Examining the Characteristics and Tactics of Chief Negotiators in Canadian Universities

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Abstract

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This study's overall goal was to examine the behavioural characteristics and tactics used by chief faculty negotiators in a Canadian university setting—a specific yet essential niche of negotiators. A sample of faculty negotiators was compared to a rubric description of "skilled" negotiators as defined by Rackham and Carlisle (1978a&b). Lastly, I aimed to add to research about emotion as well as gender in collective bargaining. In total, there were 15 participants (n=8 male; n=7 female). The negotiators were, on average, 53.9 years old, ranging from 36 to 68 years old. Using Thematic Analysis, four main tactic themes and four subthemes were found. (1) Integrity at the bargaining table, (Honesty) (2) Stubbornness (3) Traditional competitive bargaining, (4) Using Emotion (Void emotions, Emotional argument, Indignation). In comparing behavioural characteristics found by Rackham and Carlisle (1978a&b), the negotiators in the current study responded simililarly to "skilled" negotiators.
Key words: negotiation, collective agreement, faculty, thematic analysis

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Unionism in Canada began in 1832; however, it was not a fast movement due to the country's expanse (Taylor & Dow, 1988). In the 19th century, unionism started with small and spread out groups consisting mainly of craftsmen (Taylor & Dow, 1988). In the 20th century, unionism experienced rapid grew parallel to the industrialization of Canada. This shift was spurred by a new focus on manufacturing, World War One, and post-war economic growth. Particularly impressive evolution took place in the 1940s when legislation allowed union certification of members and collective bargaining as a means of obtaining monetary and nonmonetary rights

Higher education refers to post-secondary education, including both universities and colleges. Within Canada, higher education can be traced back to 1789 to King's College in Windsor, Nova Scotia. On an ideological level, universities are an essential part of today's society (Davies & Hammack, 2005). Often, individuals need to complete a post-secondary degree to achieve gainful employment in many occupations. Thus, faculty are challenged with readying our population to join the competitive labour market. Higher education faculty are a quintessential part of the role academia plays in the economy. Faculty members are unionized in most Canadian universities and colleges (Canadian Association of Union Teachers [CAUT], n.d.). For example, in 2008, 80 percent of Canadian university faculty were unionized (Dobbie & Robson, 2008). Indeed, The Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) covers approximately 122 higher education institutions consisting of 68,000 academic staff across Canada. In 2015, CAUT collected data on the "Union Status of Canadian Universities' Academic Staff

Associations" and found that 80 major Canadian universities were unionized whereas only seven were not. This is a large number of individuals who depend on a union to bargain for a fair and representative collective agreement.

In a methodological review by Buelens, Woestyne, Mestdagh, & Bouckenooghe (2008), the authors state that the most used methods to study negotiation are experimental. Thus, the authors identify a methodological gap in which more qualitative studies would help capture a more complete understanding of what happens during a negotiation. The authors also state that negotiation research lacks participants from labour and business settings (Buelens et al., 2008). Additionally, current research tends to use negotiation dyads with simplistic tasks to examine the negotiation process and outcomes. Real-life negotiations tend to be more complicated than single-issue discussions between two individuals. The purpose of the current study is to use interviews as a qualitative means of data collection to examine the behavioural characteristics and tactics university faculty negotiators use in collective bargaining; thematic analysis will be used to analyze the interview data. University faculty were selected as the participant pool. They negotiate multi-issue collective agreements as a team; this allows for a more complex real-life setting to examine behavioural characteristics and tactics.

Academic Versus Trade Union Collective Agreements

Given that faculty union members bargain for academic freedom regarding the content of their work and influence in organizational decision-making, it can be argued that within a higher education collective agreement, faculty bargain for issues above and beyond the typical industrial-oriented pay, benefits, and job security (Gillin, 2002; Wickens, 2008). Collective agreements are highly detailed and complex legally binding

documents. Within a typical faculty collective agreement, there are sections about the

industrial model wages, employee benefits, and job security. However, academic freedom

and the constraints around promoting and disseminating knowledge are an integral part of

the agreement. An example of the commonalities and differences between a faculty

collective agreement and a traditional industrial model collective agreement can be seen

in Table 1 and Table 2a&b. Saint Mary's University Faculty Union (SMUFU) was

established in 1974 and covers both university faculty and university librarians. And

Nova Scotia Government and General Employee's Union (NSGEU) was established in

1958and is a large union recognized as the bargaining agent for 30,000 public and private

sector employees (NSGEU, 2019).

Table 1

Common Articles of the SMUFU and NSGEU collective agreements

SMUFU	NSGEU
Definitions	Definitions
Recognition	Recognition
Union security and check off	Checkoff
Employer-Union bargaining relations	Union officers and representatives
Employer-Union committee	Occupational health and safety
	Labour-management committee
No strike or lockouts	No strikes and lockouts
No discrimination	No discrimination
Reductions in workforce	Layoff and recall
Rank/classification	Seniority
Salary and allowance	Hours of work
	Job sharing
	Overtime
	Callback and standby and work from home
	Temporary assignment
	Temporary employees
	Pay periods
Leave	Paid holidays
	Annual vacation
	Sick leave
	Court duty
	Leave of absence without pay
	Pregnancy and parental leave
	Bereavement leave
	Special leave
	Career development, conference and seminar leave
	Leave application
Employee benefit plans	Benefits
Discipline and dismissal	Discipline, suspension, and discharge
Grievance and arbitration	Grievance procedure
	Arbitration
Official files	Official files

Table 2

Key differences in the SMUFU collective agreement

SMUFU
**Validity
**Academic Freedom, rights, and responsibilities
**Appointment
Renewal, promotion, and Permanence
**Department chairpersons, directors of divisions, program coordinators, and associate deans
**Councils
Working conditions and miscellaneous provisions
Travel Expenses
Entry or re-entry to the bargaining unit of academic admin and related positions
Amalgamation, merger, and program suspension or closure
Amendment to university act
Correspondence
Tuition waiver

Note. (**) represents articles where faculty influence organizational decision making

Table 3

Example of a traditional industrial collective agreement

NSGEU
Management rights
Meeting and bulletin board space
Posting of vacancies
Probationary/period of assessment
Contracting out
Technological change
Protective clothing
Job evaluation
Tuition waiver
Sexual harassment/ harassment
Employer liability

The NSGEU collective agreement is a more financial framework, focusing on pay, leave, and seniority. The SMUFU collective agreement includes articles on economic topics; however, the collective agreement vastly differs regarding validity, academic freedom, employee renewal, promotion, and permanence. Validity refers to section 7 in the collective agreement surrounding "The right of employees to participate in the formulation and/or recommendation of policies and procedures within the University through duly constituted collegial bodies and committees (pg. 9)". This quote exemplifies the main difference between industrial model collective agreements and university collective agreements. Faculty collaborates with the university has a significant influence on their academic activities. For example, in the SMUFU collective agreement under article 7 validity and article 8 academic freedom, rights, and responsibilities, it states that:

> "The Employer recognizes the right, privilege, and responsibility of Faculty Members and Professional Librarians to participate in the collegial processes of the University including, but not limited to, major planning exercises and initiatives" (7.3.2).

> "In the spirit of Academic Freedom as defined in this Collective Agreement an Employee's office, classroom, workspace, laboratory, computer accounts, or any material or intellectual property produced by the Employee shall not be subject to surveillance without just cause and prior notification" (8.5).

When looking at the NSGEU collective agreement, the union employees are not afforded these freedoms in choosing how to do their job. For example, in article 3, Management rights:

"It is the function of the University to manage the operation of the University and its programs, which function includes, without limiting the generality of the foregoing the right to determine employment, complement, organization, work methods and procedures, kinds and locations of equipment, assignment, training, job classification, employee evaluation, promotion, demotion, and lay-off, subject to the provisions of this Agreement."(3.2)

Faculty are bargaining for workplace autonomy, whereas industrial unions such as NSGEU focus their bargaining on wage, benefit, and workplace safety demands. There is reason to believe that the bargaining process for Faculty negotiators may differ from that of industrial unions. Therefore, this niche of individuals could benefit from a micro-study of collective bargaining in this specific environment.

Canadian vs. American Universities

One of the closest comparison groups to unionization is the United States as we are closest geographically and in political agenda. However, although Canada and the United States have similar operational structures for higher education (Katchanovkski, Rothman & Nevitte, 2011), some distinct differences make the US an unattractive sample for the current study. Indeed, in 2004 only approximately 27.4 percent of American full-time and part-time faculty were covered by a collective agreement compared to 80 percent of Canadian full and part-time faculty (Dobbie & Robinson, 2008). Katchanovkski, Rothman, and Nevitte (2011) examined the differences in attitudes towards unionism between Canadian and American higher education faculty. When it came to the importance of collective bargaining in protecting their interests, 86 percent of Canadian faculty agreed, whereas only 62 percent of American public faculty agreed. Additionally, within the US,

public and private institutions have separate labour laws. The public sector is governed by

the court system and state legislator (AAUP, 2017). The private sector is governed by The

National Labor Relations Act, which dictates that they are barred from forming unions.

This has been the case since 1990 when the US Supreme Court ruled that faculty were

considered management exempt and hence could not be represented by a labour union

(AAUP, 2017).

      Another distinct difference between the US and Canada's academic structures is

how each country approaches academic freedom. Academic freedom is a critical part of

the modern university. Academic freedom allows faculty to control their teaching and

research without censorship or restriction within reason (https://www.caut.ca/about-

us/caut-policy/lists/caut-policy-statements/policy-statement-on-academic-freedom).

Within the US, faculty are considered management; therefore, they are not covered by

labour law. Consequently, academic freedom is protected by the right to freedom of

speech contained in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, institutional rules and

regulations, and state law. Thus, all disputes are settled within the American judicial

system (AAUP, 2004).

      Conversely, within Canada, academic freedom is not protected within the court

system or federal legislation, and thus there is no legal precedence in which to base cases

(AAUP, 2004; Fudge & Tucker, 2012; Gillin, 2001). Indeed, academic freedom not a part

of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and its constitutional guarantee of free expression.

Universities are viewed as non-agencies of the state. The strongest legal protection of

academic freedom for unionized faculty is the use of labour law pertaining to the

collective agreement. When there is a dispute, the union files a grievance. Depending on

the severity, the issue may be taken to arbitration. Thus, there is a significant amount of importance on the collective agreement. And, therefore, the individuals who bargain on behalf of the faculty's academic freedoms. For example, within the Saint Mary's University Faculty Union (SMUFU) collective agreement it states that the general purpose of the agreement is:

"Both parties agree to work co-operatively towards developing the quality and effectiveness of the education provided by the University, and to encourage a climate of freedom, responsibility, and mutual respect in the pursuit of the University's goals, and to jointly pursue the above objectives."

In addition to academic freedom, the question of whether unionism within universities is monetarily advantageous for faculty has been a focus in research over the past few decades. Indeed, Birnbaum (1974) and Morgan & Kearney (1977) both conducted studies showing a distinct pay advantage for unionized employees within a university setting. However, Guthrie-Morse, Leslie, and Hu (1981) and Kesselring (1991) found that the opposite was true. Recently, an article in Maclean's online magazine has stated that Canadian university faculty are, on average, the best paid in the world. Unlike previous research studies, the authors took into consideration the cost of living. Thus, it is essential to have a chief negotiator with the behaviour characteristics and strategic knowledge to get the members what they want and need both academic freedom and monetary concerns.

