Decentralizing without accountability : the Kenya Constituency Development Fund and separation of powers

Abstract

This study examines fiscal decentralization and accountability and suggests that there is a gap in the body of knowledge pertaining to accountability in fiscal decentralization. It appears that there is no current literature on Separation of Powers and maintenance of government checks and balances in the process of decentralization. Fiscal decentralization in Kenya through the Constituency Development Fund is our case study. A scheme established through an Act of Parliament in 2003 with the Members of Parliament as its implementers- in contravention to the Kenyan Constitution. This breach of Separation of Powers in decentralizing has resulted in a porous scheme with a weak accountability regime therefore leading to large scale abuse and mismanagement in the Fund. The author concludes that fiscal decentralization through CDFs provides promise for Kenya and other countries; however, special attention must be given to implementation issues, especially methods of dealing with Separation of Powers and constitutionalism.