

“Stalled Progress”: Regional Integration in the Caribbean

By

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Abstract: Regional Integration as a means of development is a topic that is being explored today. Many countries, of which the Caribbean is no exception, have attempted to utilise this route to serve their economic developmental ends with varying degrees of success. The purpose of this paper is to take a closer look at the Regional Integration experience of the Caribbean, primarily CARICOM and if it has been successful, as well as looking at possible explanations for the Caribbean’s success or failure in this regard. The paper will argue that CARICOM has not been successful, due to a combination of factors from both within the region and external to the region. The point will also be made however, that measuring the success of CARICOM solely in terms of economic development is short sighted and presents a limited view.

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Ch. 1: Introduction

Introduction

Regional Integration has been advanced as being a method through which small developing countries would be able to set themselves further along a path to economic development. As Nogueira (1997) noted: "... the idea of regional integration in the Caribbean-as well as Latin America- has been closely linked to the idea of economic development." (p.4) There are certain characteristics which can generally be considered as hallmarks of a successful integration process, as they seem to be present in some of what can be considered to be examples of regional integration which have met with some measures of success like the European Union- which has been noted as showing: "...evidence that the EU has experienced deep integration and relative successes." (Grenade 2011, p.17). Among these characteristics are the existence of a common currency, a common Central Bank, the free circulation of goods and services and even in some cases a common legislative body.

The benefits of integration have not only been recognized by developing countries, but also by many countries which can be said to be developed with the most prominent example of this being the aforementioned European Union. It has been noted that: "European integration has brought stability, peace and economic prosperity to Europe and it has strengthened the EU's voice in the world. It has also achieved results which would not have been possible by individual member states acting on their own." (Grenade 2011, p.17) In light of this, a closer examination of the role that regional integration is seen by many proponents of the process to play in development is something that is necessary and

perhaps even timely in light of the tendency of countries to place themselves into groupings and move toward some level of integration.

Regional integration is characterised as a process that passes through some very distinctive stages as noted by both Hardacre in the Technical paper he prepared for the International Trade Centre (p.4), as well as De Lombaerde et.al (2008, pp.3-4). These stages, ranging from least integrated to most integrated, are commonly held to be: (1) A Free Trade Area; (2) A Customs Union; (3) A Common Market; (4) An Economic Union and (5) A Political Union. The identification of these stages is usually credited to Balassa (1961). (De Lombaerde et.al 2008, pp3-4; Hardacre, (p.4)

Each stage has its own characteristics and builds on the preceding stage or stages. (De Lombaerde et.al, 2008, pp.3-4) For instance, as the highest form of Regional Integration, a Political Union will have all the elements of the preceding stages, as well as its own standalone characteristics. That is to say, countries that have created a Free Trade Area among themselves will eliminate all barriers to trade, such as tariffs and quotas, for whatever may be imported from all members of the Free Trade Area. However, tariffs and quotas can be maintained and applied to other countries which are not members of the FTA. (De Lombaerde et.al, 2008, pp.3-4). Therefore, members of a Political Union will not apply tariffs to each other, as they have already passed through the Free Trade Area stage of regional integration. However, a Free Trade Area will not have elements of a Political Union level of integration as that would be a closer level of integration that is not yet achieved.

A prime example of the integration process as it applies to small developing countries can be found in the Caribbean, reflected in the existence of the Caribbean Community or as it is usually referred to in everyday language: CARICOM. That is to say that both terms can and have been used interchangeably. However, it is an accepted fact that, in spite of almost forty years of CARICOM Regional Integration, the levels of economic development, expected through integration, in the Caribbean has not advanced as far as has been expected. Griffith (1990) makes a very neat summation of the Caribbean's states of integration when he notes: "The Caribbean integration movement survives, but it has been in a state of continual crisis" (p.28). This is referring to the notion that CARICOM has not been able to achieve the objectives that it has set out for itself, namely economic development through integration. In speaking of the state of the integration project in the Caribbean, Girvan (2013) made the amusing, but still rather depressing, assertion that: "It is not yet officially dead; but it most certainly appears to be comatose" (p.7)

The purpose of this thesis is to critically assess the barriers that have prevented CARICOM from achieving its goals particularly related to economic integration. The main barriers that will be presented range from issues internal to the region such as the role that the issue of sovereignty can play to issues that can be considered to be external to the region like international pressures, such as the Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union. The argument will be made that it is due to a combination of these "barriers" that CARICOM has been prevented from being able to achieve its goal of economic development through integration. This argument will be the primary focus of the

thesis. This critical assessment serves as the primary focus of the thesis because it is the focus that addresses the central question of the thesis which is: “Why is it that the expected benefits from CARICOM have not materialised?”

However, the thesis will also argue that looking at the success of CARICOM through an economic focus is somewhat limited, and will argue that when looked at through a social and cultural perspective CARICOM has met with some measures of success. This argument will serve as the secondary focus of the thesis, and is necessary part of the thesis as CARICOM is intended to be more than just an economic integration mechanism which is reflected in the existence of the “Pillars of Integration”, which range from foreign policy to functional co-operation, and also include economic integration. (Caricom.org, 2013, para. 2) It is necessary to address the other aspects of CARICOM apart from the economic as this would be the only way to gain a complete picture of the success or failure of CARICOM as an integration mechanism.

As a tertiary focus, the thesis will also argue that regional integration can work in the Caribbean using another integration mechanism as an example the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States: the OECS. This is a necessary focus for this thesis, if only to emphasize the fact that there is a successful example of a regional integration initiative in the Caribbean as well as being able to ascertain if there are any lessons that CARICOM can take from the OECS experience.

The thesis will be divided into four sections. The first section will consist of a general introduction which will highlight the purpose of the thesis as well give an idea as

to what arguments will be presented throughout. The argument will be twofold and the first aspect will take a look at the barriers that have prevented the levels of economic development, which were expected through regional integration from occurring. The second strand of the argument will suggest that looking at regional integration, solely in terms of economic development, is somewhat limiting and that there are other measures of developmental success for regional integration.

After the introductory section, the focus of the paper will highlight the current state of CARICOM, and contextualize it against a backdrop of regional integration. Along with contextualizing CARICOM, the paper will also give a rationale for the study being done. The paper will then move to giving a background of regional integration in the Caribbean tracing the history from the West Indies Federation to CARICOM. The purpose of this will be to highlight the importance that has always been placed on integration as a method of achieving economic development in the region. The paper will then move into an examination of existing literature, focusing primarily on work that has been done on CARICOM. Out of the literature review, the reasoning behind the central hypothesis that will govern this work will be generated. That central hypothesis is as follows: **“Due to a combination of barriers creating a lack of implementation of CARICOM decisions, the expected economic development outcomes of regional integration have not materialised. However, using economic development as the sole measure of success presents a limited view of regional integration.”** The final part of the first section will be an explanation of the methodology used, along with a justification as to why that particular method was used as opposed to another.

The second section of the thesis will focus on what can be termed as being barriers to CARICOM achieving its goals. These barriers, which are: factors external to the region; issues of sovereignty; language and communication; geography and transportation; local disinterest; and the structure of CARICOM itself, are varied and will each have their own sub-division so that the issues surrounding them can be examined in depth and the ways in which they each individually and collectively affect the potential of CARICOM to be successful.

The third section will present alternative lenses to economic development through which CARICOM can be viewed, with the intention of arguing that when looked at in this way CARICOM can be seen to have met with some success. The alternative to economic development that will be presented will be based in human and social development, with the areas that will be touched on being: education; culture; and sports to name a few. This section will also use the OECS and current developments therein, as an example of regional integration working in the Caribbean. This will be done to show that integration can work in a Caribbean context and will also highlight the differences between the two integration mechanisms.

The fourth and final section will consist of analysis and conclusions drawn from the overall study. This section will also have what can be termed as prescriptions for the future, wherein after making a final conclusion about the ways in which the barriers to integration have hindered CARCIOM from reaching its goals, ways of addressing these barriers, and indeed the utility of CARICOM itself will be offered.

At this point, I feel that it is important to highlight why it is that I am doing this study as well as to give a bit of a justification as to the direction that I intend to take it. The first thing that I should mention is that when I first embarked upon doing my Master's degree, I had no real intention of doing work on CARICOM. However, on attending a CARICOM related thesis defense the question was asked "Is CARICOM worth it?" My immediate reaction was "well of course it is". The quickness of my reaction led me to examine the current state of CARICOM even more closely, which then led me to the conclusion that I could actually write a thesis on some of the issues surrounding CARICOM. As mentioned I focused on the issues that seemed to have prevented CARICOM from meeting its goals.

My interest in this area is both personal and professional. It is personal because I do consider myself to be a committed integrationist due to my belief that the Caribbean countries stands a much better chance of being taken seriously in the international arena through a mechanism like CARICOM, than they would on their own. I also believe that through CARICOM, the member states will be better able to afford and maintain their development agendas than if they went it alone. Being able to afford and maintain levels of development and having a stronger presence internationally are intrinsically linked for reasons that will be brought out through the main body of the thesis.

My interest is also professional due to my previous posting at the Regional Integration and Diaspora Unit of the Government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. My experience in this Unit allowed me to have firsthand experience in matters of integration and also to see exactly how it is CARICOM has both worked and not worked.

One last thing should be said before moving into the body of the thesis and that is the tone that the thesis will take. There appears to be a tendency to cast CARICOM in a negative light. Most of the works I have come across usually focus primarily on CARICOM's "failures" and as such present a rather dismal picture of CARICOM's current state. While recognizing the validity of the claims being made, I did not want to go down the same route as many have gone before me which is one of the reasons that I have made a point to highlight some of the areas where CARICOM has actually been somewhat successful. With all that being said, I can now proceed with the actual thesis itself and as a starting point the paper will contextualize CARICOM, while also giving a rationale for this work being done.

Context/Rationale

To contextualize the experience of the Caribbean, it should be noted that the region is by no means alone in its quest to seek a closer union among itself. There are many integration movements that currently exist with Feng and Genna (2003) noting:

The wide variation of regional integration is a striking characteristic. Some countries form a free trade area, and evolve into a customs union, but demonstrate a lack of dynamics required to move toward a common market, let alone an economic union. Others succeed in overcoming the differences among them and creating the ultimate form of regional integration: an Economic Union. (p.278)

The above quote suggests that there are indeed many integration movements across the globe. One also only needs to pay attention to current events to realize that regional integration is a path that many countries, not just developing countries, are currently exploring. In that regard, looking at the Caribbean's experience is highly relevant in terms

of being able to ascertain if regional integration is indeed a valid path to overall development. I stress overall development here, because again, using only economic development as a valid measure of success results in only part of the overall picture being seen.

In addition to it being relevant to look at integration in the Caribbean, the need for this study is informed by conventional wisdom that, in spite of almost forty years of CARICOM Regional Integration, the levels of economic development in the Caribbean has not advanced as far as has been expected. In fact, as alluded to earlier with the quote from Griffith (1990), there are those who see CARICOM as being in a state of crisis with questions also being raised as to the continued relevance of CARICOM, (Sanders, 2013 “CARICOM Irrelevant or Essential? Caribbean 360) where some of the many challenges that CARICOM has not been able to meet are listed. There are even those who have outright stated that CARICOM has gone as far as it can (Dookeran 2013, p.6; Nogueira 1997, p.4) This further reiterates the necessity of this work being done.

It may be asked then, why if the integration process is in crisis, why should it be continued. The answer that is given the most in response, or just as a rationale for integration on a whole, is that integration gives the Caribbean far more weight on the world stage than for the member states to attempt to go it alone. For instance, it has been suggested that if the Caribbean had a deeper level of integration, they may be able to negotiate better terms for themselves when dealing with entities like the IMF or the World Bank, or even larger countries. It is, perhaps for these reasons that former Prime Minister

of Jamaica, the Hon. P.J Patterson (2003) was quoted in Gomes (2010) as saying: “If regional integration was hitherto an option, now it is an absolute imperative”

At the heart of any study is a question to which an answer is sought, and this one is of course no different. The central question of this thesis is: “Why?” To be more explicit, this thesis will seek an answer to the question of “Why have the expected benefits, in the form of economic development, of Regional Integration, in the form of CARICOM, not materialised in the Caribbean?” This question will be what the study will be focused on as being as its central question/main area of focus.

The idea that CARICOM was intended to bring about levels of economic development is shown quite clearly in Article Four of the Treaty of Chaguramas which reads:

The Community shall have as its objectives--

(a) the economic integration of the Member States by the establishment of a common market regime (hereinafter referred to as "the Common Market") in accordance with the provisions of the Annex to this Treaty with the following aims:--

(i) the strengthening, coordination and regulation of the economic and trade relations among Member States in order to promote their accelerated harmonious and balanced development;

(ii) the sustained expansion and continuing integration of economic activities, the benefits of which shall be equitably shared taking into account the need to provide special opportunities for the Less Developed Countries;

(iii) the achievement of a greater measure of economic independence and effectiveness of its Member States in dealing with States; groups of states and entities of whatever description; (CARICOM Secretariat, 2011, para.11)

In addition to addressing the central question there are some other questions that it is expected that the study will be able to address. One such question will be: “What other measures of success can be used in the case of CARICOM?” This question will be asked because it is entirely possible that CARICOM has met with success in other areas of Caribbean development than just the economic. Therefore, doing this study without attempting to address this question will result in a somewhat limited picture being created.

Another question that can be raised is “In what ways, if any, has regional integration worked in the Caribbean?” This question comes about in light of the fact that while CARICOM may be the primary integration initiative in the region, it is by no means the only one. The question must also be asked considering the region’s history with integration, highlighted earlier, to give an idea as to why it is that regional integration is still seen as being vital to the region’s interests.

Another question that the study will attempt to address is: “what were the expected benefits?” It is important to address this question mainly because it would be impossible to look at why the benefits have not materialized, without examining just what these benefits were expected to be in the first place. It is also important to address this question to again see if it is possible that there were benefits which occurred that may not have been expected.

At this point it is now necessary to trace the history of regional integration in the Caribbean. This will be done to show the extent of the Caribbean’s history with integration

and also to show that integration has always been seen as an acceptable path for the region to seek development.

Background of CARICOM and Regional Integration

Edward Greene (2005) sums up the integration experience of the region very neatly when he says: “The birth and growth of the Caribbean Integration is a fascinating history toward and retreat from objectives identified by respective advocates and practitioners of different concepts or versions of regionalism” (P.3) This statement sums up the Caribbean’s history with regionalism from Federation to CARICOM, by showing that while there have been advances, like the existence of the West Indies Federation, there have also been reverses in the integration process, such as the current stalled momentum in CARICOM.

The beginning of the Caribbean’s experience with integration began with what became known was the Federation of the British West Indies. This grouping was encouraged by the United Kingdom which was the colonial power of the member states at the time. The member states of the Federation, which officially came into existence in 1958, were: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Lucia, the grouping of St. Kitts-Nevis and Anguilla, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago

The original intention of the Federation was to ultimately establish a political union among the islands, with Britain’s long term intention being that the islands would seek independence as one entire unit. However, this was not to be. A referendum was held in

Jamaica to determine whether or not the country should remain a member of the Federation, influenced by internal political differences on the matter. That is to say, that while one of Jamaica's two political parties was in general support of remaining a part of the Federation, the other was not. The Jamaican people decided against Federation, by a narrow margin, and as a result Jamaica withdrew from the grouping.