Collective bargaining in universities

Collective bargaining is the process of negotiation between union and employer. It has become an essential process for ensuring employees' interests, rights, and job

security. The collective bargaining process involves a team of negotiators whose job it is to determine the new terms and conditions of the collective agreement through negotiation. The collective agreement is a legally binding document and is generally viable for three years, after which the process of bargaining begins again for a new or modified collective agreement. The lead of this team, and often the one who does most of the bargaining at the table, is the chief negotiator. The success of the collective agreement negotiation depends on the skills of the chief negotiator and their team.

The vast majority of collective bargaining research came at a time when higher education unionism and collective bargaining was relatively new for North America and in a phase of rapid growth (e.g., Bazerman et al., 2000; Blanton & Burnett, 1979; Garbarino, 1972; and Hedgepeth, 1974). In the '80s and early '90s, negotiation research focused on the cognitive approach centering on how behaviour and decision-making impacted negotiations and were conducted in laboratory settings (Bazerman et al., 2000). In the late 90s and into the 21st-century negotiation research began examining personal attributes such as gender (e.g., Mazei, Hüffmeier, Freund, Stuhlmacher, Bilke, & Hertel, 2015; Stuhlmacher, & Walters, 1999; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998) personal characteristics (e.g., Elfenbein, 2015; Dimotakis, Conlon, & Ilies, 2012) and emotions within a bargaining context (e.g., Druckman, & Olekalns, 2008; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004).

Negotiation Research Participants

As most negotiation research has been experimental, it has taken place within laboratory settings in which the simulations often lacked real-world applications (Sobral & Carvalho, 2002; Weingart, 2007). Both qualitative and quantitative participants are

generally students attending a negotiation course (e.g., Agndal, 2007; Anton, 1990; Kronzon, & Darley, 1999; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Olekalns, & Smith, 2007). Researchers have argued that students differ systematically from the general population in age, experience and tend to be more homogenous (Stevens, 2011). Students, as participants, pose discrepancies with real-world negotiators. Students are generally inexperienced; therefore, they do not engage in the same underlying thought processes as trained professionals, leading to suboptimal negotiation results (Herbst & Schwarz, 2011). Some studies show that this gap in negotiation outcomes can be diminished once the novice has experience (Herbst &Schwarz, 2011). For example, initially, participants demonstrate a distributive style; however, the participants adopt a more integrative style with practice. Further investigation into an individual's experience through practice has shown that although novice negotiators improve with practice, this is only the case if the negotiation tasks are similar. Therefore, participants' newfound bargaining skills are not easily transferable to new negotiation situations. The underlying factor between experience and expertise is that experts can transfer their core knowledge to different situations (Herbst & Schwarz, 2011).

The negotiation studies with an experimental design tend to have simple buyer-seller dyads or salary negotiation tasks. Collective bargaining is much more complex than one item negotiation, and it involves more than just monetary outcomes (Agndal, 2007). Due to the criticism of using students as participants, researchers have recently turned to MBA students as they have some practical negotiation experience and are therefore argued to be an acceptable alternative (Buelens et al., 2008; Herbst & Schwarz, 2011).

However, this study aims to move one step further into generalizability and use real

negotiators as the participant pool.

Currently, there is not a vast amount of studies using real-life negotiators, and

even less based on collective bargaining. Furthermore, most research that has used

trained negotiators as the participant pool used only surveys as their means of gathering

data (Agndal, 2007). Therefore, there is an opportunity to add to the current research

using a different methodology to broaden and confirm recent research results.

Additionally, the aforementioned studies also tend to examine one-on-one negotiation

instead of group negotiations (Agndal, 2007). Within collective bargaining, the union has

a team that collectively aids the chief negotiator in making decisions based on the union

members' shared interests (Agndal, 2007).

Behavioural Characteristics

Research has focused on negotiator behavioural characteristics to examine

negotiator success. There is, however, a debate as to whether there is a set of the specific

behavioural profile that marks a successful negotiator (Weingart et al., 1990). The

majority of literature examining negotiator characteristics has mainly focused on

qualitative studies (e.g., Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990). Within these

studies, the behavioural characteristics that have been examined have yielded the

subsequent results. When examining opening offers, research initially found that a

negotiator in a dyad situation is making an opening offer; high initial offers lead to a

better individual outcome (Weingart et al., 1990). However, a negative consequence of a

high initial offer is a stalemate in the negotiation. The high initial offer could be viewed

as contentious and consequently hinder the opponent's willingness to be integrative

(Weingart et al., 1990). Therefore, researchers suggest that negotiators open with a more realistic offer. When looking at the reciprocity of offers, it has been found that making multiple issues offers as opposed to going over issues one at a time allows for greater integrative outcomes (Weingart et al., 1990). Multi-issue offers lead to a better overall understanding of the opponent's interests leading to more trade-offs, leading to more integrative potential (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Weingart et al., 1990).

In one of the few real-world studies, Rackham and Carlisle (1978a) (1978b) examined what occurs before, during, and after face-to-face negotiations. They showed significant differences between the behavioural characteristics of "skilled" and "average" negotiators. Huthwaite replicated Rackham and Carlisle's (1978a) (1978b) studies in 2006 and found the same results. The authors used behaviour analysis to observe and quantify the behaviour of real-life negotiators directly. Rackham and Carlisle (1978a) (1978b) began data collection for their two-part study in 1968; results consisted of 103 observed negotiations of both successful and average negotiators. To qualify as successful, negotiators had to meet three specific criteria. (1) They should be rated as effective by both sides (2) they should have a track record of significant success and (3) they should have a low incidence of implementation failures (Rackham & Carlisle, 1978a; 1978b).

After analyzing the negotiations, Rackham and Carlisle (1978a; 1978b) found that differences between skilled and average negotiators exist in two main categories (1) how the skilled negotiator plans and (2) the skilled negotiators' face-to-face behaviour during negotiations. Negotiations require a substantial amount of planning; thus, the authors examined if there is a difference between the way skilled and average negotiators plan.

Rackham and Carlisle (1978a & 1978b) found no real difference in the amount of time

skilled and average negotiators use to plan before the negotiation. However, the authors

suggest caution as this was not an observed behaviour but a self-reported one.

Participants will be asked about how their negotiating positions were developed, the time

it took to plan, to examine planning in the current study. Skilled negotiators come up with

more options and proposals; they gave more attention to common ground areas over areas

of conflict. They also engaged in "behaviour labeling," where one makes value

statements before asking a question. For example, "Can I ask you a question" or "If I

could make a suggestion."

     Additionally, skilled negotiators test their understanding and summarize things

that have been said before moving on. Testing understanding is used to avoid

misunderstandings and to show honesty and concern. Asking questions frequently helps

on a multitude of levels. Questions help to prevent misunderstandings between parties

and are a more neutral method of communication than disagreeing. Questions give the

negotiator some control within the discussion and give them more time to sort out their

thoughts while the other side is responding to the question. It was observed that when it

came to feelings, skilled negotiators often gave more "internal information" than average

negotiators. The current study aims to extend these findings by using a more complex,

real-world sample. Unlike Rackham and Carlisle (1978a & 1978b), the current study will

use interviews instead of observation to gather a wider geographical participant pool.

Negotiation Tactics

     Coinciding with behavioural characteristics are the tactics that negotiators use to

implement their negotiation strategy and organize their approach (e.g., integrative and/or

distributive bargaining). Within negotiations, the strategy, communication, and tactics used by the negotiator are the core elements of the bargaining process (Monich, & Matveeva, 2012). Strategy pertains to the long-term plan for achieving the desired goals of the current and future negotiations. The strategy is orchestrated through tactics through which the negotiator can gain an advantage over the opponent. Negotiation tactics are defined as "specific behaviors in negotiation which implement a negotiator's strategies" (Weingart et al., 1990; p. 10). Within the literature on negotiation tactics specific to collective bargaining, negotiators use several different tactics to attain the terms they want. According to Monich & Matveeva (2012), these tactics range in levels of cooperation and confrontation. Traditional competitive bargaining, also referred to as rights-based bargaining, is defined by its "us vs. them" mentality where the goal is to win the biggest piece of the pie. This bargaining style is best understood within the interests, rights, power paradigm (Ury, Brett, and Goldberg, 1993). The rights and power portion of the paradigm are most common in adversarial negotiations as they are not focusing on mutual gains. For example, when the parties focus on rights, they try to resolve disputes based on what they believe is fair, the law, and the current contract. This focus has led to a more distributive outcome (Lytle, Brett, & Shapiro, 1999). When focusing on power in a negotiation, each side takes an offensive stand to try and get concessions from the other, leading to a distributive outcome. Additionally, focusing on power can lead to resentment and spiral into hostility and aggression (Lytle, Brett, & Shapiro, 1999). Both rights and power as a focus create an environment where the potential for integrative gains is lost.

Conversely, integrative bargaining, a more cooperative method, is defined by its

"win-win" mentality where the parties are more collaborative, focusing on each other's

common interests. Thus, the aim is to create a mutually beneficial outcome. For example,

instead of trying to get the biggest piece of the pie, the goal is to expand the pie. A

common type of integrative bargaining is interest-based bargaining. Fisher, Ury, and

Patton (1991) founded the concept of interest basted bargaining and popularized the

strategy in the book Getting to "Yes" (Fisher, Ury &Patton, 1991). This method can be

used in both distributive and integrative structured negotiations. Interest-based bargaining

requires a high level of trust between the two parties to work effectively.

Negotiation tactics range on a continuum beginning with cooperative and

integrative and ending with unethical. Research has shown that there are mixed results on

individuals' use of particular tactics within a negotiation. Thus, there exists a gray area in

which some individuals consider the tactic to be ethical, and some consider it unethical; a

prime example being bluffing (Bazerman et al., 2000). For example, an empirical study

by examined the ethicality of negotiation tactics such as the misrepresentation of

information or bluffing and found that some participants perceived bluffing as a viable

negotiation tactic, while others perceived it as unethical. These mixed reviews are also

found with more extreme tactics such as lying and deceit (Bazerman et al., 2000). Several

other manipulative and traditional tactics have been examined thoroughly within the

negotiation literature. (e.g., Anton, 1990; Kronzon, & Darley, 1999; Lewicki &

Robinson, 1998; Olekalns, & Smith, 2009). For example, research has shown that when

individuals use dishonesty as a tactic, they often have a more optimal negotiation

outcome (DeRue, Conlon, Moon, & Willaby, 2009). However, these individuals also

suffer from a loss of interpersonal trust (DeRue et al., 2009). This loss of trust can hinder

the dishonest negotiator in future interactions with the same individual(s) as integrative

bargaining requires a high level of trust.

Research Question 1: What negotiation tactics are most used in a unionized

environment?

There has not been much investigation into the use of negotiation tactics within a

unionized environment (for example, Downie, 1991). Due to the faculty-university

bargaining relationship consisting of peers on both sides of the negotiating table (Paquet,

Gaétan, & Bergeron, 2000), it would be detrimental to their working relationship to use

dishonesty and deception at the bargaining table. Thus, it is expected that this tactic will

not be one that faculty negotiators use. One of the most popular tactics used in

negotiation is controlling and manipulating information, as information is a significant

power source within a negotiation (Olekalns, & Smith, 2009; Robinson et al., 2000). This

tactic is regarded as in the "gray zone," meaning some consider it ethical and consider the

tactic unethical (Olekalns, & Smith, 2009).

H1: University chief negotiators will be unlikely to use manipulative tactics.

H2: University chief negotiators will view lying and deceit negatively.

