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OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE THROUGH MARECHAL AND LOWERGAN

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Introduction

It is the aim of this thesis to examine and relate the philosophies of knowledge of two eminent realists and in so doing to discover the pertinent concern of realism in the question of knowledge; briefly, that is, what is objectivity of human knowledge.

Considering first Maréchal's "dynamic exemplarism", we cannot but be deeply impressed with his whole dynamism of moving structure culminating in the judgment. Here is the key to a real appreciation of human capacity to grasp logical truth. He also stresses the natural spontaneity and exigency of the intellect to attain truth, and through the formal object as a transcendental anticipation, he underpins cognitional contents in being. For him also, the universe of material given is potentially intelligible through realism. Yet at the point of attaining objective knowledge in the judgment, his abstruse argument from possibility to the existence of God, objective end (to maintain contingent facts as subordinate ends as part of the structure of consequent and antecedent finality) detracts from his principal insight into the structure of human knowledge. A key weakness in grasping the objectivity of knowledge is evident at the point of judgment. Maréchal's work is not to be castigated because of its debility of argument in internal structure; rather are his basic lines of cognitional activity to be viewed as a possible source of inspiration for a philosophy of knowledge issuing from a different context. Many of Maréchal's insights into human knowing seem to have

cast their reflections upon Lonergan's work, but the scope, tone, and compelling success of the latter's notion of objectivity are as the cool winds of objective certainty sweeping the twentieth-century expanse of mathematical and scientific thought as well as the areas of common-sense knowledge.

Father Lonergan does not spend his labours on an a priori proof of the existence of objective knowledge. His concern is with the nature of knowledge, that is the structure of knowing. It is not the need of man to possess a list of abstract properties but to make a personal appropriation of his own dynamic and recurrently operative structure of cognitional activity. His pursuit of noetic activity in mathematics, scientific method or the exercise of common sense reveals an upper context in that same activity that is independent of the structure of the content of knowledge. Moreover, Lonergan shows this upper context to be invariant while recurrently operative. A moving viewpoint of upper context parallels a moving viewpoint of content. The appropriation of self-knowledge of which he speaks is a slow arduous development, not attained by appealing to logical goals or metaphysical tenets but by moving from an understanding of all present understanding to a basic understanding of all possible understanding. Such a development expands in virtue of the dynamic tendencies of consciousness itself. The enlarged consciousness of knowing and doing involves the distinction of the authentic person. All branches of knowledge are linked in the common ground of understanding, and in that step the structure of the

universe proportionate to man's intellect opens upon metaphysics. And thus, the revealed structure provides a method for selecting correct metaphysical affirmations. Self-knowledge and self-appropriation are the criterion of the real.

The formal object of the knowing faculty, being, is considered by Maréchal both from the point of view of object and subject. The formal object is defined by a relation to singular objects which are constituted in a universal unity (logical apriority) and by a relation to the knowing subject where it constitutes the form of a natural tendency (psychological apriority). And therefore, the formal object specifies both a degree of cognoscibility of the known object and a mode of knowing of the cognitive subject. Fr. Coreth,¹ ordinary professor of metaphysics at the University of Innsbruck, works from a Maréchal context as a basic line of thought. Unlike Kant's apriori, Fr. Coreth's is being as unrestricted so that the problem of objects known in Kant's world of appearance, the philosophical *pons*, cannot arise. If Coreth's apriori differs from Kant's, so must his notion of objectivity. For Kant, perception has to be the constitutive principle of objectivity. For Maréchal and later Coreth, both following a basic Thomistic line, being is known through perceptions but not by perceptions alone, for it is only by the light of intelligence that we know whether or not what we perceive is.

¹Emerich Coreth, Metaphysik. Eine methodisch-systematische Grundlegung (Innsbruck-Wien-München: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1961). See Fr. Lonergan's review of this book in "Metaphysics As Horizon" Gregorianum, Vol. XLIV (1963 Fasc. 2).

Father Coreth's position on objectivity cannot be the Kantian position of critical idealism; nor can it be the perceptionist position which relates our cognitional contents to reality, not through the intention of being in intellectual activity, but through sense. Father Coreth, like Maréchal, works out a realism that needs no other evidence outside of human rationality. Secondly, Father Coreth's immediate realism is a mediated realism, a realism that can be assembled step by step with every step guaranteed as alone rational. His transcendental method is essentially the method for explicitating the whole. The proper tool for the mediation of the immediate is the rejection of the counterposition.¹ Explicit judgments can contradict the latent metaphysics that they presuppose. Such latent metaphysics, present and operative in all our knowing, is the metaphysical in its immediacy; but it has to be made explicit in accurately defined concepts and true judgments. The contradiction has only to be brought to light to show the explicit judgment to be nonsense and its opposite to be established. Such a procedure is Coreth's transcendental method and its basis resides not in the content of the judgment but in the condition of its possibility.

To follow Fr. Coreth's argument, the point of application of this tool is in the concrete, conscious, active reality of the subject asking a question. To doubt questioning is to involve

¹ Note that the counterposition for Lonergan is any specific doctrine or theory which in any way violates the basic structure of human knowing.

oneself in a counterposition, and so, questioning is beyond the doubter's capacity to doubt coherently. His metaphysics begins from questioning, not from any manifestation of questioning, but from the performance. The condition of the possibility of questioning is always the same, an awareness that goes beyond to an unknown to be known. So it follows that the questionable, of which questioning is aware, must be as much one as the awareness that constitutes questioning. Thus, questioning is being, being in its openness to being. It is being that realizes itself through inquiry to knowing and hence to loving. This being of the questioning questioner is the latent metaphysics from which explicit metaphysics is derived. Thus, being is the ground of both the objective and subjective field for Corath.

From this synopsis, there is an evident movement of thought reflecting both Maréchal and Lonergan on the question of being. But in the equation of the objective pole and subjective pole, Lonergan would not equate metaphysics, as science, with the subjective pole. It is true according to Lonergan that the subjective pole is the inquirer, but in need of a critique that reveals where the counterpositions come from. The incarnate inquirer is social and historical. Lonergan says, "The critique, accordingly, has to issue in a transcendental doctrine of methods with the method of metaphysics just one among many and so considered from a total viewpoint". For latent in the performance of the incarnate inquirer there is a metaphysics that reveals the objective pole of the total horizon and also the method of performing, which

made explicit reveals the subjective pole in its full nature. And this criticism of Corseth's dialectic of Vollzug points out Lonergan's special contribution to the philosophy of realism. His critique of the method of performance, centering on judgment, considers the total viewpoint issuing from the subjective sphere.

Certain key terms used in this thesis perhaps require an explanation that places their proper meaning within a Thomistic context.

Maréchal's use of the term spontaneity must be distinguished from the Kantian sense. Kant's synthesis is effected through the senses in contact with noumena and then mediated by intelligence. When Maréchal speaks of the apriori becoming spontaneity to form a synthesis, he presupposes the efficient causality of the agent-intellect in the construction of the imaginative synthesis. The agent-intellect is always in act, a spontaneous apriori manner of understanding. Because human powers emanate from the essence, the higher powers are causes in relation to the lower ones. Therefore, the phantasma is a product of the imagination as produced under the guiding dynamism of intellect, and it follows that the phantasm is intelligible in potency. Kant's synthesis is separated from the intellect, but Maréchal bases this orientation of the intellect in that man is made to know. Cognitive contents are related to reality through the intention of being in intellectual activity.

The term intuition also has a Thomistic modification. Through an analogy between finite intelligence and angelic know-

ledge, Maréchal clarifies his usage of this notion. The discursive judgment, meaning one that involves a deductive process, imitates intuition by seizing reality though not directly by creation or internal production. The intellect actually produces the mental word or the intelligible in act; hence it is a quasi-creator since it contributes something over and above the empirical data. It is through the affirmation of the synthesis in judgment that the finite intelligence attains the objectifying value of a quasi-intuition. The intelligible form is objectified through concretion by way of the phantasm, in matter, and the alternative to this process is the direct intuition of the angelic intelligence. The discursive intelligence is not a potency always in act as is the angelic intelligence since human intellections are dependent upon the intermittent rhythm of sensibility, thus diminishing the interiority of object to subject. And it is the purpose of his doctrine on a sub-intellect to conciliate the two attributes of intellectual spontaneity and sensible receptivity.

We shall devote a chapter to Maréchal's notion of will in so far as it complements his delineation of the faculty of intelligence. This relationship is to be contrasted with Lonergan's involvement of intellect and will only in the integration of the levels of consciousness. Such a study comes under the terms of our title in regard to both philosophers. Maréchal's notion of objectivity of human knowledge cannot be achieved without the function of will. For Lonergan the study of will involves the

extension of rationality into the field of doing. That extension occurs not by simply knowing one's obligations but in so far as one wills to meet one's obligations. On the other hand, Maréchal will be seen to stress that the natural appetite of a rational being is a natural will, which is the dynamic principle of internal natural finality. But Maréchal's intellectual dynamism issuing from the function of will cannot be equated with Lonergan's "pure desire to know". While the function of will is beyond the metaphysical terms of knowledge, Maréchal allows the interference of this element to account for the wonder manifesting the orientation of the intellect, and it is surprising that such a notion should not have been accounted for in the function of the agent-intellect in its spontaneity for the rational mode.

The length of this work may seem to require a comment of defense. The particular development of self-appropriation, as Lonergan notes, is not an abstract concept. In his own introduction, Lonergan parallels his expanding style and schema of delineation of his thought with the moving viewpoint that can be effected only by a prolonged and arduous effort on the part of the individual. The object to be attained is not a simple understanding, but rather a personal self-appropriation. The present writer can only attest to the particular merit derived from exploring the notion of self-appropriation of one's own dynamic and recurrently operative structure of cognitive activity through the ramification of Maréchal's approach to the notion and the minute examination pursued by Lonergan.

Chapter I

Father Joseph Maréchal - Objectivity

As Maréchal attempts to resolve the old problem of the apriori cleaved from a realistic approach by Kant, he develops a position remarkably accessible to Father Bernard Lonergan's Insight. Attacking the problem of the transcendental analysis of the object in Kant, whose guarantee of such an analysis was the existence of synthetic propositions, both universal and necessary, to maintain the apodictic value of the pure sciences, Maréchal comes to a transcendental reflection which consists in finding the active part of the subject in the object or the apriori of the object. Thus the likeness of a form to matter is not static but dynamic, being a structure operating under the internal finality of the subject.¹ Although the Kantian isolation in the abstract is duly noted, Maréchal appropriates from Kant not only the objective data, considered as phenomena, and the first principle, as regulative norm, but also the power of transcending the reflection or faculty of transcendental analysis.²

This transcendental method aims to consider the apriori constituted in the object; that is, the transcendental possibilities

¹Joseph Maréchal, S.J., Le Point de départ de la métaphysique (Paris: 1926), cahier V, 21.

²Ibid., p. 28.

of the object as opposed to the empirical condition. But the understood in act is identical to the understanding in act; hence the apriori function of the faculty of understanding.¹

Truth and being are correlative. Maréchal refers to St. Thomas for a norm by which thought derives its truth or falsity. Since the spirit is radically incapable of thinking absolute nothingness, all privation of being is based on some being--"Nulla privatio tollit totaliter esse" (S. Th. I, 11, 2, ad 1); my thought is true or false only if there is a corresponding absolute relation with being.² But this necessary stability of every object thought is expressed by the first principle, the principle of identity; quod est, est or its negative form; nihil potest sub eodem respectu esse et non esse.³ The relation between the mutable, temporal, contingent given and being must offer an aspect immutable, eternal, and absolute. Contingency as such is unintelligible, but the intelligence possesses a true understanding of corporal objects in the measure that hypothetical necessity is conferred upon them by the first principle--to that extent they cease to be contingent.⁴ Every object of intelligence takes on a necessary relation to the absolute of being, and the minimal expression of this relation is found in the necessary identity of the object

¹Ibid., p. 32.

²Ibid., p. 43.

³Ibid., p. 43-44.

⁴"En d'autres termes: l'objet contingent n'est atteint directement par notre intelligence que dans la mesure de cette nécessité hypothétique que lui confère le premier principe, c'est-à-dire, au fond, dans la mesure où il cesse d'être contingent." Ibid., p. 50.

with itself.¹ Thus the necessity of affirming being is the basis of the absolute, necessary, and universal in thought. A transcendence of phenomena provides logical necessity by the law of affirmed being which is its necessary identity with itself by the application of the first principle; and hence, a necessary relation to an absolute being, necessary in itself,² follows.

In his analysis of objective understanding, Maréchal recognizes the dynamic exemplarism which is the doctrine of the intellectual apriori in metaphysical terms. Intelligence tends to truth as appetite to good, not as a tendency imposed from without but living already in the anticipation of a natural desire, so that there must be an entitive proportion between this desire and the end which determines it. Logical truth is being as known, and understanding is simply the natural and immediate result of the conjunction of subject and object in the bosom of the subject.³ The material object as such cannot participate in the immanent act. The understanding is specified by its species, "un principe dynamique vicariant", for which Maréchal finds guarantee in St. Thomas's "similitudo objecti".⁴ Through its dynamic activity, the immanent form or species impressa is a substitute for the known object; that is, the object will be known in the strict measure of its immanent species.

This opposition of subject and object expressed in the intrinsic conditions of the immanent operation of the subject must

¹Ibid., p. 51.

²Ibid., p. 52.

³Ibid., p. 66.

⁴Ibid., p. 63.

involve an identity with the object without effacing its otherness. To clarify the ontological bond between subject and object, Father Maréchal offers the interesting analogy of the relation of a key to a lock which receives it; there is in this relation not an exact identity, but a predetermined and complementary harmony or proportion.¹ The lock can receive an indefinite number of keys; yet every key does not fit every lock since the lock by its own proper design sets up a prerequisite for all keys that might enter it whether they be of gold or iron. The certain proportion antecedent to knowledge derives from an a priori exigency which pre-establishes certain characteristics of the a posteriori, the empirical given. Knowledge completely a posteriori, entirely from without (as much implicitly as explicitly) for the subject, is an impossibility; for then the subject would be reduced to the condition of undifferentiated matter deprived of the power of knowing.² In other words, if knowing is an act, it cannot be purely passive or receptive. The intellect receives in order to move out of its dynamic potentiality. The formal object of the cognitive power can be defined through the a priori exigency. Such a proportion between subject and object demanded by the exigency of the nature of the subject dictates for Maréchal a whole

¹Ibid., p. 72.

²"Une connaissance totalement à posteriori, entièrement étrangère (tant implicitement qu'explicitement) pour le sujet, est une impossibilité; car le sujet s'y trouverait réduit à la condition d'une matière indifférente, et dépourvu donc du pouvoir de connaître." Ibid., p. 73.

possible objects are already inscribed in the natural form of these powers.¹

From this general consideration of the metaphysical conditions that mediate logical truth, we move to the culmination of the whole cognitional process, the judgment. The cognitional moments prior to judgment involve sensible and conceptual determinations in the subject, but they do not as yet engender cognition of the object as object; sensation and conception bring about a state of conformity between the knowing subject and the external object, should it happen to exist, and no more.² They represent the object, says Maréchal, like a portrait represents its original without consciousness of any relation to an original. To be sure, an outside observer who might view both the subject and the object would discover the truth in sensation and the simple concept but only in as much as the truth is found in a thing which signifies something distinct from it. In other words, experience and conception at this level is simply a reproduction in some sense of the reality to be known, and the relationship implied in a sign is not in the awareness of the knowing subject. The conformity or disconformity of the concept with reality can only be known when the subject becomes aware of the relation between the subjective determination and external reality. At this point the intellect must take an

1Ibid., pp. 96-97.

2"Les moments antérieurs ou inférieurs à l'acte judicatif introduisent bien, en nous, des déterminations--soit sensibles, soit conceptuelles--mais ne nous donnent pas encore la connaissance d'un objet comme objet. La sensation et le concept..... établissent le sujet connaissant dans un état de conformité à l'objet extérieur, rien de plus." Ibid., p. 75.

active, albeit spontaneous, part in the cognitional process. By that further act, the intellect not only becomes the intelligible in act but posits the object as intentionally identified with it. This act is, of course, none other than the judgment and it consists in positing formally what was already materially contained in the powers of the subject--through sensation and the simple concept. This positing of the synthesis already materially present sets up the relation of subject and object. Hence, before the judgmental act, the representation can be called true or false only by extrinsic denomination; at the moment of judgment, the object as object becomes immanent in virtue of the known relation between species and intelligible. Furthermore, since the intellect in act is the object in act, the former now becomes formally conformed to being and is now properly in possession of the truth.

Maréchal insists on the fact that formal truth is the result of that spontaneous intellectual act by which it interposes itself as the subject and becomes possessed of something peculiarly its own, namely logical truth. In human cognition, the judgment is the only act which fully realizes logical truth because it alone gives us an awareness of the formal signification of our representations.¹

Is there a kind of preliminary judgment, the direct judgment, that places the object in an implicit relation of logical truth before the reflective judgment? Maréchal quotes Cajetan who speaks of two judgments: a judgment that is explicit, but in

¹Ibid., p. 76.

which the truth is only implicit in as much as it bears on the relation of conformity to the thing, is a judgment in actu signato; a reflexive judgment bears on the conformity itself. The two judgments are exemplified in the following respectively: The foliage is green; it is true that the foliage is green. Thus Cajetan demands two judgments: one, a direct judgment, in which the truth is implicit only; the other, reflexive, in which the truth is explicit but is the result of reflection. Maréchal repudiates this solution. The direct judgment which posits the object also posits the logical truth.¹ Judgment, as such, is a reflective act bearing implicitly or explicitly on truth; it grasps the being of the object and includes to some degree the whole immanent act.

In conjunction with objective unity, the receptivity of data on the levels of sensation and understanding must be of an immaterial nature. Sensation, strictly speaking, is neither subjective nor objective for though the object is really seized in an immediate and relative representation, it is not entitively distinguished from the subject.² There are in human understanding appropriate elements, logical and psychological, preliminary to the contingent reception of the pure sensible given.³ Every form which is not completely absorbed or exhausted by a given determined matter remains, absolutely speaking, capable of actuating another matter:

¹Ibid., p. 77.
²Ibid., p. 91.
³Ibid.

Forma in se considerata, communis est ad multa, sed per hoc quod recipitur in materia fit forma determinatae huius rei (S. Th. I, 7, 1, e.). When this form happens to be the form of a knowing power, it has the status of a permanent principle of objective determination (apriori condition), whose effect virtually extends beyond the concrete object thought.¹ Thus there is a rigorous proportion between the subjective form, the principle of knowledge (species), and the possible extension of objective knowledge which it mediates.² Moreover, if the form inhering in the subject, of itself, does not imply any spatial restriction, its possible objective extension will be spatially indefinite. Likewise, if no restriction of time is involved, the possible object will also be without temporal limit. Again, any property which, in a given object, would depend upon a formal apriori condition of this object would also participate in the logical possibilities of that apriori and would then be universal.

Briefly, the objective properties of an apriori condition are universal. Reciprocally, since the properties are universal and are the unifying principles of their particular realizations, they are grounded on an apriori condition in the most general sense of the word.³ The correlation mentioned here seems to mean that there is a logical correlation between a universal and a property that belongs to that universal.

¹Ibid., p. 93.

²Ibid.

³"Bref: les propriétés objectives d'une condition à priori sont universelles. Réciproquement, les propriétés universelles, étant, comme universelles, l'unité de leurs réalisations particulières, se fondent sur une condition à priori, au sens le plus général de ce mot." Ibid., p. 93.

Permanence of the intellect is another condition for objective truth. Unless the contingent permanence of the human intellect were grounded in the Eternal, universality and necessity of concepts would vanish. Logical apriority must be based upon an ontologically proportioned apriority (intellectus aeternus). To have understanding truly universal and necessary requires not only the apriori condition of limited anteriority and the contingent permanence of our finite intelligences but also a superior apriori which, though, transcendent, penetrates our faculties and their objects. The supreme principle of all apriority must reside in the active participation of our intelligence with the light of creative Intelligence.¹

To return to a more extensive consideration of the meaning of formal objects, Father Maréchal uses a favourite paradigm of St. Thomas to show that powers are diversified by their formal objects, not their material objects; what exists in visible objects, the visual power already has as its formal object, namely, colour as such, and what real objects imprint physically in the visual organ successively is such and such a colour.² There is a definite disproportion between the extrinsic action of objects which are multiple, particular and contingent and the unity, universality and necessity of the formal object. That the formal objects even of the senses enjoy this privilege of universality is sufficiently illustrated from a consideration of the formal object

¹Ibid., p. 95.

²Ibid., p. 97.

of sight, namely, colour. It is not the contingent coloured thing or particular object which specifies the potency but any object that has colour. Hence, it is colour as such that specifies; that it happens to be this or that coloured object is incidental. The formal object of a power (even of sense) always remains infinitely more extensive potentially than any series of particular percep-
¹tions.

The apriority of formal objects must be imprinted in the manner of an exigency or a privation in the passive faculty. This diversification of powers, then, consists in a preliminary condition residing in the power for measuring and assimilating objects. Having their particular operations with corresponding external objects, powers are in first act: that is, they represent a well defined potentiality, coupled with a natural tendency to fulfil this potentiality. Powers, in so far as they are first act, represent a privation in terms of the general form of the object
²which is to be their natural complement.

The natural potential of a power in terms of its finality is an a priori condition whose effect virtually extends beyond the concrete object thought; the formal object of sight, colour as such, has a far wider extension than any series of particular

¹ Ibid.

² "Avant leurs opérations particulières, auxquelles concourt l'objet externe, elles se trouvent en acte premier: c'est-à-dire qu'à tout le moins elles représentent une possibilité physique délimitée, doublée d'une tendance naturelle à combler cette possibilité. Comme nous le disions ailleurs, elles préfigurent en creux la forme générale de l'objet qui serait leur complément naturel." Ibid.

perceptions of colour. In other words, the formal object, compared to material objects successively acquired, presents a universality which can be either specific or generic.¹ The strict universality and immutability of formal objects, the law of first acts--not a residue of second acts--is always an apriori function, both logically and psychologically. The formal object of the knowing faculty is defined both by a relation to singular objects, which are constituted in a universal unity (logical apriority), and by a relation to the knowing subject, where it constitutes the form of a natural tendency (psychological apriority).² Therefore, the formal object specifies both a degree of cognoscibility of the known object and a mode of knowing of the cognitive subject.³

On the level of the sensible powers, the active and passive aspects of sensibility involve the spiritual immutability attached to the intentional order of the psychological apriori.⁴ Maréchal's preoccupation with the quantitative apriori of spacial and temporal elements is interesting as a reconstruction of the Kantian theme, but the pertinent idea is the projection of objectivity even to the level of the senses. More explicitly, the intentional order begins at this level in so far as there is, even here,

¹Ibid., pp. 97-98.

²"L'objet formel des puissances--et nous ne songeons ici qu'aux facultés connaissantes--se trouve constitué, par définition, à mi-chemin de deux ordres de relations: relation aux objets singuliers, dont il constitue l'unité universelle (à priori logique); relation au sujet connaissant, où il constitue la forme d'une tendance naturelle (à priori psychologique)."

³Ibid., pp. 98-99.

⁴"L'objet formel spécifie donc à la fois un degré de cognoscibilité de l'objet connaissable et un mode de connaissance du sujet cognitif." Ibid., p. 99.

⁵Ibid., p. 110.

a transcending to some extent of the limitations of concrete quantity. Latent in the sense, the synthetic forms of space and time are a pure synthesis, that is they pertain to first act and are designed as a natural combination of dispositions imposing themselves upon second acts. Nevertheless, objectivity requires that the subject be distinctly aware of himself as in the strictly immanent activity of understanding; sensation, then, can be only feebly objective since its activity is only feebly immanent.¹ The subject's reflection upon itself in sensation is reduced to a minimum. Now, the dynamic properties of the material object in relation to the formal object come to light only through a spiritual faculty capable of complete reflection. Reflection on the level of sensation may be explained by Marschal's doctrine of the agent-intellect as remote efficient cause of the imaginative synthesis. Thus, the intentional order is operative on the sense level and the phantasm is intelligible in potency.

That which is received by the senses cannot be absorbed passively in the mind as sensible phenomena. The intellective faculty has a certain internal passivity, and in that sense it is not always in the act of knowing, having to pass from potency to act in the presence of the phantasm and to conform to the representative content of the latter. The apriori of understanding becomes spontaneity to form a synthesis;² this is the necessity of agent-intellect for the rational mode. Such a spontaneity, in

¹Ibid., pp. 116-117.

²Ibid., p. 123.

fact, indicates the role of agent-intellect as a remote efficient cause of the imaginative synthesis. Secondly, the intelligible in act designates the objective form of the actuation of the intellectual power. It is important to remember Maréchal's position that the intelligible in act and the intelligence in act are identical. The necessary role of agent-intellect consists then in creating, in the possible-intellect by abstraction on the phantasms, the intelligibles in act, which means to procure the specific determinations (species), intrinsically free of all material restriction.¹ Like subsistent forms the agent-intellect is always in act, being a spontaneous apriori. The actuality of the agent-intellect is totally different from that of the intelligible in act, for it is not in any fashion the proper object known by the passive-intellect; it is more precisely an apriori manner of understanding.²

Now the agent-intellect does not of itself determine the passive-intellect but takes its specification from the phantasm by an abstractive operation. Such action, by the non-consideration of certain particularities of the image, is a kind of illumination, but the agent-intellect does not know the image objectively since its conformity is one of attitude regulated on the formal characteristics of the phantasm.³ The action of agent-intellect may be

¹ "Le rôle nécessaire de l'intellect-agent consiste donc à créer, dans l'intellect-possible, par abstraction sur les phantasmes, des intelligibles en acte, c'est-à-dire à lui procurer des déterminations spécifiques (species), libres intrinséquement de toute restriction matérielle." Ibid., p. 128.

² Ibid., p. 129.

³ Ibid., p. 132.

likened to the sun sending forth its rays. But luminosity cannot result without the interposition of an object or medium to reflect its energy.¹

The metaphysical reason for a necessary co-operation between agent-intellect and phantasm lies in the fact that, in the composite, human powers emanate from the essence, thereby regulating powers ranged hierarchically in perfection of form. It follows, then, that the phantasm is intelligible in potency: phantasma est intelligibile in potentia.² The higher powers are causes in relation to the lower ones. Phantasma as used in this context means the product of the imagination as produced under the guiding dynamism of intellect. Contrary to the traditional teaching in Thomistic manuals, the real distinction between active and passive intellect is between two functions of the intellect in Maréchal's thinking, not two powers. The agent-intellect, in the sense that as efficient cause with a quasi-transient act, viz; the production of the phantasma, is determined as any efficient cause in terms of the effect. Not that the effect determines it--which would be absurd--but rather the effect occurs because the agent acts in a particular manner. The agent-intellect is an efficient cause whose activity terminates with the phantasma, and hence the form which determines any efficient cause is manifest in the effect. Just as an act of writing is an intellectual act which supposes a kind of intellectual act and thus a determined kind of act in view of the effect, so the intellect in the production of

¹Ibid., p. 151.

²Ibid., p. 140.

the phantasma is a kind of act and its determining form must be of the nature of the cause, namely immaterial in this instance. That determining form is the species. Hence, though it is the agent-intellect that is in question here, since the agent-intellect is called 'agent' because it represents an active aspect of the 'ema¹ intellect, in determining itself by its act, the intellect as passive receives the determination.

In the first phase of its causal influence, the agent-intellect is the intelligence itself which possesses the character of both a formal and efficient cause; the second phase is the action by which the agent-intellect actively subordinates the phantasm to itself, and thereby, there results a dynamic determination of the intellective power.¹ The second phase therefore affects the intelligence in respect to its immaterial potency, that is, in so far as it is the possible-intellect. Under this permanent and constant influence of the intellect, the finality of sensibility becomes identical with that of intellect.² In human beings, as distinguished from animals, the natural appetite of sensibility is orientated towards the intelligible. Thus the orienting function of agent-intellect explains the meaning of the expression, "phantasma est intelligibile in potentia".

In summary, the agent-intellect has a twofold function. From a static point of view, that is matter and form, one was formal causality in which the inferior powers participate in the in-

¹Ibid., p. 139.
²Ibid.

tellectuality of the composite; and on a dynamic basis, the other was efficient which manifested two aspects. The first of these occurred at the level below the imaginative synthesis in a kind of illumination by which the imaginative power elicited a pattern of images suitable to intellectual abstraction. The second phase was the abstractive process in which the agent-intellect as principle cause needs a further specification, in addition to the formal cause (à priori), namely the instrumental causality of the phantasm.¹ The new determination, species intelligibilis impressa, is a relation between the intelligence as passive and the phantasm without its material conditions.

Intelligence spontaneously adapts itself to the phantasm; being immaterial and in exercise, intelligence becomes luminous to itself according to the immanent determination developed, and this determination satisfies all the conditions of an intelligible species. The new, enriching determination affects the possible-intellect according to an immaterial potential.² Thus, the intelligible species never enters objective understanding alone, as an intellectual representation achieved expressing the sensible representation, but always according to a dynamic relation with the actual phantasm.³ The species is of itself only a dynamic disposition of the intellect, qualitatively disposed in function of the phantasm.⁴ The relation, though, is immaterial and

¹Ibid., p. 146.

²Ibid., p. 146.

³Ibid., p. 151.

⁴"...la species n'est, de soi, qu'une disposition dynamique de l'intellect, diversifiée qualitativement en fonction du phantasme." Ibid.

abstract: immaterial like the intelligent power it specifies; abstract because the exterior term of an immaterial relation must be disengaged from individual matter and sensible concretion.

Here causality orients itself according to abstract characteristics although the relation involves a concrete phantasm. Father Maréchal notes that every operative potency, even in physical causality, is orientated towards its material object in terms of the abstract. His classical example is that the instinctive tendency that leads to ruminant to forage is not this or that herb, found in a certain place at a certain time, but some general characteristic of the herb.¹ Although the agent-intellect conforms actively to the concrete phantasm, it does so according to the general characteristics compatible with the metasensible nature of intelligence.

There is no suggestion here that the agent-intellect is determined exclusively in its abstract nature by quantitative being. Its spiritual nature implies a wider extension, an a priori rule not of number but of being in all its extension. While the logical universal has a direct relation to the phantasm, the direct universal is an abstracted nature of objective value, so that the possibility of knowledge beyond material quiddity is not excluded. If the agent-intellect really abstracts and thus produces the universal and numerable element of the concept, it must be in virtue of a principle of unification, commensurable, not with quantitative being as such, but, in some manner or other, with

¹Ibid., p. 152.

the entire amplitude of the knowable.¹

A third phase of a more complete reflection of intelligence on itself is required to satisfy the radical apriori of the intellect as such. The dynamic finality of the intellect may be defined as the objective capacity to surmount all limitations of being.² An act of the intellect does not preclude one of a higher viewpoint; Euclidean geometry does not rule out the metaphysical possibility of space of more than three dimensions or the logical possibility of metageometries.³ On the other hand, the immanent reconstruction of the real is never complete as there is always a margin of indetermination. If the data offered to the constructive faculty were perfectly differentiated among themselves, the subjective construction would be a pure and simple reconstruction, total within its own order; but the cognitive faculties, precisely because they are all abstractive to some degree, act with some margin of indetermination between the formal elements of understanding and the external objects of this understanding.⁴ Father Maréchal proceeds to the third degree of abstraction which can give us transcendent understanding as objectively valid, and not simply a formal representation. We must move into a dynamic point of view, scrutinizing the apriori psychological conditions which command in our concepts the character of conscious objectivity, an objective reference found only in judg-

¹Ibid., pp. 154-155.

²Ibid., p. 185.

³Ibid., p. 197.

⁴Ibid., p. 198

ment.

The concrete mode of judgment is an affirmation or negation of a synthesis essentially of two forms in a single supposition. The form of the subject is presupposed, but the logical subject appears in the object of the judgment; that is, the predicate which is a form of attribution. Therefore the base of all judgments is the principle of identity applied to an object.¹

Maréchal begins with different kinds of predication according to the nature of the predicate: whether it involves a concrete or abstract attribution.² The classical example used is 'man versus humanity'. The former is concrete, the latter abstract. The significance of this is the nature and existential status of both attributes. The concrete word designates a subsistent object; the abstract signifies an essential or accidental form of the object. It follows that every objective concept and its correlative expression indicates its object either as subsistent or as a simple form. When the expression is concrete, the subsistent object is always composite but it is never assimilated as such simply, but by a synthesis--a mode of composition. This synthesis or composition is resolved into a subject and determinations affecting the subject. Thus we have the following equivalents: concretions implies a subsistence qualitatively determined, a subject with a determined form in which it subsists. Every concept, then, which corresponds to a concrete name and at

¹Ibid., p. 206.

