


**Peacetimes or Wartimes:**  
*Peacekeeping from  
a Global-human Security Perspective*

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
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# **Peacetimes or Wartimes:**

*Peacekeeping from  
a Global-human Security Perspective*

by

Peter Coombes

# ***Peacetimes or Wartimes: Peacekeeping from a Global-human Security Perspective***

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This thesis is dedicated to Elias Aaron Coombes Kirson, born March 14, 1996.



# **Peacetimes or Wartimes:**

## *Peacekeeping from a Global-human Security Perspective*

Thesis submitted by Peter Coombes in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the Master of Arts degree in International Development Studies,  
Saint Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia.  
May 1996.

### **Abstract**

This thesis is a two part study of security and peacekeeping. The end of the Cold War, dissolution of the Soviet Union and globalization have set the stage for a radical transformation of the nature and perception of the term *security*. Recent events, including the Gulf War, the exposed racism and violence of peacekeepers in Somalia, the attack on Mohammed Aideed in Somalia, and NATO bombings in the former Yugoslavia, have fostered a new and tarnished perception of peacekeeping. This at a time when more UN peacekeeping missions have been established in the past five years than in its first 35 years. Firstly, it is my contention and premise that a paradigm shift is occurring in terms of global security issues. An objective and subjective transformation of a state-centric security system (which I call the traditional security paradigm) to a global and people centered security system (which I call the global-human security paradigm) is underway. And secondly, to best understand and utilize generic 'peacekeeping' (which includes peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy, enforcement, peacemaking and peacebuilding) it must be evaluated from the perspective of the global-human security paradigm and in particular from an international critical theory which is based on Gramscian critical theory. International critical theory clearly outlines whose security and what security is to be protected. Thus criteria for evaluating peacekeeping are established. The thesis concludes with a sweeping overview of the global policy implications needed for a people-centred security as derived from the study.

*Who brought the bomb wrapped up in business cards  
and stained with steak?  
Who hires a maid to wash his money?  
Who keeps politicians on the take?  
  
Who puts outspoken Third Worlders in jail  
just to shut them down?  
Oh the lies vary from place to place  
but the truth is still the same  
even in this town  
  
Money junkies all over the world  
trample us on their way to the bank  
They run in every race  
Windego  
  
Third Worlders see it first  
The dynamite, the dozers  
the cancer and the acid rain  
The corporate caterpillars come into our backyards,  
and turn the world to pocket change*

*Excerpt from "The Priests of the Golden Bull",  
Buffy Sainte-Marie*

## **PART I — SECURITY PARADIGMS**

### **Chapter 1 Introduction**

#### **Redefining Security**

Instead of peace, the end of the Cold War has brought about more inter- and intra-state wars, and rising social, political, economic and environmental unrest. Ursula Franklin suggests that this is because the world is essentially stuck with the military technological infrastructure of the Cold War era.<sup>1</sup> "But in

---

<sup>1</sup> The technological infrastructure is defined by Franklin in easy to understand language as "the way things are done around here" (Franklin 1996, 14).

addition to the replacement of the threat of war between the big powers by war among smaller states, we have witnessed another form of the displacement of war: its displacement into the economic sphere” (Franklin 1996, 13). What Franklin is basically arguing is that since the Western technological war machine, which developed over the past four decades, has lost its external enemy — the USSR — it is now turning inward: “In the war of global competition the enemy are the people...” (Franklin 1996, 15).

The end of the Cold War, dissolution of the Soviet Union and globalization have set the stage for a radical transformation of the nature and perception of the term *security*. For many analysts and activists, security must now be defined beyond the inherently militaristic focus of state security to encompass a broader ‘people-centred’ one. The latter sense of the concept of security attempts to find a means to ensure the socio-political and economical well-being of individuals, their communities and their environments. Ken Booth (1991) goes as far as to convincingly argue that security is, both theoretically and empirically, emancipation.

Furthermore, this critical perspective implies that a military response to security is in its own right a threat and a destabilizing force because: 1) a military response is not able to address the underlying causes of the conflict and may exacerbate the problems; 2) a military response, including an armaments build-up, destroys the environment, undermines an economy and destabilizes political

systems; and, 3) the mere presence of armaments and military alliances breeds a sense of insecurity between states and people. To adequately evaluate the effectiveness of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peacemaking as security policies, one must first begin to understand the changing perceptions and nature of global security. Global security provides the foundation of peacekeeping — that is to say, it gives peacekeeping purpose and meaning by identifying the relevant social actors and institutions, and historical agents involved.

## **Evaluating Peacekeeping**

Although the academic literature clearly distinguishes the concept peacekeeping from other related concepts now including peacemaking, peacebuilding, preventive diplomacy and warmaking, in the popular media and political discourse it is used to refer to all of the above range of actions and more. In fact, in the 1980s, Ronald Reagan dubbed the MX missile 'the peacekeeper'. Such usage makes the term, 'peacekeeping', virtually meaningless and particularly useful for propaganda purposes (i.e. to disguise war, politicians call it a peacekeeping, peacemaking or peace enforcement mission).

Yet recent events, including the Gulf War, the exposed racism and violence of peacekeepers in Somalia, the attack on Mohammed Aideed in Somalia, and NATO bombings in the former Yugoslavia, have fostered a new and tarnished perception of peacekeeping. A popular dual image seems to

prevail: 1) that peacekeeping done by the UN is ineffective and even weak, as exemplified by the UN's inability to end the war in the former Yugoslavia; and 2) paradoxically that peacekeeping is used to make war sound like a good and noble act; for example the Gulf War is often described as a 'peacemaking' or 'peace enforcement' mission.

Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has undertaken more peacekeeping missions than it did during its first 35 years of UN peacekeeping (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). These missions now vary in scope from direct military intervention — the traditional peacekeeping role of impartially separating opposing forces — to humanitarian relief, monitoring elections and disarming combatants. With these on-going changes in the broad area of UN peacekeeping it is essential to re-evaluate the very purpose of UN peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peacemaking as viable security policies. New questions need to be asked. In terms of global and human security—what is the role of peacekeeping in protecting, maintaining or re-establishing security? What is the role of international peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peacemaking in an ever globalizing<sup>2</sup> world?

---

<sup>2</sup> In this thesis I use the terms, 'global', 'globalizing' and 'globalization' as a means to distinguish a drift or change from internationalism. Internationalism implies a relationship and/or interaction between sovereign nation states. By using the term 'globalization' I wish to convey the idea that agents of historical change have an existence and impact beyond the nation state. The institutions of the United Nations, Bretton Woods, multi-national corporations and even civil society have a decision making power that is exclusive of and beyond the nation state. As well, there are politico-economic agents of history, i.e. class and gender, that form global structures. Lastly, there are environmental factors that have no relation to borders or nation states.

## **Methodology**

The following thesis offers a theoretical and analytical discussion based on a survey of available literature in the interrelated areas of: 1) peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding, preventive diplomacy, and 2) global security.

The thesis will define and assess the changing nature of global security in descriptive and analytical terms. In chapter two I will enlarge upon a specific political economy approach: international critical theory. This will provide the theoretical framework for a discussion on how global forces are not only changing our academic understanding of security but, as well, are impacting upon and creating new insecurities. These insecurities are leading many students of international relations to develop a new understanding of the world around and are leading us toward seeking new solutions and discarding old ones.

Secondly, the thesis will also review the various ways in which peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding operations have been evaluated. Then it will attempt to re-evaluate peacekeeping from a human and global security perspective comparing that re-evaluation to the more traditional evaluation processes.

The last chapter will be a broad evaluation of what global policies need and ought to be implemented to safeguard human and global security. Within

the context of a human and global security approach the thesis will discuss what form or role the various types of peacekeeping may take.

## **Thesis Statement**

Firstly, it is my contention and premise that a paradigm shift is occurring in terms of global security issues. An objective and subjective transformation of a state-centred security system into a global and people centered security system is underway. And secondly, to best understand and utilize 'peacekeeping' it must be evaluated from, what I refer to as, the global-human security paradigm and in particular from an international critical theory which is based on Gramscian critical theory. International critical theory clearly outlines whose security and what security is to be protected. Thus criteria for evaluating peacekeeping are established.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Theoretical Framework**

In reviewing the security and peace literature in this chapter, the focus will be restricted to understanding the various schools of thought regarding security that have developed since the mid 1900s. The literature on peace and security is immense; thus it is important to focus solely on that literature which helps further our understanding of what each school believes to be essential for "security". Although several key articles and books from earlier writers may be reviewed the main focus will be on the more contemporary literature of the 1980s and 1990s. This limited scope is chosen because it is over this period that a paradigmatic shift in the concept of security has occurred it is, moreover, it is a period of great transformation with the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the USSR. Through the literature review on security a theoretical framework will be developed.

### **Security Paradigms**

International Relations has traditionally been confined to the exclusive domain of Political Theory/Science, Security Studies and Strategic Studies — subsidiary research fields of International Relations. It is generally accepted by international relations practitioners and researchers that politics is at the core of their fields (Maclean 1981). This chapter will explore the theoretical implications



of analyzing security from the perspective of the interdisciplinary field of International Development Studies.

It is only when we begin reformulating security — by asking what is security, who implements and formulates security policy, and whose security is to be protected? — that we get a more holistic understanding of global society. The central focus of this section will be to argue that the traditional security literature has: 1) failed to adequately describe the security dilemmas facing both communities and the globe; and, 2) has willfully ignored prescriptions that would safeguard the real security needs of people as opposed to a dominant class. Last, in place of traditional security theories this chapter demonstrates that international critical theory is the best alternative for developing a theory of 'critical security studies'.

Albert Legault (1993) in a recent article attempts to identify the recent transformation in security studies. He argues that there are three security paradigms: 1) Peace through strength; 2) Peace through law; and, 3) an emerging one called the Trans-systemic (or ecological ) paradigm. Legault has overused and even abused the concept of paradigm.<sup>3</sup> Ostensibly he is describing three schools of thought which share common assumptions and world views. The first two he identified correspond to what most authors refer to as the

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<sup>3</sup> I base my understanding of the term 'paradigm' upon Thomas Kuhn's original work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970). A paradigm is a shared set of assumptions, *a priori* knowledge, values, beliefs, language and terminology, and exemplars by a community. Where more than one paradigm exist, most of the time they do not share the same problems and concerns and where they do they have different conceptual definitions and methodological understandings of the issue.

realist/neo-realist and idealist schools of international relations theory. The neo-realist focus is on the military protection of the state. The idealist concern, on the other hand, is on building international norms and institutions to prevent conflict between states — collective or common military security. The third school of thought, which is the closest to being a distinct paradigm, derives from the perceived need to protect the environment and maximize the survival of the planet. It is a rejection of the dominant mode of development and security with a focus on ethics. As it is presented by Legault, however, I argue that it is not a paradigm nor is it new because it continues to focus on the political elite and state-centric policies.

Legault continues by putting forward a three-tiered security system based on the convergence of the first two paradigms. It would consist of a reinforced collective security system, a hard-core security system composed of European NATO powers, and a soft-core security system emerging from regional conferences and institutions (i.e. CSCE). The third paradigm would provide the ethical foundation for the first paradigm, suggesting that the earth's very survival is dependent on sharing the planet's resources.

Although Legault's study purports to be about a paradigm shift he misses the point in the end by trying to create a synthesis between the three 'paradigms'

as he envisages them.<sup>4</sup> His conclusion accepts the ethics of the third school but rejects its prescriptions as unrealistic. He is simply restating, using a variation of concepts, the traditional idealist argument that international norms and institutions are the required means to instill a state of international security. His synthesis relies heavily on collective military security measures which is contradictory to his self described third paradigm.

John McMurty clearly represents those academics who are attempting to come to terms with the paradigm shift in security studies. He, on the other hand, strongly argues that there is only one hegemonic paradigm — the “Military Paradigm” — which has “operated across millennia as an established given of historical formation” (McMurty 1991, 415). McMurty describes this paradigm as reductively prescriptive with a conventionally assumed objective: “namely, national defence or war means the threat or the action of systematically killing, maiming, and destroying the life-supports of other human beings by maximally efficient means” (McMurty 1991, 418). The only choice within the military paradigm is “killing, maiming, and life-means destruction on the one hand or non-retaliatory pacifist non-violence on the other” (McMurty 1991, 419). The military paradigm benefits the social, political and military elite, increasing their wealth and power, while, for the most part, it uses young poor men as cannon fodder and

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<sup>4</sup> Since paradigms are based on exclusive assumptions, values and basic beliefs it is impossible to combine two paradigms. Each paradigm requires a revolutionary leap in thinking and perception. As Thomas Kuhn (1970) asserts in his postscript, there is no ontological development from one scientific paradigm to the next.

poorer countries as its killing fields. Its victims are the poor and the marginalized — women, children and men who are not part of the circles of decision-making. In conclusion, his article proposes non-military, life-enhancing principles of 'war' to guide rational and moral agency. His description of the current security system is very accurate but his proposals for life enhancing principles of 'war' have very little social relevance. McMurty's study is a philosophical position needing to be translated into social theory policy.

A. W. Singham's (1993) perspective, in Singh and Bernauer, *Security of Third World Countries*, is more descriptive and represents the more traditional neo-realist thinking. He argues that the two dominant security models are 1) the Western realists, who perceive the national security interests of the West (the US in particular) as all encompassing, and 2) the socialist security system which is very much like the first. Singham, writing before the collapse of the Soviet Union, argues that a Third World security system based on Non-Alignment is the best alternative for nations in the South, giving them stronger independence from either the socialist or capitalist camps. With the end of the Cold War, however, the two superpowers no longer dominate or override the conflicts in the South with superpower interests. Conflicts in the Third World no longer need escalate into East-West conflicts. With the change in international politics, he argues, there is an opening for the old Non-Aligned Movement and other smaller nations to regain a voice in international politics.

These three studies are recent examples of much of the literature that is available on security studies. Legault is very representative of the mainstream traditional school — albeit leaning more toward the idealist school. He defines security from a state-centric military position and any argument not within that tradition (i.e. his description of the so-called 'ecological paradigm') is presented as unrealistic and focused solely on morality and ethics. McMurty, although radical in his approach, exemplifies much of (but is not necessarily representative of) the abundant and wide-ranging peace literature. His description of the war system is very accurate and *apropos*. He presents a Hegelian idealism which is philosophical in essence but provides little direction as to how to build an alternative security system. Singham is representative of much of the security literature coming from the Third World. It is often an attempt to put a 'Third World' twist on western conceptions of international relations and security.

Instead, from the vantage point of the late-1990s, I argue that there are two paradigms: 1) the Traditional Security paradigm, and 2) what I refer to as the Global-human Security paradigm. These two paradigms are fundamentally different. They constitute two completely different world views which do not share common assumptions and values. Table 1, below, gives an overview of the contrasting, even contradictory, assumptions contained in each.

