

The Mr. Big Technique on Trial by Jury: Impressions of Defendant Character,
Confession Evaluations, and Verdicts

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Abstract

Mr. Big is an undercover Canadian police technique used to elicit confessions from suspects. Undercover officers befriend the suspect, encouraging them to join a fictitious criminal organization and participate in staged crimes. Researchers have regarded the technique as highly problematic, warning that it may elicit false confessions. Additionally, when Mr. Big evidence is presented in court, it may induce juror prejudice towards the general character of defendants. The present research evaluated the influence of three variables on mock-juror decision-making: the level of violence in the operation, amount of incentives paid to the defendant, and the defendant's intelligence. Results from Experiment 1 ($N = 270$) showed a reduction of guilty verdicts in the high incentive conditions. Experiment 2 ($N = 1,666$) results showed support for the influence of incentive and defendant intelligence on ratings of defendant character, evaluations of confession evidence, and verdicts. Significant differences were found between community and student participants on multiple outcomes.

Keywords: Mr. Big, interrogation, undercover, false confessions, jury, verdicts.

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The Mr. Big Technique on Trial by Jury: Impressions of Defendant Character, Confession Evaluations, and Verdicts

The Mr. Big technique is an undercover investigative tool used by Canadian police to elicit a confession from a suspect (Keenan & Brockman, 2010; Milward, 2013; Moore, Copeland, & Schuller, 2009; Puddister, & Riddell, 2012). Usually this technique is reserved for heinous crimes, such as murder or missing persons cases, where the police do not have enough evidence to charge a suspect. A Mr. Big operation consists of an elaborate ruse where undercover officers pose as members of a large and profitable criminal organization. The leader of the organization, Mr. Big, is an undercover officer tasked with obtaining a confession from the suspect.

The Mr. Big technique was developed in Canada, and its use as an investigative tool gained popularity in the early 1990s within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) (Moore et al., 2009). Since the 1990s, this undercover technique has been utilized by RCMP and provincial police departments to advance, or close, unsolved cold cases (RCMP, 2011). Mr. Big operations are often elaborate and complex. Costs of conducting a Mr. Big sting can reach into the millions (Keenan & Brockman, 2010; McAnally, 2009), and up to 50 (or more) undercover officers or related staff may be employed in a single operation (*Dix v. Canada*, 2002; Moore, Copeland, & Schuller, 2009). The length of each Mr. Big sting varies, with some cases lasting only a few months (e.g., *R. v. Hart*, 2014, *R. v. Mack*, 2014), while others have lasted over a year (*Dix v. Canada*, 2002; Smith, Stinson, Patry, 2010). Although each case is individually tailored to a specific suspect, there is a general patterned procedure that is followed.

The Mr. Big Procedure

A Mr. Big operation begins when police have identified a suspect. The identified suspect, also known as the “target”, is then followed for a period of time by undercover officers to gather information about his or her background (personality, habits, social life, and financial situation). The information collected during this period of surveillance is often used against the suspect as a strategy for undercover officers to best engage and build a relationship with the individual (Luther & Snook, 2016). Undercover officers then arrange a situation for the primary operative to meet and befriend the suspect, called the “bump” (*R. v. Balbar*, 2014). Often, the bump will occur at a location the suspect frequents or through a hobby the suspect enjoys (Smith, Stinson, & Patry, 2009). Shortly after this initial meeting, the primary undercover operative requests the suspect’s assistance to complete a small job. Generally, the suspect obliges the request, and is compensated for their help (Moore et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2009).

Eventually, the suspect will come to learn that their new friend is a member of a large and lucrative criminal organization. At this point, the suspect is encouraged to join the criminal gang, unaware that the organization is completely fabricated by police. Following admittance into the organization, the suspect is involved in multiple staged crimes over time. These staged crimes can range from minor infractions (e.g., credit card fraud, counting large sums of money, or delivering packages of illegal goods) to violent crimes (e.g., beatings, threatening individuals, or disposing of a body) (*Dix v. Canada*, 2002; Gillis, 2014; *R. v. Bonisteel*, 2008; *R. v. Terrico*, 2005). Payments to the suspect for their assistance in the criminal activities can range from hundreds to tens of thousands of

dollars (*R. v. Mack*, 2014). Often this criminal work is accompanied by an opportunity to participate in an extensive upcoming job that could result in the suspect receiving a handsome payout, as large as \$80,000 to \$85,000 (*R. v. Bonisteel*, 2008; *R. v. Mentuck*, 2000).

While employed within the criminal organization, the suspect is introduced to a lavish lifestyle. To demonstrate the wealth and breadth of the organization, the suspect will often be asked by the gang members to attend all-expense-paid trips in Canada. These all-expense-paid trips generally include flights, nights at expensive hotels, free meals, and copious amounts of free liquor (Luther & Snook, 2016; *R. v. Hart*, 2014, *R. v. Mentuck*, 2000; Smith et al., 2009; 2010). Large sums of money are often flashed around, or even counted by the suspect (Moore et al., 2009; *R. v. Hart*, 2014). During this time, the suspect is also invited to attend social events with members of the criminal organization, and met with newfound comradery. His new criminal friends (actually undercover officers) make a point to instill values of trust, honesty, and loyalty, and do not hesitate to demonstrate the violent repercussions to those who betray these values (*R. v. Hart*, 2014).

The operation culminates when the suspect is introduced to the leader of the criminal organization, Mr. Big. In this meeting, Mr. Big questions the suspect directly about the case they are believed to be involved in, or asks the suspect to divulge information of his criminal past to solidify his place in the criminal organization. Various reasons to confess, both explicit and implicit, may be presented to a suspect during the meeting with Mr. Big. Possible reasons to confess formerly provided to suspects in Mr.

Big cases include a) the requirement of gaining Mr. Big's trust for advancement within the organization, b) the ability of the organization to make evidence against the suspect disappear, or even c) the ability of the organization to have another member confess to the suspect's crimes (*R. v. Boudreau*, 2009; *R. v. Hart*, 2014; *R. v. Mentuck*, 2000). The meeting with Mr. Big is usually videotaped (Smith et al., 2009), and if the suspect confesses, or gives inculpatory statements about the crime in question, they are charged with the offence under investigation. The resulting taped, or recorded, confession is used as evidence against the suspect at trial.

Mr. Big Prevalence

The frequency with which Canadian police utilize the Mr. Big technique has not been documented. Only some of the cases resulting in a confession are tried and reported through court documentation. Often, researchers have to rely on news coverage of court proceedings to hear about Mr. Big cases. The RCMP has released statistics on the use of the Mr. Big technique, reporting a 95% conviction rate (based on a 75% charge or clearance rate) across 350 cases from 1990 to 2008 (Milward, 2013; RCMP, 2011). These statistics, however, do not include any information about provincial-specific Mr. Big use, or information on failed Mr. Big investigations.

Two studies have evaluated a number of Mr. Big cases to provide empirical context on Mr. Big-specific police tactics, suspect characteristics, and legal acceptance of Mr. Big evidence. Keenan and Brockman (2010) reviewed 81 Mr. Big cases that occurred between 1992 and 2010. Their review included a total of 93 suspects, demonstrating that Mr. Big investigations are sometimes carried out with more than one target for a

particular crime. The researchers also identified patterns of Mr. Big tactics, highlighted a number of concerning ethical and legal issues with the technique, and exposed that the technique is most effective when the suspect is from a vulnerable population (Keenan & Brockman, 2010). Puddister and Riddell (2012) were able to analyze 153 different Mr. Big cases (including trials, voir dires, and appeals) that occurred between 1987 and 2011. An important result of their study was the magnitude of acceptance of Mr. Big evidence by the Canadian justice system: only 13 of the 153 cases were successful in either having evidence excluded or the defendant acquitted (Puddister & Riddell, 2012).

The RCMP has made claims of their undercover techniques, chiefly the Mr. Big technique, as garnering renowned international respect (RCMP, 2011). The technique, however, has not been adopted by the United States or the U.K. (Puddister & Riddell, 2012; Smith et al., 2009). Mr. Big operations have only been employed a handful of times in Australia (Goldsworthy, 2014) and New Zealand (Glazebrook, 2015). In New Zealand, Mr. Big-type scenarios have been used by police to procure confessions from suspects in cases where there was not enough evidence to pursue prosecution (*R. v. Cameron*, 2007/2009). In the *R. v. Cameron* (2009) ruling, the New Zealand Court commented on how the technique has been considered lawful by Supreme Courts in other common-wealth jurisdictions such as Canada (*R. v. Grandinetti*, 2005) and Australia (*Tofilau v. The Queen*, 2007). In *Tofilau*, the High Court of Victoria ruled that the confessions made to undercover officers were not considered involuntary, and thus were admissible as evidence. This judgment was based on similar grounds as that of the Supreme Court of Canada in *R. v. Grandinetti*, 2005: the High Court of Victoria specified

that as the suspects believed they were dealing with criminals, undercover officers were not considered to be persons in authority.

Until recently, the Mr. Big technique has generally been accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada, even though the safeguards legally required for in-custody interrogations are not mandatory in these undercover operations (Moore et al., 2009; *R. v. Mack*, 2014; Smith et al., 2009). As a suspect in a Mr. Big case is not considered to be confessing to a person in authority, Mr. Big confessions do not fall under the *voluntariness confessions rule*, and the Crown has not had to provide evidence that a Mr. Big confession was given voluntary (*R. v. Grandinetti*, 2005; *R. v. Hart*, 2014; *R. v. Oickle*, 2000; *R. v. Osmar*, 2007; *R. v. Rothman*, 1981). Confession evidence procured through Mr. Big investigations therefore has been only subjected to the *shock test* for admissibility. The shock test is used to determine whether the police conduct throughout an operation (including the use of trickery or coercion) would shock the community (*R. v. Oickle*, 2000; *R. v. Rothman*, 1981). The Supreme Court has not provided specific distinction on what type of police conduct or trickery would shock the community (Khoday, 2013; *R. v. Oickle*, 2000;), but have specified that undercover officers posing as criminals is not sufficient to cause shock (*R. v. Osmar*, 2007). In effect, by allowing police officers to elicit statements from suspects in Mr. Big stings (where the individual is not under state detention and thus not considered to be confessing to a person in authority), the Courts have granted Canadian police the ability to use various forms of trickery and coercion that would not be permitted in a traditional in-custody interrogation (Moore et al., 2009; Poloz, 2015; Smith et al., 2009).

R. v. Hart

The Mr. Big technique made Canadian headlines in August of 2014 when the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) released a landmark ruling regarding the case against Nelson Hart, a middle-aged man from Newfoundland. Hart was suspected of murdering his three-year old twin daughters who had drowned in 2002. At the time, police did not have enough evidence against Hart to charge him with the murders, and began an undercover Mr. Big operation with the goal of extracting a confession from him in August, 2004. Undercover officers eventually elicited a confession from Hart during the Mr. Big sting, and in June of 2005 charged Hart with first-degree murder. The trial against Hart commenced in early 2007, and by March of the same year Hart was convicted on two counts of first degree murder (*R. v. Hart*, 2012). Hart began the process to appeal his conviction, and in 2012 an appeal was granted by the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal for Hart to receive a new trial (*R. v. Hart*, 2012). The appeal was granted in leave to be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Canada in December, 2013 (*R. v. Hart*, 2014). In the *R. v. Hart* (2014) ruling, the SCC provided a new guideline for how the Courts should henceforth evaluate Mr. Big evidence. Under the new guideline, a two-pronged admissibility analysis was established for the Courts to apply in future Mr. Big cases.

Included in the first prong is a new common law rule of admissibility regarding Mr. Big evidence. Any evidence stemming from Mr. Big operations will now be treated as presumptively inadmissible. The onus is now on the Crown to prove that, on a balance of probabilities, the *probative value* of evidence collected during a Mr. Big sting outweighs

the *prejudicial effect* of the operation. Specifically, evidence collected during the operation, including the confession, must have a substantial value that overcomes the prejudicial effect of the defendant confessing to a crime, willingly joining a criminal organization, and participating in criminal activities for profit (*R. v. Hart*, 2014). This balance of probabilities is markedly different from the Canadian legal standard of *beyond a reasonable doubt*. Traditionally, all confessions provided by Canadian criminal suspects during traditional in-custody interrogations are considered inadmissible until proven to be given voluntarily (without use of coercion, quid pro quo, or trickery that would shock the community) beyond a reasonable doubt, which is more akin to a certainty than a balance of probabilities (*R. v. Oickle*, 2000). To determine admissibility, Mr. Big confession evidence must be evaluated for markers of reliability. Specifically, the confession should be evaluated on whether it 1) is consistent with what is known to investigators, 2) includes details not known to the public, 3) includes mundane details only the perpetrator would know, or 4) provides an avenue to new evidence (*R. v. Hart*, 2014).

The second prong to assess evidence admissibility is related to police conduct and follows the *abuse of process doctrine*. To avoid an abuse of power, there can be no conduct on behalf of the police officers involved in the undercover operation that would overcome the will of the accused (such as threatening, or instilling fear, in the suspect). This also includes the amount of inducements offered to the suspect during the investigation, and whether undercover officers preyed upon vulnerabilities of the suspect (*R. v. Hart*, 2014). Under the second prong, the Supreme Court listed a number of

situational, and defendant specific, factors to be considered. Situational factors to be addressed include 1) the length of the operation, 2) the number of interactions occurring during the operation, 3) amount of monetary, or other, incentives presented to the suspect, and 4) the nature of the relationship between the undercover officers and the suspect (*R. v. Hart*, 2014). Specific defendant characteristics to be considered include the defendant's 1) social situation, 2) financial situation, 3) intelligence, 4) age, 5) personality, and 6) mental health.

As per the *Hart* (2014) ruling, each Mr. Big case is now required to be evaluated individually using the two-pronged admissibility analysis. In the case of Nelson Hart, it was concluded that he had a very low level of intelligence, only held a grade 4-5 level of education, was unemployed, socially isolated, and living on welfare. Hart rarely left his home, and on the rare occasions that he did he was usually only in the presence of his wife (*R. v. Hart*, 2014). Hart participated in 63 crimes during the operation, was paid a total of \$15,000, and given an opportunity to be involved in a large upcoming job that would provide him with a payout of an additional \$25,000 (*R. v. Hart*, 2014). Hart's involvement in the criminal organization provided him with money and social contacts that he was deprived of. The incentive for Hart to become involved in the criminal organization was seemingly high. In addition, Hart formed close bonds with the undercover officer he worked directly with, even referring to him as his brother (*R. v. Hart*, 2014). When the SCC evaluated the evidence against Hart using the new common law rule of admissibility (first prong), they determined the confession to be very much

lacking in markers of reliability. With no physical or other evidence against Hart, he was acquitted of the charges against him (*R. v. Hart*, 2014).

R. v. Mack

Following the landmark ruling of Hart, *R. v. Mack* (2014) was the first new ruling released by the Supreme Court of Canada to apply the two-pronged admissibility analysis for Mr. Big evidence. Dax Mack was a suspect in a missing persons case. The missing person was a roommate to Mack, and friends of Mack had come forward to police claiming that Mack had confessed to killing his roommate (*R. v. Mack*, 2014). Although police suspected Mack of committing the murder, they lacked enough evidence to charge him with the crime. A Mr. Big operation was deployed to obtain a confession from Mack, and to discover the location of the missing roommate. During the Mr. Big operation, Mack confessed twice to undercover officers that he had shot his roommate five times. Mack also led undercover officers to the site of the victim's burned remains in a fire pit on his father's property. At the site, police found gunshot casings matching a gun that had been seized from Mack's apartment. Mack was charged with first-degree murder. It is important to note that at the time of the sting, Mack had a well-paying job as a DJ and was not in need of the financial profit he made through the staged crimes. Mack participated in approximately 30 crimes, and was paid \$5,000 for his work (*R. v. Mack*, 2014).

Mack was tried and convicted of first-degree murder by a judge and jury trial in February, 2008. Mack began the process to appeal his conviction, but the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and dismissed Mack's appeal in February 2012 (*R. v.*

Mack, 2014). Mack again appealed his conviction, and this time the case made its way to the Supreme Court of Canada, and was evaluated in concurrently with the *R. v. Hart* (2014) case (*R. v. Mack*, 2014). In the Mack (2014) ruling, the Supreme Court used the two-pronged admissibility analyses outlined in *Hart* (2014) to evaluate the confession (and physical) evidence against Mack obtained through the Mr. Big sting. In their analyses, the Supreme Court determined that the case against Mack lacked many of the problematic characteristics noted in the Hart case. Mack's confession was evaluated under the new common law rule of admissibility (first prong). The Supreme Court concluded that the confession Mack gave was consistent with what investigators knew about the crime, and included a high level of accurate details. Under the abuse of process doctrine (second prong), it was determined that there was no evidence to suggest Mack was socially isolated or below average intelligence. Additionally, no highly violent situations occurred throughout the operation or in any of the crimes Mack participated in, and the monetary inducements Mack was paid were modest. Thus, there was no abuse of process as the likelihood of Mack being fearful of the undercover officers was low, and there was little incentive for him to remain in the criminal organization. In sum, the Supreme Court considered Mack's confession to be highly probative, and, on the balance of probabilities, determined that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect of the operation. This conclusion led the Supreme Court to dismiss Mack's appeal, and uphold his conviction of first-degree murder (*R. v. Mack*, 2014).

The *Mack* ruling also provided new guidelines for future Mr. Big cases that are tried by juries. In *Mack*, the SCC reiterated the issues that can come with evidence

elicited through Mr. Big stings, and as a result created future judicial instructions for judges to give a jury. Now, in addition to traditional judicial instructions, trial judges are to instruct jury members to a) look for markers of reliability to determine if the defendant's confession is reliable, b) consider situational factors and defendant characteristics outlined in *Hart* (2014), c) consider the circumstances in which the confession was procured and then admitted as evidence, and d) remember that the criminal activity the defendant engaged in was created, and encouraged, by police officers (*R. v. Mack*, 2014).

The Future of Mr. Big

Researchers have emphasized that particular police tactics used in Mr. Big stings (e.g., quid pro quo tactics, use of actual or perceived violence, egregious manipulation of known suspect characteristics, and offering suspects high monetary or social incentives) would not be permitted in traditional in-custody interrogations. If these tactics were used during an interrogation of a suspect in-custody, any resulting confession would be deemed inadmissible (Milward, 2013; Moore et al., 2009; Moore & Keenan, 2013; Puddister & Riddell, 2012; Smith et al., 2009). Although the Supreme Court of Canada addressed concerns over a few of these police tactics in the *R. v. Hart* (2014) ruling, the reality is that many of these problematic tactics are still legally utilizable under the *Hart* framework.

Presumably, Canadian police will continue to employ the Mr. Big technique for unsolved cases where a lack of evidence prevents pursuing criminal charges (Poloz, 2015). Throughout the Mr. Big process, suspect surveillance will continue. Undercover

officers remain permitted to use the information collected during surveillance as a means to best manipulate and exploit a suspect's vulnerabilities, so long as the manipulation is not egregious enough to cause an abuse of process. The level of violence occurring in the staged crimes and scenarios may have to be reduced; however violence is still permitted as long as it is not directed at the suspect (*R. v. Johnston*, 2016). The lucrative criminal lifestyle may still be demonstrated to the suspect, though the suspect may not directly be paid large sums of money. Undercover officers, especially the primary operatives, will likely continue to build strong, influential social bonds with the suspect, as this is paramount to the success of a Mr. Big sting (Luther & Snook, 2016).

