

Policing, peacekeeping and development: United Nations peacekeeping in Haiti.

By

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Policing, Peacekeeping and Development: United Nations Peacekeeping in Haiti.

Sébastien Decaens

Abstract

The objective of this research is to examine the contribution to development of the United Nations Police (UNPOL) activities within the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mandates when confronted by situations of complex emergencies. The UNPOL mandate is to train police officers and police forces to promote peace, security and development. The thesis examines the role of UNPOL within United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) several months after the 2010 earthquake. It argues that the situation of complex emergency created by the earthquake added additional complexities to existing problems within UN peacekeeping including the inability to implement suggested recommendations from previous missions and a lack of proper training of UNPOL personnel. Another problem is the confusion in the UNPOL mandate between security and development so that in a case of complex emergency, the development mandate was abandoned, focusing instead on security concerns. As a result UNPOL's development mandate was sidelined as trainers and UNPOL personnel became directly engaged in maintaining security.

The thesis presents a case study of UNPOL activities as part of MINUSTAH in Haiti from June 22, 2010 until March 22, 2011 and findings are based on an analysis of my own experience as a UNPOL trainer, undertaken within the framework of peace and development. The thesis is situated against the backdrop of Haitian history and that of the Haitian National Police (HNP), including the different UN peace missions in Haiti.

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Chapter I: Introduction

The problem: Haiti's earthquake and peacekeeping mission

On January 12th, 2010, Haiti was struck by a devastating earthquake that killed nearly 300,000 people. This terrible event left many wounded and thousands without a safe place to live, as well, it caused the destruction of major infrastructure in the country's capital, Port-au Prince. In the days that followed, all the major media outlets focused on Haiti and the world was able to see the extent of the damage. In Port-au-Prince, 15% of the population was directly affected by the earthquake. In addition to the deceased, approximately 1.5 million people were rendered homeless overnight (Fierro, 2010).

As the poorest country in the western hemisphere, Haiti's government had been struggling to develop with the involvement of the international community for over 30 years. Immediately after the tragic event, Haitian government officials were overwhelmed, as all pillars of government had been affected; the international community was in shock and the local population was devastated. The situation was made worse by the glaring absence of first responders.

The United Nations (UN) was called upon to be a major part of the emergency response. The UN was already active in the country, involved in a peacekeeping mission and other mandates since 1995. The initial response to the natural disaster was slow. It took over a week to implement, beginning with providing aid to meet basic needs, including food, potable water and shelter for thousands of people. The delay undoubtedly led to a further loss of life (Fierro, 2010).

There have been five missions in Haiti since 1995, all under different UN

mandates. The current one is United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) which began on June 1st, 2004. This mission had four main objectives: 1) to support the emergence of stable and secure transition governments 2) to assist in restructuring the Haitian National Police (HNP) 3) to participate in the disarmament process, and 4) to restore the rule of law. The mission is summarised as working towards a safe and stable climate with respect to political process and human rights. (UN, 2014) Prior to the earthquake, tremendous progress had been made under the MINUSTAH mission and local police officers were, at that point, in charge of a portion of the training of their future police officers (UN 2013).

This progress was severely challenged as a result of the earthquake, which plunged the country into a situation of complex emergency. The country had suffered damaging floods in previous years and was slowly rebuilding. On January 12th, 2010 as the reality of Haiti changed, the reality of the peacekeeping mission changed as well. The UN had to adjust quickly and drastically to the situation, and did so by modifying elements of their mandate; putting some objectives on hold and eliminating others altogether. This research will focus on the impact the earthquake had on the roles on the United Nations Police (UNPOL), which had done tremendous work in the training and development of the HNP prior to the earthquake. This important training aspect of the mission had to be put on hold to address the situation created by the complex emergency.

The level of destruction brought by the earthquake created a perfect storm, and impaired the UN and UNPOL mandates. Damage from prior floods and devastation resulting from the earthquake were added to the litany of difficulties already present in

Haiti: a weak economy, political instability following years of dictatorship, foreign involvement and an already weak physical infrastructure. These factors challenged all the UN development projects in the country, including the development of the local police services. This research will examine the impact of the earthquake and ensuing emergency on the development components of the UN's peacekeeping mandate, especially as it pertains to UNPOL's role in training the HNP to contribute to peace and development. Discussion will address the modifications that had to be made to respond to the complex emergency situation that arose after the earthquake hit.

As we will show in this thesis, the response from the international community has changed from basic intervention, where peacekeepers act as mediators, to more complex interventions, where peacekeepers act on a multidimensional platform. In the first UN peace operations, the peacekeepers were intervening in inter-state conflicts. In those situations, it was clear who the opponents were and the causes of disputes were easy to identify. The main mandate for the peacekeepers was to maintain stable conditions while a peace accord was negotiated.

Peacekeepers are now involved in peace operations where the requirements go beyond those of previous armed interventions. When it comes to international security and maintaining peace, peacekeeping operations are the method of intervention most utilized by the UN. As we will discuss, UN police officers now have a dual role; providing both security and training during the missions. Each mission has specific roles for the police officers. The four principal roles of a police officer during MINUSTAH were: police mentor, police advisor, police trainer and humanitarian support.

The literature review will also reveal that the peacekeeping missions have adapted to the development issues. In this research, it will be demonstrated that in the peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH, the mandate of the mission failed to properly adapt to the complex emergency that was created by natural disaster. Supported by the Brahimi report this research will examine some of the suggested changes in the peace operations and link them to the MINUSTAH mission. This research will demonstrate that UN civilian workers and UNPOL were ill prepared for a situation of complex emergency. In the new phase of peace operations, the judicial system and the economic system combined with political and diplomatic tools must generate sustainable peace (Cockayne, 2009). Can the objectives of attaining sustainable and peaceful solutions to conflicts be derailed by one event?

The question

In a situation of complex emergency, can the development mandate of a peacekeeping mission be fully applied by international police officers in the field? Based on my involvement in MINUSTAH as a peacekeeper, this research will describe many of the difficulties that police officers faced during the Haiti mission. One of the issues was the incapacity to satisfy the initial objective, which included participating in the training and development of the HNP. There were numerous reasons for the police officers' inability to reach their initial goals, but the crisis created by the earthquake was the predominant one. Were problems with fulfilling the mandate caused by the fact that a complex emergency situation arose? Or was it the influence of a new reality; that the international community is now requesting security before development?

UN Peacekeepers are now operating on a multidimensional level. While security and maintaining peace will always be part of the mandate, there is now the additional mandate of providing humanitarian aid, as well as monitoring and mentoring the local authority. As per MINUSTAH's mandate, the peacekeepers had to also help implement a democratic political process. The MINUSTAH mandate will be described in more depth in following sections.

Numerous definitions of 'complex emergency' have been proposed. The term first emerged in the late 1980s on the African continent, and became a "buzz" word during the Gulf War. The international community defines it as situations of disrupted livelihoods and menaces to life produced by conflicts, civil disorder and extensive movement of people, in which any emergency response has to be conducted in a complicated political and security atmosphere (WHO, 2002). In addition to the problematic situations, natural disasters can intensify the crises dramatically.

This research will argue that after the earthquake of January 12, 2010, the UNPOLs were ill equipped to face all the predicaments caused by the natural disaster. The thesis argues that the peacekeepers were not sufficiently organized to properly manage the situation of complex emergency in Haiti. When we look closely at the roles of international police officers during the peace operation MINUSTAH, we believe that in the complex emergency situation, which resulted from the earthquake, the UNPOLs could not carry out their initial mandate. The peace operation had to shift focus from development to suddenly devote skills and human resources to saving lives. We believe

due to the political history of Haiti and its geographical situation, the UN should have been better prepared to face such a devastating event.

Literature Review

Introduction

When world leaders meet to discuss stability of the world, peace and security are always important topics. After the Second World War, an idea emerged that the international community should, and would, provide help and support in any part of the world where local officials were unable to maintain an appropriate level of peace and security. This support would take the form of an armed presence. It had been made clear by the international community that when it came to the pressing and serious issues of peace and security it could not be left to chance to determine the final outcome of conflicts between or within nations, particularly when those outcomes impact the rest of the world.

After numerous conflicts, and especially since the events of September 11th, 2001, security has become more closely linked to development. As will be explained in this research, the United States of America (US) has directly linked peace and development. In their blueprint, which has greatly influenced the international community, peace and development fall under the umbrella of security.

Based on my experience in MINUSTAH, I believe that the US influence dictated how the mission was handled following the earthquake of January 12, 2010. The country was put into a situation of complex emergency, where the priority was not on peace and

development, but rather security first, and then development. The following paragraphs will focus on the origins of peace and development. The research will then differentiate the notion of peace and development from the notion security and development.

Peace and Development

This subsection will focus on the notion of peace and development. The research will attempt to explain why security is now linked to development. “Unless you can impose order, you cannot begin to rebuild. All else rests on foundation” (Newsweek 2001:37).

Since the Second World War social order, or peace and social progress have been priorities for the international community. During the decades following, academic minds linked the notions of peace and development. The idea reached its climax during the 1980s. With the later event of 9/11 placed into the equation, one can easily understand why, peace, development and security are now interconnected. If the objective is to establish freedom, human rights, and peace in a long lasting, sustainable manner, it must be done away from direct violence (Barnett, 2008).

After the Second World War, the international community decided that there was too much lost in war and agreed to work toward peace. In 1942 during the "Declaration by United Nations" the U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was the first to use the term “United Nations”. Representatives of 26 countries agreed to jointly fight against nations that threaten international stability (UN, 2005). From that moment on, the international community would congregate and work to find solutions to the world’s crises.

Acknowledging the connection between security and development was one of the biggest steps that the international community has taken in regard to peace operations. That recognition influenced how conflicts were evaluated, as well as how the response would be implemented by the international community (Institute of Peace Academy 2008). Throughout the peace and development process, the international community's responsibilities are intensified, especially in post-conflict areas.

Academic debates influence how policy makers deploy peace operations. Various theories, philosophies and views have emerged from the academic forum. For example, the structuralism approach believes that the causes of development problems are situated in international relations, specifically in the world economic system (Kay, 1989). The dependency theorists wanted to break free from the monopolistic control of the core nations. They wanted a model that would take into account all aspects of the economic system and all aspects of the political interactions (Beckford, 1972).

Also in the academic world, neoliberalism emerged as a term that has numerous meanings. Policy makers seem to agree that the main objective of neoliberal economic globalization is the removal of all barriers to commerce, and the privatization of all available resources and services. Neoliberalism promotes the free markets as the best way, or the most effective route to take when it comes to global resource allocation (Makwana, 2006).

The practical application of these theories and philosophies are met with great challenges. The influence of the academic world cannot be ignored and, as a result, peace operations have changed drastically and are now multidimensional and complex.

Under the UN umbrella, the policy makers that are responsible for peace operations come from different theoretical branches and have different beliefs when it comes to peace and development. They are influenced by their academic backgrounds, their field experience and the trends of the international community. Action plans for peace operations have each been influenced by the theories popular at the time of their development. As previously mentioned, UN peacekeeping missions were established after the Second World War and the philosophy on which the missions were based continues to be enforced today. It is now clear, however, that the philosophical platform needs to be restructured.

Security and Development in Peace Operations

As previously mentioned, the majority of international organizations have embraced the reality that security and development are linked. In the initial UN missions, military troops were deployed as the main form of intervention. Over time it became evident that this type of armed forces could not fulfill all the objectives of the new, more complex mandates. It is a fact that in order to achieve true development; stability and security in the fragile state must first be restored.

In the peace operations which occur after a physical battle often, if not always, the UN deploys the international military. These operations also implement strategies to rebuild the political, economic and security sectors of a nation (Wilson, 2006). The focus of the international community should be on fragile, conflict-affected countries where the population is suffering because of a high level of violence. The UN has intervened in numerous countries to re-establish order, post-conflict. Unfortunately, when the missions

have ended and deployed military forces have left, there has often been a resurgence of violence in those failed states.

It is now evident that peacekeepers are involved in highly complicated peace operations. Some of the classical missions have been deployed for over forty years. In contrast, the timeline of contemporary, multidimensional peace operations seem to be shorter in length. The new peace operations have different goals and mandates and with the changing of social and political times, they are constantly under the microscope (Pouligny, 2006).

Order and stability in a society are important, especially in the early stages of the development process. They are key elements that will determine the implementation of the peace operation (Hills, 2009). A country that is considered to be a failed state will have a very short period of time to come up with a solution before the international community will suggest or impose one. From the first peace operations to the current ones, powerful nations have had a lot to say when it comes to international security.

The introduction of peace operations in the Middle East coincided with the beginning of the Cold War, and all major decisions of those missions were made behind closed doors. Behind those doors, were complicated political games that are still being played today. The UN Secretariat and the Security Council are main actors when it comes to the final decisions related to peace operations. It would be naïve, however, not to take into consideration the political pressures that the international community contribute to the decision-making process (Pouligny, 2006).