This study will add to the current negotiation tactics research on several levels:

adding emotional labour as a negotiation tactic, examining chief negotiators'

characteristics and tactics in tandem, and adding a real-world aspect by collecting data

via interviews. For this study, I will specifically be examining the following manipulative

negotiation tactics: misrepresentation of information, bluffing, manipulation of an

opponent's network, inappropriate information gathering, and emotional labour, and traditional competitive bargaining.

Gender in Negotiation

Since the beginning of negotiation research, an individual's characteristics, such as gender, have been essential in negotiation outcomes (e.g., Stuhlmacher, & Walters, 1999). Indeed, gender is the most commonly studied personal variable within negotiation research (Stuhlmacher & Mayer, 1998). Researchers have applied theories from other research streams such as sociology to examine how gender affects negotiations on various levels. For example, using concepts from social psychology, Eagly and Crowley (1986) found that based on gender roles and helping, male negotiators, on average, used more pressure or forceful tactics in labour disputes compared to female negotiators. Female negotiators, conversely, were found to be more cooperative and accommodating in nature (Eagly & Crowley, 1996). Due to the volume of gender in negotiation research, several meta-analyses have been conducted to thoroughly examine the potential differences between males and females within negotiations.

The first of these meta-analyses were conducted by Walters, Stuhlmacher, and Meyer in 1998 and included 62 studies examining gender and negotiation competitiveness. Within the literature review, the authors found contradicting results. The majority of studies found men to be more competitive and women to be more cooperative, confirming previous gender role stereotypes (e.g., Eagly & Johnson 1990; King, Miles, & Kniska, 1991). However, there were several that found the opposite to be true. For example, in an experiment using a variation of the prisoner's dilemma where the opponent was not seen, King, Miles, and Kniska (1991) the authors found that when a

competitive strategy was employed, the participants were over three times more likely to guess that the individual was male. However, a surprising amount of studies found the opposite to be true (Bedell & Sist runk, 1970; Hottes & Kahn, 1974; Oskamp & Pearlman, 1965).

After conducting the meta-analysis, the authors found that women are more cooperative in negotiating than men; however, the difference is slight, only accounting for less the 1% of the variance. However, due to the significance of the homogeneity statistic (Q), Walters, Stuhlmacher, and Meyer (1998) tested the experimental paradigm as a moderator and found a significant difference between matrix games and bargaining experiments. Within matrix games, women were more competitive than their male counterparts when facing a real component. With an explicit bargaining experiment, when paired with a real-life opponent instead of a simulation, men and women acted according to gender stereotypes. Interestingly, the authors also conclude that matrix games are fundamentally different from actual bargaining.

In 1999 Stulmacher and Walters conducted a meta-analysis consisting of 21 studies that focused on gender differences in negotiation outcomes. The prevailing stereotype is that men outperform women in negotiations and thus obtain better outcomes. When examining gender differences in negotiation settlements, the authors first examined theories as to why the discrepancy exists. Gender stereotypes, behavior, and power are the three prevailing theories as to why men and women differ in negotiation outcomes. Gender stereotypes are societally driven and internalize at a young age. As such, stereotypical behaviors can be attributed to individuals subconsciously (Kimmel et al., 1980). For example, the previously mentioned presenter's dilemma study

conducted by Kniska (1991). When the confederate behaved competitively, the

participants guessed their gender to be male. When the confederate behaved

cooperatively, the participants guessed their gender to be female (Kniaka, 1991).

Additionally, Matheson (1991) conducted a study where participants completed a

series of financial contracts against a computer that was programmed to use a neutral

negotiation style. Participants were led to believe their opponent was either male or

female in the female condition, where participants attributed more cooperative style

bargaining than the male condition (Matheson, 1991). Looking at behavioural differences

between men and women, research has shown that women behave more cooperatively

than men in negotiation; however, the difference is slight (Walters, Stuhlmacher, &

Meyer, 1998).

Power has been associated with better negotiation outcomes; the individual with

higher status and more power is expected to gain better outcomes (Watson 1994).

Stereotypical gender roles are closely linked to power; men are of higher status and, thus,

more power than women who are considered lower status (Watson 1994). Some

researchers believe that power will outweigh gender in negotiation outcomes. Indeed,

researchers have found that power overall had more of an effect than gender on the

economic outcomes. Thus, power is more predictive of negotiation outcomes than

gender. The meta-analysis results showed that, overall, women achieved lower outcomes

than men (Stulmacher and Walter, 1999). The authors also conducted a moderator

analysis; however, none of the moderators (Gender stereotypes, behavior, and power)

yielded significant results. The authors theorize that the lack of results could be due to the

small sample size.

In 2015, Mazei, Hüffmeier, Freund, Stuhlmacher, Bilke, and Hertel conducted a meta-analysis examining gender differences in economic negotiation outcomes. The authors based their study on Stulmacher and Walter's (1999) work with a larger sample size. Mazie et al. (2015) examined social role theory as the first explanation as to why males and females achieve different negotiation outcomes. Societal gender roles and stereotypes are a large factor in how individuals view themselves and behave (Eagly & Wood, 2012). For example, females are regarded as nurturing, accommodating, and relationship-oriented, while men are considered competitive and assertive (Eagly & Wood, 2012). Thus, when individuals stray from these socially acceptable behaviours, they are viewed negatively (Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007).

Mazei et al. (2015) found that overall, men did achieve higher economic outcomes than women; however, the underlying effect sizes varied, thus the inclusion of following moderators categorized by a situation, person, and task: advocacy, structural ambiguity, experience, self-initiated negotiation, and integrative potential. Advocacy is closely linked with gender roles. For example, if a female negotiates for herself, this goes against their subservient gender role. However, if a female negotiates on behalf of others, it goes along with their nurturing and caring nature and is not viewed negatively (Amanatullah, & Morris, 2010). Additionally, assertiveness, an attribute that has been linked to negotiation success (Amanatullah, & Morris, 2010), is viewed less negatively when women are negotiating on behalf of others (Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005). Thus, uninhibited with social backlash for using attributes outside of their gender's scope, women negotiating on behalf of others tend to be more assertive. Indeed, Mazei et al. (2015) found that although men do achieve better economic outcomes than women on

average, the gender difference is completely diminished when women negotiate on behalf

of others.

Furthermore, when negotiators are given the negotiation parameters (Bowles et

al., 2015), the gender difference is also completely diminished (Mazei et al., 2015). This

is due to individuals being more comfortable in unambiguous situations and, therefore,

less reliant on base instincts such as stereotypes and gender roles (Bowles et al., 2015).

Thus, gender differences in negotiation are a factor of the situation as well as the

individual. In university bargaining, the chief negotiator is bargaining on behalf of others;

thus, it is reasonable to assume that the gender differences in collective bargaining should

be minimal.

Due to the constraints of the current study's methodology, the focus of gender

differences in negotiating will be examining whether there is a difference in how the male

and female negotiators respond to the interview questions involving negotiation tactics.

Additionally, it is important to ask if participants perceive that their gender affected the

bargaining table.

Research Question 2: In examining the common themes throughout the interviews, will

there a noticeable difference in how male and female participants use negotiation

tactics?

Research Question 3: Do chief negotiators feel that their gender is a factor in the

negotiation process?

Emotions in Negotiation

Physical and verbal displays of emotion are an integral part of communication

within our society. Emotions can be distinguished from one's mood in that they are short

in duration and expressed specifically towards something or someone (van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Within negotiation, emotions can be relevant in three main ways. First, individuals simply have emotions that can have predictable effects on others (Olekalns et al., 2014). This is relevant from a behaviour descriptive point of view. Second, there are strategic gains negotiators can make through emotional signals from their counterparts (Druckman & Olekalns, 2008). Third, emotional labour, whether displaying emotions truthfully or falsely, can influence negotiations (Elfenbein, Foo, White, Tan, & Aik, 2007).

Natural emotional displays within negotiation are divided into two research sub-categories; intrapersonal (within oneself) and interpersonal (between others) (Olekalns et al., 2014). Initially, researchers focused on the intrapersonal effects of emotions on negotiation outcomes. The most examined emotions within this research field are happiness and anger, as they are surmised to be relevant to most if not all negotiations (van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Forgas (1988) found that positive emotions increased an individual's willingness to work cooperatively, while negative emotions lead to competitive bargaining. Additionally, Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki (1987) found that positive emotions such as happiness lead to creativity in finding solutions to problems. Researchers have also found that being primed with a particular feeling, such as happiness, can cause participants to expand their bargaining strategy from a fixed-pie perspective to a more integrative one (Pietroni, Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Pagliaro, 2008).

Research focus then shifted to the interpersonal effects of emotional displays in negotiation. That is, how emotions can influence others within a negotiation setting. In a series of experiments, Van Kleef and colleagues (2004) examined the effects of

happiness and anger in negations. The authors found that when faced with anger,

participants made more concessions and lowered their demands. They also found that

when shown happiness, participants had a more favorable view of their opponent. The

effect of anger only occurred when it was strategically advantageous to the participant;

otherwise, the emotion was ignored (van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). There are

also ways in which emotions can influence one another. For example, reciprocity is when

an emotion displayed by one individual elicits the same emotion in another (McIntosh,

1996). Reciprocity can hinder a negotiation when the use of anger leads to anger from

the opponent instead of concession making (van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004).

Van Kleef et al. (2006) also found that participants negotiating against a happy opponent

placed higher demands and made smaller concessions. Additionally, individuals who

express anger during negotiation are perceived to be tougher bargainers, leading to

concessions (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Conversely, negative displays of emotion can

hinder or stall the negotiation process and harm the relationship of the negotiators

(Olekalns et al., 2014).

　　　　Both facial and verbal expressions of emotion are an essential part of

communication as a lot of information can be exchanged through these displays

(Druckman & Olekalns, 2008). Using the emotional expression from a counterpart can be

used as a signal to gain strategic information during a negotiation (Druckman &

Olekalns, 2008). For example, emotional displays may signal what value negotiators

attach to different negotiation issues (Druckman & Olekalns, 2008; Pietroni, Van Kleef,

De Dreu, & Pagliaro, 2008). Pietroni and colleagues (2008) found that seeing happiness

and anger in one's opponent was viewed by participants as helpful information.

Participants, in turn, used this information strategically to place values on their opponent's negotiation goals.

Research Question 4a: Do the negotiators use emotions for gathering strategic information in negotiations?

Research Question 4b: How helpful did they find this strategy?

In 2007, Van Kleef and Côté examined when the expression of anger is advantageous in a negotiation. The authors posited a model based on the power and appropriateness of the situation. In a buyer-seller scenario conducted over the phone, power was manipulated by limiting (low-power) or expanding (high-power) the number of alternatives the participant had. Anger was displayed by the following statement "This offer makes me really angry. I expect a better offer" (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007, p. 1560). To manipulate the appropriateness of the anger, participants read that the anger was warranted or unjustified. In the high-power, unjustified anger scenario, the participant more remained steadfast in their demands than the justified anger and no emotion conditions. In the low-power condition, participants' demands were lower in value regardless of if the anger was warranted or not. In a second study, using a more complicated procedure using a computer as the mode of communication, the authors replicated the first study's findings.

Many of these studies were conducted in a laboratory condition and did not use face-to-face conditions. Laboratory experiments are conducted in a sterile environment, which takes away the authenticity of emotion and stifles the emotional display (Bazerman et al., 2000; Janis 1982). With this realistic methodology, it is expected that the emotions shown at the bargaining table will be more authentic, giving us a different context to

current research. Additionally, most of the research has only examined happiness and anger. People are complex beings who feel and express many emotions, such as fear, disgust, surprise, sadness, and shame. Thus, by asking participants about what emotions they use, the current study will help expand research by providing an array of emotions to be examined in future research.