²Ibid., p. 202.

the same time designates objects in their subsistence, is formed by concretion: i.e., by a synthesis of subject (a supposit)¹ and form as in 'Man is that which has humanity'. On the other hand, the concept corresponding to an abstract name of itself signifies only the form of a subsistent object, and in order to take on the role of object in our thought, meaning to become objectified in consciousness, it must appeal to a complementary supposit. This follows from the fact that the abstract form couldn't possibly be represented as subsistent since knowledge begins with the sensible; abstract forms are not attained without abstraction and hence lack the mark of subsistence. On the other hand, if the abstract form is represented as non-subsistent (as it always is) it needs a supposit in order to become an object.

The conclusion is that the concrete is the synthetic mode proper to all objective concepts when fully representing a determined object. Finally, this mode of concretion is proper to judgment. The distinguishing mark of the judgmental synthesis is the answer 'yes' or 'no'.² In any categorical judgment there is a kind of diversity and a kind of identity present. In accidental predications, for instance, the subject and predicate indicate the same thing, but under a different intelligibility. To say a thing is a man and to designate a white thing can apply equally to the same supposit but it is not the same thing to say that a thing is a man and to say that it is white. Thus, 'Man is

¹Ibid., p. 204.
²Ibid.

white' expresses a supposit both in the subject and in the predicate but under different explicit intelligibilities. Thus Aquinas concludes according to Maréchal's analysis: the predicate and the subject are identical as supposits but are different as intelligibilities.

The underlying principle of all judgments, according to Maréchal, is that of identity, and it is expressed by the formula: Quod est, est, what is, is. Obviously between the 'est' of the subject and the 'est' of the predicate, the diversity is only logical because they both refer to the same supposit. Quod est, est signifies in a general proposition that the subject (which is --quod est) is determined by a form (forma essendi). Thus every judgment involves the synthesis which Aquinas call concretion¹. The pertinent question, then, is whether this concrete mode of judgment holds a permanent disposition in the cognitive faculties, in other words, a synthetic a priori.

The synthesis of understanding is the work of the whole intelligence which in act does not precontain its object. In contrast to the simple intuition of pure spirits, human intelligence draws up objects laboriously by reaching partial aspects by discurrere, et componere et dividendo.² Such a synthetic mode of concretion, from potency to act, involves a successive acquisition in which each step adds new determinations to anterior states which as indeterminate or less determined take on the value

¹Ibid., p. 206.

²Ibid., p. 207.

of matter. The supposit required for subsistence of abstract form and for its objectification consists finally in a material principle; hence, there must be an extrinsic dependence of the intellective faculty on the sensible and material faculties.

Fundamentally, synthetic knowledge is characteristic of any intelligence which does not pre-contain its object in act. That is to say, the Infinite Intelligence already contains its object in act since the object of Divine cognition is the Divine essence and is identical with it. The human intellect must move laboriously through a succession of partial grasps. Even the Angels, according to Aquinas, do not know by a judicial synthesis. This aspect of human cognition manifests a weakness, a weakness of the intelligible light which is a participation only of the Divine light. The source of this debility is, of course, the potential nature of the intellect which cannot reach its perfection save by successive actualisations of its radical potency. Thus, Maréchal quoting St. Thomas places the difficulty on the level of the first act of intellection: "...intellectus humanus non statim in prima apprehensione capit perfectam rei cognitionem, sed primo apprehendit aliquid de ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et proprium objectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietates et accidentia, et habitudines circumstantes rei essentiali. Et secundum hoc necesse habet unum apprehensum alii componere, vel dividere... (S. th. I. 85. 5, c)."² This is a frank

¹Ibid., p. 209.

²Ibid., pp. 207-208.

rejection of any human intellectual intuition. God, on the contrary, seizes at one stroke the total intelligibility of the object. The difference between the angelic intellect and the human is the temporality of the latter's intellectual acts; the angelic intellect, however, does not exclude all succession of acts but it never knows by composing and dividing.¹ The conclusion is that the human intellect is thus circumscribed because of its extrinsic dependence upon corporeal reality. By the same token, this material dependence is the ground of the structural dualism in the judgment of concretion.

Analysis of cognitional process reveals that the species produced in the possible intellect with the co-operation of the phantasm is only an abstract form and in no way objectively determined. That is to say, of itself it is the carrier of an intelligibility which must be reflectively determined to the datum for cognition. To emerge as an object to the mind it must lose its indetermination by being reattached to a principle of subsistence. This can be done in one of two ways: to consider the form itself as subsistent in itself, meaning, to identify the form and the supposit; or else to relate the form to a supposit which is distinct from it.² This latter method simply describes the judgment of concretion through synthesis. The first method is automatically excluded on the ground that every conceptual form is abstracted from sensible representations and objectification results by 'con-

¹Ibid., p. 208.

²Ibid.

version to the phantasm'. The second method alone remains. The supposit alone can guarantee the subsistence of the form, not is it identical with it--there is an opposition between the two but it is only of a relative nature. Thus, the form is objectified in the phantasm and, hence, is referred to the object sensibly represented in the phantasm which is the singular supposit that was needed.

Furthermore, objectively speaking, the form and the phantasm differ only in so far as the latter possesses individuating conditions which escape the abstractive and universalizing activity of the intellect. As a consequence, the subsistence which the abstract form recovers through conversion to the phantasm is tied to the principle of individuation in the sensible object.¹ More specifically, individuality is characterized by the constitution of the form of this object in a numerical unity--the concrete unity of number. This amounts to a quantification of the form or a relation of the form to quantified matter.

If, then, the judgmental synthesis really expresses the structure of our objective concepts as reflected in the judgment, one must seek for the reason in the extrinsic dependence of the intellect on the senses. Briefly, the intelligible form is not objectified save through concretion by way of the phantasm, in matter. The only alternative to this process is direct intuition. An intelligence which is non-intuitive needs the co-operation of sensibility, a receptive faculty, physically passive, whose object

¹Ibid., p. 209.

is both material and quantitative; this exigency for the sensibility, in the objective act of intelligence, demands the synthetic mode of concretion.¹

As a consequence of the discursive mode of judgment from the successive movements from potency to act and the enchainment of the intellectual representation to the temporal object of sensibility, a temporal mode of judgment must be examined. The discursive activity in time stands on the side of subject and the temporal determination in objective content bears on the form of the object. Our intelligence seizes objectively something in time. Since the rhythm of our intellections depends, indirectly and extrinsically, on the proper rhythm of sensibility, the form of time is not an internal a priori condition of our intelligence.² Then again, time as mode of the object is implied with every conversion of abstracted universal to the phantasm, as a reference to singular objects from which it was abstracted. Since the objective reference is effected, in a more or less direct manner, in every judgment, the objective view and the subjective view issue in the same conclusion. Temporality, the quantitative measure of movement, is the adjunct of sensibility and sensible objects, and it affects intellection naturally because of the substantial unity of body and intellectualive soul.³ The synthetic unity of concretion cannot be a mere identity with supposit, for then a substantial union of material supposit with the most general form, indeter-

¹Ibid., p. 210.

²Ibid., p. 213.

³Ibid., p. 214.

minate being, would be only of predicamental nature. This means that in a judgment of any kind the form which is posited in the material supposit is never exhausted by this act of concretion; otherwise it would be impossible to transcend the material supposit as such. Should the form be reduced to the most general of all determinations, and termed being, then being would be univocal because it would be limited to predicamental being, that is material being. But for our intelligence, the non-representable is non-being; the total object of our intelligence overflows the object of our representations.¹

For objective knowledge, it is not sufficient to possess the form of the object; and objectifying relation, in which the object is separated from the subject in regard to truth and being, is required. Unlike Kant's synthesis of formal unity of understanding, there is presented by Maréchal a synthesis more in terms of St. Thomas's compositio et divisio, not a synthesis as such, but a synthesis of subject and predicate by affirmation or a division of the same by negation.² Briefly, what is meant is a positing of the synthesis. The truth of the simple concept is passive, for the intellect is receptivity at that point. Knowledge on the level of understanding is essentially passive, but knowledge on the level of judgment is active in the positing of the synthesis.

Maréchal then considers an analogy between intuition and judgment; that is, between an intuitive judgment of divine or an-

¹Ibid., p. 216.

²Ibid., pp. 217-218.

golic intellection and the discursive judgment. In seizing reality, the judgment imitates intuition; but what intuition possesses directly by creation or by internal production, the discursive intelligence attains, less perfectly, by affirmation. Affirmation of the synthesis confers on judgment the objectifying value of an intellectual quasi-intuition or more of an inchoative intuition of the intelligible.

Father Maréchal defines the nature of affirmation in four qualities: first, by affirmation, judgment appears as an active attitude of intellective subject; secondly, by affirmation, judgment becomes, not simply a psychological state, but an expression of intelligence, a sort of internal locution of the knowing subject, as if the subject to affirm the being of an object must go out of its own intimacy in some way; thirdly, by affirmation, judgment enters subjective content of thought in agreement with logical truth, to achieve an expression relative to a distinct object from itself; and fourthly, by affirmation, the judgment always is an objectification of subjective form, in an exterior and absolute term determined as intentional value, that is as a term of possible action.² The first two traits, the active attitude and expression, denote a spontaneity on the part of the subject; the last two qualities, relation and objectification, indicate a virtual prolongation of movement outside the frontiers of the subject towards an absolute, ad rem. Objectifying affirmation appears

¹Ibid., p. 221.

²Ibid., pp. 222-223.

then as a middle way between an exclusively synthetic activity, halting at the formal aspect of being, and an intellectual intuition, seising being in its plenitude.¹

In acts of rational certitude, belief, and faith, a radical principle is evident. We are referring here to the nature, which is the radical principle of operation, the internal finality of the agent. Assent may be given or refused, but assent is exercised under the decisive influence of this natural appetite which moves reason before sustaining will.² In contrast, the proper object of human intelligence is material essence, but the formal object extends as far as being itself. In natural finality resides the dynamic value of the proper object, formal term of this finality, for objective end moves by desire.

Internal natural finality or natural appetite of a rational being is referred to as a natural will, distinct from the notion of electing will.³ Maréchal goes to St. Thomas for a reference which is of doubtful value in this new context: "Potest dici quod intellectus assentit (non affirmat) in quantum à voluntate (sive naturali, sive elicita) movetur (Cf. S. th. I. II^{ae}, 15, 1, ad 3)."⁴

This placing of desire in relation with all finality cuts a wide swath for it would extend to the tendency of any power whatsoever. Maréchal places this natural desire in the same power as the elicited act of will, and yet he distinguishes clearly between intel-

¹Ibid., p. 224.
²Ibid., p. 226.
³Ibid., p. 227.
⁴Ibid., p. 228.

lect and will.¹

A dual function of finality must be considered as operative in judgment. Judicative assent, determined by antecedent finality, itself determines a consequent finality. Finality does not rest in a particular affirmation for such cannot give knowledge of total being, the last end of intelligence; assent marks then the act of obtaining a subordinate end, a simple step in the pursuit of a more comprehensive end.² Affirmation appears as the meeting place of two orders of finality, both as the outcome of an anterior exigence and a point of departure of a new exigence. All formal acquisition and value for possible action result from the obscure and insatiable desire for being.³

Only in judgment does the representative form take on the nature of object, as both assimilated and unified in the subject. Affirmation is not a simple categorical function opposed to negation, not a simple formal aspect of synthesis of subject and predicate. By affirmation the particular given is objectified in perspective of final end; such an end is expressed by the judgment of a spiritual faculty capable of complete reflection. And the dynamic properties of the object manifest themselves in the fullness of this reflection. Judgment possesses a transcendental anticipation,

¹Ibid., p. 227.

²"Car le repos dans une affirmation particulière ne saurait être total, puisqu'il n'égale pas la fin dernière de l'intelligence: l'assentiment marque donc l'obtention d'une fin subordonnée, simple étape, ou moyen, dans la poursuite d'une fin plus compréhensive." Ibid., pp. 228-229.

³Ibid., p. 229.

for it is the point of a transcendental relation of objects to being, a relation posed implicitly in direct understanding and revealed in reflection.¹

Father Maréchal next considers objective understanding by analogy to the ideal intelligibility of God and his existence, which are given in some fashion in the primitive exigence of our intellectual nature. This transcendent term of the analogical relation must constitute every object as object. The subject as it were lives out its finality in terms of successive intelligible forms which are partial attainments, or attained ends, in the broad sweep of the intellectual dynamism whose ultimate term is an unrestricted object. And since this relation is posited in the order of ends--absolute order of noumenon--the immanent form at the same time is related to a subsistent, that is, to an in itself (en soi). We will consider this question of finality again in further detail, but for the present, the two orders of finality meeting in the judgment are the point of a transcendental relation of objects to being. The transcendental term of the ontological relation (being) constitutes every object as object and is imprinted implicitly in our actual understanding. To refuse such a metaphysical affirmation is to deny the possibility of objective thought.²

First, the ontological affirmation is not commensurate with the object of conceptual representation. The objective function

¹Ibid., p. 230.

²Ibid., p. 232.

of affirmation is not limited to a simple ontological transposition of the intellectual representation of sensible origin, that is the expression of an entity proportioned to a phantasm.¹ The phantasm itself is the product of the imagination as produced under the guiding dynamism of intellect.

Secondly, affirmation covers objects in the exact measure of their actuality. The amplitude of being signified in our judgments gives the objective measure of affirmation. The being of our affirmations varies between two extreme points, absolute plenitude and minimal possibility. These opposite points correspond respectively in our system of notions to concepts of pure act and pure potency: the reality of being is act; the real possibility of being is potency; and between the two, being is realized according to a graduated proportion of act and potency, which signifies that it is essentially a becoming (an act still in potency for ulterior perfection).² Obviously, priority is given to act; intelligence conceives nothing outside of being. Actuality is the measure of being: in the object, the measure of intelligibility, and, in the subject, the measure of the knowing power.³

According to the specific limitation of human knowing, only a complementary unity of matter and form can be known as object. Finite essence is to being as potency is to act. In order for the object of intelligence to be completely affirmable, it needs a

¹Ibid., p. 233.

²Ibid., p. 237.

³"...de même que l'actualité est la mesure de l'être, elle est aussi dans l'objet, la mesure de l'intelligibilité, et, dans le sujet, la mesure du pouvoir connaissant." Ibid., p. 238.

superior synthesis bringing it to an absolute condition of being, that is, reaching the point where essence is rejoined to existence, and the possible becomes the necessary.¹ Conception is only of the possible. Two limitations rear up: first matter marking the inferior limit of our concepts and Pure Being, the superior limit. Maréchal, in setting the keystone of objective thought, requires a plunge into the real by a process that uses the conceptual representation while passing beyond it.² Such a process does not demand an explicit reference to concrete matter or to pure act since it flows from a discursive intellect, that is, involving a deductive process.

Thirdly, affirmation is a dynamic substitute for intellectual intuition. Our intelligence is not a potency always in act as is angelic intelligence, since human intellections are dependent upon the intermittent rhythm of sensibility, thus diminishing the inferiority of object to subject. It is the purpose of the agent-intellect to conciliate the two attributes of intellectual spontaneity and sensible receptivity.³ But intelligence possesses transcendent principles. Sensible co-operation completes materially the transcendental determinations, innate in intelligence, thus permitting them to be expressed in objective representations.⁴ This natural possession is not simply objective for a type of being,

¹Ibid., p. 247.

²Ibid., p. 251.

³Ibid., p. 259.

⁴"La coopération sensible complète matériellement les déterminations transcendentes, innées à l'intelligence, leur permettant ainsi de s'exprimer dans des représentations objectives." Ibid., p. 260.

although it is extrinsically limited. The intelligibility grasped by the intellect transcends the phantasm whence it was drawn. Out of the potential was drawn a grasp of 'being' which is embodied in this sensible representation, but, once in the possession of the intellect, belongs to the universe of being without the restriction of this particular embodiment. The full potential of intelligence has an objective capacity for being; the full actuation of this capacity, in relation to the material given, appears an inaccessible limit....which means that never will the transcendental unity, innate in our intelligence as functional disposition, be totally objectified in our concepts.¹ Only in the judgment is the existence for unity squarely met, where concepts are attached to the absolute of being in the bosom of totalizing intellectual intuition.²

The function of intuition is replaced by the objective role of affirmation as it has been considered here, psychologically, by the exercise of affirmation, and already established above by an *a posteriori* proof. Secondly, deductively and *a priori*, by considering the value of an end of the given objectified in thought, Father Maréchal examines the objective role of affirmation that is necessary in every non-intuitive understanding. Therefore, we shall consider realism through the finality of the intellect in an *a priori* analysis.

¹ "...mais comme cette puissance a toute la capacité objective de l'être, son actuation pleine, par le moyen de données matérielles, apparaît une inaccessible limite...Ce qui veut dire que jamais l'unité transcendente, innée à notre intelligence comme disposition fonctionnelle, ne s'objectivera totalement dans nos concepts..."

² Ibid., p. 261.

Ibid.

The interpenetration of the practical and theoretical orders of intelligence may be found in internal finality.¹ The finality of immaterial agents, enrichment of form as form, is an intentional finality as opposed to natural finality. Man develops as a being which is a composite in the order of essence. His development is not only intellectual; he develops and perfects himself as a whole. Angels are already complete or perfect in their particular order of essence; hence their ontological perfection can only be in the intentional order, i.e., in the order of knowledge but not as moving from potency to act. This finality of human intelligence is not an ordered tendency to the production of a nature, but an ordered tendency to the purely intentional perfection of a subject already in act as a nature.²

The universal object of affirmation is expressed in a dynamic mode in our intelligence, as an anticipated end of a tendency. Yet, affirmation marks only a moment in a movement, an intermediary stage between initial passivity and full intuition.³ The whole passage of potency to act, through a dynamic principle, is a tendency to an anticipated end. Between these three successive elements--final cause (or anticipated end), action, and form effected--there must exist a rigorous proportion; thus, the form realized as the term of the action pre-existed as form of the active tendency itself.⁴ As a tendency in its real extension, of both

¹Ibid., p. 263.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 265.

⁴Ibid., p. 268.

an active and passive potential, is measured by an end entirely obtained, so too, the directive form of the action is measured on the term effected, at least on the formal aspect of it; dynamic at the beginning, it accumulates real determination in the course of the action, but still remains indeterminate in proportion to material possibilities not yet expressed. This amounts to a denial of innate ideas; the dynamism of the human composite acquires specification through its immanent act and yet looks forward to the ultimate term of total knowledge. Thus, we have this prescience of ends uniquely expressed in the specifying form of movements which tend to an end.¹ Partial ends take on the character of subordinate ends in regard to final end. What gives these mediate ends a dynamic value is the tendency to a final end.

Having established a correlation between the active and passive aspects of intellect, Maréchal moves on to point out the distinctive characteristic of the end of passive potency as well as active virtuality: the absence of any intrinsic limitation. Abstract being, principle of number, cannot be that end, for even after intelligible unity of material objects, there still remains in our intelligence a residue of unemployed potential. The absence of all intrinsic limitation requires, as its sole end, unrestricted being. It follows then that the form of our intellectual dynamism, considered as an immanent activity, is only expressed by the transcendental concept of being. But, this concept, unlike the predic-

¹ "...nous avons la préséance des fins uniquement dans la forme spécificatrice des mouvements qui tendent à ces fins."
Ibid., p. 270.

amental concept of being, is analogical, not at all univocal.¹

Next, Father Maréchal considers the nature of this dynamic aspect of intellect in relation to will and the ensuing question of first act.

Intelligible form is the principle of action when considered as form of a tendency; that is, the expression of the apriori. The dynamism is inseparable from the form just as the form is never isolated from the act that it specifies. And the action of intellect and will is reciprocal in second acts; in as far as will depends on objective ends, intelligence assumes priority, but in as much as intellect is put in exercise by a subjective dynamism, will precedes intelligence.² Maréchal is once again reducing the human dynamism to the action of will. In other words, Lonergan's "pure desire to know" would seem in this context to emanate from will, not directly from intellect. The truth then becomes a logical extension of the good since perfection, received must possess all the particularity of the truth known.³ Thus, elicited will can put intelligence into activity, but intelligence by objective presentation of good specifies the willing tendency. Elicited rational appetite rules itself on an explicit understanding of the good. However, there is a sense in which the true can be considered the good of intellect since truth perfects the intellect and

¹"Il s'ensuit donc que la forme de notre dynamisme intellectuel, considéré comme activité immanente, ne se traduit bien que par le concept transcendantal d'Être. Or, ce concept, à la différence du concept prédicamental d'Être, est analogique, nullement univoque;.. Ibid., p. 280.

²Ibid., pp. 289-290.

³Ibid., p. 292.

can be willed as such by the will. Maréchal would seem to extend his notion of the reciprocal activity of intellect and will somewhat further than this perfectly acceptable relation. At any rate, Maréchal makes it clear that all motion of the various potencies of the soul proceeds from two reciprocally first principles--a principle of specification (form), which is the work of intelligence, and a dynamic principle (exercise, act), which is the work of will.

The mutual inclusion of these two potencies is, in fact, first act, a permanent disposition of the faculty and an a priori condition of possibility of first operation. ¹ Such a condition is described as a dynamic tension. The first act of intelligence is to first act of will as specification is to exercise, as form to dynamism. While the dynamic impulsion does not differ from natural motion ad exercitium impressed on will by the universal cause, still the specifying principle of both faculties must be searched for in line of intelligence since the latter carries the proper formal determination, a sort of first formal act which it possesses ² by nature; that is, by the specifying motion of a universal cause. As proceeding from a transcendent agent, God, our intelligence

¹Ibid., p. 295.

²"...la motion qui constitue l'intelligence en acte premier ne diffère pas de la motion naturelle ad exercitium imprimée à la volonté par la Cause universelle...Le principe spécifiant, ou formel, de l'une et de l'autre faculté doit donc être cherché dans la ligne de l'intelligence...l'intelligence porte une détermination formelle propre, une sorte d'acte premier formel qu'elle possède par nature, c'est-à-dire par motion spécificatrice de la Cause universelle." Ibid., pp. 296-297.

presents a first natural specification, according to which it will pass to second act, in so far as extrinsic conditions of operation are open to it. The first act of our intelligence consists in this primitive specification.

It would seem, therefore, that will constitutes the dynamism of intellect in so far as the structure or apriori of intellect specifies will in a general way as desire, the end of which is being and ultimately supreme being. If the good is the object of will, the specific form of intellect is then the good of will. Without that specific form, the will would have nothing to move it. Will is the efficient cause of intellect, but will does not contain an apriori structure so must be dependent upon the intellect for every step of its movement. Will so specified moves the intellect to the full term of knowledge in the judgment because it is through this term of knowledge that will can attain its object. Truth is also attained as an extension following the end to be attained by will.

This peculiar doctrine of the intellectual dynamism requires a more explicit treatment as it varies so widely from Lonergan's notion of "the pure desire to know".

The total reasoning process is grounded on the intrinsic, objective properties of the notion of truth and the notion of the good, the formal objects respectively of intellect and will. Its basis is not at all the fact that the true may be freely wished and the good as such discerned. Actually, the psychological root of their reciprocal activity, rather consists in the natural unity of intelligence--the unlimited power of assimilating--and the will--the unrestricted appetite for the good. Hence, the mutual

inclusion of these two powers in rational activity is to be sought not only in their reciprocal operations but more radically in the complementary relation and interdependence of their first acts.¹

In this context, first act signifies the power already orientated towards its object. Now the will is a potency which, like any other potency, must pass into act by the influence of an efficient cause. Yet if the will is self-determining, how can it be under the influence of an extrinsic cause which determines the effect? This would destroy the freedom of the will. Thomists have followed St. Thomas who speaks of a promotio physica--a kind of pre-determination freely of the first cause. The agent-intellect is entirely different because it is said to be constantly in act, at least its operation merely needs something to work on in order to produce its effect. It is the agent-intellect then, in Lonergan's terminology which accounts for the questioning attitude and wonder characterizing the "pure desire to know".

Maréchal now goes on to show what he calls the relation of the two powers in first act as explained above:²

1. The first operation of the will presupposes an object which specifies its action.
2. The exercise of the will in its first volition (doubtless this dynamic tension is an endowment of nature) depends upon the first cause extrinsic to it.
3. Since this promotion is from an extrinsic agent, the latter must direct its operation towards an end.

¹Ibid., p. 295.

²Ibid., pp. 295-296.

- 49.
4. Since the end is to be attained by the movement of the patient, the specification arises from the natural form (apriori) of the patient. Thus the natural motion impressed by the first Cause on the will tends to attain an end which is inscribed by anticipation in the natural form of the patient.
 5. The natural form of a subject which is the essential law of its operating (action) is expressed immediately in the formal object of the subject's powers. Hence, in a purely spiritual subject, whose natural powers are but intelligence and will, the natural form which is the measure of the will in first act can only be the form of the intellect in first act.
 6. Since both intellect and will need an extrinsic agent (the first cause) to place them in dynamic tension or in first act to operation irrespective of any specification, the motion which constitutes both intellect and will in first act is the same.
 7. Since the will is endowed with freedom and the intellect is necessarily ordered to what it apprehends as true, it possesses, unlike the will, a formal determination impressed by the first cause (the apriori). Thus, the interdependence of the two powers is to be found in this intellectual apriori.

This doctrine on the role of the will seems to replace the natural dynamism of intellect expressed in the Pure Desire to Know.

We are not neglecting the fact that reflection can bear on a practical judgment; and hence a value judgment, which furnishes the object for the will, is effected. So much is perfectly correct, but, as will be shown later in detail, a practical judgment tends to cut short the intellectual dynamism which could move on to further questions for intelligence rather than action.

When intelligence meets an external given, it passes to second act under the formal motion of this given and under the permanent impulsion of natural appetite; a particular positive determination is subsumed under the universal form of being, which was previously only the frame and goal of all possible determinations.¹ This natural appetite refers undoubtedly to the eros or pure desire of which Lonergan speaks. An object is distinguished in consciousness, and this objective representation, grafted on the natural form of intelligence, becomes for the dynamic (appetitive) faculty a new specification, a new point of formal departure. The tendency of the appetite is now properly willing; it will effect this latter good by intellectual cognition. Next, by reflection the good of the object, thus represented, is revealed formally according to its appetibility, and the will regulates itself not so much on the brute representation as on the representation expressed as appetible or as a good. Hence arises the possibility of deliberation and free will. Reflection provides the good for the subject while rational appetite will not only continue to push intelligence to objective assimilation but will become capable of regulating fer-

¹Ibid., p. 299.

mally the intellectual operation.¹ Maréchal seems to be saying that the term of intellect and of will are identical and that deliberation and free will are mere adjuncts to the dynamism. This would fit in with his statement that the true character of rational appetite can be discerned even with the complication of psychological life. Again, he says that the characteristic of the rational tendency contrasted with the inferior appetites is that of not having a limit in the way of an end which exhausts the desirable or any good which exhausts the good.² The only specifying form which allows the free engagement of all the possibilities of this comprehensive tendency would be only the most general form possible, the one which does not exclude any other: being as such.

Even the complication of psychological life doesn't cause rational appetite to lose its true character.³ Logical theory of intellectual operation as such can abstract from contingent factors, but psychological theory of intellectual operations must keep the main line of speculative and practical habitus. Maréchal would agree, then, that love, right or wrong willing, and even emotions command in some measure our apprehension of the true. However, the appetitive tendency should not be interpreted as parallel to intellectual activity, but as the main spring or dynamic soul of the latter.⁴

Exercise and specification are identical only in God. Human

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., pp. 298-299.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 301.

intelligence becomes fully itself relative to an immanent object; and while that faculty is defined by the ontological and formal assimilation resulting from its dynamism, more peculiar to intelligence is that certain perfection of consciousness, that aesthetic and immanent brightening resulting from the assimilating form in its identity with assimilated form.¹ The successive manifestations of transcendental properties of the object in understanding have their guarantee in the natural motion of the end which in the manner of a real condition precedes the formal constitution of the object as being. The only end which satisfies man is God--not in any manner or other--but objectively,² according to the proper mode of intelligence and will. Thus, the last end of intellect and will co-incide and the intellect defines the objective term of our activity to provide a kind of intuitive understanding of absolute Being. In short, intellect attains the limits of its natural intuition by penetrating essences of created creatures and indirectly, God.

Natural finality provides the possibility of the end to which intelligence tends. Yet we pursue truth while making error and will the good while doing evil. Father Maréchal takes a realistic stand on the qualities of universality and necessity, postulated earlier. The implicit dynamism directs universally and necessarily, but our explicit determinations of the dynamism have

¹Ibid., pp. 303-304.

²"L'homme tend vers Dieu, sa fin dernière, non pas d'une manière quelconque, mais objectivement, selon le mode propre de l'intelligence et de la volonté." Ibid., p. 308.

not the same guarantee: these interpretations are based on, not a physical or logical necessity, but--as a theory of error would show--on the constructive power of imagination.¹ This peculiar doctrine that error must be referred to the imagination is ambiguous. Error like truth is found formally only in the judgment. Imagination can be the cause of error only to the extent that judgment is concerned with the intelligible as drawn from the phantasm. The resulting concept may or may not be correct, but as Lonergan points out, there is no compulsion for an affirmative judgment. In fact, there is a whole range of judgments designating not only negation or affirmation but also degrees of probability, and there may even be a deferral of judgment until more conclusive evidence is attained. Truth and falsity reside only in the judgment, unless the function of judgment is considered to be that of a rubber stamp upon an immanent synthesis.

Nevertheless, such a radical impulse is inconceivable without the objective possibility of attaining it, however remote that possibility may be. The argument seems to be that error can be detected by an intellectual power which is orientated towards the intuition of absolute Being, albeit the term is beyond the natural powers of a finite being. Thus, this objective possibility implies two conditions: the existence of an absolute being capable of communicating this perfection and the capacity or aptitude of our intelligence to receive it.²

¹Ibid., p. 315.

²Ibid.

It has been established that the first principle, intention of the agent and principle of movement, correlates with the last end. Therefore, this adequate and proportionate principle must be one in which the last end, intuitive possession of Absolute Being, will be virtually precontained.¹ But will proceeds from a natural potential which is the first principle of the total activity of the intelligent subject. The question arises as to whether this natural potential might not be incompatible with the intellectual spontaneity and autonomy of the will. Only God, whose essence is his being, has full spontaneity and autonomy. The natural inclination that will holds originally has nothing of exterior constraint. The autonomy of the will is real, but only relative and partial; it does not exclude the transcendent ascendancy of the first cause, and this ascendancy constitutes precisely the natural potential that precedes and sustains every elicited act of the will.² A being in act is required as the final basis of all ontological possibility and as first principle of all actuation. A unique pure act realizes this double universal condition: pure and simple act, God.³

Our intellectual nature, as a radical principle of immanent activity, is a finite participation of infinite actuality.⁴ The natural form of the intellect, being logically anterior to the whole elicited act of intelligence, is the form of the first act

¹Ibid., p. 318.

²Ibid., p. 321.

³Ibid., p. 322.

⁴Ibid.

of Intellect. As such it is the universal and abstract form of being. In this primitive state it does not represent an object, but simply an assimilating potential, a formal apriori condition regulating in advance our apprehension of possible objects. In order for the apriori form of intellect to objectify itself in consciousness, it must first receive from sensible material, an intelligible in potency.¹ Maréchal relates the double divine motion of first cause to the words of St. Thomas: Deus movet intellectum in quantum imprimit ei species intelligibiles (S. th. I. 105. 3, c).² And so, we consider the created intellect, not as a pure impulsion, but an impulsion under its formal aspect. Just as divine motion does not jeopardize the autonomy of the will, so too the natural form of intellect does not destroy its objective power.

The uncreated light signifies the purely intuitive intelligence which creates its external objects. As to pure spirits, so too something is communicated to us which imitates this intuitive power, the creator of its object. This means that our intelligence, although extrinsically dependent on sensibility, introduces something over and above the content of sensibility. It does this in virtue of its apriori by which it possesses virtually a meta-empirical element. It actually produces something, namely the mental word and this is 'to create' the intelligible in act.³

¹Ibid., p. 323.

²Ibid.

³"...c'est-à-dire que notre intelligence, bien qu'extrinsèquement dépendante d'une sensibilité, introduit elle-même, dans l'objet immanent, dans le verbe mental, un élément supérieur, métémpirique, qu'elle possédait en propre, à l'état virtuel: sur de l'intelligible en puissance elle crée de l'intelligible en acte." Ibid., p. 324.