Psychologists have questioned the recent Supreme Court's ruling in allowance for continued use of Mr. Big operations on the grounds that the social bonds and relationships formed during the operation are highly influential (Luther & Snook, 2016). Nelson Hart formed extremely close relationships with the undercover officers working to elicit a confession from him. Upon arrest, Hart used his one phone call to contact the primary undercover officer instead of his own wife, or anyone else (Davidson, 2015; Hunt & Rankin, 2014; *R. v. Hart*, 2014). Luther and Snook (2016) have argued that the social aspects of a Mr. Big case (e.g., the formation of close social bonds, quid pro quo tactics, and the emphasis put on trust and honesty) are very powerful and may be influential enough to overcome the will of the accused, thus infringing on the abuse of process doctrine. The researchers advocate that any resulting confession should be deemed inadmissible, regardless of the probative value, and suggest use of the technique should be completely prohibited (Luther & Snook, 2016).

Legal scholars have also evaluated the new admissibility framework provided by the SCC in the *R. v. Hart* ruling (Dufraimont, 2014; Dufraimont, 2015; Hunt, & Rankin, 2014; Kaiser, 2014; Poloz, 2015; Tannovich, 2014;). In recent reviews, some legal scholars have argued that by creating a new common law rule of admissibility for assessing Mr. Big evidence, the Court has over-complicated the law rule of evidence. Instead of creating an entirely new legal framework, it has been argued that the Supreme Court should have simply altered the pre-existing confessions rule and excluded the “person in authority” clause (Hunt & Rankin, 2014; Kaiser, 2014). In addition, one concurring justice, Karakatsanis J, opposed the creation of a new common-law rule of evidence set out in the *Hart* ruling (Hunt & Rankin, 2014; *R. v. Hart*, 2014).

Mr. Big False Confessions

Although the Supreme Court has asserted that all Mr. Big evidence is now presumptively inadmissible, and that the onus is on the Crown to demonstrate admissibility, this balance is only weighed on a set of probabilities (*R. v. Hart*, 2014). Compared to the high standard of proof required for confessions procured by persons in authority during in-custody interrogations, where voluntariness is required to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (*R. v. Oickle*, 2000; *R. v. Singh*, 2007), Mr. Big confessions do not have to meet this standard. On the balance of probabilities, the Courts may find that a Mr. Big defendant’s admission of guilt is profoundly probative, regardless of its reliability. Thus, it is likely that an unreliable confession could sway the balance of probabilities, outweigh the prejudicial effect of the operation, and be considered admissible (Dufraimont, 2015). As noted by Luther and Snook (2016), the likelihood that

post-*Hart* Mr. Big cases could elicit a false confession remains high. It is therefore reasonable to be concerned, that even post-*Hart*, Mr. Big operations may be eliciting false confessions.

The number of false confessions resulting from Mr. Big investigations is unknown; there are no records that detail this information (Keenan & Brockman, 2010). There is one case where a verified false confession was obtained from a suspect. In *R. v. Bates* (2009), the accused was involved in an armed robbery turned homicide. Police in Alberta began a Mr. Big sting on Bates to determine his involvement. During the sting, Bates confessed to committing the murder himself, when it was in fact not true: one of Bates' robbery accomplices had accidentally killed the victim when the shotgun he was brandishing caught on his jacket sleeve and misfired. Despite falsely confessing to the murder to undercover officers, which would have resulted in first-degree murder charges, Bates was correctly charged with manslaughter for his involvement (*R. v. Bates*, 2009).

A second Mr. Big case, *R. v. Unger* (1993), resulted in an acquittal after new DNA evidence caused the Court to have legitimate concerns of a wrongful conviction (Poloz, 2015; *R. v. Unger* 2005). Kyle Unger had been one of two suspects in a murder of a teenage girl. The main piece of evidence tying Unger to the crime was a hair that had been analyzed using hair microscopy (*R. v. Unger*, 2005), a now debunked science. Police conducted a Mr. Big sting on Unger, who was 20 years old at the time (*R. v. Unger*, 1993), with the goal of obtaining a confession. During the sting, Unger confessed to the undercover officers, and as a result spent approximately 14 years in prison before he was acquitted (*R. v. Unger*, 2005).

False Confession Prevalence

Admittedly, statistics on the rate of false confessions linked to Mr. Big stings are virtually unavailable. The connection between false confessions and in-custody interrogations, however, has been extensively studied in the field of psychology and law (e.g., Bem, 1966; Kassin, Drizin, Grisso, Gudjonsson, Leo, & Redlich, 2010; Smith, Stinson, & Patry, 2012). Cases of known false confessions have been evaluated to determine whether there are common features within these untrue admissions of guilt. Appleby, Hasel, and Kassin (2013) examined 20 known cases of false confessions where a convicted suspect was subsequently exonerated due to DNA evidence, an acquittal/appeal, or the real perpetrator being found. They completed a content analysis focusing on details within the false confessions and extraneous case variables. Results of their analysis demonstrated that there are two common features within false confessions obtained through custodial interrogations: often, suspects will falsely provide 1) factual knowledge of the crime, and 2) a high level of detail (Appleby et al., 2013). Kassin, Bogart, and Kerner (2012) analyzed 241 cases of exonerations via the Innocence Project. The cases were coded to identify a sub-sample of exonerations where suspects had given a false confession. The researchers concluded that wrongful conviction cases based on false confessions had higher rates of other forensic errors, including bad forensic science and informant information (Kassin et al., 2012). As the Mr. Big technique is generally reserved for cases where there is a lack of evidence, if a false confession is elicited from a Mr. Big suspect and the little evidence the police do have is corrupted in some way (e.g., stemming from bad forensic evidence or false eyewitness

identification), these circumstances would increase the likelihood of a wrongful conviction (Moore et al., 2009). Further, a confession is a heavily weighted piece of evidence against a suspect. The emphasis placed on obtaining a confession from a suspect may bias the view of evidence in a case, creating what some researchers have called a “forensic confirmation bias” (Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013). For example, if a Mr. Big suspect had a confirmed alibi for the time of the crime, but gave an admission of guilt during a Mr. Big sting, the alibi may be overlooked as a confession may be considered an ultimate indicator of guilt. This could be true for other types of forensic evidence, such as fingerprint evidence incorrectly confirming a suspect as the perpetrator (which has happened in cases as recent as 2011), as forensic evidence evaluation is not a perfect science (Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013).

Case evaluations have demonstrated that a large proportion of wrongful convictions have occurred as a result of a false confession (Appleby et al., 2013; Kassin et al., 2012). People who have falsely confessed have spent years in jail for crimes they did not truly commit before becoming exonerated. A confession, regardless of reliability, is undeniably a heavily weighted piece of evidence against a defendant on trial. As a defendant is often subjected to a criminal proceeding where he or she is judged by peers, researchers have sought to understand juror knowledge about false confessions. Costanzo, Shaked-Schroer, and Vinson (2010) assessed 461 potential jurors in the United States. The researchers were seeking a realistic sample, and therefore did not include any student respondents. Participants were questioned on their beliefs related to interrogations, police tactics, the ability of police to decipher between true and false

confessions, and the rate at which false confessions occur. Results of their study concluded that participants believed 19-24% of all confessions to be false, but 92% of participants said if pressured by police interrogators they would not falsely confess (Costanzo et al., 2010). In sum, this study has established that although potential jurors may be able to realize that false confessions do occur, and are a real issue in the justice system, they cannot imagine themselves ever falsely confessing.

In analyzing how false confessions occur, researchers have identified different features of false confessions, and as a result have classified these untrue admissions of guilt into three distinct categories: coerced-compliant false confessions, coerced-internalized false confession, and voluntary false confessions (Kassin et al., 2010). In cases of coerced-compliant false confessions, a confession is elicited from a suspect when continual pressure from interrogating officers pushes the suspect to confess to a crime they did not commit. Researchers have argued that coerced-compliant false confessions can occur in both in-custody interrogations as well as Mr. Big interrogations (Smith et al., 2012), and experimental evidence has demonstrated that police investigators are no more accurate than students at detecting false confessions (Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005).

Vulnerability

Coerced-compliant and coerced-internalized false confessions have both been linked to suspect vulnerability (Gudjonsson, 1993; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). In an experiment designed to understand the nature of the relationship between vulnerability and false confessions, participants were placed in one of four

situations where they were deceived into believing they crashed a computer by pressing a key (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). Vulnerability was manipulated by increasing or decreasing, the speed of the computer activity. None of the participants had actually done anything wrong to the computer, but: 69% of participants signed a confession saying they did, 9% of participants made up details to support their false confession, and 28% of participants displayed features of internalization (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). These results provide an important insight into how coerced-compliant false confessions are linked to vulnerability. As such, this information is particularly relevant to Mr. Big cases where suspects can vary widely on characteristics and vulnerability (e.g., intelligence, mental health, and social isolation) (*R. v. Hart*, 2014).

Researchers have explored how person-specific factors, such as intelligence, are related to vulnerability in interrogation situations and comprehension of legal rights (Fulero & Everington, 2004; Gudjonsson, 1993;). Samples of cognitively impaired adults have been assessed to explore Miranda rights comprehension (Fulero & Everington, 2004). The average intelligence quotient (IQ) score for the second sample of adults was 65. Results demonstrated very low levels of Miranda comprehension: the level of comprehension in these samples of cognitively impaired adults was substantially lower than previous studies involving comprehension of juveniles and adults (Fulero & Everington, 2004). This study is a demonstration of how intelligence can significantly impact legal rights comprehension. As suspects with low levels of intelligence may not be able to understand their legal rights, this can create circumstances in which a suspect is

especially vulnerable in an interrogative situation, and may lead to an increased likelihood of a suspect falsely confessing.

False confession experts have promoted the idea of recording all parts of in-custody police interviews and interrogations of suspects (Drizin, & Colgan, 2001; Kassin et al, 2010; Kassin, Kukucka, Lawson & DeCarlo, 2014). Researchers have also recommended that Mr. Big investigation operations should be recorded, from start to finish, to have a visual account of all interactions that take place between the undercover officers and the suspect (Moore et al., 2009; Puddister & Riddell, 2012; Smith et al., 2010). Although recording of Mr. Big undercover operations could prove beneficial by informing the Courts of the police tactics used to elicit the confession, the recordings could also be used against the defendant, as the video records would show the suspect willingly participating in what they believe to be real crimes. This could amplify a key problem of Mr. Big cases already identified by psychological researchers and the Supreme Court of Canada: the possibility of creating juror prejudice towards a defendant (Moore et al., 2009; *R. v. Hart*, 2014; Smith et al., 2009; 2010).

Juror Prejudice

When a Mr. Big suspect is charged it is possible the case will be heard either in front of a jury or a bench trial. Generally, past criminal behaviour or convictions cannot be used as evidence in court, as it provides the jury with a view of the suspect having background of criminal behaviour (Canada Evidence Act, 1985; Hunt & Rankin, 2014; Smith et al., 2010). In Mr. Big cases however, the procedure of the technique is often explained to jurors to demonstrate the context in which the police elicited a confession

from the defendant. Included in this explanation is the fact that the defendant willingly joined a criminal gang and participated in criminal acts for money. Defence lawyers for Mr. Big defendants may grapple between deciding to use details of the operation to explain the defendant's motives, or whether to try and argue that evidence be excluded from trial (Dufraimont, 2015; Hunt & Rankin, 2014).

In *R. v. Hart* (2014), the Supreme Court recognized the possibility that jurors may develop negative impressions of a Mr. Big defendant, and outlined two possible types of juror prejudice that may arise in these cases. The first is *moral prejudice*, wherein when the technique is explained to the jury, and evidence is presented against a Mr. Big defendant, the character of the accused may be tarnished due to the suspect's willingness to join a criminal organization and participate in criminal activity. The second type is *reasoning prejudice*, where the circumstances of the operation, such as specific details of the staged crimes, may distract jurors from the current charges against the accused (*R. v. Hart*, 2014).

Juror prejudice has been studied for many years in relation to pre-trial publicity, effects of media, and juror attitudes and biases (Carroll, Kerr, Alfini, Weaver, MacCoun, & Feldman, 1986; Costantini & King, 1980; Georges, Wiener, & Keller, 2013; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000; Tans & Chaffee, 1966). To understand how juror bias may arise in Mr. Big cases, it is helpful to consult research on the relationship between admitted evidence of past criminal history and future conviction rates. Wissler and Saks (1985) explored this relationship through a 2 (two different crimes) by 4 (prior conviction manipulation) experimental design. The manipulation of

prior conviction was either for the same crime, no crime, a different crime, or perjury. Results demonstrated that conviction rates were varied across the conditions, but were highest for the cases where a prior conviction was indicated, and the prior conviction was for the same crime (Wissler & Saks, 1985). These results suggest that previous criminal history, especially if this past history involves the same crime or similar type of crime, may lead to an increase in juror bias, thus impacting verdicts. These findings are of concern for defendants in Mr. Big cases tried by juries. As a propensity for criminal activities is established during a Mr. Big trial when the operation is explained, this explanation may tarnish the character of the accused in the eyes of the jury, and thus impact verdicts. This effect may be particularly detrimental in Mr. Big cases where the participant is on trial for murder, and throughout the operation had participated in highly violent staged crimes (i.e., *R. v. Bonisteel*, 2008, or *Dix v. Canada*, 2002).

Jury Decision Making

Attempts to understand juror decision-making have been ongoing for decades (Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, & Pryce, 2001), and some large strides have been made. Tying into social psychology theories of group dynamics (Davis, 1973), various models of jury decision-making have been proposed and tested. In their review of jury decision-making models, Penrod and Hastie (1979) compared and contrasted six classes of mathematical and computer generated models. The researchers ascertained that each type of model boasted modest success in reasonably predicting jury behaviour, though no model was without limitation (Penrod & Hastie, 1979). A year later, Penrod and Hastie (1980) published their research on a computer-based model of jury decision-making. The

goal of the model was to include the jury deliberation process, and it was compared to results of empirical data collected in jury research. The researchers concluded that that a model of deliberation process is necessary to assess how jury verdicts may be impacted by individual juror biases (Penrod & Hastie, 1980).

Mock-Jury Research

Scholars have questioned the integrity of jury research, and assessed its use within the court system (Bornstein, 1999; Diamond, 1997; Wiener, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2011). One area of concern involves using student versus community samples, and the applicability of results to the real world (Keller & Wiener, 2011). Where some reviews of the available research has found little to no differences between student and community samples (Bornstein, 1999), some newer research indicates that there are some differences. For example, in a study comparing 120 student mock jurors to 99 community member mock jurors on sexual assault charges as well as homicide charges, Keller and Wiener (2011) found differences in biases between the two groups. Results also indicated that student participants gave more lenient sentences in the homicide conditions, whereas community members who showed less bias in attitudes towards rape were more lenient in assigning guilt in the sexual assault conditions (Keller & Wiener, 2011). The researchers suggested that using an undergraduate sample of mock jurors may be sufficient for pilot studies or initial testing of theories, but that it would be more pragmatic to use samples of community members who are jury-eligible and therefore more representation of a real trial.

As outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in the *R. v. Hart* (2014) ruling, there are a number of situational and defendant specific factors to be considered when determining the admissibility of Mr. Big evidence. Additionally, in *R. v. Mack* (2014), the Supreme Court provided judicial instructions for jury members to specifically consider these factors. As such, the purpose of the present research was to explore how varying situational, and defendant-specific, factors of a Mr. Big case would influence mock-juror decision making. Specifically, across two experiments, this research sought to explore how the level of violence occurring in a Mr. Big operation (Experiment 1), the level of incentive offered/paid to the accused (Experiment 1 and 2), and the defendant's level of intelligence (Experiment 2) would influence mock-juror impressions of a Mr. Big defendant's character, evaluations of confession evidence, and verdicts.

Experiment 1

Method

Experiment 1 was conducted online via Qualtrics survey software. The study was a 2 x 2 design, and manipulated the level of violence and incentive occurring in a Mr. Big operation. An a priori power analysis indicated a need for a sample of 260 responses (65 per condition) in order to find a medium effect size with power of .80 (Cohen, 1977). Participants were provided case facts of a fictitious Mr. Big sting scenario, and then asked to comprehend the information and respond as if they were a juror assigned to the case. The case facts and manipulations were based on a combination of real life Mr. Big sting scenarios that have taken place in Canada.

Participants

Student participants were recruited through Saint Mary's University Psychology on-line bonus system (SONA), and were awarded .5 bonus points towards an eligible psychology class upon completion of the study. Community participants were recruited through online social media advertisements, but received no compensation. A total of 316 responses were collected. The sample of data was assessed for quality, looking for cases with missing data or repeated cases. Cases that included a repeated anonymous student ID number were removed. In removing duplicate responses, time and date were checked to ensure that the participant's first response was kept in the sample, and any subsequent responses were removed. Cases that were missing 25% data or more were removed. In total, 46 responses were removed from the sample due to duplicate or incomplete responses. Thus, a final sample of 270 participants was used in the analyses. The sample was largely composed of young (91% under 25 years) female (79%, $n = 211$) undergraduate students (96%, $n = 260$). The sample included a few community participants ($n = 10$). The majority of participants were Canadian citizens (88%, $n = 240$) from Nova Scotia ($n = 180$). Participants were mainly Caucasian (85%), African Canadian (5%), or Aboriginal (3%).

Materials

Participants were randomly assigned to one of four written Mr. Big cases, which were approximately 985-990 words in length each. In the written case facts, monetary incentive was specified as either low (\$5,000 pay, defendant had other means to make money) or high (\$35,000 pay, defendant was on welfare), and the level of violence occurring in the undercover operation was specified as either low (the disposal of a

package with contents unknown) or high (the disposal of a body). All other components described in the Mr. Big cases were held constant. A series of continuous and binary questions were developed to assess mock-juror ratings of the defendant's character, evaluations of the defendant's confession, and verdicts. Participants were also asked to answer some demographic questions, and to complete the 18-item Belief in a Just World scale (Lambert, Burroughs, & Nguyen, 1999).

Character Ratings. Participants responded to six questions related to the defendant's character, morality, past criminal behaviour, and future criminal behaviour. Specifically, participants were asked to 1) "rate the defendants overall character" (7-point interval scale from 1 "bad" to 7 "good") and 2) "rate the defendant's morality" (7 point interval scale, from 1 "bad – not at all moral" to 7 "good – completely moral"). For criminal propensity, participants were asked to rate the likelihood that the defendant had committed 3) low-level, or 4) violent, crimes in the past (7-point interval scale, from 1 "not at all likely" to 7 "completely likely"), and the likelihood that the defendant would commit 5) low-level, or 6) violent, crimes in the future (7-point interval scale, from 1 "not at all likely" to 7 "completely likely").