Since 9/11 the international community, highly influenced by the US, refuse to let

a failed state handle its situation alone. It is clear that since the tragic events in New York, the international community will not allow struggling states to collapse. The international community will not allow conditions to deteriorate in rogue states. The problems of those weaker states are now seen as the problems of the world (Traub, 2004).

Since the Second World War, it has been argued that often the decisions made by global policy makers are strongly influenced by the US's priorities. Since 2000, the US has made clear the link between development and maintaining global peace. To achieve global peace, focus must be on security and development. The definition of development is a controversial topic and this thesis is not about defining true development. When we talk about development in this research, we are referring to human development achieved through actions by peacekeepers aimed at reducing inequality. Their actions would also support the 30 articles of the universal declaration of human rights. The American government strongly believes that security issues created by failed states are rooted in their lack of development. In the 1990s, the U.S. government reached a fundamental policy conclusion: security is important to the development of democracy and police services will be a key component of securing that democracy (Hayley, 2000). To increase the comprehension of this thesis and to support the thesis statement, it is important to mention that although there was clear transition on official documents from peace and development to security and development, the UN and the international community had security on their agenda all along. It can be argued that policy makers and world leaders realised that after the events of the Second World War, the citizens were wary of efforts aimed at security and enforcement, but instead needed a more positive way of dealing with world conflict. The UN needed to find a more

peaceful way to bring about stability and the notion of peace and development was the chosen approach. After the events of September 11, 2001, the search for security was again considered legitimate and now openly played a greater role in development efforts, though the notion was there all along. (Spear and Williams, 2012)

That policy was important, because it not only made the link between security and development, but the American government identified the police services as a crucial way to obtain one of their ideals; democracy. In early 2000, US President Bill Clinton urged his policy makers to train and increase the number of American police officers involved in international peace operations. The international community has come to a theoretical agreement on what democratic policing entails. The focus should be on accountability, transparency, and protection of human rights (Hayley, 2000).

There were considerable efforts made by the international community to reform and improve the quality of police officers around the world, but in failed countries policy makers faced serious obstacles. Those obstacles seemed to be repeated in different states. The police officers, in the role of peacekeepers, faced a culture of corruption and often were not trusted by local populations. They were also involved where societies had endured decades, if not centuries, of repression. The prescription on how to manage and fix these problems is not clear (Carothers, 1999). When I was in Haiti acting as a peacekeeper, those issues persisted.

It is arguably more effective and less intimidating to local populations for police officers, rather than military, to remain in a failed state throughout the re-stabilization period. Every successful peace operation should have an exit strategy for the international community. Due to the fact that it is very difficult to predict when a mission

will be truly over, police officers have been used in peace operations, especially if policy makers anticipate a long UN presence in the host country.

Based on experience from previous missions, there are predictable changes in the host country when military forces leave after an armed intervention: the level of stability decreases and the level of crime increases. There are many reasons why the level of violence and criminality increase when the peacekeepers leave. Reasons include returning refugees, demobilized soldiers that reunite, the presence of weapons, and the high level of unemployment. Other factors are social divisions aggravated by the past conflict, lack of communication, illegitimate paramilitaries, and corrupt judicial systems. Also, although it is not often discussed, the long lasting psychological effects of violence cannot be ignored (Call, 1999). According to Call and Stanley, policy makers must think beyond the peace process. The greatest challenge to sustainability of any peace process is the installation of a system in which the rule of law is seen as one of the core values. This is especially difficult to attain when military forces had to be engaged in battles with local populations.

Peacekeeping and Development

Since its creation, the UN's principal mandate has been the preservation of international peace and promotion of development. The role of the UN can be seen in four key elements: 1) to maintain international peace and security; 2) to develop friendly relations among nations, 3) to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights, and 4) to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations (UN, Security Council, 2013). Peacekeeping deployment is intended to create a

sustainable solution to a conflict in a failed state. With the help of military, police and civilian peacekeepers, the UN must be capable of managing multidimensional mandates.

This subsection will describe the classical period of peacekeeping missions, during which the primary goals were to maintain ceasefires and stabilize conflicts on the ground. It will explain the parameters that need to be met for a peacekeeping mission to occur. The notion of peacekeeping emerged in 1948. At that time the Security Council approved a military deployment to the Middle East to observe the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Since that initial peace operation, more than 120 countries have sent men and women on numerous missions. Military personnel, police officers and civilians all serve as members of UN contingents (UN, 2014).

There are three mandatory principles that need to be met for a peacekeeping mission to occur. The first is consent of the involved parties. The peacekeepers will only intervene in a way that will bring a peace to a conflict. Second, impartiality; no side should be favoured by the peacekeepers. The peacekeepers are present to maintain, achieve or obtain peace; they are not involved in the political activities, nor are they supporting one side or the other. Finally, force will not be used except in self-defence or defence of the mandate. These are peace missions and the peacekeepers are seen as mediators and vessels of peace. With keeping the peace as their main focus, the peacekeepers are put in very difficult situations, and may, at times, have to take an enforcement role (UN, 2014).

In failed states, peace operations are one of the best tools to promote human rights on the field. Traditionally, peacekeeping is one of many elements of a peace operation. It has become difficult to separate the peacekeeping from development. As

has been previously explained, the peacekeepers are now used in different aspects of the peace process. One of those aspects is peace education.

Peace education was developed by the international community as a way to reach some of the peace operation's goals. Peacekeepers were used to promote and strengthen human rights and basic freedoms (Article 26, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN 2013). Peace education, which is promoted by the peacekeepers in failed states, now includes the issues of environmentalism and disarmament, as well as the promotion of a culture of peace (Gavriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo 2002). Once again, the peacekeepers fall under the umbrella of peace and development: a clear demonstration of the link between peacekeeping and development.

As per the platform of the UN, peace and security have always been on their agenda. Whether a solitary or group effort, and with or without the use of armed forces, development cannot be sustainably achieved in the presence of direct violence. If one wants to be able to take action that will help to achieve social development, peace must first be established (Ekanola, 2009). Peacekeepers simultaneously help to establish and maintain peace, as well as participate in the development process.

In the last two decades, the idea of development bringing peace has been explored in more depth. It is known that the notion of peace and the ongoing battle for human rights are closely related. Without acknowledging human rights, no one can claim to have achieved peace. Therefore it is only under the umbrella of peace that human rights can be completely accomplished (Dag Hammarskjöld, 2005). Another demonstration of

why peacekeepers now have a crucial role in the development aspect of a peace operation.

Since 1948, there have been over 50 United Nations peacekeeping missions. The three longest ones are the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which began in 1948, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which began in 1949, and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which began in 1964. All three missions are ongoing (UN, 2013).

The peacekeeping missions have changed over time. Initially used as a tool of mediation, they are now part of an expanded peace process. A review of the aforementioned Cyprus mission, demonstrates how peacekeeping missions have evolved and how they are now used. By analysing the mission in Cyprus, we are able to identify different roles that peacekeepers played.

Due to ongoing instability and an inability to resolve the conflict effectively, the international community has continued the mission in Cyprus well beyond the intended timeline. With the inability to politically control the Cyprus problem, UNFICYP continues to oversee the ceasefire, participate in the buffer zone, and dispense humanitarian aid (UN, 2013).

The Cyprus mandate can be seen as a template from which future peace operations have been created. The mission mandate had to grow to keep up with changing and evolving situations in the host country. The mandate's goals were to preserve international peace, to stop fighting, prevent future violence and to restore order and the rule of law (UN, 2013).

The incapability or unwillingness of two fighting parties in a host country to find political middle ground has often forced the Security Council to extend peacekeeping missions. Over time the policy makers have had to adjust and modify their approach toward the missions and how they would use peacekeepers, based on the way in which the issues became more complex and multidimensional.

Missions are staffed with soldiers and police officers for the dangerous and physical aspects of a mission. At the same time engineers, doctors, nurses and experts in numerous fields are called upon to help rebuild and or stabilize failed states. When armed forces and civilians are side-by-side, working together, it is evident that the objectives of the peacekeeping operations are no longer one-dimensional. In these missions, focus has shifted from establishing peace between two adversaries to the development of a functional society. These efforts are supported by governments and international institutions through the provision of tents, furniture and material, road transport, utility aircraft transport, portable structures such as hospital and offices, as well as numerous other services that are specifically related to local needs (UN, 2012).

It is important to acknowledge some of the sacrifices that the peacekeepers have made: approximately 3000 peacekeepers have died while serving for the United Nations (UN, 2012). There are risks in every mission, and all deaths are tragic. The risk is necessary, however, which we will see if we look back at the situation in Rwanda. In that situation where instability and devastating genocide occurred, the presence of peacekeepers was vital for the survival of the oppressed population.

In the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), the response of the UN has been questioned and deemed to have been inadequate (UN, 2012). The

following sub-sections will address some of the changes and critiques that have arisen since the late forties, with the objective of understanding the debates and reforms that have been made to peacekeeping over the years. Understanding these changes will help to explain the course of action taken by the UN following Haiti's earthquake.

Changes, from mediators to developers

In the following paragraphs the relation between peacekeeping and theories of development will be explicated. It will explain some of the changes that peacekeeping missions have faced. Changes that the peacekeeping missions underwent were often linked to changes in policies reflecting models of development theories. For example, the impact that globalization has had on missions. Globalization can be seen as the process of transformation of local or regional phenomena into global ones. It can be viewed as an attempt to unify the people of the world into a homogeneous society, one in which everyone works together. This process includes different aspects of the society; technology, culture, economics and security. One main construct of this theory is that we all have an influence on each other. If we take globalization into consideration it gives an example on how the nature of UN peacekeeping operations has changed. As a result of globalization the size, cost and number of missions increased, and the scope of peace operations broadened.

We are now in what is known as the era of modern globalization. The new reality of globalization arrived after the Second World War, and economists took over (Hoogvelt, 2001). Under the modern era of globalization, major institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were founded. Within the same

timeline, the peacekeeping missions began. The World Bank and the policy makers work closely during a conflict, especially in the post-conflict resolution process. The economic system is now an important aspect of the peace process. After 2001, numerous international organizations molded their plan for global stability into a framework that incorporated politics, economy, social priorities and security (UN, 2005). This has been referred to as “the 9/11 effect”, and as we will see, it influenced the way MINUSTAH was managed after the earthquake.

In the last sixty years, the international community has made efforts to help alleviate poverty. In early 2000, the United Nations came up with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The international community, which was focused on economic growth as a way to improve the livelihood of the less fortunate, decided to focus on people-centered approaches. The MDGs had eight goals, the last one: “Develop a global partnership for development” is the one that is closely linked to peacekeeping. This goal speaks to the need for peacekeepers to play a role in development.

Because of Haiti’s political environment, lack of economic resources and constant social turmoil, the five peace operations supported by the UN did not obtain the success expected (Zanotti, 2008). The mandates of the missions did not always bring the expected results. Policy makers had predicted that peace operations would create democratic peace. The missions did not produce peace and order, and they did not accelerate development. As explained in the Brahimi report, mandates for the UN’s peace operations were not clear enough. This was the case in the Haiti missions.

In the late 1950s, the international community agreed to deploy the first armed mission under the United Nations. The main objective of this armed mission was not to mediate and support the resolution process of a long dispute, nor was it to help in rebuilding. The very limited goal was to prevent and stop the acceleration of a violent conflict (Jones and Dobbins, 2006). Peacekeeping in that case was limited to preserving ceasefires and soothing situations on the ground; they offered important support in the efforts of resolving conflict by peaceful means.

“UN Peacekeeping was born at a time when Cold War rivalries frequently paralyzed the Security Council.” (UN, 2013). Because of that reality, it was often very difficult for the Security Council to take a decision that would satisfy all the members. This political reality over time led to expansion of the responsibilities of UN peacekeeping operations.

Although the mandate differs from mission to mission, the original objective remains: to find the best solution to any international peace and security threats. UN peacekeepers have been deployed all around the globe to avert the eruption of international and national conflicts, to supervise and control violence. The peacekeepers are also involved in supporting national actors in defending and building peace after conflicts (UN, 2013). The increasingly complex nature of the situations required greater assistance from civilians with specialized knowledge in different sectors such as administrators, police officers, legal experts and humanitarian experts.

The entrance of civilians in UN peacekeeping missions marked the beginning of the consolidation phase. In subsequent missions civilians and members of the forces

joined their skills, working toward the same goal: resolving conflicts in the most peaceful manner possible. During that period the number of military figures was reduced substantially, but the numbers of missions were the same. The UN had to respond to missions that required a higher level of complexity (UN, 2010). The results were not meeting the expectations of the international community.

The consolidation phase led into a multidimensional period which occurred after the Cold War. These peace operations continued to deploy military and civilian peacekeepers, and were designed to ensure the creation and the execution of the peace agreements. The intention was to build the platform for sustainable peace (UN, 2013).

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the notion of peacekeeping and peace building were merged. Missions were expected to build a sustainable institution of governance, and at the same time, they were expected to help in the promotion and protection of human rights. Peacekeepers had to be involved in numerous development fields, but their basic roles, like that of disarmament, remained important. The issue was, and still is, that a massive military deployment is not built to handle the public security challenges that countries in post-conflicts states are facing (T. Donais, 2004).

