

Interracial Negotiations: Outcomes and Implications

By  
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Interracial Negotiations: Outcomes and Implications

by: Annette Denise Gagnon

Abstract

August 6, 2008

White undergraduate students participated in a simulated negotiation where the partner was same-race (i.e., White) or cross-race (i.e., Black) to see whether racial dyad composition and prejudice level or ingroup identification have effects on the negotiation outcomes. The partner (a confederate) responded to the participant using a standardized script. Negotiation outcomes (i.e., joint total, point total) and their relational outcomes (i.e., how much they liked their partner) were compared across conditions. Cross-race negotiations led to lower joint outcomes, and improved relational perceptions, on various measures. Interactions between ingroup identification and race composition were also found. For example, increases in ingroup affect lead to increase in relational outcomes for same-race negotiations but not for cross-race negotiations. Taken together the significant effects suggest cross-race negotiations are significantly more taxing for individuals and this might be particularly true for individuals who are high in ingroup identification. These results suggest the potential for negative implications in the workplace with salary negotiations, training, and conflict resolutions.



### Interracial Negotiations: Outcomes and Implications

Negotiations between members of different racial groups are fraught with tensions that can lead to poor outcomes and escalating distrust (e.g., Cross & Rosenthal, 1999). Consider the issue of Land Titles for Aboriginals. Following negotiations, Aboriginals retained or were provided with certain areas that were commonly referred to as Reserves. They also retained certain rights regarding hunting or fishing. Presently, the major source of conflict between Aboriginals and the Crown are that there were misunderstandings regarding the agreement and that promises were not kept (Ontario Government, 2006). These unfavourable outcomes have increased negative perceptions of the political leaders of Canada as well as its inhabitants, thereby augmenting tension between First Nations and White Canadians.

Unfavourable or differential outcomes for minority members can also occur during interpersonal negotiations. Ayres and Siegelman (1995) found that minority group members received significantly different initial and final negotiated prices from car salespersons. Specifically, Black or female buyers were asked to pay significantly more than White male buyers. With the increase in workplace diversity over the last 10 years (Government of Canada, 2006), negotiations between members of different racial groups also occurs on a frequent basis within organizations. Seidel, Polzer, and Stewart (June, 2000) found that when minority group members negotiated their starting salaries, they ended with significantly lower salaries than White job candidates.

Individuals from different racial backgrounds can negotiate more than their salary; they can also negotiate work hours, work roles, and promotions which in turn can all be sabotaged by misperceptions, stereotypes, and tension. Particularly, in supervisor-subordinate relationships, a supervisor may negotiate more distantly with subordinates of

other racial groups in an effort to avoid behaving in a manner that could be interpreted as discriminatory. Yet this same behaviour could reduce the efficiency of negotiation and conflict resolution, ironically leading to fewer training opportunities or fewer promotions for minority group members, and increasing perceptions of (or actual) discrimination within the workplace.

Despite the potentially serious negative impact misunderstandings between members of diverse backgrounds can have on workers' interactions, there is a dearth of research investigating interracial negotiations. Therefore my thesis research focused on the implications and outcomes of negotiations between members of different racial groups. Specifically, I present a review of the current findings of intercultural negotiations as well as cross-ethnic and cross-race interactions. Finally, I present my study that attempts to fill the gap in the literature regarding negotiations between members of different racial groups.

## NEGOTIATIONS

Negotiations are a process through which individuals try to resolve conflicting interests and expectations. Cross and Rosenthal (1999) suggest that there are two different approaches to negotiations and that these approaches differ in terms of focus and goals. The first, distributive bargaining, is described as the set of behaviours used to allocate or divide a fixed amount of resources. This approach is often referred to as "hard bargaining" and is a competitive, position-based, agreement-oriented means of confronting conflict (Cross & Rosenthal, 1999). Outcomes of this type of negotiation are one-sided in the sense that for someone to win or acquire gains the other party must lose those resources. Distributive bargaining is often used in situations where the conflict is perceived as win/lose or a zero-sum gain dispute (Cross & Rosenthal, 1999). An example

of such a situation would be solely considering the sale price when negotiating the purchase of a vehicle. In this case, decreases in the sale price are to the benefit of the buyer while being detrimental to the seller. Tactics used in this type of negotiation include withholding information, obscuring communication, setting firm commitments to certain positions, and making overt threats to the other party involved (Cross & Rosenthal, 1999). Commonly used in situations where there is a fixed pool of resources, distributive bargaining is most often used by beginner negotiators and in car sales, real estate, and services provided (e.g., tow truck fees).

The second type of negotiation is integrative bargaining. Although individuals engaging in distributive bargaining focus only on their gains, individuals who engage in integrative bargaining focus on mutual gains between both parties (Cross & Rosenthal, 1999). This type of negotiation is cooperative and agreement-based in nature. During this type of negotiation, both parties try to expand the negotiation items beyond the fixed resources. In other words, parties are searching for alternatives and increasing their payoffs by engaging in joint problem solving (Cross & Rosenthal, 1999). Tactics for this type of negotiation include clearly defining the problem, openly sharing information, and exploring possible solutions (Cross & Rosenthal, 1999). An example of integrative bargaining would be that of the negotiation of a collective agreement between the union representatives and the employers. During the negotiation of the collective agreement, the employers may be unable to increase vacation time as requested by the union representatives; however, the employers may suggest that employees work an additional 30 minutes every day and for that receive every second Friday off, thereby providing their employees with additional days off without increasing their costs. By integrating several aspects while negotiating and expanding the options, individuals are engaging in

integrative negotiating in order to reach an agreement that is favourable for both parties. This type of negotiation is common among more experienced negotiators and leads to agreements that are win-win for both parties. Integrative negotiation can be used in many different scenarios including that of employment terms, union settlements, and contracts.

#### NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF MINORITY GROUP STATUS IN NEGOTIATIONS

Research on negotiations has suggested that different groups may have different negotiation outcomes. Consider gender: Although men and women do not differ in the extent to which they will negotiate a starting salary there is a significant difference in the outcome of their negotiation efforts, with men receiving a larger starting salary than women (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991). Gerhart and Rynes (1991) speculate that this difference may be due to differences in the extent to which managers are responsive to the negotiating attempts of women.

Consumer reports have also demonstrated an inequality in negotiation outcomes on the basis of demographic group membership. Specifically, Gillis and Alexander (2004) found that Black individuals consistently paid higher finance markup charges than White individuals when financing their car through a dealership. These findings occurred even when the researchers controlled for loan amount, credit worthiness, type of vehicle, and geographic area. In another attempt to examine outcomes in actual negotiations, Ayres and Siegelman (1995) had White males and females as well as Black males and females confederates negotiate the sale price of an automobile at various dealerships with unaware salespeople; the sale price was negotiated for a total of over 400 automobiles. Ayres and Siegelman found that the starting price offered by car salespeople was usually higher for Black individuals. More specifically, the starting price was highest for Black males and lowest for White males. Additionally, car dealers made slower concessions for Black

individuals relative to White individuals. This type of finding, along with the results of studies of negotiations across genders (e.g., Gerhart & Rynes, 1991), suggests that the traditional hierarchy of power and/or status of a demographic group matters during negotiations. Furthermore, Seidel, Polzer, and Stewart (2000) examined negotiation outcomes in a work setting and found similar results. In this study, the researchers collected data from 3,670 external applicants to a mid-sized high-technology firm in the United States over a 10 year period. A large proportion of the applicants (3,062) were hired and the authors compared the negotiated starting salary of different demographic groups. The findings indicate that ethnic minority group members negotiate a substantially lower starting salary than do majority group members. The authors speculate that a lack of inside information is related to these outcomes. These less favourable outcomes for groups that have lower power might be the results of problematic interactions during intergroup negotiations.

### CROSS-CULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS

Differences in negotiation outcomes can also be found when the two parties differ in terms of their national or cultural group membership. These cultural differences, along with uncertainties, perceived stereotypes, and different styles or approaches may play a role in the differential outcomes. Consider Adair (2003), who found that whereas individualistic cultures focus on direct and overt communication, collectivist cultures tend to focus on indirect communication. In addition, individualistic cultures focus on direct methods of problem solving, whereas individuals from collectivist cultures are more obliging and accommodating (Ting-Toomey, Yee-Jung, Shapiro, Garcia, Wright, & Oetzel, 2000). These differences in foci can impede either of the parties involved. For example, Adair, Okumura, and Brett (2001) found that when individuals from Japan

negotiated with individuals from the United States, they would alter their behaviour in an attempt to match that of the western communication style. Regardless of this attempt, joint outcomes were lower for these cross-cultural negotiations than were the outcomes of same-culture negotiations. Furthermore, Brett and Okumura (1998) suggest that intercultural negotiations suffer from premature closure of the negotiation and a narrow focus during the negotiation. There is also the potential for a power struggle during the negotiation because the most powerful party is not readily apparent (Brett & Okumura, 1998).

Although research on negotiation outcomes has not yet crossed into the domain of negotiations between individuals from the same culture but of a different racial group, Cross and Rosenthal's (1999) research does come close. Specifically, these authors examined the implications of providing Jewish and Arab individuals with various negotiation foci (i.e., distributive, integrative, interactive [i.e., the negotiation with the aid of a third party that is neutral], or no focus control group) and compared participants' perceptions after the negotiation. The authors found that interactive problem solving led to positive attitudinal changes towards the outgroup member, whereas integrative bargaining influenced dyadic members to have a more pessimistic view about the problem (i.e., conflict in Jerusalem). That is, when working alone instead of with the help of a third party, the two groups showed more anti-Palestinian and anti-Israeli attitudes after the negotiation (Cross & Rosenthal, 1999). This change in attitude suggests that there is a potential in cross-race negotiations not only to have different outcomes through the use of different negotiations styles but also to leave the negotiation with a change in attitude towards the negotiation partner.

These attitudinal outcomes illustrate the potential for negative implications during cross-race negotiations such as an increase in negative attitude towards the negotiation partner, less relationship building behaviour, or lower joint outcomes. It is this potential for negative implications that warrants greater research. Specifically if Cross and Rosenthal's (1999) findings regarding different negotiation approaches in cross-ethnic negotiations are accurate, it is of paramount importance to examine what effect cross-race interactions has on the negotiation process. Although not all cross-ethnic interactions share the same extent of conflict as the Israel-Palestinian subjects in Cross and Rosenthal's study, there is nonetheless often a history of conflict among different ethnic groups. Consider the history of slavery and race relations in the United States and to a lesser extent in Canada. This past can influence interactions which may have a negative influence on the negotiation outcome. Gaining an understanding in the outcomes of cross-race negotiations would therefore be a worthwhile and important endeavour.

### INTERGROUP INTERACTIONS

Research on interactions between members of different racial groups (i.e., intergroup interactions) has demonstrated that these interactions differ from same group interactions (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Richeson & Shelton, 2003). Specifically, tension arises during interactions between members of different racial groups (Devine, Evett, & Vasquez-Suson, 1996) that requires behavioural control, self-regulation, and thought suppression (Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998) which, in turn, can impede executive functioning (e.g., Richeson et al., 2003; Richeson & Shelton, 2003a; Richeson, Trawalter, & Shelton, 2005). Throughout negotiations there is also a necessity of careful preparation and problem-solving skills (Barry & Friedman, 1998) which also rely on the executive functioning. If the executive functioning is already

impeded by attempts to self-regulate and to suppress thoughts I believe that the added strain of negotiating can impact the joint outcomes attained by the individuals negotiating.

### Prejudice Level and Cognitive Functioning

Executive functioning impediments while interacting with members of other racial groups occur most frequently with individuals who are high in both explicit and implicit prejudice. In this case prejudice refers to the evaluation of, and behaviour towards someone of a different ethnic or racial group (e.g., Devine, 1989). Richeson and Shelton (2003a) examined the impact of prejudice and behavioural control on results of a Stroop task. Specifically, they measured implicit and explicit prejudice level and manipulated the race of the experimenter (i.e., White vs. Black) during a discussion. Participants believed that the goal of the study was to “examine the influence of one cognitive task on subsequent cognitive tasks” and therefore started by completing the implicit association task (IAT; Greenwald, et al., 1998) and the Affective Prejudice Scale (measure of explicit prejudice). After the IAT task, the experimenter informed participants that there would be a delay with the second task and were asked to help a different experimenter with their study. During this stage participants were asked to answer two series of questions (i.e., racially neutral questions – a college fraternity system vs. racially charged questions – racial profiling); half of the participants had a White experimenter ask the questions, whereas the other half had a Black experimenter. Participants were videotaped while they answered the questions and coders subsequently rated each participant in terms of their behavioural control (i.e., the extent to which participants moved their body and their hands as well as the extent to which participants looked around the room) and their response modulation (i.e., the extent to which



participants apologized for their response, had a hard time answering, paused while answering, asked the experimenter for clarification of the question, needed to be prompted by the experimenter, and seemed to be concealing their true opinions). After having completed this discussion task, participants were asked to complete the Stroop task.

They found a main effect such that as prejudice level increased so did the interference on the Stroop task, especially when the participant was interacting with the Black experimenter. There was no change in interference for either high or low prejudice individuals when they interacted with a White experimenter. This would suggest that interactions with individuals from different racial groups require more cognitive efforts than interactions with members of the same racial group due to the taxing nature of concealing prejudice levels. In addition, if we examine the supplementary analyses, we find that the race of the experimenter predicted response modulation for the fraternity answers and marginally predicted response modulation for the racial profiling answers. In other words the cross-race interactions also have an effect on the responses provided by the individual. In regards to behavioural control, the same pattern was found in which participants controlled their behaviour to a greater extent with Black experimenters relative to White experimenters. There were also interaction effects in which the race of the experimenter and the extent to which individuals controlled their behaviour could predict interference on the Stroop task. Specifically, during the racially neutral topic, the more participants controlled their behaviour while answering the questions asked by a Black experimenter the worse they performed on the Stroop task. The interactions could not significantly predict interference on the Stroop task for either the same-race interactions or the racially charged topics. These findings would suggest that there are no

differences in the extent to which individuals monitor their behaviour during racially charged discussions due to the sensitivity of the issue. However, during racially neutral topics there are differences between high and low prejudice individuals, such that high prejudice individuals are acting in order to ensure that their prejudiced thoughts are not being expressed.

The same is true for individuals who are in minority groups. When Richeson and Shelton's (2003a) study was replicated with Black undergraduates they found that individuals who had more negative perceptions of the dominant group (i.e., White individuals) performed worse on the Stroop task than individuals who had a less negative or a even positive attitude regarding the dominant group (Richeson, Trawalter, & Shelton, 2005). This pattern of results was only true when the experimenter was White; when the experimenter was Black there were no differences between high and low prejudice individuals on the Stroop task.

Taken together, these reviewed findings would suggest that high prejudice individuals of either the dominant or the minority groups consistently engage in behavioural control to ensure that they are not appearing prejudiced during interactions with members of different racial groups. This increase in behavioural control, in turn has an effect on the participant's executive functioning. It is suggested that these effects may be due to the taxing nature of trying to conceal prejudice levels.

#### Prejudice Level and Interaction Outcome

Although Richeson and colleagues (2005) found an impact on executive functioning, the researchers did not examine the impact of the impression provided while engaging in this control. Current literature (e.g., Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Trawalter, 2005; Vorauer & Turpie, 2004) suggests that there will be a different response

pattern when measuring affective outcomes (i.e., how much people connected to, liked, felt well treated by, and felt responded to by others). Specifically attempts to appear non-prejudiced are not always successful. Instead of making a positive impression on minority group members it was found that Black individuals evaluated high prejudice White individuals more favourably than low prejudice individuals (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Trawalter, 2005). Black participants reported that low prejudice White individuals were perceived as being less engaged during the intergroup interaction than high prejudice White individuals. In turn, this perception of low prejudice individuals as being less engaged has a negative impact on their Black partner's impression.

### Ingroup Identification

Ingroup identification, refers to the degree to which one identifies with the group to which they belong to (e.g., sports team, ethnic group, family group) and the quality of their affective evaluation (i.e., positive or negative) of their group (Perreault & Bourhis, 1999). Attachment to one's ingroup often leads to withholding positive treatment from the outgroup member, not necessarily out of antipathy towards that group, but instead it is due to a preference for one's own group (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000). It is this distinguishing factor, that of preference for one's group instead of hostility towards an outgroup that differentiates ingroup identification from prejudice. Regardless, Perreault and Bourhis (1999) suggest that discriminatory behaviour towards outgroup members can result from the extent to which individuals are identified to their ingroup. For example, individuals who have a high degree of ingroup identification are more likely to engage in discriminatory behaviours towards their outgroup than individuals who are identified very minimally to their ingroup. Furthermore, Dunlap (1995) argues that ingroup identification may actually be a better measure of intention to discriminate against individuals who are

different than typical prejudice measures. Consistent with this notion, intergroup interaction studies that have included ingroup identification measures as well as prejudice measures have found similar findings (e.g., Vorauer & Turpie, 2004).

#### Evaluative Concern

From the perspective of the dominant group member, Vorauer, Main, and O'Connell's (1998) found that during intergroup interactions the dominant group members have this perception that the outgroup member has stereotypes about them. This perception of meta-stereotypes has a greater influence on the interaction than the stereotypes the dominant group member has of their outgroup interaction partner. As a result Vorauer et al. (1998) found that the dominant group member had a lower self-esteem and less self-clarity throughout the interaction which could also have an impact on the negotiation outcome. In subsequent studies (i.e., Vorauer & Turpie, 2004) Vorauer defined this process as evaluative concern, which is a form of social awareness which entices the individual to focus on the impression they are providing to their interaction partner. Specifically, it is a concern or fear for how one is being perceived or evaluated by their partner during the interaction. This concern leads to a focus on the self during which individuals monitor their behaviour in order to ensure that the impression that is formed of them is consistent with what they believe of themselves (Schlenker & Weigold, 1992). For example, if I believe myself to be a funny person and want my interaction partner to see that aspect of me, I may focus my attention towards my behaviour and try to ensure that this behaviour is in fact reflective of my perception of being a funny person.

The purpose of this focus is to avoid criticism and to try and present oneself in a positive light (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). However, this attempt to provide a good impression does not always lead to favourable outcomes. Instead this attempt to monitor

one's behaviour can make people more cautious and more preoccupied, which can provide the impression that the individual is hesitant and less genuine (Paulhus, Graf, & Van Selst, 1989; Paulhus & Levitt, 1987). This attempt to monitor behaviour can have even more serious consequences during intergroup interactions.

Vorauer and Turpie (2004) examined the impact of evaluative concern on intergroup interactions. Specifically, they looked at the effect of evaluative concern on intimacy building behaviour, such as responsiveness to the outgroup member, the extent of self-disclosure, and positive regard exhibited. In their first study, the authors measured evaluative concern by asking participants to self-report on the extent to which they felt uncomfortable (e.g., self-conscious, tense, frustrated, anxious, suspicious, careful, uncertain, and defensive). They found that when low prejudice participants were low in evaluative concern they exhibited similar intimacy building behaviour regardless of the racial background of their partner (i.e., White or First Nations). However, in the high evaluative concern condition, lower prejudice individuals treated their First Nations partner less favourably than a White partner. When high prejudice individuals were high in evaluative concern there was no significant difference in the way with which they treated a White versus a First Nations partner, whereas there was a significant difference in partner treatment on the basis of race when evaluative concern was low. Specifically, high prejudice individuals provided less favourable treatment to a First Nations partner relative to a White partner when low in evaluative concern.

This pattern suggests that when low prejudice individuals are interacting with individuals from a different racial group, and they focus on both their own behaviour and interpreting how this behaviour may be perceived by their partner it can impede the behaviours they actually exhibit. It would seem that there is uncertainty regarding how

they think they are being perceived by a member of a different racial group and therefore they are increasing their attempts to monitor their behaviours to ensure that they are in fact not appearing prejudiced. This increased attention may distract them from actually exhibiting intimacy building behaviour leading them to “choke” under high evaluative concern (Vorauer & Turpie, 2004). By comparison it appears that the extra focus provided by high prejudice individuals can actually improve their partner’s perception of their behaviour. It would seem that even though the executive functioning is impaired for high prejudice individuals they may not provide a bad impression because they are already accustomed to the necessity of multi-tasking. That is, they monitor their behaviour while they interact with their partner. Instead it appears that they may use this extra focus to smooth out the wrinkles, so to speak, which helps them “shine” under high evaluative concern (Vorauer & Turpie, 2004).

Furthermore in their second study, Vorauer and Turpie (2004) had their participants interact with alleged partners they believed to be located in another room down the hall. There were no partners; instead participants interacted with their (alleged) First Nations partner through written questionnaires and video recordings. In order to recreate evaluative concern, the authors manipulated whether the (alleged) partners expressed either a high or a low perception of discrimination towards themselves as a First Nations person. It is the authors’ perception that such comments served as a stimuli to the participant that they should monitor their behaviour in order to avoid behaving in a manner that seems prejudiced. The results indicated that when low prejudice individuals were interacting with a First Nations partner who expected them to be prejudiced they were less warm and responsive than low prejudice individuals who interacted with a First Nations partner that had more positive expectation.

In an effort to replicate these findings, Vorauer and Turpie (2004) manipulated whether or not they actively informed participants to monitor or “watch themselves” during the interaction. The authors examined the impact of the statement on intimacy building behaviour which they assessed in a number of different ways. They started by examining global responsiveness by having independent coders count how often the participant responded to comments made by their partner and how many other-focused remarks were made (in which participants were clearly referring to something their partner said). They also had the coders count how many reciprocal self-disclosure comments (i.e., comments that overlapped with those addressed by their partner), and novel self-disclosure comments (i.e., comments relating to topics in which the participant had no previous information on the opinion of their partner relating to that topic) were made. Finally, coders were asked to assess global positive regard (i.e., the extent to which participants communicated that they liked their partner) conveyed in the interaction and to record the time spent making eye contact. In an attempt to overcome the suggested shortcoming of social desirability (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995) in the prejudice measure they were using (i.e., Modern Racism Scale) Vorauer and Turpie also substituted an ingroup identification scale for the prejudice measure, with the belief that a higher preference for one’s ingroup may result in a similar outcome to being high prejudice, specifically that of less intimacy building behaviour. Consistent with their findings in the first and second study, the authors found a trend in which low ingroup identifiers exhibited less positive intimacy building behaviours when prompted with a focus on evaluative concern relative to a no prompt control condition (i.e., participants were not warned to watch their behaviour). The authors also found an opposite but less reliable trend for high ingroup identifiers, in which these individuals exhibited more

positive intimacy building behaviours when in the evaluative concern condition. As a result of their three studies, Vorauer and Turpie suggested that low prejudice individuals and/or low ingroup identifiers may not be accustomed to monitoring their behaviour and therefore this disruption in automaticity may lead to the “choking” results that were obtained. Specifically, low prejudice individuals and/or low ingroup identifiers may not be as accustomed as high prejudice individuals and/or high ingroup identifiers to scrutinizing their behaviour to ensure that they are making socially acceptable comments, and therefore this extra attention may lead to a “choking under pressure” phenomenon.

