The effect of prestigious CEOs on strategic and operational risk-taking

dc.creator	Fralich, Russell
dc.creator	Qi, Carrie
dc.date.accessioned	2014-02-11T19:30:25Z
dc.date.available	2014-02-11T19:30:25Z
dc.date.issued	2011
dc.identifier	http://library2.smu.ca/bitstream/handle/01/25390/asb_proceedings_2011.pdf#page=450
dc.identifier.uri	http://library2.smu.ca/xmlui/handle/01/25666
dc.description.abstract	Longitudinal data from the US cellular telecoms industry between 1991 and 2009 suggest that high prestige CEOs take higher risks in capital expenditures, and less risk with R&D expenditures. No relationship was found with M&A expenditures. This suggests that CEOs only use their prestige to affect operational or internal investments.	en_CA
dc.description.provenance	Submitted by Trish Grelot (trish.grelot@smu.ca) on 2014-02-11T19:30:25Z No. of bitstreams: 0	en
dc.description.provenance	Made available in DSpace on 2014-02-11T19:30:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2011	en
dc.language.iso	en	en_CA
dc.publisher	Atlantic Schools of Business	en_CA
dc.subject.lcsh	Financial risk
dc.subject.lcsh	Operational risk
dc.subject.lcsh	Chief executive officers
dc.title	The effect of prestigious CEOs on strategic and operational risk-taking	en_CA
dc.type	Text	en_CA
dcterms.bibliographicCitation	Proceedings of the 41st Atlantic Schools of Business conference, University of Prince Edward Island, 2011, pp 446-459