In early 2000, the United Nations had deployed over 9000 civilian police (CIVPOL) around the world (Miyet, 2000). While the training and monitoring aspect of peacekeeping operations remain, they were no longer their main objectives. Police officers were now allowed to carry their personal weapons and in some cases to enforce the law. The mission of Kosovo and East Timor are good examples of that. In 1997, the President of the Security Council, in a UN Press Release, recognised the importance of

police members and acknowledged that they now have to be involved in a larger mandate: “ The civilian police perform indispensable functions in monitoring and training national police forces and can play a major role, through assistance to local police forces, in restoring civil order, supporting the rule of law and fostering civil reconciliation, (moreover the UNSC) sees an increasingly important role for civilian police.” (UN Press Release, 1997).

We acknowledge the importance of a strong military presence to support missions, especially in volatile states, but the establishment of a strong police presence is the key for a sustainable resolution of the conflict (Wilson, 2006). This is a significant point because the increased numbers of police officers and civilians coincide with the beginning of the multi-faceted and multidimensional peace operations. As formerly mentioned, most recently, the UN had to intervene in interstate conflicts, where the old model was not as efficient. As we have seen in this research, the classic model was for the peacekeepers to intervene when there was a clear dispute between two groups with different beliefs and different objectives that could not be resolved otherwise. In 1995, Haiti was one of the first countries where the UN mainly used civilian police as the principal physical presence to operate during their mission. In 1999, the mission in Kosovo, which was considered the most successful mission, based on its initial mandate and its results had the highest number of civilian police in the field at that time (UN, 2014).

The failures that led to the reforms

From the early implementation of the peace operations, the critics questioned missions' ability to truly resolve conflicts. In the mid-1990s, the three missions of Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia were simply considered failed missions. The peacekeepers failed, or were put in a situation in which they were unable, to bring peace back in those areas. The Haiti mission is not seen as a failure but the critics have questioned its efficacy. The local population are still facing threats from criminal organizations, which have not been addressed by the peace operation. The weak mandate of the mission is probably the reason why certain situations cannot be rectified (Cockayne, 2009).

From the critics of the early deployments and from the critics of the present ones, came the different reforms. The purpose of the reforms was to strengthen the capacity to effectively manage and sustain field operations. The effects of a mission must go beyond providing initial relief: the host country must be able to independently maintain and sustain the implemented solutions. To achieve this, policy makers have to intervene at the root of the problem and create lasting improvements to quality of life for local citizens.

In 2000, the UN found itself confronting dilemmas regarding their peace operations. Globally, demands and requests for the deployment of peacekeepers was increasing, but there were criticisms of the way field operations were managed. According to the UN, the three biggest challenges the peacekeeping operations were facing were; deploying its largest, most expensive and increasingly complex operations,

designing and executing transition strategies for operations where stability has been achieved, and equipping communities as much as possible with the capacity to ensure long-term peace and stability (UN, 2014).

In order to analyse the shortcoming of the missions, in the spring of 2000, the Secretary-General created a panel, led by Lakhdar Brahimi. The panel's discussions and research gave rise to what we call today the Brahimi Report. The panel offered numerous recommendations and noted the following: "in order to be effective, UN peacekeeping operations must be properly resourced and equipped, and operate under clear, credible and achievable mandates." (UN, 2014).

We found that the recommendations made in the Brahimi report in 2000 were not achieved during the MINUSTAH mission. The inability to achieve and meet the recommendations made by the panel of the Brahimi Report impacted how MINUSTAH was managed after the earthquake of January 12, 2010. This will be further explored in the Case Study to follow.

The panel made twenty recommendations that were contained in the Brahimi report. In the following paragraphs, we will focus on four: Peace-building strategy, Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy, Clear, credible and achievable mandates and, Civilian police personnel (UN, 2000).

In the Peace-building strategy, the Brahimi report made four principal suggestions. The first is that a small part of the initial budget be made available to fund "quick impact projects". They recommended a shift in the use of police officers so their actions can reflect the new focus on the rule of law, and help to "improve respect for

human rights". In complex peace operations, they suggested that in the first phase of the mission, the law-making officials consider demobilizing and reintegrating programmes into the passed budgets. Finally, the report suggested a plan be put in place in such a way that the UN would have the ability to create sustainable peace-building strategies.

The panel had clear suggestions in the Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy section and they can be briefly summarised as such. When peacekeepers are deployed, they have to have the ability to enforce the mandate in a professional and successful manner. At all times, they have to be able to defend themselves and they have to be under the support of strong rules of engagement.

The Brahimi report made four suggestions in the section on clear, credible and achievable mandates. Before any peacekeeping operations be fully deployed the Security Council has insured that the agreement meets the requirements and standard for international human rights. The panel recommended that the Security Council overestimate the number of troops in draft resolutions in order to ensure that ample troops are committed and arrive in the field. The panel suggested that the resolution of the Security Council should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations especially in potentially volatile situations. Finally, they suggested that a truthful and honest way of communicating has to be established between the Secretariat and the Security Council, so the reality of missions can be portrayed.

The five recommendations made in the Brahimi report in the section Civilian police personnel were very important, but as we will see, some recommendations are still on the wish list. The panel suggested that each Member State should have a standby unit

of police officers ready to go on a mission, on short notice. The panel recommended that the Member States would respectively train the standby unit so the members could meet the requirements of the UN. The report suggested that the Member States had a “single point of contact” where the police officers would be provided to the UN. The panel recommend an on-call unit of 100 members which could be deployed on seven days notice. This unit would be specially trained, so they would have the skills to manage and handle the majority of any new peacekeeping operations. Finally, the panel suggested that specialists in judicial, penal, human rights and or similar domain should have a standby unit as well, and be ready to be deployed with the police officers.

This research is focused on those four specific recommendations because we believe that they directly affect how police officers on the field perform their duty and interact with the locals. There have been no peacekeeping operations that have fully satisfied the suggested reforms. This explains some of the critiques and the lack of success of several recent missions.

Arising from the recommendations of the Brahimi report there have been four major reforms: “Capstone Doctrine”, “Peace Operations 2010”, “2005 World Summit {A/RES/60/1}”, “High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change {A/59/565}”(UN, 2014). The first one focused on the principles that a peacekeeper has to follow on the field. The second one was an elaboration of a reform strategy of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The third was the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission. The final reform was an attempt in setting a broader structure that would help in the establishment of future collective security.

In Haiti's situation, the addition of an 'unplanned' natural disaster created the perfect storm for the mission to fail. In the field, police officers argue that you cannot strategize for an "Act of God". In this research, it is not our objective to challenge the possibility of divine influence. Based on history and its geographical location, however, should policy makers always consider the high probability of natural disasters, in Haiti? In 2010, during the MINUSTAH mission, police officers have been declared the most important asset of the mission by the Argentinean Police Commissionaire. The police officers have been utilised in numerous roles, but under the UN protocols, it was practically impossible for the police officers to apply the initial UN mandate. For the police officers an important part of the mandate was to train the local police.

In addition to the inability to implement the report's recommendations at the suggested level, Haiti's natural disasters are keeping the country in a constant state of potential complex emergency. The US Institute of Peace further refined the definition of complex emergency as human-made crises and or national disasters that require an international response that extends beyond the mandate or capacity of a single organisation. The intervention can include military elements in order to meet security expectations. This definition is the closest to the peace operations in Haiti, and will later be explored in more depth. As we will see in this research with everything that is involved during a peacekeeping mission it was very difficult for the policy makers to follow or implement the recommendations and reforms in Haiti's situation.

The meaning of peacekeeping has changed in the eye of the public. The roles of peacekeepers have changed and each mission is more complex than the previous one.

Peacekeeping in the original sense has almost become obsolete. It has now entered an era where the peacekeepers are asked to focus on other aims, such as humanitarian aid. The peace operations have become multifaceted, which was not the case in the past. (Pouligny, 2006) At the present time, peacekeeping missions are multidimensional with multidisciplinary members. The peacekeeping missions continue to facilitate the political process and the majority of their work focuses on protection of civilians. Peacekeepers are still continuing to assist in disarmament, disbandment and reintegration of former fighters. Peacekeepers are also supporting the organization of elections, protection and promotion of human rights, as well as supporting restoration of the rule of law.

The UN has had missions in Haiti since the mid-1990s. The missions' mandates and the roles of peacekeepers have changed throughout that time; from a strong military component to directly and quickly provide security, to a capacity-building mandate intended to develop accountable security and justice institutions. Currently the mandate has limited political support from within, but the mission is still attempting to restore Haiti's constitutional rule (Cockayne, 2009). In the next chapter we will analyse the role of the police officer in failed states.

Police and development

When it comes to peacekeeping the police officers are now involved in two important aspects of peace operations: security and development. In this section, we will focus on the importance of police in society and more specifically on the role they play in development. In developed, democratic countries, the role and the importance of police are evident. The police departments play a crucial role in enforcing the rule of law. Some

may argue that the level of democracy of a country can be measured by the level of trust that its citizens have in their police. Police officers are not only seen as physical enforcers when it comes to the law, they are the gates to the justice system. Police officers are expected to provide protection to the population. They are supposed to reflect the image of the law, and they are the link between the citizens and the justice system. They have the dual role; that of community provider as well as law enforcer (Hinton and Newburn, 2009).

The role of the police officers is now, more than ever, directly linked to the success of development. As it has been mentioned and will be repeated in this research, peace has to be established for true development to occur. Prior to initiating the peace process, there needs to be physical stability on the ground. A stable situation on the ground allows policy makers to enter the failed state, have a direct view of the situation, and then make pertinent suggestions on how to begin the peace process. Police officers have a crucial role to play when it comes to maintaining the security level in which the other social components can grow and develop. Failed states and areas of the globe where conflicts cannot be resolved without the presence of armed forces are receiving the majority of the financial support, when it comes to projects focused on bringing back peace. The belief is without effective and accountable policing, solutions to wider social issues will probably not be achievable (Hinton and Newburn, 2009).

The UN sees the police officers as protectors of the civilians and since the 1990s they have been used as a tool to promote peace and security. During peacekeeping missions, in addition to provide security, peacekeepers train local police officers, and

support local and UN workers in humanitarian aid projects. Their main objectives are to establish an atmosphere where the setting for sustainable peace and development can occur (UN, 2014).

When a natural disaster occurs during a mission the platforms and the mandates of peace operations are seriously shaken and often damaged. One of the focal points of this research will be on the role police officers play during peacekeeping missions. We will look at the work that has been done in Haiti throughout the years. The HNP has been known to exercise power through demonstration of physical force in order to protect the ruler or the elite. This had to be reformed for the local population to regain trust of their police force. This reform fell under the mandate of the peacekeepers. The culture of police had to be transformed into a disciplined and disciplinary institution that would focus on the protection of the well-being and security of the population (L. Zanotti, 2008).

UN peacekeeping operations can be seen as a live organisms that needs to constantly change and adjust in order to respond to the challenges they face. As we have seen in the previous paragraphs, police officers have a key role to play during the missions. Peacekeepers bring security, but they also bring a sense of safety. “The routine encounters played out between blue helmets and host, whilst uneventful in the main, do over time accrete into a precarious and contingent security ‘mood’, ‘climate’ or ‘feeling’.” (P. Higate and M. Henry, 2010:34). In the field during MINUSTAH, the UN patrol vehicles and the presence of UNPOLs were often enough to temporarily settle the local population.

The role of police in democratization

A democratic political process is often challenged in failed states by the group that is forced to leave or abdicate their power. I have seen firsthand when I was in Haiti, the volatility that arose during elections. During this part of the mission, the main roles of the peacekeepers were to provide security and ensure the democratic political process would prevail. In terms of police and democracy, most believe that good governance and stable democracy are linked to the efficiency of the state police. The government, with the help of the police, have an important role in protecting the values promoted by democracy. According to Marenin, without an effective police institution that is democratised, political democracy will not be achieved. That connection is a key element when it comes to evaluating the success of democracy in a specific state. (Marenin, 1998)

No one would contest that security is important for a country, if only to ensure national sovereignty. The citizens' sense of security in a failed state is often very low. One consequence of the majority of civil wars is an increased number of violent crimes. Police institutions have a key role in reinstating order, and the method that they use will depend on the type of enforcement they normally use. "Conversely, police who are effective in protecting individuals from criminal threats, who respect individuals' rights, and who protect vulnerable groups regardless of ethnicity or political orientation can create a positive climate even when broader political arrangements are uncertain or less than democratic." (Call and Stanley, 2001: 152). In a politically corrupt state, with a repressive style of policing, concern for protection of human rights is often disregarded, especially after a major crisis. If the police institutions are mainly formed from one

specific segment of the population, without a strong government, they can potentially dominate the weaker group. This imbalance leaves some citizens vulnerable to abuse, and unable to trust in their police institutions.

The importance of police officers

In the following paragraphs, a correlation between police work and development will be made. With innovation in technology and the increased speed with which we receive news, we are now witnesses to tragedies that happen all around the world. Scenes of extreme violence caused by desperation can be seen on a regular basis. The UN's response involves deploying peacekeeping missions in which police officers are now a pivotal component.

