PROBLEM AND MYSTERY:
A FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION
IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS
OF GABRIEL MARCEL

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by

David M. Bulger

ST. MARY'S UNIVERSITY
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He is all pine and I am apple orchard.
My apple trees will never get across
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.
He only says, "Good Fences make good neighbors."

-- Robert Frost, "Mending Wall"

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PREFACE

I have titled this thesis "Problem and Mystery: a fundamental distinction in the philosophical writings of Gabriel Marcel" with an eye to the source material which I have found most useful in its preparation. I have examined certain of the dramatic works of Marcel and found them helpful in achieving an understanding of certain points, but on the specific question of problem and mystery and on most related questions, I have found certain of the philosophical works more valuable.

Since frequent reference must be made to these works, I have adopted a series of abbreviations of titles which I use throughout in footnotes. Any time a work is referred to in the text of this study, however, it will be mentioned by its full title, not by the abbreviation. The abbreviations and the works to which they refer are:

BH-Being and Having, Katharine Farrer, trans., (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1965)

EA-Être et Avoir, Èditions Montaigne, 1935

MJ-Metaphysical Journal, (London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1952)

MJ Preface-refers to Marcel's preface to the English edition of the Metaphysical Journal, written in 1950.

Fidelity-Creative Fidelity, Robert Rosthal, trans., (New York: Farrer, Straus and Co., 1964). Fidelity is used in preference to "CF" for the reason that in footnotes there is the possibility of confusion with the technical abbreviation "Cf."

MB I-The Mystery of Being: vol. I., Reflection and Mystery., (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951)

MB II-The Mystery of Being: vol. II., Faith and Reality., (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952)

HV-Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962)

PE-Philosophy of Existence, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949)

MAH-Man Against Humanity, (London: The Harvill Press, Ltd., 1952)

Dignity-The Existential Background of Human Dignity., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963)

It must be noted also that in any quotations reproduced from Marcel's works, any underscorings are his own unless specifically noted in the corresponding footnote.

Finally, any use of the pronoun "I" outside of this preface, will be purely and simply in an attempt to preserve in my commentary the character of Marcel's argument since in many instances he will develop notions by referring to first person experiences. I think

that such a use of "I" on Marcel's part is very much bound up with his notion of the "appeal" which we shall examine below. He is supplying to the reader the necessary pronoun to bring the argument back to himself.

INTRODUCTION

There are at least three possible ways of treating Gabriel Marcel's distinction between "problem and mystery". One of these could be a very long treatment, one a very short treatment, a third falling somewhere between the first two. The distinction could be treated in one way, then, by attempting to range far afield over every aspect of Marcel's position in an attempt to show how the distinction functions in his thought, or we could proceed by summoning up the few instances in Marcel's works where he explicitly discusses the distinction. The treatment in this paper will attempt something of a middle ground, somewhere between merely considering the various formulations of the distinction and showing it at work in every facet of Marcel's position.

However, there are definite difficulties in adopting the middle position. The very short treatment has the advantage of being able to substantiate every claim made with a definite and relatively clear-cut (for Marcel) text. The longer treatment has the advantage of drawing out all the instances where the distinction is operative, and of showing by sheer weight of evidence both the nature of the distinction and its importance. The middle position lacks the categorical statements

of the short treatment and the superior weight of the long one. All that can be hoped for from such a treatment is that what is discussed proves sufficient to the task of exhibiting the distinction and attempting to show how it operates.

The chief problem facing the commentator is how to draw together elements from various corners of Marcel's work and fuse them into a unified presentation. Much of what will be adduced as textual evidence for specific contentions we shall make about either the problematic or the metaproblematic--terms which, as we shall see, can be used to designate the areas Marcel understands as those of "problem" and "mystery"--appears largely in passing in the discussion of some other aspect of Marcel's position. This is the case because the distinction is a "working" one, it underlies and permeates large areas of Marcel's thought. Thus, in a discussion of questions such as the nature of faith, or the being o f man, a remark which is very important to our general understanding of "mystery", may appear in a parenthetical inclusion in a sentence. To reproduce this remark intelligently would require an exposition of the context leading up to the remark, and a demonstration of how it fits into such a context. Such an undertaking would produce a paper of much larger proportions than is necessary for the immediate needs of our present study.

The alternative, however, is to extract the remark from its context, letting it stand alone. While in most cases the remarks are such that an extraction of this sort is possible, in some instances there may appear puzzling references to areas other than what we have been discussing. Where practicable we shall try briefly to point out the context of the remark.

Since much of the important material necessary to our discussion is disposed in this manner throughout the Marcellian corpus, it is to be expected that there is nothing resembling a unified discussion of the distinction.. What we are dealing with, as we have pointed out, is the problem of bringing scattered material together into a single discussion. What we lack are statements on the part of Marcel that, for example, characteristic B of the problematic follows from characteristic A. For characteristic A may very well be referred to in one work, while characteristic B appears in another. What is important, however, is that both characteristics may be related in such a way that B seems to follow from A, a relationship which may, at first, seem very tenuous. What is needed is discussion of areas in which these characteristics appear and in which the relationship begins to crystallize.

With this in mind the best way of approaching the question before us is the very long approach of which we have spoken. It will show us at the end of our

discussion how the various facets are related to one another throughout the whole corpus. In this sense, perhaps the best of all approaches would be to simply reproduce the entire Marcellian corpus.

Taking a cue from Marcel himself we have decided upon an approach which is "musical".[1] What we shall do is state at the outset certain themes, which will be presented in a fairly discrete manner, connected only by their overall relationship to the general subject under discussion. We shall introduce new themes in much the same way as the paper progresses. We shall vary the themes, as in a work of music. We shall introduce new elements into them, changing the point of view each time. In so doing, we may find two or more themes beginning to relate themselves to each other through this new variation. As the work progresses, moreover, we may find some of our original themes beginning to appear in places where the dominant theme is something not immediately seen as related to them.

Ultimately, as in a work of music, we should be able to reintroduce the various themes with their subsequent variations and relationships in a finale which more or less unifies them. At this point, after following the entire work through, the relationships should be more obvious.

What we wish to avoid by this manner of proceeding are arbitrary judgments that such-and-such is based upon such-and-such when, in fact, Marcel does not make

that explicit judgment. The problem we run into is that in proceeding in this way, we run the risk of seeming to be repetitious. If, however, a careful examination is made of areas of seeming repetition, it is hoped that the change in point of view between the original statement of the theme and its reappearance will become evident. In all cases, our concern is to provide evidence upon which to make our judgments in the fourth and last chapter of this study. For the most part those judgments will have to stand without the support of definite texts, since, as has been intimated already, Marcel refrains from so explicit a tying together as we shall attempt. Thus, the only support we shall have is that of the increasingly evident relationships which have developed throughout the first three chapters. The difficulties in presenting an adequate examination of the "problem-mystery" distinction not withstanding, however, let us turn to the issue directly.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

It seems to be common practice among writers of articles and monographs on Gabriel Marcel to make reference to the lack of anything in his writings resembling an abstract, systematic approach to philosophical questions.[1] We find ourselves in agreement with these commentators on this point, and would wish to emphasize this absence. The chief difficulty which such a situation presents to the commentator is to know how to treat the material. Although one is inclined to try to reduce what is systematic to a more clearly defined, if not systematized, form. Marcel himself views such an inclination as a "temptation", thereby implying the possibility that it is to be avoided.

> "Doubtless those who have tried to expound my thought have often yielded to the temptation of systematizing it..." [2]

The lack of system, then, is not something incidental to Marcel's work. It is not a flaw, however bothersome it may be to minds of a highly "analytic" bent; rather, it is a positive notion, central to Marcel's whole work. What we are dealing with is not a mere lack, an oversight perhaps, but an active and conscious rejection of the systematic.[3]

> "For towards 1923, or at a slightly later date, I became aware that I would be unfaithful to myself if I tried to set out in a systematic form what had occurred to me in quite a different way." [4]

This rejection of the systematic on Marcel's part was no mere whim founded upon what was at best superficial acquaintance with systematic philosophy. He writes that he was "...deeply impressed by post-Kantian philosophy, particularly by Schelling."[5] He found, however, a great deal of difficulty in attempting to relate these grand systems of reason to the facts of his own experience.[6] "As I reflected on this question, it became clear that such an integration could not be accomplished or even seriously attempted..."[7] The reasons for this are bound up in some of Marcel's own personal experiences which we shall discuss shortly.

Marcel himself is not above the temptation to be systematic in his approach,[8] for he notes:

> "I do not deny that I have a nostalgia for system-building, and I admire the rigor with which Louis Lavelle, for example, ties up the loose ends of his doctrine. But I cannot hide the fact that my admiration is mingled with a certain distrust..." 9

This distrust, he remarks elsewhere, is due to his "general tendency to bring out difficulties instead of concealing them."[10] One of the difficulties with the systematic is that "...no systematisation is possible without constant recourse to the notion of totality."[11] Yet my experience, my thought, is not complete, not a totality but still developing.[12] Thus there can be no systematisation of my own thought, there can be no such thing as <u>my</u> philosophy.[13]

The system as Marcel conceives it is essentially a

manipulable entity which increases the "network of communications which links our ideas together,"[14] on the one hand, and on the other, makes these ideas more communicable by consolidating them into an entity which can be shown.[15] Ultimately, such a network, precise, well-defined, and, moreover, easily communicated, makes the philosopher seem at least to be the master of a definite sphere.

> "Moreover, it is clear that a system based on definitions and theorems decidedly diminishes the inferiority complex philosophers have had for the past fifty years with the development of the empirical sciences." [16]

We shall try wherever possible to avoid the trap of systematisation in this study. It is our hope, as we noted above in the Introduction, to present a work of a more musical order in which theme and countertheme play to a finale.

With what we have just seen in mind, there are at least two areas at which we must look before beginning the discussion of problem and mystery proper. We shall try to see first to what extent Marcel's experience has influenced his thought, and secondly, to get some idea of just how philosophy "goes about its business."

Marcel himself notes that there are several areas of his life, particularly the experiences of his early years, which have affected his later thought. The first and most important of these is his notion of the contrast between his mother and his aunt. Marcel's mother died when he was quite young.[17]

> "Judging from what I have heard of her and from her letters, full of sparkling vivacity, she was an exceptional person, marvellously adjusted to life...I have few visual memories of her; but she has remained present and mysteriously with me throughout my life." 18

After the death of his mother, the care of the family came under the aegis of Marcel's aunt, who, like his father,[19] was something of an agnostic. A convert to Protestantism from a former state of indifference to religion, this lady does not seem to have changed greatly following her "conversion".[20]

> "...she had an acute and implacable sense of the absurdity of existence. Nature, if not utterly evil, at least indifferent to right and wrong, was to her completely unreliable. In the essentially uninhabitable world in which an incomprehensible play of circumstances had caused us to be born, there was only one recourse: to forget oneself, to strive to lighten the burden of one's fellow sufferers, and to submit to the most severe self-discipline, for outside this there was nothing but license." 21

The tension between the image[22] of his mother, witty, vivacious, charming, and the reality of his aunt who was "very different from her in character"[23] has had a great effect upon the development of what is perhaps the most central element in Marcel's thought, the distinction between the visible and the invisible, between the verifiable and the unverifiable, and, as we shall see, between the problematic and the mysterious.

> "I believe now that this disparity, this hidden polarity between the seen and the unseen, has played a far greater part in my life and thought than any other influence which may be apparent in my writings." 24

Marcel also sees aspects of his family life as the sources of elements of his thought. For example, in a discussion dealing specifically with the family,[25] Marcel observes that for some members of the family the child is "...a cause of preoccupation and a subject of discussion"[26] when he is not present. This notion can easily be compared with the following passage from Marcel's autobiographical essay: "I guessed that, after I had gone to bed, the conversation in the drawing-room turned to my inadequacies and on what could be expected of me."[27] It is not greatly surprising, of course, that in a discussion of the family one might want to draw upon one's own experience, still this can stand as an example of the influence of Marcel's family life upon his thought. There are others.

In line with the discussion above, Marcel notes that a good part of the time such conversations concerned his position in school.[28] He feels that there was undue importance attached to his scholastic achievements. "I felt each time that it was a test of my whole being, since no distinction seemed to be made between my scholastic output and myself."[29] While Marcel, at this point, does not relate this notion to any specific element in his thought, we might do well to bear in mind the identification between output and person when we come to consider the question of function in chapter II.

Another aspect of Marcel's family life which had an effect upon his later thought was the area of apparent discord in terms of "temperament and opinion" between different members of the family.[30] On a certain level, the level of formulation of an opinion, the level of concept, there seemed to him to be no ground for any sort of reconciliation.

> "This led me, quite apart from any technical speculation, to perceive directly that there is a certain radical weakness in the faculty of judgment and that it is necessary to assume (I will not say conceive) the existence of a domain beyond speech in which harmony can be discerned..." [31]

On the level of judgment, the variety of opinions among the members of his family could not be reconciled in any way. Only on a "higher" level was such reconciliation possible, and since such agreement was necessary to the familial bond, Marcel posits the existence of this level, which we shall see to be the level of mystery.

Marcel writes that as a child he often prevailed upon his aunt and his grandmother to take him to remote places on his holidays. It seems to him, in retrospect, that what such desires indicated was a need to take root in those places, to feel at home: "...what mattered to me was to discover an <u>elsewhere</u> which should be essentially a <u>here</u>."[32] The attraction he felt for other European countries and locations was for him part of this need to extend the area in which he was at home.[33]

> "...oddly enough, the completely exotic countries attracted me less, no doubt because I had no hope to take root in them, to discover in them a new home which, at the same time, should be truly mine. That is why I would suggest that the metaphysics of *at home* of which I have traced the outlines in my *Du Refus a l'Invocation* already underlay my apparently childish fancies." 34

It will be impossible within our present limits to discuss Marcel's notion of "at home"[35] which is important for his notion of an active receptivity,[36] but at least we can note his view that the basis for these notions is in the need to feel at home "elsewhere".

There is one other area of Marcel's life which needs some consideration before we pass on to a discussion of some general aspects of his notion of philosophy. This is the area of Marcel's activities during the war years 1914-1918. He notes that because of his poor health he was not called up for active duty. As a result, wishing to serve in some capacity, he accepted a position with the Red Cross.

> "Our work consisted at first in obtaining news of the wounded who were hospitalized in the ambulances of the *Union des Femmes de France*; it turned out, however, that these were nearly always able to write to their families, and we were soon besieged with inquiries about others of whom nothing had been heard." 37

Oftentimes these men turned up dead or else there was no word at all about them.[38] Their relatives came to inquire about them and it was Marcel's job to see these people and to provide them with what information he had.

> "Every day I received personal visits from the unfortunate relatives who implored us to obtain what information we could; so that in the end every index card was to me a heart-rending personal appeal." 39

Rather than simply treating these individuals as items in a filing system,[40] Marcel found himself obliged to confront them on a personal level, people "from all walks of life,"[41] "persons of flesh and blood whose anguish was immediately conveyed to me by voice and glance."[42] It is at this point that Marcel's notion of the other as person begins to develop. He regards this period as one of "...the concrete sources of my reflections on the relation between the I and thou[43] and the metaphysical implications of the thou."[44]

In our discussion of Marcel's rejection of the systematic, some of the passages quoted show remarks to the effect that philosophy which is systematic is to be held in distrust. At this point, it might be well to pass from a discussion of Marcel's life to one of his conception of philosophy so that we can get some grasp of the conditions of his philosophizing.

For Marcel, philosophy is, first and foremost, characterized by the notion of a search,[45] or what is perhaps more precise,[46] an exploration.

> "From my point of view such a term as search or investigation--some term implying the notion of a quest--is the most adequate description that can be applied to the essential direction of philosophy. Philosophy will always, to my way of thinking, be an aid to discovery rather than a matter of strict demonstration." 47

This search is not to be confused with the search of the scientist for specimens or even for data.[48] The scientist's search is marked by a definiteness of direction, by a purposefulness which is lacking to philosophy.

> "Where a technician, like the chemist, starts off with some very general notion, a notion given in advance of what he is looking for, what is peculiar to a philosophic investigation is that the man who undertakes it cannot possess anything equivalent to that notion given in advance of what he is looking for. It would not, perhaps, be imprecise to say that he starts off at random..." [49]

Like the explorer, the philosopher sets out to discover without any preconception as to what he is going to discover, as Marcel puts it at one point, "...everything starts from zero."[50]

For Marcel, the philosopher is much more than a mere technician, ein Fachmensch.[51] His concern must be for more than simply the construction of dialectics, of systems of thought, or abstract worlds. "Personally, I am inclined to deny that any work is philosophical if we cannot discern in it what may be called the sting of reality."[52] Any work which tends to substitute a systematic abstraction of greater or lesser complexity for a genuine search for reality will, for Marcel, have little claim to the title of "philosophical".