Confession Evaluations. Mock-juror evaluations of confession evidence were explored through five questions. Specifically, it was important for participants to consider whether the confession was false, and also whether the confession was voluntary or coerced. Participants were asked 1) "do you believe the confession the defendant gave was true?" (binary Yes/No response, with follow-up confidence rating), 2) "do you believe the confession the defendant gave was truthful?" (binary Yes/No response, with

follow-up confidence rating), and 3) “how likely is it the defendant gave a false confession?” (7-point interval scale from 1 “not at all likely” to 7 “completely likely”). Next, it was important to evaluations of the voluntariness of the confession. Participants were asked 4) “do you believe the confession the defendant gave was voluntary?” (binary Yes/No response, with follow-up confidence rating) and 5) “do you believe the confession the defendant gave was coerced?” (binary Yes/No response, with follow-up confidence rating). *Verdicts.* Mock juror verdicts were determined by of whether the defendant is guilty or not. Specifically, participants were asked “do you believe the defendant was guilty?”, with a binary Yes/No response and follow-up confidence rating.

Results

To explore the relationships between incentive, violence, participant demographics, and the measured variables (character ratings, confession evaluations, and verdicts) a bivariate correlation was conducted (see Table 1). Results of the correlation analysis indicated a significant positive relationship between incentive and verdicts ($r = .122, p = .045$). There were no significant relationships between incentive and mock-juror overall character ratings of the defendant ($M = 3.21, SD = 1.35$), or evaluations of the defendant’s confession as false ($M = 3.69, SD = 2.31$). Results of the correlation analyses also indicated no significant relationships between the violence manipulation and mock-juror verdicts, evaluations of the defendant’s confession as false, or overall ratings of defendant character.

Table 1

Experiment 1 Correlations between the Manipulated variables, Outcome variables, and Mock-Juror Demographics

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Incentive ^A															
2. Violence ^A	.03														
3. Guilt ^B	-.12*	.03													
4. Confession (False) ^B	.10	.02	-.41***												
5. Confession (Voluntary) ^B	-.07	.03	.25***	-.29***											
6. Overall Character ^B	.09	-.04	-.19**	.19**	-.14*										
7. Low-level Crimes ^B	.07	.06	.14*	-.13*	.07	-.20**									
8. High-violent Crimes ^B	-.09	.04	.46***	-.27***	.17**	-.27***	.63***								
9. Shock ^B	.01	.02	.15*	.21***	-.24***	.15*	-.13*	-.13*							
10. Social Bond Influence ^B	.11	.01	-.22***	.20**	-.19**	.06	.09	-.07	.19**						
11. Student ^C	-.05	-.03	-.03	.06	-.06	.03	.01	.04	.03	-.02					
12. Age ^C	.08	-.04	.04	-.07	.00	-.13*	.06	.08	-.01	.05	-.43***				
13. Sex ^C	.10	.04	.06	.00	.06	-.14*	-.08	-.08	-.03	-.08	-.06	-.04			
14. Citizenship ^C	-.03	-.11	-.03	.03	-.04	-.08	.05	.02	-.04	-.01	.03	-.01	-.09		
15. Ethnicity ^C	-.07	-.04	.05	.07	-.07	-.12	.06	.04	.03	-.09	-.06	.00	.00	.52***	
16. Belief in a Just World	-.01	.13*	.12	-.12	-.01	-.02	.02	.05	.08	.04	-.11	-.03	.08	-.07	-.14*

Note. N=1666. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. ^A denotes Manipulated variables, ^B denotes Outcome variables, and ^C denotes Demographic variables.

Frequency analyses indicated that baseline guilty verdicts were quite high, at 76%, and 70% of the sample held the assumption that the defendant's confession was true. A Chi-square analysis was conducted, and results indicated there were significantly fewer guilty verdicts in the high incentive condition, $\chi^2(n = 270) = 4.01$, $df = 1$, $r = -.122$, $p = .045$, Cramer's $V = .122$. That is, participants in the high incentive condition were significantly less likely to assign a guilty verdict (65.1% of not guilty verdicts) to the defendant compared to participants in the low incentive condition (34.9% of not guilty verdicts).

Discussion

The results from Experiment 1 showed partial support for the impact of incentive on mock-juror verdicts of Mr. Big defendants. Mock-juror participants who were in the high incentive conditions were less likely to assign a guilty verdict to the defendant in the case. It is possible that participants were able to recognize that the high level of incentive the defendant was paid was a powerful situational factor, and thus were not as easily willing to assign guilt as those in the low incentive conditions. This is an interesting finding, and should be further explored in a sample of jury-eligible Canadian community participants. Unfortunately, results of Experiment 1 indicated no support for the manipulation of violence. It could be that the violence manipulation was not obvious to participants; the wording of the violence manipulation in the high-violence conditions was muted, as participants were told the defendant "disposed of a mysterious package" which was supposed to symbolize the disposal of a body.

A limitation of Experiment 1 was that participants were only provided with written case facts. In the written format it is possible that the case details, including the two manipulations, were not salient enough for participants to recognize. A second limitation was that experiment 1 did not include any attention or manipulation checks. It is possible that the sample of respondents could have simply not read, or paid attention to, the Mr. Big case they were presented with. Looking ahead, manipulation checks will be included to ensure that participants are paying attention and aware of the details in their specific case.

Experiment 2

In light of the findings from Experiment 1, a second study was conducted again utilizing a 2 x 2 experimental design. The goals of Experiment 2 were three-fold: 1) first, to increase the ecological validity of the study, 2) next, to increase the salience of the incentive manipulation, and 3) finally to replace the violence manipulation with a manipulation of defendant intelligence (IQ). In general, monetary incentive is a powerful situational factor. Additionally, low intelligence (IQ) has been linked to defendant vulnerability (Fulero & Everington, 1995; Gudjonsson, 1993;). As a result of these expectations, nine hypotheses and two general research questions were proposed. The first three hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3) were related to mock-juror ratings of the defendant's character. The next three hypotheses (H4, H5, and H6) were related to mock-juror evaluations of the confession evidence. The final three hypotheses (H7, H8, and H9) were related to mock-juror verdicts.

1. H1: As a result of the powerful situational factor of incentive, it was hypothesized that participants in the high incentive condition would be more likely to have positive ratings of the defendant's character, compared to participants in the low incentive condition.
2. H2: As low IQ has been linked to vulnerability, it was hypothesized that participants in the low IQ condition would be more likely to have positive ratings of the defendant's character as compared to the high IQ condition.
3. H3: It was hypothesized that IQ would moderate the relationship between incentive and mock-juror ratings of defendant character, such that the relationship between incentive and character would differ in strength at different levels of defendant IQ (normal and low). Specifically, it was hypothesized that incentive would have a diminished relationship with ratings of character when the defendant was reported to have a normal IQ (more negative ratings of character, even in high incentive condition), compared to when the defendant was reported to have a low IQ.




Figure 1. H3: Predicted Mock Juror Ratings of Defendant Character (1-bad to 7-good)

4. H4: It was hypothesized that due to the powerful influence of incentive, participants in the high incentive condition would be more likely to rate the confession as false compared to participants in the low incentive condition.
5. H5: As a result of the relationship between IQ and suspect vulnerability, it was hypothesized that compared to the normal IQ condition, participants in the low IQ condition would be more likely to rate the confession as false.
6. H6: It was predicted that IQ would moderate the predicted relationship between incentive and binary evaluations of confession evidence, such that the relationship between incentive and confession evaluations would differ in strength at different levels of defendant IQ (normal and low). That is, it was hypothesized that incentive would have a diminished relationship with evaluations of confession evidence when the defendant was reported to have a normal IQ (fewer false confession evaluations, even in high incentive condition), compared to when the defendant was reported to have a low IQ.




Figure 2. H6: Mock Juror Judgments of Confession Evidence (1-True, 0-False)

7. H7: As a result of the incentive manipulation, it was hypothesized that there would be fewer guilty verdicts in the high incentive condition compared to the low incentive condition.
8. H8: Due to the relationship between IQ and vulnerability, it was hypothesized that there would be fewer guilty verdicts in the low IQ condition compared to the high IQ condition.
9. H9: It was expected that IQ would moderate the relationship between incentive and verdicts, such that the relationship between incentive and guilty verdicts may differ in strength at different levels of IQ (normal and low). That is, it was hypothesized that incentive will have a diminished relationship with guilty verdicts when the defendant was reported to have a normal IQ (more guilty verdicts, even in the high incentive condition), compared to when the defendant was reported to have a low IQ.




Figure 3. H9: Mock Juror Judgements of Defendant Guilt (1-Guilty, 0-Not Guilty)

1. GR1: As verdicts are the ultimate outcome in a criminal proceeding, the present research explored how mock-juror ratings of defendant character and evaluations

of confession evidence impact the decision making process, and mediate the relationships between incentive, IQ, and verdicts.

2. GR2: Previous research has demonstrated mixed results on jury research between samples of students and samples of community members (e.g., Bornstein, 1999; Keller & Wiener, 2011). The present research explored whether there were significant differences in mock-juror decision making (verdicts, confession evaluations, and character ratings) between the student and community samples.

Method

Experiment 2 was conducted online via Qualtrics survey software. A 2 x 2 experimental design manipulated the level of incentive the defendant was paid/offered, and the defendant's level of intelligence (IQ). Defendant IQ was manipulated by including a normal condition (IQ = 100, high school education, no trouble reading a newspaper or managing finances) and a low condition (IQ = 70, fourth grade education, troubling in both reading a newspaper and managing finances). Incentive was manipulated by including a high incentive condition (payment of \$1,000, possible payout of \$80,000, unemployed defendant) and a low incentive condition (payment of \$500.00, possible payout of \$1,000, employed defendant). All manipulations were based on actual Mr. Big cases that have taken place across Canada (i.e., *R. v. Bonisteel*, 2008; *R. v. Hart*, 2014; *R. v. Mack*, 2014; *R. v. Mentuck*, 2000).

Participants

A total sample of 1,666 participants was collected and analyzed in Experiment 2. The sample was composed of non-paid ($n = 208$) and paid ($n = 1,458$) respondents,

collected separately and later combined. Both samples completed the exact same study. The samples of paid community participants and non-paid participants are discussed separately below.

Paid Participants. The sample of paid participants ($n = 1458$) was collected via the Qualtrics Panel system. Respondents were paid \$9.99 each for their participation. As Qualtrics Panel pre-screens participant responses for completion and correct answers to manipulation or attention checks, the sample did not require an assessment for quality. Demographically, the paid community participants were predominantly Caucasian (87.7%), with the next most commonly identified race either Chinese (4.9%) or Aboriginal (1.7%). Just over half of the sample indicated they were female (56.5%). Ages of paid participants ranged from 18-89, with just over half the sample 52 years old or under (51.6%). Geographically, participants were located all across Canada; however large portions of the sample currently resided in British Columbia (15.3%), Ontario (46.8%), or Alberta (11.5%). Of the sample of paid participants, 100% indicated they were a Canadian citizen, and no participants indicated they were currently a student.

Non-paid Participants. An original sample of non-paid participants ($N = 333$) was collected through the Saint Mary's University online psychology bonus point system (SONA) and online advertisements. Student participants were compensated with .75 bonus point towards an available psychology class of their choosing. Non-student respondents did not receive any compensation for participating. The sample was assessed for data quality through an iterative process. In sum, 40 cases were removed for less than 25% completion, 6 cases were removed due to duplicate responses, and 89 cases were

removed for incorrect responses to manipulation and attention checks, resulting in a final sample of $n = 208$ participants. Demographically, the majority of non-paid participants were Caucasian (82.7%), with the next most common ethnicities identified as Black/African (5.3%), Aboriginal (5.3%) and Chinese (3.8%). Three quarters of the sample identified their gender as female (75.0%). Ages of non-paid participants ranged from 18 to 64, with a majority either 25 years old or younger (86.5%). Of the sample of non-paid participants, 89.4% indicated they were a Canadian citizen. The majority of non-paid participants resided in Nova Scotia, Canada (87.5%). Almost all participants indicated they were a student (96.6%).

Materials

Four mock-trial videos of a Mr. Big case were created based on the manipulated variables. Each video contained the same five individuals: a Judge, Crown Prosecutor, Defense lawyer, Court-appointed Psychologist, and an Undercover Officer. None of the videos included a Mr. Big defendant, as having a defendant present during the trial would have created a possible confound. Each video was approximately 14 minutes in length. Text subtitles appeared on screen so participants were able to see, as well as hear, what was being said. All aspects of the mock-trial videos were held constant across the four videos, aside from the portions containing information on the manipulated variables. In each video, participants heard that the defendant provided a confession during the undercover sting, but recanted the confession at a later point in time. Participants were also told that police did not have a large quantity of physical evidence tying the defendant

to the crime (not enough to charge the defendant without a confession) – thus providing a reason why the Mr. Big operation was employed.

Three manipulation checks and two attention checks were included to ensure that participants were aware of information specific to the levels of the manipulated variables in their condition. Manipulation checks asked participants to respond to specific questions about 1) how much money was the defendant paid, 2) how much money was the defendant offered and 3) the IQ of the defendant. Attention checks also asked participants to respond to specific questions about 1) the name of individuals in the video and 2) the name of the defendant. The purpose of these checks was to address the quality of the data, and gauge the level of attention provided by the participant strictly for analytical purposes.

Character Ratings. To evaluate defendant character, mock-juror participants were asked to answer 8 questions. Participants were asked to: 1) “rate the defendant’s overall character” (7-point interval scale, from 1 “bad” to 7 “good”), and 2) “rate the defendant’s morality” (7 point interval scale, from 1 “bad – not at all moral” to 7 “good – completely moral”). In addition to this, participants were asked to rate the defendant’s 3) sophistication and 4) gullibility. Both of these responses were again on a 7-point interval scale from 1 “not at all” sophisticated/gullible, to 7 “completely” sophisticated/gullible. In addition to the general character ratings, criminal propensity was also evaluated. Participants were asked to determine the likelihood the defendant had committed either 5) low level or 6) violent crimes, and the likelihood that the defendant would commit either

7) low-level or 8) violent crimes in the future. These four questions were also rated on a 7-point interval scale, from 1 “not at all likely” to 7 “completely likely”.

Confession Evaluations. Confession evaluations were collected through five different responses. The first three responses were related to false confession evaluations. Mock-juror participants were asked 1) “do you believe the confession the defendant gave was true?” (binary Yes/No response, with follow-up confidence rating); 2) “do you believe the confession the defendant gave was truthful?” (binary Yes/No response, with a follow-up confidence rating); and 3) “how likely is it the defendant gave a false confession?” (8-point interval scale, from 1 “not at all likely” to 8 “completely likely”)¹. The remaining two questions were concerned with the voluntariness of the confession. Mock-juror participants were asked: 4) “do you believe the confession the defendant gave was voluntary?” (binary Yes/No response, with follow-up confidence rating) and 5) “do you believe the confession the defendant gave was coerced?” (binary Yes/No response, with follow-up confidence rating).

Verdicts. Mock-juror verdicts were collected through two questions. Participants were asked 1) “do you believe the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?” (binary Yes/No response, with follow-up confidence rating), and, more generally, 2) “do you believe the defendant was guilty?” (binary Yes/No response, with follow-up confidence rating).

Additional Measures. As noted in *R. v. Hart* (2014), and other cases (e.g., *R. v. Allgood*, 2015), undercover officers often build very close friendships with the suspect

¹ It should be noted that there was an error in the online Qualtrics study. The likelihood that the defendant gave a false confession was rated on a 1-8 scale, instead of a 1-7 scale.

throughout the Mr. Big investigation. As such, mock-juror participants were asked to rate how much they believed the strength of the social bonds between the defendant and undercover officers influenced the defendant's decision to confess (7-point interval scale, from 1 "not at all" to 7 "completely"). In addition, as per the original Mr. Big legality based on the shock test outlined in *R. v. Rothman* (1981) and *R. v. Oickle* (2000), mock-juror participants were asked to rate how shocked they were by the police treatment of the defendant (7-point interval scale, from 1 "not at all shocked" to 7 "completely shocked"). Participants were also asked to respond to some demographic questions, and to complete the 18-item Belief in a Just World scale (Lambert, Burroughs, & Nguyen, 1999). Demographic questions pertained to participant age, gender, ethnicity, citizenship, geographic location, and student status.

Results

Analytic Approach

The results follow a 5-step analytic strategy specific to this research design. In the first step, the data set was assessed and adjusted for quality (described in "participants" section). In the second step, specific variables were created or re-coded for analytic purposes. The third step sought to get a general overview of the strength and direction of relationships between the independent and measured variables, and thus bivariate correlation analyses were conducted. In the fourth step, the assumptions for multiple linear regression and multiple logistic regression were tested. Following tests of assumptions, the fifth step included conducting a path analyses to address the first general research question (GR1) and the nine proposed hypotheses.

Step 2: Variable Creation & Coding

In the second step of the analyses process, three variables were recoded and four were created. To address the main hypotheses of this research, incentive was coded as 0 for the low incentive conditions, and 1 for the high incentive conditions. Conversely, IQ was coded as 0 for normal IQ conditions, and 1 for low IQ conditions. An interaction term was created by multiplying the incentive variable and IQ variable together. To address the second general research question, a dichotomous “sample type” variable was created and was coded 0 for non-paid participants, and 1 for paid-participants. Sex was recoded to be 0 for males and 1 for females. An aggregated variable of “high-level criminal propensity” was created by combining the measures of likelihood the defendant has (past), and would (future), commit highly violent crimes, then dividing the variable by 2 to place responses on a 1-7 scale. An aggregated variable of “low-level criminal propensity” was created by using the same method. As the ethnicity of the sample was chiefly Caucasian (88%), the ethnicity variable was re-coded to be either 0 (for Caucasian participants) or 1 (all non-Caucasian participants).

Step 3: Correlation Analyses

A bivariate correlation analysis was conducted in the third step to explore the relationships between the manipulated variables (incentive and IQ) and the outcome variables of character ratings, confession evaluations, and verdicts (Table 2). Results indicated there were significant positive relationships between incentive and false confession evaluations ($r = .076, p = .002$), and shock ($r = .070, p = .004$), and significant negative relationships between incentive and verdicts ($r = -.076, p = .002$), and

propensity for highly violent crimes ($r = -.068, p = .004$). For IQ, bivariate correlation analyses results indicated significant positive relationships between IQ and verdicts ($r = .086, p < .001$), false confession evaluations ($r = .112, p < .001$), ratings of the social bonds between suspect and undercover officer ($r = .145, p < .001$), voluntariness of the confession ($r = .078, p < .001$), character ratings ($r = .142, p < .001$), and participant ratings of shock ($r = .052, p = .033$). Results also indicated a significant negative relationship between IQ and ratings of defendant propensity for highly violent crimes ($r = -.099, p < .001$).

Results of the correlation analyses suggest that both IQ and incentive were significantly related to the three main outcomes of interest. Incentive had a negative relationship with verdicts, but a positive relationship to confession evaluations and overall character ratings. Specifically, high incentive is negatively related to guilty verdicts, and positively associated with good ratings of the defendant's character, and a higher likelihood of the confession being false. IQ was also negatively related to verdicts, and positively related to confession evaluations and ratings of the defendant's character. Specifically, low IQ was negatively associated with guilty verdicts, positively associated ratings of the defendant's overall character as good, and positively related to higher evaluations of the likelihood the confession was false.