The role of the police officers is crucial in restoring the feeling of security among the local people, establishing the rule of law, and actively engaging in activities that help to restore order. "Police must protect human rights, especially those rights that are required for the sort of political activity that is the hallmark of democracy." (Bayley, 2005: 19). The police officers are facing numerous challenges. One of which is to understand and represent a different culture, while promoting their own values. Police officers face this challenge in their own country when they have to effectively manage the mandates of their government's policies along with the actual work that needs to be done in the field. One can only imagine the challenges they are facing when they have to enforce the law in a foreign country. This is the time to question if the police officers in Haiti's peacekeeping mandate could possibly accomplish what they are sent to do? Does

the reality of what the police officers do in the field concord with what they are mandated to do?

When analysing development projects in different countries, a direct link can be made between a safe and secure political process and a viable police and justice system in which they can properly operate (Wilson, 2006). “Security and development”, “humanitarian aid via military intervention”, the “police work in a peacekeeping mission are seen as the most important part of the mission”, the “establishment of the rule of law”: all of these terms and sentences have been used and said by the policy makers in the last decade. I had the opportunity to represent the UNPOLs at meetings where the person in charge of the police officers and the person in charge of the civilian members agreed and declared that in Haiti, the work of the police officers in the internal displaced camps was the heart of the mission.

Due to political, cultural and geographical reasons, Haiti’s situation has not improved. In 2004, when the international ranking of the richest countries was released, Haiti ranked 153 out of 177 countries (UN, 2012). After all the damages that were caused by the earthquake of January 12, 2010, Haiti dropped in the bottom five, when it comes to the poorest countries in the world. The UN increased the numbers of police officers in response, and during the worst of the situation, they planned to have approximately 5000 international police officers spread across the country. The next few paragraphs will focus on the roles and the values that are promoted by the police officers during a peacekeeping mission.

The roles and values of police officers

Honesty, Integrity, Professionalism, Compassion, Accountability and Respect are the values that are promoted by Canadian police officers. These values are taught in different missions around the world, where Canadian police officers are deployed. We believe that it is important to determine if the training done by police officers helps development. It is important to research if the values they are promoting on the field will improve the livelihood of the local population.

One of the objectives of this research is to analyze the roles of police officers in a peacekeeping mission. In this section, from the perspective of the Canadian Police and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), we will take a closer look at the roles of UNPOL in the Haiti peacekeeping operation. The first role is 'Police Mentor'. In this role, the police officer will oversee the implementation of the agreed framework for compliance to professional standards by national police officials and assist them in their efforts to deliver democratic police services. They will also provide on-the-job training to local police, either individually or in a group setting. The second role is 'Police Advisor'. In this role, the police officer will provide on-the-job training, advice and mentorship to their counterparts within the local police structure to ensure that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially and that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully protected.

The third role of an UNPOL is 'Police Trainer'. In Haiti, this is the main role for police officers. Trainers contribute to the planning and implementation of activities to fulfil the mission mandate. They are responsible for assessing and identifying current

standards and meeting essential training needs of police officers in Haiti, in accordance with the requirements of the mandate. This includes basic training, specialized and refresher training, as well as specific career development/promotion courses.

Finally, the last role of an UNPOL is ‘Humanitarian Support’. In this role, they will support the delivery of humanitarian aid by assisting in establishing and maintaining a secure environment. They engage in proactive patrols to maintain public order and security. This may include especially harsh and difficult areas such as displaced persons camps. (RCMP, 2012) The principal role of police officers around the world will always be to serve and protect their own citizens. Sometimes in failed states, the local police officers are unable or reluctant to do so. In those cases the international community is called upon to offer the same kind of protection (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, p.viii).

In conclusion of this section, the thesis would like to emphasize the importance of the role of police officer in the success of a mission. As was mentioned, missions are more complex and are becoming very challenging for policy makers. The challenges police officers faced in the early missions were demanding; the challenges police officers will face in the future peace operations will be even more difficult. Police officers have to deal with the mandate of reforming the local police and implementing the additional goals of the UN. In the field trying to accomplish all those objectives at the same time can be seen as “trying to build an airplane while you’re flying it” (Col. Chip Lewis quoted in Frayer 2007). Unless an unforeseen change occurs, the roles of the UNPOL in

Haiti will remain the same. As we have seen in the past, occasionally Mother Nature has a way to change things from difficult to complex overnight.

Complex emergency

Complex emergencies can be seen as a combination of internal conflict with major displacements of the local population caused by famine or food deficiency. It also involves fragile or failing economic, political, and social institutions. All those elements added to a natural disaster, and created what we call a complex emergency (WHO, 2012). As previously mentioned, police officers have to serve and protect the population and they have to promote the values noted above while doing so. They often find themselves in positions where they simultaneously have to play multiple roles. This is a challenge in itself, and in some cases, peacekeepers have to intervene in situations that are described as complex emergencies.

In the late 1980s, the expression ‘complex emergency’ surfaced on the African continent. It became a buzz term during the Gulf War, and it was clear then that the term applied not only to a situation caused by a natural disaster. “For the UN, a complex emergency is a major humanitarian crisis of a multi-causal nature that requires a system-wide response.” (Duffield, 1994).

Prior to the earthquake of January 2010, the UN mission in Haiti had mainly been humanitarian in nature, and the peacekeepers’ main objectives were to maintain order and help solidify the HNP. After the earthquake, Haiti was thrown into a state of emergency; a complex emergency situation. I can speak first-hand about the situation, based on the

nine months I spent in Haiti. I can attest to the challenges and complexity we faced and to the changing-nature of the peacekeeping mission in the wake of the natural disaster.

There are key elements that will worsen or prolong a complex emergency situation. One such element is the strength of local government institutions. If government institutions do not have the ability to help the population, or if they are too weak to defend the population against any type of danger, the emergency situation will be prolonged. There are a variety of triggers which may cause a complex emergency. A natural disaster could put a country in a situation of complex emergency over night; a long lasting genocide could also put a population into a complex emergency. In both situations, the weaker the government institutions are, the longer the complex emergency situations will last (Albala-Bertrand, 2000).

The mission in Haiti was a unique situation. The earthquake devastated the country both physically and emotionally. One very important aspect of the mission that was not covered by the media was the effect the earthquake had on the civilian members of the UN. In this research, the emotions UNPOL members had to overcome will be discussed in future chapters. One issue that was quietly raised by the UNPOLs was the overwhelming challenge of fulfilling the civilian mandate as well as their own. In defence to the civilian members, even with the best pre-deployment training, they could not have been prepared for the event, especially the mass loss of life. This was the biggest difference between how the civilian and the peacekeepers reacted to the situation.

Even in 2010, the platform of the peace operations was constructed for a more predictable world. The current day situations that peacekeepers face are increasingly

complex and require the decision makers to act on a multidisciplinary level. The peacekeepers are now challenged to their limits in many different ways; they confront extreme levels of poverty and human suffering, they mediate intense inter and intrastate conflicts, and often have to manage the UN mandate and respond to a situation of complex emergency (Duffield, 1994).

As previously mentioned, according to the UN statistics branch over 3000 peacekeepers have lost their lives over the years in all the different missions. As the peacekeepers are trained to perform and conduct their duties in stressful situations, they are aware of the possibility that the unfortunate may happen. The earthquake was not the first time people died in Haiti during a UN mission. However, this was the first time that such high numbers had died in such a short period of time. After speaking with UNPOLs that were present during the earthquake, it was clear that any training they had received was irrelevant on the day of the earthquake. They were deeply and strongly affected. It created fear in the civilian population, the kind of fear that can only dissipate with time. But Haiti needed help and they needed it fast.

In the twelve months that followed the earthquake, the mission worked to help millions of affected Haitians. All levels of the UN workers and all the NGOs were also affected in a variety of ways: no one was left untouched. They also had to manage a cholera outbreak, which after a lengthy investigation, was discovered to be caused by a Nepalese peacekeeper. Then hurricane season arrived, which was more devastating than normal because of all the people that were relocated to tent cities. Furthermore, Haiti

went through two violent rounds of elections. The decision makers had to confront different quandaries, which all required swift action: nothing could be postponed.

The earthquake, the cholera outbreak, the hurricane season, along with a violent election, caused a very high number of deaths. The personnel that participated in the search and rescue efforts following the earthquake were powerfully affected by the gruesome scenes they faced. Field workers and peacekeepers had only tents and tarps to offer those in need of shelter, and despite being warned of the dangers, local families moved back into unsafe buildings. It was evident that the required responses would be far more complex than those used in conventional peacekeeping missions.

To address the symptoms and redress the underlying causes complex emergency involves the development of a composite response strategy and doctrine, which embraces the many different development, emergency aid, diplomatic and military agencies which may become engaged in an ad hoc incremental manner (Philip Wilkinson, 2002: 67).

In the upcoming sections, we will demonstrate that there were numerous examples of situations where the wrong decisions were made due to the fear the earthquake and aftermath generated. A great deal of difficulties arose from that dreadful day, but in our opinion, the emotional scars that were left in the field will be permanent. The apparition of fear was the most harmful predicament. It affected the population, it influenced the UN civilian members, and it changed the way the UNPOLs and the policy makers did their work.

Part of the mandate of the police officers in MINUSTAH was to participate in the development of Haiti; one way they were trying to achieve that was by training the HNP. After the earthquake, they were unable to continue training, as they had to focus on

doing police work without executive power. The UNPOLs did not have the required resources, training and/or abilities to fulfill their mandate in a complex emergency situation.

Finally to understand the thesis statement of this research, it is important to understand the earthquake of January 12, 2010 put Haiti in a situation of a complex emergency. As discussed, this can be described as a humanitarian crisis in a country or state where there is total or extensive breakdown of power resulting from internal and/or external conflicts, and demands an international response that goes beyond the mandate or ability of any single or multiple organizations (OCHA, 1999). The thesis statement will be developed in more detail in the next section.

Thesis statement

Since 1995, the UN has deployed peacekeepers to Haiti, with the objective of restoring order and promoting a fair, democratic political system. Within that mandate the peacekeepers had to create and establish a viable Haitian police force. When we analyse the blueprint of peace and development, security is now identified as a foundational pillar. There is a push from the UN, supported by the US, to ensure and impose security protocols first and then focus on development. With the change of focus in the development theories, where security and development have now merged, can the police officers truly represent the local population while promoting the UN values?

This research will argue that after the earthquake of January 12, 2010, the UNPOLs were ill equipped to face all the predicaments caused by the natural disaster. The situation of Haiti, which was bleak to begin with, became almost unmanageable

overnight after the devastating earthquake. The peace operation had to shift focus from development, to suddenly devote skills and human resources to saving lives. When we look closely at the roles of international police officers, during the peace operation MINUSTAH, we believe that in the complex emergency situation which resulted from the earthquake, the UNPOL could not carry out its initial mandate.

This research will attempt to explain how a complex emergency affected the way peacekeeping operates, and will attempt to demonstrate how the police training aspect of the mission had to be abandoned as a result. Finally, we will discuss how the UN's response was influenced by the clear priority of security, which superseded the development objectives. While most observers might consider the UN's response after Haiti's earthquake to have been typical, we believe the response was neither effective nor sufficient. We believe due to the political history of Haiti and its geographical situation, the UN should have been better prepared to face such a devastating event.

Methodology

Research Method

This thesis explores the problems encountered by UNPOL in achieving its development mandate, as part of the UN's MINUSTAH mission carried out in the complex emergency experienced by Haiti after the 12th of January, 2010 earthquake. The bulk of the data is drawn from my participation as an UNPOL officer in Haiti between the 22nd of June 2010 and the 22nd of March 2011. This was supplemented by analysis of UN documents and reports on peacekeeping missions and mandates.

Documentary evidence

UN publications and documents helped support the thesis statement. Some of the documents date back to the 1970s, and some are as recent as 2014. The same methods were used for the data collection on the RCMP and the UN. Included in this data were reports concerning the involvement of the UNPOL during the mission, from both RCMP and UN sources. Those reports were daily police reports as well as civilians' reports created by both the RCMP and the UN.

The bulk of the evidence in this thesis comes from my involvement as a UNPOL officer and as a result I had access to confidential documents and information provided by the RCMP that were used in training and the carrying out of my daily activities. These provided general background information but since they are confidential they cannot be cited directly.

Participant Observation

Participant observation was developed from the motivation on the part of sociologists to describe and understand patterns of life. Those patterns were observed in different parts of society using non-obtrusive methods (Tesch, 1990). During the mission, I held dual roles. I was an outsider to the local population and the HNP and at the same time I was an active UNPOL officer working in the Internal Displaced People (IDP) camps. It is important to understand this was one of the biggest challenges of my mission. I had to play dichotomous roles: on one hand be the observer who took notes, accepted and documented reality, and on the other hand be an engaged participant, able to think on my feet and interact with the local population and the HNP. I had direct orders

which I had to follow for obvious operational reasons. While performing the regular duties I witnessed the effects of the UN decisions on the local population and the HNP. For the purpose of this thesis, I focused on the effects the decisions made by the UN, after the earthquake had on the UNPOLs, the HNP and the development part of the MINUSTAH mandate.