After this occurred, the then Premier of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr. Eric Williams made a pronouncement that has since become rather famous or indeed infamous: "One from ten leaves nought". He was referring to the fact that the Federation was comprised of ten members before Jamaica's withdrawal, and also giving a rationale for Trinidad and Tobago's subsequent withdrawal from the Federation. It is felt that Trinidad and Tobago's withdrawal, coming so close on the heels of Jamaica's, was due to a fear that Trinidad would be expected shoulder the economic burden of the smaller Less Developed members, which was also an argument advanced by opponents of continued membership in Jamaica. With the loss of its two largest members in terms of physical size, population and economies, the Federation collapsed in 1962. (Lewis, 1968 pp.368-386; Parry and Sherlock, 1963 pp.289-290; Hoyos, 1979 pp. 202-203)

Even with its collapse the Federation did not exist in vain. While its ultimate objective of a Caribbean political union was not met, the Federation can be seen to having laid the groundwork, both good and bad, for other integration movements in the region. An example of the positive legacy that the Federation left behind is the very fact that it existed at all. Even with its collapse, by existing the West Indies Federation showed that regional integration can occur in the Caribbean. Unfortunately, some of the issues that led to the

collapse of the Federation can also be seen as part of the Federation's legacy as they are still present today in CARICOM's effort to move toward a closer level of integration.

The next stage in the Caribbean's story of integration came in the form of the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA). Unlike the Federation, which was an arrangement that was imposed from without, CARIFTA was developed from within the region. That is to say, the idea was developed by the Caribbean Islands and implemented by them.

CARIFTA was founded in 1965 by Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad. Already it can be seen that CARIFTA had expanded its membership beyond what the Federation did with the inclusion of Guyana. By 1971 its membership had grown to include all of the other previous members of the Federation (Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago) as well as British Honduras (which would become the country of Belize).

CARIFTA differed from the West Indies Federation in a fundamental way in terms of the purpose that the arrangement was intended to serve. Unlike the Federation, CARIFTA was not designed to facilitate a political union. Rather, CARIFTA was designed to be a trading arrangement and as such was primarily economic in scope and nature. At its core, CARIFTA was intended to be a mechanism through which the integration of the economies of the region was accomplished, as well as allowing the region to have a united voice/presence on the international scene. CARIFTA lasted from 1965 to 1973. In 1973 the region continued its integration experience with the creation of a new body: The Caribbean Community. (Caricom.org, 2011 "History of the Caribbean Community")

The Caribbean Community or CARICOM, as it is commonly known, came into being on the 4th of July 1973 with the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. This event saw the transformation of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) into CARICOM. The major point of demarcation from CARIFTA to CARICOM lies in the scope that they both cover.

As stated above, at its core, CARIFTA was primarily a trading arrangement, whereas CARICOM, in addition to trade also made provisions for the free movement of labour and capital, as well as elements of functional cooperation. These are among the elements that clearly show the wider scope that CARICOM has in comparison to CARIFTA. CARICOM's membership was also wider than CARIFTA's. Its membership comprised of all the countries listed as members of CARIFTA, and also includes The Bahamas, Haiti and Suriname.

CARICOM was not the end point of the Caribbean's integration story. In 2002, the region took one step closer to having closer ties with the signing of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. The purpose of this was to allow for the transformation of: "the Common Market into a single market and economy in which factors move freely as a basis for internationally competitive production of goods and provision of services..." Thus, under this new dispensation was the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (the CSME) was born. The CSME is intended to be the primary vehicle through which economic benefits/development is delivered to the region.

One can gather from the above that Regional Integration was and indeed is, considered to be vital for the interests of the Caribbean. The history of the region, particularly of the English speaking states, has been one of regional integration. The reason for this can be found in many of the expected benefits that integration is seen as being able to offer. Article Six of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas spells out what these are expected to be under the CSME:

to improve standards of living and work; the full employment of labour and other factors of production; accelerated, coordinated and sustained economic development and convergence; expansion of trade and economic relations with third States; enhanced levels of international competitiveness; organisation for increased production and productivity; achievement of a greater measure of economic leverage and effectiveness of Member States in dealing with third States, groups of States and entities of any description and the enhanced co-ordination of Member States' foreign and foreign economic policies and enhanced functional co-operation. (CARICOM Secretariat, 2011, para. 3)

Literature Review

In order to attempt to answer the questions that I have asked above, I will need to go through the literature that currently exists on this topic. However, as said earlier, due to the area Regional Integration being very current and relevant, it is expected that there will be a plethora of available information. In order to get that amount down to a workable level, it is intended that my research will move into some very specific conceptual areas.

The areas that I expect to cover are: Regional Integration and Development, Economic Development, Human and social development and Regional Integration in the face of globalisation. Regional Integration and Development was chosen as a concept area

because it can be said that at the core of every integration movement lies a development process. Economic Development was selected due to that type of development being the one that is most emphasized in the course of the Caribbean's regional integration experience.

Human and Social Development works as one of the conceptual areas, as this area is one that has been advanced as the primary alternative to using economic development as the overarching measurement of progress. Finally, the conceptual area of regional integration in the face of globalization came about from the recognition that it would be difficult to separate the two concepts considering the world today is increasingly becoming "globalised".

In addition to the conceptual areas mentioned above, the thesis will be governed by a few particular theoretical underpinnings. The first, which will be governing the entire thesis, will be the idea of economic integration as a method of achieving economic development. This will serve as the core underlying theory of the entire thesis, due to this theory being the one that has governed the integration process in the Caribbean so far. In light of the importance of this theory to the overall direction of the thesis, it is necessary to pause for a moment and go into more detail as to what the theory entails.

Axline (1979) provides the rationale behind the theory when he notes: "By eliminating "artificial", i.e. political, barriers to economic activity within a given region the theory shows that there will be increases in the economic welfare of countries establishing a regional integration scheme." (p.3). This gives a very clear idea as to what

the expected outcome of regional integration would be. It should be noted that the theory does depend on the idea that increasing the, as Axline terms it, “economic welfare” of a country will have a follow on effect of increasing levels of overall development. As mentioned above, this appears to be the rationale behind the Caribbean embarking on its integration journey.

Another theoretical strand that shall be highlighted in the thesis will be the dependency theory. This will be highlighted because one of the arguments that will be made is that external factors have influenced the pace at which integration in the Caribbean has occurred. The reason why these external factors can play such a major role can actually be found in an examination of dependency theory, therefore that theory needs to be present in the thesis.

Yet another theory that will be used as a guide for some of the arguments that will be presented will be the particular brand of neo-liberalism that governs globalisation. For ease of reference, this theory will be referred to as globalisation theory, and will be used due to the role that the state plays in CARICOM. By this I mean, the Caribbean in general can be described as being very statist; that is there is a very clear sense of what the state is expected to do and matters pertaining to regional integration is seen as being very clearly in the purview of the state. However, one of the desired outcomes of globalisation, which has governed international economic affairs as well as development for roughly the past 30 years or so, is the reduction in the role of the state. The effect that these dichotomous views have had will be expanded on in a later section.

At this point, after having identified both the conceptual areas and the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis, attention will now be turned to some of the work which has already been done in the area of Caribbean integration. This section will also look at some work which has been done as it relates to the theories which are guiding the thesis.

The first step in highlighting work that has been done in the area of Caribbean integration will be to look at Regional Integration as a concept in and of itself, while also highlighting any developments that have occurred within the concept and practice of regional integration. To begin with, it should be noted that as Grenade (2011) pointed out: “The study of regional integration is not new. The 1950s and 1960s saw the first wave of integration theories which were used to conceptualize the early stages of European integration.” (p.4) This re-emphasizes that both the study and existence of regional integration is by no means new. As can be reasonably expected, considering how long the study of regional integration has been in existence, there have been different theories that have been advanced to explain exactly how regional integration is supposed to work. Along with the theories, there have also been debates as to which theoretical approach best describes the process of regional integration.

The first of these debates, as identified by Grenade (2011), came about between proponents of one school of thought referred to as the neo-functional school on the one hand, and the proponents of the inter-governmental school of thought. Grenade (2011) notes that: “Neo-functionalism advances the notion that national governments are willing to cede sovereignty over certain matters to regional institutions, which can then make laws and policies that are binding upon those governments.” (p.4) This immediately shows that

under this school of thought shared sovereignty was seen as being the way forward. This is brought out further when Grenade (2011) goes on to say: “In this respect regional integration refers to “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new center whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.” (p.4)

Grenade (2011) also highlighted the rationale behind the neo-functional school of thought when she noted that: “This perspective holds that the momentum for integration could be maintained where supranational agencies were given tasks that facilitated the upgrading of common interests.” (p.5) From this, it can be gathered that the neo-functional approach removed the individual state from the equation in some respects, and instead focused on utilizing overarching bodies to pursue common interests. This came to be called “supranationality” and is defined by Brewster (2003) as being a process where: “...once the consultative and legal procedures are adhered to, decisions by the Conference of Heads of Government and other Organs of the Community to which powers have been delegated, may make certain decisions that immediately have the force of law throughout the Member States.” (p.2) This again reiterates the idea that under a neo-functional/supranational approach, a state will cede some of its traditional sovereign powers to an external agency that will pursue the common interests of all states involved.

The theoretical counter for the neo-functional/supranational school however, makes almost the exact opposite argument as it relates to the role of the state in the integration process. That is to say, as Brewster (2003) put it rather succinctly: “This

exercise of national sovereignty in the context of a Community of States is otherwise referred to as intergovernmentalism.” (p.2) The contrast between this particular school of thought and neo-functionalism/supranationality is immediately apparent. Whereas the neo-functional school removes question of individual state sovereignty from the equation- by having elements of individual state sovereignty ceded to an external common body-, the intergovernmental school of thought keeps the issue of state sovereignty almost at the centre of the process by having states retain their own sovereignty in all aspects.

Grenade (2011) explained the rationale behind the intergovernmental school of thought when she noted: “Hoffman challenged neo-functional logic and pointed to the influence of the national situation and external forces on regional integration. He argued that “[e]very international system owes its inner logic and its unfolding to the diversity of domestic determinants, geo-historical situations and outside aims among its units.”” (p.5). Grenade (2011) goes on to say: “Thus inter-governmentalism draws on the realist paradigm to explain regional integration. Key assumptions include: (1) the state is the primary actor in international affairs; (2) the main reason for a state’s existence is survival; (3) national interests are paramount; (4) the struggle for power underpins relations among states.” The argument here is that because the direction that any international system goes in depends on the experiences of the states that make up that system, attempting to separate the individual state- through the ceding of state sovereignty- from advancing an integration agenda makes no sense as state interest will always reign supreme.

Grenade (2011) summed up the inter-governmental position when she noted: “Hence, inter-governmentalism is an approach to integration in which national

governments establish institutions and procedures to pursue common interests but in which those governments retain the ultimate authority to pursue an independent policy if they desire.” (p.5) Grenade (2011) also goes further to note: “With this approach, although sovereignties are pooled, member states remain sovereign entities in the international arena.” (p.5) Again, the emphasis that this school of thought places on individual state sovereignty is very apparent and stands in clear contrast to the pooled sovereignty approach of the neo-functional/supranational school.

Grenade (2011) identifies the reason why states may choose to follow the intergovernmental path of regional integration when she notes: “In essence, countries tend to pursue intergovernmental integration when they want to reap the benefits of cooperation without surrendering their independence.” (p.5) Grenade (2011) also noted that under the intergovernmental school of thought: “Regional integration can therefore be understood as a series of bargains among the political leaders of the major states in a region as the result of converging preferences among these leaders.” (p.5)

It can be gathered from the above that, along with the differing perspectives on sovereignty, the two schools of thought around which early debates on integration were focused also differed in the actual approach to regional integration. From what has been described above, the neo-functional/supranational approach seems to stress the idea of collective action for collective benefit. That is to say, by having states cede elements of their sovereign powers, the supranational approach ensures that any action that may be taken has to be agreed upon by all involved otherwise it will not happen. On the surface this appears to be an ideal form of integration, however there is the possibility that getting

all states to agree on a certain course of action may be time consuming or may not happen at all, thus paralyzing the initiative in whatever action may wish to be taken. This paralysis may then make the initiative, to the casual observer, appear to either be weak at best or pointless at worst.

The intergovernmental approach appears to eschew any form of ceding sovereignty, thus ensuring that state interest is always paramount in all actions that the initiative may take. For any proponents of the idea that the state must always reign supreme in international relations- in that anything done, must be done for the benefit of the state- this approach does seem to be best.

However, as with the supranational approach, there are drawbacks with intergovernmentalism that may not appear to be immediately apparent. In this case, I cannot see how any regional integration process can expect to function if all states retain the right to seek their own interests ahead of each other. As an example of what can potentially happen in this instance I offer this hypothetical scenario: countries A and B are in an intergovernmental type of regional integration. Country A approaches country C and enters into an agreement with that country to the unintentional detriment of country B. Countries A and C benefit, but country B does not. In this case country B, may then rightly conclude that its own interest are not served by remaining in this regional integration initiative and thus leave. Now imagine if this is not a scenario of two or three countries, but instead ten or twenty countries all looking to advance their own interests at the, whether intentional or not, expense of each other. In this case, this initiative would be judged to be schizophrenic at best or ineffective at worst.

It should be noted however, that while the schools of thought identified here appear to clearly contradict each other that does not necessarily mean that there is a situation where one or the other has to be chosen. In fact, the point is made by Brewster (2003) that: “It is even possible in instances to have a mixture of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.” (p.4) Brewster (2003) makes this claim by stressing the point that ideas of sovereignty can be altered to meet the best interest of the state, thus creating an instance where: “...sovereignty may be exercised nationally—through the intergovernmental mode, and may, when desired, also be exercised collectively—through the supranational mode.” (p.4). This then allows for both schools of integration thought to be followed at the same time.

The debate around regional integration is not restricted solely to intergovernmentalism vs neo-functionalism/supranationality. There also exists a differing perspective on the purpose of regional integration. This particularly true as it relates to regional integration in the developed world as opposed to regional integration in the developing world. That is to say, as Boxhill (1997) noted, when speaking about the genesis of European Integration, that the countries involved: “...supported regionalism not simply as a means to an end, but as an end in itself.” (p.5). The other perspective is highlighted by Grenade (2011) when she noted that: “In this context, regional integration is viewed as “collective self-reliance” which provides member countries with a stronger platform with which to interact with the global political economy and pursue relations with other groups and countries.” (p.5). Grenade (2011) further noted that: “This perspective underscores the point that regional integration is not an end in itself but can be evaluated in terms of its

contribution to development.” (p.5) It immediately becomes clear what the point of demarcation between these two perspectives is. As Boxhill (1997) noted, for the Europeans achieving a level of integration was an actual end point, whereas Grenade (2011) showed that for the developing countries, a level of overall development was the end point with regional integration only serving as a means of being able to get to that point.

Grenade (2011) also made the point that: “The New Regionalism Theory (NRT) goes further and seeks to explain the complexities of regionalisation in the context of the new wave of globalization.” From this, it can be gathered that there seemed to be a realization that the original explanations of regional integration did not work under the globalization paradigm, and therefore new rationales were sought. Grenade (2011) noted: “Regional integration is conceived as “a complex process of change simultaneously involving state as well as non-state actors and occurring as a result of global, regional, national and local level forces.” (p.5) From this, it is shown quite clearly that the New Regionalism Theory moves the issue of integration beyond being just a state concern.

It is true that both the neo-functional/supranational school and the inter-governmental school differed on the role that should be played by sovereign states in the integration process, but they did both agree that integration was primarily a state concern. However, the New Integration Theory argues that with the advent of globalization and the creation of a very highly inter-connected world that we currently live in, there are other players and factors in the integration process thus moving the question of integration beyond being solely a state concern.