Table 2
Experiment 2 Correlations between the Manipulated variables, Outcome variables, and Mock-Juror Demographics

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Incentive ^A															
2. IQ ^A	.01														
3. Guilt (BRD) ^B	-.08**	-.09***													
4. Confession (False) ^B	.08**	-.12***	-.64***												
5. Confession (Voluntary) ^B	-.03	-.08**	.41***	-.51***											
6. Overall Character ^B	.04	-.11***	-.36***	.47***	-.35***										
7. Low-level Crimes ^B	-.02	-.10**	.24***	-.33***	.29***	-.47***									
8. High-violent Crimes ^B	-.07**	-.02	.46***	-.55***	.43***	-.54***	.55***								
9. Shock ^B	.07**	.05*	-.28***	.40***	-.36***	.33***	-.30***	-.33***							
10. Social Bond Influence ^B	-.03	.14***	-.32***	.31***	-.31***	.27***	-.14***	-.34***	.21***						
11. Sample Type ^C	.06*	.00	.06*	-.10***	-.09***	-.11***	.01	.07**	.00	-.10***					
12. Age ^C	.03	-.01	.09***	-.12***	.14***	-.09***	.00	.03	-.03	-.06**	.61***				
13. Sex ^C	.03	.00	-.01	-.02	.04	.01	.05	.04	-.06*	.01	-.13***	-.17***			
14. Citizenship ^C	.03	-.01	.02	.03	-.03	.02	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.03	-.31***	-.20***	.04		
15. Ethnicity ^C	.03	-.03	.01	.02	-.02	.03	-.05*	-.01	.05	-.06*	-.08**	-.15***	.02	.28***	
16. Belief in a Just World ^C	-.01	.03	.07**	-.04	.10***	-.01	.03	.02	.01	.02	-.04	.06*	.01	.06*	-.03

Note. N = 1,666. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. ^A denotes Manipulated variables, ^B denotes Outcome variables, and ^C denotes Demographic variables.

Step 4: Assumption Testing

Step four tested the assumptions for general multiple linear and logistic regression. To test for univariate outliers standardized scores for all relevant variables were evaluated. All standardized scores follow a normal distribution. Cook's distance scores for the regression model were all >1 (.000-.008), and it was determined there were no univariate outliers (Field, 2009). Mahalanobis distance was used to test for multivariate outliers (Field, 2009). Four participants were identified as outliers. The four participants were kept in the sample as including their responses would not sway the results. The Durbin Watson statistic was computed to test the assumption of independence, $DW\ statistic = 1.96, p > 0.05$, and it was determined that the assumption of independence was not violated (Field, 2009). Multicollinearity was assessed by using tests of association. Chi-square cross tabs were used to analyze multicollinearity among dichotomous predictors (sample type, incentive, IQ, and the interaction). For multiple linear regression, variance inflation factors (VIF) and tolerance were examined. The assumption of multicollinearity was not violated in the models (Field, 2009); VIF values for all predictor variables ranged from 1.00 to 3.19, and all tolerance statistics were $>.3$ (.31 to 1.00). Point bi-serial correlations were used to analyze multicollinearity among dichotomous and continuous predictors (age, sample type, incentive, IQ, ethnicity, and sex). Sample type and age were highly correlated ($r = .611, p < .001$). To test for normality, skewness (-1.09 to 1.03) and kurtosis (-2.00 to .89) were evaluated. The assumption of normality was also assessed by viewing normal Q-Q plots. The Q-Q plots suggest normality was reasonable.

Step 5: Path Analysis

A path analyses was conducted using the PROCESS macro in SPSS (Hayes, 2013) to assess the nine proposed hypotheses (see Table 3 for a summary of support for the hypotheses), and address the first general research question (GR1).

Table 3

Summary of the nine proposed hypotheses and path analyses results.

Hypothesis	Summary	Supported (Yes/No)
H1	Compared to participants in the low incentive conditions, participants in the high incentive conditions would be more likely to have positive ratings of the defendant's character.	No
H2	Compared to participants in the high IQ conditions, participants in the low IQ conditions would be more likely to have positive ratings of the defendant's character.	Yes
H3	Incentive would have a diminished relationship with character ratings when the defendant was reported to have a normal IQ, compared to when the defendant was reported to have a low IQ.	No
H4	Compared to participants in the low incentive conditions, participants in the high incentive conditions would be more likely to evaluate the defendant's confession as false.	Yes
H5	Compared to participants in the high IQ conditions, participants in the low IQ conditions would be more likely to evaluate the defendant's confession as false.	Yes
H6	Incentive would have a diminished relationship with evaluations of confession evidence when the defendant was reported to have a normal IQ, compared to when the defendant was reported to have a low IQ.	No
H7	Compared to participants in the low incentive conditions, participants in the high incentive conditions would be more likely to evaluate the defendant's confession as false.	Yes
H8	Compared to participants in the high IQ conditions, participants in the low IQ conditions would be more likely to evaluate the defendant's confession as false.	Yes
H9	Incentive would have a diminished relationship to guilty verdicts when the defendant was reported to have a normal IQ, compared to when the defendant was reported to have a low IQ.	No

A bootstrapping method was chosen with 1000 iterations to estimate the population from our sample. The bootstrapping method was chosen as bootstrapping 1) is a non-parametric test, that 2) provides confidence intervals (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). It was important to determine how flow of the relationship between incentive, IQ, and verdicts was mediated through seven measured variables: 1) overall defendant character ratings, 2) ratings of the defendant's propensity for highly violent, 3) ratings of the defendant's propensity for low-level crimes 4) false confession evaluations, 5) ratings of confession voluntariness, 6) ratings of mock-juror shock about the technique, and 7) evaluations of whether the social bonds (between the undercover officer and the defendant) influenced the defendant's decision to confess (Figure 4). Mock-juror sample type was included in the model as a covariate to address the second general research question (GR2). Although there were no hypotheses directly related to mock-juror ethnicity or sex, they were also included as covariates in the model, as it was important to assess whether these two variables accounted for any systemic differences in results. In addition, the each participant score on the Belief in a Just World scale world was calculated, and although there were no direct hypotheses related to belief in a just world, it was also included as a covariate in the model. As this path analysis contained a large number of variables (three predictors, seven potential mediators, three covariates, and one outcome variable), it is possible that there may be an alpha inflation of significance. To account for a possible type I error, a more conservative alpha threshold value of $\alpha=.01$ was used.




Figure 4. Experiment 2 path model of effects on mock-juror guilty verdicts. $N = 1,666$. * $p < .01$, ** $p < .001$.

Simple Effects (*A* Paths)

Overall Character Ratings. To address the first three hypotheses (H1, H2, H3), and understand how character ratings may be influenced by the manipulated variables of IQ and incentive, a multiple linear regression was conducted as part of the path analysis (paths *a*). There were seven variables included in the model: incentive, IQ, the interaction, sample type, belief in a just world, ethnicity, and sex. Overall defendant character ratings were highly correlated with the ratings of the defendant's morality ($r = .736, p < .001$). Thus, the measure for ratings of overall character (from 1 "bad" to 7 "good") became the main outcome of interest. Regression analysis showed that overall this model was significant, $R^2 = .04, F(7,1657) = 9.11, p < .001$, accounting for 4% of the variance in mock-juror ratings of the defendant's overall character. Hypothesis 1 (H1) was not supported: incentive was not a significant predictor of overall character ratings, $B = .17, t(1657) = 2.10, p = .036$. Specifically, mock-juror overall character ratings of the defendant were not impacted by how much incentive the defendant reportedly was paid/offered.

In support of hypothesis 2 (H2), results indicated that overall character ratings were significantly positively predicted by defendant intelligence, $B = .42, t(1657) = 4.99, p < .001$, such that mock-jurors in the low IQ conditions were more likely to give positive overall character ratings of the defendant. Overall character ratings were not significantly predicted by the interaction, $B = -.15, t(1657) = -1.33, p > .05$, thus hypotheses 3 (H3) was not supported. Mock-juror overall character ratings of the defendant were not related to whether participants were in the high incentive and low IQ condition. Overall character

ratings were significantly negatively predicted by sample type, $B = -.40$, $t(1657) = -4.59$, $p < .001$, such that paid community participants were more likely to give negative overall character ratings for the defendant compared to non-paid student participants. Overall character ratings were not significantly predicted by participant ethnicity, belief in a just world, or sex (Table 4).

Table 4

<i>Linear Regression Analysis for Overall Character Ratings as predicted by Incentive, IQ, and the Interaction, while controlling for Individual Differences.</i>					
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE(B)</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>R</i> ²	<i>F</i>
Model				.04	9.12**
Incentive	.17	.08	2.10		
IQ	.42	.08	4.99**		
Interaction	-.15	.11	-1.33		
Sample Type	-.40	.09	-4.59**		
Sex	-.02	.06	-.27		
Ethnicity	.14	.08	1.67		
Belief in a Just World	-.04	.05	-.68		

Note. $N = 1,666$. * $p < .01$, ** $p < .001$. Overall character ratings were measured from 1 (bad) to 7 (good).

Highly Violent Criminal Propensity. As an additional measure of mock-juror impressions of the defendant, ratings of the defendant's propensity for highly-violent crimes were also assessed. A multiple linear regression was conducted as part of the path analysis (paths *a*). Seven variables were included in the model: incentive, IQ, the interaction, sample type, belief in a just world, ethnicity, and sex. Regression analysis results indicated that overall this model was significant, $R^2 = .02$, $F(7,1657) = 6.14$, $p < .001$, and accounted for 2% of the variance in mock-juror ratings of the defendant's propensity for highly violent crimes. Specifically, mock-juror ratings of the defendant's propensity for highly violent crimes were significantly negatively predicted by incentive, $B = -.29$, $t(1657) = -2.75$, $p = .006$, and defendant intelligence (IQ), $B = -.38$, $t(1657) = -$

3.53, $p < .001$, such that participants in the high incentive and low intelligence (Q) conditions were less likely to believe the defendant had been, or would be, involved in highly-violent criminal activities. Sample type was a significant positive predictor of highly-violent criminal propensity, $B = .38$, $t(1657) = 3.40$, $p = .001$, such that paid-community participants were more likely to believe the defendant has, and would, be involved in highly violent crimes. Mock-juror ratings of the defendant's propensity for highly-violent crimes were not significantly predicted by the interaction, or by participant belief in a just world, ethnicity, or sex (Table 5).

Table 5

Linear Regression Analysis for Highly Violent Criminal Propensity as predicted by Incentive, IQ, and the Interaction, while controlling for Individual Differences.

	<i>B</i>	<i>SE(B)</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>R</i> ²	<i>F</i>
Model				.02	6.14**
Incentive	-.28	.10	-2.75*		
IQ	-.38	.11	-3.53**		
Interaction	.14	.15	.96		
Sample Type	.38	.11	3.40**		
Sex	.18	.07	2.45		
Ethnicity	-.08	.10	-.78		
Belief in a Just World	.07	.07	1.01		

Note. $N = 1,666$. * $p < .01$, ** $p < .001$. Propensity for committing highly violent crimes was measured from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (completely likely).

Low-Level Criminal Propensity. As a second additional measure of mock-juror impressions of the defendant, ratings of the defendant's propensity for low-level crimes were also assessed. A multiple linear regression was conducted as part of the path analysis (paths *a*). There were seven variables included in the model: incentive, IQ, the interaction, sample type, belief in a just world, ethnicity and sex. Results indicated that the overall model was not significant, $R^2 = .01$, $F(7,1657) = 2.44$, $p > .01$, thus there was

no need to evaluate which variables significantly predicted low-level criminal propensity (Table 6).

Table 6

Linear Regression Analysis for Low-Level Criminal Propensity as predicted by Incentive, IQ, and the Interaction, while controlling for Individual Differences

	<i>B</i>	<i>SE(B)</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>R</i> ²	<i>F</i>
Model				.01	2.68
Incentive	.03	.09	.30		
IQ	-.12	.09	-1.29		
Interaction	.09	.13	.70		
Sample Type	.02	.10	.24		
Sex	.13	.07	1.93		
Ethnicity	-.28	.09	-3.10*		
Belief in a Just World	.06	.06	1.01		

Note. $N = 1,666$. * $p < .01$, ** $p < .001$. Propensity for committing low-level crimes was measured from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (completely likely).

False Confession Evaluations. To address the second set of proposed hypotheses (H4, H5, and H6), mock-juror ratings of the confession were assessed. Mock-jurors rated the likelihood the confession was false on a 1-8 interval scale, from 1 “not at all likely to be false” to 8 “completely likely to be false”. A multiple linear regression was conducted as part of the path analysis (paths *a*), to assess how the manipulated variables of incentive (H4) and IQ (H5) predicted false confession evaluations above and beyond sample type, and whether the interaction between the two manipulated variables (H6) predicted false confession evaluations above and beyond sample type and manipulated variables alone. Seven variables were included in the model: incentive, IQ, the interaction, sample type, belief in a just world, ethnicity, and sex. Results indicated that the overall model was significant, $R^2 = .03$, $F(7,1657) = 8.52$, $p < .001$, and accounted for 3% of the variance in mock-juror evaluations of the confession evidence as being false. Specifically, in support

of hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 5, both incentive, $B = .40$, $t(1657) = 2.72$, $p = .007$, and defendant intelligence (IQ), $B = .57$, $t(1657) = 3.75$, $p < .001$, were determined to be significant predictors of false confession evaluations. Participants in the high incentive and low intelligence conditions were more likely to believe the defendant's confession was false. Hypothesis 6 was not supported, as the interaction was not a significant predictor of false confession evaluations, $B = -.12$, $t(1657) = -.56$, $p > .05$. Sample type was negatively related to false confession evaluations, $B = -.69$, $t(1657) = -4.29$, $p < .001$, such that paid community participants were less likely to believe the defendant gave a false confession. Participant belief in a just world, sex, and ethnicity, were not significant predictors of false confession evaluations (Table 7).

Table 7

Linear Regression Analysis for False Confession Evaluations as predicted by Incentive, IQ, and the Interaction, while controlling for Individual Differences

	<i>B</i>	<i>SE(B)</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>R</i> ²	<i>F</i>
Model				.03	8.52**
Incentive	.40	.15	2.72*		
IQ	.57	.15	3.75**		
Interaction	-.12	.21	-.56		
Sample Type	-.69	.16	-4.29**		
Sex	-.16	.11	-1.47		
Ethnicity	.24	.15	1.63		
Belief in a Just World	-.17	.10	-1.78		

Note. $N = 1,666$. * $p < .01$, ** $p < .001$. The likelihood of the defendant giving a false confession was measured from 1(not at all likely) to 8(completely likely).

Confession Voluntariness. In addition to mock-juror evaluations of whether the confession was false, it was important to understand how participants evaluated the

voluntariness of the confession. Voluntariness was measured on a 7-point interval scale from 1 “not at all likely to be involuntary” to 7 “completely likely to be involuntary”. A multiple linear regression was conducted as part of the path analysis (paths *a*). There were seven variables included in the model: incentive, IQ, the interaction, sample type, belief in a just world, ethnicity, and sex. Results indicated that the overall model was significant, $R^2 = .03$, $F(7,1657) = 7.42$, $p < .001$, accounting for 3% of the variance in mock-juror evaluations of confession voluntariness. Defendant intelligence (IQ) was determined to be a significant negative predictor of confession voluntariness, $B = -.39$, $t(1657) = -2.87$, $p = .004$, such that mock-jurors in the low intelligence conditions were less likely to believe the defendant’s confession was given voluntarily. Both sample type, $B = .57$, $t(1657) = 3.97$, $p < .001$, and belief in a just world, $B = .36$, $t(1657) = 4.11$, $p < .001$, were significant positive predictors of confession voluntariness. Mock-jurors in the paid community sample were more likely to believe the defendant gave a confession voluntarily. Participants with a high belief in a just world were also more likely to believe the confession was given by the defendant voluntarily. Neither incentive nor the interaction significantly predicted evaluations of confession voluntariness. Additionally, neither participant sex or ethnicity were significantly related to voluntariness (Table 8).

Table 8

Linear Regression Analysis for Evaluations of Confession Voluntariness as predicted by Incentive, IQ, and the Interaction, while controlling for Individual Differences.

	<i>B</i>	<i>SE(B)</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>R</i> ²	<i>F</i>
Model				.03	7.42**
Incentive	-.20	.13	-1.47		
IQ	-.39	.14	-2.87*		
Interaction	.14	.19	.77		
Sample Type	.57	.14	3.97**		
Sex	.19	.09	2.03		
Ethnicity	-.25	.13	-1.90		
Belief in a Just World	.36	.09	4.11**		

Note. $N = 1,666$. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. The likelihood that the defendant voluntarily gave a confession was measured from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (completely likely).

Mock-Juror Shock. Although not related to any specific hypotheses, previous research has demonstrated that participant shock over the Mr. Big technique may be related to the atypicality of the scenario, and whether participants perceived a breach of the suspect's rights (Connors, Archibald, Smith, & Patry, 2016). To assess whether mock-jurors were shocked over the level of incentive offered/paid to the defendant, and defendant's level of intelligence, in the Mr. Big scenario provided in Experiment 2, participants were asked to rate how shocked they were over the police treatment of the defendant during the operation (from 1 "not at all shocked" to 7 "completely shocked"). To address whether shock was influenced by incentive, defendant intelligence, or the interaction, a multiple linear regression was conducted as part of the path analysis (paths *a*). Seven variables were included in the model: incentive, IQ, the interaction, sample type, belief in a just world, ethnicity and sex. Results indicated that the overall model was significant, $R^2 = .01$, $F(7,1657) = 3.52$, $p = .001$, accounting for 1% of the variance in shock, however neither the level of incentive, defendant IQ, or the interaction between incentive and IQ were significant predictors of mock-juror shock. Additionally, neither

sample type, participant belief in a just world, or participant ethnicity were significantly related to shock (Table 9). Only participant sex was significantly negatively related mock-juror shock, $B = -.23$, $t(1657) = -2.59$, $p = .009$, such that female participants were less likely to indicate they were shocked by the police treatment of the defendant during the Mr. Big operation.

Table 9

Linear Regression Analysis for Mock-Juror Shock as predicted by Incentive, IQ, and the Interaction, while controlling for Individual Differences

	<i>B</i>	<i>SE(B)</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>R</i> ²	<i>F</i>
Model				.01	3.52**
Incentive	.24	.12	1.99		
IQ	.18	.12	1.46		
Interaction	.00	.17	.01		
Sample Type	-.02	.13	-.17		
Sex	-.23	.09	-2.60*		
Ethnicity	.27	.12	2.20		
Belief in a Just World	.05	.08	.69		

Note. $N = 1,666$. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. The extent to which mock-jurors were shocked over the police treatment of the defendant was measured from 1 (not at all shocked) to 7 (completely shocked).

Influence of Social Bonds. Mock-jurors were asked to rate the likelihood that the social bonds between the defendant and the undercover officer influenced the defendant's decision to confess. This social bond influence was measured from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (completely likely). Although there were no specific hypotheses regarding the social bonds, a multiple linear regression was conducted as part of the path analysis (paths *a*) to determine how mock-juror ratings would change as a result of incentive, defendant's intelligence, and the interaction. There were seven variables included in the model: incentive, IQ, the interaction, sample type, belief in a just world, ethnicity, and sex. Results indicated that the overall model was significant, $R^2 = .03$, $F(7,1657) = 8.57$, $p <$

.001, accounting for 3% of the variance in ratings of the social bond influence. It was determined that the defendant's intelligence (IQ) was a significant positive predictor of the social bonds influence, $B = .45$, $t(1657) = 4.31$, $p < .001$, such that mock-jurors in the low IQ condition were more likely to believe the social bonds between the defendant and undercover officer did influence the defendant's decision to confess. Sample type was a significant negative predictor of the social bonds influence, $B = -.45$, $t(1657) = -4.14$, $p < .001$, such that paid community participants were less likely to believe the social bonds influenced the defendant's decision to confess. Neither incentive, the interaction, nor participant sex, belief in a just world, or ethnicity were significantly related to mock-juror ratings of the social bond influence (Table 10).

