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A Return to Modernization Theory: Peacebuilding and Democratization after the Cold War, The Case of Post-Duvalier Haiti

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
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Abstract

A Return to Modernization Theory: Peacebuilding and Democratization after the Cold War, The Case of Post-Duvalier Haiti

This thesis explores the relationship between multilateral peacebuilding and democratization to consider the viability of democracy in post-conflict states. It explores the nexus between development and foreign policy objectives through an exploration of democracy and security. It argues the present course of multi-lateral peacebuilding aims to establish a global approach to democracy in post-conflict states, encouraging new democracies to conform in a hegemonic political-economy. The literature and conceptual framework is then applied to the democratization process surrounding the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

The conceptual framework for this thesis is contained in two parts. The first is intended to establish a basis to explore the fluid issues of security and democracy. It questions a singular notion of these concepts, stressing a variety of differing philosophical viewpoints. The second places emphasis on the changing notions of democracy, security and development after the end of the Cold War. It seeks to examine the philosophy and policies of the *Agenda for Peace, Agenda for Development*, and *Agenda for Democratization* within the context of the modernization development paradigm. It considers the issue of "true" democratic development, arguing democratization has traditionally been an evolutionary process fuelled by time and conflict.

This framework is then applied to democratic development in post-Duvalier Haiti. It examines the historical foundation of politics in Haiti, emphasizing the role of class in establishing a totalitarian state. It also considers the political history of external intervention, especially by the United States. Lastly, it reflects on the possibility of democratic development, considering the externally set timetables and expectations of the international community.

The thesis concludes with the writer's reflections on the successful implementation of democracy in the peacebuilding paradigm, stressing the necessity of long-term political development.

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Craig MacKinnon
August 15, 1999

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the members of my committee who helped me design and write this paper, and in particular my supervisor and professor Gerry Cameron. Thank you for your guidance and insight during the past two years.

I also like to dedicate this to Mom and Dad, Tim and Terri, Jennifer, Jason and Caleb, and Melissa, who along with the rest of my family knew it was time for me to come back to something I truly love. I also dedicate this to all my true friends, and especially to my best friend, Lori, whose support and caring never goes unnoticed. I love you all.

CJM.

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Acronyms

CIVPOL	Civilian Police
FRAPHA	Front Pour l'Avancement et le Progrés Haiten
HNP	Haitian National Police
MICIVIH	Mission Civile en Haiti
MNF	Multi National Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPL	Organisation du Peuple en Lutte
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
OAS	Organization of American States
UN	United Nations
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti

Introduction

This thesis is an exploration into the promise of democratic development within post-conflict regions. It seeks to investigate, drawing upon current theoretical literature and by use of case study, the ability of newly formed democratic systems to be implemented into the political culture of the "renewed" nation-state. Therefore, the thesis will attempt to provide an insight to the following:

Are the objectives of multi-lateral peacebuilding initiatives viable for long-term democratic development in post-intervention states?

A thesis is one of the most technical and challenging excerises in one's academic life. I wanted this thesis to reflect the cumulation of my time and work in the International Development Studies programme at Saint Mary's University. And, along with the theoretical foundations discussed in these pages, I also wanted to tell a story about these very concepts and images that so much inspired me to write on this topic.

I was a third year political science student at the

University of King's College, Halifax, when the Berlin Wall fell. Ironically, I sat in a Soviet Foreign Policy class earlier in the day and listened to my professor who argued German reunification was at least ten years away.

He would later cancel his class for the next three weeks.

From my room overlooking the quad, I subsequently watched communism end in Europe, a freed Nelson Mandela walk from his prison cell, and the events leading to the Persian Gulf War transpire. I chose this topic and the case study to explore democracy from a development perspective. Like the challenges faced by the people who stood up to communist repression in Eastern Europe, the people of Haiti sacrificed too much for a simple, but profound, ideal.

As I wrote these words, the spectre of war loomed in Kosovo. While I struggled to determine my position in the conflict, the essence of democracy, tolerance and respect became a philosophical obsession. Throughout the course of my writing, I have found a renewed respect for the promise of democracy and of the human spirit. And, I hope this comes through in these few pages.

While the post-Cold War era is already a decade old, its full implications are just now being realized. The so-called "democratic revolution" has provided both opportunities and challenges for international development theory and practice.

Clearly, the emphasis placed on democratization and a renewed interest in strengthening civil society through the development process has been a direct result of a changed geo-political world.

There is a problem with the current course of democratization in the developing world. While the political development process in most nations is sought on the basis of the achievement of political security, both in terms of the nation-state and individual, the issue of statebuilding and development raises questions of timing and compatibility. The challenge facing developing states lies within finding an appropriate path for state/political development. There are key assumptions made with the introduction of a western-based liberal democracy in a society where it previously has not existed. Specifically, the current democratic model assumes a hegemony of democratic institutions and practice over the development of an emerging political culture - it seeks to ignore the intrinsic values of an indigenous political culture and social history. Moreover, it seeks to place timetables and expectations on a fledgling political system; it forgets that the development of liberal-democracy is, in itself, a product of environmental conditions, realized over centuries, and cultural influences.

From a North/Western standpoint, the end of the Cold War

has seen a reassessment of the objectives of traditional development paradigms: The ideological debate of development policy and theory from left and right has been largely replaced by a predominant liberal worldview. Likewise, the aim of the democratization process is largely based on Northern democratic principles and values. The globalization of these political and economic values raises questions of their compatibility with an emerging indigenous political culture. If the future of political development and multi-lateral peacebuilding initiatives lies within the successful promotion of stable, pluralistic liberal democracies it becomes vital to explore the objectives of a "new" paradigm within the context of the needs of the society in which it is introduced. As Mahood Monshipouri states, the end of the Cold War may have indeed opened up conditions for dialogue on human rights and democratic reform, but external demands may lead some states to reject change.

This thesis will explore this issue in context of "political modernization", stressing the importance of contemporary Northern democratic structures over the specific needs of an evolving indigenous political culture. Further, it will use the example of the United Nations peacebuilding mission in Haiti to demonstrate the role of foreign policy objectives in the design of the mission.

The story of Haiti provides a compelling basis for a case study. Ruled by terror, and divided by class division, Haiti struggles with its own aspiration of democracy. The conflicts which are so much a part of the nation's political and social history cannot be cast aside in its democratization process. What is vividly expressed is an unique combination of internal and external forces trying to shape the future of the state. On the one hand, the hopes and dreams of the majority attempt to build a society free from socio-political domination by a minority, commonly known as the *elites*. From their perspective, the "promise of democracy" resonates in seeking justice and a better life for themselves. On the other, the role of the international community is to implement a democratic system within the parameters of the expectations and comfort levels of participating states. The result is a clash of ideals surrounding the essence of democratic society, and the true role of peacebuilding to facilitate the process.

Haiti's story is, in effect, a demonstration of the complexities of the democratization process in an emerging peacebuilding model. The post-Cold War world has indeed opened new avenues for the evolution of multi-lateral peacekeeping under the UN flag. What was once considered the realm of security through the use of international military supervision, peacebuilding is designed to seek peace through

the reconstruction of the state itself. This thesis will argue that the role of the international community in this role is important, but it does not strike at the heart of true democratic development. The path toward such a political state is built on truly grounded foundations based on societal relevance - the models (and their implementation) merely serve to create a system of government that must be matched with an appropriate democratic culture. The present course of peacebuilding may indeed begin this process, but it must develop a global environment for it to be sustained.

Definitional considerations

Many of the concepts expressed in this thesis are, in themselves, opened to interpretation and debate. My intention is to provide, where possible, a range of thought regarding the terms of "democracy" and "security". This will be explained further in the chapter outline. Further, and to establish the parameters of the argument, a few broad terms have to be emphasized at this juncture. These terms are, in effect, my own reflections based on previous work in the classroom and other experiences in preparation for writing this thesis.

For the purposes of this thesis, *development* will be defined as the opportunities and choices realized through the social, political and economic growth of a nation. It implies a condition or process in which the benefits and rewards of development strengthens the people, both as individuals and as a society. Therefore, the interactive role of the state and people (through civil society) will be regarded as a pre-requisite for setting developmental objectives. This thesis will consider political development as **one** component of the process. My intention is not to underestimate the importance of economy in development theory, but merely to concentrate on the political objectives of the peacebuilding process. Economy, while not the focus, is always considered vital to human security and a sustained democracy. Where possible, I will allude to this relationship.

The terms *peacebuilding* and *post-conflict states* are, in themselves, somewhat specific in relation to Haiti. Roland Paris, writing on peacebuilding, has questioned the nature of UNMIH due to the absence of a formally recognized civil war.[ ] My response is that this is an overtly technical interpretation. As will be discussed in chapter two, the definition of peacebuilding does not support such a fine distinction. In addition, the nature of multi-lateral intervention usually does not have observable transitions from

peacekeeping to peacebuilding, or peace enforcement to peacebuilding stages. These missions form a continuum, with a transition in type of missions and/or personnel being the only true indication of a change. Similarly, the term, "post-conflict state" is used extensively in the literature and this thesis. As far as I know, this term has not been defined. For the Haitian case study I will consider "post-conflict" Haiti to be the point from the introduction of American and Canadian troops to restore order in anticipation of the exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in September, 1994. This does not mean conflict ceased to exist, nor does it mean that external intervention put an end to Haiti's internal security problems. Rather, that point will be considered as a milestone in seeking a lasting peace.

Methodology

This thesis will draw on the example of the history of post-intervention Haiti as a case study. Its purpose will be to evaluate the success of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) by critically examining the democratic and governance structures implemented in the country during this period. Of specific interest is the implementation of institutions key to

building a capacity for human security and enhancing democratic culture. These will be assessed in relation to the historical realities of the political development of the Haitian state and civil society before the peacebuilding mission. This approach is taken to demonstrate the relevance of a nation's past to its struggle to rebuild its "societal self".

This is a library thesis, and will draw from secondary research material. Information from various government and development internet sites will also be utilized. The scope of the research will draw on two major bodies of literature and the case study. First, the literature will seek to review key issues in democratization and human security in current development debates. The literature will offer a theoretical framework for an analysis of the modernization paradigm and the relationship between peacebuilding and long-term political development. It is intended that this review will be used to formulate a basic framework in which to assess the strengths and weaknesses of this model in the democratic development of post-conflict societies.

Chapter Outline

This thesis has four chapters.

Chapter One is intended to provide a brief introduction and literature review of key issues surrounding security and democracy. These ideas are drawn out to emphasize a basis for further discussion of political development through peacebuilding. In addition, this approach is designed to highlight the range of philosophical thought on these key issues. My intention is to stress the complexities surrounding the questions of security and democracy at the end of the Cold War era. Security, for most of this century, has merely been a geo-political concept. The socio-economic and socio-political components of the term have largely remained elusive in the traditional literature. Democracy is also a concept that appears to be in a state of flux, especially during the past decade. The rise of neo-liberal ideology challenges the relationship between the citizen and state. This reality will be considered in terms of the emerging importance of civil society and its ability to recreate the state's traditional role in the developing world. Chapter one concludes with this in mind, seeking to construct a theoretical basis to explore the issue of political development within the context of a post-conflict environment.

The focus of chapter two is to establish a relationship between political modernization and multilateral peacebuilding. The intent is to clearly entrench both terms

within development theory, drawing on the examples of the *Agendas* for Peace, Democracy, and Development by the United Nations. The second part of this chapter explores this relationship within the context of a more "traditional" form of democratic evolution. Building on this foundation, the chapter ends with a brief exploration of the role of political violence in democratic development. The purpose is to begin considering the importance of indigenous political development.

Chapter three is the beginning of the case study. Its objective is to provide relevant background on the socio-political culture of Haiti. Haitian civil society and state will be seen in the light of an "asymmetrical" relationship, and this will be explored in two sections. Special attention will be made to the development of an artificial "racial" divide that has created an institutionalized class structure. This has, in turn, created a historical environment spawning a culture of violence and repression.

The next chapter turns its attention to UNMIH and its role in the democratization process after the return of Aristide. This chapter concentrates on the (most notably American) foreign policy considerations of the Mission, and demonstrates the expectations of time and policy placed on the fledgling democratic state. These expectations are seen

both externally and internally. The chapter will show key strengths and weaknesses within Haitian democratic culture, emphasizing that the nation's transition is, in reality, an evolution. Its course, however, is dependent on the international community's ability to understand the uniqueness of the Haitian political state.

The last chapter, the thesis conclusion, is designed to stress the importance of the indigenous democratic state. It places the viability of democratic development on the flexibility of democratic *philosophy* rather than its *policy*. The conclusion ends with my own observations on the nexus of peacebuilding and democratic development.

Chapter 1
Literature Review and Argument

Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others –
Sir Winston Churchill

A more honest and accurate argument would be that democracy is
increasingly crippled by the acceptance of rational methodology in the
creation and selection of leaders. – John Ralston Saul'

The post-Cold War world can be compared to *A Tale of Two Cities*. On the one hand, the expectations of democratic change around the globe this decade have been truly incredible. Certainly, as we watched dramatic stories of grassroots change and democracy from Europe, to Africa, to Asia, the power of the people resonated with remarkable courage and hope for the future. On the other hand, the realities of war, ethnic cleansing, and the real threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction invade our homes and thoughts almost nightly. Because of these two, seemly, conflicting views of the world it can be very difficult to retain a certain confidence about the spread democratization process in the present day.

It should be of no surprise that the question of democratization as a development issue is relatively new,

spurred by the end of the Cold War and within an emerging pre-dominant paradigm. As the Berlin Wall (the very symbol of the Cold War in the North) fell and the peoples of Eastern Europe threw aside their yoke of Communist domination, others also felt the passion and promise of democracy. But as the world embraced what Samuel Huntington describes as "the third wave"[1] of democracy, this noble concept became policy and process, not a sense of practice and philosophy.

It is interesting to note, for instance, that this new embrace of the democratic spirit reached the World Bank during the early 1990s. By placing new demands on borrowing nations, such as a degree of democratic reform and adherence to internationally recognized human rights, the donor agency held new leverage in encouraging governmental reform. David Gillies suggests two possible explanations for this change either on the basis of "reductions of bilateral aid or because of pressure from lender governments at the Bank."[2] In other words, the notions of democracy - that fundamental faith that led people to dance on the Berlin Wall - became a policy requisite for development aid by the leading international donor agency.

Upon first glance the linkage between democracy and development does not appear problematic. After all, as

events this decade have shown, the underlying faith in democratic principles (as outlined below) appear universal. The question remains whether a democratic *system* can be just commonly accepted.

Perhaps the greatest developmental challenge in the next century will be the polarization of peoples and states around the philosophical issues of developing democracies and the establshment of internal political cultures. As Kenneth Christie notes, "despite the end of the cold war and the promise of a 'New World Order' which would produce peace, stability, and harmony on a global basis, liberal democrats have been severely disappointed." In reality, the conditionalities placed on the developing state are only as effective as the environment will allow.

War is still being waged, and most Southern states are severely threatened, politically and economically by an emerging globalization. The issue may not lie in the faith of such a brave new global relationship, but in the lack of an anchorage found within new measures of security from other sources. The bitter irony is, at the same time the relevance of the state (and even the more controversial ideal of nation) is called into question, humanity is seeking a place to hide. The structure of ethnic identity, traditionalism, and even fundamentalism presents a "new"

sense of empowerment - it offers an alternative to "cosmopolitan" political-economy.

This chapter is divided into two sections, intended to provide a theoretical exploration of two complex philosophical concepts. The first, *security*, demands a multi-layered exploration. Security has different connotations when considered from a global, nation or personal level. From a development perspective, the question of security does not necessarily correspond to the physical defence of the nation-state, but challenges us to consider it on a far more fundamental level - food, shelter, warmth, and, of course, personal safety. The other two ideals, *democracy and civil society,* demands an exploration beyond the confines of structure and mechanics. To be relevant, a discussion of this concept must be anchored. While the author fully accepts the economic and societal implications of democratic theory, this thesis will concentrate on the literature surrounding political participatory democracy.

The Question of Security

In the decade since the end of what Mary Kaldor

describes as "the imaginary war" and regardless of the actual or perceived threat posed by the confrontation of East and West, its lasting legacy remains very much a real challenge to the world at the dawn of the new millennium.

Security, as a concept in development theory, is complicated because its implications can only be seen within the context of internal or external threats perceived by the state.

