NOTICE

AVIS

WHY BE MORAL,

by

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TO JOYCE

Who alone has taught me one important meaning of
value, and whose love and encouragement have
helped make this thesis actual.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Chapter One

Introduction

The aim of this paper is, generally, to give a just-
ification of morality in terms of both the individual's and
society's adoption of a moral code. In other words, what
justification or justifying reasons are there for both the
individual and society to be moral? This paper aims to pro-
vide an answer to this question.

A request for such a justification is often formulated
simply by the question "Why be moral?". Precisely because
a request for a justification of morality is so often asked
in this form we must address ourselves to this question in
the beginning of this paper. The question "Why be moral?",
as we shall see, is quite ambiguous. If posed without a
thorough analysis involving the enumeration and examination
of the several meanings of the question, then it is possible
that the inquirer hoping to answer the question will be un-
certain which meaning or meanings he is attempting to answer.

In the second chapter, then, we will address ourselves
directly to the question "Why be moral?", if only for the
reason that a request for a justification of morality is
often expressed in this form. The object of Chapter Two
will be to list and explain the several meanings of the
question "Why be moral?", and to state exactly which of those
meanings formed as questions we intend to answer.

The third chapter will provide an examination into the
nature of morality for which we will be seeking a justifi-
cation. ' In this chapter we will attempt to list and describe
the conditions under which morality can be said to exist;
that is, we will attempt to answer the question: what are
the fundamental characteristics of which morality consists?
The larger portion of Chapter Three will be devoted to a
search for those conditions which distinguish morality from
other institutions which, like morality, attempt to guide
and regulate certain human actions.

The fourth chapter will be devoted to an attempt actu-
ally to answer the question: what justification or justi-
fying reasons there may be for the individual and society to
be moral. The first part of Chapter Four will deal with a
brief examination of the nature of justification, in order
to determine what type of justification if any is applicable
to morality; the second part addresses the issue of actually
providing a justification of morality for both the individual
and society.

Chapter Two

The Meaning of Our Question

The question "Why be moral?" is of such an ambiguous
and unclear nature that any attempt to arrive at an answer
or answers to it must be preceded by an examination of the
nature of the question itself. It is only when we become
clear and certain about the meaning or meanings of this
question that we will be able to proceed in the direction of
an answer. In fact, some of the meanings of the question
"Why be moral?" are completely irrelevant to the present
examination, while others are most pertinent. This second
chapter intends precisely to elucidate both the irrelevant
meanings and, more importantly, those which are quite rele-
vant to the planned discussion; that is, those meanings of
the question "Why be moral?" for which some answer must be
attempted at for the purposes of this paper. The aim of
Chapter Two, then, will be, first, to clarify the question
"Why be moral?" and, secondly, to pinpoint exactly the meaning
or meanings of that question we wish specifically to discuss.

The Possible Meanings of the Question: Why Be Moral?

What meanings, then, can be inferred from the question
"Why be moral?" Before responding, I should point out that
two general ambiguities exist, and it is from these ambigu-
ities that different meanings of the question "Why be moral?"
can be inferred.[1] The first general ambiguity derives from
the fact that the question "Why be moral?" may be both a

question of <u>motivation</u> and a question of <u>justification</u>.[2]
The question "Why be moral?" may be asking what motives
there are for being or acting morally, or it may be asking
what justification there is for being or acting morally.
The second general ambiguity is concerned with the fact that
the question "Why be moral?" may be asking either why an
<u>individual</u> should be moral or why <u>society</u> should be moral.

Before beginning a more detailed study of each of these
ambiguities, it should be noted that both exist in the ques-
tion "Why be moral?" quite independently of one another.
To eliminate one ambiguity in the question, then, by no means
eliminates the other. For example, in posing the question
"Why be moral?" one can be perfectly clear that he is seeking
certain motives for being or acting morally, and at the same
time be quite unclear as to whether he is searching for
motives that pertain to individuals or motives that pertain
to society as a whole. Conversely, one may be quite clear
that he is talking about individuals, and yet leave ambig-
uous the question as to whether he is searching for motives
or for a justification. The important point, accordingly, is
that each ambiguity must be treated separately, not only
because there are two quite different problems arising out
of the question "Why be moral?", but also because the
elimination of one ambiguity does not eliminate the other.

Let's turn now to a more detailed examination of the
first ambiguity between motivation and justification. It
should first be remarked, for the sake of accuracy, that

the question "Why be moral?" has implicit in itself a
definite "should". In other words, the question "Why be
moral?" means more precisely: "Why should we, as individuals,
or as a society as a whole, be moral?" The addition of
"should" merely makes the meaning of the general question
"Why be moral?" a little more precise without, however,
clearing up any of the ambiguities. The ambiguities remain
whether or not the "should" is added. For example the
interrogative: "Why should one (an individual) be moral?"
may be two questions insofar as one may be looking for either
motives or a justification. Again the question: "Why should
society be moral?" may also be twofold, seeking either motives
or a justification.

Let us first examine, then, the question "Why be moral?"[3]
where one is seeking motives for being or acting morally.
Out of this come at least two different, although quite re-
lated meanings. In the first place the question "Why be moral?"
may be asking or mean first: "What motives are there for being
or acting morally in particular instances?" where the person
asking the question wishes to find motives or motivating
reasons that will actually move him to act on the particular
moral decision he has to make. In other words, he wants to
be motivated to do or not do such and such moral conduct.
This search for motives or motivation reasons, however, should
not be confused with justification or justifying reasons.
The former are reasons sought by the questioner for the pur-
pose of actually moving, persuading or convinving himself to
act; the latter, to be discussed later, are reasons that

attempt to show or prove why an act in the moral realm ought or ought not to be performed.

Perhaps an example will show more clearly what it means for someone to seek motives when he asks the question "Why be moral?". Suppose someone asks: "Why should I not steal?". If he is searching for reasons to motivate himself not to steal and not for justifying reasons, we could answer him with such replies as: "It will be to your best advantage not to steal; that is, if you do steal you might get caught and be punished;". "Stealing, in the long run, will make you unhappy; that is, by stealing you may lose your self-respect, whereas obtaining things honestly will give you more self-satisfaction and self-esteem;" "If you dislike seeing others hurt then you should not steal, because stealing will certainly injure others." Motivating reasons, in short, attempt to appeal to one's own desires, goals and self-interest, to what it is prudential or not prudential to do or not to do. They are quite different from justifying reasons which attempt to prove or justify that certain actions are morally right or wrong regardless of whether they fall within the scope of anyone's desires, goals or self-interest.

The second meaning inferrable from the question "Why be moral?", when one is searching for motives, is actually an extension of the first. Whereas the previous question asks: "What motives are there for being or acting morally in particular instances?" we can now extend that question somewhat and ask: "What motives are there for being or acting

morally <u>at all</u>?" Here the question is not one of asking what motivates someone to act morally in particular in- stances but, rather, what motivates someone in any way what- ever to take part in or adopt a morality or system or moral code.

One might note here that when the question is raised about what motivates someone to participate in morality, we are searching for motives that constitute a person as moral as opposed to <u>amoral</u>, not immoral. A person who is immoral, then, can be presupposed to be participating in morality. To be immoral is to violate the established laws of morality. On the other hand, if we are searching for motives as to why a person participates in morality itself, and if it is found that he is not at all motivated and consequently does not participate in morality, such a person would not be <u>immoral</u> but <u>amoral</u>; that is, he does not participate in morality in any way whatsoever. Of course, by the standards of one who does participate in morality, he might well be regarded as immoral. The important point to realize, however, is that by <u>his own</u> standards he is <u>amoral</u>, simply because he does not participate in the institution of morality.

We may now turn to an examination of the question "Why be moral?" where one is seeking, not motives, but a <u>justifi- cation or justifying reasons</u> for being or acting morally. Unlike the search for motivational reasons, the search for justifying reasons for being moral is, as we mentioned before, a search for those reasons which if found to exist will be

altogether independent of a person's desires, goals or self-interest. A justification is an attempt to provide objective reasons for being moral, reasons that attempt to show <u>why one should be moral</u> regardless of whether it is within one's self-interest to be so. While motivating reasons attempt to actually move someone to act, justifying reasons attempt to show <u>why</u> an act ought to be performed.

As Paul W. Taylor observes, justifying reasons and motivating reasons sometimes may conflict.[4] For example, we may be motivated or desire to steal something, but at the same time think that stealing is wrong; that is, we may believe there are justifying reasons for why stealing ought not to be done. In such cases of conflict we should, of course, follow that course of action which has been justified, i.e., not stealing, and not the opposite course of action which is what we desire. Accordingly, to ask for justification as to why someone should do the course of action which has already been justified is a ludicrous request. The fact that a course of action is, ipso facto, justified is reason enough that it should be performed.

The following passage from Paul W. Taylor's <u>Principles of Ethics: An Introduction</u> should enlighten us further on the differences and distinction between motivating and justifying reasons regarding the question "Why be moral?"

> To justify anyone's being moral, as distinct
> from motivating some particular individual
> to be moral, is to give a sound argument in
> support of the claim that moral reasons

(i.e., justifying reasons) take priority over reasons of self-interest (i.e., motivating reasons) whenever they conflict. If we were able to discover, or construct, such an argument, it would follow that everyone ought to be motivated by moral reasons for acting rather than by prudential reasons for acting in cases of conflict. Whether any given individual will in fact be so motivated depends on the strength of his desires, not on the soundness of an argument. Even if a person's desire to be moral were indeed strengthened by his reading or hearing such an argument, thus motivating him to be moral, this is irrelevant to the question of whether the argument actually showed the moral reasons to be superior to those of self-interest. Similarily, the argument might not convince someone intellectually, nor persuade him to act morally, nor reinforce his moral motivation. But the failure of the argument to bring about such results in any given individual is strictly irrelevant to the philosophical acceptability of the argument's content.[5]

This passage shows clearly that Taylor holds motivating reasons and justifying reasons to be distinct from one another, and quite independent of one another if one is to search for reasons for being moral. In other words, a justifying reason will continue to be just that, a justifying reason, no matter how much it may motivate someone actually to be moral. Motivating reasons, on the other hand, only pertain to a person's desires or self-interest; and if those desires and self-interest happen to concur (and they may not) with what the justifying reasons dictate, then we only have a case of agreement between desires and justification. No matter what the status of a person's desires in relation to what he believes is justified, regardless of whether his desires concur or conflict with his justification, the justification remains exactly what it is and nothing more-- a justification.

Another way of looking at the distinction between motivating and justifying reasons is to examine what kind of study is necessary in searching for each of these respective kinds of reasons. If one is searching for motivating reasons for why an individual or society in general is moral, as opposed to "should be moral", which is relevant only to justifying reasons, then one's search will be primarily psychological. The reason for this is simply that a search for _motives_ necessarily entails a search for desires, goals, attitudes, conditioning, etc.; in short, reasons for why people _act_. Indeed, a large part of modern psychology is

concerned with human motivation, and whether it be a study of what motivates people to be moral or not, it remains a study of _motives_; and no matter what their object may be, why people are moral or why people begin to smoke cigarettes, motives are a facet of human behaviour and examination of them belongs to psychology.

