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**THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL CRISIS IN UGANDA:
THE LEGACY FACING THE MUSEVENI REGIME
1986 TO THE PRESENT**

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of M.A. (History)

By

**Ogenga Otunnu
Department of History
Saint Mary's University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
26 July, 1989**

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- OGENGA OTUNNU

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Approved by:
Thesis Advisor:

Wallace G. Mills
Dr. Wallace G. Mills
Saint Mary's University

3 August 1989
Date

Examiners:

John Reid
Dr. John Reid
Saint Mary's University

2 August 1989
Date

Lynn McIntyre
Dr. Lynn McIntyre
Dalhousie University

2-8-89
Date

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MAPS

ABBREVIATIONS

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE

- PHASE I 1

The Myth and Reality of National
Integration 1

British Imperialism: The Seeds of
the Crises 3

The 1900 Uganda Agreement 6

The Foggy Road to Federalism 8

The Rise to Nationalism 13

The Rise and Character of Political
Parties 14

The Uganda National Congress 14

The Progressive Party 15

The Democratic Party 15

The Uganda People's Union 16

The Uganda People's Congress 17

The Kabaka Yekka (Kabaka Alone) 18

The Power Game: U.P.C./K.Y. Alliance 21

- PHASE II 26

The Constitutional Crises: Retreat from
Democracy and the Era of Anarchy 26

Developments Following the Suspension of
Constitution 28

Amin's Era of Authoritarianism: The
External Dimension to the Crises 30

The Moshi Unity Conference, and the
Regime of Yusuf Lule 35


The Binaisa Administration and the U.N.L.F. Umbrella	38
The Return of Obote and the 1980 General Election	41
Obote II and Civil Disorder (1980-1985)	44
Endnotes	50
 CHAPTER TWO	
The Okello Regime: "Appeasement" and Anarchy	53
Endnotes	72
 CHAPTER THREE	
National Unity	73
Opposition to the Museveni Regime: The Uganda People's Democratic Movement	77
The Holy Spirit Movement	82
Uganda National Liberation Front: Anti-dictatorship	86
Endnotes	89
 CHAPTER FOUR	
Democracy	91
A New Constitution: A Myth or a Reality?	97
The N.R.M. Elections: A Shaky Political Strategy	102
The Hierarchy of the Resistance Committee	104
Endnotes	107
 CHAPTER FIVE	
The Economy	109

The I.M.F. Structural Adjustment: The Dilemma of Underdevelopment	116
Open General Licence (OGL)	120
Concessions	123
Dependence	125
Endnotes	130
 CONCLUSION	 131
APPENDIX A Chiefs by Religious Affiliations	138
APPENDIX B Proposals for National Service	139
APPENDIX C Amin's Statement on the January 25th Coup	160
APPENDIX D The Uganda Peace Talks Agreement	166
APPENDIX E Ten-Point Programme of the N.R.M.	191
APPENDIX F Letter from the Church of Uganda Diocese of Northern Uganda to President Yoweri Museveni	209
APPENDIX G Statistics on the Economy	215
APPENDIX H Maps of Uganda Showing Main Cash Crops and Climate	219
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 221

DEDICATION


Dedicated to Lukonyomoi Otunnu, Atabi Luremoi Otunnu, Livingstone Anyena, Jimmy Opira, Elson, and thousands of Ugandans who sacrificed their lives in the heat of the struggle for freedom, dignity, unity, equality, democracy and development of Mother Uganda. And to you the peasants and workers of Uganda who continue to nurse the open veins of our country.

MAP 1: POLITICAL MAP OF UGANDA, TIME OF INDEPENDENCE, 1962



SOURCE: CAMPBELL, HORACE. FOUR ESSAYS ON NEO-COLONIALISM IN UGANDA
TORONTO: AFRO-CARIB PUBLICATIONS, c 1975, n.p.

Map 2. Uganda, 1967 District Boundaries



SOURCE: JORGENSEN, JAN JELMET UGANDA - A MODERN HISTORY
 NEW YORK: ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, 1981, p. 213

ABBREVIATIONS

A.P.C.	ANTI-PERSONAL CARRIER
D.P.	DEMOCRATIC PARTY
F.E.D.E.M.U.	FEDERAL MOVEMENT
F.U.N.A.	FORMER UGANDA NATIONAL ARMY
H.S.M.	HOLY SPIRIT MOVEMENT
I.M.F.	INTEPNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
K.A.D.U.	KENYA AFRICAN DEMOCRATIC UNION
K.A.N.U.	KENYA AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION
K.Y.	KABAKA YEKKA
N.C.C.	NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL
N.L.P.	NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY
N.R.A.	NATIONAL RESISTANCE ARMY
N.R.C.	NATIONAL RESISTANCE COUNCIL
N.R.M.	NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT
P.L.O.	PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
P.P.	PROGRESSIVE PARTY
R.Cs	RESISTANCE COMMITTEES
S.P.L.A.	SUDANESE PEOPLE'S ARMY
T.P.D.F.	TANZANIAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES
U.F.M.	UGANDA FREEDOM MOVEMENT
U.N.C.	UGANDA NATIONAL CONGRESS
U.N.L.A.	UGANDA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY
U.N.L.F.	UGANDA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

U.N.L.F.-A.D.

UGANDA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT:

ANTI-DICTATORSHIP

U.N.R.F.

UGANDA NATIONAL RESCUE FRONT

U.P.C.

UGANDA PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

U.P.D.A.

UGANDA PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC ARMY

U.P.D.M.

UGANDA PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

U.P.M.

UGANDA PATRIOTIC MOVEMENT

U.P.U.

UGANDA PEOPLE'S UNION

INTRODUCTION

The political history of post-independent Uganda has been characterized by antagonistic quests for political power, physical and social insecurity, corruption, ethnic and religious conflicts, economic stagnation, and state violence. Historically, the seeds of these crises were sown by British colonialism and subsequently nourished and exacerbated by the successive regimes, and compradors of imperialism in the neo-colonial Uganda. The conflicts inherent in the socioeconomic and political system continue to exert enormous constraint on the search for national integration and democracy. The socioeconomic and political crises have come to symbolize the demise, the marginalization, and the ungovernability of the country.

The British Colonial policies of "divide and rule" and "indirect rule" sowed the seeds of ethnic tensions and antagonism which greatly undermined the quest for national integration. This legacy, compounded by the unstable and conflict-laden political system created and left behind by British Colonialism, presented formidable obstacles to the process of democratization. When this political system crumbled under the harsh political climate of post-independent Uganda, it precipitated the country into a state of chaos and anarchy.

The behaviors of political and military players in post-independent Uganda not only negated the quest for national unity and democracy but also accelerated the disintegration of a civilized society. Post-independent Uganda has witnessed the formation of ethnic, religious, military, political, and class coalitions. But such coalitions could not be put at the service of national unity and democracy. Likewise, conflict resolution through negotiations have been tried but without avail. The failures of such negotiations are due to the fact that they neither address themselves to the root causes nor do they offer any viable alternative approach to the crises. It is, therefore, imperative that a comprehensive analysis of crises in Uganda must call for a critical, rigorous and objective investigation of the interplay of all forces, external and internal, past and present.

This thesis will attempt to investigate whether the change of government in 1986 will usher in a period of Uganda's retreat from anarchy and turmoil, or whether it is just another chapter in the history of the country's decay. Judging from the undefined platform of the regime, its composition, tactics, strategy, ideology, credibility and capacity, current evidence tends to weigh more on the latter. That is, Uganda's predicaments will not only continue but will also probably become more complex and lead

to a more entrenched tradition of anarchy and state terrorism.

A variety of approaches might be adopted in undertaking an evaluation of the Museveni regime. The method for this thesis is to analyse the problems of, and the prospects for national unity and democracy* under the regime. This evaluation will be based primarily on the past and present history of the country, and the performance of the regime. This approach reduces Uganda's complex socioeconomic and political crises to a manageable proportion.

National unity and democracy are prerequisites to the country's future prosperity. These two pillars (national unity and democracy) are fundamental to the revitalization of the economy, respect for human rights, and national security. This approach, however, has definite limitations. Emphasis on the two pillars omits appropriate discussion of other significant issues, such as national economy and social service. It is difficult, if not impossible, to make any general statement based on the two pillars that will be

* Democracy in this thesis is regarded as a form of political system that allows all sections of citizenry to actively participate in a government. It should also allow for accountability of the rulers to the ruled, and the governability of the ruled. It should allow for regular elections. The governed determine their destiny.

uniformly accurate in evaluating the performance of the regime. Despite the problem of generalization, an evaluation of Museveni's regime based on the two pillars will reveal a significant portion of the overall picture.

The value of the latter approach is recognized and efforts will be made to discuss some of them, but since space precludes an attempt to provide an in-depth analysis on some of the issues, the reader or student of Ugandan political history is urged to investigate some of the issues in detail. As a word of caution, it is important to bear in mind that the dynamics of Ugandan politics poses a big threat to the validity of literature on this type of study. However, it is hoped that this study will provide a significant contribution to the understanding of Uganda's contemporary politics, and a possible prediction of the future.

How did Uganda's crises evolve to the proportion of anarchy? What efforts were made, if any, to resolve the crises? Why do these crises persist? These are some of the questions which the first chapter will attempt to answer. This chapter will examine the historical, sociocultural and political background against which the contemporary situation evolved. Efforts will be made to identify some factors which have contributed significantly to national disunity and the retreat of democratic rule. Questions will be

formulated around national integration and political legitimacy.

In this chapter, two phases will be looked at. The first phase will examine the integration of different ethnic groups or territories into what now comprises Uganda. The tactics and strategy of integration and the colonial administrative policy will be looked at as the root causes of the contemporary crises of identity and national unity. This phase covers the period between 1894 and 1966.

The second phase will cover the period between 1967 and 1985. This is a period that has been marked by anarchy and armed violence. This period also provides a continuity in the history of Buganda's attempt to secede from the country. It is this phase that dramatizes the failure of political coalitions and the retreat of democratic rule. It is hoped that this chapter will not only describe and analyse the evolution and persistence of the heritage of crisis before Museveni's seizure of power, but it will also provide a background against which the performance of the regime can be evaluated.

What was the policy of "appeasement" pursued by the Okello regime? Why did the policy crumble amidst nationwide endorsement? How did this policy pave way for the N.R.A./N.R.M. to seize power? What role did the N.R.A. and N.R.M. military strategy and political philosophy play vis-a-vis the quest for national reconciliation and demo-

cratic rule? These are some of the questions which will be addressed in chapter two. This chapter will also put emphasis on the character of the N.R.A./N.R.M. leadership before coming to power. The analysis of the behavior of the N.R.A./N.R.M. leadership is a prerequisite to a comprehensive and vigorous evaluation of the capacity, capability and vision of the Museveni regime.

Chapter three will examine the approach the Museveni regime is pursuing towards national integration. In this chapter, it will be argued that the regime has subscribed to the radical tradition in African politics. This is the tradition of declaring unity under a single military or single party by administrative fiat. Such an approach to national unity has progressively reduced prospects for meaningful and viable national reconciliation.

In chapter four, it will be argued that without a definition and practice of democracy that will break out of the narrow -- elite controlled political life of Uganda -- by bringing into the political fold those hitherto unorganized, around a programme that cuts across ethnicity and sectarian moulds that have been conventionally considered natural forms of organizing political activity -- it is difficult to see a way out of the crises.

Chapter five will provide an overview analysis of the economic history of the country from the epoch of colonialism to the contemporary neo-colonial period. The

stagnation and demise of the economy are a reflection of the broader crises in the socioeconomic and political spheres in the country. The claim by the Museveni regime to build an "independent, integrated and self-sustaining national economy" will be evaluated against the present agreement with the I.M.F. In this chapter, it will be argued that the present economic policy of the regime does not offer a positive alternative to the development of the underdevelopment of the country. Unity and democracy are not just political, they are also sociocultural and economic.

CHAPTER ONE

PHASE ONE

Background: The Myth and Reality of National Integration.

It has become a tradition in African politics for leaders and some scholars to assert that there is currently a conflict between ethnicity* and nationalism which threatens the stability of African states.¹ As a result of this assertion, ethnicity has come under frontal attack, at least verbally. To this school of thought, ethnicity is dysfunctional for national integration. The process of detribalization is seen as a weapon against this "divisive element". In the case of Uganda, conflicts between ethnicity and national unity have deep roots in the history of the country. The origin of these conflicts dates back to 1894 when Buganda Kingdom became a British protectorate.

Following the Uganda Agreement of 1900,** Buganda felt free to act almost independently of the central leadership.

*For the purpose of this thesis, ethnicity and tribalism are used interchangeably.

**Buganda and Uganda were used interchangeably. This Agreement established Buganda's special status within the protectorate.

As a result of the Agreement, Uganda's centralism was more of a myth than a reality. Buganda's spirit of autonomy and separatism was not hindered by the British Colonial administrative policy. Consequently, tensions that flowed from the British Colonial policy towards Buganda were demonstrated by the negotiations to establish Buganda's federal relationship with the central government, by Buganda's attempts to secede from the country at the time of independence in 1962, by the rise of the monarchy party (the Kabaka Yekka), and by the Kingdom's opposition to integration into the East African federalism.²

Against these entrenched ethnic contradictions, efforts were made to constitutionally reconcile ethnic demands and the needs of central government. As a result, the country witnessed a unitary form of government as well as elements of federalism. Both these forms of government existed in an uneasy relationship until 1967. The provision of federalism in the constitution was arguably an attempt to accommodate ethnic diversity and pluralism. However, as is always the case with federal systems, this undermined the sense of national identity and stability.*

*Federalism is always a tension-fitted compromise with conflicting foci of loyalty.

BRITISH IMPERIALISM: THE SEEDS OF THE CRISES.

British imperialism penetrated the country in stages. In 1894, a British protectorate was established in Buganda. This act of colonialism was preceded by a number of related events. These events were marked by the exploration of Speke and his arrival in the Kingdom of Buganda in 1862. Speke's mission was to reawaken British imperialist interest in the region and prepare the groundwork for the imperialist assault on the territory.³

Nearly three decades later, the representative of the Imperial British East African Company, Captain F.D. Lugard, arrived in Buganda. By that time, the Kingdom of Buganda was witnessing religious wars. These wars, which were the result of external machination, not only shook the seat of Buganda's traditional power but also had far-reaching implications for national unity.

As far as Buganda was concerned, the religious wars challenged the legitimacy of the monarchy and diminished the traditional symbol of Buganda's unity.* The wars also led to

*The colonial administrative policy treated Buganda as a special region in Uganda. This policy made Buganda consider herself almost as a different state within the state of Uganda. It is important to bear in mind that other parts of Uganda also perceived such a special status to mean that Buganda was not like the rest of the country. Hence, Buganda and Uganda almost came to mean two different states.

unprecedented stratification of the other territories that now comprise Uganda.

With Lugard's military support to the Protestants, the balance of power tilted in favour of the Protestants against the Roman Catholics.⁴ This incident had far-reaching implications for the country. First, war as the ultimate solution to conflict not only acquired imperial endorsement but also became a tradition of conflict "resolution" in the country. Second, religion and politics became closely intertwined. The antagonism between the Protestants and the Roman Catholics soon became reflected in the formation of political parties. Third, Uganda was bound to become a British protectorate.

Buganda's territory was increased during the following period by the seizure of land from Bunyoro.* The annexation of the lost counties to Buganda was aided by British imperialism. As a result, the question of the "lost counties" cultivated uncompromising ethnic hatred and distrust between the ethnic groups. This act of Buganda's subimperialism greatly compromised future attempts for a viable national integration.

The establishment of British rule throughout the territories now comprising Uganda was carried out through two principal methods which went hand in hand: through

*This land is later referred to as "the lost counties".

"treaties" and military conquest. Having "consolidated" its conquest over Buganda, the next formal expansion of the British sphere of influence brought the Kingdoms of Bunyoro, Ankole, and Toro and the territory of Busoga.

In Bunyoro, Colonel Colvile, who succeeded Sir Gerald Portal as Commissioner, launched decisive campaigns against King Kabarega of Bunyoro.⁵ The result of the war was that Bunyoro suffered terrible devastation. Famine and disease attacked the population and the defeat destroyed the spirit of the survivors. That was the pattern of territorial integration.

In the following years, the British protectorate spread to the rest of the country. The British Colonial policy of "divide, conquer and rule" was deployed in these areas. Ethnic groups were played against each other. As a strategy, the British used "collaborators" to supervise the subjugation of the indigenous peoples. The most prominent of these "collaborators" was Semei Kakunguru, a Muganda warrior and an administrator.⁶ In the name of the British protectorate, Semei Kakunguru conquered Northeast territories. He brought the Langi, Bagishu and the Iteso under the sphere of British influence. By using Kakunguru and his Baganda army, the British exercised its policy of falsification. The Baganda were seen as the real enemy of the other conquered ethnic groups. As a result, the Baganda were hated throughout the country. The hatred and suspicion became a stumbling block to national unity.

THE 1900 UGANDA AGREEMENT.

Buganda's special position in Uganda was one of the most significant legacies of British imperialism. This position was indicated in the Agreement. The Agreement curbed Buganda as a province of the protectorate, and it stipulated that the Kabaka could exercise direct rule over the natives of Uganda [Buganda] in a manner approved by Her Majesty's Government. Article 6 of the Agreement read:

....So long as the Kabaka, chiefs and the people of Uganda [Buganda] shall conform to the laws and regulations instituted for the governance with Her Majesty's Government, and shall cooperate loyally with Her Majesty's Government in the organization and administration of the said Kingdom of Uganda, Her Majesty's Government agrees to recognize the Kabaka of Uganda as the native ruler of Uganda under Her Majesty's protection.

The Agreement had far-reaching implications for Buganda and for future national political systems. In theory, Buganda's autonomy was preserved, but in practice, Buganda surrendered her sovereignty. From the time of the signing of the Agreement, Her Majesty's representative had to approve the behavior of the Kabaka and his Lukiko (parliament). Buganda had to be governed by the laws of the protectorate, and only those laws which did not constitute a breach of contract could be approved.

This Agreement also brought about a significant alteration of Buganda society. Freehold land was introduced, increasing the powers of those chiefs who controlled land at the time of the Agreement. In this and other ways, the

power of the chiefs was confirmed at the expense of other contenders for political dominance. It was also this Agreement that for the first time, formally propounded the principle of indirect rule.

What was the meaning of this Agreement in terms of national unity? It was the interpretation of the Agreement, and not so much its content, that was to pave the way for future crises. According to Anthony Low and Cranford Patt, Buganda and British Overrule 1900-1955,

Since so much apparently came to be based on the Agreement, ... it was natural for Buganda to consider that their relationship was quasi-diplomatic. Moreover, given the concessions they had secured, the Agreement, equally naturally, appeared to the Baganda as in some sense at least an Agreement between equals.⁸

Since the British regarded the Agreement with Buganda as in a category separate from subsequent "Agreement" with other local Kingdoms, Buganda had to be treated differently from the rest of the country. This Agreement became the legal framework upon which Buganda separatism was to be based. It is, therefore, imperative to indicate, that the special status which the Agreement accorded to Buganda, ignited hatred, resentment and suspicion by other ethnic groups which were treated differently. This Agreement, therefore, became a millstone around the neck of national unity.

Whereas British Colonialism was to rule the Kingdom through tribal political authorities, this policy of indirect rule had negative implication for national unity.

For instance, in other parts of Uganda, the system of indirect rule was modified. Local chiefs were appointed by the colonial administration. Even in circumstances where traditional chiefs remained as leaders, they had to operate within a new and alien system.⁹

The policy of indirect rule assisted the colonial administrators who had practically no experience in ruling divergent ethnic groups. This policy was based on the premise that the indigenous people would obey their "traditional" leaders more readily. The rationale for executing the policy was also the fact that the British Colonial authority did not have enough financial resources to administer the territories directly. In essence, the territories paid for the cost of being colonized.

Unfortunately, the British could not have both "cheap administration" and national unity based on this policy. In the final analysis, the British achieved the former at the expense of the latter. In other words, indirect rule inhibited the development of national identity by stimulating "parochial ethnic identity."

THE FOGGY ROAD TO FEDERALISM.

No sooner had the ink of the 1900 Agreement dried on the paper, than the protectorate government began to intervene directly into the affairs of Buganda. It imposed

its own interpretation of the Agreement on the Kingdom. By the 1930s, central supervision over traditional authorities had become extensive.¹⁰ At that material time, it appeared as if Uganda was heading towards a unitary form of government. However, with the increasing British intervention in Buganda, Buganda separatism exploded to the surface. The future of a unitary form of government became foggy.

Buganda's attempts to resist the "surrender" of its autonomy were clearly illustrated by the violent riots of 1945 and 1949. These riots were aimed at disowning chiefs who were thought to conspire with the protectorate government against Buganda's "independence". However, it was not until the 1950s that the most serious crisis to British Colonial rule occurred in Buganda.¹¹ This crisis was a faithful testimony to Buganda's unwillingness to be a party to the establishment of a unitary state.

Buganda, anxious about its position in an independent Uganda and refusing to be treated like the other regions, sought to limit the political involvement of the Kingdom with the rest of the country. This assertion of the right to self-determination was an anticipated consequence of indirect rule. Paradoxically, both Buganda and the British based their conflicting positions on the 1900 Agreement, an identity of claims which made the crisis inevitable.

As independence leaped towards Uganda's doorstep, it became apparent that British attempts to create a unitary state were in jeopardy. The British efforts to create a

unitary state were based on the smallness of the country. Unfortunately, this rationale neglected the ambiguity of the 1900 Agreement and downplayed the question of ethnic pluralism. In an attempt to "postpone" another violent upsurge of Buganda separatism, the Colonial Governor, Sir Andrew Cohen, and Kabaka Edward Mutesa II signed a joint memorandum in 1953. This memorandum outlined Buganda's special status in a unitary Uganda. The rationale for this memorandum, according to Sir Andrew Cohen, was that a failure to work in harmony with ethnic loyalties,

Would have been harmful or at least unreal, and the view we took was that strengthening the unity of the country would not be furthered by failing to recognize the attachment of the peoples to the parts.¹²

However, this approach would not stand the test of time, because the British Colonial authority had made too many false starts towards national unity. As far as the Memorandum was concerned, the Colonial authority bargained with Buganda in an attempt to discourage Buganda from seceding as long as Her Majesty's Government was in charge of the country.¹³ It had become quite clear that Buganda's separatism was a living thorn in the flesh of the unitary state.

Since it became politically impractical to establish a viable unitary system, the Colonial authority incorporated elements of federalism in the constitution. This action by the Colonial authority was aimed at reconciling ethnic

demands and national needs. Federal status was given to those parts of the country that had hereditary rulers; such as, Buganda, Toro, Ankole and Bunyoro. But this unequal partnership within the constitution brewed resentment and brought forward new demands. For example, on March 2, 1962 at a ceremony in which he took the oath of office, Prime Minister Bendicto Kiwanuka spoke of anxieties in the kingdoms and the Busoga,* as well as of traditional rulers' legitimate demands. Prime Minister Kiwanuka expressed his willingness to grant special status to the districts, so that it could allay the fears of the rulers and their subjects in the kingdoms. It was hoped that this would bring about peace and stability of government.¹⁴ However, when this approach was partially effected in Obote's government, it failed.

The constitution reflected the British Colonial approach based on federalism, semi-federalism and a unitary system of government. Yet all these were supposed to operate under the same basic law. Its constitutional asymmetry instead increased conflicts between the constituent units.

*Busoga is mentioned in a separate category, because it lacked a single king over the whole ethnic group, and because it had not made the same "agreements" as the other kingdoms.

Indirect rule, by systematizing the compartmentalization of life in the country along ethnic lines, left the country with serious problems of national unity. The adaptation of a federal-type constitution was an attempt to meet ethnic demands within a unified structure. However, the federal approach exacerbated rather than mitigated ethnic tensions. As a result, ethnicity has remained a vital factor in the country. The virtue of ethnicity is its capacity to give members a sense of identity and security; its main shortcoming is its tendency to undercut national unity by emphasizing particular over national needs.

Clearly, the federal solution could not satisfy all ethnic claims to separate status in the country. The various ethnic groups overlap too much to be fitted into a real pattern of ethnic states. For example, a good percentage of Buganda's population consists of non-Baganda such as the Banyarwanda, Barundi, Banyoro, Banyankole, and others. Bukedi District includes Iteso, Bagwere, Banyole, Jopadhola, Basimia, and Bagwe. A large percentage of Sebei's population are Bagishu. To try and adopt federalism to such a geographical situation is not easy. The result would be bitterness and economic chaos. To hold back these fissiparous forces, as was done, means to leave the ethnic groups without a sense of security and identity. It is a paradox that federalism, which was sought in order to allay ethnic fears, caused them, in some cases, to violently come to the surface.¹⁵

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM.

The period of most apparent nationalism in Africa was immediately after the Second World War. Nationalist movements had managed to mobilize a large section of the people and were able to extract concessions from colonial powers. However, it is inaccurate to include Uganda in this category, because it was not nationalism* that brought about independence, but rather the imminence of independence that gave rise to nationalism. As a result, nationalism did not unify the various elements in the society, but instead, it was seen as a means whereby certain groups would vie with one another for political powers.

Why was nationalism not a unifying factor? The Colonial administrative policies of "divide and rule" and "indirect rule" hindered the rise of nationalism that could reflect national interest. In most cases, federal states and districts created by the protectorate government, basically coincided with ethnic groups.** A federal state or district was a unit by itself, and few people, if any,

*Nationalism is referred to in the broader sense of the nation as a whole.

**In this thesis, ethnicity refers to common and shared descent, rigid rather than "situational". The latter (situational) is flexible, adoptable, and capable of taking different forms and meaning depending on the situation and the perceptions of advantage. The former definition is more applicable to the case study.

identified themselves with the nation as a whole. Besides, unlike Kenya, the absence of a settlers' political economy eliminated the perception of a "common enemy" which could have become a rallying point against British imperialism. It is, therefore, imperative to state that nothing brought Ugandans together to forge a feeling of national identity. There were "no political issues" of any magnitude that could arouse mass nationalism. As a result, nationalism became a tool at the service of ethnicity and religion.

THE RISE AND CHARACTER OF POLITICAL PARTIES.

The Uganda National Congress

This was the first political party to emerge in Uganda (1952). It was led by Ignatus Musazi and most of its supporters were Baganda professionals -- outside the traditional aristocracy. Unfortunately, the party had a narrow political base that deprived it of being a national party. The party never produced an agenda that reflected the interests of the nation as a whole.

In 1959, a significant split occurred in the party over the position of the party in Buganda. This split was between the Baganda section led by Kiwanuka, and the branches of the North and East led by Obote.¹⁶ By this time, the U.N.C., which had emerged from Buganda, had lost virtually all its support in the area. Probably the only

significant role the party played was in championing the return of the Kabaka from exile in Britain.

The Progressive Party

The party was formed in 1955 and was mainly led by a Protestant group. Its membership was exclusively Baganda. The party had been formed specifically as an opposition to the U.N.C. Like the U.N.C., the party supported a federal constitution. However, its support was based on the condition that the Kabaka was made the Head of State.¹⁷

The P.P. never made any headway in Ugandan politics. The party had no representation in parliament and was not represented at the London Constitutional Conference where Uganda's independence was being worked out. The P.P. collapsed without acquiring a national character.

The Democratic Party

This new vigorous party was formed in 1954 and was predominately Roman Catholic.¹⁸ The Roman Catholics had grievances against their arch rivals, the Protestants. These grievances were based on the grounds that the Protestants monopolized most of the chiefly offices in the country. This was a valid complaint. For example,

In Ankole, Toro, and Bunyoro not only was it a tradition that Kings should be Protestant, but also that no Catholic should ever become the leading minister (Enganzi or Katikiro) in any of these Kingdoms -- they were always Protestants. In Busoga, the constitutional head, the Kyabazinga, was always Protestant. In the districts of the North and East the highest post, that of Secretary General, was usually occupied by Protestants.