This phenomenon of choking under pressure for low prejudice individuals (or low group identifiers) has yet to be examined in areas such as conflict resolution or negotiations which are not only taxing and stressful (Bluen & Jubiler-Lurie, 1990) but also require active thinking to achieve the best outcome (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2007). It is for this reason that I examined the effects of evaluative concern in intergroup negotiations.

## SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES

The preliminary studies on negotiations have examined the role of cross-cultural negotiations without considering the implications of negotiations between members of a same culture but different racial group. That is, they examined negotiation behaviours between members of different cultures (e.g., Eastern vs. Western) but not those that may occur more frequently within a country. My study examines the implications of negotiation interactions between members of different racial groups, specifically those of White Canadians and Black Canadians. I believe that by manipulating the composition of the negotiation dyad there will be different patterns of outcomes for negotiation success and affective/relational outcomes. I also believe that both prejudice level and ingroup



identification will also play a role in altering the pattern of results. Therefore my independent variables will be dyad composition (Different race: Black-White or Same-race: White-White) and prejudice level (as well as the proxy prejudice variable of ingroup identification). Due to these different outcome patterns I will test for all the main effects, as well as the two-way interaction on negotiation outcomes and relational outcomes. Black-Black negotiation effects were not examined primarily due to logistic reasons and for the insufficient sample size. In addition, I chose to focus on the perceptions and impacts of intergroup negotiations on the majority group member at this time, as it is this group that often makes the discriminatory decisions in work negotiations and therefore both groups will benefit from this research.


#### Negotiation Outcomes Hypotheses

I believe that consistent with Vorauer and Turpie (2004), dominant group members' efforts to appear non-prejudiced during negotiations will distract their cognitive efforts from negotiating to monitoring their behaviour, which should negatively impact their ability to find a creative solution to the negotiation. Research on cognitive ability has revealed that it plays a role in improving joint outcomes (Barry & Friedman, 1998). If as Richeson, Trawalter, and Shelton (2005) suggest, intergroup interactions do reduce available cognitive resources due to the focus on other processes in the executive function, then joint outcomes in intergroup interactions should be lower relative to intragroup interactions. Therefore I hypothesize that there will be a main effect of race composition of the negotiation dyad, in which:

*Hypothesis 1:* Negotiations between members of different racial groups will have worse or lower outcomes (i.e., joint outcomes and individual outcomes) than negotiations between members of the same racial group.

In addition, I examined the interaction effect of prejudice level and dyad composition on negotiation outcomes. Although research has examined the role of intergroup interactions on executive functioning (e.g., Richeson, Trawalter, & Shelton, 2005), behavioural outcomes (e.g., Vorauer & Turpie, 2004), and evaluation of the individual independently (e.g., Vorauer & Turpie, 2004), research has yet to examine these factors in a combination. Negotiations provide the perfect opportunity to examine this relationship as they require both cognitive effort and a creative solution as well as include an actual interaction where you can evaluate your partner and the behaviour of the partner in the interaction. It is my belief that consistent with Richeson, Trawalter, and Shelton (2005) findings that high prejudice individuals did worse on the Stroop Task when interacting with a Black (versus White) experimenter, high prejudice individuals will also have worse negotiation outcomes due to the need to focus on their behaviour in addition to the task at hand. Low prejudice individuals, who do not normally require as much executive functioning in order to monitor themselves in cross-race interactions, should in negotiations, experience more evaluative concern and therefore should fare equally as bad as high prejudice individuals (see Figure 1). In other words, due to different reasons (i.e., high uncertainty for low prejudice individuals, and resource depletion in the executive functioning for high prejudice individuals) cross-race interactions with both high and low prejudice individuals will result in detrimental effects which will decrease the joint outcome of the negotiation compared to same-race interactions.

Figure 1.



Richeson and Shelton (2005) did not look include ingroup identification in their studies and I am therefore unsure of the effect of ingroup identification on cognitive outcomes. However, as a result of Vorauer and Turpie's (2004) study in which they used ingroup identification as a proxy prejudice variable, as well as their findings which suggest that ingroup identification does predict similar outcomes to those of prejudice level, I expect that in all cases ingroup identification will predict similar findings to those of prejudice level. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

*Hypothesis 2:* There will not be an interaction between prejudice level (or ingroup identification) and dyad racial composition on negotiation outcomes<sup>1</sup>.


#### Relational Outcomes Hypotheses

In terms of relational or affective outcomes, I believe that there will be a main effect across same or cross-race negotiations, such that participants will like their partner more and feel more comfortable when they are in the same-race condition. This is consistent with research on the implications of intergroup interactions and the tension that arises from these interactions (Devine, Evett, & Vasquez-Suson, 1996). Thereby, I hypothesize:

*Hypothesis 3:* Relational outcomes will be more positive during intragroup interactions relative to intergroup interactions.

I also believe that there will be an interaction effect of dyad composition and prejudice level on relational outcomes. Consistent with Vorauer and Turpie's (2004) finding that White low prejudice individuals will leave a bad impression with their cross-race partner and not with their same-race partner; it is my opinion that due to the evaluative nature of negotiations, participants will consistently self-monitor in order to increase their outcomes. This self-monitoring behaviour, which is similar to evaluative concern, will have an impact on their behaviour in the interaction. Again consistent with Vorauer and Turpie (2004), high prejudice individuals should either provide the same or a more favourable impression to their Black partner as they do to their White partner because they are already accustomed to self-monitoring (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2.**



*Hypothesis 4:* There will be a significant two-way interaction between prejudice level (or ingroup identification) and dyad composition on relational outcomes, such that low prejudice individuals (or low ingroup identifiers) will have worse relational outcomes in the cross-race condition relative to the same-race condition. And high prejudice

individuals (or high ingroup identifiers) will have similar or better relational outcomes in the cross-race condition relative to the same-race condition.

### Competing Hypotheses

Hypotheses 2 and 4 are based on my review of the literature and the assumption that negotiation situations are high in uncertainty and therefore will elicit a moderate to high amount of evaluative concern. In order to check the extent to which evaluative concern is present, I plan on measuring evaluative concern as a process variable. This will enable me to empirically assess if evaluative concern is generally high or low for people in the study. If this negotiation situation does not elicit at least a moderate amount of evaluative concern for the average participant, I expect a different pattern, based on past literature. There should be no difference for either of the main effects because evaluative concern is not a predicting factor in either of these hypotheses.


### *Negotiation Outcomes*

If negotiations do not elicit evaluative concern such that low prejudice individuals do not feel a need to “watch themselves” then there should be an interaction effect for prejudice level (or ingroup identification) and dyad composition for joint outcomes. Specifically, there will be no negative impact on low prejudice individuals in terms of their joint outcome and therefore they will fare better than high prejudice individuals who will still be affected by the extra depletion of the executive control (see Figure 3).

*Competing Hypothesis 2:* There will be a significant two-way interaction between prejudice level (or ingroup identification) and dyad composition, such that high prejudice individuals (or high ingroup identifiers) will have worse joint outcomes in the cross-race condition relative to the same-race condition. And low prejudice individuals (or low

ingroup identifiers) will have similar or better joint outcomes in the cross-race condition

**Figure 3.**




relative to the same-race condition.

#### *Relational Outcomes*

If negotiations do not elicit evaluative concern such that low prejudice individuals “watch themselves,” in regard to the amount of prejudice they might be projecting, there should be no interaction effect between prejudice level (or ingroup identification) and dyad composition for the relational outcomes (see Figure 4). Specifically, low prejudice individuals will not be monitoring their behaviour to a greater extent and therefore will not leave a bad impression on their negotiation partner. Thereby, I hypothesize that:

**Figure 4.**



*Competing Hypothesis 4:* There will not be an interaction between prejudice level (or ingroup identification) and dyad racial composition on relational outcomes.

I chose not to manipulate evaluative concern for a few reasons, primarily because even though attempts are made to ensure laboratory studies are as similar as possible to actual work settings they are often quite dissimilar. Furthermore, previous attempts at manipulating evaluative concern have consisted of telling the participant to “watch themselves” (e.g., Vorauer & Turpie, 2004), which I suspected would foster suspicion in the participant. Furthermore, watching one’s behaviour may also foster demand characteristics which would reduce the likelihood of the outcomes. Finally, I believed that manipulating evaluative concern would further decrease the extent to which this study would be generalizable to real world settings. In addition, I already know how to manipulate evaluative concern but I am not aware of whether or not it is present or plays a role throughout negotiations.

By measuring evaluative concern there is also the potential for three way interactions. Through this assessment I am acknowledging the possibility that evaluative concern could act as a moderator and two different interaction patterns between race composition and prejudice should be seen. Specifically, the first pattern which I detail in Hypotheses 2 and 4 would hold for those who felt a moderate to high level of evaluative concern, and the pattern in Competing Hypotheses 2 and 4 would hold for those who felt a low level of evaluative concern.

#### Inhibition of Executive Functioning

In addition, Richeson, Trawalter, and Shelton, (2005) found differences in inhibitions of executive functioning based on the race of the experimenter and the prejudice level of the participant. Specifically, high prejudice individuals performed

worse on a Stroop task when interacting with a Black experimenter relative to a White experimenter. There was no difference for low prejudice individuals. Richeson et al. suggested that the need to self-monitor plays a taxing role on the executive functioning which in turn impedes performance. Consistent with this notion I believe that because negotiations also require cognition, the process of being distracted will change with the outcome of the negotiation. I therefore analysed inhibition of executive function as a dependent variable. Thereby I hypothesize that negotiations will elicit a similar pattern to that found by Richeson, Trawalter, and Shelton (2005).

*Hypothesis 5:* Individuals who were high in prejudice (or high in ingroup identification) require more executive functioning and therefore do worse on the Stroop task when they were negotiating with someone of a different race as compared to someone of a same-race.

### Method Overview

In order to test my hypotheses I conducted a negotiation study in which participants interacted with either a member of their own racial group or a member of a different racial group. In order to reduce the variability that arises in interactions, trained confederates were used as negotiation partners. Prejudice levels and ingroup identification were assessed a few weeks prior to the actual negotiations; this helped ensure that any racism or prejudice measures were not directly associated with the study. Finally, evaluative concern and inhibition of the executive functioning were measured.

## METHOD

### Study Design Overview

The study examined the relationship between two independent variables in the form of a Race of Partner x Prejudice Level (or ingroup identification) factorial design



with random assignment to partner's race condition and the measurement of prejudice level and ingroup identification. In this study all participants were White. The first independent variable, race of the partner, was randomly assigned to ensure that half of the participants were interacting with a same-race individual (i.e., White confederate) and half of the participants were interacting with a cross-race individual (i.e., Black confederate); whereas the second independent variable, the prejudice level and the proxy prejudice variable, was measured during the pre-screening survey. Finally, I also examined the role of two process variables. The first process variable relates to whether or not the executive functioning is being inhibited. In order to assess inhibition I will be measuring the extent to which participants are distracted (through the outcome of the Stroop task) during the negotiation of both the distributive and integrative outcomes. The second process variable is that of evaluative concern and its role on both the negotiation and relational outcomes.

In the first part of the study participants completed a survey that measured their previous contact with other racial group members, their prejudice level, the extent to which they identified with their ingroup, as well as various other potential covariates and "filler" variables. Only White individuals were contacted to complete the second part of the study.

In the second part of the study, participants were asked to negotiate the terms of employment with a confederate they believed to be another student participant. Their same-sex partner was either a same-race group partner (White confederate) or a cross-race group partner (Black confederate). Participants of the experiment were assigned to the role of job candidate while the confederate played the role of the recruiter. Each dyad had five issues on which agreement had to be met. The negotiation of these issues was

conducted through an internet Chat provider (i.e., MSN Messenger) with a partner (a confederate of the experiment). Research on the outcomes of e-negotiations (i.e., negotiations through Chat or the Internet) have demonstrated that there are no differences in final price or joint profits in e-negotiations relative to face to face negotiations (Galin, Gross, & Gosalker, 2007). E-negotiations also enabled us to provide a picture of the negotiation partner to the participant during the interaction, which has been demonstrated to elicit the same response as being face to face with the partner (Lepore & Brown, 1997). This inclusion of the picture is important as it enabled us to manipulate the visual cue of their partner's race without explicitly stating that their partner is of the same or different race. Participants therefore negotiated through a Chat window that had a picture of their negotiation partner (a confederate). Pictures of the confederates had previously been compared by graduate students to ensure that they were equivalent in their attractiveness.

By having participants negotiate through Chat it enabled us to use a confederate script which increased our control throughout the negotiation. Specifically, the script was used to decrease variability by ensuring that the replies exchanged with the participants were consistent.

Dependent measures included negotiation outcomes (e.g., joint outcome, total individual points, points for vacation time, and the amount of integrative attempts that were made) and relational outcomes (e.g., how much they like their negotiation partner, how much they think their partner likes them, and how much they trusted their partner). The results of the Stroop task were also assessed. Finally, trait evaluative concern was also analyzed and I determined that it demonstrated a similar pattern to that of prejudice level in regards to the outcome variables for both the main effects and the interactions and therefore I decided include it as an exploratory variable.

### Pre-measure

#### *Participants*

Two hundred and eighteen undergraduate students (i.e., 138 females, 66 males, and 14 gender undisclosed) with a mean age of 20.4 years were recruited from Saint Mary's University through the Psychology on-line bonus system or through Professor Johanna Westar's Industrial Relations class. Participants were asked to complete a 45 minute survey and would receive 1 bonus point towards their class. Having such a large number of students increased the ease with which participants were recruited for the second part of the study which had more restrictions (i.e., White individuals who were willing to come in for a second study to engage in a negotiation).

#### *Procedure*

Participants completed a pre-measure survey that included demographic items relating to sex, ethnicity, and age as well as a number of different scales that served as measures of the independent variable (i.e., prejudice level and ingroup identification), covariates, or filler items.

#### *Measures*

##### *Prejudice Measures*

There were two different measures of prejudice that were included. These prejudice measures were included in order to examine prejudice from different angles.

*Modern Racism Scale.* The first angle is that of actual prejudice and therefore participants completed the Canadian version of the Modern Racism Scale (MRS) which has 10 items (e.g., "There are too many foreign students being allowed to attend university in Canada"; 10-point scale;  $\alpha = .75$ ; McConahay, Hardee, & Bats, 1981).

*Measure of implicit racism.* The Modern Racism Scale is an explicit measure of prejudice and therefore I also included an implicit measure of racism through a word completion task. This task included 38 word fragments which can be interpreted a number of different ways, some of which have been shown to reflect negative stereotypes about Black individuals, (e.g., \_ \_ O R which could be completed as POOR thereby indicating a subconscious negative perception of Black individuals; adapted from Sinclair & Kunda, 1999).

#### *Ingroup Identification Measure*

*Ingroup identification scale.* As a measure of ingroup identification I included Cameron's (2004) Three-Factor Model of Social Identity. There are three separate subscales to this measure, the first is that of Affect, which refers to how much the individual likes their ingroup (e.g., "In general, I'm glad to be a member of my racial/ethnic group."; 4 items;  $\alpha = .77$ ). The second subscale is that of Ingroup Ties, which refers to the extent to which the individual feels they are similar or connected to their ingroup (e.g., "I have a lot in common with other members of my racial group"; 4 items;  $\alpha = .60$ ). The third subscale, that of Centrality, measures whether being a member of the ingroup is important to the individual (e.g., "Overall, being a member of my racial/ethnic group has very little to do with how I feel about myself."; 4 items;  $\alpha = .55$ ). Participants responded to all subscales using a 6-point likert scale that ranged from 1 (i.e., *Strongly Disagree*) to 6 (i.e., *Strongly Agree*).

#### *Evaluative Concern*

As of yet there is no reliable evaluative concern scale in the research literature. For my study I wanted an evaluative concern measure that would assess how much evaluative concern individuals feel in their day to day activities (i.e., trait evaluative

concern) as well as a measure that would assess how much evaluative concern they felt during the negotiation task (i.e., state evaluative concern). Due to the lack of reliable measure I needed to construct my own measures; it is my impression that although social anxiety is not the same construct as evaluative concern it does have a significant amount of overlap and therefore certain items that had previously been used to measure social anxiety but that I felt could measure symptoms of evaluative concern in negotiations were included as the evaluative concern measure. I therefore constructed two different scales that included the most relevant items from Gavric and Gilin Oore's (2007) social anxiety and negotiation research (we also conducted a factor analysis of these items with Gavric and Gilin Oore's two negotiation tasks but the factor structure of their tasks and my task did not provide the same factor structure). Two separate scales were created; the first which was included in the pre-measure was specific to day-to-day evaluative concerns (i.e., trait-based evaluative concern), the other was specific to the evaluative concern felt in the negotiation task (i.e., state-based evaluative concern) and was completed after the negotiation task. Although these are two separate scales the post-measure (i.e., state-based evaluative concern scale) included all the same items as the pre-measure (i.e., trait-based evaluative concern scale) with slight wording changes as well as an additional five items that were specific to negotiations.

The pre-measure consisted of ten items and participants responded to these items using one of two potential 5-point likert scales that differed based on the type of question (e.g., participants responded to "I think I make a good impression on people." with responses that ranged from 1 = *Strongly Disagree* and 5 = *Strongly Agree*; whereas participants responded to specific items such as "How often do you have negative thoughts about yourself, like "I am really not doing very well here" or "I don't think I'm

making a very good impression”?” with a 5-point likert scale where 1 = *Never* and 5 = *Always* [items were grouped together under the proper rating scheme]). The total scale reliability is  $\alpha = .78$  but it is important to remember that the responses were made on two separate likert scales.

### *Potential Covariates*

*Motivation to respond without prejudice scale.* The Internal and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice scale (MIEP; Plant & Devine, 1998) was included as a potential covariate due to its ability to predict the extent to which individuals are motivated to act in a manner that is not prejudiced. Fazio et al., (1995) suggest that participants may respond in a less prejudiced manner due to social desirability or other motivating factors. Including the MIEP enables the measurement of the extent to which participants are likely to be motivated to respond in a less prejudiced manner on the MRS. The MIEP has two subscales with five items for the internal motivation subscale (e.g., “According to my personal values, using stereotypes about Black people is OK”;  $\alpha = .82$ ) and five items for the external motivation subscale (e.g., I try to hide any negative thoughts about Black people in order to avoid negative reactions from others.”;  $\alpha = .79$ ). Participants responded to the MIEP using a 9-point likert scale (1 = *Strongly Disagree* and 9 = *Strongly Disagree*).

*Previous outgroup contact.* Finally, a 4-item measure of previous contact with members of other racial and ethnic groups (10-point scale where 1 = *none at all* and 10 = *a great deal*; which has been adapted from Gagnon & Vorauer, 2006;  $\alpha = .69$ ) was included as a potential covariate for prejudice measures.

*Social anxiety scale.* Leary’s (1983) measure on social anxiety (i.e., the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation; BFNE) was included as a potential covariate to evaluative

concern (e.g., “I worry about what people will think of me even when I know it doesn’t make any difference”; 12 items; 5-point likert scale;  $\alpha = .79$ ).

*Hypercompetitive scale.* In addition, the Hypercompetitive Attitude Scale (HAS; Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczor, & Gold, 1990) was included as a potential covariate for differences in negotiation outcomes (e.g., “I find myself turning a friendly game or activity into a serious contest of conflict.”; 26 items; 5-point likert scale;  $\alpha = .82$ ).

*Self-monitoring scale.* A self-monitoring scale was also included as a potential covariate for evaluative concern because of the overlap between self-monitoring and evaluation of one’s behaviour. Specifically, Lennox and Wolfe’s (1984) Revised Self-Monitoring Scale (RSMS) was included. The RSMS has two subscales: Sensitivity to Expressive Behaviour of Others (e.g., “I am often able to read people’s true emotions correctly through their eyes.”; 6 items;  $\alpha = .75$ ) and Ability to Modify Self-Presentation (e.g., In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behaviour if I feel that something else is called for.”; 7 items;  $\alpha = .82$ ).

#### *Filler Items*

Finally, due to the sensitive nature of prejudice measures and the need to conceal the true purpose of the study, I chose to include scales that also assessed areas that are sensitive, but which are not of interest to the study. Specifically I included a measure on dispositional empathy (i.e., empathic concern scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index; IRI; Davis, 1980), a shortened version of the Internalized Homophobia scale (Ross & Rosser, 1996), and a measure of depression (i.e., Center for Epidemiology Studies Depression Scale [CES-D; Radloff, 1977]; see Appendix I for all items). These filler items had been selected to coincide with the story that was provided to participants to explain the purpose and the nature of the study. Specifically, participants were informed

that the questionnaire measured opinion and personal characteristics and that although these studies were grouped together they were in no way related to one another. Instead the students were advised that the studies had been grouped together in order to provide the students with more bonus points and to assist a separate researcher obtain the sample size she required.

### Negotiation Study

#### *Participants*

There were a total of 81 White participants (i.e., 22 men and 59 women), that were recruited to participate in the second part of the study. All of these individuals had completed the pre-measure and had agreed to be contacted by phone for a second study. Ten of these students were participating in Johanna Westar's negotiation class and therefore had previous training with negotiations. The mean age for all of the participants was 20.4 years of age.

In regards to each separate condition, 39 participants (i.e., 31 females [38%] and 8 males [10%]) negotiated with a same-race partner. The mean age in the same-race condition was of 21.2 years of age ( $SD = 3.47$ ). Nine of the students (90%) that were currently completing a negotiation class were in the same-race condition. There were 37 cross-race dyads, of which 26 were female dyads (32%), and 11 were male dyads (14%). The mean age in the cross-race condition was of 19.6 years of age ( $SD = 1.85$ ) and only one student who was taking a negotiation class participated in this condition.

