groups that may have difficulties mobilising collectively.
**Issue Framing**

In the representative tradition, it is considered essential that the citizenry is enabled to make informed decisions. Therefore, it is important that participants are provided with adequate and unbiased information. This can be achieved either through institutionally ‘independent’ sources or through a plurality of information sources. Criticism is levied if information is incomplete or biased by actors serving their own interests.

The direct democratic tradition stresses that ‘information’ cannot be provided in a context-free fashion. Therefore, it is equally important that participants in participation/deliberations are allowed and enabled to frame questions according to their own problem horizons, rather than just acting as recipients of authorised knowledge claims. Criticism is due when debates are cast in narrow, technocratic frames, excluding broader issues of social concern.

**Quality of Decision-making**

The representative tradition assumes that citizens have relatively stable, predefined interests. Politics is therefore an arena where different groups struggle to have their interests recognised. For this struggle to play out in a fair manner, it is essential that decisions are made in a transparent fashion and that the decision-makers can be held accountable for their decisions. Criticisms are advance when the basis on which decisions are made and those accountable are not transparent (Rowe and Frewer (2000) in Biegelbauer and Hansen 2011).
In the direct democratic tradition, interests and preferences are not considered to be given in advance; rather they are shaped in participation/deliberations. Therefore, the critical standard is not (only) whether the decision-making process is transparent and decision-makers can be held accountable, but whether decision-makers are genuinely open to arguments. Criticism is issued when decisions are reached through bargaining and compromise in the absence of deliberative argumentation (Webler and Renn (1995) in Biegelbauer and Hansen 2011).

The dissimilarities between the two models of democracy (representative and direct) and the particular expectations and standards they create for citizen and stakeholder engagement (in the democratisation of development policy formulation) was explicated above. The section to follow ties together the principles of participatory development and democracy theory by examining the possible functions of participation.

**Key Functions of Participation in Democracy and Development**

This section distils four key functions of participation: protective, educative, integrative, and developmental. The first three (the democratic functions) are based on the seminal work of Pateman (1970) whose work builds on classical participatory theorist, John Stuart Mills, Rousseau, and Cole. The developmental function is extracted from the cumulative impact of the democratic functions that undergirds participatory development, specifically the camp of literature that views participation as enabling to development.
Protective: The protective function includes ensuring that decision makers are kept in check and that good policy outcomes are arrived at. It is essentially an attempt to promote good governance where participation is used for instrumental or functional reasons. Importantly, this view of participation is hardly concerned with the transformation of the citizen and his/her social and psychological development. The problem with this approach is that when participants are not developed, they cannot genuinely contribute to good policy outcomes.

Educative: The major function of participation in participatory democracy is an educative one. The educative function refers to the psychological development and the learning of democratic skills and procedures. Moreover, through this function citizens become aware of matters of their development and issues of wider importance. This function occurs through the process of participation itself. Thus, the educative function of participation is a means of equipping people with the skills, knowledge and the experience to take greater responsibility for their advancement.

Integrative: Participation also serves to integrate the society and assists in the acceptance of collective decisions. This is achieved through genuinely involving citizens in decision-making processes, and arriving at decisions and outcomes that take into consideration and/or reflect their input. When this function takes root citizens are more inclined to take decision based on the common good and not their selfish ambitions.
Developmental: The developmental function integrates the protective, educative and integrative functions. In addition to the benefits of participation, democracy and good governance, this function advocates participation to ensure that policy outcomes benefit people. Moreover, this view promotes the notion that increasing people’s capacity, through participation, to improve their socio-economic situation is the true essence of development.

Since citizen participation is usually collectivised through civil society organisation the next section will explore organisation theory, which is view as having direct resonance with the objective of actualizing formal and predictable participation. Before, delving into organisation theory this section will be closed by examining the concept of civil society.

**Civil Society**

The role and importance of civil society as a counter-weight in the democratic process and as a driver, facilitator and implementer of participation in development initiatives, has been the sources of unremitting debate. As a result, the term civil society pervades discussions about (direct) democracy and development. It is first in the democratic milieu that this collectivisation of the people is located; however, the discussion to follow locates the debate on civil society in both realms.
**Definitional Debate**

Plato’s and then Aristotle’s ‘Politike Koinonia’ with the Latin translation ‘societas civilis’ are deemed the early predecessors of the term ‘civil society’. This term was used to speak of a political society comprising plural forms of association (koinonia) of civilised individuals and groups acting with a single set of goals derived from common norms and values (ethos) (Ehrenberg, 1999; Cohen & Arato, 1992; Colás, 2002). This early notion is quite different from the definitions of CS that exist today.

Today, the concept of civil society animates political and development thinkers alike. Notwithstanding the analytical exertion that encircle the term, civil society continues to evade the critical gaze, and seemingly, definitive statements about its meaning have merely given rise to even more complex labyrinths (Obadare, 2005). According to Howell, some scholars “have shunned the use of civil society, pointing to its conceptual fuzziness, ideological impregnation, and referential ambiguity” (Howell in Howell and Pearce (2001, p. 111)). For Bartton (1994), civil society is a theoretical concept, not an empirical one. It is a “synthetic conceptual construct” that is “not necessarily embodied in a single, identifiable structure” (Bayart, 1986, p. 112).

For all its contestations a litany of definitions have emerged for what civil society is understood to be: “the population of groups formed for collective purposes primarily outside of the state and marketplace” (van Rooy, 1998, p. 30); Emir Sader, “groups and networks that are now questioning neoliberal globalization” (2002, p. 87); and Philip Resnick, “intermediate sphere of associations, citizen movements, and groups that are
autonomous from the state and often invested with the attributes of democratic agency” (1997, p. 99). In sum, these definitions attest to the divergence of thought orbiting the concept of civil society and the dynamic role these organizations can play in a society, especially in the context of democracy and development.

**Conceptual Traditions**

The notion of civil society and the construction of the discourse on civil society have taken on different ideological traditions. There are three viable conceptual traditions in the use of the term civil society (Veltmeyer, 2008). One of these, associated with political science and economics, can be labeled *liberal*. Fundamentally, the liberal tradition is fundamentally concerned with ‘political development’—establishing a participatory form of politics and ‘good’ (i.e., ‘democratic’) governance. Here civil society is rooted in the Anglo-American tradition of *liberal* democratic theory in which civic institutions and political activities are essential components of ‘political society’ based on the principles of citizenship, rights, democratic representation, and the rule of law. Liberals see civil society as a countervailing force against an unresponsive, corrupt state and exploitative corporations that disregard environmental issues and human rights abuses (Kamat (2003) in Veltmeyer, 2008).

The second tradition is rooted in a sociological view of the state-society relations. The ideas of Antonio Gramsci, is similarly concerned with this form of politics that sees civil society as a repository of popular resistance to government policies and the basis of a ‘counter-hegemonic’ bloc of social forces engaged in a process of contesting state and
other forms of class power. It is based on a *radical* ideology—a shared belief in the need for radical change. “Civil society is therefore seen as a repository of the forces of resistance and opposition, forces than can be mobilized into a counter-hegemonic bloc” (Veltmeyer, 2007, p. 76).

The third tradition is associated with international cooperation for development. In this tradition, civil society is viewed as an array of social organizations representing ‘stakeholders’ in a process of economic development, and as a strategic partner in the war against global poverty waged by the World Bank and other international development associations and agencies. Here civil society is viewed as an agency for a participatory and empowering form of development. Proponents of a liberal ideology see civil society as the beneficial effects of globalization for democracy and economic progress (ibid). On the other hand, conservatives view of civil society (non-governmental organizations in particular) as ‘false saviours of international development’ (Kamat, 2003). Here the entire project of cooperation for international development (technical and financial assistance to poor developing countries) is seen as misbegotten, more likely to result in a stifling of initiative than to work as a catalyst for an improvement in the physical quality of people’s lives (Veltmeyer, 2008).

In effect, the academic discourse in it diverse ideological traditions converges around the view that civil society are “agents of change of one from or the other” (Veltmeyer, 2007, p. 76). Moreover, civil society is seen to possess the capacity for autonomous development and is agents of the virtues of democracy and, in so doing, agents of a
participatory and democratic form of development and politics (ibid). These views will be expanded on in the section to follow.

Civil Society, Development and Democracy: Some Critical Reflections

The extent to which the strength and characteristics of civil society contribute to and/or drive the processes of deepening democracy and enabling development has been hotly debated, with enthusiastic optimism and cynical critiques often going head-to-head.

Scholars in Europe and America have argued following the end of the Cold War that a “revival of civil society” (Giddens, 2000, p. 18) was a critical step in “deepening democracy”, and that civil society is inherently democratizing in character (Putnam, 1993). These arguments have also been taken up in relation the global South: civil society is correlated with the strengthening of democracy (Tusalem, 2007); a strong civil society is viewed as an essential component of all “healthy societies” (Corella, Mutesa, Hamabuyu, & Mpepo, 2006, p. 8), and CSOs give voice to marginal groups and strengthen “ownership of the development process” (Stiglitz, 1998, p. 21). An increasing numbers of scholars, however, have lamented these assertions. For example, Glaser warns against mistaking the “essentially diverse and non-purposive character of civil society” (Glaser, 1997, p. 25), and Fatton demonstrates that civil society can have “both democratic and despotic tendencies” (1995, p. 93). These debates are further extended below.
Mercer (2002) posits, the reason why NGOs emerged as the embodiment of civil society in developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s had more to do with the dovetailing of the timing of their growth with changing development discourses than it did with any inherently democratizing characteristic of NGOs. Dominant development discourse moved away from state-led models of economic development and embraced neoliberal policies of minimal state involvement in social services along with ‘good governance’ rhetoric of accountability, transparency and rule of law. Fisher, however, contends, “nothing is foreordained” about the functions and democratizing potential of CS (NGOs in particular) (1998, p. 17).

Recent scholarship on civil society challenges the primacy of hegemonic liberal ‘good governance’ discourse and opens conceptual space for theorizing and exploring the diverse forms of collective organizing and action (Orvis, 2001; Lewis D., 2002; Hearn, 2001; Hearn, 2007; Osaghae, 2006). Seligman (1992) believes that the ideal of civil society, rooted in deeply western liberal notions of the individual and the social, and developed in a particular and distinct history, not only does not and cannot exist anywhere in the contemporary world, but also has little analytical purchase in countries with different historical and cultural trajectories. Furthermore, even if western-derived understandings of the make-up of civil society do have some relevance in non-Western contexts, scholars are far from unanimous regarding the relationship between civil society, democracy and development. Increasingly, studies suggest that not only might the interface between civil society and good governance be far more complex than previously asserted (Jenkins, 2001; Roy, 2008), but also that ’civil society’ discourses
and actors may actually function to limit political space for counter-hegemonic (non-mainstream) voices/organizing and contribute to the depoliticization of development and the propping-up of elite regimes (Powell & Geoghegan, 2004; Dijkzeul, 2006).

**Organisational Theory**

Organizational theory is chosen for this thesis to illustrate the role and importance of the organizational capacity of CSOs in achieving participation in regional integration. Specifically, organizational theory will support analysis of the adequacy of their capacity to participate and ultimately, this theory will serve as a basis from which to draw conclusions and make recommendations.

**A Brief History of Organization Theory**

Organization theory is not a new theory. Modern organization theory emerged in between the late 1800s and early 1900s. Perspectives on organisational theory are generally discussed in terms of the historical/classical and the contemporary. The classical perspective is associated with efficiency, development of hierarchy and bureaucratic organizations. Subfields have emerged to address new concerns, such as employee needs and the role of the environment. Elements of each perspective are still used in organization design, in fact, they form the basis for the contemporary perspective, which have been adapted and revised to meet changing needs (Draft, 2009).
Max Weber is seen as the figurehead of classical organisational theory. According to Weber, bureaucracies represent the ideal organizational form. The ideal organizational structure includes clearly defined responsibilities for workers and strongly controlled rules, policies, regulations and procedures. Henri Fayol is another theorist who contributed to the organization theory in the beginning of 1900s. Fayol is known for his focus on administrative principles, strategic planning, staff recruitment, employee motivation, employee guidance, including policies, and important management functions in order to create beneficial and successful organizations. Frederick Winslow Taylor pioneered scientific management, which focuses primarily on “the technical core—on work performed on the floor” (Draft, 2009, p. 23). Taylor is credited with helping to define the role of training, wage incentives, employee selection and precise work standards in organizational performance.

The hierarchical system and bureaucratic approaches that developed during the Industrial Revolution remained the primary approach to organization design and functioning well into the 1970s and early 1980s. However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s a central problem emerged with the classical perspective, is that, it failed to consider the social context and human needs (Draft, 2009).

By the middle of 1900s, researchers began to concentrate on human influences on organization rather than the composition of organizations. Abraham Maslow emphasized the importance of the human influence in organizations, his chief contribution to organizational theory, the hierarchy of human needs. Maslow contribution to organization
theory underlines that people have different needs and they need to be motivated by
different encouragements in order to reach organizational objectives. Moreover, his
theories indicate that with time people’s needs change and if they are given what they
need, new needs will arise. His assumptions suggested that when people’s needs are met,
they would be more productive. Hence, organizational success is related to the
satisfaction of people’s needs for Maslow.

Douglas McGregor came up with two theories, which are Theory Y and Theory X. In the
later one, he says the typical human is the one that dislikes their job and because of that,
they need to be directed, controlled and ruled as they want to avoid responsibility and
they are more interested in their financial awards. On the other hand, Theory Y says that
control of punishment is not the only way to make people work. People can learn to be
responsible and have the ability of solving problems and workers are accomplished
enough to self-direct at work. McGregor believed that organizations that take up Theory
Y are generally more productive and successful.

Alongside the development of organizational theoretical perspectives of bureaucratic and
scientific management, it was felt that the success of these theories had be stymied due to
their neglect of environmental factors—the contingency factors. This problem was
emphasis when all organization were treated as similar and thus designed alike.
Contingency theory, premised on the work of Joan Woodward, Gareth Morgan, Fred
Fiedler, William Richard Scott, and others, have sought to formulate “‘goodness of fit’
between their structure and the conditions in their external environment” (Pennings
(1992) in Draft, 2009, p. 47). Draft sums it up, “what works in one setting may not work in another setting. There is no “one best way.” Contingency theory means it depends” (Draft, 2009, p. 26). These perspectives serve as the basis of contemporary organisations.

**Reflections on Organisational Theory**

What is Organizational Theory? According to Draft, “it is a way of thinking about organizations. Organization theory is a way to see and analyze organizations more accurately and deeply than one otherwise could” (2009, p. 36). Draft further contends, “Organization theory might be considered the sociology of organizations” (ibid, p. 36). In reflection, organizational theory is important in the sense of understanding and examining organizations, their behaviour and their capacity. On the one hand, organizational theory aims to facilitate organizations to achieve their goals in an efficient manner and, on the other hand, it informs organizations of the possible problems/challenges that might forestall the pursuit of their goal. Notably, organizational theory stresses both the primacy of the internal and external interface and issues on the performance of organizations. Accordingly, organization theorists are interested in why organizations exist and how the social systems function. The usage of organization theory spans political science, management and economics. In these disciplines, theorists have tended to focus on the following organizational theory issues:

- The effect of social organizations on the behavior and attitudes of individuals within them
The effects of individual characteristics and action on organization

The performance, success, and survival of organizations

The mutual effects of environments, including resource and task, political, and cultural environments on organizations and vice versa

Institutions and Organisations

Institutions and organisations are concepts often used interchangeably, yet they refer to two different things. According to March and Olsen, an institution is “a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour of a specific group of actors in specific situations” (1998, p. 943). This definition of institutions is widely accepted and used by a variety of scholars (March & Olsen, 1998; Duffield, 2003; Koremenos & Snidal, 2003). For Auriacombe and De Giorgi, an institution is “a formally ordered and contractually arranged grouping of people and functions which pursue the realization of predetermined objectives by means of organized work” (2000, p. 10). It is important to note that an institution has an organisation, but is not an organisation.

An organisation represents the structure that supports an institution. “An organisation is a tool used by people to coordinate their actions to obtain something they desire or value—that is, to achieve their goals” (Jones, 2003, p. 4). Organisations have a set of rules, statement of objectives and a rationalized administrative instrument, according to Duverger (1972). Draft posits, “organizations are (1) social entities that (2) are goal-directed, (3) are designed as deliberately structured and coordinated activity systems, and
(4) are linked to the external environment” (2009, p. 11). In keeping with recent trends in management, Draft stresses the importance on people, human resources, and particularly their competencies and opportunities to learn and contribute as they work together for the common goal. It is the task of managers to deliberately structure and coordinate organizational resources to achieve the organization’s purpose. The managers are faced with two types of organisations profit organisations and non-profit organisations (Draft, 2009).

- Profit organizations: managers direct their activities toward earning money (profit) for the company.
- Non-profit Organizations: Managers direct their effort toward generating some kind of social impact (ibid).

The clear distinction between the two types of organisations is the focus on profit versus social impact. The unique characteristics and needs of non-profit organizations created by this distinction present a unique challenge for these organizations (Drucker, 1992; Wolf, 1990). Hence, non-profits face several key problems: securing a steady income, difficult to measure the effect, marketing as well for the clients but also for volunteers and donors (Draft, 2009). According the Letts et al., keeping organizational costs as low as possible and demonstrating a highly efficient use of resources is the main challenge of non-profit sector organisations today (1999).
The discussion which to follow will dwell on: organizations and institutions; organizations and environment; strategy, organizations and effectiveness; and communication.

The Organisation and the Environment
Draft argues, “turbulence and complexity have replaced stability and predictability as the defining traits of organizations today” (2009, p.36). Consequently, organisations face a number of key challenges including: globalization, intense competition, ethical scrutiny, digital communication, efficiency and effectiveness. The challenges in today’s environment have led to changes in organisations design and management. Draft contends, “organizations adapt to and are influenced by a rapidly changing environment” (2009, p. 14). The environment includes all elements outside the boundary of the organization including the industry, government and regulations. Environmental influences has occasioned a trend away from highly structured systems based on a mechanical model toward looser, more flexible systems based on a natural, biological model. Additionally, the movement is toward the learning organization, which is characterized by a horizontal structure, empowered employees, shared information, collaborative strategy, and an adaptive culture (Draft, 2009).

Strategy, Organizations and Effectiveness
Organizational dimensions fall into two type: Structural dimensions provide labels to describe the internal characteristics of an organization; and Contextual dimensions characterize the whole organization, including its size, technology, environment, and
goals (Draft, 2009). It is based on an understanding of these two dimensions that organisational design takes place and the strategies for high performance and effectiveness are developed. Managers adjust structural and contextual dimensions to most efficiently and effectively transform inputs into outputs and provide value. “Efficiency refers to the amount of resources used to achieve the organization’s goals. Effectiveness is a broader term, meaning the degree to which an organization achieves its goals” (Draft, 2009, p. 20). When combined, effectiveness and efficiency leads to a result orientation which feeds organisational success.

Communication

In organization theory, communication is a key element. Human relations are based on communication. Organization and human relations are in close relationship, and for both communication are critical to achieving goals. Information flow, usage and relevance are essential for organisations to work well. Therefore, information should be reliable, timely, and understandable. Coupled with efficient information provision, communication is necessary between the following: individuals; individuals and groups; and groups and groups.

Theoretical Implications

In this study, an organisation refers to formal structures with defined roles, responsibilities and decision-making processes that support institutions to realize their predetermined objectives. North (1993; 1994) proposes that institutions are the game and
organisations are its players. From the foregoing, we can deduce that institutions have a wider application and comprise a system of relationships that do not necessarily find expression in concrete manifestations of regulated relations, as is to be seen in the formal and material aspects of organisations.

It is clear that organizations are not simply influenced by the constituents that comprise the organizations but also the environment within which it exist. This is to say that organisation should be mindful of both internal and external considerations. An organization should endeavour to ascribe to the twin principle of efficiency and effectiveness and, therefore, use their resources in a manner that is in line with achieving its goal.