The main objective of a researcher as a participant observer is to watch and listen (Punch, 1993). As a trained police officer to watch and listen almost becomes a second nature, I made it a religious habit to transform my observations into analysis. During the day, I recorded my findings and observations, with remarks on specific events. I would then compare my notes to the training I received prior to deployment. I would analyse the difference between what I was told during training and what I experienced in field. This was the first time I was involved as a participant observer, and with the help of the thesis supervisor I was able to interpret the information gathered. It is important to mention that based on the method that I chose, what I observed and described could not be duplicated or reproduced, as these events were unique in a very specific situation (Hammersley, 2004).

Conclusion

To fully appreciate the extent of the challenges I faced during the mission as a participant observer, a deeper reflection is necessary. As was described, the role played by UNPOLs was vital to the success of the mission. As a UNPOL, I had direct and specific orders that I was required to follow based on the situation on the field. As we will see, the training I received created expectations; expectations that were not met. The

situation of complex emergency that was shaped by the earthquake produced a fracture between the initial mandate (my expectations) and what I was asked to do on field. I recognized that this was a very unique moment in time; I arrived only 6 months after the earthquake, and was there for a period of nine months. This created certain limits in the findings. The mission occurred during the reconstruction phase and the UNPOLs had an increased security role; after the earthquake this was inevitable.

As a participant observer, I was able to see that some of the problems in the field should have been handled differently, and based on Haiti's history, I feel that the UN should have been better prepared to face such an event. My experience on the field and this research revealed that if certain recommendations had been followed, a more effective and swifter response could have been executed by the UN. I saw firsthand the development aspect (training) of the mission for the UNPOL put on hold. This was a contradiction to the initial mandate, but again, was a response to the complex emergency situation.

Chapter II: The UN in Haiti

Background

Introduction

In the second chapter of this thesis I will link Haiti's political history, the natural disasters that are influenced by the country's geographical location and the Haitian culture of police. This research will review key elements of Haiti's history and the political regimes it has been under. The research will look at all the peace operations that were deployed and their change of mandate through time. An overview of the HNP will be made, as well as an enumeration of some of the challenges that the UNPOLs encountered. This will help explain the current mandate of MINUSTAH and will support our assertion, that the UN should have been better prepared to face the devastating effects of the earthquake of January 2010.

Haiti's situation

After over 200 years of independence, Haiti is still struggling and today it is one of the poorest countries in the world. Numerous internal, external, and environmental forces have sculpted Haiti into the country it is today. The next few paragraphs will give a chronological overview of keys events that shaped Haiti and gave us the country of today.

In 1492, Christopher Columbus discovered the island that he then named Hispaniola or Little Spain. In 1496, the first European settlers arrived and established themselves at Santo Domingo, which is now the capital of Dominican Republic. Two hundred years later in 1697, Spain conceded part of the island to France and they named

it Haiti or Land of Mountains. In 1801, Toussaint Louverture, a former slave, conquers Haiti. He abolished slavery and proclaimed himself governor-general of all Hispaniola. A year later, Charles Leclerc, Napoleon's brother-in-law, tried to conquer Haiti's interior without success (Coupeau, 2008). At this stage of history Haiti was seen as a sign of change and hope with regard to the abolishment of slavery. This was the precursor of many events that happened in the colonized islands. "Antislavery militants hoped that the Haitian Revolution would force whites to accept black's humanity and presented Haiti as the guardian of the rights and privileges of African American in the New World." (Coupeau, 2008:34).

In 1804, Haiti officially became independent and Jean-Jacques Dessalines declared himself Emperor. Two years later he was assassinated and Haiti divided along ethnic lines into a black-controlled north and a mulatto-ruled south. For almost 30 years, Pierre Boyer was able to unify Haiti, but he excluded blacks from power. From 1843 to 1915 there were a total of 22 different heads of state in Haiti, most of them focused on their own gain, with very little effort made to develop the country and its citizens. The frequent changes of regime that create numerous political leaders lead to a fragile state with weak policies (Coupeau, 2008).

In 1915, the USA invaded Haiti. The Americans believed the conflict endangered its property and investments in the country. Although the USA had withdrawn its troops from Haiti since 1934, they had maintained fiscal control until 1947. Haiti was used and controlled by foreign business groups and the economy suffered because Haitian leaders were unable to negotiate terms that would benefit the country. There were similar results

during the American occupation; the Haitian economy did not thrive while the American merchants had very lucrative deals (Coupeau, 2008).

It was then the Duvalier dictatorships began. In 1956, Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier took control via a military coup and was elected president the following year. In 1964, he declared himself president for life, and with the help of his militia Tontons Macoutes he established a dictatorship. “Macoutisme” embodied all the deficiencies of Haiti, including exploitation of the people, abuse of the economic system, and physical support of a non-democratic state, dishonesty in the form of bribery and fraud and violence (Fatton Jr., 2002). In 1971, “Papa Doc” died and was succeeded by his 19 year old son, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier. He also declared himself president for life. In 1986, “Baby Doc” fled the country as a result of international and internal political pressures.

During those two reins of power and terror the Haitian social predicaments did not improve (Quinn and Sutton, 2013). In 1988 after a military coup, Haiti was governed by civilians, but under military control. In 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president, in what was known to be the first free and peaceful election. A year later he lost his power after another military coup. In 1994, the USA was able to reinstate Aristide in power. In 1995, UN peacekeepers replaced American troops. In 2000, Aristide was elected for a second term. In 2004, Aristide was overthrown (Fatton Jr., 2002). In 2006, Rene Preval won a controversial election, and in 2011, Michel Martelly won the second round of presidential election (Quinn and Sutton, 2013).

Due to its geographical location in the Caribbean, Haiti has been devastated by storms and hurricanes. In the floods of 2004, over 2000 people died. In the fall of 2008, approximately 800 people were killed due to a series of storms and hurricanes. That same year more than 500 children were buried alive when a school collapsed. On January 12, 2010, up to 300 000 people were killed when the 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck the capital Port-au-Prince. Since its creation, the people of Haiti have been victimized by governments, both local and foreign. Haiti has been devastated by natural disasters. Since its independence, the international community has been observed the “development” of Haiti.

In early 1990s Aristide won the first open and democratic election by a landslide, but his polarizing political views upset the local elites and disturbed a lot of the foreign leaders. In a country with the history of Haiti this was almost the perfect recipe for a coup d'état. Only seven months after his election Aristide had to leave the country after military attacks. The following three years saw Haiti's situation worsen. After long negotiations the American military, under President Bill Clinton's leadership, supported Aristide re insertion into power. This came with serious conditions: “Aristide agreed in 1994 to implement the Strategy of Social and Economic Reconstruction” (Coupeau, 2008: 135). After that Haiti's situation was seen as an international one, the economic embargo of Haiti followed. The leaders of the military coup refused to negotiate with Aristide, in July 1994 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 940, which gave power to a multinational force to enter Haiti and reinstate Aristide. The troops, which were made up of American military personnel, successfully demobilized the military dictatorship and returned Aristide to power (Coupeau 2008).

UN in Haiti

In Haiti the UN has been involved in many facets of social and public establishments. The UN have been in Haiti under various programmes titled: International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) (February 1993 – August 1993), United Nations Mission In Haiti (UNMIH) (September 1993 - June 1996), United Nations Support Mission In Haiti (UNSMIH) (July 1996– July 1997), United Nations Transition Mission In Haiti, (UNTMIH) (August 1997- November 1997), United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) (December 1997 - March 2000), (UN, 2014)

The UN's main goals were to stabilize the country, bring economic growth and establish a democratic government. The involvement of the UN did not stop there; they were also involved in building better health and education systems (UN, 2014). Security was an important issue in Haiti. In 1995, the United Nations began to provide support to the Haitian government under the peacekeeping operations. This research focuses on the peacekeeping operations, more specifically, on the deployments that occurred after the earthquake of January 2012.

It can be said that Haiti has been victimized by numerous complex emergencies, which although similar, cannot be dealt with in the same manner. The peace operations responses have to be customized to surmount all the different obstacles that they face. They have to be suitable to the political conditions of the time (Wilson, 2010). The following paragraphs will review the ratified missions that occurred in Haiti and their specific mandates, all of which led to the present mission, MINUSTAH.

The peace operations

The International community and more specifically the UN Security Council have been supporting the presence of peacekeepers in Haiti since 1993. The first mission was “Mission des Nations Unies en Haïti” (MINUHA, 1993-1996), in which the peacekeepers were in charge of modernizing the Haitian forces and creating a new police force. (UN, 2014) It was followed by “Mission D’Appui des Nations Unies en Haïti” (MANUH, 1996-1997), during this peace operation, the objective of the peacekeepers was to improve the professional skills of the police, to maintain the security condition, and to work on the stability of the country in an effort to successfully implement a new national police force. (UN, 2014) Then came “Mission de Transitions des Nations Unies en Haïti” (MITNUH, 1997), in which the main goal of the peacekeepers was to encourage and to contribute to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP). It was followed by “Mission de Police civile des Nations Unies en Haïti” (MIPONUH, 1997-2000), in which the goal of the peacekeepers was to assist in the professionalization of the HNP (UN, 2014).

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, “Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti” (MINUSTAH) was established on June 1st, 2004 by Security Council resolution 1542. MINUSTAH is the fifth approved mission of this country (UN, 2014). This UN mission succeeded a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) authorized by the Security Council in February 2004, after President Bertrand Aristide was exiled from Haiti after numerous armed conflicts within the country. “The blueprint for the UN understanding of its mission in Haiti is the governmental rationality that had

accompanied the formation of states in Classical Europe – that is, disciplinarily and the ‘science of police’.” (L. Zanotti, 2008:554).

The MINUSTAH mission was implemented to help the Haitian police force gain a level of professional competency and to maintain the security conditions and stability required for successful implementation of a national police force. This mission would build on the mandates of previous missions which have been described above. The mandate of MINUSTAH consists of ensuring a safe climate, as well as, a stable one to support the political process in progress and assist the Government. It is important to mention the three pillars of the mandate of MINUSTAH: safe and stable climate, respect of the political process and human rights. The mandate was modified after the earthquake that struck Haiti in January 12, 2010 (UN, 2014).

Changes in the mandate

If we analyze the situation of Haiti, since the initial deployment of the civilian police officers in 1995, the different missions have had similar mandates, but the violence and instability are recurrent.

In the peacekeeping operations, the international community had to remodel their theories so it merges social topics and security as core parts of the new mandates. “The WDR 2011 calls for a paradigm shift in the development community’s work on FCS. The proposal paradigm is that violence and other challenges plaguing FCS cannot be resolved by short-term or partial solutions in the absence of institutions that provided people with security, justice, and jobs.” (IMF, 2011,p.iii). There was a change in the Haitian mission’s mandate, as there was a change in mandate in the peacekeeping

operations in general. The SMART programs, which were the guidelines throughout the 1990s, were replaced by what is called the three “Rs”. The focus of the missions when they were under SMART was more on monitoring and they were very limited in their extra curriculum activities. The three “Rs” allowed or forced the peacekeepers to be involved in reform, restructuring, and rebuilding tasks. The criteria for selection of the peacekeepers had to change because of what the demands of the missions evolved. The need for peacekeepers with strong policing skills was still very present, but now on the field the missions also needed peacekeepers with management and administrative abilities (Greener, 2009). The next paragraphs will explore some of the difficulties that the UNPOLs are facing in Haiti.

Challenges of the United Police Officers in Haiti

One of the challenges of the peacekeepers during the Haiti mission was to reform the local police, the HNP, into an organization that is considered qualified through the lens of the international community. The HNP needed a cultural change to bring them to a level of professionalism that would meet the standards of the international community. To help the creation of a sustainable national police force, the peacekeepers had to simultaneously infiltrate and integrate the HNP. Initially the UN had to replace the local authorities with the peacekeepers (Hayley, 2001).

The HNP is the first police organization in the history of Haiti. After the reinstatement of Aristide in 1994 and the abolition of Haitian military, it was the perfect scenario for Haiti to create a new organisation that would handle the security of this volatile nation (Depestre, 2004). In January 1995, the Haitian police academy was

created and in 1996, Pierre Denize was selected as the first HNP Director General (Donais, 2005). A lot of expectations from the Haitian population and the international community came with the establishment of the HNP. But with all the difficulties (financial and political), corruption quickly penetrated the organization, and high hopes changed to despair. The national police, who at first was seen as the key player in bringing the country into a great stability level, were no longer trusted by the Haitian people. This situation had created a bad relationship between the police and the local population, in which very little confidence is shown (Stromsem, and Trincellito, 2003).

During the peak of its recruitment program there were almost 6500 HNP officers. By 2003 that number was down to 3000. Those numbers seem to vary every year, Global Security has the number of HNP member at a little over 8500, but according to the Haitian Secretary of State for Public Security, Reginald Delva, there are now 10 000 HNP officers. He also said that they want to increase the number to 16 000 by the year 2016.