#### *Negotiation Task*

The negotiation case was an employment negotiation in which the issues to be decided included the starting salary, the amount of vacation time, the health insurance plan, the location of employment, and the way in which overtime is to be paid (see



Appendix II for the participant's instructions). The information in the booklet provided participants with information about their priorities and the points associated with these priorities. For example, vacation time was of the utmost importance for the participant with a potential for a total of 65 points, whereas salary was the second most important with a potential for 32 points. Note that for the employer these issues were reversed where they could potential gain 65 points for salary and 32 points for vacation time (see Appendix III for confederate instructions and points). Needless to say, there was an integrative potential for both participants on the issues of vacation time and salary. The issues of health insurance plan and overtime were entirely distributive in nature (i.e., more points for one party resulted in less points for the other party) while the final issue (i.e., location) was the same for both parties.

### *Procedure*

Four participants and four confederates (a Black female and a Black male as well as a White female and a White male) arrived at the laboratory for a study on negotiations. I greeted all eight of the participants and provided them with an overview of the study. Specifically, they were to negotiate an agreement that had both distributive and integrative potential through MSN Chat. After the introduction, participants were asked to introduce themselves while a research assistant took a picture of each participant. They were advised that the picture would enable them to know who they were negotiating with. A second research assistant compiled a list of all eight participants' names in the order in which pictures were taken in order to ensure that the proper pictures were being displayed with the proper individual. Booklets which included the instructions and priorities for each party were then "shuffled" and distributed to participants in a way that ensured that

all participants played the role of job candidates and that all confederates were playing the role of employers.

While participants were reading their instructions they were asked to find their name on the list of names previously compiled and to indicate the station number provided on their booklet in order to ensure once again that each picture was paired with the proper individual. A research assistant then took the list of participants as well as the camera down to a separate computer laboratory to upload the pictures onto the computers. This same research assistant used a dime to randomly assign participants to conditions (i.e., for each station the research assistant flipped a coin, if it was heads the research assistant uploaded the picture of the confederate who was of the same sex but different race, whereas if it was tails the research assistant uploaded the picture of the confederate that was of the same gender but different race). Note that gender of the participant and confederate was always matched.

During this time participants read their instruction booklets and completed a short quiz to ensure their understanding of the materials. Once this was completed participants were instructed that they were now going to relocate to two separate computer laboratories to complete the negotiation task with their partner. They were instructed that for the purpose of the study they were going to be in separate laboratories to ensure that opposing parties could not see or receive information regarding the other party's priorities. A research assistant as well as the experimenter brought each set of negotiators to their proper laboratory. Specifically, participants met in the MacLab (i.e., the department of psychology's computer laboratory) while confederates returned to the experimenter's laboratory where two wireless computers as well as two wired computers were waiting. Either the research assistant or the experimenter were present at all times to

monitor the negotiations and answer any questions that arose. Confederates were provided with a paper version as well as a Microsoft Word document version of the script (see Appendix IV) they used to reply to the offers that participants were making. The experimenter or a research assistant was always present to answer or guide confederates through difficult scenarios and to ensure consistency. After 40 minutes or having reached a mutual agreement participants were asked to complete an on-line version of the Stroop task (Chudler, 2006) at their respective computers. After having completed the Stroop task participants were asked to complete an on-line questionnaire which measured evaluative concern throughout the interaction, as well as relational and negotiation outcomes. Finally, participants were asked to provide their email address in order to receive the feedback and debriefing once the study had been completed.

#### *Confederate Script*

The script had the counter offer or reply required for the various offers participants made. By providing confederates with these scripts it ensured that participants initiated the negotiation and therefore the confederate's role was to follow and ensure that not only are they providing the same responses and counter offers for each participant but that they were also providing the same responses as the other confederates. For example, after the first opening offer of vacation time every confederate provided the following comment block if the request was greater than 5 days: "You sure are looking for a lot of days off, I was thinking more along the lines of 5 days of vacation for your first year." If the request was 5 days they wrote out the following comment block: "That seems like a reasonable request. I think we can offer you 5 vacation days." The negotiation continued with the confederate slowly increasing the amount of vacation days based on the offer provided by the participant. For example, if the participant

remained firm on their request of 25 days of vacation time, the confederate would go through seven comment blocks before finally agreeing to provide 25 days of vacation. The number of comment blocks differed on the basis of how important the issue being discussed was important to the employer (i.e., the confederate). Specifically, for salary which was the most important for the employer there were 11 counter offers, whereas for location, insurance plan, and overtime there was only one counter offer and then the confederate agreed to the request of the participant (see Appendix IV for the whole script).

### Dependent Measures

#### *Negotiation Outcomes*

##### *Integrative Attempts*

In order to assess the number of integrative attempts participants made throughout the negotiation (i.e., were willing to concede on a low-priority issue [low point value] to get high returns on a high-priority issue [high point value], research assistants were asked to read the negotiation and count how many attempts participants made to integrate more than one item when negotiating. For example, if the participant suggested that they were willing to take a less optimal health plan (e.g., Plan B instead of Plan A) if their opponent was willing to let them have more vacation time (e.g., 20 days instead of the current offer of 15 days).

##### *Distributive Points*

The participant's total points for all five issues (i.e., salary, vacation time, location, insurance, and overtime) was used to determine this outcome. A higher amount of points reflected an agreement that was more favourable for the participant.

##### *Vacation Time*

Vacation time was also included as it was the issue that was of the most importance to the participant. A participant could get from 0 points to a total of 65 points based on the amount of vacation days they agreed upon. Only the participant's points were used in determining this outcome.

#### *Joint Outcome*

The joint outcomes of the negotiators were also measured. Points have been associated with each option for both sides negotiating, participants were asked to tally up their points at the end of the negotiation. Both the confederate and the participant's points were combined to determine the joint outcome.

#### *Inhibition of Executive Functioning*

The outcome of the Stroop task was also examined to determine the extent to which the negotiation and the outcome of the negotiation had an impact on cognitive abilities or automaticity. Participants were asked to state the colour in which a word was written, during two separate trials. In the first trial, the word happened to coincide with the actual colour (i.e., "red" was written in the colour of red). For the second trial, the colour of the word was different than the actual word (i.e., "red" was written in the colour of blue). The difference in between both trials was used as a measure of inhibition of executive functioning.

### Post-negotiation Assessment

#### *Negotiation*

Participants were also asked to report on how challenged, focused, and prepared they were during the negotiation on a 7-point scale (1 = *Not at All*; 7 = *Extremely*; Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001), as well as to rate their negotiation partner and the percentage this individual obtained (i.e., 0 % = *Nothing*; 50% = *Even Split*; 100% = *Got*

*Everything*). Finally, participants were asked to provide an estimate of the power they believed their partner had in the negotiation (i.e., 0% = *No Power*; 50% = *Evenly Distributed*; 100% = *Had All of the Power*; Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001). These variables were not gathered as primary dependent measures but rather as potential data checks as analysis dictated.

### *Evaluative Concern*

The post-negotiation measure of evaluative concern was the state-based evaluative concern which attempted to measure how much evaluative concern the negotiation task elicited in participants. The questionnaire consisted of 15 items which were once again selected from the scales included in Gavric and Gilin Oore's (2007) social anxiety and negotiation work. Ten of the items included were the same as those provided in the pre-measure (i.e., trait based evaluative concern) but wording was altered in order to make the questions specific to the negotiation task. Five additional items were included; these items were specific to the negotiation task. Participants responded to the state-based evaluative concern scale with three separate 5-point likert scales (it is important to note that items with similar response scales were grouped together and the proper scale was clearly identified at the top of these items). For example, participants responded to items such as "I was worried that my partner would not like me" with a scale that ranged from 1 = *Not at all Characteristic*, to 5 = *Extremely Characteristic*, whereas for items with a similar format as "How often did you find yourself wondering how your partner was evaluating you or your negotiation techniques?" participants responded with the following scale that ranged from 1 = *Never* to 5 = *Always*. Finally, participants also used a scale that ranged from 1 = *Strongly Disagree* to 5 = *Strongly Agree* for items such as the following item: "I

think I made an impression on my partner of an effective negotiator.” Overall the total scale has a reliability of  $\alpha = .67$ .

### *Relational Outcomes*

#### *Liking*

Five questions were used to assess whether participants liked their partner. This reduced version of Rubin's (1973) liking scale had a 7-point scaling system in which higher numbers reflected greater agreement with the question. Participants were asked to answer each question (e.g., “I think that the other participant is unusually well-adjusted”;  $\alpha = .81$ ) by selecting a number from the provided 7-point scale (Rubin, 1973). A composite score of all the items was computed with higher scores indicating greater liking.

#### *Desire for Future Interactions*

The subsequent six questions assessed participants' desire for future interaction with their partner (e.g., “Would you like to meet the other participant outside the experiment?”; Coyne, 1976). Respondents were required to illustrate their agreement using the same 7-point scale as was used for the previous questions ( $\alpha = .91$ ). Composite scores were then computed with higher scores indicating a greater desire for future interaction.

#### *Similarity*

I also included a perceived similarity scale adapted from McCroskey, Richmond, and Daly's (1975) perceived homophily measure. In this section, participants had to select a number to indicate how similar they believed they were to their ostensible partner where 1 meant not at all similar and 7 indicated very similar. Participants rated their similarity on issues such as behaviour, thoughts, qualities, attitudes and values ( $\alpha = .90$ ).

Participants' scores on each item were then combined to make a composite score in which higher scores indicated higher felt similarity.

### *Meta-perceptions*

Finally participants also completed a "meta" version of the liking scale (e.g., "The other participant thinks that I am one of those people who quickly wins respect";  $\alpha = .71$ ) and the desire for future interaction scale (e.g., "Would the other participant like to meet you outside the experiment?";  $\alpha = .75$ ). These scales were included to measure how much participants think their partner liked them and desired future interaction with them. Composite scores were computed for both the meta-perception of liking and the meta-perception of the desire for future interaction scale.

### *Trust*

Trust items were also included to assess how much the participant trusted their partner as well as the extent to which the participants felt sorry for their partner (if at all; e.g., "My partner was trying to take advantage of me.";  $\alpha = .63$ ). Participants responded using a 7-point likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree and 7 = Strongly Agree). Participant scores were combined to create a composite score with higher scores indicating more trust.

The questionnaire ended with an item that asked participants what they thought the purpose of the study was, in order to assess possible suspicion (see Appendix V for all items).

## RESULTS

Four individuals (2 females and 2 males) were excluded from the analysis because they were not White and one White individual (male) was excluded from the analysis because they received a cross-gender picture.



### Participants

In order to determine whether the covariates of age, gender, and participation in a negotiation class should be used as potential covariates, independent sample t-tests were conducted between conditions to determine if there were significant differences between conditions. The comparison of the two conditions, did suggest a significant difference between age,  $t(57.41) = -2.46, p = .02$ , and participation in a negotiation class,  $t(49.54) = -2.77, p = .01$ . There was no significant difference for gender,  $t(74) = .92, p = .36$ . Based on these findings only the potential covariates that differed significantly (i.e., age and participation in a negotiation class) were added as covariates.

### Measures

#### *Prejudice Measures*

There were two prejudice measures included in this study, an explicit (i.e., MRS) and an implicit racism measure (i.e., word completion task). There was also a proxy prejudice measure, that of ingroup identification that I believed would demonstrate results consistent to those of the prejudice measures. Finally, a potential covariate scale was also included (i.e., MIEP). Correlations were computed among the different scales and the potential covariates for the scales that were related to prejudice to determine if a composite of the scales should be used (Table 1). Based on Devine's (1989) suggestion that low prejudice individuals can actually inhibit their stereotypical thoughts I decided that the implicit measure of prejudice may not be the most accurate. I therefore, decided to use the explicit measure of racism (i.e., MRS) to assess prejudice level as well as the Three Factor Measure of Social Identity (Cameron, 2004) to assess ingroup identification.

An examination of the reliability of each of the three factors of ingroup identification suggested that only two of the factors (i.e., Ingroup Affect and Ingroup

Ties) had acceptable reliability (i.e.,  $\alpha \geq .60$ ) therefore, the third factor, Centrality, was not used as a predictor. In the end, the MIEP was not used as a covariate as it is my impression that the MIEP measures social desirability more so than prejudice. In addition, as no study has yet examined the role of motivation to respond without prejudice on actual dependent outcomes, and because I felt that exploring the role of motivation to respond without prejudice was not my primary interest, I chose not to include it as a covariate. Furthermore, I felt that ingroup identification and the MRS adequately covered the realm of predictors I wanted to examine. This is not to say that future research should not examine the role of motivation to respond without prejudice on negotiations but instead that it is not my current focus.

#### *Evaluative Concern Measure*

In regards to evaluative concern, as I have previously mentioned, there is unfortunately, no good measure of this construct in the current literature. I therefore included a number of items about evaluative concern from Gavric and Gilin Oore's (2007) research on social anxiety and negotiations. Factor analyses were conducted on each of the two scales included in the study (i.e., trait-based evaluative concern [i.e., pre-measure] and state-based evaluative concern [i.e., post-measure]) to determine if the ten items included in both scales were to fall on the same factors. Specifically, it was my hope that all trait-based evaluative concern items (i.e., pre-items) would load on the same factor as all the state-based evaluative concern items (i.e., post-items). In order to assess this I conducted a Factor Analysis with a Varimax rotation. Through this analysis I determined that the state-based evaluative concern had a different factor structure than that of the trait-based evaluative concern. Based on the different factor structures and because both scales have

Table 1.

*Correlations and Descriptives for Measures of Prejudice*

	M	SD	□	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Modern Racism Scale	4.89	.93	.75	1						
Motivation to Respond without Prejudice										
2. Internal	6.08	1.40	.82	-.05	1					
3. External	5.06	1.82	.78	.09	.31*	1				
4. Implicit Racism Scale	1.59	1.19		.01	.12	-.01	1			
Three Factor Model of Ingroup Identification										
5. Ingroup Affect	4.98	.76	.77	-.05	.03	-.05	.05	1		
6. Centrality	2.53	.94	.55	-.01	.13	.08	.05	.20*	1	
7. Ingroup Ties	4.39	.85	.60	-.05	-.02	.05	.05	.46*	.03	1

\* Correlation is significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level (2-tailed).

not been validated, I decided to create exploratory scales with items that loaded on the first factor because it would explain the most variance.

The trait-based evaluative concern scale (i.e., pre-measure) was therefore derived from all the items that loaded on the first factor after a Varimax rotation (i.e., 29.17% of the variance explained; 7 items;  $\alpha = .83$ ; Table 2). As I was only selecting the first factor it did not necessarily matter which type of rotation I selected, nonetheless I determined that Varimax rotation was the most optimal rotation after conducting an Oblimin rotation which suggested that factors were not at all correlated ( $r = -.06$ ).

The actual scale used for analyses including state-based evaluative concern (i.e., post-measure) was derived from a Factor Analysis with only the items that load on the first and biggest factor after a Varimax rotation (i.e., 28.65% of the variance explained; 7 items;  $\alpha = .79$ ; Table 3). I determined that the Varimax rotation was the most optimal rotation after conducting an Oblimin rotation in which the two factors were not at all correlated ( $r = .03$ ).

### Analysis Strategy

#### *Prejudice and Ingroup Identification*

Separate multiple regressions were conducted for the MRS, and for each subfactor of the Three Factor Measure of Social Identity (i.e., Ingroup Affect or Ingroup Ties), along with condition and the interaction between the scale/factor and the condition as predictors. For example, one multiple regression would consist of ingroup affect, condition, and the interaction between condition and ingroup affect as predictors. Multiple regressions of this nature were conducted for each dependent variable (see Table 4 for descriptives of negotiation outcomes and Table 5 for descriptives of

Table 2.

*Factor Loadings for Trait Evaluative Concern Scale*

	Factor	
	1	2
I think I make a good impression on people.	<b>.81</b>	
I believe people like me personally.	<b>.72</b>	
I like people.	<b>.62</b>	
How often do you think others have positive thoughts or feelings about you?	<b>.60</b>	
How often do you think others have negative thoughts or feelings about you?	<b>.58</b>	
How often do you have positive thoughts about yourself, like "I am really doing well here" or "I think I'm making a good impression"?	<b>.56</b>	
How often do you have negative thoughts about yourself, like "I am really not doing very well here" or "I don't think I'm making a very good impression"?	<b>.46</b>	-.38
How often are you distracted by your own feelings or thoughts about how you are being perceived?		.78
How often do you find yourself wondering how others are evaluating you?		.61
How often do you feel completely focused or absorbed by what you are doing?		.38
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Varimax Rotation		

*Note:* Only factor loadings greater than .30 are displayed. Only bold items are included in the scale.

Table 3.

*Factor Loadings for State Evaluative Concern Scale*

	Factor	
	1	2
I was afraid that my partner would not like me.	<b>.90</b>	
I worried about what my partner thought of me.	<b>.88</b>	
When I was chatting with my partner, I worried about what they may have been thinking about me.	<b>.87</b>	
I worried about what kind of impression I was making on my partner.	<b>.83</b>	
How often were you distracted by your own feelings or thoughts about how your partner perceived you?	<b>.77</b>	
How often did you think something negative about yourself, like "I am really not negotiating very well here" or "I don't think I'm making a very good impression"?	<b>-.52</b>	
How often did you find yourself wondering how your partner was evaluating you or your negotiation techniques?	<b>.47</b>	
I believe my partner liked me personally.		.62
How often did you think something positive about yourself, like "I am really negotiating well here" or "I think I'm making a good impression"?		.61
I think I made an impression on my partner of an effective negotiator.		.57
I liked my partner personally.		.55
How often during the task could you tell your partner thought or felt positive things about you?		.39
How often did you feel completely focused or absorbed by the role play task?		.39
I believe my partner is not an effective negotiator.		
How often during the task could you tell your partner had negative thoughts or feelings about you?		

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring; Varimax Rotation

*Note.* Only factor loadings greater than .30 are displayed. Items in bold are included in the scale.

Table 4.

*Correlations and Descriptives for Negotiation Outcomes*

	M	SD	□	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Points	43.89	23.58		1									
2. Joint total	86.28	38.04		.82**	1								
3. Vacation	26.16	19.56		.93**	.75**	1							
4. Stroop Difference	7.35	7.44		-.07	-.22	.08	1						
5. Integrative Attempts	1.48	1.50		.11	.10	.25	-.25	1					
6. Ingroup Affect	4.98	.76	.77	.18	.03	.14	-.10	-.04	1				
7. Ingroup Ties	4.39	.85	.60	.28*	.27*	.14	-.12	-.07	.35**	1			
8. Modern Racism Scale	4.90	.94	.75	-.11	-.06	-.09	-.03	.04	.09	-.15	1		
9. Trait Evaluative Concern	3.73	.56	.82	.12	.15	.11	-.08	.11	.38**	.40**	-.04	1	
10. State Evaluative Concern	2.39	.75	.79	-.03	-.03	-.11	.12	-.24	-.18	-.02	.15	-.15	1

\* Correlation is significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level (2-tailed).\*\*Correlation is significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level (2-tailed).

Table 5.

*Correlations and Descriptives for Relational Outcomes*

	M	SD	$\alpha$	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Liking	4.68	.83	.81	1										
2. Desire for future interaction	4.32	1.17	.91	.61**	1									
3. Similarity	4.10	.95	.90	.48**	.58**	1								
4. Meta-liking	4.81	.71	.75	.40**	.21	.21	1							
5. Meta-desire for future	4.28	.94	.89	.52**	.80**	.49**	.45**	1						
Interaction														
6. Trust	4.91	.84	.63	.54**	.49**	.42**	.31**	.37**	1					
7. Ingroup Affect	4.98	.76	.77	.05	-.02	.12	.16	.11	.10	1				
8. Ingroup Ties	4.39	.85	.60	.28*	.12	.16	.14	.16	.39**	.35**	1			
9. Modern Racism Scale	4.90	.94	.75	-.05	.04	.06	.03	.10	-.26*	.09	-.15	1		
10. Trait Evaluative Concern	3.73	.56	.82	-.10	-.10	.10	.30*	.07	.12	.38**	.49**	-.04	1	
11. State Evaluative Concern	2.38	.75	.79	.31**	.04	.12	-.04	-.04	.15	-.18	-.02	.15	-.15	1

\* Correlation is significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level (2-tailed). \*\*Correlation is significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level (2-tailed).



relational outcomes). I used the more conservative analytic approach of simultaneous predictor entry of all three effects (2 mains and one interaction), in which all effects are controlled for all others and only unique relationships are significant, in order to increase the similarity of the regressions to ANOVAs (which we sometimes use to parse and demonstrate the significant interactions). ANOVA in SPSS uses this same treatment of overlapping variance (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).

### *Evaluative Concern*

Due to the dissimilarity between the factor structures of both evaluative concern scales I consulted the evaluative concern literature in order to determine which scale I should use. Past research has used both manipulations and trait-based proxy measures of evaluative concern as a moderator of experimental effects (e.g., Vorauer & Turpie, 2004). With a larger sample size I could have done the same, however due to the inadequate sample size I decided that the best way to analyze the impact of evaluative concern was to use it as a proxy independent variable in order to determine if it could predict similar results to those of prejudice level and ingroup identification. Based on the fact that both prejudice level and ingroup identification were measured as traits, I chose to use the trait-based evaluative concern scale (i.e., as taken in the pre-measure) as a predictor for future analysis. This enabled me to examine whether or not an individual's general tendency of concern for impressions played a role in the negotiation and relational outcomes.

In addition, since I hypothesized that more evaluative concern would lead to more distraction which in turn should have an effect on the outcomes I decided to conduct exploratory analyses using trait-based evaluative concern as a fourth independent variable interacting with condition to have an effect on the dependent variables. I therefore, conducted standard simultaneous entry multiple regressions with trait-based evaluative

concern, condition, and the interaction between trait-based evaluative concern and condition as predictors for each dependent variable.

### *Competing Hypotheses*

I needed to identify which of the competing hypothesis (i.e., a certain pattern of results was expected if evaluative concern is present and a different pattern of results is expected if evaluative concern is not present) I should be testing. In order to determine which competing hypothesis applied to the experimental situation, I examined state-based evaluative concern (i.e., post-measure) to determine whether there was overall, a large amount of state-based evaluative concern throughout the negotiation.

Using this state-based evaluative concern scale I found that overall there was a low amount of state-based evaluative concern reported throughout the negotiation ( $M = 2.39$ ,  $SD = 0.75$ ; range was from 1.43 to 4.57). Furthermore, when I compared the amount of state-based evaluative concern reported across the same-race and cross-race condition I did not find a significant difference,  $t(71) = 1.52$ ,  $p = .13$ , thereby suggesting that negotiations do not elicit a large amount of evaluative concern. Furthermore, the little amount of state-based evaluative concern that is present throughout the negotiations did not increase as a result of negotiating with a Black partner which leads me to believe that regardless of the composition of the dyad, negotiations do not elicit a large amount of state-based evaluative concern on their own.