At this point, after examining some of the debates that exist surrounding the concept of regional integration, attention will now be turned to some of the work that has been done as it relates to CARICOM. As may be expected considering the importance that can be applied to the central question of the thesis for the Caribbean, there has been many an attempt to provide an answer. Ian Boxhill (2005) notes: “The issue of sovereignty has always been at the forefront of discussions on Caribbean Development” (p.22) Here is a possible argument that is advanced. It is felt by many that the CARICOM’s states overarching reluctance to give up any measure of their national sovereignty, has delayed the process of Caribbean Integration. This argument can be looked at as falling in the conceptual area of regional integration in the face of globalization, due to issues of sovereignty also being very ticklish areas under the globalization paradigm.

Another argument that is put forward comes from Buddan (2005) who states: “The first 30 years of CARICOM have been preoccupied with economic integration. The next phase should add institutions that improve governance.” (p.22). This suggests that the almost exclusive focus on the economic side of integration has perhaps not been the wisest choice that could have been made. Garcia (2008) lends further credence to this idea when he notes that: “The notion that forging a shared Caribbean identity is, or may be, a necessary precondition to articulate a political project of regional integration is rarely, and only recently, included in the agenda of regional bodies dealing with economic integration” (p.54)

From the above we see arguments that seem to bridge two conceptual areas. That of economic development and human and social development. The suggestion that regional

integration movement look at areas of governance and also as a political project touches directly upon the area of social development. The suggestion that perhaps the preoccupation of the region with the economic aspects has not worked out for the best, situates that argument squarely in the area of economic development.

Munroe (2005), while not explicitly stating what he may see as a cause of the impeded implementation of the economic benefits resulting due to the deepened integration in CARICOM, does however provide a consequence of this delay. He says: "...the necessary levels of support, involvement and satisfaction with sub-regional and national governance as a general rule in our region, do not now exist and need to be strengthened." (p.66). This suggests that for the people of the region, there is a lack of enthusiasm as it relates to the integration process.

Griffith (1990) makes the point that: "Although it is apparent that no one variable can adequately explain the continual crisis in CARICOM, it is argued that the primary cause of the continual crisis must be located in the internationalization of production and the restructuring of the global economy." (pp.28-29). This argument very clearly lies right in the middle of regional integration in the face of globalisation. It also puts forward the argument that an explanation for the issues within CARICOM can be traced to globalisation. This is an argument that will be examined more closely.

It is not enough to look at literature surrounding regional integration in the Caribbean in a vacuum. That is to say as has already been said there are many different

examples of regional integration movements that exist. To reiterate the point that Feng and Genna (2003) made:

The wide variation of regional integration is a striking characteristic. Some countries form a free trade area, and evolve into a customs union, but demonstrate a lack of dynamics required to move toward a common market, let alone an economic union. Others succeed in overcoming the differences among them and creating the ultimate form of regional integration: an Economic Union. The European Union (EU) has emerged as a great accomplishment by bringing member countries together in a fairly cohesive political and economic unit. In contrast, the Forum for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has a long way to go even to achieve the modest goal of a free trade area. (Pp.278-279)

Due to the variation in experience of different integration movements, it is vital to examine CARICOM in light of these other bodies to see what lessons can be learned. There is of course the very real possibility that experience(s) of some of these movements would not be able to be translated to the CARICOM experience. However, that can still be considered to be a lesson learnt, if only for the reason that a particular explanation can now be ruled out.

It must be noted that in spite of some of the arguments, which are not new, that have been advanced the question has yet to be resolved. It is also clear that the literature does take into account the international climate within which CARICOM operates which can influence the level of development that has occurred. This is an issue that will be more thoroughly explored in the second chapter of this thesis.

Hypothesis

To attempt to do this study, I believe it is necessary to have an idea of possible answers to the questions that are being asked. Without a hypothesis to serve as a bit of a guide, it is entirely possible that the research can go into areas that are not only unnecessary, but can be distracting in that research areas can be examined that do not need to be. The hypothesis that shall guide this thesis is as follows: “Using economic development as a valid measure of the success of CARICOM, Caricom has not been successful in meeting its objectives due to a combination of both external and internal barriers. These barriers, among which are issues of sovereignty; international pressures like trade agreements; and local disinterest, have led to low levels of implementation of CARICOM decisions, which in turn has created a situation where CARICOM can said to have “failed.” However, using economic development as the *sole* measure of success presents a skewed picture of the overall state of CARICOM and regional integration in the region.”

By phrasing the hypothesis this way, I would be able to address all of the questions that the study seeks to answer including the central question as well as the secondary questions. The hypothesis suggests that the economic development of the region will be used as a measure of success, but also subtly suggests that there may be other measures of success, thus opening the way for the secondary question of “what other measures of success can be used?” to be answered.

By suggesting that there are barriers present that have prevented CARICOM from reaching its objectives, the central question is then addressed. The hypothesis also gives

examples of what some of these barriers can be, thus allowing for the reader to have a clear idea as to the direction of the arguments that the study will make. For example, one of the barriers that have been highlighted is the issue of sovereignty. The argument there will be that most forms of regional integration have as a characteristic some form of shared sovereignty. However, in the case of CARICOM there have been member states who have been greatly reluctant to do down that path. Due to that reluctance, CARICOM has not been able to move forward to become a regionally integrated entity.

The hypothesis also makes it clear that it is not only one issue that is seen as being a barrier, but rather a combination. The argument here is that there are several things that have hindered CARICOM, and that it is due to a combination of all these factors that have led to a stalling of CARICOM's forward progress.

Also by being framed in this way, the hypothesis can then lead one to ask the question "If CARICOM has not worked, are there any regional integration mechanisms that have worked?" which is one of the secondary questions already raised, so the hypothesis provides an agency through which that question can be answered as well. Another question that the hypothesis provides a way of answering is that of "what benefits were expected?" This is due to the hypothesis being designed to address why the expected outcomes/benefits of CARICOM have not materialised. In order to show that these benefits haven't occurred, it will be necessary to explain just what they were expected to be in the first place.

Methodology

This study is anticipated to be primarily an explicative study, which will call upon doing library research and will utilise a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data. It should be noted that one of the primary units of analysis will be CARICOM as a whole. The study can be described as being explicative with elements of being descriptive due to, the primary aim of the study is to attempt to give an explanation as to what it is that has prevented CARICOM from achieving its aims. It will not be possible to do that without some element of description but the main focus is on explaining, therefore allowing the study to be classified as being primarily explicative.

The study will be utilising library research instead of interviews, surveys or other primary methods for the following reasons. First, due to the very geographic nature of a region consisting of islands of varying sizes and populations, being able to ascertain an appropriate sampling size will be very difficult. Some of the issues that would make this difficult would be questions of which islands should be used? What sample size from each island would be appropriate? What economic background should be used? All of these combined would again make doing surveys or interviews unfeasible. Secondly, the question of being able to get in touch with the respondents arises, which again would make utilising primary methods untenable.

The issue might be raised of perhaps utilising the CARICOM Secretariat as respondents. To that, I would reply that Secretariat takes its mandate and directions from member states, meaning that for what I am doing the Secretariat may not exactly be the

most appropriate group of respondents due to them being powerless in a sense to act on moving the integration process forward unless given that clear mandate and resources with which to do so.

There is also the fact that this issue is one which has been examined by many scholars and thinkers throughout the region, so finding secondary sources would not be an issue. The question, however, may then arise as to why it is I am doing this study? That is, if as I claim, there are other works out there is there need for another one? To that I would reply: that I think there are some things about mine that makes it a bit unique. One such thing would be that I am arguing that there is a combination of factors that have hindered CARICOM, whereas other works that have been examined so far point to one particular factor, whatever it may be, as being the reason why CARICOM is not working.

As mentioned, the study will be using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative data, while looking at CARICOM as a single unit of analysis. CARICOM will be looked at as whole, because that is the way in which the issue is treated. CARICOM itself is what is under analysis, and as such needs to be treated as a single entity. The quantitative data will be looked at by looking at the GDPs of the region to see what, if any, economic development has occurred. The qualitative data comes into play by examining the objectives that the Treaty of Chaguaramas, which brought CARICOM into being, laid out and using those to argue that CARICOM has not met them. I will also make use of secondary qualitative data to advance arguments as to why this would be the case. Qualitative data will also be helpful in answering the question of “What other measures of

success can be applied in the case of CARICOM?" This would also work toward addressing what other forms of regional integration may have met with success in the region.

Chapter 2: Barriers to Closer Regional Integration

2.1: Introduction

Before delving into some of the arguments that have been made regarding the barriers to a closer level of integration in the Caribbean, it would perhaps be appropriate at this juncture to make the comparison between CARICOM and some other integration initiatives that exist outside of the Caribbean. Due to the European Union being one of the more well-known examples of a regional integration programme, it would make sense to start the comparison by looking at the E.U first.

The first thing that should be noted about the European Union is highlighted by Grenade (2011) where it is pointed out that: “The European Union (EU) is the most advanced regional integration project in the world. It is characterized by a unique mix of intergovernmentalism and supranationality and supported by strong networks and interests.” (p.5) There are a few things of great interest to be noted from the above. The first is that the EU is identified as being “the most advanced regional integration project in the world”. This makes sense considering that the EU is one of the oldest current integration projects that exists, having the beginning of its existence rooted in the 1950s growing out of the existence of the European Coal and Steel Community (Grenade 2011, p.4), thus allowing it over fifty years of advancement.

In addition to the length of time that the EU has been in existence, when Boxhill’s (1997) observation that Europe saw: “...regionalism not simply as a means to an end, but as an end in itself.” (p.5), is taken into account it becomes clear how it is that the EU was

able to achieve as much as it has. That is to say, the European Union can be safely assumed to have spent quite a lot of time on the integration process due to the end goal being regional integration itself, and not anything else that integration may have led to.

The second thing of note is that the EU is described as having elements of both inter-governmentalism and supra-nationality. This then shows that the claim made by Brewster (2003), highlighted earlier, regarding the possibility of being able to combine both schools of thought into one whole, is indeed borne out.

When both CARICOM and the EU are compared side by side, some of the differences between the two are very apparent at a glance, whereas some others need a little further digging to be brought in the light. Among the very obvious differences between the two initiatives is the question of a common currency. The EU has one in the Euro, whereas CARICOM does not. Another somewhat obvious difference between is the existence of a common court. It is noted by Grenade (2011) that: “The European experience suggests that a common court acts as a glue to sustain integration.” (p.17) It should be noted and stressed that CARICOM does indeed have a common court of its own in the Caribbean Court of Justice (the CCJ), that was intended to serve, among other functions, as a court of final appeal in both criminal and civil cases. (Grenade 2011, p.17) However, as is noted by Grenade (2011): “To date only Barbados, Belize and Guyana have acceded to the Appellant Jurisdiction of the CCJ” (p.17) Essentially this means that common court of CARICOM which currently has fifteen full Member States, serves only three of those members in all of its intended functions. If, as Grenade (2011) suggested, that the existence of a common European Court has been of vital importance for the maintenance of the European

integration project, the fact that the CCJ has full jurisdiction in only three member states is a rather telling indicator of the state of Caribbean integration.

Another difference that exists between both bodies was highlighted by Boxhill (1997) in his discussion on the differing viewpoints on the entire regional integration process that can be found between the developed and developing countries. As has already been highlighted, he noted that: “The EEC, therefore, emerged against a background of an ideology which eschewed narrow nationalism and *supported regionalism not simply as a means to an end, but as an end in itself.* (p.5, emphasis added) He noted in comparison that: “In the Third World, regional integration has as its primary concern economic development and economic growth.” (p.5) Again, the point here is that for the Europeans integration itself was the goal, but integration mechanisms in the Third World-of which CARICOM is an example- saw regional integration as being a path to economic development. This idea that the Caribbean saw integration as a means to an end instead of an end in and of itself is borne out when the objectives of CARICOM are taken into account. These Objectives range from economic integration and development to foreign policy co-ordination (CARICOM Secretariat 2011, para.4), however, there is nothing that suggests that integration in and of itself is seen as a goal.

Another point of demarcation that exists between CARICOM and the EU lies in the way both bodies approach decision making. As has been indicated on more than one occasion by this point, the EU utilizes a combination of inter-governmentalism and supra-nationalism (Grenade 2011, p.4, p.17; Brewster 2003, p.5) In describing the way in which CARICOM operates, Byron (2004) made the point that: “The temper of the times made

the founders protective in the extreme of individual territorial sovereignty. Consensus yes, submission to majority no. Agreement yes, but with all the opportunity in the world for second thoughts. Cooperation and coordination yes, but only so far as it might suit the individual cause.” (p.3) When the description of the inter-governmental paradigm is taken into account, especially as it relates to its view that states must retain individual sovereignty and will also act in their own interest (Grenade 2011, p.5; Brewster 2003, p.2), it is clear that CARICOM functions under the inter-governmental paradigm of regional integration, and functions solely under that paradigm.

2.2: Current State of CARICOM

At this point, after having made a comparison between CARICOM and the European Union, attention will now be turned to the current state of affairs in CARICOM itself. It has been suggested in many circles that CARICOM as an agent of integration has not been successful in doing so. This claim can be seen in the existence of the many conferences, and the conference reports/presentations which have been held to attempt to explain why this is the case. One such example is the collection of presentations entitled “Caribbean Imperatives: Regional Governance and Integrated Development” which bound together the presentations at a conference held in Kingston, Jamaica.

The type of integration that CARICOM was intended to bring about, as has been mentioned previously, was economic in nature with the expected end result being an increased level of economic development for the member states and the region as whole, for as Boxhill (1997) noted: “In the Third World, regional integration has had as its primary

concern economic development and economic growth.” (p.4). However, it is accepted that CARICOM has not been able to do this for a variety of reasons. Before moving into an examination of the circumstances that have led to CARICOM not being able to meet its objectives, it will be necessary to describe the current state of CARICOM and show why it is that there has been the argument that CARICOM has failed.

One of the best pieces of evidence that can be used to argue that CARICOM has met with some level of failure comes from the language that is used to describe the current state of the CARICOM integration process. Many commentators use the word “crisis”, which immediately gives a sense of the way in which the integration process is viewed. For example, Winston H. Griffith (1990) titled an article he wrote describing the state of Caribbean integration as “Crisis in Caribbean Integration”, and also makes reference to Caribbean integration being in crisis throughout. For instance he makes the point: “Although it is apparent that no one variable can adequately explain the continual crisis in CARICOM, it is argued that the primary cause of the continual crisis must be located in the internationalization of production and the restructuring of the global economy.” (Pp.28-29) Again, due to the emphasis and use of the word crisis, it can be gathered that the state of Caribbean integration as represented by CARICOM is not in the best of shape, and indeed is in critical condition.

Griffith is not the only person who has used the word “crisis” in a manner which can be used to describe the current state of CARICOM. Current Prime Minister of St. Lucia, Dr. Kenny Anthony is noted as saying: “Our region is in the throes of the greatest crisis since independence.” (Sanders, 2012, St Lucia PM: Caribbean in greatest crisis since

independence, para.1) It should be noted that in this case Prime Minister Anthony was speaking of the overall state of Caribbean Development, and not CARICOM per se. However, when one takes into account that one of the core objectives of CARICOM was to facilitate the development of the region, and that development is said to be in a state of crisis, it is not unreasonable to extrapolate that crisis state to CARICOM itself.