Philosophy must, on the contrary, ground itself in what is experienced, in what is felt by the individual. It must arise out of this basis if it is to consider its questions. Hence, "...the philosopher who compels

himself to think only as a philosopher places himself on the hither side of experience in an infra-human realm; but philosophy implies an exaltation of experience, not a castration of it."[53]

For Marcel, abstraction is the enemy of true philosophical thought.[54] His insistence on the concrete has the effect of emphasizing experiences which he holds have not been traditionally considered philosophical data. He remarks in the Preface to Homo Viator that in the texts following he will not be conforming to "philosophical rules".[55] Elsewhere, in speaking of the importance which he attaches to "encounters"[56] he notes "They are a spiritual fact of the highest importance, though unrecognized by traditional philosophy."[57] Further, in a study of the bond which holds a community together, he writes:

> "It would be relevant at this point to refer to a few simple, immediate experiences which philosophers have either wrongly ignored because they seemed trivial, or unduly intellectualized by applying to them the traditional normative criteria." [58]

What Marcel means here are experiences such as having been loved, having been the object of hope, having suffered.[59]

Marcel sees the basis of metaphysics as a position of confrontation with the possibility of absolute lack of hope, that is, metaphysics' position is to be taken up "face to face with despair";[60] and he remarks in much the same vein that "...the fact that suicide is always

possible is the essential starting point of any genuine metaphysical thought."[61] He sees the problem of the soul as the pivot of metaphysics,[62] and fidelity, hope and love as approaches to ontology.[63]

Another area Marcel considers "fair game" is the area of religion, in particular, Christianity. This can be seen as merely another example of his emphasis on the "exaltation of experience".

> "Now, as any other time, the philosopher is placed in a given historical situation from which he is most unlikely to abstract himself completely; he would deceive himself if he thought that he could create a complete void both within and around himself. Now this historical situation implies as one of its essential data the existence of the Christian fact--quite independently of whether the Christian religion is accepted and its fundamental assertions are regarded as true or false. What appears to me evident is that we cannot reason to-day as though there were not behind us centuries of Christianity..." [64]

Christianity is a fact of experience[65] and as such, according to the conception of philosophy we are evolving, it must be considered the concern of the philosopher.

Marcel's manner of philosophizing is in "the nature of an appeal to the listener or reader, of a kind of call upon his inner resources."[66] It is the production of "currents"[67] whereby life can be reborn in regions of the mind which have yielded to apathy and are exposed to decomposition."[68] What Marcel attempts to do, then, is not to demonstrate abstract truths or weigh the argument down with statistics, but rather he attempts to evoke a "response",[69] a resonant chord, an harmonic

vibration. It is not greatly surprising, therefore, that such a "method" should find it advantageous to proceed by means of the use of metaphor.[70]

Moreover, this form of philosophizing falls well within the realm of what Marcel terms "proof". For him, when I am trying to "prove something to someone",

> "The proposition I am concerned to prove is for him part of a zone of darkness, contrasted with the zone which is illumined for him as for me... I believe one can say that I am concerned with prevailing on him, i.e. on his attention, really, to focus an intense enough light on his field of apperception to enable him to reach that adjoining region in near proximity which was already illumined for me but is still in the shadows for him." 71

Any sort of manner in which I can bring this light to bear upon the darkness will be considered a "proof", by this definition. For Marcel, as we have seen, this bringing to bear of light is bound up with the use of metaphor to evoke a response in an individual. In strict terms, this can make little claim to consideration as a "proof", a demonstration leaving no doubt as to its conclusion. But Marcel notes that the interesting thing about any proof is that it is useless when it is most needed.

> "Thus we confront the paradox that generally, proof is efficacious only when we can if necessary do without it; while on the other hand, it will always seem circular to the person to whom it is directed and who must be persuaded." 72

Marcel entertains some suspicions about the value of objective verification as proof in some instances. Such verification always involves the notion of "normal conditions."

> "...when I affirm that a certain proposition is verifiable, I imply that there is a set of conditions which are general in principle, i.e. are understood as normal or applicable to any agent capable of uttering valid judgments." 73

He is not referring here to experiences which are almost entirely objective in character for which these conditions may be postulated, but to areas where such a postulate must be ruled out of court.

> "For instance, on the level of appreciation or of aesthetic creation, the idea of a postulate is devoid of meaning. A particular musical composition, for example, seems a pure chaos of sound to my neighbor while I discern an order which completely escapes him: shall we say that one of us is experiencing it under normal conditions while the other is not? This is plainly an improper way of speaking. It would be more appropriate to say that I am somehow in harmony with the work while my neighbor is not." 74

In this instance the place of normal conditions is rather doubtful. The connection between such an experience and philosophy may not at this point be entirely clear, but it will become clearer as the paper progresses.

Marcel's notion of his philosophical activity is one of a "drilling" rather than a "construction",[75] a digging into experience rather than an attempt to build a model of it.[76] His position has been termed a "Neo-Socratism",[77] a term Marcel rather likes,[78] for the reason that "the term neo-Socratism implies above all the--in no way sceptical--attitude of interrogation that is constant with me..."[79]

There is one aspect of Marcel's life upon which[80]

we have not touched yet because it seems to demand consideration by itself. This is the place of music in his life, something Marcel looks upon as having had a fundamental influence on his thought.

> "In an excellent article in Commonweal[81] on the style of my thought, Mr. Seymour Cain observed correctly that I am not a spectator who is looking for a world of structures susceptible of being viewed clearly and distinctly, but rather that I listen to the voices and appeals comprising that symphony of Being..." 82

For Marcel, Being is not an abstract structure, or even a spectacle for my viewing,[83] but rather a symphony, a tumult of sound, a variety of voices and rhythms, a texture of statements made, varied, recapitulated, varied again. It is expressed in crescendos, diminuendos, crashing fortissimos and subtle pianissimos. It dies away only to renew itself in a new movement. About this description of his work, Marcel comments:

> "Nothing could be more precise. Without any allusion to the fundamental role music has played in my life, it must be remembered that my thinking takes its departure above all from feeling, from reflection on feeling and on its implications." 84

The state of harmonic resonance which we have just discussed above, the feeling evoked by a work of music or by a well-tuned metaphor, all of this is considered by Marcel as essential to his thought.

Moreover, in looking back over his life, Marcel finds that it can be aptly described in musical terms.

> "...encounters always appear in retrospect as having been called for from within my very self so that in such a domain the distinction between external and internal ultimately becomes irrelevant, of more exactly, becomes absorbed into an harmonically

> richer reality. It seems to me that these encounters which enrich the very texture of our lives can be understood by analogy with what happens in musical creation where one theme calls forth another." [85]

We shall see considerably more of this breaking down of the distinction between the internal and the external as the paper progresses. We can pass over it for now, but we shall return to it later.

As he notes,[86] Marcel is fond of frequent use of musical metaphors to draw out the meaning of his work.. For example, he speaks of the development of his thought in the Mystery of Being as having "moved by working gradually and progressively at the orchestration of a number of themes which were the initial data."[87] Throughout his works,[88] one comes up against this sort of usage.

The influence of music on Marcel's philosophical development began when he was quite young, when he found that the deciphering of music "awoke in me the desire for the concrete".[89] He also notes, again with reference to non-abstraction, that:

> "It is most likely that my passion for music helped to prevent me from imagining this world, if to imagine is, at least in some sense, to project a form into space; this explains the conviction of profound truth which came to me with the discovery of Schopenhauer's theory of music." [90]

The non-structural dynamism of music, the experience of which might be described as "enfolding",[91] prevents the establishment of cold structures, first abstracted and then inserted into reality.

But the influence of music goes even deeper than simply the use of metaphors or the invoking of a desire

for the concrete. Marcel describes the essays in Homo Viator[92] as being, in essence, musical. We are no longer entirely on the plane of analogy, but dealing with a definite description of at least some aspects of Marcel's thought. Later in the same work, he uses as a working distinction, a distinction between the order of the logical and the order of the musical, in which latter sphere he finds that a particular phenomenon belongs.[93] The reason for this sort of statement is that music functions far more deeply in Marcel's thought than simply as an influence or an occasion for the use of metaphor.

Referring back to the years around the advent of the First World War, Marcel recalls the effect of music upon him at that time.

> "In music I found a mysterious and unshakeable testimony: A musical phrase by Bach or Beethoven--and here I mean almost exclusively the Beethoven of the last period--seemed invested with a supreme authority which did not allow of any explanation. One was beyond knowledge and yet it was as if one breathed a certainty which went infinitely beyond the limits of a simple, individual emotion deriving from a particular temperament or sensitivity. The greatest musical works seemed to invoke directly a certain communion." [94]

He describes the experience of great musical works in terms of "beyond" knowledge and "beyond" simply an emotional reaction. In this passage we see music described as opening up an area almost of "certainty",[95] transcending the knowledge of individual objects.[96] The certainty of which Marcel speaks is bound up in a supra-rational universality given in music. This is a universality which occurs beyond the level of the

conceptual.

> "Through a phrase from Brahms (in one of the Intermezzi, op. 118, I think) which has been in my head the whole afternoon, I have suddenly come to see that there is a universality which is not of the conceptual order; that is the key to the idea of music." 97

The unity of a musical theme, moreover, is something which transcends the elements which make it up; it cannot be broken down into an aggregation of those elements. It is possible, of course, to break up a line of music, or even a whole work, into the notes and chords which make it up, but to do so "...is to have lost sight of the individual, qualified reality of the chord or of the melody, substituting for it a <u>schema</u> which has no more relation to the melody than an anthropometric gauge has the the pictorial essence of a human face."[98] To break up a melody in such a way is, in fact, to miss the forest for the sake of the trees, much as the musician who is simply a technician will become so engrossed in the contrapuntal value of a discord that he misses its "inner necessity to which, however, no strictly logical character can be attached."[99]

In music, moreover, there is a further unity or identity which transcends the notes, chords and melodies which make it up. This is the unity of the thing stated with the way in which it is stated.[100]

> "Consider non-representative musical expression. It is a sphere where the thing stated cannot be distinguished from the manner of stating it. In this sense and in this sense only, music has, strictly speaking, no meaning, but perhaps just because it is meaning." 101

Music cannot be broken down into "statement" and "meaning", we cannot search for a meaning outside of the actual musical expression, for the expression is the meaning. Music is its own meaning.

Music is the place of transcendent unity, of supra-conceptual universality, and of "certainty" which is beyond knowledge. It is a place of mysterious resolution in a higher order for the conceptual discords we have seen Marcel refer to above, the differences of opinion and temperament, a palce other than the world of external objects, "...the world in which I move when I am improvising on the piano, a world which is also, I am quite certain, the world in which the creative musician constructs his melodies. It is the world in which everything is communication, in which everything is bound together."[102]

There are two final notions which we will undertake to examine here as further background to the problem-mystery distinction. One is a notion predating the distinction but which must be considered an early formulation of it;[103] the second, which we shall treat of first, is the notion which appears after Marcel's initial formulation of the distinction[104] but which seems to be a "type" of the mystery half of the distinction. This latter notion is so briefly discussed by Marcel[105] that by no argument could we justify assigning a separate section for it. The first notion, on the other hand,

might well rate a separate section,[106] but such an undertaking would place us outside the limitations of this paper. We shall consider both, then, in a single section.

The second notion to which we refer above is Marcel's notion of "admiration". We have already seen a very rudimentary example of this in the discussion above of Marcel's position on "normal conditions". The experience of admiration is basically characterized by a "lifting".

> "The verb lift forcefully and accurately denotes the kind of effect admiration evokes in us, or rather realizes in us as a function of the object which evokes it. This is so evident that when, for example, we communicate our enthusiasm to someone who does not share it at a musical performance or poetry reading, it not only seems that the other person is earth-bound while we are soaring, but we also have a painful impression that he is dragging or weighing us down; the violence with which we protest against his attitude is in a sense a measure of the effort with which we resist him." [107]

The person who can appreciate in no way the heights to which our admiration is carrying us can make that admiration begin to sour, and drag us down from those heights. But, by implication, admiration which is communicated should at least have the effect of allowing us to soar. In any event, "soaring" is the basic element of admiration.

Admiration also has as its function the ability to "tear us away from ourselves and from the thoughts we have of ourselves..."[108] Simply reflecting on the

nature of admiration whould make this evident, for while we might speak of an individual's admiring himself, usually we do so in a tone of disapproval.. Admiration is something usually reserved for the other and implies concern for something other than oneself. If one is to admire, one must not close in upon oneself, thus Marcel remarks:

> "There is perhaps no example on the psychological plane which better illuminates the extensions of meaning the Bergsonian distinction of the closed and open is capable of receiving." 109

It is essential to the nature of admiration that one should open oneself to the other[110] and not wall him off.

Another aspect of admiration is its ability to give the individual who admires an experience of fullness, a sense of being "filled" with admiration.[111]

> "...to affirm that admiration is the active negation of an inner inertia (112) is inadequate; it is particularly necessary to note that it can be conceived not only as an <u>elan</u> but even more as an irruption (the verb 'innundate' refers here to an unmistakeable reality); that irruption can only occur in a being who is not a closed or hermetic system into which nothing can penetrate." 113

In admiration the individual opens himself to a "flood", to an innundation which fills him. If he is preoccupied with building dikes around himself, such an innundation is impossible.

Ultimately, admiration is something which comes as a result of something's (a play, a symphony, etc.) being given to me in such a way that I can admire it.

> "More precisely, but without elaborating the question any further, I shall say that admiration is related to the fact that something is revealed to us. Indeed, the ideas of admiration and revelation are correlative..." 114

I can only admire what is revealed to me, but the revelation must be such that it can evoke my admiration. At the same time, I must be able to admire what is revealed, I must be able to respond to it..

> "The English word response provides some positive indications of what is meant (116) since it expresses better than the French term reponse that vital reaction which is lacking in the being who is internally inert or aesthenic." 117

Response taken even, let us say, in its medical usage, means a reaction which is life-oriented, directed towards activity. A response to a work of art is a reaction to the "appeal" which the work exudes.[118]

Admiration, then, is essentially a "lifting" experience, which requires "openness" of self, which has the effect of "flooding" the individual who admires, and which is a "response". It will be well to bear these characteristics in mind when we come to discuss "mystery" for we shall see them again then. Whether or not admiration is a full-fledged mystery is an open question, but it is an experience which many of us have had, and is, if not a mystery, at least a "type" of mystery.

The second area which we are going to consider in this section predates the distinction and may be considered

as an early, somewhat rougher, formulation of it. This is the distinction between the "verifiable" and the "unverifiable" which occurs in Marcel's Metaphysical Journal.

> "I am sure I am not deceiving myself when I say that it is no more than the formulation of a distinction that is necessary to make the Journal intelligible.. For what is the unverifiable of which so much is said in the first part of the Journal, if not mystery itself?" 119

Verification, as it is discussed in the Journal, is an activity which essentially involves an object to be verified. It always involves a "third party" who bears out any contentions made about the object and who "verifies" them.

> "We must not overlook the fact that verification always implies the idea of a third party (X: it is of the essence of the third party to be no matter who) and bears on an object." 120

This involvement of a third party is necessary, but the personality of the third party is contingent, and necessarily so. It matters little who verifies (presupposing of course a certain level of intelligence and technical qualification if such is needed) so long as there is a party to do the verifying. This "no matter who" is such that the act of verification can be carried out indefinitely, "It must be added that verification supposes the possibility of indefinite numbers of substitutions..." 121

The level of the verifiable remains ultimately the level of the thing, of the object, of the person con-

sidered as object. "All that is of the order of the he or it is verifiable..." [122] The "he" or "it" is always a thing, always an objective datum for verification.

The unverifiable on the other hand is what surpasses this triadic relationship of subject, object, and verifier. "...that which only allows for a dyadic relation is unverifiable--that is it transcends all verification". [123] What allows for a relation which is only between the subject and the other is on the level of the unverifiable. Such a relation is only possible where a thou is involved, and on this level, the level of the thou, the sort of "no matter who" substitution of the verifiable is unthinkable. [124]

The unverifiable is essentially the world of the "beyond". It is beyond time and space, [125] and beyond hard and fast categories and distinctions.

> "Supposing we could conceive a world, a beyond, in which the relations of consciousness to consciousness were reduced to processes of partial identification and participation, that world would be the kingdom of the unverifiable. In last analysis even the distinction between beings would be abolished like the distinction between experiences..." 126

The unverifiable is that which transcends all verification, not merely that which at the moment is beyond our technical abilities to verify. [127] The things that are unverifiable are things which cannot be reduced to the conditions necessary for verification, they transcend them in kind, not merely in degree. [128] An

example of such a "thing" is freedom:

> "Freedom, which is the condition of all verification, cannot itself be thought save radically unverifiable, that is, as liberated from the conditions of existence which an object must satisfy if it is to be an object of verification..." 129

Freedom is the very condition of its being thought, and of its being verified, and thus it is more basic than those acts which stem from it, transcending them. It is "beyond" the conditions which must be filled for proper verification. "The act by which I think freedom is the very act by which freedom comes to be."[130]

The unverifiable is the proper object of reflection. Again by way of example, it is only in reflecting upon the freedom which grounds my thought that I can come to achieve some grasp of the object of my concern. Reflection is the proper mode of approaching what is unverifiable.