Justifying reasons, on the other hand, are concerned with the actions of people, specifically with moral actions: not, however, with why they actually do or do not perform them, but with why they _should or should not_ perform them. Consequently, an appeal to the science of psychology will be of little help in a search for justifying reasons. A justifying reason, it should be noted further, is not the kind of reason which functions and exists as a constituent of the human mind, as motivating reasons are. We might regard motivating reasons as "subjective" while justifying reasons are "objective"; that is, independent of human desires and self-interest, and able to be posited as distinct, existing, ultimate principles on which we can base and vindicate our moral conduct.

Because of their nature, then, justifying reasons will not require a psychological, or even a scientific investigation; they will require a _philosophical_ investigation, specifically, that type of philosophical inquiry performed in _ethics_.[6]

Before concluding our treatment of justifying reasons, we may look now at the meanings able to be inferred from

the question "Why be moral?" when one is seeking a justification or justifying reasons. We inferred two motivational reasons from the question "Why be moral?"; and in a similar manner, accordingly, we can infer two justifying reasons. The first justifying reason parallels the first motivational reason: What justification or justifying reasons are there for being or acting morally in particular instances? In other words, the question asks what justification there is for performing or not performing each of the individual moral actions. For example, what justification is there for not stealing, not murdering, being benevolent, being kind?, etc. It should be noted that this first meaning entails justification for each of the individual moral actions separately, and not the sum total of individual moral actions which, as we will see shortly constitutes the basis for a second meaning of justification.

The second meaning of justification, then, is similar to the second meaning of motivation, the important difference, of course, being that the former entails justifying reasons while the latter entails motivating reasons. The meaning reads: "What justification or justifying reasons are there for being moral at all?" In other words, this second meaning is concerned with those justifying reasons that will vindicate someone or society's adopting or participating in morality as a whole.

If we consider an example of an everyday moral dilemma, we should be able to see more clearly the distinction between

the two meanings of justification just described. Consider
the problem of abortion. Some maintain that it is morally
wrong, others that it is not.[7] Clearly, both parties are
arguing over a specific moral issue, and not over morality
as a whole. In trying to convince each other of their own
views, they must, then, provide justifying reasons that apply
to the issue of abortion and not to morality as a whole.
In other words, the respective parties are not arguing over
whether or not their opponent has any morals, that is, whether
he participates in morality as a whole, but over one specific
issue; and morality has many issues.

Like all other specific moral issues, the abortion question
is an example of the first meaning of justification; that is,
it involves the problem of providing a justification or justi-
fying reasons for being moral in a particular instance, with
the "particular instance" being abortion, capital punishment,
stealing, murder or any one of a long list of moral problems.

With regard to the second meaning of justification, that
is, a justification for being moral or participating in moral-
ity as a whole, it is easy to see that an everyday example of
this meaning does not appear as frequently or as easily as for
the first meaning. How often in everyday affairs is an indiv-
idual or society called upon to justify participation in
morality as such or adoption of a moral code? Or consider the
opposite: how often is an individual or society called upon to
justify not participating in or adopting a moral code? Indeed,
it would be quite difficult, perhaps even impossible, to find
an individual or a society purporting to have absolutely no moral
code, probably more difficult even than to have an individual or
society justify participating in a moral code.

However, we must not be led to believe that because we
are hard pressed to find concrete examples of this second
meaning of justification that its importance is in any way
less or its relevance to the human condition is in any way
inferior to that of the first meaning. It may be that the first
meaning is the framework by which individual, separate moral
issues are to be discussed and, hopefully, to some extent solved.
But the fact remains that whatever the adequate justifications
for each separate moral problem may be, these "separate" justi-
fications may well be groundless or unfounded if they are not
founded on or deduced in some way from a "higher" justification
such as that entailed by the second meaning, the justification
of morality itself. In other words, if we have not justified
having a morality as a whole, how can we hope to justify the
different parts (moral issues) that make up morality? In
any event the important point to realize is that the second
meaning of justification is not to be regarded lightly; it
may be the basis upon which all practical moral conduct is to
be founded.

Of the two meanings of justification, then, the second is
the more basic and, indeed, the ultimate issue with regard to
the justification of morality or of being moral. It does not
ask for a justification of any specific moral issue, but pre-
sents a question that seeks justification for morality itself.
That question can be formulated as follows: "What justification
is there for participating in or adopting morality or a moral
code?"

Having dealt with the first ambiguity in the question
"Why be moral?", that between motivation and justification,

let us now shift our attention to the second ambiguity, that between the individual and society.

It will be remembered that the treatment of the first ambiguity, motivation and justification, left the second intact, that between the individual and society (see footnote 3). Generally, all that we need to say about this second ambiguity is that either "individual" or "society" may be used with each and any of the four meanings derived from the first ambiguity between motivation and justification. For each of the meanings derived for motivation and justification, then, a further division may be made between "individual" and "society".

Let us take an example of one of the meanings from motivation and justification in order to see more clearly these additional divisions in meaning. For example, with the question: "What justification is there for being moral in particular instances?", there is no ambiguity as regards motivation and justification; the formulation of the question explicitly employs the term "justification". There is, however, ambiguity as regards "individual" and "society"; we do not know from the question as stated for whom or what the justification is being sought: is it for an individual or for society as a whole?

The meaning of the question as stated above, then, may be further divided as follows: "What justification is there for an <u>individual</u> to be moral in particular instances?" and "What justification is there for <u>society</u> to be moral in

particular instances?" Each of the other three meanings for
motivation and justification may be further divided in the
same way into either the "individual" or "society".

One final remark regarding the use of the term "indiv-
idual" in these meanings: it may be substituted for by
either the term "I", or "you", or "he" or "she", depending
on what sense the inquirer has in mind when posing the
question "Why by moral?" with application to an individual.
The term "individual", then, is only a general term used to
cover all the singular personal pronouns. For example, one
may ask, "Why should I be moral?", "Why should you be moral?",
and so on; all these forms are examples of the form, "Why
should the individual be moral?"

We have now completed our discussion of the ambiguities
contained in the question "Why be moral?", and the meanings
derived from them. Let us now summarize and list these
meanings in order to be clear about what they are and how
they are classified.

Why be moral?

Questions of motivation

1. What motives are there for the individual to be moral
   in particular instances?

2. What motives are there for society to be moral in
   particular instances?

3. What motives are there for the individual to be moral
   as a whole?

4. What motives are there for society to be moral as a
   whole?

Questions of justification

5. What justification is there for the individual to be moral in particular instances?

6. What justification is there for society to be moral in particular instances?

7. What justification is there for the individual to be moral as a whole?

8. What justification is there for society to be moral as a whole?

It will be noted that the only major division made is that between the meanings that fall under "motivation", and those that fall under "justification". The reason for this is simply that all potential answers to the question "Why be moral?" are one of two kinds: motivational or justificatory. That is, we are attempting either to give motives for being moral, or to give justifying reasons for being moral. With regard to the "individual" or "society" they are, in themselves, only variations of both the two different kinds of answers: motivational or justificatory. Note that the "individual" and "society" are contained in both divisions, "motivation" and "justification".

The relevant meanings of the question: Why be moral?

As stated in the opening paragraph of this chapter, the chapter's aims were twofold: to clarify the question "Why be moral?" and to pinpoint exactly the specific meaning or meanings of that question we wish to address.

The entire preceding discussion has been devoted to the first of those aims, and it is now time to fulfil the second. First of all, we can dismiss entirely all those meanings that fall under the "Questions of motivation" division of the previous chart. We shall not be concerned with finding answers to these questions inasmuch as they properly belong to the science of psychology or to that science in combination with other social sciences: sociology and anthropology may be cited as possible candidates here.

Consequently, our concern will be only with those meanings that fall under the division: "Questions of justification". It is only these meanings and the search for answers to these meanings formed as questions that can properly be regarded as belonging to ethics.

The only remaining problem has to do with determining which of those four meanings under "Questions of justification" will best exemplify the topic and problem we wish to discuss. Our concern, generally, will not have to do so much with those meanings involving particular instances either for the individual or for society--meanings 5 and 6--but will be concerned primarily with those meanings involving morality as a whole. Or, if one prefers, we will be concerned with those meanings involving a justification of participating in morality itself, both for the individual and for society; that is, with meanings 7 and 8 on the chart.

The reason our concern is focused on those latter meanings is that they involve an appeal to and a quest for ultimate

principles as regards morality. Specifically, the meaning of
the question "Why be moral?" in its ultimate form; that is,
where it seeks the ultimate principles or answers, is that
meaning which seeks a justification for why the individual
and society should or should not participate in or adopt a
morality or a moral code.

In comparison, particular instances of moral conduct do
not lend themselves to ultimate principles or answers. In-
deed, we may justify each and every moral issue; but such
"justifications" apply only to the specific moral issue they
are meant to justify. They do not justify morality or
participation therein; and it is this latter and ultimate
problem we wish to investigate.

Chapter Three

The Nature of Morality

We said at the close of Chapter Two that we wished to
investigate the problem of justifying morality or, to use
our formulated meanings of that problem, to investigate the
problem of justifying participation in or adoption of moral-
ity or a moral code, both for the individual and society.

The second chapter, then, has solved one problem, that
of clarifying the question "Why be moral?" and stating
exactly what meaning of that question we wish to investigate.
There remain, as it were, at least two more fundamental
problems to be investigated before we can actually attempt
an answer to the question per se. First, we must examine
the nature of morality itself, not only a profitable but a
necessary enterprise, inasmuch as it seems quite reasonable
to assume that we must at least have knowledge and insight
into the thing itself before anything can be justified.
Secondly, we must examine the nature of justification it-
self. This may seem an unnecessary task at the present,
but let us just say that there is more than one meaning
for justification and, whatever the various meanings may be,
they should be investigated along with their relation to
morality and certain problems in ethical theories. The
former problem, then, an investigation into the nature of
morality, will be the topic of this third chapter. The
nature of justification will be discussed later.