Perhaps one of the best descriptions of the current state of the integration process comes from Girvan (2013). In providing a description of the state of the overall integration process of CARICOM, he noted: “Progress has slowed to a virtual standstill; the momentum has been lost; interest has waned. It is not yet officially dead; but it certainly appears to be comatose.” (p.7). This provides a very clear picture of where CARICOM currently is.

There also exists in CARICOM what can only be termed as an “implementation deficit” which can also be seen as having contributed to the “crisis” in CARICOM. The way that decisions work in CARICOM is that they are taken at meetings of the bodies of the Community, be it the Heads of Government or one of the Councils of CARICOM such as the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED). The next step is for the decisions to be implemented in each member state, whether by being passed into law if needs be, or just simple action of acting upon the decisions.

However, for reasons that will be examined later as this section is focused more on giving a snapshot of the current state of CARICOM, it is up to each member state to actually take action so that the CARICOM decisions become reality. It has been noted that

there are a quite few decisions that member states have not fully acted upon, with the greatest example of the result of this inaction being the fact that the CSME still has yet to come into full being. The follow on effect, as it relates to the CSME which is the vehicle through Economic Development is expected to be delivered to the region, is that while there may have been some levels of economic development achieved by member states, it has not been the same across the board.

Girvan (2010) put together a table (p.15) which shows very clearly showed the state of implementation of CARICOM decisions as it relates to moving toward a closer level of integration and is reproduced in the table below.

CSME Participating Countries: State of Legislative Compliance with Implementation of the CARICOM Single Market

Compliance Category	No. of Compliance Instruments Required	No. of Compliance Instruments in Effect	Percentage In Effect
Legal and Institutional Infrastructure	113	77	68
Free Movement of Goods	83	49	59
Free Movement of People	88	43	49
Right of Establishment	113	67	59
Movement of Capital	16	11	69
Free Movement of Services	700	307	44
Intellectual Property	45	27	60
Other	8	4	50
Total	1166	585	50

It should be noted that the figures listed above do not indicate an individual country's compliance with CARICOM decisions, but rather, show the compliance level across the board. The figures can be said to speak for themselves, showing that there is only a **total** percentage of fifty of actions that needed to be taken to move the integration process along. In terms of individual categories, it can be seen that those figures range from forty-four percent to sixty-nine percent with no category having a complete hundred percent level of implementation. Again, it should be stressed that these figures apply across the board and do not reflect individual countries performances. However, an idea as to what the member states level of implementation can be gotten by looking at the figures in the table.

It is somewhat interesting and disheartening to note that one of the categories that has the lowest completion percentage is that of Free Movement of People. The idea behind CARICOM's Free Movement of people, referred to in the Revised Treaty of Chaugaramas as Article 45 "Movement of Community Nationals" (p.30), is that all CARICOM Nationals should be free to move around the region, as long as the country that they are entering is a participant in the CSME.

However, there have been complaints that some Member States have not been compliant with meeting their obligations. The best example of this is the case currently before the Caribbean Court of Justice regarding the treatment allegedly meted out to a Jamaican National, Ms. Shanique Myrie by Barbadian Immigration Officials. Ms. Myrie claims, among other charges, that: "...she was discriminated against because of her

nationality...” (Jamaica Observer, 2013, para. 3) and as a result has taken action against Barbados. The outcome of this case will have serious implications for the entire integration process as Ms. Myrie is requesting of the Court that they: “...determine the minimum standard of treatment applicable to CARICOM citizens moving around the region.” (Jamaica Observer, 2013, para. 4) One of the pillars of any successful advanced integration process is the ability of Member States’ Nationals and Citizens to move freely in the area, therefore the ruling of the CCJ will greatly impact the entire process.

The necessity for the CCJ to be involved in this matter can be gathered when the actual wording of the Articles that govern free movement in CARICOM is closely examined. Article 45 states: “Member States commit themselves to the goal of free movement of their nationals within the Community” (Revised Treaty of Chaguramas, p.30). On the surface of it, it does appear that this Article does allow for the free movement of CARICOM Nationals. However when examined closely, it becomes apparent from the language used that Member States are really under no obligation to actually allow the free movement of CARICOM Nationals through their territories. By stating that member states “commit” themselves to free movement, it can be gathered that while free movement is agreed on in **principle**, there is nothing that explicitly states that the actual **practice** of free movement is to be enacted.

The situation becomes even more complex when Article 46 of the Treaty is taken into account. Among other things, Article 46 makes it very clear that the free movement provision will not be extended to all CARICOM Nationals but instead to particular categories. These categories are: University graduates; media workers; sportspersons;

artistes and musicians. (p.30) The existence of these categories again highlight the necessity for the CCJ to determine the minimum expectation that all CARICOM Nationals should have in regard to both their treatment and rights when travelling throughout the region.

A question may be raised as to why it is that if the Member States have taken the step of agreeing to commit themselves to free movement, then why is free movement still an issue for some. In addition to the issue raised above, where free movement has been restricted to certain categories, there is also an issue of what has been termed as “contingent rights”. From meetings I have attended, contingent rights can be considered to “social” rights. That is, these rights are usually concerned with access to services such as healthcare, education etc. Speaking from personal experience, again from meetings I have attended, the issue of what rights and to what degree that should be extended to CARICOM Nationals moving from one Member State to another has led to Member States being very reluctant to fully implement the free movement provisions of the Treaty.

As an example the government of Barbados pays for the education and healthcare of its nationals, but have said that they would not be able to afford to do the same for all CARICOM Nationals who may come to Barbados. Another issue that arises is that even if contingent rights are extended to an individual, do they extend to the individual’s spouse and family as well. Again, the government of Barbados has stressed its inability to be able to afford the costs of these rights if granted in full, and as a result the free movement of Community Nationals remains in limbo.

It may have been noticed that reference has been made to Member States who are participating in the CSME as if to make a difference between CARICOM proper and the CSME. The reason for this, is that that is exactly what was occurring. That is to say, that there are Member States who have made use of the opt-out clause contained in the Revised Treaty of Chauguramas to not move forward with the rest of CARICOM in establishing the Single Market and Economy. While Member States are indeed well within their rights to take such action, one cannot help but see such action as casting doubt on the legitimacy of CARICOM as an integration process if one of its own Member States, in this case the Bahamas, has refused to move forward with the rest of CARICOM.

One of the purposes of this study is to attempt to provide an explanation for the situation described above. As has been already stated, the central thesis of this work posits that CARICOM has been unsuccessful due to a combination of factors ranging from issues of sovereignty to the international environment that CARICOM must operate in. These factors have been identified as being both internal to the Community and its member states as well as being external. By describing some of these factors as being external it is meant that these particular circumstances arise due to influences outside the Community's control.

This particular section of the thesis will go into detail as to what these factors are and the role that they have played in negatively impacting CARICOM's ability to meet the purpose for which it was designed. We shall go through the process by moving from a macro level to a relatively micro level. That is to say, we shall begin by looking at the external factors that may have played a role in the impeding of CARICOM and thus

situating the organisation and initiative in a global context. We shall then look at the factors that can be identified as being internal to CARICOM. Along with the factors being identified, the role that they played in somewhat delaying the looked for benefits from CARICOM will also be examined.

2.3 External Factors

The most critical major external factor that has had an impact on the levels of integration in the Caribbean is the international system within which the region must operate. Watson (1995) notes: “Historically, the world environment has shaped the development of the Caribbean Region.” (p.165). The quote here tells us provides an example of what the relationship between the Caribbean and the wider world has been, and it is suggested that international arena has always played in a role in shaping the Caribbean. I would argue that the same holds true in regard to CARICOM and regional integration in the Caribbean. This idea is brought out even more clearly by Payne and Sutton (2007) who note that:

Prompted by the imperatives of debt and structural adjustment and sustained by the harsh realities of active United States (US) involvement in its affairs over the whole period of the Reagan presidency, the region switched tracks to embrace the favoured neoliberal development paradigm. What is striking about this change in retrospect is that the intellectual driving force behind the region's development strategy came from outside the Caribbean for the first time in the modern period. During the 1960s and 1970s the region's governments had generally sought to follow what were at least distinctively Commonwealth Caribbean variants of classic modernisation and anti-dependency development approaches. However, from the beginning of the 1980s onwards the script *became one that was largely written elsewhere*. (p.1)

The above quote from Payne and Sutton shows quite clearly that the Caribbean's development agenda, of which CARICOM was to be a part, became an agenda that was now being influenced by elements external to the region.

Griffith (1990) notes: "Although it is apparent that no one variable can adequately explain the continual crisis in CARICOM, it is argued that the primary cause of the continual crisis must be located in the internationalization and the restructuring of the global economy" (pp.28-29). This shows again the idea that international events can and have had an impact on CARICOM. Griffith in fact suggests that one of the reasons why CARICOM has not been able to achieve its stated goals can be placed into context as being a result of factors that occurred outside of the region. Here it is seen quite clearly that the role that the international system plays is one that can hinder integration in the Caribbean.

The circumstance described in the preceding passages reflect very clearly the worldview that can be seen through the lens of dependency theory. Dependency theory was/is a school of thought that was developed in the 60s and was used to provide an explanation for the state of underdevelopment primarily in Latin American countries. (Kay, 1989, p.125) This school of thought found fertile ground in the Caribbean and was used to make the claim that the problems of development that the region faced was a direct consequence of its dependency on the developed world. (Girvan, 2005, p.4)

This level of dependency can then be seen to have allowed the developed world to have a significant level of influence on the region whether through agencies like the IMF or through trading blocs like the European Union. There are very concrete examples that

can be pointed to in recent times that exemplify this relationship, and reflect the idea that dependency theory can also be seen as an exercise in power relations. The first would be the relationship between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Jamaica.

Girvan (2012) makes two points that show quite clearly the unequal power relationship that exists between Jamaica and the IMF, which can then be further seen as having implications for Jamaica's relationship to CARICOM. The first that is noted: "For 35 years of the 50-year independence experience, therefore, Jamaican economic policy has been under the direct supervision of Washington-based international financial institutions; or carried out within a framework that they approve of, and is aimed at maintaining the confidence of donors and investors." (p.5) This is remarkably telling, that a country which is going to be celebrating its 51st anniversary of independence this year has, for the majority of time it has been independent, taken economic direction from an external source.

The second point that is raised by Girvan (2012) states:

The last IMF agreement, made in 2010, is a clear demonstration of the extent to which the government of Jamaica has lost the ability to independently determine its own policies. The Letter of Intent and its Annexes outline 10 undertakings by the GoJ in the area of fiscal policy, three in monetary policy; and over 40 actions of structural reform under various headings over one to two fiscal years; including undertakings to change a number of existing laws and regulations. There are also nine different quantitative performance criteria which it must observe. On top of all this the government of Jamaica is obligated to make daily reports to the IMF on 13 items, weekly reports on 6 items; monthly reports on 22 items, and quarterly reports on 10 items. It would be an interesting project for some research student to compare the powers exercised by the IMF over Jamaica's economic policy with those exercised by the British Governor and the Colonial Office in London

under Crown Colony rule. I am of course not referring to power in the constitutional sense, but the real power exercised by the IMF by means of financial leverage and its intrusion into a vast range of public policies (p.6.)

This second quote shows even more clearly than the first just how beholden Jamaica is to the IMF, to the point that one can possibly say that the IMF is in charge of Jamaica's economic destiny and not be too far off the mark. This can be seen as affecting Jamaica's relationship to the rest of CARICOM and the CSME due to the possibility of Jamaica being restrained from being able to fully commit to CARICOM because, due to the IMF, it has prior commitments. This then sets up a potential clash between the importance Jamaica places on CARICOM, and the importance the IMF places on it.

That is to say that if the IMF were to insist that Jamaica meets its obligations to them over its obligations to CARICOM, Jamaica may have no choice but to do that. If that were to happen, it is possible that the validity of CARICOM as an integration enterprise could be called into question if one of its member states is not meeting its obligations to the process. One such example could be in terms of funding the operations of CARICOM. That is to say, that if Jamaica is caught between paying its debts to the IMF and meeting its share of the operating cost of CARICOM, I would suggest that it is entirely possible for the IMF to insist that its debts be paid first, with the result being that Jamaica may not be able to meet its CARICOM obligations.

The issue of funding is also another example of the way in which external factors can play a role in directing the integration process. The harsh truth is that “he who pays the piper, calls the tune”, and CARICOM relies heavily on external funding from sources such as the European Commission through the EDF (European Development Fund). Therefore, the likelihood of CARICOM defying the Commission even if it may be in its best interest to do so will be rather slight.

An interesting example of the role that external factors can play in directing regional integration in the Caribbean lies in the very existence of the CSME itself. As Girvan (2013) noted: “The CSME is constructed within the framework of the liberalisation/privatisation/ deregulation paradigm of the Washington Consensus and globalisation.” (p.17). The fact that the CSME was constructed in a framework that came from outside the region shows clearly that external factors have indeed played a role in directing the development of the region. This example also lends credence to the point raised by Payne and Sutton (2007) that the development agenda/process of the region was: “.....largely written elsewhere” (p.1)

Girvan (2013) also noted of the CSME: “The model of integration on which it is based is known as ‘Open Regionalism’. In this model, internal and external liberalisation go together. Governments give maximum play to the role of market forces and of the private sector in economic life.” (pp.14-15). It is interesting to contrast this with the point made by Mandle (2010) who noted that

one of the ideas behind the initial CARICOM projects was to allow for a level of import substitution industrialization (ISI) to develop. (p.4) It is interesting to contrast these two points mainly because they indicate two almost diametrically opposed views. The initial move towards a closer integration as represented by CARICOM was developed in the region, and can perhaps be seen as having been protectionist in nature as that was the main purpose of most ISI policies. However, with the changing global environment, when CARICOM decided to move a closer level of integration, a mechanism was formulated whose conceptual foundations had their origins external to the region as indicated by Girvan (2013).

Another excellent example of the way in which external factors can influence the direction of regional integration in terms of CARICOM, and still reflect the validity of the dependency theory- particularly in the light of power relationships between states- is the recently signed Economic Partnership Agreement between CARIFORUM and the EU. I feel that is necessary to give a brief overview and background to the EPA so that it is clearly understood.

To understand the rationale for the existence of the EPA, we must first look at the relationship between the United Kingdom and her colonies particularly in the Caribbean in this case. As Fridell (forthcoming) noted, for a variety of reasons the U.K granted to her former colonies: "...a preferential trade arrangement centred on a quota system that reserved the bulk of UK market for

bananas exported from Commonwealth countries that traded in sterling.” (p.8). This preferential arrangement was very beneficial to the banana exporting Caribbean countries of Jamaica, St. Lucia, Dominica, Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. However, this arrangement was challenged at the World Trade Organisation level as being in violation of WTO Trade Rules.

After several years of dispute, the U.K agreed to terminate the arrangement. It should be noted that when the UK decided to end the preferential access, the Caribbean producers had no choice but to accept the decision, thus reflecting yet again the state of dependency that existed between the Caribbean and the UK in this case. The Economic Partnership Agreement was designed to replace the preferential access agreement. Two things should be noted about the EPA: (1) The EPA applies to all member countries of the European Union and CARIFORUM, instead of just the U.K and Jamaica and the Windward Islands; and (2) the EPA is a reciprocal arrangement, meaning that it is now a two way street. The preferential access agreement was not reciprocal, in that the UK opened their markets to Caribbean bananas, but did not require any thing to be done in return. The EPA however, allows for the opening of the European Markets to CARIFORUM products, with CARIFORUM markets being opened in turn for European products.

