

Signature page

The Crisis of Global Governance: Can International Political Legitimacy be Maintained?

By
Bryn M de Chastelain

A Thesis Submitted to
Saint Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Political Science.

August, 2020, Halifax, Nova Scotia

Copyright Bryn de Chastelain, 2020

Approved: Marc G. Doucet, PhD
Professor

Date: 31 August 2020

The Crisis of Global Governance: Can International Political Legitimacy be Maintained?

By
Bryn M de Chastelain

A Thesis Submitted to
Saint Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Political Science.

August, 2020, Halifax, Nova Scotia

Copyright Bryn M de Chastelain, 2020

Approved: Marc G. Doucet, PhD
Professor

Date: 31 August 2020

The Crisis of Global Governance: Can International Political Legitimacy be Maintained?

by Bryn M de Chastelain

Abstract

This essay explores the severity of the current crisis moment for global governance. This crisis is predicated upon decreased engagement of key western democracies coupled with the rising presence and tolerance of illiberal practices and authoritarian states. The essay argues that the crisis is one of legitimacy, which is not specific to a particular approach to global governance, but is in fact representative of the barriers to legitimacy for multilateral institutions in their entirety. The essay begins by situating the crisis moment and expanding on key factors that have contributed to it, including populism, nationalism, xenophobia, illiberalism, and organizational funding schemes. Drawing on the literature of John Ikenberry and Amitav Acharya, the liberal internationalist and fragmentation approaches are used as analytical frameworks to understand the relationship between political legitimacy and global governance. This exploration of legitimacy draws on early modern theorists Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber and connects to analyses of international political legitimacy through Jan-Aart Scholte and Jonas Tallberg. The discussion of legitimacy examines input and output sources of legitimacy for global governance institutions. Based on the coexistence of liberal internationalism and fragmentation, the essay concludes that the two approaches are not in conflict with each other as one might assume, but instead both continue to grapple with the question of international legitimacy. The purpose of this essay is to identify the key barriers to legitimacy facing global governance approaches. The essay concludes by identifying important components of international political legitimacy that must be further considered when assessing global governance approaches.

31 August 2020

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| Abstract | 3 |
| Table of Contents | 4 |
| Abbreviations | 5 |
| Introduction | 6 |
| Chapter 1 - Today's Crisis: Worse than before? | 10 |
| The Significance of Populism in the United States | 11 |
| The Rise of Nationalism and Xenophobia in Europe | 12 |
| Increasing Tolerance for Illiberalism | 13 |
| Funding: A Precarious Arrangement | 16 |
| Chapter 2 - Understanding the Crisis Moment | 18 |
| Introducing the Liberal International Order | 18 |
| The Fragmentation Approach | 21 |
| Chapter 3 - Understanding Political Legitimacy | 24 |
| Understanding Early Modern Interpretations of Legitimacy | 25 |
| (i) Authority | 25 |
| (ii) Normative and Sociological Legitimacy | 27 |
| (iii) Authority and Legitimacy | 28 |
| Sources of Institutional Legitimacy | 29 |
| Input-Oriented Sources of Legitimacy | 30 |
| (i) Membership | 30 |
| (ii) Multi-Stakeholder Approach | 32 |
| (iii) Financial Power | 33 |
| Output-Oriented Sources of Legitimacy | 34 |
| (i) Favourable Outcomes | 35 |
| (ii) Normative Structures | 36 |
| (iii) International Law | 37 |
| (iv) Fair Procedure | 37 |
| Legitimacy Matrix | 38 |
| Chapter 4 - The Future of Global Governance | 40 |
| Coexistence of Liberal Internationalism and Fragmentation | 41 |
| Institutional Performance | 43 |
| The Role of Institutions | 45 |
| The Problem of Illiberalism | 47 |
| Conclusion | 49 |
| Works Cited | 53 |

Abbreviations

EU – European Union

IGOs – Inter-governmental organizations

IMF – International Monetary Fund

SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization

NGOs – Non-governmental organizations

UN – United Nations

The Crisis of Global Governance: Can International Political Legitimacy be Maintained?

Introduction

Foundational principles of contemporary global governance and modern international organizations have been around since the early 19th century. While these principles have faced periodic moments of profound crisis over the past two centuries, one could argue that the Post-World War II configuration of global governance and international organizations has never been threatened to the same extent as today. The first example of modern European cooperation was the Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine, founded in 1815 (Stephen, 2018, 96). The European Concert of Powers was another significant pre-World War I international institution with a regional focus in Europe (Acharya, 2017, 277). Over the decades that followed, many different components of global governance emerged. International cooperation was central to global governance and produced policy outcomes including, but not limited to, coordinated climate plans, financial regulation, trade agreements, and the establishment of international standards of human rights (Tallberg et al, 2018, 3). That said, international cooperation is increasingly threatened by the decreasing engagement of Western democracies and the rising tolerance of illiberal practices and authoritarian states. These factors have had a significant impact on the legitimacy of global governance and will be explored further in later sections.

Many International Relations (IR) scholars agree that liberal internationalism has constituted the main approach to global governance through the 20th and 21st centuries (Ikenberry, 2009, 71). However, liberal internationalism has consistently faced moments of crisis arising from a lack of commitment to multilateral agreements or limited results from key institutions. Although crisis moments are not new to liberal internationalism, there is growing

concern regarding the current state of legitimacy for global governance (Önis & Kutlay, 2020; Ikenberry, 2017; Nye, 2017; Abramowitz, 2018; Abrahamsen et al, 2019; Scholte, 2011).

This thesis will explore this crisis moment and assess the current legitimacy gap for global governance. This thesis begins by examining the current crisis moment and asking whether it is more pressing than ever before. By unpacking nationalism and populism in Western states, the rise of illiberalism, and the changes in organizational funding, the crisis moment can be better understood. Through the discussion of these key themes, this thesis argues that the current crisis moment is more pronounced and therefore must be seriously considered. This leads to questions about the legitimacy of global governance, which requires an understanding of certain analytical approaches.

The second section of this thesis focuses on situating analytical approaches to global governance: namely, liberal internationalism and fragmentation as presented in John Ikenberry's literature on 'liberal internationalism' and Amitav Acharya's understanding of a 'multiplex world' that consists of many separate international orders (Acharya, 2017, 272). Ikenberry and Acharya adopt disparate approaches to global governance and have each contributed to significant literature on the differences between liberal internationalism and fragmentation. Their collective work is therefore fundamental to an understanding of the present crisis moment and, by extension, this thesis. The purpose of this thesis is not to offer a comprehensive review of liberal internationalism and fragmentation, but instead to utilize these approaches as analytical tools to understand the topic of legitimacy as it pertains to global governance.

In order to further understand the current legitimacy gap within global governance, the thesis will engage with the political theory of legitimacy. Much of the work of Acharya and Ikenberry focuses on the role of international institutions within global governance with attention

to the role of states and state actors. It is important to note that multilateral institutions are not the only form of global governance and instead constitute one venue through which international political legitimacy can be examined. For the purposes of exploring how the question of political legitimacy can be posed in the context of global governance, this thesis will draw particular attention to the role of states and international organizations while at the same time acknowledging that ‘international legitimacy’ can be analysed in ways that do not centre around states or international organizations. To begin, this analysis will involve an exploration of early modern political theorists, including Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber in order to understand early perspectives on legitimacy within domestic political systems. The political theory in this section mostly focuses on individual states. For this reason, the section transitions to more current understandings of international political legitimacy drawn from the work of Jan Aart Scholte and Jonas Tallberg. The thesis will introduce Scholte and Tallberg’s legitimacy matrix, which posits that international organizations attain legitimacy through input-sources (procedure) and output-source (performance). This matrix will also demonstrate that the question of international legitimacy can be posed outside of multilateral institutions as well. In this way, this thesis will focus on international organizations with the understanding that they are one of many components of international political legitimacy. In attempting to understand international political legitimacy, this section of the thesis will identify the core challenges facing both liberal internationalism and fragmentation as approaches to global governance. Ultimately, it becomes clear that both of these approaches are facing a legitimacy gap.

In the final section, this thesis raises questions about the future of global governance and its legitimacy deficit. This section includes a discussion on the coexistence of fragmentation and liberal internationalism which challenges the idea that one approach to global governance is

superior to another. Further, this section involves exploring institutions and organizational performance by raising questions pertaining to the future of international political legitimacy. Finally, this thesis addresses the topic of illiberalism and the potential implications for the legitimacy of global governance.

The thesis simultaneously offers a connection between approaches to global governance and the drivers of international political legitimacy. The literature on liberal internationalism and fragmentation centres around the role of multilateral institutions, but as noted the thesis will demonstrate that international legitimacy can be attained outside of international organizations. For this reason, although there will be a significant focus on the role of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), the thesis will identify additional components of legitimacy in order to fully understand the legitimacy deficit facing global governance.

This is the central problem that the thesis is trying to address: liberal internationalism and fragmentation are not competing approaches to global governance, but instead are both vulnerable to global governance's crisis of legitimacy. Through an exploration of international political legitimacy with liberal internationalism and fragmentation as analytical tools, this thesis seeks to emphasize the importance of the legitimacy crisis while producing questions about the future of global governance. This leads to a number of questions about how legitimacy is obtained and sustained within global governance. These issues do not present a clear answer and thus, this thesis will not attempt to solve the current crisis moment. Instead, it will draw attention to the challenges and questions that global governance must face in order to obtain and maintain legitimacy in an evolving global environment.

Chapter 1: Today's Crisis: Worse than Before?

Crises of global governance are not new. It is a common understanding within the international legal sector, for instance, that crisis is not infrequent and instead underlines the discipline and its reality (Charlesworth, 2002, 65). Orford, for example, argues that global governance continues to find itself in a “moment of danger” as it struggles to attain and maintain legitimacy (2004, 467). Given the absence of a formalized international sovereign figure, it is understandable that global governance systems would continue to face moments of crisis. Some global governance models have consisted of a state or group of states acting as “law’s sovereign guarantor”, however; this process prioritizes certain states over others and seeks to replicate a system of authority that international governance is meant to transcend (Orford, 2004, 444; Kennedy, 1994, 14). The alternative is a reality consisting of “pervasive uneasiness” that occurs without a single authority figure (Orford, 2004, 443).