Table 10

Linear Regression Analysis for Influence of the Social Bonds as predicted by Incentive, IQ, and the Interaction, while controlling for Individual Differences

	<i>B</i>	<i>SE(B)</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>R</i> ²	<i>F</i>
Model				.03	8.57**
Incentive	-.05	.10	-.47		
IQ	.45	.10	4.31**		
Interaction	-.05	.14	-.35		
Sample Type	-.45	.11	-4.14**		
Sex	.01	.07	.10		
Ethnicity	-.23	.10	-2.31		
Belief in a Just World	.04	.07	.54		

Note. $N = 1,666$. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. The likelihood that the social bonds between the defendant and undercover officer influenced the defendant's decision to confess was measured from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (completely likely).

Total Effects (C Paths)

Guilty Verdicts. To assess the final three hypotheses regarding mock-juror verdicts (H7, H8, and H9), a multiple logistic regression was conducted as part of the path analyses (paths *c*). As the two questions participants responded to providing verdicts were highly correlated ($r = .575, p < .001$), only the guilty beyond a reasonable doubt question was analyzed to avoid issues of multicollinearity. The total effects of incentive (H7), defendant intelligence (H8), and the interaction (H9), on guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (BRD) verdicts (paths *c*) were tested. Descriptive analyses indicated that 632 participants rendered a “guilty” verdict, while 1034 rendered a “not guilty” verdict, and the probability of a mock-juror rendering a not guilty verdict was 63.6% higher than the probability of a mock-juror rendering a guilty verdict. Seven variables were included in the model: incentive, IQ, the interaction, sample type, belief in a just world, ethnicity, and sex. Results indicated that the overall model was significant, $\chi^2(7, N = 1,665) = 39.49, p < .001$. In support of hypotheses 7 (H7) and hypotheses 8 (H8), both incentive, $B = -.43, z = -2.99, p = .003$, and defendant intelligence (IQ), $B = -.48, z = -3.23, p = .001$, were significant negative predictors of guilty verdicts. Specifically, mock-juror participants in the high incentive condition were less likely to render a guilty verdict, and mock-jurors in the low intelligence conditions were also less likely to render a guilty verdict. Both sample type, $B = .44, z = 2.68, p = .007$, and belief in a just world, $B = .30, z = 3.09, p = .002$, were determined to be significantly positively related to guilty verdicts. Specifically, paid community participants were more likely to render a guilty verdict, and mock-jurors who hold a higher belief in a just world were also more likely to render a

guilty verdict. Both participant sex and ethnicity were determined to not be significantly related to verdicts (Table 11).

Simple Effects (*B* Paths)

Next, it was assessed whether guilty verdicts were uniquely related to the seven mediating variables while controlling for IQ, incentive, the interaction, sample type, belief in a just world, ethnicity, and sex. This assessment was carried out by conducting a multiple logistic regression through the path analyses (*b* paths). Results indicated that the overall model was significant, $\chi^2(14, N = 1,665) = 893.38, p < .001$. Guilty verdicts were significantly related to false confession evaluations ($B = -.71, z = -15.10, p < .001$), evaluations of confession voluntariness ($B = .15, z = 3.35, p < .001$), and ratings of the defendant's propensity for highly violent crimes, ($B = .44, z = 6.39, p < .001$). Specifically, for every 1 unit increase in mock-juror evaluations of the likelihood that the defendant gave a false confession, guilty verdicts decreased by .71; for every 1 unit increase in evaluations of the confession as voluntary, guilty verdicts increased by .16; and for every 1 unit increase in mock-juror ratings of the defendant as having a propensity for highly violent crime, guilty verdicts increased by .44. Guilty verdicts were not significantly related to overall character ratings ($B = -.08, z = -1.14, p > .01$), ratings of the social bonds influence ($B = -.11, z = -2.17, p > .01$), mock-juror shock ($B = .00, z = -.06, p > .01$), or low-level criminal propensity, ($B = -.18, z = -2.42, p > .01$) (Table 11).

Direct Effects (*C'* Paths)

Overall, when controlling for all seven mediators, the direct effects of incentive and IQ on guilty beyond a reasonable verdicts (*c'* paths) were not significant. Neither

incentive, $B = -.32$, $SE = .19$, $z = -1.67$, $p > .01$, or defendant intelligence (IQ), $B = -.20$, $SE = .20$, $z = -.99$, $p > .05$, directly relate to guilty beyond a reasonable doubt verdicts when the seven mediators were included in the model (Table 11). Thus, it was concluded that full mediation of the effects from incentive and IQ occurred when all seven mediating variables are in the model. In addition, the direct effects (c' paths) of participant sample type, $B = -.21$, $SE = .22$, $z = -.99$, $p > .05$, and participant belief in a just world, $B = .29$, $SE = .13$, $z = 2.13$, $p > .01$, on guilty beyond a reasonable doubt verdicts were no longer significant when accounting for the seven mediators.

Table 11

Effects of Incentive, Defendant Intelligence, Interaction, and the Seven Mediating Variables on Guilty Verdicts while controlling for the Sample Type, Sex, Belief in a Just World, and Ethnicity

Variables	Total Effects (c paths)	Direct Effects (c' path)	Simple Effects (b paths)
Level 1			
Incentive	-.43*	-.32	-
IQ	-.48*	-.20	-
Interaction	.21	.31	-
Sample Type	.44*	-.21	-
Sex	.02	-.18	-
Ethnicity	.03	.40	-
Belief in a Just World	.30*	.29	-
Level 2			
Overall Character Ratings	-	-	-.08
Highly Violent Criminal Propensity	-	-	.44**
Low-Level Criminal Propensity	-	-	-.18
Likelihood of False Confession	-	-	-.71**
Confession Voluntariness	-	-	.15**
Mock-Juror Shock	-	-	-.11
Social Bonds Influence	-	-	.00

Note. $N = 1,666$. * $p < .01$, ** $p < .001$.

Total Effects model: $\chi^2(7, N = 1,665) = 39.49$, $p < .001$.

Direct Effects model: $\chi^2(14, N = 1,665) = 893.38$, $p < .001$.

Indirect Effects (*AB* Paths)

The indirect paths (*ab* paths) for incentive, IQ, and each of the seven mediator variables were explored using the bootstrapping approach. The relationship between incentive and guilty verdicts was mediated by mock-juror false confession evaluations ($B=-.29$, $SE_{\text{bootstrapped}}=.11$, $CI_{\text{bootstrapped}}$ [-.50 to -.08]), and mock-juror ratings of the defendant's propensity for highly violent crimes ($B=-.13$, $SE=.05$, $CI_{\text{bootstrapped}}$ [-.24 to -.04]). Social bonds, overall character ratings, ratings of low-level criminal propensity, confession voluntariness, and shock did not significantly mediate of the relationship between incentive and verdicts.

The relationship between defendant intelligence (IQ) and guilty verdicts was mediated by false confession evaluations ($B=-.41$, $SE_{\text{bootstrapped}}=.12$, $CI_{\text{bootstrapped}}$ [-.64 to -.18]), the voluntariness of the confession evaluations ($B=-.06$, $SE_{\text{bootstrapped}}=.03$, $CI_{\text{bootstrapped}}$ [-.14 to -.02]), and propensity for highly violent crimes ($B=-.17$, $SE=.06$, $CI_{\text{bootstrapped}}$ [-.30 to -.07.]). Neither overall character ratings, mock-juror shock, influence of the strength of the social bonds, or ratings of low-level criminal propensity significantly uniquely mediated the relationship between IQ and verdicts.

Discussion**Summary of Results and Implications**

The purpose of the present research was to shed an empirical light on the Mr. Big technique. Specifically, the present research sought to gain insight into how varying situational and defendant specific factors that occur in Mr. Big operations may influence mock-juror decision-making. The present research sought to assess mock-juror

impressions of a Mr. Big defendant, mock-jurors' evaluations, Mr. Big confession evidence, and mock-jurors rendering of guilty verdicts. Results from both Experiments 1 and 2 provided evidence that mock-juror ratings of defendant character, evaluations of confession evidence, and verdicts, can be influenced by two specific Mr. Big factors: the level of incentive offered/paid to the defendant during the operation, and the defendant's level of intelligence.

Character Ratings. When a jury is presented with Mr. Big evidence (such as a confession), they are also often provided with some explanation of how a Mr. Big sting works, and how the evidence against the defendant was obtained. When a Mr. Big case is presented in court in a trial by jury, jurors are informed that the defendant willingly joined a criminal gang and participated in staged criminal activities for money. As noted by the Supreme Court in *R. v. Hart* (2014), this explanation may create juror prejudice towards the defendant. To assess mock-jurors' impressions of the defendant's character, participants were asked to rate the defendant's overall character on a scale from bad to good. Three hypotheses related to character ratings were proposed.

First, it was hypothesized that participants in the high incentive conditions would be more likely to have positive ratings of the defendant's character, compared to the low incentive conditions (H1), however this was not supported by the present research. The results of both Experiment 1 and 2 indicated that overall, mock-juror ratings of the defendant's character were not impacted by the level of incentive the defendant was paid/offered during the Mr. Big operation. Although this hypothesis was not supported, this finding is still of interest. In general, incentive is a powerful situational factor, but

perhaps not strong enough to influence how jurors perceive a defendant's overall character. It could be that character evaluations are more influenced by defendant-specific characteristics, such as personality or mental health, rather than the amount of money offered to a suspect during a Mr. Big sting.

Next, it was hypothesized that participants in the low IQ conditions would be more likely to have positive ratings of the defendant's character as compared to the high IQ conditions (H2). This hypothesis was supported in Experiment 2 – participants who were told the defendant had a low level of intelligence (IQ of 70, grade 4 education) were more likely to give positive overall character ratings as compared to mock-jurors in the normal IQ conditions. As low intelligence has been linked with suspect vulnerability (Gudjonsson, 1993), it could be that the mock-jurors in the present study recognized this, and in turn either understood that the defendant's willingness to join a criminal gang did not necessarily indicate that he has a bad overall character, but rather was a result of his low level of intelligence and cognitive functioning.

Finally, it was hypothesized that IQ would moderate the relationship between incentive and mock juror ratings of defendant character (H3), such that incentive would have a diminished relationship with character ratings when the defendant was reported to have a normal IQ, compared to when the defendant was reported to have a low IQ. Results from Experiment 2 indicated that this third hypothesis was not supported: there was no impact of the interaction between incentive and IQ on mock-juror ratings of the defendant's overall character. This result could be caused in part by the lack of a direct relationship between incentive and defendant character.

Mock-juror ratings of the defendant's criminal propensity were also assessed, as previous research suggested that it might be possible that criminal history could influence juror decision making (Wissler & Saks, 1985). Typically, a defendant's past criminal history is not admissible in court as it may create juror prejudice (Canada Evidence Act, 1985; Hunt & Rankin, 2014; Smith et al., 2010). Though as previously noted, in Mr. Big cases jurors hear information about how the operation works, including how the defendant willingly joined, and worked for, a criminal organization. In the present research, mock-juror ratings of the defendant's criminal propensity were measured two ways: propensity for low level crimes (past and future), and propensity for highly violent crimes (past and future).

The results from Experiment 2 indicated that mock-juror ratings of the defendant's propensity to commit low-level crimes were not influenced by either the level of incentive paid/offered to the defendant, or the defendant's level of intelligence. Conversely, mock-juror ratings of the defendant's propensity for highly violent crimes were related to both of these variables. Specifically, mock-jurors who were in the high incentive conditions were less likely to believe that the defendant had been involved in highly violent crimes in the past, or would be involved in highly violent crimes in the future. For the intelligence (IQ) manipulation, mock-jurors in the low intelligence conditions were less likely to believe the defendant had a propensity for highly violent criminal activities. These results are not unexpected, and are somewhat intuitive. It may be that mock-jurors sympathized with a defendant who functions with a below average intelligence, recognizing the defendant may be vulnerable. This vulnerability may have

been recognized as a proxy for decreased decision-making abilities, or an increased likelihood of being influenced by others. If this is the case, the present results provide promise for cases where Mr. Big defendants are considered to be below average intelligence, and thus vulnerable. As an alternative explanation, it could be that mock-jurors were unable to see how a defendant who functions at a low level of intelligence would be able to partake in violent crimes, as they may believe violent crimes are associated with intelligent criminals.

Confession Evaluations. One concern highlighted by forensic psychologists is that the Mr. Big technique can likely induce a suspect to falsely confess to a crime they did not commit (Moore et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2009). To address this, three hypotheses were proposed in relation to mock-juror evaluations of the defendant's confession. Specifically, to address the hypotheses regarding false confession evaluations, mock-jurors rated the likelihood that the defendant gave a false confession from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (completely likely).

First, it was expected that participants in the high incentive conditions would be more likely to rate the confession as false compared to the low incentive conditions (H4). Hypothesis 4 was supported: incentive was a significant predictor of mock-juror false confession evaluations. In particular, those participants who were told the defendant was paid, and offered, high sums of money while in financial need, were more likely to believe the defendant gave a false confession. This result is important, as it may be that mock-jurors are able to recognize that the high sums of money were a powerful

situational component of the Mr. Big investigation, and may have had an influence on the defendant confessing to the crime.

Next, it was hypothesized that that participants in the low IQ conditions would be more likely to rate the confession as false compared to the normal IQ conditions (H5). In support of hypothesis 5, defendant intelligence (IQ) was a significant predictor of mock-juror false confession evaluations. Mock-juror participants, who were informed that the defendant had a below average intelligence (IQ) and a low level of education, also were more likely to believe that the confession was false. A possible reason for this result could be that mock-juror participants were able to recognize the defendant having a lower level of functioning intelligence was vulnerable, and this vulnerability could have influenced the decision to confess.

Finally, it was hypothesized that IQ would moderate the predicted relationship between incentive and evaluations of confession evidence. It was expected that incentive would have a diminished relationship with evaluations of confession evidence when the suspect was reported to have a normal IQ (mock-jurors would be less likely to evaluate the confession as false, even in high incentive condition), compared to when the suspect was reported to have a low IQ (H6). Hypothesis 6 was not supported: results indicated that the interaction did not significantly moderate or predict mock-juror evaluations of the likelihood the defendant's confession was false.

Confession evidence is often evaluated for admissibility based on the voluntariness prior to being admitted at trial. Traditionally, confessions elicited during in-custody interrogations through coercive methods may not be admitted as evidence (*R. v.*

Oickle, 2000; *R. v. Singh*, 2007). It was therefore relevant to assess mock-juror ratings of the voluntariness of the defendant's confession, and how these evaluations may be influenced by the defendant's intelligence and the level of incentive paid/offered to the defendant during the Mr. Big operation. Results from Experiment 2 demonstrated that the defendant's level of intelligence significantly predicted participant ratings of the confession voluntariness. Specifically, mock-juror participants in the low IQ conditions were less likely to believe the defendant voluntarily gave the confession to undercover officers. As voluntariness of a confession is considered when determining confession admissibility, this is an important result. Perhaps the mock-jurors were able to understand that the defendant, who was below average intelligence, may be vulnerable, and that this vulnerability allowed undercover officers to coerced the confession through the Mr. Big operation.

Verdicts. The most important piece of this research was the assessment of mock-juror verdicts. The verdict rendered by a jury is the ultimate judgement in a defendant's guilt. As such, there were three hypotheses designed to evaluate how guilty verdicts are influenced by the defendant's intelligence, and the level of incentive the defendant was paid/offered. These three hypotheses were assessed by asking mock-juror participants to provide a binary judgement of whether or not they believed defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

First, it was expected that the mock-jurors in the high incentive conditions would render fewer guilty verdicts compared to mock-jurors in the low incentive conditions (H7). In support of hypothesis 7, results indicated that mock-juror participants in the

high incentive conditions were less likely to render a guilty verdict, as compared to those in the low incentive conditions. Specifically, mock-jurors who were told the defendant received a large amount of money for his work within the organization, and was offered a handsome payout for the final job, were unable to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the defendant was guilty. It seems that mock-juror participants were able to realize that the large sums of money offered to the defendant during the Mr. Big sting had a powerful influence on his decision to confess, thus leading to a false or inaccurate confession, and as such they were unable to determine the defendant as guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Next, it was hypothesized that there would be fewer guilty verdicts in the low IQ condition compared to the high IQ condition (H8). Hypothesis 8 was also supported: mock-juror participants in the low IQ conditions were less likely to render a guilty verdict as compared to those in the normal IQ conditions. Perhaps participants were able to make the link between the defendant's general lack of intelligence as a vulnerability, thus impacting his decision to confess, and as a result were not able to determine the defendant as being guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Finally, it was hypothesized that relationship between incentive and guilty verdicts would be moderated by defendant intelligence. Specifically, it was expected that incentive would have a diminished relationship with guilty verdicts when the defendant was reported to have a normal IQ (more guilty verdicts, even in the high incentive condition), compared to when the defendant was reported to have a low IQ (H9). This final hypothesis was not supported; the interaction between incentive and defendant

intelligence were not related to guilty verdicts. It is possible that the mock-juror participants in Experiment 2 viewed the incentive the defendant was paid/offered and the defendant's level of intelligence (IQ) independently, and did not consider them related to one another. If the mock-jurors did not view incentive and intelligence as relating to one another, this may have affected the decision-making process about rendering a verdict, and verdicts may have been based on either incentive alone or IQ alone instead of a combination of the two.

A general aim of the present research was to understand the flow of the relationships between incentive, defendant intelligence, and guilty verdicts through seven mediator variables (GR1). A path analyses was conducted to determine if incentive and defendant intelligence still directly predicted guilty verdicts, or if the relationships between incentive and defendant intelligence guilty verdicts are actually a result of potential juror prejudice (overall character ratings, ratings of defendant's criminality propensity for highly violent and low-level crimes), mock-juror evaluations of the defendant's confession (falseness and voluntariness), and other situational variables (ratings of shock and the strength of the social bonds). Initially, both high incentive and low defendant intelligence directly led to fewer guilty verdicts. However, when including the seven mediators in the model, the total effects of incentive and IQ on verdicts were fully mediated, and thus no longer directly related to verdicts. By including the mediating variables, the relationships of incentive and IQ to verdicts became indirect, and flowed through the mediating variables of false confession evaluations, evaluations of confession voluntariness, and ratings of the defendant's propensity for highly violent crimes.