It may have been noticed that there has been much reference made here to CARIFORUM instead of CARICOM. The reason for this was to begin to

highlight the way in which the EPA has affected Caribbean integration. As mentioned before CARICOM is comprised of: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname. However, **CARIFORUM** is comprised of CARICOM plus the Dominican Republic. This is noteworthy because the EPA has forced CARICOM into a closer relationship with the Dominican Republic than one that may have been willingly chosen. In that sense, the EPA has already overridden CARICOM as an integration mechanism.

The idea that the EPA has forced CARICOM into a closer relationship with the Dominican Republic through CARIFORUM can be gathered simply based on the fact that the Dominican Republic is not a Member State of CARICOM. This is in spite of the fact that: “...since 1989, the Dominican Republic has been trying to gain membership status in CARICOM” (Trinidad Express, 2013, para. 3) It is clear that considering that the Dominican Republic applied CARICOM over twenty years ago, and is still waiting to be approved for Membership, that for whatever reason CARICOM has been very reluctant to move to closer level of integration with the Dominican Republic by itself. With the advent of the EPA and CARIFORUM however, the decision can be seen to have been taken out of CARICOM’s hands.

Girvan (2010) makes the point, in regard to the EPA that: “Its implementation machinery cuts across the governance machinery of CARICOM organs. *The question arises as to what will be the role and purpose of CSME when the EPA is fully implemented?*” (p.12, emphasis added) This shows quite clearly that there is a sense that the EPA can perhaps surpass and supplant the CARICOM integration process once fully realized. For evidence of this, one needs only to look at the Bahamas. The Bahamas had opted out of moving toward the closer level of integration that the CSME entails. However, by signing the EPA the Bahamas is now open to that closer integration with the rest of CARICOM whether or not they actually wanted it. While it can be argued that this shows the utility of the EPA, it does cast doubt on the validity of CARICOM’s own integration process.

Thanks to one of the clauses within the EPA, the agreement has the potential to slow, alter or even stop completely CARICOM’s attempt at a closer level of integration. This is due primarily to the reciprocal nature of the agreement, and the insistence that whatever is offered to one country which is signatory to the agreement must be offered to all other countries. For instance, there is not yet a full Customs Union component of CARICOM, where goods can move freely throughout the region. However, if the CARICOM member states were to move a deeper level of integration by establishing a Custom’s Union, not only would the same benefits need to be extended to the Dominican Republic but also to all countries in the European Union as a result of the EPA. With this in

mind, it could perhaps be understood why CARICOM might be a touch reluctant to move forward with its integration process. This can then have the follow on effect of stalling even further any movement toward a higher level of development in the region.

The question may then arise as to why, if the EPA can have such a significant impact on the integration process of the region, was it agreed to? The answer to that boils down once again to what is provided by dependency theory. Basically, CARIFORUM was given no real choice in the matter. In fact, based on several issues that came to light when the “negotiations” ended, there were several instances where an outside observer might be forgiven for thinking that instead of negotiations occurring between sovereign nations, this was an instance of the colonial power informing their colonies as to exactly what was going to be happening to them, complete with promises of reward and threats of punishments. Girvan (2012) notes:

At successive stages of the negotiations, EU officials were able to exclude discussion of issues favourable to the ACP and to incorporate issues on the EU agenda (Girvan 2009a). They invoked interpretations of WTO rules that served their objectives; and offered concessions to countries compliant with their negotiating agenda. Collective resistance from an ACP regional group was met with offers to negotiate with individual countries. As the negotiating deadline approached, the threat of losing access to the EU market was invoked... (p.3)

The above is a very clear cut example of dependency in action. The EU dominated the meetings that led to the creation of an Agreement that was in their

best interests and not the Caribbean's. It is even more pointed that when the Caribbean expressed reservations about signing the EPA, the response from the EU can be boiled down to being "sign or else...." In this light, it can be seen that external forces can indeed play a major role in influencing the direction of the integration process in the Caribbean.

It would perhaps be tempting to make the claim that the level of integration in the Caribbean is as low as it is, and that CARICOM has been as "unsuccessful" as it has, thanks to the international system. It certainly seems to make sense, and also fits the customary narrative of small island developing states being run over roughshod by an uncaring international system. Again this claim seems feasible, especially when one examines the potential role that international agencies such as the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF can and have played in the region. However, when a closer look is taken, one cannot help but conclude that while external agents have played a role in delaying the anticipated benefits of integration to the region, the role that these agencies have played cannot be the entire story. The rest of the story can be found in the action or inaction of the members of CARICOM themselves which have been highlighted in Table 1.

The implementation deficit that exists have had a direct impact on CARICOM on a whole. This is primarily because in order for CARICOM to achieve its goal of economic development through the CSME, Member States

would have had to have acted to implement the mechanisms that would facilitate that transition. However, as has been shown, this has not happened fully. This section of the thesis will then look at some of the circumstances locally that have led to this happening.

2.4: Sovereignty

The first sort of “local” issue that has been raised by commentators touches directly on the entire issue of CARICOM being made up by several independent sovereign states. Indeed it is this tendency of the member states to keep insisting that their sovereignty be respected that many point to as being the direct cause of the slow gains in CARICOM. Boxhill (2005) notes that “The issue of sovereignty has always been at the forefront of discussions on Caribbean Development” (p.22). This emphasises that, for some, sovereignty is a major issue that plays a role in Caribbean Integration. The question then becomes why sovereignty plays such a major role in influencing the direction of the integration process in the Caribbean.

The question may also be asked why sovereignty shouldn’t be an important issue for the member states of CARICOM. After all, that was the entire purpose of these countries seeking their independence from the colonial powers. They were to take charge of their own destinies and choose their own paths. On the surface, this all sounds wonderful and indeed it is. However, it becomes a problem when the issue of integration comes into play. This is primarily due to the fact that any successful integration project usually involves the surrendering of some level of sovereignty, as seen in the case of the EU

(Grenade 2011,p.17) and which has been described as being “...the most advanced regional integration experiment” (Grenade 2001, p.4). However, in the case of the CARICOM member states, there have been countries that have point blank refused to even entertain the thought. The statement, usually attributed to former Prime Minister of Jamaica Bruce Golding, fully encapsulates this tension perfectly by saying: “Jamaica’s sovereignty begins and ends at its borders” This statement shows a mindset that refuses to give up any measure of sovereignty, which can be seen as one of the reasons as to why CARICOM has not been able to function the way it was envisioned by the crafters. This necessitates a closer examination of the role that sovereignty plays in influencing the direction of the integration process of CARICOM.

The first thing that must be addressed however, is exactly what the term “sovereignty” means and how it can apply in the context of the Caribbean. Sovereignty is, usually in the cases of states, taken to be referring to the idea of a state being the final arbiter of its own fate. That is to say, the state is considered to be supreme in matters relating to the state. That is, the state can make its own decisions and is beholden to no other entity, nor does it owe any other entity an explanation for its actions. Boxhill (2005), in providing a definition of the term, notes that: “There are many definitions of sovereignty. One of the most popular is that advanced by F.H Hinsley which states that sovereignty is the “final and absolute political authority in the political community...and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere. Hinsley (1986, p.26)” (pp.23-24). This shows quite clearly the idea that that the state is supreme.

However, as Boxhill also notes, the type of sovereignty described above, “individual” sovereignty, is not the only type that exists. He notes that there exists what he terms as “collective” sovereignty which he describes as: “...a group of nation states which have pooled together resources in the form of what Chris Patten calls ‘pooled sovereignty’.” (p.24) In his description of the characteristics he highlights what the issue may be as it relates to the impact that sovereignty can have on the furtherance of the integration movement in the Caribbean. He notes: “Collective sovereignty always involves devolution of some of the national sovereignty to a supranational body as is the case of European Community (EU) or even weaker bodies like CARICOM” (P.26) The very fact that moving forward with integration will mean that member states will have to give up elements of their national sovereignty to an overarching body, may go a very long way in giving an explanation as to why it is that at times member states in CARICOM have appeared to be highly reluctant in moving forward on the integration agenda.

The question may now be asked of “why?” That is to say that yes understanding that member states may be reluctant to give up their national sovereignty to a supranational body explains the seeming glacial pace at which Caribbean integration moves at. However, there is a question of why this reluctance even exists in the first place. Boxhill (2005) gives a potential explanation when he notes: “...most people do not perceive that they will be better off, both in terms of their rights and quality of life in a politically integrated region. In other words, collective sovereignty is unlikely to positively impact on their search for recognition.” (p.27)

It can be argued that CARICOM does not seek to create a politically integrated unit in the Caribbean as it currently stands, and as such Boxhill's comment does not apply. However, the point remains that almost all successful integration movements have all functioned with the surrendering of at least some sovereignty and Boxhill does provide an understanding as to why it is member states do not wish to give up elements of their sovereignty. He goes further in explanation when he notes that: "...many people in this region are not still not very pleased with the way in which they have been governed since independence, and that is probably what is reflected in the lack of widespread enthusiasm for collective forms of sovereignty such as federation." (p.28) This suggests that the people of the region, for whatever reason, have not been overly impressed with their local governments, and see no reason to assume that a supranational body, perhaps made up of the same people, would function any better. In short: "all of dem is de same!!", and if they are all the same then why put them in a position of being responsible for an entire region.

It can also perhaps be assumed, that considering the effort and work it took for some of the countries in the region to get themselves in a position where they would be able to determine their own fates, any suggestion of giving up those hard won rights can be seen as almost a betrayal of those who have come before. A hint of the importance that is placed on the work on of those who won sovereignty for the Caribbean countries can be seen from the following statement: "How many Jamaicans today understand why our forefathers fought for independence and sovereignty?" (Jamaica Observer, 2008, para. 6)

2.5: Language and Communication

When one thinks of the Caribbean the image that comes to mind is usually sun, sand, and sea. What does not come into mind however, is the fact that there are a variety of languages spoken throughout the islands. On the surface of it, after some thought this seems to be a no brainer. After all, the history of the region is one of conquest and colonialism by the European powers; namely the English, French and Spanish. One would however think, that with the majority of the members of CARICOM being English speaking territories differences in language would not be a barrier to integration. This does not appear to be the case.

The situation on the ground is that even where Standard English is the “official” language of a country; it is not exactly used in the normal day to day communications of its citizens. This ranges from the patois of St. Lucia, to the unique spin that Jamaicans put on the language. This presents a problem especially when one is attempting to convince a country’s populace of the desirability of something like CARICOM, but communicates solely in English.

Cooper (2005) points out the difficulty encountered for the entire integration movement when she makes the point, in speaking of famed Jamaican poet Louise Bennett, that: “Bennett’s subversive poetry demystifies the grandiose rhetoric of the elite, underscoring their failure to articulate their elevated vision of political transformation in the region in a language that the masses of Caribbean people can truly understand” (p.31)

This reiterates again the idea that the “language of integration” is not one that the general populace of the region can relate to.

Cooper (2005) makes the point even more clearly when she notes: “Much of the public debate on Federation was being conducted in English, not Jamaican.” (p. 31). There are two things of note here. First is that a line is drawn very clearly between “English” and “Jamaican” as languages. This demarcation of the two provides an explanation as to why it is that simply conveying ideas in English was not enough in this instance, which leads to the second noteworthy thing from the quote.

As can be noted, this quote relates to the debates that surrounded the question of Jamaica’s continued membership in the West Indies Federation. As has been covered already, with Jamaica’s departure followed swiftly by Trinidad and Tobago the Federation collapsed. Cooper suggests that a prime reason for that is due to the language being used to convey the rationale for the Federation not being the language that Jamaicans in general spoke or communicated in. Therefore, the general populace remained unconvinced of the validity of the Federation and as a result voted against Jamaica’s continued membership in that body. It can perhaps be gathered that not using the correct language to convince a people of the benefits of integration already doomed one integration movement and care should be taken so that history does not repeat itself.

There is yet another way in which language can be seen as being a barrier to further integration, and that would be because of an actual language barrier. As was mentioned earlier, the majority of CARICOM Member States speak English or some version thereof.

However, English is not the only language spoken among the member states. Haiti is of course a French speaking country, Suriname speaks Dutch as its official language, and while Belize officially speaks English, it is a Central American country so one is probably safe to assume that Spanish is very prevalent throughout. The point being made here is that with the official language of CARICOM being solely English, there is a possibility that some of the citizens and nationals of the three countries listed feel disconnected from the rest of CARICOM because they literally do not understand the language being spoken or written.

The situation just described is different than what occurs in the closest regional integration initiative to CARICOM, which the European Union. Like CARICOM, the EU is comprised of countries who do not all have English as their official language. However, **unlike** CARICOM in the EU: “In the European Union, every language is an official language. Government Officials speak in the language of their country, and those comments are translated...” (PRI.org, 2013, para.1)

2.6: Geographic dispersal and Transportation

A factor that does not seem to have been taken into account but perhaps should be is the geographic dispersion of the region. By this it is meant that the members of CARICOM do not occupy a single individual landmass. As can be seen from any map of the region 1, the member states of CARICOM are scattered around the entire Caribbean basin. When this is contrasted with another example of an integration movement, the European Union the differences are quite striking.

What becomes very clear is that the countries of the European Union are, for the most part, on the same landmass. It can then be argued that perhaps due to this fact, it is somewhat easier for countries to see themselves as being part of a greater whole. The opposite can also be argued, that due to the characteristics of the Caribbean being made up primarily of islands that there is perhaps a reluctance to consider oneself as part of a greater whole. This phenomenon, which can also be described as “islandness” or an idea that the world begins and ends at your borders can perhaps also manifest itself in the insistence of each member state to keep a hold of their own sovereignty as has been touched earlier.

Another factor, tied into the geographic characteristics of the region, is the issue of transportation. It is one of the hallmarks of any successful integration movement that there is a free movement of people, goods and services. In order for this to happen, there must be a system of transportation in place to facilitate this free movement. I would suggest that in the case of the European Union, due to the countries occupying a single mass, establishing a transport system, whether through a road network as shown in figure three or a railway network was feasible.

However, in the case of CARICOM, the situation is different. Again, due to the fact that CARICOM is made up primarily of islands, setting up a similar type of transportation system is nowhere near as feasible. That is not say that there is no traffic between the islands, it is however not very easy to go directly from the east to the west. For instance, to travel from St. Vincent to Jamaica, it would be necessary to overnight in Barbados, then make a stop in Antigua before arriving at the final destination. From this it can be gathered that being able to travel around the region, while not impossible, can be seen as a hassle.

Due to this, and in addition to what has been mentioned of the geographic dispersal of the region, it can perhaps be claimed that the idea of “island-ness” and isolation have come about which have then led to a reluctance to move forward with an integration agenda.

2.7: Disinterest

Yet another factor that has played a role in the overall lack of progress on the integration front is the level of interest or lack thereof on the part of the people in the region. Sanders (2012) highlights this when he commented on a statement delivered by Dr. Kenny Anthony in regard to the current state of Caribbean development. Prime Minister Anthony made the comment that: “Make no mistake about it. Our region is in the throes of the greatest crisis since independence. The spectre of evolving into failed societies is no longer a subject of imagination. How our societies crawl out of this vicious vortex of persistent low growth, crippling debt, huge fiscal deficits and high unemployment is the single most important question facing us at this time” (Sanders, 2012, St Lucia PM: Caribbean in greatest crisis since independence, para.1)

In commenting on this, Sanders notes that it should be: “... expected it to be a matter of discussion at all levels of society in the 15 member-states of CARICOM. Yet, beyond its brief reportage in some of the regional media, attention to this grave warning died almost immediately after it was spoken.” (Sanders, 2012, St. Lucia PM: Caribbean in greatest crisis since independence, para. 3) He goes further to note:

The reasons for the absence of widespread discussion including by the regional media, is probably because the Caribbean public has become accustomed to inaction by regional governments, institutions, and

private sector organisations. Few would doubt the importance of what Prime Minister Anthony said and the urgency of addressing it. But all appear unconvinced that anyone will act decisively to change the situation. So, the appraisal – alarming and forceful as it is – evokes little more than resigned weariness in Caribbean publics. (Sanders, 2012, St. Lucia PM: Caribbean in greatest crisis since independence, para. 4)

This comment by Sanders puts the level of disinterest that is held by some towards CARCIOM in stark relief. As he notes, a comment by a current CARICOM Head of State about the state of Caribbean development is almost ignored. This level of disinterest is very clearly quite high, and can be seen as having a follow on effect in terms of the integration movement.