Based on these results I can now determine which of the competing hypothesis was applicable. Specifically, because of the overall low amount of state-based evaluative concern I would expect the pattern suggested by both competing hypotheses. Specifically, since low prejudice individuals (or low ingroup identifiers) are only impeded by evaluative concern which fosters a need to self-monitor their behaviour there should be

no difference across conditions for both negotiation and relational outcomes. As a recap low prejudice individuals are impeded by evaluative concern because it fosters a need to self-monitor their behaviour when they do not normally whereas high prejudice individuals need to self-monitor their behaviour during all interactions especially the cross-race interactions. The taxing nature of self-monitoring on high prejudice individuals' executive functioning should impede tasks that require cognitive processing such as negotiations. However, high prejudice individuals must also monitor their behaviour during interactions with same-race individuals as they are unsure of how these individuals will react to prejudice behaviour and therefore there should be no difference on their relational outcomes.

Therefore as Competing Hypothesis 2 states low prejudice individuals (or low ingroup identifiers) will have similar or better joint outcomes in the cross-race condition relative to the same-race condition, whereas high prejudice individuals (or high ingroup identifiers) will have worse joint outcomes in the cross-race condition relative to the same-race condition due to their constant need to self-monitor which will impede their executive functioning. Consistently, Competing Hypothesis 4 states that there will not be an interaction between prejudice level (or ingroup identification) and dyad racial composition on relational outcomes.

### *Effect Significance*

For all analyses, I interpreted effects with a significance of  $p < .05$  as being significant,  $p < .10$  as being marginally significant, and finally anything above  $p > .10$  as having no effect. All significant and marginally significant effects are reported.

### Negotiation Outcomes

In this section I will discuss analyses that test the hypotheses that refer to the negotiation outcomes. Specifically I will discuss analyses related to Hypothesis 1, which suggests a main effect of condition on negotiation outcomes such that cross-race dyads will do worse than same-race dyads. As well as analyses that relate to Competing Hypothesis 2 which proposes a two-way interaction between prejudice level (or ingroup identification) and dyad composition, such that high prejudice individuals (or high ingroup identifiers) will have worse negotiation outcomes when negotiating with a cross-race partner relative to a same-race partner whereas low prejudice individuals (or low ingroup identifiers) will have similar or better joint outcomes regardless of the race of their negotiation partner.

### Data Cleaning

As a subject matter expert I examined each of the raters' interpretation of each negotiation in regards to integrative attempts. When there was a disagreement I read through the negotiation and settled the disagreement. I should note that I was blind to the condition.

### *Inhibition of Executive Functioning*

In order to assess inhibition of executive functioning the outcome of the Stroop Task will be assessed as a dependent variable. If differences are found between conditions it will be assumed that it is due to the inhibition of the executive functioning.

### *Prejudice*

In order to test Hypothesis 1 and Competing Hypothesis 2, I conducted regression analyses with all the dependent measures with age and participation in a negotiation class as covariates. The predictors were the composite score of the MRS (prejudice), condition

(White vs. Black confederate), and MRS X Condition interaction. The analysis did not yield any significant effects (see Table 6).

### *Ingroup Identification*

#### *Ingroup Affect*

In order to continue testing Hypothesis 1 and Competing Hypothesis 2, regression analyses predicting all dependent measures were conducted with ingroup affect (prejudice), condition (White vs. Black confederate), and the Ingroup Affect X Condition interaction as predictors. Age and participation in a negotiation class were once again used as covariates. The analysis of the dependent variables distributive points, vacation time, integrative attempts, and Stroop task yielded no significant effects (see Table 6).

*Joint outcomes.* The analysis of joint outcomes yielded a significant main effect of condition,  $b = -155.74$ ,  $\beta = -2.08$ ,  $t(71) = -2.68$ ,  $p = .01$ , whereby same-race negotiations ( $M = 91.95$ ,  $SD = 35.94$ ) ended in higher joint totals than cross-race negotiations ( $M = 80.32$ ,  $SD = 39.75$ ). This lends support to Hypothesis 1 that joint outcomes would be lower for cross-race negotiations. In addition, there is a significant interaction effect,  $b = 32.75$ ,  $\beta = 2.20$ ,  $t(71) = 2.82$ ,  $p = .01$ , which when parsed with the covariates of age and participation in a negotiation class, suggests that as ingroup affect increases there is a decrease in joint outcomes for cross-race negotiations,  $b = -15.44$ ,  $\beta = -.35$ ,  $t(31) = -2.14$ ,  $p = .04$ , whereas with same-race negotiations as ingroup affect increases the joint outcomes also increase,  $b = 21.70$ ,  $\beta = .40$ ,  $t(32) = 2.50$ ,  $p = .02$ . (See Figure 5 for the estimated marginal means with a median split<sup>2</sup>). In other words participants that have a

Table 6.


*Summary of Regression Analysis for Modern Racism Scale and Ingroup Affect as Predictors of Negotiation Outcomes*

Variable	Points			Vacation Time				Joint Total				Stroop Task				Integrative Attempts			
	$\beta$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$R^2$
Step 1			.10**				.06				.05				.01				.03
Age	.93	.12		.70	.18			.91	.07			.10	.04			.07	.11		
Negotiation Class	15.81	.23		9.78	.11			18.55	.17			-2.30	-.11			-1.11	-.19		
Step 2			.01				.02				.01				.05				.03
Condition	-3.05	-.07		13.71	.35			-18.98	-.26			2.58	.18			.00	.00		
MRS	-2.27	-.09		-2.6	-.01			-2.93	-.07			-.47	-.06			-.01	-.00		
Cond X MRS	1.43	.15		-2.08	-.26			5.07	.33			-1.12	-.38			.06	.09		
Step 1			.10**				.06				.05				.01				.03
Age	.58	.07		.58	.08			.93	.07			.04	.02			.08	.13		
Negotiation Class	17.82	.26		10.47	.19			18.45	.17			-1.95	-.09			-1.21	-.21		
Step 2			.07				.03				.11**				.05				.03
Condition	-43.16	-.93		1.94	.05			-155.74	-2.08**			-10.01	-.70			2.69	.89		
Ingroup Affect (IA)	2.05	.07		4.08	.15			-10.34	-.21			-1.66	-.17			.03	.02		
Cond X IA	9.60	1.04		.29	.04			32.75	2.20**			1.50	.53			-.48	-.82		

\*  $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$

high affective perception towards their ingroup, alter their behaviour when negotiating with a member of a different racial group such that both parties negotiate worse agreements, thereby lending partial support to Competing Hypothesis 3.

Figure 5.



#### *Ingroup Ties*

There were no significant results with ingroup ties as a predictor. Table 7 has a summary of all the negotiation outcome results.

#### *Evaluative Concern*

Exploratory analyses were conducted with evaluative concern to assess whether the pattern of effects would be similar to those proposed by Hypothesis 1 and Competing Hypothesis 2. I conducted regression analyses predicting all dependent measures with trait-based evaluative concern, condition (White vs. Black confederate), and the Trait-based Evaluative Concern X Condition interaction as predictors. There were no significant effects for joint outcomes, distributive points, integrative attempts, or the Stroop task (see Table 7).

Table 7.

*Summary of Regression Analysis for Ingroup Ties and Trait Evaluative Concern as Predictors of Negotiation Outcomes*

Variable	Points			Vacation Time						Joint Total			Stroop Task						Integrative Attempts		
	$\beta$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$R^2$
Step 1			.10**						.06								.05				.03
Age	.93	.12		.70	.11			.91		.07			.10	.04					.07	.11	
Negotiation Class	15.81	.23*		9.78	.18			18.55		.17			-2.30	-.11					-1.11	-.19	
Step 2			.11**						.05								.09*				.01
Condition	-25.40	-.55		-34.63	-.88			-30.60		-.41			-11.31	-.79					1.24	.42	
Ingroup Ties (IT)	6.26	.22		.26	.01			10.01		.22			-1.91	-.22					-.00	-.00	
Cond X IT	6.12	.61		8.17	.98			7.35		.46			2.01	.66					-.21	-.33	
Step 1			.10**						.06								.05				.03
Age	.93	.12		.70	.11			.91		.07			.10	.04					.07	.11	
Negotiation Class	15.81	.23*		9.78	.18			18.55		.17			-2.30	-.11					-1.11	-.19	
Step 2			.05						.08								.04				.06
Condition	-57.64	-1.24		-74.58	-1.89*			-70.12		-.94			-8.27	-.58					-1.88	-.63	
Trait Evaluative Concern (EC)	-3.09	-.07		-6.62	-.16			.76		.01			-2.09	-.15					.09	.03	
Cond X EC	16.55	1.38		20.74	2.03**			20.33		1.05			1.51	.41					.58	.74	

\*  $p < .10$


\*\*  $p < .05$



### *Vacation Time*

The analyses yielded a marginally significant main effect of condition on the vacation time accrued by participants,  $b = -74.58$ ,  $\square = -1.89$ ,  $t(60) = -1.91$ ,  $p = .06$ , where cross-race negotiations ( $M = 23.13$ ,  $SD = 17.26$ ) resulted in participants negotiating lower amounts of vacation time relative to same-race negotiations ( $M = 29.17$ ,  $SD = 21.40$ ). An interaction effect was also found,  $b = 20.74$ ,  $\square = 2.03$ ,  $t(60) = 2.04$ ,  $p = .05$ ; such that as evaluative concern increased for participants in the same-race condition, the amount of vacation time they accrued increased marginally significantly,  $b = 15.03$ ,  $\square = .33$ ,  $t(31) = 1.87$ ,  $p = .07$ . The results for the cross-race condition were not significant,  $b = -8.23$ ,  $\square = -.23$ ,  $t(30) = -1.46$ ,  $p = .16$ . It would therefore seem that as evaluative concern increases so does the amount of vacation time for participants negotiating with a same-race partner (See Figure 6 for the estimated marginal means with a median split).

**Figure 6.**



### *Summary*

Although I did find some support for both Hypothesis 1 and Competing Hypothesis 2 with ingroup affect and trait-based evaluative concern (on a more exploratory nature), as predictors with joint outcomes and vacation times as dependent

variables, unfortunately there were still a large number of analyses with the dependent variables that did not come out as significant. Furthermore, it is important to note that although these analyses were not significant the results were in the same direction as both joint outcomes and vacation time.

### Relational Outcomes

In the following section I will examine the role of the various predictors on the relational dependent variables. Therefore, I will be testing Hypothesis 3 which relates to the main effect of condition on the relational outcomes. I will also be testing Competing Hypothesis 4 which suggests that there will not be an interaction between dyad composition and prejudice level (or ingroup identification).

### *Prejudice*

To test Hypothesis 3 and Competing Hypothesis 4, I conducted regression analyses with all dependent measures with the following predictors: MRS (prejudice), condition (White vs. Black confederate), and the interaction in between MRS X Condition. As with previous analyses, I included age and participation in a negotiation class as covariates. There were no significant results for trust, liking, desire for future interaction, meta-perception of liking, and meta-perception of desire for future interaction (see Table 8).

### *Differences versus Similarity*

There were marginally significant effects for perceptions of the extent to which participants believed their partner was similar from them on key behaviours or aspects. Specifically, there was a marginal effect of condition,  $b = 2.26$ ,  $\eta^2 = 1.24$ ,  $t(60) = 1.83$ ,  $p = .07$ , where cross-race negotiations ( $M = 4.13$ ,  $SD = 1.04$ ) resulted in participants reporting

Table 8.

*Summary of Regression Analysis for Modern Racism Scale and Ingroup Affect as Predictors of Relational Outcomes*

Variable	Liking			Desire for Future Interaction			Similarity			Meta-Liking			Meta-Desire for Future Interactions			Trust		
	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\beta$	$\beta$	$R^2$
Step 1		.05			.05				.03			.03			.04			.01
Age	.04	.13	.09	.23		.06	.05		.05	.21		.17	.05			.04	.14	
Negotiation Class	-.60	-.26*	-.78	-.25		-.41	-.16		-.37	-.18		-.25*	-.67			-.15	-.06	
Step 2		.03			.05				.05			.00			.04			.10*
Condition	-1.48	-.93	-.85	-.39		2.26	1.24*		-.50	-.36		-.01	-.01			-.38	-.23	
MRS	-.23	-.25	.00	.00		.34	.33*		-.04	-.05		.11	.11			-.26	-.29*	
Cond X MRS	.29	.88	.07	.16		-.46	-1.21*		.10	.34		-.07	-.19			.01	.02	
Step 1		.05			.06				.01			.02			.05			.02
Age	.04	.14	.10	.26*		.05	.14		.04	.16		.18	.06			.06	.21	
Negotiation Class	-.64	-.28*	-.88	-.28*		-.33	-.13		-.34	-.17		-.27*	-.73			-.27	-.11	
Step 2		.06			.10*				.04			.10*			.16**			.10*
Condition	-2.64	-1.62*	-4.28	-1.90**		-1.48	-.80		-2.64	-1.89**		-4.40	-2.35**			-3.24	-1.97**	
Ingroup Affect (IA)	-.10	-.09	-.26	-.18		.10	.08		-.05	-.05		-.13	-.11			-.08	-.08	
Cond X IA	.53	1.64*	.76	1.71**		.29	.79		.51	1.86**		.80	2.15**			.61	1.88**	

\* $p < .10$

\*\*  $p < .05$

that they believed their partner was more similar to them than same-race negotiations ( $M = 4.08$ ,  $SD = .87$ ). A marginally significant interaction effect was also found,  $b = -.46$ ,  $\beta = -1.21$ ,  $t(67) = 1.83$ ,  $p = .07$ . However, when parsed out there were no significant regressions for either the cross-race,  $b = .29$ ,  $\beta = .23$ ,  $t(33) = 1.37$ ,  $p = .18$ , or the same-race condition,  $b = -.10$ ,  $\beta = -.13$ ,  $t(32) = -.70$ ,  $p = .49$ .

### *Ingroup Identification*

#### *Ingroup Affect*

To test Hypothesis 3 and Competing Hypothesis 4, I conducted regression analyses predicting all dependent measures. The predictors were ingroup affect (prejudice), condition (White vs. Black confederate), and the Ingroup Affect X Condition interaction, age and participation in a negotiation class were included as covariates. There were no significant results for similarity with ingroup affect as a predictor (see Table 8).

*Liking.* The analysis did yield a marginally significant main effect of condition,  $b = -2.64$ ,  $\beta = -1.62$ ,  $t(63) = -1.93$ ,  $p = .06$ , in which participants liked their cross-race partner more ( $M = 4.75$ ,  $SD = .77$ ) than a same-race partner ( $M = 4.62$ ,  $SD = .90$ ). These results run counter to what was hypothesized in Hypothesis 3. However, the main effect is qualified by the marginally significant interaction effect,  $b = .53$ ,  $\beta = 1.64$ ,  $t(63) = 1.93$ ,  $p = .06$ . The interaction effects suggests that contrary to what is suggested by the main effect, for participants that negotiated with a White partner, as their ingroup affect increased so did their self-report of how much they liked their partner,  $b = .46$ ,  $\beta = .35$ ,  $t(31) = 2.26$ ,  $p = .03$ . The regression was not significant for participants with a Black negotiation partner,  $b = -.06$ ,  $\beta = -.07$ ,  $t(32) = -.34$ ,  $p = .74$ . These findings not only

suggest that the slopes are steeper for same-race conditions which create a main effect but also suggest that increases in ingroup affect may be beneficial for same-race dyads, whereas there does not appear to be a change for cross-race dyads. These findings do not support Competing Hypothesis 4.

*Desire for future interaction.* The analysis of the extent to which participants wanted to engage in future interactions with their partner demonstrated a main effect of condition,  $b = -4.28$ ,  $\beta = -1.90$ ,  $t(63) = -2.31$ ,  $p = .02$ , in which participants reported a greater desire to interact with a cross-race partner ( $M = 4.56$ ,  $SD = 1.12$ ) than a same-race partner ( $M = 4.08$ ,  $SD = 1.18$ ). This pattern of results is the opposite of what was predicted in Hypothesis 3. The analysis also yielded an interaction effect,  $b = .76$ ,  $\beta = 1.71$ ,  $t(63) = 2.07$ ,  $p = .04$ . For participants who negotiated with a Black partner as ingroup affect increased, their desire for future interaction with their partner decreased,  $b = -.46$ ,  $\beta = -.35$ ,  $t(30) = -2.23$ ,  $p = .03$ . Participants negotiating with a White partner did not significantly differ on the basis of the extent to which they identified with their ingroup,  $b = .46$ ,  $\beta = .28$ ,  $t(31) = 1.63$ ,  $p = .11$ . This pattern of results suggests that there are only significant differences for participants in the cross-race condition, such that as preference for one's ingroup increased desire for future interaction decreased, this finding is counter to Competing Hypothesis 4.

*Meta-perceptions of desire for future interaction.* The analysis did yield significant unique effects of condition on participants' meta-perception of whether their partner would be willing to engage in future interactions,  $b = -4.40$ ,  $\beta = -2.35$ ,  $t(63) = -2.95$ ,  $p = .00$ . Participants in the cross-race condition ( $M = 4.50$ ,  $SD = 0.85$ ) believed that their partner would think of them in a more positive manner than participants in the same-


race condition ( $M = 4.06$ ,  $SD = 0.98$ ). Nonetheless, the interaction once again suggests a different pattern,  $b = .80$ ,  $\beta = 2.15$ ,  $t(63) = 2.68$ ,  $p = .01$ . Specifically, for participants that had a White negotiation partner there was a positive relationship between ingroup affect and meta-perception of desire for future interactions,  $b = .65$ ,  $\beta = .43$ ,  $t(31) = 2.71$ ,  $p = .01$ , such that increases in ingroup affect lead to increases in ratings of how much participants thought their partner would like to interact with them in the future.

Participants negotiating with a Black partner did not have significant differences based on their level of ingroup affect,  $b = -.24$ ,  $\beta = -.24$ ,  $t(32) = -.24$ ,  $p = .19$  (see Figure 7 for the estimated marginal means with a median split). This pattern of results suggests that once again although the main effect suggests that cross-race dyads were evaluated more favourably the interaction suggests that overall as ingroup affect increases same-race dyads have the highest ratings of meta-perceptions of desire for future interaction. This finding does not support Competing Hypothesis 4.

*Meta-perceptions of liking.* The analyses also yielded a significant main effect of condition for participants meta-perception of how much their partner liked them,  $b = -2.64$ ,  $\beta = -1.89$ ,  $t(63) = -2.26$ ,  $p = .03$ . Consistent with the results found for participants' meta-perceptions of desire for future interaction, participants in the cross-race condition ( $M = 4.82$ ,  $SD = 0.65$ ) believed that their partner would like them more than participants in the same-race condition ( $M = 4.79$ ,  $SD = 0.77$ ). This pattern of results once again runs counter to what was predicted in Hypothesis 3. However, as with previous relational outcomes the main effect is qualified by a significant interaction between affective ingroup identification and condition on participant's meta-perception of how much their partner liked them,  $b = .51$ ,  $\beta = 1.86$ ,  $t(63) = 2.20$ ,  $p = .03$ . Participants in the same-race

condition demonstrated a positive relationship between ingroup affect and meta-perceptions of how much their partner liked them,  $b = .50$ ,  $\eta^2 = .42$ ,  $t(31) = 2.65$ ,  $p = .01$ , such that as ingroup affect increased so did their perception of how much their partner liked them. The regression for participants negotiating with a cross-race partner was not significant,  $b = .05$ ,  $\eta^2 = .06$ ,  $t(30) = .32$ ,  $p = .75$ . Once again, these results suggest that as ingroup affect increases White dyads have the most favourable relational outcomes (see Figure 8 for the estimated marginal means with a median split). This pattern of findings does not support Competing Hypothesis 4.

**Figure 8.**



*Trust.* Finally, there were also significant effects for the extent to which participants trusted their partner. Specifically, there was a main effect of condition,  $b = -3.24$ ,  $\eta^2 = -1.97$ ,  $t(63) = -2.37$ ,  $p = .02$ , in which participants reported trusting a Black negotiation partner more ( $M = 5.00$ ,  $SD = 0.72$ ) than a White negotiation partner ( $M = 4.82$ ,  $SD = 0.95$ ), this pattern of findings is counter to Hypothesis 3. Consistent with previous relational outcomes the main effect is qualified by a significant interaction effect,  $b = .61$ ,  $\eta^2 = 1.88$ ,  $t(63) = 2.34$ ,  $p = .03$ . The interaction effect suggests a positive relationship between ingroup affect and trust for same-race dyads,  $b = .54$ ,  $\eta^2 = .39$ ,  $t(31)$

$= 2.41, p = .02$ , such that as ingroup affect increases so does their trust in their partner. The regression for the cross-race dyad, is not significant,  $b = -.04, \beta = -.04, t(30) = -.22, p = .83$ . In other words, affective preference for one's ingroup does foster more trust with members of that ingroup, whereas preference for one's ingroup does not significantly have an effect on trust behaviour towards an outgroup member, thereby suggesting that the main effect may not be entirely accurate. This pattern of results runs contrary to Competing Hypothesis 4.

#### *Ingroup Ties*

The following analyses also tested Hypothesis 3 and Competing Hypothesis 4. Specifically, I conducted regression analyses predicting all dependent measures with age and participation in a negotiation class as covariates and ingroup ties (prejudice), condition (White vs. Black confederate), and the Ingroup Ties X Condition interaction as predictors. With the aforementioned predictors there were no significant results for liking, and similarity (see Table 9). However, significant results were found for desire for future interactions, meta-perceptions of desire for future interactions, and trust.