> "The factual conditions that govern the search for truth should be capable of being defined psychologically. We can conceive the possibility of a psychology of the search for truth which would take all the subjective factors into account (interest, curiosity, desire for glory, etc.)...Strictly speaking all this can be regarded as object for verification. But the pure activity about which we are speaking is only capable of appearing to a reflection that itself bears on the donditions of the possibility of the terms..." 131

This is a reflection which gives us the whole object. It is creative, it creates itself in the very act of thinking itself. The act by which I reflect on freedom is the act by which freedom is created.

The unverifiable can, however, always be reduced

to the level of causal categories, and, in a sense, in order that clarity and definition may enter the picture, must be so reduced.

> "...when the unverifiable descends into existence, it substitutes itself for existing causes, and when reflective thought comes back into it, it is obliged to operate in an inverse way and reintroduce the causes." [132]

When we reflect [133] upon the unverifiable we tend to categorize it, to explain it in causal categories. The unverifiable itself transcends this level of causes, but in trying to approach it we are obliged to "causalize" it.

With these areas considered in this first chapter as background, we can turn our attention to the elements of the distinction between problem and mystery itself in an attempt to see what Marcel understands by it. We will find it necessary to examine the characteristics of "problem" and their counterparts on the level of "mystery", and we will attempt to see how these various characteristics are related to each other by considering the implications of each sphere on human existence. Moreover, we will see another of Marcel's distinctions, the distinction between Being and Having which will help to elucidate the distinction between problem and mystery while it in its turn will be further illuminated through its relationship to problem and mystery.

CHAPTER II

PROBLEM

We will begin our discussion with an examination of "problem" rather than "mystery". The reasons for this mode of procedure are twofold: a., "problem" is, by definition,[1] more easily defined and "objectified" and these characteristics will afford us at least the opportunity for initial clarity; secondly, to use a musical metaphor of the type of which Marcel is fond, such an examination situated at the very beginning of our discussion can serve as a ground-bass upon which to build the somewhat more intricate and difficult melody of the metaproblematic or mysterious.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE "PROBLEM"

Marcel's initial definition of "problem", and one which he has modified little since,[2] is as "...something met with which bars my passage. It is before me in its entirety."[3] Initially and also essentially, Marcel's notion of "problem" is as something which is outside me,[4] something exterior, external, something placed in my path against which I stumble.[5] Marcel notes that this characteristic is indicated by the very etymology of the term:

> "The word 'problem' should be understood here with its Greek root in mind: <u>problema</u>. There is a problem when anything is placed <u>in front of me</u>, blocking my way..." [6]

One of Marcel's commentators goes on to note that

these Greek roots "...are perfectly correspondent to the Latin roots of 'object'."[7] The etymology of "problem" in itself yields the notions of externality and seemingly objectivity.[8] Problem taken at its most basic is something "...wholly apart from me and in front of me."[9]

The world of the problem is the world of externality, of objects. The object qua object is something essentially viewed from a distance, cut off from me and set down "elsewhere".[10] The mode of objectivity is the mode of that which is not present, the mode of absence.[11] The world of the problem is an alien world,[12] a world in which I am not at home.[13] It is a world, moreover, which draws harsh lines of demarcation between the object and myself. "In the sphere of the problematic, the difference between within and without is important..."[14] This point is important because it will easily be seen that at least three philosophical positions could be developed here, one emphasizing the without, one emphasizing the within, and one synthesizing the two. What is significant is that any notions corresponding to these descriptions still remain well within the realm of the problematic.

The problematic is the manifold, the diverse, the infinite.[15] Marcel notes shortly after making his original distinction,[16] that "It is a proper character of problems, moreover, to be reduced to detail."[17] It is essential to the nature of a problem that it be broken up into

workable elements, a breaking up which can continue on ad infinitum. Moreover, problems tend to be multiple and to multiply.

> "There exists in such a world (i.e. a world where cause explains effect), nevertheless, an infinity of problems, since the causes are not known to us in detail and thus leave room for unlimited research." [19]

The world of the "purely natural",[20] is a world of infinite problems since it is a world in which the answers are infinite and not immediately forthcoming. Our search on this level can go on to infinity.

In a world of infinite multiplicity, if there is to be any continuity at all, it will be a continuity which I,[21] in some manner or other, construct.

> "It seems to me that every effort to problematize is conditioned by the ideal assumption of a certain continuity of experience which is to be safeguarded against appearances...I should be inclined to say that the continuity implied in all problematisation is the continuity of 'a system for me'." 22

The world of the problematic is precisely the world in which we attempt to systematize our experience, to limit and define our experience in order that we may "safeguard it". Against those "appearances" which are troublesome to the cut and dry[23] objectivity of the problematic.

The characteristics of objectivity, multiplicity, and system, and the categorical distinction between the "inner" and the "outer" are all in some way relatable to what might be termed the first "major" charac-

teristic of the problematic, the characteristic of externality, of "outsideness". All of these characteristics are related to the problem considered in itself, externality, objectivity, multiplicity and even system are all concerned with the problem as it exists apart from the man who confronts it, that is, all of these elements are on the side of the problem confronted rather than on the side of the confronter. We have not troubled ourselves greatly up to this point with characteristics which involve the confronter more intimately. But if we return to Marcel's original definition of problem, we find not only that the problem is something which I meet, something "before me in its entirety", it is, moreover, something which "bars my passage"[24], which blocks my way.

> "A problem is something which I meet, which I find complete before me, but which I can therefore lay siege to and reduce." [25]

Not only <u>can</u> I lay siege to it, but I must, for it bars my passage, it disrupts the flow of my thought. Marcel notes that there is inherent in a problem "...a certain disorder for which I struggle to substitute an orderliness capable of satisfying the requirements of my thought."[26] I struggle to find an answer, I seek out a cause, I strive for any element which will bring order out of the chaos which has interupted a formerly smoothly proceeding line of thought. Such an element may not be immediately forthcoming,[27] but, if I am

dealing with a problem, it exists and when found will constitute the solution of the problem.[28] The second "major" characteristic of the problematic, then, is its essential "resolvability." "When I am dealing with a problem, I am trying to discover a solution."[29]

As was the case with exteriority, there are several characteristics which follow from what is implied by the resolvability of the problem. The problem exists "complete before me", that is to say, the problem together with its solution exists as a whole. Any difficulty which arises is on my part when I fail to see the whole which the problem and the solution form, I see only a lack which I consider disorder. We give evidence of this in our ordinary way of regarding a seemingly difficult problem which we have solved, when, in retrospect, we remark, "It was really quite simple after all." The effect and the cause, the question and the answer, all exist outside of me. All that is required of me is that I join them together like pieces of a cosmic jig-saw puzzle.[30]

The level of the problematic is the level of "data placed before me"[31] upon which I am required to work, and with which I am expected to find a solution. Thus, the problematic is fundamentally "closed",[32] a closed structure existing apart from me. When I have arrived at the solution, I close the book on this particular problem, although the answers which close

this problem may give rise to further problems.[33] But, even in granting this, the problem, in itself, is finished, complete, "closed", we would pose it again solely for purposes of instruction (as in the case of problems in a physics textbook, for example, the solutions to which have already been found.)

The solution of a problem always implies that I have discovered or constructed a proper method of solving it. When I am confronted with a problem, I require a technique[34] for solving it. Marcel notes, "...every genuine problem is subject to its own technique, and every technique consists in resolving problems of a determinite type."[35] Every problem, then, has a technique appropriate to it, a technique arising from the necessity of resolving the problem.

The world of the problematic is not, however, merely an abstract world where problems are considered impartially and coldly, (although it may certainly be that). The necessity for resolving the problem, which necessity technique serves, may be the emotional impetus of a desire for some item or a fear that it might be lost. In more abstract terms, the problem is how to get or how to keep, but in concrete terms, it may be nothing more than a vague obstacle to what I want or don't want. The world of the problematic is the world where desire and fear hold sway.

> "The world of the problematic is the world of fear and desire, which are inseperable...it is the kingdom of technics. Every technique serves, or can be made to serve, some desire or some fear; conversely every desire and every fear tends to invent its appropriate technique." 36

Desires and fears are problems raised, as it were, to the fever pitch. There is, as in every problem, an obstacle against which I stumble, and there is also a technique which reduces the problem. And in some cases the technique is what enables me to get what I want or prevent the loss of what I have.

Technique, the mode of resolving problems, implies at least two other areas of the problematic, the first of which is the notion of function. The technique is concerned with the efficient utilization of the functions of the object in question, and of the problem solver together with all his tools. The concern of the technical is "...how the various functions, once they have been inventoried and labelled, can be made to work together without doing one another harm."[37] The "kingdom" of the technical, the world of the problematic, is "...the world of the functional--or of what can be functionalized."[38]

The problematic, then, as the realm of the technical, has the tendency to evaluate things in terms of function and to describe them in those terms.[39] Moreover, it will place a great premium on whether those functions are properly and efficiently utilized or not.

> "Quite generally, we can in fact say that the development of techniques does inevitably tend to give a primacy, at the practical level, to the idea of output. Given these conditions, a being whose output has fallen below a certain level and become practically nil will, from the point of view of a world in which technique rules, a technocratic world, be regarded as an unprofitable charge on the society..." [40]

A being which cannot be utilized, a being which does not function efficiently, which does not, in short, produce, is literally "useless", it has no uses. The technical is born out of the need for proper, efficient function, and is itself, a mode of controlling function for the end of resolving the problem before it, and often, as we have seen, for the sake of allaying desire and fear.[41]

Our initial notion of the problematic was as something "outside" of me, the objective. That which is an object is fundamentally that which can be somehow observed. Further, now problematic as the level of the object is the level of observation.[42] In reply to the question "What is observation?", Marcel writes:

> "I observe a phenomenon or something that I take to be a phenomenon, which is outside myself and which I note. I cannot help noting it--I am <u>obliged</u> to note. At the same time I see, when I think about it, that my observation does not in any way modify the phenomenon I have observed, and moreover that the <u>I</u> who observes is highly impersonal: the observation I have made could have been made equally well by anyone in my place." [43]

The problematic as the level of observation is thus the level of impersonality, the level of the "anyone", of Heidegger's <u>das man</u>,[44] of the "everybody

knows".[45] It is the nature of the problem to require only a solution and whatever techniques are necessary to solve it.. It also requires an agent (human or otherwise) which can utilize those techniques, but it does not require that I "...trouble myself with this Me who is at work: he is here simply presupposed."[46] Moreover, it is in the very nature of a technique that it should be able to be carried out by anyone in similar circumstances, otherwise it would be useless.[47] Marcel brings this out by recounting a story from his childhood:

> "There is a story, for instance, that I often tell, of how I had to pass an examination in physics which included, as a practical test, an experiment to determine one of the simpler electrical formulae--I forget which now, let us say the laws of electrolysis--and I found myself quite incapable of joining up my wires properly; so no current came through. All I could do was write on my paper, 'I cannot join up my wires, so there is no current; if there were a current, it would produce such and such a phenomenon, and I would deduce...' My own clumsiness appeared to me, and it must have appeared to the examiner, as a purely contingent fact. It remains true in principle that anybody and everybody can join up the wires, enable the current to pass through, and so on."[48]

The problem in this instance is one of establishing an electrical current. The solution to the problem involves such and such a technique which coordinates the functions of man and apparatus. When one of the functions involved, let us say manual adeptness, does not fulfill itself, the technique is frustrated and the problem remains unsolved. The fact that it is Gabriel Marcel who is clumsy is totally irrelevant, for it could have been his neighbor at the next table and

the problem would have been just as unresolved.

Depersonalization such as we have just seen is a feature of the problematic, and it is also a feature, as was implied above, of the scientific. At one point Marcel terms this depersonalization "self-effacement",[49] and ties it up with the scientific. "The effacement of self actually consists purely and simply in abstracting from a certain number of recognized contingent conditions."[50] The scientist must abstract from those contingent conditions of his personality which would prevent the wide acceptance of his discovery, technical advance, etc.

The level of the problematic is the level of the "scientific". Marcel frequently uses the term "scientific" in conjunction with the term "problematic" in such a way that it is easily suspected that the terms are closely related.[51] Moreover, Marcel states in one place that "There is only progress in problematic thought"[52] and in another "that nowhere else but in the realm of applied science can we speak of perfectibility and progress in an absolutely strict sense."[53] Since by "applied science" Marcel understands "any branch of learning which tends to guarantee to man the mastery of a definite object",[54] we can certainly place all fields of technology under this heading, and there seems to be some ground for putting other scientific areas there too.

The scientist is concerned with "problems",[55] he

breaks down and classifies,[56] he "draws up the minutes" of what he has broken down,[57] and he proceeds in defined stages from one problem to the next.[58] The scientist frequently uses more or less elaborate techniques in resolving his problems. Finally, impersonality seems, to him, to be a necessary condition for his work.[59] There seems to be some ground for bearing out our contention that the problematic is the level of the scientific, but the relationship between the two will become more obvious when we consider the manner in which the problematic is usually confronted.

The "attitude of the scientist"[60] is essentially one of observing the discrete elements of reality which he breaks down into further components to afford better observation.[61] The mode of "knowing" proper to the problematic is what Marcel terms "critical"[62] or "primary"[63] reflection. This reflection is "thought which has not thought itself",[64] it is the "scientific knowledge which banishes to infinity".[65] Primary reflection involves the establishing of what might be termed a "broken succession", a step by step break-down of the events leading up to the problem in order to arrive at the cause and ultimately the solution. To illustrate this, it will be necessary to quote a rather lengthy passage from one of Marcel's works.

> "I put my hand, let us say, into my pocket to take my watch out. I discover that my watch is not there; but it ought to be there; normally my watch <u>is</u> in my pocket. I experience a slight shock.

> There has been a small break in the chain of my everyday habits (between the act of putting my hand in my pocket and that of taking out my watch). The break is felt as something out of the way; it arrests my attention, to a greater or lesser degree, according to the importance I attach to my watch.. To reflect in this kind of case, is to ask oneself how such a break can have occurred...What I have to do is to go back in time until I recall the moment when the watch was last in my possession. I remember, let us say, having looked at the time just after breakfast...Between then and now something must have happened to the watch. My mental processes are rather like--there is no avoiding the comparison--the actions of a plumber who is trying to trace a leak...Say that I succeed in recalling the fact that there was a moment when I put the watch down on a table; I shall go, of course, to see whether it is still on the table; and there, let us say, the watch still is. Reflection has carried out its task, and the problem is solved..." [66]

Primary reflection, then, breaks up the question of "where is my watch?" into "When did I last have my watch", "What have I done since then", etc. Reflection considered as "primary", "...is nothing other than attention where attention is directed towards this small break in the chain of daily habit".[67] It is the function of primary reflection to break down a unity into a succession "primary reflection tends to dissolve the unity of experience which is first put before it..."[68] Thus, the mode of approaching the problematic on the side of thought is by setting up a "breaking-down", or what can literally be termed "ana-lysis".

HAVING

So far we have considered the characteristics of problem only in themselves. In the last two sections of this chapter, our concern will be to show how these

characteristics are exhibited and related in the notion of Having, and also in their implications for human existence. In both of these areas we shall see the characteristics of the problematic reappear but this time from new points of view with new implications.

Marcel remarks, "It seems clear to me that the realm of Having is identical with the the realm of the problematic,.." [69] We could hardly hope for a more categorical assertion. This follows upon, and in part answers, an earlier question as to whether the only type of problem was a problem of Having. [70] Upon our interpretation of the term "identical" rests the issue of whether or not the question is answered in full.

Having essentially involves some measure of exteriority, of "outsideness". "What we <u>have</u> obviously presents an appearance of externality to ourselves", [71] that is to say, our possessions are in some way outside, beyond us; they are objects, things. [72] Thus, the level of Having is essentially the level on which distinction between within and without has significance.

> "...we cannot express ourselves in terms of Having except when we are moving on a level where, in whatever manner or in however analogical a sense, the opposition of <u>without</u> and <u>within</u> retains its meaning..." 73

The distinction between within and without in the case of Having is bound up in the "duality of possessor and possessed." [74] On the level of Having, there are only

two possibilities, two categories into which phenomena can be placed, viz., either the "self" or the "other qua other".[75] "The man who remains on the plane of Having... is centred either on himself or on another treated as another..."[76] He must choose one or the other, he cannot choose both,[77] and there are no other possibilities.

The world of Having is the world in which the distinction between the Same and the Other[78] has importance, it is a world founded upon this distinction. Marcel asks, "Could not Having be thought of somehow as a way of being what one is not?"[79] That is, we must ask whether the world of Having with its essential distinction between the Same and the Other is not a world in which we become alienated from ourselves.