Obviously the intellect contributes something over and above the empirical data; hence it is a quasi-creator and by the same token a quasi-intuitive power. This 'created' element is isolated by an analysis of the diverse intelligibles present to our thought. It is to be found in what is independent of the relations to sensation and is referred to the intellectual nature as to its proximate cause. At the foundations of the analysis we encounter the apriori which contains virtually everything that is to be known--it is the power of the agent-intellect.

As apriori rule or formal exigence, not yet objective, first principles, which are part of the apriori disposition of the intellect, permit participation in intuitive power. This participation in Divine Truth is limited to first principles, to the transcendental attributes of being, but not according to generic and specific types. It is not an ontological exemplarism or Platonism.¹ Here, by a natural disposition of a dynamic order, first intelligibles, *A. e.* real form of a natural tendency, reveal themselves by co-naturality in objects which mark at intervals the concrete exercise of this tendency. Father Maréchal has characterized his thought as a dynamic exemplarism, confined only to first intelligible principles.

With this delineation of finality as basis, the explicit fact of objectivity in finality remains to be clarified. In the vital assimilation of the object by the subject in the intellectual act, there is always the intentional character in the relation of object to subject. The knowing subject is itself one of the terms

¹Ibid., p. 326.

of the perceived relation. In second acts, the intelligence is not directly passive, that is, in regard to sensible objects. Such passivity pertains properly to the senses; the intelligence conforms to the phantasm, but intellectual passivity exists only in respect of the intellect to itself, that is the passive-intellect to the agent-intellect. Unlike the pure receptivity of matter to a form, the reception of a form by the intellect results not in a composite in which the elements remain diverse as principles, but in an identity--the identity of act; the intelligible in act is the intellect in act.¹ The full term of finality is reserved for the reflective judgment. According to the reciprocal causality of intellect and will, the specific form of intellection, species, is not static but manifests the pattern of a tendency to an end as the intelligence moves from potency to act. Each species acquired takes a dynamic value and constitutes a term² in regard to this activity. Never is the active potential of intelligence exhausted; after assimilation characterized by the production of an intentional form, the active power of intelligence turns to new conquests to be added always as subordinate ends in agreement with the last end. This relation of finality is the foundation of objectivity.

The first condition for the objectification of the immanent form is that it separate in some fashion from the subject as such, and in separating from the subject, that it acquire a being, en³ soi, qualified as a thing.

¹Ibid., p. 330.

²Ibid., p. 332.

³Ibid.

The form must exist in opposition to the subject by presenting the character of an intelligible object as a being in itself, a subsistence. However, in this first degree of objectivity, the opposition does not imply that the objective form is distinguished from the subject in its total ontological reality, but from the subject precisely as knowing.

Although the form may be juxta-posed or extra-posed to the subject as knowing, this is not enough because it must further be referred to an en soi or a subsistent. Thus, the first degree of extraposition does not immediately imply that the en soi of the objectified form is necessarily distinguished from the ontological reality of the subject in its totality.

Maréchal says that the metaphysical opposition of two subsistents, that of the subject and that of the object, poses a problem much less elementary than that of the objective apprehension of the content of the representation. It is sufficient that the subject, as a function, opposes the object to itself as an en soi.¹ The principal thesis will be that in a discursive intelligence the assimilated form is opposed to the subject and acquires an en-soi according as it constitutes for the subject a dynamic value, a moment of active becoming. The point here seems to be that there is a conscious opposition between the assimilated form and the knowing subject as subject in virtue of the finality of intellect which attains its end by successive acquisitions which point towards the total completion of its dynamic tendency

¹Ibid.

as well as towards the phantasm whence it came.

A purely passive acquisition, as prime matter receives form, does not point towards further completion in itself. In itself that kind of passivity is static. Again Maréchal states: As an end actively possessed, but possessed precisely as the 'form' of an aspiration orientated towards subsequent ends, in a word: as ¹intimating formally, ulterior ends. This is to say that the very nature of assimilation and the presence of the intelligible form points to ulterior ends to be acquired successively and alone explains the essential dynamism of the cognitive process. Hence, it is in this sense that the immanent form is vitally operative as an end looking in both directions, namely, towards total fulfilment and towards the object assimilated by the form. There is a passing moment when aspiration (dynamic tendency) becomes possession and this imperfect possession gives rise again to further desire. Does this not reveal a relation which sets off the form as the central element in this dynamism from the subject itself? A good is distinguished from the need which it satisfies ²and from the further need which still remains. Maréchal seems to conclude that, since we are dealing with the order of Ends, the purely psychological experience gives rise to the logical necessity of the noumenal, and hence the form is automatically related to a subsistent, en soi. This is tantamount to present-

¹Ibid., p. 333.

²Ibid.

ing in thought the essential characteristic of an ontological object.

It is this logical implication which Maréchal will seek to show. The whole secret of objective knowledge lies in the logical necessities involved in the nature of the intelligible form and the end, i.e. the finality of intellect. The reality in itself of these ends necessarily pursued in the exercise of all discursive thought is for the subject, not only a dynamic exigence, but also a logical necessity. Objectivity in immanence is a necessary condition for the exercise of non-intuitive thought, and finality poses dynamically the reality of objective ends for objective certitude. Therefore we are to find the vital indissoluble unity of intelligence as speculative faculty and intelligence as assimilating dynamism in respect to ends.

The adequate subjective end of our intellectual dynamism--perfect beatitude, the possession of the perfect good--consists in a saturating assimilation of the form of being, in other words, in the possession of God. But, our subjective end, God, must be possible or our radical tendency would be a logical absurdity.² It would be a logical incompatibility for the subject to wish an end that did not exist for both the implicit and explicit order of reason. But as objective end, God, a being necessary in himself, involves a dialectical exigence since

¹Ibid., p. 335.

²Ibid., p. 336.

his existence is affirmed as the condition of all possibility.¹ Therefore the possibility of a last subjective end presupposes the existence of the objective end, God; and in each intellectual act is affirmed implicitly this radical necessity: Thus, when the subjective end is the last end, it is pursued necessarily in virtue of an apriori disposition, a natural will, logically preliminary to all contingent activity. To wish necessarily and apriori the subjective end is to adopt necessarily and apriori the possibility of this end, and consequently, to affirm necessarily and apriori the existence of objective end; our implicit affirmation of Absolute Being bears the stamp of an apriori² necessity.

Such an argument for the existence of God, as objective and subjective end, founding the logical and psychological necessity of the intellective process, will hardly stand critical scrutiny. It comes very close to innatism and in certain respects resembles the arguments used by Scotus to prove the infinity of God. Scotus gave closest attention to the infinity of God because his concept of infinity is not an attribute, but rather it is the intrinsic mode of the being.

First, God, as efficient Cause, able to produce an infinity of effects, must be infinite in power.³ Therefore, in as much as God possesses in himself in an eminent fashion the causality of

¹Ibid., p. 337.

²Ibid., p. 338.

³Scotus, John Duns, Opus Oxoniense, 1, 2, 2, nn. 25-29.

all possible secondary causes, He must be infinite in himself. Scotus always emphasized the value of an *a posteriori* proof, but he did not hold to that criterion in all his proofs.

Secondly, God must be infinite since he knows an infinity of intelligible objects. Here is his reason for supposing that God knows an infinity of objects: "Whatever things are infinite in potency, so that if they are taken one after the other they can have no end, are infinite in act if they are together in act. But it is clear enough that intelligible objects are infinite in potency in respect to the created intellect, and in the uncreated intellect all (the intelligibilia) which are successively intelligible by the created intellect are actually understood together. Therefore, there are in the uncreated intellect an infinite number of actually apprehended objects."¹

Thirdly, Scotus considers a proof from the finality of will. "Our will can desire and love an object greater than any finite object...and what is more, there seems to be a natural inclination to love above all an infinite good...It thus appears that in the act of loving we have experience of an infinite good: indeed, the will seems to find no perfect rest in any other object...The infinite good must therefore exist."²

And the fourth argument of the Oxford Commentary purports that infinite being is not incompatible with finite being but it is incompatible with the ens eminentissimum that there should be

¹Ibid., 1, 2, 2, n. 30.

²Ibid., 1, 2, 2, n. 31.

a more perfect being.¹ But infinity is greater or more perfect than finitude, and infinity and being are compatible. The ens eminentissimum is therefore infinite. The proof that infinity is compatible with being seems to be that one can discern no incompatibility between them.

In this discussion of infinity, Scotus refers to the Anselmian argument.² The intellect, the object of which is being, finds no mutual repugnance between 'being' and 'infinite', and should these two be incompatible, it would be strange that the intellect did not discern the incompatibility, especially since "a discord in sound so easily offends the hearing". Why would not the intellect 'shrink back' from the idea of the infinite, if it is incompatible with its own proper object, being? Scotus felt that the Anselmian argument must be coloured by adding the words 'without contradiction'. Thus: God is that than which, having been thought without contradiction, a greater cannot be thought without contradiction. Then, if the summum cogitabile is possible (compatible with being), it must exist. His reason for the judgment that that which really exists is greater or more perfect than that which does not really exist extramentally is as follows: That which really exists is maius cogitabile than that which does not really exist but is merely conceived, inasmuch as that which really exists is 'visible' or capable of being intuited, and that which can be intuited is 'greater'

¹Ibid., 1, 2, 2, nn. 31-32.

²Ibid., 1, 2, 2, n. 32.

than that which can be merely conceived or can be known by abstractive thought alone.

Maréchal makes the leap from a natural tendency to assimilate being and possibility of a last subjective end to the existence of God because of a kind of necessary affirmation of his existence, a being necessary in himself as the condition of all possibility. Scotus jumps from the possibility of God to his existence, because the intellect finds no mutual repugnance between the infinity of God and being, the proper object of the intellect. In both cases an innate, implicit affirmation seems to be the motivation for the argument for the existence of God. Both proofs argue only from the ground of possibility, albeit with the presumption of an ontological status. When Scotus speaks of the intellect 'shrinking back' from an idea incompatible with its proper object, being, he certainly uses the terminology of intuition rather than rational evidence. Then, Maréchal speaks of the rational absurdity should our radical tendency predispose us to wish an end that did not exist; this is very close to what Scotus says of the idea of the summum cogitabile, meaning that which exists or is capable of being intuited is greater than that which does not really exist. And especially when that end is the fullness of being, the existence of a being necessary in himself becomes for Maréchal an apriori necessity.

To return to Maréchal's subordinate ends founded upon finality, what, then, is the status of these ends partially

subordinated to last end? Since the apriori form of their intellectual movement is constantly open to new determinations and is never satiated, the particular reality of their logical affirmation can be only contingent reality. These partial specifications contain contingent elements. In so far as they constitute this or that determination, they are not of the nature of a pure necessity. In other words, the particular realities involved in logical affirmation are of necessity only contingent. Nevertheless, there is always a hypothetical necessity presented. They didn't have to exist and hence are contingent, but existing they are assimilated as subordinate ends in the total dynamism of intellect heading towards its final and necessary end. Hence, they are necessary as a matter of fact, not of right. Their objective existence, logically enveloped in their contingent assimilation, applies itself to a necessity: quia sunt, non possunt non esse.¹

Father Maréchal detects the property of extroversion in immanence from the desire to possess strange forms in the quality of their otherness. Two aspects of finality, first, the assimilation or diffusion of good, and secondly, the production or appetite for good, introduce in the subject the principle of an immanent disjunction of subject and object; and outside of this finality there is no possible psychological basis for the objectifying function of the knowing act.

¹"Leur existence objective, logiquement enveloppée dans leur assimilation, s'appuie elle-même à une nécessité: quia sunt, non possunt non esse." Maréchal, op. cit., p. 339.

Judiciary affirmation expresses in objective understanding the dynamically bilateral moment.¹ The moment of judgment expresses the double function of the intelligible form: both looking towards the final end and backwards to the particular object. The direct concept, initial moment of understanding, has the objective content and carries the intention of being in the first place, but the immanent form is objectified only in virtue of an objectifying attitude of the subject which orientates the form towards the final end. Secondly, by reflection, the self consciously objectifies this content and the relation of logical truth is illuminated. Further reflection brings into consciousness not only the primary relation of logical truth, as agreement and opposition of subject and object, but the dynamic value of this agreement. Thirdly, the liason and opposition of subject and object sets up a dynamic value in the objectified form as a permanent end or good in a transcendental sense. Even a primitive judgment is scarcely just an objective representation punctuated by 'yes'. For in order to form a proposition, grammatically constructed with subject and predicate, the intelligence must have analyzed the primitive judgment and recognized the synthetic structure (concretion) of the concept.² This does not happen without understanding, at least in a confused way, the universal as universal, since the function of the predicate demands an abstract concept,

¹Ibid., p. 341.

²Ibid., p. 343.

representing a form separated from the whole particular supposit. Judgment looks back to the supposit for the supposit alone guarantees the subsistence of abstract form, and the relation encountered is one of a relative opposition. Briefly, a non-intuitive intelligence, for its determination of objective value, requires opposition in immanence, according to an inherent relation in the subject that must be understood implicitly or explicitly by him. That is, this immanent relation is regulated according to the ultimate actuality of the subject. Thus, there is a conscious opposition between the assimilated form and the knowing subject as subject in virtue of the finality of intellect, so that a subordinate end is always accompanied by a looking forward to the total completion of the dynamic tendency.

For an activity to be productive and appetitive requires an immanent principle of disjunction; the secret of this condition lies in the immanent relation of a tendency to an end.¹ The dynamic relation of finality must be enveloped in the same act by which these determinations are assimilated in such a fashion that the act which assimilates must be identical to the act which disassociates.² This disassociation can take place only if the assimilated form is grasped and held as a subordinate end. This act itself introduces the immanent form into the ontological order since 'ends' are noumenal. Obviously, the primordial motion which sustains the dynamism is the absolute objective last end of Good

¹Ibid., p. 344.

²Ibid., pp. 344-345.

itself. These subordinate ends depend for their very nature as end upon the superior end, upon which they depend intrinsically. In other words, it is the supreme end or good which sustains the dynamism of intellect. Maréchal has already defined this dynamism precisely in terms of the last end without which it would have no meaning. Once finality is established, subordinate ends become virtually part of the metaphysical hierarchy--that is, they have an ontological status.

The affirmation may be defined as the active reference of conceptual content to reality.¹ The immanent representation has value only in virtue of implicit affirmation. This implicit affirmation is metaphysical in the sense that it must relate the object to the absolute character of being. This notion is perhaps parallel to the Imergen statement that being must 'underpin' the whole cognitional process. Meaning comes from being and since cognition has to do with meaning, being must sustain the whole cognitional process. Hence, the metaphysical affirmation, says Maréchal, just like the dynamic orientation of the intellect, is the very condition of possibility of any object of thought.² Again, this affirmation is exercised but not yet recognized in the first moment of objective cognition, at least in all its implications. Further, Maréchal distinguishes two implicit aspects of the intellectual representation. The first is purely analytical

¹Ibid., p. 345.

²"L'affirmation métaphysique est donc bien, comme attitude dynamique, la condition de possibilité de l'objet dans notre pensée..." Ibid.

as it is drawn from the representation. The second aspect is subjective (an implicit transcendental in the Kantian sense), coupled with the apriori conditions, the functional exigences of intelligence as such, having been placed in act in objective understanding, of which they are the subjective conditions of possibility.¹ Such subjective conditions of possibility can be recognized by the subject through reflection on itself and take the form of a rational deduction which endows them with objective necessity. In the final analysis, the empirical elements in our cognition grasped successively by the fundamental tendency of the intellect (the apriori) carries us along to the assimilation of total being. Thus, Maréchal parallels St. Thomas in that once we know that God exists, we wish to know his essence.

The acknowledgement of a last subjective end involves the final objective end when the relation of subject and object in finality is fully considered. Infinite Being is the keystone of the archway of metaphysics: a vast system of objects, some subsistent in themselves and others attached to subsistence in mental and physical modes; reflection discovers them for us more and more distinctly, as possible echelons of our ascension toward God.²

Corresponding to our knowing and willing tendency toward God, the mediation of finite objects refracts to the infinite. Metaphysics becomes, then, a science of intellectual love, with the last end of the universe being the same end as intelligence.³

¹Ibid., p. 346.

²Ibid., p. 347.

³Ibid., p. 348.

Therefore, the last end of the universe is truth, but the end resides in the act, not in the potential, the intelligible in act. The act of Divine Truth is subjective as much as objective for his essence is identical with his being. Finite intelligence needs to rejoin objectively by intellectual acts the principle that inspires and sustains them.

Our intellectual nature will have fully accomplished its destiny when, having already received its dynamic impulsion from the first truth, it will contemplate in turn this first truth as its immediate and saturating object.¹ By nature we receive only the initial impulsion toward first truth as desirable but not explicitly demanded. Intellectual finality is characterized by a disproportion between radical capacity and natural power. Father Maréchal makes the following comparison: natural tendency leads to the last term as nearly as the course of a projectile flying toward an object too remote, for while curved towards the sun it lacks the constant force to lift it while neutralizing its weight; its initial aim has marked the target, but the power² deployed is too feeble and the movement declines far below. In fact, intellectual activity can never be perfect as long as it proceeds through an indirect understanding of God. Though weighted with matter, intelligence is capable of discerning in us objectively an infinite natural tendency. Only the compensation of supernatural grace is a sort of ransom of the magnificent privilege of intelligence.³

¹Ibid., p. 349.
²Ibid., p. 350.
³Ibid., p. 351.

Realistically speaking, intellectual activity is a way towards first truth, supernatural or not, this course or domain being a field of faith as well as rational understanding.¹ Human truth, seen in its integral nature, is at the same time natural and supernatural. All truths are approximations, fragmentary participations of the Divine Truth of Subsistent Intelligence.

The question of objective evidence must be considered within the framework of the rational process, in other words, rational evidence. Such immediate evidence will consist, in every case, in a suitable proportion between knowing subject and objective content of its understanding.² Certain acts of understanding for which we have evidence we put in relation with reality; their objectivity is not exclusively the form of the real but more exactly the real according to its form.³ Form could not give a true understanding, only a representation; for the real, that it be existing or only possible, must always agree directly or indirectly with the line of act. Certainly, our discursive intelligence selects the conceptual form, but the intellect must pass from simple representation of actual or possible existence to an absolute position of existence.

The proportion between subject and objective content, a realized equilibrium, under complete reflection, can never receive absolute guarantee in a non-intuitive intelligence, for spontaneous understanding, mingling with imagination, can give us false evidence while intending legitimate evidence. To define

¹Ibid., p. 352.

²"L'évidence immédiate consistera, en tout cas, dans une proportion entre le sujet connaissant et le contenu objectif de sa connaissance." Ibid., p. 355.

³Ibid., p. 356.

incontestably legitimate evidence would be the task of a critique of understanding.¹

This peculiar notion of truth and error residing in the power of imagination smacks of Leibnitz and Spinoza. Briefly, for Spinoza, mind and body do not act upon each other, because they are not other, but are one; there are not two processes, but only one. The body cannot determine the mind to think nor the mind determine the body to remain in motion, or at rest, or in any other state; for the decision of the mind and the desire and determination of the body are one and the same thing.² There is this double aspect in the whole world, for the external material process is but one side to the real process which would include an internal correlative process. The inward or mental process corresponds exactly with the external and material process; the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.³ Thus, mind, in the large sense, corresponds with the nervous system so that every change in the body is accompanied by a correlative change in the mind. In Maréchal's thought, according to the subordination of the powers ranged in perfection of form, there is a necessary co-operation between agent-intellect and phantasm. But if, as he emphatically maintains, the judgmental act is a definite contribution to the process, and not part of a mere immanent synthesis, these references to the power of imagi-

¹Ibid., p. 355.

²Spinoza, Baruch, Ethics, III, 2.

³Ibid., II, 17.

nation are ambiguous.

Nevertheless, subject and object commune through particular phenomena, not by a simple similitude of forms (for the form is intentional and always intends being) but rather by a dynamic¹ grasp which founds the logical truth of our direct judgments. There is a vital participation of subject and object, a communication in the line of act, so that whatever objective evidence is sought must bear upon the subject-object relation.

In communication according to the continuity of act which binds both sides, the consciousness of the actuality of the object in the activity of the subject is possible only in a faculty transparent to itself. The proper object of the intellect is inherent in the senses materially and remains completely opaque to the latter. This proper object can be deciphered only by an immaterial faculty which is limited or specified in its own proper activity by the object present in the senses.² This is a reference to the agent-intellect which is determined as any efficient cause by the form of the act and manifest in the effect. In remotely producing the imaginative synthesis, it is specified in terms of that same synthesis but according to the mode of its own esse and agere, namely immaterially--this specification is the intelligible form. Though the senses put us in touch with the Real, only the intelligence can seize the Real as act by its proper dynamic continuity with it.³

¹Maréchal, *op. cit.*, p. 361.

²Ibid., p. 362.

³Ibid., p. 363.

Since this activity carries something which enters into synthesis with sensible data, the element of constructivity is involved in the notion of objectivity. Briefly, this notion of constructivity is not a Kantian one. It is not a purely mental construct since what is known must come through the phantasm. The imaginative synthesis is not purely a product of sensation, for, according to the doctrine of the hierarchy of powers, the higher powers are causes in relation to the lower ones. More precisely, constructivity in intellectual activity refers to the rational mode of assimilating data, the spontaneous apriori of agent-intellect. Again, such constructivity does not compromise objectivity. The mental word or immanent term, being the universal in act, is not an exact copy, feature for feature, of the exterior object which is universal only in potency. But the immanent object, synthetically constructed, is not as yet the known object. The communion of subject and object falls under the defining light of consciousness to become objective. It means by "known object" the totality of objective understanding, implicit and explicit, the amplitude of this known object will extend to even the particular extrinsic object which was the original term of the synthetic process. ¹ Powers are for objects and objects for powers because objects are intelligible in potency.

Reflection is able to delineate the metaphysical object under its transcendental aspects of being, the true and the good.

¹Ibid., p. 364.

Even the exterior object is potentially good and true. Powers are for objects and objects are for powers because objects are intelligible in potency. The immanent object is perceived formally, by reflection, as limitation of active subject, as truth in act, or intelligible in act, or appetible in act, or else as the universal in act, according to such and such a qualitative diversity; in such a way the exterior object is true, intelligible, appetible and universal in potency.¹ The conclusion would be that the metaphysical depths of external reality become intelligible in accordance with their affinity with the intellectual act.

The intelligibility of the sensible thing cannot reveal its metaphysical depth except in so far as it completes the apriori of the subject, the virtual act of the active subject. Such a priority of act is neither pure potentiality nor pure act, either from the point of view of subject or object, since by this principle, the essence of subject as subject and the essence of sensible object can be reattached by us to supreme actuality.² This priority of act is the necessity for the apriori, for it is because of the apriori that the intelligent subject is placed in

¹L'objet immanent est perçu, formellement, à la réflexion, comme limitation du sujet actif, comme vrai en acte, ou intelligible en acte, ou appetible en acte, ou bien comme universel en acte, selon telle ou telle diversité qualitative exogène: dès lors, l'objet extérieur, directement appréhendé, à partir duquel se développe la réflexion révélatrice, ne se peut concevoir que comme être, limitant, ou comme quelque chose en soi; puis, comme vrai en puissance; comme intelligible en puissance; comme appetible en puissance; enfin comme universel en puissance, selon tels et tels caractères qualitatifs." Ibid., pp. 365-366.

²Ibid., p. 367.

first act and is therefore not a pure potential. On the other hand, the first act of the subject is not a pure act or else the subject would not know by successive actualizations. The synthetic and constructive power of intellect furnishes the only means of setting up metaphysical relations of subject and exterior object. Such synthetic activity accords with the exigencies of its formal object, being apriori in agreement with a term, so that it is rationally preliminary to a particular given and at the same time psychologically prior to empirical content. To return to a recurring theme in the whole work, rational anteriority of formal object of the faculty to material object provides the possibility of unlocking the universe in an objective fashion.

No incompatibility rises between the apriori function and the objective nature of intellectual activity. The apriori here designates only the spontaneity of the subject in the experience of an external gift offered to it; the immanent product of this experience participates at the same time in the properties of the subject and those of the object.¹ In the light of this complementary action of subject and object, the synthetic apriori according to necessary finality serves to reveal the object.

Unlike Kant, the truth of whose metaphysical judgments cannot be known since their synthetic unity does not have the constitutive unity of object, Maréchal makes the a priori synthesis the basis of all judgments. This agreement of subject and object is logically enveloped in the dynamic nature of our understanding.

¹Ibid., p. 369.

Maréchal's whole epistemological demonstration is developed in a metaphysical framework. The content of affirmation always possesses some value of reality.¹ The problem of the nature of this value may be considered on the side of object or from the point of view of the spontaneity of the cognitive function; both have a meeting place in the relation of finality.

Intelligence to be reflectively conscious of truth, already implicitly possessed in its objective content, must find in its direct act a proportio ad rem, a reference to the reality in itself.² The subjective necessity revealed by reflection in direct understanding is not the case simply of truth in the abstract, but of a subjective necessity in a primitive nature that bears upon the whole objective content. It is impossible for the intellectual faculty to deny or doubt this necessity without at least affirming the implicit logic of the very act of doubt or negation. If then the fundamental condition of some such attitude of intelligence resides truly in the absolute objective reference--ad rem--according to a formal coincidence, this objective reference generally constitutes a condition of the possibility of the dubitative or negative attitude (which is always reducible to an affirmation)³ as well as of the directly affirmative. It would seem that the basis of doubt or negation resides in the exigence of subjective function for affirmation. To deny the

¹Ibid., p. 372.

²Ibid., p. 374.

³Ibid., p. 376.

object would mark in the subject a flagrant incoherence, a denial of the first principle.¹ In fact, to deny the truth, once attained, would involve one in self-contradiction. Objective necessity enveloped in the universal exigencies of affirmation differs from a subjective constraint blindly followed.² Logical contradiction introduced here is not one of conceptual terms, but a contradiction between the implicit and the explicit of judgment. The judgment: "There is no truth" affirms implicitly the truth it denies.³ When we make the proposition, "Truth is", we are not signifying a representation of an existing thing but merely the general fact of existence that is directly evident in the agreement between the terms: truth, is. Knowledge of the objective bond of truth and being is possible only to God. What the discursive faculty sees clearly will not be the bond itself but that the bond must be affirmed or suffer contradiction; our evidence is not the essential evidence of the thing, but, the logical evidence of judgment which expresses the thing.⁴ The judgment is the result of logical exigencies when evidence demands affirmation or negation, but it is not necessary to have an intuitive knowledge of the relation between essence and existence but merely that it does here and now obtain.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 377.

⁴"...ce que voit clairement la faculté discursive, ce ne sera pas ce lien en lui-même, mais que ce lien doit être affirmé sous peine de contradiction; notre évidence n'est pas l'évidence essentielle de la chose, mais l'évidence logique du jugement où s'exprime la chose." Ibid., p. 378.

Father Maréchal's indirect character of evidence is a position of realism; a discursive intelligence has a restricted means of reaching being, but it does attain to objects and through them to being. The evidence of these objects, as much under the relation of actual existence as possible existence, reveals itself to us only in the evident necessity of affirming them in the heart of judgment (through intellectual composition), with the impossibility of taking a logically coherent attitude outside of this affirmation.¹ Logical evidence then is the evident logical necessity of affirming the metaempirical object.

Then follows the evident necessity of first principles--the principle of non-contradiction or identity and all the transcendental principles of unity, truth, and finality, of which the evidence is the same as of being. Since these principles are common to all and all demonstration proceeds from them, this objective evidence must be immediate and identical with the soul. And since they command all understanding, direct and reflective, these first principles are revealed but are not demonstrable; they operate as an inevitable primitive illumination, mysterious² in its essence of which the source escapes us. From this point of view, it is ridiculous to search for some other means of evidence outside of rationality. In regard to methodic doubt, St. Thomas's argument ad hominem by reduction to the absurd might offer some comfort, but it is reason itself, considered in the

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 379.

primordial law of affirmation, which enchains us to its *λόγος*,
to its internal or external word--an ineradicable realism of
affirmation.¹

Thus, realism, that such is the manner of human understand-
ing, returns us to the natural exigence or apriori condition dis-
tinguished earlier. The root of the metaphysical demonstration
maintains the first principles in the immanence of our understand-
ing, a natural factor, a primordial exigence, a postulation of
nature, the transcendental act of affirmation, which without being
an intuition of essences, imposes upon us at all times, under
penalty of logical annihilation, the categorical application of
the formal laws of being to the whole content of consciousness.²
This necessity, then, is the nature of act--the act of intelli-
gence. Father Maréchal states emphatically that to wish to avoid
this necessity would be to establish a speculative mirage and
open oneself to contradiction--the impossible divorce of life of
the spirit and the internal locution which expresses the mental
word.³

It is the judicative function which gives the objective

¹ Ibid., pp. 379-380.

² "A la racine de la démonstration métaphysique, il faut donc recon-
naître, soutenant les premiers principes dans l'immanence de notre
entendement, un facteur naturel: exigence primordiale, postula-
tion de nature, acte transcendantal d'affirmation qui, sans être
une intuition des essences, nous impose toutefois, sous peine
d'annihilation logique, d'appliquer catégoriquement les lois
formelles de l'être à tout contenu de conscience." Ibid., p. 380.

³ Ibid.

content of thought its unity and significance. The basic nature of judgment is affirmation, even in cases of doubt and negation as when the objective value of being was placed in implicit or explicit conflict¹ in the judgment. The attitude of judicative function is still basically affirmative in its act to acquire content. But, in every judgment denying or putting in doubt the truth as such, or the first principle, or being in general, the primordial and absolute function of affirmation destroys the content even that it posits; these judgments are then logically impossible.² A denial of the apriori condition is a denial, in the logical sense, of the possibility of objective thought.

Judgment stands as an additional and completing function in the whole intellectual act. The intellective subject enters in the internal conflict only as the function of judging, as an objectifying control on the content of consciousness.³ What is meant is that the subject takes a position in judgment on the content of consciousness that was hitherto only of the nature of possibility. I acquire a critical understanding of the truth of my representations, when, by a rigorous chain of reasoning, I attach them to the essential assimilating tendency of the intelligence, as an intrinsic condition of the possibility of every absolutely objective representation.⁴ In summary, Maréchal states that the spirit knows its proper truth to be inchoative understand-

¹Ibid., 381.

²Ibid., p. 382.

³Ibid., p. 381.

⁴Ibid., p. 383.

ing and yet implicit (being completely reflective and reasoned). In the measure that the intellect discovers the necessary proportion of its acts to the reality, that is in the measure that it discovers in these same acts (in objects in so far as they are immanent), a natural exigence for objective reference arises. This natural exigency is based on the radical and universal law¹ of intelligense or on the transcendental act of judging.

Maréchal places objective evidence within the intellectual process itself. Evidence, properly objective in the order of metaphysical understanding, derives from two logical sources: a normative necessity, strictly analytical, and a pure, radical, natural necessity of affirmation, a transcendental necessity. From analytical necessity follow the alternatives of being or non-being, in respect to formal object; and from transcendental necessity, affirmation, which imposes upon us the application of these alternatives to a content, and so advances the result in favour of realism.² Thus, an analysis of judgment reveals the basic apriori of rational activity: the natural dynamism under the formal object of intellect.

Let us conclude this analysis with a summary of the principal ideas to receive further adaptation in our consideration of Lonergan's Insight.

In the first place, the notion of being is basic to Maréchal's work. Basically, Maréchal designates the principle of identity as

¹Ibid., pp. 382-383.

²Ibid., p. 383.

the minimal expression of being. From his analogical argument, being is that through which the intellective act is manifested, as a kind of 'underpinning' of the intellective process, termed a normative necessity which is realized indirectly by reflection.

Secondly, the apriori contribution, a predisposition or orientation of the subject in the immanent process, places objectivity in a realistic position.

Thirdly, the dynamism of moving structure through phantasm, intellectual representation, and judgment, the anticipated end, removes the static barriers to truth. The tendency still remains indeterminate in relation to material possibility not yet expressed, but the proportion between immediate term, i.e. subordinate ends, and final end is always immanent in the structure.

Fourthly, the apriori form of understanding operates through the process as a relation so as to involve a rigorous proportion between the form, species, and possible extension in objective understanding.

Fifthly, the contingent permanence of this apriori condition gives meaning to the notions of universality and necessity.

Sixthly, powers being in first act, both logically as universality and psychologically as tendency, determine not only a mode of knowing but also a certain degree of knowability in objects.

Seventhly, first act or apriori aspect of cognitive power is extended even to the sensible powers so that the potentiality for intelligibility exists in the whole order according to the

hierarchy of powers.