*Desire for future interaction.* There was a main effect of condition in regards to participants' desire of future interaction with their partner,  $b = -4.04, \beta = -1.81, t(64) = -2.51, p = .02$ , in which participants had a greater desire for future interaction in the cross-race condition ( $M = 4.56, SD = 1.12$ ) relative to the same-race condition ( $M = 4.08, SD = 1.18$ ). This pattern does not support Hypothesis 3. As with the results of ingroup affect the main effect is qualified by a significant interaction,  $b = .77, \beta = 1.62, t(64) = 2.22, p =$



Table 9.  
Summary of Regression Analysis for Ingroup Ties and Trait Evaluative Concern as Predictors of Relational Outcomes

Variable	Liking			Desire for Future Interaction			Similarity			Meta-Liking			Meta-Desire for Future Interactions			Trust		
	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\Delta R^2$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\Delta R^2$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\Delta R^2$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\Delta R^2$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\Delta R^2$	$\beta$	$R^2$	$\Delta R^2$
Step 1		.05			.05			.02			.03			.04			.02	
Age	.04	.14		.09	.24		.06	.17		.04	.18		.05	.14		.05	.17	
Negotiation Class	-.63	-.28*		-.81	-.25*		-.39	-.15		-.37	-.19		-.64	-.24		-.19	-.08	
Step 2		.06			.11**			.02			.09*			.18**			.23**	
Condition	-1.26	-.78		-4.04	-1.81**		-.94	-.51		-2.42	-1.74**		-4.32	-2.32**		-3.02	-1.85**	
Ingroup Ties (IT)	.09	.09		-.33	-.22		.02	.02		-.14	-.15		-.27	-.22		.10	.09	
Cond X IT	.26	.76		.77	1.62**		.20	.50		.51	1.71**		.84	2.12**		.60	1.71**	
Step 1		.05			.05			.02			.03			.04			.02	
Age	.04	.14		.09	.24		.06	.17		.04	.18		.05	.14		.05	.17	
Negotiation Class	-.63	-.28*		-.81	-.25*		-.39	-.15		-.37	-.19		-.64	-.24		-.19	-.08	
Step 2		.02			.07			.01			.20**			.06			.07	
Condition	.16	.10		-.78	-.35		.28	.15		-2.97	-2.13**		-1.49	-.80		-3.10	-1.90**	
Trait Evaluative Concern (EC)	-.18	-.11		-.36	-.16		.19	.10		.11	.08		-.01	-.01		-.15	-.25	
Cond X EC	-.05	-.12		.07	.11		-.08	-.16		.77	2.14**		.27	.57		.76	1.81*	

$p < .10$


\*\*  $p < .05$

.03. However, when parsed out the regressions were not significant for either the same-race participants,  $b = .37$ ,  $\beta = .26$ ,  $t(32) = 1.53$ ,  $p = .14$ , or the cross-race participants,  $b = -.38$ ,  $\beta = -.25$ ,  $t(33) = -1.65$ ,  $p = .11$ . This suggests, that there is no difference for either dyad composition regardless of the extent to which participants are tied to their ingroup, which is consistent with the null hypotheses suggested in Competing Hypothesis 4.

*Meta-perception of liking.* For participants perceptions of the extent to which they believed their partner liked them, a main effect of condition was found,  $b = -2.42$ ,  $\beta = -1.74$ ,  $t(64) = -2.35$ ,  $p = .02$ . Specifically, participants in the cross-race condition ( $M = 4.82$ ,  $SD = 0.65$ ) believed that their partner would like them more than participants in the same-race condition ( $M = 4.79$ ,  $SD = 0.77$ ). The main effect is once again qualified by a significant interaction effect,  $b = .51$ ,  $\beta = 1.71$ ,  $t(64) = 2.28$ ,  $p = .03$ . Specifically for same-race participants there is a positive relationship between ties to one's ingroup and meta-perceptions of how much one's partner likes them,  $b = .39$ ,  $\beta = .39$ ,  $t(32) = 2.41$ ,  $p = .02$ . In other words, as ties to one's ingroup increased so did same-race participants' meta-perception of the extent to which they thought their partner liked them. When participants' were in the cross-race condition, there was no significant difference,  $b = -.09$ ,  $\beta = -.11$ ,  $t(30) = -.61$ ,  $p = .54$ . These results suggest that although the main effect suggests that meta-perceptions of liking are higher for cross-race dyads, same-race dyads result in a greater discrepancy where individuals who have high ties to their ingroup have much higher perceptions of how much one is liked by a same-race partner than individuals who have low ties to their ingroup. This finding is counter to Competing Hypothesis 4.

*Meta-perception of desire for future interaction.* In regards to participant's meta-perception of their partner's desire for future interaction a main effect of condition was found,  $b = -4.32$ ,  $\square = -2.32$ ,  $t(64) = -3.34$ ,  $p < .01$ , in which participants perceive their Black partner ( $M = 4.50$ ,  $SD = 0.85$ ) as having a higher desire for future interaction than a White partner ( $M = 4.06$ ,  $SD = 0.98$ ). This is again counter to our hypothesis and is qualified by a significant interaction effect,  $b = .84$ ,  $\square = 2.12$ ,  $t(64) = 3.00$ ,  $p < .01$ . Specifically, for same-race participants, the relationship between ingroup ties and their meta-perceptions of desire for future interaction is positive,  $b = .53$ ,  $\square = .42$ ,  $t(32) = 2.54$ ,  $p = .02$ , such that once again as ingroup ties increased so did participant's meta-perception of desire for future interaction. When participants were in the cross-race condition the relationship was not significant,  $b = -.30$ ,  $\square = -.27$ ,  $t(30) = -1.64$ ,  $p = .11$  (see Figure 9 for a depiction of the estimated marginal means). These results suggest that there is a steep positive relationship between meta-perceptions of desire for future interaction and ingroup association for same-race condition participants that might actually contradict the main effect. Regardless the results obtained are counter to

**Figure 9.**



#### Competing Hypothesis 4.

*Trust.* Finally, analyses also yielded significant results with ingroup ties and condition as predictors of trust,  $R = 22.5\%$ ,  $F(3, 64) = 6.37$ ,  $p < .01$ , in which there is a significant main effect of condition,  $b = -3.02$ ,  $\beta = -1.85$ ,  $t(64) = -2.71$ ,  $p = .01$ . Specifically, participants in the cross-race condition ( $M = 5.00$ ,  $SD = 0.72$ ) trusted their partner more than participants in the same-race condition ( $M = 4.82$ ,  $SD = 0.95$ ), which is also counter to Hypothesis 3. There was also a significant interaction,  $b = .60$ ,  $\beta = 1.71$ ,  $t(64) = 2.47$ ,  $p = .02$ , in which trust increased as ingroup ties increased for both conditions. Participants in the same-race condition demonstrated the largest relationship. Specifically, as same-race participants' ingroup ties increased so did their trust for their partner,  $b = .72$ ,  $\beta = .61$ ,  $t(32) = 4.82$ ,  $p < .01$ . A similar but insignificant pattern was found for participants in the cross-race dyad, where once again as ingroup ties increased so did their trust in their partner,  $b = .12$ ,  $\beta = .13$ ,  $t(30) = .68$ ,  $p = .50$ . This pattern of results is not consistent with Competing Hypothesis 4.

#### *Ingroup Identification*

Throughout the analysis of relational outcomes a few of the dependent variables had significant effects with both ingroup affect and ingroup ties as predictors. Specifically, similar results occurred for both predictors on the dependent variables on perceptions of desire for future interaction, meta-perceptions of how much their partner liked them, meta-perceptions of how much their partner wanted to engage in future interactions with them, and trust. Because both ingroup affect and ingroup ties are two subfactors of the larger construct of ingroup identification they should theoretically be correlated and therefore these effects may not be entirely different unique effects. In

order to assess whether or not these were distinct effects for both predictors I entered both predictors in a regression analysis with all of the pertinent dependent variables. The results suggest that these predictors are correlated and when entered simultaneously in a regression they compete with one another. Consider meta-perceptions of liking; when both predictors are entered the interaction is only marginally significant for ingroup ties and condition,  $b = .45$ ,  $\beta = 1.52$ ,  $t(61) = 1.17$ ,  $p = .09$ . The interaction of ingroup affect and condition was not significant,  $b = .27$ ,  $\beta = .99$ ,  $t(61) = 1.02$ ,  $p = .31$ . A similar pattern was found for both meta-perceptions of desire for future interaction (i.e., Ingroup ties X Condition,  $b = .65$ ,  $\beta = 1.62$ ,  $t(61) = 1.94$ ,  $p = .06$ ; Ingroup affect X Condition,  $b = .46$ ,  $\beta = 1.25$ ,  $t(61) = 1.36$ ,  $p = .18$ ) and trust (i.e., Ingroup ties X Condition,  $b = .50$ ,  $\beta = 1.44$ ,  $t(61) = 1.44$ ,  $p = .09$ ; Ingroup affect X Condition,  $b = .28$ ,  $\beta = .87$ ,  $t(61) = .95$ ,  $p = .35$ ). For participants personal perceptions of how much they wanted to engage in future interactions with their partner neither interaction was significant (i.e., Ingroup ties X Condition,  $b = .56$ ,  $\beta = 1.17$ ,  $t(61) = 1.33$ ,  $p = .19$ ; Ingroup affect X Condition,  $b = .48$ ,  $\beta = 1.07$ ,  $t(61) = 1.12$ ,  $p = .27$ ). These results suggest that these effects are not entirely unique and that ingroup ties is the strongest predictor of significant relational outcomes.

### *Evaluative Concern*

#### *Trait-based Evaluative Concern Scale*

Finally, trait-based evaluative concern was also included for exploratory analyses in hopes that it would replicate the pattern suggested by Hypothesis 3 and Competing Hypothesis 4. In order to test these hypotheses I conducted regression analyses with trait-based evaluative concern, condition (White vs. Black confederate), and the Trait-based Evaluative Concern X Condition interaction. Age and participation in a negotiation class

where used as covariates. There were no significant results for liking, desire for future interaction, similarity, or meta-perceptions of desire for future interaction (see Table 9).

*Meta-perceptions of liking.* The analyses with trait-based evaluative concern as a predictor along with condition yielded a significant effect for meta-perceptions of how much the partner liked them,  $R = 19.7\%$ ,  $F(3, 64) = 5.41$ ,  $p < .01$ . The unique effects are significant for both condition,  $b = -2.97$ ,  $\beta = -2.13$ ,  $t(64) = -2.49$ ,  $p = .02$ , and the interaction,  $b = .77$ ,  $\beta = 2.14$ ,  $t(64) = 2.47$ ,  $p = .02$ . For the condition effect, participants in the cross-race condition ( $M = 4.82$ ,  $SD = 0.65$ ) believed once again that their partner would like them more than participants in the same-race condition ( $M = 4.79$ ,  $SD = 0.77$ ). For the interaction, regardless of condition, increases in evaluative concern lead to increases in meta-perceptions of liking. The relationship is stronger for participants with a same-race partner,  $b = .94$ ,  $\beta = .61$ ,  $t(32) = 4.31$ ,  $p < .01$  relative to a cross-race partner where the regression is not significant,  $b = .19$ ,  $\beta = .16$ ,  $t(30) = .88$ ,  $p = .39$ . In other words, participants believed their partner would like them more when they were high in trait-based evaluative concern. Although this was an exploratory analysis, I expected that trait-based evaluative concern would play a similar role to that of prejudice level (or ingroup identification) and therefore should be consistent with Competing Hypothesis 4; this was not the case.

*Trust.* Analyses of trait-based evaluative concern that included trust as a dependent variable were also marginally significant. Specifically, there was a unique significant effect of condition,  $b = -3.10$ ,  $\beta = -1.90$ ,  $t(64) = -2.05$ ,  $p = .04$  such that participants in the cross-race condition ( $M = 5.00$ ,  $SD = 0.72$ ) trusted their partner more than participants in the same-race condition ( $M = 4.82$ ,  $SD = 0.95$ ). There was also a

marginally significant interaction effect,  $b = .76$ ,  $\beta = 1.81$ ,  $t(64) = 1.93$ ,  $p = .06$ .

However, when the interaction is parsed out neither the cross-race regression,  $b = -.23$ ,  $\beta = -.16$ ,  $t(30) = -.89$ ,  $p = .38$  or the same-race regression,  $b = .53$ ,  $\beta = .29$ ,  $t(32) = 1.68$ ,  $p = .10$  is significant. This pattern of results for trust suggests that there is no effect of trait-based evaluative concern regardless of condition which is consistent with Competing Hypothesis 4. It would therefore seem that trait-based evaluative concern may not play a role on trust behaviour.

### *Summary*

In summary, I did not find support for Hypothesis 3 and with the exception of desire for future interaction with ingroup ties as a predictor and trust behaviour with trait-based evaluative concern as a predictor the interaction pattern found did not support Competing Hypothesis 4. Although there were dependent variables for which I did not find significant results, the direction of the results is consistent with the dependent variables that demonstrated significant results. See table 10 for a visual summary of all the analyses that were significant.

## DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to examine the implications and outcomes of majority group individuals (i.e., White Canadians) negotiating with a cross-race partner as compared to a same-race partner. It was hypothesized that there would be differences in both negotiation outcomes and relational outcomes. Specifically, participants in the cross-race condition would do worse than participants in the same-race condition for both these outcomes. It was also expected that there would be interactions between the condition and the prejudice level (or ingroup identification) of the participant such that a

Table 10.

*Summary of Analyses which Resulted in Significant Effects*

Variable	Points	Joint Outcome	Vacation Time	Integrative Attempts	Stroop	Liking	Desire for future	Felt Similarity	Meta-liking	Meta-desire	Trust
Condition								X			
MRS											X
Condition X								X			
MRS											
Condition		X				X	X		X	X	X
Ingroup Affect											
Condition X		X				X	X		X	X	X
Affect											
Condition							X		X	X	X
Ingroup Ties											
Condition X Ties							X		X	X	X
Condition			X						X		X
Trait Evaluative											
Concern (EC)											
Condition X EC			X						X		X



different pattern of results is expected on the basis of whether or not negotiations elicit evaluative concern. If evaluative concern is present throughout the negotiation then low-prejudice individuals will “choke” under the pressure of focusing on their behaviour (e.g., Vorauer & Turpie, 2004) and therefore will have worse relational outcomes when negotiating with a cross-race partner. High-prejudice individuals, who are already accustomed to monitoring their behaviour, should have similar or better relational outcomes in the cross-race condition relative to the same-race condition.

If evaluative concern is present it should also have an impact on negotiation outcomes. Specifically, regardless of the presence of evaluative concern, high-prejudice individuals who require more executive functioning (e.g., Shelton & Richeson, 2006) when interacting with a member of another racial group, should have worse negotiation outcomes due to the high cognitive load required to monitor their behaviour. Low-prejudice individuals will only fare worse if evaluative concern is present as they will also feel a need to monitor their behaviour which will increase their cognitive load as well.

If evaluative concern is not present throughout the negotiation, I predicted a different set of outcomes. As evaluative concern is the factor that seems to impede low-prejudice individuals, there should be no change in their behaviour across conditions for either the relational outcomes or the negotiation outcomes. However, high-prejudice individuals which are not impeded by evaluative concern but instead by the cognitive load that is required to monitor one’s behaviour will only do worse in the negotiation outcomes which require additional cognitive functioning. The relational outcomes should be the same across both conditions for high-prejudice individuals as they will already be

accustomed to monitoring their behaviour. I also believed that ingroup identification would mirror the results of prejudice level, such that the same pattern of results would be found for high ingroup identifiers as that of high prejudice individuals, whereas low ingroup identifiers would behave similarly to low prejudice individuals.

### Summary of Ingroup Identification and Prejudice Results

The results suggest that overall, White dyads fare better in negotiations than cross-race dyads. This finding seems to be consistent for both negotiation outcomes (e.g., joint outcomes) and evaluations of the partner (e.g., how much they like their partner). Furthermore, it appears that as preference for one's ingroup increases so does the joint outcomes and the evaluations of the White partner. Taken together, these findings would suggest that White dyads fare better in negotiations because participants like each other more. In addition, the findings with regards to prejudice, specifically the fact that there was only one significant outcome whereas for the other predictors (i.e., ingroup affect and ingroup ties) there were a larger number of significant outcomes, it would seem that it is not necessarily a dislike for a Black participant but instead a preference for a White participant that plays a predictive role in the outcome. Finally, negotiation outcomes did suggest that as preference for one's ingroup increased, the negotiation outcome decreased for the cross-race dyad, thereby lending more support to the notion that ingroup preference fosters a higher evaluation and better negotiation outcomes.

### *Prejudice Level versus Ingroup Identification*

Although there are many potential influential processes that can lead to the detrimental outcomes found in this study, I chose to examine the impact of both prejudice level and ingroup identification on the outcomes. This decision was based on the

suggestion that the prejudice scale I had included (i.e., Modern Racism Scale) is actually outdated (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995; Migetz, 2004). In addition, research conducted by Dunlap (1995) suggests that ingroup identification is often more predictive of acceptance of diversity than are the traditional prejudice measures. Therefore I chose to analyze the dependent variables using both the MRS scale and the ingroup identification scale. Specifically, I included the MRS with the belief that most of the literature on which I based my hypotheses had used this scale. Nonetheless, I also felt it important to include a scale that attempted to overcome the shortcomings mentioned and that had also been used by researchers in the intergroup interaction field. Vorauer and Turpie (2004) have used both the MRS and ingroup identification scales throughout their three studies and found consistent results; therefore I chose to do the same. In this case, the MRS predicted only one significant result (i.e., differences versus similarities) and when parsed out the interaction was not significant, whereas the factors of affect and ingroup ties of the Three Factor Model of Social Identity (Cameron, 2004) did predict some significant findings. In light of these findings it is important to mention that although prejudice level did not predict many significant findings the sample tested was in the midrange for prejudice level and the extent to which participants responded to being prejudiced also had a significant range. This variability does suggest that although I only found one significant finding I cannot attribute the lack of findings on the other variables to a sample that is not prejudiced. Instead it is possible that it is not entirely prejudice towards one's outgroup that affects behaviour but instead a preference for one's ingroup.

### Negotiation Outcomes

#### *Distributive, Integrative, and Total Outcomes*

My findings indicate that participants in cross-race negotiations appear to have lower joint outcomes and less success with their most important issue (i.e., vacation time) relative to participants in same-race negotiations. In the previously mentioned consumer studies detrimental effects were only found for the minority group member in regards to receiving a lower final offer when compared to the final offer received by a majority group member (e.g., Ayres & Siegelman, 1995; Seidel, Polzer, & Stewart, 2000), however the results of the current study suggest that there is a potential for detrimental effects for both the negotiator and their cross-race partner in interracial negotiations. Specifically in the current study, there was integrative potential with both the salary and the vacation time with the job candidates benefiting more from the vacation time and the employer benefiting more from the salary. If participants negotiated on average less vacation time with their cross-race partner neither participant is fully benefiting from the integrative potential. Furthermore, significant differences were only found for integrative issues, whereas there were no significant differences for distributive issues. These findings are consistent with cross-cultural research which suggests that both joint outcomes and integrative attempts suffer while distributive outcomes are not significantly altered when members of different cultures (i.e., Japan and the United States) negotiate (Okumura & Brett, 2001). It would therefore seem that the uncertainty and tension that is present during cross-race interactions (e.g., Devine, Evett, & Vasquez-Suson, 1996) does have a detrimental effect on cross-race negotiations and the negotiators' outcomes.

#### *Prejudice and Negotiation Outcomes*

The absence of significant findings with prejudice measures as a predictor suggests that with this current sample, prejudice is not a key issue determinant of

negotiation and relational outcomes in this current task. Had prejudice results been significant for any of the analyses, it would suggest that dislike for the outgroup plays a role in participants behaviour and partner evaluations. Instead this absence of findings suggest that it is something other than outgroup dislike that accounts for these changes in behaviour and ratings during intergroup interactions. Furthermore, the results would suggest that instead of dislike, preference is a key factor in predicting different behaviours patterns.

### *Ingroup Identification and Negotiation Outcomes*

Ingroup preference does in fact predict different trends for joint outcomes. Specifically, for cross-race dyads as the participants' affective ingroup identification increased their joint outcomes decreased, whereas for participants in same-race dyads, as their affective ingroup identification increased so did their joint outcomes. Therefore, people high in ingroup identification had the worse joint outcomes in the cross-race condition relative to all other participants. It would therefore seem that either (a) individuals who are high in ingroup affect prefer to lose points rather than provide their cross-race partner with a higher offer or that (b) individuals who are high in ingroup affect are distracted by their need to ensure they are not disclosing any of their disfavoured opinions of their outgroup partner and therefore cannot focus on the integrative potential. Considering the absence of significant results in regards to distraction it would seem that distraction may not be the best explanation for these results. Instead it may be that preferential treatment towards the ingroup seems is the factor at hand or it may be something entirely different that was not considered. Interestingly, these findings provide a possible explanation to Cross and Rosenthal's

(1999) findings with the Jewish and Arab individuals who were engaging in a discussion on the conflict in Jerusalem. Specifically, the authors found that when prompted to take an integrative approach to resolving the conflict both parties fared worse. Therefore it may actually be a conscious choice not to let the other party gain anything. Furthermore, since this pattern of results was only found for the joint outcomes it may mean that there is no cross-race effect on distributive negotiations which again is consistent with Cross and Rosenthal (1999).

### Relational Outcomes

Relational outcomes differed for cross-race negotiations relative to same-race negotiations but not in the expected direction (i.e., Hypothesis 3). Instead there were differences between conditions in regards to participants in the cross-race condition providing more favourable evaluations of their partners. However, in each of these cases the main effect is superseded by the interaction and therefore one should not put too much weight on the results of these main effects. Instead we see that for cross-race dyads the slope for ingroup affect or ingroup ties as a predictor was non-significant whereas the one for the same-race dyads was quite steep. The different slopes suggest that although the average is higher for cross-race dyads it is only because the reports are more consistent throughout the different levels of ingroup identification, whereas for the same-race dyads there are very low ratings for individuals low in ingroup identification and very high ratings for individuals high in ingroup identification which in the end provide a lower average than that of the cross-race dyad.

### *Prejudice Level and Relational Outcomes*

Although prejudice levels did predict a significant interaction with regards to the extent to which participants believed their partner was similar to them, the meaning of this interaction is not entirely clear. Specifically, when the interaction is parsed out the findings are no longer significant. It would therefore seem that, either participants were using self-monitoring in regards to their responses and therefore opted to make more socially desirable responses or that in this sample prejudice is not a good predictor of partner ratings in negotiations.

#### *Ingroup Identification and Relational Outcomes*

The interaction findings in regards to the impact of ingroup identification and condition on relational outcomes provided a pattern that differed from the expected pattern. Although I expected that there would not be a difference across conditions for relational outcomes regardless of whether individuals were high or low ingroup identifiers, I found that there were differences based on whether participants were high or low in ingroup identification when they were in the same-race condition. Specifically, when participants were negotiating with a White partner, their partner ratings increased as their affective ingroup identification increased, such that participants high in ingroup identification provided the most favourable reports of their partner. Conversely, when participants were negotiating with a Black partner there was only the one significant relationship in which participants reported less desire for future interaction with their Black negotiation partner as their ingroup affect increased. Thereby, suggesting that although preference for one's ingroup does lead to less desire to interact with someone from an outgroup, it does not have an effect on how much participants reported liking their partner or their meta-perceptions of this participant. Nonetheless, preference for

one's ingroup does lead to more favourable evaluations for White partners, which ultimately does suggest that unfortunately for Black partners they do get differential treatment.