The Cold War provides a good backdrop for an assessment of the two types of security issues. Because of its very nature, and dictated by the clearly monumental consequences of a nuclear exchange, this forty year conflict was fought solely on the battlefield of ideological and technological competition in the North, while fuelling civil and regional war in the South. This paradox indicates the idealistic notion of *security* in both settings, and became the only means in which both the United States and Soviet Union could engage each other short of nuclear war. While the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction kept the peace over Europe and North America, it also gave license for the superpowers to construct other zones of strategic interest in the developing world. The South's role in the Cold War can be reduced to being the grounds for surrogate military action largely out of the absence of externally constructed

"systemic security" arrangements, such as NATO or the Warsaw Pact⁺ and the need to establish a strong nation-state after post-colonial rule.

Security, then, dominates academic discussion of conflict in the South after the Second World War. What is striking about the notion is how broad the issue is in reality. It is important to understand that the fundamental elements of security - protection, sovereignty, stability and survivability - remain relatively consistent, but writers choose to attach specific importance to various concepts. Moreover, key to the debate being engaged in the current literature is the scope and nature of the perceived threat. This reflects, in part, the confusion of the implications of the uni-polar world and the so-called "New World Order". These considerations are especially important because of the unique construction of the Southern "nation-state", and its position in the international system in the post-colonial, post-Cold War era. Thus, as Robert O. Slater points out, the very notion of security depends on the observer's standpoint, seeing the system being either a Westphalian or polarized model.³ And, as the political globalization of the Third World continues, the very notion of security will invariably change on an internal and external basis.

Upon first glance, security embodies a purely military or strategic connotation. Mohammed Ayoob loosely defines Third World security within the realm of survivability of the state.[ ] This is a purely political or strategic explanation, considering:

> [the] vulnerabilities that threaten to, or
> have the potential to, bring down or
> significantly weaken state structures, both
> territorial and institutional, and the regimes
> which preside over these structures and
> profess to represent them internationally.[ ]

The above definition is clearly a legacy of the Cold War. It implies the presence of external threat potentials, realized either through direct hostility (e.g., military aggression, or espionage) or through internal conflicts that threatens the instability of the state (civil war, insurrection, insurgency movements). The definition continues by stressing the "survivability of states in either the territorial or institutional sense, or of governing elites within those states."[ ] In this manner, the state, and the regimes that run them, are the primary recipients of a security and/or defence policy. The hopes of dreams of the people, the "citizens" of the state are either implied within the political institutions of the

state, or remain outside of and irrelevant to it. Thus, under this notion, the history of sponsorship of various dictatorships throughout the Cold War could be justified because their removal could pose "a vulnerability" to the existing structure of the state.

This concept is also similar to the notion adopted by the Commonwealth Secretariat in assessing specific "vulnerabilities" of smaller member states. While the 1985 report identifies emerging issues of global concern in the late Cold War years, it still maintained the basic premise of security as "the absence of threat to the capacity to govern, protect, preserve and advance the state and its peoples consistent with the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states."[1] While, unlike Ayoob, the determination of the people is given equal weight with the survivability of the state, the conditions of the "threat" remain unspecified.

A state system cannot function within the realm of policy and structure - it must hold a basic set of principles, either artificially constructed or naturally evolved, to justify its existence internationally. Robert Latham states security must respect not only the political and defence realities of the state, but also include its socio-cultural composition. Or, as he points out, the ideal

must include the survivability of the "places in which lives are made and lived.": A more personalized notion of security, it extends beyond the structural to include and recognize importance of nation - who and what composes society is elevated to a position worth defending. This attitude is also taken by Arnold Wolfers and Walter Lippmann who both see the fundamental essence of security as the protection of societal values.: While this view does not, on one level, directly contradict more strategic notions of security, it reserves the right also to question it.

These differing philosophies of security pose unique questions for the developing world of the post-Cold War era. On one hand, emphasis placed on state forces the issue of political stability at all costs. Indeed, as Liisa Laakso and Adebayo O. Olukoshi suggest, the decline of the African state as the central agent has directly led to civil crises in Liberia, Somalia, or Rwanda.: Yet, even for the purpose of this thesis, the essence of security must also be viewed from a political economy perspective. As stated above, the inner dimensions of security become less about military threat potential and more about the long-term development of the nation-state. Therefore, threat assessment is gauged on a much broader scale.

Yezid Sayigh attempts to bridge the gulf between

strategic security and the intrinsic social, political and economic welfare of the state. His definition includes "safeguarding the political and territorial survival of the state, ensuring the organic (physical and collective) survival of the population, establishing the conditions for economic welfare and preserving inter-communal harmony." In other words, he seeks to explain security within a more humanistic vein. While the protection of the state is still the ultimate goal, the preservation of the nation, or the socio-political, socio-economic welfare of people, is held up as a vital component of its very function. Also, Sayigh stresses the necessity for security to be envisioned both within an external and internal context. While territorial integrity is essential to the identity of the state in relation to the international system, the internal welfare maintained in a stable "pluralistic" environment, according to Sayigh, ensures the nation remain intact.

According to Brian L. Job the conceptual meaning of security cannot be limited to military, social and political consequence. Instead he views an assessment of security within four fundamental dimensions. The first incorporates Lippmann and Wolfer's assertion of "core values" within a specific national setting. The second is dependent upon whose perspective of security in placed into play. On this

point, Job stresses security can be placed within four levels (the citizen, nation, regime and state), each having a specific need. The third dimension focusses on the "scope and content" of security. This can include elements of military, political, economic, ecological and environmental security considerations. The fourth dimension is seen within the theoretical framework in which it is viewed. This will determine the perceived security needs as the observer sees the situation relative to the percieved threat.

In other words, a nation-state's security objectives are of individual need therefore, a global definition cannot be achieved. What is striking about Job's assessment is it encompasses all fundamental elements of security previously discussed, while moving the debate away from the sole forum of state and nation. Along with the broad, traditionally top-down notion is the importance of the individual.

John Martinussen puts security within a purely developmental context. In his words, the fundamental component of security is realized in a nation-state's "choice of development strategy." Security then becomes a pre-requisite for social, economic and political development. Martinussen focuses on the aspect of internal security, stressing conflict within the nation-state is

usually caused through an "uneven development with concentrations of growth, progress and privilege in small geographical and social enclaves."[..] His definition echoes other writers mentioned earlier, reminding his audience of the importance of seeking security in concert with political and economic development. His standpoint would also reflect a need for security at a more fundamental level. One of the most basic of these would be the assurance of a population's food security. The equal distribution of food and other essential items are a requisite for ethnic and class stability.

The problem with the relationship between security and development is rooted in class-conflict and the power structure of the state. Even when viewed through the lens of liberal-democratic ideals of an equalitarian society, the use of internal security is to assert a degree of control of the population. This is seen within a broad scope, from a civilian police force executing recognized laws on one end, to the paramilitary forces engaging in ethnic warfare on the other. Ayoob considers the emphasis on internal security in the South as a response to the "lack of unconditional legitimacy of Third World states and regimes."[..] In this case, the problems of nation-building in an often artificially constructed post-colonial state places high

demands on the security apparatus. In short, if a natural social identity of a nation-state does not deter internal instability, the brute force of arms and men will. As Nicole Ball also notes, the importance of internal security, and the subsequent expenditure devoted to it, is primarily to protect the ruling class and their socioeconomic system. The day-to-day protection of the civilian population is rarely considered.[3] As will be explored later in this thesis, the legitimization of internal security threats is a predominant theme in Haitian military-civil relations. When viewed in this light, the history and certainly the political culture of the island-state does not appear to support a natural platform for democratic renewal. Thus, internal institution-building must address issues of building a social environment for common internal security.

Choosing an appropriate definition of security remains difficult because of the fluid geopolitical situation, especially within the developing world. Certainly, conventional notions of security in the wake of inter-state tension is still a key consideration. Clearly, the ongoing conflict between Iraq and the United States, the developing nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, and the expanding threat of war between North Korea and Japan all serve as reminders that territorial and ideological

competition has not ended with the Cold War. Still, the challenges of internal security within the contextual framework of the demands and constraints upon the nation-state have become a more likely source of conflict. While the nature of political violence is briefly examined in the next chapter, the sources of internal instability have not (as many may have hoped) been extinguished by superpower competition. In fact, the absence of bipolarity contributing to an intensified spectre of religious or ethnic warfare, the challenges of globalization and environmental degradation all need to be addressed.

Therefore, key to any working definition of security is the defence of common values, and economic and political institutions binding and enhancing the nation-state.

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To understand the changing role of security in the Third World, the lasting legacy of the Cold War has to be revisited. As already discussed, this is no easy task considering the complexity of the geo-political world in the past decade. What is clear, however, within the literature is a general consensus on the role the superpowers played in shaping the developing world during the Cold War years which

has, in turn, led to what Brian Job describes as "the insecurity dilemma."[21] The history of the "war by proxy" in the developing world can be traced through a series of crises and conditions that piqued the superpowers interest.

Direct and indirect, public and secret involvement, the Cold War was fought in all parts of the world. Vietnam, Afghanistan, Egypt, El Salvador, Angola, Ethiopia, and Somalia, all became targets for American, Soviet and Chinese involvement. Broadly speaking, however, the interest each side gave to the South was based on strategic competition, masked by grand notions of assistance.

Michael Clough in his essay on American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era notes:

> [T]wo points need to be made concerning the
> Cold War and [Soviet] containment. First,
> the onset of the Cold War convinced the
> foreign policy establishment that Communist
> ideology and Soviet expansion represented the
> greatest threat to the emergence of the
> Wilsonian world order. Containing communism
> thus became a necessary .. condition for
> world progress. Second, containment, by
> playing on fears of communism, fostered the
> emergence of a strong consensus in support of
> an internationalist program.[22]

The fear of spreading communism, especially in new states emerging from de-colonization is an important issue, because

out of it came the very justification for international development. Such sentiments were echoed by the early modernization theorists who envisioned development as a mere strategic necessity to expand America's sphere of influence and to restrain perceived Soviet aggression during the early 1950s. Walter Rostow, in *An American Policy in Asia* stated:

> The United States must develop a more vigorous economic policy in Asia. Without such a policy our political and military efforts in Asia will continue to have weak foundations... Asia's economic aspirations are linked closely to the highest political and human goals of Asia's peoples; and American economic policy in Asia has, therefore, important political as well as economic meaning.⁻⁻

Clearly, the objective of Western policy-makers at the time (and for the duration of the Cold War) was to pursue objectives designed to bring the developing world in harmony with the economic and political ideologies of Washington and London. As Boris Kagarlitsky notes, the aim of political and economic modernization was to create a western-based democratic and culturally oriented model for society.⁻⁻

The former Soviet Union's involvement in the affairs of the Third World also was designed to establish alliances, while promoting a communist ideology. In the post-Second World War era, the aim of the Soviet Union was to undermine

Western government influence in the developing world by aiding newly independent states who showed signs of heading towards "socialism".[⁻] In the later years of the Cold War, Soviet policy shifted from seeking the friendship of soft socialist nations to engaging specific Marxist-Leninist factions in the developing world.[⁻]

It was within this seemingly clear division - or competition - that the unique security situation emerged. The question of security in the post-Cold War era is less elusive. Certainly the past decade has presented a new set of problems for political and economic stability. The apparent victor of the global conflict (the West) has carved out a specific ideological agenda based on notions of global capitalism and liberal democratic values. The question remains, however, is how the developing world chooses to respond.

The Question of Democracy and Civil Society

Perhaps one of the most confusing, and indeed challenging, issues facing political development in the post-Cold War era is democratization. This should be of little surprise because democracy, by its very nature, is one of the most complex forms of rule in human history.

And, while western democracy in the modern era enjoys relative security and stability, its own development has had a long heritage of bloody conflict dating from the wars of the early Greek city-states. Therefore, the inherent challenge to political modernization is how to promote and implement a modern democracy in a socio-political environment without such a history. It is because of this very fact *security* and *democracy* are linked in these chapters.

The primary theoretical literature takes the reader back another step to explore common requirements for the democratic state.

Many foundations in contemporary democratic theory begins with the work of David Easton, who put forward a model explaining the policy formulation process of a basic political system. His work centred on key components in the decision-making process, based on external forces, the actual legislative process, its decisions, and the subsequent response to policy and legislation.[30] Easton's work was expanded on by Gabriel Almond and James Coleman who argue political systems are formulated based on "input" and "output" functions, that are respectively dependent upon political mobilization and legislative process.[31] These three writers lay the foundation of a discussion concerning

the shape of a basic form of democratization. Anchored within this issue, also, is a widely debated philosophical debate: Is *democracy* a form of government steeped within political institutionalism, an ideological stance based upon held values, or a process designed to uphold key elements of heritage and tradition?[32]

Most writers will not disagree with the basic components of a democratic system, but will question the form it may take. One of the most influential academics on the subject, Robert Dahl, notes democracy is a relationship between "opportunities" given to the citizens and "institutional guarantees" required of the state.[33] This is broken down within three components of opportunities to "formulate preferences, signify preferences and have preferences weighed equally in conduct of government."[34] This is achieved through a system of basic political, civil, and human rights with the objective to allow for citizen participation and state accountability. For Dahl, the ultimate goal of a democracy or, in his terms, *polyarchy* is envisioned in a system that is "highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation."[35] In such a system the use of a multi-party "modern" democracy is of less importance than the legitimacy of the form of government as measured by its degree of public participation. For Larry

Diamond and his colleagues, the notion of democracy is largely comparable to Dahl. They note the following:

> Democracy ... denotes a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and *extensive* competition among individuals and organized groups for effective positions of government power, at regular intervals ...a "highly inclusive" level of political *participation* in the selection of leaders and policies... and a level of *civil and political liberties* ... sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.[15]

In other words, the system is a two-way dialogue between the ruler and ruled. It is built upon fundamental principles to allow for collective and individual action in the affairs of the nation, with the expectation of the protection of the political and civil security of the individual. This two-pronged model for democracy has cautiously been accepted by Terry Lynn Karl, who also notes that a democratic system must reflect, among other things, civilian control of the military and other defence forces, and mechanisms of regime accountability.[37] For Zehra F. Arat, in lieu of a more comprehensive definition of a procedural/structural form of democracy, his definition is simply "popular control of government."[38]

While the above writers see democracy within a purely

political context, others have suggested it should also have a socio-economic function. For Mohood Monshipouri, any principles of a democratic system must include provisions for socioeconomic equality.[39] Therefore, the political component of the democratic process is only one small component of a functioning democracy. Certainly, this is a variation of Dahl, Diamond and others who see an invariable responsibility of protection and service between state and citizen. On the other hand, critics such as Samir Amin have suggested present forms of democratic government serve only to promote inequality and growing social injustice.[40]

Of course, the issue of the social limits of democracy - especially in Western nation-states - has largely been the pre-occupation of both political theorists and politicians. The linkage between social and political democracy is challenged by the actual composition of the state itself. As Anthony Giddens notes, the rise of the welfare-state and civic rights were a means to promote an allegiance to the nation-state during times of conflict. The end of the Cold War and the absence of an enemy may, in effect, be a cause of crisis in the legitimacy of the Western democratic system.[41]

Nevertheless, what is interesting in all these notions of democracy is their belief in the "democratic" system.

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These ideals - participation, control, accountability, social justice - all point to an inst0itutional structure. Clearly, as Arat reflects, the nature of democracy, to be an open term, has given rise to different democratic systems.[42] The challenge of democratic development in the post-Cold War world is the political and economic forces that shape change within developing states. Western governments who have won the Cold War now seek to design a democratic and economic system with foundations built on conformity and universality.

Perhaps, the literature on the democratic *system* is too constrictive. The growing literature of democratization from a development perspective challenges the roots of the process as a "top-down" or institutionalized approach. If democracy is what the great political philosophers like Rousseau or de Tocqueville suggested in the 18th century, the essence of the true democratic heritage lies with civil society. Writers such as Philip Resnick suggest that the emphasis on civil society after the fall of communism in Europe comes out of a lack of faith in current state institutions.[43]

The rise of civil society as a benchmark for democratic development is part of this challenge. The term becomes problematic because its contemporary definition remains

largely elusive. The present notion of "civil society" is the result of its long genealogy within western political theory, dating from the fourth century B.C.[14] Resnick offers a contemporary explanation of civil society based on three "broad" areas: Firstly it is found in the vast coalition of groups banned together for a common cause. Secondly it stresses an alternative forum for conducting politics, and finally it offers a sense of hope for solidarity after an initial victory over an oppressive regime.[15] All three expectations are revisited by Diamond and his colleagues with respect to democratic development in the Latin American context.[16]

Others have suggested that the ultimate successes or failures of these objectives rests with civil society's ability to "engage" or "disengage" from the state. If civil society is strong when it counters the state, the response will be a robust interaction between the two. A weak response will ultimately fail, destroying the citizen's very means of encouraging socio-political change.[17] Moreover, Jeff Haynes suggests the fundamental element in measuring true success of a democratic state lies in the separation between the state and civil society.[18] In other words, this political "space" is necessary in order for the elements of civil society to form around a common issue.