In order to pursue this question there are several areas we must consider, the first of which is the notion of the essential "showability" of what is had. From an inquiry into what is meant by "having a secret",[80] Marcel proceeds to the conclusion that what is had or possessed is "showable".[80] That is, if I have a secret, I have it to the extent that it could be shown to the Other.[82]

> "This act of shewing may take place or unfold before another or before one's-self. The curious thing is that analysis will reveal to us that this is devoid of meaning. In so far as I shew my own views to myself, I myself become someone else. That, I suppose is the meatphysical basis for the possibility of expression. I can only express myself in so far as I can become someone else to myself." 83

Even if I keep my secret to myself, it is, at least in principle, something intended for the other qua other. There is some ground here for tentatively asserting that on the level of Having the person is essentially defined in relation to the Other, while it is not clear that the converse holds, for the reason that the Other seems to be the ultimate criterion even for the person's regarding himself.

> "In so far as I conceive myself as having in myself, or more exactly as mine, certain characteristics, certain trappings, I consider myself from the point of view of another--but I do not separate myself from this other except after having first implicitly identified myself with him." [84]

I must first make myself "other" in order that I may view myself, on this level of Having. Characterisation, which is described as a "claim to possession"[85] is an enumeration of properties "...an absolutely external proceeding".[86] To the extent that I am characterized as possessing such-and-such characteristics, I am set in front of the "other" and cut off from myself.[87] It would seem, in the light of all this, that Marcel's question as to whether or not Having is a "way of being what one is not", could be answered in the affirmative, but we shall leave the question open for the moment in the hope that further discussion will settle the issue a little more satisfactorily.

The world of Having also is the world of desire. "To desire is to have and not to have..."[88] In a sense,

a "physical or non-objective" [89] sense, I have what I desire, but I have it "without having. That is why there is a kind of suffering or burning which is an essential part of desire." [90] I both have the thing and I lack it, I am torn between them.

The object of my desire can eventually come to be had "objectively" by me, I can come to possess it entirely. It now takes on a new posture. It is no longer the object of my desire, but rather it is the object of my fear.

> "...in so far as this quid (the thing possessed) is a thing, and consequently subject to the changes and chances proper to things, it may be lost or destroyed. So it becomes, or is in danger of becoming, the centre of a kind of whirlpool of fears and anxieties, thus expressing exactly the tension which is an essential part of the order of having." 91

I fear that the object I possess will sooner or later, break away from me.. I fear for what I possess, I desire what I do not possess completely. I am constantly the victim of one or the other so long as I remain on the level of Having. Having, then, is the realm where desire and fear operate.

It is not greatly surprising that the level of Having as the realm of desire and fear should be concerned with "technics". Having is "...the realm where technics can be used." [92] A technique, in the light of what we have seen of Having, is a way of getting or preventing the loss of, an object. The technique itself,

moreover, is something which I can number among my possessions. It is not surprising, further, that the level of Having should be the level of function, for, as Marcel notes, "A function is, by its very essence, something that one has..."[93]

We will not be considered too much amiss, perhaps, if at this point we simply note that Marcel's categorical assertion of identity between the level of Having and that of the problematic seems to be borne out by his thought on the subject of Having. The notions of exteriority, inner and outer, otherness, desire and fear, technique and function are all, more or less explicitly, present in his description of Having. The notion of objectivity is implied in exteriority, while the notion of "completeness" is implied in Marcel's notion of Having as containing, "To contain is to enclose; but to enclose is to prevent, to resist, and to oppose the tendency of the content towards spreading, spilling out, and escaping."[94] To have is, in a sense, to maintain in a complete form.

We have been gradually moving from a point of discussion of the bare characteristics of the problem to a greater involvement of the notions of what the problematic implies for man. In our discussion of Having we started to see, however vaguely, some of these implications. Let us now turn our attention to the specific question of the human implications of the problematic.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN

The world of the problematic holds certain implications for man. Some of these we have already seen at least implicitly in some of our considerations of the problematic. It was fairly obvious in our initial discussion of "exteriority", that the world of the problematic is, in its most basic state, apart, other, alien. It is thus a world which is not myself, which I cannot know as well as myself. There is at least the possibility that this world might be hostile, unfriendly. As we shall see, this is something more than a possibility.

The notion of objectivity has implications for man considered both as self and as other. In the instance where I regard myself objectively as having given characteristics, I must do so from the standpoint of the other, I must cut myself off from myself, I must alienate myself.[95] In short, if I try to regard myself objectively, on the level of the problematic, I must become what I am not.

The force of the notion of objectivity is greater, however, when we consider it from the side of the man who comes into our range of vision as an object, as "other qua other". I can treat this person as an object only on condition that I consider him as apart, as a "him".

> "When I consider another individual as <u>him</u>, I treat him as essentially absent; it is his absence which allows me to objectify him, to reason about him as though he were a nature or given essence." 96

The "him" is the other as object, reduced to the same level as the other objects in my gaze. I regard him as absent, as something to which I need not pay any attention at all because it isn't there. Still, I may even speak to this thing,[97] I may address him as "you",[98] but in essence he is for me "that man over there",[99] that object in the corner which is not describing itself, filling in the particulars of its life.

Let us now shift the focus slightly and place ourselves in the position of the "other" so considered. There is, first of all, an everyday occurrence where we are confronted by some civil servant over some minor matter, let us say, in making out application for a social insurance card.

> "It can also be imagined that you are confronting some employee who asks you to state your identity. The remarkable fact, however, is that the more my questioner is external to me, the more I am by the same token external to myself; in confronting a Mr. so-and-so I also become another Mr. so-and-so unless I literally ahppen not to be a person anymore--a pen which traces words on paper or a simple recording apparatus..." 100

In a situation as graphic as this, my own externality or objectivity as seen through the eyes of the other makes me disquietingly aware that I present to him a facade which is not really myself. I am, in the final analysis, this object which the other sees.

Another example of the effect of objectivity which Marcel offers, and which is a bit more striking than the above, is the following:

> "I am thinking above all of the irritation a person invariably feels when he notes that two others are talking about him in his presence and calling him 'he'. ('He is like this,' or 'He usually does this" and so on.) A person spoken of in this way feels that he is being treated as an object and so is being relegated to the level of things--or at best, to the animal level. He is being deprived of his status as subject." 101

This irritation could grow rapidly into genuine anger on the part of the individual so considered.[102] The other two are talking about him as if he were not really there, as if he were not really there, as if he were absent. In fact, to the extent to which they objectify him, he is absent. As we shall see in discussing "mystery", the person cannot be reduced to objective characteristics, and this disquiet, this "tension"[103] felt by the person who regards both himself and the other objectively, is, for Marcel, an indication, of an area beyond the observable, beyond the objective.

Two other notions are bound up in "objective" implications. The first of these is the notion of the catalogue. The world considered as objective is a world in which the cataloguing of characteristics and properties is possible.[104] If we apply the notion of the catalogue to man, we are confronted with the "agglomeration of functions",[105] the aggregate of properties, the man who is the creature of his dossier.

> "In what does this growingly complex organization--this socialization of life, as we may call it--really consist? Primarily in the fact that each one of us is being treated today more and more as an agent, whose behaviour ought to contribute something towards the progress of a certain social

> whole, a something rather distant, rather oppressive, let us even frankly say, rather tyrannical. This presupposes a registration, an enrolment, not once can for all, like that of the new-born child in the registrar's office, but again and again, repeatedly, while life lasts...But the essential point to grasp now, is that in the end I am in some danger of confusing myself, my real personality with the State's official record of my activities; and we ought to be really frightened of what is implied in such an identification." 106

I am always dissatisfied with and a bit afraid of any confrontation which attempts to reduce me to my dossier, which sums me up in its terms. "Let us try to imagine, now, the sheer dumbfoundedness of the civil servant who, on asking me, 'So you are Mr. so-and-so?' received the curt reply 'Certainly not'". 107 I am to such a "creature" 108 simply a number which designates an enumeration of characteristics, "It is just as if somebody had said to me : 'State the identity of Number 98', and as if I had the job of answering for this unfortunate Number 98..." 109 I and the enumeration of my characteristics are not really the same entity. Possibly this is the meaning of Marcel's rather cryptic notation that whatever can be catalogued is an occasion for despair. 110

In the light of all this, it is not surprising that the level of the problematic should be the level of impersonality, of the anonymous "one". The anonymous observer of the problematic is without identity, he is "...only a recording instrument, a recorder among many thousands." 111 I am a recording instrument numbered

98, located between numbers 97 and 99, and nothing more. I am "one among others."[112]

This "one among others" is what is designated by the term "individual". "The individual is only a statistical factor--and conversely, a statistic is a possibility only on the level of the one."[113] (Item number 98 occurs between items 97 and 99.) The one is essentially faceless, a shield behind which to hide when wishing to evade identification.[114]

> "...to someone who tells me: 'It has been claimed that the King of Belgium killed himself,' I reply or should reply: 'Who claims that?' The question shifted to the plane of the who, exists outside of the realm of the one; by confronting the enemy, I force him to declare himself; the one is qua one, what never declares itself." 115

The one is a barrier of anonymity under which all sorts of claims may be made.[116] But it is essentially that which I am not, it is a "fiction",[117] a "step down"[118] from my personality. By invoking the one I lay aside all right to claim what the one holds as my own.

> "Everything occurs as though a certain anonymous quality of social life progressively invaded me to the point where it ultimately abolished in me any temptation to see in my destiny a line of development, particular characteristics, a visage. In the final analysis, we acknowledge little more than pleasure and pain as being able to resist this depersonalization of an existence which has become internally collectivized: but there is no reason to think that this kind of resistance can be effective in the long run." 119

I become identified with the "crowd", my personality is immersed in it. The only things left which point to my peculiar person are the pleasure and pain which I feel..

The second notion bound up in objective implications is that of "function" and its corresponding value "utility" or "output". The person considered objectively in terms of function can be looked upon as a sort of bank from which we draw certain useful "commodities" when they are needed.[120]

> "...let us take the very simple case of my addressing an unknown passer-by in order to ask him the way. The passer-by is in this case treated as a pure source of information; one will at first be tempted to say that there is no great difference between the role thus assigned him and that of a street map which I consult." [121]

The passer-by in this instance is considered by me as a sort of "filing cabiner"[122] from which I hope to extract information. I apprehend this individual in terms of a given function, I consider him almost entirely as a function, as an "actor...who is reduced to living as though he were in fact submerged by his functions".[123]

> "Travelling on the Underground, I often wonder with a kind of dread what can be the inward reality of the life of this or that man employed on the railway--the man who opens doors, for instance, or the one who punches the tickets. Surely, everything both within him and outside him conspires to identify this man with his functions--meaning not only his function as a worker, as trade union member or as a voter, but with his vital functions as well. The rather horrible expression 'time-table' perfectly describes his life." [124]

Such a man <u>is</u> to all intents and purposes the function "ticket-taker". He is swallowed up by his function, it becomes him, it substitutes itself for him.[125] There is really very little difference between such a man and a machine.[126]

> "It is indeed a fact that I also can conceive of myself as a pure piece of mechanism and make it my chief business to control the machine as well as possible. From the same standpoint, I can regard the problem of my life purely as a problem of tangible results...If, indeed, I passively accept a group of regulations which seem to be imposed upon me by the circle to which I belong by birth, by the party to which I have allowed myself to be attached without any genuine thought on my part, everything goes on as though I were really nothing but an instrument, a mere cog in the wheel..." 127

A "cog", a functional instrument, a little machine which is part of a bigger machine, is all I can be considered on this level. I am a machine, moreover, which is frequently in need of oiling and repair so that it may continue to carry out its function. "It is therefore natural that the individual should be overhauled at regular intervals like a watch (this is often done in America.)" [128]

But the effect of a life so bounded, so reduced to bare instrumentality, is to produce a certain dissatisfaction. What is peculiar to such a life is a feeling of "dull, intolerable unease." [129]

> "Thus the danger arises of a most fatal disorder invading the very heart of existence, for the man who is apparently striving to become a machine is nevertheless alive, although he ignores more and more systematically his condition as a living being." 130

The chief difficulty with trying to be a machine, is that man basically is not a machine. He is a creature that does more than simply function, he loves, he trusts, he hopes. He has his pains and his joys, and all of this because he is alive. Hence, to reduce him to a machine is to degrade him.

But this sort of danger is relatively minor in comparison with the danger given rise to by the notion of "utility" as a value. An interesting question to be raised here concerns the situation once the man-machine has ceased to function at peak efficiency.

> "Let us notice at this point that to represent the human being as an instrument inevitably leads at last to extreme consequences, such as the pure and simple doing away with old people and incurables: they no longer 'serve any useful purpose', hence they are only fit for the rubbish heap; why should we take the trouble to keep up and feed machines which are past use." 131

Persons who no longer fulfill their functions become "useless mouths", a quaint expression denoting both the unproductivity of such persons and their ability to consume what they have not "paid for" by their productivity. Such persons are nothing less than unwelcome in such a society.

Within the world of the problematic, within the world of function and utility, a non-functioning, inefficient "item" is valueless, an unprofitable machine. In the final analysis, it is a burden upon the whole body, upon the society "...which still feels itself bound to care for and maintain him." [132] Assuredly, most societies still do feel themselves so bound. Yet, in our increasingly "technocratic" [133] societies there is a growing tendency to do little more than tolerate the "useless one".

> "I need hardly insist on the stifling impression of sadness produced by this functionalised world.

> It is sufficient to recall the dreary image of the retired official, or those urban Sundays when the passers-by look like people who have retired from life. In such a world, there is something mocking and sinister even in the tolerance awarded to the man who has retired from his work." 134

In a world of productivity, he who does nothing becomes a rather "sad case", he who is without anything to do is desolate. He who can do nothing is barely tolerated.

The world of the problematic is the realm of Having. We have already seen how the possession of characteristics in effect separates me from myself,[135] and secondly, how the thing possessed and not possessed is an object of desire while the thing fully possessed becomes an object of fear.[136] Having is seen by Marcel as a place of "radical insecurity".[137]

> "The more we allow ourselves to be the servants of Having, the more we shall let ourselves fall a prey to the gnawing anxiety which Having involves..." 138

The tension brought on by the obsession we have with objects possessed or not possessed is capable of producing an anxiety about them. Moreover, the greater the store that we set by our possessions, the greater the danger that we shall lose them. We are, in a very real sense, "possessed".[139]

> "Having as such seems to have a tendency to destroy and lose itself in the very thing it began by possessing, but which now absorbs the master who thought he controlled it." 140

Returning to the duality of possessor and possessed discussed above, we can see that what might have seemed

a simple distinction between the self and object, here becomes more complex. The roles are reversed in a sense, or not so much reversed as reciprocated. I do possess, but to the extent that I do, I am possessed. What is more, I tend to identify myself with this possession.

Finally, at least for our purposes, the realm of the problematic can be seen as the realm of the technico-scientific. On the level of the scientific, I become the object of a whole plethora of classifications and catalogues,[141] with "...my life appearing as a particular group of phenomena falling within the province of the natural sciences, perhaps of sociology too, but deprived of its characteristic intelligibility..."[142] My life is reduced to a position of "equality", of sameness of footing, with other types of life, which is simply not the case. "Man, whatever brainless biologists may think about him, will never be on the same level as the animals."[143]

The threat (we can no longer refrain from the use of this term, loaded as it is) from technology, however, is decidedly greatest of all. This is not to say that there is anything inherently evil in techniques themselves; Marcel emphasizes that they are, at bottom, neutral.[144] It is rather the case that man's approach to them is getting out of hand.

> "I have said that man is <u>at the mercy of his technics</u>. This must be understood to mean that he is increasingly incapable of controlling his technics, or rather of <u>controlling his own control</u>." 145

The technique, which at its most basic was seen as an aid in solving the problem, threatens to become the master, to reduce man to a state of slavery to its demands,[146] to submerge him in the faceless, irresponsible "one".[147] We can easily wonder whether the anonymous computer programmer is really the master of his machine or its slave.

The chief threat from the technical is something other than this; and perhaps the most insidious threat of all we have seen. The technique is concerned with the notions of function and output. It takes as its chief criterion of value the "efficient" utilization of function to achieve the desired rate of output. Efficiency, output, success are the ends of the technical, yet in the face of ultimate issues, the technique is grossly inefficient and unsuccessful. Thus,

> "...despair consists in the recognition of the ultimate inefficacy of all technics, joined to the inability or refusal to change over to a new ground...It is for this reason that we seem nowadays to have entered upon the very era of despair; we have not ceased to believe in technics, that is to envisage reality as a complex of problems; yet at the same time the failure of technics as a whole is as discernible to us as its partial triumphs. To the question: what can man achieve? we continue to reply: He can achieve as much as his technics; yet we are obliged to admit that these technics are unable to save man himself..." [148]

Faced with the ultimate issue of death, for example, we must concede that no technique can avert it.[149] But what is even more fundamental, the technique can only grant us knowledge about objects, functions, characteristics.[150] It can give us no inkling into Being, into the Being

of myself, for instance. The plane of the problematic is, for this reason, and for others we have not seen, the place of despair.