Although crises of global governance have occurred in the past, the present crisis moment is, arguably, more pressing. The liberal international order and fragmentation models of global governance, which will be examined more closely in Chapter Two are increasingly threatened by a lack of legitimacy in the international political environment.

In the last few years, there have been countless threats to global governance. Even in the face of an ongoing climate crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic, both of which demand international collaboration and cooperation due to their inherently transnational nature, some governments and leaders are still rejecting the current multilateral system. Between the increased power of illiberal and authoritarian governments and the rise of populist leaders, the institutions and regimes of global governance have been significantly undermined. This contributes to the overwhelming concern within the field of IR that the liberal international order is in an especially

concerning moment of crisis. This section will identify these concerns and demonstrate their connection to international organizations. As this section will demonstrate, the crisis moment can be understood as a combination of rising illiberal practices and decreasing western engagement as they pertain to multilateral institutions. This will be shown through a number of key themes, including the rise of nationalism and populism, increased toleration of illiberal practices and governments, and a shift in financial support for international organizations.

The Significance of Populism in the United States

For some observers, the election of Donald Trump in 2016 represented a significant change in American politics. Within an established populist agenda, Trump campaigned to put ‘America first’ and promised to create economic prosperity through isolationist policy (Carpenter, 2017, 35). Kagan argues that Trump’s election in 2016 signalled that a number of Americans demonstrated an “unwillingness to continue upholding the world order” (2017, 268). This is based on underlying components of Trump’s campaign, which included an “America first attitude towards global rules” that has resulted in a significant change in America’s approach to international affairs (Ikenberry, 2017, 4). Nye proposes that “the liberal international order is a project of just the sort of cosmopolitan elites whom populists see as the enemy” (2017, 14). Trump’s election was able to capitalize, in part, on this view of the cosmopolitan elite as the enemy. This view was accompanied by what some perceive to be the rejection of America’s significant international engagement and commitment to international cooperation.

From the perspective of liberal internationalism, the Trump campaign’s understanding is flawed, as states are expected to value international cooperation in order to benefit from outcomes that reflect shared interests, such as the maintenance of free trade or human rights

(Ikenberry, 2017, 3-5). Ikenberry goes on to argue this ‘America first attitude’ “misses the larger, interdependent logic of the U.S.-led system” (2017, 4). This refers to the perspective that as a powerful state, the United States has historically agreed not to act individually, but instead to restrict aspects of its power in order to appeal to other states (2017, 5). In turn, the United States receives access to other global regions through cooperation as opposed to conflict. This allows the United States to maintain political and financial influence that helps to shape the nature of international agreements and commitments in a way that is beneficial to its national interests. For some scholars, the Trump administration’s approach is relatively unprecedented based on America’s record of supporting liberal values in the post WWII international order (Ikenberry, 2017, 6). This contributes to the severity of the crisis moment for global governance.

The Rise of Nationalism and Xenophobia in Europe

European nationalism has grown to involve an overwhelming rejection of key international organizations; notably the European Union (EU). With a significant increase in the number of elected officials from “xenophobic, far-right parties” (Abramowitz, 2018, 15), democratic values in Europe have been significantly undermined since the influx of refugees into Europe in 2015-2016. Far-right political sentiments are not new to Europe, but presently, right-wing support is increasing. Although many European states do not yet have populist leaders, they could in short order, all of which suggests that public political sentiment is changing in Europe (Abramowitz, 2018, 15-16; Carpenter, 2017, 33-5, 41). The EU itself is committed to multilateralism and asserts that a united Europe is critical for citizens (Dworkin & Leonard, 2018, 3-4; Gowan, 2018, 3). Dworkin and Leonard propose that “a renewed commitment to multilateralism [is] the best way of securing Europeans’ security and prosperity” (2018, 23). The

discussion of a “renewed commitment” is reflective of the political environment within Europe and current hesitancy towards the EU.

The best example of this is the result of the United Kingdom’s 2016 referendum, popularly known as ‘Brexit’, where citizens voted to leave the EU. But even before Brexit, European sentiments were tense. In 2011, Marine Le Pen, the French leader of the National Front, began to question France’s EU membership, beginning with a scathing public address undermining the importance of the EU, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (Reynié, 2016, 53). There are additional concerns beyond Europe, too. The EU Council on Foreign Relations has identified the USA as one of three main challengers at the United Nations (UN), alongside Russia and China (Gowan, 2018, 5). This is extremely problematic as it demonstrates a breakdown of American-European cooperation, which, as many scholars in IR have noted, has been central to the post-WWII liberal international order (Gowan, 2018, 17). This breakdown has also contributed to the creation of “political space” for illiberal states – Russia and China among them – in key international organizations such as the UN (Gowan, 2018, 6). Considering the importance of European states and the US in creating and monitoring the current global governance system, this fracturing alliance presents a threat to global governance.

Increasing Tolerance for Illiberalism

Illiberal and authoritarian practices are often incorrectly equated. Although similar in nature, illiberal practices are violations or rejections of human rights whereas authoritarian practices represent a threat to democracy itself (Glasius, 2018, 517; Zakaria, 1997, 40). For the purpose of this analysis, the term ‘illiberal’ will reflect illiberal and authoritarian practices, given

the fact that sustained illiberal practices can lead to threats to democracy as well (Glasius, 2018, 517).

The increasing tolerance of illiberal states and practices can be seen in Europe through the actions of states such as Hungary and Poland, who have been “uprooting democratic institutions and intimidating critics in civil society” (Abramowitz, 2018, 16). States such as Russia and China have continued to undermine and alter the liberal international system in order to achieve their political ends, however these ends may be defined. Abramowitz describes this phenomenon as an incessant need for Russia and China to “compromise rules-based institutions beyond their borders” (2018, 10). Not only do illiberal states and practices represent a threat to the liberal international order, but their actions raise important questions about the future of global governance. China and Russia consistently oppose the US, UK, and France on topics pertaining to humanitarian situations (Oludoun, 2014, 77). Even Acharya, a proponent of regional fragmentation, has not sufficiently accounted for the presence of illiberal practices within global governance, as they directly conflict with liberal normative structures, which are central to global governance for liberal states such as the US, UK, and France. For this reason, the growing tolerance of illiberal practices contributes to the crisis of the liberal international order (Deudney & Ikenberry, 2018, 19; Zakaria, 1997, 31; Petrusek, 2019, 104).

Illiberal states still have a defined role within the current system of global governance. States such as China and Russia hold veto power on the UN Security Council; arguably the most consequential authority on matters of peace and security in international relations. These states are playing a central role in challenging norms of the rules-based international order by providing counter-norms. This is most clearly seen through the focus on countering potential infringement on the sovereignty of individual states. China leads these efforts through “critiquing

liberal democracy's universalism as well as the political conditionality that international institutions adopt to further universal democratic norms" (Cooley, 2015, 51). This perspective prioritizes the individual sovereignty of states as opposed to acknowledging the liberal internationalist perspective that democratic principles and models of governance help to foster global peace and security. Abramowitz argues that China is providing a framework for other states to follow that includes actions leading to "politicized courts, intolerance for dissent, and predetermined elections" (2018, 1). However, these actions are not unique to China and are becoming more frequent worldwide. This authoritarian rejection of democratic practices is closely connected to illiberal practices, including a weakening of support for internationally recognized standards on human rights.

Russia and China have retained their power within the UN without formally supporting the spread of democratic norms around the world. This is further supported through the idea that: "China has tried not to overthrow the current order but rather to increase its influence within it" (Nye, 2017, 13). On the other hand, initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional group established in 2001 that prioritizes state sovereignty and rejects global governance institutions, demonstrates the ways in which authoritarian states are impacting the liberal internationalist character of the global governance system through the creation of new organizations and the rejection of international cooperation outside of specified regions or policy domains (Cooley, 2015, 52). This assessment is critical to the current crisis of global governance and challenges the historically liberal interpretation of legitimate global governance systems.

Funding: A Precarious Arrangement

International organizations largely rely on state funding in order to be able to provide services and execute programming. Changes to funding allocations create a tangible threat for the existence of international organizations, but they also posit a darker reality in terms of how financial wealth dictates global governance. The first component to consider is the direct financial contributions of major states. China now provides more in development assistance to Latin America than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined and has also doubled their aid contributions in Africa (Cooley, 2015, 59). Increased Chinese funding does not stop there. China has become the “second-largest contributor to the \$7 billion UN peacekeeping budget” behind the US (Gowan, 2018, 8). This funding comes at a time when the American President is “willing to rethink the United States’ financial and political commitment to the UN” (Ikenberry, 2017, 6). This is an important consideration as Cooley identifies that “in the 1990s, the West still had a near-exclusive role as the provider of international funding” (2015, 60). China has been the greatest exception to this, however, Cooley identifies that many “emerging donors have stepped in to aid countries not serviced by the Western-led aid community” (2015, 59). The reality is that changes to global governance funding models could significantly impact the liberal international order. If the US and European states no longer provide the most funding for international organizations, and have less influence as a result, the current crisis moment could be exacerbated.

There is a perception that has been heavily perpetuated by the Trump Administration that American involvement and financial support to key international organizations is unequal and greater than other member countries’ contributions. This claim is based on the fact that the US typically contributes higher membership dues to international organizations than other member

states (Graham, 2017, 22). Ikenberry argues that the US has historically contributed in this way in order to lead the international order, and in doing so, prioritize American interests regarding the economy, politics, and security (2017, 4). However, many theorists argue that, more than merely advancing American interests, these contributions are necessary in cementing the liberal international order around the world (Nye, 2017, 13; Ikenberry, 2017, 4-5). In this way, rejecting the liberal international order is equivalent to giving up significant global political influence and undermining the order in and of itself.