Civil society, in effect, becomes the "anti-political".[ ] The main assumption rests upon the notion of "check and balance"[ ] to state power and authority. Civil society becomes a "vital" and "tangible" component of the democratization process; that it becomes a calculated, ever-present, (and like the state itself) an institutionalized entity.

There is, however, a caution here: The ideals of civil society become complicated by the very expectations it incites. This view of the relationship between state and society is also based on the assumption of strong, centralized governmental power. The "resurgence of civil society" is, similarly linked to the belief in a sustainable public mobilization effort. In other words, this connection is envisioned as truly a "symbiotic relationship".[ ]

One of the challenges to this interrelationship is the apparent decline of the nation-state. It is not by sheer accident that renewed interest in grassroots political movements coincided with pressures placed on Third World states to re-define their role within the socio-political development process. The era of neo-liberalization and structural adjustment has given necessity for citizen groups (churches, labour and other so-called "non-state actors") to become mobilized in lieu of "top-down" leadership. Such

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sentiment is echoed by Henry Veltmeyer who sees the rise of civil societal mechanism in Latin America as a social response to neo-liberalism.[32] Perhaps, this can be illustrated in terms of a "forced" disengagement from the nation-state.[33] For international organizations, like the World Bank, embracing the concept of civil society becomes an attractive policy option. The support of community-based initiatives places political power in the hands of local NGOs. This gives rise to "new" definitions for political mobilization. The meaning of *empowerment*, for instance, turns from traditional notions of the state providing the political and social tools required for true citizenship, to one based on a more individual and communal focus.

While a shift to community mobilization and a strengthening political, or civic, association is generally regarded as positive, its effectiveness is a timely question. If civil society is seen as being a symmetrical or parallel entity to the state, one has to wonder what its capacity is to sustain social change. For Resnick, the promise of civil society to be an effective voice in post-communist Eastern Europe has largely gone unrealized.[34] Chazan suggests the same trend in post-colonial Africa.[35] The integration of social groups banning together to overthrow

a common enemy is one thing; cohesion to become a counter-point to state power in the workings of daily democracy is another.

This may be evaluated in terms of a 'single-issue' agenda. Farmers and other groups may ban together to fight the conditions of poverty in Africa,[*] but it is unlikely that combination would remain cohesive in other issues. Such concerns are not exclusively found in fledging democratic systems either, but is very reminiscent of the fate of many "grassroots" movements in western democracies. Key examples of this are the fate of Anti-Vietnam war movement in the United States, or similar protest movements in France during the 1960s and 1970s.

At the same time, it must also be stressed that members of civil society, generally, aim to influence decisions of power, not to overthrow governmental institutions. After all, the ideal role of the citizen is to have a say in the democratic process, to have others carry out their wishes. Therefore, as Haynes states, the role of political action on environmental issues of the Nigerian Ogoni or the anti-nuclear protestors in Tahiti remain focused.[*] The faith of civil society, however, suggests a different viewpoint. What is striking is the current definition, not to mention expectation, does not include traditional ideas of pluralism

and social diversity. While it accepts the term as a broad umbrella of non-state actors, it refuses to recognize the ever-present politics among the groups it represents. Again, the issues of student organizations, labour, and the Church may indeed empower the groups on a specific agenda, but does not guarantee a permanent alliance. Civil society, then, becomes ineffective to continue to engage the state only because it is not allowed to change its composition.

Still, on a more fundamental level, the above concepts - security and democracy - have always been inseparable. In his 1991 essay Ken Booth explores the relationship between security and emancipation, arguing security in the post-Cold War era should be perceived on a more human level. He poses a fundamental question that, when placed in the context of democratic development and state-building, is vital to a re-consideration of the security question after the Cold War:

> It is illogical to privilege the security of the means as opposed to security of the ends. An analogy can be drawn with a house and its inhabitants. A house requires upkeep, but it is illogical to spend excessive amounts of money and effort to protect the house against floods, dry rot and burglars if this is at the cost of the well-being of the inhabitants. There is obviously a

relationship between the well-being of the
sheltered and the state of the shelter, but
can there be any question as to whose
security is primary?[19]

Booth presents an interesting question: In a social
setting where the internal security of a people is called
into question, is the state and democratization process
relevant? While this question has also been raised by
Samuel Huntington in his exploration of authoritarianism and
control,[ ] perhaps another response can be seen in the
notions of governance. How one defines this term is
ultimately dependent upon the political economic outlook.
As David Gillies suggests, the requirements for the essence
of "good governance" by donor agencies depends on the
emphasis placed on developmental priorities.[ ] For John
Martinussen, the elements of governance can be seen in the
ability of state and civil society to accommodate the broad
development of a diverse populace.[ ] In other words, as
Mahood Monshipouri points out the key to governance is in
the degree of legitimacy of the state and ruling elites.[ ]
In other words, the mechanics of internal human security,
democracy, and empowerment may not lie within the present
liberal notions of the process, but a mutual consensual
relationship between the governed and governing body.

The Cold War is over and is relegated to history, and yet the world is forced to live with its consequences on a global scale. The issues of security (on all levels), democracy, and statebuilding in the South confront us at the close of this century. How these concepts are defined and, indeed, addressed will become key to international development into the twenty-first century. This decade has witnessed remarkable hope, and deep despair through ethnic division, renewed regional warfare and socio-economic despair. And while the West envisions the future security of the planet under the guise of economic liberalism and western democracy, there must be a re-examination of how the South will fit that mould.

Chapter two will explore this issue by attempting to address security and state-building within the development context of peacebuilding. It will begin to examine the primary question posed by this thesis.

Chapter 2
Peacebuilding and Democracy: A New Paradigm?

> Democracy is found in masterless dwellings (for here everyone is on an equality), and in those in which the ruler is weak and everyone has licence to do what he pleases - Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*

Ken Booth's use of emancipation as a basis for expressing human security issues may best emphasize the great faith the the international community placed in the democratization process immediately following the end of the Cold War. As the former Soviet Bloc nations were turning away from their totalitarian governments and a freed Nelson Mandela walked the streets of South Africa, the sense of democratic victory swept the globe. This triumph of the people over the individual chains they carried meant (at least in principle) that all things were now possible; the great conflict between the powerful and powerless was won.

Karl Marx's own vision of the end of history had come, only it was heralded in by the liberal-democratic revolution, not the communist state.

The joy of the democratic "triumphialism" had a profound impact on how development was initiated and conducted, both in theory and practice. While the "democratic revolution" was

urged on by journalists, Western politicans and academics, development policy took steps to place the essence of democracy into practice. And, while donor agencies always spoke of "institution" and "capacity" building, the emphasis on democratization added a new dimension to development at the macro level.

The nexus between development, security and peace was envisioned in the way conflict would be solved in the impending "new world order" that would apparently emerge after bipolar competition came to an end. Although few actually believed the emerging geo-political environment would end intra- and inter-state conflict (the 1991 Gulf War proved that), the path towards a peaceful, secure world was sown by the seeds of democratic transformation. Where the universality of democracy was able to take root, the people would experience the rewards of development.

This signifies a dangerous assumption about the "true" essence of the democratic state. The question remains whether this notion of the democratic state can be easily adopted by all nation-states emerging from conflict, within the parameters and expectations set by the international community.

This chapter will consider the marriage between development and democracy in the form of *peace-building*. It

will examine the theory of conflict resolution and prevention through a post-conflict development agenda. Specifically, the intention is to begin to ask the question of the relationship between long-term democratic growth, development, and societal security in order to examine its successful implementation in a post-conflict zone. In order to do this, we must first step back to review briefly the contextual basis in which to examine peace-building within a development paradigm.

The Rise of Political Modernization

From a development perspective, the world of the 1980s and 1990s would be as traumatic as the political upheavals that highlighted those decades. The ideals of democratization can not be totally separated from the larger international political economy of the era. If the 1970s can be considered the decade of both "basic needs" and dependency theories of development, the subsequent decades can be viewed as giving rise to neo-liberalism and globalization. John Brohman explains that the theory of development based on a Keynesian notion of state investment was quickly replaced by the rise of Thatcherism and Reaganism during 1979-80. These elections were followed by the rise of neo-conservative governments in other G-7 nations during the early 1980s.[61] The result was a

push towards a global economic system based on the foundation of neo-liberalism. That is, the key to global development shifted to the principles of a purely market driven economic system. This, coupled with the reform of the Bretton Woods organization, created the basis the so-called economic New World Order, and had substantial implications for the course of Southern development. Among these are the stifling effects of Structural Adjustment Programs to collect Southern debt.

This inherent faith in the universality of neo-capitalist economics can be translated into the belief of the global transplanting of liberal-democratic political ideals, and the corresponding economic systems they form. This belief in the flawlessness of North/Western political and economic institutions is a recurring theme in the history of development theory and practice. What is interesting during this period is the apparent re-emergence of modernization that had dominated western development theory during the 1950s and 1960s. A theory based on the foundations of Western industrialism and capital investment, the main impetus is seen in the removal of indigenous socio-cultural values in the wake of "modern" and "progressive" social structures. The emphasis is placed not on what is held dear, but of what is "known" to work. In other words, modernization theory begins at a point of paradox - what is "old" lacks credibility, and is

incompatible with the "new" and tested.

While a detailed explanation of the economic and industrial components of the theory is not needed at this juncture it is, however, important to review one of its focal elements. Proponents of the modernization school believed development was initiated by underdeveloped societies making the transition away from a traditional existence to modernity. This had significant underpinnings for the traditional socio-political organization of the newly *reformed* state. Because the held belief among the modernization school was that indigenous culture contributed, and even encouraged, underdevelopment the adoption of "modern" political structures were imperative to ensure long-term socio-political growth. Moreover, the adoption of western democratic systems and values was seen as key to the failure of Soviet influence in developing states. Writing on the objectives of political modernization Boris Kagarlitsky states:

> In the conceptions of early ideologues of modernization the idea of industrial society was closely linked with democracy on the Western model. Parliamentarianism and civil liberties were considered indispensable political elements of modernization, conditions of its success.[66]

He continues by noting the impetus for true industrial growth

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does not necessarily lie in the success of the democratic state, pointing to industrialism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union before *peristroika*.[ ]

As already alluded to in the last chapter, the philosophical belief in modernity's solution to development was laden with strategic objectives anchored in early Cold War foreign policy in the West.   Born out of the successes of European reconstruction in the post-war period of the late 1940s, and actively promoted in the era of decolonization during the 1950s, the emphasis on modernization in developing states was an effort to deter pro-communist sympathies in the South. The rewards of rapid industrialization were successful in Europe and Japan during the post-war era, but the adaptation of the theory was for political means. In other words, modernization theory sought to integrate the developing world to fit a specific mould; encourage it to think, act, and, even fear like the West. To this end, it should also be of little surprise modernization was achieved by the power of capitalism.

Such sentiments are echoed in Seymour Martin Lispet's *Political Man*. This classic work not only elevates the European and North American democratic experience as a model to ward off communism, it is based on the relationship between democratization and economic development. The degree by which

a nation is considered modern is calculated in terms of industrialization, urbanization and education.[3] Lipset's work is anchored within a qualitative methodology and attempts to demonstrate the accumulation of wealth, in the Western context, leading to greater democratic stability. In his own words, and agreeing with Max Weber, Lipset states "modern democracy in its clearest form can occur only under capitalist industrialization."[4]

The road to democratization has not been solely a project for the modernization school. An emerging "transitional" school of thought emerged during the mid-1960s, essentially arguing that the success of democratic development must be measured in terms of cultural circumstance. In other words, the faith of a scientific, or calculated, approach to democratization was unfeasible. Dankwart Rustow challenged the modernization school by suggesting the variable of individual actors within differing social structures would respond to the implementation of a western-based democratic structure very differently from the Euro-centric experience. He states the main problem with applying a physical science perspective to a social scientific issue – democratization – is it ignores cultural development.[5] His assessment of the fate of democratization lies in its ability to become a part of the indigenous socio-political environment. His main

argument, therefore, does not challenge modernization as a philosophical construct, it only questions how it is implemented.

A third school, comprised of the structuralists, is represented by the work of Barrington Moore. In his analysis, Moore places the democratization process as a class struggle leading to social revolution. He uses the examples of the American and French Revolutions to illustrate the fall of ruling classes to the peasants. His argument is based on the loss of power by the landholders that have traditionally resisted the development of democratic structures. Moore disagrees with the modernists on one fundamental point: Instead of building a social system based on egalitarian ideals as liberalism suggest, modernization will invariably disempower the peasant class. Such arguments are also put forward by structuralist theorists such as Raoul Prebish, Celso Furtado, and Osweldo Sunkel who all stressed the necessity of the labour class to be given the opportunity to have access and draw rewards from advance production technology. In other words, the essence of democratic values moves beyond the narrow political context to incorporate equitable and egalitarian principles of socio-economic development.

Building an International Consensus? The *Agendas*

Of these paths of political development, the modernization school appears to be gaining some of its former lustre, and creating a new means to achieve security and development. The necessity to integrate the South for fear of Soviet expansionism has passed, but the belief in an adaptation to a globalized (or predominantly Northern) economy has remained an important theme in development theory during the 1990s. From the standpoint of democratization, the same belief in transplanting a western democratic system of government was shaped by the triumiphalists during the period. If the first glimmers of the "democratic revolution" were seen in the Gdansk Shipyards of Poland during the 1979-80 Solidarity movements, its final victory was celebrated in the halls of the United Nations just over a decade later. Moreover, the essence of democracy that gripped the international community within that decade left the fundamental realm of "the people" to become packaged, institutionalized as a methodology or policy to be adapted in all circumstances around the globe.

This is clearly seen in the policies adopted by the UN during the mid-1990s. Beginning in 1992, former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a series of reports

linking the goals of international development, peace and security, and democratization. The first entitled, *An Agenda for Peace,* outlined the UN's future mission to encourage international peace and security within the context of the changing international climate. Its centrepiece was defining the role of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, and the focus of this thesis, post-conflict peace-building. In his introduction, Boutros-Ghali states the necessity of a reformulation of UN security policy within the following context:

> The sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To reach them will require our utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to promote sustainable economic development for wider prosperity, to alleviate distress and to curtail the existence of massively destructive weapons.

The *Agenda for Peace* was followed by Boutros-Ghali's report on the future of global development three years later. In keeping with the above commitment to link social and economic well-being, the *Agenda for Development* solidified the necessity of these objectives within the promotion of a democratic regime. He states the following:

> Democracy and development are linked in
> fundamental ways.   They are linked
> because democracy provides the only long-
> term basis for managing competing ethnic,
> religious and cultural interests in the
> way that minimizes the risk of violent
> internal conflict ...   They are linked
> because people's participation in the
> decision-making processes which affect
> their lives is a basic tenet of
> development.⁶

A noble and honourable ideal, however, democracy within

these contexts would remain undefined for another year.   The

last of the Agendas was delivered in 1996.   Perhaps the lesser

known of the three, the *Agenda for Democratization* embodies

the very hopes and dreams of an universally common acceptance

of the "democratization process" so tightly held by the

triumphalists themselves.   What is particularly interesting

about this document is Boutros-Ghali refrains from endorsing

one "true" form of democratic system or a time frame

consistent with a transitory period.   Instead he speaks of "an

emerging consensus" by which democratic institutions are most

likely to promote development.   He also speaks of the

relationship between democratic rule and the entrenchment of

peace, both at a national and international level.⁷   However,

the foundations on which the democratization process lie are

based on recognized institutional structures.   While the

development of a "democratic culture" is vital, the function

of democracy is viewed within the "traditional" systems of legislative, executive and judicial branches of government based on the Western model. The ability of the state to recognize basic human and civil rights becomes a gauge by which a democracy is measured."

At first glance, the essence of these three documents can and should be raised as the most important UN documents this decade. Still, the functionality of such a system in political cultures outside the liberal-democratic system has to be critically assessed. The conceptual framework for *peace-building* as stated above came out of the optimism of the United Nations immediately following the Cold War. What is also striking about the *Agenda for Peace* from which the ideal was given birth was that it was presented to the Security Council just after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Boutros-Ghali attempts to re-focus international peace and security issues away from the sources of conflict spurred by the geo-politics of bi-polarism, to the more complex problems of ethnic tension, under-development, and ecological degradation." The solution to these problems are indeed found both within the ever-reaching "cosmopolitan democracy" the UN system aspires to achieve and through the efforts of local democratic development.