This is so because in none of the areas which we have discussed above can the question--the cry of anguish, almost--"que suis-je?"[151] "What am I?", be answered. What does it mean to be?[152] On the level of the problematic, I will never find an answer to this question. What I will find are characteristics, objects, functions, techniques, enumerations, catalogues, multiplicity.

This question, this "cry of anguish" is the point on which Marcel's entire position revolves as on a bearing. "What am I?" is man's last vestige of revolt against dehumanizing technocracy[153] something he himself is building, against the alienation of objectivity, against the brokenness of the dossier. "What am I?" is the betrayal of a need for the realm which shines through the cracks in the armor of Having,[154] which is concealed by the problematic.[155] This is a need for Being, an ontological need.[156] It is a need for the realm of the metaproblematic, a need for the mysterious to which we now turn our attention.

CHAPTER III

MYSTERY

Before we begin the discussion of mystery proper, it will be useful to have a look at Marcel's notion of "incarnation", which is, basically, "to appear to oneself as body, as this particular body, without being identified with it nor distinguished from it..."[1] Such an examination will permit us to make the transition from the problematic to the metaproblematic with greater ease, since, as we shall see, the body is situated on the border between these two spheres.

Marcel states in one of the early texts of Being and Having,[2] that the body is the "central 'given' of metaphysics".[3] For Marcel, the body is essentially something given, a datum.[4] But it is a datum which is not completely objective.

> "...note must be taken that the priority I thus ascribe to my body depends on the fact that my body is given to me in a way that is not exclusively objective, i.e. on the fact that it is my body." [5]

Moreover, "...it is the 'given' starting from which a fact is possible."[6] The body is seen, then, as a partially non-objective datum which in addition, is in some manner or other the ground of factuality.

The non-objective aspect of incarnation is bound up in Marcel's notion of the body as a "nexus" uniting me to the universe, the "nexus of my presence to the world, my body being this nexus manifested."[7] The body is,

essentially, a link or bond between me and the world, or rather, more than merely a link, a deep uniting of me and the world. My body, insofar as it is the nexus, "is the datum relative to which there are other existents..."[8] The existence of other beings is essentially related to my body, as Marcel has occasion to point out.

> "We could put this another way by saying that my body is endowed with a density that is lived or felt; and in so far as I bring other things before myself as existents, I confer on them, too, by analogy, a density of the same order." [9]

This density is what Marcel terms elsewhere "ontological weight".[10] The being of the existents which come before me is fundamentally related to the being of my body, a being, moreover, which I can feel. This is not so much an endowing of these existents with being as it is a recognition of a kind of brotherhood between them and my body, a recognition that both are standing on the same level..

This being is something which not only can be felt, but must be felt since there is no room for third party observation. My body is "given" non-objectively to the extent that it is <u>my</u> body.

> "If I abstract from the index characterising <u>my</u> body--insofar as it is mine--if I construe it as one body among an unlimited number of other such bodies, I will be forced to treat it as an object, as exhibiting the fundamental properties of objectivity. It then becomes an object of scientific knowledge; it becomes problematic, so to speak, but only on condition that I consider it as not--mine..." [11]

The body, as we have seen rather briefly above,[12]

can be the object of inquiry for a number of scientific disciplines. But thus considered, it becomes simply "one among other" bodies, it is essentially <u>this</u> body, not <u>my</u> body,[13] and as this body it becomes, in effect, simply a <u>machine</u>[14] described in terms of its functions.[15]

> "My body is not, and cannot be, an object in the sense that an apparatus exterior to myself is an object. There is a tendency to minimize as much as possible the difference between my body and an apparatus belonging to me (e.g. a watch). Americans have themselves 'checked up' in clinics. A revealing phrase." 16

<u>My</u> body is not a machine, it is not solely the sum total of its functions,[17] it is not this because it is <u>mine</u>. Considered in terms of function, moreover, the body comes to be viewed largely as an instrument, as an apparatus which I use for some purpose or other; e.g. to get me from place to place.

> "...we must start by examining the instrumental relation. It seems plain that any instrument is a means of extending, developing, or strengthening an original power possessed by the person who uses it; this holds for a knife as much as for a lens. These powers or aptitudes are active properties of an organic body. If I consider my body from the outside, I can evidently think of it as a mechanism or as an instrument...If I think of my body as an instrument, I thereby ascribe to the soul of which it is the instrument, as it were, those potentialities which the body ordinarily realizes; thus the soul is converted into a body and the same regress will now occur in connection with the soul." 18

Its powers, then, cannot belong to it since an instrument is essentially an extension of power. The only other alternative is to ascribe them to the soul. But now we are ascribing bodily powers to the soul and

since those bodily powers are instrumental, or so we are arguing, the soul must be the instrument of something else to which we will again have to ascribe those powers. Ultimately my body "...cannot be reduced to being my mechanism, my instrument; I mean that it somehow transcends its being my instrument. I <u>am</u> my body...whereas I am not my spade or my bicycle."[19]

This raises the question of what it is to say that I <u>am</u> my body. It does not mean that I am "identical with my body".[20] Marcel terms this a "materialist assertion",[21] and it maintains not a unity of myself with my body, but rather an identity. It involves the assertion that there is not one thing which is "I" and another which is "my body"; there is only the latter, and what I mean when I say "I" is the same as what I mean when I say "my body".[22]

The sort of world this position conjures up is a world completely without anything other than "bodies", a rather unsatisfactory world at best.

> "Can we, then, find haven in the concept of a world of bodies? What, however, confers unity on such a world? Furthermore, in a purely objective world, what becomes of the principle of intimacy (<u>my</u> body) around which the existential orbit is created?" 23

A world of discrete bodies is, at bottom, a world without any pervading unity, a world which cannot unite to form any safe shelter. Ultimately, it is a world in which the phrase "my body" is without meaning since in such a world "I" am "my body" and the terms of distinction are useless.

At the same time, I am so closely united with my body that objective judgments of other sorts are precluded. I cannot achieve the vantage point from which to make them, even though this might seem to be possible since, to a certain extent, I can view my body from the outside.[24]

> "...reflection detects the fallacious nature of such a divorce; as we have noted, reflection compels me to acknowledge that this separate entity, this self relative to which the possession of this particular body is accidental, cannot be thought of either in isolation or in relation, nor yet as identical with that from which I claim to separate it." [25]

I am not separate from my body and neither am I identical with it. I am, on the contrary, united to it. We form an intimate unity which does not admit of objectification by me. I cannot find a platform from which to observe this unity.

Part of the difficulty which the body presents to the questioner arises out of the fact that my body is something I both have and do not have.[26] Having involves the power of disposal over what is had,[27] but it is clear that we cannot speak of a disposal over <u>my</u> body. Granted we can dispose of the body with regard to transporting it from place to place, with regard to its position, etc., but we cannot achieve anything like absolute disposal over it without involving ourselves in a paradoxical situation.

> "The objection may be made that I can nevertheless dispose of my body since I have the physical power of killing myself. But it is obvious that such a disposal of my body has as its immediate result the impossibility of disposing of it, and even

> coincides with this impossibility in the final analysis. My body is something of which I can only dispose, in the absolute sense of the term, by putting it into such a state that I shall no longer have any power to dispose of it. This absolute disposal is therefore in reality a putting out of use." 28

I do not possess my body absolutely in the sense of having absolute disposal over it, for if I could achieve this I would possess the power of no longer possessing my body. As it happens, at the moment at which I achieve absolute disposability, that is, at the moment of my suicide, I lose, in that very instant, <u>all</u> power of disposability over my body. The moment of absolute having is the exact same moment of absolute loss, where my body is concerned, and it is to be wondered if the former is not cancelled out by the latter.

Further, for Marcel, Incarnation involves "being in the world."[29] That is to say, man is essentially <u>in</u> the world, involved in a situation.[30] The notion of situation extended over a wider temporal, societal, cultural area becomes the notion of the "condition" of man, which like the situation, is always definite. Marcel writes that there are:

> "...certain fundamental experiences which are part of our <u>condition</u>. I believe that this latter term should be increasingly substituted for that of 'nature' in philosophical anthropology. I repeat that whoever would again take up Hume's task today, should entitle his work <u>On the Human Condition</u>." 31

Man's condition is his "being in the world", it is what is implied by his incarnation. Man is essentially a wayfarer,[32] a being not at home in a world of objects.[33]

Yet it is essential for him to be among those objects, since this is a fundamental part of his condition.[34] While man is detached from these objects in the sense of not being at home among them, it is still necessary to his condition that he not cut himself off from them in any way.. His detachment must still be a "participating"[35] in the world.

The human condition as Marcel conceives it implies an order which is not of the order of objects. Even if there were not such an order, that is, even if there were no order in which man could find a home, by virtue of the fact that he himself is not entirely objective, he could not be at home among objects. As it is, there is such an order. "Perhaps we should see in the human condition a certain vital and spiritual order which we cannot violate without exposing ourselves to the loss not only of our equilibrium, but even of our integrity."[36] This aspect of the human condition must receive at least equal emphasis with that of man's necessarily being involved with objects, and possibly it should receive more emphasis since it can be forgotten, or denied.[37]

For man, despair of ever getting beyond the world of the objective is always a possibility. It is not necessarily the case that we recognize the order of the beyond, of the spiritual. Despair is an essential part of the human condition, and equally essential is the possibility of crying "Enough!"[38]

> "Despair is possible in any form, at any moment and to any degree, and this betrayal may seem to be counselled, if not forced upon us, by the very structure of the world we live in. The deathly aspect of this world may, from a given standpoint, be regarded as a ceaseless incitement to denial and suicide." 39

Despair and suicide are at least two of the factors in the human condition which betray a sense of need for the order of the vital, the spiritual, and the integral.[40] This need which arises out of man's condition, and is pointed to by elements in man's condition is what Marcel terms the "ontological need",[41] the need for "being" in the midst of a plethora of objects.

To summarize briefly: my body seems to occupy a sort of "middle state",[42] a position partly subjective and partly objective, but in fact transcending both.[43] It can be reduced to problematic description, but again, it surpasses and transcends this. It opens up

> "...a world where the self can recognize itself, act, expand; a world intermediate between the closed and the open, between having and being, of which my body necessarily seems the symbol or materialized nucleus." 44

The body, then, exists both in a world where it can be problematized, a world where it can be objectified, a world in which despair and also suicide are possible; and in a world in which it transcends all of this. This latter is a world where the ontological need is satisfied, a world of mystery.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MYSTERY

Marcel's notion of "mystery" is perhaps best understood if we begin with an attempt to distinguish it from the problematic. Mystery is beyond the problematic,[45] it is beyond the verifiable,[46] beyond the systematic[47]--beyond, in short, the world in which the calculable triumphs.[48] "Mystery is the metaproblematic."[49] As such, mystery transecnds technique,[50] cannot be reduced to detail,[51] and is not describable in terms of progress.[52]

Mystery is defined as being fundamentally a place, not where I observe or am observed, but where I am involved.

> "A mystery, on the other hand, is something in which I find myself caught up, and whose essence is therefore not to be before me in its entirety."[53]

I am, by my very essence, a creature who is involved,[54] and I cannot detach myself from that involvement.[55] A mystery, then, is not something I comprehend, but something which comprehends me.[56] It is something which transcends my ability to question it, something more basic than my question.

> "A mystery is a problem which encroaches upon its own data (57) and invades them, and so is transcended <u>qua</u> problem."[58]

The problematic conceals the mystery,[59] the mystery is a problem which has gone beyond itself, or which cannot be set as a problem. The "problem" of freedom is one example of such a situation, that is, of the data's encroaching upon itself.

> "What is inappropriately called the problem of freedom provides us with another example. I have defined mystery as 'a problem which encroaches on its own immanent conditions of possibility', and this encroachment is particularly obvious in the case of freedom. For freedom is a ground of that very thought which tries to conceive it." 60

Freedom is something which transcends my ability to conceptualize it because it is one of the conditions for conceptualization. It is more basic than my thought.

It is essential to the nature of mystery that it is capable of being recognized.[61] At the same time, I can refuse to recognize it for what it is, I can attempt to reduce it to the level of the problematic. "It is, no doubt, always possible (logically and psychologically) to degrade a mystery so as to turn it into a problem."[62] Thus, to problematize a mystery, something which is always possible, is to degrade it, to make it less than it is. One of the clearest examples of such a degradation is the "problem" of evil.

> "I am naturally inclined to consider evil as a disorder which I look into; I try to make out its causes, the reason for its existence, and even its hidden ends. How is it that this machine is so defective in its functioning? Or is this apparent defect due to a defect, not apparent but real, in my own vision, a kind of spiritual presbyopia or astigmatism? If so, the real disorder would lie in myself, and yet would remain objective in relation to the mental censorship which unmasked it. But evil simply recognized, or even contemplated ceases to be evil <u>suffered</u>, in fact I think it simply ceases to be evil.. I only really grasp evil in proportion as it touches me." 63

Evil is thus seen as either being a functional defect in the universe considered as a machine, or a defect in my way of viewing that universe. In either

case, the universe, which is the real or apparent place of evil is viewed from the outside, much as a mechanic views a motorcycle which doesn't run.[64]

> "In so doing, I consider myself not only immune to its illness or infirmity, but also external to a universe which I claim mentally at least to be able to reconstruct in its totality." [65]

When I attempt to problematize evil, I do two things: a., I take a position "incompatible with my real situation,"[66] and b., I cease to be considering evil. Evil is not something which in its essence can be objectified, it is something felt, suffered, something to which I am not immune. To reflect "critically" is often to destroy, as the biologist who carefully dissects the flower into its various component parts destroys the flower. The aggregate of parts in the dissecting pan is not the flower.[67]

Mystery, then, is something beyond the scope of objective verification, something destroyed by such verification, or, if not in all cases destroyed, at least degraded. Mystery "cannot be observed but only acknowledged--I am even tempted to say, if the term did not have a foreign ring to the philosophical ear--not so much acknowledged as greeted."[68]

Mystery can also be considered "the unknowable",[69] "a problem to which the mind arbitrarily attaches the tag, no thoroughfare..."[70] Mystery can be considered simply as a problematic road not open yet, it can be considered as a hole in our knowledge which an ever advancing

science will eventually plug. But the unknowable is simply the limiting case of the problematic, still well within the limits of the problematic. Mystery is a whole higher level.

> "...mystery is not, as it is for the agnostic, construed as a lacuna in our knowledge, as a void to be filled, but rather as a certain plenitude, and what is more, as the expression of a will, of an exigence that is so profound that it is not aware of itself and constantly betrays itself in forging false certainties..." 71

Mystery, as involvement, more than transcends the level of the problematic. It is itself transcendence, it is the transcendence of the very categories of the problematic themselves, the inner and the outer; it is the sphere where this distinction "melts away."[72]

> "...if the metaproblematic can be asserted at all, it must be conceived as transcending the opposition between the subject who asserts the existence of being, on the one hand, and being as <u>asserted</u> <u>by that subject</u>, on the other, and as underlying it in a given sense." 73

Mystery transcends the opposition of the inner and the outer, of the same and the other,[74] of subject and object. Marcel's notion of mystery is not, then, as it might seem at first, a subjectivist notion, because on the level of mystery the category of the subjective is transcended.

The "act" by which the opposition between inner and outer is transcended is what Marcel terms "participation",[75] which he notes is rather different in his usage from that of Plato.[76] Mystery is this very participation.

> "The metaproblematic is a participation on which my reality as a subject is built..." 77

As metaproblematic, as transcendent, this participation can be degraded:[78] "We irresistably tend to objectify this participation and to construe it as a relation..."[79] We attempt to make the metaproblematic of participation into an objective relationship of, for example, subject and object.

> "Our essential immediacy is disclosed in this act alone, and our discovery of it may occur in rather different areas which nevertheless communicate with one another--the areas of metaphysics, poetry, and art." 80

The introduction of the notions of poetry and art brings us to another "transcendent" aspect of the mysterious, an aspect which it might be argued is a type of participation,[81] i.e., creativity. Creativity is seen by Marcel as something which overflows the bounds of the subject who creates, something beyong our problematic categories.[82]

> "...here I encounter again what I have said elsewhere about the opposition between a mystery and a problem. There is surely no creativity aside from a certain mystery which envelops and reverberates through the creator; so that what we call creation at the core of which passivity and activity, as the romantics have observed, are fused and united." 83

Creation is, then, a liberation, a freeing of something beyond the problematic categories of passivity and activity, something which unites them. Moreover, creation is not necessarily the production of an artifact, for there can be production without creation as there can

be creation which produces no discernable object. Creation is a kind of self-fulfillment.[84] What is created in the act of creation is, in a very real sense, the creator himself.[85]

PRESENCE

The heart of Marcel's notion of mystery is the aspect of presence, an examination of which will elucidate much of what has already been discussed and will be discussed in this chapter.

> "Perhaps the shortest way towards our needed definition of the notion of mystery would be to begin by working out the distinction, at the spiritual level, between what we call an object and what we call a presence. Here, as always, we are taking as our starting point certain very simple and immediate experiences, but experiences which philosophy until our own day, has always tended to overlook." 86

Discussion of the problematic has shown already how we can come to consider another individual as an object by treating him as though he were absent. We have also seen how an individual can consider us as an object by treating us as absent. In this connection Marcel refers to a common experience which it is to be supposed most of us have had at one time or other.

