Abstract:
The history of the German Blitzkrieg into France in 1940 often looks at the
German advances as unique and as a surprise to the armies of France and Great Britain. This study considers this image in relation to the spearhead arm of the German advances, the tank. It examines the theory and doctrine behind the use of the tank in the German offensives of 1940, and the origins of these ideas. By comparing developments in Germany with its Second World War opponents such as France and Great Britain we see that the proliferation of ideas regarding the organization and employment of tanks in warfare was widespread. Furthermore, the historical impression of the swift advance of German tanks in 1940 as a surprise to the French or British is revealed as problematic, as these ideas had been widely explored in these nations throughout the interwar years. The exchange of ideas between military thinkers in the interwar period is shown through an examination of the published material and modern historical analysis relating to the development of these ideas in each nation considered.