As a first preliminary remark, it should be noted that we do not wish to discuss the nature of _ethics_ or moral philosophy; that is, the philosophical study of morality and moral actions. Morality, which we do wish to discuss here, is, generally, that form of human activity in which judgements are made of both moral obligation and moral value. Secondly, it should be noted that the nature of morality can be discussed in two distinguishable modes. In his paper "The Concept of Morality", William J. Frankena explains the distinction as follows:

> ...for when we ask what morality is or what is to be regarded as built into the concept of morality, we may be asking what our ordinary concept of it is or entails, what we actually mean by "moral" and "morality" in their relevant uses, or what the prevailing rules are for the use of these terms. And here the question is not just what we do say, for what we do say may not conform to our rules or it may be less than our rules permit us to say. It is our rules for using "moral" and "morality" that we want, not our practice-in Ryle's terms, our use, not our usage-what we may say, not what we do say. However, when one asks what morality is or how it is to be conceived, one may be interested, not so much in our actual concept or linguistic rules, as in _proposing_ a way of conceiving it or a set of rules for talking about

it, not so much in what our concept and uses
are, as in what they should be. If the ques-
tions are taken in the first way, the dis-
cussion will be a discriptive-elucidatory one,
and the arguments pro and con will have a
corresponding character; if they are taken in
the second sense, the inquiry will be normative,
and the arguments will have a different
character, though, of course, one may still
take the fact that we actually think and talk ,
in a certain way as an argument for continuing
to do so.[1]

We shall take primarily a "descriptive-elucidatory"
approach in our discussion, rather than a "normative",
proposing or prescribing one. It should not be thought
that in subscribing to the former method we are passing
judgement on whether a "normative" approach to the study of
the nature of morality is in any way inferior to that of a
descriptive approach. The question of which is the better
method is another problem in itself and need not be dis-
cussed here. Because the nature of this paper is analytical
or meta-ethical, however, its goals will be best served by
examining the nature of morality in a descriptive rather
than a normative fashion. We are interested in what moral-
ity is, not with what it should be.

Thirdly, let us state initially two obvious and basic
facts about morality: first, there is something recognized

by, human beings as morality; that is, morality <u>exists</u> insofar as human beings designate certain things, actions, etc. as being moral or constituting morality. Secondly, most if not all human beings participate in morality; that is, most people adopt some form of moral code. It should be noted that we are treating the term "morality" here in its most general sense; it does not denote any one system or code but all of them taken together, no matter how diversified individual systems may be. This, of course, presupposes a common element or elements in all moral systems such that they may all be classified under the heading of "morality". What these common elements of morality might be are discussed later in this chapter.

A final preliminary remark: it should not be supposed that morality can exist independently of human participation in it. If there were no human beings, there would be no morality. Such a comment assumes, of course, that man made and constituted morality for his own benefit; that morality does not exist independently of human beings. This assumption seems to be true if one regards the notion of morality we wish to consider in this paper. We do not wish to consider a transcendental morality; that is, the possibility of a morality which exists as some sort of absolute moral code having objective existence independently of human beings. The sense of morality that concerns us is the idea of morality as a social phenomenon, a product of human nature and human condition. On empirical evidence morality in this

latter sense does exist, and whether it exists in the
"transcendental" sense is somewhat of an idealist problem
with which we are not concerned.

Let us, then, begin our treatment of the nature of
morality. We will not attempt to exhaust all the aspects
and cover all the problems associated with this subject.
Such a study would indeed be an enormous undertaking, of
much larger scope than can be handled here. What we wish
to accomplish is happily of a much more modest nature: to
give a satisfactory general account of the nature of moral-
ity in order to help achieve the goal of providing a satis-
factory answer to the question "Why be moral?".

The question "What is morality?" is ambiguous, as has
been said. It could be asking for a definition of morality,
or it could be asking for a descriptive list of features and
characteristics that constitute morality. It is this latter
sense of the question we wish to pursue. Although perhaps
helpful as a summation or conclusion to a completed study
of the nature or morality, a definition of morality, here is
much too superficial and inadequate for our purposes. Ac-
cordingly, we shall proceed to examine the features and
characteristics of morality.

Let us attempt first to establish its most general
feature. Morality may be regarded as being several things:
a (moral) code, "an activity, enterprise, institution, or
system";[2] and in a wide sense morality is all these things.
If we are to choose the word that best applies to morality

from the list just cited, however, I think we shall have to
choose "code" as the one narrowing the meaning of morality
better than any of the others. Indeed, in everyday discourse
"code" is used quite often in conjunction with the concept of
morality: for example, "moral code", "code of ethics"[3]; and
it is used with good reason. The chief <u>function</u> of morality
is that of a code, and it is a code's function, "not just to
know, explain or understand, but to guide and influence
action, to regulate what people do or try to become, or at
least what oneself does or tries to be".[4] "Code", then, is
a more comprehensively specific characteristic of morality
if one considers that we may have "activities", "enterprises",
"institutions" and "systems" which are not codes.

Morality, then, is a system or institution and, more
specifically, a code which consists of rules, principles and
ideals having as their purpose and function the guidance of
human action and conduct. While the preceding sentence could
function as a general definition of morality it is inadequate
on at least one very important account. As it stands, such
a definition is indistinguishable from a general definition
of "law, convention, prudence and religion".[5] In other words,
each of the above four terms could replace the term "morality"
in the definition. The question which naturally follows,
then, is what distinguishes morality from law, convention,
prudence and religion.

To answer this question we might first determine the
kinds of human actions and conduct morality attempts to guide.
This will be insufficient in itself, however, because there

are many actions guided by morality which are guided by
another system or institution as well. For example murder,
which is generally against the moral code,that is, is immoral,
is generally illegal, against the law as well. Secondly,
if examining actions is insufficient by itself in distin-
guishing morality from other systems, we might examine the
rules, principles and ideals of morality to see how they may
differ from other systems. Where there is an overlapping of
actions coming under the guidance of two or more "codes", of
course, there will be a corresponding overlapping of the
rules, principles and ideals guiding those actions. For
example, where the _action_ of murder is prohibited by both
law and morality, naturally the _rule_ governing the prohibi-
tion of murder will exist in both law and morality.

It is evident, then, that a mere listing of moral
actions and their corresponding rules will not aid us
greatly in distinguishing morality from other guiding in-
stitutions. It may help, however, in cases where actions
and rules are found to be unique to morality, acknowledging,
however, that any listing of-actions and rules which include
both those which morality has in common with other systems
and those which it does not, no matter how complete, is still
only a list which will ultimately fail to provide us with a
distinguishing characteristic or characteristics to separate
morality from other systems of code. We wish to find the
essential characteristics which apply solely to morality; a
mere listing of its actions and rules will not accomplish
this.

We have said that morality is a code, a guide to action. Perhaps if we examine morality from the standpoint of being a "code", we shall find some distinguishing characteristics. We have seen that a listing of moral actions and rules is inadequate, primarily because of their overlapping with the actions and rules of other systems. Therefore, the essential differences of morality from other systems such as law, convention, etc, must be differences in the kind of code morality has, as opposed to the kind of code existing in other systems.

How, then, does a moral code differ from other codes such as those of law, convention, prudence and religion, for example. Let us begin to answer this question by examining the general nature of "code" as it exists in these guiding institutions. As we have said, the function of a code is to guide, influence and regulate action or behaviour. All of the above listed institutions, including morality, have codes functioning in this way. The question which follows is why such institutions attempt to guide and regulate actions; that is, what general reason is there for these institutions to attempt to guide and regulate actions?

Quite simply, the reason all guiding institutions attempt to guide and regulate action is because in doing so something valuable, desirable or worthwhile is attained.

There seem, then, to be two types of valued actions here: those which are valued in themselves; and those which are valued because they are a means to some goal or end.

Not only are certain actions themselves valued, then, but the <u>results</u> or <u>ends</u> of other certain actions are also valued.

We must also recognize the converse of actions which are valued. There also exist actions and the ends of actions which are <u>undesirable.</u> These actions and ends of actions are not merely value-neutral or valueless; they are objectionable, unwanted. We use many adjectives to predicate the various "undesirable" actions, of course, and the specific kind of action performed to a large extent will determine the adjective we use to describe the action. For example, we would not ordinarily call "murder" merely undesirable although murder may be undesirable; a more forceful adjective is more appropriate. For the sake of argument, however, let us group the sum total of "unwanted" actions and ends of actions under the heading of "undesirable" and summarize what has been said about actions which are guided or regulated. They are of two kinds: those which are valued; that is, desirable, wanted, having worth; those which are undesirable; that is, unwanted, objectionable.

Actions of the first kind are those used with "should" or "ought". For example: "One should drive carefully" or: "One ought to show kindness." These are actions which are valued, wanted. Actions of the second kind are those used with "should not" or "ought not". For example: "One should not drive on the left side of the road (except in England and a few other places)", or: "One ought not to steal." Such statements refer to actions which are undesirable or unwanted.

In general we may say that, regardless of what institution attempts to do the guiding or regulating, guided or regulated actions are actions which are <u>prescribed</u>. They are prescriptions either to do certain actions or to refrain from doing others. Moreover, they are prescribed not merely for the sake of prescribing, but because the actions and the ends of the actions are valued or desired. When the prescription is one of prohibition, the actions and the ends of actions are undesired, unwanted or detestable.

Whatever the guiding institution and whatever actions are to be guided or regulated, then, there exists as the purpose and basis for their guidance something which is valued and considered worthwhile. What other reason in fact could there be as the raison d'être of these guiding institutions than the attainment of things valued? For example, any system of law in a given society was not created as a game, as something to pass the time; it was created for the general purpose of ordering that society and preventing chaos. While contributing to the general, overall goal of an ordered society, even the individual laws in a legal system have more immediate goals which are valued in themselves. The law forbidding murder, for example exists because human life is valued. The other guiding institutions similarly guide and regulate actions because, in doing so, something valuable is attained. Convention, for instance, involves a familiar and accepted way of performing certain social activities, and what is

valued is either the results expected from such activities,
or the activity itself or both. The wedding ceremony is a
typical example of convention. The desired or valued end
is the marriage of the two partners, while the ceremony
itself, for many couples, is also valued along with the
actual marriage. (Quite often the parents place more value
on the ceremony than do their children who are entering
wedlock.)

. The question following naturally from the foregoing can
be formulated in this way: if the value of actions and the
ends of actions forms the basis and purpose of guiding
institutions, including morality, then how do the values of
morality, moral values, differ from the values sought by
other guiding institutions? To provide a satisfactory answer
to this question, may produce an adequate, if somewhat
superficial, response to the question of what distinguishes
morality from other guiding institutions.

There are several important observations to be made
about the nature of morality, however, if we are to answer
the question adequately; and we shall digress here in order
to consider them. First, insofar as it is concerned with
values, morality is predisposed to involve judgements.
In other words, if one is to participate in morality, one
will necessarily make normative moral judgements about him-
self and others. Further, moral judgements are of two
kinds: judgements of moral obligation, and judgements of
moral value.[6] Both kinds may be subdivided again into

particular and general judgements. For example, a particular judgement or moral obligation is: "I ought not to steal now;" a general judgement of moral obligation is: "We ought to tell the truth." A particular judgement of moral value is: "He is a good man;" a general judgement of a moral value is: "Good people are honest."

The point in listing these moral judgements is that if, as a guiding institution, morality has the attainment of values as its purpose, then the judgements which occur in morality must be judgements of value or evaluation. The second group of judgements listed above are clearly that, judgements of moral value, but the first group are judgements of moral obligation. We must determine, then, whether this first group is also a kind of value judgement.

Present in any expression of obligation, moral or non-moral, are the notions of "should", "ought" and "must" even though they are not always expressed; their senses at least are always understood. For example: "All men have a right to be free" is equivalent to: "All men should be free." Whenever a judgement of moral obligation is made, that is, whenever a judgement is made having a "should", "ought", or "must" expressed or understood, then, the presupposition exists that there are at least two alternatives or courses of action possible, the "right" one and the "wrong" one. The "right" alternative is the course of action one "should" do, while the "wrong" alternative is the course of action one "should not" do. Now implicit in any judgement of moral obligation is a judgement of moral value. This is so because one alternative is judged or evaluated as "right", while the other alternative is judged or evaluated as "wrong".