A similar pattern of results was found with the ingroup ties subscale of the Three Factor Model of Social Interactions. Same-race negotiations yielded a similar pattern where, as participants ingroup ties increased so did their ratings of their partner whereas, for cross-race negotiations, there was no significant difference. It would therefore seem that overall participants provide more favourable ratings of their partners because of an ingroup preference rather than outgroup dislike. These findings are consistent with previous ingroup versus outgroup literature which suggests that ingroup biases are heightened after ingroup negotiations (e.g., Park & Judd, 1995; Thompson, 1993). Finally, these results are also consistent with Veinot and Gilin Oore's (2008) naturalistic approach to examine different negotiation dyad combinations (i.e., majority-majority, minority-majority, and minority-minority). Specifically Veinot and Oore found that majority-majority negotiations often resulted in an enhanced sense of liking for their partner, and a higher meta-perception of liking. They also found that majority-minority negotiations resulted in the least favourable outcomes.

Regardless of the differences found, it was hypothesized that there would not be a difference across conditions for either high or low prejudice individuals (or high or low ingroup identifiers). Although, these results do not actually support the hypothesis, they do not altogether disconfirm the hypotheses, as this study only measured liking and desire for future interaction from the perspective of the participant and not from their negotiation partner. It would therefore still be possible for their partner to evaluate low



ingroup identifiers and high ingroup identifiers differently and more specifically in a manner that is consistent with the hypothesis.

#### Evaluative Concern

I would have liked to conduct three-way interactions between evaluative concern, prejudice level (or ingroup identification), and condition, however due to insufficient sample size and power (e.g., Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007) it was advisable to take a different approach. As a result I found that there was a small amount of state-based evaluative concern throughout the negotiation and that this amount did not significantly differ across conditions thus leading me to test both competing hypotheses which I expected would occur if there was a minimal amount of state-based evaluative concern throughout the negotiations. It is important to note that although only a small amount of state-based evaluative concern was found for this experiment, this may not generalize to all negotiations. Specifically, the negotiation task was conducted through Chat which provided participants with the protection of a computer to buffer their facial expressions and also enabled them to think through their comments. Face-to-face negotiations do not provide this mask and therefore may elicit more state-based evaluative concern than was found. Furthermore, actual negotiations are often conducted with individuals with whom the negotiators must work with in the future. This ongoing relational aspect was not captured in this negotiation and it is my belief that the thought of future interactions may also elicit more state-based evaluative concern than was found.

Nonetheless, as I was still interested in the interaction between evaluative concern and the condition on the negotiation I chose to examine trait-based evaluative concern as an exploratory proxy independent variable with the impression that it would predict

similar findings to those of prejudice level (or ingroup identification). Although this alternative did provide me with some insight as to the effects of evaluative concern on the negotiation, previous literature (e.g., Vorauer & Turpie, 2004) has outlined that it is the combination of prejudice level, evaluative concern, and experimental condition that has the effect of choking or shining under pressure. Future research should attempt to determine the joint effects of evaluative concern, prejudice level (or ingroup identification), and experimental condition on negotiation outcomes instead of each effect independently.

#### *Evaluative Concern and Negotiation Outcomes*

Trait-based evaluative concern was included as an exploratory independent variable. I believed that this variable would predict a relationship similar to the hypothesized relationship between prejudice level (or ingroup identification) and condition. An examination of the role of trait-based evaluative concern on the dependent variables did result in a significant effect when participants were negotiating their vacation time. Specifically, the main effect suggested that participants negotiating with a cross-race partner often settled for less vacation time than participants negotiating with a same-race partner. An examination of the potential predictive role of trait-based evaluative concern in this outcome suggests that individuals who were high in trait-based evaluative concern did tend to secure the most vacation time in the same-race condition, whereas no significant trend was found for the cross-race condition. It would therefore seem that for individuals who were high in trait-based evaluative concern, integrative potentials were the most evident in the same-race dyad. This outcome may be related to the perspective taking that often comes with monitoring how one is being perceived.

Specifically, it is possible that perspective taking provides people with the opportunity to put themselves in the other person's shoes and see themselves through their partner's eyes which may also, by extension, enable them to consider their partner's position in the negotiation and lead to greater integrative attempts when negotiating with a White partner. There was no significant difference between individuals who were high or low in trait-based evaluative concern for the cross-race condition, which I can speculate may be due to participants being weary about asking for too much vacation time regardless of their the amount of their trait-based evaluative concern and therefore settled for less. This may be due to participant's fear that hard bargaining may lead their partner to believe that they are prejudiced during cross-race negotiations and therefore, they resort to a more obliging conflict style. Consistently, Carter and Oore (2008) found that when engaging in simulated conflicts, participants in the cross-race condition did prefer to use a more obliging conflict style by giving in to their partner's requests. Based on these findings it would therefore seem important to further test whether participants fear appearing as prejudiced and therefore will be more avoiding or obliging in their negotiation of major issues.

#### *Evaluative Concern and Relational Outcomes*

The inclusion of trait-based evaluative concern as an exploratory independent variable also yielded significant results. Specifically, as trait-based evaluative concern increased so did participants' ratings on the relational outcomes for same-race partners. These findings are consistent with the current evaluative concern literature (e.g., Vorauer & Turpie, 2004). Specifically, evaluative concern is a perspective an individual takes and individuals who are high in evaluative concern are more likely to see themselves through

their partners' eyes. Furthermore, as same-race interactions are usually daily occurrences, participants should feel at ease in such interactions. As a result the reported meta-perceptions should be higher as they really believe that they are doing a good job, which is precisely what was found.

### Inhibition of the Executive Functioning

I hypothesized that a main factor impeding negotiations would be distraction or a heightened cognitive load. I included the Stroop task to measure the extent to which participants were distracted throughout the negotiations. However, there were no significant results for differences across conditions with the Stroop task. It is therefore not entirely clear whether or not the differences in negotiations results occur because of distraction. The results seem to suggest that distraction does not play a role however the lack of significant findings may be due to the way with which participants were asked to complete the Stroop task. Specifically, participants were only asked to complete the Stroop task after the negotiation. Had participants been asked to complete the Stroop task both before and after the negotiation we could have compared the difference between both the pre- and post-negotiation Stroop task scores which may have provided a better picture of how distracted the participant was throughout the negotiation.

That being said, I believed that cross-race negotiations would be impeded by the distraction that would be a result of evaluative concern. An examination of the evaluative concern findings suggested that low or high trait-based evaluative concern did not have a differential impact on the relational outcomes during cross-race negotiations. Instead there were differences between individuals who were high and low in evaluative concern on the relational outcomes in the same-race condition. In addition, when I looked at

ingroup identification I found a similar pattern where there is no significant difference on relational outcomes between individuals who are high and low in ingroup identification for the cross-race condition but a significant relationship in the same-race condition. It would therefore seem that the process at hand may not be one of distraction but instead it may be more of a process of ingroup favouritism or facilitation, in which White individuals prefer to provide better relational evaluations to other White individuals. Although this does seem to be the pattern for the relational outcomes, the negotiation outcome is slightly different, specifically that of joint outcomes. The results suggest that as ingroup affect increases for same-race dyads the joint outcomes increase, while with a cross-race dyad the joint outcomes decrease. It would therefore seem that there is some ingroup facilitation but that there is also some evidence of worse treatment with an outgroup member. It is difficult at this point to determine whether as hypothesized this is due to cognitive load or if once again it is related to the plausible process of ingroup facilitation in which participants chose to be less accommodating to a cross-race partner. Further research with a better measure of cognitive distraction should be conducted in order to determine the process for these outcomes.

### Implications

With cross-race negotiations obtaining less than same-race negotiations the potential for misunderstandings and conflict in the workplace is apparent. For example, consider both a White individual and a Black individual who are negotiating a contract of employment for the same position with a White employer. The employer may unintentionally provide the White individual with a better package than the Black individual. This unintentional discrimination may be due ingroup facilitation, similar to

an 'old boys club' where the intention is not to discriminate towards the other individual but instead to provide better treatment to an ingroup member. Furthermore, if we continue with the same scenario a few weeks after they have both been hired, both employees discuss their contract and the Black individual finds out that their contract is significantly different to that of the White individual; the Black employee may then in turn blame their employer of discrimination or being prejudiced. The employer may not have been consciously discriminating against the Black employee but instead was unintentionally facilitating his or her ingroup. Regardless, both the employee and the employer will suffer as a result through the negotiation outcome and the ensuing conflict. If we examined the same scenario but looked at the relational outcome after the contract negotiation, based on the findings the employer would leave the negotiation with the White individual with a higher global evaluation of the White individual whereas, after there would be no change after a negotiation with the Black individual. This pattern is once again related to preferring one's ingroup and providing them intentionally or not with better treatment. However, even if the overall impression does not drop it also does not increase which again could lead to conflict and misunderstanding in the future, especially if the White individual is invited out to lunch one day with the employer, whereas the Black individual is not.

Taken together, these results suggest that cross-race negotiations are breeding grounds for misunderstandings and conflict between the parties involved. Although future research should examine ways of overcoming these effects, one plausible way would be through the contact hypothesis. The contact hypothesis posits that increasing positive intergroup exchanges leads to better interactions as a whole (e.g., Allport, 1954;

Levin, van Laar, & Sidanius, 2003). If negotiating parties spent more time getting to know each other they may realize their similarities and by extension create new ingroups. Furthermore, the familiarization need not be with a specific individual, instead the contact hypothesis suggest that it is with different members of different ethnic or racial groups, that one should become familiar in order to increase the positive thoughts or thoughts of how they are similar to individuals of those ethnic or racial groups as a whole.

### Measures

Even though there are significant effects for both negotiation and relational outcomes there are a large number of variables for which no effects were found (e.g., points, Stroop task, and integrative attempts). It is important to mention that regardless of the lack of findings on these variables, the findings I did find are for the most part highly consistent with each other and provide us with a clear picture. Furthermore, as the field of cross-race negotiations has been for the most part unexamined I felt it necessary to develop specific hypotheses but was unsure which measures would best capture the effects of same-race as compared to cross-race negotiations and therefore included a broad range of measures.

### Study Design Weaknesses

#### *Experimental*

It is important to take note of certain limitations that may have affected our selection of hypotheses. One obvious limitation is that of the limited sample size, which decreased the power of statistical tests considerably and limits the type of analyses conducted (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Another limitation is that of the laboratory

setting, which may lead participants to pay special attention to their behaviour throughout the negotiation. Although some of the outcomes are consistent with previous field negotiations (i.e., Ayres & Siegelman, 1995), people's actual negotiation behaviour may be different during negotiations that are not simulated. Finally the scenario, although created to enhance ecological validity and to increase generalisability may not be an accurate depiction of what normally occurs in employment negotiations. It would therefore seem important to replicate this study in a more naturalistic setting, although there are practical constraints to such a study.

### *Methodology*

In terms of methodology, there are also limitations with the use of confederates and the use of the scripts. Specifically, although confederates were trained to use a script and were encouraged to ask questions when encountering an ambiguous offer, it is possible that different responses were provided for similar ambiguous offers. In addition, using a script to enhance the controls throughout the negotiation also decreases the extent to which the negotiation is flexible and by extension constrained confederates from adapting to abnormal offers. Finally, there was no opportunity to actually rate participants on their interaction and how likable they are, in the future a coding scheme should be devised and coders should read each negotiation to obtain an overall rating of the participant.

### *Summary of Results*

In sum, cross-race negotiations did yield lower joint outcomes relative to same-race negotiations. There were also differences in negotiation outcomes on the bases of ingroup identification which were consistent with our hypothesis. Individuals high in



ingroup identification negotiated better joint outcomes with a same-race partner, whereas individuals high in ingroup identification negotiated worse joint outcomes with a cross-race partner. The relational outcomes, although significant, were more positive in the cross-race negotiations, which was not in the expected direction. These unexpected findings may be due to the way in which relational outcomes were measured. Finally, there are significant relational differences across conditions for participants on the basis of whether they were high or low in ingroup identification which were not in the expected direction. Specifically, as participants' preference for their ingroup increased so did their evaluation of their same-race partner. In addition, as prejudice measures were not significant it would appear that it is not a dislike for a cross-race partner that fosters these results but instead a preference for their own ingroup that facilitates the preferential treatment.

### Conclusion

Current consumer researchers, (e.g., Ayres & Siegelman, 1995; Seidel, Polzer, & Stewart, 2000) have identified differences in negotiation outcomes on the basis of race or ethnic membership. This thesis has provided clear evidence that there are indeed different outcomes in cross-race negotiations that can have a detrimental effect not only on the minority group member but also on the majority group member. Nonetheless, the process through which these outcomes occur is still unclear, and further research is warranted.

In terms of future directions, I believe that it will be important to examine minority group members in a controlled same-race and cross-race negotiations in order to determine whether their outcomes are also impeded during cross-race negotiations and to

shed more light on the processes that underlies such differences in the hopes of one day overcoming these effects.

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## Appendix I

## Pre-measure Survey

*CESD*

**Please read all instructions carefully before you begin:** The following is a list of 20 questions concerning feelings and behaviours that people sometimes have and exhibit. For each question, can you please indicate how often you have felt or behaved this way during the past week. Please circle your answer in the "Answer" space provided as well as on the **bubble sheet**. Please respond using the following rating scale.

Fill in "1" if in the past week you rarely felt or behaved this way.

Fill in "2" if in the past week you have felt or behaved this way a little or some of the time.

Fill in "3" if in the past week you have felt or behaved this way occasionally or moderately.

Fill in "4" if in the past week you have felt or behaved this way most or all of the time.

Fill in only one response for each question. Remember to **transfer all your answers onto the bubble sheet**. Keep in mind that there are no correct answers and just try to answer as honestly as you can.

Rarely or none of the time (Less than 1 day)		Some or a little of the time (1-2 days)		Occasionally or a Moderate Amount of Time (3-4 days)		Most or all of the time (5-7 days)	
1		2		3		4	
						Answer	
1.	I was bothered by things that usually don't bother me.			1	2	3	4
2.	I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor.			1	2	3	4
3.	I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or friends.			1	2	3	4
4.	I felt that I was just as good as other people.			1	2	3	4
5.	I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing.			1	2	3	4
6.	I felt depressed.			1	2	3	4
7.	I felt that everything I did was an effort.			1	2	3	4
8.	I felt hopeful about the future.			1	2	3	4
9.	I thought my life had been a failure.			1	2	3	4
10.	I felt fearful.			1	2	3	4
11.	My sleep was restless.			1	2	3	4

12.	I was happy.	1	2	3	4
13.	I talked less than usual.	1	2	3	4
14.	I felt lonely.	1	2	3	4
15.	People were unfriendly.	1	2	3	4
16.	I enjoyed life.	1	2	3	4
17.	I had crying spells.	1	2	3	4
18.	I felt sad.	1	2	3	4
19.	I felt that people disliked me.	1	2	3	4
20.	I could not get "going."	1	2	3	4

**EC**

For each item, indicate how well it describes you by circling the appropriate number using the scale at the top of the section as a reference. Please transfer your responses to the appropriate bubble on the **bubble sheet**. Please respond using the following rating scales.

1 Never	2 Some of the time	3 Half the time	4 Most of the time	5 Always
21. How often do you think others have positive thoughts or feelings about you?				1 2 3 4 5
22. How often do you think others have negative thoughts or feelings about you?				1 2 3 4 5
23. How often do you have positive thoughts about yourself, like "I am really doing well here" or "I think I'm making a good impression"?				1 2 3 4 5
24. How often do you have negative thoughts about yourself, like "I am really not doing very well here" or "I don't think I'm making a very good impression"?				1 2 3 4 5
1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neither Agree nor Disagree	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
25. I like people.				1 2 3 4 5
26. I believe people like me personally.				1 2 3 4 5
27. I think I make a good impression on people.				1 2 3 4 5
1 Never	2 Some of the time	3 Half the time	4 Most of the time	5 Always
28. How often do you find yourself wondering how others are evaluating you?				1 2 3 4 5
29. How often do you feel completely focused or absorbed by what you are doing?				1 2 3 4 5
30. How often are you distracted by your own feelings or thoughts about how you are being perceived?				1 2 3 4 5



## IRI

The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by putting an "X" in the appropriate box using the scale at the top of the page as a reference as well as by filling in the appropriate bubble on the **bubble sheet**. Please respond using the following rating scale.

Statements	Statement Describes Me				
	Not Well				Very Well
	1	2	3	4	5
<b>EXAMPLE:</b> I enjoy socializing with friends.					<b>x</b>
41. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.					
42. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.					
43. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.					
44. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.					
45. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.					
46. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.					
47. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.					
48. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments.					
49. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.					
50. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.					
51. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.					
52. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.					
53. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.					
54. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.					



*HAS*

The following statements relate to competition. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by crossing the appropriate box on the scale at the top of the page as well as on the filling in the appropriate bubble on the **bubble sheet**. Please respond using the following rating scale.

Never true of me 1	Seldom True of me 2	Sometimes true of me 3	Often true of me 4	Always true of me 5
--------------------------	---------------------------	------------------------------	--------------------------	---------------------------

Statements	1	2	3	4	5
55. Winning in a competition makes me feel more powerful as a person.					
56. I find myself being competitive even in situations which do not call for competition.					
57. I do not see my opponents in competitions as enemies.					
58. I compete with others even if they are not competing with me.					
59. Success in athletic competition does not make me feel superior to others.					
60. Winning in competition does not give me a greater sense of worth.					
61. When my competitors receive rewards for their accomplishments, I feel envy.					
62. I find myself turning a friendly game or activity into a serious contest of conflict.					
63. It's a dog-eat-dog world. If you don't get the better of others, they will surely get the better of you.					
64. I do not mind giving credit to someone for doing something that I could have done just as well or better.					
65. If I can disturb my opponent in some way in order to get the edge in competition, I will do so.					
66. I really feel down when I lose in athletic competition.					
67. Gaining praise for others is not an important reason why I enter competitive situations.					
68. I like the challenge of getting someone to like me who is already going with someone else.					
69. I do not view my relationships in competitive terms.					
70. It does not bother me to be passed by someone while I am driving on the roads.					
71. I can't stand to lose an argument.					
72. In school, I do not feel superior whenever I do better on tests than other students.					
73. I feel no need to get even with a person who criticizes or makes me look bad in front of others.					
74. Losing in competition has little effect on me.					
75. Failure or loss in competition makes me feel less worthy as a person.					
76. People who quit during competition are weak.					

## TFMSI

**INSTRUCTIONS:** We are all members of different social groups or social categories. We would like you to consider **your race or ethnicity** (e.g., African-American, Latino/Latina, Asian, European-American) in responding to the following statements. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully, and respond on the page as well as by filling in the appropriate bubble on the **bubble sheet** by using the following scale from 1 to 6:

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6

	1	2	3	4	5
77. Winning in competition makes me feel more powerful as a person.					
78. I find myself being competitive even in situation which do not call for competition.					
79. I do not see my opponents in competition as my enemies.					
80. I compete with others even if they are not competing with me.					
81. Success in athletic competition does not make me feel superior to others.					
82. Winning in competition does not give me a greater sense of worth.					
83. When my competitors receive rewards for their accomplishments, I feel envy.					
84. I find myself turning a friendly game or activity into a serious contest of conflict.					
85. It's a dog-eat-dog world. If you don't get the better of others, they will surely get the better of you.					
86. I do not mind giving credit to someone for doing something that I could have done just as well or better.					
87. If I can disturb my opponent in some way in order to get the edge in competition, I will do so.					
88. I really feel down when I lose in athletic competition.					
89. Gaining praise for others is not an important reason why I enter competitive situations.					
90. I like the challenge of getting someone to like me who is already going with someone else.					
91. I do not view my relationships in competitive terms.					
92. It does not bother me to be passed by someone while I am driving on the roads.					
93. I can't stand to lose an argument.					



94.	In school, I do not feel superior whenever I do better on tests than other students.					
95.	I feel no need to get even with a person who criticizes or makes me look bad in front of others.					
96.	Losing in competition has little effect on me.					
97.	Failure or loss in competition makes me feel less worthy as a person.					
98.	People who quit during competition are weak.					
99.	Competition inspires me to excel.					
100.	I do not try to win arguments with members of my family.					
101.	I believe that you can be a nice guy and still win or be successful in competition.					
102.	I do not find it difficult to be fully satisfied with my performance in a competitive situation.					

### PCWEG

Please answer the following questions using the following scale. Remember that there are no right or wrong answers and try to respond as truthfully as possible. **Be sure to answer all questions on this survey and transfer all of your answers onto the bubble sheet.**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9					
None at all								A great deal					
					Answer								
77.	How much previous contact have you had with Black Persons?				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
78.	How much previous contact have you had with First Nations?				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
79.	How much previous contact have you had with Asians?				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
80.	How much previous contact have you had with East Indians?				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

## RSMS

Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each statement, please indicate the degree of your agreement/disagreement by circling the appropriate number on the page as well as by filling in the appropriate bubble on the **bubble sheet**. Once again, remember that your first responses are usually the most accurate.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6

81. In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behaviour if I feel that something else is called for.	1	2	3	4	5	6
82. I am often able to read people's true emotions correctly through their eyes.	1	2	3	4	5	6
83. I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending on the impression I wish to give them.	1	2	3	4	5	6
84. In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change in facial expression of the person I am conversing with.	1	2	3	4	5	6
85. My powers of intuition are quite good when it comes to understanding others' emotions and motives.	1	2	3	4	5	6
86. I can usually tell when others consider a joke to be in bad taste, even though they may laugh convincingly.	1	2	3	4	5	6
87. When I feel that the image I am portraying isn't working, I can readily change it to something that does.	1	2	3	4	5	6
88. I can usually tell when I've said something inappropriate by reading it in the listener's eyes.	1	2	3	4	5	6
89. I have trouble changing my behaviour to meet the requirements of any situation I find myself in.	1	2	3	4	5	6
90. I have found that I can adjust my behaviour to meet the requirements of any situation I find myself in.	1	2	3	4	5	6
91. If someone is lying to me, I usually know it at once from that person's manner of expression.	1	2	3	4	5	6
92. Even if it might be to my advantage, I have difficulty putting up a good front.	1	2	3	4	5	6
93. Once I know what the situation calls for, it's easy for me to regulate my actions accordingly.	1	2	3	4	5	6

## BFNE

The following 12 questions will ask you about certain thoughts, cognitions, or worries that people sometimes have. Please indicate how well each statement characterizes you and circle your answer in the left hand column of this questionnaire as well as fill in the appropriate bubble on the **bubble sheet**.