Table 1 Assumptions and values of two security paradigms

	Traditional Security Paradigm		Global-human Security Paradigm
	Realist/ neo-realist	Idealist	
<i>Role of the state</i>	the state is the only legitimate agent/actor	the state is a prominent agent/actor along with international state institutions	the state and institutions are agents/actors but other agents of change and power are more important including class, gender, and cultural.
<i>International order</i>	anarchical and Hobbesian in nature	order based on international laws and institutions	global capitalist and military system
<i>Power</i>	coercive military state powers	coercive military state and collective state powers	oppressive military state and collective state power. emancipatory people power (class, race, gender, culture...)
<i>Whose security</i>	the state and a small military, economic and governing elite	the state and a small international military, economic and governing elite	individuals, communities and the ecological system (women, children, the poor, marginalized and disadvantaged)
<i>Security objectives</i>	maintain status quo	stop and prevent intra- and inter-national armed conflict	social, economic, political and ecological emancipation
<i>Areas of study and concern</i>	strategic military studies	international laws, institutions and interrelations	multi-disciplinary focus on social, economic, political and ecological development
<i>Theory/ Methodology</i>	problem-solving theory / ahistorical or 'great man' history	problem-solving theory / ahistorical or institutional history	international critical theory / historical materialism (dialectic between subjective and objective reality)

There are at least two major schools of thought in the literature, including the realists and idealists, which form the traditional security paradigm. Within this paradigm and within each school of thought are strains of a new school of thought based on a broader, more comprehensive, global perspective of security. Yet, within this traditional paradigm the underlying beliefs include the acceptance of the nation state as the unit of analysis, security of the state as paramount, and military alliances or collective security policies as the norm.

The second paradigm includes several schools of thought: Marxism, dependency theory, world systems theory and critical theory analysis. This paradigm, what I call the global-human security paradigm, is often excluded in the literature, as is typified above by the work of Legault. It shares the understanding that security is a broader concern with social, economic and political dimensions. As well, the state is not the central unit of analysis. In its place are class and other oppressive socio-economic structures. In essence, this is a political economy approach, but its main failing has been to separate and even ignore issues of security in favour of emancipation.

### **Traditional Security Paradigm**

Traditional security studies, theory and policy, focus on the power of the military to protect the nation state from internal disorder and, in particular, external aggression. Other aspects that deal with non-military security of human society, including environmental, cultural, social and economic power relations,

have been ignored and even brushed aside by mainstream academia and political practitioners as secondary to the 'real power' of the military. International relations or security studies have focused almost exclusively on the political relationships between states.

John Negretto argues that both realism and idealism fall into what he calls "the 'Hobbesian Trap,' the belief that a monopoly of violence is the necessary and sufficient condition for peace and order in a given community" (Negretto 1993, 519). The idealist, who Negretto sometimes refers to as the world federalist, assumes that community order is maintained by keeping the elements of coercion with the state so that all that needs to be done to avoid war is to transfer that monopoly of coercion to an international system or regime. For realists, as long as the nation state is the basic unit of international relations, maintaining a balance-of-power is the only means to deter war (Negretto 1993, 516-517). This helps to demonstrate that the categorization of the orthodox security literature into realist and idealist is not a rigid division and may at times be fluid: the two sides of the same coin.

### ***Realism***

One school of thought, the realist and neo-realist, has dominated the security debate for the past forty years or so. It perceives war as an inevitable, unfortunate, but sometimes necessary policy choice. This hegemonic approach includes writers such as Carl von Clausewitz, Raymond Aron, Kenneth Waltz,



Hedley Bull, Hans J. Morgenthau, Emma Rothschild and Henry Kissinger. This orthodox school is the mainstay of international relations thinking and perceives the idealist approach as naive, unrealistic, 'woolly-headed', and even dangerous. For example, in response to potential criticism that he may have ignored the vast literature of the peace movement, Paul Hirst, a neo-realist, remarks:

I can find in Peace Movement writing no political analysis of *how* to achieve nuclear disarmament among the Great Powers, only pious invocations that it *should* happen and the belief that it will happen if enough people commit themselves to it. This is no more than the high minded stock-in-trade of the 'liberal conscience' and it repeats a politics of moral earnestness, in other words, a non-politics, which has been with us since the nineteenth-century (Hirst 1987, 204 original emphasis).

Colin Gray, who falls strongly into the neo-realist camp, presents another fine example of this type of hegemonic thinking:

In addition to being unattainable, visions of global security can have dangerous consequences in the behaviour that they may trigger or encourage on the part of their devotees. The behaviour appropriate to a globally secure world governed by saintly leaders is not the behaviour most suitable for a world at least partially populated by Serbian, Croatian, Iraqi and other tribal bands of thuggery. Inherently good ideas applied at the wrong time quite literally can kill (Gray 1994, 27).

The realist school is concerned primarily with power, essentially military power, which is not merely determined by the quantity or quality of weapons. It is determined by the geo-political position of a state and by the economic and industrial capacity of a country to build and maintain a military system. Or, to put it differently, security is safeguarded by the state's capacity to deter external or

internal aggression. Realists' theories focus on balance-of-terror, arms control and balance-of-power, hegemonic versus bipolar and multi-polar power balances, game theory and other 'rational' theoretical arguments.

Central to all these realist perspectives is the sovereignty and power of the nation state. For neo-realists the state is the primary actor in international relations, and the quintessential threat to security is the fear of military attack on the state by another state. In turn, the state is perceived, even defined, as the only legitimate authority allowed to use violence to protect its sovereignty from external aggression or internal disorder (Aron 1968 & 1995; Rothschild 1995; Kissinger 1995; Waltz 1959).

From a realist perspective, the international system, governed by state relations, is characterized as Hobbesian in nature. That is, it is an anarchical system. Each nation state acts for and on behalf of its own "national interests". The protection of the state's sovereignty includes protecting its political and economic interests, even when they are well outside its borders or domain of influence. The strong and mighty will prevail, and it is only when a balance-of-power or hegemony is established that the security of the state is safeguarded. A key *axiom* of the realist is that war is politics by other means. Thus, from this established perspective war is not considered a failure in policy, but rather a calculated policy choice pursued by rational state leaders.

Mohammed Ayooob (1995), in his recent book, *The Third World Security Predicament*, attempts to define security from an alternative Third World perspective. Yet his definition sits upon the foundations of Western neo-realist thinking. Ayooob, a Third World neo-realist, is unwilling or unable to understand security outside of the realm of inter-state politics.

In other words, debt burdens, rain-forest decimation, or even famine do not become part of the security calculus for our purposes unless they threaten to have political outcomes that either affect the survivability of state boundaries, state institutions, or governing elites or weaken the capacity of states and regimes to act effectively in the realm of both domestic and international politics (Ayooob 1995, 9).

The Gulf War is a perfect example of how the dominant political elite act within the confines of neo-realist thinking. The concern of the United States and Europe in leading a war against Iraq had nothing to do with the political, economic or social welfare of people who live within the bounds of Iraq's brutal military dictatorship or under the oppressive oligarchic rule of Kuwait. One of the central reasons for that war was to prevent Iraq from becoming the hegemonic power of the Middle East which could have excluded Western interests and would have threatened cheap oil supplies to the developed western world.

### ***Idealism/Internationalism***

The idealist approach to security and peace has a long history. In the modern era it is associated with classical writers such as Emmanuel Kant or

Claude Henri Saint-Simon, and presently it includes writers such as Albert Legault, Inga Thorsson, Michael Doyle among many others.

War from the idealist perspective is not only unfortunate; it is also not an inevitability and is an unnecessary behaviour of people and/or systems. It can be avoided by institutionalizing international norms and agreements between sovereign states.

Kant proposed that states have to accept three "definitive articles" which once accepted will lead to a state of perpetual peace (Betts 1994). The first definitive article is that the civil constitution of every state should be republican. Kant suggested that states would naturally gravitate towards becoming a republic since it was the most efficient and best way to organize government.<sup>5</sup>

The second definitive article is that the law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states, forming a pacific federation or pacific union.<sup>6</sup> Thus, according to Doyle, it seems that what Kant is suggesting is a collective security arrangement among states that is built upon a reciprocal understanding that their security is mutual. And Doyle suggests that such a collective security arrangement may rely on the third definitive article which is a cosmopolitan law that is "limited to conditions of universal hospitality" (Doyle 1986, 1158).

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<sup>5</sup> "By *republican* Kant means a political society that has solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order" (Doyle, 1986: 1156).

<sup>6</sup> The pacific union is not an international government or a single peace treaty among all states. An international government or world state, according to Kant, was not very likely and if there was such a state the risk of it being tyrannical was too high a cost. A single peace treaty would not be sufficient to maintain peace.

From the Kantian perspective, once republican states are established they are prone to avoid war because the citizens, to whom the constitution is responsible, are more hesitant to fight since they are the ones who must bear the cost. But as Doyle points out this alone does not make for peaceful relations. A republic builds a culture that is respectful and accepting of differences, and this is projected onto the international arena. This positive interaction as part of the cosmopolitan law of universal hospitality encourages economic cooperation between liberal republican states — it “...permits the ‘spirit of commerce’ sooner or later to take hold of every nation, thus impelling states to promote peace and to try to avert war” (Doyle 1986, 1161).

Doyle adds that a further benefit of liberalism to international peace, is that in a liberal republic the market is separate from the state which enables the state to act as an impartial negotiator when contentious international market issues arise (Doyle 1986).

Yet, liberal democracies will go to war with non-democracies because they cannot trust another state which is not openly governed and constrained by representation. Liberal republics are willing to protect their ‘democratic rights’ against non-democracies because they “...do not authentically represent the rights of individuals” (Doyle 1986, 1162).

David Forsythe questions “whether democracies might engage in covert forcible action against each other?” (Forsythe 1992, 385). His is not an empirical

study, but is based on cases in which he argues that the United States used covert forcible action against a series of elected governments in Third World countries during the Cold War. The evidence is clear and well supported that in at least six cases the US did use forcible covert action against elected governments.<sup>7</sup> In another three cases of covert action, the US used propaganda, political influence and economics in an effort to dictate government policies.<sup>8</sup> Other cases of covert action have been asserted but not substantiated.<sup>9</sup> Forsythe suggests that the US used these covert actions because they feared that the governments in place were either too Leninist in their approach or were too soft on Leninism.

The distinction between these covert actions and war is somewhat academic. The end goal is the same whether a government or state system is overthrown by covert action or direct invasion.<sup>10</sup> These violent actions on the part of the US do not support and in fact fly in the face of Kant's and modern liberal theories of a pacific union of democratic republics. The US committed

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<sup>7</sup> These cases of violent covert actions include the following: Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1957), Brazil (from 1961), Chile (1973) and Nicaragua (from 1984). (Forsythe 1992, 385). Some of these examples are not covert and were very much overt actions at the time including Nicaragua, Chile and the Dominican Republic (Sørensen 1992).

<sup>8</sup> These cases of political covert actions include the following: British Guyana (from 1953), Costa Rica (from 1955), and Ecuador (from 1960). (Forsythe 1992, 385).

<sup>9</sup> These assertions of political covert actions include the following: the United Kingdom (1959), the Dominican Republic (1965), Greece (1967), Jamaica (from 1976), and India (at various times). (Forsythe 1992, 385). The invasion of Grenada is sad example of US covert action followed by direct military intervention.

<sup>10</sup> The mining of Nicaragua's harbours and funding of the Contra guerrillas by the United States is perfect example of a covert action where the distinction between covert actions and war is blurred. In essence the United States hired a private army to fight its war with Nicaragua.

itself to these types of actions because it perceived its economic and political interests to be at risk and these democracies, since they are not *liberal* democracies as defined by the US, are expendable. As George Sørensen points out,

Thus, not any kind of democracy is smoothly integrated in the pacific union envisaged by Kant; and it appears that those who are met with enmity instead of amity are the mass-dominated democracies, defined as regimes where 'mass actors have gained the upper hand' and push for reforms from below, attacking the power and privilege of the elites (Sørensen 1992, 405).

Barry Buzan argues that there is a strong and durable link between international political economy and the content of the international security agenda (Buzan 1994, 99). Buzan's argument is a well developed attempt to bridge the gap between the neo-realists and the idealists. Buzan relies on the framework that the international system is anarchical and that we must consider security at three levels: the individual, the state and the international system (Dalby 1992).<sup>11</sup> But he also recognizes that the self-interest of one state may infringe upon the security of another state or upon the security of the individual. Thus, like the idealist, he advocates that increased interaction between states leads to a recognition by state leaders that international cooperation is within their security interests. He does not argue, and counters the contention, that economic relations determine security ones, but "the danger arises when malign economic structures occur in tandem with other political and military elements of

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<sup>11</sup> These three levels are based on Kenneth Waltz's classical treatment of war and peace (Waltz 1959).

strategic instability..." (Buzan 1994, 100). Buzan is clear in stating that a more stable international environment is dependent on a Western-style political and economic maturity being imposed on states and the international system (Buzan 1994; Dalby 1992).

The record to date, argues Sørensen, against the smaller mass-democracies (non-Western Third World countries) being allowed to pursue their own policy goals and needs has not been very good. The dominant liberal democracies and the international institutions which they control, "the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, are at pains to stress promotion of the strictly liberal elements of the new democracies: privatizations, public sector cutbacks, free market policies, the protection of private property" (Sørensen 1992, 405).

Although the security of the nation state is important from the idealist perspective, its security must be safeguarded by collective, cooperative or common international military security systems. The United Nations could be one such vehicle, while more radical liberal perspectives call for international government and an international army. Yet, once again, the underlying premise of security here is focused on its military aspect. Western liberal democracies would continue to perceive the existence of non-liberal democracies as destabilizing forces. Denser liberal economic relations could help define a more peaceful international relationship between states, but ultimately, political and



military agreements would be the centre-pieces for international security. Thus the formation of a military alliance of collective or common security, or the institutionalizing of an international army (or global peacekeeping force) may exclude and even oppose the existence of non-liberal democracies.

It is of interest to note that Hirst attempts to argue that Kant's Perpetual Peace and Schell's The Abolition are better categorized in the vein of "*realpolitik*" along the lines of Hobbes. Yet, Hirst seems to be ignoring the very premise of Kant's Perpetual Peace which relies on a *should*: because it is in their interests, states *should* agree to a series of articles, including that "no state shall by force interfere with another state" (Kant in Hirst 1987, 206-207). Essentially this is no different and no more political than the arguments put forward by many disarmament authors, including the argument which asserts that it is in the interests of all people that they *should* organize to change state policies. It is not the purpose of this chapter to debate Hirst. However, it seems that all he has done is to re-categorize Schell and Kant to attempt to prove that the only viable policies for peace are from the realist school of thought.<sup>12</sup>

Hirst is correct when he states that most, if not all, of the idealist literature is based on *ifs* and *shoulds*. But he misunderstands much of the literature when he states that it is not realistic and is non-political. In fact, his statement says more about his aim than it does about the idealist peace literature. Some of the

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<sup>12</sup> see Negretto 1993 for further and opposing discussions on Kant pages 501-523.

latter is based on the moral imperative that peace is the right way and thus we should pursue that path. There is essentially nothing wrong with such a goal but relying on *ifs* and *shoulds* as the means forward leaves the theory in practice on shaky ground. What Hirst and the realists forget is that realism is built upon theory. And, just as much as any other tradition, it too has its normative values — ‘an elite group are best at governing’ and ‘the state is the centre of power protecting individuals’ are both norms of realism. The idealist literature puts forward a variety of policy alternatives ranging from reforms of the United Nations, to verified arms control agreements, to economic development alternatives, to massive societal reforms. As well, its political agendas range from liberal to radical liberal. Some of these policies have been accepted in the past as realistic alternatives. Idealism is based on the assumption that change occurs by influencing ideas and the political elite, and restructuring international norms.

### ***Criticisms of the traditional security paradigm***

Within both schools of the traditional security paradigm further developments are now being made to account for areas other than the military, which impact upon security, as well as to account for the globalization of security policies. Yet, the underlying concentration has not changed. The traditional security paradigm ignores economic and social power relations as agents of historical change.