Eightly, the spontaneity of intelligence in adapting to data is consistent with the principle of first act of the intellectual power.

Ninthly, the abstract product of the agent-intellect must be in virtue of a higher principle than material quiddity; such a principle must extend to the entire scope of the knowable. The intellectual faculty may be defined by its abstractive and assimilating power, but more peculiar to intellectual power is the perfection of interior illumination from identity with assimilated form.

Tenthly, the dynamic finality in intellect is the objective capacity to overcome all the limitations of being.

In the eleventh place, the margin of indetermination in the reconstruction of reality, possibly the surd, may be accounted for by the discursive mode of human intellect.

In the twelfth place, the objective process culminates in judgment in the manifestation of truth and falsity, not as a synthesis on conceptual level, but as an objective attitude toward the synthesis of subject and predicate in respect to final end. Judgment is the point of a transcendental relation of objects to being, a new and radical dimension in cognitive process.

In the thirteenth place, finality is operative through judgment and moves toward knowledge of total being through particular affirmations. The antecedent finality of the obscure a priori desire results in judgment, which is the turning point of a new exigence,

dynamic in its comprehension. Objectivity resides in the heart of judgment; affirmation posits the being of a particular given in perspective of final end, the totality known as being. The obscure nature of the spiritual power of reflection as it affects judgments needs concrete delineation, but the passage from the possible of concepts to the real of judgment becomes evident in the transcendental constitution of the term, what should be a virtually unconditioned in being. God is purely unconditioned in being, but the human cognitive faculty has an indirect intuition through objects, which in act manifest being as a transcendental relation. In order for objects to be affirmed, essence must be rejoined to existence. Thus, the orientation rises in the depths of being, as first act, and becomes explicit in human knowledge through an engagement with the material world of finite essences, by means of sensible receptivity, abstraction of the intelligible by agent-intellect, reflection and the judgment of actuality.

In the fourteenth place, in a subsequent analysis of will, a condition of dynamic tension is set; the potencies of intellect as form, and will as dynamic tendency must be included in first act, although the specifying principle resides in the intellectual power. And, in the last end, God, intellect and will meet. These first principles do not jeopardize the relative autonomy of the will or the objective power of intellect in the process of attaining specific determination through finality. Judgment expresses the dynamically bilateral moment, objective content relating to

the phantasm and objective attitude of the subject in virtue of final end. The objective attitude, a property of extroversion in immanence, a desire to possess forms in their otherness (being), is distinguished as a productive or appetitive tendency in terms of finality. Logical truth is illuminated by reflection, but the explicit distinction of another, i.e. a dynamic value, issues from a principle of disjunction. Through the immanent finality of the intellective faculty, the act which assimilates is also the act which disassociates. The link, then, is that the primordial motion sustaining the dynamism is virtually the absolute objective end of all truth and all good. The last end of the universe is truth, the intelligible through objective act. The aspect of extroversion in objectivity cannot be interpreted as an appetitive tendency parallel to intellectual activity. Further, that love as the action of will in some measure commands the true rings with overtones of Lonergan's pure desire to know, albeit by a distortion of the efficacy of the intellective faculty. The further possibility of free will and deliberation rest upon objective assimilation. The good and the true are placed here within a strictly rational process.

Finally, the question of objective evidence revolves round a favorable proportion between objective content and knowing subject in respect to finality, as the spiritual power can seize the real as act by a dynamic continuity with it. Truth is somehow realized through this dynamic proportion, so that, upon reflection, when and if judgment is placed, the content of affirmation always

possesses some value of reality. Seizing the object in the act of concretion covers even the exterior object as origin. Only in affirmation is the bond with being or reality affirmed by objective reference; the evidence of objects reveals itself to us only in the necessity of affirming them in judgment, for no other logically objective attitude can be taken outside this act. Thus, the revelation of objects, and consequently of the universe, possible to human understanding in the complementary action of object and subject is the stand of realism. Objective evidence cannot be severed from this proportion, but the explicit nature of such a proportion wants further treatment.

Chapter II

Critique Of Maréchal's Notion Of Objectivity

In the question of objectivity of Knowledge there are certain decisive points of divergence between Maréchal and Lonergan. The first lies in the nature of the grasp of the unconditioned. Secondly, Maréchal's proof of the existence of God from the exigencies of the cognitional process has doubtful validity. And thirdly, Maréchal makes an illegitimate transference of will to the domain of cognition in order to explain the 'desire' to move towards an unrestricted object. We will develop these points in contrast with Lonergan's ideas in a brief way here with the hope of highlighting the tremendous contribution that Lonergan has made to the area of epistemology, a contribution to be made the central theme of this thesis.

Despite Maréchal's emphasis on the dynamic aspect of cognitional process, he sets up only a normative structure of the process of attaining truth. While he shows the formal object of intellect to be wider than predicamental being because of the exigence for being in all its dimension, he never gives a convincing account of how that final increment in judgment is reached. Maréchal specifies the content of judgment in a 'yes' or 'no' as a kind of mental word pronounced upon the synthetic proposition so that there is always an implicit or explicit recognition of truth. Lonergan will show this assent or negation

to be the proper content of judgment, but the distinction between the two attitudes is more deeply rooted than this. The mental word as assent or negation, for Lonergan, is part of the cognitive process; a real increment issuing from a reflective insight on the content of judgment.¹ Judgment is part of the whole process, the final part. Maréchal's use of assent or negation as the content of judgment derives wholly from the rational exigence. The mental word is pronounced upon the synthetic proposition through a reflective act. When Maréchal states that in even a primitive judgment there is a rudimentary understanding of the synthetic structure (concretion) of the concept,² the objective reference is used here more for the element of opposition in immanence in terms of finality than as a reflective insight that grounds this particular judgment. In fact, the reflective act is never defined so as to show how judgment should issue from it. Although he defines affirmation as the active reference of conceptual content to reality,³ still he implies that truth derives from the mental expression of the dynamism. It would almost seem that the formal object of the intellect is more than a predisposition of the faculty to particular objects, that being is virtually presentained and upon an awakening in the dynamism through a communication with objects becomes explicit, affirming the particular validity of the object only in virtue of this

¹Note that Lonergan distinguishes between two aspects of the verbum: the incomplex or simple word which is the concept and the complex word which is the judgment.

²Vide supra, p. 66, n. 2.

³Vide supra, p. 68, n. 1.

dynamism. One is led to question whether judgment for Maréchal is merely a 'rubber stamp' effect upon conceptual content. Such an act would be purely subjective, missing being except by a quasi-intuitive grasp impossible to a finite intelligence. It is no great wonder that Maréchal laboured to establish a relation of the created element in human knowledge with the creation of intuitive knowledge. Maréchal is more concerned with the isolation of this created element, virtually precontained in the *apriori*, than in its constitutive relation with the whole content of judgment. Objectivity rises from this contribution on the basis of finality. Lonergan will grapple with the objectivity of the whole content of judgment. One might rebut that according to Maréchal the intelligible in act is the intelligence in act, that it isn't the dynamism alone that attains to being. Such a statement distinguishes an end actively possessed from a purely passive acquisition such as prime matter receives a form. Yet, Maréchal's objectivity hinges on finality; in the immanent extraposition of the object as an en soi in judgment, the object constitutes a dynamic value, a moment of becoming, only in virtue of the finality of the intellect.

Objectivity in Maréchal's sense of the word, i.e. in terms of finality, resides in the dynamic relation of subordinate ends to final end. A subordinate end takes its value simply from this relation. The judgment of concretion manifests the bilateral moment, back to the singular phantasm and yet forward to the fullness of being. Thus, the exigence for judgment psychologically

experienced is guaranteed in terms of finality--the fullness of being--but the subordinate ends in themselves, in attaining the intention of being, cannot be considered virtually unconditioned, that is having a guarantee in themselves as particular facts. Maréchal indicates the absolute aspect of the contingent reality of subordinate ends only in so far as they are posited in relation to finality. The dynamism that rises from the primordial motion is responsible for them in its exigence for the fullness of being; the apriori element is evident because the intelligible in act is the intelligence in act, and, bearing in mind that the formal object of the intellect is being, hypothetical necessity is conferred upon the objects of understanding by the first principle, the principle of identity--an identity or absolute relation with being. The subordinate ends or judgments of particular truths have no guarantee in themselves aside from this relation, in which there is always the intention of being moving towards final end, and somehow by a reflective act, 'being' is dynamically grasped and elicits the mental word of judgment. Maréchal says that the dynamic properties of the object manifest themselves in the fullness of this reflection.¹ The intellect, an immaterial power transparent to itself, is able to communicate by a dynamic continuity with the act of the object. But, he never pins down the special contribution of this transcendental reflection by which the intellect attains to a final increment of the cognitive

¹Vide supra, p. 30.

process, if, indeed, such can be termed a real increment. Perhaps, for this reason, Maréchal felt obliged to resort to the power of imagination as the source of truth and error, the redeeming factor of judgment to be found in its constructive and reconstructive activity. Only the final end is a fixed position, though unattainable for a discursive intelligence; particular judgments advance one towards that goal.

So much could be acceptable were these subordinate ends truly objective, that is, were they absolute as a matter of fact, though, of course, not as the right of contingent beings. We must conclude that Maréchal does not conceive the virtually unconditioned, despite the semblance of such fixed positions in his conception of the dynamic intellectual act. One might compare his analysis of finality to Hegel's dialectical process advancing towards the Absolute Idea; neither have found fixed positions of objective reference, for there are no facts for either. Every position or judgment brings forth its counter-position, but all are acceptable simply as advancing one towards the Absolute Idea, or even towards Maréchal's fullness of being. This grasp of the unconditioned is the central point of divergence between Maréchal and Lonergan; yet it is a strategic point because, despite Maréchal's marvelous insight into the dynamic structure of cognition rooted in the pure desire to grasp being through truth, he does not attain a workable ground for the virtually unconditioned of judgment nor a refutation of the charge of possible relativism.

Secondly, this finality is posited by Maréchal on the condition of the existence of God, final end. Without the existence of objective end, subordinate ends would not achieve objectivity, i.e. absolute order of noumenon. The transcendental term of the ontological relation, being, to constitute every object as object, must be imprinted in our actual understanding, apriori. Thus, the existence of God is affirmed as the condition of all possibility. This implicit affirmation of Absolute Being is sufficient for Maréchal to demand the existence of God, objective end of the dynamism, because of an apriori disposition, logically preliminary to all contingent activity. Thus, Maréchal moves from the possibility of God to his existence, so that the intellectual dynamism implies this implicit affirmation of God, and yet the dynamism itself depends upon the existence of God for objectivity of subordinate ends. We are either involved in a vicious circle or else the guarantee of objectivity is founded upon a kind of innatism. If there is objectivity in human knowledge, it must be based upon a firmer logical ground.

Thirdly, Maréchal recognizes the essential dynamic quality of the intellect, but to attribute this natural exigence for being as truth to the faculty of will destroys the notion of 'the pure desire' of intellect and involves the wide extension of the power of will to any power whatsoever to explain a dynamism. Maréchal states that the will and intellect are not to be considered as parallel faculties but that the will is the dynamic root or mainspring of intellect, with intellect pro-

viding the specification.¹ First, if intellect does not move by its own dynamism, its insatiable desire for being, it is difficult to find the disinterested desire by which intellect grasps truth when the power of will is its means of exercise. Even if the desire, then, is still considered a pure disinterested desire for truth, that makes the term of intellect and will synonymous even though Maréchal maintains that elicited will is an extension beyond the cognitive act, when in second acts the action of intellect and will are reciprocal.

It is very peculiar that Maréchal did not place this tendency in the natural dynamism of intellect, especially since he specifies the agent-intellect, efficient causality of the intellect, as a function constantly in act. He seems compelled because of his use of finality to place the primordial motion of will within the first act of intellect and to pursue this transcendental unity in final end. Not only does the complementary relation and interdependence of these two faculties in first acts cloud the notion of 'the pure desire to know' as the real orientation of the intellect but also it brings in the problem of how the will can be free when in first act it is predetermined like any other potency. The intentional character of the intellect should be quite different from the will which is under the influence of an extrinsic cause as a good that may or may not move the will to act. Nevertheless, it can only be the agent-intellect in Maréchal's terminology that denotes the spontaneous wonder and

¹Vide supra, p. 51, n. 4.

questioning attitude that Lonergan terms 'the pure desire to know'.

Lest one make too facile a rendering of the complexities of Father Maréchal's analysis of objectivity and his struggle to carry a Kantian framework, let it be clear that this thesis is not motivated by the intention of grafting the delineation of objectivity as developed by Father Lonergan upon the pre-eminently a priori character of the preceding synopsis. In actual fact, Father Maréchal's thought was not the inspiration or even contributing factor to Lonergan's modern approach to the epistemological question. However, despite the wide variance of philosophical position and consequently of method, the insights that are suggested in the historical antecedent take on an explicit nature in Lonergan's treatment in Insight; and not only an explicit nature but also a higher viewpoint open to further rewarding insights as to the nature of human understanding and consequent activity.

Chapter III

Lonergan - Objectivity From A Higher Viewpoint

The Notion of Judgment

Judgment will assume the focal point in this presentation of Father Bernard Lonergan's notion of objectivity.

First, the notion of judgment is reached in its determinate nature by a reference to propositions. The mental attitude towards propositions may be one of agreement, of disagreement, or just of consideration. If it is the latter, a proposition presents an object of thought, that is the content of conceiving, defining, thinking, supposing, or considering. "But, a proposition, also, may be the content of an act of judging; and then it is the content of an affirming or denying, an agreeing or disagreeing, an assenting or dissenting."¹

Secondly, judgment is determined by its relation to questions. There are questions for reflection which may be answered by 'yes' or 'no', and also questions for intelligence that cannot be answered in such a way. Questions that ask, 'What is it?' would make a 'yes' or 'no' answer appear ridiculous, because these are questions to be met by intelligence. Questions that ask, 'Is it so?' expect the appropriate form of affirmation or denial. "Our second determination of the notion of judgment is, then, that judging is answering 'yes' or 'no' to a question for reflection."²

¹Bernard Lonergan, S.J., Insight (rev. students ed.; New York: Philosophical Library Inc., 1958), p. 271.

²Ibid., p. 272.

Thirdly, judgment shows the determination of a personal commitment. Lack of perfection in other powers, such as memory, is generally accepted because one's ability in these areas may be limited in various ways. However, a poor judgment causes the judge to suffer acute embarrassment since in judgment the variety of answers available would cover all the factors involved in any particular judgment.

One is not ready to confess to poor judgment because the question for reflection can be answered not only by 'Yes' or 'No' but also by 'I don't know'; it can be answered assertorically or modally, with certitude or only probability; finally, the question as presented can be dismissed, distinctions introduced, and new questions substituted.¹

The one who judges is making a personal commitment and must assume full responsibility for his judgment.

Judgment is then related to the general structure of cognitive process. Here, two processes, direct and introspective, operate on three levels; the level of presentation, the level of intelligence, and the level of reflection. 1st

At the level of intelligence are the acts of inquiry, understanding, and formulation.

Thus, the question, 'What is it?' leads to a grasp and formulation of an intelligible unity-identity-whole in data as individual. The question, 'Why?' leads to a grasp and formulation of a law, a correlation, a system. The question, 'How often?' leads to a grasp and formulation of an ideal frequency from which actual frequencies non-systematically diverge.²

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., pp. 272-273.

The simplicity and scope of Lenergan's grasp of the level of intelligence expands out upon the whole field of special studies of the present and yet grounds them in a common apprehension of their basic principles.

The level of intelligence by its nature of inquiry presupposes a complementary level. Understanding presupposes something to be understood, some presentation as substance for an illuminating power. This is the level of presentation.

Its defining characteristic is the fact that it is presupposed and complemented by the level of intelligence, that it supplies, as it were, the raw materials on which intelligence operates, that in a word, it is empirical, given indeed but merely given, open to understanding and formulation but by itself not understood and in itself ineffable.¹

On the other hand, the level of intelligence is presupposed as the complement of a further level of reflection. The concepts, definitions, and considerations of intelligence rise in the process for a higher purpose; such activities are followed by the question, 'Is it so?'. "As questions for intelligence, What? and Why? and How often?", stand to insights and formulations, so questions for reflection stand to a further kind of insight and to judgment."² On this third level emerge the notions of truth and falsity, of certitude, and even of probability that is not to be identified with the determination of frequency on the level of intelligence.

¹Ibid., p. 273.
²Ibid.

The preliminary discussion of the three determinations of judgment centers in the third level, reflection. In this third level is involved the personal commitment and the utterances that signify the commitment. But the questions for intelligence and reflection are not conceptual formulations or utterances of any kind. "By the question is meant the attitude of the inquiring mind that effects the transition from the first level to the second and, again, the attitude of the critical mind that effects the transition from the second level to the third."¹

These three levels of cognitional process operate in two modes determined by the nature of the data. Data from the senses, being sounds, colours, tastes, odours, touch perceptions, and various modifications of these, present material for the direct mode. From all levels come the data of consciousness, not only acts of seeing, hearing, tasting, etc., but also acts of imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, and judging. Such data as experienced receive further refinement through the process of inquiry, insight and formulation, reflection and judgment.

Thus, the three levels of the direct mode of cognitional process provide the data for the introspective mode; and as the direct mode, so also the introspective mode unfolds on the three levels, an initial level of data, a second level of understanding and formulation, and a third level of reflection and judgment.²

This general outline in the way of analysis indicates the nature of unification of cognitional levels. The contents of the

¹Ibid., p. 274.
²Ibid.

various acts are incomplete if isolated from the process. Questions for intelligence must have something to understand from the initial level of given or imagined presentations. Conception expresses the grasped idea along with what is essential to the idea from the prior level. Reflection brings the critical question to be answered in judgment. "The cognitional process is thus a cumulative process; later steps presuppose earlier contributions and add to them".¹ Having confirmed such a synthesis, Lonergan returns to the actual nature of distinctions in the levels of cognition. Not all the additions have the same weight. Free images from the data level are merely provisional. Conception denotes by the abstractive power a new mode of the particular given. "Finally, some constitute, as it were, the addition of new dimensions in the construction of the full cognitional content; and it is this addition of a new dimension that forms the basis of the distinction between the three levels of presentation, intelligence and reflection."²

A cumulative process of this kind legitimately supports a distinction between the proper and borrowed content of the judgment. The proper content, being that new dimension, consists in the answers 'Yes' or 'No'. The borrowed content has a direct and indirect aspect. The direct borrowed content is the question posed for answer, and the indirect borrowed content emerges in the reflection linking question and answer.

¹Ibid., p. 275.

²Ibid.

Thus, the direct borrowed content of the judgment, 'I am writing' is the question, 'Am I writing?' The proper content of that judgment is the answer, 'Yes', 'I am'. The indirect borrowed content of the same judgment is the implicit meaning, 'It certainly is true that I am writing.'¹

From this development of cognition, each element may be designated as a partial increment, for each is a contribution to the process. In position, judgment is the last act in a series, but it is much more than a final peg. The 'Yes' or 'No' of this final increment loses its meaning if separated from the question it answers. Yet, the question is the manifestation of reflective attitude toward intelligent formulation, and formulation is a new mode of presentation reconstructed through insight. "It follows that the judgment as a whole is a total increment in cognitional process, that it brings to a close one whole step in the development of knowledge."²

A final determination of judgment rises in its contextual aspect. Single steps of inquiry culminate in single judgments which are related to each other in a meaningful fashion. Father Lenegran designates the general aspects of cognitional context as logic and dialectic.

Logic is the effort of knowledge to attain the coherence and organization proper to any stage of its development. Dialectic, on the other hand, rests on the break-down of efforts to attain coherence and organization at a given stage and consists in bringing to birth a new stage in which logic again will endeavour to attain coherence and organization.³

¹Ibid., pp. 275-276.

²Ibid., p. 276.

³Ibid.

Logic through a complete system of selection and organization can very neatly pinpoint meaning and in so doing will reveal any weakness in separate stages of the development of knowledge. Actually, the very nature of uniformity of the logical ideal is the basis for radical revision of terms and postulates in cognitional process. The relation of the two aspects, logic and dialectic is one of opposition and complement. As one stage of development breaks down, the logical ideal rebuilds from a new position. Such revision is limited within the process; no revision can be made of the revisers. Insights are acts of grasping concrete unities, systematic regularities, or ideal frequencies, and judgments are always personal commitments to a 'Yes' or 'No' under ideal conditions. Revision is subject to the general conditions of beginning with presentation, moving through insights and formulations, to terminate in reflection and judgment. "The simple fact of the uniformity of nature in revisers provides both logic and dialectic with an immutable ultimacy."¹

In this framework of logic and dialectic, the contextual aspect of judgment reveals itself in three manners. In the relation of present to past, past judgments may be characterized as habitual orientation. The nature of such an orientation has tremendous scope, setting up a predisposition to new judgments, evaluating insights, even directing attention, for this habitual orientation is always operative though perhaps not recognized as such by the individual. Even previous insights remain as part of this context and these evaluate fresh insights and

¹Ibid., p. 277.

influence conceptions. Here, we have the most authentic backdrop to a drama.

Hence, when a new judgment is made, there is within us a habitual context of insights and other judgments, and it stands ready to elucidate the judgment just made, to complement it, to draw distinctions, to add qualifications, to provide defense, to offer evidence or proof, to attempt persuasion.¹

Secondly, relations within the present may be considered in two manners. "Existing judgments may be found to conflict, and so they release the dialectical process. Again, though they do not conflict, they may not be completely independent of each other, and so they stimulate the logical effort for organized coherence."²

The third manner is the relation of present to future. The full weight of the dynamic structure of knowing is revealed in this relationship; each judgment is a total increment, involving a complex supporting complement, but each judgment is only a single increment, a minute part of a particular total knowledge, and certainly such an increment seems infinitesimal in perspective of the total knowledge of the universe. Further, our knowing process is dynamic in that it is habitual; only one judgment can be made at a time so that this habitual background of knowledge has a tremendous field of endeavour since no one judgment could be both comprehensive and concrete and so encompass present knowledge.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

All we know is somehow with us; it is present and operative within our knowing; it lurks behind the scenes and it reveals itself only in the exactitude with which each minor increment to our knowing is effected. The business of the human mind in this life seems to be, not contemplation of what we know, but relentless devotion to the task of adding increments to a merely habitual knowledge.¹

Critique.--The whole possibility of the apriori quality of knowing presented by Father Maréchal attains richer meaning when reviewed after Lonergan's realistic analysis of judgment. Structural questions as attitudes of inquiring and critical mind, never to be confused with utterances or formulations as Lonergan stipulates,² are undeniably a dynamic contribution on the side of subject. Without them, presentation would be isolated from human understanding. Maréchal's notion of species as regulating form, realized as a moving relation of subject to object until an adequate proportion is maintained,³ is more nearly approached in light of the answer required by subject before the total increment can be reached. Obviously, Lonergan's operative and structural questions prior to individual judgments and, on a wider scale, the dialectic and logic of cognitional context are manifestations of a dynamism, some radical impetus seeking a final term through judgment.

On the level of conceptual formulation, Lonergan has noted the construction is a new mode of a unity-identity-whole as well as laws and ideal frequencies, following upon the nature of the

¹Ibid., p. 278.

²Vide supra, p. 99, n. 1.

³Vide supra, p. 17, n. 2.

particular questions for inquiry.¹ Maréchal's elaboration of an implicit truth and potential identity operative on this level is a narrower grasp of intellectual inquiry. Further, if a clearly new dimension forms the basis of distinction between the three levels of cognition, a cumulative process still exists since each step is based solidly upon the previous one. The proper content of judgment would be meaningless without its borrowed content. An attempt to allow for the element of borrowed content in judgment may have been one reason Maréchal conceded implicit truth on the level of conception; yet, in his intense preoccupation with the rigid demands of a priori conditions on all levels, he allows a blurring of two distinctive aspects of cognitional act. However, clarity is bestowed on the whole cognitional act by Lonergan's exposition of the decisive increment in judgment.

Lonergan's determination of judgment as a personal commitment opens a whole field of human responsibility in knowing, especially since each judgment becomes a contextual complement to other judgments. Maréchal approximates this notion only in so far as judgment displays an internal locution, as if the subject moved out of its own intimacy to manifest itself in some way, a property of extroversion.² This idea touches on the area of responsibility in as much as such a movement involves the subject in actuality or objectivity, not simply possibility. Judgment affirms or denies by extrinsic determination, that is, in

¹Vide supra, p. 97, n. 2.

²Vide supra, p. 28, n. 1.

virtue of a position taken by the subject; the dynamism which supplies the object also takes an active attitude of opposition to it. In the context of Insight, any subjective whim can be considered, but that which has a rigid conformity to reality through objective reference obliges the judging subject to act with responsibility within all the provisional forms of judgment.¹

Reflective Understanding

Reflective understanding is probed by Father Lonergan to satisfy that increment and pursue the resulting variations of judgment. On the level of understanding, insights lead to formulations of unity, system or ideal frequency; on the level of reflective understanding, insight also meets the critical question to grasp the sufficiency of evidence for prespective judgment. Judgments certainly involve a grasp of sufficiency of evidence; otherwise, judgment would be relegated to the nature of guessing. Then, the nature of the act satisfying the reflective question, 'Is it so?' in certain judgment must involve the grasp of sufficiency of evidence. "But what are the scales on which evidence is weighed? What weight must evidence have, if one is to pronounce a 'Yes' or a 'No?'"²

"To grasp evidence as sufficient for a prespective judgment is to grasp the judgment as virtually unconditioned."³ To be virtually unconditioned means to have conditions which are ful-

¹Ivide supra, p. 97, n. 1.

²Ibid., p. 279.

³Ibid., p. 280.

filled; whereas a formally unconditioned has absolutely no conditions. Thus, the borrowed content is initially constituted at the reflective level as conditioned.

Accordingly, a virtually unconditioned involves three elements, namely:

- (1) a conditioned,
- (2) a link between the conditioned and its conditions, and
- (3) the fulfilment of the conditions.

Hence, a prospective judgment will be virtually unconditioned if

- (1) it is the conditioned,
- (2) its conditions are known, and
- (3) the conditions are fulfilled.¹

When the question for reflection obviously manifests the prospective judgment as conditioned, it is the task of reflective understanding to grasp the conditions of the conditioned and their fulfilment. Prospective judgments are propositions of various degrees of complexity, but the grounding act of reflective judgment in every case bears the two elements of the link between the conditioned and its conditions and the fulfilment of the conditions.

The first illustration considered is a deductive inference in which the major premise links the conditioned to its conditions and the minor premise presents the fulfilment of the conditions. Then the conclusion of a deductive inference is a virtually unconditioned. "Reflective insight grasps the pattern, and by rational compulsion there follows the judgment."² In the example:

If X is material and alive, X is mortal.
But men are material and alive.
Therefore, men are mortal.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 281.

Now the conclusion is a conditioned, for an argument is needed to support it. The major premise links this conditioned to its conditions, for it affirms, If A, then B. The minor premise presents the fulfilment of the conditions, for it affirms the antecedent, A. The function, then, of the form of deductive inference is to exhibit a conclusion as virtually unconditioned.¹

However, the deductive inference presupposes other judgments to be true, and while it serves as a clear illustration of the grasp of a prospective judgment as virtually unconditioned, it is not the basic case of judgment.

Such a deductive inference expresses the link and fulfilment most clearly, but the most common form of judgment is the reflective insight, where the link and fulfilment are further judgments. Judgments, though, are end products of cognitional process; judgments that form the link between the conditioned and the conditions and the fulfilment of conditions have existed in a more rudimentary state in cognitional process. "The remarkable fact about reflective insight is that it can make use of these more rudimentary elements in cognitional process to reach the virtually unconditioned."²

Concrete judgments of fact.--To exemplify the function of reflective insight, Lenegran gives the incident of a man returning home from work to find the windows smashed, smoke in the air, and water on the floor and making the restrained judgment of fact, "Something happened."³ Such a judgment represents the conditioned.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

Fulfilling conditions will be two sets of data: the remembered appearance of his home and the present contrasting aspect. First, it is important to note that the fulfilling conditions are found on the level of presentation, the level of the acts of sight and smell.

"The link between the conditioned and the fulfilling conditions is a structure immanent and operative within cognitional process. It is not a judgment. It is not a formulated set of concepts, such as a definition. It is simply a way of doing things, a procedure within the cognitional field." ¹ Actually this structure or procedure is the moving field already outlined in three levels of presentation, intelligence, and reflection. Such procedures can be analyzed, but analysis does not effect any improvement in operation; the outstanding fact is that procedure is immanent and operative.

In the judgment of fact cited, the man refers two sets of data to the same set of things, his home. He has had a direct insight this time on the second level of cognitional process, which pyramids the first and the two together implement a process designated as knowing change. "Just as knowing a thing consists in grasping an intelligible unity-identity-whole in individual data, so knowing change consists in grasping the same identity or identities at different times in different individual data." ² If the statement of a change is affirmed, we have a

¹Ibid., p. 282.

²Ibid.

judgment. Even before being analysed, these structures existed and operated in cognitional process. Therefore, it is the structure that links the conditioned with the fulfilling conditions in the concrete judgment of fact. Three elements were involved: two sets of data on the level of presentation, the insight on the level of intelligence referring both sets to the same thing, and both levels taken together yield the notion of a knowing change. "Reflective understanding grasps all three as a virtually unconditioned to ground the judgment, Something happened."¹

The simplicity of this example easily refracts under introspective analysis. Yet, cognitional structure yields a cumulative development of understanding not only of experience, but also of specialized knowledge, so that the complexity of data and structure could produce a virtually unconditioned almost inaccessible to introspective analysis. "But the general nature of the concrete judgment of fact would remain the same as in the simple case we considered."²

Critique.--It is in this area of reflective understanding, the avenue for grounding judgment, that Maréchal's work seems least commanding. His immediate evidence of an adequate proportion between subject as knowing power and objective content within finality is illuminated if seen through Lonergan's analysis of reflective grasp of fulfilling conditions and the link between the conditioned and the fulfilling conditions. Further, the

¹Ibid., p. 283.

²Ibid.

³Vide supra, p. 71, n. 2.

notion of reflective insight grasping rudimentary elements in cognitive process through immanent procedures is a broadening parallel to Maréchal's recognition of the fact that the dynamic properties of object manifest themselves in the fullness of reflection.¹ Maréchal does note that the nature of communication of subject and object is not through a simple similitude of forms but by a dynamic seizure, which grasps the logical truth of our direct judgment, a communication in the line of act that is possible only in a faculty transparent to itself.² But, he seems always to be approaching the point of an explicit analysis of the grasp of the virtually unconditioned. However, Maréchal's interest lay more in the direction of resolving the subject-object relation according to the continuity of act rather than tackling the epistemological question; it is enough for him that our proper truth is inchoative understanding, being completely reflective and reasoned to discover the necessary proportion of its acts to the reality and fulfil its natural exigence for objective reference in judgment.³

Another important feature of Lenegran's analysis is the fact that when reflective insight does grasp the structural pattern of fulfilment, judgment follows by rational compulsion.⁴ The increment is not simply a tidy supplement in cognitive process; it is the dynamic climax of the whole procedure; so that

¹Vide supra, p. 38.

²Vide supra, p. 73, n. 1.

³Vide supra, p. 82, n. 1.

⁴Vide supra, p. 107, n. 2.

when all the conditions for judgment have been satisfied, it would be silly, and even mentally unhealthy, not to posit judgment. This is the aspect of judgment that was most fascinating to Father Maréchal, for objectivity was reached only in judgment under the compulsion of formal species. In fact, he emphasizes that affirmation imposes itself upon us under the penalty of logical annihilation should we not allow the formal laws of being to apply to the whole content of understanding, that to avoid this necessity is to open oneself to contradiction and the impossible divorce¹ of the life of the spirit and its vital expression. Rational activity would be completely thwarted were it not permitted its full scope in actuality.

Correct insight.-- If then, insights are the pivot of knowing structures, Lonergan pursues the nature of insights to determine how they can be known to be correct. Insights, both direct and introspective, rise to satisfy structural inquiry. To pose the problem in another way: an insight could be a very clever idea but how can it be known to be correct. Lonergan returns to the illustration of the man who finding his home in such altered circumstances pronounces that there has been a fire. The insight grounding this judgment must answer pertinent questions, either involving the primary interest or dependent ones. Insights not only arise to answer questions but are also followed by further questions as, 'What started the fire?' 'Where is my wife?'; then again, if the transition of interest is made away from the

¹Vide supra, p. 60, n. 2,3.

initial issue, the reasons for such a transition may be that more compelling interests have distracted the attention or that the initial interest may be exhausted, because about it there are no further questions to be asked.¹ The whole problem of insights centres on the fact that insights arise in response to an inquiring attitude. A distinction between vulnerable and invulnerable insights must be made.