This, in and of itself, is not a new agenda issue for the

UN. The very foundations of the UN Charter are built on the ideals of a global participatory democracy. But, as the organization's role had changed in the sphere of international relations, so too had the way it engaged to promote peace and democracy. The *Agenda* had radically altered the face of international peacekeeping missions under the UN flag. As a comparison with the notion of peacebuilding, UN peacekeeping missions traditionally were based on a fundamental "passive" political/strategic stance. Missions were not intended to become part of the ultimate solution to a conflict, merely provide a buffer to keep warring factions separated. It should be of no surprise, then, that the framework of the UN peacekeeping mission is a product of the Cold War itself. The rationale for peacekeeping was designed to find a middle-ground to appease superpower demands in international crises. As Georges Abi-Saab explains, the role of UN-led forces was to act more like an "international police force", than a military contingent. This is seen by the example of the United Nations Emergency Force that was deployed in the wake of the 1956 Suez Crisis, and later adapted in Cyprus, Lebanon, Golan Heights and other conflicts around the globe.[30]

A perhaps more technical definition is found in the *Agenda for Peace*, embodying operations consisting of a "deployment of a United Nations presence in the field,

hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned ...[and] is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace."[ ] In essence, it seeks to promote a uniquely diplomatic "fix" to a complex military/strategic problem. As Abi-Saab points out, the implementation of troops in this capacity is to create a consensus between opposing factions and to provide a collective response under Article 42 of the UN Charter.[ ]

Since the Cold War, multi-lateral peacekeeping missions have drastically increased and changed in composition. According to the work of Steven R. Ratner, the use of "first generation peacekeeping" (modelled on the UNEF and other early missions) ended with the adoption of a humanitarian component in traditional roles. In 1988, the UN undertook a cease-fire monitoring and refugee repatriation mission in Afghanistan. Under the auspices of the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, troops were tasked to monitor an agreement that would see the end of Soviet occupation.[ ] The main difference between UNGOMAP and previous peacekeeping missions was its mandate to monitor a political settlement to a conflict.[ ]

The main objective of this mission was entrenched in Boutros-Ghali's vision of *preventative diplomacy*. The use of UN troops would be deployed to "prevent disputes from arising

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between parties, [and] to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts when they occur".[35] The use of UN forces, then, would be a bridge between warring factions to discourage renewed hostilities. Preventative diplomacy, however, is a term that can easily be misleading. The proactive approach that needs to be taken to prevent conflict can easily be seen as a "development" project, rather than an issue of traditional diplomacy. An example of this may be, as James Sutterlin suggests, operations supporting population resettlement or civilian police training".[36]

Interestingly, peacekeeping and preventative diplomacy is also attached to the more traditional military role of *peacemaking*. While the function of the UN is, ultimately, to create a forum to promote international peace, it must be remembered the organization can also declare war. The premise of military action is stated in Articles 39 and 42 of the Charter. Under these mandates, the role of the Security Council is to determine the nature of the threat to international peace, and the means to restore order.[37] A breach of international security can mean an attack or invasion of a foreign power, i.e. the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, or ethnic cleansing in Rwanda or the Balkans. Sutterlin states the essence of "international security" has evolved from the traditional, and is not limited to an

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interstate conflict but may also be used to justify international involvement in civil wars.[34] Of course, this is a highly contested interpretation and has profound significance on how the international community engages in military conflict. The use of external force to curb the course of an internal conflict raises issues of territorial sovereignty.

Security within these roles stresses the presence of an armed force to end hostilities or enforce a peace agreement. As important as these are, they cannot (by their nature) attempt to create social change by eliminating the roots of conflict. Peacebuilding, in itself, must stand outside and beyond traditional approaches dealing with conflict within the UN system. The emphasis on peacebuilding links national and international peace and security with sustainable social and economic development. This focus is evident in the broad roles envisioned by *Agenda for Peace*. As Boutrous-Ghali states:

> [Peacebuilding] must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well being. Through agreements ending political strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing

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efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.[19]

In short form, the conceptual framework of peacebuilding focused upon three general areas: a cessation of hostilities and the disarming of warring factions, the creation of a stable and secure environment for the civilian population, and the establishment of a functioning democratic state. When viewed from the perspective of a post-conflict state, the developmental framework for implementation of these objectives requires intensive institutional restructuring. This is especially true within states and political cultures without a historical base from which to draw. The mission draws on skills traditional military forces do not normally possess. For Micheal Harbottle, the use of multi-national peacekeeping/peacebuilding troops demand that nations stress humanitarian and environmental issues in training. He suggests, specifically, qualities in peacebuilding forces ranging from patience and restraint, to a good sense of humor.[20] Peacebuilding missions, by their very nature, cannot be exclusively military operations. They must draw on expertise of civilians to guide the process.

Peacebuilding within a Modenization Paradigm?

From a purely developmental perspective, the key to the creation of a democratic and secure state flows from not only the political, but also from the economic. Again, the overlapping themes of peace, democracy and development are vital components of the peacebuilding process. Interestingly, however, this linkage is found most clearly in *Agenda for Development.* Boutros-Ghali addresses this issue on two levels. First, there is a need to promote a rebuilding of physical and social infrastructure torn apart in the conflict zone. The logic is, simply, to create an environment in which the civilian population can foster new socio-ecomonic opportunities. This includes activities such as mine clearance, road construction, and food production. Secondly, an environment in which all citizens can 'buy into' the new social economy is an essential component of long-term development. Attention is specifically given to former soldiers and security forces who need to be re-integrated into the civilian population. What is also noteworthy is the *Agenda's* emphasis on rehabilitation rather than punishment. From this standpoint, ex-combatants are actively engaged in the development process by means of pursuing vocational training and educational programming.[31]

In the broadest of terms, the conceptual basis for a peacebuilding regime is an achievable goal. After all, the

relationship between the equality of "democracy" and the opportunity of "development" is largely unchallenged. The question of peacebuilding, however, lies within the process in which this relationship is manifested and the ultimate societal mould in which it takes shape. As Sutterlin notes, the idea of building peace in a post-war situation, especially within the paramaters of the Agendas can be disregarded as vague and unattainable. From a "logistical" viewpoint, the idea of peacebuilding remains an operational problem. While peacebuilding, in and of itself, is meant to be a pivotal step towards a lasting peace, it remains unclear when such an endeavour begins (and ends). Or, as Ratner suggests, the problem may be attributed to a "definitional" issue - is there a clear line between peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations?

These are clearly Western perspectives and the question of language is very important. The above passage from Boutros-Ghali's report places the responsibility of peacebuilding in the hands of the UN. And, although the focus of the peacebuilding process is dependent upon (in theory) local participation, the main thrust of the project is on the *implementation* of a liberal-democratic structure, not its natural *evolution*. This raises a potential quandary for post-conflict states, namely who owns the peacebuilding

process? In writing on the issues of *Agenda for Peace,* David Cox notes the issue of *sovereignty* was raised during a review of the document during the 1992 meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement. In essence, the role of the UN in the intervention of a nation-state to promote human rights and democacy was challenged on the basis of the rights of a sovereign state.[¹⁴]

It is this aspect of political sovereignty that presents the most fundamental challenge to the peacebuilding process. As illustrated in Chapter One, the very notion of democracy - its shape, its actors, and indeed its goals - all remain open to philosophical interpretation. This is further complicated by the mere challenges facing a nation or people previously at war. What may be honourable, and indeed worth pursuing, is an *unique* project of political development.

Still, the uniqueness of the "individual" nation-state is, clearly, problematic in a "homogenous" global economy. As Pierre Lizée notes, the evolution of globalization demands political stability and the adoption of democratic values.[¹⁵] While the virtues of a democratic society are being achieved, we run the risk of alienating the very peoples and groups that the promise of democracy is envisioned to reach.

In his book, *The Nation-State and Violence,* Anthony Giddens suggests that the transition from a "traditional" to a "modern" society is marked by the creation of new

administrative and class structures. Each one of these transitions brings new patterns of domination, control and sanctioning of political violence. He states the function of the modern state, with few expectations, provides for the legitimization and control of violence within the territory it is enforced.˝ We are also reminded that political violence - ranging from clashes with police forces during civil protests to outright terrorism and civil war - has been a factor in political discourse on all continents.˙ Certainly, the process of democratic development is never static, nor is it ever complete. It must also be remembered that, while some nations posses long-standing democratic traditions, the sign of a functional democracy may very well be it remains a work in progress. Mohammed Ayoob reminds us that the western democratic state is a product of its own violent history, and new democracies may indeed have to travel the same turbulent paths.˝ In his work, he describes three main phases leading to the emergence of the "modern" state, including the period of absolutist government of the King and feudal state; the rise of "centralized monarchies", designed to cement a common people and identity, and the evolution of representative governments developed out of a need to share power with civil society.³⁹

The process of state-building - especially in the Third

World - is seen as a requisite for the growth of the nation. Still, this is a project that cannot be engaged within a series of time constraints and expectations imposed by external forces. Ayoob states that, one of the contributing factors leading to the rise of German and Italian fascism was the search for political escapes in the wake of a series of crises, spurred by mass politics.⁻

If Ayoob is correct, the natural evolution of democratic systems are born out of conflict and violence. This presents a problem for a post-conflict state emerging into the international economy. If the vision of the *Agendas* is to promote an "universal" notion of democratic change, how best can post-conflict peacebuilding achieve this goal and promote indigenous political structures? The next chapter will focus on Haiti's long struggle of democracy. The nation's socio-political history emphasizes the complexities associated with the democratization process during a peacebuilding era. And, while some may view Haiti as a failure, its path towards democracy is clearly a work in progress. How we judge the successes or failures of democratic development+ must be in the context of the societal past. Perhaps, Haiti's story can shed new light on the intricacies in which democracy takes shape.

Chapter 3
Searching for Democracy in Haiti

"The Constitution is made of paper, bayonets are of steel."

"In Haiti, the army is an apolitical institution that guarantees
freedom." - General Raoul Cédras, de facto military leader in
Haiti, 1991

In the previous chapters, the essence of a secure and stable
democratic state was explored in the context of "political
modernization". The faith held within Western political-
economy, namely variants on the liberal democratic tradition,
is seen by the North as the model - the best path for lasting
peace and development. For holders of this viewpoint the
blending of "the people" with the promise of the international
marketplace is regarded as the great equalizer, the best way
for the wounds of conflict to be healed. Certainly, and
regardless of how such a society is envisioned, it is
difficult to argue against the ideals linking the political
and economic security of a nation-state (and all citizens
within) to lasting peace. However, one fundamental question
remains unresolved. If the essence of the "true" path to
democratic change is indeed found in the modern state, can

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both the pressures and demands on a society emerging from conflict make such a democracy *viable*?

Such a question can be explored within the context of post-Duvalier Haiti. While the nation's political and societal conflict never reached the status of a "true" civil war, its unique history of class warfare allows Haiti the dubious distinction of a society "emerging from civil strife". As in Cambodia, El Salvador, and Bosnia, the introduction of a multi-lateral peacebuilding regime in Haiti was to repress the causes of "ethnic" confrontation by reforming the institutions responsible for their amplification. Still, the question remains whether state reform alone can erase the years of societal repression and state sanctioned violence.

Beginning with the fall of Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, to the present constitutional questions facing the government of President René Préval, the road to democratic reform has taken many turbulent and violent paths. As the international community watches and wonders whether its "investment" in Haiti's political future was in vain,[113] the nation's very success in laying the foundations for its own brand of democracy hangs in the balance. The role of that investment, and the expectations attached to it, provide us with a measure by which to evaluate the peacebuilding model. Still, in order to examine the long-term impact of this form

of democratization, we must first explore briefly the political history of Haiti. The development of pre-Aristide political society, namely the state and civil society, must be considered. Using this as a basis, the role of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to assist in the establishment of democracy will be evaluated in the next chapter.

★★★★★★

It can be said of Haiti that it is truly a nation and society of extremes.

Haiti's road to democracy is marked both by a history of institutional violence and ever-present economic challenges facing its people. When one thinks of the Caribbean nation, undoubtedly the negative overshadows the positive. Certainly, images of poverty, institutionalized corruption and state violence comes first to mind. It is difficult for an outsider who scans recent news on Haiti, or reads current human rights reports to be overly optimistic of Haiti's future. Still, it is in these circumstances we can truly evaluate the success of Haiti's democratic evolution as it faces political modernization.

The nation's economy, for instance, provides a potential

flash point for conflict. The country's Gross National Product in 1995 was $US 250/person,[124] with an inflation rate of 18 percent.[125] Moreover, Haiti remains one of the most densely populated countries on the globe. With an estimated population of 6.6 million in 1997, it has a population density of 264.4 persons per square kilometre.[126] Haiti's economic struggle is worsened further by a deepening environmental crisis. One gripping example is the rate of deforestation on the island: With an estimated five percent of land considered forests and woodlands, the remaining wood resources are constantly threatened by agricultural industry and energy sources.[127] Finally, the impact of Haiti's Structural Adjustment Program negotiated with the International Monetary Fund in 1995 has led to instability in public and in Parliament.[128]

Against this backdrop lies Haiti's violent history. Haiti's experimentation with popular democracy has a rich heritage stretching from the era of French colonialism. As Kummar and Cousens note, the issues involved during the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) can be linked to similar revolutions occurring in France and the United States at the time but did not achieve an "equitable" social state.[129] Even after Haiti's independence from France, the institutionalization of class and ethnic conflict remained

firmly entrenched in the socio-economic, sociopolitical life of the nation. For Kummar and Cousens, this history of confrontation is realized within four broad areas. The first factor has already been mentioned - the persistent role of class and ethnic division in the socio-political history of the state. Secondly, the social impact caused by successive changes in leadership, and the establishment of a tradition of violence through suppression. This instability can also be illustrated externally through the support of foreign governments to ensure political or economic objectives. Thirdly, the use of voodum and other symbolism as a tool of state sanctioned violence used by police, military and para-military forces. Finally, the recurring theme of environmental degradation and resource depletion has led to further socio-economic divisions in Haiti.[...] This last point must always be considered when evaluating the prospects for development in the country.

These intertwining factors cannot be examined in isolation of each other. Clearly, the use of power and violence has created a political "heritage" that can not be disregarded as irrelevant to Haiti's political future. The historical challenge to the formation of the democratic state has been manifested in what Michel-Rolph Trouillot considers the "asymmetrical" power struggle between the state and civil

society.⋯ Certainly, the resistance by the people to the wishes of the state (or de-facto state) has usually been met by state-sanctioned violence, and actively supported by the ruling classes.

Such is the case in the development and "institutionalization" of ethnicity or class conflict. The racial history is truly paradoxical - the state (and the army that ensured its survival) practiced the same principles the nation stood against in its own struggle for independence from Napoleon's France.⋯ Ironically, Haiti considers itself the first "Black Republic" in the Western Hemisphere. However, its political and economic development has been dominated by the power struggle between *noirs* and *mullatoes*. To an outsider, this issue is perplexing as virtually all Haitians can trace their ancestry to the African continent. Understanding the role of colour in Haitian society, however, can not come from the colour of one's skin, but rather from the social class to which they belong.

Historically, this paradox can be defined within the creation of a "black" middle-class in the years following independence. The rise of this middle class, or *classe intermédiaire,* has both roots in rural and urban settings. Writing on the formation of class in Haitian society, David Nicholls notes that the emergence of the rural *classe*

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intermédiaire was the result of peasant land-owners becoming medium-sized coffee producers. These individuals engaged in the perpetuation of an economic and social dependence over their peasant workers, thus creating a paternal relationship. This type of social structure allowed the basic elements for the development of the systemic political corruption so often associated with Haiti. Certainly, this became a predominate issue during the Duvalier regimes. The development of the urban middle-class, on the other hand, is traced to the education of a selected group of urban poor, and their eventual incorporation into the civil service or business community.[13]

It is interesting to note the attitudinal changes needed to bridge the gaps between the "repressed" and the "repressor". Both of these groups adopted attitudes and social symbols of European, specifically French, "culture". As Irwin P. Stotzky notes, the emphasis on class may have indeed meant that all Haitians were tied to a common heritage, but the social status of the person in terms of education, wealth, and power dictated their ultimate "blackness".[14] It should be of little surprise, then, the issue of colour (or more accurate class) has been a focal point of societal conflict during this century.