It is, therefore, accurate to state that the D.P. was formed to "correct" the imbalance created by the domination of the Protestants (see Appendix A). Being the product and part of the crisis itself, the party could not bring about national unity. According to the architects of the party, in light of the fact that the Catholics were in the majority in the country, it was hoped that the party could defeat other parties and establish a "Catholic hegemony". But those who were not Catholics also united to form other political parties.

The Uganda People's Union

Towards the end of 1958, the party was formed. The founders of the party were opposed to Buganda's special status in Uganda. In other words, the party was opposed to those parties which were formed to protect the Kabaka at the expense of other Kings in Uganda. The members of the party were against the way British imperialism had allowed Buganda to develop as a separate entity from the rest of the country.

The formation of the U.P.U. was intended to fight the Baganda-based parties and mobilize the rest of the country. The party drew its leadership from the western region and Busoga. Compared to the other parties, the U.P.U. was strong, but like the other parties, its strategy of isolating Buganda could not permit it to bring about national integration.

The Uganda People's Congress

The party was born on March 9, 1960. It was an amalgamation of Obote's breakaway group from the U.N.C. and the U.P.U. Its creation was an attempt by both the U.N.C. and the U.P.U. to enlarge their domains outside their traditional territories. The U.P.U. brought along with it the western support that the U.N.C. had lacked. Meanwhile, the U.N.C. carried the Northern base support to the new party. However, the U.P.C. was predominantly Protestant and lacked support from Buganda. An important aspect of the alliance, like any other future alliance, was that the leaders brought personal following rather than party organization. As a result, the leaders were powerful but not necessarily the party.

Among other things, the party formulated its agenda to promote unity under a strong government. The party also claimed to uphold the dignity and prestige of hereditary rulers. The party had a number of serious problems. First,

it was composed of two camps with incoherent ideologies. This was to breed problems for the party, and it made its policies conflictual. Second, given the lack of support the party had in Buganda and the inevitable problems associated with accepting hereditary rulers, the party had to make some "daring" compromises. These compromises will be discussed under the U.P.C./K.Y. alliance. It seems, therefore, that as far as the party was concerned, the path to national unity was foggy.

The Kabaka Yekka (Kabaka Alone)

The party was formed in Buganda in 1961. Its main objective was the preservation of the institution of Kabakaship and the "independence" of the Kingdom. The Baganda had for a long time respected the throne. Although with the advent of colonialism the symbol of Buganda's unity had been weakened, the Kabaka still had a big following in the Kingdom. The monarchists feared that in times of political transition, traditional institutions would be destroyed. Therefore, to safeguard the institution in Buganda, a movement had to be formed and that was the Kabaka Yekka.*

* The fact that K.Y. was referred to as a movement rather than a political party (by the Lukiko) clearly
(Footnote Continued)

As previously discussed, the Baganda had throughout the colonial era vehemently opposed any move designed to reduce the status of the Kabaka. Thus, on several occasions, the colonial authority had to accept the inevitable and concede to some of Buganda's demands, for example, the 1900 Agreement which would hinder viable national integration that gave Buganda a special status. Such a concession heightened the Buganda citizenry's sense of separate identity. From 1955, as the country moved closer to independence, the Baganda adopted an increasingly fearful and isolationist attitude towards centralism.

In 1960, Buganda separatists made another abortive attempt to secede from the country. The fear of impending changes that independence would impose on Buganda forced the Kingdom to boycott the first nation-wide election in 1961. Although voluntary adherence to the boycott was substantial, large scale intimidation occurred. Unfortunately for the Lukiko, about two percent of eligible voters, who were Catholics, voted for the D.P. This allowed the D.P. to win 20 of the 21 seats.²⁰ With a further 23 seats elsewhere, compared to the U.P.C. total of 35 seats, the D.P. formed a government.²¹

(Footnote Continued)

illustrated the monarchists' rejection of political parties in Buganda. Political parties were viewed by the Lukiko as foreign institutions led by young men who had no sympathy for the Kingdom.

Having failed to win a federal status in the self-governing Uganda together with the fact that despite the election boycott, the election had been held in Buganda, the Kingdom found itself in a bizarre situation. The only alternative left was to isolate and defeat the D.P. Thus the formation of the K.Y. was a tactical manoeuvre to dislodge the D.P. and preserve the "autonomy" of the throne.

The actual formation of K.Y. was done by merging two organizations -- "Banabulezi" [the people of Bulemezi] and the "Abana Ba Abaami" [chiefs' sons]. The former had been formed after the banning of the Uganda National Movement. Its aim was to inspire the people of Bulemezi with the love of Kabaka and their country [Buganda]. The latter was formed basically to foster the position of the chiefs and their sons in Buganda. The two organizations could easily merge because they had similar objectives -- both could achieve their aims by safeguarding the Kabakaship. Hence, it was thought that the name "Kabaka Yekka" would create a sense of unity and common purpose in Buganda. The objectives and composition of the party were stumbling blocks on the road to national unity.

In the foregoing analysis of the rise and character of political parties, two important facts have been established. First, the composition and political philosophies of the parties were detrimental to national unity. Second, no major political party or movement emerged as overwhelmingly dominant. It is, therefore, imperative to

indicate that these factors were to have significant effects on the type of independence rule that later emerged.

THE POWER GAME: U.P.C./K.Y. ALLIANCE.

The alliance between the two political organizations which were diametrically opposed to each other, at least ideologically, startled most politicians and scholars of Ugandan political history. Ali Mazrui, Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda, describes the mood that, "...here was the party of radicalism [U.P.C.] associating itself with a party of Conservatism [K.Y.]."²² Some scholars describe this marriage of convenience as a "remarkable feat in the politics of negotiation."²³ It is, therefore, important to understand why and how this coalition was formed and what implications it had for national unity and democracy.

The regime in Mengo^{*} was monarchist and Protestant. It deliberately frustrated those Baganda Catholics who were in politics and public service. As a result of the frustration, the D.P. had been formed as an instrument by which justice could be attained for the Catholics. Thus, when the D.P. won the 1961 election, it came as no surprise that the monarchists resented this last minute political

^{*}Mengo was the seat of the Buganda monarchy.

ascendancy of the Catholics. Besides, the D.P. victory was earned at the expense of Buganda traditionalism. Mengo, therefore, sought the alliance in the hope of strengthening its hands in dismantling the D.P. threat before independence. It was also hoped that the alliance would restore Buganda's special status in the country. The alliance meant:

That in order for Buganda to defend its autonomy and prestige, it had, for the first time, to seriously consider aligning itself with the indigenous political forces in other provinces of the country.²⁴

The U.P.C., on the other hand, sought the alliance for its own interests. Its leadership was also predominantly Protestant, but it also realized that it had lost in the 1961 election due to its weakness in Buganda. Since it was quite evident that the loyalty to the throne in Buganda was still formidable, any party which was to gain influence in Buganda had to establish its loyalty to the throne. Probably, a secondary yet important motivation for the U.P.C. to form the alliance was the hope that it (the alliance) would be able to prevent the obstreperous Buganda government from disrupting politics at the centre.

On the eve of the 1961 Uganda Constitutional Conference, a meeting was held between the representatives of the U.P.C. and the Buganda Constitutional Committee.²⁵ The result of the meeting was the birth of the U.P.C./K.Y. alliance. The alliance ensured the integration of Buganda

into independent Uganda. The U.P.C./K.Y. alliance greatly influenced the character and content of the independent constitution.

As a result of the alliance, the U.P.C. did not put any candidate in the region of Buganda in the 1962 Lukiko election.* The contest was between the K.Y. and the D.P. At the end of the election, the K.Y. emerged victorious with an overwhelming majority. As a result, the Lukiko opted for indirect elections to the National Assembly, thus ensuring that K.Y. leaders would be Buganda's representatives. The stage was set for the national election.

In the general election of April 1962, U.P.C. won 37, D.P., 24, and K.Y., 21 seats. When the elected members met for the first time and in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, the U.P.C. majority became 43, the K.Y. 24, but that of the D.P. remained the same.²⁶ Subsequently, Kabaka Mutesa II became the president with Milton Obote as Prime Minister. But since the alliance was based on political imperatives rather than ideological convictions, it rested on bare soil.

Before analyzing the collapse of the alliance and the ensuing anarchy, it is important to briefly examine the

* After all, the U.P.C. did not have any constituency in Buganda, so the terms of the alliance was to U.P.C.'s "advantage."

delicacy of the alliance amidst political manipulations and manoeuvres. According to Ali Mazrui,

this elevation of Sir Edward Mutesa to the presidency of the nation was perhaps a political move of shrewdness. Inevitably, it would complicate the loyalties of Sir Edward to entrust him with responsibilities which would force upon him the broader national cause, as well as the narrower one of his own ethnic Kingdom. His election to the presidency was indeed part of the price for the continuing alliance between the K.Y. and the U.P.C. -- a pact of understanding to share positions of eminence in the new Uganda. Nevertheless, the move had potential value as an instrument either for conversion of Sir Edward Mutesa to a pan-Uganda vision or as a move towards complicating his perspectives and loyalties deeply enough to make the Ganda challenge to the U.P.C. less formidable.²⁷

The alliance maintained the separate traditional domains of each of the parties to the pact. It did not convert Mutesa II to a pan-Uganda vision; instead, it made problems for him, his Kingdom and the country. Besides, unity and stability could not be achieved by administrative fiat.

It soon became clear that the parties to the contract were busy trying to outmanoeuvre each other. With political power in their hands, each party felt that sooner or later, it would assume "absolute power." Following the crossing of floors by some members of the D.P. and the K.Y. to join the U.P.C., Obote felt that he was strong enough to terminate the uneasy "marriage" between the U.P.C. and the K.Y. in August 1964. However, the political repercussions of the collapse of the alliance, compounded with the military mutiny,²⁸ and the power struggle within the U.P.C., were to

throw the country into an era of anarchy and retreat from democratic rule.

PHASE II

The Constitutional Crisis: Retreat from Democracy and the Era of Anarchy.

An important development occurred in parliament while Obote was on a tour in Northern Uganda. The Secretary General of the Kabaka Yekka, Mr. Daudi Ochieng, M.P., alleged in the National Assembly on February 4th 1966, that,

Members of the Government, together with a high-ranking army officer, were involved in a plan to overthrow the Uganda constitution. More specifically, he alleged that the Prime Minister (Dr. Obote), the Minister of State for Defence (Mr. Onama), and the Minister of Planning and Community Development (Mr. Nekyon) had shared a sum of 2 1/2 million shillings. Colonel Amin (the Deputy Army Commander) was said to have received a gratuity of 340,000 shillings for his part in the affair and, furthermore to have been seen instructing people in a plan to overthrow the constitution. Mr. Ochieng moved a motion, later adopted by the Assembly, that Colonel Amin should be suspended pending the conclusion²⁹* of the police investigation into his bank account.

This development had two significant implications. First, by voting to accept the formation of a committee to investigate the allegation without prior consultation with the Prime Minister, the action by the cabinet ministers was

* Obote appointed a Commission to investigate the allegation -- members: Justice Miller (Judge of the High Court of Kenya), Sir Clement de Lestang (Court of Appeal of East Africa), and Justice Saidi (High Court of Tanzania). The commission ruled that the allegation occurred due to the breakdown of communication between the government and the parliament.

tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister. The behavior of the cabinet ministers can best be understood against the background of power struggle within the U.P.C. itself. As a result, Obote would soon resort to unconstitutional behavior in an attempt to cling to power. Second, the prominence of the military in politics soon became a reality. Thereafter, the survival of Obote's government would depend on the military, under Idi Amin.

Immediately he returned from Northern Uganda, Obote ordered the arrest and subsequent detention of five of his cabinet ministers. The main reason he gave for the action he took against the ministers was that they had intrigued against the authority of the government.³⁰ On February 24th, Obote suspended the Constitution; the reason given was that he was trying to "ensure stability and unity in the country, because of an attempt by certain persons to overthrow the government with the help of foreign troops."³¹

The establishment of a Security Council was next. The move by Obote had two significant implications. First, autocracy and personal rule replaced constitutional democracy. Second, the government alienated itself from the electorates. With the "creation" of a security council, the country had become a police state.

DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE SUSPENSION OF CONSTITUTION

In a declaration issued as a special issue of the Uganda Gazette on March 2nd, Obote assumed the Executive authority of the country. In addition, the duties, powers and other functions formerly exercised by the president or vice president were all vested in him [Prime Minister]. The declaration brought the central government and Buganda to a head on collision.

The reaction by the Lukiko was quick and to the effect that Sir Edward was still the Head of State as set out in the "Constitution". According to the Lukiko, the 1962 Constitution, which safeguarded its interest, was the only constitution it would adhere to.³² But the Constitution had already been suspended by Obote because it did not safeguard his interest. This is the irony of constitutions in African politics. As long as a constitution protects the interests of the "incumbents", it is adhered to. Otherwise, it is abolished or rewritten to suit their power needs.

After the abrogation of the 1962 Constitution, Obote drafted a new Constitution and introduced it to parliament. There was no prior consultation or information regarding the document. In the most undemocratic manner, Obote did not allow any debate on the new Constitution. He passed it in parliament, and in April, he became the President of the country.³³ It is, therefore, clear that while in theory the

country had one Constitution (the new one), in practice, the country had two constitutions.

In a more fierce response to Obote's abrogation of the 1962 Constitution and his unilateral adoption of a new one, the Lukiko made a declaration that:

Obote has separated Buganda and other parts which believe in the 1962 Constitution from the rest of Uganda, therefore, those parts are not bound by the new constitution... . Obote has cut down the chains that joined Buganda to Uganda. Buganda no longer recognizes Obote as a leader responsible for Buganda's affairs.... Uganda's government is therefore asked to remove itself from Buganda.³⁴

The "magic" that the U.P.C./K.Y. alliance had created collapsed on its own weight. Buganda was now prepared to have its independent government.

Obote responded by declaring a state of emergency in Buganda; and in keeping with the dictum of "might is right", he ordered Amin and his men to capture the Kabaka's palace. It is important to bear in mind that the use or misuse of the military to crush opposition to state power was not the invention of Obote. British imperialism had used it in the same country. Obote was only following the footsteps of his predecessors.

However, Obote's military "victory" shattered all future prospects for national unity and the rule of law. In the eyes of the regions that had Kingdoms, Obote was now seen as a Northerner struggling against the privileges of the Southerners. Hence, the rigidification of the North-South divide.

Obote did not leave the door open for national reconciliation with his foes. Instead, he tried to effect a reconciliation between "his party" and the soldiers.³⁵ Although the "civil-military" reconciliation was essential for the survival of his personal rule, this exposed the weakness of the regime to the army. The army knew clearly that it could dictate the life span of the regime.

As anarchy spread, the military became aware of the favourable environment for its takeover of power. First, the government had lost touch with the masses. Second, the country was in a state of political chaos. Third, there were willing allies both within and outside the country that were encouraging for a military take over. Therefore, it did not come as a total surprise when on the 25th of January 1971, Idi Amin overthrew Obote.*

AMIN'S ERA OF AUTHORITARIANISM: THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION TO THE CRISES.

The 1971 coup was a result of both internal and external contradictions. Having briefly looked at the internal causes, it is imperative to examine the roles external factors played in the coup and in the ensuing

*Obote never expected Idi Amin to overthrow his government. After all, Idi Amin had very limited education and came from an "insignificant" tribe. So how would he develop ambition to take over power?

crises. In his policy of the "Move to the Left,"* Obote made some sweeping changes in the areas of foreign policy, monetary reform, and nationalization. These changes caused fear and resentment to multi-nationals and foreign countries with vested interest in Uganda.³⁶ To such external interest groups, Obote's "move" could be closely associated with the 1967 Arusha Declaration. Such a development in Uganda would also jeopardize their (external powers') interests in Kenya³⁷ (also see Appendix B).

The reactions of some external interests to Obote's new policies can be illustrated by two examples. First, during the Commonwealth conference in Singapore in 1971, the British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, predicted that "some of the fiery leaders sitting around the table would not return home."³⁸ It was Obote who did not return home. This statement by the British Prime Minister confirmed Obote's previous accusation of British involvement in a plot against his government. It was, therefore, not surprising that the British Conservative government was among the first foreign governments to recognize Amin's coup.

*This thesis is aware of the ideological camps political leaders in Uganda in particular, and Africa in general often identify themselves with. However, more often than not, such leaders act in contradictory manners. It is, therefore, imperative to judge them by their actions rather than by what they say.

Second, Obote's move against the use of Northern Uganda to aid the Southern Sudanese insurgency angered the Israelis who were actively involved in the Southern Sudan. It is important to bear in mind that the Israelis had been closely involved in the training of the military establishment in Uganda. The involvement of Israel in the coup was confirmed by the chief of Israeli military team in Uganda, Colonel Bar-Lev, that:

Amin had approached him, saying that his loyal supporters were outside Kampala and that the president [Obote] would be able to arrest and kill him before they could rescue him. Bar-Lev advised Amin to bring to Kampala those soldiers who were from the same tribe as Amin, and to make sure that he had paratroopers, tanks and jeeps. So equipped, explained Bar-Lev, 600 men could overpower 5000 men.

The external dimension of crises in neo-colonial Uganda came out vividly during this period. However, this was just the beginning of the external dimension to the crises in this period.

In an effort to broaden his political support and establish his regime, Idi Amin manipulated one ethnic group against another, and religious groups against each other. He was also able to play foreign powers against each other. These acts of manipulation will perhaps explain why his regime survived so long.

In keeping with the tradition of military coups in Africa, Amin announced that he had overthrown Obote because of corruption, unlawful detention of some innocent people, and incompetence (see Appendix C). The regime soon acquired

support of some intellectuals, who were either disenchanted with the Obote regime or were just opportunists. This coalition between the civilian and the military gave the regime some "credibility" both at home and abroad.

In order to acquire some breathing space, the regime promised to return the country to democratic rule in five years. This was immediately followed by the release of most political detainees, including the former Obote cabinet ministers. In order to consolidate his political gains in Buganda, Amin brought the remains of Sir Edward Mutesa II for state burial at the royal tomb. In the area of international relations, Amin cheered western investors by opposing the nationalization of foreign firms begun by Obote. This move by Amin was widely applauded by western democracies. But the heightened expectations, both "within" and outside the country, would be frustrated by the regime.

In order to consolidate his position in the military, Amin initiated a great purge in the army. He eliminated the Acholi and Langi, and later other ethnic groups whose loyalty he doubted. It is important to bear in mind that the move to militarism, and state terrorism began with the elimination of the Acholi and Langi, and the subsequent militarization of the country. The expansion and the unprecedented importance of the military was illustrated by the drastic increase in military expenditure from Uganda shillings 170 million in 1969/70 to 565 million in 1971/72.⁴⁰

The year 1972 saw new challenges to the regime. The Ugandan exiles invaded Mbarara with the support of Tanzania.^{41*} The invasion was a humiliating defeat for the exiles and President Nyerere. Amin crushed the invasion and retaliated by bombing the Tanzanian towns of Bukoba and Mwanza. The abortive invasion had two important implications. First, the involvement of Tanzania in the internal affairs of Uganda became a reality, a legacy that still faces Uganda. Second, it provided Amin with a chance to eliminate those whom he believed were against his government, particularly, the Acholi and Langi civilians. This marked a significant development in the history of political revenge, a legacy that still haunts the country to the present day.

In an effort to repair his damaged image at home, Amin expelled the Asians in 1972. By this action, Amin appeared to have scored an important political victory at home. This was based on the fact that the relationship between the Asian Capitalists and the local populace had always been very uneasy. However, this action angered the British government which had all along supported Idi Amin. The British government was perturbed by this action because Britain had to shoulder the Asian problem. Amin, aware of

*Tanzania never recognized Amin's government; it saw the regime as a puppet of imperialist machination.

the impending clash with his British ally, shifted his allegiance to the Soviet Union; that was Amin's diplomacy.

The Israelis, who had been instrumental in the rise of Amin to power, were shocked when the authoritarian ruler expelled them from the country. To make matters worse, Amin gave the Israeli embassy to the P.L.O. From that time until his fall in 1979, Amin used the religion of Islam as an important determinant of his foreign policy. This foreign policy enabled him to acquire military and financial support to keep himself in power. It is, therefore, imperative to indicate that the involvement of foreign powers in the crises kept the authoritarian rule alive. The external dimension of the crises is a legacy that persists to the present day.

On the domestic scene, Amin increased the power of the military in virtually every aspect of the society. As a result, there was complete breakdown of law and order, corruption, moral decay, economic collapse, and unprecedented ethnic and religious conflicts. These problems have since become part of the crises that continue to tear apart the country.

THE MOSHI UNITY CONFERENCE, AND THE REGIME OF YUSUF LULE.

Following Amin's invasion of Tanzania in early 1979, 22 groups of Ugandan exiles formed a "common front", the Uganda

National Liberation Front, to overthrow Amin.⁴² The formation and composition of the "front" had two important implications. First, it would make the involvement of Tanzania in the internal affairs of Uganda legitimate, especially following Amin's invasion. Second, the composition of the "front" by the different ethnic, ideological and political groups was a reminder of the pre-Amin politics. The only common denominator was the hatred for Idi Amin, and perhaps the quest for personal political ambitions.

As a result of differences within the "front", a less controversial candidate was elected to lead the Uganda National Liberation Front. That was, professor Yusuf Lule, a Muganda academic and a "salient" sympathizer of the K.Y. The U.N.L.F. created the National Consultative Council (N.C.C.) as its interim parliament. This coalition was a necessary condition to topple Idi Amin and to fill the power vacuum that would follow the overthrow of Amin. However, the duration of the coalition was bound to be short, because in the absence of the "common enemy", nothing else would hold it together.

The Uganda National Liberation Army (U.N.L.A.) was formed as the military wing of the U.N.L.F. The U.N.L.A. was composed of officers and men who owed their loyalty to individuals, rather than to the newly formed organ. The majority of the fighting men were led by Lt. Col. David Oyite Ojok (a close aide to Obote) and by Col. Tito Okello.

Smaller groups were headed by Col. Omaria, Akena P'Ojok, and Yoweri Museveni.⁴³ The composition of the army, like its political wing, was a potential threat to the restoration of democracy, law and order, and national unity.

Professor Lule was elected on the understanding that he would exercise his power with the consent of the N.C.C. But within two months in office as president, he was being accused of making unilateral decisions and of being a tribalist. Immediately after Lule appointed four more ministers from Buganda without ratification by the N.C.C., he was removed from office.⁴⁴ It seemed that Lule had apparently failed to grasp the fact that he had no personal power base either within the N.C.C. or the U.N.L.F.

For the sixty-eight days that he was in power, Lule had made the Baganda to believe that the regime was theirs. This misconception raised the Baganda's spirit of pride. Following Lule's removal from office, the Baganda acquired hostile attitudes towards the U.N.L.F. The removal of Lule illustrated the power struggle within the front, and the difficulty of national unity and democratic rule. The removal of Lule brought about political chaos and instability in Buganda.

**THE BINAISA ADMINISTRATION AND
THE U.N.L.F. UMBRELLA**

With the removal of Lule, a second compromise candidate was elected. Although the election of Binaisa* to the presidency was perhaps aimed at forestalling Buganda's opposition to the "front", Buganda's confidence in the new political institution was not restored. To the Baganda, Binaisa was created by forces opposed to them (Baganda). Besides, Binaisa had been instrumental in defending Obote's abrogation of the 1962 constitution. Binaisa's regime proved as ineffective as his predecessor's. The "front" was utterly divided, and its members were increasingly concerned with self-enrichment. As a result, there was complete breakdown of law and order, and wide spread corruption.

The civil-military relations had deteriorated significantly. The the T.P.D.F. and U.N.L.A. were involved in activities of lawlessness. It is, therefore, important to indicate that the image of the military did not symbolize the beginning of a new era; rather, it was a continuation of the old order. This situation was made worse by the formation of tribally based militia in the North, East and West of the country. The militia, like the U.N.L.A., did not pay its allegiance to the state, but rather to their

* Binaisa, a Muganda, had worked as Obote's Attorney General during the period of the constitutional crisis.

ethnic leaderships. In other words, the country had personal armies, headed by military war lords.

In response to the mounting political pressure from Tanzania and within the N.C.C., Binaisa promised a national election in 1980. Binaisa's strategy to stay in power, and the "desire" for national unity, forced him to indicate that an election would be organized under the U.N.L.F. umbrella. It simply meant that the old political parties of the pre-Amin coup would not contest. It further meant that the U.N.L.F. was beginning to shed-off its role as a "front" by trying to become a political "party". It seems that Binaisa's understanding of the crises was, that the old political parties were the root causes of the predicament. This assumption ignored the most elementary fact. That is, by banning political parties, he would have not banned those behaviors that made the parties what they were. In terms of the restoration of democracy, this approach was bound to lead the country into a single party state. It is not that "democracy" cannot necessarily exist in a single party state, but rather the unilateral imposition of the political system is itself a negation of democratic principles.

Binaisa's decisions were bound to boomerang, for a number of reasons. First, unity and democracy cannot be achieved by administrative fiat. That is, the banning of political parties does not in itself constitute an end to those divisive and undemocratic behaviors. Besides, his action was undemocratic, in that his regime had a big

problem of legitimacy. He also forgot that he did not have a power base from which he could realise his aspirations.

Second, his perception of the umbrella was misleading. There was no umbrella under which the people of Uganda stood united. The U.N.L.F. was not a united "club" of the ruling elites. Even if such an umbrella existed (which it did not), it could not survive the political storm in the country. Third, Binaisa did not understand why the T.P.D.F. fought the way it did, and in whose interest Nyerere kept his army in Uganda.

Binaisa's decision met with stiff resistance from the old political parties, particularly the U.P.C. As soon as Binaisa appointed Brigadier Oyite Ojok as Uganda's Ambassador to Algiers on 12th May 1980,⁴⁵ the crisis within the U.N.L.F. reached its logical conclusion. Binaisa was removed from the office, and the Military Commission took over power. The Military Commission was headed by Paulo Mwanga (Chairman, and a close aide to Obote), Yoweri Museveni (Vice Chairman), Tito Okello (Army Commander) and Oyite Ojok (Army Chief of Staff). The Commission promised to organize an election in the same year - 1980.

THE RETURN OF OBOTE AND THE 1980 GENERAL ELECTION

Dr. Obote returned to Uganda on 27 May 1980,* after eight years in exile in Tanzania. He immediately began his electoral campaign on behalf of his old party -- the U.P.C. With his return to the country, it became clear that he had the overwhelming support of the military commission and of the army. Unfortunately, this support, which he got at the expense of other parties, cast a shadow of doubt about Obote's ability to unite the country. His perception of democracy was also questionable.

When the campaigns started, it became clear that the contest was primarily between the U.P.C. and the D.P. The D.P., led by Dr. Kawanga Semogerere, drew its support from its traditional area of Buganda, and among some Catholics in other parts of the country. During the campaign, the party spent most of its time attacking Obote and the U.P.C. According to the party, Idi Amin was the product of Obote's abuse of political power. This nature of political campaign was a clear reminder of the politics that had thrown the country into a state of anarchy. Despite its fairly well-managed campaign, the D.P. was at a big disadvantage; the party had not played a significant role in the overthrow

*The return of Obote to the South-Western town of Bushenyi on May 1980, was later commemorated by the U.P.C. government, as "Hero's Day".

of Idi Amin. As a result, the party lacked the support of the army.

The U.P.C., led by Dr. Obote, drew most of its support from its traditional areas of the North and East. The weakness of the party in Buganda was a reminder of the history of the party itself. The U.P.C., on the other hand, accused the D.P. of conspiring with Idi Amin against the U.P.C. government. Obote repeatedly indicated during the campaign that the D.P. kept Amin in power. He challenged the D.P. to show the country its army that fought against Amin. The U.P.C. campaign sent two important messages to the country. First, the U.P.C. became synonymous with the liberation of the country.* Second, Obote considered the U.N.L.A. to be essentially a U.P.C. army. It was, therefore, not surprising that "the army blocked some D.P. candidates from contesting; thus allowing the U.P.C. to win 17 uncontested seats."⁴⁶

The election was monitored by a team of Commonwealth observers. The team was welcomed by various interest groups, for different reasons. As far as Tanzania was concerned, this would help to explain that Nyerere did not overthrow Amin to restore his traditional friend, Obote. In other words, the presence of the team amounted to an

* True, the U.N.L.A. had "liberated" the Ugandan people from Idi Amin. But it also became clear that it was desirable to liberate the people from their liberators.

international endorsement of Tanzania's occupation of Uganda.