> "We can, for instance, have a very strong feeling that somebody who is sitting in the same room as ourselves, sitting quite near us, someone we can look at and listen to and whom we could touch if we could touch if we wanted to make a final test of his reality, is nevertheless far further away from us than some loved one who is perhaps thousands of miles away, or perhaps, even, no longer among the living. We could say that the man sitting beside us was in the same room as ourselves, but that he was not really present there, that his presence, did not make itself felt." 87

Communication between myself and such a person can at best be nothing more than a purely physical phenomenon, a "...passing of messages between a reception point and an emission point..."[88] an impersonal sort of communication which could easily be carried out by two properly programmed computers. "He understands what I say to him, but he does not understand me..."[89] What is interesting is that this lack of presence is not necessarily founded upon my lack of knowledge of the particulars of this man's life, on the contrary, the more I know about such a man in objective, functional, practical terms, the less he is present to me.[90]

If we return, however, to this man whose presence has not made itself felt, who stands before me as the sum total of his particulars, the "creature of his dossier", he may, in the course of our conversation, mention something which puts the whole relationship on a slightly different footing.

> "It can happen, however, that a bond of feeling is created between me and the other person, if, for example, I discover an experience we have both shared (we have both been to a certain place, have run the same risks, have criticized a certain individual, or read and loved the same book); hence a unity is established..." 91

On the other hand, we may meet an individual who makes us feel his presence immediately, whose impact on our lives is such that "suddenly all our perspectives are turned inside out..."[92] Sometimes, such a person may pass swiftly from my sight, so to speak, but the few

moments that his presence was granted to me may change my life.[93]

> "Let us recall, for example, in order to see all of this more concretely, the sort of experiences we all may have had in connection with a funeral. Certain persons whom we would consider perhaps as friends have offered us only stereotyped formulas which seem to be delivered by an automatic distributor; those persons were not present and we ourselves were not present for them. Some other person, on the contrary, by a look, an intonation, or by the very quality of his silence, has brought us undeniable testimony of presence. We were together, and this encounter, this co-presence, has left behing a sort of furrow which prolongs it." 94

This experience Marcel terms the "encounter" which he defines as a "co-presence";[95] it involves an awareness of mutual presence on the part of strangers, or on the part of persons not significantly present to each other before. The encounter, moreover, can be reduced to an objectifiable relationship which can be explained, ultimately, in objective terms.

> "Suppose that I am told, for instance: 'The reason you have met this person in this place is that you both like the same kind of scenery, or that you both need the same kind of treatment for your health'--the explanation means nothing. Crowds of people who apparently share my tastes were in the Engadine or in Florence at the time I was there; and there are always numbers of patients suffering from the same disease as myself at the health resort I frequent. But neither this supposed identity of tastes nor this common affliction has brought us together in any real sense; it has nothing to do with that intimate and unique affinity with which we are dealing." 96

The experience is an immediate one, not explicable in terms such as these no matter how detailed the explanation becomes. This manner of "explaining away" the encounter is simply another example of the temptation

to turn what is more than an object[97] into an object.

Presence is, at bottom, a unity which surpasses objective examination. The person present to me is[98] with me, we are together, we are we. If I encounter a stranger on the street and ask him for directions, I can be said to be with him only in the sense of being objectively proximate to him, if another person came up afterward who knew me and asked about the conversation, I would probably reply, "I asked him directions", rather than, "We were discussing the route to..." But now, this person who is an acquaintance of mine, is clearly more with me than was the first. We might very well betray this in our manner of speaking ("Well, we must get together again soon.") Or, I encounter an old friend, one I have not seen for some time. My immediate awareness of being with this person can reach a level such that I may even lose track of time and place.

The person who is "with" me is essentially "thou"[99] to me. We have already seen the person who is absent called "him", and the "him" is a thing: "...in so far, on the other hand, as he is a Thou, he is freed from the nature of things, and nothing that I can say about[100] things can concern him, can concern the Thou." The "thou" is essentially that which I am present for, the[101] thou is a "guarantee of union".

The second person, the thou,[102] is that to whom I appeal, and I do so because only the thou can respond to my appeal.

> "...I address the second person when what I address can respond to me in some way--and that response cannot be translated into words." 103

The appeal of the mourner in our above example, an appeal for sympathy, received a response, not in words, for there were many of those, but rather in "a look, an intonation". He who responded showed himself to be a thou, because there can be a response only to an appeal.[104]

The function of the appeal is, unlike objective verification, to "mysteriously restore us to ourselves."[105] Rather than being the ground for a separation of me from myself, it is that which brings me back to myself.

> "Whereas objectification, particularly for the him, implies a dialogue between me and myself, hence a triadic relation, in the presence of the thou, I attain an inner unification which makes possible a dyadic relation." 106

In objectification, I had to become two people, in a sense, myself and the object which confronted the object under observation.[107] I had to step outside myself and become a third party in order to verify the objectivity of my observation. In presence, on the other hand, I am myself only. This is particularly true when the thou is someone I love. "The being whom I love can hardly be a third person for me at all; yet he allows me to discover myself..."[108] Love is essentially that which transcends the categories of the same and the other,[109] love as a function of the thou is transcendent.

The nexus so important for the concept of incarnation now becomes more intelligible. My body, as the manifestation of this nexus, is present to me.[110] Thus

the universe, particularly the human element, can be present to me. However, the universe so conceived is not dependent upon me,[111] but is, on the contrary, free.

> "If...I treat the other as Thou, I treat him and apprehend him qua freedom because he is also freedom. What is more, I help him, in a sense to be freed, I collaborate with his freedom." [112]

Thus, the thou is essentially that which I can never hope to possess, to limit, to encircle. He is free and beyond this if he is thou, he transcends my ability to define him.

Participation, moreover, is more easily grasped in the light of the thou, for not only do we speak of participating in a given activity, we imply in the very notion of participation that others are participating too.[113] Creativity, moreover, is only understandable in the light of the thou, "for the true artist does not create for himself alone but for everyone..."[114]

As there was a way of confronting the problematic, so too there is a way of apprehending the metaproblematic. This is also a type of reflection which, because it comes after primary reflection,[115] Marcel terms secondary reflection. Secondary reflection has as its task the putting together of what primary reflection has rent asunder.

> "...the function of secondary reflection is essentially recuperative; it reconquers that unity (lost in primary reflection..." [116]

In texts earlier than the one above, Marcel terms secondary reflection "recollection", and notes that it is something which comes only in silence.

> "I have dwelt this morning on the subject of recollection. This is a central datum upon which very little work seems to have been done. Not only am I in a position to impose silence upon the strident voices which usually fill my consciousness, but also, this silence has a positive quality. Within the silence, I can regain possession of myself. It is in itself a principle of recovery. I should be tempted to say that recollection and mystery are correlatives." 117

He remarks later on, in much the same vein, that "mystery cannot be given except to a creature capable of recollection..." [118] Recollection is something which comes in silence, which helps me to recover myself, and which is correlative with mystery.

In another place, Marcel speaks of the "recovery of an intuition" [119] which would otherwise be lost. While this notion may very well anticipate his later notion of secondary reflection, he finds fault with it because it is incompatible with the notion of intuition. [120]

> "Rather than to speak of intuition in this context, we should say that we are dealing with an assurance which underlies the entire development of thought, even of discursive thought; it can be approached only by a second reflection--a reflection whereby I ask myself how and from what starting point I was able to proceed in my initial reflection which itself posited the ontological, but without knowing it. This second reflection is recollection in the measure in which recollection can be self-conscious." 121

Secondary reflection, then, puts me back into the picture. It gives me myself as the one who posits the primary reflection. It, in a sense, "recaptures a

reality"[122] which I have known immediately, and gives me back the immediacy of that moment.

Secondary reflection is, for Marcel, "synonymous with philosophy itself".[123] It restores concreteness to my thought. It is, moreover, an expression of my very freedom itself.

> "This reflection of the second degree or philosophical reflection exists only for and by means of freedom; nothing external to me can force me to exercise it in this respect; the very notion of constraint in this context is devoid of content." [124]

Thus, I can exercise or not exercise secondary reflection at my will, and moreover, I am free to hold, even, that it does not exist. I can reject it or try to problematize it.

BEING

For Marcel, being is a mystery;[125] that is to say, it is not a problem.[126] Marcel defines Being as that which is not reducible to certain problematical categories: for example, Being is defined as that which surpasses all inventories,[127] it is beyond calculation. Being is that which resists the critical reflection of the problematic.

> "As for defining the word 'being', let us admit that it is extremely difficult. I would merely suggest this method of approach; being is what withstands--or would withstand--an exhaustive analysis bearing on the data of experience and aiming to reduce them step by step to elements increasingly devoid of intrinsic or significant value." [128]

Being is that which will not admit of "breaking-down" into component parts. It is not simply an aggregate of components.

> "When we ask ourselves what is the link between being and the appearances it presents, we are

> really asking how they can be integrated into it. At the moment the notion of integration comes up, we are back on the level of having. Being, it seems, can never be a sum." 129

Being transcends its appearances. It cannot be considered as simply the sum total of those characteristics presented to us. One might well wonder "whether being is not essentially uncharacterisable, though of course it will be understood that the uncharacterisable is not the same as the indeterminate."[130] At the same time, we cannot think of Being as in a vacuum, an element removed from the characteristics which it supports. Being is not something apart from its characteristics, it underlies them and must be thought together with them.[131] Yet it, itself is beyond characterisation.

Being transcends, moreover, the categories of passivity and activity, the categories of what is fixed and what is in motion. "I am convinced...that being, as it has been conceived by all great metaphysicians, perhaps without exception, transcends the opposition between static and dynamic..."[132] It transcends, further, the categories of genus and species, "we must realize that to affirm being is absolutely to transcend 'knowledge by genus and species.'" 133

Being is what we find ourselves involved in. "We are involved in Being, and it is not in our power to leave it: more simply, we are..."[134] Being is the place of my involvement, it is not a datum given to me from which I can abstract, and which I can circumscribe.

Marcel notes that "Knowledge is within being, enfolded by it."[135] I can have no knowledge which is somehow outside of being.

Human being, for Marcel, is basically something transitory, a process from the darkness of birth to that of death.[136]

> "It is precisely the soul that is the traveller; it is of the soul and of the soul alone that we can say with supreme truth that 'being' necessarily means 'being on the way' (en route)." 137

Man's condition is to be a wayfarer, a pilgrim in a world where he is not at home, now, we see that his very being is "being on the way", not stationary but moving always.

Being is fundamentally bound up in creation, in creativity. The man who creates does more than simply produce something which becomes an object of having, he "puts himself into his work", he lives it, he is his work.

> "As soon as there is creation, in whatever degree, we are in the realm of being; that is what we must manage to make fully intelligible. One difficulty arises from the fact that creation, in the finite sense of the word, is no doubt only possible in the midst of a kind of having. The more creation can shake this off, the nearer it is to absolute creation." 138

The closer one can come to the realm of Being in creation, the more absolute is that creation.

For Marcel, Being is the place of fullness.[139] Being is something which fills me, which "enfolds me".[140]

Being, for Marcel, is like the fullness of love. In contrasting the fulfillment of Being with the perfection which characterises the problematic,[141] Marcel notes:

> "But when we spoke of fulfillment, it was not quite on the ground of form as form that we were taking our stand. It was rather that we envisaged what I called an experience of fulness, like that which is involved in love, when love knows that it is shared, when it experiences itself as shared." [142]

The awareness, the feeling of fulfillment which accompanies the experience of love is a type of the fulfillment which is Being. The experience of Being as fulfillemnt is akin to joy, or perhaps it is the ground of joy.

> "Consider Being as the principle of inexhaustibility. Joy is bound up with a feeling of something inexhaustible, as Nietzsche saw." [143]

We are left to our own devices to conclude as to whether or not joy is the feeling of Being, but it certainly is possible to interpret what Marcel is saying above as giving an affirmative answer to this question. Joy might be described in common parlance as a feeling of "well-being"; it is certainly an experience of overwhelming security and is for this reason tied up with hope.[144]

Ultimately, Being as fullness is closely related to the notion of a fullness of truth.

> "It is surely impossible for us not to have at any rate a vague assurance that being can only nominally be distinct from a certain fullness of truth. That fullness is in contrast with the partial, specialized truths to which it is difficult to attach any ontological import... It is the fullness which is the contradiction

> at once of the hollowness of a functionalized world and of the overpowering monotony of a society in which beings take on more and more the appearance of specimens which it is increasingly difficult to differentiate." 145

It might well be wondered, at this point, whether the awareness of inexhaustibility might not be the ground of the density we feel in our bodily existence, the density our bodies confer on other existents.

Since Being is a mystery, we can and almost must[146] attempt to problematize it in order to develop a clearcut picture of what we are dealing with. We will try to reduce it to the level of the problematic by some means or other so that we can define it.

> "The peculiarly disconcerting nature of our enquiry rests upon just this point, that when we speak of <u>being</u>, we cannot but project before ourselves some sort of schema--however abstract it may be--and yet at the same time we must free ourselves from from this very projection, we must recognize and expose its illusory nature." 147

How is Being to be approached? What methods are to be used? The basic question we are concerned with here is not the isolation of an esoteric element for examination, but the simple "...what does <u>to be</u> mean, or again what is it that makes a being to be a <u>being</u>."[148] And in this search, we are cautioned that we are looking for something which is not itself a characteristic.

> "It calls for only a most elementary philosophical reflection to realize that <u>to be</u> cannot be a property, since it is <u>to be</u> that makes possible the existence of any property at all..." 149

Since we cannot break down Being and analyze it, our approach to it must be by way of secondary reflection.[150]

When we are dealing with Being, with that which withstands analysis, we can only attempt to "recapture" the entire concrete reality.

> "I believe that our point of reference can be based only upon experience itself, treated as a massive presence which is to be the basis of all our affirmation...we should...look at it as something which should be taken into account by whoever is intent, I shall not say upon grasping being (for by now it must be abundantly clear that being can never be the object of such a grasp), but upon undertaking a concrete approach to being." 151

For Marcel, then, the approach to Being is through immediate experiences and their recollection, through much of the data we considered in chapter I in outlining the general aspects of Marcel's position.[152]

An ontology such as this, one which attempts to appraoch Being concretely through immediate experience, is bound up with that most immediate experience, the relationship between I and thou.

> "...we cannot fail to see that intersubjectivity, which it is increasingly more evident is the cornerstone of a concrete ontology, is after all nothing but charity itself." 153

It need hardly be pointed out that Being is opposed to Having. Marcel notes this explicitly in discussing the distinction between desire and love, where desire is, as we have seen, on the level of having and not having, while love far surpasses this level, love is something which, in the final analysis, I am.[154]

The basic distinction between the problematic and the mysterious turns, in a sense, on the distinction between what I have and what I am, between what I can

separate from myself and count, and what enfolds and penetrates me as deeply as my own Being.

THE PERSONAL

The person is first and foremost that which somehow transcends the instants of his life and the enumeration of his characteristics. It is what grounds all of this: "...the personality infinitely transcends what we may call its snapshot states..."[155] What is essential to the person is that he cannot be reduced to categorial, problematical detail.

The person is that which is opposed unalterably to the one, to the "they say...", to <u>das man</u>. The reason here is that, while it is of the nature of the one to evade, it is proper to the person to <u>confront</u>.

> "...to <u>confront</u> is what is characteristic of the person. We can maintain, from this point of view, that courage is the dominant virtue of the person--while the <u>one</u> seems on the contrary to be the locus of every flight and evasion." 157

The person is essentially what "declares itself", what owns up, what does not flee. The person is that which stands and assumes responsibility, "In this sense the person is the active negation of the one..."[158]

In order to understand Marcel's notion of the person better, we should examine his notion of the "act". This is the area where the question "did you do it?" must be answered by a yes or a no,[159] "...the essence of the act is to commit the agent."[160] The act, if it is an act, gives rise to responsibility for it.

> "When I say that my act commits me, it seems to me that it means just this: what is characteristic of my act is that it can later be claimed by me as mine; at bottom, it is as though I signed a confession in advance: when the day comes when I will be confronted by my act, whether through my own agency or that of another--the distinction here is of no consequence--I must say: yes, it is I who acted in this way, ego sum qui fecit; what is more: I acknowledge in advance that if I try to escape, I am guilty of a disownment." 161

When I act, or rather, when I act, I am implicitly affirming for future reference that it was I who did it, and if confronted, I must answer "yes, I did it."[162] For this reason, Marcel goes on to remark that it is, in fact, the act which yields the "person".