Recently, Buzan (1994), for example, has attempted to argue the interdependence between economic and security issues from a traditional perspective, a synthesis between idealism and realism. It is evident that he fails to further the argument as originally put forward by Kant. His central thesis is that increased economic relations will provide the opportunity for creating more cooperative international relations. Underlying his argument is that the transplanting of Western values, including Western (read liberal) state structures and the global capitalist system, on to Third World and Eastern states is necessary for international security and stability. Yet, he has failed to recognize or understand the global capitalist structure and its violent impact on peoples around the world. Instead he isolates NATO's relations and global capitalism as the military and economic model that the rest of the world would be best to pursue if they want security and stability. To put it simply, what Buzan is arguing is that if everyone was like us and did what we (the Western world) wanted, then there would be security and stability.

So, notwithstanding the end of bipolarity, the traditional security paradigm continues to focus on the political-military elite and the state as the only actors of power and change. The state-centrism of idealism and realism assumes that communities and individuals are protected by the state. It is evident that around the globe states not only fail in protecting their people but are too often the violators of their physical, social and economic security. To name a few examples: the government of Nigeria has recently demonstrated its disregard for

political dissent by executing political activists; Guatemala continues to use its armed forces to suppress indigenous groups; China continues to arrest and harass democracy advocates; Saudi Arabia denies basic human rights to half its population, women; Iraq is a brutal dictatorship; the autocracy of Kuwait ensures its power and wealth, in part, by denying citizenship to hundreds of thousands of people; in the United States a high proportion of blacks suffer from poverty, and black men are grossly over represented in US prisons; and, in Canada indigenous people suffer humiliating poverty, discrimination and marginalization. John McMurty boldly states that it is a well-known fact that ruling groups have used 'national security' to justify and maintain their class hold on their privileged positions of office or wealth (McMurty 1991, 422). The effect of what he calls the military paradigm "is to increase the wealth and power of the already wealthy and powerful" (McMurty 1991, 415).

## **Global-human Security Paradigm**

The second paradigm — what I call the global-human security paradigm — has developed out of a long tradition of radical political economy. It includes a vast spectrum of writers and political leaders from Karl Marx to Vladimir Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and many other Marxists whose main concern was imperialism. As well, this paradigm includes neo-Marxists and non-Marxists such as Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, Samir Amin and even Johan Galtung, who focus on forms of international dependency, world systems theory and structural imperialism. These schools, in general, perceive war as an

inevitable consequence of the contradictions within capitalism, whether it be Western capitalist conflicts and domination or global capitalism. From a radical political economy perspective, the prescription for ending war is the creation of a world in which all states are socialist or the dissolution of the international dependence between centre and periphery. This is not so different from the long standing liberal tradition based on Kant's perpetual peace, which states that once all governments are liberal democratic then war will essentially come to an end. What is essentially different about the radical perspective is that class or world structures of inequality are recognized as the factors impeding the emancipation of people. Using the language<sup>13</sup> of the traditional security paradigm, the major focus of the radical perspective is social and economic security.

Arising out of this vast literature is an expanded theory of international relations. It concerns itself with problems and issues not normally accepted by the traditional paradigm as vital to understanding international relations. The structures causing global economic inequality, food insecurity, militarism, and environmental degradation are vital security issues as opposed to the (collective) military security of states.

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<sup>13</sup> The language of these two paradigms, traditional and global-human security, is often very different and even contradictory. Security, meaning military security, is not often used in the global-human security paradigm and is essentially a meaningless term unless one refers to political, economic, food, health, and/or ecological security.

Within the literature of the global-human security paradigm one can find certain aspects of all the schools discussed above, but there are constitutive underlining assumptions and beliefs to which the old schools do not adhere, accept or even understand. These are as follows: 1) the security of the nation state is not central and is often insignificant and unimportant in analysis; 2) security of individuals and people(s) is paramount; 3) security and sustainability of the environment is essential to our very survival; 4) economic, social and political security based on equality, freedom and emancipation are essential in preventing conflict; 5) wars benefit the wealthy and powerful giving them even more wealth and power further escalating class conflict; and, 6) so called 'military security' or militarism is in and of itself a threat to human and global security. The latter is so because: a) a military response is not able to address the underlying causes of the conflict and may even exacerbate the problems; b) a military response, including an armaments build-up, destroys the environment, undermines economies and destabilizes political systems; and, c) the mere presence of armaments and military alliances breeds a sense of insecurity between states and people.

### ***Critical Theory***

One of the more developed schools within the global-human security paradigm which consciously addresses security issues is critical international theory analysis. Critical theory developed out of the Frankfurt school and its theoretical foundations are built upon the early writings of Marx. In particular it

draws on Marx's theory of dialectics as the means to understanding historical development and change (Veltmeyer 1974/1975, 1978). Unlike orthodox Marxists, who succumb to economic reductionism, international critical theory equally emphasizes ideology and economic hegemony as developed in the writings of Antonio Gramsci.<sup>14</sup>

The traditional security paradigm claims to be an objective science or theory. John Maclean aptly demonstrates that international theory (the traditional paradigm) is ideological in the sense that it has distorted 'reality' by removing "... the theoretical power of the totality of social relations on the one hand, and the historical and social context of concrete and empirical social relations at all levels on the other" (Maclean 1981, 119). He goes on to state:

... that the holist methodology developed by Marx is superior. It includes, or more precisely, starts from, the phenomena observable to us in international relations, but also offers both a coherent and sustained epistemological basis for going beyond reality as it appears to be, and a secure platform from which to oppose, within the discipline and the practice of international relations, that view which holds that international relations are fundamentally and timelessly irrational (Maclean 1981, 120).

One of the leaders in critical international theory, Robert Cox, builds on historical materialism using Gramsci's concept of hegemony.<sup>15</sup> "Hegemony at

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<sup>14</sup> For an excellent introduction and overview of Gramscian political economy I refer the reader to Capitalist Hegemony and the 'New' World Order: A Gramscian Analysis of Global Restructuring, a master's thesis by David Hooey (1992).

<sup>15</sup> Cox demonstrates that Gramsci applies hegemony to the bourgeoisie, the dominant class. And since their hegemony is entrenched in civil society they do not have to run the state themselves. Hegemony is not the dominance of one state over another it is a world order of class interests based on an historical reality. For a detailed discussion see Cox (1983).

the international level is thus not merely an order among states. It is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production..." (Cox 1983, 171). Hegemony is not to be conflated with dominance of one state over another. Hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, is realized when there is widespread acceptance of the predominant ideology and economic conditionalities of a leading class. It is not based on a crude economic determinism or state-centrism, as in orthodox Marxism. Hegemony must be contested and "...determined by a range of national, cultural, economic and historical factors" (Hooey 1992, 30). This sets the theoretical foundations for an international relations theory which can be more inclusive and more holistic, in that it includes social, political, economic, gender and environmental security issues.

As well, Cox states that '[t]heory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose' (Cox 1981, 128 original emphasis). So, while traditional security thinking is preoccupied with trying to influence the state and political elite with its ideology of *realpolitik*, critical security studies is geared toward the security, protection and even emancipation of the politically and economically marginalized from structures of oppression and violence (Jones 1995; Cox 1981; Dalby 1991). Critical international relations theory questions the very foundations of security studies. It is, as delineated by Cox (1981), concerned with the historical process. It questions the nature and the means of institutions and socio-political relations and whether or not they may be changing. It asks:



what is security; whose security are we to be concerned with; what insecurities do they face; and who are the actors of change?

Critical Security Studies insists on taking the broader security agenda seriously. This does not entail any attempt to deny or ignore the continuing salience or importance of military security. It does mean, however, that proponents of Critical Security Studies, by placing 'the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless' at the centre of its agenda recognize that for most of the world's population, apparently 'marginal' or 'esoteric' concerns — such as environmental security, food security and economic security — are far more real and immediate threats to security than interstate war. Indeed in very many cases, and not only in the disadvantaged South, the arms purchased and the powers accrued by governments under the guise of protecting their citizens from interstate war are far more potent threats to the security of those citizens than any putative foreign enemy. Eschewing the statism of mainstream security discourse, proponents of Critical Security Studies recognize that, globally, the sovereign state is one of the main causes of insecurity: it is part of the problem rather than the solution (Jones 1995, 309-310).

In the dominant world of global *realpolitik*, the sovereign nation state is the guardian of security. Yet from an individual, community, environmental or global perspective such a state within the capitalist system is the protector of a small political, economic and military elite, "...whose main purpose is to maintain and strengthen these groups' already dominant position" (Jones 1995, 311).

The Westphalian system of the nation state as the protector of the individual is failing at the human and global level (Booth 1991). The state is unable to protect the individual or community from global economic forces and is even the perpetuator of social-political human rights violations (Makhijani 1991).

At the global level the state system is unable to deal with international and global environmental disasters and is the perpetrator of the threat of nuclear annihilation.

Critical international relations theory provides an historical means of understanding the hegemony of the global capitalist system. With such a theoretical reference point a more holistic understanding of security issues becomes apparent and easier to understand.

### **International Critical Theory as a Theoretical Framework**

This chapter has reviewed the various schools and debates that are presently pursued in the international security literature, including the realist, neo-realist and idealist schools of thought. Furthermore, it has brought in the debate emerging out of the global-human security paradigm, namely the international critical theory school which is questioning the very foundations of international relations theory.

It has been argued that international critical theory provides a superior understanding of international relations and security for those who believe the purpose of analysis is to search for ways to improve peoples' lives. The traditional security paradigm has focused on the security of the state and the governing elite at the expense of security for communities and people(s). It over-accentuates the political power relations between states, thus falling into the trap of simplistic reductionism. Critical security theory examines global social,


cultural, economic and political power structures as a holistic system. This in turn provides a more holistic understanding of the hegemony of the global capitalist system. Finally, as a more inclusive theory that focuses on the marginalized, it helps highlight the 'real' security and insecurity dilemmas facing people, as opposed to those emphasized by the ruling hegemony.

## Chapter 3

### The Real World of Traditional Security

This chapter describes the various aspects of what in this thesis I refer to as the traditional security paradigm, portrayed in Figure 1 below. This is the

*Figure 1 Hierarchy of traditional security paradigm*



main concept of security that has survived since the seventeenth century, it is a form of militarism, and “has been defined almost entirely in terms of national survival needs” (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 78-79). The traditional security structure is hierarchical. Essentially, it is based on military structures and assumes that an elite governing structure can ensure the security

of a whole population. The state, using military, economic and political powers, controls its population and maintains its interests in an anarchical state system.

## **National Security**

Security from this perspective simply means that the state (or potentially a larger regime which supersedes the state, as proposed by world federalists) is the only structure that has the legitimate right to use coercive power to ensure that law and order are maintained. Thus security is a matter of protecting state or regime stability from external or internal acts of aggression.

Within this perspective, the state's monopoly of the use of coercive power is not questioned; in fact, such power is seen as essential for security. What is questioned is the configuration of power within and between states. Thus within this perspective, the various schools of thought debate who within a regime has legitimacy to exert coercive power. For example, in a liberal democracy to what extent is the military responsible to democratic forces? Traditionally, even in liberal democracies, foreign affairs and military relations have been highly secretive areas of decision making with very limited democratic participation, all for reasons of "national security".

In addition the debate is about how states should best improve military power relations between each other. This includes debates on topics such as: 1) what size of military is needed in a particular geo-strategic position; 2) whether or not a multi-polar balance-of-power is more stable than either a bipolar balance-

of-power or hegemonic power; and 3) is a nuclear weapons system more secure than a conventional weapons system?

The debate also includes discussions on how to best maximize the benefits of political agreements between states — what type of state coalition agreements can strengthen state security, and regional, bilateral, multilateral or international agreements? But in general the state remains *prima facie*:

International stability and cooperation are welcomed by most states in the world, only because most states support the status quo, but this does not mean that their commitment to some ideal of international cooperation supersedes or contradicts their attachment to their own state interests (Holmes 1993, 334).

## **Collective Security**

Collective security is a term used by both the realist and idealist schools; but each has very different underlining assumptions when using the term. In the idealist literature, collective security relies on all international actors renouncing the use of coercive force and accepting international law. This perspective will be further discussed under the heading of 'common security' in the following chapter. This thesis uses the term collective security only in the realist sense of its meaning, described below.

From the traditional paradigm perspective, James Goodby (1993) effectively argues that collective security does not have to be "a universal alliance committed to the automatic use of force anywhere in the world against

any aggressor no matter what the circumstances" (Goodby 1993, 305).

Collective security has a basic underlying military base. Goodby outlines a number of criteria for when collective military action should be taken. It does not represent a fundamental change to the concept of collective security. The principle remains unchallenged, that military power will be used, but it will only be used within particular and pre-arranged conditions. Furthermore, whether collective security includes all states or is a small group of nations, the central proposition is that if one of the states is attacked, then by a pre-arranged moral and legal agreement the members of the collective security pact will act as though all were attacked. As a united military force the states will use their collective military power (from threats to actual military intervention) to coerce the attacker to meet their demands (Morgenthau in Goodby 1993, 304). Lastly, collective security does not rule out intervention in another country's domestic affairs as long as the collective pact perceives the actions of that state as a threat to one or all of them. It is in this direction that peacekeeping in the 1990s is heading under the leadership of the United States.

As outlined in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the conditions of collective security are based on the same fundamental military principles as discussed above. "It is inherently military focused" (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 80). There is a normative dimension to collective security (and military alliances as discussed next). Collective security is based on the assumption that states and governing elites will adhere to their moral and legal

obligations. For example, it is assumed that the US and Britain will not use their nuclear weapons against each other since they are NATO partners. If the international system were truly based on military might and power and was an anarchical system such disputes would not be inconceivable.

It should be noted that in principal, collective security as envisaged under the Charter of the United Nations is profoundly different from collective security of military alliances, such as NATO which I explain in more detail below. In practice, the use of collective security undertaken by the United Nations have essentially been missions of collective defence. The Korean war, although officially a UN collective security action, was clearly a United States 'defence' action to curtail the spread of communism. The Gulf War, although defended as a legally constituted collective security action, was a full-fledged US-lead military invasion of Iraq.

## **Military Alliances**

Military alliances have played major roles in traditional security systems. Until recently such international military politics were dominated by the Cold War and its two alliances, NATO and the WARSAW Pact. Although Third World countries formed the Non-Aligned Movement, the Eastern and Western alliances affected the very security and foreign policy of every nation in the world by actively involving themselves in conflicts around the world.



Traditional security perceives military alliances as a type of collective defence, and once again, it is assumed and strongly argued that such alliances, if properly maintained and organized, will enhance a country's security by counter-balancing other military powers, be they countries or alliances. The UN is now partially playing this role since the end of the Cold War. Enabling coalitions to act on its behalf in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and the Gulf War are prime examples of this new role for the UN. As a collective security agency the UN has legitimized the ability of coalitions (US and NATO led) to do 'peacekeeping' (warmaking might be a better term) from an offensive and non-neutral stance. In the three cases just mentioned the UN has gone beyond its Cold War role of acting as a impartial peacekeeper to become a third actor in those conflicts. The UN Security Council, which is an oligarchy of western states, is acting upon and protecting western interests. It is my belief that it is mere double speak to refer to NATO bombings against Serbian forces as part of UN peacekeeping or peacemaking. No matter what one thinks of the actions of the Serbian forces, these bombings were state violence, implemented for and on behalf of a western military alliance, and thus these actions can only be referred to as 'acts of war'.