Hamilton (2005) provided a possible explanation as to why this level of disinterest came about. She pointed out: “However, in making all of these decisions the Heads of Governments did not seek a specific mandate from the people. Unlike the European Union, which pursued a similar economic strategy since the *1957 Treaty of Rome*, no referendum was held in any CARICOM country.” (p.245). The point made here is that the people of the region were not consulted on the direction of regional integration or even if they wanted an official type of integration. This can then lead to the disinterest/apathy present in the people of the region, primarily because they do not feel a real sense of connection to the integration project. Hamilton (2005) made a very neat summation of this mindset when she noted: “As a consequence, we have *Integration from the Top*. Our parents (governments) have formally integrated while most of the children in the region have no what is happening” (p.245)

Due to this level of disinterest, the general populace of the Caribbean has not really placed any pressure on their leaders to actually complete the integration project upon which they have been working on for over thirty years. Sanders' description of the reaction of the general populace of the Caribbean being: "...little more than reigned weariness..." is indeed quite telling. It perfectly encapsulates what can almost be termed as CARICOM fatigue. That is to say, that for years the people of the region have been hearing news about the promises of advances in integration, only to see no real payoff. The result has now seemed to be that the expectation is when regional leaders speak about CARICOM, that there will be grandiose promises and commitments followed by no action.

Therefore, it now seems as if people simply do not care, and with them not caring there is no impetus to place pressure on regional leaders. With that pressure not being placed, and with the tendency of the Caribbean countries to be government focused, regional leaders have no real push to cause them to move faster or at all on the integration process. Sanders raises a very real and very chilling potential result of this when he notes:

This is a worrying condition for the CARICOM region. For, if the public has lost faith in the willingness of governments and institutions to act swiftly and together to extract them from crisis, the consequences will be even more serious. They will include increased emigration of the skilled persons in our societies, shrinkage of investment by local business people, and a general malaise in the productive sector. In short, it will lead to a worsening of the crisis. (Sanders, 2012, St. Lucia PM: Caribbean in greatest crisis since independence, para. 4)

2.8: Structure of CARICOM

At this point in the thesis there have been several factors that have been identified as having played a major role in delaying the integration process in the Caribbean. The factors which have been identified so far range from external factors to issues of sovereignty and to an overall lack of interest. However, there is one factor that can be considered to have had the most major impact on CARICOM not being able to achieve its goals. This would be the very structure and way in which CARICOM was designed and set up in the first place. The role that the design of CARICOM can play in the integration process cannot be overstated as everything that occurs in relation to it must occur in this framework, and the shape of the framework will affect the ease or lack thereof of being able to work.

One of the first things that must be noted when it comes to a discussion of the framework of CARICOM applied directly to the Treaty of Chauguramas itself. While the Treaty does spell out what is that CARICOM is intended to do and governs all interactions among CARICOM member states, the point cannot be stressed enough that at no point does the Treaty describe itself as being “binding”. That is to say, that any decision made under the purview of the Treaty does not have the immediate force of law behind it, therefore the decisions do not HAVE to be implemented. With no implementation, there is no action.

Byron (2004) quotes the report of the West Indies Commission which gives a very clear picture of the way in which CARICOM was structured when it is noted:

The temper of the times made the founders protective in the extreme of individual territorial sovereignty. Consensus yes, submission to majority no. Agreement yes, but with all the opportunity in the world for second thoughts. Cooperation and coordination yes, but only so far as it might suit the individual cause. Deadline yes, but no sanctions for slippage. Decision making yes, but for decision-implementation only a grudging maybe. It would not matter, therefore, how far reaching any new goals set might be. If the means to match them in practice were unavailable then the Treaty would remain a child of its times and the region would be stuck in the lower gear of a former era (West Indian Commission 1993: 47). (Pp.3-4)

From the above, it can be gathered that CARICOM could be described as having been set up with the best of intentions, but with no real mechanism being in place to ensure that these intentions were actually carried out. It should also be noted that, regional integration in the Caribbean began before the rise of many of the trading blocs that exist today. It should also be noted that integration in the Caribbean context also did not come about due to the internationalisation of trade as it exists today, but the structure was already in place. Therefore, instead of the Caribbean attempting to create a regional integration initiative that would be designed explicitly to tackle issues that arise from the current international environment, CARICOM was used to fulfill that function even though it is not one it was explicitly designed for.

It can therefore be gathered that CARICOM was designed to ensure that individual member states were able to decide when and what decisions they would carry out. It is for this reason that Payne and Sutton (2001) make a rather startling claim when they note: “Indeed, strictly speaking, CARICOM **is not an integration movement at all**, if the term integration is considered to be a process in which countries have to be prepared to accept that the greater regional good must predominate over national concerns even to the point

when, on occasion, their national interests are damaged.” (p.174, emphasis added) Payne and Sutton make this claim after pointing out, like the West Indies Commission before them, that CARICOM was designed to function with the individual member state remaining supreme, and retaining political control over themselves. (Payne and Sutton, 2001, pp.173-174). This once emphasizes the inter-governmental nature of CARICOM.

The one thing that comes out very clearly here is that if there is to be any forward movement on CARICOM and using CARICOM as a mechanism to bring about economic development in the region, the onus lies on member states to act in such a way that brings about this movement. The obstacles identified here are not insurmountable, but they do need to be addressed if CARICOM is to be expected to live up to its expectations.

Chapter 3: Successes of Integration

3.1: Introduction

The impression may have been gathered from everything said so far that regional integration in the Caribbean has not been able to meet with any level of success. This however is not exactly true. In terms of CARICOM, it is true that when examined through an economic lens the picture that is presented is not exactly glowing. However, I do feel that looking at integration through solely an economic lens actually results in a limited and somewhat skewed picture being presented. Therefore, this section of the thesis will widen the scope of looking at integration from an economic perspective to include areas such as the social and cultural aspects of integration, and will highlight any potential successes that CARICOM has achieved in these areas.

Along with expanding the idea of what integration is, so as to show some possible success that CARICOM has been able to achieve, this section of the thesis will also highlight a successful example of the integration process in the Caribbean mainly the OECS. In order to do this, a brief history of the OECS will be given, as well as recent developments that have taken place. A brief comparison between the OECS and CARICOM shall be given looking at the similarities and differences between the two, and also to determine if what has occurred in the OECS could be replicated in CARICOM.

3.2: Successes

Although CARICOM has usually been seen as having the economic development of the region as its core objective, it is by no means the *only* objective. Along with moving towards a higher level of sustainable economic development, CARICOM also addressed some areas of functional co-operation that range from international affairs to disaster response. CARICOM's record in these areas is indeed much better than it is in the areas of economic development. Indeed as Nogueira (1997) noted: "It should be recognized that despite CARICOM's shortcomings in the area of economic integration, the results achieved in other areas of regional cooperation have been highly positive..." (p.6)

Foreign Affairs is one area where dividends from another aspect of regional integration, apart from the economic aspect, has clearly paid off. In this area, CARICOM members have adopted an approach to putting forward joint positions on issues that would affect them. The advantage of that becomes clear when one thinks in terms of pure numbers. That is to say, that it is far more advantageous to have fourteen countries saying the same thing on one issue, than it would be for one or two to attempt to tackle whatever the issue may be. Simms and Simms (2007) raise this point when they note: "It can also be argued that the bargaining power of individual nations will be enhanced as we bargain in the WTO as a region, and this is already happening through the work of the Regional Negotiating Machinery." (p.258)

An excellent example of this can be seen in the EU-CARIFORUM negotiations which resulted in the signing of the Economic Partnership Agreement. While the argument

has been advanced that the EPA, as it is right now, is not exactly in the best interest of the region, the point remains that that through the existence of mechanisms like the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery, CARICOM was able to negotiate with the E.U as one entity. One shudders to think of what the result may have been if individual member states had attempted to deal with the EU on their own.

Another example of a joint approach to international relations paying dividends for CARICOM can be found in the May 29th, 2013 online edition of Caribbean Journal under the headline reading “US CARICOM sign Trade Agreement”. The article goes on to say: “United States Vice President Joe Biden and Haiti President Michel Martelly signed a US-CARICOM Trade and Investment Framework Agreement on Tuesday during the former’s visit to Trinidad and Tobago” (Caribbean Journal, 2013, US CARICOM sign Trade Agreement, para.1) The argument can be made here, that whereas the individual member states may not be attractive by themselves to gather US interest, as a bloc they can attract more attention, and this can again be seen as success of CARICOM.

Another aspect of international relations that is revealed by the new agreement between the United States and CARICOM is that there currently exists a trend where countries like the U.S prefer to deal with nation blocs instead of individuals. While it cannot be said that CARICOM was responsible for this development, the fact remains that by its very existence CARICOM has made it easier for member states to interact with other more powerful countries. In this light, CARICOM can be seen as also being successful.

Another current example of CARICOM making it easier for the member states to deal with third party countries are the current CARICOM-Canada Trade negotiations. Again, by working through CARICOM instead of going it alone, member states can more easily have a result that they can live with than might have been the case if individual members attempted to deal with Canada on their own. While it is too early to ascertain the end result of the negotiations, I do feel that it is a safe assumption to use the region's experience with the EPA as being somewhat of a guideline for what could result from the CARICOM/Canada negotiations.

As an example, I can point to the fact that there was quite a lengthy discussion as to whether or not development would be included in the agreement. Canada insisted that this current negotiation was to be solely a trade agreement, whereas CARICOM felt that it was important that any trade agreement should have a development component. It is entirely possible that if this was being done on a country to country basis, say between Canada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, once Canada declared that the would be no discussion of a development component that would be the end of it. However, CARICOM was able to keep the discussions going whereas an individual country may not have been able to. In short, as Nogueira (1997) pointed out: "...CARICOM has been a very effective political instrument for winning trade and financial concessions from the United States and Canada..." (p.6). This again reiterates the fact that CARICOM has indeed met with some measure of success when interacting with other countries.

Yet another area where some levels of success can be highlighted for CARICOM lies in the field of education. With the existence of the Caribbean Examination Council

(CXC) there is a standardised level of education at both the secondary and post-secondary level, through the application of the CXC Level exams and the CAPE A 'level exams respectively. That is, the Levels are done at the secondary school level and the A 'levels are done at the post-secondary, but pre-university level. This can be considered to be a success of CARICOM mainly because it serves as an example of an element of integration which has worked.

The area of disaster preparedness/response is yet another area where it can be argued that CARICOM has achieved a measure of success. Due to the location of the region, CARICOM member states lie in an area that is very prone to natural disasters primarily in the form of hurricanes. The devastation caused by hurricanes can be catastrophic, putting severe strain on member states as they attempt to recover. It is, perhaps, in light of this that the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) came about, replacing its predecessor the Caribbean Disaster Response Agency (CDERA). The mandate of CDEMA is to function as a co-ordinating agency for disaster response and management. The existence of this agency takes some of the strain off of member states and can be seen as a success of CARICOM in this regard.

It is clear that when CARICOM is examined through a lens other than an economic view, it does not look as if its record is exceedingly bad. Indeed, as stated by former Prime Minister of Jamaica P.J Patterson (2013): "There is a fine record in the areas of functional cooperation – education, health, response to natural disasters, and development financing spring readily to mind." (p.76). In light of this, it seems that making pronouncements as to the failures of CARICOM- referring to the economic aspect of integration- without looking

at other aspects does indeed provide a somewhat distorted and skewed perception of what CARICOM has actually accomplished.

As mentioned earlier, CARICOM is not the sole integration initiative that exists within the Caribbean Basin. Among the others that exist the most successful has to be considered to be the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, and it is to that body that the attention of the paper will now be turned to.

3.3: OECS: A Caribbean Comparison

To begin this section, it is first necessary to give a history of the OECS, who its members are and how it came to be. As has been stated previously, the West Indies Federation was the first attempt at broad integration in the Caribbean and came to an end when Jamaica and Trinidad both withdrew membership. It was then hoped that Barbados and the rest of the English colonial islands in the Eastern Caribbean would seek independence as a unit, but that did not happen as Barbados chose to seek independence on its own for fear that Barbados would have been expected to shoulder the costs of development for the rest of the Eastern Caribbean. The countries that were left on their own started the genesis of what would become the OECS.

The OECS itself as a body came into being on the 18th of June, 1981 with the signing of the Treaty of Basseterre, so called due to the Treaty being signed in Basseterre capital of St. Kitts and Nevis. The original member states are: Antigua and Barbuda,

Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. These seven are considered to be full member states, with the British Virgin Islands and Anguilla being Associate members and having joined in 1984 and 1995 respectively. It will be noted that all of the full members of the OECS are also members of CARICOM. It is for this reason that the OECS is commonly referred to as being a sub grouping within CARICOM, albeit one that is governed by its own Treaty.

The OECS has several characteristics that mark it as being a successful integration movement. There exists a common currency that is used throughout the subgrouping, a common court in the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court and a common central bank in the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. Recent developments in the grouping have seen the OECS move toward a closer level of integration with the creation of the OECS Economic Union, which came into being with the signing of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre on June 18th 2010, and being enacted officially on January 21st 2011. (OECS Secretariat, OECS Economic Union Launch, paras. 1-2)

Along with the already existing features of an integration movement, the move to an Economic Union saw the creation of some completely new bodies and mechanisms. One such body was the OECS Assembly which serves as a sub-regional parliament and is made up of representatives that are nominated by both government and opposition of the member states. That is to say that the governments and oppositions can each nominate representatives from each national Parliament to serve in the Assembly, based on the number of seats that each have in the National Parliaments. The first Formal Sitting of the Assembly was scheduled occur on March 23rd, 2013, following the inauguration in August

2012. (OECS Secretariat, First Official Sitting of the OECS Assembly Scheduled for March 23rd, 2013 para.1)

Another element of the OECS Economic Union is that it has created mechanisms to allow for the free movement of people. This particular element means that every OECS national is entitled to national treatment throughout the OECS. That is to say, that when entering an OECS member state who is signatory to the Economic Union, an OECS National is entitled to be treated as though they were a national of the country they are entering, and as such will be subject to the same rights and privileges as a national. This would mean that they should not be subject to a deep level of questioning at the immigration desks throughout the OECS.

There are also plans to incorporate a Customs Union element in the Economic Union, so that goods will be able to move freely throughout once they have entered the Union. That is to say, once goods come into the area Customs duties will only be collected at the initial port of entry and after that, the goods can move freely through the Union space. Goods that originate within the Economic Union will automatically be able to move freely without having to pay Customs duties at any point.

The OECS Economic Union will also maintain the same level of joint actions that the OECS itself had. That is to say, that there will still be joint overseas representation as well keeping the joint pharmaceutical procurement service that was in existence. It should be noted that one of the major reasons that the OECS came into being was predicated on

the idea that: “Sharing of costs was the way to go to enjoy the benefits of integration” (OECS Secretariat, 2008 p. 4)

Based on some of the hallmarks that the OECS had had and the very fact that it has taken the next step toward a closer level of integration, it stands to reason that the claim can be made that the OECS is indeed an example of a successful integration scheme. Therefore, it can be reasonably concluded that integration can indeed work in the Caribbean.