This is only further complicated through the ongoing increase in earmarked donations to international organizations from a variety of stakeholders. Initially, designated donations were prohibited in many institutions, but “rule changes opened the door to the rise in earmarked resources” (Graham, 2017, 17). These resources can be tied to specific projects or initiatives, which allows individual states to more easily dictate the direction and decisions of a particular organization. This transition has also allowed other stakeholders to become more actively involved in the work of IGOs. Most organizations do not include non-state actors within their voting structure, but donations from non-state actors have the potential to influence decision-making within institutions nevertheless (Graham, 2017, 21). This form of fragmentation involves greater engagement of non-state actors, but many theorists also argue that it is a direct threat to the liberal international order. Cooley argues that the changes in international organization funding create “more contention over the normative foundations of the international order (with non-liberal voices having a bigger say than before), more authority for counter-norms such as non-interference in countries’ internal affairs, and more influence for various authoritarian alternatives to liberal democracy” (2015, 60). This argument raises questions pertaining to the

legitimacy of the current global governance structure and whether it is still effective in maintaining the liberal international order.

In concluding this section, it is necessary to understand that the current crisis moment is multifaceted. The rise of populism in the USA, nationalism and xenophobia within the EU, illiberal practices, and organizational funding have contributed to a significant crisis moment for liberal internationalism. Populism, nationalism, and xenophobia have significantly affected the ability of European countries and the USA to effectively maintain the liberal international order. Deudney and Ikenberry offer that these factors contribute to Europe and the USA undermining the liberal order which they historically promoted (2018, 19). Further, illiberal practices are of grave concern for liberal internationalism. Gheciu asserts that liberal and illiberal states and leaders will continue to clash in years ahead, particularly in the West (2019, 45). This increase in illiberal states and authoritarian practices has the potential to become more significant as states such as China continue to increase their funding of international organizations. As illiberal states continue to maintain global influence, the severity of the crisis moment will only be enhanced (Dworkin & Leonard, 2018, 7). Alongside decreasing participation from the USA and EU countries, the increasing tolerance for illiberal practices within a fragmented structure creates a significant challenge for the liberal international order as it seeks to maintain democratic and liberal norms amidst a number of increasingly illiberal states.

Chapter 2 –Understanding the Crisis Moment

Introducing the Liberal International Order

This section will not provide a comprehensive overview of the liberal international order but will instead utilize the approach as an analytical tool to understand how the question of

legitimacy relates to global governance. According to some IR scholars, international cooperation, as embodied in the establishment of the first universal international organization, began to formally materialize after World War I, with the efforts of Woodrow Wilson and key European actors in creating the League of Nations (Ikenberry, 2009, 71). Ikenberry and others describe this as the first stage of liberal internationalism, with significant subsequent developments based on this model during the post-World War II and Cold War periods (Ikenberry, 2009, 71). Central to these developments was the creation of the League's successor, the United Nations (UN). The UN charter was adopted in October 1945 with the goal of creating a system conducive to continued collaboration, peace, and security after World War II (Carswell, 2013; Ikenberry, 2009, 73). Ikenberry argues that this order was liberal based on the general values of cooperation, restraint, and sovereign equality (2009, 72).

From the perspective of liberal internationalism, the founding of the UN along with the other key economic multilateral institutions, in addition to the goal of maintaining peace and security, also sought to strengthen and expand a rules-based international order. A rules-based order refers to the creation and maintenance of agreed-upon norms that are meant to guide international activity (Ikenberry, 2018, 12; Dunne, 2010, 537). As the order has developed, it has evolved in terms of its focus, now encompassing a broad range of critical policy domains that include, among others, financial policies, trade agreements, human rights, peace and security, and the maintenance of international law (Ikenberry, 2017, 2; Dworkin & Leonard, 2018, 4; Alcaro, 2018, 155).

While the 'rules' of the rules based international order may seek to govern many policy domains, which in turn concern the activities of a wide spectrum of domestic and international public and private actors, cooperation between states remains a critical component of the liberal

international order. In other words, the role of the state remains crucial to the liberal internationalist world view. Ikenberry asserts that early liberal internationalism prioritized rules to “facilitate and reinforce cooperation and collective problem solving” (2009, 72) among states. This cooperation has been critical in creating a liberal international order that both creates a system of allies and partnerships which promote peace and security while maintaining a focus on supporting the expansion of norms often associated with the prevailing model of Western liberal democracies (Ikenberry, 2009, 73; Stephen, 2018, 114; Beetham & Lord, 2001, 446).

Many scholars maintain that the liberal international order was successfully maintained for seven decades, yet there is growing concern regarding its stability (Abrahamsen et al, 2019, 11; Ikenberry, 2009, 77; Kagan, 2017, 269). Ikenberry’s understanding of liberal internationalism is critical in contextualizing the liberal international order’s progression over time and the manner in which it has emerged from moments of crisis. Table 1 illustrates the central components of the different eras of liberal internationalism, as theorized by Ikenberry.

Table 1 – Ikenberry’s Progression of Liberal Internationalism

| Category | Characteristics | Crisis |
|------------------------------|---|--|
| Liberal Internationalism 1.0 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Universal Membership - Emphasis on State Sovereignty/Independence - Normative Structure - Focus on Trade and Collective Security | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Normative frameworks were not binding - Insufficient institutional commitments - Insufficient commitment to security |
| Liberal Internationalism 2.0 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Western-focused system - USA as hegemonic state - Added policy domains (economic regulation + human rights) - Reduction in State Sovereignty | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Impact of the end of the Cold War on American hegemony - Decreased state sovereignty and human rights - Lack of authority figure |

(Ikenberry, 2009, 74-79)

Ikenberry asserts that the start of liberal internationalism (1.0) emerged under Woodrow Wilson but failed based on a lack of institutional commitments and strong normative frameworks (2009, 75-76). This means that institutions were unable to collaborate to the extent that was needed to mitigate economic and security issues. Liberal Internationalism 2.0 was built upon American hegemonic power resulting from the Cold War, but in the post-Cold War period, the United States has failed to maintain significant influence amidst increasingly contested norms and structures (Ikenberry, 2009, 79). As noted above, table 1 summarizes Ikenberry's perspective on the key characteristics and failings of liberal internationalism 1.0 and 2.0. The table is helpful in understanding how the liberal order might respond to the current crisis moment, albeit one that is arguably more severe than in the past.

The Fragmentation Approach

While many view the post-war order through the 'liberal internationalist' lens, and while liberal internationalism may be one of the dominant perspectives in IR, some scholars have proposed alternative analytical frameworks. Among these alternatives, the concept of 'fragmentation' has figured prominently. Most notably, the work of Acharya is critical in terms of explicitly connecting fragmentation to global governance and framing the concept as one in opposition to the liberal international order. Fragmentation can be seen as an approach to global governance based on the acceptance and promotion of regionalized structures that do not necessarily prioritize hegemonic states. Fragmentation refers to a political environment in which policy domains are "marked by a patchwork of international institutions" that cover different subject areas or regions (Biermann et al, 2009, 16). Fragmentation was first explored in the 1970s as theorists began to unpack overlapping responsibilities within international institutions

(Biermann et al, 2009, 16-17; Andresen & Hey, 2005; Schmidt & Kochan, 1977). It was also an important concept within international law, often in emphasizing the importance of consistent authority and legal practices (Koskienemmi & Leino, 2002, 558; Hafner, 2004, 856).

Acharya recognizes the growing presence of fragmentation through regional and international agreements, the role of social movements, and civil society actors (2016, 453). In this regard, Acharya further posits that fragmentation may offer an alternative model of global governance to the liberal international order. He argues that a “key factor driving fragmentation is the outdated system of privilege enjoyed by Western countries and their abuse of existing rules and norms and resistance to the lack of reform of multilateral institutions” (2016, 457). In this regard, fragmentation is not a new construct, but may have newfound support based on the potential positive implications for industrializing nations or states from the Global South, who have not had sufficient international power in the past. Oludoun further supports this argument, specifically by looking at the role of the UN, which is described as an “out-dated distribution of world power” (2014, 87). However, fragmentation is not solely advantageous due to increased membership. There are a number of components to fragmentation which are summarized in the table below.

Table 2 – Biermann’s Typology of Fragmentation

| Categories/Degrees | Synergistic | Cooperative | Conflictive |
|---------------------------|--|---|---|
| Institutional Integration | One core institution, with other institutions being closely integrated | Core institutions with other institutions that are loosely integrated | Different, largely unrelated institutions |
| Norm Conflicts | Core norms of institutions are integrated | Core norms are not conflicting | Core norms conflict |

| | | | |
|----------------------|---|--|---|
| Actor Constellations | All relevant actors support the same institutions | Some actors remain outside main institutions, but maintain cooperation | Major actors support different institutions |
|----------------------|---|--|---|

(Biermann et al, 2009, 19)

Biermann’s typology of fragmentation is effective in identifying the key categories and degrees of fragmentation. This typology outlines how fragmentation materializes in terms of its impact on norms, actors, and institutions. The model incorporates the aforementioned categories and theorizes three distinct degrees of fragmentation: synergistic, cooperative, and conflictive (Biermann et al, 2009, 19). Synergistic fragmentation involves highly integrated institutions and norms, which are supported by a majority of actors. This would allow for a fragmented, yet collaborative system. Cooperative fragmentation includes institutions and norms that are not in conflict with each other, but are not necessarily complementary. Similarly, actors cooperate with institutions even if they are not directly involved themselves. Finally, conflictive fragmentation consists of disconnected institutions with conflicting norms and unique supporters. This leads to clashes between institutional and normative structures depending on the level of support from key actors. This model is supported by various theorists who accept that fragmentation exists within global governance and that further study must determine the future impacts of the fragmentation approach (Zelli, 2018, 173; Keohane & Victor, 2011, 14).

This section has outlined the liberal internationalism and fragmentation approaches to global governance primarily through the work of Ikenberry and Acharya. Ikenberry provides an understanding of the progression of liberal internationalism and outlines how the approach has progressed from the post-World War I period to the post-Cold War period. Ikenberry further identifies that liberal internationalism has faced crisis moments before, which is helpful in understanding the current crisis moment. In terms of fragmentation, Acharya describes the

approach as an alternative to liberal internationalism which increasingly accounts for industrializing and non-Western states. Biermann's typology further unpacks fragmentation and develops a categorization system simplifying the approach to the impact on institutions, norms, and actors. This assists in understanding the degrees of fragmentation and offers a tool for comparison between the approaches. Rather than provide an in-depth analysis of liberal internationalism and fragmentation, this discussion has focused on using each approach as an analytical tool to discuss the issue of legitimacy in the context of global governance. However, political legitimacy is a complex subject and can be explored from many angles, which will be the subject of the next section.