Almost 20 years after the first UN mission, the challenges in Haiti remain the same. The most predominant problem continues to be the culture of corruption that is greatly supported by the lack of pay of the HNP officers. The international community and the UN have put a lot of effort into reform of the Haitian police, but this has been, and continues to be, a great challenge. When we look at the political rationale of the UN for the HNP it is clear that they want to change the mentality from that of 'vigilante', to a recognized and respected organization that supports human rights (Zanotti, 2008).

One of the mandates of the peacekeeping operations is to protect the people. As explained by Cockayne, in Haiti's situation there are two groups that offer protection to the population. The first group offers physical protection, to the people and the land, the

UN peacekeepers fall under that group. The second group focuses more on what the enforcement world calls ‘the feeling of security’. As the national police the HNP falls under that group. But in order to keep power, a group will go as far as creating a threat to legitimize their presence. It is beneficial for them to keep Haiti in the terrible condition that it is presently in. That creates the danger that Haiti might find its self in a permanent state of corruption, where the locals in every sphere of society are extremely vulnerable to bad influences (Cockayne, 2009).

Conclusion

In this chapter we were able to see how 200 years of geographical and political turmoil have shaped Haiti. Since the involvement of the UN in Haiti, there have been five missions including MINUSTAH. The UN had numerous objectives in those missions; from modernizing the Haitian forces, to the creation of a national police, to increasing the level of professionalism of that newly created national police. Safe and stable climate, respect of the political process and human rights, were the three pillars of the mandate of MINUSTAH. That stable climate was supposed to help establish a democratic political process which would entrench the respect of human rights. If all that would have been accomplish there would have been tremendous progress in the development of Haiti.

Numerous reforms have been attempted and more will have the same fate if the culture of corruption of the HNP and Haiti is not addressed or taken into consideration. As we will see in this particular case study, the earthquake paralyzed much of the development program for almost a full year. The training section for the HNP had to be

temporarily closed. The UNPOL could not be spared for training as they were needed on the field for rescue and recovery tasks. In the next section, we will look at a personal perspective of my experience as part of a UNPOL officer in Haiti.

Chapter III: The operation on the ground

Introduction

In this chapter we will look at the roles I had in the MINUSTAH mission from the 22nd of June 2010 to the 22nd of March 2011. We will examine what I was told I would do and compare it to what I actually did. We will make a connection between all my actions during the nine months I was in Haiti and MINUSTAH's mandate, as well as policing and development. We will also look at the specific steps of a deployment. Following the days of the earthquake of January 12, 2010, the RCMP began recruiting candidates that would have an interest in doing a peacekeeping mission in Haiti to volunteer.

I was born in Haiti and lived there for the first four years of my life. I was fortunate enough to become an RCMP officer and I always wanted to give back to my birth country. It was not difficult to explain and convince my loved ones why I needed to go. In this section I will describe the preparation of a police officer prior to the mission. I will describe how the mandate was explained to the individuals involved, and then I will illustrate what we really did in the field. I will explain how the difficulties and the failures of the mission were embedded in the new reality that was caused by the situation of a complex emergency.

The three pillars under which MINUSTAH was operating were: to work towards a secure and stable environment, political process and human rights. The UNPOLs were mainly involved under the secure and stable environment pillar. This is where the creation, transformation and training of the HNP were supervised. The pillar of political

process covered all main actions that would promote a democratic political process. The third pillar which was the most important for the international community, human rights, included every operation that would promote human rights (UN, 2014).

In Haiti as UNPOL we had a very weak mandate, due in part because we did not have executive power. By executive power we are referring to the law enforcement aspect. The UNPOLs were not allowed to investigate, interview or interrogate the locals nor do basic police work without the presence of the HNP. The following paragraphs will explain why this became problematic. Part of the frustration was due to the fact that the UNPOLs were in a situation where they had to ask permission from the HNP who they were supposed to be training.

Preparation and expectations

Police officers as UNPOL

“The main objective of the UN Police is ensuring compliance with the UN mandate as well as international criminal justice and human rights standards.” (RCMP, 2014) In this sub-section, we will explain the role of a UNPOL according to the Canadian police or more specifically the RCMP. The thesis will describe the principal roles of a UNPOL.

a. Police Mentor

Mentors will oversee the implementation of the agreed-upon framework for compliance to professional standards by national police officials and assist them in their efforts to deliver democratic police services. They will also provide on-the-job training to local police, either individually or in groups.

b. Police Advisor

Advisors will provide on-the-job training and advise and mentor their counterparts within the local police structure to ensure that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially and that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully protected.

c. Police Trainer

Trainers will contribute to the planning and implementation of activities to fulfil the mandate of the mission. They will be responsible for assessing and identifying the current standards and essential training needs of police officers in Haiti in accordance with the requirements of the mandate. This includes basic training, specialized and refresher training, and specific career development/promotion courses.

d. Humanitarian Support

Support the delivery of humanitarian aid by assisting in establishing and maintaining a secure environment. Share information with NGOs and respond to varying concerns identified in the field. “Proactive patrols to maintain public order and security. This may include especially harsh and difficult areas such as displaced persons camps.” (RCMP, 2012).

In this case study, the “advisor” role was essentially non-existent. When we arrived in June 2010, I began to work in Cité Soleil and there was a major problem between the HNP and the UNPOLs. I was not able to discern the root of the problem but the local people needed help, and we were forced to work together. The local police had some respect for the Canadian police officers, but as far as taking advice or guidance, we

were far from that. The trust had been broken which disrupted the advising aspect of the mandate.

Even if the local police would probably not admit it, the “mentor” aspect of peacekeeping was very present and quite efficient. Not to give ourselves too much credit, but with Canadian colors on our shoulders a lot was expected of us, and a lot of respect was given to us. Due to the high expectations of the Canadian members, we were scrutinized by our peers from other countries. In this section of this paper, I will not criticize members from other countries but I will state that their caliber and experience in police work, as well as the requirements for their members to be accepted on the mission were not equivalent to ours. The local police officers were not fooled by a “bêret bleu”. They disliked members of some countries. They questioned the presence of UNPOLs that were coming from countries that were as weak politically and as corrupt, if not more, than Haiti.

The “security” aspect of the mission was the easiest one to identify and accomplish. During my time there, I began working in Cité Soleil, which is one of the most dangerous cities in the country. I then worked in the Internal Displaced Person (IDP) camp, where the country needed the UNPOL because they did not have enough police officers to cover the area and to control the new population that was created because of the earthquake of January 2010.

Many other factors contributed to the challenging security situation: hurricane season, the cholera which was brought by the UN (Nepalese battalion), and two rounds of elections. As well, we had to provide security support to all the civilian volunteers, and

members of all the NGOs who were working to help Haiti. In some cases we received tremendous assistance from the army. I will continue this section by describing what we did in the two training weeks in Ottawa prior to the deployment.

Pre-deployment, Training

I will now briefly explain the process that a member has to go through prior to deployment; this will help explain our state of mind as we entered the mission. For a Canadian member to qualify for the Haitian mission, a member needs to have a minimum of 5 years of service at the time of application. The member has to clear the physical and psychological tests, and then successfully complete the interviews conducted by both the RCMP and a member of the UN. Upon completion, I felt excited and proud to have been selected.

I then began two weeks of training in Ottawa. This is when and where the Canadian police, led by the RCMP, ensure that your file is flawless. They must be confident that the candidates they select are worthy and fully understand the expectations of the mission. They have two weeks to go through your personal and professional history. On the tactical aspects of the process, every member has to be recertified in the use of force and the use of every weapon that will be given to them. I was the junior member of my contingent, I had five years of service, which when I reflect back, completely influenced my behaviour during the mission. I felt that I had to prove to the senior members that I truly belonged among them.

The first point of concern about the mission arose during the two weeks in Ottawa. We had all the paper work which was, doubly and triply checked. However, only

one day was allotted for cultural awareness. There were approximately six hours planned to prepare the members for the reality of Haiti. In comparison to the majority of the 53 countries present in the mission, Canadian members were better prepared and better equipped. This is probably why the Canadian police officers and the Canadian officials had such high expectations in regards to our roles in this particular mission.

Expectations

The majority of police officers had dreamt of saving the world, not as a developer, but as a superhero. After a couple years of service, there is a major reality check about what true police work is and the non-gratifying aspect of our chosen career. When a member has an opportunity to serve on a peacekeeping mission that old dream of saving the world comes back. In this specific case, it was even more amplified because the RCMP went coast to coast to find the right candidates. When it comes to this mission specifically, all the candidates were asked what they expect from the mission. There were numerous answers but, directly or indirectly, the candidates wanted to have an impact on the local population. The candidates wanted an opportunity to have a positive and lasting influence on the local police. As it was explained to us, this was how we would help in the reconstruction phase; this was how we would participate in the development of Haiti.

During the training in Ottawa, we were told that we would be teachers and mentors, and participate in humanitarian aid. The Haiti mission is an armed mission and depending on the stability of the country, we were expected to do security work as well. As it was explained in the previous section, a peacekeeper will only use his weapons in a situation of self defense or to defend a civilian. Based on the risk assessment of UN

security, the UNPOLs in MINUSTAH would always be armed. After talking to members that had experienced the Haiti mission, I was expecting to work with the HNP and depending on where I would be posted, teach and support them in developing a better police force. Based on the requirements that were needed to be part of the mission, I was expecting my future coworkers from the different countries to be very professional, as we will see this was not the case.

Arrival

My mission started on June 22, 2010, which was more than six months after the earthquake. Based on the information I received during training, I was expecting the majority of debris to have been removed and reconstruction to be started. When we arrived, the mission seemed to be on pause. It was no longer chaotic, but no one seemed to know in what direction the next steps should be taken. I expected, and hoped, to have a tremendous adventure and I knew it would not be easy. I did not expect the biggest problems that I would have to deal with would be with the UNPOLs and UN management.

In my humble opinion, the most important point when it came to expectations was the difference between the information given to us and the reality of what was happening in the field. In defence of the individuals that were providing the training, there was not yet any real data collected since the earthquake. They did what they could with what they had. One part of our duty was to report to them so they could properly prepare the following contingents. When we arrived in Haiti, the civilian peacekeepers were seeking information from the police officers to understand the extent of the damage caused by the

catastrophic event. High expectations from the police officers, in addition to field assessments based on very little data, were the perfect mix for a hard reality check shortly after arrival.

In the field

The acclimatisation period

The senior members had warned me that it would take me from four to six weeks to acclimatize myself to the mission. The weather, the isolation, the slower pace of dealing with things and the reality of being away from my family for so long would definitely affect me.

The first week and a half was a mini-version of the training we had in Ottawa. In the induction period, I had to qualify with my firearm, complete an oral, written and reading test (a grade 8 level at best), and we had to do a driving test. Surprisingly, the driving test was where UNPOLs failed the most. The induction team were making sure that the new police officers had the minimum requirements. Canada was one of the only countries that actually trained their members for this specific mission. Other UNPOL's had no knowledge of what to expect from either the country or the mission. Suddenly those six hours of cultural training did not seem that bad after all.

During the induction, we were interviewed by people who would be comparable to staffing or human resources. Once again you have to explain why it is good for the UN to have you here in Haiti and what can you bring to the mission. This is where things

became complicated for the UN. The requirements of a Canadian police officer were not the same as the requirements of a police officer of other countries, and with five years of service, I was more qualified and more trained than a lot of members from other countries. Under UN policy you cannot have one country that controls everything during a mission; they look for what they call the “National” equity. Therefore, highly qualified members with numerous years of service found themselves at the bottom of the command hierarchy. Personally it was not a problem, but a lot of my Canadian colleagues had a hard time working for someone with less experience and knowledge.

Cité Soleil

My first posting was in *Cité Soleil*, the other members of my contingent were concerned about the high level of violence in this city. *Cité Soleil* is a slum that was known to be one of the most dangerous cities in the world. The city was controlled by armed gangs who created lawless neighborhoods. MINUSTAH had numerous armed operations that began in 2006 and by 2009 the mission had been able to restore law and order to the area. The HNP said that MINUSTAH was the key factor in re-establishing security in the city (UN, 2014). I was the first Canadian in months, if not years, to be posted there. This posting greatly influenced the decisions I would make for the rest of the mission.

The other UNPOLs were surprised to see a Canadian member in *Cité Soleil* and one of the first questions I had to answer was about how long I was going to be there. I would always answer the same: “I am here to stay a minimum of three months”. This

was the time required before asking for a rotation. If you did not like a posting, they would appreciate if you would try to stay there for a third of the mission.

In *Cité Soleil*, the role of an UNPOL was what they called *collocation*. We were supposed to patrol everyday with the HNP and do check points. As UNPOL, we were expected to monitor their actions and give advice and feedback on their work. One common trait among police officers, that seem to be present no matter the origin of the police officer, is that we are all 'alpha' personality type. Some members of the HNP had a hard time accepting the fact that strangers were coming to their country telling them how to do their work. The HNP were even selective and they, at times, refused to receive any advice from members from African countries. The HNP members had a lot of respect for the Canadian, American and the French members.