The questions may then be asked: “How is it that the OECS has met with success and CARICOM has not? And can the success of the OECS be replicated at the CARICOM level?” These are reasonable questions to be asked, and it is an attempt to provide the answers that the paper will now turn.

The first thing that should be stressed is that the OECS’ experience with integration is different from CARICOM’s for one very good reason. As was noted in the OECS FAQs (2008):

The OECS was in part established to serve as an umbrella body for already existing institutions e.g. the Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority (1965) a child of the British Caribbean Currency Board (1950), later renamed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (1983); the Directorate of Civil Aviation (1957) now called the Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority; and the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (1967) (p.3)

There are two things of note that can be gathered almost immediately when the quotation above is examined. The first is that the OECS as a body came into in order to group bodies that already existed. This then means that the OECS did not start on its integration journey

from scratch. That is to say that even before there was an “OECS”, there did exist some bodies that can be seen as having elements of integration. CARICOM in contrast did not have a similar experience.

The second thing of note is the fact that there existed an Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority, meaning that there was already a common currency in place before the OECS came into being. Having a common currency is usually seen as being one of the major hallmarks of a successful integration movement, usually due to a single currency allowing for ease of financial transactions between members.

Due to the Currency Authority already existing, the OECS did not have to face the hurdle of attempting to merge six or seven currencies into one. The currency which existed was simply kept. The same however does not hold true for CARICOM. In CARICOM, in addition to the Eastern Caribbean dollar of the OECS, each member state has its own currency creating a circumstance of nine different currencies currently being in use. The difficulty of moving an integration process forward under such circumstances becomes clear in this case. That is to say, that questions of what currency to use can be expected to arise. For instance, should an existing currency be used or should a completely new one be developed. This can then go back to the issues of sovereignty which have been raised before.

Another element that has allowed the OECS to be able to move forward on its integration path is one that has been argued as having been an obstacle for CARICOM to move forward. That would be the geographical nature of the way in which the islands are

dispersed. As mentioned earlier, the members of CARICOM are scattered throughout the Caribbean Basin and the same holds somewhat true for the members of the OECS. However, unlike the rest of CARICOM the OECS is dispersed among a single archipelago meaning that the member states of the OECS make up the line of English speaking islands in the Eastern Caribbean that can again be seen from any map of the region.

When the picture of the OECS is contrasted with that of CARICOM as a whole, it can be seen that the OECS member states are geographically closer to each other in terms of distance than some of the CARICOM Member states. Due to this, some of the issues related to isolation of member states from each other that were presented in as being obstacles for CARICOM have not really materialised in the OECS. To use a concrete example in the case of St. Vincent and the Grenadines it is very difficult to consider ourselves as being isolated from the rest of the OECS when the southern coast of St. Lucia is clearly visible from the northern coast of St. Vincent.

There has also been a tradition of travel between the islands on day excursions on public holidays. My own experience demonstrates this, as I can recall hearing many ads to that effect when growing up. This again works against any sense of being isolated from other member states.

There is yet another vitally important difference between the OECS and CARICOM that can explain why it is that the former is able to move forward with its own integration programme. Article 8.8 of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre reads as follows: “Decisions made by the Authority under the preceding paragraphs shall be *binding* on all Member

States and all Organs of the Organisation...” (P.9 emphasis added). It is outright stated here that decisions taken under the Treaty will be binding on Member States, thus meaning that all decisions will have the force of law behind them. As was noted earlier, the Treaty of Chaugaramas does not have similar language, and as such decisions taken at the CARICOM level do not have the same automatic force and weight behind them. The rationale for the new OECS Treaty to be binding was addressed in the OECS Faq where it is stated that:

Under the Treaty of Basseterre decisions taken by the Authority are not **automatically** legally binding and enforceable in Member States. This reality has slowed up the deepening of OECS integration and by extension the larger flow of benefits to the people of the OECS. Notwithstanding the benefits of the last 27 years of integration much more could have been achieved for the people of the OECS but for the **unenforceability** of a number of important decisions taken by the Authority. (OECS, 2008, p.8)

It may be noted that Article 8.8 also addresses what was highlighted as being one of the major obstacles for CARICOM moving forward on its integration agenda. That obstacle would be the insistence of some CARICOM Member States to hold on to their individual state sovereignty. However, close examination of Article 8.8 suggests that this is not exactly the case for the OECS Economic Union. By making reference to the existence of an Authority, it can be gathered that there may be a body above individual state governments. This reading is somewhat accurate, as the OECS Authority is made up of the sitting Prime Ministers of member states, which has a rotating Chairmanship that changes every six months, and goes in alphabetical order.

It is noted that: “Each Participating Member State will pass common legislation transferring power to the centre i.e. the Authority” (OECS FAQs, 2008, p.9). This in a

nutshell shows that indeed that there is some element of ceding of individual sovereignty to an over-riding body. It should be noted however that the Authority does not have blanket authority over member states. The areas in which the Authority has over-riding competency/sovereignty are very clearly delineated and include: Civil Aviation, Trade Policy and Maritime Jurisdiction and boundaries among others. (OECS FAQs, 2008, p.9)

It should also be noted that, like CARICOM, the OECS has several areas where they work together. These areas are not like those listed above, which is to say that the OECS Authority does not have full control over decisions made. However, they are areas where the governments will work together for mutual benefit. These areas range from tourism to investment and, interestingly, are explicitly spelt out in the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. This marks a difference from CARICOM where the areas are not as spelt out but are rather suggested.

The final thing that should be noted, is that the OECS and CARICOM represent examples of two of the approaches toward regional integration highlighted earlier. As has already been stated, CARICOM represents a prime example of the inter-governmental approach where national sovereignty is expected remain paramount. The OECS however, reflects a supra-national approach where national sovereignty is ceded to an external body which, as highlighted by Grenade (2011, p.4) can be seen as one of the core tenets of the supra-national approach.

In looking at the two integration movements represented each by CARICOM and the OECS, it is safe to come to the conclusion that the OECS has progressed farther than

CARICOM has. This is important to note for two reasons. First, it shows that integration can indeed work in a Caribbean context. This is not to say that the member states of the OECS have a significantly greater level of economic development than the rest of CARICOM. However, the claim has been made that thanks to the structure of the OECS, particularly the Currency Union elements, the OECS Member States weathered the storm of the financial meltdown better than they would have if they had to face it alone. A very good example of this, and one that I can speak from experience on, is the creation of what was called the Eight point Stabilisation Programme that was crafted and co-ordinated by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank as a response to the Financial Crisis.

The second thing that should be noted about the OECS' progress is that it can serve as somewhat of a blueprint for CARICOM to move forward with its own integration process. As has been stated, the OECS had particular circumstances that allowed it to go down the path it did that does not exactly apply to CARICOM. However, that is not to say that there is nothing that CARICOM cannot take from the OECS. The most basic lesson that can be taken from the OECS by CARICOM is that integration can be achieved, it will however require some level of sacrifice on behalf of the Member States.

Apart from official integration movements there do exist successful examples of integration throughout the region. First and foremost is the University of the West Indies (UWI), with three main campuses on three different islands, as well as Open Campuses that are scattered throughout the region. The existence of a world renowned university that serves the people of a region as relatively far flung as the Caribbean is indeed amazing. UWI can also be seen as being a mechanism of integration in and of itself in that provides

a meeting place for people from different parts of the Caribbean. In fact one thing that most people who graduate from UWI always say is that they have a bed in each island. By this it is meant, that through the friendships forged at university, they feel welcome in other Caribbean islands. This can also be seen as being a method that can work against the feeling of some of the islands being isolated from each other.

Another example of this unofficial integration can be found in the West Indies Cricket Team. The team is comprised of players from the countries where cricket is played. Again in either cheering or cursing the team's performance, the people of the region are brought together.

Yet another example can be found in the cultural arts of the region. For instance, a major part of Trinidad and Tobago's Carnival celebrations is having a competition where soca artistes from other islands are invited to perform. This serves the cause of integration by exposing Trinidadians to artistes they may not have otherwise heard, and also grants a wider audience to the artistes themselves. Along with this, there is also the existence of CARIFESTA, which can be considered to be a major venue through cultural exchange happens by bringing together people from throughout CARICOM.

The final example of integration that is not done through any formal body is a sense of "Caribbean-ness" that seems to have been developed over the recent years. That is to say, that there is a tendency of people, particularly young people to think of themselves as being a part of a greater whole. This can be seen in the prevalence of many Caribbean orientated sites instead of just country specific sites. This is also seen on social media,

where there are pages that are again more region specific than they are country specific. This suggests that in spite of the inaction on the parts of CARICOM Heads of State, the integration process is alive and well in the region, reflected in the existence of an integrated sense of Caribbean-ness. This comes out quite clearly in Girvan (2012) when he quotes Beckford as saying: “Caribbean people are already integrated. The only people who don’t know it are the governments.” (p.1)

Chapter 4: Discussion and Conclusion

4.1: Discussion

At this point in the paper there have been several arguments put forward in an attempt to explain why it is that one of the premier examples of regional integration in the Caribbean has not been able to deliver the outcomes which were expected. Arguments were put forward which touched on the external environment of the region and also pointed out that internal factors also played a role. This section of the paper will examine those arguments put forward and will make a final judgement as to their validity.

The first argument that was presented pointed out the effect that external factors can have on CARICOM. It is an undisputable fact that that external actors have always played a role in Caribbean development. In fact, the claim can be made that external actors have actually driven Caribbean development for years. In terms of CARICOM, it was in response to the external environment that the idea of regional integration gained traction in the first place, and currently it is very hard to make the claim that there is still not some level of dependency on the part of the region towards external actors whether the E.U, the U.S etc., and as such placating those countries may take precedence over making any strides forward in terms of integration.

However, one can consider if sometimes the fact that the Caribbean region is in a dependent relationship to other countries has not been used as a crutch or excuse to not push the integration movement forward. The state of dependency is one that applies to individual countries and can actually be addressed through integration. In fact some may

even argue that integration is the only path out of the highly uneven, unequal and dependent relationship that Caribbean states find themselves in. (OECS Secretariat, 2008, pp.7-8) This is not to discount the validity of the argument that external factors can play a role in the integration process. However, it is possible to suggest that these factors are used as a scapegoat or an excuse.

Another argument which was made related to the issue of sovereignty. The argument goes that some of the member states of CARICOM are highly reluctant to give up any elements of their sovereign rights to an overarching supranational body. The difficulty is of course that it is not possible to have any sort of an integration movement without some elements of sovereignty being ceded to another body. There is also a very great irony in the fact that as more and more nations move towards some element of integration, the Caribbean- which may have been one of the earliest examples of an integration process- has stalled its progress over a refusal to give up sovereign rights.

Another issue as it relates to the idea of sovereignty and indeed reveals somewhat the fallacy in some member states refusing to budge on the issue was raised when the influence that external pressures can have on regional integration was discussed. As may be recalled, it was shown very clearly that in certain respects, Jamaica for example, has already lost elements of its sovereignty. Indeed, as Girvan (2012) noted:

It would be an interesting project for some research student to compare the powers exercised by the IMF over Jamaica's economic policy with those exercised by the British Governor and the Colonial Office in London under Crown Colony rule. I am of course not referring to power in the constitutional sense, but the real power exercised by the IMF by means of financial leverage and its intrusion into a vast range of public policies (p.6)

The comparison between the powers of the IMF now, and the powers of the Crown under colonial rule shows quite clearly that in some respects Jamaica can also be considered to be a colony of the IMF. Therefore, one can say that the claims of Jamaican “sovereignty” have been rendered moot. It is somewhat ironic that there has been this reluctance on the part of the Jamaica due to claims of sovereignty as it is very possible that by giving up elements of its sovereignty to CARICOM, a better chance is stood of reclaiming its sovereignty from the IMF. There is also the near certainty that CARICOM will be nowhere as intrusive as the IMF when it comes to the day to day affairs of Jamaica.

Sovereignty can be considered to one of the greatest of all obstacles facing CARICOM. This is simply because, again, no integration process can proceed without some elements of state sovereignty being given up. So long as member states refuse to take this step, it is very unlikely that CARICOM will be able to achieve the objectives of economic development through the CSME that it has set for itself.

Language is actually one of the more interesting factors when it comes to issues that have been keeping CARICOM from meeting its goals and objectives, and is also one that I don't think has gathered the attention it deserves. Certainly, speaking for myself, until reading Cooper (2005) it did not even occur to me the ways in which language can play a role in hindering integration. First, there is the fact that as has been said there are two member states, Haiti and Suriname where English is not spoken as the official language. It is true that one can assume the governments of these countries can communicate in English, but then the question arises as to whether or not that is enough. If one assumes that the benefits of economic development are meant to be achieved for all

the people of the region, creating a situation where some of those people will literally have no idea what is being proposed or planned seems to defeat the purpose.

Secondly, as Cooper (2005) pointed out, just because the “official” language is English, does not mean that the majority of people, even in English speaking member states, actually do speak it. While Cooper focused primarily on Jamaica in the examples she used, also showing the way in which using the “wrong” language allowed Jamaicans to be convinced that Federation was not in their best interest, the same holds true in all of the other member states. That is to say, that while English is the official language, what is actually spoken is a version of English and not Standard English. This creates a problem of when attempting to communicate in Standard English to the general populace, sometimes the message can be lost.

Further compounding the problem, is the fact that when the decision documents, called communiques, are released, they are released in what can only be termed as “legalese”. This then creates a problem of even having people who do speak Standard English not being fully clear on what the communiques actually contain. This then creates even more potential for miscommunication when they may try to communicate the contents of a legalese document, to Standard English, to whatever local dialect is being spoken. This can result in the people of the English speaking member states being in the same boat of non-English speakers when it comes to not being clear as to what it is the benefits of CARICOM are and what needs to be done to achieve them.

This issue of legalese also applies to the way in which the Revised Treaty of Chaguramas is written, thus creating a situation where people avoid reading it simply because it is too hard to understand. There is also the fact that the Treaty is currently only available in English, thus once again leaving some Haitians and Surinamese unaware and unable to find out what exactly is contained therein.

I would suggest as a possible way around this issue of language that the drafters of communiques keep two things in mind. First is that, again, as there are member states whose first language is not English, that communiques, the Revised Treaty and just general communication be prepared in all languages of the organisation. This can also have the effect of showing that Haiti and Suriname are considered full members of the Community as efforts are being made to communicate in their own language. That is not to say that right now Haiti and Suriname are not considered to be full members of the Community; I however think that making an effort to have these documents in Dutch, French and Spanish can send a powerful symbolic message that stresses that these countries are indeed seen as being full members of the Community.

Secondly, while understanding that tradition holds that all official communication is usually written in legalese, I do think that it should be borne in mind that the beneficiaries of economic development through CARICOM are the people of the region. In that light, keeping all communication in a style that is not conducive to being easily read somewhat defeats the purpose.

Addressing this issue of language and communication in the manner suggested above will also go toward addressing the issue of the level of seeming disinterest that the inhabitants of the region have regarding CARICOM. Again, this level of disinterest has, in short, allowed the CARICOM Member Governments to avoid having to meet their obligations through the implementation and enacting of the necessary mechanisms that CARICOM needs in order to bring the CSME and Economic Development into reality. By the populace not demanding these actions be done, mainly because they do not know they need to be done, the Member States Governments have been able to get away with not working on CARICOM or at least putting it on the back burner while they tend to local concerns.