In the case of the Gulf War, traditional security appeared to work very well. Not only was Iraq removed from Kuwait but the potential regional military power and hegemony that Iraq could have built was demolished, ensuring that Western interests were not threatened in the region (Hippler 1994). In the case

of the former Yugoslavia, the collective use of military force has enforced a Western dominated peace accord. In the case of Somalia, here is what one author has had to say:

It was a mistake to allow Admiral Howe's gun diplomacy to dominate, for right from the start it undermined even the idea of peace. In the event, the UN reverted to the bullying tactics of a Rambo on the rampage and lost, giving Aideed's rag-tag army of flip-flop-wearing militiamen the erroneous impression that they had won a historic battle.

Back to squaring the circle of terror, we are forever hostages to the warlords. To the UN, I would say: 'Good riddance'; to the warlords: 'Plague on your plunder' — and to peace: 'Please come where you are most welcome. We've missed you! (Farah 1995).

As an outcome of collective security, and even due to perceived national security needs, nation states have created and maintained various forms of military alliances. The balance-of-power between the Warsaw Pact and NATO alliances have been considered, in the theoretical literature, as the fundamental force that has kept world peace from 1945 to the late 1980s. Within the various schools there is much debate about how the balance-of-power manifested itself, ranging from those who believed an unlimited and uncontrolled build-up of nuclear armaments was essential to those who put forward the belief that arms control was essential in maintaining a balance-of-terror.

## **Armaments procurement and production**

Another outcome of traditional security is that the very power base of a nation, military alliance or collective security system is military procurement and

production. From this perspective the show of strength, and thus security, is in the economic and industrial capacity of a nation to design and manufacture weapons systems or, alternatively, to purchase weapons systems. The larger and more pervasive the military industrial complex of a nation or military bloc, supposedly the more stable the security system.

The concept of traditional security has provided the rationale for creating powerful national military systems, for selling, procuring and producing massive arsenals of conventional and nuclear armaments, and for forming exclusive military alliances. These are the broad policy approaches that are supposed to provide security — security being the protection against internal or external aggression.

The 1980s were characterized by some as the age of militarization (Wallensteen, 1985). Global military spending peaked in 1987 at \$995 billion US and since that time it has gradually decreased, reaching \$767 billion US in 1994 (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 124). From the 1960s to 1992 Third World military expenditures grew three times faster than similar expenditures among the industrialized countries. From 1973 to 1989 total Third World real military expenditure went from \$95.3 billion to a massive \$220 billion (1982 constant US dollars). Arms imports for the same period had an average annual growth rate of 7% (Suchman and Eyre 1992, 137). More recent figures show that military expenditures have begun to decline for Third World countries and

that global arms transfers have dropped from just over \$70 billion in 1987 to \$32 billion in 1993 — the largest portion of this reduction being due to Russian/Soviet Union reductions which have gone from just over \$30 billion to \$2.8 billion. Yet the Third World continues to be the primary purchaser of arms. In 1993, the Third World consumed 65% of global arms transfers (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 127).

It is no coincidence that the five major exporters of weapons and weapon-systems have been and continue to be the five permanent powers of the UN Security Council (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 127). These exports not only helped to subsidize their own military industries but fit well with their political and economic foreign policies, which constituted attempts to encourage Third World nations to remain or become loyal to one side or the other in a divided world. Part of the result has been massive military spending by governments and the establishment of military governments in the Middle East and in South and East Asia (Kaldor in SIPRI, 1985; Myrdal, 1976).

### ***Small Arms***

Throughout East and Southeast Asia and throughout the Middle East there continue to be arms races between China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan and even escalating arms buildups in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Most of the build-up is in the area of small armaments.

Another major factor and concern is that small arms are playing a larger role in conflicts around the world. It is very difficult to control the manufacture and purchase of these weapons, and since they are relatively cheap a state or group can buy thousands of small machine guns for the price of what one tank would have cost. The world market is glutted with M-16s, AK-47s, Stinger surface-to-surface missiles, landmines of all types and many other weapons (Rana 1995). "Many of the small arms used in Rwanda were reported to be shipped in from Uganda where an AK-47 could be obtained for the price of a chicken" (Rana 1995, 5). So, although arms transfers in terms of dollar amounts are decreasing, the number of small arms and problems associated with them is expected to increase.

Until recently, small arms were considered somewhat marginal to the international arms trade. Now, it is being increasingly recognized by some major military manufacturers that small arms may well be the weapons faced worldwide in actual situations of combat into the late 1990's and the early 21st century. The United States is believed to have made the maximum investment in research and development on small arms (Rana 1995, 6).

These are the weapons of choice for small insurgency groups and it is Third World states that are most often faced with such conflicts. The likely response of military and autocratic regimes will be a further restriction of social and political rights which in turn will incite further cause for rebellion and uprising.

From the extreme end of the traditional security perspective, more armaments equals more security, although a more moderate view would argue

that arms-control, arms-agreements and even arms-limitations may provide a more balanced and thus a more secure system.

## **Military Security IS Security**

This chapter has attempted to briefly demonstrate that in practice the real world of traditional security is focused almost exclusively on military power. This preoccupation of militarism is packaged in a variety of ways, some more benevolent than others. All focus on an international system of military stability. While some focus on arms control and stability (collective and common security) others focus on military superiority and/or dominance (national or collective defence and alliances). And all are concerned with the military security of the state as opposed to the economic cultural and political well-being of people and the ecological survival of the earth.

The following chapter will address current post-Cold War security issues. It will demonstrate that the traditional security paradigm is unable to address these issues. Thus, these objective conditions are realizing the development of a new global-human security paradigm. The social political rise of this paradigm, inevitably, makes it more inclusive of the rising security issues facing individuals, communities and the globe.

## **Chapter 4**

### **The Changing World of Global Security Trends**

War has been and is the central security issue which most visibly impacts upon states and people around the world. Although, since the end of the Cold War, world military spending and arms transfers to the developing world have decreased, in 1994, thirty-nine major conflicts continued to be waged around the world, the majority of which were being fought in the developing countries of the South (Project Ploughshares, 1995). Most of these conflicts are internal/civil wars with the larger proportion of the victims being civilian non-combatants who are maimed and killed in the battles, and are left homeless and starving because of the war's destructive power. Since 1945, it is estimated that well over 40 million people have died because of the direct and indirect effects of war. And from 1987 to 1994 the number of war refugees doubled from 13 million to 26 million people while the number of internally displaced persons has shown an even more dramatic increase (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). Children and women are among the prime victims of war.

It is within this context of the growing destructive impact war has on societies and people and within the context of the growing internationalization and even globalization of military, social, economic and environmental problems that the very nature and perceptions of security have changed. This chapter

examined these changes while the implications for security policies will be outlined in chapter six.

## **Nuclear Weapons**

One of the first and most apparent global factors to have caused a perceptual shift in security after World War II was the threat of nuclear weapons. Although the threat of nuclear annihilation hung over the heads of most people since the early 1950s it was only in the late 1960s and 1970s that a growing number of people began to be aware of the looming threat. By the mid 1980s it was evident to a vast number of people world-wide that the very survival of the world was in the control of the two superpowers. Never before had everyone's existence been threatened by so few. In a best seller, The Fate of the Earth (1982), Jonathan Schell described a bleak vision of the earth following a nuclear war as a 'republic of insects and grass':

It is often assumed that the holocaust, even if it were full-scale, would be restricted to the Northern Hemisphere [...] but in fact there is no assurance that hostilities would not spread to other parts of the world (Schell 1982, 71).

The nuclear destruction of the earth, according to Schell, would mostly be due to the environmental collapse brought on by a full-scale nuclear war. It is within this context that (in)security began to be re-examined. Shortly after Schell's book the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (the Palme Commission) released its report Common Security: A Programme for



Disarmament (1982). Its central theme was the prevention of nuclear war by means of an agenda for what the authors called Common Security. The basic principle proposed was that, "International security must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than on a threat of mutual destruction" (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, 1982, xi).

During the height of the Cold War, the Commission was far-reaching in its recommendations and proposals from nuclear disarmament to reforming the United Nations. Even economic security for the Third World was among the recommendations. But the report consistently referred back to the threat of nuclear weapons and the enormous costs of the arms race. In retrospect, the security of the Third World seemed to be secondary to the security issues of the major powers:

We are convinced that it is absolutely necessary to meet the security needs of the Third World by collective responsibility. These needs are closely intertwined with efforts to safeguard peace and improve relations between the nuclear powers (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982, xi).

A key proposal in our recommendations is the implementation of a modified version of the UN Charter's concept of collective security. Its basis would be political agreement and partnership between the permanent members of the Security Council and Third World countries. *Its scope would be limited to Third World conflicts...* (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, 1982 emphasis added p. 162-163).

Again, in retrospect, one wonders why the Palme Commission singled out Third World conflicts as appropriate for collective UN action and not the conflicts of the Northern industrialized nations? Eurocentricity is one obvious explanation.

The main point to be made is that the concept of security had begun to shift its priorities and its prescriptions for implementation well before the end of the Cold War was even in sight. Nuclear deterrence was presented as militarily unstable and even as an agent of economic destabilization since it consumed so much energy, people, resources and dollars (Bok and Vayrynen in SIPRI 1985; Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982; Kaldor 1978). "We are all in the same boat," was the new refrain coming forward from all sides.

## **Ecology and Development**

Alongside the anti-nuclear war movement was the beginnings of the environmental movement. Like the anti-nuclear war movement that of the environment had its own landmark report — Our Common Future from the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987). As this Commission pointed out, along with a large number of scientists and environmentalists, the environment has no boundaries; the negative effects of over-industrialization, massive military spending and poverty are local, regional and global.

In the past 20 years we have moved from awareness of isolated and local instances of environmental damage to the recognition of much more system-wide problems. With acid rain, global warming,

widespread ocean pollution, and holes in the ozone layer... (Clow, 1994, 4).

It was increasingly apparent that ecological disaster now threatened our very survival on this earth; that is, if we did not follow the plan of the Commission, or at least if we did not revise our concept of security to include the environment and development. Unlimited economic growth and the waste of resources on the arms race not only destabilized security but actually threatened to cause the collapse of the ecological system. On the regional and local level it could exacerbate or cause conflicts such as the struggle over scarce resources (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 291-294).

Military defense, or the acquisition of armaments, cannot resolve environmental problems. Nor can it help to limit or change the dominant development process so that it can now fit within the parameters of a 'sustainable development'. In fact, arms and violent conflict can only worsen environmental insecurity (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 294-300). Witness the Gulf War where environmental disaster was commonplace, threatening the regional atmosphere, oceans and water supplies.

## **Social Threats**

Over the past two decades the world has appeared to be shrinking — we can travel anywhere worldwide at any time in a matter of hours; communications have improved to the point where we can watch an event anywhere on the planet as it is happening; and, we can communicate by phone, fax, and e-mail

without knowing we have crossed borders. For this thesis I downloaded important documents from Project Ploughshares in Waterloo, ON and from the United Nations through one of its computers, somewhere either in New York, Vienna or Geneva, within minutes, and without moving from my desk.

Whether globalization can be objectively measured economically or not, the perception of globalization is in itself a force that is changing the concept of security. When we are able to watch wars as they actually take place or we are able to view the horrors of military rule and underdevelopment in a country half way around the world, our perception of (in)security is bound to change.

The impact of social, economic and political problems have more than a moral, ethical or perceptual impact. The impact on a global level is physical and tangible. It is not a coincidence that most wars are being fought in the poorest regions of the world. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali states it clearly: "Our Aims must be clear: [...] And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression" (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). Economic, environmental, social and military problems have displaced tens of millions of people, and left tens of millions homeless. Over one thousand million people are estimated to be destitute (Senarclens 1994, 441). Economic and war refugees are moving back and forth across borders by the hundreds of millions. They have ominous effects on financial and environmental and local, regional and international resources.

Social issues, including population growth, environmental limits, food and energy consumption, poverty, unemployment and immigration have security dimensions on a global scale: "...they are already influencing the development and security of communities, states and international relations as a whole" (Senarclens 1994, 448). And furthermore, as an example of insecurity: "...political strife over access to resources and their distribution will intensify in industrialized and poor countries alike" (Senarclens 1994, 441).

The typical armed conflict does not result from a state's ambitions for regional or global dominance, but from its failure to foster or maintain a society that can provide adequately for its own citizens, either for their political, social, and economic rights and interests or for their basic, physical needs (Project Ploughshares, 1995).

## **The Growing Threats of Conventional Weapons**

In a sense we have gone full circle. In any discussion on traditional security the main concept is that of national or state security being protected by building a strong military force, with the ultimate security umbrella being nuclear weapons. But as this thesis has shown, nuclear weapons are perceived more as actual threats to our very security both in military terms and socio-economic terms. Thus, the traditional security blanket must revert back to the notion of using conventional weapons. But this argument also has major flaws — not necessarily theoretical flaws, or flaws affecting American or European academics, or political, and military elites who make the decisions about war. Rather it involved flaws for the tens of millions of refugees, millions of wounded

civilians and those who will die. It destroys communities and states, socially, economically and environmentally.

Most current conflicts are fought by low-paid, or unpaid, soldiers equipped with light, easily obtainable weapons. 'Small arms,' the ones that do most of the killing on the planet, are relatively cheap, and business in small arms is still booming. In Rwanda, surely one of the deadliest conflicts the world has witnessed for some time, AK-47 assault rifles were reportedly more common than bicycles in 1994 (Project Ploughshares, 1995).

As mentioned earlier in chapter three, small arms may well be the weapon of choice now and for the next few decades. The problem is that arms control, arms verification, arms limitation, arms agreements and disarmament measures are extremely difficult, if not impossible to implement because of the very nature of small arms. The latter are small, easy to transport, and easy to produce (Rana 1995, 15-16). The state, especially states that are considered illegitimate or where the political culture perceives small arms as essential to individual freedom, is losing its ability to deal with the problems of small arms. These are not just local, state or regional issues. Small arms are crossing borders world wide and, maybe even more significantly, there is a strong link between small arms and organized international crime (Rana 1995 p.15-16).

Small arms, like nuclear weapons, have in and of themselves become security problems for individuals and the world. The impact of their destruction is immeasurable — millions of refugees to tens of thousands are wounded, killed or unable to work because of landmines alone.

## **Economic Threats and Globalization**

The UNDP 1994 Human Development Report's principal concern was the peace dividend and human security. Human security, from the UNDP's perspective, includes economic, food, health, environment, personal, community and political security — a truly comprehensive list of security needs. In a slightly more detailed explanation, economic security, according to the UNDP, is defined as requiring "an assured basic income — usually from productive and remunerative work, or in the last resort from some publicly financed safety net" (UNDP 1994, 25).

This definition of economic security oversimplifies and misconstrues the problem, however. Yes, employment and even a 'social safety net' are essential for peoples' economic well-being. Policy measures that institutionalize employment measures and social security protection are essential. But the Report's focus on human and global security ignores the systemic problems of the global economic system by failing to adequately analyze what causes unemployment and inequality. The UNDP Report is concerned about economic security only in the sense that unemployment or under-employment may cause social or military violence — that is, when economics impacts upon the political.

The present global capitalist economic system does not function to create employment and economic security for everyone equally. Rather, it is structured in opposition to that desired goal. Profit maximization sanctions and even

requires the maximization of production with a minimal work force and lowest possible wages. Lower wages in turn can be obtained when there is a high level of unemployment. This may appear to be a simplistic sketch of the capitalist system but it represents the essential logic inherent in the system. It is a system which is not conducive to human security goals, even as outlined by the UNDP. It is a system that thrives on competition and inequality. "Economic competition and conflict have taken on the very characteristics of active, slaughtering warfare — from propaganda and scapegoating to the loss of lives, displacement of populations and the destruction of natural and built environments" (Franklin 1996, 13). It is an understanding of the global capitalist system that the UNDP Report is missing and requires if it is to fully grasp the subjective and objective reality of global-human security.