The results of the path analysis further support the notion outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in *R. v. Hart* (2014) that Mr. Big cases are complex, and there are a number of factors that play a role throughout a trial which influence juror verdicts. In particular, the present research has demonstrated support for two main path effects. First, when the incentives offered to a suspect were high, mock-jurors were a) more likely to believe the defendant's confession was false, and b) less likely to believe the defendant had a propensity for highly violent crimes, thus leading to a decreased likelihood of mock-jurors in the high incentive condition rendering a guilty verdict. Second, when the defendant had a below average IQ, mock-jurors were a) more likely to believe the defendant gave an involuntary confession, b) more likely to believe that the confession was false, and c) less likely to believe the defendant had a highly violent criminal propensity, thus leading to a decreased likelihood of mock-jurors in the low IQ condition rendering a guilty verdict. Both confession evaluations and character evaluations, such as a defendant's propensity for crime, are issues that jurors may either consciously or unconsciously consider throughout a Mr. Big trial. These are also two aspects defence lawyers have to decide whether to try and explain in court or to try and have removed from evidence (Dufraimont, 2015; Hunt & Rankin, 2014).

Sample Type. Results of the path analyses revealed an interesting result: there were differences in many of the measured variables as a result of participant sample type. Specifically, differences were noted in measured outcomes based on whether participants were from the paid-community sample or the not-paid student sample. Previous research has demonstrated mixed results about conducting jury research with student participants

versus community participants. Some researchers have indicated that there are no differences between students and community participants (Bornstein, 1999); while others have suggested that there are indeed differences (Keller & Wiener, 2011). Although not directly hypothesized, one general goal of the present research was to explore this question.

The results of Experiment 2 demonstrated that participants in the paid-community sample were generally harsher in their character ratings, such that the community participants were more likely to rate the defendant as having an overall bad character as compared to the non-paid student participants. These paid community participants were also more likely to rate the defendant as having a propensity for highly violent crimes. That is, paid community participants were more likely to think the defendant had a bad overall character, and that the defendant has been, and would again be, involved in violent criminal activity. Paid-community participants were also less likely to believe the defendant's confession was false, less likely to believe the social bonds between the defendant and undercover officer influenced the defendant's decision to confess, and more likely to believe the confession was given voluntarily.

The most interesting result regarding sample type was related to guilty verdicts. Specifically, the participants in the paid community sample were more likely to render guilty verdicts compared to the non-paid student participants. Of the guilty verdicts, 90% were rendered by community participants. This particular result is important; as it is likely the Canadian community members may be more likely to serve on a jury than student participants, and research conducted with community participants is considered to

be more valid, thus may be more useful within legal contexts (Costanzo, Shaked-Schroer, & Vinson, 2010). Additionally, these results mirror those of the study conducted by Keller and Wiener (2011) where student participants acting as mock-jurors gave more lenient sentences in a homicide case as compared to the sample of community participants.

Comparing the demographics between the paid community sample and non-paid student sample, results indicate there was only one two main differences. The sample of non-paid students was mainly composed of participants under the age of 25 (86.5%), while the paid community participants had a small amount of participants under 25 (9.6%). Additionally, the non-paid student sample was chiefly composed of females (75%), where the community sample was more of an equal split of males to females. In terms of ethnicity and citizenship, the two samples did not differ.

It should be noted that correlation analyses also indicated sample type was highly related to participant age, and as such age was not included in the path analyses due to this correlation, to avoid multicollinearity, as there were no research questions pertaining to participant age. It could be that the sample type variable was a function of participant age, and that the differences in mock-juror decision making were related to how old the participants were. Ages should be looked at in terms of groupings (e.g., 21-30, 31-40, and so on), to understand how responses may change between particular age groups. This issue should be explored in future research.

It is also important to recognize that the student sample in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were from a population of psychology students at a mid-sized Atlantic

Canadian university. As such, it is not feasible to say that in general students are more lenient in their judgments than community members, as students in the present research were represented by a specific group. Furthermore, it may be that students, and in particular psychology students, are more aware of cognitive functioning and the decision-making process and this knowledge may have impacted their willingness to find the defendant guilty in the present research. In addition, researchers have argued that students in general may have a higher cognitive functioning, and thus be able to recall information better than a community participant in jury simulation research (Keller & Weiner, 2011; Weiten & Diamond, 1979). Future research should look at larger samples of students, nationally, from various disciplines. A second limitation to the present results in participant differences is that community participants were not asked to provide their level of education, so it is impossible to say whether the community participants in Experiment 2 had some level of secondary education. Future research into the differences between student and community samples should seek to address the level of education of the community participants.

In sum, there is a lack of research regarding the differences in conducting psychology research, specifically in relation to mock-jury research, with samples of students versus samples of community participants. This issue is important in regards to the integrity of psychology research, particularly for mock-jury research, where validity is important for the results to be applicable to real world settings (i.e., the court room) (Keller & Weiner, 2011). Although research with community participants is often considered to be the gold standard, there appears to be an inherent sense within the

research community that students work as a good preliminary sample, and that any results demonstrated within a sample of students should be more pronounced within a sample of community participants.

Limitations

The present research is not without limitations. The first limitations pertain to the study materials and ecological validity of the study. Although the present study employed a video of a mock-trial, the trial took place over the course of 14 minutes. This length of time is not at all realistic of the in-depth, and often lengthy, trial experience jurors would experience in real life. Furthermore, a video is not truly representative of the experience an individual would undergo while serving as a real jury member. As participants were able to partake in the study from the comfort of their own home, this could impact the validity of the present results. While assigning a verdict to the defendant, participants may not truly feel that they hold a person's future in their hands. It is possible that participants were more willing to assign a guilty verdict, as this was not a real case, and may have believed that the impact of their judgment held no serious weight. An additional limitation is that respondents who participated in this study were not actual jurors. As such, the results of this study should be interpreted with caution. Verdicts were provided individually by the mock-jurors, and again this also is a limitation to the ecological validity of the study. There may be differences in the results of the measured outcomes, particularly with verdicts, associated with the process of individual mock-juror decision-making compared to jury-deliberation. Previous research has demonstrated

differences in verdicts for attractive defendants in individual versus group mock-jury decision-making (Patry, 2008)

Finally, as the sample utilized in experiment 2 was large (1,666 respondents), all of the results from this experiment must be taken with a grain of salt. When conducting analyses with large sample sizes, interpreting results based on p values may lead to almost all the results indicated as significant (Lin, Lucas, & Shmueli, 2013). An a priori power analyses conducted for experiment one (for the 2x2 design) initially indicated a need for 260 responses in order to find a medium effect size with power of .80 (Cohen, 1977). In the multiple regression analyses, a very small amount of variance in the measured variables was explained by the variables in the model (1-4%). As experiment 2 also implemented the same design, the sample size of 1,666 greatly exceeded the required number of participants. Although the path analyses used a more conservative alpha value ($\alpha = .01$) to decrease the likelihood of a type I error, these results should still be interpreted with caution.

Future Directions

Future research on the use of the Mr. Big technique as an undercover investigative tool should seek to assess how different defendant characteristics may be manipulated by undercover officers and evoke an abuse of process. A number defendant-specific factors to be evaluated were outlined by the Supreme Court in the *Hart* (2014) ruling, and researchers should also focus on addressing how these factors may influence juror decision making. Characteristics such as the defendant's age should be considered an important variable to assess, as youthfulness can be considered a risk factor for

vulnerability. Additionally, the state of the Mr. Big defendant's mental health, and whether there were any cognitive disabilities present, should be evaluated in relation to juror decision making, as these may also be linked to vulnerability. It would also be beneficial to determine whether specific personality types (i.e., differences in the big 5 personality traits), or the defendant's social situation, has any influence on juror decision making in Mr. Big cases. The situation-specific factors outlined by in *R. v. Hart* (2014) should also be explored. Future research could look into the length of the operation, the number of interactions between the defendant and undercover officers, and the nature of relationship between the undercover officers and the accused (i.e., how strong were the bonds between them). Although the results of experiment 1 did not show support for a violence influencing juror decision making, this should be either further examined in future research.

A second area that should also be explored in relation to juror decision-making in Mr. Big trials is whether or not there is corroborating evidence supporting the defendant's confession. Generally, Mr. Big stings are only used in cases where there is insufficient evidence to charge a suspect without a confession. As outlined in *Hart* (2014), a confession that includes a high level of accurate details, or leads police to discover new evidence, would be considered highly probative (*R. v. Hart*, 2014). This was reiterated in the *Mack* (2014) ruling, when the Supreme Court determined that the probative value of Mack's confession, which led to the discovery of new evidence, outweighed the prejudicial effect of the operation (*R. v. Mack*, 2014). Researchers should seek to evaluate how jurors would assess a defendant's character, evaluate confession evidence, and

render a verdict, in cases where there is corroborating evidence, or the confession leads to the discovery of new evidence.

As discussed by Modlaver J on behalf of the Justices in the *R. v. Hart* (2014) ruling, and as previously suggested by researchers (Drizin, & Colgan, 2001; Kassin et al., 2010; Kassin et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2010), video recording of all interactions taking place during a Mr. Big sting may become common place. Although video evidence would be useful to provide detailed records of the interactions that occur throughout Mr. Big sting operations, thus allowing the courts to more easily assess Mr. Big cases using the new *Hart* framework, it could also pose a potential issue. If video evidence of the interactions (specifically, the staged crimes) during Mr. Big cases is considered admissible evidence at trial, depending on what is contained in the videos, it may possibly increase juror prejudice towards a Mr. Big defendant. This may especially be the case if in the video a defendant appears to be callous, boasting, or using foul language. In future research, it would be beneficial to compare jury verdicts, and judgments of the defendant's character, when videos of Mr. Big sting interactions are included as evidence, versus when it is not.

Fortunately, there are other successful methods available to interrogate suspects which Canadian police could employ instead of conducting Mr. Big stings. One of these methods is the cognitive interview, which was originally designed to interview victims and eyewitnesses, but has been adapted to interrogate suspects (Geiselman, 2012). The cognitive interview utilizes retrievals to engage the suspect and encourage them to recall as much information as possible, and directs interviewers to wait until at least halfway

through questioning before they make any objections about the suspects account (Geiselman, 2012; Meissner, Kelly, & Woestehoff, 2015). In the hopes of reducing false confessions, this type of method of using open-ended, memory based, interviewing, should be preferred over traditional accusatory interrogation styles. In Canada, forensic psychologists have been working with policing agencies to promote, teach, and apply the PEACE method of police investigative interviewing (Snook, Eastwood, Stinson, Tedeschini, & House, 2010). PEACE is a model of policing originating from the U.K., and stands for “Prepare/Plan, Engage/Explain, Account, Closure, and Evaluation” (Snook et al., 2010). In a sense, the PEACE methodology is similar to the cognitive interview: police are trained to use open ended questions and try to gather as much information as possible from a witness, victim, suspect, or other type of interviewee.

In cases where there is little forensic evidence pointing to a suspect, police sometimes employ the Mr. Big technique. It is possible however, that police who are trained in the either PEACE, or cognitive interviewing, method may be able to gather more information from suspects and witnesses than through the use of traditional interrogative techniques (i.e., the Reid technique). Through use of these alternative interviewing methods, investigating officers may be able to better solidify, or eliminate, a suspect. Although the PEACE method has yet to be adopted by all provincial and national policing agencies in Canada, it is hoped that as the method becomes more accepted and common place, use of the Mr. Big technique may be reduced.

Concluding Remarks

Taken together, the results of the present research seem intuitive, as largely they reflect the concerns previously outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in *R. v. Hart* (2014). However, as a result of the current research there is now empirical research supporting these concerns: both the level of incentives given, and offered, to the defendant, as well as the defendant's level of intelligence, influenced mock-juror decision making in a Mr. Big case. It is important that research on the Mr. Big technique continues to take place, and that the technique continues to be scrutinized. The results of the present research are also pertinent to the other jurisdictions, such as Australia and New Zealand, which have adopted and used this undercover technique.

It is clear that the Supreme Court and police in Canada view the Mr. Big technique as an effective tool to use in unsolved cold cases where a heinous crime has been committed (*R. v. Hart*, 2014; *R. v. Mack*, 2014; Quan, 2014). As the Supreme Court has ruled in allowance for continued use of Mr. Big operations (*R. v. Hart*, 2014), the RCMP and provincial police jurisdictions have continued to use the Mr. Big technique. Mr. Big cases are still progressing through the Courts, and confession evidence continues to be admitted (e.g., ; *R. v. Balbar*, 2014; *R. v. Keene*, 2014; *R. v. Ledesma*, 2014; *R. v. Magoon*, 2015). Some Courts have even extended Mr. Big confessions to implicate third parties to a crime (*R. v. Campeau*, 2015).

A main concern of Mr. Big stings is the possibility of eliciting a false confession from a suspect. The Innocence Project estimates that 1 in 4 people who have been wrongfully convicted gave a false confession (Innocence Project, 2016), and as analyses on DNA exonerations have empirically demonstrated that the reality is false confessions

are not at all uncommon (Kassin, Bogart, & Kerner, 2012; Appleby, Hasel, & Kassin 2013). Without a doubt, it is important to solve cold cases to bring closure to the victim's family, friends, and community. However, if a suspect falsely confesses through a Mr. Big sting, it is not serving the families, public, or judicial system any benefit. False confessions that lead to wrongful convictions are a blight on the justice system in Canada. As many legal and psychological scholars have argued, and coinciding with the results of the present research, future use of the Mr. Big technique should proceed with caution.

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Appendix A: Experiment 1 – Informed Consent**Mr. Big Operations and Judgments of Suspects**

SMU REB #15-071

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INTRODUCTION

I am first year MSc in Applied Science student at Saint Mary's University concentrating in Psychology and Law. I am conducting research under Dr. Marc Patry, chair of the Psychology Department and Full-time Faculty member. You are invited to participate in this research study on Canadians perceptions of right to counsel upon arrest.

PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH

The purpose of this research is to gain further understanding of peoples' perceptions of Mr. Big police stings, including police tactics and judgments of suspects.

WHO IS ELIGIBLE TO TAKE PART?

You are eligible to participate in this study if you are between the ages of 18-65.

WHAT DO I HAVE TO DO?

You are invited to complete an online study. The study should take approximately a half hour to complete. Participation in this study is voluntary. Where the study is conducted online, you may participate from home or at any location of your choice. The first section of the study will contain crime-related situations in which you will read and respond to. The second section of the study will contain questions about general knowledge of the legal system. The third section of the survey will contain demographic questions.

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF THIS RESEARCH?

This study will potentially benefit the research, and possibly legal, community by providing further information on peoples' perceptions of Mr. Big police stings, as well as judgments of suspects. This study could potentially benefit you as a participant by increasing your knowledge about Mr. Big police stings.

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS FOR PARTICIPANTS?

Although there are no foreseeable risks to you as a participant in this study, there is always a chance you may have uncomfortable feelings while responding to some of the questions. If at any point in time you have feelings of anxiety or arousal, you can withdraw from the study. If you are a student at Saint Mary's University, you are invited

to use the free counseling services available to you. Counseling services are located on the fourth floor of the Student Center (on campus). You can reach them by telephone: 902-420-5615 or email counselling@smu.ca. If you are not a Saint Mary's student, you are encouraged to call the Mental Health Mobile Crisis team. This is a free service that provides short-term crisis management. You can reach Mental Health Mobile Crisis toll free by telephone: 1-888-429-8167. If neither of these options are available to you, you are encouraged to seek counseling services either by telephone or in person at an agency closest to you.

WHAT WILL BE DONE WITH MY INFORMATION?

All of your survey responses including your demographic information will be kept confidential. Only the research team and I will have access to your information. Data from the survey will be collected and stored on a password-protected, encrypted website (Qualtrics.com) which is hosted outside of Canada (in Ireland). Qualtrics uses the same encryption type (SSL) that on-line banking sites use to transmit secure information. No individual participant information will be used in the reported findings of this research. All data will be stored on a separate secure thumb drive kept in a locked cabinet at Saint Mary's University, and destroyed at the appropriate date and time.

HOW CAN I WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY?

If at any point in time you wish to withdraw from this study you can do so without penalty. If you wish to withdraw, your data will be destroyed and not used in the study or in any other manner. If you wish to withdraw from the study you can close the browser at any time during the survey before completion.

COMPENSATION

Saint Mary's students have the opportunity to complete this online survey through the SONA bonus points system and receive up to .5 bonus point** for an available class of their choosing.

HOW CAN I GET MORE INFORMATION?

At the end of the survey you will see a feedback letter. If at any point in time you have any questions or comments feel free to contact myself, or Dr. Marc Patry, using the information provided above. If you would like to learn about the results of this study, you are again invited to contact us with the information provided above.

If you have any questions or concerns about ethical matters, you may contact the Chair of the Saint Mary's University Research Ethics Board at ethics@smu.ca or (902) 420-5728.

By checking the informed consent box below, I consent to participate in this study and the use of the collected data for research purposes. I understand what this study is about and appreciate the risks and benefits. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I can withdraw from this study at any time without penalty.

Appendix B: Experiment 1 – Instructions

In Canada, police sometimes use a tactic called a “Mr. Big” operation in an attempt to catch criminal suspects. Most of the time, the cases are high profile and involve serious crimes such as murder. The police identify a suspect, and create a fictitious crime organization which is entirely made up of undercover police officers posing as criminals. The suspect is brought in to “work” for the criminal organization, and is unaware that it is fake, or that he is working alongside of police officers. All of the crimes that take place in these Mr. Big operations are simulated, but many times the suspect receives real payment for his “work” within the organization. The simulated crimes can range from simple delivery of packages, to the disposal of a body.

Please read the following case information provided below. Imagine that you are a juror in this case. Pay close attention to the details provided in the case, and please respond to the questions accordingly.

Appendix C: Experiment 1 – Mr. Big Case SummariesCase Summary 1 – Low Incentive, Low Violence:

Mr. Marshall was suspected of murdering his roommate. The police had heard from several of Mr. Marshall's friends that he had confessed to them about the murder. Police did not have enough evidence to charge Mr. Marshall with murder, so they began an undercover "Mr. Big" sting operation. The police wanted to see if Mr. Marshall would confess to the murder of his roommate. The police created a scenario in which Mr. Marshall believed he had won an all-expenses paid fishing trip. Mr. Marshall was an avid angler, and took the trip he had believed he won without question. On the trip, Mr. Marshall met Ben, and they quickly hit it off and became friends. Mr. Marshall was unaware that his new friend was an undercover officer, who was purposely befriending him as part of the Mr. Big operation.

Mr. Marshall and Ben continued to spend time together after the fishing trip. They frequently went fishing together and became really close. Mr. Marshall had even told Ben that he was the best friend he had. One day, Ben asked Mr. Marshall to help him repossess a vehicle, which was a part of what Ben did for work. Soon after, Ben informed Mr. Marshall that he was actually working for a criminal organization, and that he could get Mr. Marshall a job working for the organization if he wanted.

At the time, Mr. Marshall had a job where he was making good income and was not in financial trouble. Regardless, Mr. Marshall took the work his new friend offered, and over the course of a few months participated in 30 different low-level crime jobs. The low-level crime jobs included tasks such as picking up or delivering packages, counting money, and different types of fraud (ex. Credit card fraud). In total, Mr. Marshall was paid \$5,000 for his work in the organization.

During the months that Mr. Marshall was working for the crime organization, he had to travel across the country for various jobs. The criminal organization paid for all of Mr. Marshall's first class flights, and paid for Mr. Marshall to stay in expensive hotel suites. While Mr. Marshall was on these "business" trips, he dined at some of the finest restaurants. When Mr. Marshall met with "business" partners, he was taken to strip clubs and had all of his drinks and expenses paid for. The first time Mr. Marshall was to meet the big crime boss, he was flown across the country and met the crime boss at his high-rise ocean-view condo. That same day the big crime boss took Mr. Marshall out on his yacht. In total, the police spent \$400,000 during this Mr. Big operation to make it appear as legitimate as possible.