**Conclusion**

This chapter reviewed the theoretical triad used in this thesis—participatory development, democracy and organizational theory. Participatory development established the rationale for and posited the benefits of CS involvement. PD also cited critical issues and considerations regarding participation, in and of itself, its potential uses, misuses and shortcomings. Democratic theory provided the ethos and summary basis for citizen involvement—collectivised through CS—in the affairs of their governance. The democratic merits of participation were traced using two conflicting assumptions and influential normative models of democracy—‘representative’ and ‘direct’—about what constitute legitimate participation, with each valuing participatory
processes according to different criteria. The ensuing conclusion was that participatory processes of involvement are ideologically framed and materially structured. Organizational theory enunciated the considerations that orbit organisations and, by extension, affect their ability to achieve their goals. In CARICOM, it is envisaged that organisations within CS will serve as the conduits of citizen participation and, thus, considerations of organisational capacity and resource factors are of principal relevance. Moreover, organizations are not simply influenced by the constituents that comprise them, but also the environment within which it exist. This is to say that organisation should be mindful of both their internal and external environment.
Chapter 3:

SITUATING THE RESEARCH:
CARICOM Regional Integration and the Rhetoric of Civil Society Participation

"Responsive as it is to the economic and political realities of the post-war world, Caribbean regionalism is the outgrowth of more than 300 years of West Indian kinship—the vagaries of the socio-economic political history of a transplanted people from which is evolving a Caribbean identity. Without that element of West Indian Identity a Community of the Caribbean would be mere markings on parchment—a Community without a soul, without vision of a shared destiny, without the will to persist and survive” (The Caribbean Community in the 1980s, Report by A Group of Caribbean Experts, (1981, p. 1)).

This chapter comprises two parts aimed at situating the research contextually. Part I provides the context of CARICOM regional integration. It commences with an exploration of the concept of regional integration. The second section offers a brief background sketch of CARICOM member countries. The third section provides an historical overview of CARICOM vis-à-vis the political economy of Caribbean RI. The next two sections map the organizations of CARICOM and its four pillars. Part I is brought to a close by locating CARICOM in its current milieu of issues, challenges and opportunities. Part II ‘regionalizes’ the debate on CS, participation and RI. It provides the ethos and benefits of CS participation in RI, together with the history of CSO participation in the Caribbean region. To conclude, the discussion is docked by cataloguing the participatory rhetoric of CARICOM; the antecedents of CSO participation.
Regional Integration

Regional integration (RI) as a strategy for development has gained increased currency with the rise of globalization—to which it can be seen as a counter-point. RI has taken on many shapes and forms: varying from tiny associations that include no more than a few actors and focus on a single issue; to huge continental-unions that address a multitude of common problems, from territorial defence to food security. Far from being solely a state-led undertaking, RI projects have come to include a variety of actors, including civil society, private businesses and interest groups. Together, these actors engage in collective problem solving of transnational issues.

RI is a concept that has been defined in a variety of ways. According to Odhiambo (2010), RI can be seen as the process through which states within a region form trading blocs or federate politically and/or cooperate functionally. Van Langenhove and Costea, defines regional integration as “a process of deepening cooperation over areas that countries agree on as common interests” (2007, p. 2). Soomer posits, “regional integration can be described in two ways, as a process and as an outcome” (2003, p. 1). As a process, it entails a country’s willingness to share or unify into a larger whole; the degree to which the unifying states share and what they share determines the level of integration. As an outcome, Soomer (2003) sees regional integration as occurring when
pre-established criteria are met. These criteria are outlined in the treaties or agreements that establish regional integration institutions and its goals. Thus, Soomer (2003) advises, RI as an outcome means recalling goals previously agreed upon, evaluating progress made and specifying the next course of action.

According to some authors, this conceptual pluralism makes regionalism a phenomenon notoriously difficult to study beyond the remit of specific case studies of regional organizations/projects (Behr & Jokela, 2011). Yet, according to Tavares (2004), notwithstanding the numerous academic concepts and definitions it is possible to conclude that all regional projects share four essential elements: (1) a common geography; (2) regular and intense interactions on both a political and economic level; (3) commonly shared regional perceptions; and (4) agency and outside recognition. Beyond these elements, it is possible to note that regionalism evolves in close relationship with both global and national forces (ibid).

It is important to distinguish between policy-induced and market-induced regional integration processes. Policy-induced processes are arrangements based on treaties. In this context, policy-makers in response to changes in the world economy devise regional integration projects. The resultant treaties codify the economic framework that has been agreed upon through negotiation and bargaining. Policy-induced regionalist projects seek to manage the substance and direction of social change represented by the globalisation and regionalisation trends. Market-induced integration, on the other hand, produces an economic regionalisation that is driven mainly by private actors (Dieter (1997), in Soko
Consequently, it can be argued that regional integration represents not only a reaction to the increasing globalisation of the economy, but also as a reaction to growing problems in specific policy areas. Regional integration therefore represents an attempt to strike a balance between, on the one hand, exploiting the advantages of free trade and growing markets and, on the other hand, safeguarding the ability of the state to craft and implement social policies intended to mitigate the negative aspects of economic globalisation.

In contemporary global political economy RI projects have been bifurcated between ‘old regionalism’ and ‘new regionalism’ (New Regionalism Approach (NRA)) (Dieter 1997, in Soko 2007)). Propelled primarily by the forces of globalisation, the new regionalism has been a crucial catalyst in the breakdown of the old regionalism, which was characterised by the division between the capitalist and the socialist worlds. It has coincided with fundamental changes to the world economy. Firstly, there has been a trend towards the triadisation of the world economy; the great majority of merchandise and capital flows in the world economy take place between the three poles of Europe, North America, and East Asia. Secondly, the new regionalism has been characterised by a growing integration of previously marginalised developing countries into the capitalist world economy—even though a large number of these developing countries are still excluded from the globalisation processes. Thirdly, global economic actors have become more diverse. Participation is no longer confined to state actors it also includes non-state actors, as stated above. In this regard, transnational corporations have played an increasingly prominent role in the world economy. Additionally, integration projects in
the new regionalism have been typified by trade strategies oriented towards the world market (Gamble & Payne, 1996).

In summary, the parallel dynamics of globalisation and regionalisation have gained ground in both the developed and developing world. According to Jakobeit (1997), experience has highlighted a need for integration approaches that are sensitive to the unique development problems being faced. Therefore, it is imperative that developing countries seeking to integrate their economies at the regional level recognise the necessity to develop integration strategies that are responsive to their unique circumstances and needs.
CARICOM: The Region

Figure 1: Map of the Caribbean Regional

Source: J. F, Hornbeck (2008), CARICOM: Challenges and Opportunities for Caribbean Economic Integration.

CARICOM is a project of regional integration that comprises fifteen states and territories in the wider Caribbean Basin. The members are: the independent countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean (Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines) as well as Haiti, Montserrat and Suriname. The Bahamas and Montserrat are not members of the CSME. Haiti has acceded to but its CSME obligations have been waived for several years following the January 2010 earthquake. There are also five Associate Members which are overseas territories of the United
Kingdom: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands.

In order to better understand CARICOM, it may be useful to present a characterisation of the region and member countries. CARICOM members are mainly islands (except for Belize, Guyana and Suriname) and the majority of them are very small. All members are classified by international organisations as developing countries, many of which are referred to as Small Island Development States (SIDS). The CARICOM Secretariat distinguishes member states between least developed countries (LDCs) and more developed countries (MDCs).

The Bahamas has the highest GDP per capita income at 22,431 US-$ per year (data for year 2011) (World Bank, 2012). According to the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI), the Bahamas reach position 53 in the World ranking (out of about 160 countries) (UNPD, 2011). Compared to the least developed member states (that is, Haiti with a GDP per capita of 725 US-$ in 2011 (World Bank, 2012) and an HDI ranking of 153 (UNPD, 2011) this reflects huge differences in the average standard of living between the CARICOM member states. The same heterogeneity can be detected with regard to population size. Population ranges from 53,000 in St. Kitts and Nevis up to 10,000,000 million in Haiti (World Bank, 2012).

The economies of CARICOM member states are not very diversified. Agriculture the historical mainstay for many countries is losing importance, but still accounts for a high
proportion of GDP in most CARICOM countries. Manufacturing constitutes only a small part of industrial production and its share has been declining in most countries over the last twenty years. Because the Caribbean is a very attractive region for tourism, the service sector is well developed in most countries and still growing in many of them.

Trade is focused on a few exported goods. Main trading partners for most of the CARICOM states are Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago as well as the US, for some states also Britain and Japan. CARICOM as a whole has negative trade balances with all its main extra-regional trading partners, except for the United Kingdom. The deficits are most severe with Japan, Venezuela and the Latin American Integration Association.

**Historical Overview of Caribbean Regional Integration**

Integration has been deliberate over in the English-speaking Caribbean for centuries (Mordecai (1968), in Girvan 2010; Bishop, Girvan, Shaw, Mike, & Kirton, 2011). In terms of it recent evolution, that is, from the post-colonial era to date, Caribbean regionalism presents a number of distinct phases of action (Payne, 2008; Bishop & Payne, 2010; Bishop, et al., 2011). These phases are outlined below:

Decolonisation and Federation: The West Indies Federation (‘The Federation’) agreed to in principle in 1947 was “the first modern attempt to craft a comprehensive regional settlement” (Bishop & Payne, 2010, p. 5). Forged out of the crucibles of the post-World War II era, The Federation’s expressed aim was to create a single federated political unit
that would become independent of Britain. The Federation lasted from 1958-1962; infighting, British ambivalence and the desire for national independence on the part of the larger countries (namely, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago) rendered it a short-lived political union.

CARIFTA: Conceptualised in 1965 as a result of calls from the government of Trinidad and Tobago for a ‘Caribbean Economic Community’, the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) was consummated in 1968 as a “standard free trade agreement” (Bennett, 1999, p. 135). CARIFTA liberalised trade in manufactured goods, provided for trade in agricultural goods and established special arrangements for the LDCs. Four years into the life of CARIFTA, the head of member states decided to take their cooperative endeavours a step further and deepen relations, mainly, due to dissatisfaction with trade creation levels.

CARICOM: CARICOM replaced CARIFTA in 1973 with the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. In addition to the issues of economic concern, political matters influenced the decision to move beyond CARIFTA. Notably, countries saw the need for greater cooperation, broader development objectives and a unified approach to international affairs (via foreign policy coordination) (CARICOM, 1998; Bennett, 1999; Lewis V., 1999). Acquiescent to those wishes, CARICOM emerged as a stronger form of integration with three ‘pillars’: economic integration (a common market in goods), functional cooperation (education, health and several other areas), and foreign policy coordination (security was added as the fourth pillar of integration in 2007).
CSME: CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) has its legal basis in the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (2001). The Single Market component of CSME was officially inaugurated in 2006 and the Single Economy is scheduled for completion in 2015. At this juncture, it is widely noted that CARICOM is suffering from an ‘implementation deficit’; the CSME has been afflicted by this deficit and, thus, its implementation is off schedule in the number of key areas.

**Why Integrate?**

As is the stipulation with all RI schemes, the question of ‘why integrate’ always emerges. In the case of the Caribbean, stakeholders and the wider development community have accredited integration as a key mechanism for advancing the region’s development. "Only a unified Caribbean, politically and economically, can save the regional from its fatal particularism" according to Pasty Lewis (Lewis D. , 2002, p. 363). Girvan, in reference to the Caribbean, the “regional option is a survival imperative, a development imperative” (2011b, p. 26). "To provide dynamic leadership and service, in partnership with Community institutions and Groups, toward the attainment of a viable, internationally competitive and sustainable Community, with improved quality of life for all" (CARICOM, 2012). This is the mission statement of CARICOM.

Specifically, Caribbean countries are greatly aware of their small size, and this constraint, perhaps more than anything else, has driven the regional integration process—coupled
obviously with the impact of globalization (INTAL, 2005). While the constraints of small size and globalization provide powerful incentives for integration among Caribbean countries, history, shared identity and culture have also played important roles (ibid). While those factors provide overarching rationale, largely, the motivation for these forms of integrated assemblages are based on the need to attenuate particular constraints on (economic) development—small markets, limited capital, and limited resources, among others (Girvan, 2010). Several ‘extra-economic’ benefits can be realized by countries that are contiguous or in close proximity. For example, small islands developing countries, can gain economies of scale, share costs by operating common services, pool negotiating power and political clout in their interface with the wider global community, and more broadly, can derive synergies from combining human, financial, institutional and other resources. Considering the aforementioned factors, the regional integration has been concretised as a viable pathway to economic competitiveness and sustainable development for the Caribbean.

**Political Economy of Caribbean Regional Integration**

Over the more that forty-year history of integration efforts in the Caribbean, specific political economy strategies have characterized different epochs. The table below presents a snapshot of these strategies, from which development efforts have been fashioned.
Table 2: Political Economy of Economic Integration Initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy</strong></td>
<td>Regional import substitution</td>
<td>Integration for development and transformation</td>
<td>Open Regionalism</td>
<td>Developmental Open Regionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Orientation</strong></td>
<td>Inward-looking</td>
<td>Inward-looking</td>
<td>Outward-looking</td>
<td>Outward-looking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agency</strong></td>
<td>Market-driven</td>
<td>State interventionist</td>
<td>Market-driven</td>
<td>State-market collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theory</strong></td>
<td>Neoclassical</td>
<td>Development and transformation</td>
<td>Neoliberalism</td>
<td>Modified neoliberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principal Intellectual Influence</strong></td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Context</strong></td>
<td>• Exhaustion of national import substitution</td>
<td>• Trade expansion under CARIFTA</td>
<td>• Washington Consensus</td>
<td>• Inauguration of CARICOM Single Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• UK application to European Economic Community (EEC)</td>
<td>• UK decision to join EEC</td>
<td>• Uruguay Round</td>
<td>• Sequencing of Single Economy Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• EU Single Market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motive Force</strong></td>
<td>Mainly Internal</td>
<td>Mainly Internal Governments</td>
<td>Mainly External Globalisation</td>
<td>Mainly Internal Governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Governments</td>
<td>• Private sector</td>
<td>• WB</td>
<td>• Ppprivate sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regional academics (UWI)</td>
<td>• Regional academics (UWI)</td>
<td>• IMF</td>
<td>Regional stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Donor countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CARICOM Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regional academics (UWI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Girvan, Norman (2010). Caribbean Community: The Elusive Quest for Economic Integration p.5
CARICOM Organizational Mapping

Figure 2: The Organs and Bodies of the CARICOM


Figure 2 shows the organs and bodies of CARICOM, as established by the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (2001). The basic institutional structure of CARICOM was developed from the intergovernmental structure of CARIFTA, its predecessor. The structure serves
to support the four ‘pillars’ of CARICOM, which are economic integration, functional co-operation, foreign policy co-ordination, and crime and security.

Initially CARICOM was divided into the Community and the Common Market. The Community was charged with implementing political and functional aspects of coordination, while the Common Market dealt with trade issues, namely the Common External Tariff (CET) and Free Trade. The two main centres of authority were the Conference of Heads of Government and the Common Market Council of Ministers. In addition to these two a Secretariat (now known as the CARICOM Secretariat) was established (out of the Commonwealth Caribbean Secretariat of CARIFTA) to coordinate and facilitate the activities of CARICOM (Chernick, 1978; Axline, 1979; Erisman, 1992).

Since the 1990s the institutional configuration of CARICOM has changed somewhat; there is no longer the somewhat artificial division between the Community and the Common Market. The two main ‘organs’ in CARICOM responsible for making decisions remain the same though:

The Heads of Government Conference (HGC) in which each country has one vote and binding resolutions can only be made with unanimity. This body holds ultimate decision-making power and has the mandate for concluding treaties and overseeing relations with non-member states on behalf of CARICOM.
The Council of Ministers (previously Common Market Council of Ministers) comprises government representatives and meets throughout the year; usually convening prior to the HGC to work out the details of the issues to be considered by their heads of government. Both the HGC and the Council, has governmental representatives, and may focus on national rather than regional interests if they wish.

Apart from these main organs, there are now four others that did not exist at the time CARICOM was created:

- The Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP)
- The Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED)
- The Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR)
- The Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD) (CARICOM, 2005).

There are now also three assisting ‘bodies’ dealing with:

- The Committee for Legal Affairs
- The Budget Committee
- The Committee of Central Bank Governors (CARICOM, 2005).

The CARICOM Secretariat, which is independent of national officials and is not a decision-making organ, remains part of CARICOM. It now includes various specialised committees that deal with social and economic issues of importance.
In addition to these organs, bodies, and the Secretariat there are CARICOM institutions such as the University of the West Indies and the Caribbean Development Bank that have been formed over the years, some prior to and some during the life span of CARICOM, with the Caribbean Court of Justice (established in 2005) being the most recent. In 1997 CARICOM leaders created a body floating somewhere between the Secretariat, Community institutions and the Council of Ministers in the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM), which was to develop and execute a negotiating strategy for trade issues in the region.

Nevertheless, the basic intergovernmental plus Secretariat structure adopted from CARIFTA remains but has expanded and evolved, as has CARICOM. The main point to note though is that the institutional structure of the group continued to reflect the need for decision making to be located in national governments. Autonomy was not ceded to any overarching body that would coordinate economic policies within the region or towards the outside world.

**Mapping CARICOM’s Four Pillars**

The four pillars of CARICOM—economic integration, functional co-operation, foreign policy co-ordination, and crime and security—will be discussed below.

_Economic Integration_
The pillar of economic integration is aimed at promoting trade and economic development. The key bodies that drive this pillar are: The Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED), and the Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP); which have wide-ranging Treaty responsibilities for the monitoring and implementation of the Single Market and Economy. The Office of Trade Negotiations (OTN) is an important body responsible for the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements between the Community and extra-regional partners, and the coordination of multilateral negotiations in the WTO. The Committee of Central Bank Governors relates mainly to COFAP and is responsible for monetary policy cooperation and coordination. Other functional bodies in this pillar include: the Caribbean Organisation of Tax Administrators (COTA); Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM); Caribbean Regional Organisation for Standards and Quality (CROSQ); Caribbean Telecommunications Union (CTU), CARICOM Competition Commission; the CSME Unit; and the EPA Implementation Unit.
**Functional Cooperation**

Functional Cooperation is, arguably, the most successful aspect of CARICOM integration. There are twelve areas of functional cooperation, shown in Figure 2.

**Figure 3: Areas of Functional Co-operation within CARICOM**

1. Education  
2. Health  
3. Environment and Sustainable Development  
4. The Caribbean Sea  
5. Disaster preparedness  
6. Labour  
7. Culture  
8. Youth  
9. Sport  
10. Gender and Development  
11. Illicit Drugs—Traffic and Abuse  
12. Information and Communication

*Source: CARICOM (2005) Our Caribbean Community Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle p. 233*

Notable examples of successful functional cooperation are: the Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC) in secondary education, the University of the West Indies (UWI) in tertiary education, and the Pan-Caribbean Partnership against HIV/AIDS in the area of health. Environment, natural disasters, research, and development are other notable successes of functional cooperation. The following institutions are subsumed under this pillar: Caribbean Agriculture Research and Development Institute (CARDI), Caribbean Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD), Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDEMA), Caribbean Environment Health Institute (CEHI), Caribbean Food and Nutrition Institute (CFNI), Caribbean Meteorological Institute
(CMI), the Caribbean Meteorological Organisation (CMO), the Council of Legal Education (CLE) and the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC).

Foreign Policy Coordination

The Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR) has responsibility for the coordination of the foreign policies of CARICOM states, as well as, their political relations with third-party states and multilateral institutions. COFCOR attempts to ensure that common policies and positions are both consistent with the goals and objectives of CARICOM and are promoted and implemented effectively. Moreover, given the myriad other associations, institutions and organisations to which many CARICOM states either belong or have relations, COFCOR’s role involves ensuring the compatibility and congruency between the agendas and commitments made by members and those of CARICOM.

Crime and Security

Crime and security are highly important issues for CARICOM member states. Their geographic location and make-up as largely geographic discontinuities render them susceptible to the virulence of crime and security issues. These issues have implications for the safety of individual safety and socio-economic well-being of individual states and the region as a whole. In response to security concerns, CARICOM states have proposed a multi-dimensional definition that encompasses human security, including access to sustainable livelihoods, protection from transnational criminal networks and environmental security. The lead institution in this pillar is the Council of Ministers
responsible for National Security and Law Enforcement. Support institutions include: the Caribbean Aviation Safety and Security Oversight System (CASSOS); the CARICOM Implementing Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS); and the Regional Security System (RSS).