The American occupation of Haiti starting in 1915, for

instance, provides the observer with a historical account of the racial domination of the "elite"[115] *mulattoes* and the black middle-class (in concert with the American government) over the rural peasant class. Whereas U.S. involvement in Haiti was justified as a necessity to re-establish order and democracy, it was an attempt to solidify Washington's strategic and economic sphere of influence in the Caribbean Basin. During this period, the peasant class was used as virtual slave labour in the development of national infrastructure projects, leading to armed revolt and massacre of dissenters.[116] From the standpoint of state violence, the imposition of American force gave rise to the establishment of a new Haitian army, the *Garde*, and the *police rurale* to protect foreign interests. As Trouillot explains, the imposition of the Garde (and indeed its ties to the middle-class) set a precedent for future manifestations of the Haitian army. While just as brutal as the traditional miliary, the new regime solidified the use of the military and police as tools of repression by the state. [117] The American occupation, therefore, can be considered as a crucial step in solidifying a political culture of violence and class division in Haitian society. As authors such as James Ferguson note, economic "modernization" and the "institutionalization" of an externally structured political order achieved to only further frustrate the *noir*

majority.[114]

There is also an inescapable connection to "modernization" and the repression of the Haitian citizenry. Bearing this in mind, it should be of no surprise that the deployment of American Marines, just under 80 years later to "restore democracy" would have great historical significance. After all, Haitian leadership during the Occupation was designed to ensure an "hegemony" with American interests, and further entrenched Anti-Western philosophies among the peasant classes.[115]

The years following the 1933 withdrawal of American troops only led to further division in Haitian society. The government of Sténio Vincent, a mulatto and ally of the Roosevelt Administration, quickly usurped the constitutional process to consolidate control over the government. Claiming most Haitians were incapable of supporting democracy, Vincent rewrote the constitution and implemented a system of institutional corruption.[116] Vincent was eventually driven from office, due mainly to decreasing American support, and was replaced by Elie Lescot. While in office, Lescot further strengthened Haitian-U.S. relations by promoting American military and commercial interests during the Second World War. He also implemented a campaign to rid the country of Voodum, the traditional *noir* faith. This would only serve to further

isolate the black majority from the mulatto elite.[121]

It was in this habitual disregard for the majority of its citizens that successive governments lost control of the Haitian government. More importantly, this systematic discrimination served to mobilize black politicians and Lescot would eventually be deposed by a military junta. Haiti's next leader, Dumarsais Estimé, was different - he was black. Writing on the power of Estimé, and his influence over François Duvalier, Elizabeth Abbott notes, "[a]fter decades of white and mulatto domination, Haitians responded whole heartedly to Estimé's bitter racism and approved with full hearts his efforts to improve their lot".[122]

Although forced out of office Estimé had inspired a generation of *noiriste* scholars and leaders. Although it would be another seven years, the dream that he implanted would be resurrected with the presidency of Dr. Duvalier.

In 1957 François "Papa Doc" Duvalier began his family's rule of the country. Although volumes have been written on the Duvalier regime, the focus of this chapter only allows a glimpse of the Papa Doc and his son's rule and legacy. It must be said, however, that the "political" and "economic" revolutions promised by both father and son only led to the consolidation of power and wealth for the family. In other words, the promise of a just society - even for the *noirs* -

quickly dissolved once Papa Doc assumed office.

Duvalier used both external and internal events to retain power. Long known for his anti-American sentiments, was also able to play on fears of successive administrations for their quiet acceptance. As Ferguson notes, the Cuban Revolution gave Duvalier the impetus for "requesting" American aid in return for denouncing Fidel Castro.[13] This trend would continue for almost another twenty years until the Carter Administration demanded human rights reform from the government of Baby Doc. Under pressure of losing American funding Haiti experimented with limited political reforms. This quickly ended with 1980 the election of Ronald Reagan[14]

Internally both Duvaliers relied on the efforts of the *tonton macoutes* (Croéle for "Uncle Knapsack" or bogeyman) to maintain societal order through a systematic regime of terror and violence, fuelled by voodooism. Officially known as Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale, the tonton macoutes were a specialized secret police organization used to repress opposition to Duvalierist rule. Trouillot explains that the tactics of state sanctioned violence were unique to this organization, setting them apart from other Haitian military or para-military forces. This is evident in three general areas: the use of force on individuals of every age group, a lack of distinction of gender in sanctioning violence

(torture-rape was a tool of choice), and infiltration of state repression in key areas of civil society (ranging from the Church to the Boy Scouts).[125]

Ironically, it was a strengthening civil society that finally ended the Duvalier dynasty. In the wake of a citizen uprising over the assassination of three school children in Gonaïves by the military in 1985, and in protest of the so-called "food riots"[126] the grip of Duvalier's hold on Haiti was slipping. In 1986, Baby Doc fled the country to France aboard a U.S. Air Force cargo plane. Following his departure the Haitian government yet again fell into the hands of a military junta under General Henri Namphy, head of the Haitian Army. The junta, however, became unstable as Namphy attempted to consolidate his power. Successive regimes and half-hearted attempts to implement a democratically elected government tried to appease internal and external (namely from the U.S. government) opposition.

Haiti's first try at elections, for instance, came in the fall of 1987. The military (in a protest against the imposition of an independent electoral council) took steps to quash the new government. [127] Following this, Haiti was ruled by various generals who often spoke of democracy and civilian rule, but never took steps to implement their "desires". In 1990, the government (the third since 1986) under Lieutenant-

General Prosper Avril collapsed and was replaced by a civilian

Supreme Court Justice, Madamme Ertha Pascal-Touillot.[128] Under

her regime, Pascal-Touillot took steps to prepare Haiti for

civilian elections and include various civilian groups within

a provisional government. This arrangement subsequently

collapsed only three months after the appointment of a

civilian government. Under the threat of a military revolt and

increasing public disenchantment, elections were called for

December 16th.[129]

This would be a turning point in the nation's political

history.

From the standpoint of this thesis, a brief consideration

of the emergence and capacity of Haitian civil society is a

vital element to assessing the ultimate success of the

peacebuilding process.

While Luc Smarth developed a history of popular protest

from 1968 through grassroots community movements, it would

still be nearly another twenty years before a collective

effort could, effectively, stop Duvalierism.[130] As already

stated, the 'formation' of civil society in Haiti during the

1970s and 1980s was a direct response for the need for

political change, the means, the ability to break the cycle

of violence. When studying the political history of Haiti,

one has a sense that the nation's troubled past also gave

light to a new determination for social justice. The problem, however, remained in its articulation.

The issue of the countless killings and systematic murders of political opponents with no recourse for justice during the recent past, for instance, became the paramount issue in the struggle during the immediate post-Duvalier era. Caught between the horrors of the past and the uncertainties of the future, the common element bonding civil society was the *dechoukaj*, or uprooting.[131] It became **the** symbol - the necessity - giving the popular movement further fire.[132] Or, in Smarth's words, the development of the popular movements came from ordinary Haitians' desire to "join together in the fighting for their rights and making the voices heard on the issues and decisions concerning their nation".[133]

It was this need for change that, in 1990, hoisted Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, into the presidency. Aristide, a *noir* priest, rose to power through his brand of liberation theology. With eighty percent of the population of Haiti practicing (officially) Roman Catholicism, religion became the focal point for citizen education and eventual political action. It should be of no surprise that Aristide and other priests could rally a broad coalition of Haitians around the use of Gospel teachings to express a need for socio-political change. Speaking to the Pax Christi Assembly in 1997,

Aristide offered an example:

> Armed with the holy spirit we should not doubt
> ear or questions. The thirst and the hunger of
> those wondering in the wilderness is also a
> sign of life. It is good when those who do not
> have enough to eat cry out. And those who are
> hungry for justice must cry out too. ... Over
> 5000 people were killed [in the 1991 coup],
> thousands more were beaten, raped, and
> imprisoned... Biblical reconciliation comes
> after judgement. ... This will not come
> tomorrow. But we continue to work so that it
> will come.[134]

The Church and other community based groups also used the media to encourage a wider degree of public support. Amazingly, the flow of information was, on one hand, extremely public and, thus, vulnerable to opposition by the government. Smarth states that the use of radio as a tool for anti-government mobilization and education first signed on in 1978. Radio Soleil was later joined by other stations owned by the Church.[135] In a country where an estimated 55 percent (in 1995) of the population is illiterate,[136] these stations played a tremendous role in generating public dissent towards Duvalier and his successors. This, coupled with Aristide's ability to use the medium to rally the people would give an emerging civil society an unique tool. Perhaps the use of broadcasting during the 1986 march on a prison at Fort Dimarche is a striking example. While government forces

opened fire on the protesters, Aristide remained live on Radio Soleil to give updates on the massacre.[137]

Thus, the success on an emerging civil society was placed on the old adage of "strength through numbers". It is clear that these groups, while concentrating on a vague idea of building a better state through the creation of a democratic state, chose their modes carefully. While some of these groups chose to challenge the military directly through demands and protests, others saw defiance in more subtle ways through the education of youth.

On the level of community association, the emergence of the community groups remained decentralized, but extremely effective to participate in opposing the events around them. The movement, largely concentrated in the neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince and other cities, refrained from adopting a formal structure out of fear of falling to the same power struggles found in the military government. They concentrated on building consensus based on the grassroots.[138]

Moreover, the popular organizations cannot be defined as purely resistance organizations, but saw their power in the ability to organize "state" issues in lieu of a government they recognized. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, these organization maintained a system of committees tasked with specific issues, much like the organizational structure of a

government entity. These committees would be based on an internal democratic structure and would be accountable to a general body.[139]

Finally, Smarth illustrates the necessity for these groups to remain vigilant, not by a defensive posture, but through education and knowledge. To oppose the ruling regime by direct and forceful confrontation would also reduce the popular movement to the level of the army. Instead, there was great emphasis placed on creating a dialogue among community groups based on informed insights. Thus, they encouraged youths attached to the groups to take an active interest in both local and global issues for future discussion and debate.[140] Again, there was the feeling the that ultimate victory over totalitarianism would come through a campaign of peace and reason, not further violence and bloodshed.

This brief examination of civil society in Haiti provides us with a glimpse of the social forces working against the military, the elite, and other groups linked to systemic repression. In the first chapter, the importance of civil society as an effective means to unseat authoritative regimes was reviewed. Resnick, for example, sees the role of civil society as a means to promote broadly based coalitions against a common threat, an alternative means to engage the

political process, and a point of solidarity. As described, the essence of Haitians banning together against the state succeeded in all three. Using Touillot's observation the Aristide Revolution not only changed the composition of the traditional middle- and elite-class state, but it also forced the state itself to change. Moving from the asymmetrical Aristide's government forced the state to share power with its own people.

Unfortunately, the established state was not ready for such a revolution.

In September 1991, the presidency of Jean-Bertrand Aristide came to an end in a bloody coup. As Jean-Germain Gros notes, the presence of a peasant priest in government "represented everything that it (the elite) hated and feared."[141] Exiled in the United States, Aristide watched as the military, under General Raoul Cédras, took steps to rid the country of all forms of civil society. In the nearly four years of the coup, Haiti reverted to a lawless state of terror. In a 1992, a Human Rights Watch report stated the immediate terror of the Army resulted in "at least three hundred civilian deaths and wounded thousands more."[142] By the end, that figure skyrocketed to over 5000 casualties.

It is important to note that the foundations for the

eventual implementation of the UNMIH were laid soon after Aristide's exile. During this period, the exiled President convinced the United Nations and the Organization of American States to impose an oil embargo to try driving Cédras from power. In July 1993, the military and Aristide agreed to the Governor's Island Agreement, calling for the return of the President and removal of the military leadership, and the installation of a multinational peacekeeping force. The plan subsequently failed a month later, forcing American and Canadian troops to retreat before landing in Port-Aux-Prince. It would be another year before foreign troops landed in Haiti. In September 1994, amidst negotiations with American officials and immient invasion, the miliary government backed down and allowed for the "soft landing" of U.S. Marines.[113]

Operation Restore Democracy and UNMIH had begun.

The fundamental belief in a democratic Haiti is not a new concept within the hearts of the majority of her people. Clearly, Haiti's story can be seen within the light of Trouillot's "asymmetrical state". The consolidation of power, and the use of institutional violence to maintain it, are persistent themes in Haiti's political history. It is in these realities that the dreams of peace, development, equity

and equality were viciously denied. These, combined with the historical patterns of external pressure to influence the course of Haitian affairs, pose serious questions to the future for those beliefs.

In chapter two the essence of political modernization was explored within the context of a peacebuilding model. In terms of civil conflict, the perceived prescription for a successful recovery is found within the restructuring of the state's institutions to promote peace, confidence building and true public participation. In the case of Haiti, the past does not merely reflect a period where these essential element were suspended, but the inability of an environment where they could develop in the first place. Certainly, the reconstruction of the state itself is a key component, but can this, in and of itself, promise *true* societal change?

As the nation-state attempts to define its own democratic culture, the true test of success may be found within the tenacity of the people not to revisit their past. The question, therefore, remains if the efforts of Haiti's peacebuilding experience provided the nation with the tools to finally make long-term democratic development sustainable.

Chapter 4
UNMIH and Political Modernization: Visions of Democracy and Security?

United, we shall raise the banner of a state of law on the flag poles of
justice, reconciliation, justice, tolerance, respect, and economic
progress. - President Jean Bertrand Aristide

Haiti's long road towards democracy began with the ideals
of liberation theology, and quickly spread to other areas of
an emerging civil society. This important fact stresses the
way in which democratic development took shape. It grew from
the repressed - the poor - to filter up through the ashes of
the Duvalier legacy. Certainly, the Haitian struggle for a
democratic state - an equitable and equal society - can be
seen as a revolution in the true sense of the word. The
people battled, and won, the war over institutionalized
corruption and terror that was a part of their lives for so
long.

Of course, the victory of civil society is only the first
step towards a sustaining democracy. The essence of
democratic government lies in the creation of a compatible
state. Again, the history of contrasts in Haiti is relevant
to the topic at hand: a nation founded on the principles of

colonial revolt, its history reflected a divided, "asymmetrical" society based on class and a borrowed sense of racism. It was out of this very legacy that encouraged the military coup that forced President Aristide from power.

And it was that legacy the international community wanted to bury with the redemocratization process.

The question remains, however, if a true *Haitian* democracy will be allowed to develop in its own merits and time? In previous chapters, the relationship between multi-lateral peacebuilding and political modernization was explored. In Haiti, this issue must be explored in relation to both internal and external expectations of the democratic state. Thus, this chapter is designed to be an assessment of the institution-building component of UNMIH, and attempt to provide a frame of reference by which the sustainability of democracy can be measured. It will, specifically, focus upon three cornerstones outlined by President Aristide - electoral reform, the restructuring of the Haitian police and justice system, and the outlook for economic development.

It should be understood that the ultimate success of the democratic state in Haiti has to be left to future historians. Still, the contribution of UNMIH in the short-term provides the opportunity to explore the legitimacy of the "peacebuilding paradigm" within the context of a

democratization regime.

In September 1994, U.S. Marines landed in Port-aux-Prince to restore civil order and implement a framework allowing President Aristide to return from exile in the United States. Operation "Restore Democracy" and the subsequent Multi National Force (MNF) deployment was not only designed to escort a leader to his country, but to facilitate a means by which Haitians could embrace the spirit of *dechoukaj* that was so prevalent during the first days without Duvalier. The main difference, of course, is that the international community would be there to oversee - guide - the way in which the process would take place. And, any measure of democratization through the peacebuilding process would have to be judged by the multi-lateral mission.

At its height, the UNMIH consisted of 6000 troops, 567 civilian police (CIVPOL) personnel, 250 international civilian staff and 200 Haitian staff. This figure can be compared to the 21 000 MNF troops during the initial peace enforcement operation.[144] Troops were supplied by Argentina, Canada, and the United States. The CIVPOL component of the Mission represented twelve UN member states.[145] The deployment and implementation of the United Nations Mission In Haiti, and the return of President Aristide, is widely regarded as a new

start for Haiti. At the UN transition ceremony, marking the end of the largely American-led Restore Democracy, President Aristide noted:

> United, we shall raise the banner of a state of law on the flag poles of justice, reconciliation, justice, tolerance, respect, and economic progress. United under this banner, we will guarantee security and peace. United in this state of law, a new police force in training will take its rightful place. Recommendations made to reform our judicial system will be implemented. Plans to organize free and fair elections will succeed as together we move from secure and stable to safe and more secure.[115]

The emphasis on creating a lasting democratic culture is not confined to the *system* itself. Aristide's remarks stress, not only the institutional changes needed - a representative political body and functioning justice system - but the necessity to build a new societal focus to facilitate these changes. What is just as striking is the role economic development plays in sustaining a new democratic culture. In other words, the emphasis on a lasting democracy is seen to hinge on its evolution rather than its imposition.

From the standpoint of the peacebuilding mission, one has to take a crucial look at the role in which external

forces can adequately shape internal political development. Certainly, the establishment and growth of a new political culture does not transplant itself immediately. As discussed in Chapter two, the development of western democracy itself is but a product of centuries of struggle between the power of state and the political maturity of its people. The "modern" political state in the North is itself a work in progress: its development is an evolution over time. The essence of democracy can not be static by its own nature.