At one point in time Mr. Marshall met with the crime boss who was wearing a suit, but looked quite disheveled. The crime boss explained to Mr. Marshall that he needed him to take care of an important job for him. The crime boss said he had just been involved in a deal that had gone bad, and needed Mr. Marshall to dispose of a large package for him.

Mr. Marshall was unsure what was contained in the package, but he disposed of it by throwing it off of a cliff.

After some months had gone by, Mr. Marshall went to meet with the big crime boss again to discuss further work for the criminal organization. The crime boss told Mr. Marshall that he needed assurance that Mr. Marshall was committed to the criminal organization. The crime boss told Mr. Marshall that he could not stay in the criminal organization without proving he had committed a serious crime in the past, as further advancement in the crime organization meant that Mr. Marshall would see and be a part of very serious crimes. The big crime boss told Mr. Marshall that they had connections, and knew that Mr. Marshall had been a suspect in a murder investigation. The crime boss prompted Mr. Marshall to talk about the murder of his roommate and disclosed that it was Mr. Marshall's choice to talk. However, Mr. Big also stated that if Mr. Marshall did not talk about what happened, he may never move up the ranks in the criminal organization. At first, Mr. Marshall was hesitant to disclose any information about the murder of his roommate and did not say anything at that point in time. Three weeks later, Mr. Marshall met with the crime boss again. During the second meeting Mr. Marshall disclosed to the crime boss that he had murdered his roommate and disposed of the body.

Prosecution summary:

Mr. Marshall should be found guilty of first degree murder. Mr. Marshall gave a confession to undercover officers willingly during the Mr. Big operation. Mr. Marshall had the opportunity to leave the criminal organization at any point in time during the operation; however he chose to stay and wanted to advance in the organization. Mr. Marshall willingly participated in over 30 simulated crime scenarios, and took payment for them. Mr. Marshall is a selfish person, and only wanted to work in the criminal organization to make money even though he had other avenues of potential revenue that did not involve committing crimes.

Defense Summary:

Mr. Marshall should not be found guilty of first degree murder. Mr. Marshall gave a confession to undercover officers under false pretenses. Mr. Marshall was fearful for his life, and fearful that he left the criminal organization that he might be killed. Mr. Marshall was afraid that if he did not say what the crime boss wanted him to say, that there would be serious repercussions and his refusal might be met with violence. Mr. Marshall formed close bonds with the undercover officer Ben, and stayed in the criminal organization as he was influenced by the comradery and new found friendships he had.

Case Summary 2 – Low Incentive, High Violence:

Mr. Marshall was suspected of murdering his roommate. The police had heard from several of Mr. Marshall's friends that he had confessed to them about the murder. Police did not have enough evidence to charge Mr. Marshall with murder, so they began an

undercover “Mr. Big” sting operation. The police wanted to see if Mr. Marshall would confess to the murder of his roommate. The police created a scenario in which Mr. Marshall believed he had won an all-expenses paid fishing trip. Mr. Marshall was an avid angler, and took the trip he had believed he won without question. On the trip, Mr. Marshall met Ben, and they quickly hit it off and became friends. Mr. Marshall was unaware that his new friend was an undercover officer, who was purposely befriending him as part of the Mr. Big operation.

Mr. Marshall and Ben continued to spend time together after the fishing trip. They frequently went fishing together and became really close. Mr. Marshall had even told Ben that he was the best friend he had. One day, Ben asked Mr. Marshall to help him repossess a vehicle, which was a part of what Ben did for work. Soon after, Ben informed Mr. Marshall that he was actually working for a criminal organization, and that he could get Mr. Marshall a job working for the organization if he wanted.

At the time, Mr. Marshall had a job where he was making good income and was not in financial trouble. Regardless, Mr. Marshall took the work his new friend offered, and over the course of a few months participated in 30 different low-level crime jobs. The low-level crime jobs included tasks such as picking up or delivering packages, counting money, and different types of fraud (ex. Credit card fraud). In total, Mr. Marshall was paid \$5,000 for his work in the organization.

During the months that Mr. Marshall was working for the crime organization, he had to travel across the country for various jobs. The criminal organization paid for all of Mr. Marshall’s first class flights, and paid for Mr. Marshall to stay in expensive hotel suites. While Mr. Marshall was on these “business” trips, he dined at some of the finest restaurants. When Mr. Marshall met with “business” partners, he was taken to strip clubs and had all of his drinks and expenses paid for. The first time Mr. Marshall was to meet the big crime boss, he was flown across the country and met the crime boss at his high-rise ocean-view condo. That same day the big crime boss took Mr. Marshall out on his yacht. In total, the police spent \$400,000 during this Mr. Big operation to make it appear as legitimate as possible.

At one point in time Mr. Marshall met with the crime boss who was wearing a suit, but looked quite disheveled and was covered in blood. The crime boss explained to Mr. Marshall that he needed him to take care of an important job for him. The crime boss said he had just been involved in a deal that had gone bad, and needed Mr. Marshall to dispose of the body of a person he had just killed. Mr. Marshall took the body, which was wrapped in a tarp, and disposed of it by throwing it off of a cliff.

After some months had gone by, Mr. Marshall went to meet with the big crime boss again to discuss further work for the criminal organization. The crime boss told Mr. Marshall that he needed assurance that Mr. Marshall was committed to the criminal organization. The crime boss told Mr. Marshall that he could not stay in the criminal organization

without proving he had committed a serious crime in the past, as further advancement in the crime organization meant that Mr. Marshall would see and be a part of very serious crimes. The big crime boss told Mr. Marshall that they had connections, and knew that Mr. Marshall had been a suspect in a murder investigation. The crime boss prompted Mr. Marshall to talk about the murder of his roommate and disclosed that it was Mr. Marshall's choice to talk. However, Mr. Big also stated that if Mr. Marshall did not talk about what happened, he may never move up the ranks in the criminal organization. At first, Mr. Marshall was hesitant to disclose any information about the murder of his roommate and did not say anything at that point in time. Three weeks later, Mr. Marshall met with the crime boss again. During the second meeting Mr. Marshall disclosed to the crime boss that he had murdered his roommate and disposed of the body.

Prosecution summary:

Mr. Marshall should be found guilty of first degree murder. Mr. Marshall gave a confession to undercover officers willingly during the Mr. Big operation. Mr. Marshall had the opportunity to leave the criminal organization at any point in time during the operation; however he chose to stay and wanted to advance in the organization. Mr. Marshall willingly participated in over 30 simulated crime scenarios, and took payment for them. Mr. Marshall is a selfish person, and only wanted to work in the criminal organization to make money even though he had other avenues of potential revenue that did not involve committing crimes.

Defense Summary:

Mr. Marshall should not be found guilty of first degree murder. Mr. Marshall gave a confession to undercover officers under false pretenses. Mr. Marshall was fearful for his life, and fearful that he left the criminal organization that he might be killed. Mr. Marshall was afraid that if he did not say what the crime boss wanted him to say, that there would be serious repercussions and his refusal might be met with violence. Mr. Marshall formed close bonds with the undercover officer Ben, and stayed in the criminal organization as he was influenced by the comradery and new found friendships he had.

Case Summary 3 – High Incentive, Low Violence:

Mr. Marshall was suspected of murdering his roommate. The police had heard from several of Mr. Marshall's friends that he had confessed to them about the murder. Police did not have enough evidence to charge Mr. Marshall with murder, so they began an undercover "Mr. Big" sting operation. The police wanted to see if Mr. Marshall would confess to the murder of his roommate. The police created a scenario in which Mr. Marshall believed he had won an all-expenses paid fishing trip. Mr. Marshall was an avid angler, and took the trip he had believed he won without question. On the trip, Mr. Marshall met Ben, and they quickly hit it off and became friends. Mr. Marshall was unaware that his new friend was an undercover officer, who was purposely befriending him as part of the Mr. Big operation.

Mr. Marshall and Ben continued to spend time together after the fishing trip. They frequently went fishing together and became really close. Mr. Marshall had even told Ben that he was the best friend he had. One day, Ben asked Mr. Marshall to help him repossess a vehicle, which was a part of what Ben did for work. Soon after, Ben informed Mr. Marshall that he was actually working for a criminal organization, and that he could get Mr. Marshall a job working for the organization if he wanted.

Mr. Marshall was on welfare at the time, and was struggling to pay his rent and other bills. Mr. Marshall took the work his new friend offered, and over the course of a few months participated in 30 different low-level crime jobs. The low-level crime jobs included tasks such as picking up or delivering packages, counting money, and different types of fraud (ex. Credit card fraud). In total, Mr. Marshall was paid \$35,000 for his work in the organization.

During the months that Mr. Marshall was working for the crime organization, he had to travel across the country for various jobs. The criminal organization paid for all of Mr. Marshall's first class flights, and paid for Mr. Marshall to stay in expensive hotel suites. While Mr. Marshall was on these "business" trips, he dined at some of the finest restaurants. When Mr. Marshall met with "business" partners, he was taken to strip clubs and had all of his drinks and expenses paid for. The first time Mr. Marshall was to meet the big crime boss, he was flown across the country and met the crime boss at his high-rise ocean-view condo. That same day the big crime boss took Mr. Marshall out on his yacht. In total, the police spent \$400,000 during this Mr. Big operation to make it appear as legitimate as possible.

At one point in time Mr. Marshall met with the crime boss who was wearing a suit, but looked quite disheveled. The crime boss explained to Mr. Marshall that he needed him to take care of an important job for him. The crime boss said he had just been involved in a deal that had gone bad, and needed Mr. Marshall to dispose of a large package for him. Mr. Marshall was unsure what was contained in the package, but he disposed of it by throwing it off of a cliff.

After some months had gone by, Mr. Marshall went to meet with the big crime boss again to discuss further work for the criminal organization. The crime boss told Mr. Marshall that he needed assurance that Mr. Marshall was committed to the criminal organization. The crime boss told Mr. Marshall that he could not stay in the criminal organization without proving he had committed a serious crime in the past, as further advancement in the crime organization meant that Mr. Marshall would see and be a part of very serious crimes. The big crime boss told Mr. Marshall that they had connections, and knew that Mr. Marshall had been a suspect in a murder investigation. The crime boss prompted Mr. Marshall to talk about the murder of his roommate and disclosed that it was Mr. Marshall's choice to talk. However, Mr. Big also stated that if Mr. Marshall did not talk about what happened, he may never move up the ranks in the criminal

organization. At first, Mr. Marshall was hesitant to disclose any information about the murder of his roommate and did not say anything at that point in time. Three weeks later, Mr. Marshall met with the crime boss again. During the second meeting Mr. Marshall disclosed to the crime boss that he had murdered his roommate and disposed of the body.

Prosecution summary:

Mr. Marshall should be found guilty of first degree murder. Mr. Marshall gave a confession to undercover officers willingly during the Mr. Big operation. Mr. Marshall had the opportunity to leave the criminal organization at any point in time during the operation; however he chose to stay and wanted to advance in the organization. Mr. Marshall willingly participated in over 30 simulated crime scenarios, and took payment for them. Mr. Marshall is a selfish person, and only wanted to work in the criminal organization to make money even though he had other avenues of potential revenue that did not involve committing crimes.

Defense Summary:

Mr. Marshall should not be found guilty of first degree murder. Mr. Marshall gave a confession to undercover officers under false pretenses. Mr. Marshall was fearful for his life, and fearful that he left the criminal organization that he might be killed. Mr. Marshall was afraid that if he did not say what the crime boss wanted him to say, that there would be serious repercussions and his refusal might be met with violence. Mr. Marshall formed close bonds with the undercover officer Ben, and stayed in the criminal organization as he was influenced by the comradery and new found friendships he had.

Case Summary 4 – High Incentive, High Violence:

Mr. Marshall was suspected of murdering his roommate. The police had heard from several of Mr. Marshall's friends that he had confessed to them about the murder. Police did not have enough evidence to charge Mr. Marshall with murder, so they began an undercover "Mr. Big" sting operation. The police wanted to see if Mr. Marshall would confess to the murder of his roommate. The police created a scenario in which Mr. Marshall believed he had won an all-expenses paid fishing trip. Mr. Marshall was an avid angler, and took the trip he had believed he won without question. On the trip, Mr. Marshall met Ben, and they quickly hit it off and became friends. Mr. Marshall was unaware that his new friend was an undercover officer, who was purposely befriending him as part of the Mr. Big operation.

Mr. Marshall and Ben continued to spend time together after the fishing trip. They frequently went fishing together and became really close. Mr. Marshall had even told Ben that he was the best friend he had. One day, Ben asked Mr. Marshall to help him repossess a vehicle, which was a part of what Ben did for work. Soon after, Ben informed Mr. Marshall that he was actually working for a criminal organization, and that he could get Mr. Marshall a job working for the organization if he wanted.

Mr. Marshall was on welfare at the time, and was struggling to pay his rent and other bills. Mr. Marshall took the work his new friend offered, and over the course of a few months participated in 30 different low-level crime jobs. The low-level crime jobs included tasks such as picking up or delivering packages, counting money, and different types of fraud (ex. Credit card fraud). In total, Mr. Marshall was paid \$35,000 for his work in the organization.

During the months that Mr. Marshall was working for the crime organization, he had to travel across the country for various jobs. The criminal organization paid for all of Mr. Marshall's first class flights, and paid for Mr. Marshall to stay in expensive hotel suites. While Mr. Marshall was on these "business" trips, he dined at some of the finest restaurants. When Mr. Marshall met with "business" partners, he was taken to strip clubs and had all of his drinks and expenses paid for. The first time Mr. Marshall was to meet the big crime boss, he was flown across the country and met the crime boss at his high-rise ocean-view condo. That same day the big crime boss took Mr. Marshall out on his yacht. In total, the police spent \$400,000 during this Mr. Big operation to make it appear as legitimate as possible.

At one point in time Mr. Marshall met with the crime boss who was wearing a suit, but looked quite disheveled and was covered in blood. The crime boss explained to Mr. Marshall that he needed him to take care of an important job for him. The crime boss said he had just been involved in a deal that had gone bad, and needed Mr. Marshall to dispose of the body of a person he had just killed. Mr. Marshall took the body, which was wrapped in a tarp, and disposed of it by throwing it off of a cliff.

After some months had gone by, Mr. Marshall went to meet with the big crime boss again to discuss further work for the criminal organization. The crime boss told Mr. Marshall that he needed assurance that Mr. Marshall was committed to the criminal organization. The crime boss told Mr. Marshall that he could not stay in the criminal organization without proving he had committed a serious crime in the past, as further advancement in the crime organization meant that Mr. Marshall would see and be a part of very serious crimes. The big crime boss told Mr. Marshall that they had connections, and knew that Mr. Marshall had been a suspect in a murder investigation. The crime boss prompted Mr. Marshall to talk about the murder of his roommate and disclosed that it was Mr. Marshall's choice to talk. However, Mr. Big also stated that if Mr. Marshall did not talk about what happened, he may never move up the ranks in the criminal organization. At first, Mr. Marshall was hesitant to disclose any information about the murder of his roommate and did not say anything at that point in time. Three weeks later, Mr. Marshall met with the crime boss again. During the second meeting Mr. Marshall disclosed to the crime boss that he had murdered his roommate and disposed of the body.

Prosecution summary:

Mr. Marshall should be found guilty of first degree murder. Mr. Marshall gave a confession to undercover officers willingly during the Mr. Big operation. Mr. Marshall had the opportunity to leave the criminal organization at any point in time during the operation; however he chose to stay and wanted to advance in the organization. Mr. Marshall willingly participated in over 30 simulated crime scenarios, and took payment for them. Mr. Marshall is a selfish person, and only wanted to work in the criminal organization to make money even though he had other avenues of potential revenue that did not involve committing crimes.

Defense Summary:

Mr. Marshall should not be found guilty of first degree murder. Mr. Marshall gave a confession to undercover officers under false pretenses. Mr. Marshall was fearful for his life, and fearful that he left the criminal organization that he might be killed. Mr. Marshall was afraid that if he did not say what the crime boss wanted him to say, that there would be serious repercussions and his refusal might be met with violence. Mr. Marshall formed close bonds with the undercover officer Ben, and stayed in the criminal organization as he was influenced by the comradery and new found friendships he had.

Appendix D: Experiment 1 – Measures

1. Do you believe Mr. Marshall is guilty of the crime he confessed to?
 - A. Yes___
 - B. No___

2. How confident are you that Mr. Marshall is guilty?
 1. Not at all confident
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely Confident

3. How confident are you that Mr. Marshall is not guilty?
 1. Not at all confident
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely Confident

4. Do you believe the confession Mr. Marshall gave was truthful?
 - A. Yes___
 - B. No___

5. How confident are you that the confession Mr. Marshall provided was truthful?
 1. Not at all confident
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely Confident

6. How confident are you that the confession Mr. Marshall provided was not truthful?
 1. Not at all confident
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.

- 6.
 7. Completely Confident
7. How likely is it that the confession Mr. Marshall gave was a false confession?
 1. Not at all Likely
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely Likely
8. How likely do you think it is that Mr. Marshall has committed low-level crimes in the past (aside from those in the police sting)?
 1. Not at all Likely
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely Likely
9. How likely do you think it is that Mr. Marshall has committed violent crimes in the past (aside from those in the police sting)?
 1. Not at all Likely
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely Likely
10. How likely do you think is it that Mr. Marshall would commit low-level crimes in the future?
 1. Not at all Likely
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely Likely
11. How likely do you think it is that Mr. Marshall would commit violent crimes in the future?

1. Not at all Likely
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely Likely

12. Rate the defendants character.

1. Bad
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Good

13. Rate the defendants morality.

1. Bad
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Good

14. Are you shocked by the police treatment of Mr. Marshal?

1. Not at all shocked
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely shocked

15. Are you shocked by the amount of money spent by the amount of money spent on this operation?

1. Not at all shocked
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely shocked

16. To what extent do you think the monetary incentives that Mr. Marshall was paid influenced his behaviour in general?
1. Not at all
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely
17. To what extent do you think the monetary incentives that Mr. Marshall was paid influenced his decision to confess to the crime in question?
1. Not at all
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely
18. To what extent do you think the violence Mr. Marshall was exposed to influenced his behaviour in general?
1. Not at all
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely
19. To what extent do you think the violence Mr. Marshall was exposed to influenced his decision to confess to the crime in question?
1. Not at all
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely
20. Rate the strength of the social bonds formed between Mr. Marshall and the undercover officers.
1. Not at all strong

- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely strong

21. To what extent do you think the social bonds formed between Mr. Marshall and the undercover officers influenced his behaviour in general?

1. Not at all
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely

22. To what extent do you think the social bonds formed between Mr. Marshall and the undercover officers influenced his decision to confess to the murder of his roommate?