There were two schedules: the day shift from seven in the morning to three in the afternoon and the evening shift which was from three in the afternoon to ten at night. During the training in Ottawa, the officers in charge were unaware of the situation between the UNPOL and the HNP. When it happened, no one seemed to know, but there was a major fracture in the relationship of the UNPOL and the HNP. When we arrived many of the HNP refused to work with the UNPOL.

This last point is very important in understanding the uniqueness of this mission. Our main mandate was to train the HNP, to patrol with them and be invited to participate as mentors in their investigations. This was the legal and practical agreement between the UN and the Haitian government. Without going into much more detail, we were not supposed to work without the HNP, and unless someone's life was in danger (in front of

us) we could not intervene. Telling a group of well trained and excited police officers that they cannot intervene is the best way to crush their “superhero” dreams.

A week and a half after I started in *Cité Soleil* another Canadian police officer was sent to my post and together we started to change things. Everyday we would go into the HNP office and ask if anyone would come and work with us, we did not care about their skills or gender, we just wanted someone. Every day we had conversations with highly ranked officers of the HNP. It took us approximately three weeks, but before I left for my next posting, we had made friends with some HNP members. Normally their supervisor would lend us one member for the patrols which was a tremendous improvement.

Being bilingual (English and French) helped me a lot during the mission, even if it was supposed to be a French mission, a surprisingly high number of members could not speak or understand French. The Team Leader of *Cité Soleil* used my linguistic skills in meetings and debriefings, which helped get me noticed and gain credibility with the other members. During a mission, as a police officer, there are two ways to survive. Either you try to make a difference no matter what the situation and you roll with the punches or you hide for the duration of your mission and count the days until the end. Unfortunately some members chose the easier road.

An important challenge the UNPOLs faced throughout the entire mission is self-explanatory: security. In this paper, I mentioned the uniqueness of this mission. One of the reasons the mission was distinctive, was that UNPOLs had to juggle all the roles previously described and, at the same time, represent law enforcement. I can personally

say that there was some confusion between the roles that police officers played during the mission and their expectations.

The humanitarian relief aspect of the mission was also confusing because it was not really in our mandate in the field, but was often mixed with or under the umbrella of security. We had to ask permission from our superior (which was almost never denied) to go and work in the orphanage. These were the true moments of the mission because we knew we were not going to win a medal for courage, but when you saw those kids smile after receiving toys and books we managed to bring in the country, it was definitely worth it. This was our mission within the mission; this is what I hope will stay with me forever.

I decided to volunteer to go work in the Internal Displaced People camps (IDP). This was a risky decision, but as far as I was concerned, I just survived *Cité Soleil* where we had been attacked and even had shots fired in our direction. I was dealing with internal conflicts that were unfortunately created by the UN. Other than my Canadian co-worker, no one from developed countries had been sent to that post for almost a year. It was time for a change.

IDP Camps

The police commissioner came and gave us a long speech, explaining that we were now the heart and soul of the mission. We would work in extreme conditions, and we would see poverty like we never seen before, but for the mission MINUSTAH to survive we had to do an excellent job. At the beginning, we were separated into two units: the mobile patrols and the permanent camps. Having worked in general duty not

that long ago and feeling the need for a little bit of action, I asked to work in the mobile patrol.

After having numbers of long conversation with the other UNPOLs, we believed that the mobile patrol unit in the IDP camps were doing what we considered police work. When the unit was fully operational, there was 24 hour coverage, separated into three shifts. We still had some difficulties in working with the HNP, but because they were aware of the importance of our presence and the importance of the work we were doing in the camps, we had HNP members that were assigned specifically to our units.

This was a very unique situation, because the initial mandate of a UNPOL was to mentor and monitor the HNP. On the more quiet days, we were supposed to help with humanitarian aid. We were not supposed to do police work as we know it (patrolling, investigating, arresting people), but the earthquake created a need for a policing unit. Some camps had more than 50 000 people and before NGOs and the civilians could begin their work, order had to be restored.

At first, I was in charge of 6 members from Nepal, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, New Guinea and Jordan. Our first mandate was to locate and identify the camp which caused the members a lot of frustration. The mobile patrol unit was put in place at the beginning of August, and almost eight months after the earthquake. Prior to that, nothing seemed to have been done at the ground level. Once we were more familiar with our new environment, I directed my members go into out on the field and meet the people living in the camp. It was mandatory that each member actually walk in the camps and take some time to talk to the people. It was community policing at its best.

Our second mandate was to ask the people about their needs and find out what could we do to help however, this mandate created problems as well. The locals were afraid of the police as a result of the very direct and physical way the HNP had handled situations. It took us a long time to gain the trust of the people, because we were working with the HNP. Another problem we had to face was that some of the UNPOL's were experts in their fields, such as undercover, swat team, close protection, detective, which has nothing to do with community policing. It was a steep learning curve, even if they had many years of service. Finally, it was strange to us (UNPOL) when civilian workers of the UN were coming to ask us about our findings, as they were supposed to give us information and tell us where to go and what to do.

One month later, I was named Team Leader of one of the mobile units and I was put in charge of 30 members from all around the world. We were now three units covering day and night shifts and our zone was the whole Port-au-Prince area. As a Team leader, I had to spend 25% of my time in the office dealing with paperwork and scheduling. I was fortunate enough to spend the rest of my time on the field with my crew.

Each camp had a committee, led by a president, and we had to establish a good rapport with that president if we wanted to have any kind of relationship with the people living in the camps. There were days that we helped the NGOs during the distribution of goods. As a Team Leader, I was able to dictate where we were going to spend our efforts. I personally focused on the children and women as they were the most at risk in the camps.

In the last three months of my mission, I was Coordinator of the IDP camps. I was in charge of all the mobile units made up of 140 people. I was supposed to spend 75% of my time in the office, dealing with meetings, staffing, and lot more of paperwork. I managed to be in the field almost half of my time. The Unit Commander agreed with my argument that we needed a Coordinator in the field to watch over operations.

I had done community policing in different communities in the Halifax area but I would not be able to compare the level of appreciation that we were receiving in the IDP camps. As a Coordinator, this is where I had most influence as I met with different group of civilians workers of the UN. I sat on the relocation committee of displaced people and I was able to witness the stress and frustration because very little progress had been made in that regard.

Complex Emergency from the field

The mission in Haiti was a very unique situation; the earthquake devastated the country both physically and emotionally. One very important part of the mission that was not covered by the media was the earthquake's effect on the UN civilian members. In this paper, I mentioned some of the frustrations that arose among the UNPOLs because we felt as if we were doing the civilians mandate as well as ours.

A year after the earthquake, I had the opportunity to speak to civilians that were present during the event. I came to the conclusion no matter how much preparation they received, they were not prepared to lose some of their members in a situation of danger. Police officers are always aware of the real and present possibility that life might be lost in the line of duty. This was not the first time people died in Haiti during a UN mission.

However, this was the first time that such a high number had died in such a short period of time: it was shocking. After talking to the police officers involved in the mission, it did not matter what kind of training they received, the event affected them. It created fear for the civilians, the kind of fear that can only abate with time.

Within twelve months, the mission had to deal with the earthquake affecting millions of Haitians, all levels of the UN workers and all the NGOs. No one was left untouched. In addition, there was a cholera outbreak which a lengthy investigation discovered to have been caused by the UN itself. This was followed by a hurricane season with devastating consequences because of all the people living in the tents. Finally, Haiti also went through two volatile rounds of elections.

We had to deal with so many different important things; we were never able to postpone any activities. The earthquake, cholera and the hurricane season along with a violent election that led to a high death toll. I personally did not participate in the search and rescue that was done after the earthquake, but the members I spoke to could still remember the smell left by all the dead bodies. I saw families moving into unsafe buildings and we did what we could to explain to them that they should not live there. But we did not have other options for them, and they did not want to live in a giant tent or under tarps. During the peak of the cholera outbreak, I had to teach all my members how to keep themselves safe, because I insisted that we continue to go into the dangerous zones. I helped Doctors Without Borders and taught the locals and the people living in the IDP about basic hygiene.

During the elections, I transported civilians with the voting ballots. I have seen voting posts completely destroyed, rocks being thrown at the members and the civilians. I witnessed people being killed because they were not voting for the 'right' people. Despite all these disruptions, the policy makers in New York declared that it was a successful election. Someone was burned alive in the second round because he was refusing to vote for the popular party, and we considered that a successful election? To restore order in the city, we had to open barricades on the streets and drive through flames. I saw the despair on the people's faces in the IDP camps when they were cut off from the world for three entire days.

I spent the first four months building a rapport with the HNP and the local population. I honestly believed that when and if trouble was to arise, we would do our best to help them both. During the elections, there were many riots and, as previously mentioned roads were blocked, shots were fired, but it was nothing that we had not planned for. I did not question the decision of UN security to keep the civilian volunteers at home, but in the worst of the riots when the cities were in flames, surprisingly they decided to keep us (The UNPOL!) home, as well. This is a peace mission and the earthquake created a fear among decision makers even if they did not set foot in Haiti. I personally have never felt as ashamed to be a police officer until the day I had to answer the phone and tell the people of the IDP camps that we could not go and help them.

I was able to see the smoke caused by the flames. I had to follow orders and send all men and women home. The following day my supervisor had to go against UN security and we did what we were getting paid to do. The relationship between the HNP

and the UNPOL was not good before those events, and after that they simply avoided us. We understood why.

I could have picked numerous examples of situations where the wrong decisions were made due to the fear that was created by the earthquake and the massive loss of life. There are a lot of effects that resulted from that dreadful day, but the fears that were created, in my opinion, were the most damaging one. It affected the population, the UN civilian members, the UNPOL and the policy makers. Decisions were not made with clear minds; decisions were made in fear.

Analysis and reflections

My experience in relation to the mission's objective

My expectations constantly changed during the nine months I was in Haiti. I was born in Haiti, this was the first time I returned since I had been adopted and moved to Canada. I had numerous personal and professional goals. For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on the professional aspect of my expectations.

When people ask me about the mission, I quickly respond that it was an eye opener. It is somewhat obvious that I would be shocked by some of the things I saw. My knowledge of Haiti, due to my origin, were above average but still not great. During the training, the instructor described it as a reconstruction period. When we arrived, however, part of the cleaning had not even been completed. They spoke about the IDP camps and how we were supposed to work in them, but when we arrived nothing was in place yet. Because of this, numerous members went to work in different units or float for

the initial period of their mission. We did not participate in the first part of the mission; the reconstruction. It was not directly in our mandate, but a lot of members were expecting to be part of it at some level.

What I remember of the first 6 six weeks was: confusion, repetition, and frustration. We were confused and surprised about how the UN was so unorganized and how difficult it seemed for the UN to make a final decision. It was repetitive because there was a lack of communication between the units. We were extremely limited in our abilities to work as UNPOL and it was almost impossible to have someone understand what was expected from the initial mandate. All that adjustment, in addition to the communication problem with the locals and the UNPOL's from other countries, mixed with home sickness created a lot of frustration.

Then I was transferred to the IDP camps, the mandate was clear and easier to follow. Community policing, was the heart of the mission. As I was moving up the ladder of command, so was my level of confusion and frustration. The UN was insistent on having the UNPOL do foot patrols and interact with people and to produce a report at the end of each day. If we think about how we do work back in Canada what they requested seemed simple. The problem was that more than 50% of the members working in IDP camp units could not speak nor read French or English. They had no knowledge of the Haitian culture and were unable to speak or learn Creole. It is extremely difficult, nearly impossible, to do community policing when you cannot communicate with the people you are serving.

During the elections our mandate was clear; hold a safe election for the Haitian people. We did our best to keep it safe for the population, but very few supervisors had

experience on how volatile and violent an election could become in third world countries like Haiti. On the field, it was chaotic and dangerous at times. Fortunately, no members were severely hurt, and at the end of it, the headquarters in New York were happy with the results. I hope that the administration have learned from this experience, because we did not have enough members for the elections, and some had to make the terrible choice of protecting themselves or the public. A new president had been elected along with a new government that was supported by the international community. It is in place and it was done in a democratic way, this was one of our principal mandates.

Conclusion

My nine months in Haiti were a tremendous experience, in which I had the chance to work with police officers from all around the world and with different domains of expertise. There were a lot of frustrations, especially on the administrative side of the mission. During the meetings, the police officers felt that the policy makers in New York could not truly understand the reality of the field. I went on the mission with numerous goals, one of them was to gather information on the training of the HNP and if it was applicable, use that information in my thesis. Due to the earthquake, the development section of the mission was shut down for practically eight months, the focus was on reconstruction, humanitarian aid and security. Due to the uniqueness of the mission, I was introduced to the notion of complex emergency, and it was at that specific moment that the mission began to make sense.

I am subjectively fascinated by the roles of the police in the UN peacekeeping mission. I am still interested in the importance of security in development. The UN has clearly stated the importance of the civilian in the Haiti mission, MINUSTAH. There

were numerous occasions throughout the mission which demonstrated the importance of the police. The UNPOL went from having an important support role to being the heart of the mission. A question came to my mind regarding the mission: if the police represent and reflect the society that they serve and if they are the heart of the mission, is the police(UNPOL) the key factor in the success of the Haiti peacekeeping mission?