### ***Multi-national Corporations***

To understand economic (in)security we need to address the actors involved. The state is not the only actor in international relations. However, by separating politics from economics it is easy to come to this conclusion, as do neorealists and other academics within the field of traditional security. Yet when attempting to understand social economic power relations it is apparent at all levels that various actors and forces are at play — it is not just the state that has power over international relations. There are both immutable and changeable forces at the global level.



Firstly, the immutable global forces are those forces inherent in global ecological and even social systems. The earth's ozone layer is the epitome of such a force. Its destruction would be the destruction of all society and even the earth's biosphere — it is an inherent power that forces all individuals, societies and institutions to find a means to protect the ozone in order to save civilization as we know it. It is thus an essentially immutable relationship. Or, at the economic level we can say that inherent in trade at all levels, person to person or global, are social relations between individuals, communities or their institutions. Such social relations, in essence, are about power — whether equal or unequal, whether fair or unfair, the existence of these relations is immutable; that is they cannot be gotten rid of, but their form is changeable. Thus, the second set of global forces are those that are imposed upon the environment by human activities and institutions. Changeable forces are extrinsic to ecological or social relations; they are imposed upon systems by societal norms, culture and beliefs. Destruction of the ozone is not inherent to trade relations, although on the other hand depletion of the ozone is an inevitable outcome of unrestrained industrialization. Thus, there exists a simple power relation that demonstrates that unrestrained industrialization has destructive power. As a global society we ultimately have the choice to restrain industrialization to protect the ozone or attempt another form of development that will not harm the ozone. Those are changeable relationships.

As this thesis is concerned primarily with those economic actors and forces which impact upon security, I will return to that discussion. In the present global system, which is a global capitalist system (Petras and Polychroniou 1995; Frank 1983; Makhijani 1991), it is apparent that corporations are one of the central actors that work outside the scope of the state and even use the state for their own purposes. Corporations, using the state as their conduit, have defined the international trading system. They have made the latter a system geared toward profit maximization and since these corporations are principally located in the developed world, capital automatically flows to them. Although the relation of dependency or exploitation has been most harsh on the Third World, in reality we do not have to turn to the South to see the effects of this relationship. There are clear examples in the Canadian context. For several decades Cape Breton helped fuel the Canadian economy<sup>16</sup> with coal and steel. The profits of the resource extraction were withdrawn from the region, enlarging the profits of multinational corporations first in Britain and then in the US and central Canada. The region is now one of the poorest in Canada.

On a global scale the South has supplied the North with raw materials, food products (tea, bananas, etc.) and cheap labour. Inherent in this immutable relationship has been an unequal and unfair exchange. As a result, "Third World states suffer an acute lack of control over the international environment in which

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<sup>16</sup> In part Cape Breton supplied coal and steel to first the British and, later in the century, to the American economy.

they must function [...]. Hence, states which are dependent on the export of single commodities [...] are extremely vulnerable to the workings of a mechanism which is completely outside their control" (Thomas 1987, 4). The state has regulated trade relations to ensure the corporations' ability to develop international trade, and often it has used military power to enforce and impose those trade relations. In today's global economy the state appears to be negotiating regional and global trade relations that minimize its own or other institutional abilities to interfere with global corporate trade. Corporations now make decisions largely independent of states, and these decisions directly impact on the social, political and economic well-being of people, determine state policies and set the agenda for the global monetary and trade institutions. Arun Makhijani judiciously describes the contemporary role and power of corporations in the following paragraph:

Annual sales of the largest multinational corporations total around \$100 billion, exceeding the gross national products (GNP) of all but half-a-dozen Third World countries and the GNPs of many relatively wealthy capitalist nations as well. Moreover, banks and corporations have much more concentrated control over these sums of money than many nations do. They can generate revenue in hard currency, which generally is in short supply in Third World countries. Large portions of their holdings are liquid or can be converted to liquid assets. They can move capital around the world with the speed of an electric signal in a computer network. They can invest in or divest from communities and countries at a moment's notice. They are responsible for the extraction of vast quantities of the earth's natural resources. To a considerable degree they determine the prices of products around the world. Their policies are not restrained internally or guided by the well-being of the community or the environment. And they are institutionally unabashedly devoted to the pursuit of profit (Makhijani 1991, 187).

The unidirectional pursuit of profits and the lack of control by the world's populations and institutions over corporations is a direct threat to peoples' and communities' economic security. At this level of decision making, corporations can determine whether or not a region, state, community or individual is worthy of their investment and employment. In most places around the globe, at a moment's notice they can reduce personal wages or delete a job, while individuals and communities have few, if any, economic alternatives.

### ***Global Institutions***

At the global level the economic elite, with the support of the governments of nation states, have established world institutions that extend corporate dominance on a world scale. The Bretton Woods institutions are predominantly controlled by the United States, Japan and Germany and thus implement policy primarily determined by (western) neo-liberal ideology (Thomas 1987; Petras and Polychroniou 1995). The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) structural adjustment programs not only impose and guard a neo-liberal economic agenda, but often foment violent political strife. Strikes, riots and rebellions have ensued against the harsh and even oppressive measures that have been taken in compliance with structural adjustment policies (Petras and Polychroniou 1995; Thomas 1987). For example, in the mid to late 1980s at least twenty violent protests were staged in Third World countries on which structural adjustment was imposed, resulting in over 3,000 dead (Ferraro and Rosser 1994). Petras and Polychroniou go on to argue "that state repression rises geometrically with

the decline of income, and state budget cuts in health, education, and pensions” (Petras and Polychroniou 1995, PE-40).

Repressive policies against workers and unions are standard features of the structural adjustment programmes. The World Bank and the IMF support such anti-democratic policies. By bolstering compliant regimes financially and managerially they enhance their capacity to override popular opposition (Bjorn Beckman in Hooey 1992, 118).

However, the effect of structural adjustment programs goes well beyond the fomenting of social unrest. It directly undermines the economic security of whole populations by further impoverishing states (Petras and Polychroniou 1995; Thomas 1987; Ferraro and Rosser 1994). “The sobering point is that programs of this sort have been adopted repeatedly and have failed repeatedly” (Jeffrey Sachs quoted in Ferraro and Rosser 1994, 341). Social conditions in Third World countries have been worsened by the slash and burn policies of the IMF and World Bank. Structural adjustment programs prevent governments from investing in state infrastructure and social programs (Thomas 1987; Chossudovsky 1995). Yet, no country is isolated from the policies of the World Bank and IMF, including the developed world. For the past decade, it would appear that Canada has been ‘voluntarily’ implementing similar austerity programs for the same reasons — debt reduction, cutting social programs, encouragement of foreign investment and increased exports, with pressure from international monetary institutions.

These policies exacerbate rather than alleviate the debt crisis that many Third World (and developed) nations face. According to Ferraro and Rosser (1994) the debt crisis has a self-reinforcing dynamic. Money that could be used for increased production or increased social well-being is used to service foreign debts. In turn, production falls off, leading toward further indebtedness. The social and economic costs of the debt for many nations are debilitating and violent, as outlined in the following:

Money that *could* have been used to build schools or hospitals in developing countries is now going to the advanced industrialized countries [as interest payments]. As a consequence, fewer babies will survive their first year [...] Capital that *could* have been used to build factories and provide jobs is now sent abroad; as a result, the problem of unemployment and underemployment will only get worse in poor countries (Ferraro and Rosser 1994, 345, emphasis added).

The capitalist system is constantly in flux and expansion. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is an example of capital's need to prioritize unrestricted trade over the human need of securing employment and over the ability of a community or nation to choose its own economic structure and policies. The NAFTA enables corporations to move resources and goods between Canada, the US and Mexico with fewer obstacles and costs being placed in their way (Lal 1994).

The NAFTA was seen by indigenous leaders in Mexico as the continuance and deepening of 'American imperialism'. Exacerbated by 500

years of struggle against European and American (neo)colonialism, indigenous people led a rebellion in Chiapas just hours after the NAFTA came into effect (Lal 1994). *Comandante* Marcos put it candidly: "The free-trade agreement is a death certificate for the Indian peoples of Mexico..." (Lal 1994, 1515). Free trade is an instrument for ensuring the security of corporations; that is, it ensures the free mobility of capital while restricting labour's mobility. Accordingly, it diminishes the human security needs of most people and their communities. Consequently, those who do not benefit from liberalized trade perceive the NAFTA as an injustice and as an institutionalized form of violence against people.

On a global scale a small economic elite benefit from its institutions, corporations and, through control of international governing institutions and nation states, they are able to set national laws, international norms and agreements that accommodate their interests. To protect these institutions, security has been defined and operationalized in terms that protect the nation state and its governing elite — which are actually controlled by corporations and their owners. But, when we begin to perceive security from the perspective of the majority of people — the poor and marginalized, women, non-European, — economic and social justice become interchangeable with the concept of security.

## ***Militarism***

Marilyn Waring (1988) gives an excellent overview of the development of the orthodox measures used to determine economic growth. She outlines the relationship between our current system of economic measurement and militarism. The creation of the GNP as a measure between 1939 and 1943 by Keynes, Stone and Gilbert was essentially a system to help pay for the war. A 1939 paper co-authored by John Maynard Keynes and Richard Stone entitled The National Income and Expenditure of the United Kingdom, and How to Pay for the War, set the stage for further development by Milton Gilbert of our present day national accounting system. "But Gilbert's purpose and economic problem was 'how to pay for the war'. He strongly supported the use of the GNP as the *proper measure in analyzing the economic relationship between defence expenditure and total output*" (Waring 1988, 56 original emphasis). Thus, as Waring properly points out, "national income estimates everywhere, to this day, [are] an assessment of *how best to pay for the war*" (Waring 1988, 56-57, original emphasis).<sup>17</sup>

The 'military industrial complex' still permeates all sectors of society. In fact, the US economy is heavily over-dependent on military expenditure (Galbraith 1992). World military expenditure has dropped from almost a trillion dollars per year in 1987 to only \$767 billion per year in 1994. Most of this

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<sup>17</sup> Waring's main argument is that the United Nation's standards of economic measurement are biased against women, the poor, the marginalized and the ecosystem.



decrease is due to the collapse of the military economy of the former USSR (Commission on World Governance 1995). The US, while cutting costs, has improved the 'killing and maiming-efficiency' of its armed forces through modernization (McMurty 1991).

Militarism is first and foremost an ideology that espouses the belief that political violence is legitimate and even necessary. But militarism is also reflected in the structure of the world economic system. It is associated with authoritarian and repressive governments, which have massive military capabilities. A large segment of society, including its resources, finances and people are geared toward maintaining the military system. The Third World's largest source of armaments is the industrialized North. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has become by far the leading arms exporter to the Third World. On top of supplying arms to the South, the industrialized North, in particular the US, has helped to install military regimes in the Third World and provided them with political and economic support (Forsythe 1992).

If a country develops an economic system that is based on how to pay for the war, and if the amounts of fixed capital investments that are apparent are tied up in armaments, and if that country is a major exporter of arms and its industrial fabric is dependent on them, then it would be in that country's interests to ensure that it always has a market. It is not an exaggeration to say that *it is clearly in the interests of the world's leading arms exporters to make sure there is always a war going on somewhere* (Waring 1987, 170, emphasis added).

On the other hand, the standard UN indicators of economic growth leave out poverty, unemployment, starvation, war and even death as insignificant factors in the global capitalist system.

The military system exploits massive amounts of resources, energy and people. Essentially, the military system is much less productive than a civilian sector. Civilian production and services create more jobs and produce end products that are used for further production and reproduction. The military system is inflationary and unstable since it is a supply controlled industry. Under the auspices of national security, governments will spend immense amounts to get the military components or hardware they want, often at the expense of social programs. As for technical spin-offs from military research, it is ultimately more effective to spend money directly on civil research and technology rather than wait for the trickle down effects — which, if they come, are often small and insignificant to the real issues facing communities and individuals (Luckham 1978; Kaldor 1978; Dumas 1990).

More recent empirical studies show that the relationship between armament expenditures and economic growth is a negative one (Ball 1988; Deger 1986; Faini et. al. 1984; Mintz and Stevenson 1995; Abell 1994). A study by Julia Kwong and Zachary Zimmer analyzing modernization and dependency theories of development concluded:

Like dependency theorists, we have to conclude that arms imports hurt social development, the creation of an indigenous military

infrastructure does not necessarily benefit a nation, and that a nation is likely to gain from these programs when its military complex is capable of producing arms for sale to other countries [...] — increased militarization among the developing nations will damage their social development (Kwong and Zimmer 1995, 78).

Nicole Ball (1988) argues that economic development requires an equitable distribution of resources and a political system that enables various sectors to articulate their needs, but “[t]he greater the political power of the armed forces, the less likely it is that these requirements will be met” (Ball 1988, 391). Unfortunately, instead of securing the well-being of people, armed forces have shown more interest in expanding their own economic and political power (Ball 1988).

### ***Economic Security***

This thesis attempts to demonstrate that traditional security studies perspectives, including the established neo-realist and idealist/internationalist, fail to adequately explain the relationship between economics and security for the majority of the world’s population. Traditional security studies see security from the view-point of a dominant class (essentially an interlocking global economic, political and military elite). Historically, this dominant class has been confined to the nation state, but in recent history, technology, corporate expansion and international institutions have globalized this class of corporate owners, political and institutional managers and military elites.

Security, if properly understood, must be viewed from the perspective of the majority of the world's people. The protection of the nation state is not the prime goal of the non-elite. Economic security, the right to employment and an equitable livelihood is what determines the fate of most people. Essentially security is freedom from oppression and exploitation. From this perspective economics and security interweave and do not have to, as Ayoob argues, threaten "political outcomes that either affect the survivability of state boundaries, state institutions, or governing elites or weaken the capacity of states and regimes to act effectively in the realm of both domestic and international politics" (Ayoob 1995, 9). Ayoob's perspective is of interest, but it represents the security interest of the global ruling class which is predominantly white, male and European. From an equitable global-human security perspective, security is about ensuring the interests of the marginalized, the poor, women, non-white — in other words the vast majority of the world's population. Ensuring our security has very little to do with boundaries or state institutions. In fact, present institutions — corporations, military regimes, Bretton Woods institutions, neo-colonial structures, even the sovereign state as it is presently constituted — are what undermine the economic and social security of most people.

The present global capitalist system in conjunction with global militarism not only tolerates conditions of inequality, mass deprivation, mass poverty and mass insecurity; it thrives on such unacceptable conditions. While millions of people suffer directly from the consequences of war, everyday even more people

suffer and die from the structural violence of global capitalism and militarism — homelessness, hunger, starvation and social violence. As a poignant example, over 15 million children die each year from poverty and it can be shown that it is capitalism that keeps these children (one billion people in all) in absolute poverty (Paul Elins in Petras & Polychroniou 1995, PE-38).

## **Defining Global-human Security**

Using the above described threats and the emerging processes of globalization as outlined above this section will provide distinct definitions for both global security and human security as separate but compatible 'new' security concepts. Used together they form the basics for a comprehensive security system.

With these major developments as just outlined, it is no surprise that we have been beset with yet another commission dealing with the state of the earth. And with the end of the Cold War it is no surprise that once again security is a key issue. Our Global Neighbourhood, the Report of the Commission on Global Governance (1995), states that, "The security of people recognizes that global security extends beyond the protection of borders, ruling elites, and exclusive state interests to include the protection of people. It does not exclude military threats from the security agenda" (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 81).