1. Not at all
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely

23. Do you believe that Mr. Marshall's confession was true?

1. Yes
2. No

24. How confident are you that Mr. Marshall's confession is true?

1. Not at all confident
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely confident

25. How confident are you that Mr. Marshall's confession is not true?

1. Not at all confident
- 2.

- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely confident

26. Do you believe the confession Mr. Marshall gave was coerced?

1. Yes
2. No

27. How confident are you that the confession Mr. Marshall gave was coerced?

1. Not at all confident
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely confident

28. How confident are you that the confession Mr. Marshall gave was not coerced?

1. Not at all confident
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely confident

29. Do you believe the confession Mr. Marshall gave was voluntary?

1. Yes
2. No

30. How confident are you the confession Mr. Marshall gave was voluntary?

1. Not at all confident
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely confident

31. How confident are you the confession Mr. Marshall gave was not voluntary?

1. Not at all confident
- 2.

- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely confident

32. To what extent do you believe Mr. Marshall was acting independently (not under the influence of the undercover officers) in general?

1. Not at all
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely

33. To what extent do you believe Mr. Marshall was acting independently (not under the influence of the undercover officers) when he confessed to murdering his roommate?

1. Not at all
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely

Appendix E: Experiment 1 – Demographic Questions

1. Age: _____
2. Sex:
 - a) Male _____
 - b) Female _____
3. Please specify which ethnic/cultural group(s) that best describe you.
 - a) White
 - b) Chinese
 - c) Japanese
 - d) Korean
 - e) South Asian
 - f) South East Asian
 - g) West Asian
 - h) Black/African
 - i) Filipino
 - j) Aboriginal
 - k) Middle Eastern
 - l) Arab
 - m) Unsure
 - n) Other
 - o) If other race/ethnic group please specify: _____
4. Are you a Canadian Citizen?
 - a) Yes _____
 - b) No _____
5. Which Canadian province or territory are you originally from? _____
6. Which Canadian province or territory do you currently live in? _____
7. Where are you from? _____
8. Do you have any affiliation with the legal system or law enforcement? (ex. work, volunteer, study)
 - a) Yes _____
 - b) No _____
 - c) Please specify: _____
9. Are you currently a student?
 - a) Yes _____
 - b) No _____

10. Are you a Saint Mary's University student?

- a) Yes _____
- b) No _____

11. Have you ever taken any of the following courses? Check all that apply.

- a) Psychology and Law (Psych 3320)
- b) Advanced Psychology and Law (4443)
- c) Canadian Criminal Justice System (Crim 2304)
- d) Human Rights and Social Justice (Soci 3210)
- e) Criminal Law (Soci 3510)
- f) Introduction to Forensic Psychology (Psyc 3338)
- g) Advanced Forensic Psychology (Psyc 4438)
- h) I have never taken any of these courses.

12. Are you participating in this study through the SONA bonus point system?

- a) Yes _____
- b) No _____

13. Where do you gather most of your legal knowledge from? _____

Appendix F: Experiment 1 – Debriefing Form

I would like to thank you for your time and participation in this study. Please feel free to give any interested persons my email address to receive a link to the online study.

Once again, the purpose of this research study is to gain further understanding of perceptions of Mr. Big police stings, and judgments of suspects.

You should remember that all of your responses, including demographic information, will be kept confidential and used only for research purposes. None of your individual information will be shared.

If you have any questions, comments, or concerns, or would like to receive more information about this study feel free to contact myself, or Dr. Patry, using the information previously provided in the informed consent form. If you are interested in learning about the results of this research, please feel free to again contact either researcher.

If you experienced any lasting negative effects from your participation in this study I would urge you to please report it within 24 hours, as it will have to be reported to the Research Ethics Board at Saint Mary's University. Please keep in mind the Saint Mary's Counseling Center is located on the fourth floor of the Student Center building. You are encouraged to use their services and may contact them via email: counseling@smu.ca or via phone: (902) 420-5615. If you are not a Saint Mary's student, you are encouraged to call the Mental Health Mobile Crisis team. This is a free service that provides short-term crisis management. You can reach Mental Health Mobile Crisis toll free by telephone: 1-888-429-8167. If neither of these options are available to you, I would urge you to seek services either in person, or by telephone, to an agency closest to you.

If you have any questions or concerns about ethical matters, you may contact the Chair of the Saint Mary's University Research Ethics Board at ethics@smu.ca or (902) 420-5728.

Christina Connors
Saint Mary's University
Email: christina.connors@smu.ca
SMU REB #15-071

Appendix G: Belief in a Just World Scale

Belief in a Just World Scale

PsycTESTS Citation: Lambert, A. J., Burroughs, T., & Nguyen, T. (1999). Belief in a Just World Scale [Database record]. Retrieved from PsycTESTS. doi: 10.1037/t15579-000

Test Shown: Full

Test Format: The Belief in a Just World Scale utilizes a six-point Likert-type scale with responses ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

Source: Lambert, Alan J., Burroughs, Thomas, & Nguyen, Tina. (1999). Perceptions of risk and the buffering hypothesis: The role of just world beliefs and right-wing authoritarianism. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, Vol 25(6), 643-656. doi: 10.1177/0146167299025006001, © 1999 by Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc. Reproduced by Permission of Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

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PsycTESTS™ is a database of the American Psychological Association

Items

1. I think that in general there is justice in the world.
2. Someday I will be compensated for suffered injustices.
3. By and large, people get what they deserve.
4. In my life, justice always prevails.
5. I am usually treated fairly.
6. Even when confronted with great suffering, it is important to maintain one's belief in compensating justice.
7. I usually get what I deserve.
8. Injustices in all areas of life (e.g., professional, family, politics) is the exception rather than the rule.
9. Even victims of serious injustice can expect things to even out in the long run.
10. Overall, events in my life are just.
11. In the long run, people will be compensated for injustices.
12. People try to be fair when making important decisions.
13. Even my worst luck will turn out all right in the end.

14. In my life, injustice is the exception rather than the rule.
15. Justice always prevails over injustice.
16. Most of the things that happen in my life are fair.
17. By and large, I deserve what happens to me.
18. Important decisions that are made that concern me are usually just.

Appendix H: Experiment 2 – Informed Consent

Mr. Big Operations and Judgments of Suspects
SMU REB #15-071
Principle Investigator: Christina Connors
Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Marc Patry
Psychology Department
Saint Mary's University, 923 Robie Street, Halifax, NS B3H 3C3
Phone: 902 223 6501 Email: Christina.connors@smu.ca
Email: marc.patry@smu.ca

INTRODUCTION

I am second year Masters of Applied Science student at Saint Mary's University concentrating in Psychology and Law. I am conducting research under the supervision of Dr. Marc Patry, chair of the Psychology Department and Full-time Faculty member. You are invited to participate in this research study on Mr. Big Operations and Judgments of Suspects.

PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH

The purpose of this research is to gain further understanding of peoples' perceptions of Mr. Big police stings, including police tactics and judgments of suspects.

WHO IS ELIGIBLE TO TAKE PART?

You are eligible to participate in this study if you are between the ages of 18-65.

WHAT DO I HAVE TO DO?

You are invited to complete an online study. The study should take approximately 45 minutes to complete. Participation in this study is voluntary. Where the study is conducted online, you may participate from home or at any location of your choice. The first section of the study will contain a mock-trial video of a Mr. Big defendant in which you will watch and then respond to some questions. The second section of the study will contain two surveys: one about your belief in a just world, and the second about juries. The third section of the study will contain demographic questions.

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF THIS RESEARCH?

This study will potentially benefit the research, and possibly legal, community by providing further information on peoples' perceptions of Mr. Big police stings, as well as judgments of suspects. This study could potentially benefit you as a participant by increasing your knowledge about Mr. Big police stings.

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS FOR PARTICIPANTS?

Although there are no foreseeable risks to you as a participant in this study, there is always a chance you may have uncomfortable feelings while responding to some of the questions. If at any point in time you have feelings of anxiety or arousal, you can

withdraw from the study. If you are a student at Saint Mary's University, you are invited to use the free counseling services available to you. Counseling services are located on the fourth floor of the Student Center (on campus). You can reach them by telephone: 902-420-5615 or email counselling@smu.ca. If you are not a Saint Mary's student, you are encouraged to call the Mental Health Mobile Crisis team. This is a free service that provides short-term crisis management. You can reach Mental Health Mobile Crisis toll free by telephone: 1-888-429-8167. If neither of these options are available to you, you are encouraged to seek counseling services either by telephone or in person at an agency closest to you.

WHAT WILL BE DONE WITH MY INFORMATION?

All of your survey responses including your demographic information will be kept confidential. Only the research team and I will have access to your information. Data from the survey will be collected and stored on a password-protected, encrypted website (Qualtrics.com) which is hosted outside of Canada (in Ireland). Qualtrics uses the same encryption type (SSL) that on-line banking sites use to transmit secure information. No individual participant information will be used in the reported findings of this research. All data will be stored on a separate secure thumb drive kept in a locked cabinet at Saint Mary's University, and destroyed at the appropriate date and time.

HOW CAN I WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY?

If at any point in time you wish to withdraw from this study you can do so without penalty. If you wish to withdraw, your data will be destroyed and not used in the study or in any other manner. If you wish to withdraw from the study you can close the browser at any time during the survey before completion.

COMPENSATION

Saint Mary's students have the opportunity to complete this online survey through the SONA bonus points system and receive up to .75 bonus point* for an available class of their choosing.

HOW CAN I GET MORE INFORMATION?

At the end of the survey you will see a feedback letter. If at any point in time you have any questions or comments feel free to contact myself, or Dr. Marc Patry, using the information provided above. If you would like to learn about the results of this study, you are again invited to contact us with the information provided above.

If you have any questions or concerns about ethical matters, you may contact the Chair of the Saint Mary's University Research Ethics Board at ethics@smu.ca or (902) 420-5728.

By checking the informed consent box below, I consent to participate in this study and the use of the collected data for research purposes. I understand what this study is about and appreciate the risks and benefits. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I can withdraw from this study at any time without penalty.

Appendix I: Experiment 2 – Instructions

In Canada, police sometimes use a tactic called a “Mr. Big” operation in an attempt to catch criminal suspects. Most of the time, the cases are high profile and involve serious crimes such as murder. The police identify a suspect, and create a fictitious crime organization which is entirely made up of undercover police officers posing as criminals. The suspect is brought in to “work” for the criminal organization, and is unaware that it is fake, or that he is working alongside of police officers. All of the crimes that take place in these Mr. Big operations are simulated, but many times the suspect receives real payment for his “work” within the organization. The simulated crimes can range from simple delivery of packages, to the disposal of a body.

Please watch the following court video of a trial for a Mr. Big defendant. Imagine that you are a juror in this case. Pay close attention to the details provided in the case. After viewing the courtroom video, please respond to the questions as if you were a member of the jury for this trial.

Appendix J: Experiment 2 – Mr. Big Video Hyperlinks

1. High Incentive, High IQ:
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Mysw_F0F_I
2. High Incentive, Low IQ:
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1Nm8DMuCTw>
3. Low Incentive, High IQ
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9P-G4UYBz2c>
4. Low Incentive, Low IQ:
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ywg7iyAuLiY>

Appendix K: Experiment 2 – Measures

1. What was the name of the person on trial for murder?
 - A. Mr. Doe
 - B. Mr. Jekyll
 - C. Mr. Jones
 - D. Mr. Carson

2. Do you believe Mr. Jones is guilty of the crime?
 1. Yes
 2. No

3. How confident are you that Mr. Jones is guilty?
 1. Not at all confident
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely confident

4. How confident are you that Mr. Jones is not guilty?
 1. Not at all confident
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely confident

5. Do you believe the confession Mr. Jones gave was truthful?
 1. Yes
 2. No

6. How confident are you that the confession Mr. Jones provided was truthful?
 1. Not at all confident
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely confident

7. How confident are you that the confession Mr. Jones provided was not truthful?
 1. Not at all confident

- 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely confident
8. Do you believe Mr. Jones is guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt?
1. Yes
 2. No
9. How likely is it that the confession Mr. Jones gave was a false confession?
1. Not at all confident
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely confident
10. How likely do you think it is that Mr. Jones has committed low-level crimes in the past (aside from those in the police sting)?
1. Not at all likely
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely likely
11. How likely do you think it is that Mr. Jones has committed violent crimes in the past (aside from those in the police sting)?
1. Not at all likely
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely likely
12. How likely do you think is it that Mr. Jones would commit low-level crimes in the future?
1. Not at all likely
 - 2.

- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely likely

13. How likely do you think it is that Mr. Jones would commit violent crimes in the future?

1. Not at all likely
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely likely

14. Rate Mr. Jones' overall character.

1. Bad
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Good

15. Rate Mr. Jones' morality.

1. Bad – not at all moral
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Good – completely moral

16. Rate Mr. Jones' sophistication.

1. Low – not at all sophisticated
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. High – completely sophisticated

17. Rate Mr. Jones' gullibility.

1. Low – not at all gullible
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. High – completely gullible
18. Are you shocked by the police treatment of Mr. Jones?
1. Not at all shocked
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely shocked
19. How much money was Mr. Jones *paid* by undercover officers?
1. \$500
 2. \$1,000
 3. \$5,000
 4. \$10,000
20. Are you shocked by the amount of money Mr. Jones was *paid* by the undercover officers?
1. Not at all shocked
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely shocked
21. How much do you think the monetary incentives (the amount of money) that Mr. Jones was *paid* influenced his behavior in general?
1. Not at all
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely

22. How much do you think the monetary incentives (the amount of money) that Mr. Jones was *paid* influenced his decision to confess to the crime in question?
1. Not at all
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely
23. How much money was Mr. Jones *offered* by undercover officers for the "final job"?
1. \$1,000
 2. \$5,000
 3. \$20,000
 4. \$80,000
24. Are you shocked by the amount of money Mr. Jones was *offered* by the undercover officers for the "final job"?
1. Not at all
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely
25. How much do you think the monetary incentives (how much money) that Mr. Jones was *offered* influenced his behavior in general?
1. Not at all
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.
 - 6.
 7. Completely
26. How much do you think the monetary incentives (how much money) that Mr. Jones was *offered* influenced his decision to confess to the crime in question?
1. Not at all
 - 2.
 - 3.
 - 4.
 - 5.

- 6.
7. Completely

27. What was Mr. Jones' IQ (intelligence)?

1. 70
2. 100
3. 130
4. 150

28. How much do you think Mr. Jones' level of intelligence (how smart/not smart he is) influenced his behavior in general?

1. Not at all
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely

29. How much do you think Mr. Jones' level of intelligence (how smart/not smart he is) influenced his decision to confess to the crime in question?

1. Not at all
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely

30. Rate the strength of the social bonds formed between Mr. Jones and the undercover officers.

1. Not at all strong
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely strong

31. To what extent do you think the social bonds formed between Mr. Jones and the undercover officers influenced his behaviour in general?

1. Not at all
- 2.
- 3.

- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely

32. How much do you think the social bonds formed between Mr. Jones and the undercover officers influenced his decision to confess?

1. Not at all
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely

33. Do you believe that Mr. Jones' confession was true?

1. Yes
2. No

34. How confident are you that Mr. Jones' confession is true?

1. Not at all confident
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely confident

35. How confident are you that Mr. Jones' confession is not true?

1. Not at all confident
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely confident

36. Do you believe the confession Mr. Jones gave was coerced?

1. Yes
2. No

37. How confident are you that the confession Mr. Jones gave was coerced?

1. Not at all confident
- 2.

- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely confident

38. How confident are you that the confession Mr. Jones gave was not coerced?

1. Not at all confident
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely confident

39. What color jacket was the defense lawyer wearing?

1. Black
2. Beige
3. White
4. Pink

40. Do you believe the confession Mr. Jones gave was voluntary?

1. Yes
2. No

41. How confident are you the confession Mr. Jones gave was voluntary?

1. Not at all confident
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely confident

42. How confident are you the confession Mr. Jones gave was not voluntary?

1. Not at all confident
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely confident

43. What was the name of the court appointed psychologist?

1. Dr. Humble
2. Dr. Goodman
3. Dr. Randy
4. Dr. Richard

44. How much do you believe Mr. Jones was acting independently (not under the influence of the undercover officers) in general?

1. Not at all
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely

45. How much do you believe Mr. Jones was acting independently (not under the influence of the undercover officers) when he confessed to murdering his roommate?

1. Not at all
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. Completely

Appendix L: Experiment 2 – Demographic Questions

1. Age: _____
2. Sex:
 - a) Male _____
 - b) Female _____
 - c) Other _____
3. Please specify which ethnic/cultural group(s) that best describe you.
 - a) White
 - b) Chinese
 - c) Japanese
 - d) Korean
 - e) South Asian
 - f) South East Asian
 - g) West Asian
 - h) Black/African
 - i) Filipino
 - j) Aboriginal
 - k) Middle Eastern
 - l) Arab
 - m) Unsure
 - n) Other
 - o) If other race/ethnic group please specify: _____
4. Are you a Canadian Citizen?
 - a) Yes _____
 - b) No _____
5. Which Canadian province or territory are you originally from? _____
6. Which Canadian province or territory do you currently live in? _____
7. Where are you from? _____
8. Do you have any affiliation with the legal system or law enforcement? (ex. work, volunteer, study)
 - a) Yes _____
 - b) No _____
 - c) Please specify: _____
9. Are you currently a student?
 - a) Yes _____
 - b) No _____

10. Are you a Saint Mary's University student?

- a) Yes _____
- b) No _____

11. Have you ever taken any of the following courses? Check all that apply.

- a) Psychology and Law (Psych 3320)
- b) Advanced Psychology and Law (4443)
- c) Canadian Criminal Justice System (Crim 2304)
- d) Human Rights and Social Justice (Soci 3210)
- e) Criminal Law (Soci 3510)
- f) Introduction to Forensic Psychology (Psyc 3338)
- g) Advanced Forensic Psychology (Psyc 4438)
- h) I have never taken any of these courses.

12. Are you participating in this study through the SONA bonus point system?

- a) Yes _____
- b) No _____

13. Where do you gather most of your legal knowledge from? _____

Appendix M: Experiment 2 – Debriefing Form

I would like to thank you for your time and participation in this study. Please feel free to give any interested persons my email address to receive a link to the online study.

Once again, the purpose of this research study is to gain further understanding of perceptions of Mr. Big police stings, and judgments of suspects.

You should remember that all of your responses, including demographic information, will be kept confidential and used only for research purposes. None of your individual information will be shared.

If you have any questions, comments, or concerns, or would like to receive more information about this study feel free to contact myself, or Dr. Patry, using the information previously provided in the informed consent form. If you are interested in learning about the results of this research, please feel free to again contact either researcher.

If you experienced any lasting negative effects from your participation in this study I would urge you to please report it within 24 hours, as it will have to be reported to the Research Ethics Board at Saint Mary's University. Please keep in mind the Saint Mary's Counseling Center is located on the fourth floor of the Student Center building. You are encouraged to use their services and may contact them via email: counseling@smu.ca or via phone: (902) 420-5615. If you are not a Saint Mary's student, you are encouraged to call the Mental Health Mobile Crisis team. This is a free service that provides short-term crisis management. You can reach Mental Health Mobile Crisis toll free by telephone: 1-888-429-8167. If neither of these options are available to you, I would urge you to seek services either in person, or by telephone, to an agency closest to you.

If you have any questions or concerns about ethical matters, you may contact the Chair of the Saint Mary's University Research Ethics Board at ethics@smu.ca or (902) 420-5728.

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