Consider, for example, the negative judgement of moral
obligation: "One should not steal." Implicit here is the
value judgement: "Stealing is wrong." Why else should one
not steal? In other words, one should not steal for
strictly moral reasons, because stealing is morally wrong.
It is precisely on the basis of value judgements that
judgements of moral obligation are made.

A second observation concerns the notion of value
(good) as an end. We have seen that guiding institutions,
including morality, place value both on actions and the
ends of actions. What is valued as an end of an action we
may regard as a good as an end. Similarly, we may regard
the action which causes or effects this end as a good as a
means. What of actions which are valued in themselves,
however, actions not valued because they produce some
desired end, but valued solely because of the action itself?
There do seem to be actions of this kind, both moral and
non-moral, which are valued in themselves by some people.
Their occurrence, however, is less frequent than actions
regarded as good as a means. For example, let us consider
the evaluative aspect of sexual activity before marriage.
The typical puritanical attitude is that such activity is
immoral. Even though this example is the opposite of a
valued or desired action, it will serve equally as well
as a positive one. If one is a staunch puritan, his
attitude toward sexual activity before marriage as immoral
will rest on more than just the "evil" results possibly
effected by such activity; e.g. unwanted pregnancy, etc;

it will rest to a large extent on the "dirtyness",
"nastyness" and "impurity" he views sexual activity before
marriage itself as having.

It should be noted that although we are regarding the
action of sexual activity before marriage as an action
considered evil in itself, it is not strictly speaking an
action without any reference to a goal since the goal in
this case is the "nastiness" or "dirtyness" effected by
sexual activity before marriage. In saying that actions
are valued in themselves, then, we do not mean they are
without purpose; we mean that certain actions may be
considered "good" or "evil" regardless of what extrinsic
goals they produce. In the case of sexual activity before
marriage the extrinsic "evil" end is the unwanted pregnancy.
Sexual activity before marriage may be regarded as "evil",
however, solely on the basis of its intrinsic effects;
that is, the "nastiness" or "dirtyness" effected by
performing such activity where the "nastiness" or "dirty-
ness" may be considered inherent in the action itself.
Actions valued in themselves, then, are simply those
actions considered "good" or "evil" solely on the basis
of the intrinsic goals they produce.

In any event it will be sufficient to state that there
are many "valued" actions. Some are valued solely as a
means, some are valued both as a means and in themselves
(e.g. the wedding ceremony), and others are valued only in
themselves. In addition, value (and undesirability) is

attributed not only to actions, but to the ends or
goals of actions, that is, "things" are valued in them-
selves: for example, pleasure, happiness and various "vir-
tues" such as friendship, kindness, etc. or pain, unhappi-
ness and the various "vices" such as hatred and malice.

Let's return now to the question from which we digressed,
namely: "How do the values of morality or moral values differ
from the values of other guiding institutions?" In posing
this question we do not mean what different values there might
be, but in what respects the values of morality differ from
those of the other guiding institutions. In other words, we
will be seeking those characteristics which distinguish moral
values from non-moral values. It should be noted at the
outset that moral values may differ from non-moral values
of other guiding institutions in several essentially empirical,
observable ways. For example, we may ask: 1. Who forms the
basis of, originates, regulates, dictates and generally
controls the operation of moral values as opposed to non-
moral values of other guiding institutions: the individual or
society or both? 2. Are moral values and non-moral values
universal? Do they exist all over the world in all cultures?
3. Are moral and non-moral values constant, unchangeable, or
only rarely so? Alternatively, do they change and fluctuate
quite frequently? 4. What values are regarded as moral, and
what as non-moral?

Answers to the above questions without doubt would be
interesting and necessary for a complete and exhaustive study

of the relation between moral and non-moral values.   However,
we are only interested in the <u>basic</u> characteristics of moral
values which distinguish them from non-moral value inasmuch
as it is precisely because moral values have these unique
characteristics that they are termed "moral". Our task, then,
will involve a search for these unique characteristics of
moral values.   If they are found, we shall have distinguished
moral values from non-moral values and, thereby, have dis-
covered in what morality essentially consists, the purpose
of this chapter.

Two preliminary observations are in order here, the
first concerning those actions valued <u>as a means</u>.   Such
actions are defined as <u>moral</u> if the desired end or goal is
itself a <u>moral end</u> or <u>goal</u>. The point, obviously, is that
with respect to values valued as a means and those valued
as an end, the latter are logically, though not <u>temporally</u>
prior. In other words, the action valued as a means will
naturally occur <u>in time</u> before the desired end which the
action effects; the action's existence, however, will be
contingent upon the existence of the desired end or goal such
that, if the end or goal does not exist; neither will the
means to effect that goal <u>logically</u> exist. Moral actions
valued as a means, then, will be simply those actions which
effect moral goals. Accordingly, our discussion will centre
around moral <u>goals</u>, and how <u>they</u> can be distinguished from
goals which are non-moral. The reason, again, is simply that
moral goals are <u>logically</u> prior to the means which effect

them. This is what enables us simply to define <u>moral</u> actions valued as a <u>means</u> as those actions which effect a <u>moral goal</u>.

A second observation concerns the fact that there is no logical distinction between moral goals and non-moral goals. Nor is there any logical distinction between actions effecting those goals (actions valued as a means), whether the goals be moral or non-moral. The question arises then: what do we mean by no <u>logical</u> distinction? Simply that moral goals <u>in</u> <u>themselves</u> are <u>structurally</u> identical to non-moral goals. For example, the moral goal of attempting to prevent the taking of a human life is as a value or a goal similar to, that is, logically and structurally the same as, the non-moral goal of attempting to prevent the deterioration of one's automobile body. There are only two requirements, then, for a logical account or description of any value, moral or non-moral: first, to elucidate the value or goal sought, that is, to note that something is valued and desired, no matter what it may be, and therefore ought to be acquired; and secondly, to note that a means is required to effect the goal. Considered only in the light of these two <u>logical</u> conditions, moral values or goals are identical with non-moral values or goals.

If no logical distinction exists between moral and non-moral values or goals, then, where does the distinction lie? There must be some form of distinction since we most assuredly do differentiate, both conceptually and in practice, between moral actions and their ends and non-moral actions and their

ends. The distinction, and hence the <u>basic</u> difference(s)
between moral and non-moral values, is a <u>psychological</u> not
a logical one. How, then, are moral values or goals dis-
tinguishable psychologically from non-moral ones?

Moral values (goals), and only moral values, are
attended by a <u>certain</u> feeling or emotion. This attendant
feeling or emotion and its peculiar relationship to moral
values or goals would seem to be the unique characteristics
of moral values. It is essential, therefore, to discuss
the feeling or emotion which accompanies only moral values.

In the first instance it is clear that many non-moral
values are also attended by feelings or emotions. We have
only to think of the joy felt by a team which wins a hockey
game, or the "agony of defeat" suffered by their opponents.
These emotions are certainly felt in such situations, and
winning a hockey game is certainly a non-moral value or goal.
Moral values, then, clearly cannot be distinguished from
non-moral values solely on the basis of being attended by
just any feelings or emotions, since non-moral values also
may be attended by feelings and emotions. Accordingly we
must describe and specify precisely what this certain feel-
ing or emotion attending only moral values is.

We should point out initially that this emotion is not
a kind of emotion in the sense that joy, grief, love, hate,
anger, fear, etc. are <u>kinds</u> of emotion. The feeling or
emotion attending moral values may be described as follows:
It is the sense, feeling or, better, the <u>sentiment</u> that
these values are "good" or, with undesirable goals, "bad",

"evil". We do not have moral values passively and unemotionally; we do not have and form moral values, either as judgements of moral values proper or as judgements of moral obligation, which as we saw are a form of vlaue judgement, in a way computers feed out data sheets. Our moral values, as we have said, are attended by a sense, feeling or sentiment that in some way they are intrinsically good[7] or, if related to an undesirable end, intrinsically evil. Moreover, this sentiment for the values is accompanied by a belief or conviction concerning those very same values. We believe values to be "good" (or evil) regardless of any philosophic proofs or justification as to the truth of their objective moral "goodness" or "badness". One certainly does not need to be a moral philosopher, then, to have moral values; one needs only to have a sentiment or belief that certain ends, hence, values, are morally "good" (or "bad").

Note here the use of the word "belief" not the word "know". To "believe" that moral values are "good" or "bad" is one thing; to "know" they are so is quite another. The former is a necessary condition for simply having and forming moral values; the latter, if one attempts the task of "knowing"[8] moral values to be "good" or "bad" strictly speaking, is what one attempts to do as a part of moral philosophy; that is, to seek a justification for the objective truth of moral "goodness" or "badness". Of course, this does not mean that a person may not strengthen his own beliefs and convictions for moral values by a justification, at least to himself, for their objective validity. Neither does it mean, however, that before a person can participate in morality he must form or even agree with any philosophic argument concerning the objective validity of moral values.

Even with this fact in mind, moreover, it would not be in-
consistent for any holder of moral values to give justifying
reasons for the moral values he holds, even though such
justification might not be "philosophical" in any strict
sense. For example, a person asked why he believes murder
to be morally wrong might answer by saying simply that he
values human life. This is certainly not a philosophic
justification, but it is an adequate justification of
sorts if one is only interested in the motives behind his
moral position.

The feeling or emotion attending only moral values,
then, is the sense, feeling or sentiment accompanied by a
belief or conviction that the values are morally "good"
(or "bad"). This statement, however, is incomplete and
circular as it stands. To complete our treatment of morality's
distinguishing characteristics, we must discuss the peculiar
relationship between the feeling or emotion and moral values.
This relationship is the more important and essential item
among morality's distinguishing characteristics.

First, what do we mean exactly by this relationship?
The relationship between the emotion or the sentiment and
belief _and_ the values, is what _motivates_ one to have the
sentiment and belief _for_ the values. In general terms,
it is what motivates one to have the values themselves.
More specifically, however, it is what motivates one to
have the sentiment and belief in the values. The three
terms, sentiment, belief and values, are intergrally con-

nected; one cannot <u>have</u> a value without a sentiment and belief in that value. It was for the sake of precision, then, that we included and described "sentiment" and "belief as one element in morality's distinguishing characteristics.

Accordingly, the reason why morality is essentially different from other guiding institutions is the presence of motivational factors which <u>cause</u> a person to have values commonly accepted as moral. In other words, morality or moral values are "moral" precisely because of the <u>motives</u> that have prompted mankind to have the values. Morality, then, has a different set of motivational factors or motives from other guiding institutions; and it is this difference in motives which provides the essential distinguishing characteristics of morality from these other institutions.