Chapter IV: Conclusion

We will address some of the unanswered questions in form of recommendations. This research focused on peacekeeping and more specifically on the reality the UNPOLs that participated in the Haiti mission MINUSTAH after the earthquake of January 12, 2010. This case study brought a unique perspective, because I was enrolled as a peacekeeper for nine months in Haiti from June 2010 to March 2011. This was an opportunity to bring field work and academic research together. This research provided an overview of the UN peacekeeping mission and an historical overview of the peacekeeping missions in Haiti. In the thesis statement, we answered the main question of this research and declared the peacekeepers and UNPOLs during the peace operation MINUSTAH, were unable to carry out their initial mandate, as a result of the situation of complex emergency after the earthquake. Finally, this research brought the reader inside the point of view of a peacekeeper that had to face the challenges of working in complex emergency conditions while attempting to maintain the mandate of the UN.

Peacekeeping in review

As has been explained in this paper, the early stages of global peacekeeping operations were mainly to observe, monitor and support the peace process in interstate conflicts. The peacekeeping missions of the UN have contributed in the peace resolution in numerous ways. The missions were used as a security measure during the negotiation period. The peacekeepers were used as mediators during interstates conflicts. From the beginning the “blue helmets” were arguably the most recognized insignia of the peacekeeping missions. From those early interventions arise more complex ones and UN

peacekeeping missions are now involved in multidimensional operations. In the early 1990s a clear change in the peace operations mandates occurred. The missions are longer, involved in both intra and interstates conflicts and the policy makers had a different mindset when it comes to conflicts resolution.

The failures of some of the missions of the 1990s required policy makers to change the way they viewed and managed the peacekeeping operations. In Haiti's situation, in the early deployments, the peace operations were led by the United States. Canada took over with a more complete mandate. The platform under which the Haiti peace operation was based was part of the new way the missions were going to be conducted. The mission had to be planned and deployed in an integrated fashion between the civilian and the military. All the main objectives and the secondary objectives had to be expressed from the initial draft. The deployment of the mission had to be made in a swift manner. The mandates had to be reasonable, achievable and had to match the resources available. The mandates of the missions had to be created in a way that some flexibility could be allowed depending of the situation. Finally, if the peace operations were in a situation where a long term commitment might occur, the host country and the international community have to understand the majority of the consequences of this type of mission.

As of now, no peacekeeping operation has met all these criteria. Policy makers, critics and the international community agree on the fact that a change in focus of peace operations needs to occur. A focus on defending human rights and finding sustainable solutions for the failed states were key pillars of the future platforms of peace operations.

A successful peacekeeping operation would be one in which all peacekeepers in the field and the civilian aspects of the international aid complete their mandate and exit the host country. The host country should have a sustainable and achievable plan of action for the period immediately after the departure of the UN. The evaluation of the success of a mission will be based on the achievement of the initial mandate as well as the accomplishment of the modifications made to the mandate during the peace operations. The true measure of success will be determined long after the mission has been completed. It will be considered a true success if the host country is left in a secure and stable situation, in which the local population is self-sustaining. As previously mentioned, since early 2000, 'Security and Development' are now linked to one another. This notion influenced the reforms of the peacekeeping missions. Under the human security agenda the mission became more complex and the international community found new energy and means to support the peace operations.

The Haiti mission was a significant example of the new challenges the policy makers are facing and it is also an excellent illustration of what the peacekeepers will have to do in the future. The peace operations have to implement new strategies that are multidimensional, and are now involved in the judicial system, governmental institutions and health care programs. The expression "thinking outside the box" is often used when innovative ideas are required. In Haiti's situation, preparing for the inevitable should have been used. The UN, under different mission names, has been involved in Haiti for over 30 years, the core of the problems are similar. The consequences of earthquake were devastating, but they should not have put on hold the development aspect of the mission, especially concerning the development of the HNP.

The literature review and the observations from the field revealed that with the constant evolution of the missions and the increasing complexity of the missions influenced the role of the police officers as peacekeepers. The establishment of the rule of law, the creation of a fair judicial system in which the local population trust, and the development of a professional national police will support sustainable peace. As mentioned in this research, police officers are now a key element in the success of a peace operation. In Haiti, the peacekeepers are directly involved in the training of the local police, in supporting human rights and supporting a democratic political process. As has been demonstrated in Haiti's situation, UNPOL can become heavily involved in security and humanitarian aid if the situation requires. We argue that based on Haiti's political history and geographical location, the tragic event should not have come as a surprise and a contingency plan should have been in place: it was not.

The tipping point: Complex emergency

In a complex emergency, can the mandate of the peacekeeping mission be fully applied by the international police officers in the field or should the focus be on law enforcement? One answer to the first part of the question is, yes, if previous recommendations had been implemented. One of the recommendations of the Brahimi report was the commitment of human resources; that a permanent group be ready for deployment in situations of need similar to the earthquake. During this mission we noticed that when the peacekeepers' numbers on field reach an optimum, every aspect of the peacekeeping mandate could have been fulfilled. The mandate of the mission must be

clearly stated, and the roles of the police officers have to be approved by both the host country and the international community.

The natural disaster cannot be ignored, depending on how damaging it is, the answer to the question above might be no. As was explained in Haiti's situation, the core of the country was destroyed by the earthquake. The initial mandate was put on hold for what they called the rebuilding period. During that period, the police officers had numerous roles, from humanitarian aid where they had to support the NGOs, to security in which they supported the local police. Six months after the earthquake the peacekeepers' focus was still on security. When they had the proper numbers on the grounds the peacekeepers' centre of attention was still on security. That is why under the new international consent of security first, the peacekeepers could not fulfill the initial mandate of the mission.

The initial mandate, for the police, was to help in the democratization process and help train the local police. Shortly after the earthquake, this was put on hold for security and law enforcement. During that period, the initial mandate could not cover what was required from the peacekeepers in the context of a complex emergency. With the initial resources available this was expected. When I began the mission, the full mandate of the peacekeepers should have been re-established. Since 1995, the UN has deployed peacekeepers with the objective of restoring order and promoting a fair and democratic political system. With the change in focus in the development theories where security and development have now merged, can the police officers, which are currently the main

actors of the peacekeeping missions, truly represent the local population while promoting UN values?

The local population sees the peacekeepers as their main source of contact with the UN. The peacekeepers are the buffer between the policy makers and the civilians. It can be very challenging for peacekeepers to make the link between the mandate of the time and actual requests from the population.

Following the initial mandate is challenging, with the addition of a natural disaster that put the country in a state of complex emergency, it can be seen as unrealistic to expect the peacekeepers to fulfill their mandate. The volatile political history of this country can explain some of the reasons why the policy makers were reluctant to fully return the peace operations to its initial mandate. Under Haiti's predicaments they had no choice, but to put on hold parts of the main mandate. From the field's perspective policy makers did not know when to re-establish the original mandate, even when the peacekeepers provided reports proving that the situation was stable

Case study

This case study proved that the three big challenges that the UN were facing in regards to the peacekeeping operations in the early 2000s, were still present in 2010. The missions are increasingly larger and more complex. The duration of the missions force the organizers to implement transition strategies, but an exit strategy should remain a vital point of any mission. Finally, the creation of a sustainable solution that would increase and support peace remains elusive.

I was involved as a peacekeeper for nine months after the earthquake of January 12th, 2010 in Haiti. This humbling experience gave me an opportunity to work with military employees, UN employees, NGOs, civilian workers, police officers, locals and individuals from more than 55 different countries. I faced two reality checks: the first one was the difference between my expectations based on the training and the reality of what needed to be done in the field. The second was the clash between the lectures received and what was happening every day in the tent cities. At that time the training did not match what was happening in the field. There was not enough time allotted to the field training of the HNP, the peacekeepers found themselves doing law enforcement, police patrols, without the HNP. The peacekeepers did not have executive powers, consequently could not operate without the HNP. The IDP camps were supposed to be temporary but they are still present today. As a Coordinator of the mobile patrols of the IDP camps, I saw the reports from the field and was submitting summary reports to mission officials. Even with positive reports, the focus remained on security.

As mentioned in this research, the HNP had been receiving training from the international community and the UN since 1995. I was expecting it to have an established police academy to which UN peacekeepers would provide support. Even if the HNP had high ranked officers in charge of the academy, the UNPOLs were still very involved in the training and very little follow up was done when a cadet was leaving the learning establishment. As we have seen, the earthquake temporarily closed this section and the involvement of the peacekeepers was reduced to a minimum. Were my expectations too high? For the field training aspect of the formation of a police officer, perhaps they were. Field training happens after the academy and this when police officers to execute the

police duties. The field training is such an important aspect of the overall program in Canada, I was surprised this was not implemented. The training academy had everything in place to properly function on its own, but the UN was not relinquishing control of it to the HNP.

Another finding was the fact that the earthquake put fear into everyone who was working in Haiti during that period. This fear greatly affected the work of civilians, the UNPOLs had to gather statistical data for them, especially in remote and more dangerous areas. This had an effect on the rebuilding process and was not part of the mandate of the peacekeepers. This case study supported the researcher's thesis statement by demonstrating that, not only at the peacekeepers level, but at the policy makers' level, under a complex emergency situation, the initial mandate could not be completed. As per the literature review, the recommendations of the reforms for peacekeeping had not been met and influenced the decisions making during the mission. The focus of the international community on security first, then development prolonged the focus on security long after the situation on the field was deemed stable and safe. In the actual peacekeeping circumstances, with Haiti environmental situation and its unpredictable political history, a complex emergency can jeopardize the mandate of the mission.

Recommendations

As has been described and argued in this research, peacekeepers that were put in a situation of complex emergency after the tragic earthquake of January 12th, 2010, were not able to fulfill their initial mandate. I wondered what could have helped the peace operation to maintain its mandate and provide the support needed on the humanitarian

side of the mission. In reviewing all the personal notes I took, it became evident that two topics were noted most often. During the training and prior to deployment, the information given to the members needed to be more accurate. I understand that we arrived only six months after the earthquake and the civilians were still at the stage of gathering more information, but that should have been explained in greater depth. If that had been accomplished, it would have helped those deployed to have more reasonable expectations and gain a better idea of the reality peacekeepers were facing.

In the field, there was a clear human resource issue. The international community and the UN have been mentioning for years through the numerous reports and reforms, like the Brahimi report, that the peacekeeping mission needs an institutional change. It requires more commitment from both the financial side and the human resource side and the implementation of clear and achievable mandates. The second point is the important one that affected the deployment. We believe that there were enough peacekeepers deployed but the tardiness of their engagement was one of the issues. It is a long process to obtain all the security clearance required to work in another country. If the UN would have a team of peacekeepers ready for special deployments to go anywhere when needed, they would dramatically increase the quality and swiftness of the response in case of complex emergency.

A potential topic for future research would be the feasibility of such teams. Can countries afford to lend their military and police officers to the UN for three to five years? Is it economically and politically realistic to have a multidisciplinary team that would

have the ability upon request, needs, or international decision, to go and operate in failed states that would be facing a critical situation?

On the history of peacekeeping, I noticed that certain missions are very long in duration; for example in Cyprus (UNFICYP) established in March 1964, in Syria (UNDOF) established in June 1974, in Lebanon (UNIFIL) established in March 1978, in the Middle East (UNTSO) established in May 1948. Although their mandates have been modified, those peace operations are still ongoing. In Haiti's case, the missions have changed names but the UN keeps coming back. These were not the subject of my research, but since the early 2000s the international community seems to be reluctant to fully conclude peace operations in Haiti. Every successful mission should have an end date, where the host country is stable enough, and where the host country has been empowered by the effort of the mission to properly govern itself.

Finally, another area of potential research would be to follow police officers in the peacekeeping role from beginning to the end of a mission and then interview them a little while later. During the mission, I worked with police officers from 53 different countries and had the opportunity to keep contact with a small group. The difference the mission has made in their lives is quite surprising and the reality of the mission is very different depending on which country they are coming from.

I feel this research was important because peacekeepers will continue to be used for a long time. Since 1948, 68 missions were deployed in all corners of the world. Currently they are 15 active missions. Peacekeeping missions and operations are one of the most efficient and effective tools, due to their possible ability to adapt. It has been

demonstrated in this research that the international community, especially since 9/11, has made it clear that there is a direct link between security and development. One of their first methods of response in support of a failed state facing an internal or external conflict is the deployment of a peace operation. The peacekeepers and the developers are directly linked. I experienced it first hand and this research gives the point of view of a peacekeeper to the readers.

This research touches both the professional and academic fields of interest of mine. The managers of police officers have to recruit individuals with the skills and the capacity to adapt quickly during a peacekeeping mission. For the development of the failed state, the policy makers in charge of a peace operation have to include development of a strong national police into the final solution. Finally, this research proved that we need the peacekeepers in field to do the front line work in multiple ways, but at the same time we need the policy makers to find ways to empower the peacekeepers to perform their duties with a higher level of professionalism.

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