   Research Question 5: What emotions do the negotiators cognitively use as a strategy?

Emotional labour in negotiation

   Emotional Labour is defined by Grandey (2000) as involving "enhancing, faking, or suppressing emotions to modify the emotional expression" (p.95). There are two forms of emotional labor: deep acting and surface acting. Grandey (2003) explained the process of deep acting as "When engaging in deep acting an actor attempts to modify feelings to match the required displays. The intent, then, is to *seem* authentic to the audience." (p. 87). Since deep acting entails altering emotions rather than just faking emotions, it has been positively related to both well-being in general and performance outcomes within the workplace (Hulsheger & Schewe, 2011). Surface acting is when individuals "modify their displays without shaping inner feelings. Doing this entails experiencing emotional dissonance, or the tension felt when expressions and feelings diverge" (Grandey, 2003, p. 87).

   Emotional labour is mostly examined as individuals regulating their emotions in the workplace to fulfill the emotional display rules of organizations (Grandey, 2000). Thus, a large portion of emotional labor research pertains to the service industry, as employees are expected to follow display rules of expressing positive emotions. Given

the research examining the use of emotions as a negotiation strategy, it is not unrealistic to believe that negotiators could be using surface acting to gain concessions. However, research has shown that surface acting can be detected in others and has a negative effect on emotional reciprocity (Hennig-Thurau, Groth, Paul, & Gremler, 2006). Thus, it is crucial to examine if the authenticity and emotional display affect the negotiation. It makes sense then to posit that surface acting could explain why using anger as a strategy can have mal effects on the negotiation (e.g., van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). To date, only one article has applied emotional labour to negotiation. Côté, Hideg, and van Kleef (2013) looked at how surface acting (faking) anger affects trust between negotiators. The authors found that surface acting anger was detrimental to negotiation outcomes due to reduced trust (Côté, Hideg, & van Kleef, 2013). Participants were dissatisfied with the process and indicated that they did not wish to bargain with someone who engaged in surface acting. The current study will add to this line of research by examining what emotions the negotiators surface and how the strategy worked for them.

   Research Question 6: Have the negotiators ever faked emotions at the bargaining table? What was the outcome?

Methodology

   Collective bargaining is a complex process and would be challenging to examine within a laboratory setting. Additionally, the qualitative observation method would not be realistic, given that negotiators are protective about what goes on during negotiation. The present study used semi-structured interviews with past and current chief faculty negotiators. Interviewing will give a real insight into what is happening at the bargaining table. University faculty are a small but essential niche of individuals. Increasingly,

universities are receiving funding from businesses that believe that their agendas should

be integrated into the curriculum by providing funding. By having academic freedom in a

collective agreement, the curriculum can be kept objective and free from others' agendas.

Qualitative research methods aid us in contextualization and realism (Pratt et al.,

in press). This realism is achieved in part through organic communication (e.g.,

interview), which is then used to explore, describe, and interpret the "personal and social

experiences of the participants" (Smith, 2003, p. 2). By design, qualitative research is

more tailored to assess "why" and "how." This can be especially useful within the

complexity of an organizational setting (Bluhm, Harman, Lee & Mitchell, 2011; Lee et

al., 2011; Pratt et al., in press). The current study used semi-structured interview

questions to collect data. By basing the interview questions on pre-existing theory, this

study takes a deductive approach. This interviewing method affords flexibility, allowing

for unanticipated information while also having structure and consistency (Bitektine,

2008).

Participants and Procedures

Participants consisted of past and present faculty negotiators within Canadian

universities (N=15, male n=8; female n=7). Participants ranged across the country,

including universities in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, British Columbia, and

Alberta. Participants were solicited via email through a CAUT contact list provided by

Dr. Catano. The average age was 53, and the education level ranged from a Master's

(n=6) to a Ph.D. (n=9). Of the 99 individuals contacted, 49 individuals responded to the

initial email. Of those 49 individuals, 17 accepted and followed through to the interview.

Due to technical difficulties with the recording device, only 15 of those interviews were

transcribed. All the semi-structured interviews were conducted over the phone for

consistency. Once the negotiator agreed to participate, the interview date and time were

set up at their convenience. The average interview time was 48.75 minutes, the shortest

interview being 30 minutes and the longest being 89 minutes, with a standard deviation

of 16.33. An open-ended question at the end of the interview identified any additional

information that was not covered.

Materials

      Interview Questions. Using a semi-structured interview affords structure and

flexibility while seeking the participants' narrative to confirm or disconfirm the

hypothesis. I felt that participants' responses would be much richer than with a survey,

allowing for a mix of closed and open-ended questions. REB approval was obtained

before data collection. These questions pertained to the participant's bargaining

experience and fell into three main categories: demographics, negotiation tactics, and

negotiator characteristics. An example of a negotiation tactics question is, "Have you had

more success using integrative or distributive tactics?" Terminology was defined and

explained to participants to ensure everyone had the same understanding of the terms

used. An example of a negotiation characteristics question is, "During planning do you

concentrate on the areas that hold the most potential for conflict or the possible areas of

common ground?" Please see appendix A for the full interview protocol. There was only

one interviewer, which is a limitation that will be discussed in the limitations section.

      Recording Device. To ensure that nothing in the interview was missed, the 15

interviews were recorded using a USB- phone recorder. Participants were asked for

consent in the original email and asked again verbally at the beginning of the interview.

Transcriber. Following best practice and ensuring accuracy, a professional

transcriber was used to provide the interviews in text format. Having a transcript for each

interview aided in the subsequent coding and thematic analysis.

Analytic Approach

Qualitative research is inductive (Braun & Clark, 2006), meaning it allows

researchers to explore and give realism to theories. Conversely, quantitative analysis is a

method used to test theories, allowing us to draw themes and commonalities from the

data (Reissman, 1994). The interviews were numbered 1 through 15 and will hereby be

referred to as such. When using semi-structured interviews as a methodology, there

comes the question of how many interviews is enough? The appropriate sample size for

qualitative data is not based on a power analysis (Francis et al., 2010) but data saturation.

Saturation occurs at "the point in data collection when no new additional data are found

that develop aspects of a conceptual category" (Francis et al., 2010; p. 1230). Therefore,

there is no set number of interviews but a point in which no new information can be

gleaned from additional interviews (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). Unfortunately, the

current study did not reach saturation in the interview content. This limitation was due to

a lack of interest from potential participants. In retrospect, collecting data during the

summer semesters was a poor timing decision. While some of the interview questions had

the same themes, additional data would be needed to reach a level where no new

information is collected.

Following Braun and Clark (2006) guidelines, thematic analysis was used to

examine the interviews. This process is commonly used in analyzing interviews. As the

current study took a deductive approach, the interview codes were based on existing

literature theories or ideas. Through the process of thematic analysis, one can

systematically scrutinize qualitative data and determine quantifiable meaning. Coding

and theme development were guided by the theory laid out by studies such as Monich

and Matveeva (2012), who examined manipulative behaviour in negotiation, and

Rackham and Carlisle (1978a&b), who examined the behaviours of effective negotiators

in a real-world setting.

Braun and Clark (2006) suggest a six-phase process of thematic analysis: (1)

Familiarizing oneself with the data, (2) Generating initial codes, (3) Searching for

themes, (4) Reviewing themes, (5) Defining and naming themes, and (6) Producing the

report. It is important to note that a thematic analysis was not conducted on the

behavioural characteristics section. The purpose of the behavioural characteristics section

is to compare the responses of the current sample to the negotiator responses in the two-

part study by Rackham & Carlisle (1978).

Step 1: Once the interviews were conducted and then transcribed, I familiarized

myself with the data. I read the transcripts of the interviews several times; I also listened

to the audiotapes. Also, I made notes and suggested initial codes for reference and

consideration in the following steps. As I was the only coder, there is the limitation of not

cross-checking the reliability of the codes or identified themes. This will be discussed

further in the limitations section.

Step 2: The generation of the initial codes from the interviews using hand-coding.

Codes are defined by Boyatzis (1998) as "the most basic segment, or element, of the raw

data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon"

(p. 63). The initial search began with systematically searching for the codes that were

pre-emptively made from existing research. An example code from the existing research

would be the tactic of "bluffing." This began to take place after several interviews had

taken place and continued until all the interviews were completed and looked at globally.

Once the initial codes were found, the data were examined for additional codes that were

not explicitly outlined in the existing theory. This was a precaution to avoid narrowing

the scope and missing some important codes and themes. An example of an unexpected

code is "maintain a calm demeanor." Using the methodology set out by Braun and Clark

(2006; 2012), I used colour codes both within the interviews and in writing while reading

through the interviews.

Step 3: After thoroughly going through the interviews and coding on a micro

level, the next step is to take a more macro view. This involves organizing the codes into

different themes. Themes are defined as capturing "something important about the data

concerning the research question and represents some level of patterned response or

meaning within the data set" (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 82). The themes that were created

were mainly based on pre-existing research. However, additional themes not covered in

pre-existing literature were sought out to ensure that nothing was missed. This was done

using Excel and the electronic copies of the interviews to organize and re-organize the

codes into overarching themes.

Step 4: Once the initial themes are created, they must be reviewed and refined. This

step involves examining themes to ensure that they are cohesive and combining themes

that go together. According to Brun and Clark (2006), if the data are too diverse, the theme

is problematic; this was the case with the Gender theme. In looking at the codes, the data

regarding just gender was extremely diverse; however, every interviewee cited personality

as a factor. Therefore, gender was removed from the themes. Additionally, the honesty and integrity themes were collapsed into one theme as integrity involves honesty.

Step 5: Lastly, the themes must be named and defined. Analysis of the demographics data revealed three reasons for taking an active role in the union (1) peer influence, (2) Volunteer (3) the result of a strike. Within analyzing the negotiation tactics data, there were four main themes and four subthemes. (1) Integrity at the bargaining table, (Honesty) (2) Stubbornness when refusing "bad" proposals/ when sticking to what they want, (3) Traditional competitive bargaining, (4) Using emotion to gain concessions from the other side (Void emotions, Emotional argument, Indignation). Details and definitions of these themes are in the results section.

Results

Who are Faculty Chief Negotiators?

To begin to delve into the question of "who is a faculty negotiator?" I asked chief negotiators a series of questions about why they decided to become a more active member of their union. These questions were based on previous research on union participation that identified factors such as parental union beliefs as an influence on their own union beliefs (Barling, Kelloway, & Bremermann, 1991; Hester, & Fuller, 1999). Thus, participants were first asked if their parents were union members, which tends to predict union participation. Four of the 15 interviewees indicated that their parents were involved in a union (Mother n=3; Both parents n=1). None of these individuals indicated that they felt their parents' views influenced their own on unionism or getting involved in a union. However, those individuals (n=11) who indicated that neither parent was involved with a union agreed that their parents' pro-union views influenced their own.

Participants cited peer influence (n=7) as the main reason they became involved in their union.

The current study also identified other demographic information, which is presented in Table 1. The Chief Negotiator's gender, education, and training are as follows: 9 out of 15 interviewees had doctoral degrees, with the remaining six holding master's degrees. Eight of the 15 the negotiators identified as male. Five of the six master's holders were female. The Chief Negotiators were, on average, 53.9 years old, ranging from 36 to 68 years old.