**On the Cusp of Collapse: Challenges, Issues and Opportunities**

Ruminations have been tendered ad nauseam on the current state CARICOM. These ruminations, largely, detail the challenges, issues and imperatives that currently beset the project. The most recent dictum is the January 2012 Landell Mills report, ‘Turning Around Caricom: Proposal to Restructure the Secretariat’, which provided a trenchant assessment of the current state of CARICOM, with particular emphasis on CARICOM’s organizational engine, the Secretariat. The excerpt below captures the gist of the report:

“CARICOM is in crisis. This if for three reasons:

- Longstanding frustrations with its slow progress have continued to mount;
- A serious weakening in its structure and operation over a number of years; and
- Continued economic retrenchment since the 2008 financial crisis and the risk of a further downturn in 2012” (2012, p. 7).
Fanning out the variety of challenges the RI project has faced over the years brings into view a few key trends. The region’s trajectory has been characterized as an experience defined by moments of advances, stagnation and renewal; “these are often linked to the interplay between internal political, economic and socio-cultural dynamics, and larger global forces” (Grenade, 2011, p. 4). More specifically, in terms of stagnation, “a lack of capital, whether natural, human, political, technical or financial, has represented an enduring barrier to the implementation of agreements which already exist, let alone embarking upon new ones” (Bishop & Payne, 2010, p. 4). Hence, in recent years the project seems to be defined more by stagnation than by advances.

Given the prognosis presented in the accounts above the major challenge for the Caribbean is the apparent stagnation of CARICOM (Bishop & Payne, 2010; Grenade, 2011; Stoneman, Pollard, & Inniss, 2012). After thirty-nine years, it is generally felt that CARICOM provides a “mixed picture” (Grenade, 2011, p. 6). The prevailing view is that CARICOM has achieved relative successes in the realm of functional cooperation, and it has been less successful in the terms of the pillars of foreign policy coordination and economic integration (ibid). This record of mixed success has been punctuated by moments of renewal and stagnation.

The 1989 Grand Anse Declaration was an attempt to inject life into an ailing CARICOM with the promise of a Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) in the shortest possible time. The Report of the West Indian Commission (WIC), which followed in 1992, recommended a number of measures to resuscitate the regional project. However,
many of the recommendations of the WIC were not readily adopted. Based on the Rose Hall Declaration in 2003 CARICOM Heads of Government agreed to the establishment of a CARICOM Executive Commission to address its ‘implementation paralysis’ and strengthen the governance arrangements. To date that debate is ongoing. The Treaty of Chaguaramas was revised in 2001 and the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) was established in 2005 with the launch of the Caribbean Single Market (CSM) in 2006. However, while twelve member states of CARICOM can access the CCJ as a dispute settlement mechanism for the CSM, only Guyana, Barbados and Belize are members of the CCJ, their appellant jurisdiction.

The CSME, particularly the CARICOM Single Market (CSM) component has become the foremost arena of operation for CARICOM in the past 15 years or so. Its goal is to integrate the economies of CARICOM into a unified market in which people, goods and services, and capital move without restraint and into a single economy. The CSME project has been fraught with challenges, thus solidifying the view that while integration is seen as an imperative—and one that can perpetuate a myriad of benefits—it is problematic. Grenade points to four factors that are impact the pace of integration in the current context: “effective governance arrangements, issues of sovereignty, legitimacy, and democracy” (2011, p. 12).

Frustrations with the movement have placed CARICOM on the anvil of regional criticisms. Eminent Caribbean journalist, Rickey Singh, in an article “Sick” Caricom needs a dose of ‘people power’, makes the point that, “the bloodstream of our regional
integration process is threatened by anaemia and need an infusion of people power to resuscitate what we know as Caricom” (Singh, 2011). Ron Sanders, a former Caribbean diplomat sums it up lucidly:

“What the region needs now is more not less integration. The leaders of CARICOM, therefore, should be strengthening and sharpening the regional integration process as a vital instrument in improving the conditions of their countries individually and collectively.

But the process has to start with a willingness by leaders to talk with each other frankly, openly and with empathy, and it has to be infused with an acknowledgment that they have side tracked the regional integration process, and must put it back on a main track because their countries need it. The conversation has to be underlined by a desire to reach collective decisions that take account of the circumstances of each in trying to achieve benefits of all (2011).

Caribbean scholar, Professor Norman Girvan, in his assessment points to the “original sin” of CARICOM and contends, “the Caribbean Community is suffering from a major crisis, or more accurately, a multiple crisis—a crisis of implementation, of credibility and—dare I say—of legitimacy” (2011a, p. 1) Girvan refers to the “original sin” as “a two-headed sin” (ibid). One head is the absence of supranationality, or collective
sovereignty, which is the underlying source of the implementation deficit of the Community, and the second, is called a “participation deficit” (ibid).

One of the Caribbean’s eminent statesmen, Sir Shridath Ramphal, recently asked, “Is the West Indies West Indian?” Ramphal laments the current state of CARICOM, which is quoted at length below:

“Despite the new external compulsions, therefore, the pursuit of even economic unity, which publics largely accepted, has been a passage of attrition. It has taken us from 1965 to 2010 - 45 years – to crawl through CARIFTA and CARICOM, through the fractured promises of Chaguaramas and Grand Anse, and through innumerable pious Declarations and Affirmations and Commitments. The roll call of unfulfilled pledges and promises and unimplemented decisions is so staggering that in 2011 a cul de sac looms.

At Grand Anse in 1989, West Indian political leaders declared, “inspired by the spirit of co-operation and solidarity among us (we) are moved by the need to work expeditiously together to deepen the integration process and strengthen the Caribbean Community in all of its dimensions.” They agreed a specific work programme to be implemented over the next four years with primacy given “towards the establishment, in the shortest possible time of a single market and economy”. That was 22 years ago.
The West Indian Commission (also established at Grand Anse) confidently charted the way, declaring it a “Time for Action”. West Indian technicians took their leaders to the brink with the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. But there was no action—no political action, no political will to act. In twenty-two years, nothing decisive has happened to fulfil the dream of Grand Anse. Over those two decades, the West Indies has drawn steadily away from being West Indian.

...Words alone are never enough, except to deceive. As Paul Southwell used to remind us in Shakespearian allusion: “Words, words, words; promises, promises, promises; tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow”. Nothing has changed. In the acknowledged quest for survival (including political survival) the old urge for ‘local control’ by those in control has not matured to provide real space for the ‘unity’ we say we need. Like 19th century colonists we strive to keep our rocks in our pockets—despite the enhanced logic of pooling our resources, and the enlarged danger of ‘state capture’ by unelected groups and external forces while we dally.

...When the unsung benefits of regionalism are no longer available as instruments to bolster local development, and bargaining with larger countries, and coping with the destructive reach of drug trafficking—only then perhaps will Governments be forced into reconstructing those vital elements of regional support that neglect had helped to destroy. We will
then, perhaps, as with CARIFTA in 1965, resume the old cycle of rebuilding what we once had, but carelessly destroyed; and so ad infinitum. But let us remember, a civilization cannot survive save on a curve that goes upward, whatever the blips in between; to go downward, whatever the occasional glimpses of glory, is to end ingloriously. Caribbean civilization is not an exception. It is now as it was ninety-five years ago with Marryshow: *The West Indies must be West Indian*” (2011, pp. 5-6).

Ramphal pinpoints the nucleus of the problem: the absence of action and the refusal to capitalize on cultural synergies. In sum, “CARICOM is in serious flux… this is no surprise. After almost forty years, what has emerged is a schizophrenic model” (Grenade, 2011, p. 12).

**PART II: Regionalizing The Debate—Participatory Rhetoric**

“It is our Caribbean and our future” (CPDC, 2002, p. 3). At essence, this is the sentiment of the collective body of CSOs in the region. Connected with that sentiment is the postulate that participation in development initiatives has become “an imperative—a condition for survival (UNDP, 1993, p. 99). In a newspaper article by Anselm Caines, titled, ‘Commentary: Caribbean Integration...For Whom?’ Caines quotes the discerning remarks of a participant at a public forum who describes the integration movement as a
"prime ministerial, piecemeal, paper-based and people-less process" (2010). The article goes on to cite the need to "discontinue the trend of having the process being driven predominantly by government ministers and regional technocrats" (ibid). This, therefore, calls for engendering greater ownership of the regional integration process by all stakeholders.

How does the interface between civil society, participation and Caribbean regional integration, principally structure through CARICOM, play-out? Evidently, the Caribbean is a particular part of the world, particular history, particular issues, particular geography and a particular culture(s). Regional governments and by extension the Caribbean people have articulated, with few antagonists, that regional integration is good and desirable. These reverberations have been cited ad nauseam. However, the processes and pace with which the project is proceeding has been a point of much contention. Importantly, for “integration processes to move forward there is a need not only for political will, but also for the commitment and participation of all sectors of society” (Commonwealth Foundation, 2004, p. 30). Therefore, ultimately, government remains arbiters of who plays what role. As per CS, for it to play its role effectively alongside government and the private sector, its contributions must be recognized and encouraged (ibid).

The sections to follow ‘regionalizes’ the debate on CS, participation and RI. The ethos and benefits of CS participation in RI are presented, together with the history of CSO participation in the Caribbean region. To conclude, the discussion is docked by cataloguing the participatory rhetoric of CARICOM, the antecedents of CSO
participation. From this vantage point, one is well primed to process the empirical unearthing of the study, which will be presented in the next chapter. Before proceeding with the discussing on the ethos and benefits of participation an assessment of the literature is presented.

**Gaps in the Literature**

Despite the wealth of scholarship on the study of regionalism\(^{10}\), significant gaps exist in the literature on understanding civil society in regionalism, and regional governance in particular (Söderbaum & Godsäter, 2008; De Lombaerde, Söderbaum, Langenhove, & Baert, 2010). Most sites of RI are covered in a bounty of studies that contribute to a deeper understanding of the process from a range of theoretical and disciplinary viewpoints. However, these studies focus on state and market forces issuing relatively scant treatment to civil society in regional assemblages, thus, suggesting the low relevance of CS in these contexts (Söderbaum, F., 2007). Soderbaum and Godsäter argue the converse, and contend, “the neglect of civil society in regionalism and in regional governance is at least partly a theoretical and methodological problem” (2008, p. 2).

\(^{10}\) ‘Regionalism’ represents the policy and project, whereby mostly state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a particular region or as a type of world order. It is usually associated with a formal programme, and often leads to institution building. ‘Regionalisation’ refers to the process of cooperation, integration, and cohesion creating a regional space (issue-specific or general). “At its most basic it means no more than a concentration of activity—of trade, peoples, ideas, even conflict—at the regional level. This interaction may give rise to the formation of regions, and in turn to the emergence of regional actors, networks, and organisations” Fawcett, L. (2005) ‘Regionalism in Historical Perspective’ in M. Farrell, B. Hettne, & L. V. Langenhove (Eds.), The Global Politics of Regionalism. Theory and Practice. (p. 25). London: Pluto Press.
Accordingly, the authors cite a need to develop the theorization of civil society at the regional level; linking civil society to regionalism theory and grounding the logic of civil society involvement in regional governance in the socio-cultural and political context with which they operate. Moreover, Soderbaum and Godsäter posit “theories and conceptualisations of civil society rooted in the Western or European experience risk misunderstanding the logic of…civil society and its involvement in regional governance” (2008, p. 2). This observation implies the need to develop context specific engagement of the topic that transcends the normative ascriptions of the Western or European traditions. Furthermore the debate on governance would also have to be refashioned “bringing in the regional dimension in contrast to the current emphasis on either ‘global governance’ or ‘good governance’ at the national level” (Söderbaum, 2004, p. 419).

During the last decade, a more critical orientation has developed in the literature on regionalism. As reference in Chapter 3, these debates have emerged in the new regionalism approach (NRA). In the context of RI and economic globalisation, NRA stresses a return to the political force. In keep with this persuasion, NRA emphasises a triangle of regionalising actors—the state, market and civil society—who are deeply involved in processes of regionalisation, including its political dimensions and in formal and informal ways (Söderbaum & Godsäter, 2008). Moreover, the authors suggest that not only economic but also social and cultural issues impact regionalist projects (Söderbaum & Godsäter, 2008). The NRA perspective therefore represents a look beyond state-centrism that is more comprehensive and dynamic than that of other theories of regionalism.
Thus far, the fledging literature on civil society as actors in regional governance provides a few diverse offerings. Largely, these scholarly thoughts align with most of the wider view on CS in the political and development frames—the liberal, the conservative and the radical traditions (see Veltmeyer (2007); et al.). However, the contention is, their role requires more nuanced and problematized conceptualisations. Soderbaum and Andres highlights the views of Bjorn Hettne and James Mittelman who points to CS as protectors of the poor, emphasising the counter-hegemonic and transformative role of civil society (2008). The authors assert that such a view is problematic since CS involvement is more complex that has been presented. Thus, there is a “pressing need to sharpen our tools for analysing these processes”, which should result in the development of broader empirical outcomes vis-à-vis CS participation in RI (Söderbaum & Godsäter, 2008, p. 7).

The typology of Armstrong, Lloyd, and Redmond (2004) has emerged as a useful analytical tool for assessing the role of CS in RI. The authors’ emphasis three partly competing and partly overlapping types of civil society participation in regional governance: (1) civil society as partners in regional governance; (2) civil society as legitimating regional governance; and (3) civil society as resisting regional governance. Table 3 below summarize these roles. This typology is used for analysis in Chapter 5.
Table 3: Typology of Civil Society in Regional Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Relation to regional organisation</th>
<th>Strategies for regional governance</th>
<th>View on regional governance</th>
<th>Organisational outlook</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CS as partners</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Regional service provision, monitoring, lobbyism</td>
<td>Supportive/ modification, accelerate implementation</td>
<td>National or local NGO/CBO, regional network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS as legitimators</td>
<td>Critical engagement</td>
<td>Regional advocacy</td>
<td>Lack of public accountability, radical policy change</td>
<td>Regional centres and national NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS as resistance</td>
<td>Non-existing/conflictual</td>
<td>Alternative regional peoples-driven governance</td>
<td>Rejection/structural change</td>
<td>National and local social movement, regional networks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In sum, out of the literature has emerged that civil society together with the state and market are the key actors deeply involved in processes of regionalisation, including its political dimensions and in formal and informal ways. Historically, however, the academic focus has been on state and market led forces, only in the last decade has CS garnered more attention, particularly from the NRA. The consensus remains that there are significant gaps in the literature as the CS-regionalism nexus remains under theorised and methodologically weak.

Evidently, transitioning the debate of CS in RI to the site of CARICOM presents a difficult proposition. Not only because of the sparseness and parallels of scholarship that exist globally are replicated in CARICOM, but also because of a far more limited degree of theorizing exist. Like in other sites of RI, studies on CARICOM have tended to focus on: the necessity for RI; the benefits of RI; and the economic and political issues vis-à-vis trade, sovereignty and implementation. While CS has occupied particular focus of
CARICOM regional Heads over many years and their role and engagement has been conjectured over, it is only in recent years that CS has received critical 'academic treatment'. Girvan (2011b), Thomas (2011), and sundry others through their commentaries have advocate for and articulated the need for CS engagement, in a general sense. CPDC (2011) and Bishop, et al. (2011) have, in a more specific sense, surveyed the issue of CS in CARICOM RI, concluding on empirical grounds on the need for greater CS engagement. Hinds (2007) and Montoute (2010) have provided decidedly academic treatments of CS in CARICOM RI. However, their specific focus was on their role in CARICOM trade matters, thus, paying less attention to engagement with CARICOM in its broader sense. While these studies have obvious implications for understanding of the need for, benefits and value of CS participation they have not, in any substantial way, tackle head-on the question of 'why CS participation has not materialized'. Perhaps this harkens back to the theoretical and methodological issues highlighted through work of Soderbaum and Godsäter (2008) in the preceding paragraphs.

The purpose of this section was not to weigh in on any element of the debate. The goal, however, is to establish that significant gaps exist in the literature and highlight that the theoretical and methodological point of departure in the analysis of civil society participation in regional integration are blurred. Therefore, as suggested, studies of CS participation in RI require custom assessments and the development of methodological approached that treat adequately with the RI project being studied.
Ethos and Benefits of Civil Society Participation in Regional integration

Regional integration schemes in various parts of the globe display diverse levels of civil society participation. Notwithstanding their role (e.g., partner, legitimator or resistor) value has been ascribed to CS involvement. In view of this value, considerable effort and resources are directed at enabling participation. As a consequence, several benefits have emerged, these include: more effective policy development and implementation; and more sustainable program/project outcomes. CSOs have also brought to participatory processes technical expertise, independent monitoring capacities, and increase access to the mass of population, especially the grassroots.

At a more substantial level, CS play a vital role in representing and giving voice to the needs and aspirations of ordinary people within the integration process. With its community-level presence, CS is able to bring the experience, concerns and priorities of the ordinary citizens to the policy making and implementation process. Similarly, CSOs are well placed to sensitize and rally people surrounding their government’s policy undertakings at the regional level and the considerations it may entail. This is what Pateman (1970) refers to as the ‘educative’ and ‘integrative’ potential.

CSOs are not only important in advocating for the needs for the people with governments and development partners, but also for holding governments and their development partners accountable to their commitments. Therefore, CSOs can be seen as strengthening the democratic process on both the national and regional front. In this way, CSO
participation fosters a bottom-up character of the regional integration processes. In doing so these organizations bring the rich experiences and lessons from the ground to bear on the integration process, ensuring a more thorough approach to development and assessment of initiatives.

In view of the key benefits CS participation brings to the regional integration project, there are risks associated with failing to provide for substantial CS participation. Failing to provide opportunities for such engagement risk alienating CS actors and undermining the prospects for benefiting from their value—thereby reducing the prospects for successful regional integration efforts, its design, development and implementation. Evidently, without the contributions of CSOs it may be difficult to development effective and last approaches to forging and fostering meaningful integration efforts (Odhiambo, 2010).

**General History of Civil Society Participation in the Caribbean Region**

“Caribbean people have a long history of community giving, sharing, and participating” (Caribbean Philanthropy Network, 2010, p. 5). This legacy has its roots in the context of slavery and colonization (OAS, 2008). Conspicuously, relations between civil society and government vary between cooperation and conflict (Witter, 2004). The ‘watershed’ period for participation (forced participation) in the Caribbean was the riots of the 1930s (Potter, Barker, Conway and Klak, (2004); Blackman, (2007) in OAS (2008)). Outside of this, there was very little if any participation with the State. The 1960s and 1970s, the era
of independence for many Caribbean countries, compelled governments to undertake robust development policy interventions characterized by state-led developmental approaches (Thomas C., 2001). Essentially, the *modus operandi* of little or no formal participation between civil society and state was maintained. It was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s and the advent of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and attendant conditionalities, coupled with the influences of global norms and standards that ‘change’ came to the Caribbean. In the 1990s, governments began to recognize “the legitimate role of civil society as a partner in governance, in large part because of its regional and international commitments” (Witter, 2004, p. 14). These commitments, together with the global development sway, have influenced the uptake of participatory development approaches at the national level. These approaches are not widespread and in fact are rudimentary, with variance from one Caribbean country to the next. Variance is reflected in many respects, including: the level and degree of engagement; the issues of engagement; and the ways in which CSO are engaged. How this picture of engagement maps out at the regional level is equally interesting.

*History in CARICOM*

Obviously, CS can play diverse roles in regional governance—the typology of Armstrong, Lloyd, & Redmond (2004) offers currency here. Historically, CARICOM has had a very minimalist and state-centered approach to governance, and thus provided limited opportunities for civil society participation (Hinds, 2007; Montoute, 2010). Of the engagement that has taken place, it has surrounded matters of trade and, traditionally, involvement has been limited to the trade union movement. Historically, trade unions
have a rich history in the Caribbean. In the colonial era, they were the only non-state actors that made a noticeable contribution to the integration movement (Wickham, 1998, p. 35). Trade unions were then converted to political parties, which then became the force propelling Caribbean colonies to independence.