Chapter 3 - Understanding Political Legitimacy

The question of how political legitimacy has led to complex theorization is based on various key factors and themes. To begin exploring legitimacy, this section will build on the work of Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber and their respective understandings of legitimacy and authority. This assessment of legitimacy will then focus on what makes a political order legitimate or illegitimate. Ultimately, this section will draw on literature that has explored legitimacy within the context of international relations and global governance. This analysis will focus on a number of themes, including membership, procedure and performance, democratic norms, and international law. These sources of legitimacy can be categorized into input-oriented and output-oriented sources, depending on whether the value of a multilateral institution lies in the access it provides or the outcomes it creates (Tallberg et al, 2018, 14). This approach will allow for a stronger understanding of the question of legitimacy as it pertains to various approaches to global governance, including liberal internationalism and fragmentation.

Understanding Early Modern Interpretations of Legitimacy

(i) Authority

In order to explore legitimacy as a framework, it is necessary to look at the work of modern political theorists including Max Weber and Thomas Hobbes. Weber's understanding of legitimacy starts with the concept of 'social approval': where all power must have implicit and explicit societal approval in order to be considered legitimate. (Weber, 1968, 31). Weber's understanding is based on a domestic model, which raises an interesting question in terms of how social approval could exist within international authority: what, precisely, constitutes the 'social' in the international realm? A similar problematique can be applied to Hobbes' understanding of sovereign figures. Hobbes argues that the ideal political structure is based on a sovereign figure who derives power from its subjects. Specifically, Hobbes articulates that the ideal political structure is one where "men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some man, or assembly of men ... to be protected by him against all others" (2012, 407). This is different from Weber's concept of social approval, as for Hobbes, citizens agree to cede their power to a sovereign figure in order to receive protection. This ceding of power is set in a domestic context and seeks to promote a hegemonic political order, which is seen as more challenging within international politics due to consistent concerns regarding the lack of an 'international' sovereign authority figure.

For Weber, legitimate power is based on social approval and is made up of three types of authority: traditional, charismatic, and legal (Weber, 1968, 215). Traditional authority refers to authority based on tradition or custom; usually a component of societal structures (Weber, 1968, 227). This does not necessarily refer only to political authority. It can also refer to the authority

of religious leaders, provided that it is socially approved. Charismatic authority refers to obtaining control through popular support, typically as a result of character traits synonymous with leadership (Weber, 1968, 242). Finally, legal authority refers to the set of laws, rules, or norms that govern a particular society (Weber, 1968, 217).

Hobbes' concept of the socially approved ceding of power is similar to the reasoning behind the creation of the global governance system following World War II and the Cold War. Indeed, the post-war order was created to establish a security community, made up of states with similar interests (Dworkin and Leonard, 2018, 4). The challenge with the connection to Hobbes lies in the ability of a sovereign to maintain authority, as it is noted that "if the people rebel, the sovereign must, Hobbes argues, have recourse to arms to enforce civil order" (Williams, 1996, 221). This is unfeasible for global governance as there is a requirement for multilateral institutions to respect state sovereignty and no formal 'ceding' of sovereignty to anything resembling a 'global sovereign' takes place. This represents one of the challenges with the transition from domestic understandings of legitimacy to international realities. On the other hand, Weber's analysis of power maintains that legitimate authority can be achieved in a variety of ways, provided that it is socially approved (Weber, 1968, 215). When applied to global governance, this reinforces the idea that there is no single path to legitimacy. Although Weber and Hobbes' perspectives can be applied to global governance, they were theorized with domestic political systems in mind. For this reason, it is necessary to look at contemporary understandings of legitimacy as well.

(ii) Normative and Sociological Legitimacy

Normative and sociological legitimacy are modern concepts pertaining to how legitimacy is obtained. Normative legitimacy refers to the moral or legal “right of a political institution to rule” whereas sociological legitimacy is a “belief among the subjects of a governing institution that it is legitimate” (Agne, 2018, 25). Normative legitimacy relates back to Weber’s assertions regarding legal and traditional authority due to the fact that organizational procedures or rules can force member states to engage and collaborate within institutions. Further, aspects of charismatic authority could be compared to sociological legitimacy. Through this understanding, a leader can be designated legitimate based on leadership traits and endorsement of the latter as measured by public opinion.

This can be extended to the sociological legitimacy of multilateral institutions, based on the argument that political actors (individuals, civil society actors, and states) must believe that the organization is legitimate. This is supported by Scholte who asserts that legitimacy must have grounds beyond policy outcomes including various factors, notably charismatic leadership (2011, 114). The discussion of charismatic leadership provides a connection to Weber’s understanding of charismatic authority, which is founded on leadership through popular support. Connections between types of authority and legitimacy illustrate that they are distinct concepts, yet some theorists view them as synonymous. Buchanan and Keohane posit that an institution’s legitimacy supposes that it has the right to rule over others (2006, 409-410). This argument oversimplifies the concept of legitimacy and presents it as all-encompassing. The normative and sociological forms of legitimacy are unique yet interconnected, given the fact that social beliefs regarding legitimacy are informed by societal norms relating to the appropriate uses of authority (Tallberg

and Zurn, 2019, 577). Thus, it is imperative to consider that legitimacy and authority are not absolute and instead vary depending on individual member states, institutions, and individuals.

(iii) Authority and Legitimacy

It is critical to understand that authority and legitimacy are not necessarily the same concept but must be understood as interrelated. This distinction is relevant as a lack of authority is a central challenge of legitimacy for global governance. Rosenau and Czempiel identify that unlike individual state governments, governance does not rely on formal authority¹, which means that structures and decisions must be accepted by a majority of states in order to be effective (1992, 4). This is a limited understanding as it only mentions legitimacy in terms of membership, however; recognizing the complex relationship between legitimacy and authority is vital. For Weber and other modern theorists, authority and legitimacy are independent concepts. Weber argues that every authoritative body “attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy” (Weber, 1968, 213). This implies that institutions with authority still have to obtain legitimacy from society, thus identifying the two concepts as interrelated yet independent. Some theorists even identify a formal “authority-legitimacy link”, due to the fact that legitimacy can only exist when an organization has authority (Tallberg and Zurn, 2019, 586). This is true to an extent, but only if authority and legitimacy are considered to be on a spectrum. Organizations can have varying levels of authority depending on their perceived legitimacy, which is also a variable that can change frequently. This relates back to the crisis of global governance: decreasing perceived legitimacy in multilateral institutions. At times, institutions may retain

¹ Formal authority refers to a political system in which there is a singular entity that has legitimate authority. This authority would usually have central enforcement powers that can implement centralized policies (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992, 4; Take, 2012, 220).

authority over budgets or international policy domains, yet their perceived legitimacy is decreasing, meaning that their actions are not as impactful. This is contextualized well by Tallberg and Zurn, who describe that “a person may recognize the authority of the [World Trade Organization] as the principal forum for developing international trade law but have little confidence in the exercise of this authority” (2019, 586). They later posit that this is reflective of the “authority-legitimacy gap” based on increased political authority of multilateral institutions coupled with decreasing perceived legitimacy (Tallberg and Zurn, 2019, 583). Relating back to the crisis moment, this lack of legitimacy threatens to reduce the overall authority of international organizations.

Sources of Institutional Legitimacy

The legitimation or delegitimation of international organizations depends on perception at every stage of policy development, including “decision formulation, decision implementation, and decision outcome” (Scholte & Tallberg, 2018, 59). These stages can be subdivided into input and output sources of legitimacy. Put simply, input and output sources can be described as legitimacy attained through the procedure (input) and performance (output) of international organizations. Based on the attention applied to multilateral institutions by theorists such as Acharya and Ikenberry, this section will utilize international organizations to understand a component of international political legitimacy. Although these sources of legitimacy can be analyzed separately, a combination of input and output-related traits typically inform legitimacy perceptions.

Input-Oriented Sources of Legitimacy

Beetham and Lord assert that ‘input legitimacy’ refers to “procedures that increase public support” (1995, 453). A key part of this idea is the public’s determination regarding the fairness of rules and procedures of multilateral institutions. Input sources refer to legitimacy as a result of “providing access, participation, and representation” for members of international organizations (Tallberg et al, 2018, 14). In analyzing input sources of legitimacy, there will be a significant emphasis on key themes within global governance and how they affect perceived legitimacy. These themes include: Membership, the Multi-Stakeholder Approach, and Financial Power.

(i) Membership

The future of legitimacy within international organizations will be partly based on membership. Membership is an important component of global governance, both in terms of which states are included in various organizations, but also in terms of membership structures that may prioritize certain states over others. Some theorists have concluded that legitimacy is ultimately based on the inclusiveness and size of the membership (Keohane, 2006, 59; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2020, 3). However, inclusiveness needs to be further unpacked, as the simple membership of a particular state can be vastly different than its role. Membership impacts legitimacy through adequate participation and the determination of whether all affected parties are significantly involved in the process (Held, 2009, 539).

The UN offers a useful illustrative example of the issue of membership as it pertains to IOs. The UN General Assembly consists of 193 member states, but the Security Council is only made up of five permanent and ten non-permanent member states. In this way, the UN does retain legitimacy through its “near universal membership”, but there is a substantial power

imbalance within its structure (Kirton, 2002, 157). The Security Council was created more to concentrate power of the leading post-World War II states and there was “little indication that the Security Council should in some way ‘represent’ the UN membership generally” (Stephen, 2018, 107). This is critical to the difference between general and preferred members, which leads, in part, to global governance’s decrease in perceived legitimacy. Although it is possible for UN member states to be elected to the Security Council, the five permanent member states are in a much more privileged position, given their ability to deny the authorization of the use of force, the power of their veto, and the permanent nature of their seat. This has not gone unnoticed, as member states in 1979 began to advocate for equitable representation on the Council, yet this was met with promises of future reform which have not come into fruition (Stephen, 2018, 114). In this way, the Security Council has not capitalized on an opportunity to increase the legitimacy of the UN, instead deciding to maintain the concentration of political power and the resulting diplomatic imbalance. At the same time, the Council has attempted to counter delegitimation by creatively interpreting their legal foundation and taking on projects in new policy domains, such as organizing criminal tribunals (Stephen, 2018, 112). Further, the Security Council has created working practices that better involve non-council states (Stephen, 2018, 112). That said, these practices are all informal in nature, which allows the Security Council to retain its power internally as opposed to undergoing substantial structural reform.