The D.P. perhaps thought that the presence of the team would deter the military-backed U.P.C. from rigging the election. In the event that the election was rigged, the international community would not recognize the U.P.C. "victory". As far as the U.P.C. was concerned, it wanted to "repair" its damaged image of the pre-Amin era. The party hoped that the presence of the team would make its forthcoming "victory" appear legitimate. After all, the party was better schooled in the art of political intrigues than the team.

Although the political parties accepted the presence of the commonwealth team, for their own interests, the presence of the team had an important implication. That was, that the politicians had lost faith in the political system they claimed would restore democracy, national unity, tranquility, and development. It was, therefore, clear that the election would not offer any viable solution to the crises.

Before the results of the election were announced, the D.P. unilaterally declared itself victorious. Immediately, demonstrations by D.P. supporters left the capital city in a state of uncertainty and confusion. These demonstrations indicated that the results of the election would not be accepted by any party that was likely to lose. As if the results of the election had not come under enough challenge,

Paulo Mwanga seized powers from the electoral commission. It was now his "office" to announce the results, not the electoral commission. In the end, the U.P.C. was declared the winner.

Although the Commonwealth team indicated that the election was free and fair, the results were not accepted as accurate and valid, at least, not by the D.P. and Museveni's U.P.M.* As far as the D.P. was concerned, the U.P.C. rigged the election. As for Museveni, he had declared that he would "go to the bush", even before the election was held. But, given the fact that Museveni himself had lost to a popular D.P. candidate, his going to the bush to fight Obote's regime was a classic case of political opportunism.

OBOTE II AND CIVIL DISORDER (1980-1985)

When Obote assumed power, his government was faced with the question of legitimacy and armed insurgencies. By putting a lot of emphasis on international opinion during the election, the U.P.C. had neglected domestic opinion. As a result, the party had very limited legitimacy. To make matters worse, the government was confronted with armed

*The U.P.M. represented a group of young, and uninfluential radicals who were previously members of the U.P.C. The party had no political base in the country.

insurgencies in Buganda and in West Nile. Faced with such political and military upheavals, it became clear that the "election" of the U.P.C. would not bring political or military stability to the country.

In response to the armed insurgencies, Obote did not pursue a reconciliatory strategy. The lack of discipline in the army, and the brutality with which it (the army) destroyed suspected sympathizers of the guerrillas, totally ruined the prospects for national reconciliation. The initial military strategy was also a fiasco. The army had failed to reach the "window" from which the guerrillas were getting into the disturbed areas. As a result, the army deployed the "search and destroy" approach, thus leaving thousands of innocent people dead. However, towards the end of his regime, the army had managed to drive the insurgents out of their bases. But the split within the army was becoming a serious problem for Obote's government.

The problem within the U.N.L.A. became pronounced over the question of the succession of Brig. David Oyite Ojok, who was killed in a mysterious helicopter accident in December 1983. He was the cornerstone of Obote's control over the U.N.L.A. David Oyite was not only Obote's tribesman but he was also an efficient soldier who had the respect of the army. Besides, it was his personal command during the war against Amin that finally brought the Tanzanian-U.N.L.A. victory. Following his death, it became apparent that Obote wanted to appoint another tribesman of

his to supervise and control the army. Unfortunately for Obote, the two most senior officers, Col. Basilo Olara Okello and Col. Maruru were not his own men. It took Obote seven months to work out his strategy and appoint another Langi, Lt. Col. Smith Opon-Acak.

The appointment of Smith Opon-Acak to the position of Army Chief of Staff created a big rift within the army, especially between the Acholi and Langi. When it became apparent that the Army Commander General, Tito Okello, was about to retire, Obote decided to promote Col. Ogwang, who had already retired, to the rank of a Brigadier. The appointment of Ogwang contravened the Uganda Armed Forces Act, which allowed for the promotion of only officers and men still in active service. In other words, Obote should have reinstated Ogwang to active service before promoting him.

The promotion of Ogwang, an Itesot, was an illustration of Obote's attempt to shift military monopoly from the Acholi and the Langi to the Langi and the Itesot. After all, Obote's popularity in Acholiland was on the constant decline. It seems Obote's strategy was to groom Brigadier Ogwang to take over as Army Chief of Staff while Brigadier Smith Opon-Acak would become the Army Commander after the resignation of General Tito Okello. This move by Obote created more tension within the army.

When the Minister of State for Defence, Peter Otai (an Itesot), and the Army Chief of Staff, Brigadier Smith

Opon-Acak, arranged with the consent of the Obote to receive military support from Ethiopia for the S.P.L.A., more tension built in the army. Neither Peter Otai nor Smith Opon-Acak informed their immediate "superiors", the Minister of Defence and Vice President, Paul Mwanga and the Army Commander General Tito Okello about the military support for the S.P.L.A. As a result, when the Ethiopian military plane dropped the military supply near Agoro in Kitgum, the Commander of the Northern Brigade, Brigadier Basilo Olara Okello got the arms and called General Tito Okello and Paul Mwanga to find out what was happening. But neither Paul Mwanga nor Tito Okello was aware of the silent arrangement made by Smith Opon-Acak and Peter Otai. Thereafter, Gen. Tito Okello and Paulo Mwanga protested to Obote against leaving them uninformed about such a military arrangement.

Instead of trying to resolve the misunderstanding within the army and the cabinet, Smith Opon-Acak and Peter Otai decided to recall Brigadier Basilo Olara Okello* from the North with the intention of dismissing him from the army. Basilo refused to report to the Army headquarters

*The problem between obote and Bazilo Olara Okello came to the surface during their stay in exile in Tanzania. The relationship worsened during the 1980 election when Basilo was the Brigade commander - central Brigade. Basilo was transferred to the North because of his alleged support for the D.P. Obote wanted Basilo dismissed from the army just before the death of David Oyite Ojok in 1983. It was Oyite Ojok who opposed Obote's attempt to dismiss Basilo from the army.

because neither the Minister of Defence nor the Army Commander were aware of such an instruction.

In early 1985, a group of Acholi soldiers mutinied in the Magamaga Ordinance Depot, near Jinja. The reason for the mutiny was that the Langi were not being sent to fight against the insurgents, but were instead being promoted to higher ranks and being sent for more military training abroad. This was followed by a more serious clash at the Army Shop where the A.P.C.s were stationed. Brigadier Smith Opon-Acak decided to replace the Commander of the A.P.C., Captain Ocheri Nangai (an Acholi), with a Langi officer. When Captain Ocheri Nangai disobeyed the order and instead sent the A.P.C.s to Mbuya barracks, Brigadier Smith Opon-Acak attempted to raid the barracks and take the A.P.C.s late at night. This incident led to military confrontation between the Langi and the Acholi at the Mbuya barracks in Kampala. Brigadier Smith failed to take the A.P.C.s but a number of Acholi soldiers were killed in the incident. The Mbuya incident was a faithful testimony of the military strategy Obote had decided to take to silence the Acholi. It was also indicative of the fact that the "shaky" military alliance between the Acholi and the Langi had finally reached its logical conclusion. In the final analysis Obote's government was overthrown.

It is imperative to indicate that at the time of the coup in July 1985, Museveni's N.R.A. was on the verge of total defeat. They had been driven out of their last

stronghold in the Luwero Triangle, and were confined to areas of the Ruwenzori forest, Fort Potal area in the west and near Masindi. Museveni himself had fled Uganda to join his family in Sweden, where he was at the time of the coup.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER ONE

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CHAPTER TWO

THE OKELLO REGIME: "APPEASEMENT"*
AND ANARCHY

The military council set up under the chairmanship of General Tito Lutwa Okello after the coup on 27 July 1985 lasted barely six months. From the very beginning, its leadership was characterized by factiousness, ineptitude and lack of a coherent policy. The military strength of the council, particularly the U.N.L.A., was greatly weakened by the previous split between the Acholi and the Langi. Although the coalition with some factions of former Amin's soldiers attempted to occupy the vacuum created by the absence of the Langi from the regime, it also created alienation of the regime, especially among the vast population that did not want anything to do with the atrocities of the 1970s.

By September 1985, the military council had accommodated, among others, four leaders of armed groups who were opposed to the Obote regime: Major Amin Onzi of the U.N.R.F., Dr. Andrew Kayira of the U.F.M., Capt. George Nkwanga of the F.E.D.E.M.U. and Major General Isaac Lumago of F.U.N.A.. By this time, all the political parties had

*For similar analysis of the policy of "appeasement" and causes of World War II, see Keith Eubank, World War II: Root and Causes, p. 89.

already joined the government: the D.P. led by Dr. Paul Semogerere, the U.P.C. led by Paulo Mwanga and later by Waligo, the C.P. led by Joshua Manyanja-Nkangi, the U.P.M. led by Bidani Sali, and the newly formed N.L.P. led by Dr. Obonyo. The N.R.A./N.R.M., however, refused Okello's repeated invitation to join the council.

Following consultations between Okello and the other groups that had joined the government, the military council promised to hold "free and fair" elections within a year.* General Okello deplored military interventions in politics on the ground that they often led to the destruction of life and property.** But he attempted to justify the coup on the pretext that Obote had tried to create factions in the army so as not to hold the scheduled elections.*** It is imperative to examine why and how Okello's policy came in place. Why the N.R.A. refused to join the government. And why the policy failed.

* The N.R.A./N.R.M. wanted an interim government that included them to stay in power for four years before holding any elections.

** Okello's view perhaps explains his previous unwillingness to overthrow Obote. Ironically, it was during this period that indiscipline among the soldiers increased so much so that there was total anarchy in the country. Destruction of life and property became the order of the day.

*** Elections were supposed to be held by the end of 1985. With the increasing unpopularity of Obote and "his men" in Acholi, it was unclear what role the military would play to help Obote during the election.

It is important to bear in mind that when Okello's forces were fighting against Obote, they initially thought that they were fighting a defensive war which would not necessarily lead to the overthrow of Obote.* In other words, Okello's forces did not know that what had started out as a "defensive" war would lead to the overthrow of a regime with a strong leadership. This state of uncertainty, compounded by lack of political direction, deprived the regime of any coherent and workable political agenda. It is not an overstatement to say that the anti-Obote forces followed a policy of "get in and see," a policy that was totally inadequate to fill in the power vacuum that was created by the overthrow of Obote.

The Okello regime assumed that the overthrow of Obote would mean an end to the war and crises in the country. By personalizing the crises, the military regime forgot that Obote was himself both the product and part of the crises of Uganda at a definite stage in its history; he had not acted exclusively on his own, but was also subjected to "external" influences. Such an erroneous assumption was a clear

*It was Basilo Olara Okello and not Tito Okello who was instrumental in the overthrow of Obote. Basilo Okello persuaded Tito Okello (no relation) to fly with him to the Southern Sudan in order to persuade some of Amin's former soldiers to join them and fight against Obote. It is ironic that Amin's soldiers joined the same group that had thrown them out of the country; perhaps each side had something to gain from the coalition. Obote's troops were too strong for Okello's, but they lacked organization.

illustration of the inability of the regime to comprehend the complexity and the multi-dimensional factors of the causes of the crises. As a result of this misconception, the regime hastily developed and applied its policy of "appeasement" by trying to bring into government every fighting group and political party. Although the N.R.A. still refused to join the government, the regime was still convinced that sooner or later it (N.R.A.) would join in. According to the then Minister of Defence, Col. Toko, "the N.R.A. had been given freedom to move around in the honest hope that they would cease the armed struggle. The army welcomed the N.R.A. men into the barracks and were allowed to share their facilities."² But this policy was bound to boomerang, as the N.R.A. would seize the advantage to expand its military base.

The regime was also engaged in talks with the smaller armed opposition groups in an attempt to bring them fully into the military council. Captain Joseph Nkwanga, Commander of the Federal Democratic Army, laid down eight conditions, including demands for immediate integration of all fighting groups into the National army. It urged the Baganda to support the regime, while demanding a promise that elections would be held within a year; that all political prisoners would be released; and that human rights would be respected.³ It also demanded that a national conference be held to discuss the future of Uganda.⁴ The

Uganda Democratic Redemption Union,* led by Dr. Bernard Bagorogoza, criticized the D.P. for immediately recognizing and joining the military government and demanded the dissolution of the military council. The Uganda Freedom Movement, led by Dr. Andrew Kayira, joined the government immediately after the coup and its demand for positions in the government was met. The Uganda National Rescue Front, led by Major Onzi, negotiated the terms for the integration of his group into the government; the group got what it wanted. The former Uganda National Army, led by Amin's former Chief of Staff, Major General Isaac Lumago, also negotiated the terms under which they would become part of the military council; they were also offered a place on the council.

But the military regime did not make any effort to integrate the different armies into a single national army. There was no single command; instead, the various armed groups were designated different parts of the city. This made Kampala resemble Beirut, where different armed factions control their own territory in the city. Lawlessness and anarchy became the order of the day.

*When it became clear that the military government was seeking peace through negotiation almost at any cost, some people formed "armed" groups in order to bargain for positions.

The Okello policy of "appeasement" was an attempt to resolve conflict through negotiation. This policy was not designed specifically to meet Museveni's increasing demands. It was a policy that recognized the danger of war in the country. The policy was later applied more vigorously to meet Museveni's demands. However, when it became clear that Museveni could not be appeased, the policy was exercised for the purpose of political survival.

In an effort to sell his policy of "appeasement", Okello dismissed Paulo Mwanga as prime minister. This was done at the request of the leadership of the D.P. and some members of the N.R.A. Although these groups argued that they did not view the presence of Mwanga favourable in government because of his behaviour during the 1980 elections, it seems that the real reason was that both groups saw Paulo Mwanga as a threat to their getting to power.

General Tito Okello approached President Moi of Kenya to chair the Nairobi Peace Conference. The conference was essentially between the military government and the National Resistance Movement. When the peace talks opened finally on 26 August 1985, President Moi promised that Kenya would do everything possible to assist Uganda in its efforts to re-establish peace.

In his communication to the media, Museveni warned that the faction in charge of Uganda Army was likely to spoil the coup effort to gain rehabilitation in the eyes of the

people. He called for a serious effort to settle Uganda's main problems once and for all and stated that it was the desire for peace that prompted him to negotiate with the military leaders.⁵

From the very beginning of the talks, Museveni demanded the resignation of the military council and claimed half the seats on the new council. During the second and third round of talks, the N.R.M. increased its demands for representation on the council. Having originally agreed at the second round of talks to accept six members on the council (Tito Okello accepted this figure -- six -- and also agreed to the N.R.A. nominating one of its members as vice chairman of the council), Museveni increased his demands to seven members. He also objected to seats being given to any of the other armed groups, most of whom had already come to terms with the military council.* Museveni's demands were aimed at achieving two important goals. First, by demanding more seats on the council, the N.R.M.'s position would be numerically equal to that of the Okello government. According to this strategy, the N.R.A. would put in the best of its men on the council as opposed to Okello's weak men already on the council. In the final analysis, the N.R.A.

* Museveni's strong opposition to the smaller armed groups having any place in the interim government, was partly the result of the clash between the N.R.A. and other Buganda based groups in Luwero, just before he fled to Sweden.

would be in a better position to manipulate events from within the council. Second, Museveni's objection to any representation of other armed groups was meant to isolate the military regime and cause stiff opposition to it by these groups that would be dropped from the council. In other words, Museveni's strategy was that of victory through the policy of exclusion and "divide and conquer".

The N.R.A. opposition to any role being given to Amin's former soldiers was perhaps the most contradictory demand.* It was contradictory in the sense that some of Amin's former soldiers were the best fighters on the side of the N.R.A. during this period. Perhaps the N.R.A. was determined to win the international opinion by "disassociating itself" from the Amin's men. More importantly, the N.R.A. was bending to the demands from one of its principal supporters, Tanzania. The leadership in Tanzania was opposed to the presence of Amin's former soldiers on the council, because of the Tanzanian-Ugandan conflict of the 1970s. But this demand was not met by the military regime because it was contrary to its policy of "appeasement" through inclusion rather than exclusion of Ugandans.

* Museveni had himself made an agreement with two of Amin's former principal lieutenants, Brig. Moses Ali and Maj. Gen. Mondo of the U.N.R.F. in January 1982 in Tripoli, Libya.

The military regime suggested that all the fighting forces, including the U.N.L.A., should lay down their arms during the transition stage, and that Kenya and Tanzania should be asked to send military force to monitor the observance of the agreement to disarm and to hold the ring until a new national army was created. Museveni rejected the ideas as compromising the national sovereignty of Uganda.* Even though Museveni accepted a ceasefire, the N.R.A. stepped up its military activity in the same month of September.

The position of the military regime had been greatly weakened by the time the fourth round of talks opened on 28 October. Not only had the N.R.A. expanded its military base in the west and southern Uganda, but the other armed groups that had joined the military council had united in their opposition to the N.R.A. demands for an equal share of power in the council and the elimination of any representation from their side. Nevertheless, Gen. Tito Okello began his new round of talks by accepting the N.R.A. demand for equal representation on the council, with seven members from the U.N.L.A and seven from the N.R.A., with another four places

*It is true, the arrangement would disturb the sovereignty of Uganda, but Museveni did not oppose the presence of Tanzanian troops in Uganda in the early 1980s. Yet, some Tanzanian troops were already in Western Uganda training his men. Museveni did not see the presence of the Rwandese soldiers led by the N.R.A. number two man, Maj. Gen. Rwejema, as being contradictory.

reserved for the other fighting groups. While the N.R.A. accepted the offer of parity, it maintained its objections to the participation of any other armed groups in the proposed interim government. The N.R.A. and the council formally accepted a ceasefire on 28 October; but on the very next day, a number of battles were fought between the N.R.A. and the U.N.L.A.⁶

On the opening day of the fifth round of talks on 4th November, the military council accused Museveni of wishing to divide the country along ethnic lines by his announcement the previous day that the N.R.A. had set up its own administrative structure in the southwest of the country. General Tito Okello accused Museveni of attempting to divide and polarize Uganda into Bantu and Nilotic factions (South-North divide) so that he could exploit the differences to take power by force.⁷ Museveni claimed that the purpose of forming an interim government to administer the areas under the N.R.A. control was to provide social services. He named the chairman of the N.R.M., Haji Musa Kingongongo, as the chief administrator.⁸ No progress was realized during the fifth round of talks.

In the weeks preceding the sixth round of talks, Museveni accused the military council of launching a new offensive against the N.R.A. It was at this time that he claimed that Egypt had sent military experts to the country, and that Canadian mercenaries and former British SAS instructors were complicating the peace process through

their military involvement on the side of the military government.⁹ This accusation was quite valid, except that Egypt had sent in military supplies but not instructors (though Egypt denied any involvement). Museveni threatened to "open" his own offensive unless the U.N.L.A. attacks ceased, and said that he would break off the negotiations. If the peace talks failed, he added, "the N.R.A. would be forced to take Kampala by force."¹⁰ It was at this juncture that Museveni's motive to get to power by any means was clearly spoken out for the first time. This period also marked the turning point in Okello's policy of "appeasement"; from now on the policy would be used for the purpose of political survival.

The sixth round of talks was delayed when Museveni announced that he would not be personally available to meet before 26 November. Without giving any reason for this absence at such a critical stage in negotiations, General Tito Okello accused him of "having gone shopping for arms to come and cause more bloodshed in Uganda."¹¹ Only then did Museveni say that his absence was due to his wish to visit his family in Sweden.

It is important at this stage to turn briefly and examine developments in other areas that influenced the character and subsequent collapse of the talks. In an attempt to consolidate its position in Western Uganda, the N.R.A. used political and military strategies including "terrorism". Banks were robbed, a Uganda Airline jet was

hijacked to Kasese on its domestic flight to Arua, coffee was raided from the coffee marketing store and smuggled to Rwanda and Tanzania, and those opposed to the N.R.A. in the area under its occupation were severely punished.

In its military campaign against the military government, the N.R.A. established its base and activities in areas between concentrations of population and relatively inaccessible territory. The N.R.A. valued the populated areas for actual fighting, the enlistment of support and the seizure of material necessities. For instance, Masaka, where population and economic activities (coffee and plenty of foodstuff) are concentrated, also has rugged terrain, heavy forest cover and swampy areas, thus providing the ideal juxtaposition of civilization and wilderness so essential to successful guerrilla warfare.

On the political front, the National Resistance Movement mobilized support from the west and the south of the country by appealing to anti-Northern sentiments. In order to broaden his position in Buganda, Museveni used the son of the former Kabaka, Prince Mutebi, to appeal to the people in the area. The approach the N.R.M. used was to have far-reaching implications for the unity of the country, and for the movement later when it seized state power. First, the concentration of the guerrilla activities in the west and south, and the anti-Northern campaign, meant the

exclusion of Eastern^{*} and Northern Uganda from the composition of both the N.R.M. and N.R.A. In other words, both the military and political wings of Museveni's power base remained ethnic in composition and ideology. This was not a negation of unity by accident, but it was rather by strategy. That is the strategy of "divide and conquer." Such a strategy, needless to say, was bound to put a heavy constraint on the quest for national reconciliation and unity. Second, the presence and active participation of Prince Mutebi during the N.R.A. political and military campaign heightened the monarchist expectations about the restoration of Buganda "lost glory". Failure to meet such expectations upon assuming power was bound to create a rift within the N.R.M./N.R.A.

The N.R.A. obtained military and financial support from some foreign countries and international firms. The single most important source of military and financial support was Libya^{12**} President Gadafi of Libya had earlier on been the strongest supporter of Amin's regime of murder and terror. As indicated before, Gadafi's support to the N.R.A. was the result of the January 1982 Tripoli Pact signed between

^{*} Eastern Uganda was a stronghold of Obote's U.P.C.

^{**} The link between Gadafi and Museveni later created a problem of acceptance of the N.R.M. regime by some western democracies, especially the U.S.A. The N.R.M. was seen as a "terrorist organization".

Museveni and some of Amin's former soldiers. Some military, financial and diplomatic support also came from neighbouring Tanzania and Kenya.

The behaviour of Kenya and Tanzania had significant impacts on the character and final collapse of the Peace Talks. The choice of Nairobi as the venue for the talks was overall a political miscalculation on the side of the Okello regime. The Nairobi government had always offered sanctuary and political support to the N.R.A.* Besides, the powerful financial magnate, 'Tiny' Rowland of Lonrho, a close friend of the Kenyan president (Lonrho owns the Standard newspaper in Kenya, the Observer and the Guardian newspapers in London), was directly involved in financing the N.R.A. operations both within and outside Uganda.¹³ Perhaps Kenya was more reluctant to see the Okello regime stay in power because of the internal military problem she had. Since the abortive coup of 1982, Moi had not yet fully resolved the military problem in his country. As a result, he would be the last person to support a military government next door.

* Ironically, immediately the N.R.A. seized power, relations between Uganda and Kenya reached a breaking point. The two countries nearly went to war twice in less than four years. At the beginning of 1989, Vice President of Kenya, Dr. Josphat Munghai was fired from his job by President Moi on the alleged connection between Munghai and Museveni (Munghai was vice president for about a year). While Kenya appears to be helping some Ugandans opposed to the Museveni regime, Uganda and Libya are training some Kenyans opposed to Moi's government (the Libyan Embassy in Kenya was closed in 1987).

This situation was further aggravated by the fact that both Gen. Tito Okello and the then Commander of the Kenyan Army, Lt. Gen. Mulinge had been close friends since the days of the King's African Rifles.

The Kenyan government failed to play an effective role in restoring peace in Uganda not only by supporting the N.R.A. financially and later militarily but also by supporting the N.R.A. diplomatically. For instance, towards the end of 1985, the Kenyan permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Langat, visited the area controlled by the N.R.A. without consulting with the Ugandan government.¹⁴

The military government made another serious mistake in its quest for peace by assuming that Tanzania would play an active role in bringing to an end the crises in Uganda. The regime appealed to Tanzania to convince Museveni to accept the "Peace offer". Unfortunately, the Okello regime was blind to the reality on the ground. The reality was that Tanzania was supplying both weapons and military instructors to the N.R.A. Ironically, some of the body guards of Gen. Tito Okello were also Tanzanians, and they had access to top military documents. As a result, they were able to convey some top military information through the Tanzanian Embassy to the N.R.A.* Just as in the case of Kenya, the Tanzanian

*Tanzania had all along supported Museveni. It was at the "request" of Tanzania that the U.N.L.F. had to appoint
(Footnote Continued)

government was aware of the close relations between the then commander of the Tanzanian People's Defence Forces, Gen. Mushunguri and General Tito Okello. The Tanzanian government could not tolerate any external influence on the Tanzanian army, especially at the time of the uncertain transition of power from Nyerere to Mwinyi.

From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that neither Kenya nor Tanzania were prepared to allow the peace talks to succeed. Both Kenya and Tanzania thought that the N.R.A. would be in a better position to create the type of "peace" they wanted in the region. Their support for the N.R.A. directly complicated the peace process and finally led to its collapse.

As Museveni consolidated his position in the west and south, his demands kept on increasing at the Nairobi Peace Conference. The more he demanded, the more the military government gave in and the more complicated the prospects for "peace" through negotiation became. Towards the end of 1985, it had become increasingly clear that "appeasement" would not satisfy Museveni. He had discovered the inaction

(Footnote Continued)

Museveni as Defence Minister in 1979. The rationale for this "request" was that Museveni had declared himself a revolutionist, especially while he was studying at the University of Dar es Saalam. Tanzania wanted to avoid any future military conflict between the two counties.

** This thesis holds the view that peace can not be realised in Uganda through military might.

and weakness of the Okello regime. Museveni's demands made any other alternative for peace unworkable. He himself did not have a consistent thread of vision for the country. The only thing he wanted was absolute power.

During the sixth round of talks, the military government conceded to the N.R.A. demand to reduce the army (government's) from over 60,000 to 3,700. The composition of the new army was to be as follows:

NUMBER OF SOLDIERS

Uganda Liberation Army	3,700
National Resistance Army	3,580
Federal Army	
Uganda Freedom Movement	1,200
Uganda Rescue Front	
Former Uganda Army	
 Total	 8,450

Source: The Uganda Peace Talks - Agreement for the Restoration of Peace to the Sovereign State of the Republic of Uganda (Nairobi: 1985) p. 17 (also see Appendix D).

In theory, the difference between the government troops and the N.R.A. would be 120, but in reality that difference was almost not there. This can be explained by the fact that there were some high ranking officers in the U.N.L.A. who were either members of the N.R.A. or its sympathizers. Among such people was the Army Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Maruru,^{*} who was in very close contact with the N.R.A. The rationale of having a small army was, according to Museveni, based on the economy and the civil-military relations. Ironically, Museveni himself would later upon coming to power increase his army to over 50,000 soldiers.

Although the concession by the military government had the potential of forcing the army to overthrow the government, it seems that the strategy of the N.R.A. was to lower the morale of the government fighting troops. The folly of the government decision was revealed when the U.N.L.A. refused to fight, thus allowing the N.R.A. easy victory.^{**} It is imperative to indicate that the N.R.A. triumph over the U.N.L.A. in January 1986 was attributable

^{*} During Obote II, Maj. Gen. Maruru (then a Colonel) had been accused of collaborating with the N.R.A. As a result, he had not been promoted on a number of occasions and he was no longer an effective officer. But when Okello got to power, he was promoted and made Army Chief of Staff.