**Please respond using the scale provided.**

Remember that there are no right or wrong answers and try to respond as truthfully as possible. **Be sure to answer all questions on this survey and transfer all of your answers onto the bubble sheet.**

Not at all characteristic of me	Slightly characteristic of me	Moderately characteristic of me	Very characteristic of me	Extremely characteristic of me
1	2	3	4	5
				Answer
94.	I worry about what people will think of me even when I know it doesn't make any difference			1 2 3 4 5
95.	It bothers me when I know people are forming an unfavourable impression of me			1 2 3 4 5
96.	I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my shortcomings.			1 2 3 4 5
97.	I worry about what kind of impression I am making on someone.			1 2 3 4 5
98.	I am afraid that others will not approve of me.			1 2 3 4 5
99.	I am afraid that people will find fault with me.			1 2 3 4 5
100.	Other people's opinions of me bother me.			1 2 3 4 5
101.	When I am talking to someone, I worry about what they may be thinking about me.			1 2 3 4 5
102.	I am usually worried about what kind of impression I make.			1 2 3 4 5
103.	If I know someone is judging me, it has a big effect on me.			1 2 3 4 5
104.	Sometimes I think I am too concerned with what other people think of me.			1 2 3 4 5
105.	I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things.			1 2 3 4 5

**MIEP**

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement by circling your answer in the left hand column of this questionnaire as well as filling in the appropriate bubble on the **bubble sheet**.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9					
Strongly disagree		Disagree		Neutral		Agree		Strongly agree					
					Answer								
106.	Because of today's politically correct standards I try to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people.				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
107.	I try to hide any negative thoughts about Black people in order to avoid negative reactions from others.				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
108.	According to my personal values, using stereotypes about Black people is OK.				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
109.	Being nonprejudiced towards Black people is important to my self-concept.				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
110.	I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people in order to avoid disapproval from others.				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
111.	Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about Black people is wrong.				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
112.	If I acted prejudiced toward Black people, I would be concerned that others would be angry with me.				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
113.	I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important to me.				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
114.	I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people because of pressure from others.				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
115.	I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced towards Black people.				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9



## *Information Processing Task*

Because we are interested in how exchanging different types of information affects information processing, we now ask you to complete a word fragment completion task that assesses this.

Please look at each of the following word fragments and try to "fill in the blanks" to create a word. For each fragment there are several different possible completions. Fill in the blanks according to what seems most natural, or most likely, to you.

Respond to these items by filling in the word that immediately strikes you as most natural: Go with the word that first comes to mind, no matter what it is. Try to move through these items as quickly as possible. If you can't think of an answer within a few seconds, leave the item blank and move on to the next one (and don't go back to it, just leave it blank).

- |                     |                     |               |
|---------------------|---------------------|---------------|
| 81. __ CE           | 96. BR _____        | 111. CR ____  |
| 82. WE A _____      | 97. _ NO B          | 112. __ A M   |
| 83. _ A L L         | 98. __ P P _        | 113. __ Y S   |
| 84. L A __          | 99. MI _____        | 114. _ A P    |
| 85. S P ____        | 100. __ T E         | 115. L O __   |
| 86. CO ____ E       | 101. SO __ D        | 116. F _ N    |
| 87. __ A C K        | 102. WEL _____      | 117. DR __    |
| 88. __ T E R        | 103. __ U D _       | 118. EM _____ |
| 89. ____ I L        | 104. GEN _____      | 119. SU __ Y  |
| 90. __ O R          | 105. CO _____       |               |
| 91. YE _____        | 106. RE _____ T I C |               |
| 92. __ C H          | 107. _ B L _        |               |
| 93. CL _ S _        | 108. T O ____       |               |
| 94. A _ T I S T I C | 109. __ N C E       |               |
| 95. DR ____         | 110. SI __          |               |

*Demographic Information*

130. Age: \_\_\_\_\_
131. Major: \_\_\_\_\_
132. Cumulative GPA at SMU: \_\_\_\_\_
133. Year in University (circle): 1<sup>st</sup> Year 2<sup>nd</sup> Year 3<sup>rd</sup> Year 4<sup>th</sup> Year  
5<sup>th</sup> Year Post-Graduation
134. Gender (circle): Male Female
135. Racial/Ethnic group(s) (circle as many as apply):
- Black Hispanic
- Asian White
- Native (First Nations)
- Other (please specify): \_\_\_\_\_

---

If you are interested in participating in the e-negotiations study please leave your contact information in the space provided. Only researchers in the lab will have access to this information and it will only be used to contact you for further participation and extra bonus points. Please provide your name and your phone number as well as your birth date (day and month).

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Phone Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date of birth (Day and Month): \_\_\_\_\_

**WRITE YOUR STUDY CODE HERE**

**Remember your participant code for this exercise  
consists of three letters and four digits.**

\_\_\_\_\_  
Middle Initial

\_\_\_\_\_  
Street: first two letters

\_\_\_\_\_  
Birth Day

\_\_\_\_\_  
Birth Month

Appendix II

Participants' Instruction Booklet

**KIWI  
E-Negotiation Study**

**Terms of Employment Task  
Session # 2**

**Fall 2007**

**IMPORTANT FIRST STEP: WRITE YOUR STUDY CODE HERE**

**Remember your participant code for this exercise  
consists of three letters and four digits.**

\_\_\_\_\_  
Middle Initial

\_\_\_\_\_  
Street: first two letters

\_\_\_\_\_  
Birth Day

\_\_\_\_\_  
Birth Month



## **Terms of Employment Exercise**

---

### **Background information**


For this negotiation exercise, imagine that you have applied for this position at AndYet Consulting. This high profile company is located in the downtown area and has been known to have plenty of room for advancement. You know that with a little hard work you could probably land your dream job in no time. The company has offered you the position and it is now up to you to negotiate the contract.

You must negotiate the terms of employment in a one-on-one negotiation with another student. You must argue to get the best outcome as possible for your own sake!!

Your opponent will represent the employer who will want the best outcome for them which would mean the lowest cost for them. Read the following information carefully so you can debate in the strongest position possible – ***remember you will win more lottery tickets for getting a deal that is in the job candidate's best interest.***



***Your role: Job Candidate***



You will play the role of the job candidate. You must decide with your opponent the terms of your employment.

#### **YOUR PRIORITIES**

As a future employee you want to get as high a salary as possible with as many vacation days as possible. You will earn "points" for getting your partner to agree to your requests/demands. More points mean a better chance at the \$100 prize that will be given to someone in this session!

### Negotiable issues

There are five different areas that must be agreed upon: **vacation time, salary, insurance, location, and overtime.**

**Vacation Time!!** You must decide with your opponent how many days of vacation you will get, each day of vacation you get will entitle you to get paid days off!

- ***This is your highest priority.*** You have just finished university and would like to do some traveling but cannot afford to do so without a job. Your best alternative is to get as much vacation days as possible. You will get maximum points for getting an agreement of 25 days of vacation (i.e., 5 weeks), but you will get zero points if you agree that you should only get 5 days of vacation (i.e., 1 week).

Vacation Time: How many paid days of vacation you will receive.	
Options:	Pts:
25 days	65
20 days	35
15 days	15
10 days	5
5 days	0

**Salary.** You must decide with your opponent on your starting salary.

- **You want a large salary.** You have recently completed your degree and would like to earn more than the market average of \$45,000. You will earn the most points of any issue in this task if you can negotiate for the highest salary possible \$60,000. You will earn no points if you agree to a starting salary to a salary that is less than \$45,000.

Salary – How much you will get paid on a yearly basis	
Options:	Pts:
≥ \$60,000	32
\$55,000 - \$59,999	16
\$50,000 - \$54,999	8
\$45,000 - \$49,999	4
\$30,000 - \$44,999	0

**Insurance.** You must decide with your opponent which insurance plan you will receive.

- There are five different plans that offer full or partial coverage of a combination of either optical, health, and/or dental.
  - Plan A: Full coverage of Health, Dental, and Optical
  - Plan B: Full coverage of Health and Dental
  - Plan C: Full coverage of Health
  - Plan D: Partial coverage of Health and Dental
  - Plan E: Partial coverage of Health
- You would really like to have Plan A because it offers the full coverage of all three options (i.e., Health, dental, and optical). You will get maximum points if you can agree on Plan A. You will earn no points if you agree to Plan E which has only partial Health insurance coverage.

<b>Insurance: Which Insurance Plan will you receive?</b>	
<b>Options:</b>	<b>Pts:</b>
<b>Plan A: Full Health/Dental/Optical</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Plan B: Full Health/Dental</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Plan C: Full Health</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Plan D: Partial Health/Dental</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Plan E: Partial Health</b>	<b>0</b>

**Overtime.** You must decide with your opponent how you will be paid for working overtime (i.e., more than the 40 hours a week).

- There are five different options to if and how you can be paid for overtime.
  - Double time: You are paid twice your hourly wage
  - Time and a half: You are paid your hourly wage plus half
  - Banked time: All overtime will be banked and can be used as vacation time at a later date
  - Straight time: You will be paid your usual hourly wage
  - Salary: You are on a salary and therefore will not be paid for any overtime

- You would really like to get paid double time for all of your overtime. You will earn maximum points for an agreement of double time for your overtime and no points if you agree to being paid in a salary like manner.

<b>Overtime: How will you be compensated for working overtime?</b>	
<b>Options:</b>	<b>Pts:</b>
<b>Double time</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Time and a half</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Banked time</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Straight time</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Salary</b>	<b>0</b>

**Location.** You must decide with your opponent regarding the office from which you will be working.

- AndYet Consulting has offices in five different locations throughout the Maritimes.
  - Halifax
  - Dartmouth
  - Bedford
  - Antigonish
  - St Johns, NB
- You already live near the office in Halifax and would prefer not to commute. You will get maximum points if you can agree on working in the Halifax office. You will earn no points if you agree to work in the St Johns, NB office which would require you to move.

<b>Location: In which office will you be employed?</b>	
<b>Options:</b>	<b>Pts:</b>
<b>Halifax</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Dartmouth</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Bedford</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Antigonish</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>St Johns, NB</b>	<b>0</b>

**Points and prize money.** The greater the point total of your agreement, the more lottery tickets you will receive. Any tickets you earn will be entered in a draw for a winner of the \$100 cash prize. Someone in your section will win, and the better you negotiate, the better the chance it will be you.

**Keeping your points confidential.** The point chart on the next page is a summary of all the issues and your points for each option. You should have this schedule out to help you as you try to negotiate an agreement, but **you must not show this schedule to your opponent or discuss exact numbers of point payoffs at any time.**

IF you do not come to an agreement on all issues on the table, you will not receive the position. You will get ZERO POINTS for this negotiation.

**Starting the negotiation.** To replicate as much as possible actual job negotiations, the employer will make the first comments and/or offers.

### Summary of Priorities and Points for Job Candidate

Salary—  Your yearly earnings.		Vacation time—  How many paid days off you will have:		Insurance Plan—  What type of insurance coverage (full vs partial) you will have (health, optical, dental?).		Location—  Which geographic location will you work out of?		Overtime—  Will you be paid for overtime? And if so how?	
Options	Pts	Options	Pts	Options	Pts	Options	Pts	Options	Pts
≥ \$60,000	32	25 days	100	Plan A	12	Halifax	4	Double time	8
\$55,000 - \$59,999	16	20 days	45	Plan B	9	Dartmouth	3	Time and half	6
\$50,000 - \$54,999	8	15 days	15	Plan C	6	Bedford	2	Banked time	4
\$45,000 - \$49,999	4	10 days	5	Plan D	3	Antigonish	1	Straight time	2
\$30,000 - \$44,999	0	5 days	0	Plan E	0	St John, NB	0	Salary	0

**Lottery ticket conversion: You will receive 1 ticket for every 5 points you earn in the deal.**

**KEEP THIS PAGE AVAILABLE FOR NEGOTIATION  
(BUT DON'T SHOW IT OR DISCUSS IT WITH YOUR OPPONENT)**

### Reminders

- ] Do not show the point chart to the Employer or discuss exact point values.
- ] The employer will make the opening comments and/or offers.
- ] You will have 20 minutes to negotiate; we will give you a warning when there is 2 minutes left.
  - You must agree on an option for each of the five issues with the employer in order to reach a deal. If you do not reach a deal by the end of the negotiation period, you will receive zero points.
- ] Fill out your agreement form to show the deal that you made, if you come to agreement in the negotiation period.

**Quiz for Job Candidate**

**Instructions:** Answer each of the following questions on this page by circling the answer or answers you believe to be correct. You may look back to the instructions to help you.

1. Circle the negotiation topics that are important for you:
  - a. Vacation time
  - b. Location
  - c. Insurance
  - d. Salary
  - e. Overtime payment
  
2. In this scenario, what will happen if you and the employer do not agree on each option within the 20 minute period? (circle one)
  - a. No points will be awarded
  - b. You will not receive the position
  - c. The employer will be fired
  - d. Everything but "c"
  
3. How many points would you get if you negotiated the following deal for the position in this exercise: a starting salary of \$52,000, with 10 days of vacation, Plan B for insurance, you will bank your hours for overtime, and you will work out of Halifax? (circle one)
  - a. 0 points
  - b. 23 points
  - c. 30 points
  - d. 37 points



**When you have finished the quiz please  
STOP HERE and put down your pencil.  
Wait for the instructor to give you the next directions.**

### **Answers to the Quiz for Job Candidate**

1. A and D
2. D
3. C

Please mark any questions you had wrong. Now we will take 3 minutes to look up the instructions to clarify any answers you had wrong. If you had all questions correct, please spend the 3 minutes reviewing the background information.

## Terms of Employment Negotiation Agreement Record

**Important: Please write your study code and your partner's study code here first:**

Job Candidate: Write your study code here: \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_

Employer: Write his or her study code here: \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_

1. Did you reach agreement with the Employer in the negotiation period? (Circle one) YES NO
2. IF you reached an agreement, please fill in the details. If you did not reach an agreement, leave this table blank.

Salary	Vacation time	Insurance Plan	Location	Overtime
Option agreed:	Option agreed:	Option agreed:	Option agreed:	Option agreed:
\$ _____	_____ days	Plan _____	_____	_____
My points for this option:	My points for this option:	My points for this option:	My points for this option:	My points for this option:
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

3. Add your total points across each of the 5 issues. MY TOTAL POINTS FOR THIS DEAL = \_\_\_\_\_

Appendix III

Confederates' Instruction Booklet

**PEARL  
E-Negotiation Study**

**Terms of Employment Task  
Session # 2**

**Fall 2007**

**IMPORTANT FIRST STEP: WRITE YOUR STUDY CODE HERE**

**Remember your participant code for this exercise  
consists of three letters and four digits.**

\_\_\_\_\_  
Middle Initial

\_\_\_\_\_  
Street: first two letters

\_\_\_\_\_  
Birth Day

\_\_\_\_\_  
Birth Month

## ***Terms of Employment Exercise***

---

### ***Background information***


For this negotiation exercise, imagine that you are the employer for AndYet Consulting. This high profile company is looking to hire a new employee. You've gone through all the interviews and are now preparing to offer the job to the best candidate. Although you interviewed a number of other candidates no other individual was as qualified and you really need to hire someone as soon as possible.

You must negotiate the terms of employment in a one-on-one negotiation with another student. You must argue to get the best outcome as possible for the company's sake!!

Your opponent will represent the job candidate who will want the best outcome for them which would mean the highest outcome for them. Read the following information carefully so you can debate in the strongest position possible.



***Your role: Employer***



You will play the role of the employer. You must decide with your opponent the terms of their employment.

### **YOUR PRIORITIES**

As the employer you want to negotiate as low a salary as possible with as little vacation days as possible. In addition you will earn "points" for getting your partner to agree on your goals.

### Negotiable issues

There are five different areas that must be agreed upon: **Salary, vacation time, insurance plan, overtime, and location.**

### Salary!!

Salary – How much you will get paid on a yearly basis	
<i>Options:</i>	<i>Pts:</i>
≥ \$60,000	0
\$55,000 - \$59,999	5
\$50,000 - \$54,999	15
\$45,000 - \$49,999	35
\$30,000 - \$44,999	65

### Vacation time.

Vacation Time: How many paid days of vacation you will receive.	
<i>Options:</i>	<i>Pts:</i>
25 days	0
20 days	4
15 days	8
10 days	16
5 days	32

### Insurance.

- There are five different plans that offer full or partial coverage of a combination of either optical, health, and/or dental.
  - Plan A: Full coverage of Health, Dental, and Optical
  - Plan B: Full coverage of Health and Dental
  - Plan C: Full coverage of Health
  - Plan D: Partial coverage of Health and Dental

- Plan E: Partial coverage of Health

<b>Insurance: Which Insurance Plan will your employee receive?</b>	
<b>Options:</b>	<b>Pts:</b>
Plan A: Full Health/Dental/Optical	0
Plan B: Full Health/Dental	3
Plan C: Full Health	6
Plan D: Partial Health/Dental	9
Plan E: Partial Health	12

### **Overtime.**

- There are five different options to how you will pay your employee for overtime.
  - Double time: They are paid twice their hourly wage
  - Time and a half: They are paid their hourly wage plus half
  - Banked time: All overtime will be banked and can be used as vacation time at a later date
  - Straight time: They will be paid their usual hourly wage
  - Salary: They are on a salary and therefore will not be paid for any overtime

<b>Overtime: How will the employee be compensated for working overtime?</b>	
<b>Options:</b>	<b>Pts:</b>
Double time	0
Time and a half	2
Banked time	4
Straight time	6
Salary	8

### **Location.**

- AndYet Consulting has offices in five different locations throughout the Maritimes.
  - Halifax
  - Dartmouth
  - Bedford

- Antigonish
- St John, NB

Location: In which office will they employee work?	
Options:	Pts:
Halifax	4
Dartmouth	3
Bedford	2
Antigonish	1
St John, NB	0

**Keeping your points confidential.** The point chart on the next page is a summary of all the issues and your points for each option. You should have this schedule out to help you as you try to negotiate an agreement, but **you must not show this schedule to your opponent or discuss exact numbers of point payoffs at any time.**

IF you do **not** come to an agreement on all issues on the table, the candidate will not accept the job and you will have to find someone else. You will get ZERO POINTS for this negotiation.


### Reminders

- ] Do not show the point chart to the Job Candidate or discuss exact point values.
- ] You will have 40 minutes to negotiate; we will give you warnings when there are 2 minutes left.
  - You must agree on an option for each of the five issues with the in order to reach a deal. If you do not reach a deal by the end of the negotiation period, you will receive zero points.
- ] Fill out your agreement form to show the deal that you made, if you come to agreement in the negotiation period.



### Summary of Priorities and Points for Job Candidate

<b>Salary—</b> Your yearly earnings.		<b>Vacation time—</b> How many paid days off you will have:		<b>Insurance Plan—</b> What type of insurance coverage (full vs partial) you will have (health, optical, dental?).		<b>Location—</b> Which geographic location will you work out of?		<b>Overtime—</b> Will you be paid for overtime? And if so how?	
<i>Options</i>	<i>Pts</i>	<i>Options</i>	<i>Pts</i>	<i>Options</i>	<i>Pts</i>	<i>Options</i>	<i>Pts</i>	<i>Options</i>	<i>Pts</i>
≥ \$60,000	0	25 days	0	Plan A	0	Halifax	4	Double time	0
\$55,000 - \$59,999	5	20 days	4	Plan B	3	Dartmouth	3	Time and half	2
\$50,000 - \$54,999	15	15 days	8	Plan C	6	Bedford	2	Banked time	4
\$45,000 - \$49,999	35	10 days	16	Plan D	9	Antigonish	1	Straight time	6
\$30,000 - \$44,999	65	5 days	32	Plan E	12	St John, NB	0	Salary	8



**KEEP THIS PAGE AVAILABLE FOR NEGOTIATION**  
**(BUT DON'T SHOW IT OR DISCUSS IT WITH YOUR OPPONENT)**

Employer

Terms of Employment  
Negotiation Agreement Record

Important: Please write your study code and your partner's study code here first:

Employer: Write your study code here: \_\_\_\_\_  
and  
Job Candidate: Write his or her study code here: \_\_\_\_\_

- 1. Did you reach agreement with the Job Candidate in the negotiation period? (Circle one) YES NO
- 2. IF you reached an agreement, please fill in the details. If you did not reach an agreement, leave this table blank.

Salary	Vacation time	Insurance Plan	Location	Overtime
Option agreed:	Option agreed:	Option agreed:	Option agreed:	Option agreed:
\$ _____	_____ days	Plan _____	_____	_____
My points for this option:	My points for this option:	My points for this option:	My points for this option:	My points for this option:
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

3. Add your total points across each of the 5 issues. MY TOTAL POINTS FOR THIS DEAL = \_\_\_\_\_

## Appendix IV

## Confederates' Script

There will be five aspects of the job up for negotiation. The salary, vacation time, insurance, location, and how the candidate will be paid for overtime.

Throughout the scripts the various blocks or replies are grouped together under five different categories.

- Introduction – A
- Chitchat – B
- Content – C
- Offers – D
- Trouble shooting - E
- Closing - F

You can further differentiate the blocks by the letter that follows the first letter. This letter identifies the topic to which this response is geared, for simplicity this letter is the first letter of the issue.

- Salary – S
- Vacation time – V
- Insurance – I
- Overtime – O
- Location – L

After this letter there is also a number, this number identifies where this response block is relative to the others of the same type.

Let's look at an example. Block DO3 would be an offer response that is relative to overtime and is third in the order.

Let's begin.

---

*Confederate Employer Script*

Confederates are required to say the scripted lines verbatim. Words such as “and” and clarifiers can be used to increase flow.

*Block A.*

As you know I am the employer for this job and we would like to hire you for the position. I would like to discuss the terms of your employment. Of the things up for discussion I am most interested in the starting salary and the vacation time and have certain numbers in mind. We will have to discuss all issues and since I am the manager I should mention that all of these issues are negotiable.

**\*\*The confederate's next response depends on the type of the response the participant makes.**

- If the participant continues with this introduction and talks about his or her preferences you would make a **chitchat** reply (block B).
- If the participant starts to discuss content (i.e., the various issues without actually providing offers) you would a **content** reply (block C).
- If the participant goes straight to making offers you would go to the **offer** section (block D).