The question of peacebuilding in Haiti, therefore, is in reality an attempt to accelerate this process of designing the perfect democratic state. The work of UNMIH was heralded as a legitimate and necessary step towards re-democratization in Haiti. However, it should be of little surprise that the role of the international community (namely the United States) was to ensure the establishment of "proper" democratic development in the nation-state. The issue of democratization (as a project), then, moves from the establishment of an indigenous political system to one of meeting the goals and expectations of the outside world. The key issues many critics suggest, both in the role of the UN during the mission and the subsequent changes in Haitian society, are of substance and time. In other words, the democratic and secure "new" Haiti has been slow to emerge from the ashes of post-

Aristide society. As James R. Morrel and his colleagues observe, the investment of the UN mission has done little to address the country's political stalemate among factions, or create an environment for increased economic security.[145]

This assessment may indeed be accurate in comparison to established liberal democracies but can be applied to Haiti still living with the ghosts of its past. As stated above, if we consider political development as a continuum, the path towards a democratic state remains evolving. Perhaps a more fair assessment of Haitian democratic development to date lies with an exploration how far it has come, rather than the distance it still has to travel.

However, this philosophical ideal is not embraced in the real world of foreign policy.

The initial American response to the 1991 coup, for instance, was less concerned with the restoration and survival of democratic government than the maintenance of national security interests. The populist wishes of the people and the legacy of the 1990 election became secondary to appeasing the elite interests in Port-aux-Prince who support the de facto government of Raoul Cédras. This was evident in the policy adopted by the Bush Administration during the first days after the coup: The democratic spirit that led to the demise of the Duvalier dynasty and the rise of Aristide should be tempered

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into acceptance of a power-sharing arrangement between the military and Parliament.[149] The wishes of 67% of the voting public were weighed against the necessities of mantaining stability in the Caribbean basin. Of course, the importance of Haiti was not viewed solely from a military perspective, but also as an economic imperative. Despite the legacy of Duvalier the and well known social circumstances of its people, Haiti became a haven for American manufacturing companies eager to exploit the benefits of cheap labour.[150] More important to the eventual UNMIH was the road taken by the newly elected Clinton Administration just a year later. While wary of the importance of returning Aristide to power, the so-called "Clinton Doctrine" was designed to "professionalize" the military and police forces while encouraging viable civilian leadership alternatives to Aristide.[151]

In other words, the role of the international community in guiding Haiti's transition to democracy was to facilitate the creation of a political regime able to meet the wishes of its people, but more importantly, maintain an environment suitable to the political economy of the United States. Or, as recently stated in an editorial, the "Clinton Doctrine" attempts to facilitate military involvement to achieve foreign policy objectives under the justification of humanitarian assistance.[152] Moreover, the growing problems of Haitian

refugees trying to enter the United States placed further internal political demands on the new administration to respond.[153]   It was also that for that reason which shaped Clinton's expectations for a quick withdrawal of U.S. forces.[154]

From the perspective of internal political development, the influence of the North placed certain inherent conditions on the course of events on the ground. Of course, this means the people of Haiti may decide their leaders and choose to participate in the affairs of the nation, but the development of the society's political and economic system would conform to a broader paradigm. In short, the price paid for the international community's support came with its own concessions.

This is best seen by the example of the transition Aristide underwent while in exile. A "tamed" version of the populist president is best illustrated within the Governor's Island Agreement, signed in September, 1993.[155]   The Agreement's objectives were clear: it called for the restoration of President Aristide, the granting of an amnesty to the leaders of the coup, and the restructuring of the Haitian military. All of these reforms would be implemented with assistance from the OAS and UN.[156] Moreover, changes within Aristide's government, highlighted by the appointment

of Robert Malval, a Haitian business leader and favoured by the establishment. These compromises were clearly contrary to the wishes of Aristide during the first few months of the coup.[157]

From the perspective of the eventual peacebuilding mission in Haiti, the same expectations of the international community overshadowed the wishes of the people. The Governor's Island Agreement may have failed in its intended timetable, but the same underlying principles were eventually adopted in UN Security Council Resolution 933, establishing an extended mandate for UNMIH. This was, namely, to restore democracy, professionalize the Haitian police and military, and to protect civilian humanitarian workers.[158] In its broader "peacebuilding" context, the role of UNMIH was to establish the conditions for "an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections" monitored by the UN and OAS. All of this was to be completed by February, 1996, just under two years of the Mission's mandate.[159]

This approach to democratic development raises many issues previously discussed in this thesis. If we consider UNMIH from both an "institution-building" and "security" standpoint, the fundamental goal of bringing democracy back to Haiti remains elusive. The essence of a democracy (regardless

of how it is envisioned) is a product of time and conflict. The maintenance of its institutional composition is but secondary to the development of its cultural identity. In light of its past, the restoration of the head of state and the reformation of its internal security apparatus should be regarded as its first step towards a functioning democracy. And, while it is correct to assume that the role of a multi-lateral peacebuilding mission should not be responsible for the complete evolution of a democratic state, its ability to be a positive influence is also accepted. In other words, the function of peacebuilding operations in the development of democratic states must reflect the realities of the situation at hand.

This, too, raises issues of actually whose security is being ensured through the process. As Mohammed Ayoob reminds us, the notion of national security is to protect the institutions and order of a society's own elites. This is in contrast to Yezid Sayigh's emphasis on the protection and socio-economic welfare of the nation's population.[169] The case of UNMIH challenges us to consider the relevance of both viewpoints. By the establishment of a new democratic system in Haiti, did the UN actually ensure the long-term security of the majority or satisfy the powerful elite in the suburbs of Port-Aux-Prince?

It is on this basis on which we must consider the role of UNMIH in the political modernization of Haiti. While the MNF is, in some respects, tertiary in the search for true democracy, its deployment in the country is a component of a larger policy objective.

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The Question of Liberal Democracy In Haiti

The UN response to the Haitian situation was one of the first opportunities in which the philosophical goals of the *Agendas* were put into practice. If we consider the peacebuilding model, the objectives of the mission are based on the basic assumption that a truly democratic system would serve to resolve the conflicts so apparent in Haitian political and economic life. This was envisioned through the reorganization of the very institutions associated with Haiti's violent past. A system that is, say, built to be accountable to the people will be responsive to the needs of the population. It serves a basic assumption about the essence of the state within a "modern" democratic society - a reformed state, itself, will encourage and enhance a democratic culture within its citizenry. In short, the ideals appear to encourage a "top-down" approach to "fix" a political

problem.

In Haiti, the road to true democracy was seen to be paved by the restructuring of government and justice system, and the promotion of economic reforms to encourage growth. In these three areas, when the international community finally intervened, the emphasis placed on democratic reform was closely linked to the belief of the tried and proven solutions in established democracies.

The issue is by which measure do we evaluate the success of an emerging democracy in Haiti? The expectations and conditions placed on Haiti by means of the peacebuilding mission emphasize a belief that any democratic development *should* and *must* correspond to precise outcomes set by external forces. This is based on a perceived notion that there is a grand schedule by which to judge the experiment's success or failure. As explained earlier, this is the same belief held in the modernist school. As long as the state held on to its "traditional" societal values, the rewards that the "new" society offered would not be realized. In the case of Haitian democracy, as soon as conditions were met, the security and stability promised would be realized. The problem, however, is whether it is realistic to assume those conditions of the "prevailing norm" of democracy can be adequately achieved in a nation so ravished by political turmoil and economic

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underdevelopment.

The return and restoration of Haiti's elected government was regarded as the paramount objective of UN/OAS involvement, especially in the immediate wake of the 1991 coup. Still, the 1990 election was but the first successful democratic victory in the nation's history. Haiti's development as a democratic state in the immediate post-Duvalier era remained untested. Certainly, the events leading to the 1990 election reflected a political situation in a state of flux: the hopes and aspirations for a democratic society existed in the hearts of the people but could not emerge in the existing institutional environment. This is reflected by Jean-Germaine Gros who suggests the successes or failures of Haitian democracy during this period can be attributed to internal "institutional weaknesses". He outlines these in the context of weaknesses in the relationship between parliament and the presidency, the lack of true leaders committed to democratic reform, and the deep economic problems facing the nation-state.[...] Ironically, the same state once responsible for so many vagrant violations of human rights and security was the very entity needed for a strong, sustainable democracy. The return of President Aristide, while important to the Haitian political process, served only as the first step towards ensuring continued growth of the democratic spirit he so actively embraced.

What is interesting to note, however, is these apparent weaknesses have never been seriously addressed by the state or the international community. From the perspective of the UNMIH, the strengthening of Haiti's political institutions has largely remained in the realm of education and election monitoring. Yet, the electoral process while, obviously crucial to a healthy democracy, is only a part of the process. The international community tends to forget that the selection of leaders is only a beginning. The health of a functioning system is assessed by how a government performs vis-a-vis the democratic principles it is sworn to observe. This emphasis on such matters as voting irregularities and other functional problems with the 1996 presidential elections serve to overshadow the broader issues of the relationship between the state and its people.[162]

Democracy in Haiti, however, is much more complex. Its evolution cannot be viewed as a linear process. The facilitation of democracy in Haiti must be assessed on the basis of its own strengths and weaknesses. One striking example lies within the first successful (and peaceful) transition of civilian government in Haiti. Despite controversy over the length of term constitutionally allowed to Aristide,[163] presidential elections were held, hoisting René Préval to power in February 1996. While international

observers concede the election did have significant flaws, this transition signifies the first real stages towards non-violent change in government.[__] The problems facing the Préval administration, however, stem not from the legitimacy of the office he holds but from the challenges of running a new democracy with severe economic conditions. The daily functioning of government is constrained by both the internal and external demands placed on it.

Although this thesis has focused on the question of "political development", it must be recognized that the prospect of a sustained democracy can only be achieved in an environment of economic stability. As stated in earlier chapters, the adoption of "modern" democracy also means the transition to a global economy. For most regions in the developing world, this is clearly problematic.

Haiti is a country of limited indigenous industry and resources. During the decade following the end of the Duvalier regime, the Gross Domestic Product actually decreased in real terms as the population increased.[__] Not surprisingly, the international community has also placed economic expectations on Haiti, by imposing a regime of Structural Adjustment. The hopes and dreams of a responsive state, able to generate development funding, has largely gone unfulfilled. Despite the necessity of the $500 million in promised aid, the already

fragmented parliament has been unwilling to pass legislation approving the conditions for governmental reform.[166]

This is further complicated by no strong opposition to the Organisation du Peuple en Lutte, which forms one of three coalition parties under the banner of Plat-forme Politique Lavalas. While there are parties representing both the left- and right-wing, they have largely remained ineffective to counter the popular support of the OPL. It is important to note that Préval, who led the OPL to victory is seen in the North as a moderate, and worthy of working with, has also been a political ally of Aristide. This relationship changed soon after the election, fracturing the OPL. Aristide currently leads the dissenting group, Le Fanmi Lavalas.[167] This political "tug-of-war" is further exacerbated by attempts to side step both Parliament and other elected officials by claiming their terms of office had expired under the constitution.[168] These political situations may indeed serve as minor setbacks in relation to the broader issues of democratic development. However, they reflect a potential for increased public disenchantment towards the government.[169]

The question, however, should be whether public discontent is a negative development. Dissent has, indeed, played a role in the Préval administration. It is important to note that mass demonstration as largely occurred as

peaceful protest, rather than violent confrontation. In 1997, for instance, members of grassroots organizations staged nation-wide strikes in protest over legislation to privatize key state enterprises. This followed similar strikes a year earlier to demand better health and education services.¨ The public again went to the streets in January, 1999 to protest Préval's dismissal of parliament.¨ In stark contrast, less than 10% of eligible voters participated in the 1997 legislative elections.¨ In terms of the democratic process, it would appear that the faith held in democracy has shifted from the state back onto civil society. It aims to engage public debate and, thus, dialogue with the political leadership through other proactive means. In other words, dissent through the use of protest is used to sustain Haitian democracy at a grassroots level.

From the perspective of UNMIH, the political development component of the mission can be fairly evaluated. When history is taken into consideration, the thought of public protest in Haiti is traditionally a violent affair. Yet, it is important to highlight that these protests demonstrated a new reality in Haiti life - that the people could demand change without fear of repression. The newly implemented Haitian National Police (HNP) remained neutral, with little violence reported. In other words, Haitians may indeed have

to deal with a constitutional crisis, but their personal freedoms to express discontent are, for the time being, largely guaranteed by the state. It is in this form of protest that the public may have the best chance of effecting true socio-political change. The problem, however, is in determining a mechanism in which the state, through the use of law enforcement agencies, can mediate public unrest to enhance positive dialogue. As Kumar and Cousens note, while politics remain a powder keg for violence in Haiti, mediation and patience is needed to bridge gaps between the people and their local officials.

The Question of Security in Haiti

Perhaps more at issue in relation to the actual framework of UNMIH is its connection to the renewal of the military and national police in Haiti. As already alluded, the role of the MNF was to establish an environment in which the repressive component of the state could be transformed into a normative law enforcement agency, conforming to the standards of international convention. This professionalization of the police and military was designed to be a compromise to ensure the continued existence of the Haitian authorities, and the elite who support them. These concession may have made for a

strong bargaining tool to effect policy objectives, but has it promoted a sense of greater security for Haitians coming to terms with their violent past?

This answer, like so many others in Haiti, is not easily explained. Certainly, the issue of crime in Haiti is almost always connected to politics. As seen in the last chapter, the state has historically used the military and paramilitary force to smash opposition through the use of terror. UNMIH, like the peacekeeping/peace enforcement force before it, was confronted with this harsh reality. In many respects, the nature of peacebuilding in Haiti is a historically ironic concept in relation to these reforms: an external military and police force deployed to mobilize a new force from the ashes of the tonton marcoutes, or the *attachés* under the Cédras regime.

The objectives of UNMIH, interestingly, were as such. Constructing the new Haitian National Police was to graft "clean" members of the former military onto a multi-national trained civilian police force. Applicants of the new force came from "thousands of eager and jobless young men."[1] This, in effect, demanded a transitory force under the supervision of the UN. Canada was one of the nations that responded to this challenge, supplying as early as 1993 members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to train and supervise members

of the new force. This role continues with a contingent of 24 officers providing technical support in developing a new national justice system. Reform of the judicial system has proven to be slower than the implementation of the HNP. This has placed a unique challenge to law enforcement officers, who are not responsible for actual criminal investigations. As Michael Bailey, Robert Maguire and others note several members of the HNP have admitted to CIVPOL mentors that they would rather take justice into their own hands than wait for an ineffective court system.

Reforming the system in which the traditional law enforcement regime operates came out of the necessity to create a universally applicable law for all Haitians. The roots of this aspect of UNMIH can be traced to a letter from Aristide to UN Secretary-General Bourtos-Ghali in early 1992. The President requested that the UN/OAS establish an international civilian agency to monitor human rights abuses and provide assistance in the separation of the Haiti police force from the military. Within the terms of the Governors Island Agreement Boutros-Ghali responded by requesting the Security Council approve a mission profile involving CIVPOL training and monitoring for an initial period of six months. He also requested provisions for re-organization of the military, including "training for officers and non-

commissioned officers in non-lethal skills in order to prepare them for what would become their primary mission, including disaster relief, search and rescue, and surveillance of borders and coastal waters." Finally, Boutros-Ghali asked for a contingent of military engineers to help convert military facilities to CIVPOL use.

On the surface, this re-constitution of the nation's law enforcement agencies appears to be sound. A closer look, however, reveals an inherent difficulty with the practicality of the process. Reforming the institutions in question is a first step, but it does little to respond to the culture of fear and mistrust towards the state. Ironically, this does not necessarily mean the HNP are feared either. As Gros explains the short transition to democracy has almost created a counter culture against all forms of authority, even to the extent of ignoring traffic lights. To say a state is democratic should not be interpreted to mean it is secure. Many writers suggest that the training of Haiti's 6800 police force has largely been aimed towards expediency, rather than ensuring the long-term success of the force. As Pamela Constable explains, there were growing fears of the newly trained police force not having the experience required to "fill the security void" after UNMIH was downsized in early 1996. Similar concerns are echoed in documented cases

ranging from police brutality and professional misconduct, to even examples rash decisions in time of panic.[¹]

While the time element adds to the difficulties the HNP faces, it is also important to consider the level of support the force has to build a culture of trust within the general community. A society that has historically viewed the police and military as the enemy, it should be of little surprise that the only protection offered for decades came from the ownership of arms. The UNMIH mandate allowed for the disarmament of the military and paramilitary forces. However, American troops fell into a "don't see, don't disarm policy", only seizing weapon caches readily available as they occupied military installations. This allowed members of the Front Pour l'Avancement et le Progrès Haïten (FRAPH), largely comprised of former paramilitary thugs under General Cédras, to hide stores of guns from the MNF.[²] The MNF did attempt to disarm the public through voluntary "buy-back" incentives and by conducting random spot checks. A thorough search of individual residences and properties was impossible as the Haitian constitution allows gun ownership for self-defence.[³] This partial disarmament only added to the fear and mistrust in the country. As Laurie Richardson explains, the process has increased the level of "common crime", as still-armed former paramilitaries turn to extortion to make a living and

their fellow citizens resort to vigilantism to stop them.[134]

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Building a democratic culture, and a secure society can only come from patience and time. The problem of political modernization is it becomes obsessed with the promise of the future, and does not look for lessons in the past. For Haiti, the path towards development (political or otherwise) is constricted by its own history that is yet to be reconciled.