This represents an important component of the crisis of global governance: the determination of membership and involvement in multilateral institutions. The extent to which legitimacy is affected by membership cannot be understated as many member states are looking for more powerful roles and responsibilities within key institutions (Acharya, 2017, 276). This is further expressed through the argument that “hegemonic ideologies may operate as a structural

factor at the international level that includes or excludes certain states from full membership or participation in the order” (Allan et al, 2018, 849). These factors demonstrate the importance of membership as an input-source of legitimacy.

(ii) Multi-Stakeholder Approach

Representation and membership within global governance has already been impacted based on the increased use of the multi-stakeholder approach to global governance. This approach involves engaging non-state actors, notably non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academics, and corporate actors in key partnerships (Acharya, 2017, 273). It is generally accepted that this approach has improved the legitimacy of certain global initiatives, based on the engagement and collaboration between state and corporate actors (Mele & Scheepers, 2013, 562) (Bøås & McNeill, 2017, 19). This approach has been effective in increasing the legitimacy and effectiveness of global governance in certain key policy domains, notably regarding economic regulation, international trade, and human rights. Haufler argues that the private sector’s influence is increasingly being harnessed by international organizations in order to generate broader support for internationally beneficial policy outcomes (2010, 404). Further, Scholte has identified that by engaging non-state actors, international initiatives such as the Kimberley Process² and the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria³ have been able to advocate for improvements to human rights (2011, 116). On the other hand, the multi-

² The Kimberley Process is a global regulatory network that tracks the sale of rough diamonds in order to prevent diamonds from conflict zones entering global markets. The regulatory scheme is handled through an international certification process, yet it is implemented through domestic legislation and civil monitoring processes (Haufler, 2009, 404).

³ The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria was established in 2002 with the aim of reducing the impact of the aforementioned epidemics worldwide. The Fund invests approximately \$4 Billion USD every year through partnerships with non-state actors, including NGOs, local governments, and the private sector.

stakeholder approach is generally understood as not having been utilized effectively within the topics of peace and security, which is a key policy domain for key large multilateral and regional institutions. That said, these examples demonstrate that innovative approaches to membership within global governance can be critical in increasing its perceived legitimacy, as well as the efficacy of outcomes on economic and humanitarian affairs. In other words, incorporating non-state actors has been understood as an effective mechanism in increasing legitimacy.

(iii) Financial Power

A key component of legitimate institutional procedure is the financial contributions of actors to international organizations. These contributions are similar to membership fees, given the understanding that institutions require funding and resources in order to function. The relationship between financial contributions and perceived legitimacy is demonstrated through the benefits that actors received from their contributions. A key example of this is the Trump Administration's repeated threats to reduce funding for central institutions, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) if other states do not also fund equitably (Gheciu, 2019, 44). These threats were realized to some degree when Trump threatened to revoke funding to the World Health Organization (WHO) during the COVID-19 pandemic (Wamsley, 2020). This is a substantial action, as the US provides 22% of WHO's funding each year, with fluctuations depending on voluntary contributions (Wamsley, 2020). Although Congress maintains some level of control over authorizing funding, Trump's rhetoric still displays a threat to international organizations. Scholte and Tallberg define proportionality as when states contribute financially to organizations based on their relative means, but financial power is exercised when states demand particular outcomes for their fiscal contributions (2018, 63). This is a component of fair

procedure, as inequities are created when states feel that they are receiving the same collective benefits while funding a higher proportion of operations and programs.

Another critical aspect of financial power involves private actors and the ability of corporations, in particular, to influence the actions of multilateral institutions. For example, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation are the third-highest funder of the WHO, behind the United States and the United Kingdom respectively (Graham, 2017, 20). This can be problematic because it can lead to explicit concerns regarding the determination of collective gains. The funding choices of private actors are far more likely to include internal or personal factors (Graham, 2017, 20). This demonstrates the power of financial contributions to international organizations. In order for procedural elements to remain legitimate, there must be an explicit degree of impartiality that ensures that decisions are made in favour of societal needs as opposed to private preferences (Scholte & Tallberg, 2018, 63-64).

Output-Oriented Sources of Legitimacy

The perceived effectiveness of global governance is an essential component of legitimacy. Scholte and Tallberg describe that the legitimacy of international organizations depends on “whether audiences see them as enhancing or undermining desired conditions in society” (2018, 60). In other words, one way that international organizations can attain legitimacy is through “generating benefits for state and societal actors” (Tallberg et al, 2018, 14). Specific benefits can be difficult to describe based on the fact that they differ depending on varying domestic interests, but the results of multilateral institutions are critical in assessing “performance in meeting the needs and values of citizens” (Beetham & Lord, 2001, 444). Result-based factors affecting legitimacy can be described as output sources. In analyzing output-

sources, there will be emphasis placed on the substance of the decisions of international organizations. Crucial factors in measuring the substance of these decisions include: Favourable Outcomes, Normative Structures, International Law, and Fair Procedure.

(i) Favourable Outcomes

Hurd's analysis of favourable outcomes draws on Scharpf's understanding of procedural factors and substantive outcomes. Scharpf asserts that input-oriented arguments cannot fully account for legitimacy perceptions based on the importance of performance-based indicators (1999, 188). In this regard, Hurd reiterates the value of this two-part analysis in arguing that favourable outcomes, correct procedure, and fairness are critical components for institutional legitimacy (2007, 67). Correct procedure is an input-source of legitimacy, while fairness can be attributed to either input or output sources. Favourable outcomes are first based on consent, which implies that member states will not consent to international organizations unless they see potential for political gains (Hurd, 2007, 67-68). They are also based on self-interest, which refers to the fact that member states will involve themselves in organizations that perpetuate their domestic interest (Hurd, 2007, 68). This is what could be considered a 'realist approach', but it reinforces the fact that favourable outcomes for a specific member state will reinforce their commitment to the institution. This concept of self-interest is important, because member states may remain involved in the work of multilateral institutions if they feel that there are potential benefits in the future, regardless of the current situation.

(ii) Normative Structures

The decisions and outcomes of international organizations both exist within normative structures but also contribute to the development of new global norms. Democratic norms have been a component of a legitimate liberal international order, but there is increasing anti-democratic sentiment which threatens to reduce the efficacy of global governance under a rules-based model. Cooley situates this through arguing that authoritarian regimes have sought to “erode the norms that inform and underlie the liberal international political order” (2015, 49). Historically, the promotion of democratic ideals, norms, and principles has underpinned the liberal international order as it spreads the values prioritized by Western democracies. Although norm creation is an essential component of global governance, there is not adequate support for the claim that norms have to be democratic. This is central to the work of Acharya, who asserts that norm creation is more effective when based around local constructs (2018, 91). This is an intriguing consideration, as it presents the possibility that international norms are critical to legitimacy, but not necessarily tied to liberal democratic values.

That said, norms still have to apply to a set of values in order to be deemed legitimate. This is what is argued by Cooley, as counter norms are continuously being created in opposition to liberal values (2015, 50-51). Although this argument is valid, it may cement a difference between liberal and illiberal practices. This contributes to a crisis of legitimacy, as states will increasingly disagree and reduce collaboration based on a lack of common values. This is supported by Jones, who asserts that western democracies are “reluctant to become directly involved in dialogues with those [states] who violate international norms” (2019, 130). This represents the challenge of maintaining liberal internationalism with illiberal states, as proponents of the liberal order are less likely to approve of their actions.

(iii) International Law

International law is an intriguing way to engage with legitimacy, as it has implications both in terms of procedure and performance. International law is primarily an output source of legitimacy due to the creation of global guidelines and legal systems mandating states and actors, although it similarly creates precedents and procedures that more closely appear as an input-source. Some theorists argue that international law seeks legitimacy from “rationalist arguments about interdependence” and mutual benefit (Koskenniemi & Leino, 2002, 556). One of the challenges with international law is that there is a constant possibility for it to be unsettled (Orford, 2004, 459). This means that international law is only legitimate if states continue to view it as ‘just’ or at least continue to behave in a manner that adheres to the rules. In this regard, international law can be seen as an important output source, because of the impact of effective legal precedents on the legitimacy of international organizations. International law is built on coordination and is constantly changing depending on the shifting geopolitical climate. International law represents an environment in which crises of authority and legitimacy are consistently discussed and debated.

(iv) Fair Procedure

The topic of fair procedure can also be characterized as an output source of legitimacy. This concept is based around sociological procedural theory, which identifies that when “rules are passed according to accepted procedures and by established authorities, people appear to accept them as legitimate” (Hurd, 2007, 71). This is an output source as it relates to how procedures are utilized in creating outcomes, as opposed to the process itself. In other words, fair procedure can lead to decisions which are perceived as legitimate based on the process that was

followed. Correct procedure explains why states who are not necessarily benefitting from international organizations may remain engaged. If outcomes are developed based on a set of pre-determined rules, state actors are more likely to view the process and outcome as legitimate. What is not accounted for is the response of states that are continually facing outcomes that do not benefit them. Returning to the crisis moment, the growing concern surrounding the lack of acceptance of the rules-based international order can be seen as stemming in part from a system that has benefitted western democracies over other member states. Through assessing output sources, it is clear that the performance of international organizations plays an important role in determining legitimacy perceptions for member states.