^{**} The N.R.A. had some mercenaries on its side, other than the Rwandese. This was clearly seen at the battle of the Karuma falls when among those killed on the side of the N.R.A. were a few Kenyans and Tanzanians.

more to the policy of "appeasement", lack of morale among the fighting men, disorganization and the collapse of coordinated command, than it was to the strength and resourcefulness of the N.R.A. Peace through negotiation had failed again. National Unity, democracy and national development remained on the constant retreat.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER TWO

- 1 Radio - Voice of Uganda 9/10 & 10/12/1985.
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- 5 The Standard (Nairobi) 27/8/1985, pp. 1,7.
- 6 Voice of Uganda, op. cit., 28/10/1985.
- 7 Ibid., 5/11/1985.
- 8 Daily Nation (Nairobi) 5/11/1985, pp. 1,3.
- 9 The Times (London) 27/11/1985, p. 1.
- 10 The Kenya Times 27/11/1985, pp. 1,4.
- 11 Voice of Uganda op. cit., 25/11/1985.
- 12 Oliver Furley, Uganda's Retreat From Turmoil?
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- 13 Personal interview with David Franklin, London,
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- 14 Personal interview with the Aide of Gen. Tito
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CHAPTER THREE

NATIONAL UNITY

When it seized power in January 1986, the N.R.A./N.R.M.* was confronted with the problem of national unity, a problem which the Museveni regime exacerbated during its military campaign.** As a result of its political and military philosophy, the regime subscribed to the radical tradition in African politics. This is the tradition of declaring unity under a single military organization or single party by administrative fiat.

The regime attempted to legitimize itself by claiming not only a national, but a vanguard status.¹ This self-proclaimed vanguard declared itself the sole legitimate representative of the national interest. It thereby rendered all other political tendencies illegitimate. By this unilateral proclamation, the regime has progressively reduced prospects for national unity.

It is, therefore, imperative to critically examine why against this military and political agenda, the regime

*The N.R.A. and N.R.M. are used interchangeably due to unclear demarcation between the military and political wings.

**The military campaign did not end with the overthrow of Tito Okello; it still continues in the North and East of the country.

formed a "coalition government."* In its short stay of five years in the bush, the N.R.A. military presence extended to no more than half the country and its political hold to even less. As a result, the N.R.A. lacked an organized base in over half of the country (see Appendix E). This fact dictated the necessity for a "coalition government."

In retrospect, it is clear that the formation of a coalition government was not based on political conviction and the need for national unity, but rather for the purpose of political survival. Consequently, the coalition was organized around a distribution of offices. The stress on the distribution of cabinet and other posts² was a direct result of a double failure on the part of the N.R.M. First, it was a failure to articulate a concrete strategy for national unity. Second, it was a failure to make concrete analysis of existing political parties; instead of characterizing them as nothing but "sectarian".³ And furthermore, just as it was erroneous to assume that the existing parties were uniformly "sectarian", so it was wrong to argue that the N.R.M. was uniformly anti-sectarian.

*The N.R.M. formed a coalition government with the D.P., U.P.M. FEDEMU, U.F.M., U.N.R.F., F.U.N.A., a small faction of the U.P.C. and later with the break-away group of the U.P.D.A. Ironically, the N.R.M. was opposed to the presence of the U.N.R.F. and F.U.N.A. in Okello's government during the Nairobi peace talks.

With such a definition of the broad base, (that is, a coalition of opposing "ethnic" groups), the N.R.A. was in no position to counter forces aggravating ethnic conflicts in the country. For these interests organized along sectarian and ethnic lines were the very forces Museveni put at the centre of his regime. And since this centre stage tended to exclude the U.P.C.,⁴ the political party that was the backbone of the Obote regime, it appeared that the ethnic and political forces the regime claimed to represent had been marginalized. Such was the backdrop of the divide on the two sides of the Nile becoming a lively political issue.

To grasp the significance of this issue to the question of national unity, it is important to realise that the divide is also embedded in historical differences. To begin with, these differences can be seen by examining how different parts of Uganda were incorporated into the colonial political economy. The regions west of the Nile (the political "South") were by and large the home of export crop production, whereas the lands to the east of the Nile (the political "North") tended to function much more as labour reserves late into the Colonial period.

As a result, there was also a difference in the character and tempo of class formation in the two regions. Classes -- particularly those sectors of the middle class located in trade, administration and landed property -- were far more developed in "the South" than in "the North". Thus, when the Amin regime expelled Asian proprietors in

1972, the real beneficiaries of the resulting property distribution were by and large from the Southern middle class, even though the Amin regime was considered a "Northern regime". The triumph of "the Southern" middle class seemed complete with the victory of the N.R.A.

So far as ethnicity went, the colonial division of labour was always that "Northerners" controlled the army and the government while "Southerners" were dominant in the civil service and trade.⁵ But now, for the first time, the "Southerners" were dominant in everything. Did the N.R.M. have an alternative for the North?

The military and political agenda of the N.R.A. from the very beginning exacerbated this divide. The Museveni regime transformed the previously manageable, discussible and resolvable internal conflict in the North and East, into civil wars. These wars have progressively brought everything in sight to ashes, driving these areas back to a medieval status. It is, therefore, arguable that the N.R.A. policy strategically created a political vacuum in these areas. This policy cannot be put at the service of national unity.

OPPOSITION TO THE MUSEVENI REGIME.*

THE UGANDA PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC ARMY.

Opposition to the Museveni regime has comprised three major variants. The first are the assortment of groups whose origin is the leadership of the previous regime, particularly those from the armed forces. The best known of these groups is the U.P.D.A. led by a former prime minister, Otema Alimadi.⁶

The U.P.D.A. was formed in early 1986 by a former secretary of Defence, Lt. Col. Wilson Owiny Omoya, and former Minister of Health, Dr. H. Benjamin Obonyo. Its formation occurred after a series of meetings between the two groups led by Lt. Col. Owiny and Dr. Obote in Lusaka.⁷ However, Obote did not give it his full support because most of the commanders of U.P.D.A. were the same people who overthrew the U.P.C. government. It was hoped that by using the name U.P.D.A., the group would mobilize members of the Uganda People's Congress and the Democratic party against the Museveni regime.

But the reasoning of the architects of the group was erroneous. First, it is not the name of a group that mobilizes people, but rather the conviction of the people

* There are other armed groups that are opposed to the Museveni regime; for example, the Uganda People's Army led by Peter Otai and F.E.D.E.M.U. led by Dr. Nsibirwa.

that lead to the formation of an organization. Besides, the overthrow of the U.P.C. government is viewed as a step towards victory by the D.P. As such, the D.P. would be the last group to associate itself with any attempt to bring the U.P.C. back to power.

Second, Lt. Col. Owiny and Dr. Obonyo do not have any political constituency in Uganda. Without the political and military support of Obote, the U.P.C. support that the group hoped to get could not be easily obtained. Although the composition of the U.P.D.A. became almost exclusively Acholi,* Acholiland, like any other part of "the North", is utterly divided along religious and political lines.

In "Northern" Uganda in early 1986, these small cliques that comprise the U.P.D.A. had been so discredited that they failed to evoke any support or sympathy from the peasant population. For a start, in their ignominious retreat from Kampala, they had robbed and plundered these same peasants.⁸ This culture of violence, which had become part of the army, forced the peasants in the area to embrace the N.R.A. But even in the preceding months when the N.R.A. unleashed a reign of terror on the local population in these areas, the U.P.D.A. still failed to translate peasant disillusion with the Museveni regime into support for itself.

* Acholi refer to the people and Acholiland refers to the areas traditionally inhabited by the Acholi.

"Weakened by defections, lacking guns, ammunition or external funds,"⁹ the U.P.D.A. decided to appoint professor Bwangamoi as their new leader.** But this new appointment, which had been initiated by the fighting men, was challenged by the political wing, the U.P.D.M. under Alimadi and Lt. Col. Owiny. As a result, the U.P.D.A. has remained utterly torn apart by power struggle. A vicious leadership contest still haunts the group.

In its political and military campaign against "the Northerners", the N.R.A. clearly indicated to "the Southerners" that their real enemies are the people from the North. Such a campaign escalated the spirit of hatred and revenge among "the Southerners" against "the Northerners". This position can be illustrated by two examples. A Muganda taxi driver said that

They (the Northerners) killed our people for many years and even invited Anyanya from the Sudan to come and help them kill us. I can never forgive them; they should also be killed. Now we₁₀ have defeated them and they will never rule us again.

This position is further illustrated by a statement released by Museveni's press secretary, Hope Kivengere, that

** The political wing the U.P.D.M. had failed to mobilise military and financial support for the military wing. That was what led to the "move" by the U.P.D.A. in the "North".

... the fight between a modern army such as the N.R.A. and a backward group which these elements represent is inevitable, if this society¹¹ is to cleanse itself once and for all of such forces.

It is, therefore, not surprising that "the government troops have been burning villages and detaining or killing civilians in areas where villagers are thought to have given aid to the rebels"¹² (also see Appendix F). In its strategy to cleanse the "country" from these "backward people", the N.R.A. has continued to use absolute brutality, including the alleged use of chemical weapons supplied by Libya.¹³ As a result of the policy of the extermination of "the Northerners", it has been estimated that in its short stay in power, the Museveni regime has massacred hundreds of thousands of innocent people in these areas.¹⁴ Despite the problem of verifying the figures of those killed by the regime, it is clear that the Museveni regime has an agenda that counters every effort towards national reconciliation and national unity.

It is, therefore, important to critically examine why the N.R.A., against its philosophy, signed a peace pact with the splinter group of the U.P.D.A. The signing of the peace pact on June 3, 1988¹⁵ was not based on ideological conviction. As seen above, the Museveni regime did not believe in dialogue with the insurgents.

The most important "moderating factor" in the N.R.A. policy towards the armed insurgencies in the North and East has been the economy. The economy is on its knees; the

regime has failed to improve the living standards of "the Southerners". The wars have "devoured scarce shillings and dollars, damaged even further the country's infrastructure, tied down the N.R.M. and N.R.A.'s most dedicated and politicized cadres, held back the economic recovery, and pushed inflation to over 240 percent."¹⁶ The failure by the regime to improve the economy has transformed the heightened optimism in "the South" to pessimism about the government. The resulting frustration has been a potential threat to the survival of the regime from within its power base in the South. Consequently, the regime had to minimize the impact of the war on the economy and give itself more time to work on the economy.

The I.M.F. prescribed the reduction of money supply as a precondition for aid to the country. Other conditions laid down by the I.M.F. included reconstructing and pruning the civil service; it also meant that the structural adjustment would include reduction in the military expenditures. But since the military is the backbone of the regime, cutting the military expenditures without any form of an accord with the insurgents would have been tantamount to committing suicide. The I.M.F. conditions were further complicated by the demand for security on the side of foreign investors. As a result, the regime had to seek some form of a settlement with the insurgents.

Since the regime had marched to power, it thought that it would not take long to defeat the insurgents militarily.

However, it proved impossible to defeat the insurgents in the North and East. The wars had also become costly to the N.R.A. in terms of human resources. As a result, there were defections to the insurgents and there was growing discontent within the rank and file of the N.R.A. It therefore became crucial for the regime to avoid a major catastrophe within the army.

With the split within the U.P.D.A. over lack of military support from its political wing, the opportune moment had arrived for the N.R.A. to strike a deal with the splinter group of the U.P.D.A. This culminated in the signing of the Peace Accord between the 100 brigade of the U.P.D.A. led by Lt. Col. Angello Okello and the N.R.A. led by Yoweri Museveni. It is important to indicate that such a coalition is too shallow to permit any viable national reconciliation.

THE HOLY SPIRIT MOVEMENT

The opposition group that did succeed where feuding factions from previous regimes failed was of an entirely different type. This was the Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Lakwena.* The H.S.M. is distinguished from other groups by

*"Lakwena" means a messenger - a prophet/a prophetess. For the first time in the history of the country, a woman
(Footnote Continued)

the fact that its leadership came from the fringes of peasant society itself. This was, in other words, a typical peasant movement under a peasant leadership. This fact accounted for both its strength and weakness.

The H.S.M. was organized as a reform movement to cleanse the society from within. Alice Lakwena demanded adherence to a strict code of conduct. Its first major battles were against the U.P.D.A. over who was to lead the peasants of Acholiland. It is important to note that the H.S.M. started its campaign by attacking the undisciplined U.P.D.A., and not the N.R.A. This initial strategy provided the movement with integrity and weapons. It also divided opposition to the Museveni regime.

However, neither this movement nor its leadership gained an understanding of the wider forces that shape the future of peasant society. And like many a peasant movement with predominantly peasant leadership -- such as, the Yakan cults against British Colonialism at the turn of the century in West Nile, the Maji Maji resistance against the Germans a decade later in Southern Tanganyika, the Mau Mau in the 1950s in Kenya, and some of the Simba guerrillas in Zaire in

(Footnote Continued)

led a powerful military and political opposition to the male-dominated state power. No wonder the opposition she led could be simply dismissed by the N.R.M. as being backward.

the 1960s -- it took recourse to "superstition and witchcraft."¹⁷

Popular support for the H.S.M. came from two areas: Acholiland and Teso. In the latter too, the initial conditions for this support were sown by mistakes made by the N.R.A. In the absence of previous political work reflecting an organized political base, the Museveni regime fell back on a "natural" base -- migrants from western Uganda -- thereby deepening instead of healing divisions within Teso society. As these divisions led to recrimination, including "confiscation of cattle by the N.R.A.,"¹⁸ large sectors of the population began to look elsewhere for political guidance and leadership.

Lakwena's temporary success in organizing peasant support is explained by two factors. First, it reflected a vote of no confidence by the peasantry in its conventional leadership. Second, it illustrated the failure of the N.R.A./N.R.M. to arrive at a viable program for the North and East.

During the period of H.S.M.'s active operation, several of the commanders and leaders of the former regimes -- for example, Lt. Col. Kilama or former Minister of Education, Professor Ojok -- joined with Lakwena. This was the result of the failure of members of the previous regimes to rally popular support, in contrast to the success of the H.S.M. in the same endeavour. The joining of forces was in most instances opportunist, as individual commanders or leaders

hoped to join the movement with popular support, and use it later to realise their personal ambitions. From all accounts, every time these individuals tried to assert their independent leadership, they failed.

Lakwena lost not because she was finally outwitted militarily by the N.R.A. but rather due to the fact that she lost political superiority over the N.R.A.* This happened the minute her forces stepped into territory where they had no political support. Without the peasant support behind her, Alice Lakwena's H.S.M. was defeated and disintegration of her forces was a matter of time.

The short active life of the Holy Spirit Movement should really be seen as a failure on the part of the N.R.A. to provide political leadership to the Northern and Eastern peasantry at a time of internal crisis. At that time, for the Museveni regime to regard the manifestation of the internal political problems in Northern and Eastern Uganda and the existence of H.S.M. as nothing but a military challenge was surely a clear sign of political failure. The resulting military "victory" of the N.R.A. must be

* Alice Lakwena was defeated in the battle of Iganga, about 70 miles from Kampala. However, when Alice Lakwena fled to Kenya, Lakwena II came into existence. This time, the H.S.M. was led by Alice Lakwena's father, Okoya. The assumption of the leadership by Okoya, is perhaps in keeping with the tradition of a prophecy being passed over to a member of "the chosen family".

considered a political failure for the policy of constructing "a broad base" on a nation-wide basis.

**UGANDA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT:
ANTI-DICTATORSHIP**

The third type of opposition to the Museveni regime is a group of intellectuals, the U.N.L.F.-A.D., based in London. This group was first organized on the eve of the 1979 Moshi conference, an event that catapulted them straight into the post-Amin regime in Kampala. The U.N.L.F.-A.D. continues to hope for a repetition of the Moshi conference, whereby it may step into yet another political vacuum in Kampala. This group has continued to call for a round table conference, but without luck.

Thus, at the second anniversary, the Museveni regime could claim to have crushed the most significant of the organized military opposition and to have established military control over most of the country.¹⁹ But this military fact including the defeat of the H.S.M., will not solve the political problem in the North and East. Neither can the problem simply be solved by handing out positions and jobs to prominent individuals.

It is important at this stage to draw certain lessons from the political history of Uganda. This experience demonstrates not only the urgent need for national unity, but also the dangers involved in trying to declare this

unity either administratively by decree, or by military "victory". It is clear that all previous attempts to achieve unity in this fashion have failed. Why should a similar attempt succeed under the N.R.A./N.R.M.? By outlawing "Sectarian" organizations, sectarian interest will not disappear. Instead, they will stop organizing openly until they are strong enough to do so. It is always better for a regime to allow its opponents to operate openly rather than underground, in a legal arena rather than in the bush, honestly rather than under camouflage.

There is nothing unusual about a regime calling upon the nation to unite behind it! If that is all that were required to create unity, nowhere in Africa would it be a problem today. The way to unity is not through administrative decree or military "victory", but through arriving at a programme that reflects the interests of the majority, while providing safeguards for the interests of the minority. And it is through organizing the masses to implement that programme. It is important to indicate that the key question is not of pace, of moving fast or slow, of being patient or impatient; the key question relates to direction and method.

But given the failure of the Museveni regime to build a broad base around a principled programme, Uganda will end up building the sort of sectarian broad base that is written into the constitution of Lebanon, where the president must be a Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the

supreme court judge a Shia Muslim. Such a political arrangement does not bring about national unity, and it is often counter-productive to national development.

A one-sided emphasis on unity will lead to an unprincipled reconciliation among forces of the society, whatever the label under which they may operate; a one-sided accent on struggle will lead to a romantic posturing whose outcome can only be suicidal.

Finally, without a definition of democracy that would break out of the narrow, elite controlled political life of Uganda by bringing into the political fold those hitherto unorganized, around a programme that cuts across ethnicity and sectarian moulds that have been conventionally considered natural forms of organizing political activity, it is difficult to see a way out of these crises. On this issue centres the political debate on the question of democracy in today's Uganda.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER THREE

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CHAPTER 4

DEMOCRACY

When the N.R.A. seized power in early 1986, it ushered in what it believed was a new and revolutionary concept of democracy. That type of democracy was supposed to be a participatory, grass roots-popular, as opposed to representative, elitist and parliamentary.¹ Against the conventional practice of democracy which was limited to holding elections at the Summit, the national parliament, the N.R.A. upheld the alternative of organizing every village community into a Resistance Council. The regime created on this base a hierarchy of Resistance Councils. This alternative, it claimed, was far more democratic; it extended democracy from the elite to the mass of working people while allowing them to hold officials accountable all the time.

The institution of the Resistance Councils was born in the course of the guerrilla war. The creation of the R.Cs. was to draw support to counter and survive state repression² (also see Appendix E). The institution of the Resistance Council was arguably an attempt to crack the regime of administrative authoritarianism introduced by the colonial power into village society at the turn of the century. This was the regime which had been created out of the policy of "indirect rule." This institution did not have any check or

balance from countervailing institutions, as for example, clan authority in the older days.

In the village, this regime of dictatorship was symbolized by a peasant facing authority fused in the person of the village chief, who acted as the source of law, its arbiter and its executor, without any significant check or balance. A change of regime brought, at most, a change in the person of the chief, not in the relationship between peasants and the chief. Surely, in such a context, the introduction of a village council and committee that could hold this chief accountable was a noteworthy development.

But the context in which the Resistance Councils were formed no longer obtains. The N.R.A. is no longer a guerrilla army; it is now a state army. The N.R.A. is not part of the opposition; it is the leading element in government. In this new context, new questions have arisen about the role and status of the R.Cs. But these questions can only be answered in the context of a wider question: Which institution is to play a leading role in Ugandan society? Or, to put it differently, what forces must organize and lead the effort to change Ugandan society?

To this question, there is no single answer, not even in the circles of the N.R.A./N.R.M. While discussion on this issue is circumspect and hushed, one can discern at least three different tendencies within the ruling circles. There is a tendency that argues that it is the N.R.M. which will change society.³ To understand why this position is

not widely shared, it is important to grasp the relationship between the N.R.A. and the N.R.M. as it evolved during the guerrilla war. During the bush war, the N.R.A. was not simply a military organization; it was simultaneously a political organ. Its cadres were at the same time military and political. Conversely, the N.R.M. was not a political arm of the N.R.A.; it was really its external wing.⁴ The N.R.M. resembled far more the U.N.L.F. of 1979, a loose coalition of small middle class groups, brought together more often than not by the promise of position and privilege.

That is why the N.R.M. headquarters established in Kampala in 1986 was led by personnel from the N.R.A., and began to work as if it was about to establish a wholly new organization. In this top-down exercise, key emphasis was put on cadre buildings and the key institution created for the purpose was a cadre school.⁵ In the pragmatic, experimental, trial-and-error-method that has become characteristic of the N.R.M.'s style of work, the cadre school has gone through a number of phases in its orientation.

The first question faced by the cadre school was: where to obtain the necessary manpower for cadre building? In the first phase, the doors of the school were thrown open to anybody who appeared to be pro-N.R.A. The result, given the widely held belief that the school was about to train the agents and beneficiaries of the new regime, was that

opportunistic and unemployed elements became the majority of those attracted to it.

In time, this fact became clear and a change of policy ensued. Realizing that the short duration of the guerrilla war had not given it an independent machinery of implementation and that it was forced to rely on a corrupt civil service, the N.R.M. proceeded to draft layer upon layer of state functionaries into the cadre school.⁶ For those who care to draw lessons from history, there was an uncanny resemblance with the cadre school established by the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana.

The important point to bear in mind is that, with this change, the N.R.M. cadre school ceased to be a cadre school except in name. Its purpose was no longer to train political "combatants" for a political struggle; its objective now was more modest, to give a touch of political consciousness to state functionaries. It is imperative to indicate that a cadre school must function as an adjunct to real struggle in life, not as a substitute for it. To function as such, however, a cadre school would have to draw its personnel from the arena of democratic struggle from among workers, peasants, students, and women and not exclusively from state functionaries. Also, these products would have to return to the mass movements to help change the society.

But the N.R.M. is afraid to organize an active body of cadres spread through the various segments of Ugandan

Society. The N.R.M. believes that such an arrangement will simply be turned into one amongst several political parties, a development which will only serve to intensify the internal division of Ugandan society. Thus, instead of welcoming open political competition, it has put a ban on all political party activity.

What is the practical significance of this ban? Those whose aim is to conserve the existing structure of the society have no need to create new ones; that need only exists for those who wish to transform that structure. Kampala and other urban centres are sites of daily religious rallies. In reality, some of these religious rallies are political rallies under another name. That is the contradiction of trying to achieve unity by administratively banning other organizations.

Another tendency argues that fundamental change will be brought to the country by the R.Cs. It is this point of view which has unleashed a debate on the role and status of R.Cs for there is no clear agreement on what this should be. The question, as put in a nutshell by the recently published Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Local Government, is, "Are the R.Cs to be organs of the state or of the N.R.M. or of the people?"⁷

The bureaucratic point of view sees the R.Cs as no more than appendages of the civil service, created to implement government policy more effectively. In other words, the R.Cs are seen as the organ of the State. The "democratic"

point of view holds that the R.Cs could legitimately be the site of healthy debate between points of views that cover the whole range of ideological positions within Ugandan society. The "sectarian" point of view sees the R.Cs as organs of the single political group, the N.R.M.

If the developments of the past years are anything to go by, the bureaucratic point of view would seem to be gaining the upper hand. Of particular significance are two recent measures. The first created a permanent secretary in charge of the R.Cs in the ministry of local government.⁸ In other words, R.Cs, which are supposed to resist civil service excesses, are now put under the control of a civil servant.

The second measure has turned District Administrators into civil servants, eventually to be hired, promoted and fired at the discretion of the public service commission. These measures are mutually reinforcing. At their inception, District Administrators were supposed to be political representatives of the N.R.M. As such, they were supposed to coordinate district R.Cs. Now, the tendency is to turn both the District Administrators and the R.Cs into agents and extensions of the civil service, which the N.R.M. will be expanded.

But the N.R.M. is itself a broad front, and includes under a single organization, a "diversity of views". Furthermore, in the absence of an active and organized core of N.R.M. Cadres committed to building an organization, they

will become a passive mirror reflecting tendencies in the country. In that event, the R.Cs democracy is to be the occasion for extending the ban on parties themselves with the N.R.M. as the sole political organization in the country. Then, the N.R.M. may simply become a camouflage of the best organized party within the broad base; today that party is the D.P. In the final analysis, could Uganda not have a parallel to the Kenya situation, where the old K.A.D.U. today reigns supreme but under the banner of K.A.N.U.?

Perhaps, the last important tendency, at least in the discussion here, is that which sees neither the N.R.M. nor the R.Cs as the institutional leadership of the Museveni regime; instead, it sees this role falling on the shoulders of the army, the N.R.A.⁹ Such a point of view reflects a vote of no confidence in civil society and its institutions; it indicates both a sense of despair about creating new civilian institutions to organize new civilian forces in the interest of transforming society and a failure to do so.

But if the army is to dominate and direct civil society, will the regime not perpetuate the crisis of Ugandan society? In the past, in such a situation, rulers were tempted to deal with opponents militarily and not politically; opposition became synonymous with sabotage, and criticism with treason. As in the past, this policy allowed successive regimes to simply consolidate the official machinery of repression in the name of guarding the national

interest, and thereby further intensified the crisis of civil society.

A serious consideration of Ugandan history would conclude that the salvation of the country lies in the opposite direction; that is, civic society should be strengthened in its influence in the institution. For this to happen, it is necessary to implement a comprehensive programme of democratization, one that goes far beyond the multi-party democracy at the summit. This would mean democratization of the base, by transforming chiefs into civil servants accountable to the "organs of the people" and by introducing forms of work place democracy. It would mean upholding the right of organization, thereby guaranteeing the existence of autonomous mass organizations, independent of the state. Finally, it would mean the freedom of political organization, thereby removing bans on political activity, and calling for open political activity by all parties, including the N.R.M. This is important because the N.R.M. is caught up in a contradiction. On the one hand, it tries to be a home for all tendencies in the society, a home for the "broad base". But on the other hand, it also claims to be a movement that wants to change the same society. In its attempt to move in all directions, the result is paralysis of the regime.

If the N.R.M. wants to live by its promise to bring "fundamental changes" to Ugandan society, it must charter a programme of action and organize to implement such a

programme. It has to stop being a pale reflection of various conflicting points of view. It must develop a coherent and definite political agenda that reflects the needs of the country, rather than being a site for a "broad base".

But if it is to do so, the N.R.M. must allow the same freedom of organization and activity to all those who disagree with its own programme. Thus, if Uganda is to have a political order that is both democratic and progressive, there is no escape from freedom of political organization at this stage in Ugandan history.

This point of view is, however, most unpopular within the ranks of the regime. The emphasis there is far more on a "broad base" than on transformation. This is because of the weakness of the N.R.M. vis-a-vis other political tendencies. Because of this weakness, there is a strong tendency within the N.R.M. today to try and create national unity administratively.

A NEW CONSTITUTION: A MYTH OR A REALITY?

When he seized power in January 1986, Museveni promised that his government would rule the country for a four-year interim period, after which there would be elections under a popularly approved constitution.¹⁰ But for the past three years, very little has been heard about the new constitution, or even the promise of a nationwide

consultation process that was supposed to precede the new constitution.

The failure by the Museveni regime to make any substantial move on the issue of the new constitution aroused suspicion about the intention of the regime. To members of the old political parties, Museveni's early talk about the election and a new constitution was a ploy to buy time, while consolidating his hold on power. In the face of the government's unclear position of the issue, several groups sprang up to discuss and agitate for the promised "constitutional reforms". Most prominent among these groups are the Bataka, the clan elders of Buganda. What the Bataka want is the restoration of the independence constitution.

The federalists want the restoration of the kingdoms under a constitution that will allow each major ethnic group to preserve its distinctive political identity and social traditions. To the federalists, the recognition of ethnic diversities is often the strongest guarantees against ethnic feuding and eventual national disintegration.¹¹

The demands by the federalists have put the Museveni regime in a very precarious situation. When the N.R.A. started its guerrilla war, it was not in "Museveni's tribal area of Ankole," but in Buganda, the heartland of the political traditionalists. This position is made even more delicate by the fact that Museveni had persuaded and used the heir to Buganda's throne to rally support for his guerrilla war. The traditionalists gave in all their

support to the N.R.A., hoping that their monarchy would be restored after the N.R.A. military victory. Museveni is aware of this debt he owes to the traditionalists who fought to bring him to power. It is, therefore, clear that the dilemma the regime faces is the product of its own making.