The movement from the Federation to the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) saw little opportunity for non-state actors largely because of the focus on private sector trade. However, when CARICOM replaced the CARIFTA, it brought with it the inclusion of functional cooperation and an opportunity was created for participation with CSOs. In reality however, there has not been meaningful participation because the integration movement in the English Caribbean has been centred on the CARICOM Secretariat, which does not promote the inclusion of diverse interest groups. Additionally, the focus on trade has meant that engagement has been isolate to organisation that deal with such, thus, with disregard for the larger and wider group of organisations who tackle other issues of development (ibid). Another feature of CS engagement in CARICOM has been its tendency to ad hoc; this is tied to the fact that engagement has depended heavily on external initiation. Put another way, CS engagement has been project base and the consequence and conditionalities set by of an external organisations (donors, etc.). Outside of trade, and to a much lesser extent, CS participation in CARICOM includes engagement with conflict resolution, disaster relief, poverty reduction, and social development (Montoute, 2010).

Cognizant of the espousals of Wickham reference above, there have been numerous
declarations for including civil society in a more formal and predictable way in the CARICOM regional integration. This participatory rhetoric is captured in the section to follow, which examines the antecedents of CSO participation in CARICOM.

**Participatory Rhetoric: Antecedents of Civil Society Engagement in CARICOM**

Thomas characterizes RI in the Caribbean succinctly, “our actions sometimes contradict our public rhetoric” (Thomas T., 2011). According to Girvan, “our (i.e., the Caribbean’s) problem is not lack of thinking, lack of technical and analytical work, or even lack of formal decisions. Our problem is, and has always been, lack of implementation” (Girvan, 2011b, p. 27). Those lamentations speak to the undeniable gap between policy decisions and implementation in CARICOM. Policy decisions express “certain value (institutional dimension), imply particular stakes (political dimension) and hardly ever speak for themselves (practical dimension)” (Hupe, Nangia, & Hill, 2011, p. 5). Therefore, it is through implementation that policies are given true life, and policy makers in CARICOM continue to fall short in giving true life to policies by closing the institutional, political and practical gaps in implementation.

A survey of the mechanisms aimed at actualizing formal and predictable in CS participation in CARICOM reveals antecedents of an implementation deficit.
The Antecedents

The commitment to participation in the Caribbean regional integration is not new. CARICOM traces its engagement of people back to the 1973 (Isaac, 2004). The preamble of the ‘Treaty of Chaguaramas’ (1973, revised 2001), states, it is “desirous of restructuring the organs and institutions…and redefining their functional relationships so as to enhance the participation of their peoples, and in particular the social partners, in the integration movement” (CARICOM, 2001, p. 1). Article 26 goes on to flesh-out, in detail, the particulars of such participation; “to enhance the decision-making process in the Community…establish and maintain an efficient system of consultations at the national and regional levels” and further, that “consultations [will be] undertaken at successively lower levels of the decision-making process.” Institutionalised annual exchanges with the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) were also listed. The JCG was then made up of the Caribbean Association of Industry and commerce (CAIC), the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL), and the Caribbean Consumer Committee (CCC). At this time also the JCG engaged in dialogue with the Common Market of Ministers via meetings. In the late 1980s, however, discussions with the JCG took the form of direct exchanges with Heads of Government instead of the Common Market of Ministers. In 1995, The Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC) assumed the umbrella role of NGO participation in the JCG.

The next participatory antecedent ensued from the Grande Anse Declaration (1989) in the form of the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP). The ACCP was established 1994 as a deliberative body for deepening the integration movement
through the following objectives:

1. To involve the people of the Community, through their representatives, in the process of consolidating and strengthening the Community

2. To provide opportunities for involvement in the issues of the integration process by members of Parliament in each Member State and Associate Member, in addition to those who now participate

3. To provide a forum for people of the Community to make their views known through their representatives

4. To provide more frequent contact in the monitoring of the policies of the Community

5. To provide enhanced opportunities for the coordination of the foreign policies of Member States

6. To promote greater understanding among Member States and Associate Members for the purpose of realizing and safeguarding the ideals and principles of democratic governments in the Community and facilitating the economic and social advancements of their peoples

7. To encourage the adoption by the Governments of Member States of the Community of a common policy on economic, social, cultural, scientific and legal matters deliberated upon by the Assembly

The inaugural sitting of the Assembly took place in Barbados in May 1996. Since that time the ACCP has had two other sittings, in October 1999 and November 2000 in Grenada and Belize respectively. The ACCP fell short of what was envisaged at it
conception largely based on the fact that its powers were limited to posing question to CARICOM organs and passing resolutions that had no legal force.


“The Commissioners contended that CARICOM needed “normative moorings’ and that they had found “a yearning for giving the Community a qualitative character – values beyond the routine of integration arrangements; indeed standards by which these arrangements themselves can be judged and to which they can be made to conform.” In their view “the Charter [could] become the soul of the Community, which needs a soul if it is to command the loyalty of the people of CARICOM” (2004:27).

The Charter was approved (subscribed to) by Head of Government of the CARICOM member states and was intended to be legislated nationally, however, at this juncture it

---

11 The CARICOM Heads of Government established an Independent West Indian Commission comprising eminent West Indians to carry out a process of public consultation with leaders, teachers, writers, intellectuals, creative artistes, businessmen, sportsmen, trade unionists, churches and other community organizations, as the Community prepared to face the challenges of the 21st century. The report of that Commission entitled Time for Action has proved a seminal work in the advancement of the Community’s goals.
remains without legally binding on member states. In substance, the Charter enumerates overarching principles and key issues of good governance. In the Charter, Heads of Governments articulated their determination to “create a truly participatory environment within the Caribbean Community which will be propitious to genuine consultation in the process of governance” (CARICOM, 1997). Beyond this central ethos, the document delineates the process for reporting and monitoring the implementation and provisions of the Charter. Spanning both the national and regional ambit, member states were tasked with submitting periodic reports on engagement with social partners to the Conference of Heads of Government. Further, at the national level, states were asked to establish national committees or designate a body to monitor and ensure the implementation of the Charter. Evidence to support whether follow-up reports or the mechanisms to monitor such were ever implemented or is not available.

Another participatory antecedent came in 2002 when regional Heads sort to chart a new path for civil society engagement by holding a broad based civil society conference titled ‘Forward Together’—the aim being, “to foster partnership and collaboration in order to advance regional development” (CARICOM, 2002). Consonant with this aim the conference objectives were to:

- Identify strategies for financing development that pay attention to the needs of the poor and marginalised groups;
- Establish new approaches to collaboration and consultation between civil society and government, especially in the pursuit of the CSME; and
- Strengthen the scope of dialogue and collaboration among the various strands of Non-State Actors in promoting regional development.

The ‘Liliendaal Statement of Principles on Forward Together’ (referred to as ‘Liliendaal Statement of Principles’ or ‘Liliendaal Principle’, see Appendix III for a copy) was the culminating document of the conference Forward Together. This statement vocalized the dissatisfactions of government and civil society regarding the current state of engagement. At its core, the Liliendaal Statement elaborated the agreed upon typology for engagement and expressed for both parties (CS and Heads) several broad principles for strengthening their relationship. The principles included “the establishment of mechanisms for continuous dialogue between the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community and Civil Society” and, an “essential way to complement relevant programs to ensure social reconstruction, cohesiveness, peace, poverty reduction, and equity that would enhance regional integration and make the community more economically viable” (CARICOM, 2002). Further, the Heads of Government also “emphasized the need for more constructive participation of CS representative in appropriate decision making organs of the Community, such as, the Council Trade and Economic Development (COTED), the Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP), the Council for Human and Social Development (COHOSOD), etc.” (ibid). To date the nature of engagement has not proceeded as was envisioned in the 2002 Liliendaal Statement of Principles. One example, the (intended) annual presentation of Civil Society to CARICOM Heads of Government was last held in July 2004.
‘The CARICOM Civil Society Participation and Engagement in Regional Integration Project’ (2010-11) is the most recent participatory antecedent. The project was funded under the Caribbean Integration Support Program (CISP) of the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) (an external source) and implements by the Directorate for Foreign and Community Relations, CARICOM Secretariat. The Project primary goal was the creation of a Regional Strategic Framework and Plan of Action for instituting civil society participation in CARICOM, including the CSME. The report was concluded in 2011 and the contents submitted to the Heads of Government for them to opine.

**Conclusion: The Confluence: Civil Society, Participation, and CARICOM**

At this time, while the stated commitment (rhetoric) of Heads of Government to the participatory engagement of CS is clear, as suggested in the antecedents above, the tangible manifestations of those statements are lacking. What is also clear is the relative consensus that the active participation civil society is critical for successfully advancing the regional integration project. It is there for paradoxical that meaningful engagement has not been actualized.

Part II of this chapter brought together the strands of debates presented in Chapter 2. The section commenced by exploring the gaps in the literature vis-à-vis CS, RI and Participation. The rationale CS participation in a regional integration project was outline. The historical antecedents of participatory engagement of CS in CARICOM were
surveyed. The debate now rests at the point of return, the research question. The chapter to follow explores this question through empirical field research.
Chapter 4:

PRESENTATION OF FIELD RESEARCH DATA:
The Reality of Civil Society Participation in CARICOM

Introduction

The previous chapter provided a contextual, historical and literature background to CS participation in CARICOM specifically and, generally, in the Caribbean. This chapter presents the primary field research data. In order to maintain the integrity of the data, this chapter does engage in analysis. After the findings are presented objectively, in the next chapter the implications and conclusions will be analysed against the theoretical triad set out in Chapter 2.

In July 2011, I completed in-depth of semi-structure key-informant and elite interviews in the CARICOM member territories of Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago. Key-informant interviews were conducted with CSO executives from a range of organizational identities. Elite interviews were carried out with well-placed regional experts on the topic. During the field investigation and empirical data collection exercise, five focal areas emerged. These focal areas coalesce around the research question of this thesis. The five focal areas are as follows and will be further examined below:
1. Participation

2. Potential Contributions of CS to Regional Integration

3. Considerations for a Framework for Participation

4. Constraints on Civil Society Participation

5. Institutional Approaches to the Integration Challenges of Participation

Participants in the interviews have been assured anonymity. In keeping with this, code names are attached to direct quotations. A legend that established the logic of the code names used is provided in Appendix II.

1. Participation

For this research project, and this focal area in particular, establishing what the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) means was an essential starting point for a discussion on RI and, equally so, for participation. Accordingly, a coherent view of what CARICOM means, from the perspective of CS, was sought.

For CS the concept of CARICOM is thought of as fluid and viewed as bifurcated, that is, having both an institutional and an organic form:

1) The institutional form: In this mould CARICOM is viewed largely as the regional body charged with ‘integration’ (economic, political, social, etc.) matters, “Pooling resources, and allowing the collective benefits of cooperation and collaboration to
redound to the people of the region” (TTInt2). The Secretariat (and other organizational component of CARICOM, in particular, the HoG Conference) is viewed constitutively as the institutional sum of CARICOM.

2) The organic form: From this perspective, CARICOM is defined as “the people of the region” (TTInt3). It is a community, “as people live it and know it” (BBInt1). Moreover, it is a “real reality, a real life thing—CARICOM is an organic thing, meaning, it touches our lives historically and culturally—it is part of our ethos in the region. It's a lived experience” (TTInt2).

Having defined CARICOM in their own terms, CSOs noted that they seek engagement with both forms. Consequently, all of the CSOs interviewed collectively and unequivocally declared their support for Caribbean RI. Accordingly, such support is for some organisations their “raison d'être” (BBInt1), and for others their “purpose, mission and overall motivation” (GYInt2).

Consequently, the view that, yes, CARICOM should be a mechanism through which CSOs participate in regional integration was propounded with unanimity among respondents. The institutional form of CARICOM held as an important “platform for future change” (TTInt3). The deliberations regarding making it such a platform will be cogitated on in the focal areas to follow. Suffice it to say, CARICOM needs “an injection of participatory processes” (GYInt2).
Respondents were quick to add, CARICOM is not the only mechanism through which they can participate citing “organic integrated impulses” which lie outside of the “policy focus and elitist” natures that characterises formal institutions (BBInt2). Concurrence emerged around “a meeting of these two different forms of integration (institutional and organic) if it is (CARICOM is) to mean anything to ordinary people” (BBInt2). Accordingly, a diverging position surfaced that CS involvement should also have an existence outside of CARICOM—which will serve as a complementary avenue and a supplement to CS participation in CARICOM (the institutional form).

In view of the support for CARICOM (the regional integration project), the follow emerged as the primary concerns of interviewed participants: Regional integration, regional identity, regional loyalty, regional links, regional interaction, a common platform in the international arena, a common sense of being one people from one space.

Probing the question of ‘primary concerns’ vis-à-vis regional integration further, and with greater exactitude, wide ranging concerns emerged. These trepidations are discussed below:

- An out of sync conception of CARICOM: “People of the regional want to get together in a less restrictive way than is conceived by our policy makers” (BBInt1). The view was advance that the conception of ‘CARICOM’ held by regional Heads seems to be at odds with the one held by CS.
- A lack of political will: The pervasive outlook is that “HoGs don't have any real commitment to RI and, thus, the regulations that have been put up serve more as a hindrance than as a facilitator of peoples’ integration” (BBInt1).

- Leadership: A major issue with RI “has to do with the lack of leadership and vision of current leaders in the region”.

- Implementation deficit: This view is mounted on the limited legal capacity that CARICOM, in its current configuration, has to implement decisions and take ideas forward. This is an area of unnerving concern.

- A low level of awareness: The feeling is that people and organizations are not sufficiently aware and knowledgeable of what development cooperation (RI) means for them and for the CARICOM region.

- Sovereignty: Some informants characterised the RI project as “a group of sovereign states” with members not fully committed to integration. As a result, the short-term political interests of individual states are often given priority over the longer-term common good.

- Representation: The acknowledgement that the RI project remains primarily a top-down process and therefore lack the integral element of ‘peoples’ participation was voiced as a fundamental concern.
The concern of participation lies at the heart of this thesis and was therefore surveyed with detail and intensity. The expressed intent was to determine from CSOs, what would constitute participation in Caribbean regional integration for them. The ruminations of a key informant offer an appropriate starting point to this area:

“Participation ranges along a continuum: first, providing information; second, providing support via resources from CARICOM governments to CSOs; third, the actual decision making and governance structure that allow CS inputs and opinions into decisions; and fourth, feedback and evaluation thereafter” (TTInt2).

Another explanation on participation points with vehemence to the view that CS engagement constitutes “consultative status, at minimum” (GYInt1). The espousal of an elite interviewee augments this perspective:

“Civil society engagement should go beyond consultation. Consultation suggests two-way communication with no guarantee that the suggestions will influence final decisions. Their inclusions should be genuinely participatory, having the ability to contribute to decision making, e.g., through voting” (TTInt1).
Querying another participatory option, the concept and consideration of observer status was mentioned with some disdain and was viewed as limiting and restrictive. A key informant posited that they “would want to participate as fully as possible” (BBInt1) and, therefore, observer status does not permit the level and quality of engagement envisaged. Accordingly, it was expressed that participation should therefore include: consultations on particular issues; the ability to make submissions on matters; the option to act as project implementers; avenues to provide technical input; the chance to engage in public education; among other considerations.

The summary position of interviewees is that a system of engagement should provide CSOs with the opportunity to participate in a working relationship that enables CSOs to make practical and theoretical contributions to the programs and goals of CARICOM.

2. Potential Contributions of CS to Regional Integration

Musings in support of CS engagement in the Caribbean regional integration project have come from diverse quarters. Largely this idea of CS participation is founded on their potential to contribute to the RI project in a myriad of ways. CSOs were asked to share what their engagement would bring to CARICOM integration. The views are distilled below, as the key contributions of CS to RI:

Alternatives to development: “We present an alternative from the technical view of development”, this was a position of accord held by the research sample. More
specifically, they contend that, “CS can present a view or model of development that 1) is more long-term, and 2) is more responsive to people’s lives and actual experiences at the community level” (BBInt1).

Skills and technical expertise: Defining CS in its broadest sense—everyone outside of the administration of government—one interviewee asserted, “we possess the widest array of skills and expertise” (BBInt1). Through formal channels, those skills and expertise can be brought to the fore in the form of a substantial contribution to development.

Improved governance: This contribution was discussed in two ways. Firstly, CS view their inclusion as having the potential to result in improved performance from policy makers, as CS will serve as ‘checks and balances’ in the regional integration project. Moreover, their inclusion will “help to strengthen the accountability of governments to constituents, through increasing their awareness and understanding of the programmes” (GYInt2). Secondly, CS involvement would constitute a responsibility on their behalf to deliver and in so doing “improve the governance of the regional so that democracy becomes not just a formalize structure, a structural something, but something that is lived, vibrant and responsive to the emerging Caribbean civilization” (BBInt1).

Provide an understanding of the needs ‘on the ground’: The position that CS understands the needs of people ‘on the ground’ was advanced stridently. Accordingly, CS is therefore able “to bring proposals and make input towards the regional integration
process, to advance the lives of ordinary people” (TTInt1). One example cited is through furnishing policy makers with ‘evidence based research’ which may guide and shape development policy formulation. Another example is though impacting policy with ‘local knowledge’. In so doing, “the regional integration process would therefore not be based on theoretical models (only) but be driven by the needs of the citizenry (and reflect) a more realistic approach to governance and integrating people” (TTInt2).

Ownership and legitimacy: The position resound that when CSOs participate and contribute to RI process, the voices and needs of the ordinary people are included in decision-making. The corollary to this is that inclusion “fosters ownership and brings legitimacy to the development process” (TTInt1).

3. Considerations for a Framework for Participation

Having established their willingness to participate, defined the nature of participation CS is desirous of, enumerated their keys regional integration issues of concern, and outlined the potential value CS can bring to the integration project, the focus in now being shifted to actualizing their participation in RI. This focal area dwells on the main considerations surrounding creating a framework for CS participation. Stated differently, this section seeks to unearth some of the key ‘terms of reference’ that should inform any framework of CS participation in RI.
The proposals of interviewees with respect to a model framework for participation are best captured in this statement, “we want formal and predictable channels” (BBInt1). From this assertion a number of specific terms for consideration were tendered, the essence of which is captured in the discussion to follow.

Civil society informants concurred that to actualized participation and deepen engagement a shared level of responsibility exists for both parties (CARICOM and CS). Respondents contend that genuine recognition of civil society as development partners at the national and regional level by government is the core of and the base starting point for catalysing the process of meaningful participation. The indicators of this genuine spirit of engagement are variegated—and as a consequence, highly noticeable and very much in contrast to the historical antecedents that presage participation.

Interviewees expressed the need for creations of democratic space(s) where CSOs can funnel their input into the overall machinery of CARICOM. These spaces must have both national and regional dimensions with complementarities between the two. Candid in their remarks, there was overriding solidarity on the stance that for engagement to take place a commitment to restructure/strengthen the CARICOM Secretariat was obligatory. Moreover, distinct mention was made of the need to adopt regulations and institute administrative actions, which would impel implementation of decisions approved at the regional level. The most radical of the calls advanced was for a modification of the “existing model of governance from liberal to participatory democracy to incorporate more people participation” (TTInt1).
Key informants and elite interviewees alike, alluded to the provisions outlined in the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society, the Liliendaal Statement of Principles and, most recently, the CARICOM Civil Society Project Report, as being highly instructive on the requirements for facilitating CS participation and engagement in CARICOM process. The illuminations of those documents may serve as a broader point of reference and in many instances are captured in the espousals below. Specifically, interviewees suggested that the following terms should be addressed or should serve as points reference when framework for participation:

- Any framework should be instated based on a legally binding model of participatory operation, which should see the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society brought into law (through national legislation)

- A genuine response to the CS sector’s capacity development needs is a prerequisite for greater involvement in regional integration at all levels

- Any framework should be genuinely transparent, inclusive and representative, and thereby, facilitate the participation of a wide cross-section of CSOs

- Of necessity, any framework should be characterised by structural, procedural and organizational complementarities between the national and regional level of participation
- Any framework should be open and consensus based; allow for wide-ranging discussions on the gamut of issues that encircle Caribbean development

- Any framework should facilitate an agreeable level of meaningful interface between policy makers and CSOs at the national and regional level

- Any framework should be characterized by an adequate level of systematised dialogue and feedback

- Any framework should be imbued with a result-oriented culture—one characterised by engines of intellectual inquiry and the implementation of decisions

- Establish designated conduits that facilitate effective information flow and sharing from policy processes vis-à-vis the national-regional nexus of participation

- Pre-establish the regularity of meeting engagement, which, of necessity, should specify a clear forum and timetable for participation

- Install institutional touch points, nationally and regionally (perhaps a national focal point (NFP) and/or NGO DESK) to provide a means to influence government policy through the collective voice
Despite the abovementioned points of reference CSO were keen to note, “you needed the governance arrangements (referenced earlier) – the legal framework and the facilitating unit. The main issue for CSO is for action to be supported financially. That framework for them should be informed by the terms outlined above. For sample frameworks, see Appendix V.