It is important to note that this latest report, Our Global Neighbourhood, has taken us a step further and beyond the notion of common security.<sup>18</sup> It is not just with the common security of states that the report concerns itself when making recommendations. It is, as well, and importantly so, concerned with the common security of people. This is a step in the right direction toward recognizing changing power in the global system as outlined above. As one of its proposed international norms it recommends that military force not be recognized as a legitimate political instrument, yet it adds the following proviso: "except as self-defense or under UN auspices" (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 85).

As a report it makes a compromise between what ought to exist and what the commission believes is realistic. This might explain the above exception and why the report mentions the concepts of comprehensive security and human security but then proceeds to imply that these are noble but not necessarily realistic. Here is what it states just before putting these two concepts to the side:

[Collective security] is inherently military focused. Comprehensive security, on the other hand, emphasizes changing the present military-based notion of security. Among its dominant ideas are cooperation, confidence-building, transparency, gradual disarmament, conversion, demobilization, and demilitarization. Recently a new concept — human security — has received attention. This is a people centred approach that is concerned not so much with weapons as with basic human dignity. As explained in the Human Development Report 1994, human security includes safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression, as well as protection from sudden and harmful

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<sup>18</sup> For a complete definition of the term 'common security' see Palme (1982). It is in this report that the term was first popularized.

disruptions in the patterns of daily life (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 80).

As a practical political tool to support change, the report may be crucial in moving governments forward in adopting new approaches to security. But as a discussion on security issues the report fails to fully recognize the importance of the two concepts, comprehensive and human security. When it calls on governments to renounce force "except as self-defense or under UN auspices," it ultimately falls into the same old mold of traditional security. The global factors outlined in the previous sections of this chapter are real insecurities and cannot be fixed with force whether it be state-centred or a global force. A forceful response is apt to intensify some of the very problems it was meant to resolve. The Gulf War is a good example. Iraq, the aggressor country, invaded and occupied Kuwait. The traditional security response was to gang up and forcefully remove the Iraqi military from Kuwait. Within the guidelines of the report this ought to be done under the auspices of the UN. For the most part this is what actually happened, although officially it was only supported by the UN under an American lead coalition force which defended Kuwait from invasion. From the traditional security perspective the war was a success, pushing back Iraq and reducing its military power. Yet, from an approach that "includes the security of people and the planet" (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 78) the Gulf War was an indisputable disaster: leaving an estimated 100,000, or more, dead; as many if not more wounded; tens of thousands of refugees; economic

destruction of infrastructure and trade systems devastated in two countries; environmental disasters with oil spills and burning oil wells; and last, the fact that a brutal dictatorship continues in Iraq and an oppressive autocracy is well entrenched in the liberated nation of Kuwait.

Comprehensive and human security concepts are essentially normative and prescriptive in nature, but they are, as well, responses to real insecurities that affect all of us. These insecurities, as outlined above, demand more than the traditional military response because 1) the military is unable to resolve the problems; 2) a violent response may exacerbate and create greater problems; and 3) armament build-ups are an insecurity in and of themselves.

### ***Global Security***


Global security, then, is distinct from common security in that it perceives military force to be antithetical to security interests. The military industrial complex is a threat to society as is the build-up of nuclear and even conventional weapons. The fundamental threats facing nation states and the people of the world derive from social, economic and environmental problems. These threats cannot be dealt with using the traditional military response and indeed will only be exacerbated by such a response. Global security not only requires global political, social, ecological and economic responses; it is all of these.



## ***Human Security***

Human security on the other hand approaches security from the perspective of individuals and their community. It is a micro orientation which places emphasis on the socio-economic well-being of people. It is a form of security which assumes that people are the centre of security policies and not the nation state. It is compatible with and inherent in global security. Yet, it still does not encompass the broader range of factors of global-human security, portrayed in figure 2 below.

*Figure 2 Holistic Global-human security paradigm*



### ***Global-human Security***

I use the two terms, global and human, together since they are more descriptive of the security paradigm that is emerging, as outlined in this thesis. Comprehensive security does not reflect the duality of the system as presented here; thus I reject the term. The emerging security paradigm has both global and individual dimensions, it is both micro and macro oriented, and it is multi-dimensional — social, economic, cultural, gendered and political.

Peacekeeping as it is practiced within the framework of the traditional security paradigm is but one policy oriented toward preventing and stopping armed conflict. The following chapter will re-evaluate generic peacekeeping from a global-human security paradigm perspective. Obviously, based on the above definitions the guidepost for such an evaluation are a durable long-term security that protects individuals from armed-conflict and structural violence. Moreover, it starts with the proposition that security is non-military and concerned with sweeping global economic and ecological issues.

## **PART II — PEACEKEEPING**

### **Chapter 5** **Making the Peace**

Peacekeeping in its generic form has been a central policy tool of the UN for forty years as a means to deal with inter- and intra-national conflicts. Using the above discussion on how security has shifted theoretically and in real terms this chapter will present a broad theoretical assessment of peacekeeping. Firstly, this chapter starts by defining the various peacekeeping concepts — peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, enforcement and warmaking, and peacebuilding. These concepts will be used throughout this section. Secondly, this chapter will continue with a brief historical overview of peacekeeping. Thirdly, it will present a brief review of the literature showing that peacekeeping has been mostly, if not only, assessed from a traditional military perspective with the emphasis on meeting technical and policy goals. A more theoretical and normative assessment has been virtually ignored as has the global and human security perspective. Thus, the chapter will end with a broad comparative theoretical assessment and review of peacekeeping.

#### **Defining the Peacekeeping Concepts**

##### ***Peacekeeping***

The concept 'peacekeeping' has both a generic and a specific functional meaning. Generically it refers to any action undertaken by the UN or a regional

alliances to prevent, maintain or instill 'peace' between conflicting parties (Epstein in Jacobson *et. al.* 1994). In this instance, it can refer to almost anything from the Gulf War to the UN's role in rebuilding a political system in Cambodia. This author believes that such a broad use of the term is unfortunate and at times harmful since it is used as a propaganda tool to soften the impact of what is in effect war. Using military force to coerce differing parties to resolve an issue (for example: the Gulf War or NATO bombings in the former Yugoslavia) is not an act of peace, it is an act of state violence or war.

In its more precise and specific meaning, however, peacekeeping refers to a specific operation or action taken by military and/or police personnel under the auspices of the UN, who are lightly armed for strictly defensive purposes only, and whose purpose is to supervise or maintain peace agreements with support from the conflicting parties (Epstein Jacobson *et. al.* 1994, 100; Diehl 1994, 13; Boutros-Ghali 1992). In more recent missions non-military personnel, particularly non-government organizations (NGOs) have played more prominent roles.

As the mandate of peacekeeping broadens a threshold is crossed where the operation can no-longer be classified as peacekeeping in the specific sense just described. The following concepts outline the various forms of generic (interrelated) peacekeeping, helping to distinguish a variety of actions,

operations and processes that are profoundly different from each other in the post-Cold War era.

### ***Preventive diplomacy and Peacemaking***

Preventive diplomacy includes those actions taken to “...prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). In Boutros-Ghali’s report An Agenda for Peace (1992), preventive diplomacy is defined to include fact-finding missions, early warning systems, preventive deployment of personnel, and the creation of demilitarized zones. It can include using official diplomats, representatives of the UN and other global state bodies, and individuals and institutions of civil society.

Peacemaking is an agreed method of resolving international disputes or, at the very least, the negotiating by conflicting parties to cease hostilities. In either case, it is a process of peaceful settlement. The most obvious and central tool for a peaceful settlement is mediation and negotiation which can effectively involve an impartial third party including another state, the United Nations, non-government organizations, or even the World Court as an arbitrator of disputes. In An Agenda for Peace it is suggested that economic and organizational assistance could ameliorate the conditions that have caused the dispute or conflict in the first place. As well, the report suggests that military and economic sanctions and collective military force may be useful tools in the peacemaking

process. These latter actions go beyond the bounds of peacemaking to encompass enforcement and warmaking, below.

### ***Enforcement and Warmaking***

Enforcement measures and actions are undertaken with or without the consent of the conflicting parties involved and are used to restore international, regional or national peace. Military or economic sanctions, whether imposed by states or the UN, are used to coerce a state or group to succumb to an international norm or demand. Again, in this case civil society can take a limited role in imposing economic or political enforcement (the international boycott against apartheid South Africa was in part organized by international NGOs). This type of action can essentially be called non-military enforcement to help distinguish it from the types of peacekeeping or peacemaking initiatives described above.

Another step that the UN is authorized to take under Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter is what is sometimes referred to as 'peace-enforcement'. This involves the use of military force to impose sanctions, embargoes or a peace agreement (Epstein in Jacobson *et. al.* 1994, 101). The types of action taken in Somalia or the former Yugoslavia fall within this category since, under the auspices of the UN, limited military force was used to pacify one or more sides in the conflict (Holmes 1993, 329) and the agreement of all parties was not first solicited. This type of action would best be called military enforcement as

distinct from non-military enforcement. Civil society does not have the means or the ability to participate in this type of action or in the following.

The last type of action that can be taken by the UN is indistinguishable from war. The Gulf War and Korean War clearly fall into this category. They are essentially international collective actions to repress an 'aggressor' and force them to accept an agreement. Kim Holmes (1993, 329), a neo-realist, uses the term warmaking to refer to this type of action. It is distinct from military enforcement since the military action in this case is not limited to 'strategic bombings' or other 'strategic actions'. Warmaking uses full military force to compel an enemy to submit to an agreement. For example, in the Gulf War, Iraq was clearly viewed as the enemy, whereas in the former Yugoslavia there is no clear enemy and therefore limited force was used for 'self-defence' of peacekeepers and to enforce specific requirements.

### ***Peacebuilding***

Peacebuilding, as used in An Agenda For Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1993) is the counterpart to preventive diplomacy. In this instance, peacebuilding refers to the reconstruction of political, social and economic institutions that will enhance a lasting peace and sense of confidence, following a conflict. It can include such measures as disarming the warring parties, repatriation of refugees, monitoring elections, reforming government institutions by promoting political participation, and protecting human rights (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). These various activities can

be done prior to the outbreak of hostilities to help lay the foundations for trust, confidence and even potential power sharing. Peacebuilding in its more narrow sense refers to an action and does not have to be implemented following a conflict; it may precede the conflict in an effort to reduce already existing tension. Yet, peacebuilding in its broader sense is an ongoing process that can and should be conflated with development. At this level peacebuilding is more than reconstruction, it is about building political and economic structures which address the underlying causes of war and structural violence.

## **Peacekeeping: A Historical Introduction**

### ***Cold War Peacekeeping***

The first official peacekeeping mission was a response to the Suez Crisis in 1956. Lester B. Pearson is credited for having been the brain behind the precedent-setting peacekeeping mission that responded to the Suez crisis. For his actions he received the Nobel Peace Prize. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) monitored a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel and monitored the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces. Like many of the other peacekeeping missions during the Cold War, not only did this mission help to stop a regional war, it found a way to keep the USSR and the US from getting involved, and thereby preventing the escalation of the conflict (Durch 1993b, 7-9). Prior to 1956, three missions led by the UN did not involve a UN military force monitoring a peace agreement or cease-fire. These missions were either investigative teams or observer groups with a mandate only to report their



findings. Strictly speaking, these would not be labeled peacekeeping as defined above, but they are the precursors leading up to the 1956 mission.

Including the three observer missions of 1947 to 1950, in total the UN organized 13 peacekeeping operations during the Cold War period. The only mission during this time which escalated from peacekeeping to an attempt to enforce a mandate was that in the Congo in 1960. The mission was initially implemented to help restore law and order and to assist in the withdrawal of Belgian forces. But as internal politics and civil strife increased, it was caught in the middle and the reaction by the UN force was to intervene directly in the internal affairs of the Congo (Diehl 1994, 50-51). "It set a potential precedent for coercive UN operations elsewhere, but the political trauma caused led many in the UN to view it as 'the UN's Vietnam,' as an experience never to be repeated" (Durch 1993b, 8).

During this period a classical example of peacekeeping would include the Cyprus mission which was similar to the Congo in political terms but had a very different outcome (Diehl 1994, 53). Lightly armed military personnel were sent to restore law and order and to prevent further fighting. For ten years the operation managed to control and de-escalate several crises (Diehl 1994, 53). In 1974, following a coup and the Turkish invasion of the northern half of the country, a cease-fire was quickly agreed to and the role of the UN peacekeepers changed. Now they were to monitor a buffer zone within a divided Cyprus (Diehl 1994, 54-

55). At all times the UN peacekeeping forces refrained from military action and acted as an impartial third party between Greek and Turkish Cyprus.

### ***Post-Cold War Peacekeeping***

The most dramatic change in the past 40 years of peacekeeping was precipitated by the end of the Cold War which has profoundly changed how the UN — the Security Council in particular — makes key decisions. In 1956, the United Nations General Assembly responded to the Suez crisis by sending an impartial, lightly armed force to the region to help separate opposing sides. By contrast, following the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council authorized the use of any and all means deemed necessary to oust Iraq from an occupied Kuwait. A US-led coalition then launched the largest collective military action since World War II. In the former Yugoslavia, UN peacekeepers are responsible for protecting 'safe-zones' and NATO forces have bombed Serbian positions to help protect these zones and to encourage peace talks, ultimately leading to the Dayton Peace Agreement.

Since the later part of the 1980s, the role of the UN in dealing with violent conflict has broadened and expanded to cover a multitude of actions from peacekeeping and peacebuilding to non-military enforcement and even war. In total, in 1994, the UN was actively involved in twenty-eight conflicts around the world, nine of which were, according to Boutros-Ghali (1995), classical peacekeeping operations, eight of which were considered multi-functional

peacekeeping, and another eleven were preventive-diplomacy/peacemaking missions.

The number of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peacemaking and UN enforcement operations has dramatically increased: 21 missions were established from 1988 to 1994. In just six years this is almost double the number established during the first 40 years of the UN. As well, the number of military personnel involved increased almost eight-fold, from 9,570 in 1988 to 73,393 in 1994. And the overall budget for the various peacekeeping to peacebuilding operations increased from US \$230 million in 1988 to \$3,610 million in 1994 (Boutros-Ghali 1995).

Probably more important is the fact that most of the new conflicts involving the UN are intra- rather than inter-state wars. For example, of the 11 UN operations established from January 1992 to January 1994, nine were related to intra-state conflicts and only two were inter-state wars (Boutros-Ghali 1995).

The new breed of intra-state conflicts have certain characteristics that present United Nations peace-keepers with challenges not encountered since the Congo operation of the early 1960s. They are usually fought not only by regular armies but also by militias and armed civilians with little discipline and with ill-defined chains of commands. They are often guerrilla wars without clear front lines (Boutros-Ghali 1995).

It has been suggested that since the end of the Cold War the UN is now free to do what it was originally designed to do — that is, to use its collective

security abilities to resolve international disputes (Epstein in Jacobson *et. al.* 1994, 98). The broadened and expanded role of the UN in international disputes suggests it just may be trying to fulfill that role. Thus, at this time of transitions it seems important to reconsider the role of UN involvement in international disputes. Not only should we be asking when and how, but also to what end should the UN be involved? In terms of global-human security, we need to ask: what is the role of the UN and why is it or *should* it be doing peacekeeping?