Most of the negotiators (n=14) did not have any type of formal training or experience at the bargaining table before taking on the role of chief negotiator. "It was baptism by fire" (Interview 5). When asked about previous experience, six of the 15 interviewees indicated that they had no prior experience before becoming the Chief Negotiator; however, the remaining nine had previously been at the table as part of their negotiations team. Only one individual had any formal training before becoming a chief negotiator. Two had no formal or informal training; however, the remaining 12 had been to CAUT Chief Negotiators forums.

Formal or Informal Training

"I would say about none. I was on the strategy committee before that but not ever at the table. It was baptism by fire." (Interview 5)

"I wouldn't say so, I mean I've been to union gatherings where we had information, but it was not related to bargaining per se. I was at the CAUT bargaining workshop last year so, or two years ago, I don't remember." (Interview 3)

"Only what I had learned as a team member in the first round
The CAUT workshops would be all I have." (Interview 8)

Table 4:

Characteristics of Negotiators Interviewed

Interview	Age	Gender	Level of education	Level of experience
1	45	M	PhD	CAUT; local workshop; one round on the team
2	52	M	PhD	CAUT; Chief negotiators forum
3	44	M	PhD	CAUT
4	62	M	PhD	CAUT; ~10 rounds
5	56	F	Masters	CAUT
6	61	M	PhD	CAUT; international negotiating exp.
7	39	M	PhD	Previous round
8	51	F	PhD	CAUT; previous round
9	36	F	Masters	CAUT
10	62	F	PhD	None
11	63	F	Masters	None
12	68	F	Masters	CAUT
13	56	F	Masters	CAUT
14	50	M	Masters	CAUT
15	63	M	PhD	FPSE

Note: Experience is up until their bargaining round as Chief

Gender in negotiation:

Interviewees were asked if they perceived that their gender played a role in their negotiations. Most interviewees' (n=10) did not overtly perceive that their gender played a role and instead cited that personality had more impact overall. However, this is partly due to the closed-ended questions used in the interview, which will be discussed further in the limitations section. Participants may not have explicitly stated gender made a difference; however, some of the answers showed gender effects. Of those who did not perceive gender influenced the negotiation, four were female.

> "It's hard to separate personal characteristics from somebody's gender I guess. Cause it's all in the package, like there's a person and they have a gender and they have a way of talking and they have a particular style and

it's a little hard to do the counter-factual. So what would it have been like when asked, you know negotiating with, on the other side of the table, from someone who is otherwise the same but had a different gender. I mean if you change their gender, then you change probably a lot of other things too. So it's a little tricky" (Interview 2).

Additionally, those who felt gender did play a role (n=3 female; n=2 male) cited personality as a larger factor than perceived gender differences. A few of the male participants stated that they preferred a female counterpart:

"…So you know if, based on my experience, I would prefer to deal with a female chief negotiator based on my experience because they tend to be able to control the table better than male, two males going at one another." (Interview 4)

"Women are more problem solvers, we're not as aggressive, and that can be an advantage or a disadvantage depending on how you work it. So, I would say yes my gender has affected the way I negotiate. I don't think it's affected my success at all, but just how I go about it" (Interview 5).

One female participant felt that she was being left out specifically due to her gender.

"...Yes, so the comment that was made at one point was I'll talk middle-aged male to middle-aged male for you. Like I don't understand and yah and it's stressful enough trying to negotiate with the other side but stressful enough trying to get your own team. And it's not like my word is the be all, end all, but, so yah it's funny that you ask that gender thing because I kind of wanted to bring that up at the negotiators forum that we should be looking at, like the question of gender in negotiations, not just across the table but within your own team dynamic" (Interview 9).

In reviewing the interviews by gender, there was no discernable difference in how male and female chief negotiators used the targeted negotiation tactics. However, there were some fundamental dynamics that we did not anticipate that came out of the interviews. I will discuss gender implications and the context of gender more broadly in the discussion section.

What Influenced the Individual to become a Chief Negotiator?

In asking the interviewees why they become involved in being an active member of their union, three factors emerged:

- **Peer influence**: Peers or mentors who encouraged them to take on the role of chief negotiator (n=5)

    > "… he made a comment that it's better to have a seat at the table, a place at the table than to be on the sidelines, so that helped me really think about this different and so my first actual involvement was I was appointed to the bargaining team as, when we negotiated our first collective agreement, I was the health sciences librarian appointed to the bargaining team." (Interview 9)

- **Volunteerism**: Someone was needed, so they decided to offer themselves as a chief negotiator (n=7)

    > "… just someone was needed and I had already been in union work before so I was interested in that and three years ago it was a negotiation round so I applied to be on the committee and I got to be president of that committee too. And that's actually how I got to be president of the grievance committee, kind of a follow-up, automatic follow-up." (Interview 3)

- **Strike**: Became more involved in the process after a faculty strike and eventually worked up to chief negotiator. (n=3)

    > "My second year the faculty voted to go on strike, and that was the second strike in a couple, within three rounds, and I was new to the university and just didn't, have a good grasp of what the issues were, asked a lot of questions and started getting more involved. So when the contract was about to expire, the next time around, I just decided to throw my hat in the ring" (Interview 7)

Negotiation Tactics

The current study examined the type of tactics used by faculty Chief Negotiators. Four themes and one subthemes emerged. The themes are illustrated with quotes from the negotiators along with the number identifying the theme.

- **Theme: Integrity at the bargaining table:** Trying to understand where the other side is coming from (n=15).

  > "I mean you have, all you have at that table is your integrity and you know there's two rules at that table. The first rule is if you're going to present information it better be correct, and the second rule is never make up anything". (Interview 4)

  > "Everybody has to keep their eye on the prize and the prize is not winning or losing, or having an influence on the people who are sitting from across the table. The prize is getting the best possible deal that you can for your members and I don't care who's across from the table, and I don't really care who is at the table with us, I just want people to make sure that you know, you don't get wrapped on in individual issues, on individual personalities, on the sort of environment at the table" (Interview 4)

  o **Sub Theme: Honesty:** Refusing the use of "strong" tactics that the negotiator viewed as negative. (n=15)

    > "I mean we try to take an honest and forthright approach to bargaining and so I don't want to say we don't use tactics but we try to work from a position of you know, of making justifiable demands that can be explained and that reasonable people would consider to be reasonable" (Interview 15)

- **Theme: Stubbornness:** Refusing to give in to the other side's perceived unfair demands and sticking to their positions. (n=5)

  > "If stubbornness is a tactic, then we use stubbornness because we learned the value of the word no. So I guess a tactic that we used was you're going to push us, than we're going to just say no" (Interview 9)

  > "So once we had negotiated the other terms and conditions, once we had negotiated money, then we were bringing back that issue and telling them it was a hill to die on, and it worked brilliantly." (Interview 4)

- **Theme: Traditional competitive bargaining:** Making an opening demand higher than what you hope to receive. (n=10)

  > Oh yah definitely we do that more in the, the, not so much the issue itself but the range of possible ways that the issue can be presented. So we will often ask for something, not deliberately over stating it, but we're asking

for an ideal, you know what we would hope would be the best possible thing, knowing full well that we'll never get it. (Interview 15)

- **Theme: Manipulative Tactics**. Integrity and honesty at the table were the approaches chief negotiators took. All 15 negotiators stayed away from manipulative tactics such as falsification and deception; a few (n=3) used misrepresentation as to a strategy "Yes, if you define that as something appearing to be more significant than you let on, then it actually is, yes" (Interview 9). About half (n=7) of the negotiators used bluffing as a tactic. "Many times. Well, now bluff meaning taking sort of a hard position on something that in the end is probably not going to be a hard position (Interview 4)." When the negotiators felt they were being manipulated by the other side of the table, they walked away.

  > "I don't believe in it, you'll be called out in that crap and then your reputation, all you have in the labour movement to be honest with you is your reputation. And if you damage that you're done. And to me what damages a relationship or damages your reputation is lying, falsification, demeaning, all of those kinds of things, so no I stay away from that stuff" (Interview 11).

Emotions in Negotiation

As previously stated, emotions can be relevant within a negotiation context in three main ways. First, individuals simply have emotions that can have predictable effects on others (Olekalns et al., 2014). Second, strategic gains negotiators can make through emotional signals from their counterparts (Druckman & Olekalns, 2008). Third, emotional labour, whether displaying emotions truthfully or falsely, can influence negotiations (Elfenbein, Foo, White, Tan, & Aik, 2007). As emotions in a negotiation

context are a relatively new research field, the current study asked three broad questions.

Participants were asked what (if any) emotions negotiators used at the bargaining table to

gain concessions. The sub-themes of void emotions, emotional argument, and indignation

emerged from the interviews.

- o **Void emotions:** Showing a lack of emotions. Remaining calm and giving no

    reaction in the face of aggression or hostility from the other side. (n=5)

    > "Yah I'm not convinced that I got the upper hand but I've certainly used
    > emotion yes…And the lack of them, that's another important issue, not
    > responding emotion" (Interview 2)

- o **Emotional argument:** eliciting an emotional response from the other side to see

    the merits of the proposed articles. For example, eliciting shame or compassion on

    the other side. (n=8)

    > "We were saying look our proposal is to make these members' lives better,
    > these are people who had contributed for year after year after year, without
    > any job security, without any health and welfare benefits, with lower
    > salaries and yet here you are denying them the opportunity to be full
    > participants in this university. That's an emotional argument and I don't
    > know if it worked, if that was the only thing that made it work, but it
    > certainly, we've been blatantly using emotional arguments for as long as
    > I've been involved" (Interview 15).

- o **Indignation:** When asked about the use of anger in negotiations, negotiators used

    the terms indignation or outrage instead of outright anger. (n=5)

    > "Yah for the most, I would think there have been times like I said, I think
    > the bluffing comes in there more kind of like righteous indignation, how
    > dare you suggest that kind of thing, where it's really not that big of a deal,
    > but just to let them know we're not going to entertain that, you know what
    > I mean?"(Interview 11)

Using Emotions Strategically

When asked about the use of emotions at the bargaining table (n=9), negotiators stated that they used emotion strategically. Regardless of whether the negotiators had used the strategy, all 15 agreed that it could be a useful strategy. About half (n=7) of negotiators said they had intentionally "faked" emotion at the bargaining table. However, it was more of an over-exaggeration than outright faking.

> "They're probably sometimes a bit more overstated than I actually feel. I can sometimes step back and see the process for what it is and know that part of what goes on is a little bit of role playing" (Interview 8).

How do Faculty Negotiators Develop Their Positions?

All 15 chief negotiators cited the following five components in preparing for collective bargaining. The process began from about six months to a year before the start of negotiations:

1) Research/ history

   - What other universities are currently doing

   - Current law

   > "We have meetings with members, so we meet with members in different faculties, or departments, or areas, and try and get their feedback, it's like a discussion, a roundtable discussion that they can just sort of them sort of tell us what they're interested in." (Interview 5)

2) Grievances

   - Both resolved and current grievances to examine ongoing issues.