The recent visit of Prince Mutebi to Uganda sent a clear message to the Museveni regime. He was greeted by thousands of Baganda prostrating themselves in the time honoured fashion of the Baganda greeting of their king. One of the highlights of Mutebi's visit was the opening of the 1988 Buganda inter-clan soccer tournament.¹² The tournament, lasting several months, is the signal for much unbridled Buganda jingoism. Its message is unmistakable; Buganda is alive and kicking and still proud of its heritage and tradition. The tournament was, in a sense, a political campaign camouflaged under a different name. How Museveni handles that potentially explosive issue may well influence the character and life span of the regime.

Although Museveni could probably justify his silence on the constitution on the pretext that there was still a major armed conflict in the North and East, the overriding factor was political survival. Since the regime is still unsure of its political support, postponing such an issue would also mean prolonging the life span of the regime, at least for the moment.

However, the issue at stake is not the drafting of a new constitution per se, but rather the nature of the

constitution and the degree to which regimes will adhere to the same. As far as the N.R.M. is concerned, its view about the new constitution is illustrated by the statement of the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Mr. Njuba:

It is the constituent assembly and the N.R.A. that will have the final say about the kind of constitution Uganda should have, that is how Ugandans should govern themselves... it will be unrealistic to argue on a constitution not endorsed by the N.R.A. [the army-emphasis]. Because this will be a sign of ingratitude to the liberation of Uganda.¹³

From the statement, it is clear that the Museveni regime is prepared to draft a constitution that will defend its position in power. This approach is in keeping with the tradition of drafting constitutions in African politics. The only trouble is that it does not provide for a democratic rule. The statement also puts the N.R.M. claim of bringing "fundamental change and democracy" to the country under rigorous test.

THE N.R.M. ELECTIONS: A SHAKY POLITICAL STRATEGY

The Museveni regime organized elections for the Resistance Councils in February 1989. The elections marked a fairly major tactical success for the Museveni regime. However, the elections also concealed a vacuum in the N.R.M. strategic thinking. According to the regime, this was arguably the first fair elections to be held since

independence.¹⁴ "The N.R.C election was a fulfillment of a promise the N.R.M. made when it came to power."¹⁵ But most Ugandans had assumed that the regime would organize elections after a new constitution. However, it is now clear that the proposed constituent assembly is not likely to meet before 1991, since it was at about the time of the election that Museveni appointed a Constitutional Commission.

Although the N.R.M. argues that the elections were fair, this does not necessarily mean that they were democratic. Judging from the nature of the elections, critics have dismissed it as an attempt to legitimize Museveni's dictatorship and a move towards a one party state. After all, the N.R.C has 68 nominated seats out of a total of 278. Of these, 38 constitute the "original" N.R.C, Museveni's close associates from the days of the bush war, while 10 are from the National Resistance Army. Museveni nominated the remaining 20, which further provided him with a chance to pick his own people.¹⁶

During the elections, only the village R.Cs were directly elected by the people. Subsequent R.Cs, at parish, sub-county, county and district level up to the N.R.C, were elected by an electoral college of those in the levels below. The N.R.M. type of democracy only allowed campaigning for not more than 5 minutes at the district level.

The elections were carried out under the N.R.M., and Museveni did not allow any real campaign because of the

uncertainty about the popularity of his regime. Nevertheless, many candidates' party affiliations were obvious. Unsurprisingly, the D.P., a junior coalition partner, appeared to have consolidated its position in the elections.

THE HIERARCHY OF THE RESISTANCE COMMITTEE

THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE
COUNCIL



THE DISTRICT
RESISTANCE COUNCIL



THE COUNTY
RESISTANCE COUNCIL



THE GOMBULALA
RESISTANCE COUNCIL



THE MULUKA
RESISTANCE COUNCIL



THE VILLAGE
RESISTANCE COUNCIL

SOURCE: The Embassy of the Republic of Uganda, Ottawa, Canada 1989.

If these elections were a deft political manoeuvre, they only serve to underline the lack of long term strategy. The point is that Museveni has not used his tactical advantage to push through policies which might win more durable support for his regime, in the North, East or Buganda. The government simply has no programme other than a vague promise of governing better than its predecessors. This understandably holds little attraction in the conflict-ridden areas of the East and North, where civilians are subject to the horrific abuses from the N.R.A. And even in the South, the government promise is wearing thin.

Memories are short, especially in Kampala. Ominously, the internal security organization and military intelligence (of the N.R.A.) are increasingly adopting the style of Idi Amin's State Research Bureau or Obote's national Security Agency. There are growing reports of torture and deaths in custody. It is, therefore, imperative to indicate that the Museveni regime symbolizes a change of old guards, but not transformation of the Ugandan Society.

The Museveni regime proclaims itself opposed to "sectarianism"--meaning the old parties, ethnic and religious allegiances--to the extent that it introduced a controversial and meaningless law against it in 1988.¹⁷ Yet ironically, ministerial portfolios are assigned on an unerringly sectarian basis, arguably to ensure that all parties, ethnic and religious are represented, not because

of their adherence to a particular political philosophy, but because of who they are.

An important question that remains to be answered is how the country will be run when the new constitution is drafted. In other words, will it be a multi-party or a one party state under the N.R.M.? Will the role of the R.Cs be expanded? As discussed above, all these views find currency within the N.R.M. leadership. But most likely, the present all party-no party coalition will continue. Hence, the likelihood is that any new constitution will look much the same as the present arrangement. In that case, the Museveni regime will cling on to power at any cost. But unfortunately, such a strategy for political survival will not usher in a new era of democratic rule, stability and development. It is, therefore, important to indicate at this juncture that, given the character, the composition, the strategy and the ideology of the Museveni regime, Uganda is slowly but surely moving towards yet another major socioeconomic and political catastrophe; one that is probably unprecedented in the history of the country.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER FOUR

¹ Catharine Watson, "Ending the Rule of the Gun," Africa Report (January - February 1988), pp. 14-17.

² Ten-Point programme of N.R.M. (N.p, N.R.M. publication, 1985), p. 8.

³ "Does Uganda Really Want Democracy?" New African (January 1989), p. 22.

⁴ "First Stage General Elections" Africa Research Bulletin, 15/3/1989, p. 9183B.

⁵ "Interview with Museveni" Africa Report, op. cit., p. 21.

⁶ Personal interview with the permanent Secretary Ministry of Energy, Mr. Opika Opoka (Nairobi), September 1986.

⁷ "Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Local Government." (Kampala, 1988) p. 7.

⁸ The New Vision, 12/2/1988, p. 1.

⁹ "Constitutional Debate has Started on Wrong Note," Weekly Topic (Kampala) 21/12/1988, p. 5.

¹⁰ "Swearing in Ceremony" Radio - Voice of Uganda, 27/1/1986.

¹¹ Personal interviews with the leader of F.E.D.E.M.U., Dr. Nsibirwa, (Nairobi) July 1987.

¹² "Mutebi's Visit" The Citizen (Kampala) 25/7/1988, pp. 1,4.

¹³ "Constitutional Debate has Started on Wrong Note," op. cit., p. 5.

¹⁴ "The Resistance Committee - Elections" Weekly Topic, (Kampala) 15/3/1989, pp. 8-9.

¹⁵ The New Vision (Kampala) 7/2/1989, pp. 1, 8.

¹⁶ Africa Research Bulletin, 15/3/1989, pp. 9183, 9184. For the election guidelines, see The New Vision. February 7, op. cit.

¹⁷ Weekly Topic, (Kampala) 15/12/1988, pp. 1,3.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ECONOMY

The economic history of Uganda is a reflection of the broader history of crises in the country. During the epoch of colonialism, Uganda like other colonies in general, provided the imperial power with markets for goods manufactured and raw materials for industrial production. As a colony, therefore, the country could not produce what it wanted, even if it had the capacity to do so, nor could it trade with other countries other than those identified as "acceptable".* Like most colonial economies, the Ugandan economy was built fundamentally to service external interests and encouraged the dependency of the country on external forces. The introduction and subsequent expansion of coffee, cotton, tobacco, and tea as crops to be exported unprocessed, was a faithful illustration of the colonial economic policy.**

*For similar analysis on colonialism and underdevelopment in Africa, see Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar es Saalam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972), especially chapter III. See also E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa (London: Hernemann, 1923), pp. 35-107.

**Such a policy could not allow for the accumulation and ploughing back of capital into the economy of Uganda. Even where investments were made, they did not promote the development of appropriate technology which would have led to viable development.

After nearly six decades of the entrenchment of dependency, Uganda's economy at the time of independence in 1962 seemed to have visible signs of growth even though the ultimate beneficiary continued to be the metropolis. As was the case throughout the continent, new projects were introduced to expand economic productivity soon after independence. The government embarked on a well defined economic agenda.

The first five year development plan (under Obote I)* led to the creation and expansion of credit schemes, infrastructure and supporting services, the cooperative movements, group farms, tick eradication programmes, and irrigation schemes. These factors led not only to increased production in agricultural** and industrial sectors, but they also led to increased health and social services. Hospitals, dispensaries and clinics were built and primary health care services were initiated and expanded to broaden the horizon of health status in the country. Agricultural colleges, cooperative colleges, and schools were built to support the development strategy.

* Obote I refers to the government led by Dr. Obote from 1962 - 1970, and Obote II refers to the period under Obote's leadership from 1980 - 1985.

** Agriculture is overwhelmingly the most important sector of the economy. It accounts for about 95% of the country's export earnings.

Yet one thing remained a stark reality. Though "Ugandans were now in control," they continued to manage an essentially colonial economy (in a neo-colonial Uganda).^{*} They were operating an economic system which was created to exploit Uganda for the benefit of an external system. As in other sectors of Ugandan society, independence meant an intensification of economic activities that enhanced the inequalities of the colonial system.^{**}

The collapse of Uganda's economy became most demonstrably noticeable during Amin's reign of terror, especially with the "allocation" of businesses to Africans

^{*}For a similar analysis on neo-colonialism and its implications for development in Africa, see Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism the Last Stage of Imperialism. (New York: International Publishers, 1965), p. 4. This thesis recognises the fact that underdevelopment in Uganda, like in other parts of Africa, has internal causes as well. This includes corruption, militarism, ethnicity, nepotism, high population growth and climatic problems (population growth and climatic problems are not significant causes of underdevelopment in Uganda).

^{**}The colonial economic policy divided Ugandan society into different areas: The South became a "cash crop" growing area, Karamoja and Ankole were cattle keeping reserves, the North and part of the West were labour reserves. Each area had to perform the duties designated to it by the colonial system. This system could not aid the quest for national unity, national identity and equitable development in the country. This policy was changed in the 1930s following the influx of refugees from Rwanda into Uganda. The refugees provided cheaper labour in the southern "cash crop" growing areas. Although other areas were soon brought into the cash crop growing economy, nothing substantial was done to provide incentives to those areas which were least developed. The thesis recognizes the fact that climate was also a factor that influenced the colonial policy (see Appendix H).

following the expulsion of the Asians in 1972. The Asians had been beneficiaries in the system that was racially based. Their position in the structure of the economy had also been a hindrance to the emergence of African business entrepreneurship. Certainly, their expulsion from the country in ninety days introduced disequilibria into the economy with consequences which became dramatic by 1977¹ (also see Appendix G).

It would be misleading, however, to attribute the total economic collapse of the 1970s to the mere expulsion of the Asians. Many other factors were involved. The misallocation of businesses that followed the expulsion of the Asians implied no continuity, because those who took over from them were not equal to the task. With the establishment of political terror through the organs of the state and the fleeing of capable manpower to exile, the import/export network started to collapse. Domestic production declined substantially; this led to shortages of commodities, high inflation, corruption, nepotism, and personal greed.

A significant number of factors which had negative impacts on production emerged at this point. These included: the breakdown in credit arrangements, shortage of basic agricultural inputs and late or no payment to farmers for their produce (loss of incentives). A net impact of the crisis inevitably led to substantial decrease in agricultural output of major export commodities.

This period also saw a shift in the structure of production from export crops to food crops. This was the direct result of the government's inability to pay farmers in time, lack of credit facilities and breakdown of supporting infrastructure. In a desperate attempt to reverse the situation, the government introduced its controversial "double production campaign" by which every household was ordered to grow at least an acre of export crop.

A combination of the declining economy and nation-wide killings led to mass exodus of both professionals and ordinary people* out of the country. This greatly undermined the proper functioning of schools, hospitals and the economy. For some people who remained in the country, the informal sector became the life saver, and those with connections in government benefitted from the nation-wide corruption. Instead of investing in productive sectors like agriculture and industry, the regime spent the scarce resources on the military. During this period neither schools nor hospitals were built. With anarchy in the country, foreign investment reached its lowest level. On

*A substantial number of those who fled the country were economic refugees. It was this period that marked the beginning of mass exodus of economic escapees from the country, a trend that still goes on to the present day.

the whole, Uganda's economy became much more dependent and much weaker than at the time the regime seized power.

The war of "liberation" of 1978-79, and the insurgencies of 1981-86, were conducive neither to agricultural production nor investment. During Obote II a lot of emphasis was put on increasing production in agriculture and industry. The reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes were designed to increase outputs. Priority was given to essential items which were considered vital for the revitalization of the economy. Unfortunately, there was no proper planning and even where there were successes in the economy, the guerrilla war, corruption, inefficiency, and high military expenditures neutralized the achievements (see Appendix G).

When the N.R.M. seized power, it was confronted with a demise in economic planning. In its Ten-Point programme, the regime set itself the goal to build an "independent, integrated and self-sustaining national economy"^{2*} (see Appendix E). The economic policies adopted by the government have been predominantly monetary. The first step in this direction was the devaluation and taxation of the previous Ugandan currency and the introduction of a new currency.

*The thesis shares the views expressed in the N.R.M. Ten Point on the problems facing the economy. However, the performance of the regime contradicts the "policy statement".

The move by the government was influenced by three important reasons. First, it was a condition for obtaining aid from the I.M.F. The government's objective was realized as numerous international conferences with donors have since taken place. Second, it was a strategy to control inflation by reducing money supply. Unfortunately, this policy has led to the highest inflation rates in the economic history of the country.

Attempts to control inflation almost exclusively through monetary policies have deprived some vital sector of the economy of the needed resources and incentives. Although a series of devaluations of the currency have taken place and may in the long run force the inflation down, it also has the potential of decreasing outputs. Devaluation has led to a widening gap between wages and inflation. As a result, the N.R.M. claim of "eliminating corruption"*³ is a futile exercise. Third, devaluation was also aimed at increasing exports. This has not been successful because the bottlenecks have not been overcome and output has not been encouraged.

The N.R.M. made a series of barter trade arrangements with a number of developing countries (south - south

*Corruption cannot be eliminated by administrative measures. It is the economy that can determine the level of corruption. Since those with fixed income cannot survive on their earnings, they are forced to resort to "illegal" means to make ends meet.

developmental strategy) in the hope that it would avoid the problem associated with the scarcity of foreign exchange and international trade. This approach to development has failed due to lack of proper economic planning and the war which has ravaged agriculture in the North and East of the country.*

Since the Museveni regime has continued to rely heavily on the I.M.F. prescriptions for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the economy, it is important to analyse the implication of such a policy on the government's goal to "build an independent, integrated and self-sustaining national economy," and the future of the country's quest for economic development, national unity and democracy.

THE I.M.F. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: THE DILEMMA OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Perhaps the most controversial "member of the N.R.M.'s broad base is the I.M.F." Yet, there is a suffocating climate of celebration that marks all discussion of the I.M.F. programme in Uganda. It is necessary to first summarize the point of view of the I.M.F. The I.M.F.'s

*The North and East dominate in the production of some of the items for barter trade: maize, cotton, simsim and tobacco (see appendix H - Map 2).

analysis of the economic crisis in Africa can be summarized in three simple statements.

First, the I.M.F. argues that its analysis has a pragmatic, and not an academic bias. From a practical point of view, it is vital to underline the internal source of the problem.⁴ This does not mean that the crisis in Africa has no external causes. The I.M.F. accepts the reality of external causes; but it argues that these are beyond the control of the individual governments and therefore belong to the writings of academics, not policy makers.

Second, in the short run, the crisis is really budgetary. It is a failure at good housekeeping. Thus government expenditures have exceeded revenues; the demand for foreign exchange has outstripped its supply. The solution in the short run is to cut demand drastically, by a sharp cut in incomes, through a freeze on wages, and by a cut in social programmes and subsidies. This sort of short run demand is what the I.M.F. calls "the shock".

Third, the problem in the long or medium run, argues the I.M.F., is that of increasing production; in other words, it is a problem of increasing supply. How can this be done? By a transfer of resources from those classes which tend to consume to those classes which have a tendency to invest, from the majority of workers, peasants and civil servants to the minority of entrepreneurs, from the working majority to the propertied minority -- who are believed will provide the engine for economic growth.

This transfer of resources can be accomplished by a set of what the I.M.F. calls "conditionalities". Of these, three* are central in this: devaluation, the squeeze of bank credits to the state and its expansion to the private sector, and liberalization of trade, particularly of imports--what is called Open General Licence (OGL). This is what the I.M.F. calls "freeing the market".

In contrast to the I.M.F. point of view, this thesis will try to establish the following: first, that in the Ugandan case at least, the I.M.F. is wrong about the source of the crisis, both the short run budgetary crisis and the long run crisis of productivity. Second, that the concessions made by the N.R.M. government are marginal. The real significance of the I.M.F. programme lies in its policy

*The country has also been so preoccupied with the question of devaluation and so sharply divided as to its intrinsic significance, that it is vital to grasp that, in itself, devaluation is neither good nor bad. Its significance depends on its overall context. It is important to remember that a devaluation is not only an external adjustment in the value of currencies. A devaluation is also an internal shift when accompanied by liberalization. In the case of Uganda, unless the government combines a devaluation with a corresponding increase in fixed incomes, every devaluation has so far turned into a redistribution of resources internally, from those with fixed income (workers and civil servants) to those who are able to increase the price of what they sell, the "Mafutamingi" (the rich) minority.

The position of the "Mafutamingi" is further strengthened by the I.M.F. "conditionality" which demands that banks restrict credit to the state and expand it to the private sphere that social savings in financial institutions also be put at the disposal of the "Mafutamingi".

orientation, summed up by the "conditionalities" (devaluation, credit restriction, trade liberalization). The "conditionalities" of the I.M.F. have not altered one bit in the Ugandan case. The only difference is that they are phased. This is particularly the case with OGL, which was unleashed at once in the first I.M.F. programme under Obote II, but it is now being introduced in phases. The poison, in other words, is being administered gradually.

Third, an attempt will be made to establish that when fully implemented, the tendency of the I.M.F. programme will be to undermine any attempt to create an independent, integrated and self-sustaining economy (an objective claimed by the N.R.M. in its Ten Points), and undercut the momentum towards democratization in Ugandan society. It will in fact, consolidate those forces unleashed by the Amin and Obote II dictatorships. For these reasons, it is vital for democratic forces to begin to think of an alternative strategy, and to do so in a public and democratic way. It is important to begin with a discussion of the "conditionalities".

OPEN GENERAL LICENCE (OGL)

The transfer of resources to "Mafutamingi"* is then followed by a third "conditionality". Its purpose is to give the "Mafutamingi" group the right to use these resources to import what it finds profitable, regardless of its consequences to society. Why does the I.M.F. want this? Out of malice? No, it genuinely believes that this is for the good of the country, at least in the long run. The I.M.F. believes that this class will invest the money, increase output, thus increasing employment and eventually incomes to everybody.⁷

To increase the income of the masses in the long run, the I.M.F. argues that the government must decrease its (income) in the short run! This is what it calls the "bitter pills"! Is this true? If one takes into account the experience of the first I.M.F. programme in the country, it is not true. In its first programme, the I.M.F. introduced OGL alongside an auctioning system for foreign exchange.⁸ It is important to examine the results.

The figures of 1983/84 of the foreign exchange auctioned to the "Mafutamingi" indicate that nearly 20% was used to import luxury items. Another 25% was used to import

*Mafutamingi is a Swahili word which refers to the rich.

mass consumption goods (textiles, soap, cigarettes) for which there was idle production capacity in local factories.⁹ Contrary to the I.M.F. assumption, the "Mafutamingi" group has a high tendency to consume luxuries. And even when it invests, the structure of the Ugandan Market is such that the most profitable investments are to be found in trade in unproductive ventures.

This is clear even from looking at what has been going on under the second I.M.F. programme. Most private investment is either going into trade, into private luxury housing or into the entertainment "industry", such as hotels and discos. There is a larger point here which is worth considering with more seriousness. Many people think that all the country needs is money, foreign aid. Some scholars in Uganda think that England^{*} industrialized because it plundered the wealth of the colonies.

This is part of the story, but not the whole of it, not even money the most important of it. If money (whether from the colonies or from wherever) is what explains industrialization, then why did England industrialize but not Portugal? Portugal had colonies as England did, and from its Latin American colonies, it (Portugal) looted fabulous wealth. But that wealth was squandered in luxuries

^{*}The example of England's industrialization is appropriate because of the historical link between the two countries.

by the dominant classes of Portugal--landlords and merchants--instead of being invested in production.

In fact, that wealth found its way to England whose products the Portuguese merchants and landlords imported, and in turn assisted in industrializing England. It is important to grasp one key issue. Money is not necessarily capital. If consumed or squandered, it is not capital. If invested in luxury or other activities without a significant linkage to the local market, its positive significance is not for the local economy, but for the economy with which it has significant linkages.

The real secret of England industrialization, from which an important lesson can be learnt, was the internal character of English society. One major reason why England could industrialize, but wealthier empires in history could not, was that unproductive classes lost out to productive groups who took control over the use of social resources, who could transform money into productive capital. That is why Ugandans should ask themselves: what is the nature of the "Mafutamingi" to whom the I.M.F. wants the country to "hand over" control over resources in society?

The government's argument, on the other hand, is that the second I.M.F. programme is different from the first one. This time there has been no introduction of an open OGL. This time the OGL is restricted.¹⁰ In other words, this time, the "Mafutamingi" do not have total freedom to import

whatever they want to. They have to respect the list of government priorities. What are these priorities?

CONCESSIONS

The main concession made by the I.M.F. to the Museveni regime is to allow for phased introduction of OGL. Currently, the OGL is restricted to industrial imports, and these imports are further prioritized for those industries producing basic consumer goods and construction materials. This is all fine, except that most industrial plants in the country that would fall under these headings are extremely import dependent. They have little connection with any local raw materials base; they should in reality be considered extensions of foreign economies merely located on Ugandan soil.

Their operation and expansion stimulate external economies, while they are essentially parasitical on Ugandan agriculture, but without contributing any dynamism to the growth of the same agriculture. Here are examples of these industries, beginning with a few that produce "construction materials". Uganda Baati produces iron sheets for roofing materials. This firm simply cuts imported coils of metal sheet, coats them with imported zinc, and brands them "made in Uganda" using an imported stamp!

A very interesting example is that of Uganda Clays in Kajansi (located between Kampala and Entebbe). These are

actually two plants, one set up in the colonial period and the other in 1969. The older plant uses local clay from Kajansi, Mukono and Gomba. The other one is heavily dependent on imported glaze from Italy and a borax oxide from Britain. Even the bricks made there are European type. They are made hollow for the European winter. In Uganda weather, these cause discomfort, besides the fact that they cannot be joined using local materials.

What about some examples of industries producing "basic consumer goods"? Begin with TUMPECTO which produces mugs, buckets, trays, and basins. It simply imports these in shapes, dips them in imported chemical solutions, and dries them for sale locally. Vitafoam is another such industry, which has just set up yet another plant. This industry mixes imported chemicals with Ugandan water to form mattress block, which it then cuts into various mattress sizes for sale. Perhaps the worst example is the Dairy Corporation which produces milk in a country with higher cattle to human ratio than exists in most European states. It takes import dependence to truly absurd levels.

This plant mixes imported milk powder with local water, pours the result into imported packing materials and carries these in imported plastic crates. So "patriotic" are the packing machines they use, that the Swedish machines will only accept Swedish "Tetrapak" and the French ones will only

pack in French cellophane sachets.* The point is that the N.R.M. government's Rehabilitation and Development Plan is taken straight out of a text book. It shows no real understanding of the nature of Ugandan industries, of their heavy import dependence, and thus of the need to restructure them.

As a result, the Plan lacks any concrete and relevant industrial strategy. This is why the temporary concessions made by the I.M.F. to the Museveni regime, of an OGL temporarily restricted to industrial imports, is being wasted and will come to nought. Meanwhile, the country will soon be moving to an open OGL. As it does this, control over the economy and the direction of its development will slip fully into the hands of the "Mafutamingi" locally and donors externally.

DEPENDENCE

In spite of all the talk of "freeing the market," the I.M.F. programme is actually destroying the local market. Any programme which destroys the purchasing power of the local population cannot but lead to a shrinking of local

* For similar analysis on how industries are heavily dependent on imported inputs and technology, see Jan Jelmert Jorgensen Uganda A Modern History. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981, p. 21.

markets. It is important to remember that the tragedy of Africa is that its internal markets are restricted not simply by size of population and of countries. A far more important restriction on its markets is the fact that its working population lives in squalid poverty, and represents no effective purchasing power. Internal markets in Africa are restricted to markets for luxury goods for the minority "Mafutamingi" groups.

This is how matters were in Europe some five centuries ago, roughly at the start of the slave trade. One of Europe's major achievements over that period has been to create markets for mass consumption. The point is that there are no pre-existing markets simply waiting to be "freed"; the real need of the hour is not to "free" markets, but rather to create a mass consumption market. Instead of contributing to that need, the I.M.F. programme is busy undermining even the embryonic beginnings of such markets.

The significance of this development will be enormous, not only for the economy, but also for Uganda's politics. It is worth looking at this briefly. It is important to understand this to realise why the I.M.F. programmes everywhere have a tendency to lead to increased regional and social tensions. Those concerned about regional (and therefore nationality) tensions in Uganda this century, wonder how to create a single country (unity).

It is important to know that the task of creating one country also involves creating one economy, an "integrated"

economy. In a country where every region is increasingly integrated with some foreign country, instead of with another region -- one producing and exporting coffee, another tobacco, a third something else -- no matter how much one preaches to the people about the need for thinking as one country, the real relations between regions will not be of inter-dependence, but of competition.

The irony is that the more such an economy develops, the more regions tend to draw apart. This is also the case with social groups in such an economy. In England, workers are not simply the producers of wealth; they also represent an important market for capitalists producing mass consumption goods. If a government reduces the wages of workers significantly, it will also have a negative effect on capitalists whose products these workers purchase for consumption.

But for the "Mafutamingi" of Uganda, peasants are only a source of exportable wealth and food; peasants are not a market for what these "Mafutamingi" sell. This will be even more the case with the I.M.F. programme, as consumption of the masses is not being subsidized. This type of programme will actually create two countries in one, a sort of informal "apartheid".

The economy is not only becoming less integrated, but it is also increasingly losing the little independence it has. Before the first I.M.F. programme began in 1980, Uganda's debt/service ration - was 18.9%. After the first

programme in 1985, that ratio had jumped to 55%.¹¹ With the start of the second programme in 1988, it was almost 60%.¹² In other words, 60% of Uganda's export earnings were needed simply to service the country's debt. The government lives on borrowed money, while local savings are being transferred to the "Mafutamingi".

In what direction is Uganda developing with such a policy? Is the country moving in the direction of countries like the Sudan, Zambia and Mozambique, whose debt/service ratio is today greater than 100%? Those countries are compelled perpetually to request a rescheduling of debt in return for both accepting the policy of "conditionality" from donors and agreeing to pay a higher interest rate on rescheduled debt. This is not a way of solving debt problems today by transferring it to the next day. These nations act like alcoholics who take yet another drink to have stable hands for the next few hours.