Insights are vulnerable when there are further questions to be asked on the same issue. For the further questions lead to further insights that certainly complement the initial insight, that to a greater or less extent modify its expression and implications, that perhaps lead to an entirely new slant on the issue. But when there are no further questions, the insight is invulnerable. For it is only through further questions that there arise the further insights that complement, modify, or revise the initial approach and explanation.²

Such activity of insight is part of the immanent and operative law of cognitional process. We have been able to make the distinction between vulnerable and invulnerable insights simply because there is an operational distinction prior to any conceptual distinction.

When an insight meets the issue squarely, when it hits the bull's eye, when it settles the matter, there are no further questions to be asked and so there are no further insights to challenge the initial position. But when the issue is not met squarely, there are further questions that would reveal the unsatisfactoriness of the insight and would evoke the further insights that put a new light on the matter.³

¹Ibid., pp. 283-284.

²Ibid., p. 284.

³Ibid.

"The link between the conditioned and its conditions is a law immanent and operative in cognitional process."¹ The conditioned is the prospective judgment which is really that this or that direct or introspective insight is correct. Actually, the invulnerable insight is the prospective judgment; it is the idea sustained from the inquiring process through any number of subordinate or minor insights. It is now possible to formulate the immanent law of cognitional process: an insight is correct if there are no further pertinent questions.

Consequently, conditions for the prospective judgment are fulfilled, if there are no further, pertinent questions. At this point rises the disclaimer who may say that his mind was satisfied because of a lack of further questions in a certain issue, and yet he may make a very rash judgment. Indeed, to demand that every possible further question be satisfied could involve constant indecision. The immanent law again restated is: "If, in fact, there are no further questions, then in fact, the insight is invulnerable; if, in fact, the insight is invulnerable, then, in fact, the judgment approving it will be correct."² The law does not determine the fact of vulnerability or invulnerability of insight when there is an absence of further questions in my mind.

The intractibility of human nature prevents a simple solution to the practical application of immanent law. But Father

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., pp. 284-285.

Lonergan does shed some light on this vast human problem through an analysis of its main factors and the general nature of their solution.

First, further questions need to be given the opportunity to arise. "The seed of intellectual curiosity has to grow into a rugged tree to hold its own against the desires and fears, conations and appetites, drives and interests that inhabit the heart of man."¹ Even questions grow from a definite context, and sometimes it takes an arduous effort to consider whole retinues of pre-suppositions and related data to allow the questioning process to move from insight to higher insight. Informed questioning never operates in a vacuum. It is true that the concrete application of insights in ordinary life cannot be carried out like a scientific investigation. "But I do mean that something equivalent is to be sought by intellectual alertness, by taking one's time, by talking things over, by putting viewpoints to the test of action."²

Secondly, the prior issue must be fully understood. "Behind the theory of correct insights, there is the theory of correct problems."³ The example of the man making the concrete judgment of fact that there had been a fire was a judgment of a situation that did exist and the inquirer understood the conditions of the situation; therefore, the problem was accurately posed. Not all problems are of such a concrete and certain nature. The correct presentation of the problem provides a definition of the pertinence of any further questions.⁴

¹Ibid., p. 285.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

Good judgment about an insight depends upon a large number of related correct insights. Children manifest intellectual curiosity through endless questions, but certainly no one credits them with good judgment in these tender years; and young men and women display alertness of mind through their attainment of scholastic achievement, but the law restricts their activity in matters requiring judgment.¹ There is even the difficulty of maintaining prior insights on a level which makes them adaptable to changing environment. "Good judgment about concrete insights presupposes the prior acquisition of an organized set of complementary insights."²

Thirdly, there is the process of learning. It can be best described in Father Lenegran's words, "the gradual acquisition and accumulation of insights bearing on a single domain."³ Judgment, though in abeyance during the learning process, is being developed and formed for mature exercise. By the free development of the learning process, direct and introspective understanding is increased and intellectual curiosity as strengthened against other desires. "At the same time, the logical retinues of presuppositions and implications of each insight are being expanded either to conflict and provoke further questions or else to mesh into coherence."⁴ Thought experiments of operational possibilities have time to develop through learning and these can be contrasted with actual practice and reconstructed through the corrective

¹Ibid., pp. 285-286.

²Ibid., p. 286.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

influence of failure. This learning process is an actual regulative development of the elements of logic and dialectic immanent in cognitional process. Our mind is geared, so to speak, to build up an expanding coherent system of presuppositions through judgment, but the process is protected by the dialectical feature when schemes reveal conflict of meaning and contradiction in expanding dependent ideas.

The process of learning, then, is the answer to the problem of correctness of insights in individual judgments. Prior insights, which are the backdrop to subsequently related insights, are not correct simply because they are judged to be correct. "They occur within a self-correcting process in which the shortcomings of each insight provoke further questions to yield complementary insights."¹ However, this notion does not entail an infinite preoccupation in any one area. "This self-correcting process tends to a limit."² A limit is determined by familiarity within situations; if we know what to expect, we can act decisively when the expected occurs; and if the unexpected moves out beyond our scope of the situation, we recommence the learning process until self-correcting process reaches its limit in easy mastery of the concrete situation.³

Fourthly, the human failures of rashness and indecision have a basis in temperament; such disabilities of character prevent the normal function of the self-correcting process, and

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 286-287.

people of such temperament constantly miss the mark.

For unless a special effort is made to cope with temperament itself, the rash man continues to presume too quickly that he has nothing more to learn, and the indecisive man continues to suspect that deeper depths of shadowy possibilities threaten to invalidate what he knows quite well.¹

"Human judgments and refusals to judge oscillate about a central mean,"² Certainly, variations of judgment occur, but on certain points not even the rash or indecisive would disagree; so that the facts of human judgment can be discerned. The general form of certitude of knowledge or ignorance of knowledge must be considered in terms of the virtually unconditioned. There occurs a reflective insight in which at once one grasps:

(1) a conditioned, the prespective judgment that a given direct or introspective insight is correct,

(2) a link between the conditioned and its conditions and this on introspective analysis proves to be that an insight is correct if it is invulnerable and it is invulnerable if there are no further, pertinent questions, and,

(3) the fulfilment of the conditions, namely, that the given insight does put an end to further, pertinent questioning and that this occurs in a mind that is alert, familiar with the concrete situation, and intellectually master of it.³

Critique.--The importance of Lonergan's position on insight cannot be over emphasized; correct insight is the pivot of judgment. Its constructive influence, as immanent procedure working through all levels of cognitional process, finally grounds judgment as virtually unconditioned in a reflective grasp of a conditioned

¹Ibid., p. 287.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

or prospective judgment, a link between the conditioned and its conditions that is an invulnerable insight, and the consequent fulfilment of the conditions. Father Maréchal also considers a constant constructive power enmeshed in his process of knowing object as the real according to its form. The function of agent-intellect and judgment would be merely mechanical notions were it not for the actual dynamic interplay of insight through immanent object within a process moving towards a formally determined end. His explicit determinations of the dynamism do not have a guarantee of physical or logical necessity for they are subject to truth and error under the constructive power of imagination.¹ Again, Maréchal considers the possibility of certitude of knowledge for a non-intuitive intelligence, whose spontaneous understanding, mingling with imagination, can receive false evidence under the intention of legitimate evidence.² His truth must be pursued in that same self-correcting process of acquisition of correct insights and dialectic reconstruction that Lonergan defines. One cannot deny that Maréchal envisaged in some way the immanent function of insight through constructive power of imagination, illuminating by successive effort the immanent object within the levels of cognition, even unto the grasp of the bond or link with being that must be affirmed in judgment.

Concrete analogies and generalisations.--Father Lonergan proceeds to analyze types of judgment other than concrete judgments of

¹Vide supra, p. 53, n. 1.

²Vide supra, p. 72.

fact. First, the nature of analogy argues that if A is correctly understood, some similar situation, B, is understood in the same fashion. The generalization, then, is based on the assumption that any other similar situation is to be understood in the same fashion. "In both cases what is at work is the law, immanent and operative in cognitional process, that similars are similarly understood. Unless there is a significant difference in data, there cannot be a difference in understanding the data."¹ This way of thinking holds true for regularities, rules, laws, correlations, ideal frequencies, and things.

Simply, analogy and generalization are innate procedures of intelligence. There is no problem of teaching men to generalize, but there is a problem of teaching them to frame generalizations correctly, especially since the convenient nature of generalization² eliminates the arduous task of conceptual process. The real problem is that of preventing men from generalizing on insufficient grounds. The first requirement of analogy is that the basic insight of the first situation be correct or else the second will also be mistaken. For the basic insight to be correct, the learning process must have reached its level of easy familiarity, so that no further pertinent questions occur. Secondly, the analogy must involve situations that are truly similar. In concrete situations where analogy is being made by one person using another's apparently similar situation, the

¹Ibid., p. 288.

²Ibid.

particular fulfilment of conditions in the experience of familiarity cannot be conveyed from the basic insight to the certain grounding of the analogous situation. "But unless the two situations are similar in all respects, my familiarity with one does not enable me to tell whether or not further questions arise when my insight is transferred to the other."¹

For this reason, arguments from analogy can be of an insidious nature, although, as such, the analogy and generalisation are valid procedures, and have a compensating factor in the area of human collaboration in the process of learning. The key to mastering their use resides in the link of the cognitional law that similars are similarly understood, and the fulfilment rests in a similarity such that no further pertinent questions arise in the general case or in the particular one.

Common-sense judgments.--Human collaboration in the process of learning has produced a large body of generally approved common-sense judgments whose proximate ground and source lies in the procedures of concrete judgments of fact, judgments on the correctness of insights into concrete situations, and concrete analogies and generalisations.

Human beings perform implicitly and unconsciously the art of teaching in an historically laborious process.

Talking is a basic human art; by it each reveals what he knows and provokes from others the further questions that direct his attention to what he had

¹Ibid., p. 289.

overlooked. More general and more impressive than talking is doing; deeds excite our admiration and stir us to emulation; we watch to see how things are done; we experiment to see if we can do them ourselves; we watch again to discover the oversights that led to our failures.¹

Thus, the discoveries of individuals add to the general accumulation of insights absorbed and modified with each passing generation.

The self-correcting process of learning goes on in the minds of individuals, but the individual minds are in communication. The results reached by one are checked by many, and new results are added to old to form a common fund from which each draws his variable share measured by his interests and his energy.²

Common-sense judgments, resting upon the self-correcting process of learning through communication and collaboration, are human products and therefore subject to human passions. "The mixed character of human drives can generate a common deviation from the pure product of intelligence and even a common dishonesty in refusing to acknowledge the effective pertinence of further, pertinent questions."³ Error is pre-eminently human, only emphasized by particular class and national prejudices. We all share in both the benefits and errors of common-sense collaboration. "We have no choice about withdrawing from it, for the past development of one's own intellect can no more easily be blotted out than the past growth of one's body, and future develop-

¹Ibid., p. 290.

²Ibid., p. 290.

³Ibid.

ment will have to take place under essentially the same conditions and limitations as that of the past,"¹

In order to discern whether common-sense might be expected to operate successfully in certain fields, it is necessary to define the object of common-sense judgments. Such a task first requires a distinction between description and explanation.

Description deals with things as related to us. Explanation deals with the same things as related among themselves. The two are not totally independent, for they deal with the same things and, as we have seen, description supplies, as it were, the tweezers by which we hold things while explanations are being discovered or verified, applied or revised.²

In other words, description is in terms of the given while explanation is in terms of ultimates to be approached by analysis. Indeed, description may be considered in two main varieties; linguistically, a difference is revealed in scientific and ordinary description because, fundamentally speaking, things as related to us are considered under different preoccupations. Scientific description selects the relations of things to us that lead more directly to knowledge of the relations between things themselves. Ordinary description concerns the things as related to us, and its object is whatever is to be known through concrete judgments of fact, judgments on the correctness of insights into concrete situations, concrete analogies and generalisations, and the collaboration of common-sense. "To anticipate a later vocabulary,

¹Ibid., p. 291.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 292.

the domain of ordinary description is a section of the universe of being, of what intelligently is grasped and reasonably affirmed. How much of that section really is reached by ordinary description, is of course a further question."¹

Three determinations of the realm of common-sense judgments may be drawn. First, human collaboration that results in common sense involves belief.² This type of belief is such that the subject operates on the principle that if his suppositions are incorrect, the error will be revealed indirectly through his present activity. "Secondly, the human collaboration that results in a common sense is under the dominance of practical considerations and pragmatic sanctions."³ While the further questions that arise are not initiated by theoretical considerations, nevertheless, they lead to revision of insight and judgment of what is true. Thirdly, as mentioned, the human collaboration that results in a common sense is subject to the deviations and aberrations based on the mixed motives of man. As long as a person operates within the framework of these mixed motives, his judgments can only be suspect. "It is only when I go to the root of the matter and become efficaciously critical of myself that I can begin to become a reliable judge; and then that becoming will consist in the self-correcting process of learning which has already been described."⁴

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 293.

⁴Ibid.

While science and common sense can be concerned with the same things, they cannot conflict because they speak from completely different viewpoints. In actual fact, acceptance of such a conflict prompted the expression of primary and secondary qualities in the Renaissance as an attempt to meet the problem of an apparent overlap and contradiction by putting the scientific interpretation in prominent position of importance. Lonergan demarcates separate yet complementary domains of these two realms of knowledge. "There is a comprehensive, universal, invariant, non-imaginable domain; its object is the thing-itself, with differences in kind defined by explanatory conjugates, and with differences in state defined by ideal frequencies."¹ This field is to be reached by subtracting from the empirical residue. "There is also an experiential, particular, relative, imaginable domain; its object is the thing-for-us, with differences in kind defined by experiential conjugates, and with differences in state defined by expectations of the normal."² This area of knowledge includes the empirical residue since it views things in their individuality, their accidental determinations.

Logically, the distinction is even more noticeable for it causes two modes of discourse. Not only a whole field of technical and scientific terms have mushroomed but also apparent contradictions in affirmations resolve themselves when qualifying terms such as 'from the point of view of explanation' or 'from

¹Ibid., p. 294.

²Ibid.

the point of view of ordinary description' are used.¹

Methodological differences underly the logical separation. Both areas of knowledge must reach their conclusions through the self-correcting process while operating with different criteria. Pertinent questions set the course for conclusions. "It is this fundamental difference in the criterion of the relevance of further questions that marks the great divide between a scientific attitude and a common-sense attitude."² The scientist keeps pushing to ultimate explanation by asking 'Why?', while the layman seeks answers to satisfy questions of daily life. If the objectives of one field be transposed upon the other, the result is complete frustration, for pure science cannot answer the question 'What is its use?' and the practical attitude seeks only the truth which can be applied.

The terms of ordinary description do not shift in meaning because the elements of daily experience are fairly constant. On the other hand, since in the field of science relations of things among themselves cannot be reached by immediate experience, each pertinent step in ultimate explanation involves a revision in fundamental terms.

Again, because science is analytic and abstractive, its terms are exact; because its correlations purport to be generally valid, they must be determined with utmost precision; because its terms are exact and its correlations general, it must be ready to

¹Ibid., p. 295.

²Ibid.

bear the weight of a vast superstructure of logical deductions in which each conclusion must be equally exact and valid generally.¹

Yet, ordinary description, as has been noted, must make stringent use of analogy and generalization since concrete situations are rarely truly similar. "The collaboration of common sense aims, not at establishing general truths, but at building up a core of habitual understanding that is to be adjusted by further learning in each new situation that arises."²

In their objects, their criteria, their field of discourse, and their methods, science and common sense are distinct, but complementary within the sphere of knowledge. It would be a mistake to place their judgments in competition with each other; in fact, their successful co-operation has engineered the superstructure of applied science and technology. But we still have those overly ambitious claims of the proponents of science who being "misled by a confusion between the heuristic and the representative functions of imagination, they assumed that the business of science was to paint a picture of the really real."³ Father Merriam's simple solution of the dilemma of common sense versus science hits squarely the heart of the problem.

Common sense itself, being so confined to concrete situations, cannot formulate general rules but has to learn anew as situations vary while the background of instances and even proverbs

¹Ibid., p. 296.

²Ibid., p. 297.

³Ibid., p. 298.

provide possible rules of procedure. The pull of desires and emotions must be disciplined to allow calm and measured judgment. Only the individual judges can know what is correct for their individual situations, for no one else can possess their evidence as given or reach their particular level of familiarity from the self-correcting process in that situation.

The common element in common sense is not some list of general truths about which all men can agree; it is not some list of particular truths about which all men can agree; but it is a collaboration in the erection of a basic structure by which, with appropriate adjustments, each individual is enabled to fill out his individual list of particular truths.¹

And each individual's acquirement of particular truths occurs inasmuch as reflective understanding grasps the virtually unconditioned.

Probable judgments.---Probable judgments must be considered since reflective grasp does not always reach the virtually unconditioned either² to affirm or deny it absolutely. The probability of judgment must not be confused with the intelligent grasp of ideal frequency as a measure of probability in conceptual terms; the probable judgment arises from the question for reflection, and, as such, anticipates a divergence between the judgment and actual fact, since complete familiarity is not attained. Again, the probable judgment is not to be considered a guess; a guess is a non-rational expression, but the probable judgment issues from the rational process as an approximation of the complete term of judgment.

¹Ibid., p. 299.

As we have seen the self-correcting process of learning consists in a sequence of questions, insights, further insights that moves towards a limit in which no further, pertinent questions arise. When we are well beyond that limit, judgments are certainly obvious. When we are well short of that limit, judgments are at best probable. When we are on the border-line, the rash are completely certain and the indecisive full of doubts.¹

As the self-correcting process approaches a limit of no further, pertinent questions, it yields probable judgments that are probably true as approximations of a truth not yet known.

The probable judgment involves insights that ground the judgment as an approximation; the immanent procedure constitutes the link that insights are correct when there are no further, pertinent questions and the fulfilment is a certain approximation of the self-correcting process of learning to its limit in familiarity. Here, the link can not be that there are no further questions, but simply that since no further questions do occur, a restricted judgment of probability is made.

The study of the probable judgment brings us to a consideration of the probability of the empirical sciences. Lonergan's grasp of the interlocking nature of scientific laws and generalisations is solidly illustrated by the question of an independent measurement of weights to support the conclusion that the initial abstraction allows one to return to the concrete only after the exploration of successively widening circles of inquiry.² "The generalisation of classical laws, then, is no more than probable

¹Ibid., p. 300.

²Ibid., pp. 301-302.

because the application of single laws raises further questions that head towards the systematization of a whole field."¹

Statistical laws are no more than probable because they presuppose some classification of events. "Similarly, more accurate investigation may lead to the discernment within the statistical law of a systematic element that can be abstracted in classical form to leave a new statistical residue."² The question then rises as to whether empirical generalizations which are only probable are not grounded in particular facts of concrete judgments. Yet, observables have to be refined by the latest measurements and theoretical structure, both subject to revision. "Hence, one may say that empirical science is solidly grounded in fact in virtue of its concrete judgments and, at the same time, one may add that technical developments and theoretical advance can render such facts more or less obsolescent."³ The judgments of empirical science are truly probable.

It is rather interesting to note that Gavin Ardley,⁴ to take one example, makes a case for an illicit procrustean feature in scientific thought; in fact, he terms modern physics an 'apriori pragmatism'. He concludes that the physicist is working with pure conjugates that cannot be interpreted in reality. Lonergan makes the distinction between explanatory (pure) conjugates and experiential conjugates as separate yet complementary domains of

¹Ibid., p. 302.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 303.

⁴See Aquinas And Kant, Gavin Ardley (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1950).

knowledge; he also pinpoints so neatly this quality of probability characteristic of science. While Ardley ostracizes science from the legitimate field of knowledge because of what may be termed a synthetic structure divorced from the really real, Lonergan shows the special demands of science, the relations of objects among themselves, technical developments, the tendency to general systematization, that render concrete judgments as useless, though such judgments have been the basis and orientation towards scientific thought just as description leads to explanation. The breadth of Lonergan's scope of human knowledge takes in so many incomplete positions.

Empirical science, then, in its nature of probability is converging upon truth. "This convergence, this increasing approximation, is what is meant by the familiar phrase, the advance of science."¹ Is this advance indefinite or approaching a limit? Lonergan presents arguments for the likelihood of the latter. First, increasing accuracy with the invention of new techniques and instruments would seem to head towards a limit, perhaps, well beyond our present expectations; still we have no reason to expect an infinite series of them, and once such possibilities become exhausted, the canon of selection comes into play.² "Secondly, as the advance of science has a lower limit in the field of presentations, so also it has an upper limit in the basic structure of the human mind."³

¹ Lonergan, loc. cit.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 304.

Revision loses its determinate meaning in the speculation of revising the revisers. The structural features of cognitional process form an inevitable base for all systems of thought; if the invariants of mental structure require parallel invariants in theoretical constructions, then an upper limit to the variation of theoretical constructions follows.¹ The foundations of logic are placed in the inevitabilities of our thought process; even the theory of relativity in its basic postulate rests upon a structural feature of our cognitional process.² That is, the root of all heuristic structure is the detached and disinterested desire, and so, the root of the whole process is the directed dynamism. Whatever is to be known is by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation of the virtually unconditioned, moving always towards a limit, a coherence in each system. Therefore, the conclusions of empirical science have positive probability in as much as the self-correcting process of learning is approaching a limit. "Our argument was based upon the immanent tendency of the process itself to a limit, inasmuch as each great stage of scientific development heads for the closed coherence of system, and each successive system grips the facts with greater nuance and accuracy over wider expanses of data."³ Even the possible existence of external limitations of the process only point to the possibility of some future system, yet unknown, that will meet the requirement of a body of facts of

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
³Ibid.

wider diversity.

Analytic propositions and principles.--Next, there are analytic propositions and principles. The following terms of meaning with their definitions are required to understand the present analysis of the analytic proposition and principle:

- (1) partial terms of meaning,
- (2) rules of meaning,
- (3) formal terms of meaning, and
- (4) full terms of meaning.

The full term of meaning is what is affirmed or denied.

The formal term of meaning is what could be affirmed or denied, but, in fact, is merely supposed or considered.

The partial term of meaning is what is meant by a word or by a phrase.

Rules of meaning govern the coalescence of words and phrases into the complete sense that may be supposed or, affirmed or denied.¹

In analytic propositions, the link resides in the rules of meaning that generate the full meaning from partial terms of meaning, and the fulfilment is supplied by the meaning or definitions of the terms.

Thus, if A is defined by the relation, R, to B, and B is defined by the converse relation, R', to A, then by the rules of meaning it follows that there cannot be an A without the relation R, to B, and that there cannot be B without the relation, R', to A. Such conclusions resting on the definitions and rules of meaning are analytic propositions.¹

It may be seen from this example that the meaning of an analytic proposition could be simply hypothetical. The analytic proposition in itself offers no guarantee that its terms do

¹Ibid., p. 305.

²Ibid.

occur in any other judgment or supposition. In fact, analytic propositions can be produced at will because of the multitude of partial terms of meaning and the equal multitude of further partial terms that can be supplied by the art of definition. The key to the production of analytic propositions is that rules of meaning provide a principle of selection of partial terms that will coalesce into full meaning. "But significant increments of knowledge are not obtained by mere ingenuity and, in fact, the analytic proposition, by itself, is not a significant increment of knowledge; without the fulfilment of further conditions it remains in isolation and fails to enter fruitfully into the texture of knowing."¹

However, analytic principles are quite a different matter, and their definition supports Father Lonergan's judgment that they are hard to come by.

By an analytic principle is meant an analytic proposition of which the partial terms are existential; further, the partial terms of an analytic proposition are existential if they occur in their defined sense in judgments of fact, such as the concrete judgment of fact or the definitively established empirical generalization.²

The provisional analytic principle, an analytic proposition in which the terms are probably existential, that is, they occur in probable empirical generalizations, will concern us here. The serially analytic principle, an analytic proposition in which the terms are serially existential, will be considered finally under mathematical judgments.

¹Ibid., p. 306.

²Ibid.

The analytic principle also denotes in its terms a basic character of intelligence that is outside the realm of both common sense and empirical science. Common-sense-meaning is much the same as the structure of common sense; common sense terms and concepts receive their complement of meaning from a habitual core of understanding. The exact meaning of common sense concepts can be analyzed, but, in actual process, there is the insight that is expressed by the conjunction of several concepts. The definition of concepts is not undertaken by common sense. Certainly, common sense has principles but not the analyzed definitive type found in analytic principles. "But prior to analysis, to concepts, to judgments, there are the native endowments of intelligence and reasonableness and the inherent structure of cognitional process. These are the real principles on which the rest depend."¹

Again, analytic principles lie beyond the realm of empirical science.

It is true of course that every insight yields several concepts linked together through insight; it is also true that the empirical scientist formulates definitions, postulates, and inferences; but the trouble is that the empirical scientist knows his insights not as certainly correct but only as probable. Hence his defined terms, in the sense they are defined, are as much subject to revision as the probable judgments of fact that contain them and validate them.²

As has been pointed out, the advance of science is actually an advance of the self-correcting process of learning; as it reached

¹Ibid., p. 308.

²Ibid.

a more comprehensive level, its terms have to be revised. The nature of the provisional analytic principle can be understood in the context of successive formulations of empirical science.

First, they are the expression of insights that grasp the intelligible form in data; thus, they are probable empirical conclusions. Secondly, they are the presupposition of the further questions that lead to further insights; from this viewpoint they are provisional analytic principles. Thirdly, they are revised in the light of the further insights and so cease to be probable empirical conclusions and provisional analytic principles to pass into the limbo of the analytic propositions whose terms have no existential reference.¹

Mathematical judgments.--Finally, in mathematical thought a dual emphasis is placed on the intelligent grasp of problems and their solutions and on the reflective process of checking. Checking is a conscious working out of the reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned to ground judgment. What is the specific nature of the virtually unconditioned in mathematical judgments? Checking reveals the form of a deductive inference, and the coalescence of definitions into self-justifying meaning implies the analytic proposition. But, the premises of mathematical thought cannot be mere analytic propositions, which are produced at will. Not only is mathematical thought achieved through labour and genius but also it shares as a tool in the probable existential reference of empirical theories. "But prior to a probable existential reference or isomorphism; before a department of mathematics can be applied, it must possess an inherent possibility of being applied."² It is this inherent possibility which is the dis-

¹Ibid., p. 309.

²Ibid., pp. 310-311.

tinctive feature of mathematical judgments.

A definitive study of the mathematical judgment involves the material element, the formal element, and the actual element. The material element has already been called the empirical residue, the individual, the continuum, particular places and times, and the non-systematic divergence of actual frequency from probable expectations.¹ The formal element may be designated by abstraction as enriching; for insight, as has been noted, goes beyond data to add intelligible unities and correlations and frequencies, which, indeed, contain a reference to images or data but, none the less, add a component to knowledge that does not exist actually on the level of sense or imagination.² Then, the actual element becomes the conjunction of the material and formal elements. This is precisely Maréchal's notion of the subjective formal object and the material object in the dynamic continuity of the intellect.

The mathematical formal element is dynamic for it moves in a succession of higher viewpoints which develop completely separate fields, but still, the images of the lower field have provided the conceptual background for the intelligent grasp of a new idea. Simply, any logically developed system must have a complement of antecedents, for the mind does not begin to operate on the reflective level from a vacuum. "Not only is there the link between the higher viewpoints and preceding lower viewpoints, but also there

¹Ibid., p. 311.

²Ibid.

is a bias from the particular to the general, from the part to the totality, from the approximate to the ideal."¹ Therefore the expansion of intelligence in mathematical thought is not completely free; if there exist edges and surfaces for example, the mathematician does work out a total series of possible geometries. Even though the formal element of mathematical thought, being the ideal and the complete, reveals a disinterest in the existent, still there must be some matter that is investigated. "Still it does seem to be true that the empirical residue does supply mathematics with samples of the type of stuff on which mathematical ideas confer intelligibility and order."² The material element that remains for the mathematician could only be the empirical residue of all data.

The formal and material elements by their conjunction take on an actual character. This conjunction is described by Lonergan's striking metaphor of the blades of the scissors and was previously delineated as the upper and lower limit in the field of empirical method.

Not only is there a lower blade that rises from data through measurements and curve-fitting to formulae, but also there is an upper blade that moves downward from differential and operator equations and from postulates of invariance and equivalence. Moreover, it is no secret that the upper blade owes its effectiveness to the labours of the mathematicians.³

¹Ibid., p. 312.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 312-312.

This upper blade works in the complementary domains of science and mathematics. The ideal goal of empirical science is to attain an intelligible counterpart of explanatory conjugates and ideal frequencies for all aspects of data. Complementing this goal is the movement of mathematical thought, which confers intelligibility through enriching abstraction upon any material which resembles empirical residue.

For the mathematician begins from the empirical residue with which the empirical scientist would end; and if the mathematical exploration of intelligible systems is thorough, then it is bound to include the systems of explanatory conjugates that the empirical sciences will verify in their respective domains.¹

Now to return to the distinction of the virtually unconditioned in mathematical judgments. The terms and relations of provisional analytic principles were seen to occur, in their defined sense, in probable judgments of fact. "Finally, the terms and relations of serially analytic principles ground the deductive expansions that explore completely, generally, and ideally, the total range of fields to which outright and provisional analytic principles give access in a particular, fragmentary, or approximate manner."² Together the material and formal elements of mathematical thought fulfil the requirements of serially analytic principles.

Now, the empirical scientist seeks the intelligibility that, when combined with the empirical residue in the data of its

¹Ibid., p. 313.

²Ibid.

various divisions, will give a complete but definitive explanation of those data. Beyond that, the mathematician establishes generally, completely, and ideally the range of possible systems that include verifiable scientific systems as particular, fragmentary, or approximate cases. ¹ This basic parallel of abstractive method and relevance to empirical residue in data is the foundation for Lonergan's decision for the possibility of isomorphism between ² the relations of empirical science and those of mathematics.

These determinations of the formal, material, and actual elements of mathematical thought comprise the ground for the inherent possibility of existential reference; namely, the isomorphic structure of the domains of empirical science and mathematics. The dynamic character of mathematical thought is evident in this analysis for even the material element opens upon the whole field of empirical science, not specifically physics, and all further additions to the present residue for further enrichment offered by the mathematician. "Yet his creations will remain serially existential, for they will exhibit the series of systems to some of which the empirical scientist will be able to say 'Yes'."³

Summary and general critique.--To summarize Father Lonergan's definitive work on the nature of judgment, the pertinent fact of immanent structure, rising in a pattern of link of the conditioned to its conditions and the fulfilment of conditions, grounds judg-

¹Ibid., p. 314.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 315.

ment in a sufficiency of evidence. These two elements have been shown to assume different manners to provide for the judgments of formal inference, judgments of fact, judgments on the correctness of insights, generalizations and analogies, probable judgments, and analytic propositions with their derivative provisional analytic principles and serially analytic principles. As we move away in the spectrum from the judgment of concrete fact to the mathematical judgment, the intensive abstraction is realized in an enriching addition of intelligible unities and correlations and frequencies. The operational distinction of vulnerable and invulnerable insights, the notion of knowing change, the immanent law that similars are similarly understood, the self-correcting process itself approaching its limit of familiarity and mastery; in fact, the upper blade of cognitional process, all are analyzed manifestations of laws immanent and operative in cognitional structure. Even as the complexity of rational structure emanates from the study of judgment, there emerges the idea of an isomorphic structure, not only between mathematical relations and the relations of empirical science, but also between immanent structure and its total virtually equivalent fields of endeavour. Indeed, it is the upper blade, so prominent in Maréchal's analysis of the apriori, formal element in human knowledge, that manifests itself here in realistic proportion in the heart of judgment.

Self-Affirmation Of The Knower

If the analysis of the grasp of the virtually unconditioned is indeed the actual case, then the matter can only be settled by making a correct judgment. A judgment of self-affirmation is a suitable instance for in it the self both affirms and is affirmed. "By 'self-affirmation of the knower' is meant that the self as affirmed is characterized by such occurrences as sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and affirming."¹ Such an affirmation would be a judgment of fact, the fact that by knowing, these acts are performed. The conditioned, then, would be the statement, 'I am a knower'. The link between the conditioned and its conditions would be the insight into the 'I' as a concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole characterized by these acts. But since "the fulfilment of conditions is given in consciousness"², the notion of consciousness must come under analysis first.