**\*\*If at any point there response does not match one of these please go to the Troubleshooting section or ask the researcher.**

## **Chitchat (Block B)**

There are different chitchat comments, please use the one that applies to the specific situation. In order to identify which one applies read the comment next to the block.

*Block B1 – If the participant mentions that he or she would really like to get the job.*

I am the manager here and have been here for quite some time. I think you have potential and I really hope we can reach an agreement.

*Block B2 – If the participant mentions that he or she is also interested in salary and vacation days*

I see that you are also interested in the amount of vacation days and your starting salary. I agree those are important topics.

***If the participant mentions that he or she understands that but does not make any other comments***

*Block B3*

Great. What do you think is a reasonable offer?

## Content (Block C)

### **Salary**

*Block CS1 – If the participant mentions something about wanting a high salary because \_\_\_\_\_*

Well we aren't a really big firm and therefore we really can't afford to pay top wages as starting salaries, especially if we want to offer wage to experience with your time spent with the company.

*Block CS2*

Remember this is a package deal and there are other issues up for negotiation. The culture in our company is that you start low and work your way up through bonuses and salary increases. This is not the same for other issues such as insurance plan and overtime where employees can be different.

*Block CS3*

I am not all that flexible on the salary; we do after all have other bills to pay. But I do take this in consideration when discussing other issues including your vacation time.

### **Vacation time**

*Block CV1 – If the participant mentions something about wanting a lot of vacation time because of \_\_\_\_\_*

We don't have very many employees within an office which makes it difficult to offer a lot of vacation time and get everything accomplished.

*Block CV2*

We are discussing five different issues and there are issues on which I am more flexible than others. In the past other employees have started with a minimal amount of vacation days whereas they have had very different insurance plans and overtime pay schedules.

*Block CV3*

I am the manager and therefore I could be flexible with vacation time as long as the rest of the package is equitable with other starting employees.

## **Insurance**

*Block CI1 – If the participant makes a comment about the insurance*

With less than 10 employees in each office location we don't get very good discount rates for insurance coverage.

*Block CI2*

Full insurance package are very costly to the firm, and we've found that employees hardly ever use all of the benefits.

*Block CI3*

Currently our employees have minimal coverage and we'd like to keep this precedent.

## **Overtime**

*Block CO1 – If the participant makes a comment about overtime*

Whether or not there is an opportunity for overtime depends on the contract and the ease with which you can handle the workload. We're hiring you with the belief that we'll not have to pay you for a lot of overtime.

*Block CO2*

We always have to provide an estimate of our work hours to clients; this estimate is usually how much we'll be paid for the contract. Overtime hours worked should not be too costly to our organization.

*Block CO3*

I believe that finishing work in time is a worthwhile incentive to be productive. So, I don't believe in being paid for overtime.

## **Location**

*Block CL1 – If the participant makes a comment about the location.*

Well we do have locations across the Maritimes and I'm sure we could work out an arrangement for your preference but we do have a specific location that's in mind.

*Block CL2*

We do have openings in a few different offices and we'd prefer that you do stay in Nova Scotia.

*Block CL3*

Our biggest office is in the South End and we do need the most help and expertise there.

## **Offer (Block D)**

There are three different categories for each issue as well as different negotiation strategies for each issue. Make sure to familiarize yourself with each issue before beginning.

The offer will differ based on the strategy that the participant takes. You are not to make the first offer on anything.

If the participant does not budge on an offer – do not budge unless otherwise indicated.

Whenever the confederate agrees with a statement have them confirm the details.

**\*\*\*Always, let the participant start the negotiation.\*\*\***

---

## **Location**

If the offer is not Halifax refer to Block DL1. Accept the next offer.

*Block DL1 - Counter*

Well I was thinking of somewhere closer than that. Are you sure you would like that location?

*Block DL2 – Agree – Not Halifax*

Well if you are sure that is where you want to work. We can get you an office in \_\_\_\_\_

*Block DL3 – Agree – Halifax*

Great! We were thinking Halifax as well!

---

### ***Overtime and/or the Insurance Plan***

For either of these issues,

- If they offer higher than the mid point take it.
- If they offer at the mid point or lower
  - Counter 2 steps up
    - ♣ Eg. They request: Time and a half
      - You counter: Straight time
  - Accept the next offer even if they do not budge

### **Insurance**

*Block DI – Statement to include for offers regarding Insurance plans*

<b>Insurance Offer</b>	<b>Counter Offer</b>
Plan A	Plan C
Plan B	Plan D
Plan C	Plan E
Plan D	Accept
Plan E	Accept

*Block DI1:*

Agree above mid point:

I think that Plan \_\_\_\_\_ is a great insurance plan. I'm sure you will not be disappointed.

*Block DI2:*

Counter:

That is quite the request for insurance! I was thinking more along the lines of \_\_\_\_\_. This would fit better into our budget.

*Block DI3*



Agree:

Well I would prefer not to, but I want this to work out. So I guess we can find room in the budget for Plan \_\_\_\_\_.

---

## Overtime

*Block DO – Statement to include for offers regarding Overtime*

Overtime Offer	Counter Offer
Double time	Banked time
Time and a half	Straight time
Banked time	Salary
Straight time	Accept
Salary	Accept

*Block DO1:*

Agree above mid point:

\_\_\_\_\_ seems like a reasonable request. I think I can work with that.

*Block DO2:*

Counter:

If I didn't know any better I would think that you were hoping to work a lot of overtime. How about we go with the \_\_\_\_\_ method of paying overtime?

*Block DO3:*

Agree:

Well you drive a hard bargain. I guess we will have to make sure to help you out if you need it instead of having you work overtime. So we agree it will be \_\_\_\_\_ in regards to overtime.

---

## Salary or Vacation Time

### SALARY RULES

Rules:

- Can only make one concession at a time (that is can only go down one level at a time)
- You are not allowed to get 0 or 5 points unless there is a trade off or you have used all of the comment blocks listed
  - Eg you are giving them 25 days of vacation but they are only getting a salary of \$44,000

Pattern of replies:

- Regardless of the offer your starting point is at \$44,900
- In order to increase the salary to the next range they need to have made two counter offers (the first request does not count), these offers need not have changed but they need to be made twice.
  - Eg
    - First request is \$60,000 you counter with \$44,900
    - Second request is still \$60,000 you remain firm on \$44,900
    - Third request is still \$60,000 you can then go up to \$49,000
- If they decrease their request each time you must stay firm on the first 2 counter offers and then can go up.
  - Eg
    - First request is \$60,000 you counter with \$44,900
    - Second request is \$57,000 you remain firm on \$44,900
    - Third request is \$54,000 you can then go up to \$49,000
- After the first concession if they choose not to accept you need **two** counter offers to increase the salary once again (from \$49,000 to \$53,000).
- After the second concession, if they choose not to accept you need **three** counter offers to increase the salary once again (from \$53,000 to \$56,000).
- After the third concession, if they choose not to accept you need **two** counter offers to increase the salary once again (from \$56,000 to \$62,000)
- If at any point your new counter offer is in the same range as their offer, accept the offer.
- If participants drop from the upper bound (i.e. salary greater than \$55,000) and then go to the mid point or lower see the schedule of comments for your next comment

## Salary Flow Chart

	Range		Comment			Range		Comment
<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#1</b>				<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#7</b>		
	≤44,999	Agree	DS1			≤54,999	Agree	DS3
Offer					Offer			
	≥45,000	Counter	DS2			≥55,000	Counter	DS9
<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#2</b>				<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#8</b>		
	≤44,999	Agree	DS3			≤54,999	Agree	DS3
Offer					Offer			
	≥45,000	Counter	DS4			≥55,000	Counter	DS10
<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#3</b>				<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#9</b>		
	≤44,999	Agree	DS3			≤54,999	Agree	DS3
Offer					Offer			
	≥45,000	Counter	DS5			≥55,000	Counter	DS11
<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#4</b>				<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#10</b>		
	≤44,999	Agree	DS3			≤59,999	Agree	DS3
Offer					Offer			
	≥45,000	Counter	DS6			≥60,000	Counter	DS12
<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#5</b>				<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#11</b>		
	≤49,999	Agree	DS3			≤59,999	Agree	DS3
Offer					Offer			
	≥50,000	Counter	DS7			≥60,000	Agree	DS13
<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#6</b>							
	≤49,999	Agree	DS3					
Offer								
	≥50,000	Counter	DS8					

\*If participants drop down to the mid range (ie salary of \$50,000 to \$54,999) at any point prior to sequence 4 go directly to sequence 4 and continue from there. This is only true when negotiating salary independently of vacation time.

## Salary Blocks

*Block DS – Comments to include with salary negotiations*

*Block DS1*

Agree

That seems like a reasonable request. I think we can offer you \_\_\_\_\_ as a starting salary.

*Block DS2*

Counter offer 1

Well that is quite the large request you make, I was thinking more along the lines of a starting salary of \$44,900.

*Block DS3*

Agree after any counter offer

You were definitely the best candidate we interviewed, and I think we can find room in our budget for \_\_\_\_\_ as your starting salary.

*Block DS4*

The starting salary I am offering is just below the market average of \$45,000 and I don't think I am being unreasonable by suggesting \$44,900.

*Block DS5*

This is Halifax not Toronto do you really think we can start our employees at that wage? I'm going to stay firm on my \$44,900.

*Block DS6*

You have brought up some valid points, I am willing to increase my offer a few thousand dollars to \$49,000.

*Block DS7*

Remember that this is a package deal, and that your benefits are also included in our costs. I think \$49,000 is a generous offer.

*Block DS8*

You really think you should have a higher starting salary don't you? Well you were the most qualified employee, how bout a starting salary of \$53,000?

*Block DS9*

I've increased my offer by almost \$10,000, this is definitely higher than I initially wanted. I'm sorry but \$53,000 is the best I can do.

*Block DS10*

You have to remember that I need to keep this fair and I don't want to start an agreement that I can't follow. If I offer you any more than \$53,000 I may have to let someone else go!

*Block DS11*

Ok, ok. What would you say of a starting salary of \$56,000? This is more than \$10,000 over the industry average.

*Block DS12*

Unbelievable, you'll be earning more than most of your peers and you still want more. Don't forget we do have room to move up. I think \$56,000 is a very generous offer.

*Block DS13*

I'll agree to your requested salary of \_\_\_\_\_ if you agree not to let me down in terms of contracts! This is definitely unexpected.

## VACATION TIME RULES

### Rules:

- Can only make one concession at a time (that is can only go down one level at a time)
- You are not allowed to get 0 or 5 points unless there is a trade off or you have gone through all the comment blocks
  - Eg you are giving them 25 days of vacation but they are only getting a salary of \$44,000

### Pattern of replies:

- Regardless of the offer your starting point is at 5 days of vacation
- In order to increase the vacation days to the next range they need to have made one counter offer (the first request does not count), this offers need not have changed from the initial request.
  - Eg
    - First request is 25 days you counter with 5 days
    - Second request is still 25 days you can go up to 10 days
- If they decrease their request each time you must stay firm on the first counter offers and then can go up.
  - Eg
    - First request is 25 days you counter with 5 days
    - Second request is 20 days you remain firm on 5 days
    - Third request is 15 days you can then go up to 10 days
- After the first concession if they choose not to accept you need **one** counter offer to increase the days once again (from 10 to 15).

- After the second concession, if they choose not to accept you need **two** counter offers to increase the days once again (from 15 to 20).
- After the third concession, if they choose not to accept you need **one** counter offers to increase the days once again (from 20 to 25)
- If at any point your new counter offer is in the same range as their offer, accept the offer.

### Vacation Time Flow Chart

	Range		Comment			Range		Comment
<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#1</b>				<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#5</b>		
	≤5 days	Agree	DV1			≤15 days	Agree	DV3
Offer					Offer			
	>5 days	Counter	DV2			>15 days	Counter	DV7
<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#2</b>				<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#6</b>		
	≤5 days	Agree	DV3			≤15 days	Agree	DV3
Offer					Offer			
	>5 days	Counter	DV4			>15 days	Counter	DV8
<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#3</b>				<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#7</b>		
	≤10 days	Agree	DV3			≤20 days	Agree	DV3
Offer					Offer			
	>10 days	Counter	DV5			>20 days	Counter	DV9
<b>Sequence</b>	<b>#4</b>							
	≤15 days	Agree	DV3					
Offer								
	>15 days	Counter	DV6					

### Vacation Time Blocks

*Block DV – Comments to include with vacation days negotiations*

*Block DV1*

Agree

That seems like a reasonable request. I think we can offer you \_\_\_\_\_ vacation days.

*Block DV2*

Counter offer 1

You sure are looking for a lot of days off, I was thinking more along the lines of 5 days of vacation for your first year.

*Block DV3*

Agree after any counter offer

I look forward to working with you and I'm sure we can make \_\_\_\_\_ days of vacation work for us.

*Block DV4*

Normally new employees don't receive any vacation time during their first year of employment; you should consider yourself lucky to have 5 days.

*Block DV5*

Well I would rather you use your vacation time instead of calling in sick which most people tend to do; would you consider 10 days of vacation time?

*Block DV6*

You really would like more time off? Are you planning a trip somewhere? Well the industry is currently offering 15 days of vacation time how would you feel about that?

*Block DV7*

You are getting an additional 2 weeks of vacation time. I think I'm being more than reasonable. I really think you should accept 15 days of vacation time.

*Block DV8*

Fine, how about I give you an extra 5 days? That would bring you to 20 days. Does that sound like a fair deal?

*Block DV9*

I'm warning you, I'm not happy about this but I will grant you 25 days off. I expect 210% when you are at work though!

### **Combination of BOTH Salary and Vacation Time**

If they combine both Vacation Time and Salary in their negotiation attempts your role is a little trickier.

- If they offer a total trade off (i.e., 25 days vacations for a salary of under \$44,999) accept
- Mirror concessions if they concede on the salary
  - Eg a concession on salary on their part would be concession on vacation time
    - ♣ They start by requesting a salary of \$60,000 with 25 days vacation.
    - ♣ You reciprocate with a starting salary of \$44,900 and 5 days vacation.
    - ♣ Their next offer is \$57,000 with 25 days vacation
    - ♣ You reciprocate with a starting salary of \$44,900 and 10 days vacation.
- Only mirror the concession on vacation time after remaining firm once (unless otherwise indicated on the flowchart/blocks)
- If they are not making concessions at all follow the same pattern as individual cases.
- Once you have made the concession follow the blocks until another concession is made.
- If at any point part of their offer is acceptable according to the guidelines (i.e, the salary is ok but not the vacation time or vice versa) use the following block:

*Block DSV:*

I can agree on the \_\_\_\_\_ but (insert appropriate block for the other issue).

- This type of negotiation is more difficult as you will have to keep track of which block you used last and figure out if you should skip blocks or not based on the response. There is no “simple” visual schedule that can be used.

**REMEMBER:** This is meant to be negotiated as a combination; if at any point they start negotiating the issues separately (ie jumping up and down and changing their mind on previous offers) use the following TROUBLE SHOOTING comment:

## Trouble shooting (Block E)

*Block E1*

We've started to negotiate salary and vacation time as a package. If you don't want to do this anymore then we will have to start from the beginning for both issues independently.

*Block E2 - If the individual thinks we are wasting time... Use this line.*



Well if we agree to disagree, should we move on to another item? What would you like to talk about next?

*Block E3 - If the participant wants to know what to discuss next, and is not requesting anything.*

What would you think is a reasonable request for any of the other issues?

*E4 – Running out of time*

Yes we are getting short on time, what do you suggest we do?

*E5 – If Participants ask you what you would like as a starting offer for a category use one of the comment blocks that has yet to be used.*

*E6 – If the participant wants to change one of the pre-agreed deals*

I thought we had agreed on that already. I'm not willing to budge on these issues unless you want to restart?

## **Closing: After having decided on everything... (Block F)**

*Block F*

Ok so I think we have reached a deal on everything. Let me recap \$\_\_\_\_\_ as a salary, \_\_\_\_\_ days of vacation, Plan \_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_ (overtime), and \_\_\_\_\_ as a location.

Thanks its been fun.

## Appendix V

## Post-Negotiation Survey

**Please answer the following questions by circling your response.**

Methodological Checks				
1. How well did you understand the negotiation instructions? (Circle one)				
A) Not at all ----- B) A little ----- C) Somewhat ----- D) Fairly well ----- E) Very well ----				
2. How well did you know your negotiation partner? (Circle one)				
A) Not at all ----- B) A little ----- C) Somewhat ----- D) Fairly well ----- E) Very well ----				
1 Never	2 Some of the time	3 Half the time	4 Most of the time	5 Always
Concern About Threat				
3. How often during the task could you tell your partner thought or felt positive things about you?				1 2 3 4 5
4. How often during the task could you tell your partner had negative thoughts or feelings about you?				
5. How often did you think something positive about yourself, like "I am really negotiating well here" or "I think I'm making a good impression"?				1 2 3 4 5
6. How often did you think something negative about yourself, like "I am really not negotiating very well here" or "I don't think I'm making a very good impression"?				1 2 3 4 5
1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neither Agree nor Disagree	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
Perception of Social Cues				
7. I liked my partner personally.				1 2 3 4 5
8. I believe my partner is not an effective negotiator				1 2 3 4 5
9. I believe my partner liked me personally.				1 2 3 4 5
10. I think I made an impression on my partner of an effective negotiator.				1 2 3 4 5

1 Never	2 Some of the time	3 Half the time	4 Most of the time	5 Always
<b>Self-Focused Attention</b>				
11. How often did you find yourself wondering how your partner was evaluating you or your negotiation techniques?				1 2 3 4 5
12. How often did you feel completely focused or absorbed by the role play task?				1 2 3 4 5
13. How often were you distracted by your own feelings or thoughts about how your partner perceived you?				1 2 3 4 5
1 Not at all characteristic	2 Slightly characteristic	3 Moderately characteristic	4 Very characteristic	5 Extremely characteristic
<b>Fear of Negative Evaluation</b>				
14. I worried about what my partner thought of me.				1 2 3 4 5
15. I worried about what kind of impression I was making on my partner.				1 2 3 4 5
16. I was afraid that my partner would not like me.				1 2 3 4 5
17. When I was chatting with my partner, I worried about what they may have been thinking about me.				1 2 3 4 5
1 Not at all	2 Slightly	3 Moderately	4 Quite a bit	5 Extremely
<b>Methodological Checks</b>				
18. To what extent were you motivated to make get a good deal for the role play?				1 2 3 4 5
19. To what extent were you motivated by the possibility of earning money?				1 2 3 4 5
20. To what extent did you enjoy this task?				1 2 3 4 5
21. To what extent did you find this task stressful?				1 2 3 4 5
22. To what extent did you find this task interesting?				1 2 3 4 5

**Negotiation**

	Not at all						Extremely
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
23. How focused were you during the negotiation?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
24. How challenged were you during the negotiation?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
25. How prepared were you doing the negotiation?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
26. What percentage did your negotiation partner receive in terms of agreement?							
0%	25%	50%	75%	100%			
Nothing		Even Split		Everything			
27. How much power did your partner have throughout the negotiation?							
0%	25%	50%	75%	100%			
Other person had the advantage		Equal power		I had the advantage			

TURN THE PAGE.... SURVEY CONTINUES

### **Interaction**

Please indicate the extent to which you currently agree or disagree with each of the statements below by writing the appropriate number in the blank beside the item. Use the following scale:

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

28. I think that the other participant is unusually well-adjusted.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
29. In my opinion, the other participant is an exceptionally mature person.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
30. Most people would react favourably to the other participant after a brief acquaintance.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
31. I think that the other participant is one of those people who quickly wins respect.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
32. The other participant is the sort of person whom I myself would like to be.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Please answer each of the questions below by writing the appropriate number in the blank beside the item. Use the following scale:

Not at All			Neutral			Very Much
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

33. Would you like to meet the other participant outside the experiment?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
34. Would you ask the other participant for advice?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
35. Would you consider sitting next to the other participant on a 3- hour bus trip?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

36. Would you consider inviting the other participant to your house?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
37. Would you be willing to work with the other participant on a job?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
38. Would you consider admitting the other participant to your circle of friends?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

For each of the next five items, circle the number that best describes your beliefs about the other participant.

39.							
I don't behave Like he/she does				I behave like he/she does			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
40.							
I don't think Like he/she does				I think like he/she does			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
41.							
My personal qualities are different from his/hers				My personal qualities are similar to his/hers			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
42.							
My attitudes are different from his/hers				My attitudes are similar to his/hers			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
43.							
My values are different from his/hers				My values are similar to his/hers			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

The next questions ask about how you think that the other participant views you.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the statements below by writing the appropriate number in the blank beside the item. Use the following scale:

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

**The other participant thinks that:**

44. I am unusually well-adjusted.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
45. I am an exceptionally mature person.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
46. Most people would react favourably to me after a brief acquaintance.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
47. I am one of those people who quickly wins respect.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
48. I am the sort of person whom he/she would like to be.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Please answer each of the questions below by writing the appropriate number in the blank beside the item. Use the following scale:

Not at All			Neutral			Very Much
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

49. Would the other participant like to meet you outside the experiment?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
50. Would the other participant ask you for advice?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
51. Would the other participant consider sitting next to you on a 3- hour bus trip?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
52. Would the other participant consider inviting you to his/her house?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
53. Would the other participant be willing to work with you on a job?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
54. Would you consider admitting you to his/her circle of friends?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

***Trust***

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the statements below by writing the appropriate number in the blank beside each item. Use the following scale.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

55. My partner was trying to take advantage of me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
56. My partner was trying to reach an equal solution with me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
57. My partner would not try to steal from me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
58. My partner would have acted the same way for anyone.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
59. My partner was not telling me all the information.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
60. I do not trust my partner.							

TURN THE PAGE.... SURVEY CONTINUES



At this point we are interested in "checking in" with you in terms of your understanding of what this study is about. Sometimes when students take part in studies, they form their own ideas about what the researchers might be looking at. Do you have any ideas about what we might be interested in, aside from what has already been explained to you? Please outline any thoughts that you have about this in the space provided below.

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- This completes the study.
- Please make sure all your materials are together and the Session leaders will be by to pick them up for you.
- THANK YOU!

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Although it is not recommended to predict the null hypothesis and there is no way in which we can measure whether separate processes actually result in the same behaviour by the two separate groups (i.e., low and high prejudice), the null hypothesis has been included in this manner in order to simplify the association between the two competing hypotheses. In addition, by referring to the null hypothesis as Hypothesis 2 in this case it will simplify further discussions in the paper.

<sup>2</sup>Parsing this interaction using both regression and ANOVA results in the same direction of effects, but the estimated marginal means provide a clearer picture.



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