This dissertation examines B. A. O. Williams' recent
attack on utilitarianism. It begins by making it clear
just what sort of ethical theory utilitarianism is. Distinguishing between descriptive, normative, and meta-ethical
theories, it identifies utilitarianism as a normative ethical
theory. Distinguishing teleological from deontological
normative ethical theories, it locates utilitarianism in the'
teleological category. It then proceeds to define utilitarianism accordingly. In so doing, it provides a clear
contemporary formulation of the utility principle and
considers some traditional and modern defenses of utilitarianism which have a direct bearing on Williams' attack..
With the aid of the preceding clarifications and defenses
it then goes on to examine, and in every case find wanting,
Williams' objections to utilitarianism. Williams places
these objections under the following five headings ; consequentialism, utilitarianism, negative responsibility,
irrational feelings, and integrity. The examination also
reveals numerous inadequacies in Williams"' own position.
Among the more specific issues included in the examination
are the following: Williams' modified denial of consequentialism, his claim that it makes no difference for
consequentialists who produces a state of affairs, the
way in which his odd definition of "utilitarianism" leads
to much more than a verbal dispute, a contradiction in his
conception of the part happiness plays, in utilitarianism,
his.claim that an agent is specially responsible for what
he does rather than for what other people do, and.his
belief that it is misleading to think that one person's
refusal to do something makes another person do something.
Finally, it is shown that Williams begs the question both
in regard to the part which he maintains that "irrational
feelings ought to play in utility calculations and in
regard to his position that utility requirements ought
never to violate what he calls a person's "integrity".