   > "We, so there's sort of two parts to it. One is there's historical experience of the collective agreement so grievances, problems that have arisen, haven't been resolved, sent to grievance and then there's also a broad-based membership-driven complication process where over sort of a year before we begin negotiations we have a variety of instruments that we use, surveys, small group meetings, larger meetings, a number of ways to gather input" (Interview 1)

3) Membership driven input using surveys, open-ended questions, and group

meetings

"So there's two key components. One is a membership survey, the bargaining survey and the other is a review by the FA [Faculty Association] executive and then they try to bring those two things together and come up with a long, long list of bargaining issues but they whittle it down to a set of priorities." (Interview 8)

4) Committee discussion of positions and key issues

"Well the first thing we did was send an email to everybody asking for their proposition which we gathered and put in order and then we held an assembly where we discussed the, actually we put the proposition in three groups" (Interview 3)

5) Creating and refining positions and language

"So you're going to be meeting and you're going to be going over, then we go over language, we project our language for articles that we're going to [unclear] and then we weigh in on the issues and then propose the language and we have somebody to take notes and help with the research and collect the data if we need it." (Interview 12)

Behavioural Characteristics

The negotiators were asked a series of questions to determine if they behaved similarly to "skilled" negotiators in non-academic settings. According to Rackham and Carlisle (1978a&b), there is no unanimous definition of what makes a skilled negotiator; thus, they used the following three criteria: First, they should be rated as effective by both sides. Second, they should have a history of success. Lastly, they should have a low amount of failures. Failure is defined as not reaching a viable agreement (Rackham & Carlisle, 1978a&b). Negotiators, who failed to meet these criteria were considered average negotiators. The current study used the behavioural characteristics from "The Effective Negotiator" parts 1 and 2 by Rackham and Carlisle (1978a&b). The

behavioural characteristics are broken into two overarching categories, each with its

subsets. The first category focuses on the face to face behaviour of negotiators.

Face- to-Face behaviour:

      Skilled negotiators show marked differences in their face-to-face behaviour

compared with average negotiators. Rackham and Carlisle (1978a) found that skilled

negotiators avoided irritators such as "generous offers" as these can be antagonizing.

They offer fewer counter-proposals. When negotiations get hostile, skilled negotiators

tend to spend less time defending and attacking than average negotiators. Skilled

negotiators clarify language and understanding right away in negotiations and tend to

seek more information. All 15 of the negotiators within this study responded the same as

skilled negotiators when using antagonizing language and direct insults. They believe that

there is little to gain unless it was strategic, and even then, the insults were not directed at

an individual, for example:

> "We discussed that as a team in advance and I think the answer again was
> to be strategic. So in general we felt there should be no need and if there
> was a need then, if there was yah a particular event that we thought
> warranted trading insults, [unclear] emotional tension on the room then we
> would do that. But we would do it for a strategic reason not an individual
> (Interview 7)".

However, many stated that the other side did not take such a respectful approach.

> "Like it wasn't rampant by any stretch of the imagination, but they weren't
> above insulting our intelligence or insulting our professionalism more so
> than just insults (Interview 9).

      There was no discernable trend in the data; more data would be needed to

compare our participants to skilled negotiators.

> "That depends really widely. Yah I think, I mean sometimes we wanted to
> turn it around really quickly to make them do the work. Other times we
> wanted to just sort of hold on to it and that's strategic and sometimes, I mean

you know you do these things for whatever reasons to try to create pressure" (Interview 14)

Like the skilled negotiators in Rackham and Carlisle's (1978a) study, all 15 negotiators took their time and researched countering with more complex issues. Additionally, several negotiators stated that sometimes they held onto proposals for longer as a strategy to create pressure.

> "It depends on the complexity. Sometimes it's within hours, sometimes it might be a week. You know if it's something that we have to do some research on, it's going to take longer, so you know if they propose something and we want to see what's available at other universities, we'll have to do our research. Sometimes we need to consult with our legal, so it really depends on the complexity of the issue. If it's pretty simple, we'll try and do it within a day. Cause we might set aside a whole day for negotiating but part of that is going to be caucusing" (Interview 5).

When dealing with hostility at the table, Rackham and Carlisle (1978a) found that average negotiators use hostility at the table three times more often than skilled negotiators. When skilled negotiators use hostility, it is always strategic. The current study found that all 15 negotiators used one of the following three strategies when attacked by the other side

1. Walk away from the table, for example, withdraw to caucus (n=5)

   > "We would occasionally withdraw to caucus if we felt that they would be like over the top" (Interview 6)

2. Ignore and keep things calm and professional (n=4)

   > "The more they insulted us, the more they tried to pressure us, the calmer I got, the slower I spoke. And the more direct I became with them in not overtly challenging their assumptions but just addressing the points that they were making, and trying to kill them with logic, responding to what they were saying in a very calm, direct manner without being insulting or controversial or condescending." (Interview 3)

3. Call them on their "bad" behaviour (n=2)

> "I'll call them out on behaviour and I'll call them out on things you know, I'll just say look it come on, you're not, you know we're here to bargain, you've regressed here, you can expect my members to accept that kind of stuff, but calling them out or calling names or being rude, I just don't, no it's not my style" (Interview 11).

Rackham and Carlisle (1978) showed that skilled negotiators used qualifying statements they called behaviour labeling. An example is "can I ask you a question…" or "If I can suggest…" rather than just asking or stating. As with skilled negotiators, all 15 negotiators stated that they tend to test their understanding by summarizing what the other party said. Additionally, they tended to prefer clarifying ambiguous points right away; rather than later, if possible.

> "Yes, definitely we would have done that at times, said something along the lines of you know just so I'm clear, or what I understand and then kind of say back to them what we heard them say" (Interview 14)

Additionally, all 15 negotiators stated that they asked a lot of questions during a round of bargaining.

> "I would say we ask a lot of questions. A lot of clarifications and it's very common at the table for both sides to be carrying on, thinking that they understand the other side's position but they don't. (Interview 4)

Negotiation Planning

Rackham and Carlisle's second study (1978b) focused on the planning process for negotiations: time, exploration of options, common ground vs. conflict, long term thinking, setting limits, and sequence planning. The negotiators in the current study cited that preparing for negotiation was an ongoing process. However, the official preparation occurred eight months or less (n=7) to one year (n=8) before the actual bargaining began.

> "It can take months, and in [identifier removed] they usually start the planning process with a bargaining conference at least a year out." (Interview 11).

All 15 negotiators agreed that they consider both theirs and the employer's position in their planning process.

> "In fact, we run, our caucus will run, will talk about oh a number of issues, I think the last time we probably discussed ten or twelve things that we thought the executive, sorry thought the employer was going to bring to the table and had them researched and had our positions on them" (Interview 4)

When asked about focusing on the common ground vs. conflict, interviewees answers can be placed into one of two categories:

1. Concentrate on both areas of conflict and common ground (n=10):

> "I mean one wants to identify those areas to begin with, so what kinds of proposals are likely to be well received, where can we work with the other side, where are the likely sites of integrative work where we could change something to the benefit of both very clearly. Sometimes there are other places where you could do that but it's not as clear to one side or the other at first. But where it's really clear, you want to identify that and a couple of those you want to put aside to kind of start off the process, to get things rolling. So, and then of course, yes you want to identify the places where it's going to be highly conflictive and where if there is any kind of bargaining or negotiation to be done, it's you know fundamentally got to be distributive" (Interview 2).

2. Concentrate on what the members want (n=5):

> "What we do is we concentrate on what our members tell us they want. So we find out from them what their top three priorities are and that's what we concentrate on. There's always all kinds of little stuff that you can do in a collective agreement and you know some of it is a bit time-consuming, but for the most part, we concentrate on the things that are, that matter most to our members" (Interview 5).

When considering the long vs. short term implication of the negotiation, (n=8) focused on the long term, (n=6) focused on both long and short term, and (n=1) negotiator focused

on the short term. This individual also had the least experience and used the least amount

of time preparing for a negotiation

> "You focus on both of those things. And the long-term is made up of success of short-terms, and it's kind of crucial to keep that in mind too. Yes, there are sometimes when you would say we're going to not make progress here so we'll think about the longer term and how do we set up for change eventually (Interview 2)

When setting limits, skilled negotiators were significantly more likely to plan in terms of

a range. Average negotiators, in contrast, were more likely to plan their objectives around

a fixed point. In the current study, responses were mixed, and thus no themes emerged.

However, it should be noted that (n=14) negotiators needed clarification on what setting a

limit was, and once clarified, limits were thought of in only monetary terms and did not

tend to set upper limits.

> "Most of what we talk about in negotiations isn't really a number or an amount of money, it's mostly process which makes our collective agreements much more difficult to think about than a lot of the ones that you see in sort of most industrial settings where it's largely about you know the time of the shift or the number of dollars (Interview 2)."

It is important to note that the government sets a limit or "mandate cap in one province."

Therefore, for the universities in that province, it's government-mandated raise in salaries

a period.

> "Well, it's, you know it's hard to do BATNAs* when you're negotiating, when you're doing labour negotiations. It's much easier to do BATNAs when you might be negotiating over something more fixed and less fluid, but I think that you know we start off with proposals which we think are reasonable, so you know the number one question that I ask the team when we are developing proposals, is how is the employer going to react to this?" (Interview 4).

> *Note: "BATNA—best alternative to the negotiated agreement. The

> availability of an alternative to the current negotiation should an agreement

not be reached" (Brett, Pinkley, & Jackofsky, 1996). Individuals who have

a BATNA tend to achieve better outcomes in a negotiation (Brett, Pinkley,

& Jackofsky, 1996).

Rackham and Carlisle (1978b) found that average negotiators tend to use

"sequence planning" when negotiating. This means that they go through the agreement

one point at a time in order. Conversely, skilled negotiators take a flexible approach to

bargaining. Thus, they are comfortable jumping around in the collective agreement to

make trade-offs on different points. The negotiators (N=15) in this study gave no

cohesive answer, and thus more data would be needed to see a clear trend.

Discussion

Academic faculty may not be perceived as needing a union as they are a

privileged group of employees who tend to have job autonomy. However, there are still

underlying societal, economic, and political issues that are not protected without a

collective agreement—for example, the protection of academic freedom. Academic

freedom is a critical part of the modern university. It allows faculty to control their

teaching and research without unjust censorship or restriction (CAUT, 2018). The

government funds Canadian universities, and when those resources are stretched,

universities look to corporate funding (Gillin, 2001; Woodhouse, 2017). Without a

collective agreement setting the legal boundaries of academic freedom, big companies

(for example, pharmaceuticals) would have more power to push their agendas.

Another complex issue that plagues society is equity in compensation. Within

academia, collective agreements specify how salary increases and promotion criteria are

determined (Wiedman 2020). According to Statistics Canada, in 2018, employed women

earned an average of $0.87 for every dollar earned by men (Statistics Canada, 2019).

Within academia, there exists a pay gap between male and female university faculty.

Research has shown that the pay-gap increases with more experience and rank (Warman

et al. 2010; CAUT 2011). Even when controlling for starting salary, it has been found

that women fall behind their male counterparts by given smaller salary increases and

slower promotions (Warman, Woolley, & Worswick 2010).

This study's overall purpose was to use a qualitative methodology to identify who

became chief negotiators within an academic setting. The current study also wished to

examine the tactics used by negotiators within a university union setting. Collective

bargaining within academia is a unique business setting that may not reflect the standard

"blue-collar" labourer-management division (Blanton & Burnett, 1979). Thus, it is crucial

to examine if "blue-collar" tactics and behaviours are appropriate in a university setting.

This approach resulted in eight research questions conducted using a semi-structured

interview style. This study considered three main factors related to the chief negotiators:

their demographics, negotiation tactics, and behavioural characteristics.