What, then, are these motives which have prompted mankind to develop these "moral values", noting of course that it is precisely because of the motives for the values that they are called "moral"? It should be noted here that this question does not ask what motivates man to simply <u>follow</u> or participate in morality. We may participate in or follow a moral code for many reasons: fear of punishment, fear or respect for God, conditioning, etc. In fact, some of the motivational reasons for why we participate in morality may be the same reasons why we participate in other guiding institutions. For example, one may follow a legal rule or a particular convention out of fear of being punished if one does not. It is a different thing, then simply to

follow or abide by values or a value system than to have
and accept those values as one's own; that is, to have a
sentiment and belief for certain ends or goals and, hence,
to <u>have</u> a value. It is this latter sense which interests
us. We do not wish to find motives for why mankind <u>follows</u>
moral values, but for why mankind <u>has a sentiment and belief</u>
in moral values at all, where the particular motives we are
seeking may be regarded as a distinguishing characteristic
inasmuch as they are unique to the formation of those values.

We may say, generally, that what has motivated and
continues to motivate mankind to have "moral" values, either
in the sense of creating new ones or adopting as opposed to
following already existing ones, are <u>desires</u>. The desires
are basic, psychological, human desires which we may express
as follows: 1. the desire to have something of benefit done
to oneself, to others, and to other things and beings;
2. the desire not to have something of harm or injury done
to oneself, to others and to other things and beings.

Let us now attempt to explain and qualify these two
desires. It should be remarked first that the terms "benefit"
and "harm" or "injury" are used in a non-moral sense. They
are the objects of psychological desires, either innate or
conditioned, or developed from both. They are not desires
to be moral since, as we shall see, these desires are only
a part of what morality is even though they are the dis-
tinguishing characteristic of morality. Moreover, we are
looking for the basic, psychological reasons why mankind
created and continues to preserve what he has created.

Such reasons must necessarily be non-moral; otherwise, our position will be reduced to a useless circularity. These non-moral reasons are the particular desires we are in the process of describing. Now desires are products of our mind, our psyche; hence, in themselves they are purely psychological. It is only after these desires are fully cognized and human beings become fully conscious of them as desires that they are able to be "used" by human beings to create and base the institution ultimately termed "morality". This is the reason, then, that words like "good" and "bad" are used instead of "benefit" and "harm". The former terms, besides their vagueness, carry a strong moral connotation, while the latter carry a much weaker one, if indeed they carry any moral connotation at all. In any event, I use the terms "benefit" and "harm" in an absolutely non-moral sense.

Secondly, we should examine how these desires function or are operative in morality. As noted earlier, we are not looking for motives for why man follows or simply participates in morality; we are searching for motives, hence, desires, to explain why man has (created and continues to preserve) morality. With regard to the creation of morality, it is obvious that man created it [9] because he desired it, thought that it would be beneficial to his society and culture; that is, a system of morality would help prevent chaos and retain order. This is correct, but certainly we are able to derive more specific and fundamental desires than the ones just mentioned. We can look at all the individual moral principles and see quite readily that, for instance, murder

is forbidden because human life is valued; stealing is
forbidden because of a desire to hold on to one's property;
adultery is forbidden because of a desire to hold on to one's
spouse. If we look more closely, however, we see that a
common desire or desires underly the above and, seemingly,
all other moral principles and laws. These underlying de-
sires are, as expected, the desire to have benefit and the
desire not to have harm bestowed on oneself, others and other
things and beings.

I come to this conclusion a posteriori. If we examine
as many moral principles as possible, we see that the motives
for their creation can be traced to the desires of "benefit"
and "not harm".[10] In other words, all moral principles seem
to be designed to either provide benefit, or to prevent harm
for someone or something. If this is the design or purpose
of moral principles, I think we can safely assert that the
motives for their creation are in fact those very same
desires. Murder, for example, is considered "morally" wrong
because human life is valued. This, however, is far too
general an explanation. One may die of natural causes with
a human life thus being lost without there being any moral
issue. Besides the necessity of human agency to actually
commit the murder, the "wrongness" of murder rests more
fundamentally on the fact that it produces "harm" by destroy-
ing human life. Similarly, stealing produces harm to the
one from who something is stolen; lying is capable of
producing harm in a variety of ways; abortion is a moral

issue because it "harms", that is, it destroys a form of
life, the fetus (whether it can correctly be called a
complete human life is a problem central to the issue).
On the positive side of the moral sphere, charity, kindness
and benevolence, for example, are morally commendable
actions because they produce benefit.

We are able, then, to learn much of what morality
fundamentally is from examining the human motives or desires
that have played the major role in the creation of morality.
This is, of course, somewhat of an oversimplification of
morality's creation. Nonetheless, it is not the intent of
this paper to give a complete and exhaustive account of
how morality was created and continues to exist; it is only
necessary to point out that the general psychological desires
of having "benefit" and not having "harm" performed are the
basic reasons why morality was created.

With regard to the continuance of morality, we can see
that any given moral code will exist so long as there are
people who believe in it and follow it. We saw earlier that
there may be several reasons why any individual follows a
moral code: for example, out of fear or respect. Does this
mean, however, that the desires of having benefit and not
having harm are no longer operative with regard to the
continuance of morality? I think we can say with certainty
that the "desires" are operative and, indeed, necessary to
the continuance of morality. Morality is not a static human
creation; it evolves, changes. Some moral rules leave the
moral sphere; others are created. Just as the original

creation of morality, which did not involve one deliberate
action of creation at one point in time, was based on the
desires to have benefit and not to have harm; so, too, the
moral values which change have those same desires as their
psychological basis. Consider, for example, the contemporary
moral issues of either abortion or the seal hunt off the coast
of Newfoundland. Both issues are controversial because of a
desire not to have harm performed. Indeed, they are "moral"
issues because of this very desire. Again the "desires" may
be viewed as being operative even with more static moral rules.
The moral rule against murder, for example, may be followed
out of fear or respect for God or the law, or even for con-
ventional reasons - "Murder is not the proper, socially acc-
eptable thing to do". Indeed, it is not. It seems, however,
that there may be another possible reason for following moral
rules than those listed above. Can we, and do we, in fact
many times follow moral rules simply because we either
desire to help, provide benefit or, conversely, not inflict
harm? If so, we would not only be following the values to
which the rules pertained but, as explained earlier, we
would <u>have</u> those values as our own. We may, for example,
follow the rule forbidding murder simply because we desire
not to inflict harm. Indeed, if all moral rules at all
times and by all people were followed only out of fear,
respect or conditioning, I think it reasonable to hypothesize
that morality would eventually cease to exist. Indeed, the
very permanence and longevity of morality throughout human
history seem to attest to the fact that something constant

and unchanging in the makeup of human nature itself has
and will continue to motivate man to have morality. Fears
may be overcome, respect may be lost, and people may become
deconditioned. For these reasons, then, I believe fear,
respect or conditioning are not fundamental principles or
motives which have created and continue to preserve morality;
in short, they are too ephemeral. The desires we have been
discussing, however, seem to be the constant, unchanging
motives we are seeking. It follows, incidentally, that the
desire to have benefit performed and the desire not to have
harm performed may also act as motivating reasons for why
someone follows or participates in morality, just as fear,
respect and conditioning may act in the same manner.

One final note with regard to our psychological explana-
tion of morality's distinguishing characteristics concerns
the fact that, because our argument is a posteriori or
inductive, it is possible that the theory we have set forth
is not absolute. In other words, it is possible that a
moral value exists which does not have the psychological
desires of having benefit and not harm as its reason for
existing and continuing. Moreover, there is also the
possibility that a non-moral value exists which has those
very desires as its reason for existing. In any event, we
are just providing for the possibility of exception to the
general rule. The fact that our explanation may not be
absolute is not particularly disquieting. Our theory is
essentially based on human nature; and human nature, unlike

mathematics, is subject to exceptions and aberrations from any general rule made concerning that nature.

We have been describing the psychological conditions of morality, which have been found also to be morality's distinguishing characteristics. Specifically, the purely psychological conditions were the desires of providing benefit and preventing harm for oneself, others and other things and beings. These desires effected a sentiment and belief in certain ends or goals. The combination of all these factors, desires, sentiment, belief, goals results in what human beings call "moral" values. These psychological conditions and their effects, however, although a necessary and distinguishing condition of what morality is, are not a sufficient condition. For morality to exist, especially in practice, man's rationality, his intellect, is also a necessary, although not unique condition. Indeed, it is man's intellect which organizes these psychological desires into a code or guiding system known as morality. William K. Frankena aptly describes conditions which are necessary before one can properly be said to have a morality or, as he puts it, "take the moral point of view". One has a morality or takes the "moral point of view" if:

> ...(a) one is making normative judgements about
> actions, desires, dispositions, intentions,
> motives, persons, or traits of character;
> (b) one is willing to universalize one's judge-
> ments'

'(c) one's reasons for one's judgements
consists of the facts about what the
things judged do to the lives of
sentient beings in terms of promoting
or distributing non-moral good and
evil; and

(d) when the judgement is about oneself
or one's own actions, one's reasons
include such facts about what one's
own actions and dispositions do to
the lives of other sentient beings
as such, if others are affected.[11]

The conditions of morality listed by Frankena quite
obviously require a human mind or intellect to perform them.
Morality is a system, an intelligent rational system.
Therefore, it needs an intelligent mind or intellect to
create, continue and guide it. The psychological desires
of providing benefit and preventing harm are in themselves
merely desires; unaccompanied by a rational intelligence
to organize and guide them, the desires themselves cannot
be considered a "morality". In short, human rationalization
provides the actual implementation, performance and guidance
of the psychological conditions; it results in fulfilling
the "desires" by means of a system in a rational, organized
way. On a societal level this means the formation and
implementation of a general system or code; on an individual
level it means the formation and implementation of a per-
sonal system or code which may differ in any degree from

the general societal code.

A corollary to this position is that a rational system not based or founded ön the psychological desires - we have described is not a "morality". Law, for instance, is a <u>rational</u> guiding system, and it may at first seem to be related to the psychological desires öf providing benefit and preventing harm in the same manner as morality, a situation which would make law indistinguishable from morality. But even though law may have as its <u>raison de'être</u> the provision of benefit and the prevention of harm for the individual and society, it is complete as a system without these psychological considerations: laws are written in books, enforced by police bodies, and created or deleted by legislatures, without necessarily being guided by psychological desires. In essence law is virtually entirely artificial, out of "nature's hands". Law, therefore, <u>can</u> exist without psychological reasons while morality, on the other hand, cannot. Morality inextricably consists of both conditions: the psychological and the rational, and the elimination of either one results in the elimination of morality.

Before concluding this chapter, let us set down in summary form the basic conditions and, hence, the foundation of morality as we have formulated it. The following is not meant to be a definition of morality, but only a description of morality's most fundamental features.

Like all guiding institutions, morality guides and regulates human action. The purpose behind regulation of the action is that an action may be valued in itself, the

end of an action may be valued, or both the action and the
end of that same action may be valued.