It is important to note that the United Nations began monitoring human rights abuses in earnest as early as 1992. The military government agreed to a joint UN/OAS mission of 18 to monitor human rights violations, assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid, and report on the situation in country.[135] This modest group was succeeded by the Mission Civile en Haiti (MICIVIH). This broader mission had a mandate, in broad terms, to investigate human rights abuses and initiate an education campaign through the use of local media. The MICIVIH was to support the eventual UNMIH by providing technical assistance in the professionalization of the police and military, and judicial reform.[136] During the early years of the Mission, however, personnel were hampered in doing their work due to weaknesses in the mandate to address the

economic needs of those who came forward, difficulties in stopping the military from intimidating potential witnesses, and the unwillingness of the de facto government to cooperate in investigations.¹ᵗ⁷

The work of MICIVIH did, in fact, pave the way for the present peacebuilding regime. Still, this work is done by the outside community; it seeks to establish an external solution to an internal problem. This is especially true with the short timetable in which the Mission intended to operate. It was reflected in the following assessment by the UN, even before the Mission was dispatched to the field:

> We find it hard to envisage the Mission performing successfully the role of protecting human rights, including freedom of expression and association for more than a few months, without clear progress toward a political solution of the crisis satisfactory to the majority of the population.¹⁸⁸

In other words, the role of the UN is limited in providing the same measure of security that an indigenous system can. This, however, becomes problematic too. The search for justice in post-Cédras Haiti has taken second stage to political concession. In March, 1995 President Aristide appointed the Haitian National Truth and Justice Commission to

investigate "the most serious Human Rights violations perpetrated between September 29, 1991 and October 15, 1994 ... to help the reconciliation of all Haitians without prejudice against seeking legal actions based on these violations."[13] Despite this positive step, the question of criminal prosecution remains virtually impossible. During the last days of the de facto regime, the Haitian parliament passed a bill granting amnesty in most crimes against the people.[14] Of course, time and the lack of political pressure from the international community have also made prosecutions unlikely. Haiti's former dictators are living beyond the reach of Port-aux-Prince: General Cédras is reported to live with his family in a Panamanian beach house supplied by the United States.[15] The only glimmer of hope may be found in recent reports that France is considering the prosecution of Baby Doc Duvalier.[16]

As stated earlier in this chapter the ultimate success of UNMIH and Haitian democracy will have to be left to others. Only five years has passed since the restoration of President Aristide and the start of the multi-lateral mission. If seen from the perspective of a linear progression, democratic development in Haiti has not lived up to both the people's and the world's standards and expectations. However, the observer

must be careful not to impose judgements based largely on artificial timetables. There are no clear models, no tangible signposts marking Haiti's journey towards a "true" democracy.

Ironically, the democratic nation-states of the North, products of centuries of their own political evolution, impose the ideals and conditions for the very route Haiti must travel. Yet Haiti, itself, does not have the same advantage of time. For, in some strange way, the trials and victories of democracy have already been realized in other parts of the world. As far as the democratic process in Haiti, there is nothing left to explore and nothing left to say.

Or is there?

If democracy was merely an institution, its imposition would be not be difficult. But, as an expression of political culture its development is, rather, anchored within an unique societial experience. Haiti's unique society and history poses equally unique challenges to its democratic development. The path towards democracy can only come on its own terms and time.

The only question that remains is whether the international community can muster the patience to allow true democratic development in Haiti to take place.

Conclusion

What makes a democracy viable?

Most who followed the pro-democracy movements throughout the world during the late 1980s and early 1990s remember the hope activists placed in notions of the democratic state. It seemed as if the price for freedom, choice, and above all, destiny was well worth the potential sacrifices involved in the struggle for a better life. All things were within reach, and individual opportunity was now possible.

It is in these ideals of freedom and opportunity we also approach development theory and practice.

International development seeks to promote the welfare of the individual and community through manipulating key resources necessary to realize positive social change. This thesis has considered "political development" as being **one** of the cornerstones needed for such an endeavour. The *promise of democracy,* when placed into the larger context of development, serves as a catalyst for real social change. It assumes that the *people* control a common destiny, the *people* decide the course of events in their society. It also demands that the *people* are in control of their own development. In other words, the promise of democracy and development is only realized in the struggle for the societal self.

Of course, there is a problem with this vision. In

reality, the promise of democracy has been invariably attached to the hegemony of a global identity. The need for what has been described in the *Agenda for Peace* as the "emerging consensus" has been translated by policy makers in the North to be a democracy famed and packaged into a transportable system. And democracy, a philosophical ideal opened to interpretation, has become mere policy to entrench a globalized political outcome.

This has indeed placed substantial demands on the course of democratic development in post-conflict states. But the mold by which it takes shape is only as strong as its acceptance by an evolving internal political culture of the people. The problem of constructing a democratic structure under these circumstances is that it undermines a sense of *ownership* the society must have within the actual process. The passions and personalities needed to carve the foundations of uniquely democratic states are tailored to meet expectations of an outside audience. They do not, however, inspire the same hopes and dreams that the people themselves hold dear. In the end, these two competing forces are caught within a struggle for ultimate control - one vision will win either by societal acceptance and adaptation, while the other will loose by social destruction from within. Either way the true essence of a democracy risks becoming a negative force in

the political development of the indigenous democratic state.

The objectives of multilateral peacebuilding are to be a proactive influence towards lasting peace and security within post-conflict zones. It attempts, on a grand scale, to be a tertiary actor in the long-term, seeking not to impose ideals of democracy but to act as a facilitator during the political development process. On the surface, this is a truly noble endeavour. Still, the overriding issue is whether this role of "passive support" can truly resist manipulation by contributing states pursuing their own foreign policy agendas. After all, the commitment of resources, troops, and other support personnel is regarded as an investment by participating states. The spirit of multilateralism in the support of peace and democracy should not, however, be confused with the desire to promote and impose a policy effect.

This picture may indeed be melancholy until one considers the potential for democracy in Haiti. On the surface, the expectations of a stable democracy and just society may appear to have gone unfulfilled. After all, the people still live in drastic economic situations, and are afraid of the state that the international community help build. Still, impressions of this nature may be deceiving, and a more honest study may also reveal another reality. While it is true that the external

demands of structural adjustment and other internal political debates have soured Haitian democracy from an institutional standpoint, the belief in the philosophy of security and a just democracy is as strong as it was a decade ago, during Haiti's darkest hours.

And it is that belief that will ultimately decide democracy's fate.

The course of democratic development in Haiti and other states emerging from conflict cannot be seen as a linear nor calculated process. The influence of the international community in the promotion of democracy through peacebuilding regimes can only be evaluated as successful only if we consider the path in which the nation takes itself. UNMIH and other peacebuilding missions can only be considered as a point of departure - a channel by which a nation's own democratic system can evolve.

This thesis has attempted to be a critical examination of the democratization element of the peacebuilding process. Its objective was to illustrate a relationship between post-conflict peacebuilding and a new revival of "political modernization" in international development. Several writers, most notably Kenneth Bush, Micheal Harbottle, John Linabelli, Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo and others,[133] have

given their own assessments of how the peacebuilding process can be strengthened. This writer wishes to humbly add his own thoughts on this topic in relation to the viability of the democratization process.

Firstly, the growth and sustainablity of democracy in states emerging from conflict is indeed viable. Its evolution, though, is an ongoing process and cannot be compared to other emerging democracies. Every state, and more important, nation, has its own story. The true democratic process must be unique, reflecting the nation's own people and circumstance. As this thesis attempts to show in the case of Haiti, the socio-political and socio-economic past cannot be buried with the implementation of new institutions. While these are vital, they can only be accepted and trusted over time. Success of democracy can not be defined by the actions of institutions finding their place within a global reality, only by the embrace of the people it serves.

In short, the peacebuilding experience must reflect either the societal adaptation to the democratization process, or democracy's ability to accommodate society. If we view democracy as a philosophy, rather than process or policy, its very flexibility will enhance its success. The role of the international community, then, changes from an enforcer to guide. Future peacebuilding missions must go farther to

reflect a partnership with post-conflict states on their own path to democracy.

The second, but related, enhancement focuses on the evolution of the democratization process. The UNMIH was conducted largely with a specific "exit strategy" in mind. While it is correct to envision healthy democratic development as an ever-building experience, it must also be understood that the road taken is unique and marked with twists and turns. If peacebuilding attempts to aid in the development of the democratic nation-state, it must do so knowing progress is not always measured in calculated steps. Sometimes the state may actually slip briefly in it's progress as crisis looms. During this period, progress made cannot be forgotten. Indeed, the role of the international community should reflect one of renewed support of the positive, not condemnation of the negative. Its role, then, is a commitment to a long-term project. We sometimes forget the evolution of Western democracy is itself a product of centuries, and a work in progress. To assume a state emerging from conflict is equipped to settle all disputes or solve all societal issues with an instant transition to democratic government is overtly optimistic. Certainly, this transition (if allowed to evolve) will indeed become a means by which conflict can be resolved, but there is also an unnecessary

risk involved in assigning such high expectations for a newly democratic state. The process, by its own nature, demands time and patience.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, we must never forget that peacebuilding, security, democracy, and development are about the daily lives of a society's people. These ideals, in effect, form the basis for the future of persons arising from the horrors of war, or the spectre of repression. Democracy reflects hope, and demands change. These needs are not of the realm of high politics, nor of government reform. They speak rather of opportunities for education, employment and a better life. For democracy to be embraced it must first be proven. One could conclude these opportunities must arise from the creation of a non-violent environment made possible by the peacebuilding process. Certainly, this is a pre-requisite, but it has to be followed through with economic development programming. This, again, requires a long-term commitment by the outside community to aid in creating real opportunities. A state worthy of the potential loss of lives during the peacebuilding stage is also deserving of economic investment in real terms to sustain democratic development and ensure societal security.

Democracy in post-conflict zones is indeed viable and

natural. The role of peacebuilding provides a vital bridge between the state's past and future. However, this viability is dependent upon the foundation for the relevance of such a political system. The reality of the peacebuilding regime, however, lies within the realm and politics of Western foreign policy. It serves to promote a worldview that is grounded within a specific political culture that is not easily transplanted under its current expectations of time and philosophy. This is the challenge democracy faces in the developing world at the beginning of the next century. The end of the Cold War has given great opportunities for the future course of democracy. Still, the emergence of a globalized political-economy has also tempered that dialogue to one basic idea and structure. Perhaps the success of newly democratic states rests upon a belief in simplicity - the return to basic and fundamental principles of democracy, rather than its structure.

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4. Samuel Huntington. *The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.*

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6. Kenneth Christie. (1998)"Introduction: The Problem With Ethnicity and 'Tribal' Politics" in *Ethnic Conflict, Tribal Politics A Global Perspective.* Kenneth Christie, ed. Surrey: Curzon Press. p. 1.

7. Mary Kaldor. (1990) *The Imaginary War.* Oxford: Blackwell.

8. Mohammed Ayoob. (1995) *The Third World Security Predicament State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 7. Ayoob's discussion of Southern security issues actually is contrasted with North/Western security in three broad areas, its inability to gain an external orientation, the lack of the emergence of systemic security arrangements, and the unique nature of the developing state to remain unable to link national security requirements to larger regional security needs.

9. Robert O. Slater. "Conflict and Change in the International System" in *Global Transformation and the Third World.* (1993) Robert O. Slater et al ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 313. This terms originates with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia and implies a world system based on no individual power dominated the entire system. During the Cold War, if China is considered a superpower, the system was based on a tripolar structure.

10. Ayoob, p. 8

11. Mohammed Ayoob (Jan. 1991) "The Security Problematic of the Third World" in *World Politics*, 43, p. 259. cited in Mohammed Ayoob (1994) "Security in the Third World: Searching for the Core Variable" in *Seeking Security and Development, The Impact of Military Spending and Arms Transfers.* Norman A. Graham, ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 15.

12. ibid

13. ------- (1985) *Vulnerability Small States in the Global Society. Report of a Commonwealth Consultative Group.* London: Commonwealth Secretariat. p. 23. It is interesting to note, unlike other literature presented, there is a distinction between "external threat" and "internal security". It argues "domestic security and external security are to some extent interdependent ... the greater the degree of domestic security, the less is the vulnerability to external threat". (p. 36) This relationship is explored further in this chapter.

14. Robert Latham. (1997) *The Liberal Moment Modernity, Security and the Making of Postwar International Order.* New York: Columbia University Press, p. 73.

15. Arnold Wolfers (1962) *Discord and Collaboration.* Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, p. 150 cited in Latham

16. Liisa Laakso and Adebayo O. Olukoshi (1996) "The Crisis of the Post-Colonial Nation-State Project in Africa" in A.O. Olukoshi and L. Laakso, eds. *Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa.* Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. p. 7.

17. Yezid Sayigh. (1990) *Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries.* Aldelphi Paper 251. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 8.

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19. ibid

20. John Martinussen. (1997) *Society, State, and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development.* Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, p. 275.

21. ibid, p. 277

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23. Nicole Ball (1988) *Security and Economy in the Third World.* London: Adamantine Press, p. 40.

24. Job, p. 17.

25. Michael Clough (1991) "US Policy Toward the Third World in the Twenty-First Century" in *Third World Security in the post-Cold War Era*. Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, eds. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishes, p. 74.

26. Walter Rostow. (1955) *An American Policy in Asia*. Cited in Diana Hunt. (1989) *Economic Theories of Development: An Analysis of Competing Paradigms*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 45.

27. Boris Kagarlitsky. (1995) *The Mirage of Modernization*. Renfrey Clarke, trans. New York: Monthly Review Press, p. 69.

28. Robbin P. Laird and Erik P. Hoffmann. (1980) "Soviet Perspectives on North-South Relations in the Era of "The Scientific-Technological Revolution". in *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*. Erik P. Hoffman and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, p. 499. Although outdated by all standard, this volume is an valuable historical collection.

29. ibid, p. 500

30. David Easton. (1955) *The Political System*. New York: Alfred Knopf, cited in Martinussen, p. 169.

31. Gabriel S. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds. (1960) *The Politics of Developing Areas*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 17. At the heart of their system they outline specific forces that shape the political process. On the inputs to government policy they consider political socialization, interest articulation and aggregation, and political communication. The outputs are identified as rule making, application and adjudication.

32. These are similar, but somewhat differing to Martinussen's components of democratic thought (see P. 197). His analysis considers democracy as a political system, a prevailing norm, and attitudes. All three are indeed important and represented, the author is considering this issue from a larger perspective.

33. Robert A. Dahl. (1971) *Polyarchy Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 3.

34. ibid

35. ibid, p. 8

36. This definition is largely influenced by Dahl,
Polyarchy. Also taken from Seymour Martin Lipset. (1981)
Political Man. Expanded and updated ed. Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, p. 27; and Juan Lintz. (1978) *The
Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and
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p. 5. The quotation is taken from Larry Diamond et al, eds
(1990) *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing
Experiences with Democracy.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, pp. 6-7.

37. Terry Lynn Karl. "Dilemmas", pp. 1-2 cited in Mahmood
Monshipouri (1995) *Democratization, Liberalization and Human
Rights in the Third World.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner
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38. Zehra F. Arat. (1991) *Democracy and Human Rights in
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39. Monshipouri, pp. 15-16.

40. Samir Amin. (1990) *Delinking: Towards a Polycentric
World.* London: Zed Books Limited, p. 42

41. Anthony Giddens. (1998) *The Third Way: The Renewal of
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42. Arat, p. 17. He notes various terminology including
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democracy,guided democracy, and peoples democracy".

43. P. Resnick. (1997) "What Ever Happened to Civil Society"
in *Twenty-First Century Democracy.* Montreal: McGill-Queens
University Press, p. 42.