> "The act, we said, is something to assume; i.e., the person must apprehend himself in it; but in itself it is only an act to the extent that it makes possible this later course of action; hence it is interposed between the person and himself. It is in the act that the nexus whereby the person is unified with himself is realized; but it must be immediately added that the person does not exist apart from that unification." 163

As an incarnate entity, man is an act of incarnation, he says "yes" to life,[164] for, as we have seen, the possibility of suicide is always present in man's condition.[165]

The unity of the person is given in his act. When he acts he apprehends himself as transcending those characteristics with which he is usually summed up. It is essential to the nature of the act that it should involve the whole person.[166]

The act is involvement. We cannot detach ourselves from the act without destroying it as act, for we will no longer be acting but rather observing, "...we cannot

contemplate the act as spectator without negating it."[167] The person is yielded through acting not through observing.

The person is essentially openness to the other. My acknowledgement of the act is, in itself, a "laying myself open" to the other. If I encircle myself with defenses and bulwarks against the penetration of the other, I become, in a sense, those defenses and not myself.

> "I should be...inclined to admit that the personal is authentically itself only by reason of whatever is in it which smashes the frame in which it is always in danger of allowing itself to be imprisoned as ego pure and simple." 168

It is the other who gives me to myself as person.[169] I appeal to the other to recognize me for myself and it is the power of the other to respond to this appeal or to withold his response. Marcel uses the example of a small child who picks a bouquet of flowers and runs to his mother with them.

> "'Look', he cries, 'I picked these.' Mark the triumph in his voice and above all the gesture, simple and rapid enough, perhaps, which accompanies his announcement. The child points himself out for admiration and gratitude: 'It was I, I who am with you here, who picked these lovely flowers, don't go thinking it was Nanny or my sister; it was I and no one else." 170

The child singles himself out from "among others",[171] and makes himself significant, a person. But what is paramount here is that the mother must notice, she must raise the child from among others in her sight and set him apart. She must bear witness to the child's per-

sonality.

> "...we observe that this ego here before us, considered as a centre of magnetism, cannot be reduced to certain parts which can be specified such as 'my body, my hands, my brain'; it is a global presence--a presence which gains glory from the magnificent bouquet which I myself have picked, which I have brought you; and I do not know whether you should admire more the artistic taste of which it is a proof or the generousity which I have shown in giving it to you, I, who might so easily have kept it for myself. Thus the beauty of the object is in a fashion reflected upon me, and if I appeal to you, then, I repeat, I do so as to a qualified witness whom I invite to wonder at the whole we form--the bouquet and I." 172

In the light of this appeal for witness, we can look once again at Marcel's notion of presence. I am present to what can respond, (a thou), and if the thou does respond, does bear witness to my being, he gives my being to me.

> "We might say that presence is always dependent on an experience which is at the same time irreducible and vague, the sense of existeing, of being in the world. Very early in the development of a human being this consciousness of existing...is linked up with the urge to make ourselves <u>recognized</u> by some other person..." 173

The person is only intelligible in the light of the other, thus the other has the power to raise the person to himself or to reduee him to an object. The other who bears witness to my personality recognizes in me and attests to that in me which transcends my particular states and the elements of my description.

The question which precipitated our jump from the level of the problematic, and we termed it almost a cry of anguish, was the question "What am I?" On the

level of the problematic, no answer to this question was forthcoming. In fact, says Marcel, the question "has no equivalent on the level of Having."[174] On the level of Having, the only proper question is "what character does so and so have?" "To identify is in fact to recognize that something, or someone, has, or has not, such-and-such a character..."[175]

What is important with regard to the question of my being is the difficulty it poses for the person who asks it. In such a situation, we are questioning the very ground of ourselves. How can we be qualified to raise such a question?

> "It is...worth noticing that I who ask questions about Being do not in the first place know either <u>if</u> I am nor <u>a fortiori what</u> I am. I do not even clearly know the meaning of the question 'what am I?' though I am obsessed by it. <u>So we see the problem of Being here encroaching upon its own data</u>, and being studied actually inside the subject who states it. In the process, it is denied (or transcended) as problem, and becomes metamorphosed to mystery." 176

The question of my personality, "What am I?" is a question which transcends the level of the problematic. It is the ontological question <u>par excellence</u>. Ontology cannot be separated from this question.[177] The ontological question is one of my entire being. "To raise the ontological problem is to raise the question of being as a whole and of oneself seen as a totality."[178]

CHAPTER IV.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Marcel's distinction between problem and mystery is what might be termed a "working distinction". As one commentator puts it, it is the closest that he comes to a technical notion.[1] Marcel himself regards this distinction as fundamental.[2] Moreover, he regards it as fundamental for an understanding of certain specific areas of his thought, such as fidelity, faith and hope.[3] It is, then, to be assumed that an examination of these specific areas will bear out this contention and also provide a clearer picture of the general aspects of "problem" and "mystery" we have tried to bring out above. If the distinction is a "working one", it can best be viewed at work.

Our concern in the few pages that follow is to summarize briefly what has gone before and to attempt to point out some of the implications. The distinction we have considered is more than simply a distinction between two ways of looking at the same subject matter. Certainly at this point it should be clear that the subject matter is different in the respective cases. We are dealing with a distinction between two levels on which man can move. And it would seem to be possible for him to operate on both levels though with respect to different subject matter.

What is perhaps most important to our understanding

of this distinction is the possibility of mystery's being reduced to the level of problem. There is no way of actually demonstrating that the experiences making up the realm of the mysterious do in fact transcend the level of the problematic. All that can be done is to "appeal" for a reflection upon subject matter which is properly mysterious. Ultimately, the only road from the problematic to the mysterious is by way of the "dissatisfaction" we feel at everything's being reduced to problematic categories. It is a dissatisfaction which, if we persist in limiting ourselves to the problematic, could burgeon into a full-fledged despair. Such a despair, which is part of the structure of the problematic world in which we live, can provide us with a stepping stone to the metaproblematic.[4] Despair points to the need in man for a higher level where the cut and dried of the problematic gives way to a more "human" reality.

The chief area of dissatisfaction to which the problematic gives rise, is its inability to satisfy the question of my Being. The distinction between Being and Having is paramount for an understanding of the problem-mystery distinction as we have already had occasion to point out. The distinction between the problematic and the metaproblematic is a distinction between what I <u>have</u>, what I possess and can show objectively, and what I <u>am</u>, what surpasses objective verification and yet is more real to me than what I

can observe. Being is an act, Having is an object. The act is fundamental to the nature of the person, while the possession of characteristics is secondary.

The object is what makes me turn toward it a facade which is not myself, it separates me from myself and alienates me. It is a facade, moreover, which I possess and which I can trot out as the occasion demands. This "dossier" is what constitutes the statistic, the item number to which it corresponds. As a statistic, it becomes more utilizable, it lends itself to technical programs and methods. Ultimately, no matter how detailed and complete the dossier is, it is essentially faceless. It has no personality and no unity save that the characteristics listed therein are all attached to the same item number.

The object was contrasted with the presence, with the "thou". For the thou, the issue is not what I have, the various characteristics I can produce at the drop of a hat, but rather what I am, my being itself. For the thou I am a person, and his witness to that fact restores my personality to me. My being, my personality which were lost on the level of the problematic, are restored to me on the level of the metaproblematic, on the level of presence. On this level I essentially transcend the brokenness of the problematic categories, and even the subject-object dichotomy is surpassed.

We contrasted, moreover, two types of reflection,

one which breaks down the unity of reality into a succession of instants, categories, characteristics, and the other which recaptures the whole of a reality. Again, in this second type of reflection, we are given our whole being, our whole personality, not a succession or aggregate of characteristics. What I <u>am</u> is essentially a unity, what I <u>have</u> is essentially multiple. What I <u>am</u> is whole and full of my Being, what I <u>have</u> is disjointed and hollow, empty of my Being. What I <u>am</u> is myself, what I <u>have</u> is other, <u>qua</u> other. Secondary reflection has as its task the restoration of this unity, of this fullness, of myself.

We have seen some of the human implications of each area, but what we have yet to see are the philosophical ones, or rather, the implications considered in a philosophical light. It must be pointed out explicitly that in all of this there are implications for philosophy, in particular for ontology and metaphysics, since these areas concern themselves with Being. Our task, very briefly, will be to try to make more explicit some of these implications.

Marcel has termed secondary reflection "philosophy", and we are thus given to understand that the level of mystery which is the level of secondary reflection is where we find philosophy. This implies first and foremost that the problematic is not the level of concern for philosophy. It is rather the concern of what

breaks down and analyses, viz. science. The concern of philosophy is mystery.

It follows, then, that philosophy must have its starting point in those areas of the problematic which point to mystery, namely dissatisfaction and despair. It must use these as steppingstones to the areas which are its concern, the chief of which is Being. What is important, however, is that the approaches to Being are not abstract, deductive, objective arguments, which is the way of the problematic. Rather, the approaches to Being are immediate experiences the reality of which is recaptured in secondary reflection. Any study of Being, then, must be a study of and through these concrete approaches. It must proceed only through recollecting these experiences. If we are to have an ontology or a metaphysics it must be a concrete one.

It should be clear that much of what we have just said in fact parallels Marcel's notions of what philosophy should be, discussed earlier in chapter I. At the time we discussed those notions, it might have seemed that we were dealing with rather dubious subject matter. Even now it may not seem that Marcel's approach has gained any strength, but we should be able to grant that at least his conception of philosophy parallels his distinction between the problematic and the mysterious.

Moreover, Marcel's philosophical "method" of argumentation by appeal should be more understandable in

the light of our discussion of the "thou". Marcel proceeds by appealing to the other as "thou" to reflect, to recollect a common experience, and to respond to this recollection.

For Marcel, "presence" is a most fundamental part of the human condition, it is fundamental to the search for truth. It is part of the journey of our lives.

> "I want to make it my business to reflect before those who follow in my footsteps, and so perhaps to stretch out a helping hand to them as they climb the dark hill of Destiny, our common fate. We never climb alone, though we often seem to do so; belief in loneliness is the first illusion to dispel, the first obstacle to overcome; in some cases the first temptation to conquer." 5

Our very existence rests on the level of presence, on the level of the "with". We climb together, we wander together.[6] We can isolate ourselves one from another by treating each other as objects, but we are essentially wayfarers together.

The distinction between the problematic and the metaproblematic is the basis upon which all of Marcel's thought rests. It underlies every aspect of it. It allows him to distinguish between those things which are the concern of science and those which are the concern of philosophy. It implies that the philosopher must cease to be an observer of externals and become a reflective apprehender of experience. Ultimately the distinction between problem and mystery allows us to achieve an "exaltation of experience", rather than a castration of it.

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Cf. our discussion of Music as influence and archetype, pp. 13-18, Infra.

CHAPTER I

1. Cf. for example: Etienne Gilson, "Unique Philosopher", Philosophy Today, 4:278-81, w'60; pp. 278, 279; (translated from "Un Philosophe Singulier", Les Nouvelles Litteraires, 19 Juin, 1958); Jeanne Parain-Vial, "Notes on the Ontology of Gabriel Marcel", Philosophy Today 4:271-277, w'60; p.272 (translated from "Notes sur l'ontologie de Gabriel Marcel", Critique, 1960 (16), N. 158, 636-652); E.W. Hocking, "Marcel and the Ground Issues of Metaphysics", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 14, 1953-54, pp.439-469; pp. 439 & 440; H.S. Hughes, "Marcel, Maritain and the Secular World", American Scholar 35: 728-749 Aut. '66, p. 742; K.T. Gallagher, "Gabriel Marcel: Philosopher of Communion", Catholic World: 195, 96-101, My.'62; pp. 96, 97; T.C. Mihalich, "Marcel's Ontology of Love: a Background for Literature", Renascence 13: 21-25 Fall '60; p. 22; B.G. Murchland, "Spiritual Realist", Catholic World 185; 340-45 Ag. '57; pp. 340, 344; D.V. Pax, "Philosophical Reflection: Gabriel Marcel", New Scholasticism, 1964 (38), 159-177; pp. 160, 161; Seymour Cain, "Gabriel Marcel: An Evaluation", Ramparts 1: 11-15, My. '62; pp. 11, 13, 15 (reprinted from Cain's Gabriel Marcel, Hilary House Publishers, Ltd., New York, 1963); V.P. Miceli, "Marcel: the Ascent to Being", Thought 38: 395-420, Fall, '63, pp. 398, 401; Robert Ostermann, "Gabriel Marcel: the Discovery of Being", Modern Schoolman, Jan. 1954 xxxi, 99-116; p. 105; and James Collins, "Gabriel Marcel and the Mystery of Being", Thought, Dec. 1943, xviii, 665-693; pp. 675-676.
2. MJ (Preface), p. xii
3. It is not clear that Marcel has been influenced in his rejection of the systematic by any of his predecessors with whom he was acquainted. Such a rejection of the systematic is at best implicit in Nietzsche (cf. for example, chapter I of Beyond Good and Evil) and while it is explicit in Kierkegaard, Marcel notes (cf. Dignity, pp. 25-26) that his own thought was developed before he actually read Kierkegaard. The chief influence on Marcel in this respect might well be Bergson who, while he does not reject system, at least cautions against the limitations involved in any form of abstraction. (cf. Time and Free Will, London:

George Allen & Co., Ltd., trans. F.L. Pogson, pp. 129-134, esp pp. 129 & 134.)

4. MJ (Preface) p. vii
5. PE, pp. 77-78
6. Fidelity, p. 14
7. Loc. cit.
8. MJ (Preface) p. xii
9. Fidelity, p.3
10. PE, p.88
11. MJ (Preface) p. xii
12. Hence, I see things only partially. Fidelity, p.4
13. Fidelity, p. 15
14. Ibid., p.3
15. Ibid., p.4
16. Loc. cit.
17. Before he was four--cf. Dignity, p.23
18. PE, p.88
19. Ibid., p.81
20. Loc. cit.
21. Loc. cit.
22. I do not think that Marcel would approve of our usage of this term. He would, I think, rank it alongside the term "effigy" (cf. PE, p.23). Since we have not yet had occasion to introduce the more accurate term "presence", I can see no other possibility except the even more vague term "memory". In any event, what we must emphasize is that Marcel's recollection of his motive is more than an image and that our usage is thus deficient.
23. PE, p.83
24. Loc. cit.
25. HV, pp. 68-97
26. Ibid., p.70
27. PE, p.82
28. Loc. cit.
29. Loc. cit.
30. Ibid., p.79
31. Loc. cit.
32. Ibid., p.86
33. Loc. cit.
34. Loc. cit.
35. Translation of "Chez", Marcel refers to this in MJ (Preface), p.xii
36. Fidelity, p. 27
37. PE, p.90
38. This story varies with the telling--cf. Fidelity, p.31 & Dignity, p.36 for two other versions
39. PE, p.90
40. Dignity, p.36
41. Loc. cit.
42. Fidelity, p.31
43. It is to be noted that this terminology is the same as Buber's Ich und Du, but Marcel notes (Dignity, p.39) that his thought on the subject predates his first

acquaintance with Buber's work.
44. Fidelity, p.32
45. Ibid., p.61
46. Cf. MBI, p.3
47. MBI, pp. 1 & 2
48. Ibid., pp. 125-126
49. Ibid., p.5
50. PE, p.93
51. Fidelity, p.64
52. Loc. cit.
53. Ibid., p.80
54. MBII, p.168
55. HV, p.7
56. BH, p.208; we shall discuss the notion of encounter below
57. Loc. cit.
58. Fidelity, p.8
59. Loc. cit.
60. BH, p.104
61. PE, p.14
62. BH, p.11
63. Ibid., p.119
64. PE, p.29
65. That is to say, it is a fact of the experience of a "western" philosopher, a European philosopher, or an American philosopher. Marcel would consider that he himself falls into the former class.
66. MBI, p.213
67. Marcel remarks that he dislikes using a physical metaphor. As we shall come to see later in this paper he speaks of "currents" in quite another sense. Cf. Fidelity, p. 12 on the issue of his dissatisfaction with such a metaphor.
68. Loc. cit.
69. "Response" discussed in Fidelity, pp. 50 ff
70. MBII, p.14
71. Fidelity, p. 176
72. Ibid., p. 179
73. Ibid., p.6
74. Loc. cit.
75. Ibid., p.14
76. cf. BH, p.169 "model"
77. By one of his students, cf. MJ (Preface) p.xiii
78. Loc. cit.
79. Loc. cit.
80. Loc. cit.
81. Seymour Cain, "Gabriel Marcel's Way", The Commonweal, Dec. 9, 1960, pp. 271-274; p.272
82. Dignity, pp. 82-83
83. "Spectacle", BH, pp.17, 18; Fidelity, p.21
84. Dignity, pp. 82-83
85. Ibid., p.65
86. MBII, pp. 3 & 4
87. Ibid., p.65

88. For example, MBII, pp.1, 47, 69, 113, 166, 171, 187; Fidelity, 6, 10, 63; BH, 41, 225
89. PE, p.86
90. Ibid., p.77
91. BH, p.20
92. HV, p.7
93. Ibid., p.33
94. Dignity, p.26
95. It is to be expected that the sort of "certainty" which Marcel is referring to here is a certainty which is experienced rather than thought. It is more a "feeling" of certainty which is experienced but not conceived. Certainty is perhaps a poor word for the experience but it comes closest to describing it.
96. The notion of a "beyond" is found in many religious doctrines and Marcel notes (Dignity, p.25) that at this time he began to ascribe a certain "primacy" to religion.
97. BH, p.136
98. MBII, p.50
99. Ibid., p.141
100. What Marcel means here is that in music, unlike literature where ideas can be abstracted from the literary form, the statement of a musical theme is inseparable from the notes, time, and chord structure in which it is stated. The theme is its statement.
101. BH, p.57
102. MBII, p.15
103. Cf. MJ (Preface), p.x; Roger Troisfontaines, De l'existence à l'être, 2 vols. (lettre-preface de Marcel), (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953), p. 267
104. That is, Marcel's formulation of October, 1932, cf. BH, p.100
105. In Fidelity, pp. 47ff; & Dignity, p.126
106. That is, it forms the object of concern of the first part of MJ, (cf. MJ (Preface), p. x), and thus would seem to be important enough to rate individual treatment.
107. Fidelity, p.47
108. Loc. cit.
109. Ibid., p.48
110. The Bergsonian distinction between "closed" and "open" societies is what Marcel is basing his position here on. Briefly, in Bergson's conception, a "closed" society is one which develops elaborate measures for warding off invasion, which walls itslef up and turns in upon itself, while the "open" society seeks to establish friendly relations with its neighbors, to open itself outward to the others. (Cf. Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1953, pp. 229-234) Marcel is transferring this "political" notion to the level of the person. We shall see considerably more of this distinction as the paper progresses.