(A) Psychological (distinguishing) Conditions: The
psychological desires of providing benefit and preventing
harm for oneself, others and other things and beings moti-
vate a sentiment and belief [12] in certain ends or goals,
thus providing conditions, ends or goals which are con-
sidered "moral" values; (B) Rational or Intellectual Con-
ditions: These values in toto, the psychological conditions,
are organized, structured, guided and developed by the human
intellect and rationality so that they (values) may be
incorporated and put into use as a guiding system or
institution, thereby "fulfilling" the desires and their
effects. [13]

A morality can be said to exist once these two general
conditions have been met. This, of course, presents us
with a much simplified account of what morality is, as
well as with the basic "building blocks" of morality and
knowledge of its essence and raison d'être, exactly what
we desired to achieve.

Let us turn in Chapter Four to a consideration of
whether a justification of morality, both for the in-
dividual and society, is possible; and, if so, what its
nature is.

Chapter Four

The Nature of Justification

In this chapter, we shall first examine briefly the
nature of justification itself and, secondly, the question
whether any type of justifying reasons can be given to the
question "Why be moral?" Specifically, we shall be seeking
justifying reasons for those meanings of the question "Why
be moral?" formulated in Chapter Two: "What justifying
reasons are there for the individual to be moral, as a
whole?" and "What justifying reasons are there for society
to be moral, as a whole?"

One sense of justification concerns the notion of proof,
according to which we may be said to "justify" something if
we are able to prove whether or not it is true, it exists,
it is of a certain nature, etc. This type of justification
is arrived at by the methods of either (1) logical reasoning
or (2) empirical verification.

Logical reasoning is the process of arriving at a con-
clusion by either deduction or induction. Deduction is the
process which posits general premises from which a particular
conclusion (truth) may be deduced or derived. The following
is a simple example of a deductive argument in syllogistic
form:

Major premise: All fish live in water

Minor premise: A salmon is a fish.

Conclusion: Therefore, a salmon lives in water.

Of course, the conclusion is only true or sound if the

premises themselves are true, and if the rules for the logical structure of the argument are valid. Induction employs the reverse process from deduction, arriving at a general conclusion from particular premises. For example, we _induce_ the general conclusion that some force (gravity) causes objects to fall when released from our hands. We come to that _general_ conclusion (all things fall) simply by a repeated series of releasing objects (particular premises).

Empirical verification is the process of arriving at a truth by use of the senses. For example, I see a chair, and by _seeing_ the chair I conclude that the chair exists, in addition to its colour, size, kind of chair, etc. The other senses also may be employed to verify empirically some truth about the same object. For example, a blind person cannot see a chair, but is able to determine its existence by feeling or touching it. Of course the possibility of error exists with empirical verification; our senses may deceive us. For example, if one is intoxicated he may see two chairs where only one exists.

Deduction, induction and empirical verification, then, are forms of reasoning employed by modern science, especially induction and empirical verification. We will call this type of reasoning an attempt to justify something scientifically or, simply "scientific" justification.

Another sense of justification is not concerned with arriving at what _is_, but with reasons why some activity should or should not be performed. The "should" here is not

necessarily a moral should, but refers also to any type of prudential or expedient activity. For example, a justifying reason for tying one's shoelaces is to prevent one from tripping.

It would appear at first glance that, of the two senses of justification, the latter is the obviously more applicable for justifying morality, since morality is largely concerned with conduct, with what one ought or ought not to do. The former "scientific" sense of justification might seem in fact to be quite irrelevant as a means for justifying morality. As we shall see, this is precisely the fact of the matter. We must, however, examine why this "scientific" method of justification is unacceptable, since there have been moral philosophers who attempted to justify morality by this very means.

The Relation of Justification to Morality:

An Attempt to Answer the Question, "Why be moral?"

1: The Impossibility of Justifying Morality by "Scientific" Reasoning

The position that morality can be justified by scientific reasoning may be restated as that position which attempts to derive a conclusion which is a value (moral) judgement from factual premises alone. It is more commonly and simply stated as that position which attempts to derive an "ought" from an "is". Naturalism, as the position is

known, not only attempts to derive value judgements from factual premises alone; it rests on the assumption that values and, hence, value judgements, statements, and assertions, are merely one type of fact. Values, like factual judgements, therefore, are empirically verifiable, and able to be concluded as objectively <u>true</u> from the same kind of reasoning process (scientific) <u>that factual judgements are.</u>

We shall not offer a complete account of Naturalism, something which would require a separate chapter in itself. We wish only to show briefly that naturalism is unacceptable as a means of justifying morality, that moral values cannot be derived from facts alone or, in other words, that we cannot justify what we <u>ought</u> to do from what <u>is</u>. Scientific reasoning, therefore, will be shown to be unacceptable as a means of justifying morality.

The error or fallacy of Naturalism is basically an error in reasoning. An example should illustrate why an "ought" cannot be derived from an "is". <u>Argument 1</u>: "Children need the love of their parents. Therefore, parents ought to love their children.[1] We have here an "ought" conclusion, that is, a value judgement, derived or deduced from a factual premise. The argument, however, is not valid because the conslusion does not necessarily follow from the premise. It is not <u>logically</u> contradictory to hold that children need the love of their parents and, at the same time, believe that parents ought not to love their children. <u>Need</u> is not a

sufficient condition for having the need satisfied.

Consider for example this argument: Argument 2:
"Rapists need victims. Therefore, (potential) victims ought
to surrender themselves to rapists." Argument 2 is identical
to Argument 1 both in logical structure and in the fact that
"need" is involved. The only difference is the fact that the
subjects are changed (rapists and victims instead of children
and parents). If the first argument were valid, then the
second must be valid also. (One can easily see the horrendous
moral conclusions that could and would ensue if such arguments
as Argument 2 were valid.) The point is: these arguments
provide examples of the fact that value judgements cannot be
derived from facts alone.

What if we were to add an additional premise so that the
argument would be valid? For example: Argument 3: Major
premise: The needs of children ought to be satisfied. Minor
Premise: Children need the love of their parents. Conclusion:
Therefore, parents ought to love their children. Argument 3
is valid; that is, the logical form of the argument is cor-
rect and the conclusion follows logically from the premises.
The argument, however, is not sound. We have not "proved" or
justified that parents ought to love their children since it
is no longer a case of a value judgement (the conclusion)
being deduced from facts alone; the major premise is itself
a value judgement. The argument, then, is simply a case of
deriving an "ought" from an "ought". The problem is merely
taken back one step; we still have to justify the major

premise.

The fallacy we have been dealing with is commonly called the <u>deductive</u> fallacy, part of what has been called the naturalistic fallacy most notably refuted by George E. Moore in his <u>Principia Ethica</u>.[2] Another part of the "naturalistic fallacy" must also be considered in order to complete our position that values cannot be derived from facts alone; this is the so-called "definist fallacy". Naturalists have attempted not only to derive an "ought" from an "is", values from facts; they have also attempted to define all values or, better, all value predicates in purely factual or empirical terms. In other words, a value or value predicate is said to mean the same thing as a certain set of factual or empirical properties. For example, "good" might mean "pleasant", "right" mean "approved of by the majority", "evil" mean "pain", etc. Of course there have been different naturalistic theories which posit different definitions of value predicates, but <u>all</u> naturalistic theories hold, "That an ethical judgement simply is an assertion of a fact - that ethical terms constitute merely an alternative vocabulary for reporting facts."[3]

A common argument against the definist theories is known as the "open question argument", first propounded by George E. Moore and his followers. The argument states that if a value predicate <u>means</u> the same thing as a certain factual term, then wherever the value predicate occurred in

a sentence the factual term could be substituted without changing the meaning of the sentence. This seems to work well with two factual terms. Consider, for example, the definition: hockey puck means flat, black, hard, rubber disc. If the two terms or sets of terms mean the same thing, one could be substituted for the other in a sentence without changing the meaning of the sentence. In the sentence, "A hockey puck is used in hockey", we could substitute by saying, "A flat, black, hard, rubber disc is used in hockey." Since it is evident that the two sentences mean the same thing, the definition is true.

There seems to be a problem, however, regarding the interchangeability of value-predicates and facts. Consider the definition: good means pleasant. If "good" does in fact **mean** "pleasant", then these two sentences "Self-sacrifice is **good**" and "self-sacrifice is **pleasant**" must mean the same thing. It is clear, however, that the two sentences do not necessarily mean the same thing. Self-sacrifice may be "good", but it is not necessarily "pleasant". The point of the "open question" argument is that we may know something is "pleasant" and still ask seriously whether it is also "good". Or, vice versa, we may regard something as "good" and still question whether it is also "pleasant". All value predicates defined in factual terms, then, are subject to the same "open question" argument; that is, it is an open question whether the value predicate has a meaning identical to the factual term which purports to define the value.

If considered without further qualification, however, the "open question argument", strikes me as somewhat begging the question. True, we may ask seriously whether a value predicate has a meaning identical to a factual term, and we may cite instances in actual usage where they do not mean the same thing. This, however, is not a strict disproof of the definist theory because it may be objected that the meaning of value-predicates is quite vague and, hence, that a factual definition of them will hardly ever contain all of what we vaguely mean by the term. The two terms, then, value and factual, may not have identical meanings in every respect, but the definition may still be acceptable. In addition, the definists may show that a value term, "good" for example, has a number of different uses. Therefore, there may be a factual term which has a meaning identical with one of "good's" uses, and yet one could still ask the open question, "This has X, but is it good?" The "open question argument", then, may sufficiently refute some value-fact definitions, but that does not mean all such definitions are impossible.[4]

The problem with the definist theory, that is, why it does not solve the problem of justifying morality, really derives from the fact that it places what must be justified merely one step backward. As we saw with the "deductive" fallacy in Argument 3, the conclusion can only be said to be justified if one justifies the major premise. With the definists' position, if we accept a certain definition of "good" or "right", then based solely on that definition we will be able to give conditional justifications of what is

"good" or "right" but it will still be necessary to
justify the definition itself, and why we should accept it.
A definist may claim that his definition is justified in
the same way dictionary definitions are justified, ex-
pressing what we ordinarily mean by the definition. This,
however, does not show why we should adopt or adhere to the
moral principle which the definition expresses.) "Appealing
to a definition in support of a (moral) principle is not
a solution to the problem of justification, for the definition
needs to be justified, and justifying it involves the same pro-
blems that justifying a principle does."[5]

Before leaving this section, we should note that there
is one sense in which morailty may be regarded as "factual ",
namely, when we describe morality and its principles. For
example, it is a fact that most societies regard murder as
morally wrong. Description of moral principles, however,
is quite different from saying that moral principles can be
derived solely from facts where any moral principle in question
is actually a kind of factual assertion whereby its truth or
falsity and, hence, its justification, can be established in
the same manner as scientific and concrete facts are established.

Morality, then, and being moral cannot be justified by
facts alone or, in other words, by scientific reasoning. We
must now examine the possibility of justifying morality by
the second form of justification given: that is, simply reasons
in themselves, which will justify being moral.

2: The Question of Whether There are Ultimate
    Reasons for Being Moral.