It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the current economic policy of the Museveni regime will neither lead to the achievement of its proclaimed goal of "building an independent, integrated and self-sustaining national economy," nor will it lead to unity and democracy in the country. Democracy is not just political; it is also cultural and economic. The argument in this chapter is that in the economy, the need of the hour is large scale institutional changes and for major democratic transformation that will give peasants security of tenure

and control over cooperatives. The country cannot be tossed from the fire of state corruption to the frying pan of private speculation. That is why any conception of privatisation (such as that of the I.M.F.) which leaves out of consideration the interests of the vast majority in the society has to be resisted.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER FIVE

¹ Kabwegyere T.B., "The Asian Questions in Uganda 1894-1972," Kenya Historical Review, 1974, p. 2.

² Ten-Point Programme of N.R.M. (N.p.: N.R.M. Publication, 1985, p. 16.

³ Ibid., p. 28.

⁴ Kamutu E., "The I.M.F. and the Reconstruction of the Economy" Public Lecture, Makerere University, 25 March, 1983.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ "Profile: Uganda" The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1987/88, p. 8.

⁷ Financial Times, op. cit., 3/4/1989, pp. 1,4.

⁸ Personal interview with the Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office, Mrs. Betty Bigombe, Halifax, November 1988.

⁹ "Uganda's Economy" The Bank of Uganda, Entebbe: Government Printer, 1987, p. 10.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 12.

CONCLUSION

It has been established in the foregoing analysis that the contemporary crises in Uganda have their roots in the history of colonialism. The British Colonial policies and tactics by which Uganda was assembled from a collection of diverse tribes inhibited the development of national identity by stimulating "parochial tribal identity." The perpetration of the feeling of a separate existence for and in each tribal group by the imperial power, increased suspicion and tensions among the peoples of Uganda. As a result, tribal* coalitions and counter-coalitions were formed; unfortunately, such coalitions could not be put at the service of national unity.

Colonialism with its policies of oppression and exploitation is no bedmate of democracy. It was therefore not by accident that the colonial regime did not sow any seed of democratic rule in the country; instead it introduced an alien political system which did not address the fundamental questions of the accountability of the

*Tribal and ethnic groups are used interchangeably. Tribalism or ethnicity remain important forms of identity and provides each group with some form of "security", especially since the political systems have failed to meet such needs. Debates are still hot as to whether co-operative ethnicity should be revisited as a form of national identity and security.

rulers to the ruled, and the governability of the ruled through a democratic system that could provide for the uniqueness of the local needs.

As colonialism was paving the way for neo-colonialism, the British imperial power with its contradictory principles and tendencies directed the drafting of the independence constitution which was based on federalism, semi-federalism and a unitary system of government. Yet all these were supposed to operate under the same basic law. The constitutional asymmetry of such a political system, instead increased conflicts and tensions. These conflicts reached their logical conclusion with the collapse of the U.P.C./K.Y. alliance.

Obote's misuse of military and state power to silence his political opponents, his subsequent abrogation of the independence constitution, and his creation of a personal constitution, paved the way for authoritarianism and anarchy in the country. As the regime alienated itself from the mass of the population and the civil-military relation worsened, Obote's "Move to the Left" threw his regime into the hands of aggrieved parties, internal and external. Consequently, the power struggle led to the 1971 military coup.

Idi Amin's era of terror and militarization of the civil society led to unprecedented abuse of human rights and the demise of the economy. As Amin's diplomacy of "divide and rule" ground to a complete halt, his regime was

overthrown by the Tanzanian People's Defence Forces and Ugandan exiles. Amin's era left the legacies of terror, corruption, nepotism, moral decay, revenge, and economic stagnation which still haunt the country to the present day.

The U.N.L.F. coalition that took over the reign of power from Idi Amin, neither spoke with one voice nor did it have a coherent policy that reflected the needs of the nation as a whole. As the struggle for personal leadership intensified within the coalition, anarchy engulfed the nation. With the collapse of the U.N.L.F., the brief period of comparative tranquility retreated from the nation. Like its political wing, the U.N.L.A., which was supposed to restore security in the country, did not have the interest of the nation at heart. The U.N.L.A. was itself a coalition of personal armies that merely claimed national baptism by calling itself a national army. In a nutshell, neither the U.N.L.F. nor the U.N.L.A. brought about a fundamental and positive change to the country.

The U.P.C./U.N.L.A. "alliance" that brought Obote to power following the 1980 elections presented a formidable obstacle to national unity and the practice of democracy. The Obote regime relied heavily on the support of the military such that with the split in the army, the regime could not survive for long. During its stay in power, the Obote regime carried out brutal military campaigns against the armed insurgents. Such campaigns did not leave any door open for national reconciliation.

After the collapse of Obote's government in July 1985, the military junta that took over could not fill the power vacuum left behind. The military government led by Gen. Tito Okello Lutwa pursued a policy of "appeasement". This policy was an attempt to resolve the conflicts in the country through negotiation. Paradoxically, the policy led to more anarchy and the way was paved for Museveni to seize power. The policy failed basically due to the lack of clear political direction the Okello regime pursued, and also due to the vaulting ambition for power by Museveni that made every possible peaceful alternative unworkable. Kenya and Tanzania also played a crucial role in the collapse of the Nairobi Peace Agreement.

When the Museveni regime seized power, it attempted to legitimize itself by claiming a national vanguard status; thus it declared all political tendencies illegitimate. This unilateral proclamation has progressively reduced prospects for national reconciliation and unity in the country. It is clear that the formation of the "coalition government" was not based on shared political conviction and the need for national unity and development, but it was rather dictated by the need for political survival of the regime.

The rise of armed insurgents to the Museveni regime was the outcome of the N.R.M./N.R.A. policy of subordination of the North and East by military might. The current insurgencies are the direct product of the policy the N.R.A.

has pursued since the days of military campaigns when it was still an opposition armed group to the Obote and Okello regimes. The Museveni regime has continued to pursue a policy of turning the South and West against the North and East. Such a policy is a clear testimony to the political failure of the regime to bring about a meaningful change in the country. What the East and North need is a political compromise that can be arrived at through honest negotiation and reconciliation. The way to unity is not through administrative decree or "military victory" but by arriving at a programme that reflects the "interests" of the majority, while providing safeguards for the "interests" of the minority. The major problem facing the Museveni regime is not that of pace, but that of direction and method.

The Museveni regime argues that the creation of the Resistance Council is a new and revolutionary alternative for the country. However, evidence suggests unequivocally that this "new concept of democracy" has become the occasion for extending the ban on other parties with the N.R.M. as the sole political organization in the country. The N.R.M. type of democracy was clearly seen by the nature of the undemocratic elections it organized in February 1989 and the ambiguity surrounding the debates on the "new constitution".

If the N.R.M. wants to live by its "promise" to bring about "fundamental changes" to Ugandan society, it must uphold the right of organization, by guaranteeing the existence of autonomous mass organizations independent of

the state. The regime must allow for the freedom of political organization, by removing bans on political activity, and must call for open political activity by all parties, including the N.R.M.

On the economy, the development of the underdevelopment of the country is the result of the colonial policy of dependency, subsequent post-independent decades of political anarchy, nepotism, mismanagement, corruption, and massive expenditure on the military. The current economic policy of the Museveni regime is cosmetic and cannot revitalize the stagnating economy. With the concessions the regime has made to the I.M.F. "conditionalities", the control over the economy and the direction of its development will slip fully into the hands of the "Mafutamingi" locally and donors externally.

It is important to bear in mind that the task of creating one country also involves creating one economy, an integrated economy. But given the current situation whereby almost every region in the country is increasingly integrated with another foreign country, instead of with another region in the country, unity and equitable development can not be realized.

It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the current policies of the regime will neither lead to the achievement of its proclaimed goals of "building an independent, integrated and self-sustaining national economy" nor will they lead to unity and democracy. Democracy is not just

political; it is also sociocultural and economic. It is imperative to conclude on the note that the Museveni regime has not ushered in a new era that will transform the Ugandan society and bring about national unity, democracy, socioeconomic development, and tranquility.

APPENDIX A

Ever since the 1900 Agreement, which had parceled out both land and the position of chiefship on the basis of religion, the chiefs in Buganda had been predominantly Protestant and the population predominantly Catholic. Catholics were barred from holding the post of prime minister and treasurer, and were allowed only eight county chiefs as opposed to ten for the Protestants. Likewise, in the Southern Kingdoms the Protestants predominated, as the table shows:

CHIEFS BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS

KINGDOM	RELIGION	PERCENT OF COUNTY CHIEFS	PERCENT OF SUB-COUNTY CHIEFS	PERCENT OF PARISH CHIEFS
Ankole	Protestant	87.5	86.0	77.4
	Catholic	12.5	14.0	22.6
Toro	Protestant	85.9	87.0	66.5
	Catholic	14.3	13.0	33.6
Bunyoro	Protestant	100.0	88.0	63.4
	Catholic	0.	12.0	36.6

Source: Audrey Richards, ed. East African Chiefs, pp. 143, 171.

APPENDIX B

PROPOSALS FOR NATIONAL SERVICE*

These Proposals are published for public discussion and, subject to views expressed by the public and accepted by Government, legislation establishing the National Service will be based on these proposals.

OBJECTIVES

1. The basic objective of the National Service will be to mobilize all able-bodied persons to develop a real sense

*The proposals were aimed at (1) creating a sense of national identity by promoting interactions among ethnic groups through national service. (2) To fully utilize the human resources by training youth the necessary skills in agriculture, etc. (3) To promote the spirit of "African Socialism" and self reliance.

The proposals were exhaustively discussed at the university, colleges, parliament, party meetings, and community levels. The proposals were generally popular. However, the D.P. described them as an attempt to create communism in the country (it is not easy to understand what communism was according to the D.P.). Idi Amin claimed that it was one of the reasons why he overthrew the Obote regime. (See Appendix C - No. 5)

To the international monopolies with vested economic interest in Uganda and Kenya, these proposals were closely associated with the Arusha Declaration of 1967. This Declaration led to the nationalization of industries and factories and state control over export and import in Tanzania. Consequently, the above proposals were not popular to the international monopolies. Although opinions differ as to the role the proposals played in the 1971 coup, there is consensus among scholars of Uganda political history that they (proposals) were a factor that led to the overthrow of Obote I.

of individual and collective responsibility to society, within the overall national goal of "One Country -- One People".

2. For those citizens who have had little or no education/training (professional or technical), the Service will aim at providing expanded opportunities, developing their potentialities and enabling them to acquire skills.

3. The Service will further aim at the promotion of an intercourse amongst all the people of Uganda and provision of facilities for people of different backgrounds to participate in national and community projects, thereby affording to all participants in such projects opportunities to know more and more about Uganda and her people, and to develop new values and attitudes towards the Nation.

4. Since the majority of citizens of Uganda live in rural areas where the standard of living is low and amenities are few, it will be the principal concern of the National Service to encourage and promote new patterns of rural life that are compatible with modern requirements and standards. It is for this reason that it is proposed that the National Service should not be based on training in arms of war, but in arms for the sustained development of the economy, the raising of the standard of living, and the inculcation of national unity, integrity and a spirit of dedicated service to the Nation.

5. The following are, in a summary form, some of the specific goals proposed for the National Service: --

(a) To produce economic returns for individual citizens and in turn create wealth for the country, using, in the main, the efforts of the people.

(b) To improve the standard of living in the rural areas so as to make rural Uganda attractive for both young and adult to live in.

(c) To eradicate factional feelings and loyalties, and to consolidate National unity through creative participation of the people in the task of nation-building.

(d) To promote African Revolution, Culture and Aspirations.

(e) To provide facilities and opportunities for those who participate in the National Service to acquire new skills and new attitudes which will enable them to make a greater contribution to their well-being and to society as a whole than would have been possible without the National Service.

(f) To ensure that the country's manpower and other resources are usefully, equitably and rationally utilised, and to reduce the incidence of under-employment and unemployment, particularly of school-leavers, and to bring the benefits of our Independence, particularly to the rural population and urban workers.

(g) To bring home to the whole country that problems which face the country, be they economic, social or

political, can best be solved by the people themselves being involved in common endeavour and sharing the experiences of one another, and by bringing about material conditions within our society for the solution of any such problems; and further, by realising that it is the duty and obligation of every individual or group of persons to work towards the goal of self-reliance in solving problems which may face the country.

(h) To bring about the realisation that as a people our national and collective bounden duty to our Republic is to be vigilant all the time, to safeguard our sovereignty through dedicated service and to make this Republic a happier, safer, better and more prosperous country for all.

(i) To give training, particularly to the youth, so as to prepare them and enable them to prepare themselves for the life they will lead when they grow up and shoulder the responsibilities of governing themselves and to provide for their well-being.

ORGANISATION

6. The Ministry of National Service shall be responsible for policy, administration, training, and maintenance of National Service institutions and registers. Since other Ministries will be involved in the many activities and projects to be undertaken under the umbrella of the

National Service, the Ministry of National Service will be responsible for the co-ordination of such involvement, activities and projects. The main work of the Ministry will not be in the offices but in the field.

7. Medical Boards will be appointed as and where necessary to determine whether a person called up for National Service is medically fit to do the service.

TRAINING CAMPS/CENTRES

8. It is proposed to establish National Training Camps/Centres at Regional, Parliamentary Constituency and Sub-County levels. It is further proposed that these Camps should be self-sufficient, at least in food, after the initial period which should not be longer than two years.

(1) NATIONAL TRAINING CAMPS AT REGIONAL LEVEL.

It is proposed to establish initially four National Training Camps, one in each of the four Regions. The following sites have been suggested:

Buganda Region. -- Kyankwanzi area west of River Mayanja and south of Kafu River, in Ssinga County, Mubende District.

Eastern Region. -- Kitumba area in both Sabadu and Mumyuka in Bukoli County, Busoga District.

Northern Region. -- West of Alero, the area between Aswa and Deng-Denga Rivers in Anaka, Kilak County, Acholi District.

Western Region. -- River Ruimi area south of the areas occupied by Prison Farm, Group Farming and Refugee areas to Lake Kabaleka on the eastern side of Kasese-Fort Portal road in Bunyangabu County, Toro District.

9. It is proposed that these Camps should collectively, and as far as possible individually, be a "miniature Uganda" in that all the agricultural, animal husbandry and related activities, together with cultural activities, which may be found in any part of Uganda, may also be found there. They will be centres in which basic training in increased production, national consciousness and the promotion and advancement of African culture will be undertaken. It is further proposed that those called up to do their National Service in each of these Camps should come from all parts of Uganda, and arrangements will be made particularly for those engaged in crop production and mixed farming, to advance their knowledge in their occupations during their service in these Camps. Any person, irrespective of educational standard, may be called up to do National Service in any of these Camps. It is therefore proposed that these Camps should be large enough to cater for mixed farming, playing grounds, accommodation,

lecture facilities and technical workshops. In the selection of these areas particular attention will be paid to the availability of water, good farming land and easy access.

10. It is proposed that these Camps be primarily but not exclusively for adults. The youth of various categories may do their National Service in these Camps both in company with the adults or exclusively on their own. All persons called up to serve in these centres or at any one of them will participate in agriculture, animal husbandry and related activities irrespective of their professions or occupations, as well as attend courses on national consciousness and promotion and advancement of culture.

11. Lectures and demonstration activities will be conducted in English and appropriate vernacular languages. In addition some African languages (Swahili, Luganda and Lingala) will be taught.

12. Each camp will be constructed in such a manner as to have a Women's Wing and a Men's Wing, and special subjects in domestic science and child care will be conducted for women.

13. It is further proposed to provide facilities for worship at these Camps.

14. The lecturers and staff required for demonstration purposes will be drawn from persons called up for National Service and having relevant knowledge in their

various fields for the type of courses conducted. These people will also undergo a course in National consciousness and advancement of culture.

15. Any person doing his National Service in any of these Camps irrespective of his status in Uganda and irrespective of whether or not he is a lecturer, demonstrator or trainee, will be provided with the same accommodation and will be living, eating, working and playing together and subject to the same regulations and treatment.

16. No Person will do the whole of his National Service in any or all of these Camps.

(ii) CONSTITUENCY TRAINING CENTRES.

17. It is proposed to establish in each of the rural Parliamentary Constituencies, Training Centres for--

(a) primary 7 leavers who do not go for further education/training in post-Primary institutions;

(b) youths between the ages of 14 and 21 years not falling in category (a) above, but who have previously attended school and reached P.6 or P.7 and are not married at the time of call up.

The objectives of the Constituency Training Centres will include training the youth in this category for a living, cultivation of national consciousness in them, and encouraging them to promote and advance African culture. After training, it is proposed that in the case of those of them who so wish, the Ministry will be responsible for assisting them to settle in open areas and in viable communities. As in the case of the National Camps, it is proposed that Constituency Training Centres should be fairly large, accessible, have good farming land and be near a permanent source of water.

18. The young people to be catered for in this category already know how to read and write and have a working knowledge of English, but have had no opportunity to proceed further with their education, and have hitherto settled in rural areas or urban centres in an aimless

manner; yet by virtue of their age and potential they constitute a most important element in nation-building.

19. It is therefore proposed that this most important element of our society be enabled to undergo a further course of training advanced on a broad basis covering academic subjects, considerable technical education, art in various forms, some African languages (particularly Swahili, Luganda and Lingala); games of various kinds and training in leadership.

20. In the case of the P.7 leavers who are immediately called up for National Service it is proposed, on grounds of convenience, transport included, that they be admitted in the Constituency Training Centre of the Constituency of their homes, or the nearest centre to their homes in the neighbouring Constituency, for a four-year course of training.

21. It is proposed that as part of the course each student accepted for a full course at the Constituency Training Centres should own a plot of land and benefit from the proceeds of that plot, and further, that any such student who takes an interest in any technical subject any other form of hand-work, or any cultural activity should benefit financially from any such work or activity.

22. It is further proposed that P.7 leavers undertaking a four-year course in the Constituency Training Centres who show promise to benefit from further education, be selected, subject to the number of places available in

the post-Primary Boarding institutions, to spend at least two months in such institutions every year. It is recommended that at the end of each first term in the post-Primary institutions, trainees in the Constituency Training Centres join the post-Primary institutions for two months, and that students in such institutions join the Constituency Training Centres for the same period. This exchange will not take account of geographical areas of birth of the youths concerned.

23. At the end of the full course it is proposed that students who show promise to gain by higher and further training should be found places in the appropriate institutions and that the rest should be settled, not necessarily on the basis of the constituency or District in which they were born but also on a Uganda-wide basis.

24. As regards the youth in paragraph 17 (b) above, it is proposed that they be given an opportunity to undergo training and acquire skills at the Constituency Training Centres. Because of their age, however, it is proposed that their courses should be different from those of the P.7 leavers who join the Centres direct from school. Their courses should take two full years, spread over four terms of six months each per year. When not undergoing the course of training they will be required to return to their homes and work under the supervision and guidance of the National Service for the same period.

25. As regards teachers, it is proposed that trained teachers be appointed as Headmasters at these Constituency Training Centres, and that the bulk of the teachers should be students at the University, post-Secondary institutions and the higher levels of post-Primary institutions.

26. It will be observed that although Constituency Training Centres will be run within the policy of the service, the above proposals by themselves would not mean that the trainees who go to such Centres would, after four or two years, have completed the requirements of a call-up for National Service. This being so, the proposal is that these students, immediately after completing four years of training, be called for a further twelve continuous months of National Service, to be taken in any area or areas of Uganda.

(iii) SUB-COUNTY CAMPS.

27. It is proposed to establish in each rural sub-county, camps to cater for demonstration of modern methods of production and modern public health techniques, as well as to give lessons to those called up, in civics, reading and writing, elementary production methods and health education. The medium of instruction will be the vernacular language understood in the sub-county. Those who may be called up to do part of their National Service in these camps will also be trained in security work, particularly police work at the village level concerning

the maintenance of law and order. Persons trained in this police work will be liable for call-up for police duties in their areas.

28. Service in any sub-county camp will not preclude service in the National Camps or at any other place in Uganda outside the sub-county.

29. It is proposed that besides those who may be called up for twelve months' continuous service/training in these camps, the majority of persons who will be called up for training or service in these camps will be called for a period of not less than three months at a time in any one year.

(iv) STATE FARMS.

30. The Ministry of National Service, in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the Ministry of Animal Industry, Game and Fisheries, will select appropriate areas where State Farms will be established. It is proposed that these State Farms should be established with definite objectives, and one such objective should be the production of a commodity which will enable Uganda to reduce imports of such a commodity, or to produce a commodity which will enable Uganda to earn foreign currency, or to produce a commodity that will enable Uganda to start an industry.

(v) OTHER CENTRES.

31. It is proposed that well-trained persons -- professionals, technicians, artisans, or any other trained person in whatever field -- when called up, besides serving in any of the above-mentioned camps, may be required to spend a period of National Service at other centres in any area of Uganda where professional or technical service may be required. In these centres professionals and technicians of various callings will, where possible, live together but will serve the community in their particular fields of training; but while stationed in these centres any professionally qualified person or trained technician may be called upon to perform duties outside his professional training. National Service in these centres will be for a period of not less than one month in any one year.

REGISTRATION

32. It is proposed that the Ministry of National Service should maintain registers of all persons of 14 to 21 years of age and of adults of and above the age of 21 years. These registers should be kept in such a manner as to enable any person at any material time to determine the number of persons in the register of minors (14 to 21 years) and of adults of and above the age of 21 years, who are liable for National Service in any Sub-County or Parliamentary Constituency.

33. Such registers will be kept at the Sub-County Headquarters, the District Commissioner's Office for the constituencies or part of the constituency in the district, and at the Ministry of National Service Headquarters. The register of the adults of the age of 21 and above will be the Parliamentary Electoral Register.

34. A person will be registered at the Sub-County Headquarters in which he normally resides and, in the case of minors, the Sub-County in which his father or guardian resides. Any person who, having been registered in one Sub-County, later settles in another, will report the same to the appropriate authority in the new Sub-County, which authority will be stipulated in the regulations, and the authority will cause his name to be deleted from the register of that other Sub-County at which such person was previously registered, in a manner that will again be stipulated in the regulations.

35. Every citizen on attaining the age of 21 years will register the fact with the appropriate authority in the Sub-County where he normally resides. The person so registering shall furnish the appropriate authority with information regarding his previous registration as a minor and the authority will cause his name to be deleted from the register of minors.

36. It will be an offence for any persons of the ages stipulated above not to register, or to be registered in more than one Sub-County. It will also be an offence for

anybody to give false information regarding any registration, transfer of registration or cancellation of registration, or fail to notify the appropriate authority of any change of residence or attainment of the age of 21 years.

INSPECTORATE

37. It is proposed that for the purposes of close administration, discipline and in view of the magnitude of the courses to be undertaken by the Ministry of National Service, an inspectorate be established, headed by a Chief Inspector responsible to the Minister, who will ensure close supervision and control of all such matters. It is further proposed that there should be four Regional Inspectors under the Chief Inspector, who will look after National Service activities in each of the four Regions in the Country. It is also proposed that each of the four Regional Camps be under the charge of a Camp Commandant and that each Constituency and Sub-County Camp be under the charge of a Deputy and an Assistant Camp Commandant, respectively.

38. It is considered fundamental and essential that all persons in any of the National Service Camps or participating in any manner or form in the National Service should do so under strict discipline regulations.

39. Except during a national emergency or when Uganda is at war, every able-bodied person will do National Service, excluding training, for not less than one year and not more than two years. For different categories of persons, however, it is proposed:--

(a) That N.U.Y.O.* members be called up immediately to do their National Service. Persons in this category will not only undergo a course of training in reorientation and civics, but will also be taught academic and technical subjects, as well as receive instruction in languages, drama, art in various forms, and physical training. It is proposed that all persons who are already members of NUYO, have been so for at least one year, and are not in schools or training institutions and are not married, should, when called for National Service, undergo a continuous course of training and do their National Service for a period of twenty-four months; the training and the service to run concurrently.

(b) That all P.7 leavers who go to Constituency Training Centres will, on completion of their four-year course, do National Service for a period of twelve months.

* N.U.Y.O. stands for National Youth Organization.

(c) That any youth between the ages of 14 and 21 years who completed P.6 or P.7 and has done two years' training in the Constituency Training Centre should do National Service for six months.

(d) All other youths between the ages of 14 and 21 years who are not P.6/P.7 leavers and are not at school and training institutions will be liable for a call-up of service/training in the Sub-county, Constituency and the National Regional Camps, or any other centre which may be established, for a period of not less than six months at a time.

(e) That anyone who, after completing P.7, goes for training in a post-primary institution will, for each of the years he is in that institution except in the final year, be called up to do National Service/training for two months in each year. On leaving that institution such person will be liable to be called up to do National Service for six months. Any person in this category who successfully completes a course and is offered a job and accepts it, will nevertheless do National Service before he takes up the job and his employers will be required to pay him half the salary during the period when he is doing National Service.

(f) That any person who, having been admitted to an academic secondary school from P.7, will do two months of National Service/training in each of the years he

is in the school, except the final year. The final year to be S.4 or S.6 as the case may be. Any person in this category who breaks off either at S.4 or below and undertakes a course in a post-primary institution will be required, in addition to the period of National Service/training he has already done, to do two months of National Service/training for each of the years he is in that institution, except the final year. On successful completion of the course of training in any such institution, and where such a person is offered a job after the completion of his course and he accepts it, he will nevertheless first do National Service for six months before he takes up the job, and his employer will be required to pay him half salary for the six months he will be doing National Service.

(g) That any person who, having completed S.6 and having done his National Service/training for each of the years in the academic secondary stream (two months per year per class, except S.4) and is accepted in a post-secondary institution for higher learning, will be required to do National Service/training for two months a year in the first two years when he will be in that post-secondary institution. On successful completion of a course of studies in the institution and if he is offered a job which he accepts, he will be required to do National Service for six months

before taking up the job, and his employer will be required to pay him half salary during the period he is doing National Service.

40. Any person falling under categories 39 (e), (f) and (g) above will have half the period of National Service/training already done while in schools and institutions, counted as National Service at the beginning of the six months' continuous service at half-pay. In addition, it is proposed that person in these categories who do not find employment after successful completion of courses of National Service, and appropriate Government scales of salaries shall apply in these cases if the payment of half salary during the six months of National Service. If, after six months, their services are required by the Government, they will be offered employment on full term basis in the normal manner. If, however, such persons are employed by any private firm or parastatal body or any other organisation, within three years after the completion of their National Service, the employer will be required to refund to Government the equivalent of the half salary paid over the six months of National Service.

41. All persons in the Public Service who are confirmed in their appointments (this includes District Administrations, Urban Authorities, parastatal bodies and, for the purpose of these proposals, officials of the Co-operative Unions) will be liable to be called up for

National Service for a period of not less than three months at a time.

42. All persons employed by firms and other bodies in the private sector in established post, except employees of the Co-operative Unions, but including the self-employed of all descriptions, will, when called for National Service/training, be required to do not less than three months at a time.

43. All other persons not specified in the categories mentioned above will, when called up for National Service/training, be required to do three months' service/training at a time.

44. It is proposed that, notwithstanding the periods specified above, some persons may be called on to undertake serve/training for a continuous period of twelve months at a time. Persons who are so called will be provided with land in the National Service Camps which they can use for their own benefit.

Source: Dr. A. Milton Obote, "The Move to the Left", The Common Man's Charter, Entebbe: The Government Printer, 1970, pp. 13-21.

APPENDIX C**First Statement by the Soldiers Why the 1971 Coup Occurred.**

1. The unwarranted detention without trial and for long periods of a large number of people, many of whom are totally innocent of any charges.

2. The continuation of a State of Emergency over the whole country for an indefinite period, which is meaningless to everybody.

3. The lack of freedom in the airing of different views on political and social matters.

4. The frequent loss of life and property arising from almost daily cases of robbery with violence and kondoism* without strong measures being taken to stop them. The people feel totally insecure and yet kondoism increases everyday.

5. The proposals for National Service which will take every able bodied person from his home to work in a camp for

*"Kondoism" refers to acts of violence by organised crime groups especially in the capital city of Kampala.

two years could only lead to more robbery and general crime when homes are abandoned.