4. Constraints on Civil Society Participation in Regional Integration

The link between capacity and resources, and the attendant ability to participate is one that was clearly established by respondents. According to respondents, the capacity and resources that CSOs require to participate are as important as any agreements that advocate participation. Thus, informants contend, having a space to participate and not having the capacity and resources to do so render it ineffectual. For this reason, this focal area examines the capacity and resource constraints affecting CSOs ability to be meaningfully participants in CARICOM RI if called upon. It should be noted that the discussion to follow does not treat with issues of the governance mechanisms required to participate (which was deliberated on in the section that preceded) but focuses on the capability of CSOs to be participatory actors in the context of CARICOM RI.

Diverse views were tabled regarding the present capacity of CSOs to participate in CARICOM. These views ranged from CSOs not having the capacity to having some capacity and having the capacity. Probing the question, at a granular level, what emerged was the common sense that capacity is an ‘organization specific’ issue. National umbrella
organisations, regional umbrella and regional organization are seen as having ‘fair’ capacity to participate. It is important to note that the fair capacity referenced here should be interpreted in the context of the follow statement, “the only resource we don't have is money. As far knowledge, skills, experience, etc., we have that” (BBInt3). However, umbrella organisations stand in stark contrast to ‘unitary’ civil society organisations, some of which do not necessarily have the technical, organizational and financial capacity to engage CARICOM in a meaningful and sustained way. This, according to some respondents, does not mean that those organizations would not like to engage CARICOM. The belief, however, is that the demands of fulfilling their domestic mandate takes priority. Therefore, incurring the comparatively onerous resources demands of regional participation would make such participation unfeasible for these organizations.

The consensus prevailed among all informants is that the “funding situation is quite difficult” for the sector and, as a result, “at this present junction most of the organizations are not operating at their optimum” (BBInt1). This lack of resources typifies a sector that is weak, struggling and dependent. The cyclical impact of the financial predicament the CS sector faces is explained in the remarks below:

“One thing feeds the other, so because the organizations have been eroded they have been losing their capacity, managerial staff and expertise. Their governance structure has been slipping—there are slippages in the governance in terms of the requirements that they should and ought to uphold. There is also lost of physical infrastructure—old equipment that
needs replacing. So the technical, the financial, the governance, the managerial, all of these aspects are below par at the moment—so there is a real challenge in term of their full participation. So at the same time that there is a desire to participate, the ability to participate and engage at this present time is quite limited” (BBInt1).

The menu of issue constraints cited in the interview excerpt above is synopsized below:

*Technical*

“To participate in the technical dialogue (of regional integration) on an on-going basis would be a challenge for us—that's for sure” (BBInt1). “One of the main ones relate to research capacity. I think that research should drive policy and the direction of regional integration and regional development” (TTInt1). The key technical capacity issues highlighted by respondents were:

- Research
- Analytical
- Legal literacy
- Monitoring and evaluation
- Project management
Organizational

“I will say that Caribbean civil society generally face several challenges in participating in any process” (TTInt1). The main organizational capacity issues highlighted by respondents were:

- Limited manpower power
- Competent human resource
- Managerial acumen
- Governance concerns

Financial

As it pertains to finance, one respondent explained:

“Governments in the regional have not yet developed a culture of (financial) allocation so we (civil society) rely on external funding, and since the end of the Cold War the Caribbean is no longer seen as a priority area for international grant making. This means that the capacity that existed within a lot of organizations has eroded steadily over the years—so that organizations that were once vibrant at the national and regional level do not have that institutional capacity anymore. This is one of the drawbacks at the moment—so it we are thinking of real engagement of civil society from the national level in the process, some rebuilding has to take place” (BBInt1).
The main financial constraints highlighted by respondents were:

- Limited funding
- Dependence on external funding
- Inadequate diversity of funds sources
- The existence of little or no level of self-sustainability

*Operational*

In the words of a respondent:

“No consistent integrated media/communication network exists through which we and other CS networks can reliably come into contact with each other, and where we can converge along a certain vision, because there are some many CSOs doing things in silos that you are not aware. The sharing and spreading information and network it critical to how we operate” (TTInt3).

The main operational constraints highlighted by respondents were:

- Inadequate availability of information (from the CARICOM Secretariat and in a timely manner)
- Loss of and/or antiquated physical infrastructure
- Assorted impediments to communication and networking for idea convergence
- Limited ability to (fund) sustain travel
- Limited resources to marketing the work of the organization
Additional Factor Considerations—CSO’s notes to themselves

With genuine participation as the major goal, the following were tendered as factor considerations for CSOs in order to better position and enable themselves as effective participants and meaningful contributors to regional integration. CS espoused that they need to:

- Rationalize functions: The prevailing opinion is that given the current state of the sector, in terms of, slippage, loss of vitality and capacity, “CSOs need to rationalize their functions and instead of having small remnant organizations to coalesce into stronger tighter units that bring more skills together” (BBInt1).

- Cross-fertilize and synergize: The view was advanced, repeatedly, that a greater amount of networking among organizations—NGOs, trade unions, and volunteer service clubs—is needed. According to informants, the upshots of this networking are the promotion and establishment of cross-sector linkages across focal areas and the forging of national and regional synergies.

- Articulate clearly what ‘we’ mean by and want from RI: The need for issue convergence around common agreed regionalist themes, and need to articulate clearly what RI means and what they want from RI were reoccurring themes among respondents. The feeling expressed is that a CSO posited vision for RI and, equally, the
interpretation and explanation of that vision is important for the RI project.

- Develop a different leadership style: This need is best captured in the words of a respondent:

  “We are guilty of adversarial politics—confrontational engagement. We have to being to think more in terms of partnership than confrontation. You must be willing to invest the time it takes, to build thrust and to work toward a common goal. If we come with a criticism we should also come with a solution to” (BBInt1).

- Skills training and development: CSOs held in oneness the belief that skills development and training are certain imperative en route to be full and meaningful participants in RI. Some of the key areas cited for skills training and development were:

  - How to tap into and diversify funding sources
  - How to reach target audience with greater efficiency and effectiveness
  - How to improve organizational efficiency
  - How to market the work of the organization and RI
  - How to mobilize people; both volunteers and the regional citizenry
  - How to improve communication
5. Institutional Approaches to the Integration Challenge of Participation

This focus area is very much a capstone; it captures the overriding and underlying sentiments, and prevailing themes that permeated both the key informant and elite interviewee discussions. The derivate remarks were the result of both direct questions that interviewees were broached with and digressions they felt incited to discuss or allude to. In particular, these remarks enwrap the why questions of this thesis, which is, the central question.

Engagement: Feeding history into the present

The history of both RI and engagement in the Caribbean is long and storied. One respondent noted that the initial ‘architects’ of RI were national leaders of the post-independence period who had fought on the front lines of colonialism and “wanted to see a new way of life for the people”. The current architects are:

“A generation of leaders who I believe, to be fear to them—despite the popular sentiment that they don't want to surrender their spheres of power and influence—I think defining ourselves in an increasingly globalized world is challenging. What is our identity? What is the Caribbean sensibility? What is the Caribbean persona?

Marking and defining our development direction as a unique people rather than just part of a globalizing world—is a challenge—with the
penetrations of the media people reference point are more global that they are national or regional” (BBInt1).

The prevailing consensus among informants is, “we need a (participatory development) model compatible with us” (BBInt3). “We are on a new frontier in administration and governance in the Caribbean—we have to become the thinkers in our own regards” (BBInt3). Notwithstanding this reality “CARICOM have remained a top-down institution, which lack and affinity with on the ground people”. The posture of CS to this reality is “(we) can offer services at the national and regional level, both on the practical and theoretical level. It’s really about the spirits… (and) so if the recommendations that I made earlier can be incorporated we would have created the space, the framework and the possibilities for doing” (BBInt1).

Institutional approach toward engagement

CSOs were frank in expressing their opinions on the approach and disposition of regional Heads towards their participation in RI. Their assertions congregate around the view that regional heads have been apathetic towards their engagement at the national level, and consequently, CSOs “have little faith that they would engage us at the regional level, although we are very keen on engaging the heads at the regional level” (BBInt1). CSOs indicated that this is in contrast to quotidian politics at the national level, where politicians engage denizens in their communities to procure votes. However, the engagement arrangement at the regional level is vastly dissimilar. The following vignette offers further context on the matter of engagement:
“It’s not the frameworks and the structures, in and of themselves, that fail us, it’s the lack of political will that fail us. The lack of will by our policy makers to engage us, the suspicions that we have of each other; that we are coming to overthrow each other or we must prove our decision makers wrong. So when you ask if it (CARICOM) can be an appropriate structure, it can, if the political will to engage is there” (BBInt1).

Why is the uptake so slow?
At the heart of this research study is the central issue of unearthing why uptake of civil society participation in CARICOM regional has not materialize. The ruminations of a key informant below encapsulate this best:

“Governments generally think of CS as a type of opposition, because you have your lens of what is happening and you critique what is happening—as you know the democratic framework allows you the right of decent, freedom of speech, of opinion and of association. Governments tend to not see the enabling side of CS until they want it, but rather that CS constitute a threat; they function more as an opposition party, they tend to be more critical than helpful. If CS were viewed as a resource, that can enable, we would have more (rapid) uptake. The views of CS have been shared through the length and breadth of the region; governments are not committed to RI because they will have to surrender their spheres of
power. So if you are defensive of your little space and status you would not want to take onboard people that you perceive to be critical—but if you saw it as enabling resources to bring to bear on the development of the country and the region then you would.

It is a more difficult process as our democratic framework says elections every five-year. It’s based on representation rather than participation, and what we are asking for in the 21st century is ownership, involvement, participation not the old model of representation where people elect you and you go about your business…The Caribbean is a much more educated and informed region—this current generation more so than fifty to sixty years ago. So our democracy needs to live and grow, it needs to mature to the state where you have free access to information, and free interaction, where that kind of engagement between the citizenry and the policy makers can happen in a non-threatening way” (BBInt1).

Conclusion

This chapter has presented, in detail, the primary field data of this thesis. The findings delineated in the five focal areas were drawn from key-informant and elite semi-structured interviews in the CARICOM member territories of Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. The data collected focused on answering the research question of this thesis, as detailed in Chapter 1.
The next chapter will examine the findings presented in this chapter, and discuss and analyse them in the context of the theories, literature and context presented in the foundation chapters (2 and 3). I will then attempt to draw conclusions, define the implications of the findings and make recommendations, which will be presented in the final chapter.
Chapter 5:

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION:
The Rhetoric and Realty of Civil Society Participation in CARICOM

This chapter sets out the analysis of field research data by merging the theories outlined in Chapter 2 with the empirical realities presented in Chapter 4. For congruence, the analysis presented in this chapter mirrors the five focal areas distilled from the empirical field data and elaborated in the last chapter:

1. Participation
2. Potential contribution of CSOs to Regional Integration
3. Considerations for a Framework for Participation
4. Constraints to Civil Society Participation
5. Institutional Approaches to the Integration Challenge of Participation

Before delving into the focal areas, it is beneficial to restate the central question and argument of this thesis.
**Introduction**

As evidenced in the literature (Chapter 3), relations between CSOs and regional Heads goes back to the inception of the region’s RI project, although the declarations, affirmations and commitments that advocated their inclusion has changes several times. At the present time the responsibility for crafting the development direction of the region remains the exclusive preserve of CARICOM Heads—despite the acknowledged importance of the role of CS. This acknowledgement is premised on the participatory development paradigm which espouses key benefits from CS involvement; the democratisation of the development process and the promotion of development that is more economically, socially, culturally and environmentally attuned to the needs of the regional, to name a few. Thus, in principle, CS involvement should be viewed as participation for development.

This thesis seeks to understand the nuanced context and complexities surrounding actualizing civil society participation in the CARICOM RI development process. Accordingly, the central question is:

**Why is it the case that numerous declarations by CARICOM Heads of Government in support of CSO participation in the regional integration process have not resulted in any tangible, real involvement of CSOs in the institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM?**
This thesis argues that above and beyond the obvious challenges of providing the necessary framework and capacity building for CSO participation in the Caribbean integration process, the current lack of real and substantive inclusion is rooted in the structure of a representative democratic framework with limited consideration for the principles of a participatory model of democracy.

The sections in this chapter treat empirically, theoretically and analytically with the research question and argument of this thesis. Participatory development, democracy and organisation theories are used in this thesis. Their relevance and direct bearing on the thesis were iterated in Chapter 2. Participation is embedded in democracy, democracy is needed for involvement in (successful) development outcomes, and for successful development outcomes correct problem specification is needed. Participation is collectivised through CS. Democracy theory demarcates what is provided to CS and its involvement in policymaking and implementation processes. Organisational theory enables an assessment of the capacity, resources and effectiveness of CSOs, and stresses the importance of these factors for their engagement in RI policy development.

1. Participation

As a point of discussion and analysis, CARICOM serves as an important place to start, after all, its conception holds great bearing for this study. Equal in this regard is the concept of participation. How participation is defined holds immense consequence for its
realizations, its role, and ultimately, its impact. In the theoretical and methodological context of this study both conceptions are of particular import for analysis.

Primary field data signalled that CSOs hold a bifurcated notion of CARICOM, that is, having both an institutional and organic form. The former being the organizational and structural remit of CARICOM, and the latter being a “lived experience” (TTInt2) for the people of the region. CSOs avowed support for RI and seek engagement with both forms. Such support is for some organisations their mission and overall motivation, and for others, their raison d’être. However, aspirations of engagement are attached predominantly to the institutional form of CARICOM, as it is recognised as a “platform for future change” (TTInt3). Engagement in actuality is participation. Field data indicated that CSOs possess a firm grasp of what participation should mean (in the RI context). Briefly, they defined participation as a “continuum” (TTInt2) involving: the provision of information, support via resources provision, a decision-making governance structure, and a feedback and evaluation loop. Further, CSOs were clear on the need for participation that is not simply observer status and for whatever form selected to transcend consultative status. What is envisaged is for CSOs to “participate as fully as possible” (BBInt1). Decisively, participatory engagement should be genuine and allow CSOs to make theoretical and practical contributions to the goals and progress of CARICOM.

The summary of empirical data in the focal area of participation, provided above, offers a rich plane for discussion and analysis. The data suggest, CSOs see themselves as
stakeholders in the RI project, “affected by the outcomes—negatively or positively—or those who can affect the outcome of a proposed intervention” (The World Bank, 1996, p. 125). Moreover, empirical indicators have strongly suggested that CSOs possess a genuine interest in participation and have a clear conception of what participation should look like. What is envisioned is a break with what Chambers calls the “top-down model” and the uptake of a model in which “multiple, local and individual realities are recognised, accepted, enhanced and celebrated” (1997, p. 188).

2. Potential Contributions of Civil Society to Regional Integration

The focal area of the potential contributions of CS to RI policy development is an important one. Support for CS participation has its origins in diverse quarters and is premised, largely, on the potential of CSOs to add value in a multiplicity of ways. In terms of the CARICOM RI project the key ways cited were:

- CS can present an alternative model of development
- CS can offer technical expertise
- CS can contribute to improved governance
- CS can provide a real understanding of the needs ‘on the ground’
- CS can foster (people’s) ownership of the RI project
- CS can bring legitimacy of the RI development process
This focal area brought into view the many substantial potential contributions CSOs can make to CARICOM RI. Theoretically and notionally the issue of participation—whether in democracy, PD or organisational theory—is founded on the potential benefits to be accrued from operating inclusively. Through the lens of democratic theory CS involvement, to the extent elaborated above, would constitute ‘democratization’ of the RI development policy process (White, 1996). Moreover, such engagement constitutes meaningful involvement and stands to deepen and advance the region’s integration movement. Moreover, it would buttress the furtherance of ownership of the RI process and aid in legitimizing the integration process. From the perspective of PD theory, the conceptualization of Rahnema (1992) offers analytical purchase on this point. Rahnema characterises PD as having three core elements: cognitive, political and instrumental (1992). Applying this characterization to the potential contributions of CS to CARICOM it is clear their involvement span these three elements, as follows:

1. Cognitive: CS can offer a firm understanding to the needs ‘on the ground’
2. Political: CS can represent and empower the voice of the voiceless
3. Instrumental: CS can provide an alternative understanding of the Caribbean reality

The addition of the technical expertise and knowledge of CSOs of to the realities ‘on the ground’, CSOs can provide invaluable contributions towards improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the RI project in delivering on its advertised goals and objectives. Therefore, from and organisational theory perspective, their contributions and input can serve to produce and enhanced vision for CARICOM RI.
3. Considerations for a Framework for Participation

Empirically, this focal area delved into the main considerations surrounding the creation of a framework for CS participation in CARICOM. Evidently, the prior focal areas have discussed and analysed the willingness of CSO to participate, the nature of participation CSOs are desirous of, and their potential contributions the RI project. The next logical step is to cogitate on the empirical findings vis-à-vis a framework for participation.

CSO were categorical in their espousals regarding a framework for participation. Their views were best summarized in this quote, “we would want formal and predictable channels” of engagement (BBInt1). Other sentiments were tendered to overarch this edict, including: the need for genuine recognition of CS as development partners; the necessity of a genuine spirit of participation; the need for capacity development for CSOs; and the creation of democratic space(s) to channel input into CARICOM, with national and regional complementarities between the two structures. Some key structural considerations were cited, these included the needs for: a framework for participation; support mechanisms; institutional touch-points for participation; pre-established meeting frequencies; and systematic dialogue and feedback mechanisms.

The focal area regarding a model framework for participation is one rich with discussion and ripe of analysis. The field data presented a myriad of considerations. It is worth noting that the express intent was not to elaborate an actual framework (for elaborations and recommendations in this regard, see Appendix V and CPDC Report 2011) but to
inform such a framework (or to provide the empirical basis for such). The data suggest, a
numbers of factors are at play and ought to be given due consideration. These factors are
embedded in the in the theoretical triad provided in Chapter 2 and the historical
antecedents discussed in Chapter 3.

The undercurrent of the considerations advanced by respondents bespeak apprehension
fuelled, largely, by the history of failures to implement agreed upon mechanism for
participation. Foremost in the memory of CS, academics, scholars and people in the
region is that implementation is the Achilles heel of the RI project. In light of this, one
can concluded that the considerations proffered are aimed at addressing and countering
the implementation deficit.

