The coalescent model of argumentation : an examination of its foundation and application

Abstract

This thesis explicates and evaluates the Coalescent Model of argumentation, as advanced by Michael A. Gilbert. The Coalescent Model represents a conception of argument which subscribes to the view that argument is a human communicative device centered on the disagreement between dispute partners. The adequacy of this conception will be evaluated. I contend that Gilbert's definition of argument is inadequate, as it disregards methods of persuasion as central to argument. In addition, the arguments supporting the normative theory of Coalescence, which posits agreement as the goal of argument, will be appraised. I argue that Gilbert mischaracterizes the Critical-Logical mode of argumentation, and that agreement is not sufficient as the final goal of argument. Lastly, the moral argument in favour of a Coalescent approach to argument will be considered and criticised on the grounds that it relies on equivocating 'modes of communication' with 'modes of reasoning'.