6. Widespread corruption in high places, especially among Ministers and top civil servants has left the people with very little confidence, if any, in the Government. Most Ministers own fleets of cars or buses, many big houses and sometimes even aeroplanes.

7. The failure by the political authorities to organise any elections for the last eight years whereby the people's free will could be expressed. It should be noted that the last elections within the ruling party were dominated by big fellows with lots of money which they used to bribe their way into "winning" the elections. This bribery, together with threats against the people, entirely falsified the results of the so-called elections. Proposed new methods of election requiring a candidate to stand in four constituencies will only favour the rich and the well-known.

8. Economic policies have left many people unemployed and even more insecure and lacking in the basic needs of life like food, clothing, medicine and shelter.

9. High taxes have left the common man of this country poorer than ever before. Here are some the taxes which the common man has to bear:

Development Tax,
Graduated Tax,
Sales Tax,
Social Security Fund Tax.

The big men can always escape these taxes or pass them on to the common man.

10. The prices which the common man gets for his crops like cotton and coffee have not gone up and sometimes they have gone down, whereas the cost of food, education, etc., has always gone up.

11. Tendency to isolate the country from East African Unity, e.g., by sending away workers from Kenya and Tanzania, by preventing the use of Uganda money in Kenya and Tanzania by discouraging imports from Kenya and Tanzania, by stopping the use in Uganda of Kenyan or Tanzanian money.

12. The creation of a wealthy class of leaders who are always talking of socialism while they grow richer and the common man poorer.

13. In addition, the Defence Council of which the President is Chairman, has not met since July 1969, and this has made administration of the Armed Forces very difficult. As a result Armed Forces personnel lack accommodation, vehicles and equipment. Also general recruitment submitted to the Chairman of the Defence Council a long time ago has not been put into effect.

14. The Cabinet Office, by training large numbers of people (largely from the Akokoro County in Lango District where Obote and Akena Adoko, the Chief General Service Officer, come from) in armed warfare, has been turned into a second army. Uganda therefore has had two armies, one in the Cabinet, the other Regular.

15. The Lango development master plan written in 1967 decided that all key positions in Uganda's political, commercial, army and industrial life have to be occupied and controlled by people from Akokoro County, Lango District. Also the same master plan decided that nothing of importance must be done for other districts especially Acholi District. Emphasis was put on development of Akokoro County in Lango District at the expense of other areas of Uganda.

16. Obote, on the advice of Akena Adoko, has sought to divide the Uganda Armed Forces and the rest of Uganda by picking out his own tribesmen and putting them in key

positions in the Army and elsewhere. Examples: the Chief General Service Officer, the Export and Import Corporation, Uganda Meat Packers, the Public Service Commission, Nyanza Textiles and a Russian textile factory to be situated in Lango.

17. From the time Obote took over power in 1962 his greatest and most loyal supporter has been the Army. The Army has always tried to be an example to the whole of Africa by not taking over the Government and we have always followed that principle. It is therefore now a shock to us to see that Obote wants to divide and downgrade the Army by turning the Cabinet Office into another army. In doing this, Obote and Akena Adoko have bribed and used some senior officers who have turned against their fellow soldiers.

18. We all want only unity in Uganda and we do not want bloodshed. Everybody in Uganda knows that. The matters mentioned above appear to us to lead to bloodshed only.

On the same day Major-General Idi Amin Dada accepted the powers of Government and received the immediate support of the Inspector-General of Police. The pleasure of the people is shown from illustrations in this booklet which speak for themselves. On the 28th January, 1971, the political detainees were released including the five former

Ministers. On the 2nd February, 1971, the Military Head of State issued a Proclamation which removed the President, Ministers and Members of parliament and suspended Parliament. He vested all legislative and executive powers in himself. He also established a Council of Ministers to advise him.

The Council of Ministers (now called the Cabinet) was sworn in on the 5th February, 1971. Most of the members are former civil servants and only one Minister is a military man. The reason for the appointment of this technocrat Cabinet is because the present Government believes in getting down to reorganisation of the country without indulging in political extravagances.

Source: The Birth of the Second Republic of Uganda

(Entebbe: The Government Printer, 1971), pp. 26-30.

APPENDIX D

THE UGANDA PEACE TALKS AGREEMENT
FOR
THE RESTORATION OF PEACE
TO
THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

THIS AGREEMENT is MADE PURSUANT to the PEACE TALKS held in Nairobi, Kenya during the period 26th August, 1985 to 17th December, 1985 under the chairmanship of His Excellency Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kenya, BETWEEN the Military Government of Uganda which assumed power in Uganda following the ouster of the former Government of that country on the 27th of July 1985 (hereinafter referred to as "The Military Government") AND The National Resistance Movement.

WE,

The Military Government and the National Resistance Movement, The PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT

APPRECIATING the offer by His Excellency President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi and the brotherly people of the Republic of Kenya to convene, host and chair our talks and search for peace in our beloved Uganda,

RECALLING the desire of the people of the Sovereign State of Uganda at Independence on the 9th of October, 1962

to exercise fully the right to self-determination as one nation within the United Nations Organisation,

MINDFUL of the determination proclaimed by the people of the world in the Charter of the United Nations to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of all men and women of all nations, and to promote social progress and freedom, which determination was restated and subscribed to by the Sovereign State of Uganda in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity but more particularly in the bill of rights contained in the Independence Constitution of Uganda and the successive Constitutions of Uganda,

AWARE of the endless conflicts resulting from the denial of, or impediments in the way of, freedom and peace for the citizens of and people in Uganda by successive Governments, which conflicts have destroyed peace and stability, eroded national institutions and democratic principles and threatened the sovereignty and integral status of our country so dearly cherished by us and all Ugandans everywhere,

CONSCIOUS of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and peace based on respect of individual persons and of the need for respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons in Uganda without distinction as to race, sex, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or language,

RECOGNIZING the passionate yearning for peace and freedom for all citizens of Uganda everywhere and other peoples living in Uganda, a yearning shared by all nations and peoples of goodwill towards Uganda, and the decisive positive role that such citizens, nations and peoples can play in the political, social and economic development of Uganda in times of peace,

CONVINCED that any continuation of armed conflict, dictatorial rule, denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms prevent development in Uganda as well as positive international co-operation with friendly and brotherly nations and other bodies and militates against the ideal peace,

CONVINCED that Uganda has an inalienable right to peace and complete political and economic freedom and in that regard must exercise the right of self-determination as a sovereign state and integral national territory whose boundaries were more particularly delineated and described in Schedule 1 to the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda of 1967,

WELCOMING the commitment to and participation in the search for peace in Uganda by our brotherly neighbours the peoples of the Republic of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania and recognizing that instability in any one of our nations is a threat to the peace and stability of the whole East African Region,

BELIEVING that the process of restoration of peace, stability and democratic rule and Government is now irresistible and irreversible as exemplified by the spirit of mutual co-operation, trust and frankness between the parties at the Peace Talks; and in so believing, desiring a formula to terminate the problems that have for so long bedeviled and manacled Uganda such as dictatorial rule and all practices of denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms, discrimination and massacre associated with such rule,

NOW DO SOLEMNLY PROCLAIM for and in the name of Uganda the urgent necessity --

1. Of bringing to a most speedy end dictatorship in all its forms and manifestations, armed conflict and denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

2. Of restoring peace, security, law and order throughout the country through reconstruction of the country's economy, re-establishment of an effective administration both in central and local government, initiation and implementation of military reforms designed to ensure balanced, disciplined and national armed forces and security services, and,

3. Of laying the groundwork for the preparation and drafting of a popular constitution which will be the Supreme Law of Uganda, which constitution shall be promulgated by a popularly elected parliament/National Assembly in due course, and ensuring the speedy return to democratic

government through free and fair general elections within the framework of such a constitution,

AND TO THIS END DECLARE AND AGREE THAT: --

Ceasefire

ARTICLE 1 -- CEASEFIRE TERMS

After the signing of this Agreement there shall be a ceasefire on the following terms:

- (a) with effect from 0920 hours on the 17th day of December 1985, there will be complete and immediate cessation of hostilities, the commanders of the various Combatant Forces shall issue instructions to the forces under their command to ensure that within 48 hours of the signing of this Agreement all fighting everywhere in Uganda shall cease,
- (b) there shall be immediate cessation of recruitment into or formation of any Combatant Force other than the National Force and the National Army to be formed by the Military Council pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 of this Agreement,
- (c) all roads in the country shall be opened and made safe for civilian and commercial traffic to operate normally.
- (d) all hostile propaganda shall cease immediately,
- (e) with effect from the date of signing of this

Agreement, all parties shall forthwith stop the acquisition and procurement of arms, ammunitions and any other military hardware,

- (f) No soldier or any other personnel under the command or control of any of the Combatant Forces shall engage in any criminal acts or other acts that violate Human Rights,
- (g) all members of the security forces or any of the other Combatant Forces who have violated Human Rights since the 27th July, 1985, shall be immediately punished and disciplining of members of such forces shall become a routine practice and part of the operational code of conduct, nothing in this paragraph shall be interpreted to mean that any person who may have committed similar acts prior to July 27, 1985 is exonerated,
- (h) all political detainees who are known to be members of the National Resistance Movement shall be immediately released,
- (i) arrangements shall be made to provide non-military supplies to the Combatant Forces behind ceasefire lines and neutral agents may be involved in this exercise; and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing the provisions of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention on the Amelioration of the condition of wounded and sick in the Armed Forces

in the field dated the 12th August, 1949 set out in Annexure 'D' to this Agreement shall apply,

- (j) all Combatant Forces shall not under any circumstances whatsoever mobilise or deploy their troops without first obtaining authority of the Military Council and informing the Monitoring/Observer Forces,
- (k) the parties to this Agreement shall establish, on behalf of the Military Council, a Committee to be known as the Ceasefire Committee consisting of representatives of the forces represented on the Council and the Monitoring/Observer Force for the purpose of implementing the terms of the ceasefire,

The Military Council

ARTICLE 2 -- THE MILITARY COUNCIL

1. There shall be a Military Council which shall be the Supreme Organ of Government in Uganda and which shall upon the signing of this Agreement, be composed of representatives of the Combatant Forces and the Head of State as follows: --

(a) Head of State/Chairman, Military Council	...	1
(b) Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA).	...	7
(c) National Resistance Army (NRA)...	...	7
(d) Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM)...	...	1
(e) Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMU)...	...	2
(f) Former Uganda National Army (FUNA)	...	1
(g) Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF)	...	1
		<hr/>
TOTAL		... 20
		<hr/>

2. All Combatant Forces shall nominate their representatives to be appointed to the Military Council in accordance with the agreed numbers and the Head of State and Chairman of the Military Council shall sign the Instruments of Appointment. All representatives of the Combatant Forces

who are appointed to the Council shall take the prescribed Oath of Allegiance.

3. The Political Parties that took part in the 1980 General Elections may be represented on the Military Council but the mode of their representation shall be decided upon by the Military Council after due consultation with the Political Parties concerned and in accordance with Article 5(1).

ARTICLE 3 -- CHAIRMAN AND VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL

1. There shall be a Chairman of the Military Council who shall also be the Head of State of Uganda.

2. The Chairman shall preside at all meetings and sessions of the Military Council.

3. There shall also be a Vice-Chairman of the Military Council who shall in all respects rank second only to the Chairman/Head of State and who shall, subject to paragraph (6) of this Article, in the absence of the Chairman/Head of State, exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the Chairman/Head of State.

4. The Head of State at the date of signing of this agreement shall continue to be the Head of State and Chairman of the Military Council.

5. The Chairman of the High Command of the National Resistance Army at the date of signing of this Agreement shall be the Vice-Chairman of the Military Council.

6. If the Office of the Chairman/head of State or Vice-Chairman shall become vacant by resignation, death or incapacity resulting from infirmity of mind or body, the Military Council shall, by secret ballot and two-thirds majority, elect the Chairman/Head of State or Vice-Chairman, as the case may be, from among the representatives of the Combatant Forces on the Military Council.

7. At no time during the rule of the Military Council in Uganda pursuant to this Agreement shall the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the Military Council be members of the same political party or Combatant Force, the Military Council shall formulate the procedures for securing this agreed position.

ARTICLE 4 -- POWERS OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL

1. The Military Council shall be the Supreme Authority in whom the executive and legislative powers shall vest.

2. All powers of the Head of State shall be exercised by him in Council.

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) above the Head of State may exercise the legislative and executive powers of the Council in exceptional circumstances, which exceptional circumstances will be determined by the Military Council by a two-thirds majority.

4. After the signing of this Agreement and the appointment of the representatives of Combatant Forces to

the Military Council, the Military Council shall review decrees promulgated and political appointments and promotions made by the Military Government since July 27, 1985.

ARTICLE 5 -- PROCEDURES OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL

1. The Military Council shall formulate its own rules of procedure. The normal method of reaching decisions shall be by consensus except in regard to the following matters where a two-thirds majority shall be required to reach decision by secret ballot:

- (a) Matters affecting the provisions of this Agreement.
- (b) National defence policy and building of a new army and other security services.
- (c) Programme of the interim period.
- (d) Political appointments, promotions, including appointments in the security services.
- (e) Review of Decrees.
- (f) Rehabilitation of war-ravaged areas and settlement of displaced persons and fighters and soldiers who will not be absorbed into the new army.
- (g) Issues of violation of human rights.
- (h) Matters concerned with the promulgation of the new constitution and the holding of elections.
- (i) Admission and dismissal of members of the

Military Council.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph the Military Council may, in its own discretion, and from time to time, determine such other matters of national importance upon which decisions shall be reached by a two-thirds majority.

3. The two-thirds majority referred to herein shall mean that decisions by the Military Council requiring a two-thirds majority vote shall not be reached unless at least fourteen members of the twenty members of the Council vote in favour of those decisions.

CODE OF CONDUCT

ARTICLE 6 -- NEED FOR AND FORMULATION OF NATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT

1. There is need for a change in the political direction of Uganda and in this regard the nation shall require a code of conduct for leaders and public officers.

2. The Military Council shall, as a matter of urgency set up a committee or commission to formulate a National Code of Conduct which shall, among other things, prescribe the qualification for members of the Military Council, the Cabinet and other Public Officers.

3. Until such time as the National Code of Conduct is worked out, sections 41 and 42 of the 1967 Constitution of Uganda with the necessary modifications shall provide the

minimum qualifications for membership of the Military Council, the Cabinet and appointments to other Public Offices.

THE NEW NATIONAL ARMY AND NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY

ARTICLE 7 -- RECRUITMENT OF A NEW NATIONAL FORCE AND ITS FUNCTIONS

1. Soon after the cessation of hostilities under Article 1 of this Agreement and subject to paragraph (2) of this Article and the sequence of events set out in Annexure 'A', there shall be established a New National Force, composed of soldiers, from all the Combatant Forces nominated by the respective Combatant Forces in the following numbers: --

					Soldiers
UNLA	3,700
NRA	3,580
FEDEMU					
UFM					
UNRF		1,200
FUNA					
Total ...					<u>8,840</u>

2. The Military Council shall establish a selection committee consisting of the representatives of all the Combatant Forces represented on the Military Council together with representatives of the Monitoring/Observer Force for the purposes of selecting and vetting the soldiers nominated by the respective Combatant Forces to form the new force. The terms of reference of the selection committee and the criteria to be applied in the selection and vetting shall be determined by the Military Council.

3. The functions of the said New National Force shall be: --

- (a) To ensure general security in the country.
- (b) To supervise the voluntary laying down of arms by all Combatant Forces in the country and to disarm any force which does not do so voluntarily.
- (c) Under direction of the Military Council and in conjunction with the Monitoring/Observer Force, to collect and store arms received throughout the disarmament exercise under Article 12.
- (d) To participate in the recruitment and training of a New National Army.

4. During the exercise of selecting the said New Force the Military Council shall:

- (a) subject to Article 9(1) (b), make arrangements for

the maintenance and upkeep of those soldiers of the Combatant Forces awaiting selections into the New National Force or the New National Army, and

(b) ensure the retraining and resettlement of all men and women of the various Combatant Forces who are neither eligible nor qualified or who may not wish to join the said New National Army and for this purpose the Military Council shall work out, as a matter of priority, a programme for resettlement of those men and women back into civilian life.

5. The soldiers and combatants who may not be absorbed into the New National Force or Army shall be given priority for service in the Police, Prisons and other security services.

ARTICLE 8 -- THE NEW NATIONAL ARMY

1. The New National Force established under Article 7 shall be the first batch of the New National Army.

2. The New National Army shall be broad-based and representative of the country as a whole and shall be recruited in the first instance from the Combatant Forces existing at the date of signing of this agreement and in accordance with the National Defence Policy formulated under Article 9, provided that the second batch of recruitment

shall be composed in the same proportions as those used for the first batch.

ARTICLE 9 -- THE NEW NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY

1. After the signing and coming into force of this Agreement the Military Council shall, as soon as practicable, embark upon the formulation of a National Policy to determine: --

- (a) the function, size, nature, name and composition of the New National Army to enable the New National Force established under Article 7 and the Monitoring/Observer Force to carry out recruitment of the New National Army and the demobilisation of the Combatant Forces; and
- (b) the arrangements for the maintenance and upkeep of those soldiers of the various Combatant Forces awaiting selection into the New National Army.

2. In formulating a New National Defence Policy, the Military Council shall take into account the views of the National Conference on this matter.

THE MONITORING/OBSERVER FORCE**ARTICLE 10 -- THE MONITORING/OBSERVER FORCE**

1. After the signing of this Agreement the Uganda Government shall invite into Uganda a force from four Commonwealth countries namely, Kenya, Tanzania, Great Britain and Canada. The force shall be known as the Monitoring/Observer Force and shall carry out the following duties: --

- (a) To observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire.
- (b) To observe the security arrangements throughout the whole country.
- (c) To assist in the disarmament/security arrangements exercise as may be requested by the Military Council within their terms of reference.
- (d) To monitor the movements of troops to agreed assembly points.
- (e) To assist in the collection and securing of arms from soldiers who have been demobilised.
- (f) To monitor compliance with agreed arrangements and investigation of alleged breaches of the ceasefire.
- (g) To assist in the recruitment and training of the New National Army.
- (h) To carry out any other duties assigned to them by

the Military Council in consultation with their respective Governments.

2. Prior to the Monitoring/Observer Force moving into Uganda and after the ceasefire has been effected there shall be sent into the country a Reconnaissance Team, which may be from one or more of the countries invited to contribute to the Monitoring/Observer Force, to identify the positions of all the Combatant Forces and thereafter to determine the size of the Monitoring/Observer Force required. The terms of reference of the Reconnaissance Team shall be as specified in Annexure 'B' and manpower and equipment in Annexure 'C'.

3. During the period of operation of the Reconnaissance Team all the Combatant Forces shall remain at their positions as at the date of ceasefire.

4. The provisions of Annexures 'A' and 'B' as they appertain to the operation, functions and duties of the Monitoring/Observer Force shall be in addition to and not in substitution of or derogation from the provisions of this Article.

**ARTICLE 11 -- RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
AND THE TOP RANKS OF THE ARMED FORCES**

When reviewing the political appointments and other promotions made since the 27th July, 1985, the Military Council shall ensure a balance between the Combatant Forces

represented on the Military Council existing immediately prior to the signing of this Agreement and the National Resistance Movement in the Distribution of responsibilities in the Ministry of Defence and in the Armed Forces.

COLLECTION AND STORAGE OF ARMS

ARTICLE 12 -- COLLECTION AND STORAGE OF ARMS

1. Upon the ceasefire coming into effect all arms of the Combatant Forces shall be collected and stored by the respective forces within known armouries belonging to those forces. The said collection and storage shall be monitored by the Monitoring/Observer Force which shall enumerate and verify the said arms.

2. No arms shall be drawn from any armoury referred to in paragraph (a) of this Article without the express authority of the local commander and concurrence of a representative of the Monitoring/Observer Force in the area. It shall be the duty of the representative of the Monitoring/Observer Force to report drawing of arms without his concurrence to the next higher command headquarters where all the parties to this Agreement shall be represented.

DEMILITARISATION OF KAMPALA**ARTICLE 13 -- DEMILITARISATION OF KAMPALA**

1. The City of Kampala shall be demilitarised and neutralised by removing out of Kampala all troops to be determined by the Reconnaissance Team, the security of Kampala shall be maintained by the Police Force which shall have been screened and whose arms shall have been verified by the Monitoring/Observer Force. The Monitoring/observer Force shall be adequately represented to ensure the neutrality of Kampala.

2. The demilitarisation arrangement for Kampala shall remain in force until the complete demobilisation of the Combatant Forces has been achieved through recruitment in the new force established under Article 7 or resettlement of the men and women not so recruited.

PERSONS WHO SERVED IN IDI AMIN'S REGIME**ARTICLE 14 -- PROVISIONS FOR PERSONS WHO SERVED IN****IDI AMIN'S REGIME**

1. All persons who served in responsible positions in Idi Amin's Regime including those who served in the Army, the State Research Bureau or other security services and who are known to have committed atrocities or other heinous

crimes shall be punished according to law. The prosecution of such persons shall not be time barred.

2. All persons who served in the notorious State Research Bureau and Public Safety Unity shall not be eligible to join the New National Army or any other security services.

3. All ex-soldiers who served in the Army in the period 1971-1979 and who are not covered under 1 above shall have to be carefully screened and vetted to be eligible to be admitted to the new National Army or any other security services. In vetting such persons the Committee shall give preference to those who have special skills to fill places which cannot otherwise be filled, the said persons must have clean records.

**CONVENING OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE AND
GENERAL ELECTIONS**

ARTICLE 15 -- NATIONAL CONFERENCE

As soon as practicable after the signing of the Agreement, the Military Council shall convene a National Conference to discuss key national issues, to wit, tenure of the interim government, the future national constitutional framework, elections, and the national army, representatives at the said national conference shall be drawn from all districts as well as all national institutions, political parties, religious groups and the Military Council.

ARTICLE 16 -- HOLDING GENERAL ELECTIONS

Free and fair General Elections shall be held in Uganda as soon as practicable to return the country to parliamentary democracy.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

ARTICLE 17 -- IMPLEMENTATION

For the purposes of ensuring the implementation of this Agreement the Military Council constituted pursuant to Article 2 of this Agreement shall at its first meetings

expeditiously discuss and resolve matters relating to the following issues:

- (a) review of all the Decrees promulgated by the Military Government since the 27th July, 1985;
- (b) formulation of the broad guidelines for the Government Programme of Action;
- (c) establishment and formulation of the terms of reference of a commission of inquiry into the violation of human rights in Uganda since Independence;
- (d) formulation of broad guidelines for the restructuring of the New National Army and the harmonisation of ranks within the Combatant Forces as a basis for the formation by the Military Council of a New National Defence Policy under Article 9 of this Agreement which guidelines shall include strategies for the rehabilitation and resettlement of soldiers of the Combatant Forces who will not be recruited into the National Army;
- (e) review of Cabinet Portfolios and other political appointments made by the Military Government since 27th July, 1985;
- (f) such other urgent matters as may be determined by the Military Council.

2. The Military Council when deciding the above issues shall not be governed by two-thirds majority rule set out in Article 5 of this Agreement, but shall reach its decisions by consensus.

ARTICLE 18 -- PREPARATION FOR THE FIRST MEETING OF THE
MILITARY COUNCIL

Upon signing of this Agreement an Ad Hoc Committee shall be set up for the purpose of making the following practical arrangements for the first meeting of the fully constituted Military Council:

- (a) preparation of agenda for the meeting;
- (b) designation of date and venue for the meeting;
- (c) making necessary security and accommodation arrangements for the meeting.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereunto have, through their representatives, at their hands at Nairobi this 17th day of December, 1985.

SIGNED BY:

GENERAL TITO OKELLO LUTWA,
Chairman, Military Council and Head of State of Uganda.

SIGNED BY:

YOWERI MUSEVENI,
Chairman, High Command, National Resistance Army and
Interim Chairman, National Resistance Movement.

IN THE PRESENCE OF AND WITNESSED BY:

H.E. DANIEL TOROITICH ARAP MOI,
President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Republic of Kenya and Chairman of the Uganda Peace
Talks.

APPENDIX E

Ten-Point Programme of
National Resistance Movement (N.R.M.)

(1) Democracy:

Democracy, as defined by one political thinker, means "government of the people, by the people and for the people." The only problem is that rarely do we get governments that are really all these three. There are a lot of mockeries of "democracy" around the globe. In our case, for democracy to be meaningful and not a mockery, it must contain three elements: parliamentary democracy, popular democracy and a decent level of living for every Ugandan. In other words, there should be an elected parliament, elected at regular intervals and such elections must be free of corruption and manipulation of the population. In addition to this exercise, however, there must be people's committees at the village, muluka, gombolola, saza and district level. We would not deal with each level's local affairs subject to superior operation with the chiefs and police, take part in discussing local development projects with government officials, but, above all, they would be political forums to discuss relevant issues concerning the whole country and act as forums against the corruption and misuse of office by the chief government officials --

medical and veterinary, market officers, headmasters, police men, soldiers, etc. They would be a channel of communication between the top and the bottom. They would also take part in such projects like screening applicants to join the national army, police and prisons in order to avoid anti-social elements worming their way into these institutions as has been the case in the past. In fact we had already implemented this system before the enemy -- Obote -- disrupted the life of the population in the liberated zones. We had committees at village, muluka, and zone (several gombololas) levels in the following gombololas: Makulabita, Semuto, Kepeeka, Nakeseke, Kikamulo, Ngoma, Kikandwa, Bukomero, Kiboga, Bukwiri, Kasanda, Busunju, Sekanyonyi, Kakiri, Masuliita, Gombe, Wakiso, Nyimbwa, Migyera, Kalungi, Wampiti, Wabusana, Zirobwe, and Wabinyonyi. Through these committees the people could criticise anything they disapproved of e.g. NRA soldiers misbehaving. It is, indeed, people's power. In fact, now, "Abobukiiko" (committee members) is an integral part of the National Resistance Movement. Apart from the open committees in the above gombololas, there are thousands of secret committees all over the country. These, however, are not as democratic as the above on account of still being secret. Democracy in politics however, is not possible without a reasonable level of living for all the people of Uganda. An illiterate, sick, superstitious Ugandan does not

when there is formal democracy. It is normally the local elite, pandering to the various schemes of the unprincipled factions of the national elite, that manipulate the population on behalf of the latter with bribes, misinformation, taking advantage of their ignorance. Therefore, the NRM, after removing Obote must think of democracy in a total context of real emancipation. Hence, the importance of some of the subsequent points on our programme. Before leaving this point, it must be pointed out that the immediate problem of Uganda is not economic, but political. When the political questions were mishandled, the economic problem ensued; and unless the political question is amicably resolved, there will be no economic recovery in Uganda.

(2) Security

Ugandans and many other Africans have been living under insecurity in the very elementary sense of the words. Obote and Amin must have by now killed over 800,000 Ugandans between them over the past 22 years of so called independence. Even at the time of independence, the people were apprehensive about security, remembering the tyrannical rule of the pre-colonial days. This was because British colonialism in Uganda was more subtle than, for instance, Belgian colonialism in Rwanda or Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique or even British colonialism in Kenya. After

independence, Obote and his colleagues have done everything possible to discredit the whole concept of independence. It is only now in the liberated areas of NRM that Ugandans are beginning to know that African rule can provide security. As soon as NRM takes government, not only will the state inspired violence disappear, but so will even criminal violence. Given democracy at the local level, a politicized army and police and absence of corruption at the top as well as interaction with the people, even criminal violence can disappear. Thereby, security of persons will be restored and so will security of legitimately earned property.