## **Peacekeeping Literature**

The assessment of peacekeeping and other UN involvement in international conflicts, whether critical or positive, has been done mostly, if not exclusively, from the perspective of traditional security. Most studies of peacekeeping, in its general form, have looked at only one peacekeeping mission and have attempted to generalize the findings. And the few studies that cover many operations are often historical and descriptive and provide little or no analysis (Diehl 1993a, 3). Paul Diehl states that his book is one of the few to provide a theoretical analysis of why and how peacekeeping operations are successful. The question that Diehl proposes to answer is: "What are the conditions under which peacekeeping operations are successful in maintaining cease-fire arrangements and in promoting resolution of the underlying conflict between the protagonists?" (Diehl 1993a, 3). Diehl's analysis is not so different in orientation from William Durch's encyclopedic assessment of all such UN operations from 1947 to 1993, in his The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (Durch,

1993b). Both are excellent approaches to the study of UN peacekeeping and reaffirm some widely held notions; for example, that to be successful UN operations need the support of the major powers, and have worked best when they are essentially impartial. But neither book provides the necessary theoretical framework for questioning the very basis of generic peacekeeping.

Other assessments have focused on whether it should be the UN or a regional grouping or even individual states that should or need to be involved in resolving international disputes (Holmes 1993; Black and Rolston 1995; Fromuth 1993). Yet other assessments focus primarily on the actual field operations (Black and Rolston 1995). It appears that few attempt to approach the assessment from the perspective of a more general theoretical discussion; however, even Diehl, who attempts to do so, fails to put his discussion into the context of international relations theory or the theoretical literature on security.

One of the more far-reaching and most recent studies on peacekeeping by A.B. Featherstone (1994) successfully argues that UN peacekeeping should be assessed and implemented from a contingency model. Featherstone's contingency model is based on a study by Fisher and Keashly (1991). The latter argue for a pragmatic approach to peacekeeping which is based on third party conflict resolution.

It is surmised then that intervention types such as mediation, which focus on objective elements of conflict, will be more effective at certain points in the conflict; and intervention types such as consultation, which focus more on subjective elements of a conflict,

will be more effective at other points. Furthermore, the utilization of different methods at different points in the conflict can be interrelated. Fisher and Keashly call this 'complementarity'. Working within a contingency approach, then, means utilizing an appropriate intervention strategy which has been shown to be most effective at particular points in a conflict process (Featherstone 1994, 115-116).

Diehl and Featherstone ultimately fail to address the broad theoretical view because they are working within the confines of the traditional security perspective. It is essentially assumed by them that when speaking of security we are referring to the security of the state and the prevention of military conflict. Robert Cox (1981) argues that there are two levels of theory: 1) problem-solving theory, and 2) Critical Theory. Problem-solving theory takes the world as it is and tries to make the relationships and institutions work smoothly. This is what Diehl and Featherstone do. They offer a pragmatic approach that attempts to reform the UN and peacekeeping, as such. This is a useful and necessary area of study.

This thesis, however, is an attempt to go beyond the assumptions of the traditional security paradigm. Featherstone's assessment of peacekeeping is probably the most conducive to the global-human security paradigm. His approach, although problem-solving in its orientation, is flexible enough to adjust to the human and global aspects of security. A contingency theory fits well with the broad theoretical concerns of critical theory as outlined by Cox:

Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how

and whether they might be in the process of changing. It is directed towards an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory accepts as its parameters. Critical theory is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts (Cox 1981, 129).

Using the above discussion on security, the last section of this chapter will assess from an international critical theory perspective the various forms of UN involvement in international disputes. The question posed is: are the various forms of UN involvement in international conflict meeting the security needs of the traditional paradigm or the global-human paradigm?

## **Evaluating Peacekeeping**

Table 2 below presents a quick visual overview of the differences between the traditional and the global-human security paradigms. Each has very different criteria and assumptions in their respective definitions and assessments of the various types of peacekeeping. Within the global-human security paradigm it is clear that peacekeeping policies should be limited and must be placed within a more holistic development process. The traditional paradigm assesses peacekeeping policies in terms of fragmented functional end-goals.

Table 2 Evaluating peacekeeping

	Traditional Security Paradigm	Global-human Security Paradigm
<b>Peacebuilding</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. war reconstruction</li> <li>2. elections monitoring, building infrastructures, etc. for the purpose of maintaining a cease-fire or a peace agreement and preventing relapse into violent conflict.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. long-term peace process, addresses politico-economic insecurity before, during and after conflict</li> <li>2. is conflated with sustainable, democratic and equitable development — for the purpose of securing personal and ecological security.</li> </ol>
<b>Preventive diplomacy and Peacemaking</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. prevent military action</li> <li>2. build diplomatic relations</li> <li>3. arms control agreements</li> <li>4. work toward economic and social ties to prevent armed conflict</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. prevent military action</li> <li>2. build diplomatic relations</li> <li>3. complete nuclear disarmament and work toward conventional disarmament</li> <li>4. work toward economic and social ties that build the foundations for peacebuilding process</li> </ol>
<b>Peacekeeping</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. military action</li> <li>2. end goal is to separate armed combatants</li> <li>3. functional assessment</li> <li>4. terms of reference: mandate, end of hostilities, cease-fire or peace agreement.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. non-military action</li> <li>2. end goal is to separate armed forces to prepare for peacebuilding</li> <li>3. functional assessment</li> <li>4. terms of reference: mandate, end of hostilities followed by a long-term peace agreement and peacebuilding process</li> </ol>
<b>Enforcement</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. military and non-military force used to coerce conditions on one or more parties.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. non-military force used to coerce conditions on one or more parties</li> <li>2. military enforcement is not an acceptable option</li> </ol>
<b>Warmaking</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. the use of military force and coercion are part of a continuum of politics</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Not an option — the use of military force and coercion are deemed the failure of politics</li> </ol>



## ***Peacekeeping Assessment***


From the traditional security perspective, UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War can be viewed as a means to prevent regional armed conflicts from escalating into conflicts that would involve the two superpowers (Durch 1993b). From this perspective all the operations at that time successfully kept the US and the USSR out of several conflicts, including the Congo, Cyprus and even the Suez crisis. Another aspect would essentially be that such missions now and during the Cold War are collective security measures that support the interests of the major powers. The UN is acting merely as their proxy. This would explain why realists are often very cautious about UN involvement in such operations. Kim Holmes (1993, 338) argues that peacekeeping<sup>19</sup> can work under certain circumstances but the US needs guidelines to protect its interests:

The United States should, in this regard, be sensitive to three variables: (1) how a peacekeeping operation *affects American national security*; (2) how much it costs; and (3) the degree to which it *erodes American sovereignty* (Holmes 1993, 338, emphasis added).

Peacekeeping from such a traditional perspective is merely another type of military power on a continuum that starts with politics and ends with war, as shown in figure 3, below.

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<sup>19</sup> Kim Holmes (1993, 338) is using the term peacekeeping in broader terms than the above definition would allow.



From this perspective the purpose of peacekeeping is: i) to limit the amount of military force used; ii) to reduce the number of actors involved; iii) to protect the interests of the larger and more influential states; and, iv) to prevent the conflict from escalating into a more generalized conflict. From a more liberal or idealist perspective the erosion of state-power is acceptable, even preferable, as long as it is replaced by a collective military force and is intended to prevent a larger conflict. Again, the purpose remains to limit the conflict between specific parties and to protect greater international interests from local violence. A peace agreement, which is often brokered by the major powers, is necessary to maintain stability.

[T]he basic conditions for success remain unchanged: a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of Member States to contribute the military, police and civilian personnel [...]; and adequate financial and logistic support (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

This, pragmatic, specific, short-term agreement is in contrast to the global-human security paradigm which perceives military conflict at such a stage as indicating the failure of the international system to deal with the underlying problems that caused the conflict in the first instance. Peacekeeping is, from this

perspective, not just a means to limit conflict but it is seen as the 'last ditch' effort to help regain the space necessary to work toward rebuilding the confidence needed for a lasting peace agreement. A lasting peace is the necessary goal to protect people from the horrors of war.

From the perspective of the global-human security paradigm, most peacekeeping operations to date have had only a minimum amount of success. They have helped to stop or prevent the immediate hostilities but few have been able to provide the conditions necessary to build a lasting peace. Such a criticism is not meant to undermine the necessity of peacekeeping because without it many conflicts in the past could have had much worse outcomes. Yet, peacekeeping must be used in conjunction with other tools that help maintain peace, establish confidence-building measures and erode the causes of war. At a functional level Featherstone's problem-solving framework using a theory of contingency conflict diplomacy would work best. It offers an assessment of peacekeeping essentially from a non-military perspective. Within the global-human security paradigm, prevention, not peacekeeping, is viewed as the central issue. Peacekeeping is but one technique that can be used in an ongoing process of building a lasting and just peace.

### ***Enforcement and Warmaking Assessment***

In contrast to peacekeeping, which depends on the explicit participation of all parties involved, is enforcement and warmaking. From the traditional security

paradigm enforcement and warmaking are forms of collective security which states use to ensure their national security. These types of actions, whether non-military or military in orientation, can be very useful tools in forcing an 'aggressor' to abide by international norms or perceived national interests. The type of action to be used in enforcement is determined by strategic military and political interests and is part of a continuum of potential actions — with non-military sanctions and embargoes at one end and military blockades and war at the other. As an example, applying sanctions is the first tool used to put economic and social pressure on a government. If the sanctions appear not to be working then military force will be used if it is strategically advisable. The Gulf War is an example of this thinking. Sanctions were applied against Iraq as punishment and as an 'incentive' to withdraw from Kuwait. Within a short time it was decided that sanctions were not working (although this is highly debatable); thus a war against Iraq was determined to be necessary and feasible. From the traditional security perspective, together, the war and military-sanctions were considered, for the most part, highly successful. Iraq was forced to withdraw from Kuwait and its military power was decisively reduced ensuring that Iraq would not be a threat to Middle East security. "Collateral damage" for the US-led coalition was very low. It is also cited as a UN collective security success.

Another example of post-cold war peacekeeping is the “peace force” that was sent to Somalia.<sup>20</sup> Even from the perspective of the traditional security paradigm this represented a failed mission. The specifics of why it failed have been argued back and forth by many political and military writers, but ultimately the arguments are that the political conditions were not right and/or that the right type of military action was not taken. Lynn Davis suggests that the prospect for other such humanitarian actions is most uncertain but she does not rule out military action. “Ultimately, the international community can use military force. Military forces are, however, extremely blunt instruments of policy. Their use will not be successful without clear goals...” (Davis 1993, 28).

Another concern is whether or not the UN has the legitimacy to undertake enforcement, especially in cases that involve internal disputes. This relates mainly to the composition of the Security Council and UN controls and demand structures (Pearson in Black 1995, 171). Again this reflects the ongoing concerns of national sovereignty. But these issues could be resolved by restructuring the Security Council and other UN bodies (Pearson in Black 1995).

From a global-human security perspective the concern about UN legitimacy has more to do with its ability to represent people as opposed to states. Moreover, from this perspective enforcement action in general is very

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<sup>20</sup> The Somalia Operation began, more or less, as a traditional UN peacekeeping operation but was transformed by American “intervention”. It was mandated as a humanitarian endeavour and later actions, such as trying to arrest Aideed, transformed the mission into an enforcement action.

much frowned upon and is perceived in general to be illegitimate since it is the security of people that is threatened by such actions. Non-military enforcement actions are the preferred tool in times of crisis. Economic, political and cultural embargoes can be used to mount pressure on governments to accept international norms. Such sanctions as imposed against apartheid South Africa are prime examples of when such action can be successfully undertaken.

As an example, from a global-human security perspective the Gulf War was a disaster. It cost the lives of estimates ranging from 100,000 to 200,000 people. It left tens of thousands homeless and it was very difficult for the world to respond to the massive growth in refugees along the Iraq border. Security in the region remains very unstable for many people. The environment was left in ruins in Kuwait by Iraqi and coalition forces. And the economic infrastructure of Iraq was destroyed. Kuwait is still ruled by an elite family monarchy and Iraq is ruled by a brutal oligarchy.

From a global-human security perspective, then, war failed to resolve the social, economic and political security issues facing the vast majority of both Kuwaitis and Iraqis. The war's impact worsened conditions for millions of people, particularly children and women who were left homeless and without medical care, proper sanitation, or adequate food and water resources. From this perspective the short- and long-term costs of war were unacceptably high. This can be contrasted to the economic sanctions imposed against apartheid

South Africa, where it can be argued that the short-term costs of sanctions, as supported by the resistance movement in South Africa, outweighed the long-term gains of dismantling apartheid.

In Somalia, traditional security sees the failure as caused by the wrong conditions and improper use of military force to establish a peace agreement. But from a global-human security perspective the failure involves the UN not protecting people from the warlords and in taking sides in a military dispute. "With no clear guidelines for disarming the militias, I felt that the UN was affording the warlords time to amass more armaments..." (Farah 1995, 13). But more importantly, the failure occurred during the ten years leading up to the collapse of Somalia's economy and infrastructure. The massive armaments trade in the region was a direct result of the Cold War divide and an international economic system based on military profit. The collapse of Somalia's economy is due in part to over-arming but, as well, it is due to the legacies of colonialism and the imposition of 'unfair' and 'corrupt' western institutions (Abdi Ahmed Osman in UNCTAD 1991).

### ***Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking Assessments***

It is no wonder that Boutros-Ghali in his Supplement to An Agenda For Peace (1995) stated that the greatest obstacle to preventive diplomacy and peacemaking "is not, as is widely supposed, lack of information, analytical capacity or ideas for United Nations initiatives. Success is often blocked at the

outset by the reluctance of one or other of the parties to accept United Nations' help" (Boutros-Ghali 1995). In the traditional security paradigm, which is by far the dominant perspective among state leaders, the sovereignty of the state is essential to security. A breach of sovereignty is perceived to be a breach of security. Thus, full scale peacemaking and preventive diplomacy actions would constitute an erosion of the state, therefore from the traditional security paradigm approach these options are restricted.

By contrast, this reaction helps explain why states frequently do not accept the jurisdiction of the World Court, which could be an important tool for conflict resolution or peacemaking. As long as intervening countries perceive it to be their legitimate right to use force in international and even domestic affairs, both preventive diplomacy and peacemaking will have little impact unless the country in conflict is willing to give up some of its perceived sovereign power.

Preventive diplomacy is one of many types of prevention methods advocated by adherents of the global-human security paradigm. Since, from this perspective, the very threats to security are social, economic, political, environmental and even militarism itself, the methods needed for preventing armed conflict are far-ranging: from confidence-building measures to actual disarmament programs, to making formal agreements not to accept violence in the first place (Tansey 1995). From this perspective, state sovereignty is of secondary importance to the security of people and the protection of the earth.



Thus the World Court, other supra-national bodies, or non-government organizations are useful and needed tools in arbitrating conflicts and relieving the underlying conditions that may lead to hostilities. From this perspective preventive diplomacy is a step in the right direction but insufficient by itself. While peacemaking is necessary for stopping conflict, it comes too late as a durable solution.

Thus preventive diplomacy and peacemaking as defined above are essential tools but they must be part of a more radical and elaborate change in the international system. Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking are based on the traditional (realist) paradigm which is geared to preventing armed conflict or ameliorating the impact of armed conflict. The global-human security paradigm, as outlined in part one, asserts that security is not just about armed conflict or even politics. Security has ecological, economic, social and political dimensions which must be addressed in a holistic manner. Thus preventive diplomacy and peacemaking can only set the foundations for building a lasting and durable peace based on equality, justice and sustainability. Thus we are lead toward a process that must be sustainable and address the essential causes of conflict as outlined in part one.