The theoretical reverberations that flow from this data set are numerous and display
interesting perspectives. The twinning of several key considerations can be used to
illustrate this. The issue of creating a framework that is transparent, inclusive and
representative, and thereby facilitative of participation of a wide cross-section of CSOs
relates to PD, but has its genesis in democratic theory. From a PD perspective, Mohan
and Stokke (2000), White (1996) and Chambers (1983; 1994; 1997) all posit that
participatory processes should be characterised by those core features (among others) for
participation to be effective—to serve a developmental function. In democratic theory,
democracy and particularly direct democracy, advocates for participation that is widely
inclusive and, thus, gives consideration for the educative and integrative functions
(Pateman, 1970).
The consideration to establish designated conduits to facilitate effective information flow and sharing from policy processes has both organizational and democratic theory underpinnings. In the arena of organizational theory, ‘information’ is critical and so to ‘structure’. Successful decision-making and overall organization performance hinges on the effective and efficient flow of information. Organization theorist Draft (2009) contends, to build agreement among diverse groups widespread information sharing is imperative. Moreover, Draft (2009) espouses that information sharing is a vital attribute for organisations in turbulent environments. In the democratic sphere, for the representative tradition, it is considered essential that citizens are enabled to make informed decisions—premised on adequate and unbiased information. In the direct democratic tradition it is stressed that information be provided in a specific context. Criticisms are levelled when debates are casted in narrow, technocratic frames, which exclude issues of social concern. For Pateman (1970) information is a core component of the educative and integrative functions as for both to take place an adequate supply of information is needed. It is therefore conclusive that the timely provision of information is an integral part of the participation process.

The appeals for any participatory framework to be imbued with a result-oriented culture are grounded in organizational theory and PD. Organization theory contributes to facilitating organizations in achieving their goals and informs them of the possible problems/challenges they may encounter. Organisations are tasked not just with achieving their goals but also with attainment them in an efficient and effective manner. Therefore, the recommendation for a participatory process marked by a result-oriented
culture is closely linked with the organization theory concepts of effectiveness and efficiency. The adoption of such a measure can bring much benefits and tangible result to a participatory process in the sphere of RI.

PD places results at the very core of the participatory process. The stance is that, on the one hand, the involvement and coming together of development actors is aimed at a result that represents a better achievement that would have been possible through individual effort. On the other hand, the result created through collective effort is thought to be more sustainable—efficient and effective—and thus, the impact greater.

4. **Constraints on Civil Society Participation in Regional Integration**

Data analysis and discussion in this focal area revolves around the capacity and resource constraints affecting CSO’s ability to participate in a sustained and meaningful way. Having a framework and space to participate and not having the capacity and resources to do so render it useless. Therefore, capacity is an area that carries important implications for CSO participation and, thus, requires careful study.

The field data garnered presented diverse views concerning the capacity of CSOs to participate in meaningful and sustained way. In short, these viewpoints captured capacity as an organisation specific phenomenon that ranges from: ‘not having the capacity’, to, ‘having some capacity’, and ‘having the capacity’. In the case of having the capacity, this *fair* capacity to participate is attributed to ‘umbrella’ organization, as opposed to, ‘non-
umbrella’ ‘unitary’ organisations, and is even further, contextualised to mean technical
capacity and not financial capacity/resources to participate. The empirical data indicated
that, regionally, CS bemoans their current financial situation. Financial exigencies have
rendered the operations of organisations uncertain and organisational performance has
fallen well below optimum. The corollary impacts noted in the data were: technical,
organisational, financial and operational slippages. The sum of this reality is that while
CSOs express the desire to participate their capacity to engage is quite limited at this
time.

In contemplation of the constraints CSOs face, the data demonstrates they have tendered
measures aimed at better positioning and enabling the sector to be meaningful
contributors to the RI project. These measures included: the rationalization of functions;
cross-fertilizations and synergising of operations; the development of a different style of
leadership; the need for skills training and development; and the articulations of a clear
vision of what they want and mean by RI.

The set of data on the focal area of constraints to participation offers much fodder to
analyse further from various angles. In applying the theoretical triad, each theory holds
the issue of capacity with much importance and concurs on it as an imperative for
meaningful and sustained participation. For example, PD holds capacity as important and
like organisational theory places emphasis on building capacity, especially where absent.
In fact, White (2006) and others have stressed that an elemental part of participation is
building capacity and by extension empowerment. Organizational theory treats capacity
as central to efficiency and effectiveness, and, by extension, the achievement of organisational goals. Drucker (1992) and others highlight the unique proposition CSOs face in relation to their prime goal of social impact versus profit, and the unique challenges this creates in supporting themselves. In addition, organisational theory places special emphasis on the external environment. A school of thought in organisational theory, the contingency theory, underlines the need for organisations to be keen on adapting to their environment.

Delving further into the empirical field data, one can note the ‘self-declared’ variance in the capacity of CSO to participate. This reality brings into view a numbers of issues regarding the prospects of participation. Among those issues are:

1. Their ability to engage in a meaningful and sustained way;
2. The number of organisations capable of participating; and
3. The representativeness of that quantum.

The infirmed financial position of the CS sector was the key reason underlying the issues listed above. The financial position of CSOs carries further ramifications of organisational and operational slippages, which can debase their operations, and thereby impact their very ability to survive.

Notwithstanding the encumbrances states above, this dataset illustrates awareness among CSOs regarding their capacity to participate. This was conveyed in the measures CSOs
proffered to attenuate their current financial pressures and, at the same time, better enable organisations to make meaningful contributions in the region. The measures reeked with organizational, operational and financial tones. The key measures included the need for the following:

- Rationalise and synergise operations
- Develop a different style of leadership
- Skills training and development
- Articulate a clear vision RI

One would have to agree that these measures are substantive and needed recommendations that can only serve to improve the efficacy of the CS sector to make a more meaningful contribution to the RI project. Whether or not they can and would be implemented is a topic for another discussion.

5. Institutional Approaches to the Integration Challenge of Participation

As it did in the Chapter 5, this focal area will serve as the capstone for this chapter. The sources and composition of the data to be discussed and analysed in this focal area is derived from both key informant and elite interview discussions and is based on direct questions, digressions and inferences. This focal area, draws support from the other focal areas, and has the express intent of tackling the substantive research question of this thesis.
As suggested by the data and supported by the antecedents provided in Chapter 3 (Part II), attempts at CS participation in CARICOM RI is long and storied. This history and so to the history of Caribbean RI, is set into two contexts. The first context, marked by the initiators of the region’s RI project, forged out of the crucibles of the post-colonial period and fuelled by the desire to create a “new ways of life for the people” (BBInt1). The second context is set out by the current architects, who are tasked with the challenges of “marking and defining our (the Caribbean’s) development direction as a unique people in an increasingly globalized world” (BBInt1). In engaging with this challenge, the data points to two realities: (1) CARICOM has remained a top-down institution, and (2) paradoxically, although repeatedly admonished to engage CS, has not created the space, framework or possibilities for meaningful participation.

With specific regard to the disposition to engage CSOs, the field data suggested that regional Heads are apathetic towards engagement and, consequently, CSOs have ‘little faith’ that they would be engaged, especially at the regional level. Probing further, the primary field research presents the unmistakably prevalent view that regional Heads have little political will to engage CSOs. The data suggests, this may be fuelled by mistrust, skepticism and the mutual suspicions held of each other.

Surveying the implication of the three roles CS can play in RI (Armstrong, Lloyd, & Redmond, 2004) may seem intimidating for the HoGs. CS involvement stands to see them become a significant force in the RI project, which maybe or is perceived as their
potential influence. This position is consonant with this views of Williams who contends that “participation may indeed…. provide its subjects with new opportunities for voice, and its consequences are far from pre-determined” (2004, p. 559). Accordingly, HoGs may find this as too substantial a role and thus a potential threat. This harkens back to the trepidations cited in the data, which states that HoGs do not see the enabling side of CS participation, but see CS as a threat. Moreover, the pervasive sentiment surfaced that HoGs are “afraid to surrender the spheres of power” (BBInt1)—from the representative democracy viewpoint deep participation maybe regarded as tantamount to such. This stance also pervades the literature, according to Girvan, “the root of the problem is that governments are not willing to surrender any of their sovereign decision-making powers…where their sovereignty may be exercised collectively” (2012, p. 7).

Evidently, participation in the sphere of RI requires the investment of serious political capital. Moreover, while the gains of such investment may seem clear—the advancement of the region—the returns are equally uncertain (from the perspective of HoGs). The oddity of political wins, losses, and gains vis-à-vis political mileage in the regional context and its implications for the politics of the national context is uncharted territory, with sparse reference points globally, for political leaders in CARICOM. Keeping in mind that RI is in part a political process; this may be a consideration weighing heavily on CARICOM regional Heads.
Applying Armstrong, Lloyd, and Redmond (2004) typology of the three roles civil society can play in regional governance, these are the potential implications that analysis offers vis-à-vis the primary field research data:

**Civil society as partner**

By way of data analysis, one can conclude that the primary role CSO seek to play in CARICOM RI project is that of partner. In principle, the partner role in RI is a supportive one, established on a commitment to integration and the promotion of socio-economic growth and sustainability of the region (Söderbaum & Godsäter, 2008). This intention was espoused strongly in the primary data. An important point to note, which is typical of the partner role, is that CSOs in the region have advanced the need for modifications in the approaches to achieving the aforementioned RI goals. In addition to contributing to the governance facet of RI, the data highlighted CSO in the following roles: service provider, project implementer, monitor, advocate and lobbyist—all traits of the partnering role and geared toward improving and advancing the RI project.

**Civil society as legitimating regional governance**

Through analysis of the field data the intended legitimating role of CS in CARICOM was identified. By their very engagement and their own admission, CSOs assert they would “foster ownership and bring legitimacy” (TTInt1) to the RI process in the region. In the material sense, this would be actualized through collaboration with policy makers and by critical engagement with the governance process (as opposed to the more benign role of partner). Characteristically, the legitimating role is marked by intentions of radical policy
change, rather than the review and implementation of existing policies (Söderbaum & Godsäter, 2008). Furthermore, at its core, the legitimator is tasked with making the RI process more accountable and democratic—and, therefore legitimate. The retort of a respondent vis-à-vis RI equates to this, “yes CARICOM is a mechanism… (it is a) platform for future change” (TTInt3). Moreover, “people of the region want to get together in a way less restrictive than conceived by our policy makers” (BBInt1). These statements, coupling with the issues of concern articulated by CSOs indicates their intended legitimating role in CARICOM.

**Civil society as resisting regional governance**

The role of resistor to CARICOM RI warrants meticulous consideration. In contrast to what obtains under the roles of CSOs as partner and legitimator, the aims and objectives of states-led regional governance are interpreted differently and resisted. It is important to note that ‘resisting’ should not be conceived of as resisting the project of RI but the approaches, processes, policy positions and prescriptions of RI. Resisting is done by building local and national mobilisations and converging regionally to campaign, protest, demonstrate displeasure and occasion transformation, where needed.

The CARICOM RI project is largely void of such actions; in fact, examples of CS\textsuperscript{12} (potentially) resisting regional governance are somewhat difficult to identify in both primary and secondary data. However, there are some attitudes and opinions which offers

\textsuperscript{12} Note, as defined in this thesis, civil society organisations exclude trade unions who’s history of resistance in the Caribbean is well documented.
sway in this direction. For instance, respondent vigorously criticized CARICOM for being a top-down organisation—not rooted in the people. To remedy this gap CS advocate for more participation; the development of a more people-driven regionalism, from below, in characteristic contrast to the current state-centric approach. Another site of resistance referenced in the data is that CARICOM’s policies are too heavily oriented toward liberalisation of intra-regional (CSME) and international trade (economic development), with lesser consideration for functional (development) co-operation. This view is substantiated in the literature (Grenade, 2011). CSO hold the view that functional co-operation offers many tangible benefits and therefore should be advanced with greater alacrity.

In view of the menu of roles presented above—CS as partner, legitimator and resistor—and their implications for RI, a recall of a statement from the field presents a telling perspective:

“Governments are not committed to RI because they will have to surrender their spheres of power. So, if you are defensive of your little space and status you would not want to take onboard people that you perceive to be critical—but if you saw it as enabling resources to bring to bear on the development of the country and the region, then you would” (BBInt1).
That vignette brings into focus the approach of HoGs to the process of participation. In brief, it reveals that the lack of participation serves a protective function—protective of political space and power. This protective function is buttressed by the democratic framework under use in the Caribbean and, by extension, its precepts in the CARICOM space. In sum, primary field data coupled with the historical antecedents supports the position that the democratic framework used to inform participatory process is a representative one, rather than a participatory model. With that in view, the antecedents of engagement, or lack thereof, and the current posture of apprehension appear much more comprehensible.

It therefore seems fitting to end this sub-section with a quotation from the field, it sets a context of the future of engagement in the region:

“Our democracy needs to live and grow; it needs to mature to the state where you have free access to information and free interaction, where that kind of engagement between the citizenry and the policy makers can happen in a non-threatening way” (BBInt1).

This section teased out a conclusive position—according the primary and secondary data, theory, and analysis—on the central question of why CSO participation is yet to materialize in CARICOM RI. This position is woven together and presented comprehensively in the theoretical sum up to follow.
Theoretical Implications

For analysis, this thesis utilizes a theoretical triad: participatory development, democracy and organisational theories. It is worth noting that prior sections employed the aforementioned sequencing of the theoretical triad. This section, however, diverts from that sequence for reasons of analytical purchase and hierarchy, it proceeds as follows: first, organisational theory, then participatory development and, finally, democratic theory. The rationale and application of their employ will be discussed below.

Organizational Theory: Speaks to the organizational factors and considerations that orbit the realization of meaningful participation. In the context of CARICOM, it is envisaged that organisation within CS will serve as the conduits for citizen participation. Thus, considerations of organisational capacity and resource factors are of overriding significance to the achievement of CSO participation.

Through the facility of organisation theory one can elicit, from the data, several capacity and resource constraints facing CSOs. Before going into those constraints, it is worth reiterating what is an organisation. Jones defines “an organisation is a tool used by people to coordinate their actions to obtain something they desire or value—that is, to achieve their goals” (2003, p. 4). The organisation is this case is a CSO and the goal is participation. The data attest to significant problems/challenges that constrain the ability of CSOs to participate in a meaningful and sustained way. The data indicated that umbrella CSOs possess fair capacity, however, regionally and in general, organisations
bemoan their financial situation. The ramifications of the financial state of CSOs are significant organisational and operational slippages. Without exaggeration, these ramifications have serious implications for both the prospects and quality of CS participation—if participation were to be operationalized. For instance, in terms of prospects, the number of organisations available to participate and the representativeness of those organisations are important issues that affect both the viability and credibility of the participatory process. In terms of quality, the ability of CSOs to conduct research and analysis, and connectedly, their ability to make meaningful and substantial contributions as participants underlie the very goal of participation.

From the perspective of organisation theory, the awareness within CS regarding their capacity constraints and the measures proffered to attenuate those constraints can be deemed incisive, prudent and well founded. The measures tendered included: to rationalise and synergise operations; to develop a different leadership style; to engage in skills training and development; and, to articulate a clear vision RI.

White (1996) asserted that participation is a means to develop the voice and organisational capacities of those previously excluded. Accordingly, there is shared responsibility, given the value CS would add to the RI project, to capacitate CSOs to participate. However, taking the representative democratic stance, the one seemingly under deploy, capacitating CS (to this extent) would not be seen as an imperative and ad hoc participation is sufficient for the goal of protection. However, in contrast, the
approach of the direct democratic model will treat this responsibility with much intent given the educative and integrative participatory functions.

**Participatory Development:** Established the rationale for and posited the benefits of CS involvement while also citing the critical issues and considerations regarding participation, in and of itself, its potential uses, misuses and shortcomings.

The analysis extracted through the lens of PD from the data is as follows. The aim of CS participation in CARICOM RI is to infuse the process with a sense of peoples’ participation, as a goal in itself and to use this as a basis through which other development goals can be furthered. This is very much in keeping with a camp of the literature on general participation that propounds participation as both a means and an end. CS engagement in CARICOM can also be seen as promoting ‘good governance’ and, thus, the democratic principle of: transparency, effectiveness, openness, responsiveness, and accountability; acceptance of diversity and pluralism, and social inclusiveness (Veltmeyer, 2008). There is affirmative evidence in the primary data to support this. The benefits tendered vis-à-vis CS engagement represents significant value for the regional project. Markedly, the benefits parallel Rahnema’s (1992) core elements of PD:

- Cognitive: CS can offer a firm understanding to the needs ‘on the ground’
- Political: CS can represent and empower the voice of the voiceless
- Instrumental: CS can provide an alternative understanding of the Caribbean reality
In terms of the specificities of participation the data resonates with the emancipatory form of participation (UNDP, 1993; Chambers, 1994; The World Bank, 1998)—participation as a “platform for future change” (TTInt3). This is also exemplified in the views of respondents that participation should go beyond consultative status.

It would be short-sighted not to extend a critical treatment to this area. Despite the potential benefits CS participation offers CARICOM, the belief is pervasive that CSOs are not acknowledged as development actors and, further, calls for participation are not genuine. As a result, there is an unavoidably lack of confidence that formal and predictable participation would material at the regional level. Despite the cautious optimism, the feeling is that sporadic engagement, when it is politically expedient or external initiated, may persist. Given the antecedents of engagement there is merit in this view. However, the gravity of what is at stake might occasion different results.

**Democracy Theory**: Provided the ethos and summary basis for citizen involvement—collectivised through CS—in the affairs of their governance. It also attests to the constructs surrounding how participatory processes of involvement are ideologically framed and materially structured.

Using the optic of democratic theory to analyse the approach to participation in CARICOM offers interesting perspectives and revelations. The volition to engage and enable CS participation is viewed as deepening and strengthening democracy as CS is
deemed to be inherently democratizing in character (Putnam, 1993; Tusalem, 2007). Moreover, in relation the global South, civil society is correlated with strengthening “ownership of the development process” (Stiglitz, 1998, p. 21). The democratic merits of participation can be traced to conflicting assumptions about what constitute legitimate participation. In Chapter 2 a comparison of how two influential normative models of democracy—‘representative’ and ‘participatory’—value engagement processes according to different criteria was advanced, as well as, the attendant material/support considerations that follow the respective models.

The fact that citizen participation has little extension beyond voting in the national context of CARICOM member states, and that civil society engagement is irregular and restricted in the regional context, is broadly suggestive of the representative democratic approach to participation. In the representative tradition the role of the general populace is limited to the voting process (in regular election) (Schumpeter (1947) in Pateman (1970)). This is largely the reality in the CARICOM and Caribbean context. The level and depth of participatory involvement depicted and envisioned by CSO in the field data, and indicate in the historical antecedents advocating participation bespeak a level of engagement concomitant with the traditions of direct (participatory) democracy.

In direct tradition, engagement is premised on a framework that is genuinely participatory, and accordingly, it extends well beyond voting and irregular engagement into further stages of the political process, with concomitant apparatuses to support such engagement. Moreover, it involves the criteria of ‘inclusion of all affected (groups)’ and
issue ‘framing by the participants’, central tenets of the direct democracy tradition. Translating this into the development domain, the notion is that the development cannot be left to technocratic elites and therefore must include and facilitate wider and meaningful stakeholder involvement. Proponents of participatory democracy theory criticises representative democracies for offering only very limited possibilities of participation to ordinary citizens, which leads to a depoliticised public with little influence over their own lives (Sclove, 1995). In principle, representative theory has no problem with the reliance on experts and the exclusion of the broader public and stakeholders (participation) in policy development as long as, in the end, the decisions remain in the hands of the elected politicians (Biegelbauer & Hansen, 2011).

One might ask, why the continuous rhetoric of participation by CARICOM regional Heads? Why this rhetoric has not translated into a reality of participation? Rhetoric pervades the political milieu of both representative and direct democracy. All indicators in the data and literature point to the employ of the representative framework in CARICOM, however the distinction between the two traditions are the accompanying package of ideas vis-à-vis participation, which fashions the form, structure and impact of participation. The work of Cornwall and Coelho (2007) offers valuable perspective here, they assert that the committed involvement of state actors is decisive for the success of participatory projects, as they are the ones who plan and deliver services. The authors appropriately ask, “what is it that motivates state officials to participate and to follow through on decision…rather than resorting to quicker and more authoritarian decision-making processes? And what do they get out of participating in the participatory sphere?”
The authors suggest that the government might engage in participation “as a strategy that seeks to cultivate allies, strengthen networks and gain votes” (ibid). Let me hasten to add, in the context of CARICOM RI there are no electoral votes to be had, per se, as electoral politics is a national feature not a regional one. Literature from Mosse offers analytical insight here also, PD is a “politically desirable development idea”, and participation “can be made into a commodity and marketed” (2003, p. 66). These contentions offer a glance at some of the perspectives surrounding the rhetoric of participation.