Legitimacy Matrix

One can gather from the preceding analysis that input and output sources are inherently interrelated and thus, output sources may be of no use in determining legitimacy if a member state does not view the organization's process as legitimate. For example, the decisions of certain international organizations may not be relevant to a member state that is not adequately represented within its structure. Recognizing this, Scholte and Tallberg utilize a legitimacy matrix (see Table 3 below) that accounts for both procedural and performance-based factors. These factors directly relate to the input and output sources of legitimacy. In terms of procedural themes, membership relates directly to participation, the multi-stakeholder approach represents efficiency, and financial power refers to proportionality. For performance themes, favourable outcomes refer to collective gains, normative structures relate to democracy promotion, and international law connects to distributive justice. This matrix measures the procedure and performance of multilateral institutions, alongside three key categories: Democratic,

Technocratic, and Fairness (Scholte & Tallberg, 2018, 62). Scholte and Tallberg clearly identify that technocratic measures strictly refer to the strength of policy institutions and “expertise-based problem solving” (2018, 62-63). This matrix leads to six sources of institutional legitimacy, as demonstrated in Figure 3.

Table 3 – Scholte and Tallberg’s Legitimacy Matrix

| | Democratic | Technocratic | Fair |
|-------------|----------------------------|------------------|----------------------|
| Procedure | Participation | Efficiency | Impartiality |
| | Accountability | Expertise | Proportionality |
| Performance | Democracy | Problem Solving | Human dignity |
| | promotion in wider society | Collective Gains | Distributive Justice |

(Scholte & Tallberg, 2018, 62)

The results of this matrix are also well supported in the literature, as multiple theorists argue in favour of these different dimensions of legitimacy. For instance, the democratic approach resonates in the literature as authors such as Ikenberry posit that the liberal world order is based on “democratic solidarity” and promotion (2017, 4). Effective policy initiatives within international organizations have been measured based on their perceived “advancement of democratic values” (Petrasek, 2019, 107). For his part, Scharpf asserts that a technocratic approach would allow for collective gains to be realized faster and argues that this approach would be more efficient for national governments (1999, 188-189). This is further supported by Keohane and Nye, who argue that multilateral institutions can support member states through problem solving more effectively with additional resources (1974, 53). Finally, the components

of the matrix pertaining to fairness are important as a failure to provide distributive justice and impartiality leads to delegitimation (Anderson et al, 2019, 664). This is further emphasized through the necessity of predictability within international organizations (Hurd, 2007, 71; Stephen, 2018, 100). The use of this matrix will be critical in analyzing the state of institutional legitimacy for fragmentation and the liberal international approaches to global governance.

Global governance systems Approaches to global governance are legitimized or delegitimized in various ways. The effects on legitimacy can be broken down into input and output sources. These sources are critical to understanding how legitimacy is affected, particularly during the current crisis moment. This assessment of international political legitimacy also demonstrates the complexity of the topic. Indeed, institutional legitimacy is a layered subject and it is challenging to create any uniform understandings of legitimacy, especially as different combinations of legitimacy sources can be successful or unsuccessful at any given time (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2020, 25). The next section of analysis will utilize the aforementioned legitimacy matrix to assess fragmentation and liberal internationalism as legitimate global governance approaches.

Chapter 4 - The Future of Global Governance

Liberal internationalism and fragmentation have often been presented as opposing perspectives when it comes to approaches to global governance. These perspectives are both critical in understanding the current crisis of global governance, but the question of whether liberal internationalism or fragmentation will prevail in the years and decades ahead is, to some extent, irrelevant. Both approaches to global governance coexist to some degree and will continue to do so. The crisis of global governance is not one of competing approaches, but is

instead a crisis of legitimacy. Both the liberal international order and the fragmentation approach are struggling to maintain international legitimacy in a global environment full of change. This section is not a complete analysis of legitimacy as it relates to liberal internationalism or fragmentation, but instead serves to draw attention to how both models of global governance face a crisis of legitimacy. This crisis cannot be easily resolved, which is why it is important to consider the complexities of legitimacy, as outlined in Chapter 3, as they relate to both liberal internationalism and fragmentation. This section will start by examining how international legitimacy is affected by the decreasing engagement of western democracies and the rising tolerance of illiberal practices.

Coexistence of Liberal Internationalism and Fragmentation

The role of actors within global governance is one of the clearest indications that fragmentation and liberal internationalism are co-existing. The multi-stakeholder approach consists of integrating non-state actors, such as academics, NGOs, and corporate stakeholders into global governance organizations. This approach fulfills the criterion of democratic participation in the legitimacy matrix, while offering a decentralized decision-making structure. This blended approach is considered to be an effective tool in increasing legitimacy, as it incorporates a broader network of actors, beyond state leaders and diplomats (Mele & Scheepers, 2013, 562; Bøås and McNeill, 2017, 19; Plesch & Weiss, 2015, 202). Incorporating a wider scope of stakeholders can be effective in sharing accountability and responsibility within the policy development process. Bäckstrand supports this argument and adds that “multi-stakeholder partnership can connect local practices and global norms through their flexible and decentralized character” (2006, 298). By connecting local actors to international processes, it allows for burden

sharing and a greater number of perspectives to be utilized. The multi-stakeholder approach is an effective example of how fragmentation can exist within the normative structures of liberal internationalism.

The multi-stakeholder approach has been used successfully in a variety of policy domains within key international organizations. The UN has been a major supporter of this approach and has gone as far as to institutionalize the process through a commitment to developing multi-stakeholder partnerships in order to accomplish the goals of the 2030 Agenda (Hoxtell, 2016, 3). The multi-stakeholder approach was identified as a key focus through Goal 17 of the Agenda: Partnerships for the Goals. (A/RES/70/1). The Agenda calls for increased partnerships between public, private, and civil entities in order to share financial, technical, and human resources (A.RES.70/1). This has resulted in UN Sustainable Development Partnerships monitoring and oversight bodies to better track and support the creation and maintenance of multi-stakeholder partnerships (Mohammed, 2019).

At the same time, a major critique of the multi-stakeholder approach is that it allows for greater corporate involvement in government decision-making. Many NGOs have opposed increasing corporate actors within global governance. This has led to initiatives such as the “Alliance for a Corporate-Free UN” (Mele & Scheepers, 2013, 570). There is a justified concern that allowing private influence will further open the door to regulatory practices that favour corporations (Biermann et al, 2009, 29). That said, there are a number of policy domains that continue to seek greater involvement from a variety of non-state actors. Theorists have identified peace and security, refugees, and the environment as themes which have effectively elicited a multi-stakeholder approach (Acharya, 2016, 455; Shirkey, 2019, 654). One of the reasons for this is that state actors handling these domains benefit from a group of actors that can effectively

handle overarching policy development, as well as local implementation and monitoring of key projects and initiatives. This method allows for fragmentation in the form of decentralization of power, while simultaneously modeling key elements of liberal democratic pluralist practices. Indeed, involving non-state actors can increase the democratic nature of policy-development processes as more individuals and actors are involved within the process. Bäckstrand cautions that it is impossible for domestic democratic practices to be fully transferred to the international sector and thus, global legitimacy can only be achieved through hybrid models of governance that increase partnerships and accountability for state and non-state actors (2006, 293). In this way, fragmentation of actors allows for some elements of liberal values to be maintained. This demonstrates the degree to which fragmentation and liberal internationalism can coexist at certain levels.

Institutional Performance

A significant challenge for legitimacy of global governance is organizational performance. Dellmuth and Tallberg assert that public perception of legitimacy is mostly based on institutional problem-solving capabilities (2015, 13). Building on this perception, it must be determined whether effective problem-solving can occur through democratic norms, which have been historically interpreted as western-centric or whether institutions and actors will have to instead embrace a degree of impartiality within international politics. If norms within global governance were no longer necessarily democratic, it might positively impact legitimacy. However, it could also potentially signal the end of liberal internationalism. That said, strict adherence to liberal values is not necessarily tied to the legitimacy of global governance.

Indeed, there is an inherent paradox when discussing these topics. Jones articulates that “this contradiction between imperatives raises the problem of whether liberal internationalism ... has not so diluted itself as to be unworkable in practice” (2019, 128). This assertion is based on the fact that liberal internationalism has a wide set of norms and practices, which can overlap and contradict one another. For example, global governance may require additional active participants in order to be successful (which mirrors democratic ideals of pluralism), but this could come at the cost of the promotion of democratic values if the end result leads to the inclusion of ‘illiberal actors’. Within the field of human rights, where it is increasingly understood that emerging states can offer “reform proposals that will both strengthen and rationalize the system and then build a coalition of states to get them adopted” (Petrasek, 2019, 117). That said, this does not necessarily support that these coalitions would actively work against democratic norms, but it creates opportunities for illiberal states to gain influence within This is reflective of a policy domain where middle-power states are increasing their significance. This relates closely to Ikenberry’s understanding of Liberal Internationalism 3.0, in which the universal order would no longer be tied solely to western powers but would still rely on a set of identified and agreed-upon norms (2009, 82). Thus, even if normative structures were not entirely democratic, there is still value in structures that are approved by a majority of states.

Returning to Biermann’s model of fragmentation, it is important to consider that normative structures would not have to be entirely conflictive or synergistic. A cooperative normative structure would involve norms that do not inherently conflict between key states and there is some collaboration between actors, regardless of norms they subscribe to. This demonstrates that normative structures do not have to be entirely democratic, but instead could

account for other perspectives. This is necessary because western democracies are unlikely to revoke normative structures that aim to spread democracy, based on the fact that even proponents of fragmentation recognize that a global governance model accepting of illiberal norms would be a lower quality system (Acharya, 2016, 458). The question remains in terms of how illiberal states can be better incorporated into global governance without sacrificing the democratic norms that western democracies tend to prioritize. This is important because many key international organizations have historically relied on the financial contributions of western democracies. Global governance could take on multiple cooperative normative structures that do not require complete approval, but instead are focused on eliminating conflicts and pursuing mutual benefits and collective gains. This is expressed by MacDonald and MacDonald, who posit that open communities do not need to find agreeable solutions, but instead should focus on finding agreed-upon problems that need to be solved (2020, 530). Further examination of institutional performance could lead to greater understandings of international cooperation.