The notion of consciousness.--"First, consciousness is not to be thought of as some sort of inward look."³ That is, consciousness is a factor in knowing, but by knowing is meant simply the performance of certain kinds of acts. "Secondly, by consciousness we shall mean that there is an awareness immanent in cognitional acts."⁴ Along with the distinction of act and its content, there

¹Ibid., p. 319.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 320.

⁴Ibid.

is also the necessary distinction between conscious and unconscious acts. To exemplify: "Seeing is not merely a response to the stimulus of colour and shape; it is a response that consists in becoming aware of colour and shape."¹ However, there should be no confusion between conscious acts and those deliberate acts characterized by debate; consciousness has a far greater extension.

By conscious act is not meant an act to which one attends; consciousness can be heightened by shifting attention from the content to the act; but consciousness is not constituted by that shift of attention, for it is a quality immanent in acts of certain kinds, and without it the acts would be unconscious as is the growth of one's beard.²

Then to what acts is the distinction of consciousness to be attributed? Lenegran does not think that only cognitional acts are conscious, for other acts have a quality beyond the nature of occurrence as found in metabolism for example; yet, his term 'awareness of awareness' would require further study.³ Therefore, we shall consider the element beyond the content in cognitional acts as an awareness.

Awareness differs in relation to the kinds of acts. The content of cognitional acts betrays the prior disposition on the side of subject in the spheres of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness. Empirical consciousness, through its data as merely given or presented, illustrates the basic distinction between conscious and unconscious acts. On the second level of

¹Ibid., p. 321.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

intelligent consciousness, human artifacts reveal the design and invention of intelligence. On the rational level of consciousness, the groundedness of the thing in a sequence of operations reflects the reasonableness of the reflective act operating under the law of sufficient reason.

Intelligence and intelligibility are the obverse and reverse of the second level of knowing; intelligence looks for intelligible patterns in presentations and representations; it grasps such patterns in its moments of insight; it exploits such grasp in its formulations and in further operations equally guided by insights. In like manner, reasonableness and groundedness are the obverse and reverse of the third level of knowing.¹

This happy choice of metaphor places the acts, not the content, of the second and third levels of cognitional process in a dominant position; intelligence and reasonableness, as obverse elements from the side of subject, are not only prior and foremost but also they contribute the base which fans out into all the specific determinations developed through data.

Still, Father Lonergan pursues the question as to whether I am really conscious of intelligence and reasonableness. But the question misleads one to suppose there is a type of knowing that further inspects intelligence and reasonableness. Intelligent and rational consciousness proceed through inquiry and the demand for sufficient reason until the unconditioned may be affirmed or denied in the self-commitment of judgment. The world of scientific effort stands as a monument to our basic orientation to understand so that the rational increment is attained.

¹Ibid., p. 323.

"Intelligent and rational consciousness denote characters of cognitional process, and the characters they denote pertain not to the contents but to the proceeding."¹ The subject actively and spontaneously contributes to its cognitional product.

The unity of consciousness.--There are unities of consciousness.

Contents accumulate into unities: the perceived is what is inquired about, what is inquired about is what is understood, and the understanding is formulated and reflected upon; if the reflection attains a grasp of the unconditioned, the unity of content is complete in the affirmation of the unconditioned. But these unities on the side of object exist because of the unities on the side of subject; indeed, the acts of perceiving, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and affirming coalesce into the single act of knowing.

Indeed, consciousness is much more obviously of this unity in diverse acts than of the diverse acts, for it is within the unity that the acts are found and distinguished, and it is to the unity that we appeal when we talk about a single field of consciousness and draw a distinction between conscious acts occurring within the field and unconscious acts occurring outside it.²

In fact, were the unity of consciousness not given, it would be necessarily deduced because there must be the 'I' that holds the disparate acts together for a single increment. "If there were not one consciousness, at once empirical, intelligent, and

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 325.

rational, how could rational judgment proceed from an unconditioned grasped in the combination of thought and sensible experiences?¹

The unity as given.--That consciousness is given means that it is independent of formulation or affirmation. Actually there is a single agent performing many acts, which as distinguished according to empirical, intelligent, and rational involves an abstraction from experience. Neither an affirmation nor a denial would add to or diminish consciousness as such. "By an experiential fulfilment, then, one does not mean the conditioned nor the link between the conditioned and its conditions, nor the conditions as formulated, let alone as affirmed. "One does mean that the conditions, which are formulated, also are to be found in amore rudimentary state within cognitional process."²

The process of verification is a pattern of checking by reversals from formulations to the more rudimentary cognitional contents of perceiving or sensing. "But in virtue of checking one can say that the formulation is not pure theory, that it is not merely supposed or merely postulated or merely inferred, that its sensible component is given."³ Now, in the question of consciousness, there is the reversal to what is given consciously. Our formulations express the fact of consciousness, but they are not consciousness. 'I am a knower' is the statement of the conditioned. 'I am a knower if I am a unity performing certain kinds

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 326.

³Ibid., p. 327.

of acts' is the expression of the link between the conditioned and its conditions. And the conditions may be formulated as the unity-identity-whole and its particular acts. "But the fulfilment of the conditions in consciousness is to be had by reverting from such formulations to the more rudimentary state of the formulated where there is no formulation but merely experience."¹

Self-affirmation.--To ask the question for reflection is to enter the dynamic state that will only be satisfied in the unconditioned. What is meant by 'I' is given in some obscure fashion that is difficult to formulate. But, I have only to ask: Do I conceive, think, consider, suppose, define, and formulate? Then, I must reflect for I have asked the question. If I grasp this unconditioned, am I not under rational compulsion to affirm that I am a knower, or else, must I not find some weakness in the nature of the account of self-affirmation? In fact, I do ask the question and I must answer it for myself. "But the fact of the asking and the possibility of the answering are themselves the sufficient reason for the affirmative answer."²

Self-affirmation as immanent law.--The judgment of self-affirmation if supposed as a fact becomes conditionally necessary. The question 'Am I a knower?' involves a contradiction if answered 'No', and even the answer 'I do not know' implies the efficacy of the knowing power. Complete silence is the only possible

¹Ibid., p. 328.

²Ibid,

negative answer. "It is this conditional necessity of contingent fact that involves the talking sceptic in contradiction."¹

There is, as well as the conditional necessity of contingent fact, the nature of natural spontaneities and inevitabilities that go with the fact. Cognitive process does not lie outside of natural law; it is a unity of conscious acts enveloped in a natural spontaneity. One cannot escape presentations nor can one rest at that level. "Spontaneously I fall victim of the wonder that Aristotle named the beginning of all science and philosophy. I try to understand. I enter, without questioning, the dynamic state that is revealed in the questions for intelligence."² The involvement in intelligence is so much my being that to question or try to escape its questioning is self-destructive.

The check of judgment brings understanding to the realm of fact, fact that encompasses and survives repeated scientific revisions because each higher theory brings understanding closer to the facts. Fact must be concrete as it has a component in the concrete of sense and consciousness. It is intelligible as it is reached through insight and formulation, and finally, it is the virtually unconditioned which might not have been, but, in fact is, and as such is a conditional necessity.

Fact, then, combines the concreteness of experience, the determinateness of accurate intelligence, and the absoluteness of rational judgment. It is the natural objective of human cognitive process. It

¹Ibid., p. 329.

²Ibid., p. 330.

is the anticipated unity to which sensation, perception, imagination, inquiry, insight, formulation, reflection, grasp of the unconditioned, and judgment make their several complementary contributions.¹

How extensive the realm of fact is we do not know; perhaps some of its possibility dawns upon us in that fact has gone even beyond the imaginable in the four-dimensional manifold of quantum mechanics. The pertinent concern is that we are committed to fact.

We are committed, not by knowing what it is and that it is worth while, but by an inability to avoid experience, by the subtle conquest in us of the Eros that would understand, by the inevitable aftermath of that sweet adventure when a rationality identical with us demands the absolute, refuses unreserved assent to less than the unconditioned and, when that is attained, imposes upon us a commitment in which we bow to an immanent Anagke.²

The critical spirit is such that it demands sufficient reasons for everything except itself.

We are absolutely committed to rationality and its demand for the virtually unconditioned under the penalty of self-contradiction and even its deviation in rationalization when the demands of rationality are ignored. Self-affirmation, as a judgment of fact, is discerned through engagement in the rational process, because it is rooted in the natural spontaneity of rationality. There is no question of demonstration, for inquiry must use the process. "The ultimate basis of our knowing is not

¹Ibid., p. 331.

²Ibid.

necessity but contingent fact, and the fact is established, not prior to our engagement in knowing, but simultaneously with it.¹ We are involved in the conditional necessity of fact, for as we might not be, our knowing might not be or it might be other than it is. Thus, Lonergan unhinges cognitive process from the meanders of arguments about absolute necessity.

Description and explanation.--The point of conditional necessity returns us to the distinction of descriptive and explanatory conjugates. But, in both types of procedure, the inquirer can start either from the data of sense or the data of consciousness, and then go on to explain by discovering relations between things or between acts. Explanation on the basis of sense is subject to possible revision to best account for all the known facts, since the hypothetical element cannot be eliminated. But explanation on the basis of consciousness, as human nature now exists, can escape major revision since it does not have to work under the acknowledgment of the hypothetical element of the unknown of empirical method. Of course, revisions are necessary for explanation on the basis of consciousness to be reached through the self-correcting process of learning and to attain clarity on minor elements. "What is excluded is the radical revision that involves a shift in the fundamental terms and relations of the explanatory account of the human knowledge underlying existing common sense, mathematics, and empirical science."² That is, on

¹Ibid., p. 332.

²Ibid., p. 335.

the operator level (the upper blade) of all human knowledge, presentation must come through the senses, intelligent insights yield the conditioned by reaching a satisfactory limit of familiarity, and reflective insight makes the link between a conditioned and its fulfilling conditions to grasp the virtually unconditioned of judgment.

The impossibility of revision.--The notion of revision depends upon the cumulative process of the three levels of cognition. Revision is operative only when insights lead to formulation and grasp of the virtually unconditioned that most satisfactorily accounts for data. "Clearly, revision cannot revise its own presuppositions. A reviser cannot appeal to data to deny data, to his new insights to deny insights, to his new formulation to deny formulation, to his reflective grasp to deny reflective grasp."¹ From another point of view, the argument that empirical science is subject to revision, and, therefore, all human knowledge is in the same way subject to revision is false. "One must definitely know invariant features of human knowledge before one can assert that empirical science is subject to indefinite revision; and if one definitely knows invariant features of human knowledge, then one knows what is not subject to revision."²

Self-affirmation in the possibility of judgments of fact.--The same conclusions can also be reached by setting forth "the a priori conditions of any possible judgment of fact."³ These conditions,

¹Ibid., p. 336.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

having already been analysed, may be briefly summarized.

The first condition of any possible judgment of fact is the grasp of a conditioned, a link between the conditioned and its conditions, and the fulfilment of the conditions to ground the virtually unconditioned in the absolute answer of 'Yes' or 'No'. The virtually unconditioned is to be interpreted as stating that something is so, not that it must be so; the judgment is grounded by a virtually, not formally, unconditioned.

This first requirement presupposes a second one; there must be a level of intelligence that yields the conditioned in a free development that is not completely isolated from fulfilling conditions.

The third requirement is presupposed by the second. The conditioned issues from a context of conditions that in their state of being given can supply fulfilling conditions.

The final requirement is that possibility be concrete. The judgment affirming a mountain of gold has no logical contradiction, but the conditions of its possibility could only be realized from many diverse sources.¹ The possibility of judgments of fact involve experience, inquiry, free development of systematic unities and relations, reflection and grasp of the virtually unconditioned.

There must be, then, a concrete unity-identity-whole that experiences the given, that inquires about the given to generate the free development of systematic unities and relations, that reflects upon such developments and demands the virtually unconditioned as its ground for answering 'Yes' or 'No'.²

¹Ibid., p. 337.

²Ibid., p. 338.

As a corollary, the occurrence of a judgment of fact also demands the occurrence of its conditions.

For any judgment of fact, there is also a concrete unity-identity-whole or thing itself defined by an internally related set of operations, and the relations may be experientially validated in the conscious and dynamic states:

- (1) of inquiry leading from the given to insight,
- (2) of insight leading to formulation,
- (3) of reflection leading from formulation to grasp of the unconditioned, and
- (4) of that grasp leading to affirmation or denial.¹

Then the key to the argument resides in the fact that no revision could be made without the occurrence of a judgment of fact. "But if there occurs any judgment of fact, there occur the dynamic states in which may be validated experientially the relations that define the conjugate terms by which the thing-itself that knows is differentiated".² Thus, no Known could impugn the pre-c-
e-s-s, and the thing-itself in cognitional theory is the concrete unity affirmed in the conscious process itself.

Contrast with Kantian analysis.--In contrast with Kantian analysis, what would be in Kantian terms a transcendental deduction is effected here without the problem of knowing an object. Lonergan has sought the apriori conditions of the possible occurrence of a judgment of fact, not the apriori conditions of knowing an object. Secondly, we have not been operating under the assumption of noumena and phenomena, but rather under the distinction

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 336.

of content of cognitional act through experiential and explanatory conjugates.¹ In Lenergan's method, the precise nature of cognitional process must be examined before approaching the question of objectivity. Thirdly, Kant's universal and necessary judgments fall only within the scope of analytic propositions which may be only abstract possibilities, unrelated to the central context of judgments named knowledge; he cannot make a judgment of fact.

Our emphasis falls on the judgment of fact that itself is an increment of knowledge and, as well, contributes to the transition from the analytic proposition to the analytic principle, that is, to the universal and necessary judgment whose terms and relations are existential in the sense that they occur in judgments of fact.²

Fourthly, Kant's categories are austere and their source from generative principles is obscure, despite his postulation of an inner sense and an original synthetic unity of apperception.

In Lenergan's dynamic states of consciousness, inquiry generates understanding, understanding generates concepts and systems, and reflection on this conditioned product generates reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned in judgment.³ Fundamentally, the difference hinges on the possible judgment of fact. "One has only to make a single judgment of fact, no matter what its content, to involve oneself in a necessary self-affirmation."⁴

¹Ibid., p. 339.

²Ibid., p. 340.

³Ibid., p. 341.

⁴Ibid., p. 342.

Contrast with relativist analysis.--Again, in contrast with relativist analysis, the level of reflection is ignored in the relativist's preoccupation with understanding. The relativist denies any knowledge until every possible topic is exhausted; the basic presupposition to an infinite battery of questions surrounding every issue is what the relativist calls an internal relation to the object. Then, if the whole universe is viewed as a pattern of internal relations, no one thing could be known in isolation from any other part. But, the relativist limits himself to the field of questions for intelligence; the 'What?' and 'Why?' orientation yield only the conditioned. However, there are questions for reflection that ask whether the answers in the prior level of intelligence are correct. "Next, the unconditioned that is required for judgment is not the comprehensive coherence that is the ideal of understanding, that grounds answers to all questions of the first type."¹ In fact, a virtually unconditioned of judgment results from the combination of a conditioned with the fulfilment of its conditions. "Further, a judgment is a limited commitment; so far from resting on knowledge of the universe, it is to the effect that, no matter what the rest of the universe may prove to be, at least this is so."² All other questions the relativist would have us pursue are so many further items to be known through further judgments.

¹Ibid., p. 344.

²Ibid.

The questions considered by relativists receive only answers concerning things-in-themselves, that is, an explanatory system of pure conjugates. Yet, the relations of things to us are objects of knowledge, and the activity of verifying explanatory systems involves the use of description as an intermediary between the system defined by internal relations and the presentations of sense that hold the fulfilling conditions. Knowledge cannot be limited to explanatory system; for then, knowledge of the conditions of any conditioned would be identical with knowledge of the universe.

But, in fact, the universe is not simply explanatory system; its existents and its occurrences diverge ^{non-}systematically from pure intelligibility; it exhibits an empirical residue of the individual, the incidental, the continuous, the merely juxtaposed, and the merely successive; it is a universe of facts, and explanatory system has validity in the measure that it conforms to descriptive facts.¹

The relativist requires definitive knowledge of all terms in the simplest act of knowing. For the relativist to admit 'This is a typewriter' would require a most intricate knowledge of 'this', 'is', 'a' and 'typewriter'. These simple terms, relevant to cognitive theory, are not relevant to the single act of knowing a typewriter, because there is no operational obscurity in this act of knowing. "Human knowing does not begin from previous knowing but from natural spontaneities and inevitabilities."² These initial spontaneities of inquiry, critical reflection, and self-

¹Ibid., p. 345.

²Ibid., p. 345.

correcting process are inarticulate in initial development. Thus, I begin from descriptive knowledge, reaching a limiting position of familiarity through insights, and then I may proceed to further enrichment of my knowledge in the explanatory field. "To ask for evidence that excludes the possibility of my being mistaken in affirming this to be a typewriter, is to ask too much. Such evidence is not available, for if I am correct, that is merely fact."¹ Indeed, errors are just as much facts as correct judgments, for judgments of fact are correct or incorrect, not from necessity, but merely in fact. Simply, human truth proceeds in this way, and the revision acknowledging a mistake prevents a further mistake.

Critique.--Let us consider the contrast between Lonergan and Maréchal from a somewhat wider basis.

First, Lonergan widens the apriori conditions of possible judgments of fact through the immanent law of self-affirmation. Before that judgment's content of a unity-identity-whole is affirmed in conscious acts, there is already a spontaneous involvement in the dynamic acts of inquiry and reflection, so that experientially I perform these acts by an immanent law of cognitional process. Maréchal's usage of the term 'first act', apriori, seems a striving for this very notion of a conscious unity operative prior to differentiation in objective function. The initial developments of human knowing are inarticulate, as a predisposition to

¹Ibid.

know in the peculiarly human mode. Maréchal makes this transcendent act of affirmation, this primordial exigence, a necessity that is nature of act, and only speculative mirage and self-contradiction face one who avoids such a necessity.¹ This necessity is for him a quality of first act, which extends even to sensible powers in virtue of the subordination of the inferior powers to the superior ones, and second acts proceed through objective function. Certainly, the full spontaneity of the subject is evident to Maréchal in that the intellective power, only partially passive, must be set in motion by its own object, since only the intelligence, a power transparent to itself, can seize the real in act by its proper dynamic continuity with it.² Maréchal was too concerned with satisfying the conditions of finality through an implicit affirmation of the existence of God to perceive all that was experientially given; namely, the immanent law of self-affirmation. Indeed, as has been said of Kant, Maréchal sought the apriori conditions of knowing an object, while Lonergan pursued the apriori conditions of the possible occurrence of a judgment of fact.

Secondly, Lonergan settles the question of necessity by the nature of fact which is only virtually unconditioned, not formally so, since my knowing is what it is, but then again it might have been other than it is. Fact is contingent in that it expresses conditional necessity. Maréchal's analysis of discursive function

¹Vide supra, p. 80, n. 2.

²Vide supra, p. 13.

shows that the particular reality of logical affirmation can only be contingent reality applied to necessity through dynamic finality.¹ However, the form of intelligible movement is constantly open to new determination and is never satiated. Error, in the scope of both philosophers, is just as much a part of fact as is correct judgment. And the Kantian type of universal and necessary judgments attains the level of knowledge only in so far as through existential reference they become provisional analytic principles or serially analytic principles.

Thirdly, Lenegran's judgment is pre-eminently concrete as shown in the unity of consciousness both from the side of subject in cognitional act and from the side of object in cumulative content. In this aspect of judgment, Maréchal too would be affirmatively adamant. His agreement of subject and object enveloped in a dynamic nature produces a content of affirmation which always possesses some value of reality, and the nature of this value can be considered from the point of view of subject or object as both meet in finality.²

Fourthly, in the study of immanent law of self-affirmation, the contents accumulate in unities as do the acts that espouse them. Lenegran has expressed this relation, as previously given, by the metaphor of the obverse and reverse of these levels. Maréchal uses a similar figure, although not pertaining to precisely the same conditions. For him the apriori form of space at the sensible level has an element of exteriority which he

¹Vide supra, p. 65, n. 1.

²Vide supra, p. 76, n. 1.

configures by the metaphor of the observer upon a convex surface where there must be a supporting concave element; sensation must be feebly objective and subjective.¹ The a priori element contributed by subject is known by reflection through operative content; even Lonergan's wonder is not some pure wonder but always wonder about something.²

Fifthly, Lonergan specifies the initial mainspring of the radical obligation of involvement in the rational adventure as wonder or Eros. The 'I' is a victim of wonder, neither satisfied with sensible experience, understanding, or even the critical check of judgment, for each increment of judgment is a limited commitment by which the initial potential is spurred on rather than diminished. Eros demands the absolute in us through the personal commitment to the virtually unconditioned.³

In comparison Maréchal says that all formal acquisition and value of possible action result from an obscure and insatiable desire for being.⁴ But, it is difficult to pin down Maréchal's notion of this insatiable desire for being. At first, it seems to be the dynamic tendency of will in first act in which the

¹ Quoique le sens externe ne perçoive pas sa propre relativité ad extra, il perçoit directement son objet dans la perspective de cette relation d'extériorité--à peu près comme un observateur placé au centre d'une surface convexe, et dirigeant sur elle son regard, ne verrait en elle, au premier moment, que la concavité du milieu ambiant." Maréchal, op. cit., p. 116.

² Lonergan, op. cit., p. 343.

³ Vide supra, p. 107, n. 2.

⁴ Vide supra, p. 38, n. 3.

specification of the formal object, being, is contributed by the intellect and will is the dynamic mainspring of the former. Then again, the agent-intellect, as efficient causality of the intellect, a function constantly in act, parallels the pure desire of intellect more closely. The agent-intellect is an orienting function that in its formal causality subordinates the inferior powers to the intelligible and as efficient causality actively illuminates the phantasm and abstracts the specification from the phantasm to create the intelligible species.¹ At any rate, Maréchal perceived the dynamic aspect of intellect, like Lonergan, as an a priori orientation, though Lonergan hits so neatly upon the questioning attitude, the wonder, characteristic of this basic and powerful orientation. Lonergan's notion of the virtually unconditioned as the content of judgment needs yet to be placed in contrast with Maréchal's link in judgment to the absolute of being. Nevertheless, the spontaneous wonder is manifest in the dynamic cognitive processes of both authors.

Sixthly, since knowledge is not purely explanatory, by the nature of fact, it must take in a universe whose existents diverge non-systematically from pure intelligibility, a universe that encompasses the empirical residue of the individual, the incidental, the continuous, and the merely successive or juxtaposed. This is the area of unintelligibility of Lonergan's surd; for to ask 'Why is a surd a surd?' is parallel to asking 'Why is a

¹Vide supra, pp. 24-26.

'cart wheel round?'¹ Human knowledge does not halt at pure intelligibilities or explanatory conjugates as the relativist would have it stop; it must reach fact in the virtually unconditioned. For Maréchal, too, one act of intellect does not rule out a higher viewpoint taking in other conditions so as to more closely approximate the real; in the immanent construction of the real there is always a margin of indetermination.² He is not seeking a mere formal representation but a transcendent understanding that is objectively valid through the concrete mode of judgment.

Seventhly, Lonergan has cut through the Kantian barrier of object by the judgment of self-affirmation. By such a judgment the mode of knowing through the unity of conscious cognitive acts becomes the fulfilling condition to ground the content, 'I am a knower'. Thus, internal relations of acts are prior as immanent law and immediately accessible as data of consciousness, having no hypothetical element. Indeed, any judgment of fact, no matter what its content, grounds the judgment of self-affirmation for no known can impugn the process without thereby impugning its status as known. Only permanent animal silence would be the resource of the sceptic. Lonergan's break-through in one's affirmation of oneself as empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious by-passes the problem of knowing an object, and therefore, facilitates his comprehensive grasp of human knowledge.

¹Ibid., pp. 20-21.

²Vide supra, p. 27, n. 4.

Maréchal's limitations in this sphere follow his preoccupation with a classic reconciliation of the Kantian dilemma, but he does approach the absolute aspect of judgment through the spontaneous and dynamic exigence found in the acts of the subject and objectified in specific determinations.

Lastly, any radical revision of the fundamental terms and relations of Lonergan's explanatory account of human knowledge underlying existing common sense, mathematics, and empirical science is an impossibility. Indeed, there must be revisions in the self-correcting process, but ultimate explanation on the basis of consciousness cannot be impugned by any other known. The known is the knower as given in consciousness; thus any hypothetical element is eliminated. The basic features of Maréchal's determinate cognitive structure have a remarkable similarity to Lonergan's analysis, while lacking the fullness of the latter's scope. Father Maréchal also perceived the impossibility of impugning the basic acts of cognitive process that culminate in the judicative function. A denial of the a priori condition is for him a denial in the logical sense of the possibility of objective thought.¹ But the question of realism is another topic to be considered.

¹Vide supra, p. 81, n. 2.

The Notion of Being

From the main lines of cognitional process, we must turn to the pervasive notion of being. "Being, then, is the objective of the pure desire to know."¹ A consideration of the terms of this definition reveals that the desire to know cannot be limited to any particular element in cognitional process. "The desire to know, then, is simply the inquiring and critical spirit of man."² Thus, it moves him to be discontented with the flow of experience, with understanding, and even with judgment in the sense that it is always raising further questions. Man has in virtue of this pure desire his special vitality.

As a desire, it is pure and hence distinguished from other desires. "It is, indeed, impalpable but also it is powerful It is the cool shrewdness of common sense, the disinterestedness of science, the detachment of philosophy."³ It drives men relentlessly along the path of truth.

The objective of this pure desire is to know. Yet, as a desire, it is not for the satisfaction of performing the cognitive acts. A mistaken understanding, if thought correct, gives as much satisfaction as a correct understanding.⁴ Obviously, the pure desire takes satisfaction in correct content without personal motive, and for that reason, this desire is cool, disinterested, and detached.

¹Ibid., p. 348.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 348-349.

⁴Ibid., p. 349.

But the desire is not simply a knowing, for its range extends beyond any particular content. "At any time the objective includes both all that is known and all that remains unknown, for it is the goal of the immanent dynamism of cognitional process, and that dynamism both underlies actual attainment and heads beyond it with ever further questions."¹ What this objective is can only be reached by the answers coming from inquiry and reflection. Desiring, itself, is not enough to give the answer.

If being, then, is all that is known and all that remains to be known, it must be attained through judgment. "Again, since a complete increment of knowing occurs only in judgments, being is what is to be known by the totality of true judgments."² This totality, then, is a complete set of answers to a complete set of questions.

This definition of being is of the second order, for it does not determine what is meant by being, but rather how the meaning of being is to be determined. Nevertheless, it is not an indeterminate definition. "Inasmuch as the desire to know ever goes beyond actual knowledge, we could say that being is what ever is to be known by the totality of true judgments. Hence, being has at least one characteristic: it is all-inclusive."³ Therefore, apart from being there is nothing. "Again, being is completely

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 350.

³Ibid.

concrete and completely universal."¹ As concrete, nothing is left over and above the being of a thing. As universal, beyond the realm of being there is nothing.

An unrestricted notion.--If one wonders how all-inclusive being is, one hazards formulations arising from inquiry to test being's comprehensiveness.

Anything it can discover or invent, by that very fact is included in the notion of being. Hence, the effort to establish that being is not all-inclusive must be self-defeating; for at the root of all that can be affirmed, at the root of all that can be conceived, is the pure desire to know; and it is the pure desire, underlying all judgment and formulation, underlying all questioning and all desire to question, that defines its all-inclusive objective.²

Any contrary argument declaring that the will does not always sustain questioning or that questions are sometimes mistaken or impractical is briefly answered. Being is not defined as the objective of formulated questions, but as the objective of the pure desire to know. "Just as that desire is prior to any answer and it itself is not the answer, so too it is prior to any formulated question and it itself is not a formulation."³ The pure desire to know is the source not only of answers but also of questions, and the source of the criteria by which both are screened. In fact, any doubts, that being might not be the totality of true judgments or that there might be an unknowable, dissolve within being, for being is whatever we are talking

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 351.

³Ibid.

about or asking about. Judgment is absolute in the reflective grasp of the unconditioned for it resolves the dichotomy, 'Is it or is it not?' "But at the root of cognitional process there is a cool, detached disinterested desire to know and its range is unrestricted. Being is anything and everything that is the objective of that desire."¹

A spontaneous notion.--As we move from a definition of the second order, that is, what we mean by being, to a definition of the first order, what the notion of being is, a distinction must be drawn between the spontaneous, operative notion, which must be invariant and common to all men, and theoretical accounts, which vary with philosophic backgrounds.

From the previous analysis of cognitional process, the spontaneously operative notion of being has to be placed in the pure desire to know for a number of reasons. First, the notion of being extends beyond the known; secondly, although being is known only through judgment, the notion of being is prior to judging as it effects inquiry and reflection before the final increment of judgment is attained; and thirdly, there are objects of thought which prescind from both existing and from not existing.² Thinking prescinds from existing and not existing for only judgment determines whether or not a thing exists. But, in another sense, thinking is purposive; we attain limits of coherence of concepts so that we may judge. Thinking is for the purpose of

¹Ibid., p. 352.

²Ibid., p. 353.

determining in judgment whether or not what is thought does exist. The notion of being must then even be prior to the merely thought and the act of thinking, or else thinking could not be for the purpose of judging. The notion of being is prior to both conception and judgment and goes beyond them. "That notion must be the immanent, dynamic orientation of cognitional process. It must be the detached and unrestricted desire to know as operative in cognitional process."¹ Desiring to know being is not yet knowing it. Thinking being is not yet knowing it. The complete increment of judgment is a knowing of being, but it is not yet knowing being for a judgment is only a part of the totality of correct judgments.

If being then is the orientation, how is it a notion? Other purposive human actions are guided by cognitional elements which are prior to action. Unlike other actions, the desire to know is conscious both intelligently and rationally. But desire as orientation does not yet involve any cognitional content. We return to the obverse-reverse metaphor; to restate it, intelligence, as obverse, looks for the intelligible as reverse. Reasonableness, as obverse, looks for the grounded as reverse. "More fundamentally, the looking for, the desiring, the inquiring-and-reflecting is an obverse that intelligently and rationally heads for an unrestricted objective named being."² Now, if that heading for being were unconscious, there would be orientation towards

¹Ibid., p. 354.

²Ibid., p. 355.

being as well as a felt desire, but no notion of being. "In fact, the heading is intelligent and rational, and so there is not only an orientation towards being, not only a pure desire to know being, but also a notion of being."¹

Lenegran then proceeds to catch this notion of being, this intention of being, in the act of intelligence and reflection. In intelligence, the act of abstraction simply means the direction of attention to some aspect of the given with a concomitant neglect of other aspects.² This abstraction may be characterized as a disregard for unnecessary contingent factors, all other questions in the particular field, in fact, everything except what is pertinent to the direction of one's attention to the given. By abstracting, one is acting intelligently, for although the objective of the pure desire to know is unrestricted, it can only be reached by concentrating on one element at a time.³ Hence, there is in the pursuit of the unrestricted or virtually unconditioned, a restriction to what is relevant to the fulfilment of conditions in grounding a virtually, not formally, unconditioned.

However, the phases of abstracting and precluding do not operate as the exclusive act of cognitional process; further questions and issues do arise as we know from constant experience. "The abstracting and precluding were provisional; they were only moments in a larger process."⁴ Intelligent and rational conscious-

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 356.

ness, being immanent and operative in the larger process, do unrestrictedly intend a correspondingly unrestricted objective, being, everything, or the concrete universe. We have now reached, through the obverse and reverse of the full cognitional process, the establishment of the notion of being.

Just as the notion of the intelligible is involved in the actual functioning of intelligence, just as the notion of the grounded is involved in the actual functioning of reasonableness, so the notion of being is involved in the unrestricted drive of inquiring intelligence and reflecting reasonableness.¹

An all-pervasive notion.--Such being the case, the notion of being is all-pervasive because it underpins all cognitional contents, penetrates them all, and constitutes them as cognitional. Because the pure desire, wonder, underpins all contents, even to selecting data from the empirical level of knowing, sensitive living does not dominate human life. "What breaks that circuit and releases intellectual activity is the wonder Aristotle described as the beginning of all science and philosophy."² Secondly, the notion of being, as it penetrates all cognitional content, is the supreme heuristic notion.³ Prior to every content, it is the notion of the to-be-known through that content, and each content reached is part of the universal anticipation. "Hence, prior to all answers, the notion of being is the notion of the totality to be known through all answers. But, once all answers are

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

reached, the notion of being becomes the notion of the totality known through all answers.¹ Thirdly, the notion of being constitutes all contents as cognitional. The complete increment is reached in judgment, where what has been experienced and what has been thought is affirmed.