111. Our common expressions such as "choked up", and "a lump in my throat" may be considered as betraying this aspect of admiration.
112. The feeling of being weighed down exemplified in this discussion of admiration for a given work. Cf. p. 19, n. 107 supra
113. Fidelity, p.84
114. Loc. cit.
115. That is, I must be able to admire not only this object, but any object capable of admiration. Cf. Ibid., p.48
116. By the term "responsive"
117. Fidelity, p.50
118. We speak in common parlance of the "appeal" of a work of music.
119. MJ (Preface) p.x
120. MJ, p.283
121. Ibid., p.154, n.2
122. Loc. cit.
123. Loc. cit.
124. Loc. cit.
125. Ibid., p.29
126. Ibid., p.242
127. Ibid., p.28
128. Loc. cit.
129. Ibid., p.30
130. Ibid., p.31
131. Ibid., p.30
132. Ibid., p.31
133. Marcel, at this point has evidently not made the distinction between "primary" and "secondary" reflection he was later to make and which we shall examine below. It would seem that Marcel has a type of "primary" reflection in mind here, that he does not mean all types of reflective thought.

CHAPTER II

1. As defined immediately below.
2. Fidelity, p.68; HV, p.68; MAH, 66-67; MBI, p.211--it is to be noted that in most cases he simply quaotes or paraphrases his original definition.
3. BH, p.100
4. MAH, p. 66-67
5. BH, p. 102
6. MAH, 66-67
7. Kenneth T. Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1962), p. 31
8. Problem as objectively valid, cf. PE, p.10
9. MAH, p.67
10. MBII, p.27
11. BH, p.111; HV, p.15
12. BH, p.166
13. "Being at home" is discussed by Marcel in Fidelity,

27 ff. & 89; also in HV, 77ff

14. BH, p. 150
15. It is true that what is many need not be infinite in number, but Marcel makes remarks which would tend to indicate that he considers problematic knowledge infinite in terms of possible problems. Cf. n.19, Infra.
16. That is, the distinction of October 22nd, 1932.
17. BH, p.101
18. Scientific knowledge banishes to infinity, cf. BH, p. 12
19. PE, p.4
20. loc. cit: the "natural" is the problematic, cf. BH, p.101
21. "I" in the text of this paper will never be used to express a personal judgement of this writer, but merely to continue the form of quotations. Cf. Preface, p. 11 supra.
22. BH, p.127
23. Marcel's aversion to the "cut and dry" noted in Fidelity, p.12; the translator of this work has apparently made an error in his English usage since two different English dictionaries give the expression as "cut and dried". I will retain his usage in the text solely for purposes of reference. Cf, on this point the following: The Random House Dictionary, Jess Stein, ed.-in-chief, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1966), p.358; and, Webster's Twentieth Century Dictionary, (New York: Publisher's Guild, 1936), p. 417
24. MAH, 66-67
25. BH, p.117
27. Marcel terms the unknowable the "limiting case" of the problematic, it is that area of the problematic into which, because of deficiencies in our techniques, we cannot go., Cf., BH, p.118
26. HV, p.68
28. HV, p.68
29. MBI, p.213
30. This, it is to be noted, is not the position of an individual like Immanuel Kant who would tend to argue that the order is not present in the objects, that is, the solution is not present externally, but must be supplied by the mind. Cf, Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn, trans., in vol. 42, Kant, Great Books of the Western World, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), pp. 6 & 7
31. BH, p.171
32. Fidelity, pp. 133, 96, 189
33. PE, p.4
34. The English translators of Marcel's work use various forms of this term, such as "technique", "technics", "technic", & "technical". We shall interchange the uses of these terms as they are varied by the translators.
35. BH, p.103
36. PE, p.18

37. Ibid., p.4
38. Ibid., p.18
39. cf. Ibid., p.1; HV, p.126
40. MAH, p.71
41. BH, p.76
42. BH, p.125
43. PE, p.67
44. MBII, p.5; Fidelity, p.110; Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson, trans., (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1962), p.163 ff
45. Fidelity, p.110 ff
46. BH, p.171
47. MBI, p.7
48. MBII, p.87
50. Loc. cit.
51. Fidelity, pp.20,30, & 69
52. BH, p.101
53. Ibid., p.184; cf. PE, pp.88 & 92
54. BH, p.183
55. Ibid., p.102
56. MBII, pp. 12-13
57. PE, p.29
58. Fidelity, p.66
59. If it were personal, it would not satisfy the requirement of universal acceptibility, cf. MBII, p.87
60. PE, p.29
61. Perhaps the term "confronting" would be better here, but, since what we are describing is specifically intellectual activity, there would seem to be grounds for the use of "knowing" considered at its widest.
62. PE, p.5; Fidelity, p.49; MBII, pp. 65,73,74
63. MBI, p.83; BH, pp.121 & 140; HV, p.100; PE, p.14; MBII, p.75
64. PE, p.10
65. BH, p.12
66. MBI, pp. 77-78
67. Loc. cit.
68. Ibid., p.83
69. BH, p.172
70. Ibid., p.150
71. Ibid., p.155; HV, p.146
72. BH, p.155
73. Ibid., p.151
74. Ibid., p.166
75. Ibid., p.148, 151, 162
76. Ibid., p.166
77. The terms would seem to be mutually exclusive unless we posit some possibility that in choosing the "other" I thereby choose myself.
78. BH, pp.163, 153
79. Ibid., p.147
80. Ibid., p.160; also, Ibid., p.145
81. Ibid., pp. 134 & 161
82. A secret is thus little different from an object

kept., cf. BH, p.145
83. Ibid., p.161
84. Loc. cit.
85. Ibid., p.169
86. Ibid., p.168
87. Loc. cit.
88. Ibid., p.135
89. Loc. cit.
90. Ibid., p.162
91. Loc. cit.
92. Ibid., p.172
93. Ibid., p.150
94. Ibid., p.155
95. In the literal sense of the Latin "alienus", meaning "other", cf. Random House Dictionary, op. cit., p. 37
96. Fidelity, p.32
97. cf. PE, pp. 25 & 26
98. cf. discussion of the "thou", p. 71 ff., Infra
99. MJ, p.146; this is a note made August 23rd, 1918
100. Fidelity, p.33
101. Dignity, p.40
102. If the two persons realized that they were overheard by the third, this would be grounds for the arising of a feeling of shame in the sense in which Marcel understands the Sartrean notion. cf. PE, p. 51 ff; and HV, p. 175 ff
103. The problematic as the place of tension, BH, p.113
104. That is, the problematic as the level of Having is the level of the catalogue of classifications, cf. BH, p.146
105. PE, p.1
106. MBI, p.28
107. Ibid., p.85
108. Loc. cit.
109. Loc. cit.
110. Fidelity, p.70
111. PE, p.68
112. Fidelity, p.72
113. Ibid., p.114
114. Ibid., p.111
115. Loc. cit.
116. Marcel discusses "claiming" in HV, p.56
117. BH, p.127
118. BH, p.126
119. Fidelity, p.94
120. Ibid., p.71
121. Dignity, p.39
122. Fidelity, p.50
123. PE, p.3
124. Loc. cit.
125. BH, p.150
126. MAH, p.71
127. HV, p.24
128. PE, p.2
129. Ibid., p.3

130. HV, p.81
131. Ibid., p.126
132. MAH, p.71
133. MBII, p.98
134. PE, p.3 1
135. cf. p. 40, supra
136. cf. p. 41, supra
137. HV, p.46
138. Ibid., p.61
139. BH, p.69
140. Ibid., p.164
141. BH, p.145
142. Fidelity, p.93
143. Hv, p.93
144. PE, p.20
145. Ibid., p.18
146. MBII, p.149
147. cf. BH, p.125
148. PE, p.18
149. MAH, p.70
150. PE, p.18
151. EA, p.158
152. MBII, p.19
153. MBII, p.149
154. HV, p.62
155. BH, p.111
156. PE, p.6

CHAPTER III

1. Fidelity, p.20; also, BH, p.11
2. That is, the entry, undated, written about 1927 or 1928, cf. BH, p.11
3. Loc. cit.
4. Fidelity, p.17
5. BH, p.10
6. Ibid., p.12
7. Fidelity, p.21
8. Ibid., p.17
9. MBII, p.25
10. BH, p.103
11. Fidelity, p.20
12. cf. p.52, supra
13. Fidelity, p.18; cf. also, BH, p.108
14. BH, p.12
15. PE, p.2
16. BH, p.109
17. PE, p.1
18. Fidelity, p.18
19. MBII, p.26
20. Fidelity, p.19
21. Loc. cit.
22. Loc. cit.
23. Loc. cit.

24. For example, in a mirror, cf. Fidelity, p.22
25. Loc. cit.
26. That is to say, the body lies on the frontier between Having and Being, cf. BH, p.82
27. Loc. cit.
28. Loc. cit.
29. Fidelity, p.21; this, Marcel notes, is a term which originates with Heidegger, cf. op. cit., pp. 78 ff.
30. Fidelity, p.83
31. Ibid., p.91
32. HV, pp. 7, 153; this is, of course, the translation of the terms "homo viator"
33. Man's condition is such that he exists in a realm of "unsteady blocks (objects) of a universe which has collapsed and seems to be crumbling in every direction." HV, p. 153
34. That is to say, objects as the concern of Having are fundamental to man's condition, cf. HV, p.62
35. Cf. BH, p.20, "the saint"
36. HV, p.54
37. We are asserting here that this is the order of "mystery" of which one of the chief characteristics is that it can be denied, cf. our discussion, p. 64, Infra
38. Fidelity, p.77
39. PE, p.14
40. The notion of mystery as transcendent will be discussed below, cf. our discussion p. 66, Infra
41. PE, p.15
42. Marcel uses this term in reference to the position of Peter Wust on piety. It is our feeling that it describes his own position also., cf. BH, p.219
43. Or, more precisely, uniting both, but in such a way that the distinction is transcended.
44. Fidelity, p.92
45. PE, p.11
46. MBII, p.126
47. Fidelity, p.69
48. HV, p.107
49. BH, p.112
50. Ibid, p.117
51. Ibid., p.101
52. Loc. cit.
53. Ibid., p.100
54. Ibid. p.117
55. HV, p.68
56. BH, p.141
57. Marcel will later change this to read "encroaches on its own immanent conditions of possibility", cf. Fidelity, p.69; BH, p.126
58. BH,,p.171; PE, p.8
59. Ibid., p.111
60. Fidelity, p.69
61. BH, pp. 117-118
62. Ibid., p.117

63. Ibid., p.171; also Ibid., p.101
64. Fidelity, p. 68
65. Loc. cit.
66. Ibid., p.69
67. BH, p. 225
68. Fidelity, p.69
69. Which we have already seen to be on the level of the problematic, cf. p. 65, n.69, supra
70. Fidelity, p.56
71. Ibid., p.152
72. BH, p.150
73. PE, p.8
74. BH, p.167
75. Ibid., pp.17, 37, 114; Fidelity, p.21; PE, p.8
76. Fidelity, p.21
77. BH, p.114
78. From our basic definition of mystery as capable of degredation, cf. p.64, supra
79. Fidelity, p.23
80. Ibid., p.24
81. In the sense that creativity usually requires an active involvement with or in something, it might be considered a form of participation. Marcel, however, does not make this explicit identification.
82. cf., Fidelity, p.71, "creative interchange" as transcending the problematic categories of self and surroundings.
83. Ibid., p.119
84. MBII, p.45
85. Loc. cit.
86. MBI, p.204
87. Ibid., p.205
88. Loc. cit.
89. Loc. cit.
90. Dignity, p.154
91. Fidelity, p.33
92. BH, p.71
93. HV, 131
94. Dignity, p.67
95. BH, p.81; Fidelity, p.12
96. PE, p.10
97. BH, p.146; PE, p.23
98. cf. PE, p.25 and MBII, p.10
99. Fidelity, p.33
100. MBII, p.154
101. HV, p.60
102. "Thou" is perhaps an ill-chosen term (although there would seem to be no other), to translate what is meant by the second person in continental languages. The archaic form "thou", which originally corresponded to the familiar second person, is used today only formally if at all. It does not really translate the "toi" of French, the "du" of German, of the "tu" of Spanish. In all of these tongues, these forms are used and they have definite overtones of intimacy

which is immediately conveyed by any of the pronouns mentioned above, such as Marcel's "toi".

103. Fidelity, p.32
104. Ibid., p.51
105. Loc. cit.
106. Fidelity, p.36
107. cf. p.44, supra
108. Fidelity, p.33
109. BH, p.167
110. Fidelity, p.17
111. Ibid., p.21
112. BH, p.107
113. That is to say, most activities for which we commonly use the term "participate", are group activities such as games and sports. Cf. Fidelity, p.40
114. Fidelity, p.47
115. BH, p.140,121
116. MBI, p.83
117. BH, p.113
118. Ibid., p.178
119. Loc. cit.
120. PE, p.13
121. Ibid., p.14
122. HV, p.72
123. Fidelity, p.22
124. Ibid., p.23
125. BH, p.100
126. Ibid., p.102
127. Ibid., pp.102, 122
128. PE, p.5
129. BH, p.149
130. BH, p.151
131. MBII, p.20; BH, p.28
132. Fidelity, p.26
133. MBII, p.51
134. BH, p.35
135. Ibid., p.115
136. cf. HV, p.58
137. HV, p.11
138. BH, p.150
139. Marcel makes a distinction between the "full" and the "empty" as opposed to the distinction between the one and the many. cf. PE, p.3
140. BH, p.29
141. MBII, pp.47-48
142. MBII, p.49
143. BH, p.102
144. Hope holds not that It can be, but simply It will be. It is thus prophetic and has within it the certainty of prophecy. cf. PE, p.16. It is thus similar to the feeling of security at the root of joy.
145. MBII, p.42
146. That is to say, we feel the necessity of conceptualizing all facets of our experience in order to achieve

a clear grasp of them. Hence, with being, we feel the tug of this supposed necessity.

147. MBII, p.47
148. Ibid., p.19
149. Ibid., p.20
150. That is to say, the "ontological mystery" which is, of course, the mystery of being, is the object of recollection. Reflection is recollection to the extent that the latter can be self-conscious. cf. PE, pp. 12 & 14.
151. MBII, p.53
152. cf. p. 10, supra
153. MBII, p.170
154. That is, that which I love and which in me is loved, cannot be reduced to describable, possessed, properties. It is, therefore, not of the order of Having and must be of the order of Being.
155. Fidelity, p.162
156. Ibid., p.110
157. Ibid., p.111
158. Loc. cit.
159. Ibid., p.106
160. Ibid., p.107
161. Loc. cit.
162. Ibid., p.108
163. Ibid., p.113
164. BH, p.95
165. cf. pp. 61-62, supra
166. Fidelity, pp. 107, 108, 109 & 113
167. Ibid., p. 116
168. MBII, p.79
169. The other considered here as "thou", not qua other.
170. HV, p.13
171. Loc. cit.; cf. p.46, supra
172. Ibid., p.14
173. Ibid., p. 15
174. BH, p.153
175. Loc. cit.
176. BH, p.117
177. PE, p.7
178. Loc. cit.
179. Affirmation of Being, cf. BH, pp.28, 29, 34, 39
180. PE, p.7
181. HV, p.161

CHAPTER IV

1. Hocking, art. cit., p. 449, n.11
2. PE, p.4
3. Fidelity, p.78
4. By making it clear that there is such a realm which is the object of the need which I feel, the ontological need.
5. BH, p.200
6. Loc. cit.

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