(3) Consolidation of National Unity and elimination of all forms of SECTARIANISM:

One of the principal causes of strife in Uganda and Africa in general has been lack of national unity. Not only did it enable foreign powers to colonise Africa and ensure the perpetuation of colonialism for much longer than would have been the case, but sectarianism has enabled dictators and idiots to emerge, take power illegally and perpetuate their stay in power with much greater ease. Obote has been thriving on divisions as did Amin. The politics of Uganda at independence was unabashedly sectarian: DP mainly for catholics, UPC mainly for protestants outside Buganda and KY for protestants in Buganda. In the army there were

opportunistic factions, emerging according to the opportunistic politics and manipulations of the day: Bantu versus Nilotics in 1966 (where the Bantu included the Itesot who do not speak a Bantu language and where the Nilotics included the West Nilers most of whom do not speak Nilotic languages). In 1970, the West Nilers versus Acholis and Langi; then as Amin's rule progressed, moslems versus christians; after the downfall of Amin, the re-introduction of DP and UPC, having undergone some fresh permutations of sectarianism; and Obote, following the elections, trying to erect a new alliance of Acholis, Langis and Itesot against the "enemies" --principally Baganda and Banyankole.

What is the end result of all this tragic-comedy? Fragmentation of the people so that they can never unite to confront their common enemy -- underdevelopment emanating from foreign domination working through, precisely, the same opportunists like Obote (foremen of foreign interests and enemies of their own people). What enmity is there between a Muganda peasant and a Langi peasant! Or between a christian peasant and a moslem peasant! On the contrary they have got a common enemy: the Obotes and the Amins who misuse the peasant earned foreign exchange to buy whisky instead of improving rural water or building industries that would employ their sons. Therefore, unity is in the interests of the people and is feared by all exploiters -- actual and perspective. A united people cannot be duped. Therefore, the NRM and its army, the NRA, tested defenders

of all the people of Uganda, will not tolerate any sectarian opportunists of any shade. The fundamental causes of suffering of the people of Uganda must be ended. As has always been our line, the National Resistance Movement is a home of the former DP, UPC, CP and UPM members; one's religion, colour, sex or height is not considered when welcoming new members into NRM: rather we consider one's goodness or badness (e.g. corruption) or contribution. We rigorously fight tribalism and religious sectarianism and have always aimed at uniting as many people as possible, around principled programmes, in order to isolate the enemy to the maximum. Anybody that impedes the unity of the people of Uganda is an enemy of the people in more than one way. On the one hand he fragments the people's efforts towards emancipation and, on the other hand, he misdefines the enemy so as to encourage fratricidal conflicts where brother fights brother, peasant resents or fights peasant, worker resents worker, student suspects fellow student -- all under the banners of tribalism, religion, linguistic groupings, regionalism or chauvinism. Obote tried to convince the Acholi and Langi people that they stood in mortal danger if NRA won. Using the correct tactics of exposing the manipulators of the people, we have of recent dealt Obote mortal blows by releasing some of the prisoners of war we captured including the Acholis and Langis. Going back to their colleagues after treatment (for the wounded), the prisoners of war we released have caused pandemonium in

Obote's army. The wall of fear and hatred which had built up among the Acholis and Langis has evaporated and Obote is in mortal danger at the hands of the same people he had been using as cannon fodder.

(5) Building an independent, integrated and self-sustaining national economy:

This is probably the most important point of the whole programme. In the introduction we pointed out that Uganda, being a microcosm of the African situation, is a backward, under-developed country whose only progress is the "development of the under-development" to use one Scholar's words. The fundamental cause of this under-development is the structural intertwinement with the economics of the developed countries of the West on an unequal basis. This phenomenon which started almost 5 centuries ago, has caused basic malformations that will never allow us to develop. This is because, among other things, there is a constant outflow of resources (what I have called haemorrhage elsewhere) from our economy to the economies of the developed countries -- the metropolitan centres of the world system while we content ourselves with the role of outlying villages. Resources flow out, in the present era, in the forms of: cheap raw-materials (some of them -- notably minerals which are exhaustible): repatriation of high dividends on investments (which investments do not

contribute to the disengagement from foreign economic domination but rather re-inforce the dependence); payment for highly priced manufactured goods (most of them just trash of consumer goods -- e.g. whisky, toys, wigs, lipstick, perfumes, sodas, foods that could be grown even by grandmothers (for instance, tomatoes) theft of the nation's convertible currency by a multiplicity of state officials including topmost leaders; flight of capital due to insecurity; purchase with convertible currency of items that could easily be locally produced (e.g. soap, toothpaste, tooth-brushes, toilet paper etc. etc.), brain drain due to scientists seeking better opportunities or simply security for their skins; wastage of labour and resources in the over production of export crops -- e.g. - coffee -- which, being beverages, are less essential in comparison with items like grain that have got a more reliable market apart from assisting our own economy in many ways including nurturing a healthy population; etc. etc. The fore-going do not include the incalculable loss due to failing to do things that could help the economy if they were done -- e.g. lack of scientific education, distorted infrastructure of roads and railways running from the interior to the coast and never from an interior point to another point of an under-employed population -- all due to the ideological deficiencies of the elite elements that have been wielding power since independence because of a colonial education that turned them completely myopic.

A fundamental solution to all this is making deliberate efforts to build an independent, integrated, self-sustaining national economy. This means that we should shift from the present asymmetrical situation where, on the one hand, there is the "enclave" -- pseudo-modern - export - import sector that exports, cheaply, raw materials (mainly agricultural and minerals) to the advanced capitalist countries while it imports mainly consumer goods at exorbitant prices and, on the other hand, there is the subsistence sector that subsidizes the pseudo-modern sector by keeping the families of the industrial and mine-workers in the rural areas living half life. The latter technique saves the firms in the "pseudo-modern" sector from having to pay wages that would enable a worker and his family to subsist in the town which would considerably raise the subsistence wage and therefore, eat into the profits of the firms (largely foreign until Idi Amin caused more mess by "nationalising - actually donating them to his cohorts"). This asymmetrical system is characterised by almost a total absence of manufacturing industries; and whatever few manufacturing industries there are, unduly dependent on foreign inputs, which inputs, however, could be locally procured if there was any element of integration in the economy. Sometimes it is merely assembling components already made in foreign countries or rolling and wrapping toilet tissue. That sort of thing is dubbed "manufacturing" industry. You find there is no linkage between the raw-materials producing sectors and the

so called manufacturing sectors with the exception of items like cotton. Take copper, for instance, Uganda produces copper at Kilembe. Uganda also consumes copper-derived manufactured goods mainly in its electrical installations. The electrification programme in the country would provide a good market for finished copper goods using Kilembe copper. Although we are at present unable to lay our hands on the necessary statistics, we are not aware of any significant linkage between the Kilembe copper and Uganda's electricity industry. The rock is mostly got from Kilembe, smelted at Jinja and exported. Then Uganda has got to import the copper wires necessary in the generation and transmission of electricity from foreign manufacturers probably using Uganda's copper. The finished copper products are, moreover, must more expensive than the copper that was exported. There is, therefore, no linkage between the copper mining and copper consumption in the country. This is precisely what lack of integration means. Of course, such an economy as exemplified by the copper mining and copper use is not independent. It is dependent on importing finished copper products that it could economically manufacture itself; it is also exclusively dependent on foreign markets for its raw copper. It does not, however, mean that an independent economy is not inter-dependent with other economies. It is inter-dependent with other economies in fields where it cannot economically be self-sufficient. Even in the so called free markets, it is normally

competition among "equals" although at the moment USA, W. Germany and Japan are "more equal" than the other developed "equals". Uganda's reasons for not using its copper in its industries as raw materials is not concerned with "inter-dependence". It has got more to do with those who take all our copper and sell us all our requirements in finished copper products at much higher prices. It has got more to do with the colonial malformations already referred to and, therefore, the unhealthy dependence of our economy on foreign economies in fields where it could be profitably independent. Having seen what the "integrated", "independent" aspects of our proposed national economy mean, let us briefly refer to the "self-sustaining" aspect. A "self-sustaining" economy means an economy that can move under its own power and is not just a puppet of outside economies on which it is dependent. There are some internal factors that cause motion within that economy or between that economy and other economies. These are called endogenous factors. There may be other "external" factors contributing to the same economy which we call exogenous factors. These, however, are not the primary moving force; but rather, the secondary one. The internal elements of the economy would be, for instance, the capacity of the economy to make machine-making machines or to extract a metal from its ore and use the metal to manufacture finished products. Foreign capital or importation of inputs are examples of external factors. Therefore, a self-sustaining national

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economy, while it may be inter-dependent with other economies, has got an integral cohesion that enables it to exist with a measure of independence. This may mean, for instance, ability to use one's raw materials in his manufacturing industries while one's industries are contributing machinery and other inputs to the raw-materials producing sectors e.g. agriculture and mining. Therefore, with an independent and self-sustaining national economy, one would have to ensure, above all, the forward and backward linkages between the different sectors of the economy: e.g. between industry and agriculture, industry and mining, construction and industry etc. and vice versa. To give some examples, agricultural raw-materials would feed agriculture while bricks, tiles and tar would feed industry and industry would feed construction with tools etc. Such an economy is a dynamic one. The present economy of Uganda apart from the cotton industry -- is not integrated. This includes the much talked about tourism. Even in its hey-day in the pre-Amin days, there never was, for instance, sufficient linkage between tourism and agriculture. Who was producing the cornflakes, the butter, the oats, the bread, the tomato sauce, the chillis, the whiskies, the wines and the champagnes etc. etc. that were feeding the tourist industry? The linkage was, indeed, limited to probably milk and meat.

You could find that Uganda's tourist industry was inter-acting more with South African agriculture or with

agricultural based industries in other countries than with Uganda's agriculture. When the tourist industry of Uganda import a carton of butter, which could easily be bought locally with proper restructuring apart from being yet another unjustified transfer of resources in the endless haemorrhage to our detriment, the economic activity resultant to the buying of this extra carton of butter will be realised abroad and not with the national economy. That is to say that the butter producer whose carton of butter was bought by the Uganda tourist industry will be able to buy extra pairs of socks, thereby benefiting the textile industry of their country, attend a film show, thereby benefiting their entertainment industry etc. etc. Conversely, our textile and entertainment industries will be that much poorer. Hence, this haemorrhage causes both direct and indirect losses. The building of an independent, integrated and self-sustaining national economy will usher in inter-action and inter-dependence within the national economy which are currently almost totally absent. Inter-dependence with foreign economies that will remain will be healthy because it will be necessary. What we have today is not inter-dependence but dependence; it is not symbiotic but parasitic; it is not progressive but regressive. In short the following steps ought to be taken in order to move towards an independent, integrated, self-sustaining national economy.

- (i) Diversify agriculture away from the present narrow confines of just producing requirements for external markets and produce, in addition, things needed by our industrialisation process and, especially, food that can be exported to the Arab world, North Africa and Sub-Sahara Africa, apart from eliminating the food import bill.
- (ii) Building industries in the import - substitution sectors so as to eliminate the import bill for especially consumer goods e.g. soap, tooth paste, paper, textiles, etc. etc. -- taking pains to build industries that will use local inputs as much as it is technologically possible. It is of little value to build industries that are heavily dependent on imported inputs if it is scientifically possible to have local alternatives thereby limiting the out-flow of resources. Import -- substitution should also be undertaken in producing agricultural tools following, again, the principle of maximum self-sufficiency.
- (iii) Aggressive industrialisation should take place along the entire spectrum of our agricultural products. Things like butter, jam, sausages or fruit juices should be locally made for home consumption and export. The carbohydrate, protein

and fat foods we produce should be processed and packed for both local sale and for export to especially other African and Arab countries. This industrialisation cannot take place without a research institute to identify the scientific techniques necessary for processing, preserving and packing the various foods we produce for internal distribution and export. The industrialisation should not confine itself to just processing and packaging; extraction of industrially useful substances could also be done.

- (iv) Construction of basic industries -- eg. iron and steel, chemicals or construction and engineering -- should be undertaken where feasible. If one African country cannot do it alone, then several of them could co-operate on one project or on a number of projects. Without these basic industries -- e.g. iron and steel it is impossible to industrialise or develop because steel is required in so many things -- housing, road construction, machine-making, agricultural tools, automobile -- manufacture etc. etc.
- (v) We should ensure that we eventually develop a capacity to make locally, machine-making machines. We cannot content ourselves with merely importing

the whole range of foreign plants to use in our manufacturing sector.

(vi) Similarly we should ensure that we acquire, eventually, the computer technology.

(vii) In short we reject the notion that we should be dependent on others for all our technology. To do otherwise, is the best recipe for perpetual subservience.

A hundred years ago we controlled our own technological development. Now we are dependent on foreigners for the making of even safety or drawing pins. It is a shame and an unpardonable crime for African leaders to accept this situation. Moreover, we wish to point out the fact that without the building of an independent integrated, self-sustaining national economy, Uganda or indeed other African countries, will never stabilize. Much of the present turmoil is as much due to political mismanagement as it is due to a narrow economy that cannot accommodate the aspirations of so many groups within the individual countries. A local example, in the colonial days, there were only 55 Gombolola (sub-country) and 10 Saza (county) chieftaincies, the Enganzi, the treasurer, the Kihimba and the Muramuze (chief-minister, treasurer, head of civil service and chief-magistrates respectively)

in Ankole district with a population of 555,000 at that time. These were the only high level jobs in the whole district that people had to compete for. This accounted for much of the sectarianism in the politics of Ankole as the various factions of the elite tried to use the population as bases in their unprincipled struggle for jobs. These factions of the elite were: Bahmia chiefs, Bairu-protestant and Bairu-catholic elites. Proof that the whole struggle was for jobs is given by the fact that when the Bairu-Protestant clique took power in 1963, it soon split up again between the Nkomba and the Mufunguro factions. Another good example is that the Bahima chiefs, although in power from 1900 to 1946 did absolutely nothing for the Bahima population. It was during this period that the Bahima people were forced by the adverse economic situation created by the colonial situation, (tsetse flies, unplanned cultivation) lack of education and their own ignorance (and consequent arrogance) to disperse from their home-land to many other parts of Uganda.

In respect of Buganda much of the trouble was caused by the protestant clique of Mengo while they were trying to defend the colonial rewards for collaboration with colonialism as per the 1900 agreement. Eventually the Catholic elite elements of Buganda joined the DP to fight for "truth and justice" -- i.e. "justice" for the elite -- never for the masses. If you talk of "justice" for the masses, the DP leaders accuse you of communism.

Similar wars over the narrow prospects were to be seen in Busoga (Mwangu-Bakaswirewa), Acholi (Lakidi-vs-Ojera) etc. etc. In fact much of Uganda's problems have been due to these unprincipled line-ups. If the economy, however, was expansive, interest in state offices would somewhat decline. In fact with a few opportunities in farming and the commercial sector, the situation was relieved somewhat. These days you can notice retired civil servants in farming or the commercial sector. Try to imagine what would happen if there were not such, albeit limited openings. The pressures on the cohesion of society would be that much more. The situation would further improve if we embarked on the implementation of the six points enunciated above to ensure the building of a self-sustaining, integrated and independent national economy, accompanied of course by a correct line in politics.

Source: Museveni, Yoweri, Ten-Point Programme of N.R.M., Kampala: N.R.M. Publications, 1985, Ch. 1,2,3 and 5.

APPENDIX F

CHURCH OF UGANDA

DIOCESE OF NORTHERN UGANDA

TELEPHONE: 248 or 59

P.O. BOX 232
GULU
UGANDA

Our Ref.

Your Ref.

December 19, 1986.

Mr. Yoweri K. Museveni,
President of the Republic of Uganda,
Parliamentary Buildings,
Kampala,
Uganda.

Dear Mr. President,

Re: THE SECURITY SITUATION IN GULU AND KITGUM DISTRICTS (DIOCESE OF NORTHERN UGANDA).

1. The recent development in the districts of Gulu and Kitgum which make up the Diocese of Northern Uganda has given rise to much worry and serious concern to us as Bishops of the area, all the Pastors, Lay Leaders of the Church and the entire population of the area. We therefore consider it imperative to share this concern with you, Your Excellency in this brief memorandum in the sincere hope that the message contained herein will help to bring about better understanding and appreciation on the part of Your Excellency, of the scope and dimension of the tragedy now facing your subjects in the two districts.
2. The problems started in August this year. At the time, the Diocesan Bishop was in the U.S.A. where he had been invited by Habitat for Humanity International, a Christian organisation involved in the construction of low cost housing in collaboration with indigenous people in different parts of the world to participate in the celebrations marking a decade of its existence.

As your Excellency is aware, Gulu town was attacked by armed men on August 20, 1986. Similar attacks were also reportedly made on Bibia, Acholibur, and Namukora. These were subsequently followed by clashes between National Resistance Army (NRA) and the insurgents in several parts of Gulu and

Kitgum districts. Perhaps the worst of those attacks where according to the Government Mass Madia, the insurgents lost more than 80 men respectively. Owing to those incidents road links between Gulu - Kitgum, Gulu - Arua, Gulu - Moyo and Gulu - Moroto became inaccessible to civilian transports. Many travellers from Kitgum were trapped in Gulu and they have not been able to return to Kitgum since the attack on Gulu in August. There have also been several cases of ambush involving both military and civilian vehicles travelling on Kampala road. This has caused great tension and apprehension among businessmen and other travellers who frequent the road.

3. As fighting between the National Resistance Army (NRA) and the insurgents continues to escalate, there are reports of wide spread murders, robberies, lootings, rapes, arrest and detention of civilians, burning of houses, granaries with food stuff, destruction of cooking utensils and the like by the belligerent forces. One of my pastors the Rev. David Oryem was murdered at his home in Olwal Division by people who are believed to be NRA soldiers.

Besides there are many other civilians who have been murdered in cold blood, Mr. Wilson Pido is a case in point murdered at his home in Ajulu on 8/11/1986 and 11 killed at Kwayo on 10/11/1986 respectively. Many Pastors have had to flee their parishes as a result of the military conflict. To mention but a few:-

The Rev. Charles Ocen	- from Keyo Parish
The Rev. David Obedi	- from Pakwello Parish
The Rev. James Okoya	- from Kero Parish
The Rev. Samuel L. Obol	- Deputy headmaster, Sir Samuel Baker School
The Rev. David Onyac	- Purongo
The Rev. Onesimus Onywillo	- Anaka
The Rev. Jiponi Okello	- Adilang
The Rev. Ben Ojwang	- Patongo
The Rev. Kuranimo Yamokolo	- Namukora
The Rev. Alex Ocaya	- Pajule
The Rev. Laban Awok	- Kilak Corner

and the Emmanuel Development Team based at Patongo of 13 people fled the area with all their property looted including a truck UXK 065, Nissan Pick-up believed to be in the possession of NRA who are using it. Thousands of people in the two districts have had their homes broken into and their property including cattle looted and in many cases at gunpoint. To mention a few:-

The Rev. George Okello	- Christ Church parish
The Rev. James Okoyo	- Koro Parish
Mr. Geoffrey Latim Anywar	- Diocesan Secretary
Mr. Nua Ochora	- St. Phillip Parish Chairman
Mr. Lakana Onok	- Family Planning Director
Mr. Mark Avola	- Diocesan Treasurer
Mr. Apollo Onok	- Christian Rural Service Co-ordinator
Mrs. Rose Otonga	- Family Planning Staff
Canon Maria Lapura Oryem	- an old widow.

The Rt. Rev. Gideon Oboma - Assistant Bishop who was not only looted at gunpoint but he was also manhandled by NRA soldiers not to mention the gunshots fired in the victims' houses.

Most of these cases were reported to the Special District Administrator's Office and the Barracks in Gulu and on many occasions these properties were found with NRA soldiers, while others have completely disappeared. We understand that these incidents are also affecting the Catholic Church, and perhaps the Muslim as well.

4. Your Excellency, we have dwelt more on the problems facing our Pastoral work because these problems are by and large the result of the worsening security situation in the two districts. The picture is extremely gloomy especially when it is visualised in the wider context of general breakdown of Law and Order and crumbling of the legal Machinery, destruction of social infrastructures, stoppage of agricultural production and all the ills and anomalies that are associated with war and war-like situation.
5. As Bishops and spiritual leaders in the area, we are deeply

touched by the plight of the people and it is our sincere prayer that a solution to the crisis should be found as a matter of exceptional urgency.

6. It may be that there are some people in our society who for one reason or another would like to see a continuation of the military conflict in the North. If such people are there, we do believe that they constitute a minority force. The majority of our people want peace and would like to see an end to this senseless war of attrition. As J. J. Rousseau, the celebrated Philosopher said, "The most general will is the most just and the voice of the people is the voice of God".
7. Indeed Sir, we are aware of your stand on the question of Human Rights and we respect it. We do unreservedly subscribe to the view that the cardinal duty of the government is to guarantee security of life and property to all people within its domain. However, it must be appreciated that military conflicts and war-like situations pose a grave threat to the observance of the Rule of Law and the protection of Fundamental Human Rights. This point is borne out by our experience both past and present. It is therefore necessary in the first place to seek to banish war altogether from our beloved Country Uganda in-order to be able to preserve the Rule of Law and secure protection of Fundamental Human Rights. We cannot eliminate war from our society unless we develop the moral will to diagnose, expose and isolate the circumstances and elements that often give rise to and perpetuate conflicts.
8. St. James' analysis and exposition of the root causes of war is therefore very pertinent. He said and we quote, "where do all the fights and quarrels among you come from? They come from your desires for pleasure which are constantly fighting within you. You want things but you cannot have them, so you are ready to kill; you strongly desire things, but you cannot get them so you quarrel and fight. You do not have what you want because you do not ask God for it. And when you ask you do not receive it, because your motives are bad; You ask things to use for your pleasures." (James 4: 1 - 3 Good News Version).

The "YOU" here in our opinion refers to all Ugandans directly or indirectly involved in the past and present armed conflicts.

9. But as christians we are commanded to "always aim at those things that bring peace and that help to strengthen one another." (Romans 14: 19). The Bible also says, "Where there is jealousy and selfishness, there is also disorder and every kind of evil. But the wisdom from above is pure first of all; it is also peaceful, gentle and friendly; it is full of compassion and produces a harvest of good deeds. It is free

from prejudice and hypocrisy. And goodness is the harvest that is produced from the seeds the peacemakers plant in peace."
(James 3: 16 - 18)

10. It is in the spirit of peace and reconciliation that we prayerfully and earnestly implore Your Excellency to demonstrate Your Statemanship and Magnanimity by considering the following proposals for action:-
 - (a) That you and your Government initiate dialogue with all military or political groups that are behind the current war in the country. Such a move will be seen by all peace loving citizens of Uganda and friends of Uganda in other parts of the world as a great act of wisdom and statesmanship on your part.
 - (b) That you and your Government grant total Amnesty to all Ugandans who have fled the Country so that they can peacefully return home, settle and participate in the rebuilding of this Country.
 - (c) That you and your Government release all prisoners of war especially innocent civilians who are held in large numbers in Government Prisons and Military barracks.
 - (d) That you and your Government ensure that the defencelessly innocent civilian population in the areas of military conflicts are not harrassed, molested, mistreated, arrested, their houses and foodstores burnt or even killed vindictively in the process of armed conflicts, which is a gross violation of Fundamental Human Rights.
 - (e) That you and your Government permit the International Red Cross and other Relief Organisations to take food, medicines, clothing, blankets and other necesssities to the innocent civilian population who are in desparate starving situations in the villages in the two districts.
 - (f) Last but not least that you and your Government support programmes designed to resettle and rehabilitate ex-soldiers and discharge prisoners.

11. We wish to assure you of our prayers and that we will be prepared to extend a helping hand in all these with the guidance of God.

Yours Faithfully;

On behalf of all the Christians and Clergy of the Diocese of Northern Uganda.

The Rt. Rev. Dr. Benoni Y. Ogwal-Abwang
Bishop of Northern Uganda.

The Rt. Rev. Gedion Oboma
Assistant Bishop of Northern Uganda Diocese

APPENDIX G

1. PRODUCTION IN THOUSAND TONNES.

YEAR	COFFEE	TOBACCO	COTTON	TEA	SUGAR	CEMENT	COPPER
1957						86.8	
1958						106.1	
1959		8.4		4.4	82.0	86.1	17.0
1960		5.2		4.7	94.0	72.2	19.0
1961		7.2		5.1	97.0	65.9	16.2
1962		5.1		6.3	106.0	55.9	18.3
1963		2.9		6.2	124.0	55.2	20.0
1964		3.4		7.6	126.0	72.7	19.0
1965		2.8		8.4	118.0	130.8	17.2
1966				11.2	127.0	122.4	16.2
1967				11.2	137.0	139.5	15.0
1968	133.4			15.1	152.4	154.9	
1969	247.2			17.6	140.0	172.9	
1970	211.5			18.2	154.0	191.0	17.6
1971							
1972							
1973							
1974	190.0						
1975			18.4	27.0	98.0	8.2	
1976	155.9	2.5	14.0	15.2	12.0	87.0	7.0
1977	121.3	1.4	20.0	10.9	8.0	73.0	8.3
1978							
1979	103.0	0.8	6.0	1.8	10.0	4.0	
1980	135.5	0.4	4.0	1.5	15.0	2.0	0.0
1981	97.5	0.0	5.0	1.7	15.0	10.0	0.0
1982	166.6	0.1	15.0	2.6	15.0	8.0	0.0
1983	192.0	2.3	10.0	3.2	20.0	17.0	0.0
1984	204.0	2.5	19.0	5.2	33.0	30.0	0.0
1985	155.0	2.0		6.0			
1986 ^a	160.0	2.0		9.0			

^a = Estimate.

Source: Various United Nations Statistical Year Books.

2. AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATES

(Ush per \$)

<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>
8.23	7.74	7.48	7.42	50.05	94.05	153.86	359.70	672.02	1400.0

TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT
(\$ mn)

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>
Total external debt	750.9	903.0	995.3	1016.1	1030.3
Long term debt of which public & publicly guaranteed	539.7	601.5	623.4	675.2	725.9
Private non-guaranteed	--	--	--	--	--
Use of I.M.F. credit	186.2	268.5	353.9	314.9	282.4
Purchases	144.4	93.8	113.8	21.5	--
Repurchases	12.2	1.7	12.7	38.7	65.2
Short term debt	25.0	33.0	18.0	26.0	22.0

Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables.

3. GROSS OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE^a

(\$ mn)

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>
Total of which:	114.7	156.4	147.1	170.2	169.3	188.5
Grants	82.4	134.2	85.2	110.4	98.7	84.4

^a Disbursement. Official development assistance is defined as grants and loans with at least a 25 per cent grant element, provided by OECD and OPEC member countries and multilateral agencies, and administered with the aim of promoting development and welfare in the recipient country. I.M.F. loans, other than trust fund facilities, are excluded, as is aid from Eastern bloc.

Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing countries

4.


PUBLIC EXTERNAL DEBT
(\$ mn)

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>
Total, incl. undisbursed	920.9	817.2	1077.2	1244.4	1244.4	1267.5
Disbursed only	602.8	539.7	601.5	623.4	675.2	725.9
of which:						
Official creditors	474.9	429.0	498.6	543.2	605.6	675.7
Multilateral	123.3	147.9	202.9	252.6	344.4	463.1
Bilateral	351.7	281.1	295.7	290.6	261.3	212.6
Private Creditors	127.9	110.7	102.9	80.2	69.5	50.3
Suppliers	89.5	66.1	48.3	44.7	27.1	14.8
Financial Markets	36.8	43.5	53.9	34.9	39.2	32.3
Debt Service	22.2	61.6	64.8	81.6	86.3	106.2
of which:						
Principal	19.8	58.8	54.6	64.7	54.5	79.2
Interest	2.4	2.8	10.2	16.9	31.8	27.0
Debt Service ratio (%) ^b	6.7	22.3				
Concessional loans share of disbursed debt (%)	41.5	38.5	58.5	61.0	63.3	69.5
Variable interest rate loans share of disbursed debt (%)	0.9	1.2	2.6	1.8	1.5	0.5


^b Debt service as percentage of exports of goods, and services.

Source: World Bank Debt Tables.

APPENDIX H

MAP 1
MAIN CASH CROPS

MAP 2
MEAN ANNUAL RAINFALL



Source: "The Economic Development of Uganda" International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1962, n.p.

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