The final point on the disposition towards participation provides a critical perspective. It would be naive to suggest that the view of all CSO would be pure and wholly well intended vis-à-vis RI participation. In the simplest sense, the indication of slippages in the organizational governance of CSOs is cause for concern. At the macro level, issues of interest, political intent and political biases are latent factor possibly fuelling their zeal to participate. However, this position remains empirically uncorroborated (as it was not a focus of the data collection exercise).

**Conclusion**

Merging theory, data and analysis together, the following conclusion can be posited—on the backdrop of the antecedents; “innumerable pious declarations and affirmations and commitments” (Ramphal, 2011) to CS participation in CARICOM:
The empirical data supports the conclusion that the failure of CARICOM policy makers to materialize formal and predicable CS participation in CARICOM steams for the participatory reference frame within which participation is being conceived. The framework is deemed to be that of the representative democratic. Consequently and notwithstanding the participatory antecedents, a requisite framework for participation in the formal institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM has not been implemented, coupled with the support structures, chiefly, legal framework, and capacity and resources mechanisms. This scenario is in keeping with the limited scope of the principles a representative democracy participatory process where participation is limited to the protective function. This limiting precludes the regional integration project of the benefits of the educative, integrative, and developmental functions accessible through CS participation.
Chapter 6:

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
From Rhetoric to Reality—Actualizing Civil Society Participation

Summary of Findings and Conclusion

This study commenced by posing the question of why is it the case that numerous declarations by CARICOM Heads of Government in support of CSO participation in the regional integration process have not resulted in any tangible, real involvement of CSOs in the institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM? This was justifies as a significant issue given the central importance of CARICOM RI as a strategy for advancing development and attenuating the impacts of globalization on the region. Coupled with this is the ever-increasing importance ascribed to CS as interlocutors and (potential) key actors in the region who can offer significant value to the RI project. CS engagement within CARICOM has attracted additional attention given the critical prognosis of CARICOM as being “in crisis” (Stoneman, Pollard, & Inniss, 2012, p. 7) and “under existential threat” (Girvan, 2011b, p. 25). Thus, the need to understand the nuanced context and complexities surrounding the actualization of CS participation in the CARICOM became clear.
Preceding with this objective, the study reviewed the theoretical debates and competing models of participation and participatory development, democracy, and organisational theory—this theoretical triad served as the ‘lines of inquiry’ for this thesis. Participatory development established the rationale for and posited the benefits of CS involvement. PD also cited the critical issues and considerations regarding participation, in and of itself, its potential uses, misuses and shortcomings. Democratic theory provided the ethos and summary basis for citizen involvement—collectivised through CS—in the affairs of their governance. The democratic merits of participation were traced using two conflicting assumptions and influential normative models of democracy—‘representative’ and ‘direct’—about what constitute legitimate participation, with each valuing participatory processes according to different criteria. The ensuing conclusion was that participatory processes of involvement are ideologically framed and materially structured. Organizational theory enunciated the organizational considerations that orbit actualizing meaningful participation. In CARICOM, it is envisaged that organisations within CS will serve as the conduits of citizen participation and, thus, considerations of organisational capacity and resource factors are of principal relevance. Moreover, it was concluded that organizations are not simply influenced by the constituents that comprise the organizations themselves, but also the environment within which it exist. This is to say that organisation should be mindful of both their internal and external environment.

The thesis proceeded to focus on CARICOM as a geographic area and site of regional integration. A sketch of the concept of regional integration and a snapshot of the socio-economic picture of CARICOM member states were presented. A historical overview of
CARICOM vis-à-vis the political economy of Caribbean RI, in addition to a mapping of CARICOM as an organization and its four pillars were propounded. Finally, the discussion was brought to a close by situating CARICOM within its challenges, issues and opportunities, at the present juncture. In sum, it was concluded, “CARICOM is in serious flux… and this is no surprise. After almost forty years, what has emerged is a schizophrenic model” (Grenade, 2011, p. 12). Moreover, CARICOM has evolved into a 4-Ps framework: it is prime-ministerial, paper-based, piece-meal and people-less (Caines, 2010). This reality, according to many, needs to be addressed and redressed with immediacy. The sobering recognition is, however, that RI is an indispensable part of Caribbean development—the “regional option is a survival imperative, a development imperative” (Girvan, 2011a, p. 26).

This thesis then went on to converge the strands of the debate by ‘regionalizing’ the discourse on civil society, participation and regional integration, and within CARICOM specifically. Firstly, the rationale for the inclusion of civil society in the regional integration project was explored. Then the antecedents of participatory engagement of CS in CARICOM were elaborated. The concluding position was that at this time, while the stated commitment (rhetoric) of Heads of Government on CS participation is clear, the tangible manifestations (reality) of those statements are lacking. The debate was therefore rest at the point of return, the central research question.

Moving beyond the history of and beyond theorizing about the civil society participation in both the general and regional sense, this thesis looked at the reality of CS participation
in CARICOM, through primary field research data collection. This data was discussed and analyzed, and a conclusive argument crafted. The data collection exercise explored the nuances and complexities surrounding why formal and predictable CS participation in CARICOM had not been actualized to date, from which five focal areas emerged: (1) participation; (2) potential contributions of civil society to regional integration; (3) considerations for a framework for participation; (4) constraints on civil society participation; (5) institutional approaches to the integration challenge of participation.

Drawing on the analytical frames of Armstrong, Lloyd, & Redmond (2004), Rahnema (1992) and Pateman (1970) and the theoretical triad, a review of the primary field data and secondary sources presented several findings; the main ones are recounted below:

- CS view CARICOM RI as a bifurcated concept, having both institutional and organic components, and they want engagement with both, especially with the institutional component. They view the institutional component as a critical site for influencing the future course and direction of the regions’ development. Thus, CS therefore wants recognition as genuine development partners with formal and predictable participation in the institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM.

- Not only does CSOs have a genuine desire to participate, they also have a keen understanding of what participation entails, what qualities genuine participation should exhibit, what are the implications of participation of CARICOM development, and the disposition of regional Heads toward their participatory engagement.
- CS posits a potent menu of benefits that they can contribute to CARICOM RI. Their main contributions are summarized as follows (leveraging Rahnema’s (1992) core elements):

  - Cognitive: CS can provide a real understanding of the realities ‘on the ground’ that CARICOM nationals are confronted with and that require addressing;

  - Political: CS can represent and empower the voice of the voiceless, and, in so doing, add legitimacy, foster ownership, and improve governance of the RI process; and

  - Instrumental: CS can propose ‘new’ and ‘alternatives’ models of development for the emerging Caribbean civilization and connectedly can bring their skills and expertise to bear.

- While CSOs possess a strong desire to participate, by their own admission, they are affected by low capacity and weak institutional structures, which are more broadly defined as organisational, operational, financial and technical constraints. It is felt that these constraints stand to debilitate the ability of CSOs to participate in a meaningful and sustained way.

- The CS sector is characterised by the lack of specific identity and a degree of fragmentation. In view of which, CS by their own compulsion advanced several key measures—including networking, coalescing, synergizing, and converging—to improve their ability to participate meaningfully.
- The CARICOM governance environment is a highly nuances and complex one, thus it makes the actualization of meaningful participation a demanding task. Accordingly, several key terms were tendered as requisites for formulating any framework for participation. The key terms include, the need for:
  
  - Instating a participatory arrangement that is legally constituted
  - A genuine response to the CS sector’s capacity development needs
  - Structural, procedural and organizational complementarities between the national and regional level of participation
  - An agreeable level of direct interface between regional Heads and CSOs
  - Any framework should be imbued with a result-oriented mechanism and culture
  - Designated conduits to facilitate effective information flows and sharing
  - Any framework should be open and consensus based
  
- It is clear that the participatory environment in CARICOM bears the heavy burden of ‘deficits’ of implementation, trust, and resources, which is felt to be rooted in the approach of CARICOM Heads to participation, and by extension the framework of principles that informs this approach.

Conclusion

Analysis of the primary data and secondary sources underlined the deficits cited above
and offered affirmative evidence to support the claim that the approach to participatory processes in the formal institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM RI is premised, largely, on the principles of representative democratic framework. In practice, this framework is characterized by engagement that is *protective* and, therefore, limited and unthreatening of the base of political power of regional Heads. Evidently, the employ of a representative approach to participation is at variance with the quality of participation articulated in the antecedents of participation in CARICOM and the espousals of CS vis-à-vis what they envision should constitute participation. This lends an answer to the research question of this thesis. Moreover, it corroborates the argument of this thesis: that above and beyond the obvious challenges of providing the necessary framework and capacity building for CSO participation in the Caribbean integration process, the current lack of real and substantive inclusion is rooted in the structure of a representative democratic framework with limited consideration for the principles of a participatory model of democracy.

**Implications of the Study**

So what are the implications of the findings and conclusion presented above for the study of Development/International Political Economy and Regional Integration?

This research conveys some implications of study and theorising of civil society participation in regional integration. I must however caution that the Caribbean is a unique place with a particular history, distinct socio-political context and geographic
landscape. Therefore, the case study of CARICOM can be valuable, but ought to be treated in cognizance of the hitherto mentioned. As a result, the findings should not be harshly extended to other sites of RI without due consideration.

A deciphering of the ideological frame that informs the participatory process in a RI space (or in a development project generally) can serve as a highly instructive indicator of the form, structure and (potential) impact of the participatory engagement that can be acceded to by decision makers. In addition to this, the motivating benefits or functions that are being sort vis-à-vis participation, whether protective, educative, integrative, developmental, can also be gauged.

Adopting the representative approach, that is, largely the protective function in a RI project may essentially bar the project from accessing the full gamut of value that CS engagement offers. In instances where the principles of participatory democracy are embraced greater access is available to the breadth and scope of value CS can bring to the process. Some of the values/functions of participatory democracy include the integrative and educative function. It should also be noted that each framework is accompanied by both a package of material and support considerations for participation, and inevitably, a respective degree of political engagement. The latter may seem disconcerting or assuring for decision makers, therefore, resulting in the choice of one framework over the other.

As an optimist, I hope that the CARICOM member governments would move swiftly beyond rhetoric toward a reality of participation where engagement is informed more by
the principles of participatory democracy framework. I would also hope that CSOs would do all they can to enable and position themselves for such. Below are some recommendations for both CARICOM/Heads of Government and CS.

**Recommendations**

The following recommendations are based on data from primary field research and the numerous secondary sources used in this thesis. Together, this research has led me to conclude that the following key recommendations are vital requirements toward the actualization of formal and predictable CS participation in the institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM. The recommendations aim at CS will be presented first, follow by ones directed to CARICOM/Heads of Government.

**Civil Society**

*Build Capacity*

The need for CSOs to build capacity, in many respects, cannot be overstated. While some CSOs possess *fair* capacity to participate there are definite areas that require enhancement across organisations and the gamut of CSOs. This is not to say that the (technical) capacity to participate is not there but increased capacity, notwithstanding financial considerations the sector faces, can only augur well for the organisations themselves and for the quality of their participatory input in CARICOM.
Ameliorate Funding Issues

The current financial handicap the CS sector face is an issue that demands meaningful attention, not just for the sake of participation in CARICOM, but also for the vitality and survival of the sector. Funding considerations undergird the organisational, operational, technical and financial constraints highlighted in this thesis. It is therefore imperative that CSOs act with ingenuity and immediacy to diversify their sources of funding in the short, medium and long-term. Moreover, they must seek to engage in activities that can engender a level of self-sustainability in the medium and long-term—for the price and implications of funding dependencies are all too well known.

In terms of the diversification of funding sources CSOs can consider, nationally, targeting indigenous sources of financial support (group and community based giving), government institutions, local foundations and businesses. Regionally and internationally, official development assistance agencies, multilateral development banks, international foundations, international NGOs, individual donors and the Diaspora. With regards to the development a level of self-sustainability, CSOs are urged to consider fundraising through the sale of branded merchandise and organisational paraphernalia. In addition, offering services, for example consulting or project implementation, in line with the organisation’s mission can also serve as a real avenue for generating earned income.

Network and Coalesce

It is crucial that CS network and coalesce, meaningful participation depends heavily on
this. The importance of networking and coalescing is increased manifold given considerations of capacity and constraints the sector is currently ensnared in. Some recommended areas of networking and coalescing include:

- Capacity building: training and development
- Supporting research
- Developing concentrated thematic areas of priority
- Articulating and promoting a clear vision for regional integration
- Supporting awareness campaigns
- Needs assessment of the sector

**Consider Alternative Avenues for Participation**

CS is urged to consider ways to deepen their involvement and engagement in regional integration outside of the formal institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM. Particularly in view of the representative democratic reference point of CARICOM heads vis-à-vis participation, which, as point to by analysis, does not appear propitious to the level of engagement CS envision. By deepening engagement within what CS referred to as the ‘organic’ component of CARICOM, this may serve to better entrench the import of their participation. Research and advocacy that gives public ventilation to such research among CARICOM nationals can serve as a good starting point in this area.
CARICOM/Heads of Government

Largely, these recommendations aimed at CARICOM/Government Heads join the already reverberating chorus (CPDC, 2011; Bishop, et al., 2011; Thomas T., 2011) of calls to institutionalise CS participation in the formal institutions and mechanisms of CARICOM. The deficiencies of the current representative democratic framework under employ indicate the need for a ‘new’ approach informed by the principles of the participatory model of democracy. Thereby, giving consideration to the wider scope of value that CSO engagement can offer—educative, integrative, and developmental, and so on. Evidently, these ideals are incompatible with the existing model premised on the representative framework, therefore pointing to the need to shift and reconfigure the governance mechanisms in the region. This shift in framework must necessarily include the following elements:

- A re-conceptualization of the role of CS as genuine development actors and genuine participant in the formal institutions and mechanisms RI;

- A participatory framework that facilitates the formal and predictable engagement of civil society (and necessarily, legally constituted); and

- Explicit resource provisions that support the framework and, importantly, enables CSOs with the capacitate CSOs to engage a meaningfully and sustained via the framework.
Through the adoption of this ‘new’ participatory model, the potential benefits are many. As the *educative* effect of CS participation takes root, through the participatory process, attitudinal changes would result whereby people and countries become more inclined to take decisions on the basis of the common good rather than on their individual ambitions. The *integrative* function would ensure synchronization of the objectives between regional governments and those of the people. Mandates would then reflect the consensus and needs of majority, and thereby prevent the possibility of perversion by powerful interest, whilst increasing harmony and reducing the tensions that pervade top-down decision-making. Moreover, increased participation would allow greater opportunities for CS to form national and regional synergies and alliances for the collective benefit of the entire RI project. *Developmental* by engaging and empowering CS to be part of the process of integration regional Heads will have access to the widest pool of human resource expertise, that are more willing (and able) to engage the institutions and mechanisms that fuel the regional project.

In closing, according to many, including myself, CARICOM does not lack the necessary resources or tools to implement CS participation based on the principles of direct model of democracy. Given CARICOM’s current prognosis of facing collapse the need is greater now, more that even, for regional Heads to make rhetoric equal to reality and, thereby, engage civil society to counteract the challenges the region now face, and to positively alter its development trajectory.
Bibliography


Girvan, N. (2012). Caribbean integration: can cultural production succeed where politics and economics have failed?


Authorities of Social Development. Reñaca, Valparaíso Region, Chile: Organization of American States.


APPENDIX

Appendix I

QUESTIONNAIRES

Interview Questions: Civil Society Organizations (CS or CSO)

Please tell me briefly, what is CS’s definition of the CARICOM?

As a CSO, do you support Caribbean regional integration?

What are the principal concerns of CSOs regarding regional integration?

Please share with me, do you desire, as a CSO, to participate in the regional integration process?

Please tell me, as a CSO, what would constitute participation in regional integration—for example: observer status, consultative status, etc.?

List some of the essential components any framework for CS participation in RI should include?

Can you name two or three major ways CSOs would contribute to regional development through participation?

As a CSO, do you presently possess the capacity (resources, skills, etc.) to participate in the regional integration process?

Using your organization as an example, can you name three or four of the main constraints impacting your ability to participate?

Can you offer, perhaps three or four, suggestions on what is required to better equip CSO to participate in the regional integration process?

Can you outline, briefly, any institutional arrangements that would be required for CSO participation in regional integration?

Can you cite a few policy changes that need instituting as requirements for CSO participation?
Finally, is CARICOM a suitability mechanism for facilitating CSO participation in the regional integration process?

**Interview Questions: Elite Interviewees**

As someone familiar with CSOs in the Caribbean, can you cite two or three of the major ways CSOs would contribute to regional development through participation in the integration process?

Briefly, what is your assessment of the capacity (skills, resources, etc.) of CSOs to participate in the Caribbean regional integration process?

Using CSOs in this county as an example, can you name three or four of the main constraints impacting CSOs ability to participate?

Please tell me briefly, what should CSO participation in regional integration look like—for example; observer status, consultative status, etc.?

Is observer status sufficient to promote the participation of CSOs within CARICOM?

Likewise, is consultative status sufficient to promote the participation of CSOs within CARICOM?

What are a few of your specific suggestions for a proposal or model appropriate for CSO participation in CARICOM?

Can you outline, briefly, any institutional arrangements that are required for CSO participation in regional integration?

In your assessment, is CARICOM a suitability venue for facilitating CSO participation in the regional integration process?

Are there alternative ways in which civil society participation in the regional integration process may be realized?
Appendix II

FIELD INTERVIEW LEGEND

Participants in the interviews were assured Anonymity. In keeping with this, the legend below established the logic of the code name attached to the direct quotation used in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Interviews were conducted in the CARICOM member countries of Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. The codes are as follows:

Country code:
- Barbados: BB
- Trinidad and Tobago: TT
- Guyana: GY

Interview code:
- Interview: Int

- Number code: For each country each interview was numbers sequentially.

Interviews for Barbados were coded as follows: Country: Barbados, Interview Number: 1, 2, 3… For example: BBInt1, BBInt2

Interview for Trinidad and Tobago were coded as follows: Country: Interview Number: 1, 2, 3… For example: TTInt1, TTInt2

Interview for Guyana were coded as follows: Country: Guyana, Interview Number: 1, 2, 3… For example: GYInt1, GYInt2
Appendix III

THE LILIENTDAAL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON FORWARD TOGETHER

The Civil Society Forward Together Conference, a historic consultation between the representatives of Civil Society in the 15 Member States of the Caribbean Community and the Heads of Government held at the Ocean View Hotel, Liliendaal, Guyana on 2-3 July 2002:

RECOGNISED the increased challenges to the Caribbean Community, posed by globalization and the resulting complex economic, trade, environmental, social and legal issues.

DEEPLY CONCERNED about social conditions prevailing in the Community with regard to increasing transnational crime linked to trafficking in illicit arms and drugs; money laundering; the widening negative impact of terrorism; the migration of scarce skills; racism; ethnic insecurity, the high incidence of male dropouts; increased violence against women and children; persistent and increasing poverty, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic eroding the Region's human capital.

ALSO RECOGNISED that the objective of achieving the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) is not only a response to globalisation, including the impending Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), but is of the greatest value for a more coordinated system to enhance the Region's competitiveness, given our historical realities.

ACKNOWLEDGED that Civil Society has a vital role to play in the development of regional, political and social policies, the development of those programmes and frameworks currently in existence, their modification, where necessary, and the creation of new areas as required.

CONSIDERED that the establishment of mechanisms for continuous dialogue between the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community and Civil Society is an essential way to complement relevant programmes to ensure social reconstruction, cohesiveness, peace, poverty reduction, and equity that would enhance regional integration and make the Community more economically viable.