Tending local concerns is of course of vital interest to any government/political party that intends to remain in power. However, ignoring CARICOM to address local issues can be seen as being very short sighted. Much like the point raised with the issue of sovereignty, working through CARICOM can possibly address some of these local issues much easier than perhaps would be the case by going it alone.

There is not much that can be done about the geographical dispersal of the region except to say that this would be an area where other forms of integration, apart from economic, would be useful. That is to say, that by stressing the shared culture, society and history that the member states share, it is possible to engender that sense of Community even though the members of that community will be scattered widely. The transportation issue is one that the CARICOM Heads have indeed recognized as being vital, and are currently working on, and as such there is not much more that can be said about it.

It was highlighted that quite possibly the most major issue that is affecting CARICOM is related to the very structure of CARICOM itself. One aspect that was highlighted was the fact that the Revised Treaty is not binding. It may perhaps be too idealistic to make the claim that if the Treaty was binding, then CARICOM would have already achieved the CSME and been well on the path to prosperous economic development as a region. There is no guarantee that this would indeed have been the case. However, I do feel safe in saying that if the Treaty were binding, then some of the issues that have been raised particularly as pertains to the implementation deficit would indeed have been addressed.

The other point that was raised regarding the structure of CARICOM highlighted that while CARICOM was set up to meet certain objectives, the Economic Development of the region first and foremost among them, there was no real solid mechanism put in place for these objectives to be met. Currently there exists a regional Inter-Governmental Taskforce that is looking at making revisions to the Revised Treaty in hopes of driving the integration process forward. One can hope this would be one of the areas that attention is paid to.

It may be recalled that one of the purposes of this thesis was also to see in what ways if any regional integration has been successful in the region. There were several examples highlighted where CARICOM has met with some level of success, as well as a different integration initiative in the region that has so far been successful in the OECS. It is to an examination of the points made in that section that attention will now be turned.

Buddan (2005) noted that: “The first 30 years of CARICOM have been preoccupied with economic integration. The next phase should add institutions that deal with governance.” (p.63). Immediately, this statement provides the idea that it is time to branch out from looking at integration through solely an economic lens, and when CARICOM is looked at through other lenses of integration the picture is really not as dire as it appears when speaking about economic integration.

It is also important to branch out the way in looking at integration from being primarily economic based, to including other factors because just looking at it through an economic lens gives a rather limited picture. The same can be said to hold true for development. That is, that solely restricting an analysis to looking at economic development and ignoring other aspects of the development paradigm can result in a skewed picture being presented.

While it indeed can be said that CARICOM’s economic development performance may not be the best in terms of being able to achieve its goals, when human and social development are added to the equation things do look different. For instance, as pointed out there has been some measure of success in having an integrated education system. This is reflected in the use of the Caribbean Examination Council (CXC) exams. This can be counted as a success in a few ways. First, it serves as a common standard across the region of educational attainment. For instance, someone from one member state can say that have passed seven CXC subjects to another and the person they’re talking to will immediately have an understanding of what they mean.

Secondly, the very fact that CXC, a “local” examining body exists is nothing short of a triumph. “Local” in this sense means an examining body that comes from the region rather than an international board like Cambridge in England. In many ways, it is thanks to the existence of this board that Caribbean literature has flourished and been read. In this sense then, it can be said that is both a successful example of integration while also serving the cause of integration by helping to create and maintain a common Caribbean identity.

The University of the West Indies can also be seen as being a triumph of the integration process that also serves the cause of integration. Again, much like the CXC, UWI serves of the cause of integration by strengthening the ties that bind the people of the region together, and can even be considered to do this on a greater level than the CXC can. Also, like the CXC it is a local institution whose existence can allow the people of the region not to be fully dependent on external bodies which can possibly create a sense of self-reliance as a region which cannot possibly hurt the cause of integration.

There is another interesting facet to examples of integration that are not economic and that is that there exists a sense of Caribbean Identity, and a feeling that the people of the region are one. It is possible that this may be generational, as there are many who have come of age being aware that their country is a part of CARICOM and never knew anything else that was not CARICOM related. This can be seen reflected in the tendency of people, particularly younger people to consider themselves as being part of a wider whole.

It can also be seen reflected in the response of CARICOM Member States when another is badly affected by the passing of a hurricane or anything similar. There is a

tradition of quick co-operation and assistance in whatever way possible. For instance, when Hurricane Ivan pretty much flattened Grenada in 2004, the response of the region was quick and automatic, with Grenadian students even being able to attend Vincentian schools. It is perhaps for this reason that there was such a feeling of outrage, when current Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago Kamla Bissard Pressar made the comment that Trinidad and Tobago in disaster relief efforts unless there would be some economic benefit to the country. It was felt that that was neither the time nor the place for such comments to be made.

I felt that it was important to highlight an example of where integration has worked, just to stress that integration can indeed work in the Caribbean and that the example of CARICOM was not indicative of the regional integration experience in the Caribbean. Of course, one cannot exactly say that the OECS itself is indicative of regional integration. In fact, considering that both the OECS and CARICOM represent the two most major examples of regional integration in the Caribbean, the claim can be safely made that the Caribbean has an average of fifty percent when it comes to successful integration processes.

There were several factors that were highlighted in the case of the OECS that allowed that integration process to proceed in the way in which it did. One such factor was the fact there existed, even before there was something called the OECS, several bodies that already represented some elements of an integration process, among them a joint currency board. The importance of this cannot be overstated. Whereas after Federation, when it was decided to try integration again in the wider Caribbean and CARIFTA came

about, it was necessary to start from the beginning again. The same was not true for the OECS. In short, it can be said that the OECS, as an entity, simply formalised an integration process that was already happening.

The importance of having a common currency and a Central Bank, which the Joint Currency Board formed the genesis of, also cannot be overstated. As was highlighted earlier in the introduction to the thesis, one of the hallmarks of a successful integration process is the existence of a common currency, for example the Euro in the European Union. A common currency makes it much easier to do business, as everyone uses the same money and, in the case of the Eastern Caribbean Dollar, it is also easier to do foreign business as the E.C dollar is fixed against the U. S Dollar so that the exchange rate is always known.

The OECS was able to move itself along a path of closer integration to an Economic Union because again of the structures that existed. Moving toward an Economic Union was simply a matter for the OECS of building on and formalizing several practices that already existed. It is also very clear that when the OECS-E.U is examined that it is not an Economic Union in name only. The OECS has taken several steps to ensure that the Economic Union does indeed function the way in which it is supposed to.

One of the best ways in which they did that was by explicitly stating the Revised Treaty of Basseterre was to be binding on all Member States. Just to reiterate why it is that this is so important, due to the Treaty being binding it now means that any decisions taken under the Treaty by the Member States governments, will have automatic rule of law.

When this is combined with the fact that there are some areas that the OECS Authority has exclusive legislative competence over, it truly gives the impression that decisions taken by the OECS Authority will actually mean something.

It is also interesting to note that under the OECS-EU, citizens and nationals of the OECS are entitled to move freely throughout the grouping. This is similar, yet different from CARICOM in that there is expected to be no restrictions on OECS Nationals/Citizens entering another OECS Territory who is a party to the Economic Union. Whereas CARICOM Member States automatically grant each other a six month period when entering the territory, the OECS-E.U member states will not issue a limitation of a duration of stay. In short, an OECS National is entitled to national treatment in any other OECS-E.U Member state.

This is beneficial for development, because it allows the citizens of the countries to be able to go where the jobs are, as well as being able to trade freely among themselves. When this is combined with the idea of a shared responsibility over economic decisions, it can then be assumed that development for one will be development for all.

When CARICOM and the OECS are looked at side by side, it appears that the OECS Economic Union was deliberately designed, in that one can almost follow a blue print of its development. It also seems as if the OECS was deliberately modelled so as to avoid some of the shortcomings that are present in CARICOM's own design. This makes sense, if one goes back to the claim made by Payne and Sutton (2001) that: "Indeed, strictly speaking, CARICOM is not an integration movement at all..." (p.174) No matter else can

be claimed about the OECS, the fact that it is an integration movement cannot be in doubt. In fact, the point is made by Grenade (2011) that: “The OECS model is closer to that of the EU. It is well established that the European Union is the most advanced regional experiment...” (p.17) This explicit favourable comparison between the OECS and the EU drives home the point again, that not only is the OECS an example of an integration movement; it is also an example of a successful integration movement. While Payne and Sutton may have a point of the structure of CARICOM not lending itself very easily to being seen as an integration movement, one can hope that with the current work being done on revising the Treaty of Chaugaramas that some of the issues they raised will be addressed.

4.2: Conclusion

To begin the conclusion of the thesis, I think it is necessary to restate the thesis statement as a starting point. The thesis statement read as follows: “**“Due to a combination of barriers creating a lack of implementation of CARICOM decisions, the expected economic development outcomes of regional integration have not materialised. However, using economic development as the sole measure of success presents a limited view of regional integration.”** After having examined the arguments put forward to account for the state of affairs in CARICOM, it can be concluded that the thesis statement has been borne out. That is to say, that I attempted to show that the reasons why CARICOM has not been able to achieve the CSME and the expected results of economic development is primarily due to the implementation deficit that currently exists. I also attempted to show that this implementation deficit exists due to certain factors both internal and external. The idea that CARICOM has not been able to achieve its goal of economic development is

summed up quite neatly by Singh (2013) when he noted a claim made by Girvan that: “...what regional integration has accomplished so far “has not significantly impacted on regional economic development”...” (Trinidad Express, New CARICOM Model urged, para.6)

However, it should also be noted that these arguments seem designed to explain the “failure” of CARICOM, and in that regard they may not provide that good an explanation mainly because it may not be completely correct to make the claim that CARICOM has failed. I say this because, that while the arguments highlighted reveal obstacles to CARICOM’s progress, they are not insurmountable and can be addressed and eliminated if there is the will to do so.

I do have to wonder however if the focus on economic integration has done more harm than good. After all, when both sides of the integration process are examined, it does seem as if the more “humanistic” side has proceeded further than the economic aspects. I also have to wonder that perhaps integration in the Caribbean is something that should be allowed to happen organically, in that perhaps the governments of the region should attempt to facilitate instead of driving the process forward. In this sense, I think that the question of economic integration/development being the only valid type of integration that should be looked at when attempt to ascertain the success of CARICOM as an integration mechanism has also been answered by showing that there are other lenses through which integration can and should be looked at.

Here at the end of the paper, I find myself pondering two thoughts. One of them is the same thought that many other minds have: “What is the future of CARICOM to be?” The other is “Would anything have changed for the Caribbean, assuming CARICOM through the CSME had indeed met its goal?” To address the second question first, it has been raised that the current trade aspect of the CMSE does not really seem to lend itself to the idea that if the CSME was fully enacted, that much would change. Indeed as Girvan (2013) pointed out: “The bulk of the foreign trade of these economies is with countries outside of the region- more than 80% in fact.” (p.27) Girvan (2013) is not the only one to make this point. Nogueira (1997) also made the point that: “...the smaller Caribbean economies cannot generate high levels of intra-regional trade and investment and, consequently, the dynamic spillovers associated with such activities as were achieved in larger and more dynamic trading blocs such as MERCOSUR and NAFTA.” (p.6) The point here, is that the member states of CARICOM simply cannot generate enough of a market among themselves to make intra-regional trade desirable, and thus the follow on economic effects will remain out of reach. It is somewhat difficult to argue that even with CSME being fully implemented, that the size of the market that would be generated would be greatly different. However, I would counter that perhaps looking at CARICOM and the CSME in terms of being a market destination for each other’s products presents a limited view of the potential inherent in the CSME. That is, that while as individual markets CARICOM is fairly small; as a collective market it may be more attractive. Also, a fully implemented CSME may allow for a level of production integration that does not occur today. That is to say, this level of production integration may allow for products to be

produced cheaper and in more quantity as joint producers than what occurs with individual production.

In terms of what the future of CARICOM is to be, I have to say that after going through some of the arguments that have been put forward as to why it is that CARICOM is in the straits it is in, I still remain convinced that there is indeed a future for CARICOM in particular and regional integration in the Caribbean as whole. Indeed, many of the considerations that led the region to embark upon a path of regional integration still remain valid and, can actually be said to be, even more valid now than they were when first highlighted.

However, the point can be raised that the claim that CARICOM has “failed” in delivering a vehicle through which economic development can be achieved usually means that there has been little to no forward movement on the issues facing CARICOM and preventing it from meeting this goal. That is to say that it is not expected that CARICOM could have succeeded in every area, but that there should at least have been some measure of progress.

With that said, I feel that there are certain factors to be taken into account before regional integration and CARICOM are written off as being bad ideas. First, CARICOM is forty years old. While on the surface this seems like CARICOM has been around for quite a long time, and if it were a “normal” organisation this would be true, the fact is that in the realm of international relations forty years is a blink of an eye. Basically, in the grand

scheme of things, CARICOM really has not been around that long, and the issues that confront it can perhaps be chalked up to be growing pains, which can be assuaged.

In addition to CARICOM being around forty years old as a body, it is also a body made up of states. As independent entities, the oldest country is Haiti at over 200 years old, with the next oldest being Jamaica at 51 this year. With the exception of Haiti, CARICOM is made up of very young countries and as such, when looked at in this light, it is not overly surprising that CARICOM has not been as successful as may have been liked. The point that is being raised here is that the sort of successes and advances that CARICOM is supposed to deliver is very ambitious and as such will take time.

With all of that said however, it is necessary to match word to action. That is to say, that it is not simply enough to proclaim again that member states remain committed to CARICOM and regional integration. I think that now rhetoric must match with action. The proclamations that emanate of out CARICOM meetings must match with action in member states.

I think therefore, that there are two possible paths for regional integration to take in the Caribbean. The first, which is admittedly rather draconian, is to tear CARICOM down and start over. I make this suggestion because if member states are simply going to continue business as usual under CARICOM, as is currently proceeding, even keeping in mind the relative youth of both the organisation and its members, then keeping CARICOM as it is now may not be the best course of action available. Instead, it may be best to simply start over and design an integration process that incorporates the lessons learnt both from the

previous CARICOM experience and also from the OECS, and as such will work towards achieving economic development for the region.

However, the path identified above should be one that should only be taken, or indeed even considered, solely as a complete last resort. What should instead happen is that member states should stop seeing themselves as what can only be described as being victims of circumstance. Earlier in this thesis, the fact that external forces can play a very large role in influencing the direction of CARICOM was highlighted. This is a current fact of life, and seems to govern the way in which the region deals with third parties. I would suggest that it is time for the region to stop wondering what other countries can offer the region, and instead take a position of what the region can offer.

I would also suggest that it be made clear that CARICOM does not exist solely for the governments of the region, but also for the people of the region. To that end, CARICOM needs to be seen as being more than just a state concern, and move beyond the confines of inter-governmentalism and embrace the tenets of the New Regionalism Theory, which involves many actors beyond the state. (Grenade 2011, p.5). There needs to be involvement of all aspects of Caribbean society in CARICOM ranging from the state actors, to private enterprise as well as civil society.

It is time for the region to move beyond a perceived state of helplessness and to become proactive in seeking its own destiny. CARICOM offers the best vehicle through which that can be done, so that instead of fourteen tiny countries speaking with fourteen different voices, there will be fourteen countries speaking in one voice in fora where quite

frankly, size does not matter. The best way to do that would be to embrace the idea conveyed in a line from David Rudder's song "Rally round the West Indies" (1990): "Little keys can open up mighty doors" (verse 3).

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