But the increment of knowing is always completed in the same fashion. Experience is always a kaleidoscopic flow. Objects of thought are as various as the inventiveness of human intelligence. But the contribution of judgment to our knowing is ever a mere 'Yes' or 'No', a mere 'is' or 'is not'.²

Yet each level is for the whole process; experience for inquiring into being, intelligence for thinking out being, and judgment for knowing being. Judgment is, obviously, the final contribution of 'Yes' or 'No', but as the final increment, it is never a mere 'Yes' or 'No' apart from the question answered.

"Hence knowing is knowing being, yet the known is never mere being, just as a judgment is never a mere 'Yes' apart from any question that 'Yes' answers."³ Indeed, the notion of being pervades cognitional contents in as much as it is involved in the unrestricted drive of inquiring intelligence and reflecting reasonableness.

The core of meaning. -- Just as the notion of being pervades all cognitional content, it is also the core of meaning. On one hand, we have terms of meaning, simply what is meant, and, on the other

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 357.

³Ibid.

hand, the acts of meaning. Some preliminary distinctions are necessary: of the acts of meaning, the formal act would be an act of conceiving, thinking, considering, defining, supposing, and formulating; the full act of meaning would be an act of judging; and the instrumental act of meaning would be the use of words, symbols, and gestures to implement the formal or full act; then again, terms of meaning are formal terms, being what is conceived, thought, considered, defined, supposed, formulated, and the full terms, being what is affirmed or denied.¹ Now, a given judgment takes its meaning from a context of other judgments, and the meaning of a given judgment is a minute part of its context, knowledge. Therefore, not even the full term of meaning is all-inclusive. "Now the all-inclusive term of meaning is being, for apart from being there is nothing. Inversely, the core of all acts of meaning is the intention of being."²

The contrast between meaning and its core involves some problems on the different levels of acts of meaning. First, false judgments are often thought to be meaningless for they affirm what is not and deny what is. "But in the false judgment there is conflict between intention and meaning. The false judgment as a judgment intends being, it intends to affirm what is and to deny what is not."³ Instead of being meaningless, a false judgment is simply a failure to carry out the intention of being; in fact,

¹Ibid., pp. 357-358.

²Ibid., p. 358.

³Ibid.

if false judgments were meaningless, there would be nothing to be false. Then on the level of conception, the unicorn is just as valid a formal term as is a horse, for one can be conceived as well as the other. But thinking, a moment of the larger process, is for judging, and on these grounds, the unicorn would be a futile notion. "Our thinking is purposive. It is a tentative determination of the all-inclusive notion of being. It not merely thinks the object of thought but also anticipates the object of judgment."¹ Hence, formal terms like the unicorn, which are unsuccessful determinations of being, fall away from the intention of being. Lastly, instrumental acts, especially gestures, demonstrative pronouns and adjectives, serve to implement the formal or full act by drawing attention to the sensible source of meaning. "In any theory of meaning an ostensive act is an instrumental act of meaning; it presupposes formal or full acts of meaning, inasmuch as one knows what one means; and it refers to formal or full terms of meaning, inasmuch as all meaning refers to a meant."² The reason for considering the ostensive act here is the emphasis that empiricists lay on such acts, and we will merely mention this theory.

But in empiricist opinion the ostensive act has a third function; for the empiricist identifies the valid field of full terms of meaning (i.e., the universe of being) with the range of sensible

¹Ibid., p. 359.

²Ibid.

presentations; hence, for the empiricist, the extensive act not merely indicates a source of meaning but also a full term of meaning.¹

The various acts of meaning present special difficulties and apparent conflict between meaning and the core of meaning, the intention of being.

Other puzzling aspects of the notion of being.--Especially, since other concepts are represented by instrumental acts and the notion of being is also represented by the name 'being' or the verb 'to be', a mistaken analogy follows that the notion of being is basically like other concepts. "But, in fact, the notion of being is unique; for it is the core of all acts of meaning; and it underpins, penetrates, and goes beyond all other cognitional contents. Hence, it is idle to characterize the notion of being by appealing to the ordinary rules or laws of conception."²

The peculiar nature of our expression of the notion of being needs to be clarified. Where does the notion of being stand in relation to other concepts? First, the notion of being does not result from any formulation of insight, but it is present in every concept. "It is, as has been said, the orientation of intelligent and rational consciousness towards an unrestricted objective."³ Secondly, the notion of being is not an essence for it cannot prescind from existence. "Further, the notion of being remains incomplete on the level of intelligence; it moves con-

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 360.

³Ibid.

ception forward to questions for reflection; it moves beyond single judgments to the totality of correct judgments; and so it does not prescind from existence and actuality."¹ Then, in what sense is the notion of being defined? Thirdly, the notion of being cannot be defined in the ordinary sense for it underpins, penetrates, and goes beyond the content of every definition. "Moreover, it is determinate inasmuch as the structure of our knowing is determinate, and so it can be defined, at a second remove, by saying that it refers to all that can be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation."² Fourthly, since the notion of being is determinate at a second remove, it does not of itself determine which are strategic judgments. "The notion of being does not determine which position is correct; it merely determines that the intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed is being."³ Fifthly, the notion of being does not have presuppositions and properties in the manner of determinate essences. It has a full determination only in the totality of correct judgments. "However, the making of judgments is a determinate process, and one does not have to make all judgments to grasp the nature of that process. It is this fact that makes cognitional theory a base of operations for the determination of the general structure of the concrete universe."⁴

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 361.

⁴Ibid.

Sixthly, the notion of being is both univocal and analogous, and then again, it is not merely either or both. If concepts are considered univocal when they have the same meaning in all applications, the notion of being may be named univocal inasmuch as it underpins all contents, and it is the one desire to know, having one unrestricted objective.¹ Then, if concepts are considered analogous when their meaning varies systematically as one moves from one field of application to another, the notion of being² may be named analogous inasmuch as it penetrates all contents. However, since these distinctions regard determinate concepts while the notion of being underpins and goes beyond all contents, the notion of being is strictly neither univocal nor analogous. "It may be noted, however, that what frequently enough is meant by the analogy of being is precisely what we mean by saying that the notion of being underpins, penetrates, and goes beyond other contents."³

Seventhly, the notion of being cannot be abstract for it abstracts from no contents. But one does not have to make the totality of correct judgments to grasp the process, as we have seen. Strategic sets of judgments can define the general character of the concrete universe; materialists, empiricists, and idealists all have their own sets of strategic judgments. Because there are such strategic sets of judgments, the general character

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 362.

of the concrete universe is distinguished from the concrete universe in all its detail. "Clearly enough, a determination of the general character of the concrete universe is an abstract view of being, for it considers not the whole of being as a whole but the whole of being as fixed by some strategic part or aspect."¹ Thus, we reach the general notion of being as being which is determined in particular philosophies by their strategic judgments, and we determine the correct notion of being as being by examining the strategic judgments of the correct philosophy.

Eightly, the notion of being is not a genus or species or difference. Being cannot be differentiated from without for being constitutes all contents as cognitional. "Finally, the notion of being not only underpins and penetrates all other contents but also complements them inasmuch as the 'Yes' of judgment constitutes them as actually unconditioned and so endows them with an actual objective reference."²

Ninthly, one semantical argument has it that when one thinks without yet judging, either one is thinking of being or of nothing. Now if one is thinking of being, one does not need to judge to know being. The alternative of thinking of nothing is defeated by the very acts that produced this problem. Lonergan has already made the cogent distinction between thinking of being and knowing of being.³ "To think of being is to operate on the second level

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 363.

³Vide supra, p. 168.

of cognitional process; it is to be on the way towards a complete increment of knowing; but it is not to have reached anything more than a partial increment that can be completed only by judging."¹

Tenthly, abstract universal propositions are affirmed in judgment, but the notion of being is the notion of the concrete universe. From the affirmation of these propositions, one must decide that judgment is not about being or else being is not concrete. Now, the notion of being is of the universe because that encompasses all questions until the concrete is reached. "Hence, it is not the single judgment but the totality of correct judgments that equates with the concrete universe that is being."² Already, the problem of the universal proposition has been met in the analysis of the analytic proposition. The formal nature of the analytic proposition was shown to be a conditioned, linked to its conditions by rules of meaning and having its conditions fulfilled by partial meanings. The provisional analytic principle is one whose terms are probably existential. Formally, every analytic proposition regards the concrete universe inasmuch as syntactical laws are factual aspects of the coalescence of partial into complete instrumental meanings; and materially, some analytic propositions regard the concrete universe either in fact or in some measure of probability.³

Critique.--The question most pertinent to our thesis follows: Does Maréchal conceive a similar notion of being through the virtually unconditioned as fact of the concrete universe?

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 364.

Maréchal emphasizes the unrestrictedness of knowing. Intelligence tends to truth from the immanent anticipation of a natural desire, and logical truth expresses being as known.¹ The known object cannot be completely foreign to the subject as knowing power; it is held in a dynamic proportion with the subject according to the apriori exigence of the sensory, intelligent, and rational acts. The apriori condition is a rigorous proportion between subjective form 'species' and possible extension in objective understanding.² Even the abstractive nature of intelligence is directed by the apriori rule of being in all its extension, not just number.³ This unifying principle, since it is not intrinsically limited, can only be commensurate with the entire amplitude of the knowable. Indeed, the dynamic finality of intellect may be defined as the objective capacity to surmount all limitations of being.⁴ In this respect, Maréchal's formal object may be compared to Lonergan's spontaneously operative notion of being placed in the pure desire to know. Maréchal's apriori element of formal object not only penetrates all cognitional levels of content, but it also goes beyond them. In fact, Maréchal's agent-intellect is always in act as a natural spontaneity and may be likened to Lonergan's pure desire defined in the notion of being. Maréchal's apriori exigence of formal object

¹Vide supra, p. 11.

²Vide supra, p. 12.

³Vide supra, p. 27, n.1.

⁴Vide supra, p. 38, n.2.

is both rationally preliminary to particular given and psycho-¹logically prior to empirical content.

Secondly, Maréchal's judgment is existential and concrete. Cognitive process advances through an immanent proportion, but the process is cumulative and comprehensive in judgment. The being of a thing is never an abstraction; affirmation is not limited to intellectual representation, but covers objects in the exact measure of their actuality.² The reflective judgment by placing the form, content, or essence under its act implies even a reference to exterior reality.³ The whole theme of Maréchal's work is that the rational anteriority of formal object of the faculty to material object provides the possibility of unlocking the universe in an objective fashion.⁴ Not only has judgment an objective capacity for the concrete but also it brings the intellectual act to an absolute position of existence.

The quality of intellectual spontaneity also meets the requirements of a pure desire to know. Intellectual activity is placed in a condition of first act by its own apriori. This natural spontaneity is evident within the process, especially in the necessity of agent-intellect for the rational mode.⁵ Abstraction effects intelligent consideration by procuring the specific determination, and it is a spontaneous aspect of the objective framework

¹Vide supra, p. 76.

²Vide supra, p. 41, n. 1,2.

³Vide supra, p. 24.

⁴Vide supra, p. 76.

⁵Vide supra, p. 73.

of understanding. The spontaneous orientation of intellect according to abstract characteristics is in keeping with its metasensible nature.¹ Lonergan's 'pure desire to know' is for Maréchal rooted in the agent-intellect.

For Lonergan, the dynamic orientation of intelligent and rational consciousness is basically a capacity to raise questions and thereby generate knowledge if being is what is to be known by the totality of true judgments. We find an implication of this capacity in Maréchal's analysis of discursive mode of knowing through agent-intellect. The spiritual disposition in the composite nature of man demands an orientation towards knowledge of objects. The supposition of abstraction points to an extrinsic dependence of the intellective faculty on the sensible and material faculties. The concrete mode of knowing is not simply an identity with suppositum, for then being would be the most general form, indeterminate being; yet the total object of our intelligence overflows the object of our representation.² Judgment is not simply a synthesis of subject and predicate, but an affirmation or negation of a synthesis where truth and error are the objectifying manifestations which separate the object from the subject. By an analogy between the human mode of knowing and Divine identity with knowledge, Maréchal shows that the discursive intelligence must seek reality through an object, and even then it is not the essential evidence of the thing, not the

¹vide supra, p. 26.

²vide supra, p. 35, n. 1.

relation between essence and existence, that is affirmed, but that by the logical evidence of the judgment the bond with reality must be affirmed or suffer contradiction.¹ Here being is again defined at a second remove, not what being is but that which is meant by being is what is known by true judgments. Being can never be relegated to the position of a mere concept or content of any one judgment.

Judgment is the determination of an intentional anticipation; then, from the side of subject, judgment may be considered the manifestation of an active attitude.² Here, implicitly, is Lonergan's obverse and reverse of cognitional process. The looking for, desiring, inquiring and reflecting is the obverse that heads toward an unrestricted objective named being.³ Therefore, Maréchal has not only an orientation towards being but also, in an implicit sense, a notion of being; otherwise, the anticipation could not be intelligent and rational.

The all-pervasive notion of being underlies the dual function of finality. Antecedent finality, moving through conception to judgment, will be satisfied with nothing less than a recognition of the absolute. This exigence, in turn, determines a consequent finality, for particular affirmation can not give us knowledge of total being.⁴ There can be no doubt that Maréchal posited an

¹Vide supra, p. 78, n. 4.

²Vide supra, p. 36, n. 2.

³Vide supra, p. 168, n. 2.

⁴Vide supra, p. 38, n. 2.

obscure and insatiable desire for being and a notion of being, consciously operative. The transcendental unity as functional disposition is never totally objectified but is linked in judgment to the absolute of being. This intention of being, which Lonergan characterized as the core of all acts of meaning, is the common factor of the contents of affirmation, but which goes beyond all contents; it is for Maréchal, too, the dynamic factor. In the work of both philosophers, not to recognize the dynamism in its permanent apriori pattern is to lose the intention of being that advances beyond the known; both Lonergan and Maréchal move out beyond a logical basis of human understanding for both demand more than coherence.

The terms, necessity, unity, and universality, often are restricted to certain levels of cognitional process or certain products of these levels and thereby give occasion for some puzzling problems connected with the notion of being. Some clarification of Maréchal's use of these instrumental terms must be briefly attempted. Every object has a necessary relation to the absolute of being in virtue of the first principles of intelligence. A minimal expression of this relation is the necessary identity of an object with itself.¹ The particular denotation of the principle of identity, while an apparent hypostatization of the apriori dynamism to affirm being, is the basis for the absolute, necessary, and universal in knowledge. In each intellectual

¹Vide supra, p. 11, n. 1.

act is affirmed implicitly a radical necessity, the nature of the first act of intelligence.¹ This notion of necessity approximates Lonergan's notion of the core of meaning as the intention of being, initiating, pervading, and going beyond all contents. Lonergan says that the notion of being complements all contents inasmuch as the 'Yes' of judgment constitutes them as actually unconditioned and so endows them with objective reference.² Father Maréchal says that any attempt to avoid the necessity of applying the formal laws of being to the whole content of consciousness would be, in effect, the impossible divorce of the life of the spirit and the internal locution, the mental word by which it is expressed.³

Unity is objective in virtue of the proportion of subject and object maintained from the initiation of cognitional process until object is attained in affirmation. Such unity can only be the pervading notion of being operative through species.

Universality is the law of first acts of cognitional powers, an apriori function both logical and psychological.⁴ It is not to be equated with the guarantee of Kantian propositions, but rather it is an aspect of formal object to be specific or even generic. Universality and necessity are implicit in the dynamism, but explicit determinations of the dynamism have not the same guarantee.⁵ Lonergan puts the notion of universality this way:

¹Vide supra, p. 80, n. 2,3.

²Vide supra, p. 177, n. 2.

³Vide supra, p. 80, n. 2.

⁴Vide supra, p. 20, n. 1,2.

⁵Vide supra, p. 53, n. 1.

"Again, being is completely concrete and completely universal. It is completely concrete; over and above the being of anything, there is nothing more of that thing. It is completely universal; apart from the realm of being, there is simply nothing."¹ Briefly, universality is an aspect of the notion of being as distinguished from the Kantian use of the term.

Judgment according to Maréchal is the object in respect of the final end; it is the point of transcendental relation of objects to being.² Noumena is encountered here for objectivity. By analogy between the human primitive exigence and Divine Intelligence, the transcendental term of the analogical relation must constitute every object as object. Actuality is the measure of being; and though conceptual conformity is attained, objective thought passes beyond it to the real where essence is rejoined to existence, and the possible becomes the necessary.³ The discursive mode, according to its nature, does not require an explicit reference to concrete matter, potency or pure act. Affirmation may be defined as the active reference of conceptual content to reality, because its double aspects, the apriori functional exigence of subject and purely analytical portion drawn from representation, under reflection, achieve complete unity and are conferred with objective necessity only in judgment.⁴ In objective reference, the formal exigence for being is fulfilled in this

¹Ibid., p. 350.

²Vide supra, p. 39, n. 1.

³Vide supra, p. 41, n. 1.

⁴Vide supra, p. 68, n. 2 and p. 69, n. 1.

particular actuality as a subordinate end.

For Kant the unconditioned is not a constitutive component of judgment. Hegel's range is unrestricted in scope but restricted in content for it has no facts, no factually fixed points of reference. Maréchal's scope is unrestricted in the intention of being, and his dynamic formal object, like the pure desire to know, is constituted both by subject and by object, apriori exigence and objective content, in the conditional necessity affirmed or denied in judgment. Lonergan on the basis of the act of self-affirmation sums up the existential judgment this way: "The pure desire to know is affirmed. But the pure desire to know is the notion of being as it is spontaneously operative in cognitional process and being itself is the to-be-known towards which that process heads."¹ From the subjective side of knowledge, that is, apriori contribution of subject as constituted in the object, there is an excellent parallel between Lonergan and Maréchal. But the notion of being simply applied to a content, regardless of complete reflection, does not yield Lonergan's virtually unconditioned. This virtual necessity of fact, that does not have to be but de facto is, must belong to a content or object that has its conditions fulfilled in fact and is grasped as virtually unconditioned by the reflective insight. Maréchal, whose foundation of objectivity is the relation of finality,² attributes being to the content of judgment only in virtue of the final end, that is, in virtue of his unrestricted scope, and Hegel does no less.

¹Ibid., p. 374.

²Ide supra, p. 57.

The Faculty of Will in Relation
to Intellectual Activity

Finally, Lonergan's very connotation of the term, the pure desire to know, invokes a distinction in regard to intentional activity and will.

Since being is intelligible and one, it is also good. Intelligibility and the unity of being follow spontaneously since being is whatever is to be grasped intelligently and affirmed reasonably. "The goodness of being comes to light only by considering the extension of intellectual activity that we name deliberation and decision, choice and will."¹

Levels of the Good.--Now, on an elementary level, the good is the object of desire, and as such it is experienced as pleasant and satisfying; but aversion is experienced no less than desire. However, one desire is unique.

It is the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. As other desire, it has its satisfaction. But unlike other desire, it is not content with satisfaction. Of itself, it heads beyond one's joy in one's own insight to the further question whether one's own insight is correct. It is a desire to know and its immanent criterion is the attainment of an unconditioned that, by the fact it is unconditioned, is independent of the individual's likes and dislikes, of his wishful and his anxious thinking.²

From the pure desire to know and the knowledge it generates comes a second meaning of good--the good of order as in polity,

¹Ibid., p. 596.

²Ibid.

economy, and the family as an institution. It is not the object of any single desire but stands to single desires as universal condition to particulars that are conditioned; it is dynamic as system on the move, developing upon normative lines of ideas grasped, of insight into concrete situations, proposals, explicit or tacit agreements and execution of such, but it also encompasses the contribution of the human psyche, manifold desires and aversions.¹

A third aspect of good is value, for the good of order is linked not only with the manifold of desires and aversions but also with the type of good that emerges on the level of reflection and judgment, of deliberation and choice. While the good of order is essentially a formal intelligibility that is discovered only by raising questions, grasped only through accumulation of insights, and formulated only in conceptions, and though it lies outside the field of human appetite, it is itself an object of human devotion.² Individualism and socialism, both constructions of human intelligence, are objects for which men have willingly died; yet their object did not provide individual advantage. For human intelligence is not only speculative but also practical. So far from being content to determine the unities and correlations in things as they are, it is constantly on the watch to discern the possibilities that

¹Ibid., pp. 596-597.

²Ibid., p. 597.

reveal things as they might be."¹ There is then the notion of value to ground the transition from intellectual conception of possible order to its concrete realization.

The notion of will.--Will is an intellectual or spiritual appetite. "As bare capacity, will extends to every intellectual object, and so both to every possible order and to every concrete object as subsumed under some possible order."² As learning involves a laborious process to acquire easy mastery, so too a person who has not acquired willingness needs to be persuaded before he will will. "The detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know grasps intelligently and affirms reasonably not only the facts of the universe of being but also its practical possibilities."³ Therefore, the detached and disinterested desire extends its sphere of influence from the field of cognitional activities through the field of knowledge into the field of deliberate human acts.

So it is that the empirically, intelligently, rationally conscious subject of self-affirmation becomes a morally self-conscious subject. Man is not only a knower but also a doer; the same intelligent and rational consciousness grounds the doing as well as the knowing; and from that identity of consciousness there springs inevitably an exigence for self-consistency in knowing and doing.⁴

¹Ibid., p. 598.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 599.

To meet such an exigence for self-consistency in living would indeed be the goal of an authentic person. The fact of such an exigence is in no small way evidenced in the efforts of men to avoid it: the common escape in avoiding self-consciousness in external activity, rationalization, through the bold step of revising one's knowing and introducing inconsistency into knowing itself, and moral renunciation. To take refuge in any escape from self-consistency blocks the truly human mode of living and creates the inauthentic person. "The demand for consistency between knowing and doing is dynamic; it asks to be operative; it seeks to extend detachment and disinterestedness into living, and it is not satisfied with a merely speculative acknowledgement of its existence."¹

Lonergan considers such exigence for self-consistency the moral self-consciousness, not a moral code, but the dynamic function, the operative exigence for self-consistency in self-consciousness. "Is there a meaning to the word 'ought'? Our answer differs from the Kantian answer, for if we agree in affirming a categorical imperative, we disagree inasmuch as we derive it wholly from speculative intelligence and reason."² Following an intelligent and reasonable course of action is what is meant by obeying moral conscience.

The notion of value.---"Objects of desire are values only inasmuch as they fall under some intelligible order, for the

¹Ibid., p. 600

²Ibid.

value is the possible object of choice, choice is an act of will, and will is intellectual appetite that regards directly only the intelligible good.¹ The grasp of intelligible order is prior to choice.

For 'not to choose' is not the object of a possible choice and, while one's choices can be reasonable or not, while they can be more reasonable or less, still one's own rational consciousness is an accomplished fact in the field of knowing and it demands in the name of its own consistency its extension in the field of doing.²

Such a consistency cannot be attained by self-deception, rationalisation, or moral renunciation, but only by "the penetrating, honest, complete consistency that alone meets the requirements of the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know."³ This dynamic existence of rational self-consciousness leaves no room for choosing the part and repudiating the whole, choosing the conditioned and repudiating the conditions, or choosing the antecedent and repudiating the consequent.

The practical insight.—Practical insights, like any direct insights, issue from inquiry to grasp intelligible unities or correlation. The implication of existence does not reside on this level. "However, while the speculative or factual insight is followed by the question whether the unity exists or whether the unity is going to be made to exist or whether the correlation governs events, the practical insight is followed by the

¹Ibid., p. 601

²Ibid., p. 602

³Ibid.

question whether the unity is going to be made to exist or whether the correlation is going to be made to govern events.¹ Thus, while speculative and factual insights are both moving to knowledge of being, the practical insights are moving to the making of being. The objective of the practical insight is not what is but what is to be done.

Lonergan develops an important corollary:

When speculative or factual insight is correct, reflective understanding can grasp a relevant virtually unconditioned. But when practical insight is correct, then reflective understanding cannot grasp a relevant virtually unconditioned; for if it could, the content of the insight already would be a fact; and if it were already a fact, then it would not be a possible course of action which, as yet, is not a fact but just a possibility.²

Practical reflection.--Then, the grasp of the possible course of action does not automatically entail its execution. There is room for reflection as to the agreeableness, usefulness, and purpose of its execution. Would this act be merely egoistic or is it a possible contribution to the improvement of the order of things?

The world's work would never be done unless we acted largely out of habit. But might not my habits be improved? Are the values to which they commit me true or false? Am I intelligent and reasonable enough in the short run, only to be blind to the larger implications of my way of living? Or if I

¹Ibid., p. 609

²Ibid., p. 610

advert to such larger implications, am I doing what I can, to be helpful to others in this respect?"¹

A number of corollaries are developed concerning reflection on practical insight. First, reflection actuates rational self-consciousness. To be empirically conscious, I experience; to be intellectually conscious, I inquire and formulate intelligently; and to be rationally conscious, I seek to grasp the virtually unconditioned and judge on the basis of such a grasp. "But I become rationally self-conscious inasmuch as I am concerned with reasons for my own acts, and this occurs when I scrutinize the object and investigate the motives of a possible course of action."²

"Secondly, though reflection heads beyond knowing to doing, still it consists simply in knowing."³ Even though reflection reveals the proposed action to be effective, agreeable, useful, and morally obligatory, still such knowledge does not necessarily issue in doing.

Thirdly, because reflection has no internal term, it has no capacity of its own to come to an end. As a knowing it can grasp only the virtually unconditioned to attain certitude on the possibility of the proposed course of action. "But in so far as this knowing is practical, in so far as its concern is with something to be done and with the reasons for doing it, the

¹Ibid., p. 611.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

reflection has not an internal but an external term; for the reflection is just knowing, but the term is an ulterior deciding and doing."¹

Fourthly, the reflection, having no internal term, can be expanded more or less indefinitely. Since the resolution can be examined in enormous detail of probable and possible consequences, motives, variations according to time, the shift from concrete to philosophic issues, and inquiries about one's orientation in life, Lonergan concludes, "So the native hue of resolution is sicklied over with the pale cast of thought."²

Fifthly, one can refer to the incompatibility of indefinitely expanding reflection and the business of living. Reflection of a course of action is replaced by reflection on reflection. "As the former heads beyond itself to a decision, so the latter heads beyond itself to a decision to decide. As the former yields the conclusion that I should act or not act in a given manner, so the latter yields the conclusion that I should decide to decide or not decide in that manner."³ Still, it is one thing to know what to do and another to do it.

Sixthly, reflection occurs because rational self-consciousness demands knowledge and reasons for a course of action. But reflection cannot end of itself since it has no internal term. Only decision ends the reflection. "But once I have decided and as long as I remain decided, the reflection is over and done

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 612.

with. The proposed course of action has ceased to be a mere possibility; it has begun to be an actuality."¹

The decision.--The nature of decision reveals itself in a comparison with judgment:

Decision, then, resembles judgment inasmuch as both select one member of a pair of contradictories; as judgment either affirms or denies, so decision either consents or refuses. Again, both decision and judgment are concerned with actuality; but judgment is concerned to complete one's knowledge of an actuality that already exists; while decision is concerned to confer actuality upon a course of action that otherwise will not exist. Finally, both decision and judgment are rational, for both deal with objects apprehended by insight, and both occur because of a reflective grasp of reasons.²

However, the radical difference arises in the fact that judgment is an act of rational consciousness but decision is an act of rational self-consciousness. The rationality of judgment has been shown to emerge in the unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know in the process toward knowledge of the universe of being. "But the rationality of decision emerges in the demand of the rationally conscious subject for consistency between his knowing and his deciding and doing."³ The effective rationality of the subject of rational consciousness requires the limitation of other desire in the functioning of the pure desire to know, but the effective rationality of the subject of rational

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., pp. 612-613.

³Ibid., p. 613.

self-consciousness demands consistency between knowing and doing.

Then, we have a succession of enlargements of consciousness. We have found that waking replaces dreaming, intelligent inquiry compounds intelligent consciousness with empirical consciousness, and critical reflection follows understanding and formulation to add rational consciousness to intelligent and empirical consciousness. "But the final enlargement and transformation of consciousness consists in the empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious subject

- (1) demanding conformity of his doing to his knowing,¹
and
- (2) acceding to that demand by deciding reasonably."²

The practical reflection is concerned with knowing only to guide doing. In the enlarged consciousness of its activity, the term is not judgment but decision. "Consequently, practical reflection does not come to an end once the object and motives of a proposed action are known; it comes to an end when one decides either in favour of the proposal or against it."²

Secondly, although reflection may reveal a course of action to be obligatory in the way of a rational necessity, I can fail to fulfil my known obligation.

How can necessity turn out to be contingency?
The answer lies in the enlarging transformation of consciousness. The rationality that imposes an obligation is not conditioned internally by an act of will. The rationality

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 614.

that carries out an obligation is conditioned internally by the occurrence of a reasonable act of will.¹

Whereas the rational subject as a knower pursues the unfolding of the disinterested desire to know, the rational subject carrying out an obligation is both knower and doer; and the rationality of his knowing is extended into the field of doing in so far as he wills to meet the known obligation. If a proposed course of action is rationally obligatory, that is, in the field of simply knowing one's obligation, one cannot be a rational knower and deny the obligation. But in making a decision to carry out a known obligation, the rational subject is not just a knower but also a doer, and his rationality consists in extending the rationality of his knowing into the field of doing by an internal conditioning of an act of the will. The subject is not compelled by necessity to will his obligation which was necessary only on the level of knowing. He is free to consent or refuse to effect a possible course of action. The necessity in the knowing has not changed, but there is a change in context in the shift to rational self-consciousness. The rational necessity in the field of knowing becomes a rational exigence in the larger field of knowing and doing. If the subject is to be a rational doer, he must fulfil the obligation now demanded not by necessity of a fact but by an exigence for consistency between knowing and doing, between rational con-

¹Ibid.

sciousness and rational self-consciousness. Rational self-consciousness then consists in willing a rational course of action through the personal achievement of the integration of the levels of intellect and will in the enlargement of human consciousness. And many a subject has avoided rational self-consciousness through, as we have already mentioned, rationalization, revision of one's knowing, and moral renunciation that severs the natural exigence. Necessity on the level of rational consciousness is not necessity on the level of rational self-consciousness, but a rational exigence. "It is the addition of the further constitutive requirement of an act of will that

(1) marks the shift from rational consciousness to rational self-consciousness, and

(2) changes what is rational necessity in the field of knowing into rational exigence in the larger field of both knowing and doing."¹

Thirdly, while both judgment and decision are concerned with actuality, judgment merely acknowledges an actuality that already exists, but decision confers actuality upon a course of action heretofore merely possible. Actuality is known by grasping the virtually unconditioned, that is the conditioned that happens to have its conditions fulfilled. Yet the unconditioned only happens to have its conditions fulfilled, and so it only happens to be unconditioned. "Though unconditioned, it

¹Ibid., p. 615.

also is contingent. And this contingency appears

- (1) in its being,
- (2) in its being known, and
- (3) in its being willed.¹

In the first instance, in its being, actuality as act is existence or occurrence, and actuality as of the actuated supposes at least existence and also at time occurrence.

But there is no systematic deduction of existence or occurrence. The most that understanding can do is set up ideal frequencies from which actual frequencies of existence and occurrence do not diverge systematically. But actual frequencies can and do diverge non-systematically from the ideal, and so in every instance actuality is just what happens to be.²

Then again, contingency is apparent in actuality as known.

The virtually unconditioned can be grasped, if fulfilment of its conditions happens to be given. And the fulfilment can never be more than what happens, for the fulfilment consists in the occurrence of relevant data, and the occurrence of data, like all occurrence, is contingent. For it merely happens that I exist, that I experience in such and such a manner, etc.

And finally, possible courses of action revealed through insight are not necessities but mere possibilities in need of reflective evaluation. But reflective evaluation reveals not what must be so but what for certain reasons may be a fact of choice.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 616.

Lastly, even when reflective evaluation reveals only one course of action to be reasonable, there still is needed the reasonableness of actual willing; and as the reasonableness of human acts of will is not a natural endowment but an ever uncertain personal achievement, there is a third and final contingency to the actuality of courses of action.¹

The fallacy of the argument from determinate knowing to determinate willing rises from the necessary postulation of conformity between knowing and willing. "But such conformity exists only when in fact willing actually is reasonable. Hence, to deduce the determinate act of will one must postulate the conformity; and to verify the postulate one must already have the determinate willing that one is out to demonstrate."²

The uncertain personal achievement of the reasonableness of actual willing depends on that true development of the enlargement of human consciousness. Man develops biologically, psychically, intellectually, rationally, and appetitively in ever higher levels of cumulative process. The openness required as the condition for the pure desire to know is still the condition of man's exigence for consistency between rational consciousness and rational self-consciousness. "Finally, even that rounded achievement is itself not a goal but a means to a goal; for genuineness and openness and willingness name, not acts, but conditions for acts of correct understanding and good willing."³

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 625.