AFFIRMED in this context, the importance of programmes with regard to youth, labour, the elderly, people with disabilities, women, men and gender relations; sport, labour, education and training, health and access to technology; and programmes aimed at promoting respect for the rights and aspirations of our indigenous peoples.
AGREED on several broad principles for strengthening the relationships between the Caribbean Heads of Governments and national governments and the Civil Society as follows to:

**Institutionalise** the Forward Together process in the form of more regular engagements between the Civil Society and the Heads of Government, a triennial engagement as suggested;

**Emphasize** the need for more constructive participation of Civil Society representatives in appropriate decisions making Organs of the Community such as the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED), the Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP), the Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD), etc;

**Establish** a Task Force, comprising a small representative group of the Civil Society, coordinated by the CARICOM Secretariat, to develop a comprehensive regional strategic framework for carrying forward the main recommendations of the [Forward Together Conference](#) and report to the Conference of Heads of Government at its next Inter-Sessional Meeting in 2003.

The work of the Task Force should be guided by the recommendations of the three Working Groups at the [Forward Together Conference](#) –

(i) Human Resource Development with Equity, including issues in relation to Gender, Youth and Persons with Disabilities, Migration and the Diaspora;

(ii) Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) - Capital Investment and requirements for competitiveness; and

(iii) Governance and Participation.
Appendix IV

CHARTER OF CIVIL SOCIETY FOR THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY

PREAMBLE

We the People of the Caribbean Community, acting through the assembled representatives of our Governments;

RECALLING that the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community at their Special Meeting in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, in October 1992 adopted the recommendation of the West Indian Commission that a Charter of Civil Society for the Caribbean Community be subscribed to by Member States of the Community;

CONSCIOUS that the common historical, cultural and social bonds of the people of the Caribbean Community underpin the commitment of the Governments and peoples of Member States of the Community to this Charter;

DETERMINED:
- to enhance public confidence in governance, thereby reinforcing the loyalty of all the people;
- to ensure continuing respect for internationally recognised civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights;
- to uphold the right of people to make political choices;
- to create a truly participatory political environment within the Caribbean Community which will be propitious to genuine consultation in the process of governance;
- to promote, foster and maintain racial harmony;
- to uphold the principle of freedom of religion;
- to promote economic growth and sustainable development through the wise use of the human and natural resources;
- to attain economic and social justice and to pursue the goals of health, education and employment for all;
- to eliminate, as far as possible, social problems such as crime and the abuse of drugs and other substances;
- to enter the Twenty-First Century on the basis of the best possible governance and to achieve and sustain such governance by mobilising action for change;

DECLARE our resolve to pay due regard to the following principles by which our Governments commit themselves to respect and strengthen the fundamental elements of a civil society:
ARTICLE I- Use of Terms

In this Charter, unless the context otherwise requires the following expressions shall have the following meanings:

(a) "Social partners" shall mean the Government of a State, Associations of Employers, Workers Organizations and such Non-Governmental Organizations as the State may recognize;

(b) "State" shall mean a Member State of the Caribbean Community and shall include Associate Members of the Caribbean Community.

ARTICLE II- Respect for Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms

1. The States shall respect the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual without distinction as to age, colour, creed, disability, ethnicity, gender, language, place of birth or origin, political opinion, race, religion or social class but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest.

2. Those fundamental human rights and freedoms include:

(a) the right to life, liberty and security of the person;
(b) protection for the privacy of the home and other property of the individual;
(c) protection from deprivation of property without due process and just compensation within a reasonable time;
(d) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association within the meaning of the constitutions of States;
(e) freedom of movement within the Caribbean Community, subject to such exceptions and qualifications as may be authorised by national law and which are reasonably justifiable in a free and democratic society.

3. The States shall promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil and political rights and, within the limits of their resources, economic, social and cultural rights all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and which are essential for the free and full development of the person.

4. The States shall keep the general public informed of the provisions of this Charter and of international and regional agreements and declarations in the field of human rights to which they subscribe.

ARTICLE III- Human Dignity

The States shall, in the discharge of their legislative, executive, administrative and judicial functions ensure respect for and protection of the human dignity of every person.
ARTICLE IV - Right to Life, Liberty and Security of the Person

1. Every person shall have the right to life. No person shall be deprived of his or her life intentionally save in accordance with national law.

2. No person shall be deprived of his or her personal liberty or the security of his or her person except by due process of law.

ARTICLE V - Equality before the Law

1. All persons shall be equal before the law, be entitled to the equal protection of the law and to a fair and impartial hearing within a reasonable time.

2. The States shall use their best endeavours to have legal assistance extended in any case where the interest of justice so requires.

3. No person shall be favoured or discriminated against by reason of age, colour, creed, disability, ethnicity, gender, language, place of birth or origin, political opinion, race, religion or social class.

4. A law shall be deemed not to be contrary to paragraph 3 if such law provides for special measures for the sole purpose of furthering the development and advancement of hitherto disadvantaged communities or sections of the population to enable them to develop and realise their potential to the fullest.

ARTICLE VI - Political Rights

1. The States shall ensure the existence of a fair and open democratic system through the holding of free elections at reasonable intervals, by secret ballot, underpinned by an electoral system in which all can have confidence and which will ensure the free expression of the will of the people in the choice of their representatives.

2. The States shall take all appropriate measures to promote and maintain an effectively functioning representational system, including the holding of regular public sessions of representatives of the people.

3. Every person shall have the right to:

   (a) form a political party or organisation;
   (b) join a political party or organisation of his or her choice;
   (c) attend public meetings of political parties or organisations;
   (d) participate in the activities of a political party or organisation;
   (e) give expression to his or her political beliefs in a peaceful manner;
   (f) make himself or herself available for nomination for and election to any public office
for which he or she qualifies.

4. The provisions of this Article shall not preclude the States from taking measures authorised by their Constitutions to regulate persons employed in the service of the State with respect to their participation in the activities of a political party or organisation.

ARTICLE VII - Meetings, Demonstrations and Petitions

Every person shall have the right to assemble, to demonstrate peacefully and to draw up and present petitions, subject to such restrictions as may be imposed by national law in the public interest and which are reasonably justifiable in a free and democratic society.

ARTICLE VIII - Freedom of Expression and Access to Information

1. Every person shall have the right to the enjoyment of freedom of expression including the right to:

(a) hold opinions and to receive and communicate ideas and information without interference and freely to send or receive communications by correspondence or other means;
(b) seek, distribute or disseminate to other persons and the public information, opinions, and ideas in any form whatever.

2. The right conferred by paragraph 1 of this Article shall also be enjoyed by the media.

3. The exercise of the right conferred by this Article carries with it special duties and responsibilities and may be exercisable subject to such reasonable restrictions in the public interest, as may be imposed by law and are justifiable in a democratic society:

(a) for the protection of the reputations, rights and freedoms of other persons; or
(b) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health.

4. The States shall respect, encourage and promote the existence of a diversity of sources of information as a means of ensuring greater public access to information.

5. This Article shall not be construed as preventing the State from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, transmission or other means of communication, public exhibition or public entertainment.

ARTICLE IX - Religious Diversity

The States shall recognise and respect the freedom of conscience of the individual to profess and practise alone or in community with others, in private or in public, his or her religion, belief or persuasion in accordance with the dictates of his or her own conscience, subject to such restrictions as may be imposed by national law in the interest
of defence, public order or public safety or for the protection of public health or public morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others provided that such restrictions are reasonably justifiable in a free and democratic society.

**ARTICLE X - Cultural Diversity**

The States recognise that:

(a) each culture has a dignity and a value which shall be respected and that every person has the right to preserve and to develop his or her culture;
(b) every person has the right to participate in the cultural life of his or her choice.

**ARTICLE XI - Rights of the Indigenous Peoples**

The States recognise the contribution of the indigenous peoples to the development process and undertake to continue to protect their historical rights and respect the culture and way of life of these peoples.

**ARTICLE XII - Women's Rights**

For the promotion of policies and measures aimed at strengthening gender equality, all women have equal rights with men in the political, civil, economic, social and cultural spheres. Such rights shall include the right:

(a) to be elected or appointed to Public Office and to be eligible for appointment to positions of decision-making bodies at all levels of their society;
(b) to be afforded equal opportunities for employment and to receive equal remuneration with men for work of equal value;
(c) not to be discriminated against by reason of marital status, pregnancy, lactation or health-related matters which affect older women;
(d) to legal protection including just and effective remedies against domestic violence, sexual abuse and sexual harassment.

**ARTICLE XIII - Children's Rights**

1. Every child has, in particular, the right:

(a) not to be compelled to perform or to render services harmful to his or her physical or mental health, upbringing, education or social development;
(b) to protection against economic or other exploitation, physical or mental violence, injury, neglect or abuse including sexual abuse;
(c) where appropriate, having regard to factors including the child's age and mental and physical development, to be consulted and to have his or her view represented personally or by an independent person before the courts and other agencies or bodies which deal
with the welfare of the child.

2. For the purposes of this Article and Article XV, "child" means every person below the age of eighteen years unless, under national law, majority is attained at an earlier or later age.

ARTICLE XIV - Rights of Disabled Persons

1. Every disabled person has, in particular, the right -

(a) not to be discriminated against on the basis of his or her disability;
(b) to equal opportunities in all fields of endeavour and to be allowed to develop his or her full potential;
(c) to respect for his or her human dignity so as to enjoy a life as normal and full as possible.

ARTICLE XV - Access to Education and Training

1. The States shall ensure that every child has the right to, and is provided with, quality primary education.

2. The States shall ensure equal access to secondary and post-secondary education and reasonable access to continuing adult education and training.

3. Every child, irrespective of colour, creed, disability, ethnicity, gender, language, place of birth or origin, political opinion, race, religion or social class shall have the right to equal access to State or State-assisted educational institutions.

4. Every child with a disability shall have the right to special education in accordance with his or her needs funded wholly or partially by the State up to an age determined by national law.

5. Every State shall put into place measures to ensure that parents enable their children to make full use of the educational opportunities provided by the State.

ARTICLE XVI - Rights of the Family

The States, recognising the family as the fundamental unit of society, shall endeavour to ensure:

(a) the fulfilment of the necessary conditions for the promotion of family life and effective parenting skills, bearing in mind the importance of the role of each parent;
(b) the full development and protection of the family, including the extended family.

ARTICLE XVII - Good Governance
1. The States shall adopt and implement all appropriate measures to ensure good governance which is just, open and accountable.

2. The States recognise and affirm that the rule of law, the effective administration of justice and the maintenance of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary are essential to good governance.

3. The States, recognising that integral to the concept of good governance are the complementary roles of government, the social partners and the citizenry, shall ensure that the rights and responsibilities of all are clearly established and that the appropriate environment for their exercise and discharge, as the case may be, is fostered.

4. The States, in order to ensure morality in public affairs, agree that holders of public office and all those who exercise power the exercise of which affects or may affect the public interest, shall so order their affairs in accordance with national law that such ordering gives no cause for conflict to arise or to appear to arise between their private interests and their duties to the public, or to otherwise compromise their integrity. To this end, the States agree to establish a Code governing the conduct of the holders of public office and all those who exercise power, the exercise of which affects or may affect the public interest.

5. The States shall undertake:

(a) to foster continuously greater cost-effectiveness in their operations while being facilitative and supportive of the development process;
(b) to ensure that all persons are treated fairly, humanely and equally by public authorities and holders of public office and all those who exercise power so as to affect the quality of life of our people;
(c) to ensure responsiveness to the needs of the people as consumers in the delivery of goods and services.

6. The States undertake to preserve and respect the existence of an independent public service with attractive career opportunities open to all on the basis of merit and which is effective, efficient, responsive, adaptive and innovative in its conduct of public administration.

7. The States in order to further the participation of the people in the democratic process shall establish effective systems of ongoing consultations between the Government and the people.

8. The States shall undertake to ensure that in the process of governance, there is no victimisation of any person.

**ARTICLE XVIII- Participation in the Economy**
1. The States shall facilitate access by their peoples to resources in such a manner as to promote economic growth, sustainable development and full employment, especially of the young people, and to enhance the opportunities for the achievement by every person of a reasonable and secure standard of living.

2. Every person shall have the right freely and on the basis of full equality to engage in economic activities, including the right to participate in, establish and manage his or her own enterprise in the commercial, industrial, agricultural, service or other sectors.

3. The States undertake to collaborate with the social partners for the provision of creative employment for young people and the disabled and for fostering strategies for their employment.

**ARTICLE XIX- Workers' Rights**

1. Every worker has the right:

   (a) to form or belong to and participate in the activities of trade unions or other associations for the promotion and protection of his or her interest or the right not to belong to and participate in the activities of any such trade union or association;
   (b) to negotiate or bargain collectively;
   (c) not to be subjected to unfair labour practices, including intimidation and victimisation;
   (d) to work under safe, hygienic and healthy conditions;
   (e) to reasonable hours of work, rest, periodic holidays with pay and remuneration for public holidays;
   (f) to receive reasonable remuneration for his or her labour and to withhold his or her labour subject to such reasonable restrictions as may be imposed by national law in the public interest.

2. The provisions of this Article shall not preclude the States from taking measures imposing on persons in the service of the State, restrictions which are reasonably justifiable in a free and democratic society.

3. The States undertake:

   (a) to safeguard the right of workers to earn their living in freely chosen lawful occupations;
   (b) to recognise the desirability of workers earning a level of remuneration which would afford them and their families the enjoyment of a decent standard of living;
   (c) in recognition of the right of workers to collective bargaining, the responsibility to provide adequate machinery for the recognition and certification of trade unions enjoying the support of a majority of the workers based on the free choice of the workers concerned;
(d) to foster and promote a harmonious and productive working environment by sensitising workers, trade unions and employers as to their respective and mutual obligations;
(e) to provide protection for workers against arbitrary dismissal;
(f) to provide adequate machinery for the speedy resolution of industrial disputes and the restoration of normalcy in the event of strikes, lock-outs and other forms of industrial action;
(g) to provide an adequate period of leave with pay, or with adequate social security benefits for women before and after childbirth and to make it unlawful for an employer to terminate a woman's employment or take any other action that would unfavourably affect her status or promotion by reason of her pregnancy;
(h) to establish standards to be observed by employers in providing workers with a safe and healthy working environment;
(i) to provide workers with adequate social security benefits;
(j) to ensure that every person who has attained the age of retirement and does not have adequate means of subsistence is provided with social and medical assistance.

ARTICLE XX- Health

The States shall use their best endeavours to provide a health care system that is:

(a) sufficiently comprehensive to deal with all health challenges including epidemics; and
(b) well administered, adequately equipped and accessible to all without discrimination.

ARTICLE XXI- Basic Necessities

The States shall endeavour to:

(a) provide adequate social services and benefits for the population at large; and
(b) ensure that the most needy persons have access to food, housing and other basic necessities.

ARTICLE XXII- Social Partners

The States undertake to establish within their respective States a framework for genuine consultations among the social partners in order to reach common understandings on and support for the objectives, contents and implementation of national economic and social programmes and their respective roles and responsibilities in good governance.

ARTICLE XXIII- Environmental Rights

1. Every person has a right to an environment which is adequate for his or her health and well-being and a corresponding duty to protect, conserve and improve the environment.
2. The States shall take steps to establish environmental standards and to monitor compliance with such standards.

3. The States, considering the shared universal responsibility for human survival, shall put in place measures to ensure the protection and improvement of the environment and the conservation and management of its natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations.

**ARTICLE XXIV - Awareness and Responsibilities of the People**

The States hereby declare that the people have an important role to play in the pursuit and maintenance of good governance. Accordingly, the States shall build awareness, engender support and establish programmes to foster sound values and positive attitudes and shall enhance individual and institutional capacities to secure objectives, including:

(a) the inculcating, nurturing and demonstration of love of one's country;
(b) the participation in the electoral process;
(c) the development of a positive work ethic at all levels in society in the recognition of the responsibilities of the people in the areas of production, the economy and the provision of goods and services;
(d) the sensitising of the people to the importance of continuous skill upgrading, training and broadening of their skills and expertise;
(e) the building of self-reliance and the engagement in self-help activities, whether alone or in community with others;
(f) the promotion of awareness of parents to cooperate with and support the school system and programmes aimed at the character formation of students;
(g) special consideration and support of the young, aged, the disabled and other vulnerable groups;
(h) the resolution of interpersonal and domestic disputes by peaceful means, such as mediation, reconciliation and otherwise;
(i) the caring and protection of the environment;
(j) the preservation and protection of public property; and
(k) the promotion, establishment and maintenance of community-based organisations.

**ARTICLE XXV - Reports**

1. The States undertake to submit periodically to the Secretary-General of the Caribbean Community (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary-General") for transmission to the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, reports on measures adopted and progress achieved in compliance with the provisions of this Charter.

2. Reports, other than special reports which may be requested by the Conference at any time, shall be submitted every three years on a rotating basis to be determined by the Conference, indicating the factors and difficulties, if any, that affect the implementation of this Charter.
3. In the preparation of their Reports, States shall, in accordance with the provisions of Article XXII, undertake consultation with the social partners, having regard to their crucial role in the attainment of the objectives of this Charter.

4. (1) States shall each establish a National Committee or designate a body to monitor and ensure the implementation of this Charter and that National Committee or body shall comprise:

(a) representatives of the State;
(b) representatives of the other social partners; and
(c) such other persons of high moral character and recognised competence in their respective fields of endeavour.

(2) The National Committee or body, as the case may be, shall review the implementation of this Charter, analysing any problems and difficulties experienced, and receive reports of allegations of breaches of, or non-compliance with, the provisions of this Charter attributed to the State or to one or more social partners. No allegation of breaches or non-compliance may be brought by any individual or entity in relation to a matter which has been adjudicated upon by an international body, the decision of which is binding upon the State.

(3) The National Committee or body shall notify the State or social partner, as the case may be, of the receipt of any allegation and request their comments thereon and the National Committee or body shall report to the Secretary-General on allegations received, together with their comments thereon, including their own views on the matter.

5. (1) The Secretary-General shall submit annually for consideration by the Conference, in accordance with criteria established by the Conference, reports received from the National Committees or bodies pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 4(3) of this Article.

(2) The Secretary-General shall inform the States and their National Committees or bodies of the results of the deliberations of the Conference on reports submitted pursuant to this Article, together with any recommendation emanating from their consideration of reported violations, non-compliance, difficulties or problems experienced in the implementation of this Charter.

6. Allegations of violations or non-compliance shall not impose any obligations on a State to refrain from carrying out any decision of its Courts or other authorities pending consideration under this Article.

**ARTICLE XXVI- Implementation**

The States declare their resolve to pay due regard to the provisions of this Charter.
ARTICLE XXVII- Saving

Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of any regional or international agreement to which States are parties.

RESOLUTION

The Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community at their Eighth Inter-Sessional Meeting:

Reaffirming their confidence in the Caribbean Community as an association of States and Territories bonded by a common heritage and cooperating in the interests of their own peoples;

Being committed to the fundamental principles of human rights and freedoms and conscious that this Charter should enhance the integration process;

Determined to pursue the principles declared in the Charter in response to the challenges of the Twenty-First Century;

Now therefore resolve to adopt this Charter and agree to pay due regard to its principles and to ensure that this Charter receives the widest possible circulation within their respective States and Territories.

Agreed this .................... day of ..................... at.................................
Appendix V

SAMPLE REGIONAL STRATEGIC FRAMEWORKS

In the current context of CARICOM regional integration no framework exist at the regional level, that facilitates civil society participation. The follow are three proposed regional strategic frameworks developed by the Caribbean Policy Development Centre as part of ‘The CARICOM Civil Society Participation and Engagement in Regional Integration Project’ (2010-11). The project was funded under the Caribbean Integration Support Program (CISP) of the 9 European Development Fund and implements by the Directorate for Foreign and Community Relations, CARICOM Secretariat. The primary goal of the project was to create a Regional Strategic Framework and Plan of Action for instituting civil society participation in CARICOM, including the CSME. The report was concluded in 2011 and the contents submitted to the Heads of Government. None of these frameworks has been implemented. Please see below, the three sample frameworks proposed.

Figure 4: Regional Level Structure – Option 1: Civil Society Council/Ministerial Focal Point Model

Figure 5: Regional Level Structure – Option 2: The National/Regional Civil Society Council and Ministerial Focal Point Model

Figure 6: Regional Level Structure – Option 3: Enhance Regional Civil Society Council and Ministerial Focal Point Model