Using thematic analysis, interviews with chief union negotiators showed that the

tactics they used fell into four main themes and four subthemes: (1) Integrity at the

bargaining table, (subtheme: Honesty), (2) Stubbornness: the use of the word "no" when

refusing "bad" proposals/ when sticking to what they want, (3) Traditional competitive

bargaining, (4) Using emotion to gain concessions from the other side (Subthemes: Void

emotions, Emotional argument, Indignation). This study also compared university faculty

negotiators' sample to "skilled" negotiators as defined by Rackham and Carlisle

(1978a&b). When it came to negotiation planning and face-to-face behaviour, faculty

negotiators were not different from others. They were more similar to the skilled negotiator than Rackham and Carlisle's average negotiator.

What negotiation tactics are most used in a unionized environment?

When considering the first research question, there were two hypotheses. Hypothesis one was that university chief negotiators would be unlikely to use manipulative tactics. In conjunction with this, hypothesis two stated that university chief negotiators would view lying and deceit negatively. Both hypotheses were supported using thematic analysis. Indeed, the two main themes found were integrity at the bargaining table, as well as honesty at the bargaining table. The negotiators in this study strived to keep the relationship collegial at the table.

Universities are a unique business setting that calls for more collegial than competitive tactics (Blanton & Burnett, 1979). Indeed, some research has shown that honest disclosure, increased willingness to share information, and making concessions at the bargaining table can elicit reciprocity from the opposing side (Paese & Gilin, 2000, Fleck et al., (2013). Honesty and integrity in negotiation, have been tied to increased co-operative behaviours at the table and a more integrative bargaining style (Cox & Dunlop, 1950). This holds epically true in environments where individuals work closely together outside of negotiations (Cox & Dunlop, 1950). Thus, as hypothesized, university faculty negotiators did not use overtly manipulative tactics and viewed lying and deceit negatively.

Gender in Negotiation

Research on gender in negotiation has been vast, and results have been mixed (Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998). Indeed, there are a lot of moderators that must

be factored in such as the research paradigm used (for example, matrix games). When considered, this lessened the effect to almost non-existent. Of the three existing meta-analyses, all have found that overall, men achieve better economic outcomes than women in negotiation. However, this main effect is significantly diminished when negotiators have equivalent experience and training. Additionally, the difference is diminished when negotiators are negotiating on behalf of others. In the current study, when the negotiators were asked if they felt that their gender played a role at the bargaining table, 67% of participants indicated that they felt personality certainly played a factor more than their gender.

In using thematic analysis to see if there an overall difference in how male and female participants use negotiation tactics, there were no discernible differences between male and female participants. There were no themes found in the use of tactics based on gender. This finding is contrary to Eagly and Crowley (1986), who found that male negotiators on average used more pressure or forceful tactics in labour disputes compared to female negotiators. In this study, male chief negotiators were no more likely to use pressure tactics than female. This could be due to the qualitative nature of the study. Perhaps with a quantitative methodology and a large and varying sample results would reflect Eagly and Crowley's (1986) findings.

Emotions in Negotiation

Research question five asked if the negotiators felt that emotions were useful for gathering strategic information in negotiations. All 15 negotiators stated that whether it was their style or not, they felt that emotions in negotiation could be a useful strategic tool. When examining the use of emotions at the bargaining table, the negotiators stated

that they used emotion to gain concessions from the other side. In answering research

question six, there were three themes within the use of emotions at the bargaining table:

void of emotions, emotional argument, and indignation. The theme of "void emotions"

includes remaining calm in the face of aggression and hostility. Research has shown the

importance of information gained through emotional displays within negotiation

(Druckman & Olekalns, 2008; Pietroni, Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Pagliaro, 2008). Thus, it

would make sense that the lack of emotions would also give information. Emotional

labour regulates emotions by enhancing, faking, and suppressing emotions (Grandey,

2000). Given the research examining the use of emotions as a negotiation strategy, it is

not unrealistic to believe that negotiators could be using emotional suppression to show

"void emotions" as a way to get concessions from the other side.

The second theme to emerge was the use of emotions as a form of persuasion. The

negotiators in this study used this strategy to elicit shame or pity from the opposing side.

In an experiment by Dehghani, Carnevale, & Gratch (2014), the authors examined the use

of emotions in moral issues. They found that if the negotiator had strong moral feelings

about the negotiation content, the use of sadness could elicit concessions when the

opponent engaged in emotional matching. Additionally, in a study by Van Kleef, De

Dreu, & Manstead (2006) using an experimental paradigm, it was found that there was a

main effect of concession making when the opponent showed supplication

(disappointment and worry). However, this relationship was moderated by the trust

between the individuals. Individuals high in trust tended to concede, whereas those low in

trust were unaffected by the displays of supplication. This strategy could elicit some

concession making if there is a level of trust between the faculty and the university.

Future research could examine this relationship further.

The last theme that emerged within the emotions theme was the exaggeration of

emotions such as indignation. The base emotion is genuine; however, they admitted to

overstating the emotion to prove a point. The indignation was also directed at the

proposal itself, not attacking the person. Fassina and Whyte (2013) examined the tactic of

indignation in a negotiation setting, which they termed "strategic flinching." The authors

defined flinching as "verbal or physical displays of shock, disgust, or disbelief made in

response to an opening offer in negotiations as a flinch" (p. 902). The authors looked

specifically at distributive bargaining in a single issue, two-party negotiation with

students as the participants. Results showed that negotiators who flinched received more

significant outcomes than the control condition. However, individuals on the receiving

end of the flinch had a more negative view of the bargaining relationship. Thus, the

negotiators within the current study are using a strategy that is not uncommon. However,

using a "strategic flinch" by showing indignation may lead to a lack of trust from the side

receiving the strategic flinch. When it came to emotional labour in negotiation,

specifically faking emotions. None of the negotiators outright "faked" emotions such as

anger and happiness. The majority of participants (n=8) stated that they could see the

tactic's use; however, they have never tried it.

Behavioural Characteristics

In comparing the behavioural characteristics found in "The Effective Negotiator"

parts 1 and 2 by Rackham and Carlisle (1978), the negotiators in this study responded the

same as the "skilled" negotiators on all behaviours except expressing feelings. Like skilled

negotiators, the participants come up with countless options and proposals before the bargaining took place. They gave more attention to areas of common ground over areas of conflict. However, they considered both sides of the negotiation to make sure they covered all of their bases. They also engaged in "behaviour labeling," where one makes value statements before asking a question, for example, "Can I ask you a question" or "If I could make a suggestion." Like the skilled negotiator, our chief negotiators tended to test their understanding and summarize things that have been said before moving on. They were also self-proclaimed to asking questions frequently at the bargaining table. Lastly, Rackham and Carlisle (1978a & 1978b) observed that skilled negotiators often gave more "internal information when it came to feelings." In this study, participants were interviewed more extensively about emotions in negotiation and found that, like the skilled negotiator, most chief negotiators gave information on their emotions or "feelings" (n=11).

Directions for Future Research and Study Limitations

With the use of qualitative methodology comes the main limitation of generalizability. Indeed, the sample for this study is a unique niche of individuals. Future research should look to duplicate these findings within a different research paradigm, such as observation or an experimental methodology. Pratt (In Press) stated that "qualitative methods tend to excel at realism at the expense of generalizability and precision". However, these methods can have some "naturalistic and analytic generalizability." Additionally, the interview results are interpreted based on self-report. With self-reporting comes socially desirable responses defined by Zerbe and Paulhus (1987) as "the tendency of individuals to present themselves favorably concerning current social norms and standards" (p. 250). Therefore, when it comes to the central

theme of integrity, the ethicality of an individual's use of tactics could be exaggerated.

Indeed Bazerman (2011) stated that based on previous research, "We know that people

egocentrically interpret events that occur in negotiations" (p. 9). Future research could

use observation or interviewing chief negotiator dyads consisting of opposing negotiators

to get a better sense of integrity at the table. Additionally, as there was only one coder, I

was unable to cross-check the reliability in the application of the codebook and identify

themes.

     Gender results were not as straightforward as anticipated; part of that was the

interview questions being mainly closed-ended. Therefore, the answers given were

limited in scope and did not leave room for participants to expand. In retrospect,

reframing or asking broader questions would prompt more than a "yes" or "no" answer,

as was the case with the questions in this study. Participants (n=10) did not perceive that

their gender played a significant role, and instead cited that personality had more impact

overall. However, there were some unexpected and rich responses around gender in

negotiations. One participant stated, "you know I would have preferred that we'd had

more representation of the diversity of the team presenting the positions but in fact that

didn't happen too much (interview 6)." Considering the pay gap still exists within

academia, future research should examine more explicitly how the negotiation team's

diversity hinders the ability to negotiate on behalf of all members. Future research should

examine more explicitly how negotiators' gender affects what is bargained for and

focused on within negotiations within academia.

     With emotions in negotiations, future research should extend Fassina and Whyte

(2013) findings by examining strategic flinching within real-world negotiations that are

far more complex than a single issue, two parties, distributive bargaining. Future research should also consider the power dynamic at the bargaining table. Indeed, flinching may be more accepted from the side that is perceived to have less power. One area of negotiation research that was not thoroughly examined in the current study was power. Many articles review the effects of power within a negotiation (e.g., Greenhalgh, Neslin, & Gilkey, 1985; Olekalns, & Smith, 2009). The majority of research ties gender and power together (Nelson, Bronstein, Shacham, & Ben-Ari, 2015). Indeed, research into power and gender has shown that women are inherently perceived to have less power than men (Stuhlmacher, & Walters, 1999). Therefore, it is expected that women should have worse outcomes than men in negotiation. Indeed, that has been the finding that men overall achieve greater economic outcomes than women (Mazei et al., 2015). However, this effect has been shown to diminish substantially with training, when negotiating on behalf of others, and when economic information is known (Mazei et al., 2015). Nonetheless, power has been shown to affect negotiations' outcomes aside from its tie to gender (Wong, & Howard, 2016).

Conclusion

The current study used thematic analysis and found that there were three reasons for taking an active role in the union (1) peer influence, (2) Volunteer (3) the result of a strike. Within analyzing the negotiation tactics data, there were four main themes and four subthemes. (1) Integrity at the bargaining table, (Honesty) (2) Stubbornness when refusing "bad" proposals/ when sticking to what they want, (3) Traditional competitive

bargaining, (4) Using emotion to gain concessions from the other side (Void emotions, Emotional argument, Indignation).

Given the overall theme of Integrity, it is not surprising that our sample did not use manipulative tactics at the bargaining table. Overall, they felt that personality, as opposed to gender, played a role in the negotiation process. Additionally, there was no discernible difference in the tactics used by male and female participants; however, the sample size is a small one. The chief negotiators within this study felt that emotions are a useful tactic for gathering strategic information in negotiations. However, not all of them have employed this strategy. The specific emotions used by the current sample were void emotions, emotional argument, and indignation. Overall, the participants had a positive view of the genuine use of emotions at the bargaining table. Regardless of whether the negotiators had used the strategy, they all agreed that it could be a useful strategy. Lastly, in answering research question number eight, only 40% of negotiators said they had faked an emotion at the bargaining table. Of those who had, they stated that it was more of an over-exaggeration than outright faking.

In comparing behavioural characteristics found in "The Effective Negotiator" part 1 and 2 by Rackham and Carlisle (1978a&b), the negotiators in this study responded the same as the "skilled" negotiators on all behaviours except expressing feelings. This is an interesting finding as the negotiators in the current study don't have the level of experience that those in the Rackham and Carlisle (1978a&b) two-part study.