The Role of Institutions

The increased importance and frequency of regionalized international organizations and agreements is indicative of fragmentation of institutions (Acharya, 2017, 100). Although regional organizations are considered by some to threaten liberal internationalism and its central institutions (Plesch & Weiss, 2015, 203), regionalism is recognized and, in some cases, promoted in key multilateral legal instruments such as the UN Charter (Chap. 7, Art. 52). This demonstrates that central institutions of the post-WWII liberal order comprehend and allow for regional space, likely in an effort to ensure that regional issues are not defined by external actors (Acharya, 2011, 100). In part, this approach relates to the UN's commitment to multi-stakeholder

partnerships, due to the additional success gained from utilizing regional actors. On the other hand, this has prompted regional organizations and agreements to thrive amongst developing states, given the greater ability they have in influencing local issues as opposed to universal topics (Acharya, 2011, 95). This suggests that fragmented institutional structures exist to allow states to handle topics more narrow in scope. However, one of the challenges of these fragmented structures is that they can create institutions which do not uphold liberal values. This can lead to the creation of illiberal norms which challenge the role of large multilateral institutions (Abrahamsen et al, 2019, 13).

That said, there is support for the idea that liberal international institutions should promote fragmentation. Rather than refuting the approach, Plesch and Weiss posit that the current liberal international order should not be considered immutable and instead should be open to reform in order to maintain significant membership and engagement in robust organizational systems, including the UN (2015, 203). Indeed, for states that reject liberal norms, engagement with the liberal order has not necessarily decreased. China has continued its commitment to free trade among other elements of liberalism (Allan et al, 2018, 864). Further, many emerging states are gaining power within central liberal institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank (Kahler, 2013, 725). This reflects the fact that emerging states are still engaged with elements and institutions of the liberal order. That said, this also raises further questions as to how well illiberal states can integrate into historically liberal organizations. This is a challenge to the overall legitimacy of global governance and requires additional attention. However, democratic legitimization can be thought of as cyclical depending on political demand (Dingwerth, 2020, 735). This means that democratic legitimization may have been preferred for the last few decades, but may not be demanded to the same extent in the future. This concept is

central to understanding the input and output sources of legitimacy in terms of how institutions are legitimized.

The Problem of Illiberalism

Although both liberal internationalism and fragmentation exist as approaches to global governance, the crisis moment is still substantial. The crisis moment of global governance can be situated as a crisis of diminishing western engagement and rising illiberal practices. Indeed, this is what many theorists have argued, including Abramowitz, who asserts that the crisis of global governance will result in the “replacement of global democratic norms with authoritarian practices” (2018, 5). This is further supported by Ikenberry who proposes that the international order is in crisis because of a lack of dedication to liberal democracies and their values (2017, 7). It is important to reconsider this question to focus instead on the relationship between global governance and the question of legitimacy, recognizing that legitimacy is not necessarily tied to liberal values. Buchanan and Keohane argue that “multilateral institutions will only thrive if they are viewed as legitimate” (2006, 407). It is critical that legitimacy and its connection to liberal internationalism and fragmentation is further explored. The presence of illiberal practices and authoritarian states threatens to undermine liberal internationalism and it is therefore necessary to consider whether illiberalism has an overall impact on the legitimacy of global governance. Further, it is more challenging to change normative structures away from democratic values once they have been established (Dingwerth et al, 2020, 734). Based on the fact that liberal internationalism has been the central approach to global governance in the past few decades, it must be considered how easily democratic norms could be loosened.

Fragmentation and liberal internationalism can coexist provided that institutions, actors, and norms are not in conflict with each other, but instead are loosely related. The challenge with this is that certain liberal democratic values modeled on Western liberalism are ostensibly a key component of the liberal international order. This includes components of democratic ideals such as increased membership and participation (Scholte & Tallberg, 2018, 62). Nye asserts that these democratic norms were created at a time when emerging economies, such as China or India, were not as significant as they are today (2017, 10-11). The intriguing component of illiberal practices is how they no longer can be solely applied to specific countries or regions. For example, recent human rights sanctions towards Iran, Syria, North Korea, South Sudan and Myanmar, were all passed by the UN with substantial non-Western support (Petrusek, 2019, 109). Similarly, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey have all expressed support for illiberal policies and practices even though they have been considered democratization successes in recent years (Gheciu, 2019, 41; Önis & Kutlay, 2020, 4). This demonstrates that although illiberal practices are becoming more frequent, they are also becoming more unpredictable. For a global governance system that has historically prioritized the liberal values of free trade and human rights, this creates a number of problems and contributes to the severity of the current crisis moment.

The underlying problem with illiberal practices within the current global governance system can be referred to as the democratic paradox of pluralism (Önis & Kutlay, 2020, 2). This paradox consists of democratic pluralism, in which non-Western states, who historically have not been central members of global governance, are taking up opportunities within international organizations. This represents the severity of the crisis moment, as democratic practices are increasingly resulting in the toleration of illiberal practices. Returning to Scholte and Tallberg's

legitimacy matrix, the pursuit of democratic procedure, by increasing participation and membership, is not resulting in democratic performance or the promotion of democracy in society (2018, 62). In this regard, it is difficult to see how liberal internationalism can sustain its legitimacy without increasing the tolerance of illiberal practices.

The key argument here is that the legitimacy of global governance must be further studied in order to better understand the impacts of an increase in illiberal practices amidst a historically liberal global governance system. Countries considered to be “not free” only accounted for “12% of global income in 1990”, while it is 33% today (Önis & Kutlay, 2020, 14). This demonstrates the importance of economic strength to political power. Given the earlier discussion pertaining to the political shortcomings of key western democracies, it is vital to consider the impacts of emerging authoritarian states and failing democracies on the legitimacy of international organizations (Önis & Kutlay, 2020, 15). Ikenberry and Acharya both support their respective approaches to global governance, yet the crisis of legitimacy is larger and more substantial. The simultaneous realities of emerging authoritarian states and increasingly isolationist democracies will result in shifts within global governance (Önis & Kutlay, 2020, 14-15; Petrusek, 2019, 117). These shifts will not focus on cementing fragmentation or liberal internationalism as the singular approach to global governance, but will instead be focused on establishing and sustaining the legitimacy of international organizations for both western democracies and emerging states.

Conclusion

In attempting to contextualize the current crisis moment, this thesis has utilized the liberal internationalist and fragmentation approaches to unpack the legitimacy deficit facing global

governance. Rather than offer a comprehensive overview of individual global governance structures, this thesis has instead focused on the complexity of international political legitimacy and drawn attention to the persistent problem of legitimacy for global governance approaches.

In understanding the current crisis moment, this thesis demonstrated that rising nationalist and populist sentiment in Western nations significantly contributes to an unstable international political order. Coupled with the rise of illiberal practices and authoritarian states, the historically liberal world order is being severely threatened. The importance of funding within global governance systems was also explored, as the increasing financial contributions from industrializing states or private actors also threatens to change a system that has historically relied heavily on primarily Western funding. Although the crisis moment is sometimes viewed as a crisis of liberal internationalism, it is actually global governance that is facing a legitimacy crisis.

This thesis has demonstrated that international political legitimacy is a complex topic that deserves further attention. Through the work of Scholte and Tallberg in particular, it is clear that global governance can be legitimized or delegitimized in various ways (2018). This categorization of input-sources and output-sources of legitimacy is extremely helpful in understanding the dimensions of how the legitimacy of global governance systems might be considered. Specifically, input-sources represent procedural legitimacy whereas output-sources represent legitimacy based on performance. The use of this matrix also leads to an increased appreciation for the complexities of global governance approaches. Understanding the sources of legitimacy through this matrix is extremely effective for assessing global governance approaches. Further, it assists in understanding the importance of institutional legitimacy within

global governance. Determining how institutions can improve their procedures and performance in a way that increases legitimacy is a topic that deserves further attention.

Based on the complexity of international political legitimacy, the thesis articulates important questions pertaining to legitimacy and global governance that must be addressed in the near future. In terms of institutional performance, it is critical to understand that eliminating global conflicts and pursuing collective gains are important determinants of legitimacy in global governance. This directly relates to the output-sources of legitimacy and also connect to the initial discussion regarding the crisis moment. Further research into the performance and perceived value on multilateral institutions would be effective in understanding how global governance can maintain legitimacy.

A consideration of procedural components of legitimacy is also necessary in further understanding the legitimacy deficit facing global governance. In an increasingly globalized world, the fragmentation and liberal internationalist approaches have both demonstrated the growing presence of non-state actors. Membership and roles within global governance structures are critical to its perceived legitimacy and thus, identifying procedural barriers would allow for more legitimate systems to be created.

The thesis also raised important questions about democracy and illiberalism and their intersection with international political legitimacy. It can be argued that the liberal international order will not cease to exist, but will face several existential challenges pertaining to the topics of democracy and illiberal practices (Önis & Kutlay, 2020, 15). In this regard, fragmentation and liberal internationalism are effective tools in understanding the legitimacy crisis that is facing international organizations. Illiberalism and democracy are key topics based on how they intersect with sources of legitimacy. For example, Acharya's understanding of fragmentation

does not adequately account for illiberal practices and instead supports the promotion of democracy through the support of emerging states and their increased participation (2016, 458). This is similar to Ikenberry's assessment of the future of the liberal international order which would include a decentralized system of actors, but still with a focus on promoting democracy (2009, 80). From these analytical approaches, it is clear that global governance is struggling to include more state and non-state actors without compromising on Western democratic principles that have historically underlined global governance.

The democratic paradox of pluralism, as outlined by Önis and Kutlay is a critical assessment of the crisis of global governance (2020, 2). The fragmentation approach does not necessarily result in increased tolerance for illiberal practices, however; the coupling of emerging authoritarian states and weakening western democracies creates a significant challenge in terms of how to maintain legitimacy and increase accountability within multilateral institutions. In this regard, further study of illiberal practices within global governance is required in order to adequately understand the relationship between democratic norms, illiberalism, and legitimacy.

International political legitimacy is a complex topic that requires additional and ongoing attention. Global governance has faced a persistent crisis of legitimacy, but for some it is now more pressing than in the past. Through examination of sources of legitimacy and the importance of addressing both illiberal and democratic practices, the legitimacy gap for global governance can be better understood.