The higher integrations, of which we have spoken, are not pre-determined but are as "demands of finality upon us before they are realities within us."¹

Finality.--Finality takes its meaning from the heuristic notion that has been found to underlie all our knowing.

Just as cognitional activity does not know in advance what being is and so has to define it heuristically as whatever is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation, so objective process is not the realization of some blueprint but the cumulation of a conditioned series of things and schemes of recurrence in accord with successive schedules of probabilities.²

Thus, cognitional activity is the becoming known of being and objective process is the becoming of proportionate being. Then cognitional activity which itself is part of the universe is a heading towards being, but a particular heading in which universal striving becomes conscious and intelligent and reasonable.

By way of a brief consideration of Lenergan's notion of finality, we mean a theorem of the same generality as the notion of being. "This theorem affirms a parallelism between the dynamism of the mind and the dynamism of proportionate being. It affirms that the objective universe is not at rest, not static, not fixed in the present, but in process, in tension, fluid."³ Present knowing is a moment in process towards fuller knowing, and present reality is a moment in process to fuller reality.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 445

³Ibid.

"Basically, then, finality is the dynamic aspect of the real."¹
 Such a dynamism is directed in that it parallels the heuristic structure of inquiry and reflection. Potency heads to form and beyond it to act, and beyond act to coincidental manifolds of acts, and yet beyond them to higher forms and higher coincidental manifolds of acts. The dynamism is not headed to some determinate form of proportionate being. "Even if one cares to assert that finality can go no higher than man, it is clear enough that man's unrestricted desire to know provides concrete evidence that the alleged maximum of possibility is not the maximum of aspiration."²
 "At the root of all heuristic structure is the detached and disinterested desire, and so at the root of universal process we have affirmed a directed dynamism."³ As pure desire heads to what is known through the unfolding of understanding and judgment, the dynamism of universal process is directed to whatever becomes determinate through the process. "Finally, as our notion of metaphysics involves not only a major premise affirming an isomorphism between knowing and known and a principal minor premise affirming the structure of knowing but also subsidiary minor premises supplied by empirical science and common sense, so our affirmation of finality rests not simply on an apriori parallel but on that parallel as supported by vast ranges of fact."⁴

¹Ibid., p. 446.

²Ibid., p. 448.

³Ibid., p. 450.

⁴Ibid.

By isomorphism of knowing and known is meant that "the pattern of relations immanent in the structure of cognitional acts also is to be found in the contents of anticipated acts and still will be found to obtain when the heuristic contents of anticipated acts give place to the actual contents of occurring contents."¹

There exists a necessary isomorphism between our knowing and its proportionate known.

The correct locus of the parallel is to be found in the dynamic structure of our knowing. Inquiry and understanding presuppose and complement experience; reflection and judgment presuppose and complement understanding. But what holds for the activities, also holds for their contents. What is known inasmuch as one is understanding, presupposes and complements what is known by experiencing; and what is known inasmuch as one is affirming, presupposes and complements what is known by understanding. Finally, the contents of cognitional acts either refer to the known or are identical with the known, and so the dynamic structure of knowing is also the² dynamic structure of proportionate being.

And reciprocally, "proportionate being is what is to be known by experience, intelligent grasp, and reasonable affirmation."³ To return to our reference to Spinoza in regard to Maréchal's ambiguous use of the power of imagination,⁴ it is precisely this notion of isomorphism between our knowing and its proportionate

¹Ibid., p. 485.

²Ibid., p. 486.

³Ibid.

⁴Vide supra, p. 72.

known that distinguishes Lonergan's position from Spinoza's. The correct relation in the parallel of the knowing and its proportionate known is to be found in the dynamic structure of our knowing, "but the parallel is missed by Spinoza's deductivist ¹ *ordo idearum est ordo rerum.*"

Man's higher integrations in the realm of being--in knowing and doing--then are the demands of finality upon us, but in actuality these integrations are personal achievements. The notion of finality is the affirmation of fact, fact as known in proportionate being. But, for Lonergan, too, the fact of proportionate being is subordinated to the transcendent idea of being:

It follows that finality is to be conceived more accurately. Instead of an upward but indeterminately directed dynamism, there is the intended ordination of each potency for the form it receives, of each form for the act it receives, of each manifold of lower ^{acts} acts for the higher unities and integrations under which they are subsumed. So it is that every tendency and force, every movement and change, every desire and striving is designed to bring about the order of the universe in the manner in which in fact they contribute to it; and since the order of the universe itself has been shown to be because of the perfection and excellence of the primary being and good, so all that is for the order of the universe is headed ultimately to the perfection and excellence that is its primary source and ground.²

Critique.--Now, to return to Maréchal and his notion of will.

The objective role of affirmation is considered *a priori* to have

¹Ibid., p. 486.

²Ibid., p. 665.

a value of end. Through the interpenetration of the practical and theoretical orders of intelligence there is to be found internal finality.¹ We have an ordered tendency to the intentional perfection of the subject already in act as nature. A prescience of ends is uniquely expressed in the specifying form, apriori structure of intellect.² In first acts, the dynamism is inseparable from this, its proper specification, and truth is therefore a logical extension of the good because it is in terms of the structure of intellect that the objective end is presented to the will. All motion of the various potencies of the soul proceed from two reciprocally first principles--specifying form, intelligence, and dynamic exercise, will.³ We do not refer here to second acts, which proceed from this permanent disposition and have reciprocal action between intellect and will. And so from predisposition, the specifying principal of both faculties resides in intelligence.⁴ Thus far, Maréchal approximates Lonergan's notion of the pure desire to know, a unique desire in that it ignores personal satisfaction in its search for truth and is the conscious dynamic orientation and sustenance of rational life.

Thus, the potentiality of the true and the good reside in first principles; and therefore the exigence for consistency between rational consciousness and rational self-consciousness

¹Vide supra, p. 43, n.1.

²Vide supra, p. 44, n.1.

³Vide supra, pp. 26-32.

⁴Vide supra, p. 46, n.2.

would be a part of the accepted fact of Maréchal's theory. But in Maréchal's second acts, the blending of the good and the true of practical and speculative orders, in that the appetitive tendency is the main spring of intellectual activity, occasions the loss of the disinterestedness characterizing Lonergan's 'pure desire to know'. Maréchal completely neglects the integration of intellect and will in the enlargement of consciousness. But, as we have already stated, Lonergan is fundamentally at odds with Maréchal on this function of will in cognitional process; the pure desire, for Lonergan, is fully explained in the dynamic orientation of intellect itself without appealing to will as the dynamism.

For Maréchal, in the reciprocal causality of intellect and will in second acts, each species acquired takes on a dynamic value.¹ The first requirement then is that the assimilated form be opposed to the subject to constitute for the subject a dynamic value.² Because of the property of extroversión, the act which assimilates is also the act which dissociates; and hence, through judgment we have not only the truth but also the good as an expression of the bilateral moment.³ According to Maréchal acts of willing would, therefore, appear to have an internal term and precisely the same nature of contingency as rational acts in Maréchal's thought. In this respect, Lonergan's consideration

¹Vide supra, p. 57, n.2.

²Vide supra, p. 57, n.3.

³Vide supra, p. 66, n.1.

of the exigence for consistency between to the two levels of consciousness is extremely pertinent, and the uncertain yet possible personal achievement of this condition is not something to be taken for granted. Although the good willed may have perfection such as to be morally obligatory when illuminated by intellect, still such an object has two elements of contingency. It might not have been willed because its rational necessity is merely contingent; and then again in the enlargement of consciousness in willing, the object has the further contingence of the nature of possibility that could become a fact.

Finally, in the transcendental sense, both philosophers find the dynamic orientation in the goal of finality. For Maréchal, the only end which satisfies man is God--and that only in an objective manner according to the proper mode of intellect and will. Natural finality provides the possibility of this end with objective certainty, but explicit determinations of the dynamism, being contingent reality, have not the same guarantee of necessity. The natural disposition, real form and natural tendency, correlates with last end so that, by a dynamic exemplarism, non-intuitive thought pursues objectivity in immanence, and finality poses dynamically the reality of objective and subjective ends. In Lonergan's notion of finality, too, a kind of isomorphism is the reality of the whole of being; the manner of

¹Vide supra, p. 57.

fact of the universe has indeed, an apriori design as manifest in the structure of knowing itself. In this respect, proportionate being is not an indeterminately directed dynamism for there is an intended ordination of each potency for the form it receives, and the order of the universe is ultimately headed for perfection that was its primary motivation.¹ Maréchal's most memorable expression of the isomorphic nature of knowing and known is his analogy of the relation of the key and the lock which receives it, not a relation of exact identity but a pre-determined and complementary harmony.² Therefore, the formal object specifies a degree of knowability of the known object and a mode of knowing of the cognitive subject, since the intelligible in act and the intelligence in act are identical.³ In so far as the immanent object is perceived as true in act, intelligible in act, appetible in act, or universal in act, according to a certain diversity, the exterior object is true, intelligible, appetible, and universal in potency.⁴ In such a way, heuristic structure does anticipate possible contents. For Maréchal, human truth seen in its integral nature is both natural and supernatural since all truths are approximations or fragmentary participations of divine truth, of subsistent intelligence.⁶

¹Vide supra, p. 204, n.2.

²Vide supra, p. 12, n.1.

³Vide supra, p. 21.

⁴Vide supra, p. 75, n.1.

⁵As in mathematical structure the equation anticipates an answer in terms of the structure itself, so too in heuristic structure contents are to be filled out in terms of the structure itself.

⁶Vide supra, p. 71.

Albeit, on the other hand, the reference to finality is common to both philosophers and has been noted here to express the full measure of their thought; still, the use of the notion of finality does not have the same approximate ground for both philosophers. Maréchal needs an apriori guarantee of finality in the existence of God to sustain the cognitive process; Lonergan consummates his thought in the pattern of finality as naturally indicated from his vast range of human knowledge. His grasp of the virtually unconditioned, not the formally unconditioned which stands outside the field of conditioning, is the basis of the affirmation of proportionate being, objectivity, and consequent finality. Lonergan's method is not by a simple apriori parallel between cognitive process and objective process, but a parallel based on vast ranges of fact.

The Notion of Objectivity

To conclude our study of Lonergan's notion of objectivity, the explicit nature of the notion will be seen to evolve from a content of judgments. Human knowing is cyclic in that it advances from experience through inquiry and reflection to judgment only to revert to the same procedure. It is also cumulative in the coalescence of judgments into a context named knowledge. From the components emergent in cognitional process, there are partial aspects of the notion of objectivity, but the principal notion is contained in the patterned context of judgments.

Thus, there is an experiential aspect of objectivity proper to sense and empirical consciousness. There is a normative aspect that is contained in the contrast between the detached and unrestricted desire to know and, on the other hand, merely subjective desires and fears. Finally, there is an absolute aspect that is contained in single judgments considered by themselves inasmuch as each rests on a grasp of the unconditioned and is posited without reservation.¹

The principal notion.--The principal notion of objectivity is contained in a patterned context of judgments, because one can define any object as A, B, C where these in turn are defined by the correctness of a set of judgments or any subject as an object in the sense explained in the judgment of self-affirmation.

The bare essentials of the notion of objectivity are reached if we add to the judgments already discussed, viz., I am a knower. This is a typewriter, the further judgment that I am not this typewriter. An infinite number of further objects may be added by making the additional appropriate positive and negative judgments.²

And in so far as one reasonably affirms the existence of other knowers beside oneself, one can add a list of objects that are also subjects.

The first property of the principal notion of objectivity resides in the context of judgments, for "without a plurality of judgments that satisfy a definite pattern, the notion does not emerge."³ Secondly, the principal notion is not contained in any

¹Ibid., p. 375.

²Ibid., p. 376.

³Ibid.

single judgment.

Thirdly, the validity of the principal notion of objectivity is the same as the validity of the set of judgments that contain it; if the judgments are correct, then it is correct that there are objects and subjects in the sense defined, for the sense defined is simply the correctness of the appropriate pattern of judgments.¹

Fourthly, people are apt to jump to the conclusion that the existence of objects and subjects must rest on some experiential aspect of objectivity. While they may say a typewriter is an object because they see it or feel it, they would further admit that a typewriter could not be considered an object if they knew there was no typewriter at all or that what was named a typewriter was identical with everything else.²

Fifthly, the principal notion of objectivity is related to the notion of being. "Being is what is to be known through the totality of correct judgments. Objectivity in its principal sense is what is known through any set of judgments satisfying a determinate pattern. In brief, there is objectivity if there are distinct beings, some of which both know themselves and know others as others."³ The notion of being explains why objectivity in its principal sense must be known in a pattern of judgments. "For the notion of being becomes determinate only in so far as judgments are made; prior to judgment, one can think of being but one cannot know it; and any single judgment is but a minute

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 376-377.

increment in the process towards knowing it.¹ The subject cannot stand outside of being to look at it, since apart from being there is nothing; then since the subject has to be before he can look, he must be the whole or some part of being. If he were the whole of being, he would be the sole object. If he is only part, he must begin to know a multiplicity of parts as distinct and add that one part knows another.

Sixthly, the principal notion of objectivity solves the problem of transcending the knower to the known. The problem supposes the knower to know himself and places that knowing as an obstacle to knowledge outside himself. First, while the knower may experience or think about himself, he cannot know himself until he makes the correct judgment of self-affirmation. Then other judgments of objects both as beings and being other than the knower are possible through the same process.

Hence, we place transcendence, not in going beyond a known knower, but in heading for being within which there are positive differences and, among such differences, the difference between object and subject. Inasmuch as such judgments occur, there are in fact objectivity and transcendence; and whether or not such judgments are correct, is a distinct question to be resolved along the lines reached in the analysis of judgment.²

Absolute objectivity.--In respect to partial aspects of objectivity, the basis of absolute objectivity is the virtually unconditioned grasped by reflective understanding and affirmed.

¹Ibid., p. 377.

²Ibid.

in judgment. The formally unconditioned stands outside the field of conditioning altogether, but the virtually unconditioned has conditions and is a possible condition of other judgments; yet its conditions are fulfilled and in that measure it is absolute-- a de facto absolute. The content of the judgment is an absolute, having been removed from relativity to the subject that utters it, the place in which he utters it, the time at which he utters it. "Caesar's crossing the Rubicon was a contingent event occurring at a particular place and time. But a true affirmation of that event is an eternal, unchangeable, definitive validity. For if it is true that he did cross, then no one whatever at any place or at any time can truly deny that he did."¹

Father Lonergan finds in absolute objectivity a quality of our knowing that is named its publicity. "For the same reason that the unconditioned is withdrawn from relativity to its source, it also is accessible not only to the knower that utters it but also to any other knower."²

Lonergan also incorporates the principle of identity. "Again, it is the absolute objectivity of the unconditioned that is formulated in the logical principles of identity and contradiction."³ The principle of identity formulates the immutable and definitive validity of the true, and the principle of contradiction affirms the exclusiveness of that validity.

¹Ibid., p. 378.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

Each judgment in the suitable pattern or context of judgments that contain the principal notion of objectivity is an absolute in its own right; hence absolute objectivity pertains to single judgments as single. "The validity of the principal notion is a derived validity resting on a set of absolutes it involves. But the absolute aspect of objectivity has its ground in the single judgment to which it pertains."¹ However, for Lonergan, the absolute aspect of objectivity does not imply any subject-object relation; "it constitutes the entry of our knowing into the realm of being but, by itself, it does not suffice to posit, distinguish, and relate beings."² Several judgments are necessary to posit subjects and objects, to distinguish them, and to relate them in the realm of being.

Nor is absolute objectivity to be confused with the invariance proper to universal judgments. Both universal and particular judgments, if correct, are absolutely objective. In particular judgments, the variation of the expression presupposes and reveals the absolute objectivity of what is expressed. Because 'I am here now' has absolute objectivity, there is an identical truth to be repeated only by employing the different words, 'He was there then.'³

Then again, the issue of absolute space and absolute time can not be determined by appealing to the fact that a true judgment posits an unconditioned. Arguments that affirm that 'to be'

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 379.

is 'to be within space' involve Zeno's famous argument where one must question whether 'space is', and since it is not nothing it is; yet if any X 'to be' must 'be in space', then space must be in space, and one to contain the other prevents them from being identical and the second space must be within a further space, and so on indefinitely; indeed the same argument holds also for being in time.¹

Interpretations of being or of absolute objectivity in terms of space and time are mere intrusions of imagination. Absolute objectivity is simply a property of the unconditioned; and the unconditioned, as such, says nothing about space or time. If one's imagination makes the use of the preposition 'within' imperative, then one may say that every judgment is within a context of other judgments and that every unconditioned is within a universe of being.²

Then 'space is' and 'time is' by being within the universe of being, and objectively speaking, 'to be within the universe of being' is to be unconditioned along with a context of other unconditioned absolutes.

Normative objectivity.--A second partial aspect of objectivity is the normative. "It is objectivity as opposed to the subjectivity of wishful thinking, of rash or excessively cautious judgments, of allowing joy or sadness, hope or fear, love or detestation, to interfere with the proper march of cognitional

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

process."¹ In other words, the ground of normative objectivity resides in the unfolding of the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. These three qualities of the pure desire to know oppose the intervention of other human desires that would warp its proper orientation.

"Normative objectivity is constituted by the immanent exigence of the pure desire in the pursuit of its unrestricted objective. A dynamic orientation defines its objective. No less, it defines the means towards attaining its objective."² The pure desire heads toward being by desiring to understand and grasp the understood as unconditioned. "Hence, to be objective, in the normative sense of the term, is to give free rein to the pure desire, to its questions for intelligence, and to its questions for reflection."³ Such an objective involves distinguishing sound questions that do admit to possible solutions in intelligence, since the pure desire does desire to understand intelligently and to judge reasonably.

"Upon the normative exigences of the pure desire rests the validity of all logics and all methods."⁴ Belief and pragmatic utility are not sufficient grounds. All logic and method depend on a successful formulation of this dynamic exigence. "Thus, the logical principles of identity and contradiction result from the unconditioned and the compulsion it exercises upon our

¹Ibid., p. 360.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

reasonableness."¹ Such principles do not possess immediate validity, but they do possess ultimate validity in the unconditioned that formulates the dynamic exigence of the pure desire to know. The normative aspect, the unfolding of the pure desire, has a comprehensive movement in the judgments of related spheres. "Finally, precepts regarding judgment can be derived from the general requirement of the unconditioned and from the special circumstances of different kinds of judgments which may be primitive or derived, theoretical or concrete, descriptive or explanatory, certain or probable."²

Experiential objectivity.--The third partial aspect of objectivity is the experiential, that is the given as given. "It is the field of materials about which one inquires, in which one finds the fulfilment of conditions for the unconditioned, to which cognitional process repeatedly returns to generate the series of inquiries and reflections that yield the contextual manifold of judgments."³

The given is unquestionable and indubitable. The results attained by questioning may be changed by further questions, but the given is not itself affected by questioning; "it is unquestionable in the sense that it lies outside the cognitional levels constituted by questioning and answering."⁴ In the same way, although the answer to a question may be doubted, the given

¹Ibid., p. 361.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., pp. 361-362.

is indubitable. "The given is not the answer to any question; it is prior to questioning and independent of any answers."¹

Further, the given is residual and diffuse. The selection of the given is purely the work of insight and formulation and the given is the residue that remains over and above the instrumental acts of meaning, the concepts, and the insights. "Hence, since the given is just the residue, since it can be selected and indicated only through intellectual activities, of itself it is diffuse; the field of the given contains differences, but in so far as they simply lie in the field, the differences are unassigned."² As a result, the field of given is equally valid in all its parts for there is no screening prior to inquiry. "Screening is the fruit of inquiry. It takes place once inquiry has begun."³ In fact, the given must be differently significant in its different parts for once inquiry has begun it selects its relevant field in the given in respect to different departments of knowledge.

The given here includes images, dreams, illusions, hallucinations, subjective bias, and so forth, for a general theory of objectivity that will take in other fields of knowledge as well as that of natural science. Such a general theory of objectivity has to acknowledge as given a wide range of materials into which not only the natural scientist but also the psychologist or methodologist or cultural historian inquires. The account

¹Ibid., p. 362.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

of the given is extrinsic inasmuch as reflection and judgment presuppose understanding, and inquiry and understanding presuppose materials to be understood and inquired about. "Such presupposed materials will be unquestionable and indubitable, for they are not constituted by answering questions. They will be residual and diffuse, for they are what is left over once, the fruits of inquiry and reflection are subtracted from cog-¹nitional contents."

As residual and diffuse, all such materials must be regarded as equally valid. There could be neither inquiry or reflection were they all invalid, and were some valid and others invalid there would have to be a principle of inquiry; "but such a principle can be grasped and reasonably affirmed only after inquiry has begun. Prior to inquiry there can be no intelligent² discrimination and reasonable rejections."

The given must be defined extrinsically because all objectivity rests on the unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire to know. We have seen that that pure desire sets up the canons for normative objectivity, that it also is the source of absolute objectivity found in single judgments, and that it moves to the context of judgments which yields the principal notion of distinct objects and subjects in the universe of being. "Experiential objectivity has to rest on the same basis, and so the

¹Ibid., p. 383.

²Ibid.

given is defined, not by appealing to the sensitive process, but by the pure desire regarding the flow of empirical consciousness as the materials for its operation.¹

Characteristics of the notion of objectivity.--As to the general characteristics of the notion, it is the notion of objectivity that common sense presupposes, for the principal notion, absolute,² normative, and experiential aspects ground common-sense judgments. Secondly, this notion is minimal; even for the question "What is objectivity?" the normative exigences have to be respected. If the answer is to be intelligent and reasonable, there must be material for inquiry and reflection; there must be an unconditioned that is an absolute, if a definitive answer is to be attained; and finally, if the question and answer have a point, there will be other judgments in an appropriate pattern to yield the principal notion.³ Thirdly, this notion begs no questions. Like the notion of being, it does not limit itself to empiricism, rationalism, positivism, idealism, and so forth, but leaves that decision to the content of correct judgments. "Only on the supposition that inquiry and reflection, intelligence and reasonableness, have nothing to do with objectivity, is our notion invalidated. But, in that case,⁴ there does not arise the question, What is objectivity."

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 384.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

Objectivity in Maréchal and Lonergan.--Now, the culmination of Maréchal's thought in the notion of objectivity, while not set down in a form parallel to Lonergan's, can be drawn out to make an interesting contrast.

First, in the partial aspect of normative objectivity, the overpowering influence in Maréchal's work is the rational exigence for objective content. Were our intellectual nature to accomplish its destiny, it would contemplate first truth as its immediate and saturating object, but in fact our activity must be an indirect understanding of God.¹ The apriori, purely and simply,² designates the spontaneity of subject for an external gift. Then too, as a dynamic orientation, the apriori defines its own objective uniquely through an apriori anticipation of ends which are to be obtained successively through successive determinations of the intelligible species. Thus, he satisfies Lonergan's requirement that the exigence equate desire, but a desire that is intelligent and reasonable.³ Maréchal's rational anteriority of formal object of the faculty to the material object provides the possibility of unlocking the universe in an objective fashion.⁴ In so far as the faculty of intelligence possesses a formal object anterior to the presence of the material object, it possesses normative objectivity.

¹Vide supra, p. 70, n.1.

²Vide supra, p. 76, n.1.

³Vide supra, p. 216, n.3.

⁴Vide supra, p. 75.

Secondly, his normative objectivity is unrestricted in that while it brings about every absolute position in judgement, its range moves out beyond known content and even surpasses material restrictions. His explicit connotation of this unrestricted quality of normative objectivity is the dual function of finality operative in judgment. Subordinate ends are mere moments in the total becoming. Finality does not rest in particular affirmation which cannot give knowledge of total being; judicative assent, determined by antecedent finality, itself determines a consequent finality.¹ Thus, Maréchal's normative exigence is an unrestricted, insatiable, dynamic orientation upon which all possible knowledge possessed or to be possessed by man, objective knowledge, has its legitimate ground.

A second partial aspect of objectivity, experiential, could also be considered to follow Lonergan's lines of thought. The given can only be considered as potentially intelligible or appetible. The apriori as predisposition of the human mode of knowing contributes its form of act to what is merely given. The element of mental constructivity is a quality within objectivity.² Whereas Lonergan considers the heterogeneous nature of given as the materials into which the many spheres of knowledge inquire, Maréchal, too, implies the extensiveness of this field in the absence of all intrinsic limitation in the form of the dynamism

¹Vide supra, p. 37, n.4.

²Vide supra, p. 74.

to take in the entire amplitude of the knowable.¹

As Lonergan's given is defined extrinsically, in virtue of² the pure desire regarding the flow of empirical consciousness, so Maréchal extends formal objects to the level of the senses and involves the sensible powers in the logical and psychological apriority of the intelligible order.³ The given is intelligible in potency. Prior to cognitional acts the given is undifferentiated. Again Maréchal states that were the data perfectly differentiated among themselves, subjective construction would be a simple and total reconstruction, but the cognitive faculties, because they are all abstractive to some degree, act with some margin of indetermination between their formal intentional elements and the external objects of understanding.⁴ His example, that Euclidean geometry does not rule out the possibility of space of more than three dimensions or the logical possibility of meta-geometries, may be recalled in this instance.⁵ Validity, for both philosophers, derives from intelligent inquiry and reflective judgment, not from the obvious of sense experiences.

A third partial aspect of objectivity, the absolute, can also be found in Maréchal's term of judgment, but only in virtue of dynamic finality revealed in the cognitive process. He:

¹Vide supra, p. 44.

²Vide supra, p. 220, n.1.

³Vide supra, p. 20, n.4.

⁴Vide supra, p. 27, n.4.

⁵Vide supra, p. 27, n.3.

affirms that particular reality of objects of logical affirmation can be only a contingent reality; the necessity enveloped in their contingent assimilation provides them an objective existence.¹ This idea may be equated with the immutable, eternal, definitive validity that Father Lonergan finds in true affirmation, as he exemplifies it in the true affirmation of Caesar's crossing the Rubicon,² a fact now, withdrawn from the relativity of time and place. And if it is true, no one under any circumstances can deny that he did cross. Marshal's notion of objectivity must be associated with affirmation for the unity of subject and object is attained only in the absolute term of actuality. From conceptual form or simple representation of actual or possible existence, the intellect must pass to an absolute position of existence.³ The act of intelligence terminates itself in a subordinate end of judgment. In the function of judging the intellectual subject enters the conflict as objectifying control on the content of consciousness, a content that was hitherto only of the nature of possibility.⁴ Marshal states that in so far as reflective reason finds a necessary proportion of its act to the reality, it knows a natural exigence for objective reference, an exigence based on the radical and universal law of intelligence.⁵ In this regard,

¹Vide supra, p. 65, n.1.

²Vide supra, p. 213, n.1.

³Vide supra, p. 71.

⁴Vide supra, p. 81, n.3.

⁵Vide supra, p. 86, n.1.

Lonergan notes that the notion of being complements all contents inasmuch as the 'Yes' of judgment constitutes them as actually unconditioned and so endows them with objective reference.¹

There is for both Maréchal and Lonergan something more than contingent reality in the content of judgment. Thus, an absolute aspect of objectivity is evident in Maréchal's analysis of judgment, and objectivity in a wider sense resides in the heart of judgment, while moving from the impetus of rational exigence in consequent finality. The weakness in Maréchal's basic arguments for objectivity, of course, detracts from the value of the parallel.

However, the nature of objectivity returns us to Maréchal's notion of the principle of identity. Lonergan has shown that it is the absolute objectivity of the unconditioned that is formulated in the logical principles of identity and contradiction, for the principle of identity is the immutable and definitive validity of the true.² The formulation of such principles, then, results from the unconditioned and the compulsion it exercises upon our reasonableness. Now, Maréchal places logical evidence in the evident logical necessity of affirming the metaphysical object, and as the intelligence attains objects so it reaches being. Then, the evident necessity of first principles, the principle of contradiction and all the transcendental principles of unity, truth, and finality have the same evidence as being. But rather than have them formulate in logical terms the nature

¹Vide supra, p. 177, n.2.

²Vide supra, p. 213, n.3.

of the unconditioned, Maréchal has all demonstration proceed from these principles which are common to all; and hence, he says their objective evidence is immediate and identical with the soul.¹ These first principles formulate Maréchal's notion of absolute objective, but they are unsatisfactorily accounted for when contrasted with Lonergan's notion of the same principles. Lonergan puts the matter very simply; the principles of identity and contradiction are logical formulations of the absolute objectivity of the unconditioned, expressing the immutable and definitive validity of the true. Such principles do not possess immediate validity as they result from an unconditioned if a judgment occurs.

For Lonergan, while the absolute aspect of objectivity resides in single judgments and the absolute quality of single judgments grounds the validity of the principal notion, still the principal notion of objectivity must extend beyond single judgments. The absolute aspect of objectivity does not imply a subject-object relation; it only constitutes the entry of our knowing into the realm of being and cannot posit, distinguish, or relate beings.² The reason single judgments do not suffice to distinguish beings is that several judgments are needed to posit, distinguish, and relate objects that are known and others that know. Lonergan's principal notion of objectivity is closely related to the notion of being; for if being is what is

¹Vide supra, p. 79.

²Vide supra, p. 214, n.2.

to be known through the totality of correct judgments, then the notion of being becomes determinate only in so far as judgments are made correctly, not just a single judgment, a minute increment, but judgments of distinct beings.¹

Now, Maréchal's indirect character of evidence is a position of realism; a discursive intelligence does attain objects and through them being.² Thus, his notion of objectivity coincides with Lonergan's principal notion. But, to resolve the Kantian dilemma, he finds in judgment, that is single judgment, the full nature of objectivity, since, by affirmation, the object is opposed to subjective function and is posited as a single object in a single judgment. In objective function the essence of subject as subject and the essence of sensible object is re-attached by us to supreme actuality.³ However, his rational anteriority of formal object, the rational exigence like Lonergan's pure desire or normative objectivity, still demands a more complete notion of objectivity. In fact, he says that never is the active potential of intelligence exhausted, for after assimilation intelligence turns to new conquests to be added always as subordinate ends in agreement with last end, and this relation of finality is the foundation of objectivity.⁴ Lonergan, however, makes an explicit demand for the unfolding of the unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire to know in his

¹Vide supra, p. 212, n.1.

²Vide supra, p. 79.

³Vide supra, p. 75, n.2.

⁴Vide supra, p. 57.

principal notion of objectivity, the need for a set of judgments of determinate pattern for the object-subject relation.

For Lonergan, the nature of the virtually unconditioned is the key to objectivity. Maréchal had a tremendous insight into the intellectual dynamism and seems always to be approaching objectivity through the efficacy of the judgment, but he never reaches the reality that Lonergan clarifies. It is interesting to note that philosophy itself moves through higher insights by this particular grasp of the virtually unconditioned.

For Lonergan, the validity of the principal notion of objectivity is the same as the validity of the set of judgments that contain it; for if the judgments are correct, then it is correct that there are objects and subjects in the sense defined. That sense defined is simply the correctness of the appropriate pattern of judgments. Judgments are contextual while marking absolute positions of a dynamic structure; as habitual context, they complement, balance, defend, and elucidate each new judgment. Objectivity has a far more pertinent meaning than the mere attainment of a subject-object relation; it is the provisory ground of the human grasp of reality and the possibility of the authentic person in the enlargement of consciousness, in consistency between knowing and doing. Dynamic structure has a parallel dynamic objectivity that requires the openness of the subject for the unfolding of the pure desire and the personal achievement of genuineness that will recognize the rational product in the full sphere of human life. Lonergan's judgment of self-

affirmation cuts through the apparent subject-object problem and facilitates the fullness of his consideration of objectivity. The Kantian *apriori* is recast in a realistic sense and the static categories are deprived of any disastrous effect in the problem of human knowledge. The precise and consistent development of Lonergan's notion of objectivity removes us from any position of finality that involves intuition or contemplation. Our faculties are predisposed, in an *apriori* qualification, to seek and find and yet seek again as the universe of being is revealed in a factual way and to integrate through a truly personal achievement that level of rational consciousness in the enlarged transformation of consciousness in the field of both knowing and doing. An objectivity that reveals so poignantly and irresistibly our real dignity can only be satisfied by a zealous self-appropriation. One can do no more than reiterate Lonergan's own words: "The business of the human mind in this life seems to be, not contemplation of what we know, but relentless devotion to the task of adding increments to a merely habitual knowledge."¹

¹vide supra, p. 104, n. 1.

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