. The reasons we are seeking must be <u>ultimate</u>, since
the question "Why be moral?" is an ultimate question: it
asks for reasons which, if found, will be <u>absolutely suf-
ficient</u> in justifying the question.

A second important remark to be made concerning the
justifying reasons we are looking for is that they must
be <u>non-moral reasons</u>. To give moral reasons for being moral
is to beg the question. Consider the absurdity of answering
the question "Why be moral?" by saying, ".....because it is
your moral duty to be moral", or "...because it is good to be
moral." Any moral reasons given for being moral will them-
selves have to be justified. And if moral reasons are given
for the first set of moral reasons, then they will have to be
justified, and so on ad <u>infinitum.</u> Non-moral reasons, then,
are necessary right from the beginning.

We shall first deal with the question "What justifying
reasons are there for the individual to be moral, as a whole?",
since this question seems, as we shall see, more complex and
difficult to answer than the same question asked of society.
When ultimate justifying reasons are sought, then, for the
question "Why should I (individual) be moral?" the reasons
asked for are necessarily reasons that would justify an in-
dividual making an ultimate <u>choice</u> of the priority of adopting
or participating in morality over not participating in morality
or being amoral. The "choice" here is unavoidable. In seeking

reasons for being moral, we are assuming that individuals
have the ability to be or act morally and also the ability
to be or act amorally. Hence individuals have the choice
to be moral or not to be moral. Reasons justifying being
moral are essentially reasons which justify, or show why
it is better to be moral rather than not to be moral. We
are searching, then, for the ultimate reasons that justify
choosing to be moral rather than not being moral. It follows
that the choice must be ultimate.

It is impossible, however, to give reasons for an
ultimate choice since, as we shall see shortly, an ultimate
choice by its very nature rules out the possibility of
giving reasons for choosing. What is involved here is
simply a case of an infinite regress. Whenever we attempt
to provide reasons for choosing one thing over another when
we can do one or the other but not both (such is the case
with being moral or not being moral), the reasons given for
the choice must necessarily be founded or based upon a
principle already accepted or agreed upon. In other words,
a reason for choosing anything is only intelligible within
a frame of reference. "I choose to be moral because that
is the way things are" has no frame of reference or principle
upon which the statement is based; it is not a reason but
merely a tautologous statement. It is like saying: "I choose
to be moral because I choose to be moral." If we offer the
reason, "I choose to be moral because I desire to be moral",

then we are accepting the principle that satisfying a
desire is valuable, and we will have to give reasons for
that principle. Any reason for choosing to be moral, then,
will presuppose a commitment to some higher principle which,
in turn, will presuppose commitment to some yet higher
principle for which reasons will be required, and so on
ad infinitum. It is impossible, therefore, to give ultimate
justifying reasons for being moral because, first, an ultimate
choice is involved and, second, an ultimate choice is by its
very nature impossible.[6]

With regard to justifying society's adoption of morality,
or to form the question "What justifying reasons are there for
society to be moral, as a whole?", the same conclusions arrived
at for justifying the individual's participation in morality
are applicable: ultimate justifying reasons are impossible.
With society we are simply dealing with a collective group
of people who, as a group, must make a choice between having
morality or not having morality, as opposed to an individual
who must make the same choice. We should mention that an
obvious practical reason for society, as a whole, adopting
morality is simply to prevent chaos and to make life bearable.
It is not difficult to imagine that a society without a
morality would eventually collapse, order would be impossible,
or at best, an unimaginable, extreme, totalitarian state would
exist. Although this is a "good" reason for society adopting
a morality, it presupposes the principle that social order is
a good situation; it is, therefore, not an ultimate reason for

society adopting morality.

We said that the question asking why the individual should be moral was more complex and difficult to answer. With regard to ultimate reasons the answers to the two questions are, as we saw, identical. With regard to simply "good" reasons based upon an accepted principle, however, the answers to both questions are not identical. We have given a "good" reason for society adopting morality. Any individual, however, may agree with that reason and still question justifiably whether he should participate in morality. He may say: "Yes, I agree, that is a good reason for society adopting morality, and I think society should have a morality. This, however, is not a good reason why I should be moral; it is more to my advantage if I act completely for my own self-interest." We shall deal with possible "good" reasons for the individual to be moral later in this chapter.

It seems from what we have said up to this point that we are at an impasse. We cannot justify morality by an appeal to scientific reasoning, nor can we give an ultimate justification of morality by simply giving reasons. Does this mean that no justification of morality, for either the individual or for society, is possible? No; as we have seen, it means only that no ultimate justification is possible. It may still be possible and reasonable to provide a limited or conditional justicication of morality. There may still be reasons for adopting morality, even though they may not be

ultimate reasons. A justification may still be regarded
as a justification even though it it not ultimate. Our
task now will be to find a conditional but adequate justi-
fication for being moral. This means, of course, that we
will have to adopt and accept a "first" principle from which
conditional reasons for being moral can be formulated.

3: The Possibility of a Conditional Justification
    for being Moral

The first problem is to decide what our first principle
will be and why it will be the first principle. If we examine
the conclusions arrived at in Chapter Two to the effect that
morality consists generally of two parts, the psychological
and the intellectual or rational, we shall, I believe, arrive
at an acceptable logical first principle. Let us, then, try
to give justifying reasons for the "parts" of morality, as it
were. Perhaps by justifying the parts, we will be able to
derive some sort of conditional justification for the whole
of morality.

It will be remembered that the psychological part of
morality consisted of the desires of (1) having benefit bestowed
on oneself, others (humans), and other things and beings; and
(2) not having harm bestowed on oneself, others (humans), and
other things and beings. These desires in turn motivate one
to develop a value for certain ends or goals, where this value
is necessarily and naturally accompanied by a sentiment and
belief that the "values" are good, bad, right, wrong. The

desires in themselves, that is, merely having the desires,
are not open to justification. They are part of human nature,
like the desire of hunger or the desire to participate in
sexual activity. To give justifying reasons for why we
should or should not have any desire is unintelligible.
Essentially, we have no choice over our psychological
desires; they are as much a part of us as our physical
properties. Desires are "justified" simply because they
are part of our human psychological make-up. Consequently,
the values we form which are a result of the desires (benefit
and not harm) are also not open to justification simply be-
cause they are the results or natural outcome of the desires.
Nor does one need to "justify" them. It must be remembered,
however, that the values are unjustifiable only in the sense
of having them. For example, if we value not having murder
committed, then the value itself or, better, the mental
construct of the value as opposed to the actual implementation
of the value, is unjustifiable simply because it is a result,
an extension, and a further refinement of the desires which
are not open to justification. In fact, we may regard moral
values as desires themselves. They are not as fundamental
as the purely psychological desires because they are caused
by the latter, of course, and their objects of desire or value
are naturally more specific. The desire (value), for example,
of wanting to do kindness is a specific result of the desire
to bestow benefit on others.

What is open to justification, however, is the question of whether the individual or society should or should not _fulfill_ those psychological desires and their resultant values. The issue of justification, in other words, has to do with the actual implementation of those desires and values in a rational, organized system. It will be noted that we are now talking about the second part of what morality is: the rational or intellectual part of morality, which necessarily involves "moral" conduct; that is, putting into practice desires and values which have a psychological basis.

It seems, then, that we have a logical first principle: fulfilling the values arrived at as a result of psychological desires of providing benefit and preventing harm. This is a logical first principle because it relates to the fundamental parts of what morality is; indeed, it might be said to be the logical first principle of the second part of morality, viz., the rational or intellectual. The first fundamental part, the psychological, however, is not open to justification although the second part is. The second part, therefore, the rational or intellectual will have a first principle. Of course, we will not attempt to provide justifying reasons for this first principle, since that would require acceptance of a yet higher principle which would itself require justifying reasons, and so on. The mere fact that the first principle is one of the two _most_ basic parts of which morality consists is the logical reason we chose it as our first principle.

We have already given one conditional justifying reason for society's adoption of morality: to retain order and prevent chaos. If we examine this reason closely we see that it is founded on the first principle: to fulfill the desires of providing benefit and preventing harm. The reason, then, of retaining order and preventing chaos is not an ultimate reason (which is impossible), but it is an adequate reason for society's adoption of morality, meaning it is a <u>rational</u> reason, since from a practical point of view we will all live a more congenial life if society does adopt a morality. Ultimately, of course, this reason is founded upon the desires of providing benefit and preventing harm.

With regard to conditional reasons for the individual to be moral they are, as we saw, more difficult to find. Based on the first principle, we could say to any given individual: "Be or act morally because in doing so you will be fulfilling your psychological desires (benefit and not harm)." This, however, may not always be an appropriate answer since those psychological desires may vary in intensity for any given individual[7]; and further, those same desires at times may conflict with desires of self-interest, and in such cases of conflict the stronger desire will presumably be the one which is fulfilled.

In general, all we can say of individuals is that each one of us must examine his or her own desires of providing benefit and preventing harm. Fulfill them in whatever intensity

they exist. We cannot give reasons for fulfilling those desires since that is our accepted first principle. If one lacks those desires to begin with, or does not accept the first principle, then, we cannot give reasons why such a person in particular should be moral.

These of us who do possess the desires are at least motivated to fulfill them since they are _desires_. We cannot give justifying reasons for their fulfillment since the fulfillment itself of the desires is the first principle. The _prescription_ of the first principle is unavoidable. In short we are saying: fulfill those psychological desires; that is, provide benefit and prevent harm simply because, by the very fact of having those desires, you regard their fulfillment as worthwhile ends in themselves. The fulfillment of the desires is not intrinsically valuable in the _objective_, scientific sense; that is, the desires are not, or at least cannot be proved "true" or intrinsically valuable regardless of human existence. They are intrinsically valuable in the _subjective_ sense; that is, they are valuable in themselves simply because mankind _regards_ them so. In essence they are a part of what mankind is, part of his nature as a human being. This is as much as we can say regarding the justification of morality as a whole for the individual and society. What remains to be done is to offer some summary remarks in conclusion; and this will occupy the final section.

Chapter Five

Conclusion

Some readers may be disappointed to discover that no strict justifying reasons could be found for the question "Why be moral?". By "strict" we mean reasons either concluded from scientific reasoning in itself, or reasons which are ultimate. Such disappointment can be appreciated owing to the fact that, because it has within its sphere many crucial, controversial and highly emotional issues, morality tends naturally to lead many people to believe that such important matters must be able to be founded and justified in an absolute sense one way or the other. The fact that we cannot justify morality absolutely or strictly, however, is no reason to despair with respect to morality's continuance; for it is mankind's desires and motives, not arguments of justification by moral philosophers, which have been the principal forces contributing to morality's longevity.