Works Cited

- Abrahamsen, R., Andersen, L. R., & Sending, O. J. (2019). Introduction: Making liberal internationalism great again? *International Journal*, 74(1), 5–14.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702019827050>
- Abramowitz, M. J. (2018). Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis. *Freedom House*, 1-24.
- Acharya, A. (2017). After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order. *Ethics and International Affairs*, 31(3). 271–285.
- Acharya, A. (2011). Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism, and Rule-Making in the Third World. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55(1), 95–123.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00637.x>
- Acharya, A. (2018). *The End of American World Order* (2nd ed.). Polity Press.
- Acharya, A. (2016). The Future of Global Governance: Fragmentation may be Inevitable and Creative. *Global Governance*, 22, 453–460.
- Agné, H. (2018). Legitimacy in Global Governance Research: How Normative or Sociological Should It Be? In J. Tallberg, K. Backstrand, & J. Scholte (Eds.), *Legitimacy in Global Governance* (pp. 20-36). Oxford University Press.
- Alcaro, R. (2018). Contestation and Transformation. Final Thoughts on the Liberal International Order. *International Spectator*, 53(1), 152–167.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.1429533>
- Allan, B. B., Vucetic, S., & Hopf, T. (2018). The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China's Hegemonic Prospects. *International Organization*, 72(4), 839–869. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000267>
- Anderson, B., Bernauer, T., & Kachi, A. (2019). Does international pooling of authority affect the perceived legitimacy of global governance? *Review of International Organizations*, 14(4), 661-683. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9341-4>
- Andresen, S., & Hey, E. (2005). The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of International Environmental Institutions. *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, 5(3), 211–226. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-005-3804-9>
- Bäckstrand, K. (2006). Multi-stakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Rethinking Legitimacy, Accountability and Effectiveness. *European Environment*, 16(5), 290–306.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/eet.425>

- Biermann, F., Pattberg, P., van Asselt, H., & Zelli, F. (2009). The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures: A Framework for Analysis. *Global Environmental Politics*, 9(4), 14–40. <https://doi.org/10.1162/glep.2009.9.4.14>
- Bøås, M., & McNeill, D. (2017). A Modest Approach for Effective Multilateral Institutions: *SAIS Review*, XXXII(I), 17-25. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt18fs8d2.6>
- Buchanan, A., & Keohane, R. O. (2006). The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions. *Ethics and International Affairs*, (January), 405-437. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511691720.002>
- Carpenter, T. G. (2017). The Populist Surge and the Rebirth of Foreign Policy Nationalism. *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 37(1), 33–46. <https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2017.0003>
- Carswell, A. (2013). Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution. *Journal of Conflict & Security Law*, 18(3), 453-480.
- Charlesworth, H. (2002). International Law: A Discipline of Crisis. *Modern Law Review*, 65(3), 377-392.
- Cooley, A. (2015). Authoritarianism Goes: Countering Democratic Norms. *Journal of Democracy*, 26(3), 49–63. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0049>
- Deudney, D., & Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). Liberal World. *Foreign Affairs*, 97(4), 16–24.
- Dingwerth, K., Schmidtke, H., & Weise, T. (2020). The rise of democratic legitimation: why international organizations speak the language of democracy. *European Journal of International Relations*, 26(3), 714-741.
- Dunne, T. (2010). The Liberal Order and the Modern Project. *Journal of International Studies*, 38(3), 535-543.
- Dworkin, A., & Leonard, M. (2018). Can Europe Save the World Order? *European Council on Foreign Relations*
- Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (2020). What kills international organisations? When and why international organisations terminate. *European Journal of International Relations*, 1-30.
- General Assembly resolution 70/1, *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, A/RES/70/1 (21 October 2015), available from undocs.org/en/A/RES/70/1
- Gheciu, A. (2019). NATO, liberal internationalism, and the politics of imagining the Western security community. *International Journal*, 74(1), 32–46. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702019834645>

- Glasius, M. (2018). What Authoritarianism is ... and is not: a Practice Perspective. *International Affairs*, 94(3), 515-533.
- Gowan, R. (2018). Separation anxiety: European influence at the UN after Brexit. *European Council on Foreign Relations*.
- Graham, E. R. (2017). Follow the Money: How Trends in Financing Are Changing Governance at International Organizations. *Global Policy*, 8, 15–25. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12450>
- Hafner, G. (2004). Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law. *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 25(4), 849–863. <https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2007.54.1.23>.
- Haufler, V. (2010). The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global Governance and Conflict Prevention. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 89(4), 403–416. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-010-0401-9>
- Held, D. (2009). Restructuring global governance: Cosmopolitanism, democracy and the global order. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 37(3), 535–547. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829809103231>
- Hurd, I. (2007). Legitimacy, Rationality, and Power. In *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council* 66-80.
- Hobbes, T. (2012). The Leviathan. In S. Cahn (Ed.), *Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy*, Second Edition (pp. 375-430). New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hoxtell, W. (2016). Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships and the 2030 Agenda Challenges and options for oversight at the United Nations. *Global Public Policy Institute*.
- Ikenberry, J. (2009). Liberal Internationalism 3.0 : America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order. *Perspectives on Politics*, 7(1), 71-87. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311399131>
- Ikenberry, J. (2017). The Plot Against American Foreign Policy: Can the Liberal Order Survive? *Foreign Affairs*, 96(3), 2–9.
- Ikenberry, J. (2018). The end of liberal international order? *International Affairs*, 94(1), 7-23.
- Jones, P. (2019). Middle power liberal internationalism and mediation in messy places: The Canadian dilemma. *International Journal*, 74(1), 119–134. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702019834724>
- Kagan, R. (2017). The Twilight of the Liberal World Order. In M. E. O'Hanlon (Ed.), *Brookings Big Ideas for America*.

- Kahler, M. (2013). Rising powers and global governance: Negotiating change in a resilient status quo. *International Affairs*, 89(3), 711–729. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12041>
- Kennedy, D. (1994). The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy: John Jackson and the Field of International Economic Law. *American University International Law Review*, 10(2), 671-716.
- Keohane, R. (2006). The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism. In E. Newman, R. Thakur, & J. Tirman (Eds.), *Multilateralism Under Challenge? Power, International Order, and Structural Change* (pp. 56-76). United Nations University Press.
- Keohane, R., & Victor, D. (2011). The Regime Complex for Climate Change. *Perspectives on Politics*, 9(1), 7-23.
- Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1974). Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations. *World Politics*, 27(1), 39–62.
- Kirton, J. (2002). Generating Effective Global Environmental Governance: Canada's 2002 Challenge.
- Koskenniemi, M., & Leino, P. (2002). Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties. *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 15(3), 553–579. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156502000262>
- Lord, C., & Beetham, D. (2001). Legitimizing the EU: Is there a “Post-parliamentary basis” for its Legitimation? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(3), 443–462. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00298>
- MacDonald, T., & MacDonald, K. (2020). Towards a ‘pluralist’ world order: creative agency and legitimacy in global institutions. *European Journal of International Relations*, 26(2), 518-544.
- Mele, V., & Schepers, D. H. (2013). E Pluribus Unum? Legitimacy Issues and Multi-stakeholder Codes of Conduct. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 118(3), 561–576. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1605-y>
- Mohammed, A. J. (2019, July 13). Deputy Secretary-General's remarks at the High-Level Opening of the Senior-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. In *United Nations Secretary General*.
- Nye, J. S. (2017). Will the Liberal Order Survive?: The History of an Idea. *Foreign Affairs*, 96(1), 10–16.
- Oludoun, T. (2014). Peace and Security as a Catalyst for the Reform of the UN Security Council. *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, (10), 63–96.

- Öniş, Z., & Kutlay, M. (2020). The New Age of Hybridity and Clash of Norms: China, BRICS, and Challenges of Global Governance in a Postliberal International Order. *Alternatives*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0304375420921086>
- Orford, A. (2004). The Destiny of International Law. *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 17(3), 441–476. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156504001980>
- Petrasek, D. (2019). Not dead yet: Human rights in an illiberal world order. *International Journal*, 74(1), 103–118. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702019827642>
- Plesch, D., & Weiss, T. G. (2015). 1945’s Lesson: “Good Enough” Global Governance Ain’t Good Enough. *21(2)*, 197–204.
- Reynié, D. (2016). The Specter Haunting Europe: “Heritage Populism” and France’s National Front. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(4), 47–57. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0061>
- Rosenau, J., & Czempiel, E. O. (Eds.). (1992). *Governance without government: Order and change in world politics*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Scharpf, F. (1999). Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?. *Oxford University Press*, 1–9.
- Schmidt, S. M., & Kochan, T. A. (1977). Interorganizational Relationships: Patterns and Motivations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 22(2), 220–234.
- Scholte, J. A. (2011). Towards greater legitimacy in global governance. *Review of International Political Economy*, 18(1), 110–120. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2011.545215>
- Scholte, J., & Tallberg, J. (2018). Theorizing the Institutional Sources of Global Governance Legitimacy. In J. Tallberg, K. Bäckstrand, & J. Scholte (Eds.), *Legitimacy in Global Governance* (pp. 56-74). Oxford University Press.
- Stephen, M. D. (2018). Legitimacy Deficits of International Organizations: design, drift, and decoupling at the UN Security Council. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 31(1), 96–121. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2018.1476463>
- Tallberg, J., Bäckstrand, K., & J. Scholte. (2018). Introduction: Legitimacy in Global Governance. In J. Tallberg, K. Bäckstrand, & J. Scholte (Eds.), *Legitimacy in Global Governance* (pp. 3-19). Oxford University Press.
- Tallberg, J., & Zürn, M. (2019). The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations: introduction and framework. *Review of International Organizations*, Vol. 14., 581-606. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9330-7>
- Wamsley, L. (2020, April 14). Trump Says He Will Halt WHO Funding, Pending Review. *NPR*.

Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. In G. Roth & C. Wittich (Eds.). Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Williams, M. C. (2008). Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration: *The MIT Press* 50(2), 213–236.

Zakaria, F. (1997). The rise of illiberal democracy. *Foreign Affairs*, 76(6), 22–43.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt2005tk7.20>

Zelli, F. (2018). Effects of Legitimacy Crises in Complex Global Governance. In J. Tallberg, K. Bäckstrand, & J. Scholte (Eds.), *Legitimacy in Global Governance* (pp. 169-188). Oxford University Press.