### ***Peacebuilding Assessment***


Like other preventive measures, peacebuilding requires that a country be willing to enable outside personnel and organizations to intervene in what are

traditionally internal matters. Typically, this causes great concern among nation states which are very protective of their sovereignty. That is why such actions are easier for the UN following a conflict when it may already have a foot in the door (Boutros-Ghali 1995). Besides the concern for national sovereignty, there is a common concern that the international system and the UN are not equipped to handle such large actions. "Peacebuilding, however, implies removing the causes of social tension. In the worst cases, such as Somalia, Rwanda, and (probably) Afghanistan, it may mean a form of international trusteeship..." (Pearson in Black 1995, 175).

Peacebuilding is the mainstay of the concept of global-human security. From the perspective of this paradigm, peacebuilding must be a continuous process that enhances a development and peace process, see figure 4 below. Nations and the international community must always be doing peacebuilding in order to prevent violent conflict, and following hostilities it is the only viable means to break the vicious cycle of war. In addition peacebuilding is about improving people's socio-economic well-being to ensure security at all levels — personal, community and global. The peacekeeping/peacebuilding mission in Cambodia is an excellent example of a comprehensive program that must be undertaken to break the cycle of war and violence. This mission has a multi-functional range of projects, including: disarmament, demining, elections monitoring, development aid, and rebuilding political and economic infrastructures. There is also a wide-range of actors involved including: military

peacekeepers, international police, the UN and its related development organizations, aid agencies from other states, and international non-governmental organizations of all sorts. Cambodia may yet become a model not only for post conflict reconstruction but also for conflict prevention.

*Figure 4 Global-human security circle*



The policy implications of an approach that is based on global-human security are vast and far-reaching for Third World states, for the North, and for global governance structures. The list of policies includes: demilitarization and disarmament, confidence-building, formal international agreements renouncing violence, protecting the environment, and building a socially responsible society

that protects people's rights, provides for basic human needs and is equitable and sustainable. Eric Tollefson (in Jacobsen 1994) outlines some of the elements necessary to create a more secure world. He includes massive job creation, health care, clean water and sanitation, eliminating famine and homelessness, wiping out illiteracy, referenda on contentious political issues, making Third World debt manageable, energy utilization efficiency, planting trees, and research and development for renewable energy sources. The list goes on. But underlying these policies is the assumption that people need to be in control of political and economic institutions at the local, state, regional and global level. Structures that include political and economic democracy are essential. A civil society that promotes the interest of the vast majority of people is in the best position to forward such policies at the state, regional and global level.

Peacebuilding is perceived from the vantage point of the traditional security perspective as a fine and noble objective but not one that is highly embraced. It is considered to be most useful in cases where the state has failed to fulfill its obligations, such that the international community must step in. It is then perceived as a transitional policy. From a global-human security paradigm there is a sense that peacebuilding is a required and perpetual policy need. Peacebuilding, essentially, is an integral and necessary aspect of any equitable sustainable development process.

Paul Rogers, of the World Development Movement, suggests five overall responses to the core problems of poverty, environmental constraint and militarization. These five proposals are part of an elaborate political and economic program that many would consider necessary to respond to global-human security needs.

1. Processes of militarization have to be reversed.
2. Northern industrialized countries have radically to change their policies toward the South.
3. Development policies [...] must be in a form which will ensure accelerated yet environmentally sustainable development.
4. Future development in the industrialized countries must itself be sustainable...
5. There must be a change in international behaviour to ensure a rapid and effective response to any future changes in the global ecosystem (Rogers in Tansey 1993, 22).

The alternative is to keep on the same track — militarism — which is almost certain to be counterproductive (Tansey 1993; Jacobsen 1994). As a long-term process, peacebuilding must work toward broad development and peace goals as outlined above by Rogers. These policies essentially counter the global insecurities created by multi-national corporations, structural adjustment programs, and militarism as outlined in chapter four.

The following chapter briefly describes some of the policies needed to ensure that peacebuilding is more than a one time action and is integrated into a long-term development and peace process. As is already evident, the policies

required go well beyond peacekeeping and even peacebuilding. They are broad political and economic development policies and constitute part of a process of demilitarization.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Conclusion: Policies Beyond Peacekeeping**

World politics, culture and economics are in a transitional phase. The notion of traditional security is not only no longer valid, but the actual tools of traditional security, mainly militarism and war, are not capable of handling the myriad of problems faced by the global community (if they ever were capable of dealing with socio-economic security issues).

The list includes measures against terrorism and the narcotics industry; regulation of the arms trade, including control of chemical and biological weapons; efforts against global health problems such as polio and HIV/AIDS; and environmental issues ranging from global warming and marine resource and river management to the allocation of slots for satellite (Carlsson 1995, 5).

Furthermore, this list does not include the many problems such as migration and refugees, homelessness, starvation and poverty — with the addition that new global problems arise each day. The traditional paradigm does not perceive these socio-economic issues as valid security concerns unless they impact upon the state and its ruling elite. The only tools required for 'security' were war or the preparation for war against external or internal enemies. It should be no surprise, then, that a new perspective on security is developing along with new challenges and tools.

Peacekeeping was a tool developed for traditional bipolar military security politics. United Nations peacekeeping was first used during the Cold War, well before globalization impacted upon security, causing a paradigmatic shift. As

our security needs change so does the conception and implementation of peacekeeping expand to include other broader policy alternatives such as peacebuilding and sustainable development. This thesis has attempted to assess these general policy alternatives in terms of the changing nature of security.

After having demonstrated that a paradigmatic shift is occurring in the area of security to encompass human and global security needs, and after having evaluated the various forms of generic 'peacekeeping', it is evident that specific policy alternatives are necessary for the new security era. The following broad policy implications of a global and human security system are, and will continue to become, more prominent in state and global governance decision making processes.

The objective conditions of insecurity make it virtually impossible for the traditional paradigm to find lasting solutions to problems that it does not even recognize. This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that the traditional paradigm can only react by rearranging the military system — a new hegemonic power, a new balance-of-power, a United Nation's army, or a collective security arrangement. These are variations of an old theme. The only way to find solutions to the 'real' security problems facing the world is by discarding the war system, militarism, and state-centred analysis. The first step is to recognize the problems — poverty, ecological collapse, militarism, and the myriad of problems



associated with these. The second step is toward dismantling the military system. The third step is toward rebuilding a political and economic system that addresses the underlying causes of armed conflict and structural-violence.

## **Disarmament**

From the perspective of the global-human security paradigm, general and complete disarmament, as a long-term goal, is essential for several reasons. First, disarming nations builds a stronger sense of security since military threats are reduced. Second, disarming nuclear weapons protects the world from complete annihilation. Third, disarmament frees up money, resources and people to be used to build a sustainable economy. Fourth, converting to a civilian economy is more economically productive and better for the environment. And fifth, disarming insurgents and drug lords helps to protect individuals and communities from direct violence.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty symbolizes for many Third World states the dual standard imposed on the present global security system by the five major powers — the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China. While the treaty enables these countries to build and maintain their nuclear arsenals, which are a threat to all states, it imposes strict conditions on the availability of nuclear weapons and their components to non-nuclear weapons states. Moreover, the non-nuclear weapons states have accepted the

terms in the agreement while the nuclear states have not lived up to their end of the agreement, which is progress toward general and complete disarmament.

As long as nuclear weapons exist they remain a global threat. This threat has galvanized world support for nuclear disarmament over the past two decades. Today for example, the *World Court Project* is a global grassroots movement, led by international non-government organizations, attempting to get the World Court to declare nuclear weapons illegal. Since they have the support of the non-aligned states they have been successful in having the issue brought to the Court. As long as people world-wide feel threatened by nuclear weapons they will use their power in civil society to rid the world of them. Traditional security thinking, in particular the realist and neo-realist perspectives, underestimates the global power of people and their movements.

As threatening as nuclear weapons may be to our very survival, the reality is that most armed conflicts are being fought with small weapons, as outlined in chapter three. It is no coincidence that the majority of armed conflicts are being waged in the poorer regions of the world. Poverty exacerbates and is one of the prime causes of violence. Fueling these disputes and inequities with conventional weapons, mainly by the five permanent powers of the UN Security Council, further exacerbates the problem of development and social justice. Resources are squandered on weapons and in turn those same weapons are used to maintain the inequalities and disparities which are the cause of conflict in

the first place. Conventional disarmament must make massive strides forward if we are to prevent and ease conflicts such as Somalia and Yugoslavia. Or, if we are to prevent genocide as in Rwanda we must reduce and eventually rid the world of military assault rifles which enabled the massacre of tens-of-thousands of Rwandans within days. And conventional and nuclear disarmament must make massive strides forward if we are to rebuild productive economies which are geared to full employment.

## **Development**

The underlying cause of much conflict and violence is directly due to the absolute poverty and growing economic disparities between people and between nation states. Social and political oppression are the basic causes of conflict.

Evidence shows that the gulf between rich and poor is growing.

World inequality has also reached new dimensions: In 1989 the ratio differential in percapita income between the richest 20 per cent of countries and the poorest 20 per cent stood at 65 to 1, and at 140 to 1 between the richest 20 per cent of people and the poorest 20 per cent. Capitalist 'development' has ensured that one billion of the world's people live in absolute poverty. More than 15 million children die each year from poverty (Guy Arnold & Paul Elins in Petras & Polychroniou 1995, PE-38).

Structural adjustment programs — cutting social programs in favour of promoting a 'free' market economy — of the World Bank and IMF demonstrate that inequalities do foster violence. It comes as no surprise that often those countries where World Bank/IMF austerity measures are touted as most successful are

authoritarian regimes — Peru under President Fujimori, Ghana under Rawlings, and Chile under Pinochet.

The first priority of any government system must be the economic and political well-being of its citizens. The creation of an environmentally sustainable and equitable economy is the most important step toward creating global and human security for the long haul. Without human development there will not be stable global-human security.

In chapter four, it was asserted that the global capitalist system perpetuates economic insecurity. Thus a global systemic change is necessary to help build the foundations for a more secure world. This is not simply a utopian dream. The reality is that as long as the present growth model continues our global ecology is threatened. It has been said over and over that it is unrealistic to believe that we can continue the capitalist mode of growth unfettered. It is also unrealistic to believe that two-thirds of the world's population will remain content as economic, social and political disparities grow. This disparity is one of the foremost sources of present day conflict, which will inevitably grow as do poverty and oppression. The Third World will not remain content paying usurious interest rates to the richest states and their corporations. And, the middle and lower classes of the developed world will not remain content transferring wealth to the rich. As long as these disparities exist conflict will arise as in Chiapas, Mexico and Oka, Quebec.

A development process based on fairness and equality is essential. It will require addressing the power of multi-national corporations (MNCs), global governing institutions and the global political/economic elite. These powers can be addressed by: democratizing international institutions (for example, enlarging the UN Security Council to include African, Latin American, South East Asian and Middle Eastern States and abolishing the veto); democratizing the economies of nation states and global financial institutions; taking more control of MNCs; and, by directly involving the world's population in processes of political and economic decision making at national, regional and global levels.

## **Confidence-Building Measures**

To help prevent war and conflict between states and within states, measures must be taken to demonstrate to other states or to opposing forces within a state that the political will is present to help resolve conflicts in a non-violent way. Thus, as conflict arises measures can be taken to reduce the conflict to aid negotiations. Measures can also be taken to detect and attempt to foresee conflict before it happens or worsens, for example using the Good Offices of the Secretary General for early warning analysis and detection. Yet more importantly long-term measures can be taken to prevent conflict in the first place including fair trade agreements, security agreements, cultural exchanges and similarly negotiated agreements.

As state sovereignty continues to be eroded it will become more important that regional and global confidence-building measures be undertaken by individual nation states, by a democratic United Nations, and by non-government organizations. Such measures will provide the foundation for trust and building the political will needed for implementing regional and global disarmament and development policies.

In order to prevent the out-break of violence or war it is essential that all measures of diplomacy be exhausted by the parties involved directly and by outside forces. War is not the continuation of politics or 'diplomacy by other means'. Rather, war is the failure of politics and the failure of diplomacy.

## **Perpetual Peacebuilding**

With the decline of the nation state and with the globalization of security as outlined above, a new form of governing mechanism must be established to ensure global security. The present global governance bodies — for example the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, NAFTA, and World Trade Organization, among others — are dominated and controlled by the Western world in general, in particular by the United States, and their corporate institutions. But, these institutions are not able, and will not be able, to provide the necessary leadership for a global-human security as long as they are dominated by the west — the western triad: the United States, Germany and Japan. Global democratic 'revolution' is necessary. Tinkering with these bodies will not be enough as long

as two-thirds of the world's population (mostly the Third World) remains isolated from the decision-making of these international bodies. Democratizing political and economic institutions is a prerequisite to developing a true security system. The pressure for such change will ultimately come from civil society as various interests competing for more power converge.

A one time peacekeeping mission, the monitoring of elections, the rebuilding of an economy after war, de-mining, humanitarian aid, and preventive diplomacy are all necessary components of building and keeping peace, but they are not enough. The Agenda for Peace proposes all of these as important tools for building a peace but they are presented as fragmented and separate items, within a hierarchical military system. The building and keeping of peace requires a holistic and perpetual program at all levels of society, from teaching our children the merits of resolving conflicts peacefully to building economies that are ecologically sustainable and based on equality.

## **Concluding remarks**

Peacekeeping, peacemaking, preventative diplomacy and peacebuilding remain essential in creating security that is people-centred. But they are most useful when implemented within a global-human security paradigm; that is, if they work within an ideological system that is moving toward undermining the belief that war and violence are legitimate means of resolving international

disputes and that economic, social and political disparities are problems that must be addressed.

If followed to its logical conclusion, The Agenda for Peace could become an agenda for war, entangling the United Nations and the United States in a series of 'savage wars of peace' around the globe (Sokolsky 1995, 274).

Using the definitions of security outlined above, the risk of the UN becoming involved in warmaking continues as long as it adheres to reports such as An Agenda For Peace which continues to operate in the traditional security mold — a perspective which accepts that international violence and war is a legitimate means to resolving disputes, including collective security. Once it is recognized that international violence, war and militarism are part of the problem, the methods of how to resolve and prevent violence can be changed. The Agenda for Peace has many redeeming points. But if it is to succeed in preventing conflict it must recognize that peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventive diplomacy have to be presented and developed as non-violent policy tools.

The global-human security paradigm is both an ideal and an objective reality. It is an ideal in that it prescribes radical policy alternatives as outlined, and holds fast to the ethical and moral belief that security only has meaning and purpose when it is people-centred. It is an objective reality in that global capitalism and militarism are devastating the global ecology and the economic well-being of the vast majority of people.



As mentioned earlier in this thesis, there are both immutable and changeable forces. The negative impact global capitalism and militarism have on human security needs is an immutable relationship. Thus, and this is the great challenge, it is necessary to get rid of both global capitalism and global militarism. There are signs of hope that both militarism and global capitalism are being challenged. Such mammoth change does not occur overnight or within a couple of decades. It takes many decades, even centuries. It is both historically determined and consciously chosen. In chapter four, a brief review of global security trends shed some light on the possibility of positive change that may be occurring. It is the dialectical relationship between peoples' subjective desire for social, economic, ecological and political security, and the objective reality that the present state system is suppressing those needs — even creating the problems of insecurity — that sets the stage for historical change.

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