The effect of prestigious CEOs on strategic and operational risk-taking

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dc.creator Fralich, Russell
dc.creator Qi, Carrie
dc.date.accessioned 2014-02-11T19:30:25Z
dc.date.available 2014-02-11T19:30:25Z
dc.date.issued 2011
dc.identifier http://library2.smu.ca/bitstream/handle/01/25390/asb_proceedings_2011.pdf#page=450
dc.identifier.uri http://library2.smu.ca/xmlui/handle/01/25666
dc.description.abstract Longitudinal data from the US cellular telecoms industry between 1991 and 2009 suggest that high prestige CEOs take higher risks in capital expenditures, and less risk with R&D expenditures. No relationship was found with M&A expenditures. This suggests that CEOs only use their prestige to affect operational or internal investments. en_CA
dc.language.iso en en_CA
dc.publisher Atlantic Schools of Business en_CA
dc.subject.lcsh Financial risk
dc.subject.lcsh Operational risk
dc.subject.lcsh Chief executive officers
dc.title The effect of prestigious CEOs on strategic and operational risk-taking en_CA
dc.type Text en_CA
dcterms.bibliographicCitation Proceedings of the 41st Atlantic Schools of Business conference, University of Prince Edward Island, 2011, pp 446-459


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