44. ibid, p. 98

45. ibid. p. 100

46. Larry Diamond and Juan J. Linz. (1989) "Introduction:
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Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, Volume 4.
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47. Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue.(1994)"State Power and Social Forces: On Political Contention and Accommodation in the Third World". in *State Power and Social Forces*, J. Midgal et al., eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 317.

48. Jeff Haynes. (1997) "Action Groups in Regional Focus" in *Democracy, State in the Third World: Politics and Political Movements.* Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 39.

49. George Konrad cited by Resnick, p. 100

50. This does not refer to the theory of "checks and balances" within the American political system. I use this term simply to stress Konrad's belief in civil society's position as a "counter-power" to the state.

51. Chazan cited in Kohli and Shue, p. 317.

52. Henry Veltmeyer. (1996) "Neo-Liberalism and the Search for Alternative Development. (unedited draft of Working Paper 10,11)

53. Bratton cited in ibid, p. 315.

54. Resnick, pp. 101-105.

55. cited in Kohli and Shue, p. 317.

56. Haynes, p. 28.

57. ibid, p. 25.

58. Ken Booth. (1991) "Security and Emancipation" in *Review of International Studies*. London: Butterworths, 17.

59. ibid, p. 320

60. Samuel P. Huntington (1968) *Political Order in Changing Societies.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

61. David Gillies

62. John Martinussen, pp. 199-200.

63. Monshipouri, p. 27.

64. John Brohman. (1996) *Popular Development Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Development.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, p. 27

65. Henry Veltmeyer and James Petras. (1998) *The Dynamics of Change in Latin America.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

66. Boris Kagarlitsky, *The Mirage of Modernization.* Renfrey Clarke (trans). (1995) New York: Monthly Review Press. p. 69

67. ibid

68. Seymour Martin Lipset. (1964) *Political Man.* London: Mercury Books, p. 50.

69. ibid, p. 46. Lipset cites in the paragraph Max Weber. (1906) "Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie in Russland," *Archiv für Sozialwiessenschaft und Sozialpolitik,* 22, pp. 55ff.

70. Dankwart A. Rustow. (1967) *A World of Nations, Problems of Political Modernization.* Washington: The Brookings Institution, p. 17.

71. ibid, p. 249. It is interesting to note Rustow's assessment of the used of development aid in the context of the Cold War. Rustow harshly criticises American foreign policy during the 1960 for compromising political change without seeking an appropriate social change, and thus, not merely being a tool to "prop up" anti-communist dictatorships.

72. Barrington Moire, Jr. (1993) *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.* Boston: Beacon Press.

73. ibid, p. 413.

74. Diana Hunt. (1989) *Economic Theories of Development: An Analysis of Competing Paradigms.* New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 123.

75. Boutros-Boutros-Ghali. (1992) *An Agenda for Peace.* New York: United Nations, p. 2.

76. Boutros-Boutros-Ghali. (1995) *An Agenda for Development.* New York: United Nations, p. 44.

77. Boutros-Boutros-Ghali. (1996) *An Agenda for Democratization.* New York: United Nations, pp. 6-10.

78. ibid, p. 19

79. *Agenda for Peace, p. 6*

80. Georges Abi-Saab. (1995) "United Nations Peacekeeping Old and New: An Overview of Issues". in *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping.* Daniel Warned, ed. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 1.

81. *Agenda for Peace,* p. 11.

82. ibid, p. 3

83. Steven R. Ratner. (1995) *The New UN Peacekeeping, Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War.* New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 11.

84. ibid

85. *Agenda for Peace,* p. 11.

86. James S. Sutterlin. (1995) *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security, A Challenge* to be Met. Westport: Praeger Publishers, pp. 12-13.

87. See United Nations Charter. Article 39 gives the Security Council authority to "determine the existance of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of agreesion and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security". Articles 41 and 42 offer a host of responses from trade and diplomatic sanctions to the use of military force.

88. Sutterlin, pp. 74-75

89. *Agenda for Peace,* p. 32

90. Michael Harbottle. (1995) *New Roles for the Military Humanitarian and Environmental Security.* Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, No. 285, pp. 5-6.

91. *Agenda for Development,* pp. 22-23.

92. Sutterlin, p. 71.

93. Ratner, p. 16

94. David Cox. (1993) *Exploring the Agenda for Peace: Issues Arising from the Report of the Secretary-General.* Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Global Security. Aurora Papers, vol. 20, p. 14. Cox identifies conserns raised by the *Agenda for Peace* as outlined by a position paper presented at The Non-Aligned Conference held in Jakarta, September 1992.

95. Pierre P. Lizée. (December 1998) "Conflict Resolution as Construction of Security: Peace-Building, Constructive Intervention, and Human Security in Southeast Asia". Paper presented at the Conference of Development and Security in Southeast Asia held in Manila, the Philippines.

96. Anthony Giddens. (1985) *The Nation-State and Violence.* Berkeley: University of Califronia Press, p. 18.

97. Fred R. Von Der Mehden. (1973) *Comparative Political Violence.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp. 8-16.

98. Mohammed Ayoob. (1995) *The Third World Security Predicament.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 28-29

99. ibid, p. 30.

100. ibid, p. 31.

101. Jean-Bertrand Aristide. (1996) *Dignity.* Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, p. 10. Proverb cited by Christophe Wargny in the introduction

102. General Raoul Cédras cited by Wargny

103. This pessimistic attitude is often seen in Northern, namely American, media. As will be shown, such views by the media and politicians may, in fact, be to the determent of the evolution of democracy in Haiti.

104. World Bank, 1995. The figure is cited in -----. (1998) *The Europa World Yearbook 1998, Vol. 1.* London: Europa Publications, p. 1596.

105. Haiti. ODCI.internet source www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ha.html

106. *The Europa World Yearbook, 1998.* p. 1598.

107. ODCI

108. *The Europa World Yearbook, 1998.* p. 1597.

109. Creten Kummar and Elizabeth Cousens. *Policy Briefing: Peacebuilding in Haiti.* New York: International Peace Academy, 1996 internet source www.ipacademy.internet /haiti/htm

110. ibid

111. Michel-Rolph Trouillot. (1990) *Haiti State Against Nation.* Monthly Review Press, p. 15.

112. This is, in essence, what Trouillot argues. He states that despite the wishes of the people, the transition to a democratic system will only be successful after the historical seeds of institutional control are fully abandoned by the state and class structure.

113. David Nicholls (1984). "The Past and Present of Haitian Politics". in *Haiti-Today and Tomorrow An Interdisciplinary Study.* Charles R. Foster and Albert Valdman, eds. New York: University Press of America, p. 253.

114. Irwin P. Stotzky. (1997) *Silencing the Guns in Haiti The Promise of Deliberative Society.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p, 24.

115. The word "elite" is actually used by the upper classes as further distinguishing themselves from the rest of Haitian society. Perhaps one of the most descriptive accounts of this comes from Christophe Wargny in his introduction to Jean-Bertrand Aristide's *Dignity.* He writes, "One percent of the population controls over 40 percent of the wealth. The rich in Haiti like to refer to themselves as "the elite." Philanthropy is not their strongpoint. For them, the shantytown dwellers are nothing more than worms squirming on the ground. Worms that, fortunately, do not infest the heights of Pétionville.", p. 4.

116. ibid

117. Trouillot, p.106.

118. James Ferguson. (1989) *Papa Doc, Baby Doc Haiti and the Duvaliers.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 28-29.

119. Patrick Bellegarde-Smith. (1984) "Overview of Haitian Foreign Policy and Relations". in *Haiti-Today and Tomorrow An Interdisciplinary Study.* Charles R. Foster and Albert Valdman, eds. New York: University Press of America, p. 272.

120. ibid, p. 30. As will be demonstrated this is a trend in Haitian political history.

121. ibid

122. Elizabeth Abbott. (1988) *Haiti The Duvaliers and Their Legacy.* New York: McGraw-Hill, p. 56.

123. Ferguson, p. 45.

124. Trouillot, p. 242

125. ibid, p. 167

126. Luc Smarth. (1997) "Popular Organizations and the Transition to Democracy in Haiti", in *Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: the Transformation of Social Life.* Micheal Kaufman and A. Alfonso (eds). Ottawa: International Development Research Centre and Zed Press, p. 104

127. --------, (1990) *In the Army's Hands Human Rights in Haiti on the Eve of the Elections.* New York: National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, Americas Watch, p. 1.

128. ibid

129. ibid, p. 7

130. Smarth, p. 104

131. Catherine A. Sunshine. (April 20, 1987) "Haiti: how far from democracy". *Christianity and Crisis.*

132. *In the Army's Hands, pp. 2-3*

133. Smarth, p. 104

134. Jean-Bertrand Aristide in a speech to the Pax Christi USA Anniversary Assembly, Washington, DC August 8, 1997. Manuscript obtained from website www.fonaristide.org/ speaches.html

135. Smarth, p. 103

136. OCDI

137. *Jean-Bertrand Aristide Biography.* Obtained from website www.fonaristide.org/aristidbio.html

138. Smarth, p. 113

139. ibid, p. 133

140. ibid, p. 107

141. Jean-Germain Gros. (October, 1997) "Haiti's Flagging Transition". in *Journal of Democracy Studies.* Volume 8, Number 4, p. 97.

142. --------. (1992) *Human Rights Watch World Report 1992.* New York: Human Rights Watch, p. 253.

143. Gros, p. 98

144. Michael Bailey, Robert Maguire et al. *Haiti: Military-Police Partnership for Public Security.* Institute for National Security Studies. Obtained from website www.ndu.edu/inss/books/policing/chapter7.html

145. --------. (1995) *The United Nations and the Situation in Haiti.* New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, p. 17. This figure is based on troop levels specified in Security
Council Resolution 940 (1994).

146. Comments made by President Bertand Aristide at UN transition ceremony, March 31, 1995. *Foreign Policy Bulletin.* May/June, 1995, p. 78.

147. see Mohammed Ayoob.

148. James R. Morrell et al. (March, 1999). "Haiti and the Limits to Nation-Building". in *Contemporary History.* pp. 127-132.

149. Morris Morley and Chris McGillion. (Fall 1997) "Disobedient" Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti". *Political Science Quarterly,* p. 365. The Bush Administration was so afraid of President Aristide and his "revolution" that the Central Intelligence Agency recruited Emmanuel Constant, leader of the pro-military Front for the Advancement and Progress in Haiti to spy on the activities of the Aristide government.

150. Georges Faurior. (Fall, 1988) "Friendly Tyrants: An American Foreign Policy Dilemma" in *Orbis,* p. 599.

151. Morely and McGillion, pp. 371-372. Its interesting to note Clinton used Haiti as a campaign ploy in 1992. During the election, he stood closer to the principles held by Aristide himself, immediate dissolution of the military and military government and justice for the victims of the coup.

152. Charles Krauthammer (March 29, 1999) *The Clinton Doctrine.* Time Magazine. Obtained from internet website http://cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/1999/03/29/doctrine.html

153. Various writers stress that fact. During the 1992 Presidential campaign Clinton was quick to denounce the Bush's Administration's policy of forced repatriation of refugees to Haiti. After his victory, this policy was continued.

154.   Morcos Mendiburu and Sarah Meek. (1996) *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti.* Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, p. 28. The authors indicate these considerations were both domestic and external. The Administration did not want a protracted presence to loose support of an already sceptical Republican Congress, minimizing the risk of loss of lives as occurred in Somalia, and upset other states in the region.

155. The Governor's Island Agreement, however, was not implemented until a year after its signing. The military's refusal to abide to its own terms and the subsequent *USS Harlen County Incident* served as justifications for the US and UN to defer sending troops ashore to stabilize the country for the MNF. The *Harlen County* was the transport vessel used to deploy the first U.S. Marines and Canadian troops on October 12, 1993. The ship left Port-aux-Prince Harbour without docking due to demonstrations supported by the military and business elites. This cautious stance is widely attributed to the loss of American soldiers during UN missions in Somalia and Bosnia during the same time.

156.   *The United Nations and the Situation in Haiti.* New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, pp. 5-6.

157. Michel Rossignol. (September, 1994) *Haiti: International Efforts to Restore Democracy.* Background Paper. Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, p. 9. Aristide originally wanted the leaders of the jaunta arrested in anticipation of an eventual trial.

131

158. ibid, p. 12.

159. ibid, p. 13.

160. see Chapter One.

161. Jean-Germaine Gros, pp. 99-106.

162. Such sentiments were expressed by Senator John McCain, a Republican from Arizona. In his testimony before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs on July 12, 1995, he stated that recorded irregularities in the election cannot be trivialized. if this is done, it would allow Haitian democracy to be measured differently than other emerging democracies around the globe. This was contrasted by Representative Porter Goss, a Republican from Florida. Goss testified that, despite the voting irregularities, the "mood" of the electorate was more relaxed and, therefore, progress was made.

163. This contentious point is held by many Aristide supporters who feel the President's time in exile should not count against his term in office.

164. Pamela Constable (February, 1996) "A Fresh Start for Haiti?" in *Current History*, p. 65-66.

165. *The Europa World Yearbook 1998*, p. 1596. In the period of 1985-95 the GDP degreased by an average of 3.1%, while Haiti's population increased by 2.0%.

166. Greg Chamberlain. (1997) "Préval: Long on Goodwill, Short on Results". *Haiti Insight Online.* National Coalition for Haitian Rights. volume 7, number 3. Obtained from website www.nchr.org/insight/preval.html.

167. Chetan Kumar and David Malone of the International Peace Academy at a press briefing in recent developments in Haiti, January 20, 1999.

168. --------. (January, 28, 1999) "U.S. Congressmen Visit Haiti Amid Government Crisis". *Reuters.* Obtained from website cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9901/28/BC-HAITI.reut/index.html

169. see remarks made by Kumar and Malone

170. *The Europa World Yearbook, 1998.* p. 1595.

171. ------. (January, 22, 1999) "Haitians Stage General Strike to Back Parliament". *Reuters*. Obtained from website cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9901/22/BC-HAITI.reut/index.html

172. *The Europa World Yearbook, 1998.* p. 1595.

173. Chetan Kumar and Elizabeth Cousens. (1996) *Policy Briefing: Peacebuilding in Haiti*. International Peace Academy. Obtained from website www.ipacademy.inter.net/haiti.htm.

174. Pamela Constable (1996), p. 67.

175. "Peacekeeping - The RCMP's Role". obtained from the RCMP's website www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/cgi-bin/rcmpbold.pl/html/peacekeeping.htm?Haiti

176. Michael Bailey, Robert Maguire et al. *Haiti: Military-Police Partnership for Public Security.*

177. *The United Nations and the Situation in Haiti*, p. 3.

178. ibid, p. 7

179. Gros, p. 105.

180. Pamela Constable (1996), p. 68.

181. William G. O'Neill (1997) "The Haitian National Police: A Mixed Record". *Haiti Insight Online.* volume 7, number 3. Obtained from website www.nchr.org/insight/hmprec.html.

182. Mendiburu and Meek, p. 23.

183. ibid, p. 23.

184. Laurie Richardson. (May/June 1996) "Disarmament Derailed". *NACLA Report on the Americas.* volume 29, number 6, p. 12.

185. Nomi Bar-Yaacov. (Summer/Fall, 1995) "Diplomacy and Human Rights: The Role of Human Rights in Conflict Resolution in El Salvador and Haiti" in *The Fletcher Forum,* p. 58.

186. ibid.

187. William G. O'Neill. (Spring, 1995) "Human Rights Monitoring vs. Political Expediency: The Experience of the OAS/UN Mission in Haiti" in *Harvard Human Rights Journal*, pp. 107-111

188. cited in Ian Martin. (Summer, 1994) "Haiti: Mangled Multilateralism". in *Foreign Policy*, p. 76.

189. Fanny Benedetti (1996) "Haiti's Truth and Justice Commission" in *The Human Rights Brief*. The Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Washington College of Law, American University. obtained from website www.wel.american.edu/pub/humright/brief/v3i3/haiti33.htm

190. O'Neill (1995), p. 123.

191. ------. (October, 22, 1994) "Not-so-pampered in exile" in *The Economist*.

192. ------. (December 9, 1998) "France Considers Prosecuting Haiti's 'Baby Doc'". CBC. obtained from website www.cbcnews.cbc.ca/cgi-bin/templates/view.cgi?/news/1998/12/babydoc981209

193. see Kenneth D. Bush. (1996) "Beyond Bundgee Cord Humanitarianism: Towards a Developmental Agenda for Peacebuilding". in *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*. Special Issue. Ottawa: University of Ottawa, Micheal Harbottle. (1995), John Linabelli. (Summer, 1996) "Peace-Building" in *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy*, and Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo. (Spring, 1994) "Obstacles to Peacebuilding" in *Foreign Policy*.