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Tables

Table 1

Common Articles of the SMUFU and NSGEU collective agreements

SMUFU	NSGEU
Definitions	Definitions
Recognition	Recognition
Union security and check off	Checkoff
Employer-Union bargaining relations	Union officers and representatives
Employer-Union committee	Occupational health and safety
	Labour-management committee
No strike or lockouts	No strikes and lockouts
No discrimination	No discrimination
Reductions in workforce	Layoff and recall
Rank/classification	Seniority
Salary and allowance	Hours of work
	Job sharing
	Overtime
	Callback and standby and work from home
	Temporary assignment
	Temporary employees
	Pay periods
Leave	Paid holidays
	Annual vacation
	Sick leave
	Court duty
	Leave of absence without pay
	Pregnancy and parental leave
	Bereavement leave
	Special leave
	Career development, conference and seminar leave
	Leave application
Employee benefit plans	Benefits
Discipline and dismissal	Discipline, suspension, and discharge
Grievance and arbitration	Grievance procedure
	Arbitration
Official files	Official files

Table 2

Key differences in the SMUFU collective agreement

SMUFU
**Validity
**Academic Freedom, rights, and responsibilities
**Appointment
Renewal, promotion, and Permanence
**Department chairpersons, directors of divisions, program coordinators, and associate deans
**Councils
Working conditions and miscellaneous provisions
Travel Expenses
Entry or re-entry to the bargaining unit of academic admin and related positions
Amalgamation, merger, and program suspension or closure
Amendment to university act
Correspondence
Tuition waiver

Note. (**) represents articles where faculty influence organizational decision making

Table 3

Example of a traditional industrial collective agreement

NSGEU
Management rights
Meeting and bulletin board space
Posting of vacancies
Probationary/period of assessment
Contracting out
Technological change
Protective clothing
Job evaluation
Tuition waiver
Sexual harassment/ harassment
Employer liability

Table 4:

Characteristics of Negotiators Interviewed

Interview	Age	Gender	Level of education	Level of experience
1	45	M	PhD	CAUT; local workshop; one round on the team
2	52	M	PhD	CAUT; Chief negotiators forum
3	44	M	PhD	CAUT
4	62	M	PhD	CAUT; ~10 rounds
5	56	F	Masters	CAUT
6	61	M	PhD	CAUT; international negotiating exp.
7	39	M	PhD	Previous round
8	51	F	PhD	CAUT; previous round
9	36	F	Masters	CAUT
10	62	F	PhD	None
11	63	F	Masters	None
12	68	F	Masters	CAUT
13	56	F	Masters	CAUT
14	50	M	Masters	CAUT
15	63	M	PhD	FPSE

Note: Experience is up until their bargaining round as Chief

Appendix A

Demographic Questions:

- Age____

- What is your educational background?

    - What degrees/certificates do you have?

    - Where did you get them?

- Where do you currently work?

    - How long have you worked here?

- What is your position title?

- How long have you worked in your current position?

    - Have you worked this position anywhere else?

- Were your parents union members? (Barling, Kelloway, & Bremermann, 1991;

    Hester, & Fuller, 1999)

    - Mother or father

    - What was there position in the union

    - Did their views influence yours on unions?

- How long have you been a union member?

- What is your role in the union?

- How did you get involved?

    - What was your starting role?

- How long have you been a member of a negotiating committee?

- How much experience did you have before becoming Chief negotiator?

    (Rackham & Carlisle 1978 a&b)

- What type of training did you have?

    - Formal and informal

- How are your negotiating positions developed? (Rackham & Carlisle 1978 a&b)

- What kind of relationship would you say the union/the university has? (Rackham & Carlisle 1978 a&b)

    - High or low conflict

    - How is the conflict generally managed

    - Cooperative (integrative) or competitive (distributive) nature

- Have you ever called for a strike?

Negotiation Characteristics (Hauthwaite 2006; Rackham & Carlisle 1978 a&b; Sobral & Carvalho 2002)

- How much success have you had as a union negotiator?

    - Can you give me an example of a successful negotiation?

    - Can you give me an example of an unsuccessful negotiation

        - What do you think made the negotiation unsuccessful (internal and external)

- Have you ever negotiated officially outside of the union?

- How long does it take on average for you to prepare for a negotiation?

- How do you use your preparation time?

- During planning do you concentrate on the areas that hold the most potential for conflict or the possible areas of common ground?

- Do you concentrate on long term or short term implications?

- How do you plan your limits?

- Do you set both upper and lower limits?

- How often do you offer up a counter proposal?

- What do you do if you get into a defence/attack spiral?

- Throughout a negotiation, do you test your understanding or summarize what the other party has said?

- Do you feel that your gender has played a role in your negotiations? (Stuhlmacher, & Walters, 1999)

    - Do you feel the gender of the other chief negotiator has played a role or changed the dynamics of the negotiation? (Eagly & Crowley, 1996; Stuhlmacher, & Walters, 1999)

Negotiation Tactics (Rackham & Carlisle 1978 a&b)

There are many of different tactics that once could use during a negotiation. I'm interested in learning more about tactics you have used in the past.

Tactics are "a technique, method, process, or set of interrelated techniques for implementing the chosen strategy." (Monich & Matveeva, 2012, p. 315).

1. Have you had more success using integrative or distributive tactics

    - Definitions: "Integrative strategies are cooperative tactics that lead to problem-solving communication. Distributive tactics, on the other hand, generate labor-management conflict and promote individual winning through the use of offensive and defensive maneuvers." (Goering 1997, p.384)

2. There are several strong tactics that can be used to play hard ball and get the concessions you need for your union. For example:

- misrepresentation of position to the opponent (the negotiator lies about his or her preferred settlement point or resistance point)

- bluffing (the negotiator falsely states intentions to commit an action)

- falsification (erroneous and factually incorrect information is introduced as though it were true)

- deception (a collection of arguments are made that lead the opponent to draw an incorrect conclusion or deduction)

- misrepresentation to constituencies (partial truths, or complete untruths, are told in representing other parties in the negotiating relationship).

- Have you used these tactics you have used in the past to achieve success in a negotiation?

  - For example: Intentionally misrepresent factual information to your opponent in order to support your negotiating arguments or position. (Kronzon, & Darley, 1999)

  - Make an opening demand that is far greater than what you really hope to settle for. (Kronzon, & Darley, 1999)

  - Promise that good things will happen to your opponent if s/he gives you what you want, even if you know that you can't (or won't) deliver those good things when the other's cooperation is obtained. (Kronzon, & Darley, 1999)

- Which of these tactics have you experienced from the other party?

  - How did they affect you?

- Are there any tactics you have used that I have not mentioned?

- Have you ever used emotions to get an upper hand in a negotiation?

    - Have you ever faked an emotion

        - Anger?

        - Happiness?

        - Sadness

    - Have you ever experienced the opponent fake an emotion

        - How did you know they were faking?

        - How did it affect you?

        - How did it affect your view of your opponent?

Additional Tactic Questions to be used as prompts

Factor 1: Traditional competitive bargaining

12. Make an opening demand that is far greater than what you really hope to settle for

13. Convey a false impression that you are in absolutely no hurry to come to a negotiated agreement, thereby trying to put time pressure on your opponent to concede quickly

22. Make an opening demand so high/low that it seriously undermines your opponent's confidence in his/her ability to negotiate a satisfactory settlement

Factor 2: Attacking opponent's network

8. Attempt to get your opponent ®red from his/her position so that a new person will take his/her place

15. Threaten to make your opponent look weak or foolish in front of a boss or others to whom he/she is accountable, even if you know that you won't actually carry out the threat

19. Talk directly to the people who your opponent reports to, or is accountable to, and tell them things that will undermine their confidence in your opponent as a negotiator

Factor 3: False promises

4. Promise that good things will happen to your opponent if he/she gives you what you want, even if you know that you can't (or won't) deliver these things when the other's cooperation is obtained

14. In return for concessions from your opponent now, offer to make future concessions which you know you will not follow through on

24. Guarantee that your constituency will uphold the settlement reached, although you know that they will likely violate the agreement later

Factor 4: Misrepresentation

6. Intentionally misrepresent information to your opponent in order to strengthen your negotiating arguments or position

9. Intentionally misrepresent the nature of negotiations to your constituency in order to protect delicate discussions that have occurred

16. Deny the validity of information which your opponent has that weakens your negotiating position, even though that information is true and valid

17. Intentionally misrepresent the progress of negotiations to your constituency in order to make your own position appear stronger

Factor 5: Inappropriate information gathering

10. Gain information about an opponent's negotiating position by paying your friends, associates, and contacts to get this information for you

20. Gain information about an opponent's negotiation position by cultivating his/ her

friendship through expensive gifts, entertaining or `personal favors'

29. Gain information about an opponent's negotiating position by trying to recruit or hire

one of your opponent's teammates (on the condition that the teammate bring confidential

information with him/her)

Appendix B

Consent e-mail

Examining Characteristics and Tactics of Chief Negotiators in Canadian Universities

SMU REB File #16-154

Erin Sheppard

Saint Mary's University

Psychology Department

923 Robie Street, Halifax, Nova Scotia Canada, B3H 3C3

Dear (Name Here),

I am a MSc. candidate concentrating in Industrial Organizational Psychology at Saint Mary's University. I am conducting an interview research study with Dr. Vic Catano for my Master's thesis.

The study has been approved by the Saint Mary's University Research Ethics Board (REB#16-154) pertains to characteristics of chief union negotiators and the tactics they use in collective bargaining with their employer. As you may know, Dr. Catano is a long time negotiator for the faculty union at Saint Mary's and is a past Chair of CAUT's Collective Bargaining Committee, a recipient of the Don Savage Award, and Past CAUT President. The information I obtain from this study will be of benefit to faculty negotiators. Dr. Catano and I will prepare a report based on the information we collect for the use of the Collective Bargaining group at CAUT.

I am emailing this note in hopes that you would be willing to participate in my study. If you are interested, please respond with a date and time that would best fit your schedule. The interview will take approximately one hour or less to complete. Additionally the interviews will be recorded to ensure that no information is missed.

The information gathered in this study will be confidential. The interviews will be coded and themes will be documented, with no names used. By replying yes to this email you are giving consent to participate in this study, however, if at any time you wish to withdraw your interview data you may do so.

Thank you,

Erin Sheppard

Appendix C

Feedback e-mail

Examining Characteristics and Tactics of Chief Negotiators in Canadian Universities

SMU REB File #16-154

Erin Sheppard

Saint Mary's University

Psychology Department

923 Robie Street, Halifax, Nova Scotia Canada, B3H 3C3

Dear (Name here),

I would like to thank you for your participation in this study.

As a reminder, the purpose of this study is to begin to close the research gap when it comes to qualitative data on negotiation. The data collected via interviews will contribute to a better understanding on how chief negotiators characteristics and the tactics they use impact the negotiation process.

Please remember that any data pertaining to you as an individual participant will be kept confidential. Once all the data are collected and analyzed for this project, Dr. Catano and I will prepare a report based on the information we collect for the use of the Collective Bargaining group at CAUT.

If you are interested in receiving more information regarding the results of this study, or if you have any questions or concerns, please contact me at either the phone number or email address listed at the top of the page.

As with all Saint Mary's University projects involving human participants, this project was reviewed by the Saint Mary's University Research Ethics Board. Should you have any comments or concerns about ethical matters or would like to discuss your rights as a research participant, please contact the Chair of the Research Ethics Board at 902-420-5728 or ethics@smu.ca.