On the other hand, however, we should not belittle rationality since, as we have seen, it is a necessary part of morality's existence. The loss of morality or "moral decay", moreover, is more often than not the result of a loss in rationality than the result of an absence of psychological desires. In the days when slavery was practiced on this continent, for example, those who held it to be morally permissible were not necessarily lacking in desires to prevent harm or provide benefit. Their acceptance of slavery was more likely to have been founded on the belief that blacks

were physically and intellectually inferior to whites and
hence their enslavement was as justified as the ensalvement
of animals for food or work. Slavery was subsequently con-
sidered immoral, then, because of a general recognition of
the error of black inferiority, the error being an example
of false knowledge or irrationality. The fact, therefore,
that we cannot ultimately justify our moral behaviour is not
a reason for concern over the continued existence of morality;
nor does the non-existence of ultimate justification belittle
the importance morality has. With regard to the former, we
can be certain morality will continue to exist so long as
there are humans who possess desires for providing benefit
and preventing harm, along with a rationality to guide those
desires. With regard to the latter, morality's importance
does not rest to any extent on an ultimate justification. Its
importance derives from the fact that it achieves and satis-
fies certain goals which, because of our human nature, we or
at least a majority of us regard as important and valuable in
themselves. Those goals are, generally having benefit per-
formed and having harm prevented.

Our concern in this paper has been focused entirely on
the attempt to provide a justification for morality as a whole,
and we have not attempted to provide justification for any of
the many individual moral principles. Generally we can assert,
however, that what we have said concerning justification of
morality as a whole is also applicable to justification of

any particular moral principle: we cannot give a scientific.
or ultimate justification for any individual moral principle
any more than we were able to provide one for the whole of
morality. It also follows that acceptance of our first
principle of fulfilling the psychological desires of pro-
viding benefit and preventing harm is necessary in providing
a conditional, non-moral justification for any particular
moral·principle.

With particular moral principles, however, it is possible
and indeed rational to make a judgement or attempt a justifi-
cation for any particular moral principle on moral grounds.
In fact we do this all the time. We judge a person's conduct
as morally right or wrong; we may attempt to justify our own
conduct in any particular instance as being morally per-
missible; we speak of responsibility, of what one ought to do,
(morally speaking), of what is one's duty; we make moral
evaluative judgements: he is a good man, benevolence is
virtuous, honesty is the best policy, and the list of such
judgements is endless. Such moral judgements and attempts to
give reasons for them are not irrational and uningelligible;
in fact, such activity is quite the opposite. But such
activity or moral reasoning is only rational and intelligible
if one accepts the principle that moral activity in general is
valuable or worthwhile to begin with. We can give moral
reasons for doing or not doing any particular activity in the
moral sphere, but the logic of such reasons must rest on and
be consistent with accepted first principles. In this paper

we have endeavoured to provide first principles, but we have
not attempted the task of providing a system or logic of moral
reasoning which would enable moral principles to be inferred
from the first principle. This paper, then, might be regarded
as a starting point from which a system of moral reasoning.
may be developed.

Another aspect concerning the nature and justification
of morality which we deliberately did not consider is the
possibility of an external justification for being moral.
By "external justification" we mean a justification founded
upon the existence and command of God or a Supreme Being.
We did not consider such a justification because it would
have necessitated a discussion of the question of whether or
not God exists, something far beyond our scope. In general,
all we need say regarding this issue is that, if God exists
as the supreme lawgiver, then we have an ultimate, absolute
justification for being moral; that is, because God commands
it. If He does not exist, then we do not have an ultimate,
absolute justification. We are only concerned with a morality
within the context of the human condition; that is, morality
as man created it, as a product of mankind's psychological,
sociological, and intellectual development.

We have said that the psychological desires of providing
benefit and preventing harm form the characteristic of
morality distinguishing it from other guiding institutions.
As a further qualification to that position we should note

that, generally, the "benefit" and "harm" must be of a
certain level of intensity before they can be a part of
morality. The context into which "benefit" and "harm" are
set is involved as well. For example, if a person offers
another a piece of his candy bar, he is providing benefit
to another (assuming the other person wants it), but there
is no great morally commendable action taking place inasmuch
as the intensity or degree of benefit is very low. If a
person offers free food and lodging to another who is un-
doubtably starving and freezing to death, however, benefit
is being provided here, too, but the action is definitely
and highly morally commendable because the degree of benefit
is high. Similarly, as regards context, this same starving
man who stole food to preserve his life with no other
resource available would not be regarded as having done an
action which is morally wrong, even though harm is being
produced to the one from whom he is stealing. If stealing
is performed when death or injury is not imminent, on the
other hand, that action is usually considered immoral.
Again, with regard to intensity, there is no strict dividing
line separating what "benefit" and "harm" is intense enough
to be regarded as a part of morality from what is not; there
is only a general yardstick. The "benefit" and "harm" which
become a part of morality are usually of enough intensity to
involve issues of moderate to great personal and social
importance. With regard to context, there are just too many
circumstances under which any given situation may or may not

be regarded as moral for a search for a general rule of moral context to be anything but very difficult, if not impossible. We must examine each situation as it arises to determine conclusively whether it belongs in the moral sphere. Our goal, however, in describing the nature of morality was only to point out the general nature of morality's distinguishing characteristics. We merely wish to contend here that there are certain conditions which must be met before the desires of providing benefit and preventing harm can be said to constitute a part of morality.

We have not, then, given an exhaustive account of the nature of morality, nor did we deem it necessary. We are satisfied with describing its general, principal and basic features in order to arrive at the conclusions concerning morality's justification we have formulated. Morality is a product of human nature: directly, because of man's psychological desires; indirectly, because man's intellect and rationality are necessarily involved in its creation and continuance. We are not born "moral" beings, but we are born to some extent with desires and to a great extent with a potential rationality, both of which predispose us to eventually become moral beings. We are able to become "moral" or participate in morality in the sense of having moral values and a moral code only after the desires and intellect have developed and matured so that they can be combined and associated in a logical manner. Being moral is, in a sense, a part of being human. If for no other reason than that alone, I think we can soundly, or at least rationally say: "Be moral!"

FOOTNOTES

Chapter Two

1. I use the term "meanings" here to denote only the narrowest senses of the question "Why be moral?" Strictly speaking, one may seek either motives or a justification, and may mean either the individual or society when the question "Why be moral?" is posed and although any of the four senses above may be regarded as different meanings of the questions, I have reserved the term "meanings" for only those senses of the question "Why be moral?" which not only can be derived from the ambiguities: motivation or justification and the individual or society, but which are also narrower and more specific meanings of the question "Why be moral?" than the latter.

2. William K. Frankena, Ethics (2d ed., Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1973), p.114. Frankena comments briefly here on the ambiguity of motivation and justification.

3. For the sake of simplicity I will use the form of the question: "Why be moral?" rather than the form: "Why should we as individuals, or society as a whole be moral?" In the present section devoted to a discussion of the ambiguity, motivation or justification, the above two forms of the question will be identical in meaning. It should also be noted that in discussing the one ambiguity,

motiviation or justification, the question "Why be
moral?" remains ambiguous as to whether we mean the
individual or society.

4. Paul W. Taylor, <u>Principles of Ethics: An Introduction</u>
(Encino and Belmont: Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc.,
1975), p.218.

5. <u>Ibid.</u>, p.219.

6. We will say more on "ethics" as compared to "morality"
in Chapter Three.

7. Of course the problem as stated is oversimplified.
Those who argue either for or against abortion usually
maintain conditions on which the rightness or wrongness of
abortion will depend. For example, "Abortion is wrong
if there is no danger to the mother's life in not having
the abortion" or, as a pro-abortion attitude, "Abortion
does not require a life-threatening reason to make it
morally acceptable; any <u>good</u> reason such as the mother's
or family's economic situation would render abortion
morally permissible." In any case, the simplified version
of the problem is adequate to stress the point here I wish
to make.

<center>Chapter Three</center>

1. William K. Frankena, <u>The Concept of Morality</u>, University
of Colorado Studies, Series in Philosophy, No. 3 (Boulder,
University of Colorado Press, January 1967), p.3.

2. <u>Ibid.</u>, p.5.

3. When people use "ethics" in this sense what they usually mean is not moral philosophy but morality itself.

4. Frankena, *The Concept of Morality*, p.5.

5. *Ibid.*, p.5.

6. Frankena, *Ethics*, p.10.

7. I use the word "intrinsically" because, as it will be remembered, we are speaking about moral values regarded as moral ends. If they are regarded as ends then they will naturally be regarded as intrinsically "good" or "evil".

8. The use of the word "know" here should not be mis-construed. I certainly do not mean it in the sense that one "knows" certain values to be *regarded* as morally correct in any given society, or for that matter, by humanity as a whole. For example, most of us "know" that murder is *regarded* as morally wrong in most, if not all societies. If, however, we are asked why it is wrong or how we know murder is wrong as an objective truth, our answer will have to take some form of philosophic defence.

9. Man created morality but not in the same fashion that he created things, that is, inventions, works of art, buildings, etc. Without discussing the many differences between the two types of creation, that is, the differences between the creation of morality and the creation of things, may we just say that

morality is created not as a conscious, individual, deliberate act but in the sense that it is a product of man's development, both as a social animal and as a species. In any case, man considered as a whole is the cause of morality's existence; we may say, therefore, that man "created" morality.

10. One possible exception is homosexual activity between consenting adults. This activity is generally regarded by many as being morally wrong. Its "wrongness", however, may not seem to be founded upon any desire not to see harm performed since, if both homosexuals are willing and neither one is coerced into the activity then one may argue that no harm is being performed. I do not think, however, that it is a true exception since its "wrongness" is often founded upon the belief that such activity is "unnatural"; hence, homosexuals are "harming" themselves by not fulfilling their "natural" biological and emotional expectations.

11. Frankena, Ethics, p.113.

12. "Belief" is not truly a pure psychological phenomenon as desires are, and it might more properly be included under the intellectual conditions. It is only for the sake of classification, then, that I have included "belief" under the psychological conditions since it is a more direct result of the desires than the intellectual activity of forming a value system.

13. Both conditions (A) and (B) are necessary in order
to have morality; however, only condition (A) in its
entirety is unique to the formation of morality, although
as we stated earlier in Chapter Three, there may be ex-
ceptions to this rule. In any event, condition (A)
is generally unique to morality. Condition (B), however,
at least in part with regard to rationality in general,
is certainly not an unique feature of morality; most
human creations, including all forms of guiding in-
stitutions, employ human rationality and intellect.

Chapter Four

1. Taylor, Principles of Ethics: An Introduction,
p.185. For a more complete account of Naturalism
and its refutation see the above book, Chapter 8,
especially pp. 176-188.

2. George E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: University
Press, 1971), pp. 37-58.

3. Frankena, Ethics, p.100.

4. Ibid., p.99.

5. Ibid., p.101.

6. For additional discussion on this very point see Taylor,
Principles of Ethics: An Introduction, pp. 222-224.

7. It certainly seems true that not each and every one
of us possesses the same amount of desire to provide
benefit and prevent harm. Human beings vary in all other
psychological and physical ways and there is no reason
to think variance with regard to these desires does not
exist as well. Indeed, it is conceivable that a few

individuals exist who do not possess these desires
at all, or at least in a very small degree. In general,
however, most human beings do possess these desires; and
this is evident from the fact of the universal prevalence
of the creation and continuance of morality throughout
the world.

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